Reid Essays On The Intellectual Powers

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REII)'S ESSAYS
ON THE
INTELLECTUAL POWERS OF MAN.
FROM
*
t
HIS C () LLECTED WRITINGS -
BY
s1 R WILLIAM HAMILTON, BART.

*
AND WITH THE FOOT NOTES
of
T H E E D IT O R.
EDINBURGH :
M A CLA C H LAN AND STEWAR.T.
Lo ND ON . LONG MAN S AND COMPANY.
MDCCCLIII.
*
C O N TENTS.
ESSAYS ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS OF MAN.
DEDICATION, 215
PREFACE, 216
ESSAY. I.-PRELIMINARY.
CHAPTER I. Explication of Words, -
Ii. Principles taken for granted,

III. Of Hypotheses, -
IV. Of Analogy, - - - -
V. Of the pr means of Knowing the operations of the Mind,

VI.
Vii.
Of the £ of Attending to the operations of our own Minds,
Division of the rs of the Mind, - - -
VIII. Of Social [and Solitary] operations of Mind.
ESSAY II.-OF THE PoweRs we HAVE By MEANs of our ExTERNAL SENses.
. Of the Organs of Sense, - • - 245

. Of the Impressions on the Organs, Nerves, and Brain, 247
. Hypothesis concerning the Nerves and Brain,
. False Conclusions drawn from the impressions before menti oned, 253
Of Perception, - - -
What it is to Account for a Phaenomenon in Nature,

. Sentiments of Philosophers about the Perceptions of Evternal
objects; and first, of the theory of Father Malebranche
. Of the Common Theory of Perception; and of the sentiments of
the Peripatetics, and of Des Cartes, - -
267
. The sentiments of Mr Locke, * . - -
275
. The sentiments of Bishop Berkele * - - -
Bishop Berkel's entinents of the nature of Ideas,"~

The sentiments of Mr Hume, • *- -
292
The sentiments of Anthony Arnauld, - -
. Reflections on the Common Theory of Ideas,

. Account of the system of Leibnitz, -
Of Sensation, - - - • -
Of the Objects of Perception ; and first, of Primary and Second

ary Qualities, - - - -
. Of other objects o Perception, - -
Of Matter and of Space, - * -
Of the Evidence of Sense, and of Belief in general,

. Of the Improvement of the Senses,
of the F g of the Senses,
vi CONTENTS.
PAGs
ESSAY III.-OF MEMORY.
CHAPrER I. Things obvious and certain with regard to Memory, 339

II. Memory an original faculty, - - 340
III. Of Duration, - - 342
IV. of Identity, . - - - - 344
. Mr Locke's account of the Origin of our Ideas, and particularly
of the idea of Duration, - - - 346
VI. Mr Locke's account of our Personal Identity, 350
VII. Theories concerning Memory, - 353
ESSAY IV.-OF CoNCEPTION.
CHAPTER I. Of Conception, or Simple Apprehension in general, 360

II. Theories concerning Conception, - - 368
III. Mistakes concerning Conception, - - - 375
IV. Of the Train of Thought in the mind, - 379
ESSAY W.–OF ABSTRACTION.
CHAPTER I. of General Words, - - - - 389

II. Of General Conceptions, - - - 391
III. Of general conceptions formed by 4nalysing objects, 394
IV. Of general conceptions formed by Combination, - 398
W. Observations concerning the Names given to our general notions, 403
Wi. Opinion of philosophers about Universals, - - 405
ESSAY WI.-OF JUDGMENT.
CHAPTER I. of Judgment in general, .02& - - - 413

II. Of Common Sense, - - * * - 421
III. Sentiments of philosophers concerning Judgment, * - 426
IV. of First Principles in general, - - 434
V. The first principles of Contingent Truths. [On Consciousness,] 441
VI. First principles of Necessary Truths, - - 452
VII. Opinions, ancient and modern, about First Principles, 462
VIII. Of Prejudices, the causes of error, - 468
ESSAY WIL–Of Reasoning.
Chapt ER I. Of Reasoning in general, and of Demonstration, - 475

II. Whether Morality be capable of demonstration, - 478
III. of Probable Reasoning, - - - - 481
IV. Of Mr Hume's Scepticism with regard to Reason, - 484
ESSAY WIII.—OF TAsTE.
Chapter I. of Taste in general, • - - - - 490

. Of the Objects of taste, and first of Novelty, - 493
III. Of Grandeur, - • - - 494
IV. Of Beauty, , - - - - 498
>\
E S S A YS
on this
BY THOMAS REID, D.D., F.R.S.E.,

Phor RSSOR of MoRAL Philosophy IN The UNIVERSITY of Glasoow.
* Who hath put wisdom in the inward parts "-jou.

24.
64. This impression of the “Essays on the Intellectual Powers,” is made from the
only authentic edition—that of 1785, in 4to. For the convenience of reference the pages
of that edition are distinguished in the present; and by these pages I shall always, in
the notes, prospectively, quote. They will be found marked both in the text and on the
lower margin.-H.
- -
*-*
D E D I CAT I O N.
to
MR DUGALD STEWART,
LATELY PROFEssoR OF MATHEMATICs, Now PROFEssoR of MoRAL PHILosophy,
AND
DR J AMES GREGORY,
PRoFEssoR of THE THEoRY of PHYSIC IN THE UNIVERSITY of EDINBURGH.”
MY DEAR FRIENDs,--I know not to differed in opinion, and debated them

whom I can address these Essays with keenly, both in conversation and by many
more propriety than to you; not only on letters, without any abatement of his affec
account of a friendship begun in early life tion, or of his zeal for the work's being
on your part, though in old age on mine, carried on and published: for he had too
and in one of you I may say hereditary; much liberality of mind not to allow to [v.]
nor yet on account of that correspondence others the same liberty in judging which he
in our literary pursuits and amusements, claimed to himself.
which has always given me so great plea It is difficult to say whether that worthy
sure; but because, if these Essays have man was more eminent in active life or
any merit, you have a considerable share in speculation. Very rare, surely, have
in it, having not only encouraged me to hope been the instances where the talents for
that [iv.] they may be useful, but favoured both were united in so eminent a degree.
me with your observations on every part of His genius and industry, in many differ
them, both before they were sent to the ent branches of literature, will, by his
press, and while they were under it. works, be known to posterity : his private
I have availed myself of your observa virtues and public spirit, his assiduity,
tions, so as to correct many faults that through a long and laborious life, in man
might otherwise have escaped me; and I honourable public offices with which he was
have a very grateful sense of your friend entrusted, and his zeal to encourage and
ship, in giving this aid to one who stood promote everything that tended to the
much in need of it; having no shame, but improvement of his country in laws, litera
much pleasure, in being instructed by those ture, commerce, manufactures, and agricul
who formerly were my pupils, as one of you ture, are best known to his friends and
*as. contemporaries.
It would be ingratitude to a man whose The favourable opinion which he, and
memory I most highly , not to men you my friends, were pleased to express
tion my obligations to the late Lord Kames, of this work, has been my chief encourage
for the concern he was pleased to take in ment to lay it before the public; and per
this Work. Having seen a small part of haps, without that encouragement, it had
it, he urged me to carry it on ; took acount never seen the light: for I have always
of my progress from time to time; revised found, that, without social intercourse, even
it more than once, as far as it was carried, a favourite speculation languishes; and
before his death; and gave me his observa that we cannot help thinking the better of our
tions on it, both with respect to the matter own opinions [vi.] when £ are approved
and the expression. On some points we by those whom we esteem good judges.
You know that the substance of these
* See above, in “Correspondence,” p. 65, a.-H. Essays was delivered annually, for more
[ui.-vi.T
**
co
216 PREFACf.
than twenty years, in Lectures to a large one reader is a superfluous repetition, to

body of the more advanced students in this the greater part, less conversant in such
University, and for several years before, in subjects, may be very useful. If this apo
another University. Those who heard me logy be deemed insufficient, and be thought
with attention, of whom I presume there to be the dictate of laziness, I claim some
are some hundreds alive, will recognise the indulgence even for that laziness, at my
doctrine which they heard, some of them period of life. [vii.]
thirty years ago, delivered to them more You who are in the prime of life, with
diffusely, and with the repetitions and illus the vigour which it inspires, will, I hope,
trations proper for such audiences. make more happy advances in this or in any
I am afraid, indeed, that the more intel other branch of science to which your talents
ligent reader, who is conversant in such may be applied.
abstract subjects, may think that there are THQ. REID.
repetitions still left, which might be spared. Glasgow College, June 1, 1783.
Such, I hope, will consider, that what to
PR E FA C E.
HUMAN knowledge may be reduced to natures, if any other there be, we have no
two general heads, according as it relates knowledge, no conception at all.
to body or to mind; to things material or That everything that exists must be either
to things intellectual." corporeal or incorporeal is evident. But
The whole system of bodies in the uni it is not so evident that everything [2] that
verse, of which we know but a very small exists must either be corporeal or endowed
rt, may be called the Material World; with thought. Whether there be in the
the whole system of minds, from the infinite universe beings which are neither extended,
Creator to the meanest creature endowed solid, and inert, like body, nor active and
with thought, may be called the Intellectual intelligent, like mind, seems to be beyond
World. These are the two great kingdoms the reach of our knowledge. There appears
of nature' that fall within our notice; to be a vast interval between body and
and about the one, or the other, or things mind; and whether there be any interme
pertaining to them, every art, every science, diate nature that connects them together,
and every human thought is employed; nor we know not.
can the boldest flight of imagination carry We have no reason to ascribe intelli
us beyond their limits. gence, or even sensation, to plants; yet
Many things there are, indeed, regarding there appears in them an active force and
the nature and the structure both of body energy, which cannot be the result of any
and of mind, which our faculties cannot arrangement or combination of inert matter.
reach; many difficulties which the ablest The same thing may be said of those powers
philosopher cannot resolve: but of other by which animals are nourished and grow,
* See Stewart's “Life and Writings of Reid,"
by which matter gravitates, by which mag
netical and electrical bodies attract and
£ 14; and his “Elements," vol. I., introduc
tion; Jouffroy, in the preface to his “Oeuvres de repel each other, and by which the parts of
Reid,” t. i., pp. 23-53. This important Preface will solid bodies cohere.
soon be made generally accessible to the British pub
lic by a highly competent translator.-H. Some have conjectured that the phaeno
+ The term Nature is used sometimes in a wider. mena of the material world which require
sometimes in a narrower extension. When employed
in its most extensive meaning, it embraces the two active force, are produced by the continual
words of mind and matter "when employed in its operation of intelligent beings: others have
more restricted signification, it is a synonyme for the conjectured that there may be in the uni
latter only, and is then u in contradistinction to
the former. In the Greek philosophy, the word verse, beings that are active, without in
wris was general in its meaning; and the great telligence, which, as a kind of incorporeal
£e. of philosophy styled “physical or physiolo machinery, contrived by the supreme wis
gical,” included under it not only the sciences of
matter, but also those of mind. With us, the term dom, perform their destined task without
Nature is more vaguely extensive than the terms, any knowledge or intention." But, laying
physics, rhi si...at, physiology, physiological, or even
tnam the adjective natural ; whereas, in the philo aside conjecture, and all pretences to deter
sophy of Germany, Natur, and its correlatives, mine in things beyond our reach, we must
whether of Greek or Latin derivation, are, in general,
expressive of the would of matter in contrast to the * Like the tripods of vulcan
world of intelligence.-H. "ocea i, xv.16ware, 672, 8vraia' &ysva-H
(vii-2]
PREFACE. 217
rest in this, that body and mind are the of them; and on that account there is no
only kinds of being of which we can have branch of knowledge in which the ingenious
any knowledge, or can form any concep and speculative have fallen into so great
tion. If there are other kinds, they are errors, and even absurdities. These errors
not discoverable by the faculties which God and absurdities have given rise to a general
hath given us; and, with regard to us, are prejudice against all inquiries of this nature.
as if they were not. [3] Because ingenious men have, for many
As, therefore, all our knowledge is con ages, given different and contradictory
fined to body and mind, or things belonging accounts of the powers of the mind, it is
to them, there are two great branches of concluded that all speculations concerning
philosophy, one relating to body, the other them are chimerical and visionary.
to mind. The properties of body, and the But whatever effect this prejudice may
laws that obtain in the material system, are have with superficial thinkers, the judicious
the objects of natural philosophy, as that will not be apt to be carried away with it.
word is now used. The branch which About two hundred years ago, the opinions
treats of the nature and operations of minds of men in natural philosophy were as various
has, by some, been called Pneumatology." and as contradictory as they are now con
And to the one or the other of these branches, cerning the powers of the mind. Galileo,
the principles of all the sciences belong. Torricelli, Kepler, Bacon, and Newton,
What variety there may be of minds or had the same discouragement in their
thinking beings, throughout this vast uni attempts to throw light upon the material
verse, we cannot pretend to say. We dwell system, as we have with regard to the in
in a little corner of God's dominion, dis tellectual. If they had been deterred by
joined from the rest of it. The globe which such prejudices, we should never have
we inhabit is but one of seven planets that reaped the benefit of their discoveries,
encircle our sun. What various orders of which do honour to human nature, and will
beings may inhabit the other six, their make their names immortal. The motto
secondaries, and the comets belonging to which Lord Bacon prefixed to some of his
our system, and how many other suns may writings was worthy of his genius, Inveniam
be encircled with like systems, are things viam aut faciam."
altogether hid from us. Although human There is a natural order in the progress
reason and industry have discovered, with of the sciences, and good reasons may be
great accuracy, the order and distances of assigned why the philosophy of body should
the planets, and the laws of their motion, [5] be elder sister to that of mind, and of a
we have no means of corresponding with quicker growth; but the last hath the prin
them. That they may be the habitation of ciple of life no less than the first, and will
animated beings, is very probable; but of grow up, though slowly, to maturity. The
the nature or powers of their inhabitants, remains of ancient philosophy upon this
we are perfectly ignorant. Every man is subject, are venerable ruins, carrying the
conscious of a thinking principle, or mind, marks of genius and industry, sufficient to
in himself; and we have sufficient evidence inflame, but not to satisfy our curiosity. In
of a like principle in other men. The later ages, Des Cartes was the first that
actions of brute animals shew that they pointed out the road we ought to take in
have some thinking principle, though of a those dark regions. Malebranche, Arnauld,
nature far inferior to the human mind. And Locke, Berkeley, Buffier, Hutcheson,
everything about us may convince us of the Butler, Hume, Price, Lord Kames, have
existence of a supreme mind, the Maker and laboured to make discoveries—nor have they
Governor of the universe. These are all laboured in vain; for, however different
the minds of which reason can give us any and contrary their conclusions are, how
certain knowledge. [4] ever sceptical some of them, they have all
The mind of man is the noblest work of given new light, and cleared the way to those
God which reason discovers to us, and, who shall come after them.
therefore, on account of its dignity, deserves We ought never to despair of human
our study.'t It must, indeed, be acknow genius, but rather to hope that, in time,
ledged, that, although it is of all objects the it may produce a system of the powers and
nearest to us, and seems the most within operations of the human mind, no less cer
our reach, it is very difficult to attend to tain than those of optics or astronomy.
its operations so as to form a distinct notion This is the more devoutly to be wished,
that a distinct knowledge of the powers of
• Now properly superseded by the term Psychol the mind would undoubtedly give great light
ogy, to which no competent objection can be made, to many other branches of science... Mr
and which affords us--what the various clumsy peri
phrases in use do not-aconvenient adjective, psycho Hume hath justly observed, that “all the
logical.-H.
“On earth,” says a forgotten philosopher,
“there is nothing great but Man; in man there is • See Mr Stewart's “Philosophical Essays,” Pre
nothing great but Mind.”—H. timinary Dissertation, ch. in
[3–5]
2].8 PREFACE.
sciences have a relation to human nature; tural theology, morals, jurisprudence, law.
and, however wide any of them may seem politics, and the fine arts. The know
to run from it, they still return back by one ledge of the human mind is the root from
passage or another. This is the centre and which these grow, and draw their nourish
capital of the sciences," which, being once ment." Whether, therefore, we consider
masters of, we may easily extend our con the dignity of this subject, or its subser
quests everywhere.” viency to science in general, and to the
The faculties of our minds are the tools noblest branches of science in particular, it
and engines we must use in every disquisi highly deserves to be cultivated. [7]
tion; and the better we understand their [6] A very elegant writer, on the sublime and
nature and force, the more successfully we beautiful," concludes his account of the
shall be able to apply them. Mr Locke passions thus:—“The variety of the pas
gives this account of the occasion of his sions is great, and worthy, in every branch
entering upon his essay concerning human of that variety, of the most diligent inves
understanding :-" Five or six friends,” tigation. The more accurately we search
says he, “meeting at my chamber, and dis into the human mind, the stronger traces
coursing on a subject very remote from weeverywhere find of His wisdom who made
this, found themselves quickly at a stand it. If a discourse on the use of the parts of
by the difficulties that rose on every side. the body may be considered as a hymn to
After we had for a while puzzled ourselves, the Creator,it the use of the passions,
without coming any nearer to a resolution which are the organs of the mind, cannot
of those doubts that perplexed us, it came be barren of praise to Him, nor unproductive
into my thoughts that we took a wrong to ourselves of that noble and uncommon
course; and that, before we set ourselves union of science and admiration, which a
upon inquiries of that nature, it was neces contemplation of the works of infinite Wis
sary to examine our own abilities, and see dom alone can afford to a rational mind;
what objects our understandings were fitted whilst referring to Him whatever we find of
or not fitted to deal with. This I proposed right, or good, or fair, in ourselves, dis
to the company, who all readily assented; covering His strength and wisdom eveninour
and thereupon it was agreed that this should own weakness and imperfection, honouring
be our first enquiry.” If this be commonly them where we discover them clearly, and
the cause of perplexity in those disquisi adoring their profundity where we are lost
tions which have least relation to the mind, in our search, we may be inquisitive with
it must be so much more in those that have out impertinence, and elevated without
an immediate connection with it. pride; we may be admitted, if I may dare
The sciences may be distinguished into to say so, into the counsels of the Almighty,
two classes, according as they pertain to the by a consideration of his works. This ele
material or to the intellectual world. The vation of the mind ought to be the principal
various parts of natural philosophy, the end of all our studies, which, if they do not
mechanical arts, chemistry, medicine, and in some measure effect, they are of very
agriculture, belong to the first; but, to the little service to us.”
last, belong grammar, logic, rhetoric, na
* It is justly observed by M. Jouffroy, that the
division here enounced is not in principle identical
* Hume probabl had the saying of Polybius in with that previcusly propounded.-H.
his eye, who calls#" the mother city (unreirs + Burke-H.
f Galeu is referred to-H.
Air) of Philosophy:
[6.7]
* -------------- ~ *
E S S A YS
9N. This
ESSAY I.
P R E LIM IN A R Y.
CHAPTER I. the sake of those who are less conversant

in this branch of logic.
*XPlication of Wortus, When one undertakes to explain any art
or science, he will have occasion to use
THERE is no greater impediment to the many words that are common to all who
advancement .# knowledge than the ambi use the same language, and some that are
guity of words. To this chiefly it is owing peculiar to that art or science. Words of
that we find sects and parties in most the last kind are called terms of the art, and
branches of science; and disputes which ought to be distinctly explained, that their
are carried on from age to age, without being meaning may be understood.
brought to an issue. - A definition" is nothing else but an ex
Sophistry has been more effectually ex plication of the meaning of a word, by words
cluded from mathematics and natural whose meaning is already known. Hence
philosophy than from other sciences. In it is evident that every word cannot be
mathematics it had no place from the begin defined; for the definition must consist of
ning; mathematicians having had the wis words; and there could be no definition, if
dona to define accurately the terms they use, there were not words previously understood
and to lay down, as axioms, the first prin without definition. Common words, there
ciples on which their reasoning is grounded. fore, ought to be used in their common
Accordingly, we find no parties amongma acceptation; and, when they have different
thematicians, and hardly any disputes." [10] acceptations in common language, these,
In natural philosophy, there was no less when it is necessary, ought to be distin
sophistry, no less dispute and uncertainty, guished. But they require no definition.
than in other sciences, until, about a cen It is suffieient to define words that are un
tury and a half ago, this science began to be common, or that are used in an uncommon
built upon the foundation of clear defini meaning.
tions and self-evident axioms. Since that It may farther be observed, that there
time, the science, as if watered with the are many words, which, though they may
4ew of Heaven, hath grown apace; dis need explication, cannot be logically defined.
putes have ceased, truth hath prevailed, A[11] logical definition—that is, astrictand
and the science hath received greater in roper definition—must express the kind
crease in two centuries than in two thous #!
of the thing defined, and the spe
and years before. cific difference by which the species defined
It were to be wished that this method, is distinguished from every other species
which hath been so successful in those belonging to that kind. It is natural to the
branches of science, were attempted in mind of man to class things under various
others; for definitions and axioms are the kinds, and again to subdivide every kind
foundations of all science. But that defini into its various species. A species may
tions may not be sought where no defini often be subdivided into subordinate species,
tion can be given, nor logical definitions be and then it is considered as a kind.
attempted £ the subject does not admit From what has been said of logical defi
of them, it may be proper to lay down some nition, it is evident, that no word can be
general principles concerning definition, for logically defined which does not denote a
* It was not the superior wisdom of mathema • In what follows, there is a confusion of defini
ticians, but the simple and palpable character of their tions verbal and real, which should have been care
object-matter, which determined the difference.-H. fully distinguished.-H.
[9–11]
220 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essay 1.
species; because such things only can have know none that has abused definition so
a specific difference; and a specific differ much as Carolus [Christianus] Wolfius, the
ence is essential to a logical definition. famous German philosopher, who, in a
On this account there can be no logical work on the human mind, called “Psycho
definition of individual things, such as logia Empirica,” consisting of many hun
London or Paris. Individuals are distin dred propositions, fortified by demon
guished either by proper names, or by acci strations, with a proportional accompani
dental circumstances of time or place; but ment of definitions, corollaries, and scholia,
they have no specific difference; and, there has given so many definitions of things
fore, though they may be known by pro which cannot be defined, and so many de
per names, or may be described by circum monstrations of things self-evident, that
stances or relations, they cannot be defined." the greatest part of the work consists of
It is no less evident that the most general tautology, and ringing changes upon
words cannot be logically defined, because words.
there is not a more general term, of which There is no subject in which there is
they are a species. more frequent occasion to use words tha.
Nay, we cannot define every species of cannot be logically defined, than in treating
things, because it happens sometimes that of the powers and operations of the mind.
we have not words to express the specific The simplest operations of our minds must
difference. Thus, a scarlet colour is, no all be expressed by words of this kind. No
doubt, a species of colour; but how shall man can explain, by a logical definition,
we express the specific difference by which what it is to think, to apprehend, to believe,
scarlet is distinguished from green or blue? to will, to desire. Every man who under
The difference of them is immediately per stands the language, has some notion of the
ceived by the eye; but we have not words meaning of those words; and every man
to express it. These things we are taught who is capable of reflection may, by attend
by logic. ing to the operations of his own mind,
Without having recourse to the prin which are signified by them, form a clear
ciples of logic, we may easily be satisfied and distinct notion of them; but they can
that words cannot be defined, which signify not be logically defined.
things perfectly simple, and void of all com Since, therefore, it is often impossible to
position. This observation, I think, was define words which we must use on this
first made by Des Cartes, and afterwards subject, we must as much as possible use
more fully illustrated by Locket And, common words, in their common accepta
however obvious it appears to be, many in tion, pointing out their various senses where
stances may be given of great philosophers they are ambiguous; and, when we are
who have perplexed [12] and darkened the obliged to use words less common, we must
subjects they have treated, by not knowing, endeavour to explain them [13] as well as
or not attending to it. we can, without affecting to give logical de
When men attempt to define things which finitions, when the nature of the thing does
cannot be defined, their definitions will not allow it.
always be either obscure or false. It was The following observations on the mean
one of the capital defects of Aristotle's phi ing of certain words are intended to supply,
losophy, that he pretended to define the as far as we can, the want of definitions, by
simplest things, which neither can be, nor preventing ambiguity or obscurity in the
need to be defined—such as time and mo use of them.
tion.: Among modern philosophers, I 1. By the mind of a man, we understand
that in him which thinks, remembers, rea
* It is weli said by the old logicians, Omnis in sons, wills.t. The essence both of body and
tuitiva notitia est definitio; -that is, a view of the of mind is unknown to us. We know cer
thing tself is its best definition Au: "his is true,
both of the objects of sense, and of the objects of self. tain properties of the first, and certain oper
consciousness.-H. ations of the last, and by these only we can
+ This is incorrect. Des Cartes has little, and define or describe them. We define body
Locke no title to praise for this observation. It had
been made by Aristotle, and after him by many to be that which is extended, solid, move
others; while, subsequent to Des Cartes, and pre able, divisible. In like manner, we define
*ious to Locke, Pascal and the Port-Royal Logicians, mind to be that which thinks. We are con
to say nothing of a paper of Leibnitz, in 1684, had re
duced it to a matter of commonplace. In this instance, cious that we think, and that we have a
Lockecan, indeed, be proved a borrower. Mr Stewart variety of thoughts of different kinds—such
(“Philosophical Essays,” Note A) is wrong in think
ing that, after Des Cartes, Lord Stair is the earliest as seeing, hearing, remembering, delibe
philosopher by whom this logical principle was rating, resolving, loving, hating, and many
enounced; for Stair, as a writer, is subsequent to
the authors adduced.--H.
1 There is not a little, however, to be said in vin * This judgment is not false; but it is exaggerated
dication of Aristotle's definitions. Leibnitz is not -H.
the only modern philosopher who has applauded that 1 This corresponds to Aristotle's second definition
of Motion, which requires, however, some ill s of the soul, or that a post ri. Wide supra, p. 203
tration of the special significance of its terms-H. a, note *.-H.
[12, 18]
oHAP. 1.] EXPLICATION OF WORDS. 221
other kinds of thought—all which we are there is no absurdity in supposing a bein

taught by nature to attribute to one internal to have power to operate, when it does no
principle; and this principle of thought we operate. Thus I may have power to walk,
call the mind or soul of a man. when I sit ; or to speak, when I am silent.
2. By the operations" of the mind, we un Every operation, therefore, implies power;
derstand every mode of thinking of which but the power does not imply the operation.
we are conscious. The faculties of the mind, and its powers,
It deserves our notice, that the various are often used as synonymous expressions.
modes of thinking have always, and in all But, as most synonymes have some minute
languages, as far as we know, been called distinction that deserves notice, I apprehend
by the name of operations of the mind, or that the word faculty [15] is most properly
by names of the same import. To body applied to those powers of the mind which
we ascribe various properties, but not oper are original and natural, and which make a
ations, properly so called: it is extended, part of the constitution of the mind. There
divisible, moveable, inert; it continues in are other powers, which are acquired by
any state in which it is put; every change use, exercise, or study, which are not called
of its state is the effect of some force im faculties, but habits. There must be some
pressed upon it, and is exactly proportional thing in the constitution of the mind neces
to the force impressed, and in the precise sary to our being able to acquire habits
direction of that force. These are the ge and this is commonly called capacity."
neral properties of matter, and these are 4. We frequently meet with a distinction
not operations; on the contrary, they all in writers upon this subject, between things
imply its being a dead, inactive thing, in the mind, and things external to the mind.
which moves only as it is moved, and acts The powers, faculties, and operations of the
only by being acted upon..t. [14] mind, are things in the mind. Everythin
But the mind is, from its very nature, a is said to be in the mind, of which the #
living and active being. Everything we is the subject. It is self-evident that there
know of it implies life and active energy; are some things which cannot exist without
and the reason why all its modes of thinking a subject to which they belong, and of which
are called its operations, is, that in all, or in they are attributes. Thus, colour must be
most of them, it is not merely passive, as in something coloured; figure in something
body is, but is really and properly active. figured; thought can only be in something
In all ages, and in all languages, ancient that thinks; wisdom and virtue cannot exist
and modern, the various modes of thinking but in some being that is wise and virtuous.
have been expressed by words of active When, therefore, we speak of things in the
signification, such as seeing, hearing, reason mind, we understand by this, things of which
ing, willing, and the like. It seems, there the mind is the subject. Excepting the
fore, to be the natural judgment of man mind itself, and things in the mind, all other
kind, that the mind is active in its various things are said to be external. It ought
ways of thinking: and, for this reason, they therefore to be remembered, that this dis
are called its operations, and are expressed tinction between things in the mind and
by active verbs. things external, is not meant to signify the
It may be made a question, What regard place of the things we speak of, but their
is to be paid to this natural judgment ? subject.t
May it not be a vulgar error? Philosophers There is a figurative sense in which things
who think so have, no doubt, a right to be are said to be in the mind, which it is suf
heard. But, until it is proved that the ficient barely to mention. We say such a
mind is not active in thinking, but merely thing was not in my mind; meaning no more
passive, the common language with regard than that I had not the least thought of it.
to its operations ought to be used, and ought By a figure, we put thething for the thought
not to give place to a phraseology invented
by philosophers, which implies its being * These terms properly stand in the following re
merely passive. lations:-Powers are active and passive, natural
3. The words power and faculty, which and acquired. Powers, natural and active...are called
are often used in speaking of the mind, Faculties: Powers, natural and passive, Capacities
or Receptivities: Powers acquired are Habits, and
need little explication. Every operation habit is used both in an active and in a passive sense:
supposes a power in the being that oper the Power, again, of acquiring a habit, is called a
Disposition.-On the meaning of the term Power, see
rates; for to suppose anything to operate, further, under the first Essay on the Active Powers,
which has no power to operate, is mani chap. iii, p 23-H
festly absurd.-- But, on the other hand, + Subject and object are correlative terms. The
former is properly td in quo: the latter, id circa
quod. Hence, in psychological language, the subject,
* Operation, Act, Ener , are nearly convertible absolutely, is the mind that knows or thinks- e.,
terms; and are opposed t aculty, (of which anon,) the mind considered as the subject of knowledge or
as the actuel to the pot. 1 - H. thought; the object, that which is known, orthought
+ “Materiae datum est cogi, sed cogere Menti.” about ihe adjectives subjective and olfective are
Mannuus.-H. convenient, if not indispensable, expressions.-H.
[14, 15]
of it. In this sense external things are in mony, when it is clear and cogent. The
the mind as often as they are the objects of perception of external objects by our senses,
our thought. is an operation of the mind of a peculiar
5. Thinking is a very general word, which nature, and ": to have a name appro
includes all the operations of our minds, and priated to it. It has so in all languages.
is so well understood as to need no defi And, in English, I know no word more
mition.” [16] proper to express this act of the mind than
To perceive, to remember, to be conscious, perception. Seeing, hearing, smelling,
and to conceive or imagine, are words com tasting, and touching or feeling, are words
mon to philosophers and to the vulgar. that express the operations proper to each
They signify different operations of the sense; perceiving expresses that which is
mind, which are distinguished in all lan common to them all.
guages, and by all men that think. I shall The observations made on this word
endeavour to use them in their most com would have been unnecessary, if it had not
mon and proper acceptation, and I think been so much abused in philosophical
they are hardly capable of strict definition. writings upon the mind; for, in other writ
But, as some philosophers, in treating of the ings, it has no obscurity. Although this
mind, have taken the liberty to use them abuse is not chargeable on Mr Hume only,
very improperly, so as to corrupt the Eng yet I think he has carried it to the highest
lish language, and to confound things pitch. The first sentence of his “Treatise
which the common understanding of man of Human Nature” runs thus:-"All the
kind hath always led them to distinguish, perceptions of the human mind resolve
I shall make someobservations on the mean themselves into two distinct heads, which
ing of them, that may prevent ambiguity I shall call impressions and ideas.” He
or confusion in the use of them. adds, a little after, that, under the name
6. First, We are never said to perceive of impressions, he comprehends all our
things, of the existence of which we have sensations, passions, and emotions. Here
not a full conviction. I may conceive or we learn that our passions and emotions
imagine a mountain of gold, or a winged are perceptions. I believe, no English
horse; but no man says that he perceives writer before him ever gave the name of a
such a creature of imagination. Thus per perception to any passion or emotion.
ception is distinguished from conception or When a man is angry, we must say that he
imagination. Secondly, Perception is ap has the perception of anger. When he is
plied only to external objects, not to those in love, that he has the perception of love.
that are in the mind itself. When I am He speaks often of the perceptions of me
pained, I do not say that I perceive pain, mory, and of the perceptions of imagina
but that I feel it, or that I am conscious of tion; and he might as well speak of the
it. Thus, perception is distinguished from hearing of sight, or of the smelling of touch;
consciousness. Thirdly, The immediate for, surely, hearing is not more different
object of perception must be something pre from sight, or smelling from touch, than
sent, and not what is past. We may re perceiving is from remembering or imagin
member what is past, but do not perceive ing."
it. I may say, I perceive such a person 7. Consciousness is a word used by
has had the small-pox; but this phrase is philosophers, to signify that immediate
figurative, although the ": is so familiar knowledge which we have of our present
that it is not observed. The meaning of it thoughts and purposes, and, in general, of
is, that I perceive the pits in his face, which all the present operations of our minds.
are certain signs of his having had the small Whence we may observe, that conscious
pox. We say we perceive the thing signi ness is only of things present. To apply
fied, when we only perceive the sign. But consciousness to things past, which some
when the word perception is used properly, times [18] is done in popular discourse, is to
and without any figure, it is never applied confound consciousness with memory; and
to things past. And thus it is distinguished all such confusion of words-ought to be
from remembrance. avoided in philosophical discourse. It is
In a word, perception is most properly likewise to be observed, that consciousness
applied to the evidence which we have of
external objects by our senses. But, as *fn the Cartesian and Lockian philosophies, the
this is a [17] very clear and cogent kind of term Perception was used almost convertibly with
Consciousness: whatever we could be said to be
evidence, the word is often applied by ana conscious of that we could be said to perceive. And
logy to the evidence of reason or of testi there is nothing in the etymology of the word, or in
its use by ancient writers, that renders this unexclu
sive application of it abusive. In the Leibnitzian
• Thought and thinki are used in amore, and in philosophy, perception and apperception were dis
a less, restricted signification. In the former mean tinguished in a liar manner-of which again.
ing they are limited to the discursive energies alone; Reid is right in his own restriction of the term; but
in the#er, they are co-extensive with conscious he is not warranted in blaming Hume for having used
ness.-ri. it in the wider signification of his predecessors.-H.
[16–18 |
eita P. 1-3 EXPLICATION OF WORDS. 223
is only of things in the mind, and not of not conceive it;” meaning that we cannot
external things. It is improper to say, I believe it.
am conscious of the table which is before Thus we see that the words conceive,
me. I perceive it, I see it; but do not say imagine, apprehend, have two meanings,
I am conscious of it. As that consciousness and are used to express two operations of
by which we have a knowledge of the opera the mind, which ought never to be con
tions of our own minds, is a different power founded. Sometimes they express simple
from that by which we perceive external apprehension, which implies no judgment
objects, and as these different powers have at all; sometimes they express judgment or
different names in our language, and, I opinion. This ambiguity ought to be at
elieve, in all languages, a philosopher tended to, that we may not impose upon
ought carefully to preserve this distinction, ourselves or others in the use of them. The
and never to confound things so different in ambiguity is indeed remedied, in a great
their nature." measure, by their construction. When
8. Conceiving, imagining, and appre they are used to express simple apprehen
hending, are commonly used as synony sion, they are followed by a noun in the
mous in our hanguage, and signify the same accusative case, which signifies the object
thing which the logicians call simple appre conceived; but, when they are used to ex
hension. This is an operation of the mind press opinion or judgment, they are com
different from all those we have mentioned. monly followed by a verb, in the infinitive
Whatever we perceive, whatever we re mood. “I conceive an Egyptian pyramid.”
member, whatever we are conscious of, we This implies no judgment. “I conceive
have a full persuasion or conviction of its the Egyptian pyramids to be the most an
existence. But we may conceive or imagine cient monuments of human art.” This
what has no existence, and what we firmly implies judgment. When the words are
believe to have no existence. What never used in the last sense, the thing conceived
had an existence cannot be remembered; must be a proposition, because judgment
what has no existence at present cannot cannot be expressed but by a proposition.
be the object of perception or of conscious When they are used in the first sense, the
cess; but what never had, nor has any thing conceived may be no proposition, but
existence, may be conceived. Every man a simple term only—as a pyramid, an obe
knows that it is as easy to conceive a winged lisk. Yet it may be observed, that even a
horse, oracentaur, as it is to conceive a horse proposition may be simply apprehended,
or a man. Let it be observed, therefore, that without forming any judgment of its truth
to conceive, to imagine, to apprehend, when or falsehood: for it is one thing to conceive
taken in the proper sense, signify an act of the meaning of a proposition; it is another
the mind which implies no belief or judg thing to judge it to be true or false. [20]
ment at all. t. It is an act of the mind by Although the distinction between simple
which nothing is affirmed or denied, and apprehension, and every degree of assent or
which, therefore, can neither be true nor judgment, be perfectly evident to every man
false. who reflects attentively on what passes in
But there is another and a very different his own mind—although it is very neces
meaning of those words, so common and so sary, in treating of the powers of the mind,
well authorized in language that it cannot to attend carefully to this distinction—yet,
easily be avoided; and on that account in the affairs of common life, it is seldom
we ought to be the more on our guard, that neoessary to observe it accurately. On
we be not misled by the ambiguity. Po this account we shall find, in all common
itemeesand[19]good-breeding lead men, on languages, the words which express one of
most occasions, to express their opinions those operations frequently applied to the
with modesty, especially when they differ other. To think, to suppose, to imagine,
from others whom they ought to respect. to conceive, to apprehend, are the words we
Therefore, when we would express our use to express simple apprehension; but
opinion modestly, instead of saying, “This they are all frequently used to express
is myopinion,” or, “This is my judgment,” judgment. Their ambiguity seldom occa
which has the air of dogmaticalness, we say, sions any inconvenience in the common
“I conceive it to be thus—I imagine, or ap affairs of life, for which language is framed.
prehend it to be thus;” which is understood But it has perplexed philosophers, in treat
as a modest declaration of our judgment. ing of the operations of the mind, and will
In like manner, when anything is said which always perplex them, if they do not attend
wetake to be impossible, we say, “We can accurately to the different meanings which
• Reid's degradation of Consciousness into a are put upon those words on different oc
casions.
faculty, (in which he seems to follow Hut.
, in opposition to other philosophers,) is, in 9. Most of the operations of the mind,
every point of view, obnoxious to every possible ot from their very nature, must have objects
jection. See note H.-H
# Except of its own ideal reality.-H. to which they are directed, and about which
| 19, 201
224 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [EssAY 1.
they are employed. He that perceives, sopher communicates to us. But when we
must perceive something; and that which are required to put out the old light alto
he perceives is called the object of his per gether, that we may follow the new, we
ception. To perceive, without having any have reason to be on our guard. There
object of perception, is impossible. The may be distinctions that have a real foun
mind that perceives, the object perceived, dation, and which may be necessary in
}nd the operation of perceiving that object, philosophy, which are not made in common
are distinct things, and are distinguished in language, because not necessary in the com
the structure of all languages. In this mon business of life. But I believe [22] no
sentence, “I see, or perceive the moon,” instance will be found of a distinction made
I is the person or mind, the active verb in all languages, which has not a just found
see denotes the operation of that mind, and ation in nature.
the moon denotes the object. What we 10. The word idea" occurs so frequently
have said of perceiving, is equally applicable in modern philosophical writings upon the
to most operations of the mind. Such opera mind, and is so ambiguous in its meaning,
tions are, in all languages, expressed by that it is necessary to make some observa
active transitive verbs; and we know that, tions upon it. There are chiefly two mean
in all languages, such verbs require a thing ings of this word in modern authors—a
or person, which is the agent, and a noun popular and a philosophical.
following in an oblique case, which is the First, In popular language, idea signi
object. Whence it is evident, that all fies the same thing as conception, appre
mankind, both those who have contrived hension, notion. To have an idea of any
anguage, and those who use it with under thing, is to conceive it. To have a distinct
standing, have distinguished these three idea, is to conceive it distinctly. To have
things as different—to wit, the operations of no idea of it, is not to conceive it at all.
the mind, which [21] are expressed by active It was before observed, that conceiving or
verbs; the mind itself, which is the nomin apprehending has always been considered
ative to those verbs; and the object, which by all men as an act or operation of the
is, in the oblique case, governed by them. mind, and, on that account, has been ex
It would have been unnecessary to ex pressed in all languages by an active verb.
plain so obvious a distinction, if some sys When, therefore, we use the phrase of
tems of philosophy had not confounded it. having ideas, in the popular sense, we
Mr Hume's system, in particular, confounds ought to attend to this, that it signifies
all distinction between the operations of the precisely the same thing which we com
mind and their objects. When he speaks monly express by the active verbs, conceiv
of the ideas of memory, the ideas of imagin ing or apprehending.
ation, and the ideas of sense, it is often im When the word idea is taken in this po
possible, from the tenor of his discourse, to pular sense, no man can possibly doubt
know whether, by those ideas, he means whether he has ideas. For he that doubts
the operations of the mind, or the objects must think, and to think is to have ideas.
about which they are employed. And, Sometimes, in popular language, a man's
indeed, according to his system, there is ideas signify his opinions. The ideas of
no distinction between the one and the Aristotle, or of Epicurus, signify the
other. opinions of these philosophers. What was
A philosopher is, no doubt, entitled to formerly said of the words imagine, conceive,
examine even those distinctions that are to apprehend, that they are sometimes used
be found in the structure of all languages; to express judgment, is no less true of the
and, if he is able to shew that there is no word idea. This signification of the word
foundation for them in the nature of the seems indeed more common in the French
things distinguished—if he can point out language than in English. But it is found
some prejudice common to mankind which in this sense in good English authors, and
has led them to distinguish things that are even in Mr Locke. Thus we see, that
not really different—in that case, such a having ideas, taken in the popular sense,
distinction may be imputed to a vulgar has precisely the same meaning with conceiv
error, which ought to be corrected in philo ing, imagining, apprehending, and has like
sophy. But when, in his first setting out, wise.[23] the same ambiguity. It may, there
he takes it for granted, without proof, that fore, be doubted, whether the introduction of
distinctions found in the structure of all this word into popular discourse, to signify the
languages, have no foundation in nature, operation of conceiving or apprehending,
this, surely, is too fastidious a way of was at all necessary. For, first, We have,
treating the common sense of mankind. as has been shewn, several words which are
When we come to be instructed by philo either originally English, or have been long
sophers, we must bring the old light of naturalized, that express the same thing;
common sense along with us, and by it
judge of the new light which the philo • On the history of the term Idea, see Note G.-H.
[21 23]
on AP. ..] EXPLICATION OF WORDS. 225
why, therefore, should we adopt a Greek derstanding; the natures and essences of all
word. in place of these, any more than a things being perfectly known to him from
French or a German word P Besides, the eternity.
words of our own language are less ambi Itought to be observed that the Pythago
guous. For the word idea has, for many reans, and the Platonists, whether elder or
ages, been used by philosophers as a term latter, made the eternal ideas to be objects
of art; and in the different systems of phi of science only, and of abstract contempla
losophers means very different things. tion, not the objects of sense." And in
Secondly, According to the philosophi this, the ancient system of eternal ideas
cal meaning of the word idea, it does not differs from the modern one of Father Ma
signify that act of the mind which we call lebranche. He held, in common with other
thought or conception, but some object of modern philosophers, that no external
thought. Ideas, according to Mr Locke, thing is perceived by us immediately, but
(whose very frequent use of this word has only by ideas. But he thought that the
probably been the occasion of its being ideas, by which we perceive an external
adopted into common language,) “are world, are the ideas of the Deity himself,
nothing but the immediate objects of the in whose mind the ideas of all things, past,
mind in thinking.” But of those objects of present, and future, must have been from
thought called ideas, different sects of phi eternity; for the Deity being intimately
losophers have given a very different ac present to our minds at all times, may dis
count. Bruckerus, a learned German, wrote cover to us as much of his ideas as he sees
a whole book, giving the history of ideas. proper, according to certain established
The most ancient system we have con laws of nature; and in his ideas, as in a
cerning ideas, is that which is explained in mirror, we perceive whatever we do per
several dialogues of Plato, and which many ceive of the external world.
ancient, as well as modern writers, have Thus we have three systems, which main
ascribed to Plato, as the inventor. But it is tain that the ideas which are the imme
certain that Plato had his doctrine upon diate objects of human knowledge, are
this subject, as well as the name itea, from eternal and immutable, and existed before
the school of Pythagoras. We have still the things which they represent. There
extant, a tract of Timaeus, the Locrian, a are other systems, according to which the
Pythagorean philosopher, concerning the ideas which are the immediate objects of
soul of the world, in which we find the sub all our thoughts, are posterior to the things
stance of Plato's doctrine concerning ideas." which they represent, and derived from
They were held to be eternal, uncreated, them. We shall [25] give some account of
and immutable forms, or models, according these ; but, as they have gradually sprung
to which the Deity made every species of out of the ancient Peripatetic system, it is
things that exists, of an eternal matter. necessary to begin with some account of it.
Those philosophers held, that there are Aristotle taught that all the objects of
three first principles of all things: First, our thought enter at first by the senses;
An eternal matter, of which all things were and, since the sense cannot receive external
made; Secondly, Eternal and immaterial material objects themselves, it receives their
forms, or ideas, according to whichthey were species—that is, their images or forms,
made; and, [24] Thirdly, Anefficient cause, without the matter; as wax receives the form
the Deity who made them.'t The mind of of the seal without any of the matter of it.
man, in order to its being fitted for the con These images or forms, impressed upon the
templation of these etermal ideas, must un senses, are called sensible species, and are
dergo a certain purification, and be weaned the objects only of the sensitive part of the
from sensible things. The eternal ideas are mind; but, by various internal powers, they
the only object of science; because the ob are retained, refined, and spiritualized, so as
jectsof sense, being in a perpetual flux, there to become objects of memory and imagina
can be no real knowledge with regard to them. tion, and, at last, of pure intellection.
The philosophers of the Alexandrian When they are objects of memory and of
school, commonly called the latter Plato imagination, they get the nameof phantasms.
nists, made some change upon the system of When, by farther refinement, and being
the ancient Platonists with respect to the stripped of their particularities, they become
eternal ideas. They held them not to be a objects of science, they are called intelli
principle distinet from the Deity, but to be gible species : so that every immediate
the conceptions of things in the divine un
* Reid, in common with our philosophers in general,
had no knowledge of the Platonic theory of sensible
• The whole series of Pythagorean treatises and perce, aton, and yet the gnostic forms, the cognitive
fragments in the Doric dialect, in which the doc reasons of the Platonists, held a far more proximate
trines and phraseology of Plato-and Aristotle are so relation to ideas in the modern ac ation, than the
marvel y anticipated, are now proved to be com Platon c ideas themselves. These, in fact, as to all
paratively recent forgerics. Of these, the treatise that relates to the coctrine of perception and ima.
under the name of Timaeus, is one.-H. ginati n, may be thrown wholiy out of account. See
* See above, p. 204, a, note *-H. , below, under p. 116.-H.
[24, 25] Q
object, whether of sense, of memory, of which we could have no perception, no re
imagination, or of reasoning, must be some membrance, no conception of the mediate
phantasm or species in the mind itself." object."
The followers of Aristotle, especially the When, therefore, in common language,
schoolmen, made great additions to this we speak of having an idea of anything, we
theory, which the author himself mentions mean no more by that expression, but
very briefly, and with an appearance of thinking of it. The vulgar allow that this
reserve. They entered into large disquisi expression implies a mind that thinks, an
tions with regard to the sensible species: act of that mind which we call thinking,
what kind of things they are; how they and an object about which we think. But,
are sent forth by the object, and enter by besides these three, the philosopher con
the organs of the senses; how they are ceives that there is a fourth—to wit, the
preserved and refined by various agents, idea, which is the immediate object. The
called internal senses, concerning the num idea is in the mind itself, and can have no
ber and offices of which they had many existence but in a mind that thinks; but the
controversies. But we shall not enter into remote or mediate object may be something
a detail of these matters. external, as the sun or moon; it may be
The reason of giving this brief account of something past or future; it may be some
the theory of the Peripatetics, with regard to thing which never existed. [27] This is
the immediate objects of our thoughts, is, the philosophical meaning of the word idea ;
because the doctrine of modern philoso and we may observe that this meaning of
phers concerning ideas is built upon it. Mr that word is built upon a philosophical
Locke, who uses this word so very fre opinion : for, if philosophers had not be
quently, tellsus, that he means thesame thing lieved that there are such immediate objects
by it as is commonly [26] meant by species of all our thoughts in the mind, they would
or phantasm. Gassendi, from whom Locke never have used the word idea to express
borrowed more than from any other author, them.
says the same. The words species and I shall only add, on this article, that, al
phantasm, are terms of art in the Peripa though I may have occasion to use the word
tetic system, and the meaning of them is to idea in this philosophical sense in explaining
be learned from it." the opinions of others, I shall have no occa
The theory of Democritus and Epicurus, sion to use it in expressing my own, because
on this subject, was not very unlike to that I believe ideas, taken in this sense, to be
of the Peripatetics. They held that all a mere fiction of philosophers. And, in the
bodies continually send forth slender films popular meaning of the word, there is the
or spectres from their surface, of such less occasion to use it, because the English
extreme subtilty that they easily penetrate words thought, notion, apprehension, answer
our gross bodies, or enter by the organs of the purpose as well as the Greek word
sense, and stamp their image upon the idea; with this advantage, that they are
mind. The sensible species of Aristotle less ambiguous. There is, indeed, a mean
were mere forms without matter. The ing of the word idea, which I think most
spectres of Epicurus were composed of a agreeable to its use in ancient philosophy,
very subtile matter. and which I would willingly adopt, if use,
Modern philosophers, as well as the Peri the arbiter of language, did permit. But
patetics and Epicureans of old, have con this will come to be explained afterwards.
ceived that external objects cannot be the 11. The word impression is used by Mr
immediate objects of our thought; that Hume, in speaking of the operations of the
there must be some image of them in the mind, almost as often as the word idea is
mind itself, in which, as in a mirror, they by Mr Locke. What the latter calls ideas,
are seen. And the name idea, in the philo the former divides into two classes; one of
sophical sense of it, is given to those inter which he calls impressions, the other ideas.
mal and immediate objects of our thoughts. I shall make some observations upon Mr
The external thing is the remote or mediate Hume's explication of that word, and then
object; but the idea, or image of that object consider the proper meaning of it in the
in the mind, is the immediate object, without English language.
“We may divide,” (says Mr Hume,
* This is a tolerable account of the doctrine
vulgariy attributed to Aristotle.-H.
“Essays," vol. II., p. 18,t)“all the percep
tions of the human mind into two classes
* If by this it be meant that the terms of species
and phantasm, as occasionally employed by Gassendi or species, which are distinguished by their
and Locke, are used by them in the nean
ing attached to them in the Schools, Reid is wrong. * On Reid's ambiguous employment of the ex
Gassendi, no more than Des Cartes, in adopting pressions mediate and immediate object, see Noe
these terms of the i eripatetics, adopted them in B; and, on his confusion of the two hypotheses of
their Peripatetic signification. Both these philoso representation, Note C.-H.
phers are explicit in declaring the contrary; and t “ Enquiry concerning Human Understanding.”
what these terms as employed by them denote, they $ 2. The quotation has been filled up by the origi
have clearly stated. Locke is less precise.-H. nal.--H.
[26, 27
cHAP. ..] EXPLICATION OF WORDS. 227
different degrees of force and vivacity. The tions, are distinguished by the degrees of
less lively and forcible are commonly deno their force and vivacity, is to confound a •
minated Thoughts or IDEAs. The other difference of degree with a difference of
species want a name in our language, and species, which every man of understanding
in most others; [I suppose because it was knows how to distinguish.” [29]
not requisite for any but philosophical pur Thirdly, We may observe, that this
poses to rank them under a general term author, having given the general name of
or appellation.] Let us, therefore, use a perception to all the operations of the
little freedom, and call them IMPREssions; mind,+ and distinguished them into two
[employing that word in a sense somewhat classes or species, which differ only in de
different from the usual.] By the term gree of force and vivacity, tells us, that he
impression, then, I mean all our more lively gives the name of impressions to all our
perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, more lively perceptions—to wit, when we
or love, or hate, or desire, or will. [And hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or
impressions are distinguished from] ideas desire, or will. There is great confusion
[which] are the [28] less lively perceptions, in this account of the meaning of the word
of which we are conscious, when we reflect on impression. When I see, this is an im
any of those sensations or movements above pression. But why has not the author
mentioned.” told us whether he gives the name of im
This is the explication Mr Hume hath pression to the object seen, or to that act of
given in his “Essays” of the term impres my mind by which I see it? When I see
stons, when applied to the mind: and his the full moon, the full moon is one thing,
explication of it, in his “Treatise of Human my perceiving it is another thing. Which
£ I 1.
is to the same purpose. [Wol. I. of these two things does he call an impres
t". Disputes about words belong rather to sion ? We are left to guess this; nor does
all that this author writes about impressions
ians than to philosophers; but clear this point. Everything he says tends
philosophers ought not to escape censure to darken it, and to lead us to think that the
when they corrupt a language, by using full moon which I see, and my seeing it, are
words in a way which the purity of the lan not two things, but one and the same thing.:
uage will not admit. I find fault with Mr The same observation may be applied to
Hume's phraseology in the words I have every other instance the author gives to
quoted illustrate the meaning of the word impres
First, Because he gives the name of per sion. “When we hear, when we feel,
ceptions to every operation of the mind. when we love, when we hate, when we de
Love is a perception, hatred a perception; sire, when we will.” In all these acts of
desire is a perception, will is a perception; the mind there must be an object, which is
and, by the same rule, a doubt, a question, heard, or felt, or loved, or hated, or desired,
a command, is a perception. This is an or willed. Thus, for instance, I love my
intolerable abuse of language, which no phi country. This, says Mr Hume, is an im
losopher has authority to introduce." pression. But what is the impression ? Is it
Secondly, When Mr Hume says, that we my country, or is it the affection I bear to it?
may divide all the perceptions of the human I ask the philosopher this question; but I
mind into two classes or species, which are find no answer to it. And when I read all
distinguished by their degrees of force and
civacity, the manner of expression is loose • This objection reaches far more extensively than
to Hume; in fact, to all who do not allow an imme
and unphilosophical. To differ in species diate knowledge or consciousness of the non-ego in
is one thing; to differ in degree is an perception. Where are the philosophers who io?
other. Things which differ in degree only Aristotle and Hobbes call imagination a dying sense;
must be of the same species. It is a andf As Des Cartes is equally explicit.-H.
others previously had done.-H.
Inaxim of common sense, admitted by all f This objection is easily answered. The thing,
men, that greater and less do not make Hume would say,) as unknown, as unperceived, as
yond the sphere of my consciousness, is to me as
a change of species.t. The same man zero; to that, therefore, I could not refer. As per
may differ in the degree of his force and ceived, as known, it must be within the sphere of my
vivacity, in the morning and at night, in consciousness; but, as philosophers concur in main
taining that 1 can only be conscious of my mind and
health and in sickness; but this is so far its contents, the object, as perceived, must be either
from making him a different species, that a mode of, or something contained within Iny mind,
it does not so much as make him a dif and to that internal object, as perceived, I give the
name of impression.-Nor can the act of perception
ferent individual. To say, therefore, that (he would add) be really distinguished from the ob
two different classes, or species of percep ject perceived. Both are only relatives, mutually
constituent of the same indivisible relation of know
ledge; and to that relation and these relatives I give
* Hume did not introduce it The term Percep the name
points of impression,
of view, precisely isas,applied
the term perception in different
to the
tion was so used by Des Cartes and many others; and,
asdesires, feclings, &c. exist only as known, so are they mind perceiving, to the object perceived, and to the
all, in a certain sense, cognitions (perceptions.)-H. act of which these are the inseparable constituents.
+ “Magis et minus non variant speciem."-H. -this likewise has reference to what follows.-H.
[28, 29]
228 ON. THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essav 1.
that he has written on this subject, I find duced in a body by the operation of some
this word impression sometimes used to sig external cause. A blow of the hand makes
nify an operation of the mind, sometimes no impression on a stone wall; but a bat
the object of the operation; but, for the tery of cannon may. The moon raises a
most part, it is a vague and indetermined tide in the ocean, but makes no impression
word that signifies both. on rivers and lakes.
I know not whether it may be considered When we speak of making an impression
as an apology for such abuse of words, in an on the mind, the word is carried still farther
author who understood the language so well, from its literal meaning; use, however,
and used it with so great propriety in writ which is the arbiter of language, authorizes
ing on other subjects, [30] that Mr Hume's this application of it—as when we say that
system, with regard to the mind, required a admonition and reproof make little impres
language of a different structure from the sion on those who are confirmed in bad
common: or, if expressed in plain English, habits. The same discourse delivered in
would have been too shocking to the com one way makes a strong impression on the
mon sense of mankind. To give an instance hearers; delivered in another way, it makes
or two of this. If a man receives a present no impression at all.
on which he puts a high value, if he see It may be observed that, in such ex
and handle it, and put it in his pocket, this, amples, an impression made on the mind
says Mr Hume, is an impression. If the always implies some change of purpose or
man only dream that he received such a will; some new habit produced, or some
present, this is an idea. Wherein lies the former habit weakened; some passion raised
difference between this impression and this or allayed. When such changes are pro
idea-between the dream and the reality? duced by persuasion, example, or any ex
They are different classes or species, says ternal cause, we say that such causes make
Mr Hume: so far all men will agree with an impression upon the mind; but, when
him. But he adds, that they are distinguished things are seen, or heard, or apprehended,
only by different degrees of force and viva without producing any passion or emotion,
city. Here he insinuates a tenet of his we say that they make no impression.
own, in contradiction to the commonsense In the most extensive sense, an impres
of mankind. Common sense convinces every sion is a change produced in some passive
man, that a lively dream is no nearer to a subject by the operation of an external
reality than a faint one; and that, if a man cause. If we suppose an active being to
should dream that he had all the wealth of produce any change in itself by its own
Croesus, it would not put one farthing in active power, this is never called an im
his pocket. It is impossible to fabricate ar pression. It is the act or operation of
guments against such undeniable principles, the being itself, not an impression upon it.
without confounding the meaning of words. From this it appears, that to give the name
In like manner, if a man would persuade of an impression to any effect produced in
me that the moon which I see, and my see the mind, is to suppose that the mind does
ing it, are not two things, but one and the not act at all in the production of that effect.
same thing, he will answer his purpose less If seeing, hearing, desiring, willing, be
by arguing this point in plain English, than operations of the mind, they cannot be im
by confounding the two under one name— pressions. If [32] they be impressions, they
such as that of an impression. For such is cannot be operations of the mind. In the
the power of words, that, if we can be structure of all lan they are con
brought to the habit of calling two things sidered as acts or operations of the mind it
that are connected by th?"same name, we are self, and the names given them imply this.
the more easily led to believe them to be To call them impressions, therefore, is to
one and the same thing. trespass against the structure, not of a par
Let us next consider the proper meaning ticular language only, but of all languages."
of the word impression" in English, that we If the word impression be an improper
may see how far it is fit to express either word to signify the operations of the mind,
the operations of the mind or their objects. it is at least as improper to signify their
When a figure is stamped upon a body by objects; for would any man be thought to
pressure, that figure is called an impression, speak with propriety, who should say that
as the impression of a seal on wax, of [31] the sun is an impression, that the earth and
the sea are impressions?
printing-types, or of a copperplate on paper.
This seems now to be the literal sense of It is commonly believed, and taken for
the word; the effect borrowing its name granted, that every language, if it be suffi
from the cause. But, by metaphor or ana ciently copious in words, is equally fit to
logy, like most other words, its meaning is express all opinions, whether '
be true
extended, so as to signify any change pro
* See below, under p. 338.-H.
". But see Scaliger, “De Subtilitate," Exerc. 908,
r
£30-32]
ei: AP. I.] EXPLICATION OF WORDS. 229
or false. I apprehend, however, that there insentient being can have the least resem
is an exception to this general rule, which blance to it.
deserves our notice. There are certain What we have said of pain may be
common opinions of mankind, upon which applied to every other sensation. Some of
the structure and grammar of all languages them are agreeable, others uneasy, in
are founded. While these opinions are various degrees. These being objects of
common to all men, there will be a great desire or aversion, have some attention
similarity in all lan that are to be given to them; but many are indifferent,
found on the face of the earth. Such a and so little attended to that they have no
similarity there really is; for we find in all name in any language.
languages the same parts of speech, the Most operations of the mind that have
distinction of nouns and verbs, the distinc names in common language, are complex
tion of nouns into adjective and substan in their nature, and made up of various
tive, of verbs into active and passive. In ingredients, or more simple acts; which,
verbs we find like tenses, moods, persons, though conjoined in our constitution, must
and numbers. There are general rules of be disjoined by abstraction, in order to our
grammar, the same in all languages. This having a distinct and scientific notion of the
similarity of structure in all languages, complex operation. [34] In such operations,
shews an uniformity among men in those sensation, for the most part, makes an in
opinious upon which the structure of lan gredient. Those who do not attend to the
guage is founded. complex nature of such operations, are apt
If, for instance, we should suppose that to resolve them into some one of the simple
there was a nation who believed that the acts of which they are compounded, over
things which we call attributes might exist looking the others. And from this cause
without a subject, there would be in their many disputes have been raised, and many
language no distinction between adjectives errors have been occasioned with regard to
and substantives, nor would it be a rule the nature of such operations.
with them that an adjective has no mean The perception of external objects is
ing, unless when joined to a substantive. accompanied with some sensation corre
If there was any nation who did not dis sponding to the object perceived, and such
tinguish between [33] acting and being acted sensations have, in many cases, in all lan
upon, there would in their language be no guages, the same name with the external
distinction between active and passive object which they always accompany. The
verbs; nor would it be a rule that the difficulty of disjoining, by abstraction, things
active verb must have an agent in the thus constantly conjoined in the course of
nominative case, but that, in the passive nature, and things which have one and the
verb, the agent must be in an oblique case. same name in all languages, has likewise
The structure of all'' is grounded been frequently an occasion of errors in the
upon common notions, which Mr Hume's philosophy of the mind. To avoid such
philosophy opposes, and endeavours to errors, nothing is of more importance than
overturn. This, no doubt, led him to warp to have a distinct notion of that simple
the common language into a conformity with act of the mind which we call sensation, and
his principles; but we ought not to imitate which we have endeavoured to describe.
him in this, until we are satisfied that his By this means, we shall find it more easy to
principles are built on a solid foundation. distinguish it from every external object that
12. Sensation is a name given by philo it accompanies, and from every other act of
sophers to an act of mind, which may be the mind that may be conjoined with it.
distinguished from all others by this, that For this purpose, it is likewise of import
it hath no object distinct from the act itself." ance that the name of sensation should, in
Pain of every kind is an uneasy sensation. philosophical writings, be appropriated to
When I am pained, I cannot say that the signify this simple act of the mind, without
pain I feel is one thing, and that my feeling including anything more in its signification,
it is another thing. They are one and the or being applied to other purposes.
same thing, and cannot be disjoined, even I shall add an observation concerning the
in imagination. Pain, when it is not felt, word feeling. This word has two meanings.
has no existence. It can be neither greater First, it signifies the perceptions we have of
nor less in degree or duration, nor anything external objects, by the sense of touch.
else in kind than it is felt to be. It cannot When we speak of feeling a body to be hard
exist by itself, nor in any subject but in a or soft, rough or smooth, hot or cold, to
sentient being. No quality of an inanimate feel these things is to perceive them by
touch. They are external things, and that
* But sensation, in the language of phi hers, act of the mind by which we feel them is
has been generally employed to denote the whole pro easily distinguished from the objects felt.
cess of sensitive cognition, including both perception
1 roper and sensation proper. On this distinction, Secondly, the word feeling is used to signify
see below, Essay II., ch. xvi., and Note D.*-H. the same thing as sensation, which we have
{33, 34]
just now explained; and, in this sense, it conducts himself in the affairs of life. Of
has no object; the feeling and the thing those principles, some are common to all
felt are one and the same. [35] men, being evident in themselves, and so
Perhaps betwixt feeling, taken in this necessary in the conduct of life that a man
last sense, and sensation, there may be this cannot live and act according to the rules
small difference, that sensation is most com of common prudence without them.
monly used to signify those feelings which All men that have common understand
we have by our external senses and bodily ing, agree in such principles; and consider
appetites, and all our bodily pains and a man as lunatic or destitute of common
pleasures. But there are feelings of a sense, who denies or calls them in question.
nobler nature accompanying our affections, Thus, if any man were found of so strange
our moral judgments, and our determina a turn as not to believe his own eyes, to
tions in matters of taste, to which the word put no trust in his senses, nor have the
sensation is less properly applied. least regard to their testimony, would any
I have premised these observations on man think it worth while to reason gravely
the meaning of certain words that frequently with such a person, and, by argument, to
occur in treating of this subject, for two convince him of his error? Surely no wise
reasons: First, That I may be the better man would. For, before men can reason
understood when I use them; and, Secondly, together, they must agree in first principles;
That those who would make any progress and it is impossible to reason with a man
in this branch of science, may accustom who has no principles in common with you.
themselves to attend very carefully to the There are, therefore, common principles,
meaning of words that are used in it. They which are the foundation of all reasoning
may be assured of this, that the ambiguity and of all science. Such common principles
of words, and the vague and improper appli seldom admit of direct proof, nor do they
cation of them, have thrown more darkness need it. Men need not to be taught them;
upon this subject than the subtilty and for they are such as all men of [37] com
intricacy of things. mon understanding know; or such, at least,
When we use common words, we ought as they give a ready assent to, as soon as
to use them in the sense in which they are they are proposed and understood.
most commonly used by the best and purest Such principles, when we have occasion
writers in the language; and, when we have to use them in science, are called arioms.
occasion to enlarge or restrict the meaning And, although it be not absolutely neces
of a common word, or give it more precision sary, yet it may be of great use, to point
than it has in common language, the reader out the principles or axioms on which a
ought to have warning of this, otherwise we science is grounded.
shall impose upon ourselves and upon him. Thus, mathematicians, before they prove
A very respectable writer has given a any of the propositions of mathematics, lay
good example of this kind, by explaining, down certain axioms, or common princi
in an Appendix to his “Elements of Criti ples, upon which they build their reason
cism,” the terms he has occasion to use. ings. And although those axioms be truths
In that Appendix, most of the words are which every man knew before–such as,
explained on which I have been making That the whole is greater than a part, That
observations; and the explication I have equal quantities added to equal quantities
given, I think, agrees, for the most part, make equal sums; yet, when we see no
with his. thing assumed in the proof of mathematical
Other words that need explication, shall propositions, but such self-evident axioms,
be explained as they occur. [36] the propositions appear more certain, and
leave no room for doubt or dispute.
In all other sciences, as well as in mathe
CHAPTER II. matics, it will be found that there are a
few common principles, upon which all the
PRINCIPLES TAKEN FOR GRANTEn. reasonings in that science are grounded,
and into which they may be resolved. If
Asthere are wordscommon to philosophers these were pointed out and considered, we
and to the vulgar, which need no explica should be betterable to judge whatstress may
tion, so there are principles common to both, be laid upon the conclusions in that science.
which need no proof, and which do not If the principles be certain, the conclusions
admit of direct proof. justly drawn from them must be certain.
One who applies to any branch of science, If the principles be only probable, the con
must be come to years of understanding, clusions can only be probable. If the prin
and, consequently, must have exercised his ciples be false, dubious, or obscure, the
reason, and the other powers of his mind, superstructure that is built upon them
in various ways. He must have formed must partake of the weakness of the found
various opinions and principles, by which he ation.
[35-37]
- -- -
- -
cHAP. II.] PRINCIPLES TAKEN FOR GRANTED. 231
Sir Isaac Newton, the greatest of ma hide its evidence, and to make a man of
tural philosophers, has given an example candour doubt of it. Such cases happen
well worthy of imitation, by laying down more frequently, perhaps, in this science
the common principles or axioms, on which than in any other; but they are not alto
the reasonings in natural philosophy are gether without remedy. There are ways
built. Before this was done, the reason by which the evidence of first principles
ings of philosophers in that science were may be made more apparent when they are
as vague and uncertain as they are in brought into dispute; but they require to
most others. Nothing was fixed; all was be handled in a way peculiar to themselves.
dispute and controversy; [38] but, by Their evidence is not demonstrative, but
this happy expedient, a solid foundation intuitive. They require not proof, but to
is laid in that science, and a noble super be placed in a proper point of view. This
structure is raised upon it, about which will be shewn more fully in its proper place,
there is now no more dispute or con and applied to those very principles which
troversy among men of knowledge, than we now assume. In the meantime, when
there is about the conclusions of mathe they are proposed as first principles, the
matics. reader is put on his guard, and warned to
It may, however be observed, that the consider whether they have a just claim to
first principles of natural philosophy are of that character.
a quite different nature from mathematical 1. First, then, I shall take it for granted,
axioms: they have not the same kind of that I think, that I remember, that I rea
evidence, nor are they necessary truths, as son, and, in general, that I really perform
mathematical axioms are. They are such as all those operations of mind of which I am
these : That similar effects proceed from the conscious.
same or similar causes; That we ought to The operations of our minds are attended
admit of no other causes of natural effects, with consciousness; and this consciousness
but such as are true, and sufficient to ac is the evidence, the only evidence, which
count for the effects. These are principles we have or can have of their existence. If
which, though they have not the same kindof a man should take it into his head to think
evidence that mathematical axioms have : or to say that his consciousness may de
yet have such evidence that every man of ceive him, and to require proof that it can
common understanding readily assents to not, I know of no proof that can be given
them, and finds it absolutely necessary to him; he must be left to himself, as a man
conduct his actions and opinions by them, that denies first principles, without which
in the ordinary affairs of life. there can be no reasoning. Every man
Though it has not been usual, yet I con finds himself under a necessity of believing
ceive it may be useful, to point out some of what consciousness testifies, and everything
those things which I shall take for granted, that hath this testimony is to be taken as a
as first principles, in treating of the mind first principle."
and its faculties. There is the more oc 2. As by consciousness we know cer
casion for this ; because very ingenious tainly the existence of our present thoughts
men, such as Des Cartes, Malebranche, and passions: so we know the past by re
Arnauld, Locke, and many others, have membrance.t. And, when they are re
lost much labour, by not distinguishing cent, and the remembrance of them fresh,
things which require proof, from things [40] the knowledge of them, from such
which, though they may admit of illustra distinct remembrance, is, in its certainty
tration, yet, being self-evident, do not admit and
Iness.
evidence, next to that of conscious
of proof. When men attempt to deduce
such self-evident principles from others 3. But it is to be observed that we are
more evident, they always fall into incon conscious of many things to which we give
clusive reasoning: and the consequence of little or no attention. We can hardly at
this has been, that others, such as Berkeley tend to several things at the same time;
and Hume, finding the arguments brought and our attention is commonly employed
to prove such first principles to be weak about that which is the object of our
and inconclusive, have been tempted first thought, and rarely about the thought it
to doubt of them, and afterwards to deny self. Thus, when a man is angry, his
them.
It is so irksome to reason with those who
deny first principles, that wise men com • To doubt that we are conscious of this or that,
is impossible. For the doubt must at least postulate
monly decline it. Yet it is not impossible, itself; but the doubt is only a datum of conscious
that [39] what is only a vulgar prejudice ness; therefore, in postulating its own reality, it ad
may be mistaken for a first principle. Nor mits the truth of consciousness, and consequently
annihilates itself. See below, p. 579 on Con
is it impossible that what is really a first £". in the history of psychology, see Note 11.
principle may, by the enchantment of words, * Remembrance cannot be taken out of Con
have such a mist thrown about it, as to sciousness. See Note H.-h
f38-4.17
232 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. | Essav 1.
attention is turned to the injury done him, thing that is moved. And to suppose that
or the injurious person; and he gives very there can be motion while everything is at
little attention to the passion of anger, al rest, is a gross and palpable absurdity. In
though he is conscious of it. It is in our like manner, hardness and softness, sweet
power, however, when we come to the ness and bitterness, are things which cannot
years of understanding, to give attention to exist by themselves; they are qualities of
our own thoughts and passions, and the va something which is hard or soft, sweet or
rious operations of our minds. And, when bitter. That thing, whatever it be, of
we make these the objects of our atten which they are qualities, is called their sub
tion, either while they are present or ject; and such qualities necessarily suppose
when they are recent and fresh in our me a subject.
mory, this act of the mind is called reflec Things which may exist by themselves,
tion. and do not necessarily suppose the exist
We take it for granted, therefore, that, ence of anything else, are called substances:
by attentive reflection, a man may have a and, with relation to the qualities or attri
clear and certain knowledge of the opera butes that belong to them, they are called
tions of his own mind; a knowledge no less the subjects of such qualities or attributes.
clear and certain than that which he has All the things which we immediately per
of an external object when it is set before ceive by our senses, and all the things we
his eyes. are conscious of, are things which must be
This reflection is a kind of intuition, it in something else, as their subject. Thus,
gives a like conviction with regard to in by my senses, I perceive figure, colour,
ternal objects, or things in the mind, as hardness, softness, motion, resistance, and
the faculty of seeing gives with regard to such [42] like things. But these are qualities,
objects of sight. A man must, therefore, and must necessarily be in something that
be convinced beyond possibility of doubt, is figured, coloured, hard or soft, that
of everything with regard to the opera moves, or resists. It is not to these qua
tions of his own mind, which he clearly lities, but to that which is the subject of
and distinctly discerns by attentive reflec them, that we give the name of body. If
tion.* any man should think fit to deny that these
4. I take it for granted that all the things are qualities, or that they require any
thoughts I am conscious of, or remember, subject, I leave him to enjoy his opinion as
are the thoughts of one and the same a man who denies first principles, and is
thinking principle, which I call myself, or not fit to be reasoned with. If he has
my mind. Every man has an immediate common understanding, he will find that he
and irresistible conviction, not only of his cannot converse half an hour without say
present existence, but of his continued ing things which imply the contrary of what
existence and identity, as far back as he he professes to believe.
can remember. If any man should think In like manner, the things I am conscious
fit to demand [41] a proof that the thoughts of such as thought, reasoning, desire, ne
he is successively conscious of, belong to cessarily suppose something that thinks,
one and the same thinking principle—if that reasons, that desires. We do not give
he should demand a proof that he is the the name of mind to thought, reason, or
same person to-day as he was yesterday, or desire; but to that being which thinks,
a year ago—I know no proof that can be which reasons, and which desires.
given him ; he must be left to himself, That every act or operation, therefore,
either as a man that is lunatic, or as one supposes an agent, that every quality sup
who denies first principles, and is not to be poses a subject, are things which I do not
reasoned with. attempt to prove, but take for granted.
Every man of a sound mind, finds him Every man of common understanding dis
self under a necessity of believing his own cerns this immediately, and cannot enter
identity, and continued existence. The tain the least doubt of it. In all languages,
conviction of this is immediate and irresist we find certain words which, by gramma
able; and, if he should lose this conviction, rians, are called adjectives. Such words
it would be a certain proof of insanity, denote attributes, and every adjective must
which is not to be remedied by reasoning. have a substantive to which it belongs
5. I take it for granted, that there are that is, every attribute must have a subject.
some things which cannot exist by them In all languages, we find active verbs which
selves, but must be in something else to denote some action or operation; and it
which they belong, as qualities, or attributes. is a fundamental rule in the grammar of all
Thus, motion cannot exist, but in some languages, that such a verb supposes a per
son—that is, in other words, that every
* See infra, pp. 60, 105,581, where a similar, and action must have an agent. We take it,
324, 516, where a different extension is given to
'#' On Attention and Reflection, in the therefore, as a first principle, that goodness,
history of psychology, see Note 1.-H. wisdom, and virtue, can only be in some
[41, 42]
"--
cHAP, 11.] PRINCIPLES TAKEN FOR GRANTED. 233
being that is good, wise, and virtuous; otherwise. Who can doubt, for instance,
that thinking supposes a being that thinks; whether mankind have, in all ages, believed
and that every operation we are conscious the existence of a material world, and that
of supposes an agent that operates, which those things which they see and handle are
we call mind. real, and not mere illusions and appari
6. I take it for granted, that, in most tions? Who can doubt whether mankind
operationsof the mind, there [43] must be an have universally believed that everything
object distinct from the operation itself. I that begins to exist, and every change that
cannot see, without seeing something. To happens in nature, must have a cause?
see without having any object of sight is Who can doubt whether mankind have
absurd. I cannot remember, without re been universally persuaded that there is a
membering something. The thing remem right and a wrong in human conduct P
bered is past, while the remembrance of it some things which, in certain circumstan
is present; and, therefore, the operation ces, they ought to do, and other things
and the object of it must be distinct things. which they ought not to do? The univers
The operations of our mind are denoted, in ality of these opinions, and of many such
all languages, by active transitive verbs, that might be named, is sufficiently evi
which, from their construction in grammar, dent, from the whole tenor of men's con
require not only a person or agent, but duct, as far as our acquaintance reaches.
likewise an object of the operation. Thus, and from the records of history, in all
the verb know, denotes an operation of ages and nations, that are transmitted to
mind. From the general structure of lan us.
guage, this verb requires a person—I know, There are other opinions that appear to
you know, or he knows; but it requires no be universal, from what is common in the
less a noun in the accusative case, denoting structure of all languages, ancient and mo
the thing known; for he that knows must dern, polished and barbarous. Language is
know something; and, to know, without the express image and picture of human
having any object of knowledge, is an ab thoughts; and, from the picture, wemayoften
surdity too gross to admit of reasoning." draw very certain conclusions with regard
7. We ought likewise to take for granted, to the original. We find in all languages the
as first principles, things wherein we find same parts of speech-nouns substantive
an universal agreement, among the learned and adjective, verbs active and passive,
and unlearned, in the different nations and varied according to the tenses of past, pre
ages of the world...f. A consent of ages and sent, and future; we find adverbs, preposi
nations, of the learned and vulgar, ought, tions, and conjunctions. There are general
at least, to have great authority, unless we rules of syntax common to all languages.
can shew some prejudice as universal as This uniformity in the structure of lan
that consent is, which might be the cause guage shews a certain degree of uniformity
of it. Truth is one, but error is infinite. in those notions upon which the structure of
There are many truths so obvious to language is grounded.
the human faculties, that it may be ex We find, in the structure of all lan
pected that men should universally agree in guages, the distinction of [45] acting and
them. And this is actually found to be being acted upon, the distinction of action
the case with regard to many truths, against and agent, of quality and subject, and many
which we find no dissent, unless perhaps others of the like kind; which shews that
that of a few sceptical philosophers, who these distinctions are founded in the uni
may justly be suspected, in such cases, to versal sense of mankind. We shall have
differ from the rest of mankind, through frequent occasion to argue from the sense
Pride, obstinacy, or some favourite passion. of mankind expressed in the structure of
Where there is such universal consent language; and therefore it was proper
in things not deep nor intricate, but which here to take notice of the force of argu
lie, as it were, on the surface, there is the ments drawn from this topic.
greatest presumption that can be, that it is 8. I need hardly say that I shall also
the natural result of the human faculties; take for granted such facts as are attested
and it must have great authority with every to the conviction of all sober and reasonable
sober [44] mind that loves truth. Major men, either by our senses, by memory, or
enam pars eo fere deferri solet quo a natura by human testimony. Although some wri
deducitur.–CIc. de Off. I. 41. ters on this subject have disputed the
Perhaps it may be thought that it is authority of the senses, of memory, and of
impossible to collect the opinions of all men every human faculty, yet we find that such
upon any point whatsoever; and, there persons, in the conduct of life, in pursuing
fore, that this maxim can be of no use. their ends, or in avoiding dangers, pay the
But there are many cases wherein it is same regard to the authority of their senses
and other faculties, as the rest of mankind.
* See Note B.-H. + Sce Note A.-H. By this they give us just ground to doubt of
[43-45]
their candour in their professions of scep objects of sense, and to inquire into the
ticism. causes of things, and the secret operations
This, indeed, has always been the fate of of nature—it was very natural for them to
the few that have professed scepticism, that, indulge conjecture; nor was it to be ex
when they have done what they can to pected that, in many ages, they should dis
discredit their senses, they find themselves, cover the proper and scientific way of pro
after all, under a necessity of trusting to ceeding in philosophical disquisitions. Ac
them. Mr Hume has been so candid as to cordingly, we find that the most ancient
acknowledge this; and it is no less true of systems in every branch of philosophy were
those who have not shewn the same can nothing but the conjectures of men famous
dour; for I never heard that any sceptic for their wisdom, whose fame gave author
run his head against a post, or stepped into ity to their opinions. Thus, in early ages,
a kennel, because he did not believe his [47] wise men conjectured that this earth
eyes. is a vast plain, surrounded on all hands
Upon the whole, I acknowledge that we by a boundless ocean; that, from thisocean,
ought to be cautious that we do not adopt the sun, moon, and stars emerge at their
opinions as first principles which are not rising, and plunge into it again at their
entitled to that character. But there is setting. -
surely the least danger of men's being im With regard to the mind, men in their
posed upon in this way, when such prin rudest state are apt to conjecture that the
ciples openly lay claim to the character, and principle of life in a man is his breath; be
are thereby fairly exposed to the examina cause the most obvious distinction between
tion of those who may dispute their au a living and a dead man is, that the one
thority. We do not pretend that those breathes, and the other does not. To this
things that are laid down as first principles it is owing that, in ancient languages, the
may not be examined, and that we ought word which denotes the soul, is that which
not to [46] have our ears open to what properly signifies breath or air.
may be pleaded against their being admit As men advance in knowledge, their first
ted as such. Let us deal with them as an conjectures appear silly and childish, and
upright judge does with a witness who has give place to others, which tally better with
a fair character. He pays a regard to the later observations and discoveries. Thus
testimony of such a witness while his cha one system of philosophy succeeds another,
racter is unimpeached; but, if it can be without any claim to superior merit, but
shewn that he is suborned, or that he is this—that it is a more ingenious system of
influenced by malice or partial favour, his conjectures, and accounts better for com
testimony loses all its credit, and is justly mon appearances.
rejected. To omit many ancient systems of this
kind, Des Cartes, about the middle of the
last century, dissatisfied with the materia
CHAPTER III. prima, the substantial forms, and the occult
qualities of the Peripatetics, conjectured
OF hypotheses. boldly, that the heavenly bodies of our sys
tem are carried round by a vortex or whirl
EveRx branch of human knowledge hath pool of subtile matter, just as straws and
its proper principles, its proper foundation chaff are carried round in a tub of water.
and method of reasoning; and, if we en He conjectured, that the soul is seated in a
deavour to build it upon any other found small gland in the brain, called the pineal
ation, it will never stand firm and stable. gland; that there, as in her chamber of
Thus, the historian builds upon testimony, presence, she receives intelligence of every
and rarely indulges conjecture; the anti thing that affects the senses, by means of a
quarian mixes conjecture with testimony, subtile fluid contained in the nerves, called
and the former often makes the larger the animal spirits; and that she dispatches
ingredient; the mathematician pays not the these animal spirits, as her messengers, to
least regard either to testimony or conjec put in motion the several muscles of the
ture, but deduces everything, by demon body, as there is occasion." By such con
strative reasoning, from his definitions and
axioms. Indeed, whatever is built upon * It is not, however, to be su that 1988 Cartes
conjecture, is improperly called science; allowed the soul to be seated by local presence in any
part of the body; for the smallest point of body is
for conjecture may beget opinion, but can still extended, and mind is absolutely simple and in
not produce knowledge. Natural philoso capable of occupying place. The pineal gland, in the
phy must be built upon the phaenomena of Cartesian doctrine, is only analogically called the seat
of the soul, inasmuch as this is viewed as the cen
the material system, discovered by observ tral point of the corporeal organism; but while
ation and experiment. through this point the mind and body are "nutually
When men first began to philosophize– connected, that connection is not one of a mere
physical dependence, as they do not operate on earh
that is, to carry their thoughts beyond the by direct and natural causation.-H.
[46, 47.]
citAP. III.] OF HYPOTHESES. 235
jectures as these, Des Cartes could account made concerning the inward structure of
for every phaenomenon in nature, in such a the human body, never one was made by
plausible manner as gave satisfaction to a conjecture. Accurate observations of ana
great part of the learned world for more tomists have brought to light innumerable
than half a century. [48] artifices of Nature in the contrivance of this
Such conjectures in philosophical matters machine of the human body, which we can
have commonly got the name of hypotheses, not but admire as excellently adapted to
or theories." And the invention of a hypo their several purposes. But the most saga
thesis, founded on some slight probabilities, cious physiologist never dreamed of them
which accounts for many appearances of till they were discovered. On the other
nature, has been considered as the highest hand, innumerable conjectures, formed in
attainment of a philosopher. If the hypo different ages, with regard to the structure
thesis hangs well together, is embellished of the body, have been confuted by obser
by a lively imagination, and serves to ac vation, and none ever confirmed.
count for common appearances, it is con What we have said of the internal struc
sidered by many as having all the qualities ture of the human body, may be said, with
that should recommend it to our belief, justice, of every other part of the works of
and all that ought to be required in a philo God, wherein any real discovery has been
sophical system. made. Such discoveries have always been
There is such proneness in men of genius made by patient observation, by accurate
to invent hypotheses, and in others to experiments, or by conclusions drawn by
acquiesce in them, as the utmost which the strict reasoning from observations and ex
human faculties can attain in philosophy, periments; and such discoveries have always
that it is of the last consequence to the pro tended to refute, but not to confirm, the
£ of real knowledge, that men should theories and hypotheses which ingenious
save a clear and distinct understanding of men have invented.
the nature of hypotheses in philosophy, and As this is a fact confirmed by the history
of the regard that is due to them. of philosophy in all past ages, it ought to
Although some conjectures may have a have taught men, long ago, to treat with
considerable degree of probability, yet it isjust contempt hypotheses in every branch
evidently in the nature of conjecture to be of philosophy, and to despair of ever ad
uncertain. In every case the assent ought vancing real knowledge in that way. The
to be proportioned to the evidence; for to Indian philosopher, being at a loss to know
believe firmly what has but a small degree how the earth was supported, invented the
of probability, is a manifest abuse of our hypothesis of a huge elephant; and this
understanding. Now, though we may, in elephant he supposed to stand upon the
many cases, frin very probable conjectures back of a huge tortoise. This hypothesis,
concerning the works of men, every conjec however ridiculous it appears to us, might
ture we can form with regard to the works seem very reasonable [50] to other Indians,
of God has as little probability as the con who knew no more than the inventor of it;
jectures of a child with regard to the works and the same will be the fate of all hypo
of a man. theses invented by men to account for the
The wisdom of God exceeds that of the works of God. They may have a decent
wisest man, more than his wisdom exceeds and plausible appearance to those who are
that of a child. If a child were to conjec not more knowing than the inventor; but,
ture how an army is to be formed in the when men come to be more enlightened,
day of battle-how a city is to be fortified, they will always appear ridiculous and
or a state governed-what chance has he childish.
to gness right? As little chance has the This has been the case with regard to
wisest man when he pretends to conjecture hypotheses that have been revered by the
how the planets move in their courses, how most enlightened part of mankind for hun
the sea ebbs and flows, and how our minds dreds of years; and it will always be the
act upon our bodies. [49] case to the end of the world. For, until
If a thousand of the greatest wits that the wisdom of men bear some proportion to
ever the world produced were, without any the wisdom of God, their attempts to find
previous knowledge in anatomy, to sit down out the structure of his works, by the force
and contrive how, and by what internal of their wit and genius, will be vain.
organs, the various functions of the human The finest productions of human art are
body are carried on, how the blood is made immensely short of the meanest works of
to circulate and the limbs to move, they Nature. The nicest artist cannot make a
would not, in a thousand years, hit upon any feather or the leaf of a tree. Human
thing like the truth. workmanship will never bear a comparison
Of all the discoveries that have been with divine. Conjectures and hypotheses
are the invention and the workmanship of
* See above, note *, p. 97, b.-H. men, and must bear proportion to the capa
[48–50]
city and skill of the inventor; and, there evidence that the cause he assigns does
fore, will always be very unlike to the really exist. If there is not, reject it with
works of God, which it is the business of disdain, as a fiction which ought to have no
philosophy to discover. place in genuine philosophy. If the cause
The world has been so long befooled by assigned really exists, consider, in the next
hypotheses in all parts of philosophy, that place, whether the effect it is brought to
it is of the utmost consequence to every explain necessarily follows from it. Un
man who would make any £ in real less it has these two conditions, it is good
knowledge, to treat them with just con for nothing.
tempt, as the reveries of vain and fanciful When Newton had shewn the admirable
men,whose pride makes them conceive them effects of gravitation in our planetary sys
selves able to unfold the mysteries of nature tem, he must have felt a strong desire to
by the force of their genius. A learned man, know [52] its cause. He could have in
in an epistle to Des Cartes, has the follow vented a hypothesis for this p 2 as
ing observation, which very much deserved many had done before him. But his phi
the attention of that philosopher, and of all losophy was of another complexion. Let
that come after him –“When men, sit us hear what he says: Rationem harum
ting in their closet, and consulting only gravitatis proprietatum ex phaenomenis non
their books, attempt disquisitions into nature, potui deducere, et hypotheses non fingo.
they may, indeed, tell how they would have Quicquid enim er'phaenomenis non deduci
made the world, if God had given them that tur hypothesis vocanda est. Et hypotheses,
in commission; that is, they may describe seu metaphysicae, seu physicae, seu qualita
[51] chimeras, which correspond with the tum occultan um, seu mechanicae, in philoso
imbecility of their own minds, no less than phia experimentali locum non habent.
the admirable beauty of the universe cor
responds with the infinite perfection of its
Creator; but without an understanding CHAPTER IV.
truly divine, they can never form such an
idea to themselves as the Deity had in of ANALOGY.
creating things.”
Let us, therefore, lay down this as a IT is natural to men to judge of things
fundamental principle in our inquiries into less known, by some similitude they ob
the structure of the mind and its opera serve, or think they observe, between them
tions—that no regard is due to the conjec and things more familiar or better known.
tures or hypotheses of philosophers, how In many cases, we have no better way of
ever ancient, however generally received. judging. And, where the things compared
Let us accustom ourselves to try every have really a great similitude in their na
opinion by the touchstone of fact and ex ture, when there is reason to think that they
perience. What can fairly be deduced are subject to the same laws, there may be
from facts duly observed or sufficiently at a considerable degree of probability in con
tested, is genuine and pure; it is the voice clusions drawn from analogy.
of God, and no fiction of human imagina Thus, we may observe a very great si
tion. militude between this earth which we in
The first rule of philosophising laid down habit, and the other planets, Saturn, Ju
by the great Newton, is this :-Causas re piter, Mars, Venus, and Mercury. They
rum naturalium, non plures admitti debere, all revolve round the sun, as the earth
guam quae et verae sint, et earum phano does, although at different distances and
menis explicandis sufficiant. “No more in different periods. They borrow all their
causes, nor any other causes of natural light from the sun, as the earth does.
effects, ought to be admitted, but such as Several of them are known to revolve round
are both true, and are sufficient for ex their axis like the earth, and, by that
plaining their appearances.” This is agolden means, must have a like succession of day
rule ; it is the true and proper test, by and night. Some of them have moons,
which what is sound and solid in philoso that serve to give them light in the absence
phy may be distinguished from what is hol of the sun, as our moon does to us. They
low and vain." are all, in their motions, subject to the
If a philosopher, therefore, pretends to same law of gravitation, as the earth is.
shew us the cause of any natural effect, From all this similitude, it is not unrea
whether relating to matter or to mind, let sonable to think, that those planets may,
us first consider whether there is sufficient like our earth, be the habitation of va
rious [53] orders of living creatures. There
* for this rule we are not indebted to Newton. is some probability in this conclusion from
It is only the old law of imony, and that ambigu analogy.
ously expressed. For, in their plain meaning, the
words “et were sin" are redundant; or what follows is In medicine, physicians must, for the
redundant, and the whole rule a barren truism.-H. most part, be directed in their prescriptions
L51–53]
cHAP. Iv.] OF ANALOGY. 237
by analogy. The constitution of one human things compared; and, therefore, must be
body is so like to that of another that it is weakest of all when we compare body with
reasonable to think that what is the cause mind, because there are no two things in
of health or sickness to one, may have the nature more unlike.
same effect upon another. And this ge There is no subject in which men have
nerally is found true, though not without always been so prone to form their notions
some exceptions. by analogies of this kind, as in what re
In politics we reason, for the most part, lates to the mind. We form an early ac
from analogy. The constitution of human quaintance with material things by means
nature is so similar in different societies or of our senses, and are bred up in a con
commonwealths, that the causes of peace stant familiarity with them. Hence we
and war, of tranquillity and sedition, of are apt to measure all things by them; and
riches and poverty, of improvement and to ascribe to things most remote from mat
degeneracy, are much the same in all. ter, the qualities that belong to material
Analogical reasoning, therefore, is not, things. It is for this reason, that man
in all cases, to be rejected. It may afford kind have, in all ages, been so prone to
a greater or a less degree of probability, conceive the mind itself to be some sub
according as the things compared are more tile kind of matter: that they have been
or less similar in their nature. But it disposed to ascribe human figure and hu
ought to be observed, that, as this kind of man organs, not only to angels, but even
reasoning can afford only probable evidence to the Deity. Though we are conscious of
at best; so, unless great caution be used, the operations of our own minds when they
we are apt to be led into error by it. For are exerted, and are capable of attending
tnen are naturally disposed to conceive a to them, so as to form a distinct notion of
greater similitude in things than there them, this is so difficult a work to men
really is. whose attention is constantly solicited by
To give an instance of this: Anatomists, external objects, that we give them names
in ancient ages, seldom dissected human from things that are familiar, and which
bodies; but very often the bodies of those [55] are conceived to have some similitude
quadrupeds whose internal structure was to them ; and the notions we form of them
thought to approach nearest to that of the are no less analogical than the names we
human body. Modern anatomists have give them. Almost all the words by which
discovered many mistakes the ancients we express the operations of the mind, are
were led into, by their conceiving a greater borrowed from material objects. To un
similitude between the structure of men derstand, to conceive, to imagine, to com
and of some beasts than there is in reality. prehend, to deliberate, to infer, and many
By this, and many other instances that others, are words of this kind ; so that the
might be given, it appears that conclusions very language of mankind, with regard to
built on analogy stand on a slippery founda the operations of our minds, is analogical.
tion; and that we ought never to rest upon Because bodies are affected only by con
evidence of this kind, when we can have tact and pressure, we are apt to conceive
more direct evidence. [54] that what is an immediate object of thought,
I know no author who has made a more and affects the mind, must be in contact
just and a more happy use of this mode of with it, and make some impression upon
reasoning than Bishop Butler, in his “Ana it. When we imagine anything, the very
logy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to word leads us to think that there must be
the Constitution and Course of Nature.” some image in the mind of the thing con
In that excellent work the author does not ceived. It is evident that these notions
ground any of the truths of religion upon are drawn from some similitude conceived
analogy, as their proper evidence. He between body and mind, and between the
only makes use of analogy to answer objec properties of body and the operations of
tions against them. When objections are mind.
made against the truths of religion, which To illustrate more fully that analogical
may be made with equal strength against reasoning from a supposed similitude of
what we know to be true in the course mind to body, which I conceive to be the
of nature, such objections can have no most fruitful source of error with regard to
weight. the operations of our minds, I shall give an
Analogical reasoning, therefore, may be instance of it.
of excellent use in answering objections When a man is urged by contrary motives
against truths which have other evidence. —those on one hand inciting him to do some
It may likewise give a greater or a less action, those on the other to forbear it—he
degree of probability in cases where we can deliberates about it, and at last resolves to
find no other evidence. But all arguments, do it, or not to do it. The contrary motives
drawn from analogy, are still the weaker, are here compared to the weights in the
the greater disparity there is between the opposite scales of a balance; and there is
T54. 55]
not, perhaps, any instance that can be
named of a more striking analogy between CHAPTER V.
body and mind. Hence the phrases of
weighing motives, of deliberating upon of THE PROPER MEANs of RNowrxes "rite
actions, are common to all languages. oPERATIONs of The MIND.

From this analogy, some philosophers
draw very important conclusions. They SINCE we ought to pay no regard to hypo
say, that, as the balance cannot incline to theses, and to be very suspicious of analo
one side more than the other when the gical reasoning, it may be asked, From what
opposite weights are equal, so a man can source must the knowledge of the mind
not possibly determine himself if the motives and its faculties be drawn P
on both hands are equal; and, as the bal I answer, the chief and proper source of
ance must necessarily turn to that side [56] this branch of knowledge is accurate reflec
which has most weight, so the man must tion upon the operations of our own minds.
necessarily be determined to that hand Of this source we shall speak more fully,
where the motive is strongest. And on after making some remarks upon two others
this foundation some of the schoolmen" that may be subservient to it. The first of
maintained that, if a hungry ass were them is attention to the structure of lan
placed between two bundles of hay equally guage.
inviting, the beast must standstill and starve The language of mankind is expressive of
to death, being unable to turn to either, their thoughts, and of the various opera
because there are equal motives to both. tions of their minds. The various opera
This is an instance of that analogical rea tions of the understanding, will, and pas
soning which I conceive ought never to be sions, which are common to mankind, have
trusted; for the analogy between a balance various forms of speech corresponding to
and a man deliberating, though one of the them in all langu which are the signs
strongest that can be found between matter of them, and by which they are expressed:
and mind, is too weak to support any argu And a due attention to the signs may, in
ment. A piece of dead inactive matter, many cases, give considerable light to the
and an active intelligent being, are things things signified by them.
very unlike; and, because the one would There are in all langu modes of
remain at rest in a certain case, it does not
follow that the other would be inactive in a
speech, by which men : their judg
ment, or give their testimony: by which
case somewhat similar. The argument is they accept or refuse; by which they ask
no better than this—That, because a dead information or advice; by which they com
animal moves only as it is pushed, and, if mand, or threaten, or supplicate; by which
pushed with equal force in contrary direc they plight their faith in promises or eon
tions, must remain at rest; therefore, the tracts. If such operations were not com
same thing must happen to a living animal: mon to mankind, we should not find in all
for, surely, the similitude between a dead languages forms of speech, by which they
animal and a living, is as great as that are expressed.
between a balance and a man. All languages, indeed, have their imper
The conclusion I would draw from all fections—they can never be adequate to all
that has been said on analogy, is, that, in the varieties of human thought; and there
our inquiries concerning the mind and its fore things may be really distinct in their
operations, we ought never to trust to rea nature, and capable of being distinguished
sonings drawn from some supposed simili by the human mind, which are not distin
tude of body to mind; and that we ought guished [58] in common language. We can
to be very much upon our guard that we only expect, in the structure of languages,
be not imposed upon by those analogical those distinctions which all mankind in the
terms and phrases, by which the operations common business of life have occasion to
of the mind are expressed in all languages. make.
[57] There may be peculiarities in a particular
language, of the causes of which we are
* This illustration is specially associated with ignorant, and from which, therefore, we can
Joannes Buridanus, a celebrated Nominalist of the draw no conclusion. But whatever we find
14th century, and one of the aeutest reasoners on the common to all languages, must have a com
great question of moral liberty. . The supposition
of the ass, &c., is not, however, as I have ascertained, mon cause; must be owing to some com
to be found in his writings. Perhaps it was orally mon notion or sentiment of the human
advanced in disputation, or in lecturing, as an ex mind.
ample in illustration of his Determinism; perhaps it
was employed by his opponents as an instance to We gave some examples of this before,
reduce that doctrine to absurdity. With this latter
and shall here add another. All languages
view, a similar refutation of the principles of our
have a plural number in many of their
modern Fatalists was, as we have seen, ingeniously
essayed by Reid's friend and kinsman, Dr James nouns; from which we may infer that all
Gregory.-H. men have notions, not of individual things
[56–58]
cit A P. v.] OPERATIONS OF THE MIND. 239
only, but of attributes, or things which are All the notions we have of mind and of
common to many individuals; for no indi its operations, are, by Mr Locke, called
vidual can have a plural number. ideas of reflection." A man may have as
Another source of information in this distinct notions of remembrance, of judg
subject, is a due attention to the course of ment, of will, of desire, as he has of any
human actions and conduct. The actions object whatever. Such notions, as Mr
of men are effects; their sentiments, their Locke justly observes, are got by the power
passions, and their affections, are the causes of reflection. But what is this power of
of those effects; and we may, in many cases, reflection ? “It is,” says the same author,
form a judgment of the cause from the “that power by which the mind turns its
effect. view inward, and observes its own actions
The behaviour of parents towards their and operations.” He observes elsewhere,
children gives sufficient evidence even to “That the understanding, like the eye,
those who never had children, that the whilst it makes us see and perceive all [60]
parental affection is common to mankind. other things, takes no notice of itself; and
It is easy to see, from the general conduct that it requires art and pains to set it at a
of men, what are the natural objects of their distance, and make it its own object.”
esteem, their admiration, their love, their Cicero hath expressed this sentiment most
approbation, their resentment, and of all beautifully. Tusc. I. 28.
their other original dispositions. It is This power of the understanding to make
obvious, from the conduct of men in all its own operations its object, to attend to
ages, that man is by his nature a social them, and examine them on all sides, is the
animal; that he delights to associate with power of reflection, by which alone we can
his species; to converse, and to exchange have any distinct notion of the powers of our
good offices with them. own or of other minds.
Not only the actions, but even the opi This reflection ought to be distinguished
nions of men may sometimes give light from consciousness, with which it is too
into the frame of the human mind. The often confounded, even by Mr Locke. All
opinions of men may be considered as the men are conscious of the operations of their
effects of their intellectual powers, [59] as own minds, at all times, while they are
their actions are the effects of their active awake; but there are few who reflect upon
principles. Even the prejudices and errors them, or make them objects of thought.
of mankind, when they are general, must From infancy, till we come to the years
have some cause no less general; the dis of understanding, we are employed solely
covery of which will throw some ' upon about external objects. And, although the
the frame of the human understanding. mind is conscious of its operations, it does
I conceive this to be the principal use of not attend to them ; its attention is turned
the history of philosophy. When we trace solely to the external objects, about which
the history of the various philosophical opin those operations are employed. Thus, when
ions that have sprung up among thinking a man is angry, he is conscious of his pas
men, we are led into a labyrinth of fanciful sion; but his attention is turned to the
opinions, contradictions, and absurdities, person who offended him, and the circum
intermixed with some truths; yet we may stances of the offence, while the passion of
sometimes find a clue to lead us through the anger is not in the least the object of his
several windings of this labyrinth. We may attention.
find that point of view, which presented I conceive this is sufficient to shew the
things to the author of the system, in the difference between consciousness of the
light in which they appeared to him. This operations of our minds, and reflection upon
will often give a consistency to things seem them; and to shew that we may have the
ingly contradictory, and some degree of former without any degree of the latter.
probability to those that appeared most The difference between consciousness and
fanciful." reflection, is like to the difference between
The history of philosophy, considered as a superficial view of an object which pre
a map of the intellectual operations of men sents itself to the eye while we are engaged
of genius, must always be entertaining, and about something else, and that attentive
may sometimes give us views of the human examination which we give to an object
understanding, which could not easily be had when we are wholly employed in surveying
any other way. it. Attention is a voluntary act; it re
I return to what I mentioned as the main quires an active exertion to begin and to
source of information on this subject-at continue it, and it may be continued as
tentive reflection upon the operations of our long as we will; but consciousness [61] is
own minds.
* Locke is not (as Reid seems to think, and as M.
Stewart £ the first who introduced Re.
* * * very error,” says Bossuet, “is a truth 6ection either as a psychological term, or a psycholo
airused."- 11. gical principle. See Note I.-H.
| 30–61)
involuntary and of no continuance, changing tinually passing from one thought and one
with every thought. - operation to another. The scene is con
The power of reflection upon the oper stantly shifting. Every man will be sen
ations of their own minds, does not appear sible of this, who tries but for one minute
at all in children. Men must be come to to keep the same thought in his imagination,
some ripeness of understanding before they without addition or variation. He will find
are capable of it. Of all the powers of the it impossible to keep the scene of his imagin
human mind, it seems to be the last that ation fixed. Other objects will intrude,
unfolds itself. Most men seem incapable of without being called, and all he can do is to
acquiring it in any considerable degree. reject these intruders as quickly as possible,
Like all our other powers, it is greatly im and return to his principal object.
proved by exercise; and until a man has 2. In this exercise, we go contrary to
got the habit of attending to the operations habits which have been early acquired, and
of his own mind, he can never have clear confirmed by long unvaried practice. From
and distinct notions of them, nor form any infancy, we are accustomed to attend to
steady judgment concerning them. His objects of sense, and to them only; and,
opinions must be borrowed from others, his when sensible objects have got such strong
notions confused and indistinct, and he may hold of the attention by confirmed habit, it
easily be led to swallow very gross absurd is not easy to dispossess them. When we
ities. To acquire this habit, is a work of grow up, a variety of external objects
time and labour, even in those who begin it solicits our attention, excites our curiosity,
early, and whose natural talents are toler engages our affections, or touches our pas
ably fitted for it; but the difficulty will be sions; and the constant round of employ
daily diminishing, and the advantage of it ment, about external objects, draws off the
is great. They will, thereby, be enabled to mind from attending to itself; so that
think with precision and accuracy on every nothing is more just than the observation
subject, especially on those subjects that of Mr Locke, before mentioned, “That the
are more abstract. They will be able to understanding, like the eye, while it sur
judge for themselves in many important veys all the objects around it, commonly
points, wherein others must blindly follow a takes no notice of itself.”
leader. 3. The operations of the mind, from their
very nature, lead the mind to give its atten
tion to some other object. Our sensations,
CHAPTER VI. [63] as will be shewn afterwards, are natu
ral signs, and turn our attention to the things
of The difficulty of ATTENDING To The signified by them; so much that most of
oPERATIONS OF OUR ow'N MINDS, them, and those the most frequent an 1
familiar, have no name in any language. In
THE difficulty of attending to our mental perception, memory, judgment, imagination,
operations, ought to be well understood, and and reasoning, there is an object distinct
justly estimated, by those who would make from the operation itself; and, while we are
any progress in this science; that they may led by a strong impulse to attend to the
neither, on the one hand, expect success object, the operation escapes our notice.
without pains and application of thought; Our passions, affections, and all our active
nor, on the other, be discouraged, by con powers, have, in like manner, their objects
ceiving that the obstacles that lie in the way which engross our attention, and divert it
are insuperable, and that there is no cer from the passion itself.
tainty to be attained in it. I shall, there 4. To this we may add a just observation
fore, endeavour to point [62] out the causes made by Mr Hume, That, when the mind
of this difficulty, and the effects that have is agitated by any passion, as soon as we
arisen from it, that we may be able to form turn our attention from the object to the
a true judgment of both. passion itself, the passion subsides or van
1. The number and quick succession of ishes, and, by that means, escapes our
the operations of the mind, make it difficult inquiry. This, indeed, is common to almost
to give due attention to them. It is well every operation of the mind. When it is
known that, if a great number of objcts be exerted, we are conscious of it; but then
presented in quick succession, even to the we do not attend to the operation, but to
eye, they are confounded in the memory its object. When the mind is drawn off
and imagination. We retain a confused from the object to attend to its own opera
notion of the whole, and a more confused tion, that operation ceases, and escapes our
one of the several parts, especially if they notice.
are objects to which we have never before 5. As it is not sufficient to the discovery
given particular attention. No succession of mathematical truths, that a man be able
can be more quick than that of thought. to attend to mathematical figures, as it is
The mind is busy while we are awake, con necessary that he should have the ability to
[62, 63]
-- - -
CHAP. v1.1 OPERATIONS OF THE MINI). 241
*istinguish accurately things that differ, medes, Pappus, and others among the an
and to discern clearly the various relations cients, and still greater by the moderns;
of the quantities he compares—an ability yet what [65] was laid down in Euclid's
which, though much greater in those who “Elements” was never set aside. It re
have the force of genius than in others, mains as the firm foundation of all future
yet, even in them, requires exercise and superstructures in that science.
Habit to bring it to maturity—so, in order Natural philosophy remained in its in
to discover the truth in what relates to the fant state near two thousand years after
operations of the mind, it is not enough that geometry had attained to its manly form :
a man be able to give attention to them : for natural philosophy seems not to have
he must have the ability to distinguish ac been built on a stable foundation, nor carried
curately their minute differences; to resolve to any degree of maturity, till the last cen
and analyse complex operations into their tury. The system of Des Cartes, which was
simple ingredients; to unfold the ambiguity all hypothesis, prevailed in the most enlight
of words, which in this science is greater ened part of Europe till towards the end of
than in any other, and to give them the same last century. Sir Isaac Newton has the
accuracy and precision that mathematical merit of giving the form of a science to this
terms have; for, indeed, the same precision branch of philosophy; and it need not ap
in the use of words, the same cool attention pear surprising, if the philosophy of the
to [64] the minute differences of things, human mind should be a century or two
the same talent for abstraction and analys later in being brought to maturity.
ing, which fit a man for the study of math It has received great accessions from the
ematics, are no less necessary in this. But labours of several modern authors; and
there is this great difference between the two perhaps wants little more to entitle it to the
sciences—that the objects of mathematics name of a science, but to be purged of cer
being things external to the mind, it is tain hypotheses, which have imposed on
much more easy to attend to them, and fix some of the most acute writers on this sub
them steadily in the imagination. ject, and led them into downright scepticism.
The difficulty attending our inquiries What the ancients have delivered to us
into the powers of the mind, serves to concerning the mind and its operations, is
account for some events respecting this almost entirely drawn, not from accurate
branch of philosophy, which deserve to be reflection, but from some conceived analogy
mentioned. between body and mind. And, although
While most branches of science have, the modern authors I formerly named have
either in ancient or in modern times, been given more attention to the operations of
highly cultivated, and brought to a con their own minds, and by that means have
siderable degree of perfection, this remains, made important discoveries, yet, by re
to this day, in a very low state, and, as it taining some of the ancient analogical no
were, in its infancy. tions, their discoveries have been less use
Every science invented by men must ful than they might have been, and have
have its beginning and its progress; and, led to scepticism.
from various causes, it may happen that It may happen in science, as in building,
one science shall be brought to a great that an error in the foundation shall weaken
degree of maturity, while another is yet in the whole; and the farther the building is
its infancy. The maturity of a science may carried on, this weakness shall become the
be judged of by this—When it contains a more apparent and the more threatening.
system of principles, and conclusions drawn Something of this kind seems to have hap
from them, which are so firmly established pened in our systems concerning the mind.
that, among thinking and intelligent men, The accession they [66] have received by
there remains no doubt or dispute about modern discoveries, though very importantin ,
them : so that those who come after may itself, has thrown darkness and obscurity
raise the superstructure higher, but shall upon the whole, and has led men rather to
never be able to overturn what is already scepticism than to knowledge. This must
built, in order to begin on a new founda be owing to some fundamental errors that
tion. have not been observed ; and when these
Geometry seems to have been in its in are corrected, it is to be hoped that the im
fancy about the time of Thales and Pytha provements that have been made will have
goras; because many of the elementary their due effect.
propositions, on which the whole science is The last effect I observe of the difficulty
built, are ascribed to them as the inventors. of inquiries into the powers of the mind, is,
Euclid's “Elements,” which were written that there is no other part of human know
some ages after Pythagoras, exhibit a sys ledge in which ingenious authors have been
tem of geometry which deserves the name so apt to run into strange paradoxes, and
of a science; and, though great additions even into gross absurdities.
have been made by Apollonius, Archi When we find philosophers maintaining
R
[64–66]
242 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essav 1.
that there is no heat in the fire, nor colour Although this general division may be of
in the rainbow;" when we find the gravest use in order to our proceeding more metho
philosophers, from Des Cartes down to dically in our subject, we are not to under
Bishop Berkeley, mustering up arguments stand it as if, in those operations which are
to prove the existence of a material world, ascribed to the understanding, there were
and unable to find any that will bear ex no exertion of will or activity, or as if the
amination: when we find Bishop Berkeley understanding were not employed in the
and Mr Hume, the acutest metaphysicians operations ascribed to the will; for I con
of the age, maintaining that there is no such ceive there is no operation of the under
thing as matter in the universe—that sun, standing wherein the mind is not active in
moon, and stars, the earth which we inhabit, some degree. We have some command
our own bodies, and those of our friends, are over our thoughts, and can attend to this
only ideas in our minds, and have no exist or to that, of many objects which present
ence but in thought; when we find the themselves to our senses, to our memory,
last maintaining that there is neither body or to our imagination. We can survey an
nor mind—nothing in nature but ideas and object on this side or that, superficially or
impressions, without any substance on which accurately, for a longer or a shorter time;
they are impressed—that there is no cer so that our contemplative powers are under
tainty, nor indeed probability, even in ma the guidance and direction of the active;
thematical axioms: I say, when we consider and the former never pursue their object
such extravagancies of many of the most without being led and directed, urged or
acute writers on this subject, we may be apt restrained by the latter and because the
to think the whole to be only a dream of understanding is always more or less di
fanciful men, who have entangled them rected by the will, mankind have ascribed
selves in cobwebs spun out of their own some degree of activity to [68] the mind in
brain. But we ought to consider that the its intellectual operations, as well as in those
more closely and ingeniously men reason which belong to the will, and have ex
from false principles, the more absurdities pressed them by active verbs, such as see
they will be led into; and when such absur ing, hearing, judging, reasoning, and the
dities help to bring to light the false prin like.
ciples from which they are drawn, they may And as the mind exerts some degree of
be the more easily forgiven. 167] activity even in the operations of under
standing, so it is certain that there can be
no act of will which is not accompanied
CHAPTER VII. with some act of understanding. The will
must have an object, and that object must
plvision of THE POWERS of THE MIND. be apprehended or conceived in the under
standing. It is, therefore, to be remem
THE powers of the mind are so many, so bered, that, in most, if not all operations of
various, and so connected and complicated the mind, both faculties concur; and we
in most of its operations, that there never range the operation under that faculty which
has been any division of them proposed hath the largest share in it." -
which is not liable to considerable objec The intellectual powers are commonly
tions. We shall, therefore, take that gene divided into simple apprehension, judgment,
ral division which is the most common, into and reasoning..t. As this division has in
the powers of understanding and those of its favour the authority of antiquity, and of
will." Under the will we comprehend our a very general reception, it would be in
active powers, and all that lead to action, proper to set it aside without giving any
or influence the mind to act-such as appe reason: I shall, therefore, explain it briefly,
tites, passions, affections. The understand and give the reasons why I choose to follow
ing comprehends our contemplative powers: another.
by which we perceive objects; by which
we conceive or remember them; by which • It should be always remembered that the various
we analyse or compound them; and by which mental energies are all only possible in and through
we judge and reason concerning them. each other; and that our psychological analyses do not
any real distinction of the operations which
rt
• A merely verbal dispute. See before, p. 205, b, we discriminate by different names. Thought and
note.-H. volition can no more be exerted apart, than the sides
t It would be out of place to enter on the exten and angles of a square can exist separately from each
sive field of history and discussion relative to the other.-H.
distribution of our mental powers. It is sufficient + This is a singular misapprehension. The divi.
to say, that the vulgar division of the faculties, sion in question, I make bold to sav, never was
adopted by Reid, into those of the Understandi proposed by any philosopher as a psychological dis
and those of the Will, is to be traced to the classifi tribution of the cognitive faculties in general : on
cation, taken in the Aristotelic school, of the powers the contrary, it is only a logical distribution of that
into gnostic, or cognitive, and orectic, or appetent. section of the cognitive faculties which we, denomi
On this the reader may consult the admirable intro nate discursive, as those alone which are proximately
duction of Philoponus-or rather of Ammonius Her concerned in the process of reasoning-or thought, in
miae-to the books of Aristotle upon the Soul.-H. its strictest signification.-H.
[67, 68]
char. vii.] DIVISION OF THE POWERS OF THE MIND. 243
It may be observed that, without appre simple apprehensions, notions, or ideas.

hension of the objects concerning which These are the materials which nature gives
we judge, there can be no judgment; as it to work upon ; and from the simple ideas
little can there be reasoning without both it is furnished with by nature, it forms
apprehension and judgment: these three various others more complex. Secondly,
operations, therefore, are not independent By comparing its ideas, and by perceiving
of each other. The second includes the their agreements and disagreements, it
first, and the third includes both the first forms its judgments. And, Lastly, From
and second; but the first may be exer two or more judgments, it deduces con
eised without either of the other two." It clusions of reasoning.
is on that account called simple apprehen Now, if all our knowledge is got by a
sion : that is, apprehension unaccompanied procedure of this kind, [70] certainly the
with any judgment about the object appre threefold division of the powers of under
hended. This simple apprehension of an standing, into simple apprehension, judg
object is, in common language, called having ment, and reasoning, is the most natural
a notion, or having a conception of the ob and the most proper that can be devised.
ject, and by late authors is called having This theory and that division are so closely
an idea of w. In speaking, it is expressed connected that it is difficult to judge which
by a word, or by a part of a proposition, of them has given rise to the other; and
without that composition and structure they must stand or fall together. But, if
which makes a complete sentence; as a all our knowledge is not got by a process
man, a man of fortune. Such words, taken of this kind—if there are other avenues
by themselves, signify simple apprehen of knowledge besides the comparing our
sians. They neither affirm nor [69] deny; ideas, and perceiving their agreements and
they imply no judgment or opinion of the disagreements—it is probable that there may
thing signified by them; and, therefore, be operations of the understanding which
cannot be said to be either true or false. cannot be properly reduced under any of
The second operation in this division is the three that have been explained.
judgment; in which, say the philosophers, Let us consider some of the most familiar
there must be two objects of thought com operations of our minds, and see to which
pared, and some agreement or disagree of the three they belong. I begin with
ment, or, in general, some relation discerned consciousness. I know that I think, and
between them; in consequence of which, this of all knowledge is the most certain.
there is an opinion or belief of that relation Is that operation of my mind which gives
which we discern. This operation is ex me this certain knowledge, to be called
pressed in speech by a proposition, in which simple apprehension ? No, surely. Simple
some relation between the things compared apprehension neither affirms nor denies.
is affirmed or denied : as when we say, All It will not be said that it is by reason
men are fallible. ing that I know that I think. It re
Truth and falsehood are qualities which mains, therefore, that it must be by judg
belong to judgment only; or to proposi ment—that is, according to the account
titns by which judgment is expressed. given of judgment, by comparing two ideas,
Every judgment, every opinion, and every and perceiving the agreement between
proposition, is either true or false. But them. But what are the ideas compared?
words which neither affirm nor deny any They must be the idea of myself, and the
thing, can have neither of those qualities; idea of thought, for they are the terms of
and the same may be said of simple appre the proposition I think. According to this
hensions, which are signified by such words. account, then, first, I have the idea of my
The third operation is reasoning; in self and the idea of thought; then, by com
which, from two or more judgments, we paring these two ideas, I perceive that I
draw a conclusion. think.
This division of our intellectual powers Let any man who is capable of reflection
corresponds perfectly with the account com judge for himself, whether it is by an opera
monly given by philosophers, of the suc tion of this kind that he comes to be con
cessive steps by which the mind proceeds vinced that he thinks? To me it appears
in the acquisition of its knowledge ; which evident, that the conviction I have that I
are these three: First, By the senses, or think, is not got in this way; and, therefore,
by other means, it is furnished with various I conclude, either that consciousness is not
judgment, or that judgment is not rightly
* This is not correct. Apprehension is as impos. defined to be the perception of some agree
sible without judgment, as judgment is impossible ment or disagreement between two ideas.
without apprehension. The apprehension of a thing
or notion, is only realized in the mental affirmation The perception of an object by my
that the concept ideally exists, and this affirmation is senses is another operation of [71] the
a judgment. In fact, all consciousness supposes a
:#. understanding. 1 would know whether it
tion
as all consciousness supposes a discrimina
| be simple apprehension, or *:" or
n
[69–71]
244 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS.
reasoning. It is not simple apprehension, By the first, I understand such operations

because I am persuaded of the existence of as necessarily suppose an intercourse with
the object as much as I could be by demon some other intelligent being. A man may
stration. It is not judgment, if by judg understand and will; he may apprehend,
ment be meant the comparing ideas, and and judge, and reason, though he should
perceiving their agreements or disagree know of no intelligent being in the universe
ments. It is not reasoning, because those besides himself. But, when he asks inform
who cannot reason can perceive. ation, or receives it; when he bears tes
I find the same difficulty in classing me timony, or receives the testimony of an
mory under any of the operations men other; when he asks a favour, or accepts
tioned. one; when he gives a command to his ser
There is not a more fruitful source of vant, or receives one from a superior; when
error in this branch of philosophy, than he plights his faith in a promise or con
divisions of things which are taken to be tract-these are acts of social intercourse
complete when they are not really so. To between intelligent beings, and can have no
make a perfect division of any class of place in solitude. They suppose under
things, a man ought to have the whole standing and will; but they suppose some
under his view at once. But the greatest thing more, which is neither understanding
capacity very often is not sufficient for nor will; that is, society with other intelli.
this. Something is left out which did not gent beings. They may be called intellec
come under the philosopher's view when tual, because they can only be in intellectual
he made his division: and to suit this to beings; but they are neither simple appre
the division, it must be made what nature hension, nor judgment, nor reasoning, norare
never made it. This has been so common they any combination of these operations.
a fault of philosophers, that one who would To ask a question, is as simple an opera
avoid error ought to be suspicious of divi tion as to judge or to reason; yet it is
sions, though long received, and of great neither judgment nor reasoning, nor simple
authority, especially when they are grounded apprehension, nor is it any composition of
on a theory that may be called in question. these. Testimony is neither simple appre
In a subject imperfectly known, we ought hension, nor judgment, nor reasoning. The
not to pretend to perfect divisions, but to same may be said of a promise, or of a con
leave room for such additions or alterations tract. These acts of mind are perfectly
as a more perfect view of the subject may understood by every man of common under
afterwards suggest. standing; but, when philosophers attempt
I shall not, therefore, attempt a com to bring them within the pale of their divi
plete enumeration of the powers of the hu sions, by analysing them, they find inex
man understanding. I shall only mention plicable mysteries, [73] and even contradic
those which I propose to explain; and they tions, in them. One may see an instance
are the following: of this, of many that might be mentioned,
1st, The powers we have by means of in Mr Hume's “Enquiry concerning the
our external senses. 2dly, Memory. 3dly, Principles of Morals,” $ 3, part 2, note,
Conception. 4thly, The powers of resolv near the end.
ing and analysing complex objects, and The attempts of philosophers to reduce
compounding those that are more simple. the social operations under the common
5thly, Judging. 6thly, Reasoning 7thly, philosophical divisions, resemble very much
Taste, 8thly, Moral Perception;" and, last the attempts of some philosophers to re
of all, Consciousness.f. [72] duce all our social affections to certain
modifications of self-love. The Author of
our being intended us to be social beings,
CHAPTER VIII. and has, for that end, given us sociati intel
lectual powers, as well as social affections."
OF SOCIAL OPERATIONS OF MINn. Both are original parts of our constitution,
and the exertions of both no less natural
THERE is another division of the power: than the exertions of those powers that are
of the mind, which, though it has been, solitary and selfish.
ought not to be overlooked by writers on Our social intellectual operations, as well
this subject, because it has a real founda as our social affections, appear very early
tion in nature. Some operations of our in life, before we are capable of reasoning;
minds, from their very nature, are social, yet both suppose a conviction of the exist
others are solitary. ence of other intelligent beings. When a
child asks a question of his nurse, this act
* Moral Perception is treated under the Active
Powers, in Essay V.-H. * “Man," says Aristotle, “is, by nature, more
f Consciousness obtains only an incidental consi political than any bee or ant.” And, in another
deration, under Judgment, in the Fifth Chapter of work, “Man is the sweetest thing to man”-4,624,
the Sixth Essay.-H. rw #3's as awbeares - H.
| 72, 73]
- - --~~~--~~~
cHAP. VIII.] OF SOCIAL OPERATIONS OF MIND.
of his mind supposes not only a desire to philosophers; it has been analysed into its
know what he asks; it supposes, likewise, very elements of subject predicate, and co
a conviction that the nurse is an intelligent pula. All the various modifications of these,
being, to whom he can communicate his and of propositions which are compounded of
thoughts, and who can communicate her them, have been anxiously examined in
thoughts to him. How he came by this many voluminous tracts. The expression
conviction so early, is a question of some of a question, of a command, or of a pro
importance in the knowledge of the human mise, is as capable of being analysed as a
mind, and, therefore, worthy of the con proposition is; but we do not find that this
sideration of philosophers. But they seem has been attempted; we have not so much
to have given no attention, either to this as given them a name different from the
early conviction, or to those operations of operations which they express.
mind which suppose it. Of this we shall Why have speculative men laboured so
have occasion to treat afterwards. anxiously to analyse our solitary operations,
All languages are fitted to express the and given so little attention to the social %
social as well as the solitary operations of I know no other reason but this, that, in
the mind. It may indeed be affirmed, that, the divisions that have been made of the
to express the former, is the primary and mind's operations, the social have been
direct intention of language. A man who omitted, and thereby thrown behind the
had no intercourse with any other intelli curtain.
gent being, would never think of language. In all languages, the second person of
He would be as mute as the beasts of the verbs, the pronoun of the second person, and
field; even more so, because they have the vocative case in nouns, are appropriated
some degree of social intercourse with one to the expression of social operations of mind,
auother, and some of them [74] with man. and could never have had place in language
When language is once learned, it may be but for this purpose: nor is it a good
useful even in our solitary meditations; and argument against this observation, that, by
by clothing our thoughts with words, we a rhetorical figure, we sometimes address
may have a firmer hold of them. But t
persons that are absent, or even inanimated
this was not its first intention; and the beings, in the second person. For it ought
structure of every lan shews that it is to be remembered, that all figurative ways
not intended solely for this purpose. of using words or phrases suppose a natural
In every lan , a question, a com t and literal meaning of them." [75]
mand, a promise, which are social acts, can –
be expressed as easily and as properly as * What, throughout this chapter, is implied, ought
judgment, which is a solitary act. The ex to have been explicitly stated-that language is natu
ral
pression of the last has been honoured with ought to man; and consequently the faculty of speech
to have been enumerated among the mental
a particular name; it is called a proposition; powers.-H.
it has been an object of great attention to
ESSAY II.
OF THE POWERS WE HAVE BY MEANS OF OUR

EXTERNAL SENSES.
CHAPTER I. to other powers which are thought to re

semble them. For these reasons, they claim
of The opte.ANs of sense, to be first considered.
The perception of external objects is one
Of all the operations of our minds, the main link of that mysterious chain which
£" of external objects is the most connects the material world with the intel
iliar. The senses come to maturity lectual. We shall find many things in this
even in infancy, when other powers have operation unaccountable; sufficient to con
not yet sprung up. They are common to vince us that we know but little of our own
us with brute animals, and furnish us with frame; and that a perfect comprehension
the objects about which our other powers of our mental powers, and of the manner of
are the most frequently employed. We their operation, is beyond the reach of our
find it easy to attend to their operations; understanding.
and, because they are familiar, the names In perception, there are impressions upon
which properly belong to them are applied the organs of sense, the nerves, and brain,
[74, 75]
246 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essay 11,
which, by the laws of our nature, are fol perceiving external objects without suchor
lowed by certain operations of mind. These gans." Wehave reason to believe that, when
two things are apt to be confounded; but we put off these bodies and all the organs
ought most carefully to be distinguished. belonging to them, our perceptive powers
Some philosophers, without good reason, shall rather be improved than destroyed or
have concluded, that the [76] impressions impaired. We have reason to believe that
made on the body are the proper efficient the Supreme Being perceives everything in
cause of perception. Others, with as little a much more perfect manner than we do,
reason, have concluded that impressions are without bodily organs. We have reason to
made on the mind similar to those made on believe that there are other created beings
the body. From these mistakes many others endowed with powers of perception more
have arisen. The wrong notions men have perfect and more extensive than ours, with
rashly taken up with regard to the senses, out any such organs as we find necessary.
have led to wrong notions with regard to We ought not, therefore, to conclude,
other powers which are conceived to resemble that such bodily organs are, in their own
them. Many important powers of mind nature, necessary to perception; but rather
have, especially of late, been called internal that, by the will of God, our power of per
senses, from a supposed resemblance to the ceiving external objects is limited and cir
external—such as, the sense of beauty, the cumscribed by our organs of sense; so that
sense of harmony, the moral sense." And we perceive objects in a certain manner,
it is to be apprehended that errors, with and in certain circumstances, and in no
regard to the external, have, from analogy, other.t.
led to similar errors with regard to the If a man was shut up in a dark room, so
internal; it is, therefore, of some conse that he could see nothing but through one
quence, even with regard to other branches small hole in the shutter of a window,
of our subject, to have just notions concern would he conclude that the hole was the
ing the external senses. cause of his seeing, and that it is impos
In order to this, we shall begin with some sible to see any other way? Perhaps, if he
observations on the organs of sense, and on had never in his life seen but in this way,
the impressions which in perception are he might be apt to think so; but the con
made upon them, and upon the nerves and clusion is rash and groundless. He sees,
brain. because God has given him the power of
We perceive no external object but by seeing; and he sees only through this small
means of certain bodily organs which God hole, because his power of seeing is circum
has given us for that purpose. The Su scribed by impediments on all other hands.
preme Being who made us, and placed us Another necessary caution in this matter
in this world, hath given us such powers of is, that we ought not to confound the or
mind as he saw to be suited to our state gans of perception with the being that per
and rank in his creation. He has given us ceives. Perception must be the act of some
the power of perceiving many objects around being that perceives. The eye [76] is not
us—the sun, moon, and stars, the earth and that which sees; it is only the organ by which
sea, and a variety of animals, vegetables, we see.: The ear is not that which hears,
and inanimate bodies. But our power of but the organ by which we hear; and so of
perceiving these objects is limited in various the rest.S
ways, and particularly in this—that, with A man cannot see the satellites of Jupiter
out the organs of the several senses, we but by a telescope. Does he conclude from
perceive no external object. We cannot this, that it is the telescope that sees those
see without eyes, nor hear without ears; it stars ? By no means—such a conclusion
is not only necessary that we should have would be absurd. It is no less absurd to
these organs, but that they should be in a * However astonishing, it is now proved beyond
sound and natural state. There are many all rational doubt, that, in certain abnormal states
disorders of the eye that cause total blind of the nervous organism, perceptions are possible,
through other than the ordinary channels of the
mess; others that impair the powers of vi senses.--H
sion, without destroying it altogether: and + The doctrine of Plato and of many other phi
the same may be said of the organs of all losophers. Reid ought, however, to have said,
limited to, instead of “by our organs of sense :” tor.
the other senses. [77] if the body be viewed as the prison of the soul, the
All this is so well known from experience, senses must be viewed at least as partial outlets.
that it needs no proof; but it ought to be : A £30axus, oux #26-24xei, says Plato, followed
observed, that we know it from experience by a host of philosophers, comparing the senses to
only. We can give no reason for it, but windows of the mind...-H.
that such is the will of our Maker. No * “The mind fees,” says Epicharmus-“the mind
hears, all else is deaf and blind"-a saying alluded to
man can shew it to be impossible to the as proverbial by Aristotle, in a passage to the same
Supreme Being to have given us the power of effect, which cannot adequately be translated:
Xatafizz **** ***.*. ***** *********
• He refers to Hutcheson.-H.
revor $Xu, #: re, N* r * : *, * * * * * *
* * * * * *. This has escaped the cominentators.-H.
See p. 878, n. [76-78]
caap. II.] OF IMPRESSIONS ON THE ORGANS, &c. 247
conclude that it is the eye that sees, or which some impression is made upon the
the ear that hears. The telescope is an organ."
artificial organ of sight, but it sees not. The effluvia of bodies drawn into the
The eye is a natural organ of sight, by nostrils with the breath, are the medium of
which we see; but the natural organ sees smell; the undulations of the air are the
as little as the artificial. medium of hearing; and the rays of ligh
The eye is a machine most admirably passing from visible objects to the eye, ar.
contrived for refracting the rays of light, the medium of sight. We see no object
and forming a distinct picture of objects unless rays of light come from it to the eye.
upon the retina; but it sees neither the We hear not the sound of any body, unless
object nor the picture. It can form the the vibrations of some elastic medium, oc
picture after it is taken out of the head; casioned by the tremulous motion of the
but no vision ensues. Even when it is in sounding body, reach our ear. We per
its proper place, and perfectly sound, it is ceive no smell, unless the effluvia of the
well known that an obstruction in the optic smelling body enter into the nostrils. We
nerve takes away vision, though the eye perceive no taste, unless the sapid body be
has performed all that belongs to it. applied to the tongue, or some part of the
If anything more were necessary to be organ of taste. Nor do we perceive an
said on a point so evident, we might ob tangible quality of a body, unless it touc
serve that, if the faculty of seeing were in the hands, or some part as our bodies.
the eye, that of hearing in the ear, and so These are facts known from experience
of the other senses, the necessary conse to hold universally and invariably, both in
quence of this would be, that the thinking men and brutes. By this law of our na
principle, which I call myself, is not one, ture, our powers of perceiving external ob
but many. But this is contrary to the ir jects, are farther limited and circumscribed.
resistible conviction of every man. When Nor can we give any other reason for this,
I say I see, I hear, I feel, I remember, than [80] that it is the will of our Maker, who
this implies that it is one and the same self knows best what powers, and what degrees
that performs all these operations; and, as of them, are suited to our state. We were
it would be absurd to say that my memory, once in a state, I mean in the womb, wherein
another man's imagination, and a third our powers of perception were more limited
man's reason, may make one individual than in the present, and, in a future state,
intelligent being, it would be equally ab they may be more enlarged.
surd to say that one piece of matter see It is likewise a law of our nature, that,
ing, another hearing, and a third feeling, in order to our perceiving objects, the im
may make one and the same percipient pressions made upon the organs of sense
oeing. must be communicated to the nerves, and
These sentiments are not new; they have by them to the brain. This is perfectly
oceurred to thinking men from early ages. known to those who know anything of ana
Cicero, in his “Tusculan Questions,” Book tomy.
I., chap. 20, has expressed them very dis The nerves are fine cords, which pass
tinctly. Those who choose may consult the from the brain, or from the spinal marrow,
passage." [79] which is a production of the brain, to all
parts of the body, dividing into smaller
branches as they proceed, until at last they
CHAPTER II. escape our eyesight: and it is found by
experience, that all the voluntary and in
•F THE IMPREssions on THE organs, NERVEs, voluntary motions of the body are performed
as to Brains, by their means. When the nerves that
serve any limb, are cut, or tied hard, we
A second law of our nature regarding have then no more power to move that limb
perception is, that we perceive no object, than if it was no part of the body.
unless some impression is made upon the As there are nerves that serve the mus
organ of sense, either by the immediate cular motions, so there are others that serve
application of the object, or by some medium the several senses; and as without the for
which passes between the object and the mer we cannot move a limb, so without the
organ. latter we can have no perception.
In two of our senses—to wit, touch and * This distinction of a mediate and immediate ob
taste—there must be an immediate applica ject, or of an object and a medium, in perception, is
tion of the object to the organ. # the inaccurate, and a source of sad confusion. fe per
other three, the object is perceived at a dis ceive, and can perceive, nothing but what is in rela
tion to the organ, and nothing is in relation to the
tance, but still by means of a medium, by organ that is not present to it. All the senses are, in
fact, modifications of touch, as Democritus of old
taught. We reach the distant reality, not by sense.
• Cicero says nothing on this head that had not not by perception, but by inference. Reid, how.
been said before him by the Greek philosophers.-H. ever, in this only follows his predecessors.-H.
(79, 807
248 oN THE INTELLECTUAL PoweRs. [EssAY 11.
This train of machinery the wisdom of clude ingeneral—that, as the impressions on
God has made necessary to our perceiving the organs, nerves, and brain, correspond
objects. Various parts of the body concur exactly to the nature and conditions of the
to it, and each has its own function. First, objects by which they are made, so our
The object, either immediately, or by some perceptions and sensations correspond to
medium, must make an impression on the those impressions, and vary in kind, and in
organ. The organ serves only as a medium degree, as they vary. [82] Without this exact
by which an impression is made on the correspondence, the information we receive
nerve; and the nerve serves as a medium by our senses would not only be imperfect,
to make an impression upon the brain. as it undoubtedly is, but would be fallacious,
Here the material part ends; at least we which we have no reason to think it is.
can trace it no farther; the rest is all in
tellectual."
The proof of these impressions upon the CHAPTER III.
nerves and brain in [81] perception is this,
that, from many observations and experi HYPOTHESES CONCERNING THE NERVES AND
ments, it is found that, when the organ of BRAIN.
any sense is perfectly sound, and has the

impression made upon it by the object ever WE are informed by anatomists, that, al
so strongly, yet, if the nerve which serves though the two coats which inclose a nerve,
that organ be cut or tied hard, there is no and which it derives from the coats of the
perception; and it is well known that dis brain, are tough and elastic, yet the nerve
orders in the brain deprive us of the power itself has a very small degree of consistence,
of perception when both the organ and its being almost like marrow. It has, how
nerve are sound. ever, a fibrous texture, and may be divided
There is, therefore, sufficient reason to and subdivided, till its fibres escape our
conclude that, in perception, the object pro senses; and, as we know so very little about
duces some change in the organ; that the the texture of the nerves, there is great
organ produces some change upon the room left for those who choose to indulge
nerve; and that the nerve produces some themselves in conjecture.
change in the brain. And we give the The ancients conjectured that the ner
name of an impression to those changes, vous fibres are fine tubes, filled with a very
because we have not a name more proper to subtile spirit, or vapour, which they called
express, in a general manner, any change animal spirits; that the brain is a gland,
produced in a body, by an external cause, by which the animal spirits are secreted
without specifying the nature of that from the finer part of the blood, and their
change. Whether it be pressure, or at continual waste repaired; and that it is by
traction, or repulsion, or vibration, or some these animal spirits that the nerves perform
thing unknown, for which we have no their functions. Des Cartes has shewn
name, still it may be called an impression. how, by these animal spirits, going and re
But, with regard to the particular kind of turning in the nerves, muscular motion,
this change or impression, philosophers perception, memory, and imagination, are
have never been able to discover anything effected. All this he has described as dis
at all. tinctly as if he had been an eye-witness of
But, whatever be the nature of those im all those operations. But it happens that
pressions upon the organs, nerves, and the tubular structure of the nerves was
brain, we perceive nothing without them. never perceived by the human eye, nor
Experience informs that it is so; but we shewn by the nicest injections; and all that
cannot give a reason why it is so. In the has been said about animal spirits, through
constitution of man, perception, by fixed more than fifteen centuries, is mere con
laws of nature, is connected with those im jecture.
pressions; but we can discover no neces Dr Briggs, who was Sir Isaac Newton's
sary connection. The Supreme Being has master in anatomy, was the first, as far as
seen fit to limit our power of perception; so I know, who advanced a new system
that we perceive not without such impres concerning [83] the nerves." He conceived
sions; and this is all we know of the them to be solid filaments of prodigious
matter.
This, however, we have reason to con • Briggs was not the first. The Jesuit, Hon".
ratus Fabry, had before him denied the old hypothe
• There can be no doubt that the whole organism sis of spirits , and the new hypothesis of cerebral
ofthe sense, from periphery to centre, must co-operate fibres, and fibrils, by which he explains the phaeno
simultaneously in perception; but there is no rea mena of sense, imagination and memory, is not only
son to place the mind at the central cxtremity alone, the first, but perhaps the most ingenious of the class
and to hold that not only a certain series of organic that has been proposed... Yet the very name of Fabry
changes, but a sensation, must precede the mental is wholly unnoticed by those historians of philosophy
cognition. This is mere hypothesis, and opposed to who do not deem it superflucus to dwell on the tire.
the testimony of consciousness.-H. some reveries of Briggs, Hartley, and Bonnet.-H.
[81–83]
onar. m. HYPOTHESES CONCERNING THE NERVES, &c. 249
tenuity; and this opinion, as it accords bet and 5 of the first part of his “Observa
ter with observation, seems to have been tions on Man.” “Prop. 4. External objects
more generally received since his time. As impressed on the senses occasion, first in
to the manner of performing their office, the nerves on which they are impressed,
Dr Briggs thought that, like musical cords, and then in the brain, vibrations of the
they have vibrations differing according to small, and, as one may say, infinitesimal
their length and tension. They seem, how medullary particles. Prop. 5. The vibra
ever, very unfit for this purpose, on account tions mentioned in the last proposition are
of their want of tanacity, their moisture, excited, propagated, and kept up, partly by
and being through their whole length in the aether—that is, by a very subtile elastic
contact with moist substances; so that, al fluid; partly by the uniformity, continuity,
though Dr Briggs wrote a book upon this softness, and active powers of the medullary
system, called Nova Visionis Theoria, it substance of the brain, spinal marrow, and
seems not to have been much followed. nerves.”
Sir Isaac Newton, in all his philosophical The modesty and diffidence with which
writings, took great care to distinguish his Dr Hartley offers his system to the world
doctrines, which he pretended to prove by by desiring his reader “to expect nothing
just induction, from his conjectures, which but hints and conjectures in difficult and
were to stand or fall according as future obscure matters, and a short detail of the
experiments and observations should esta principal reasons and evidences in those
blish or refute them. His conjectures he that are clear; by acknowledging, that he
has put in the form of queries, that they shall not be able to execute, with any ac
might not be received as truths, but be curacy, the proper method of philosophising,
inquired into, and determined according to recommended and followed by Sir Isaac
the evidence to be found for or against Newton; and that he will attempt a sketch
them. Those who mistake his queries for only for the benefit of future enquirers”
a part of his doctrine, do him great injus seem to forbid any criticism upon it. One
tice, and degrade him to the rank of the cannot, without reluctance, criticise what is
common herd of philosophers, who have in proposed in such a manner, and with so
all ages adulterated philosophy, by mixing good intention; yet, as the tendency of this
conjecture with truth, and their own fancies system of vibrations is to make all the oper
with the oracles of Nature. Among other ations of the mind mere mechanism, depend
queries, this truly great philosopher pro ent [85] on the laws of matter and motion,
posed this, Whether there may not be an and, as it has been held forth by its vota
elastic medium, or aether, immensely more ries, as in a manner demonstrated, I shall
rare than air, which pervades all bodies, make some remarks on that part of the sys
and which is the cause of gravitation ; of tem which relates to the impressions made
the refraction and reflection of the rays of on the nerves and brain in perception.
light; of the transmission of heat, through It may be observed, in general, that Dr
spaces void of air; and of many other phae Hartley's work consists of a chain of pro
nomena? In the 23d query subjoined to his positions, with their proofs and corollaries,
“Optics,” he puts this question with regard digested in good order, and in a scientific
to impressions made on the nerves and form. A great part of them, however, are,
brain in perception, Whether vision is as he candidly acknowledges, conjectures
effected chiefly by the vibrations of this and hints only; yet these are mixed with
medium, excited in the bottom of the eye the propositions legitimately proved, with
by the rays of light, and propagated along out any distinction. Corollaries are drawn
the solid, pellucid, and uniform capillaments from them, and other propositions grounded
of the optic nerve? And whether hearing upon them, which, all taken together, make
is effected [34] by the vibrations of this or up a system. A system of this kind re
some other medium, excited by the tremor sembles a chain, of which some links are
of the air in the auditory nerves, and pro abundantly strong, others very weak. The
pagated along the solid, pellucid, and uni strength of the chain is determined by that
form capillaments of those nerves? And of the weakest links; for, if they give way,
so with regard to the other senses. the whole falls to pieces, and the weight
What Newton only proposed as a matter supported by it falls to the ground.
to be inquired into, Dr Hartley conceived Philosophy has been, in all ages, adul
to have such evidence, that, in his “Ob terated by hypotheses; that is, by systems
servations on Man,” he has deduced, in a built partly on facts, and much upon con
mathematical form, a very ample system jecture. It is pity that a man of Dr Hart
concerning the faculties of the mind, from ley's knowledge and candour should have
the doctrine of vibrations, joined with that followed the multitude in this fallacious
of association. tract, after expressing his approbation of
His notion of the vibrations excited in the proper method of philosophising, pointed
the nerves, is expressed in Propositions 4 out by Bacon and Newton. The last con
[84, 85]
250 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essay 11
sidered it as a reproach when his system no other way in which the phaenomena may
was called his hypothesis; and says, with be produced, and, therefore, they must be
disdain of such imputation, Hypotheses non produced in this way. There is, therefore,
fingo. And it is very strange that Dr no proof of vibrations in the infinitesimal
Hartley should not only follow such a me particles of the brain and nerves.
thod of philosophising himself, but that he It may be thought that the existence of
should direct others in their inquiries to an elastic vibrating tetherstands on a firmer
follow it. So he does in Proposition 87, foundation, having the authority of Sir
Part I., where he deduces rules for the Isaac Newton. But it ought to be observed
ascertainment of truth, from the rule of that, although this great man had formed
false, in arithmetic, and from the art of conjectures about this aether near fifty
decyphering; and in other places. years before he died, and had it in his eye
As to the vibrations and vibratiuncles, during that long space as a subject of in
whether of an elastic aether, or of the in uiry, yet it does not appear that he ever
finitesimal particles of the brain and nerves, ound any convincing proof of its existence,
there [86] may be such things for what we but considered it to the last as a question
know; and men may rationally inquire whether there be such an aether or not.
whether they can find any evidence of their In the premonition to the reader, prefixed
existence; but, while we have no proof of to the second edition of his “Optics,”
their existence, to apply them to the solu anno 1717, he expresses himself thus with
tion of phaenomena, and to build a system regard to it –“Lest any one should think
upon them, is what I conceive we call build that I place gravity among the essential
ing a castle in the air. properties of bodies, I have subjoined one
When men pretend to account for any question concerning its cause; a question,
of the operations of Nature, the causes I say, for I do not hold it as a thing estab
assigned by them ought, as Sir Isaac New lished.” If, therefore, we regard the
ton has taught us, to have two conditions, authority of Sir Isaac Newton, we ought
otherwise they are good for nothing. First, to hold the existence of such an aether as a
They ought to be true, to have a real exist matter not established by proof, but to be
ence, and not to be barely conjectured to examined into by experiments; and I have
exist, without proof. Secondly, They ought never heard that, since his time, any new
to be sufficient to produce the effect. evidence has been found of its existence.
As to the existence of vibratory motions “But,” says Dr Hartley, “supposing
in the medullary substance of the nerves the existence of the aether, and of its pro
and brain, the evidence produced is this: perties, to be destitute of all direct evidence,
First, It is observed that the sensations of still, if it serves to account for a great
seeing and hearing, and some sensations of variety of phaenomena, it will have an in
touch, have some short duration and con direct evidence in its favour by this means.”
tinuance. Secondly, Though there be no There never was an hypothesis invented by
direct evidence that the sensations of taste an ingenious man which has not this evi
and smell, and the greater part of these of dence in its favour. The vortices of Des
touch, have the like continuance, yet, says Cartes, the sylphs and gnomes of Mr Pope,
the author, analogy would incline one to serve to account for a great variety of
believe that they must resemble the sensa phaenomena.
tions of sight and hearing in this particular. When a man has, with labour and in
Thirdly, The continuance of all our sensa genuity, wrought up an hypothesis into a
tions being thus established, it follows, that system, he contracts a fondness for it,
external objects impress vibratory motions which is apt [88] to warp the best judgment.
on the medullary substance of the nerves This, I humbly think, appears remarkably
and brain; because no motion, besides a in Dr Hartley. In his preface, he declares
vibratory one, can reside in any part for a his approbation of the method of philoso
moment of time. phising recommended and followed by Sir
This is the chain of proof, in which the Isaac Newton; but, having first deviated
first link is strong, being confirmed by ex from this method in his practice, he is
perience; the second is very weak; and the brought at last to justify this deviation in
third still weaker. For other kinds of Ino theory, and to bring arguments in defence
tion, besides that of vibration, may have of a method diametrically opposite to it.
some continuance—such as rotation, bending “We admit,” says he, “the key of a cypher
or unbending of a spring, and perhaps others to be a true one when it explains the cypher
which we are unacquainted with; nor do completely.” I answer, To find the key
we know whether it is motion that is pro requires an understanding equal or supe
duced in the nerves-it may be pressure, rior to that which made the cypher. This
attraction, repulsion, or something we do instance, therefore, will then be in point,
not know. This, indeed, is the common when he who attempts to decypher the
refuge of all hypotheses, [87] that we know works of Nature by an hypothesis, has an
[86–88]
chap. III.] HYPOTHESES CONCERNING THE NERVES, &c. 251
understanding equal or superior to that to make mathematics and logic, natural

which made them. The votaries of hypo history and civil history, natural philoso
theses have often been challenged to shew phy and philosophy of all other kinds,
one useful discovery in the works of Nature coincide omni ea parte.”
that was ever made in that way. If in Since Sir Isaac Newton laid down the
stances of this kind could be produced, we rules of philosophising in our inquiries into
ought to conclude that Lord Bacon and the works of Nature, many philosophers
Sir Isaac Newton have done great disser have deviated from them in practice; per
vice to philosophy by what they have said haps few have paid that regard to them
against hypotheses. But, if no such in which they deserve. But they have met
stance can be produced, we must conclude, with very general approbation, as being
with those great men, that every system founded in reason, and pointing out the
which pretends to account for the phaeno only path to the knowledge of Nature's
mena of Nature by hypotheses orconjecture, works. Dr Hartley is the only author I
is spurious and illegitimate, and serves only have met with who reasons against them,
to flatter the pride of man with a vain con and has taken pains to find out arguments
ceit of knowledge which he has not attained. in defence of the exploded method of hy
The author tells us, “that any hypo pothesis. [90]
thesis that has so much plausibility as to Another condition which Sir Isaac New
explain a considerable number of facts, helps ton requires in the causes of natural things
us to digest these facts in proper order, to assigned by philosophers, is, that they be
bring new ones to light, and to make er sufficient to account for the phaenomena.
*rimenta crucis for the sake of future Vibrations, and vibratiuncles of the me
inquirers.” dullary substance of the nerves and brain,
Let hypotheses be put to any of these are assigned by Dr Hartley to account for
uses as far as they can serve. Let them all our sensations and ideas, and, in a word,
suggest experiments, or direct our inquiries; for all the operations of our minds. Let
but let just induction alone govern our us consider very briefly how far they are
belief. sufficient for that purpose.
“The rule of false affords an obvious and It would be injustice to this author to
strong instance of the possibilityof being led, conceive him a materialist. He proposes
with precision and certainty, to a [89] true his sentiments with great candour, and they
conclusion from a false position. And it is ought not to be carried beyond what his
of the very essence of algebra to proceed in words express. He thinks it a consequence
the way of supposition.” of his theory, that matter, if it can be
This is true; but, when brought to jus endued with the most simple kinds of sens
tify the accounting for natural phaenomena ation, might arrive at all that intelligence
by hypotheses, is foreign to the purpose. of which the human mind is possessed.
When an unknown number, or any un He thinks that his theory overturns all
known quantity, is sought, which must have the arguments that are usually brought for
certain conditions, it may be found in a the immateriality of the soul, from the
scientific manner by the rule of false, or subtilty of the internal senses, and of the
by an algebraical analysis; and, when rational faculty; but he does not take upon
found, may be synthetically demonstrated him to determine whether matter can be
to be the number or the quantity sought, endued with sensation or no. He even
by its answering all the conditions required. acknowledges that matter and motion,
But it is one thing to find a quantity which howeversubtilly divided and reasoned upon,
shall have certain conditions; it is a very yield nothing more than matter and motion
different thing to find out the laws by which still; and therefore he would not be any
it pleases God to govern the world and way interpreted so as to oppose the imma
Produce the phaenomena which fall under teriality of the soul.
our observation. And we can then only It would, therefore, be unreasonable to
allow some weight to thisargument in favour require that his theory of vibrations should,
of hypotheses, when it can be shewn that in the proper sense, account for our sensa
the cause of any one phaenomenon in nature tions. It would, indeed, be ridiculous in
has been, or can be found, as an unknown any man to pretend that thought of any kind
quantity is, by the rule of false, or by alge must necessarily result from motion, or
braical analysis. This, I apprehend, will that vibrations in the nerves must neces
never be, till the aera arrives, which Dr sarily produce thought, any more than the
Hartley seems to foretell, “When future vibrations of a pendulum. Dr Hartley
generations shall put all kinds of evidences disclaims this way of thinking, and there
and enquiries into mathematical forms; fore it ought not to be imputed to him.
and, as it were, reduce Aristotle's ten Ca All that he pretends is, that, in the human
tegories, and Bishop Wilkin's forty Summa constitution, there is a certain connection
Genera to the head of quantity alone, so as between vibrations in the medullary sub
[89, 90]
stance of the nerves and brain, and the | degrees of strength and weakness? Heat
thoughts of the mind; so that the last de and cold, roughness and smoothness, hard
pend entirely upon the first, and every kind ness and softness, pain and pleasure, are
of thought [91] in the mind arises in conse sensations of touch that differ in kind, and
quence of a corresponding vibration, or each has an endless variety of degrees.
vibratiuncle in the nerves and brain. Our Sounds have the qualities of acute and
sensations arise from vibrations, and our grave, loud and low, with all different de
ideas from vibratiuncles, or miniature vibra grees of each. The varieties of colour are
tions; and he comprehends, under these many more than we have names to express.
two words of sensations and ideas, all the How shall we find varieties in vibrations
operations of the mind. corresponding to all this variety of sensa
But how can we expect any proof of the tions which we have by our five senses
connection between vibrations and thought, only *
when the existence of such vibrations was I know two qualities of vibrations in an
never proved ? The proof of their connec uniform elastic medium, and I know no
tion cannot be stronger than the proof of more. They may be quick or slow in vari
their existence; for, as the author acknow ous degrees, and they may be strong or
ledges that we cannot infer the existence weak in various degrees; but I cannot find
of the thoughts from the existence of the any division of our sensations that will make
vibrations, it is no less evident that we can them tally with those divisions of vibra
not infer the existence of vibrations from tions. If we had no other sensations but
the existence of our thoughts. The exist those of hearing, the theory would answer
ence of both must be known before we can well; for sounds are either acute or grave,
know their connection. As to the exist which may answer to quick or slow vibra
ence of our thoughts, we have the evidence tions; or they are loud or low, which an
of consciousness, a kind of evidence that swer to strong or weak vibrations. But
never was called in question. But as to then we have no variety of vibrations cor
the existence of vibrations in the medullary responding to the immense variety of sens
substance of the nerves and brain, no proof ations which we have by sight, smell, taste,
has yet been brought. and touch.
All, therefore, we have to expect from Dr Hartley has endeavoured to find out
this hypothesis, is, that in vibrations, con other two qualities of vibrations; to wit,
sidered abstractly, there should be a variety that they may primarily affect one part of
in kind and degree, which tallies so exactly the brain or another, and that they may
with the varieties of the thoughts they are to vary in their direction according as they
account for, as may lead us to suspect some enter by different external nerves; but these
connection between the one and the other. [93] seem to be added to make a number;
If the divisions and subdivisions of thought for, as far as we know, vibrations in an
be found to run parallel with the divisions uniform elastic substance spread over the
and subdivisions of vibrations, this would whole, and in all directions. However,
give that kind of plausibility to the hypo that we may be liberal, we shall grant him
thesis of their connection, which we com four different kinds of vibrations, each of
monly expect even in a mere hypothesis; them having as many degrees as he pleases.
but we do not find even this. Can he, or any man, reduce all our sensa
For, to omit all those thoughts and oper tions to four kinds? We have five senses,
ations which the author comprehends under and by each of them a variety of sensations,
the name of ideas, and which he thinks are more than sufficient to exhaust all the
connected with vibratiuncles; to omit the varieties we are able to conceive in vibra
perception of external objects, which he tions.
comprehends under the name of sensations; Dr Hartley, indeed, was sensible of the
to omit the sensations, properly so called, difficulty of finding vibrations to suit all the
which accompany our passions [92] and variety of our sensations. His extensive
affections, and to confine ourselves to the knowledge of physiology and pathology
sensations which we have by means of our could yield him but a feeble aid; and, there
external senses, we can perceive no corre fore, he is often reduced to the necessity of
spondence between the variety we find in heaping supposition upon supposition, con
their kinds and degrees, and that which may jecture upon conjecture, to give some credi
be supposed in vibrations. bility to his hypothesis; and, in seeking out
We have five senses, whose sensations vibrations which may correspond with the
differ totally in kind. By each of these, sensations of one sense, he seems to forget
excepting perhaps that of hearing, we have that those must be omitted which have been
a variety of sensations, which differ specific appropriated to another.
ally, and not in degree only. How many Philosophers have accounted in some de
tastes and smells are there which are spe gree for our various sensations of sound by
fically different, each of them capable of all the vibrations of elastic air; but it is to be
[91–93
m-----, ---"
-->
cHAP. Iv.] FALSE CONCLUSIONS, &c. 253
observed, first, That we know that such vi

brations do really exist; and, secondly, That CHAPTER IV.
they tally exactly with the most remarkable
thanomena of sound. We cannot, indeed, FALSE CONCLUSIONs DRAWN from the
shew how any vibration should produce the IMPRESSIONS BEFORE MENTIONED.
sensation of sound. This must be resolved
into the will of God, or into some cause SoME philosophers among the ancients,
altogether unknown. But we know that, as well as among the moderns, imagined
as the vibration is strong or weak, the that man is nothing but a piece of matter,
sound is loud or low; we know that, as the so curiously organized that the impressions
vibration is quick or slow, the sound is of external objects produce in it sensation,
atute or ve. We can point out that perception, remembrance, and all the other
relation *''': vibrations which operations [95] we are conscious of." This
produces harmony or discord, and that foolish opinion could only take its rise from
relation of successive vibrations which pro observing the constant connection which
duces melody; and all this is not conjec the Author of Nature hath established be
tured, but proved by a sufficient induction. tween certain impressions made upon our
This account of sounds, therefore, is philo senses and our perception of the objects by
sophical: although, perhaps, there may be which the impression is made; from which
many things relating to sound that we can they weakly inferred that those impressions
not account for, and of which the causes were the proper efficient causes of the cor
remain latent. The connections described responding perception.
'' this branch of philosophy are the But no reasoning is more fallacious than
work of God, and not the fancy of men. this—that, because two things are always
If anything similar to this could be shewn conjoined, therefore one must be the cause
in accounting for all our sensations by of the other. Day and night have been
vibrations in the medullary substance of the joined in a constant succession since the
nerves and brain, it would deserve a place beginning of the world; but who is so foolish
in sound philosophy; but, when we are told as to conclude from this that day is the
of vibrations in a substance which no man cause of night, or night the cause of the
could ever prove to have vibrations, or to following day? There is indeed nothing
be capable of them; when such imaginary more ridiculous than to imagine that any
vibrations are brought to account for all our motion or modification of matter should pro
sensations, though we can perceive no cor duce thought.
respondence in their variety of kind and If one should tell of a telescope so exactly
degree to the variety of sensations—the con made as to have the power of seeing; of a
nections described in such a system are the whispering gallery that had the power of
creatures of human imagination, not the hearing; of a cabinet so nicely framed as to
work of God. have the power of memory; or of a machine
The rays of light make an impression so delicate as to feel pain when it was
upon the optic nerves; but they make none touched—such absurdities are so shocking to
upon the auditory or olfactory. The vibra common sense that they would notfind belief
tions of the air make an impression upon even among savages; yet it is the same
the auditory nerves; but none upon the absurdity to think that the impressions of
optic or the olfactory. The effluvia of external objects upon the machine of our
bodies make an impression upon the olfac bodies can be the real efficient cause of
tory nerves; but make none upon the optic thought and perception.
or auditory. Noman has been able to give Passing this, therefore, as a notion too
a shadow of reason for this. While this is absurd to admit of reasoning, another con
the ease, is it not better to confess our clusion very generally made by philoso
ignorance of the nature of those impressions phers is, that, in perception, an impression
made upon the nerves and brain in percep is made upon the mind as well as upon the
tion, than to flatter our pride with the con organ, nerves, and brain. Aristotle, as
ceit of knowledge which we have not, and was before observed, thought that the form
to adulterate philosophy with the spurious or image of the object perceived, enters by
brood of hypotheses?" * The stoics are reprehended for such a doctrine
“Quondam porticus attulit
* Reid appears to have been unacquainted with Obscuros nimium sencs,
the works and theory of Bonnet-With our author's Qui sensus et imagines
"ctures on the physiological hypotheses, the reader E corporibus extimis
: compare those of Tetens, in his “Versuche." Credant mentibus imprimi,
of Stewart in his “Philosophical Essays.”-H. Ut quondam celeri stylo
Mosest aequore paginae
£ nullas habeat nota",
ressas figere literas.” &c
The tabula rasa remounts, however, to Aristotle
-indeed to Plato-as an illustration.--Hi.
(94, 95)
ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essay 11.
254
the organ of sense, and strikes upon the duced in it by the object. But this is a
mind." Mr Hume gives the name of im hypothesis which contradicts the common
pressions to all our perceptions, to all our sense of mankind, and which ought not to
sensations, and even to the objects which be admitted without proof.
we perceive. Mr Locke affirms very posi When I look upon the wall of my room,
tively, that the ideas of external objects are the wall does not act at all, nor is capable
produced [96] in our minds by impulse, of acting; the perceiving it is an act or
“that being the only way we can conceive operation in me. That this is the common
bodies to operate in.” It ought, however, to apprehension of mankind with regard to
be observed, in justice to Mr Locke, that he perception, is evident from the manner of
retracted this notion in his first letter to the expressing it in all languages.
Bishop of Worcester, and promised, in the The vulgar give themselves no trouble
next edition of his Essay, to have that pas how they perceive objects—they express
sage rectified; but, either from forgetful what they are conscious of, and they express
ness in the author, or negligence in the it with propriety; but philosophers have an
printer, the passage remains in all the sub avidity to know how we perceive objects;
and, conceiving some similitude between a
sequent editions I have seen. and a mind that
There is no prejudice more natural to body that is put in motion,
man than to conceive of the mind as hav is made to perceive, they are led to think
ing some similitude to body in its opera to that, as the body must receive some impulse
make it move, so the mind must receive
tions. Hence men have been prone to
imagine that, as bodies are put in motion some impulse or impression to make it per d,
by some impulse or impression made upon ceive. This analogy seems to be confirme
them by contiguous bodies, so the mind is by observing that we perceive objects only
on upon the
made to think and to perceive by some im when they make some impressi the nerves and
pression made upon it, or some impulse organs of sense, and upon
given to it by contiguous objects. If we such brain; but it ought to be observed, that
have such a notion of the mind as Homer is the nature of body that it cannot
ed
had of his gods—who might be bruised or change its state, but by some force impress
wounded with swords and spears—we may upon it. This is not the nature of mind.
All that we know about it shews it to be in
then understand what is meant by impres its nature living and active, and to have
sions made upon it by a body; but, if we
conceive the mind to be immaterial-of the power of perception in its constitution,
but still within those limits to which it is
which I think we have very strong proofs–
we shall find it difficult to affix a meaning confined by the laws of Nature.
to impressions made upon it.
It appears, therefore, that this phrase of
There is a figurative meaning of impres thebymind's having impressions made upon
stons on the mind which is well authorized, it corporeal objects in perception, is
and of which we took notice in the observa either a phrase without any distinct mean
tions made on that word; but this meaning ing, and contrary to the propriety of the
applies only to objects that are interesting. English language, or it is grounded upon
To say that an object which I see with per an hypothesis which is destitute of proof.
fect indifference makes an impression upon On that on account, though we grant that in
my mind, is not, as I apprehend, good percepti there is an impression made
English. If philosophers mean no more upon the organ of 198] sense, and upon the
nerves and brain, we do not admit that
but that I see the object, why should they the object makes any impression upon the
invent an improper phrase to express what
every man knows how to express in plain mind. There is another conclusion drawn from
English * ons made upon the brain in
But it is evident, from the manner in the impressi
which this phrase is used by modern philo solid perception, which 1 conceive to have no
sophers, that they mean, not barely to ex foundation, though it has been adopted
press by it my perceiving an object, but to very generally by philosophers. It is, that,
explain the manner of perception. They images by the impressions made on the brain,
think that the object perceived acts upon and are formed of the object perceived;
the mind in some way similar to that in as itsthatchamber the mind, being seated in the brain
of presence, immediately
which one body acts upon another, by perceives those images only, and has no
making [97] an impression upon it. The
impression upon the mind is conceived to perception of the external object but by
be something wherein the mind is alto them. This notion of our perceiving ex
gether passive, and has some effect pro ternalimages objects, not immediately, but in cer
tain or species of them conveyed by
* A mere metaphor in Aristotle. (See Notes K. the senses, seems to be the most ancient
and M.). At any rate, the impressio
to be
n was supposed
made on the animated sensory, and not on the
| Philosophical hypothesis we have on the
intellect.-H. subject of perception, and to have with
[96–98]
caAP. Iv.] FALSE CONCLUSIONS, &c. 255
small variations retained its authority to are perceived only by certain images, or
this day. shadows of them, let into the mind, as into
Aristotle, as was before observed, main a camera obscura."
tained, that the species, images, or forms The notions of the ancients were very
of external objects, coming from the object, various with regard to the seat of the soul
are impressed on the mind. The followers Since it has been discovered, by the im
of Democritus and Epicurus held the same provements in anatomy, that the nerves
thing, with regard to slender films of sub are the instruments of perception, and of
tile matter coming from the object, that the sensations accompanying it, and that
Aristotle did with regard to his immaterial the nerves ultimately terminate in the
species or forms. brain,t it has been the general opinion of
Aristotle thought every object of human philosophers that the brain is the seat of
understanding enters at first by the senses;" the soul; and that she perceives the images
and that the notions got by them are by that are brought there, and external things,
the powers of the mind refined and spirit only by means of them.
ualized, so as at last to become objects of Des Cartes, observing that the pineal
the most sublime and abstracted sciences. gland is the only part of the brain that is
Plato, on the other hand, had a very mean single, all the other parts being double,t
opinion of all the knowledge we get by the and thinking that the soul must have one
senses. He thought it did not deserve the seat, was determined by this [100] to make
name of knowledge, and could not be the that gland the soul's habitation, to which,
foundation of science; because the objects by means of the animal spirits, intelligence
of sense are individuals only, and are in a is brought of all objects that affect the
constant fluctuation. All science, according senses.S
to him, must be employed about those Others have not thought proper to con
eternal and immutable ideas which existed fine the habitation of the soul to the pineal
before the objects of sense, and are not liable gland, but to the brain in general, or to
to any change. In this there was an essen some part of it, which they call the sen
tial difference between the systems of these sorium. Even the great Newton favoured
two philosophers. [99] The notion of eter this opinion, though he proposes it only as
mal and immutable ideas, which Plato bor a query, with that modesty which dis
rowed from the Pythagorean school, was tinguished him no less than his great genius.
totally rejected by Aristotle, who held it as “Is not,” says he, “the sensorium of animals
a maxim, that there is nothing in the intel the place where the sentient substance is
lect, which was not at first in the senses. present, and to which the sensible species of
But, notwithstanding thisgreat difference things are brought through the nerves and
in those two ancient systems, they might brain, that there they may be perceived by
both agree as to the manner in which we the mind present in that place? And is
perceive objects by our senses: and that there not an incorporeal, living, intelligent,
they did so, I think, is probable; because and omnipresent Being, who, in infinite
Aristotle, as far as I know, neither takes space, as if it were in his sensorium, inti
notice of any difference between himself mately perceives things themselves, and
and his master upon this point, nor lays comprehends them perfectly, as being pre
claim to his theory of the manner of our sent to them; of which things, that prin
perceiving objects as his own invention. ciple in us, which perceives and thinks,
It is still more probable, from the hints discerns only, in its little sensorium, the
which Plato gives in the seventh book of his images brought to it through the organs of
Republic, concerning the manner in which the senses?”||
we perceive the objects of sense; which he His great friend Dr Samuel Clarke
comparesto persons in a deep and dark cave, adopted the same sentiment with more con
who see not external objects themselves but fidence. In his papers to Leibnitz, we
only their shadows, by a light let into the find the following passages: “Without
cave through a small opening.t being present to the images of the things
It seems, therefore, probable that the Py perceived, it (the soul) could not possibly
thagoreans and Platonists agreed with the perceive them. A living substance can
Peripatetics in this general theory of per only there perceive where it is present,
ception—to wit, that the objects of sense either to the things themselves, (as the
omnipresent God is to the whole universe.)
* This is a very doubtful point, and has accord. • An error. see below, under p. 116.-H.
ingly divided his followers, Texts can be quoted to
prove, on the one side, that Aristotle derived all our That is, since the time of Erasistratus and Galen.
notons, a posteriori, from the experience of sense;
and, on the other, that he viewed sense only as afford. 1 Which is not the case. The Hypophysis, the
ing to intellect the condition requisite for it to be. Vermiform process, &c., are not less single than the
come actually conscious of the native and necessary Conarium.-H.
notions it, a priori, virtually possessed.-H. See above, p. 234, b, note *.-H.
+ Reid wholly mistakes the meaning of Plato's | Before Reid, these crude conjectures of Newton
smile of the cave. See below, under p. 116.-H. were justly censured by Genovesi, and others-. H.
[99, 100]
or to the images of things, (as the soul of seat in the brain—this, surely, is not so well
man is in its proper sensory.) Nothing established as that we can safely build
can any more act, or be acted upon, where other principles upon it. There have been
it is not present, than it can be where it is various opinions and much disputation about
not. We are sure the soul cannot perceive the place of spirits: whether they have a
what it is not present to, because nothing place P and, if they have, how they occupy
can act, or be acted upon, where it is not.” that place? After men had fought in the
Mr Locke expresses himself so upon dark about those points for ages, the wiser
this point, that, for the [101] most part, part seem to have left off disputing about
one would imagine that he thought that them, as matters beyond the reach of the
the ideas, or images of things, which he be human faculties.
lieved to be the immediate objects of per As to the second point—that images of all
ception, are impressions upon the mind it the objects of sense areformed in the brain
self; yet, in some passages, he rather we may venture to affirm that there is no
places them in the brain, and makes them proof nor probability of this, with regard to
to be perceived by the mind there present. any of the objects of sense; and that, with
“There are some ideas,” says he, “which regard to the greater part of them, it is
have admittance only through one sense; words without any meaning." -
and, if the organs or the nerves, which are We have not the least evidence that the
the conduits to convey them from without image of any external object is formed in
to their audience in the brain, the mind's the brain. The brain has been dissected
presence room, if I may so call it, are so times innumerable by the nicest ana
disordered as not to perform their function, tomists; every part of it examined by the
they have no postern to be admitted by. naked eye, and with the help of microscopes;
“There seems to be a constant decay of but no vestige of an image of any external
all our ideas, even of those that are struck object was ever found. The brain seems
deepest. The pictures drawn in our minds to be the most improper substance that can
are laid in fading colours. Whether the beinagined for receiving or retaining images,
temper of the brain makes this difference, being a soft, moist, medullary substance.
that in some it retains the characters drawn But how are these images formed ? or
on it like marble, in others like freestone, whence do they come 2 Says Mr Locke, the
and in others little better than sand, I shall organs of sense and nerves convey them from
not enquire.” without. This is just the Aristotelian
From these passages of Mr Locke, and hypothesis of sensible species, which modern
others of a like nature, it is plain that he philosophers have been at great pains to
thought that there are images of external refute, and which must be acknowledged to
objects conveyed to the brain. But whether be one of the most unintelligible parts of
he thought with Des Cartest and Newton, the Peripatetic system. Those who con
that the images in the brain are perceived sider species of colour, figure, sound, and
by the mind there present, or that they are smell, coming from the object, and entering
imprinted on the mind itself, is not so evi by the organs of sense, as a part of the
dent. scholastic jargon long ago discarded from
Now, with regard to this hypothesis, sound philosophy, ought to have discarded
there are three things that deserve to be images in the brain along with them.
considered, because the hypothesis leans There never was a shadow of argument
upon them; and, if any one of them fail, it brought by any author, to shew that an
must fall to the ground. The first is, That [103] image of any external object ever
the soul has its seat, or, as Mr Locke calls entered by any of the organs of sense.
it, its presence room in the brain. The That external objects make some impres
second, That there are images formed in sion on the organs of sense, and by them on
the brain of all the objects of sense. The the nerves and brain, is granted; but that
third, That the mind or soul perceives these those impressions resemble the objects
images in the brain; and that it perceives they are made by, so as that they may be
not external objects immediately, but only called images of the objects, is most impro
rceives them by means of those images. bable. Every hypothesis that has been
102 contrived, shews that there can be no such
''. the first point—that the soul has its resemblance; for neither the motions of
animal spirits, nor the vibrations of elastie
* No great stress should be laid on such figurative chords, or of elastic aether, or of the infinites
passages as indications of the real opinion of Locke,
which, on this point, it is not easy to discover. See
Note O.-H. * It would be rash to assume that, because a phi
+ Des Cartes is perhaps an erratum for Dr Clarke losopher uses the term image, or impression, or idea,
If not, the opinion of Des Cartes is misrepresented: and places what it denotes in the brain, that he
for he denied to the mind all consciousness or imme therefore means that the mind was cognizant of such
diate knowledge of matter and its modifications. corporeal affection, as of its object, either in percep
But of this again, See Note N.-H. tion or imagination. See Note K.-H.
L101–103]
--~~~~~~~
ci, AP. Iv.] FALSE CONCLUSIONS, &c. 257
imal particles of the nerves, can be sup means of the organs given us for that pur
posed to resemble the objects by which pose. But these organs do not perceive.
they are excited. The eye is the organ of sight, but it sees
We know that, in vision, an image of the not. A telescope is an artificial organ of
visible object is formed in the bottom of the sight. The eye is a natural organ of sight,
eye by the rays of light. But we know, but it sees as little as the telescope. We
also, that this image cannot be conveyed to know how the eye forms a picture of the
the brain, because the optic nerve, and all visible object upon the retina; but how this
the parts that surround it, are opaque and picture makes us see the object we know
impervious to the rays of light; and there not; and if experience had not informed us
is no other organ of sense in which any that such a picture is necessary to vision,
image of the object is formed. we should never have known it. We can
It is farther to be observed, that, with give no reason why the picture on the re
regard to some objects of sense, we may tina should be followed by vision, while a
understand what is meant by an image of like picture on any other part of the body
them imprinted on the brain; but, with produces nothing like vision.
regard to most objects of sense, the phrase It is likewise a law of our nature, that we
is absolutely unintelligible, and conveys no perceive not external objects, unless certain
meaning at all. As to objects of sight, I impressions be made by the object upon the
understand what is meant by an image of organ, and by means of the organ upon the
their figure in the brain. But how shall we nerves and brain. But of the nature of
conceive an image of their colour wherethere those impressions we are perfectly ignorant;
is absolute darkness? And as to all other
and though they are conjoined with percep
objects of sense, except figure and colour, tion by the will of our Maker, yet it does
I am unable to conceive what is meant by an not appear that they have any necessary con
image of them. Let any man say what he nection with it in their own nature, far less
means by an image of heat and cold, animage that they can be the proper efficient cause
of hardness or softness, an image of sound, of it. [105] We perceive, because God has
or smell, or taste. The word image, when given us the power of perceiving, and not
applied to these objects of sense, has abso because we have impressions from objects.
lutely no meaning. Upon what a weak We perceive nothing without those impres
foundation, then, does this hypothesis stand, sions, because our Maker has limited and
when it supposes that images of all the circumscribed our powers of perception, by
objects of sense are imprinted on the brain, such laws of Nature as to his wisdom seemed
being conveyed thither by the conduits of the meet, and such as suited our rank in his
organs and nerves : " [104] creation."
The third point in this hypothesis is,
That the mind perceives the images in the * The doctrine of Reid and Stewart, in regard to
brain, and external objects only by means our perception of external things, bears a close ana
of them. This is as improbable as that logy to the Cartesian scheme of divine assistance, or
of occasional causes. It seems, however, to coinc de
there are such images to be perceived. If most completely with the opinion of Ruardus Andala,
our powers of perception be not altogether a Lutch Cartesian, who attempted to reconcile the
fallacious, the objects we perceive are not theory of assistance with that of physical influence
“statuo,” he says, “nos clarissimam etdistinctissimana
in our brain, but without us.* We are so hujus operationis et unionis posse habcre ideem, sh
far from perceiving images in the brain, modo, quod omnino fact reoportet, ad Deum. caus
that we do not perceive our brain at all; sam ejus primam et liberam ascendamus, et ab ejus
beneplacito admirandum hunc effectum derivemus.
nor would any man ever have known that Nos possumus huic vel illi motui e. gr. campanae,
he had a brain, if anatomy had not dis sic et hederae suspensae literis "critis, verbis quibus
cunque pronunciatis, aliisque signis, varias ideas
covered, by dissection, that the brain is a alligare, ita, ut per visum, vel auditum in mente ex
constituent part of the human body. citentur variae ideae, p, rcel tiones et sensationes :
To sum up what has been said with re annon hunc clare et facile intellioimus, Deum crew.
torem m ntis et corporis potuisse instituere et or, i.
gard to the organs of perception, and the are, ut per vaios in corpore motus variae in mente
impressions made upon our nerves and excitettur ideae et perceptiones; et vicissim, ut per
brain. It is a law of our nature, estab varias mentis volitiones, varii in corpore excitentur
et producantur matus * H nc et pro varia alter
lished by the will of the Supreme Being, utrius partis dispositione altera pars variis modis
that we perceive no external object but by affici potest. Hoc autem a Deo ita ordinatum et
effectum esse, a posteriori, continua, certissima et
clarissima experientia docet Testes irrefragabiles
omnique exceptione majores reciproci hujus com
• These objections to the hypothesis in question, mercii, operationis mentis in corpus, et corporis in
have been £, urged both in ancient and in mentem, nec non communionis status, sunt sensus
omnes tum erter-ni, turn interni, ut et omnes et
modern times. See Note K-H.
* If this tie taken literally and by itself, then, ac singulae et continua actiones mentis in corps, de
cording to Reid, perception is not an immanent cog quibus modo fuit actum. "I quis vero a proprieta
nition; extension and figure are, in that art, not fibus mentis ad proprietates corpors progreat velit.
aut ex natura diversissimarum haruna substantiarum
merely suggest d conceptions; and, as we are perci
pient of the non-ego, and, conscious ofthe perception, deduceremotum in corpore, & perceptiones inn ente,
-e are theretire conscious of the non-ego. But see aut hos effectus ut necessario connexos spectare;
Note C.-H. nae is frustra erit, nihil intelliget, perversissime phi
[104. 105]
258 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. i Essay 11.
a clear than in a foggy day. An object
CHAPTER V. seen indistinctly with the naked eye, on
account of its smallness, may be seen dis
of PERCEPTION, tinctly with a microscope. The objects in
this room will be seen by a person in the
IN speaking of the impressions made on room less and less distinctly as the light of
our organs in perception, we build upon the day fails; they pass through all the
facts borrowed from anatomy and physio various degrees of distinctness according to
logy, for which we have the testimony of the degrees of the light, and, at last, in
our senses. But, being now to speak of total darkness they are not seen at all.
perception itself, which is solely an act of What has been said of the objects of sight
the mind, we must appeal to another is so easily applied to the objects of the
authority. The operations of our minds other senses, that the application may be
are known, not by sense, but by conscious left to the reader.
ness, the authority of which is as certain In a matter so obvious to every person
and as irresistible as that of sense. capable of reflection, it is necessary enly
In order, however, to our having a distinct farther to observe, that the notion which
notion of any of the operations of our own we get of an object, merely by our external
minds, it is not enough that we be conscious sense, ought not to be confounded with that
of them; for all men have this consciousness. more scientific notion which a man, come to
It is farther necessary that we attend to them the years of understanding, may have of the
while they are exerted, and reflect upon them same object, by attending to its various
with care, while they are recent and fresh attributes, or to its various parts, and their
in our memory. It is necessary that, by relation to each other, and to the whole.
employing ourselves frequently in this way, [107] Thus, the notion which a child has of
we get the habit of this attention and reflec a jack for roasting meat, will beacknowledged
tion ; and, therefore, for the proof of facts to be very different from that of a man who
which I shall have occasion to mention upon understands its construction, and perceives
this subject, I can only appeal to the reader's the relation of the parts to one another, and
own thoughts, whether such facts are not to the whole. The child sees the jack and
agreeable to what he is conscious of in his every part of it as well as the man. The
own mind. [106] child, therefore, has all the notion of it
If, therefore, we attend to that act of which sight gives; whatever there is more
our mind which we call the perception of an in the notion which the man forms of it,
external object of sense, we shall find in it must be derived from other powers of the
these three things:–First, Some con mind, which may afterwards be explained.
ception or notion of the object perceived; This observation is made here only that we
Secondly, A strong and irresistible convic may not confound the operations of differ
tion and belief of its present existence; and, ent powers of the mind, which by being
Thirdly, That this conviction and belief are always conjoined after we grow up to under
immediate, and not the effect of reasoning." standing, areapt to pass for one and the same.
First, It is impossible to perceive an Secondly, In perception we not only have
object without having some notion or con a notion more or less distinct of the object
ception of that which we perceive. We perceived, but also an irresistible conviction
may, indeed, conceive an object which we and belief of its existence. This is always
do not perceive; but, when we perceive the the case when we are certain that we per
object, we must have some conception of it ceive it. There may be a perception so
at the same time; and we have commonly faint and indistinct as to leave us in doubt
a more clear and steady notion of the object whether we perceive the object or not.
while we perceive it, than we have from Thus, when a star begins to twinkle as the
memory or imagination when it is not per light of the sun withdraws, one may, for a
ceived. Yet, even in perception, the notion short time, think he sees it without being
which our senses give of the object may be certain, until the perception acquire some
more or less clear, more or less distinct, in strength and steadiness. When a ship just
all possible degrees. begins to appear in the utmost verge of the
£ we see more distinctly an object at horizon, we may at first be dubious whether
a small than at a great distance. An object we perceive it or not; but when the percep
at a great distance is seen more distinctly in tion is in any degree clear and steady, there
remains no doubt of its reality; and when
losophabitur nullamgue hujus rei ideam habere po the reality of the perception is ascertained,
terit. Sivero ad focum (reatorem adscendamus, the existence of the object perceived can no
eumque vere agnoscamus, nihi hic erit obscuri,
hunc effectum clari-sime intelligemus, et quidem per longer be doubted."
caussam ejus primam ; quae perfectissima demum
est scientia "-H. * In this paragraph there is a confusion of that
* See above, p. 183, a, note *; p. 128, b, note *; which is pe ceived and that which is inferred from
and Note C.-H. the perceition.-H.
[106, 107 |
chA1 v.] OF PERCEPTION. 259
By the laws of all nations, in the most by various accidents, be reduced to this
solemn judicial trials, wherein men's for state. General rules that regard those
tunes and lives are at stake, the sentence whose intellects are sound are not over
passes according to the testimony of eye or thrown by instances of men whose intellects
car witnesses of good credit. An upright are hurt by any constitutional or accidental
judge will give a fair hearing to every objec disorder.
tion that can be made to the integrity of a The other exception that may be made
witness, and allow it to be possible that he to the principle we have laid down is that
may be corrupted; but no judge will ever of some philosophers who have maintained
suppose that witnesses maybe imposed upon that the testimony of sense is fallacious,
by trusting to their eyes and ears. And if and therefore ought never to be trusted.
a sceptical counsel should plead against the Perhaps it might be a sufficient answer to
testimony of the witnesses, that they had this to say, that there is nothing so absurd
no other evidence for what they [108] de which some philosophers have not main
clared but the testimony of their eyes and tained." It is one thing to profess a doc
ears, and that we ought not to put so much trine of this kind, another seriously to be
faith in our senses as to deprive men of life lieve it, and to be governed by it in the
or fortune upon their testimony, surely no conduct of life. It is evident that a man
upright judge would admit a plea of this who did not believe his senses could not
kind. I believe no counsel, however scep keep out of harm's way an hour of his life;
tical, ever dared to offer such an argument; yet, in all the history of philosophy, we
and, if it was offered, it would be rejected never read of any sceptic that ever stepped
with disdain. into fire or water because he did not believe
Can any stronger proof be given that it his senses, or that shewed in the conduct of
is the universal judgment of mankind that life less trust in his senses than other men
the evidence of sense is a kind of evidence have.t. This gives us just ground to appre
which we may securely rest upon in the hend that philosophy was never able to
most momentous concerns of mankind; conquer that natural belief which men have
that it is a kind of evidence against which in their senses; and that all their subtile
we ought not to admit any reasoning; and, reasonings against this belief were never
therefore, that to reason either for or against able to persuade themselves. -
it is an insult to common sense ? It appears, therefore, that the clear and

The whole conduct of mankind in the distinct testimony of our senses carries
daily occurrences of life, as well as the so irresistible conviction along with it to every
lemn procedure of judicatories in the trial man in his right judgment.
of causes civil and criminal, demonstrates I observed, Tairdly, That this conviction
this. I know only of two exceptions that is not only irresistible, but it is immediate;
may be offered against this being the uni that is, it is not by a train of reasoning
versal belief of mankind. and argumentation that we come to be
The first exception is that of some luna convinced of the existence of what we
tics who have been persuaded of things that perceive; we ask no argument for the
seem to contradict the clear testimony of existence of the object, but that we per
their senses. It is said there have been ceive it; perception commands our belief
lunatics and hypochondriacal persons, who upon its own authority, and disdains to
seriously believed themselves to be made of rest its authority upon any reasoning what
glass; and, in consequence of this, lived in soever.: [110]
continual terror of having their brittle frame The conviction of a truth may be irre
shivered into pieces. sistible, and yet not immediate. Thus, my
All I have to say to this is, that our conviction that the three angles of every
minds, in our present state, are, as well as plain triangle are equal to two right angles,
our bodies, liable to strange disorders; and, is irresistible, but it is not immediate; I
as we do not judge of the natural constitu am convinced of it by demonstrative rea
tion of the body from the disorders or dis soning. There are other truths in mathe
eases to which it is subject from accidents, matics of which we have not only an irre
so neither ought we to judge of the natural sistible but an immediate conviction. Such
powers of the mind from its disorders, but are the axioms. Our belief of the axioms
from its sonnd state. It is natural to man, in mathematics is not grounded upon argu
and common to the species, to have two • A saying of Varro.-H.
hands and two feet; yet I have seen a man, f All this we read, however, in Laërtius, of Pyrrho;
and a very ingenious one, who was born and on the authority of Antigonus Carystius, the
without either hands or feet. [109] It is reat sceptic's contemporary. Whether we are to
lieve the narrative is another question.-H.
natural to man to have faculties superior to t if Reid holds that in perception we have only a
those of brutes; yet we see some indivi conception of the Non-E, o in the Ego, this belief is
either not the reflex of a cognition, but a blind faith,
duals whose faculties are not equal to those or it is mediate, as held by Stewart.-Philos. Ess, it
of many brutes; and the wisest man may, c 2.-H.
[108-110] * 2
- - - -- -

ment—arguments are grounded upon them; ner the notion of external objects, and the
but their evidence is discerned immediately immediate belief of their existence, is pro
by the human understanding. duced by means of our senses, I am not
It is, no doubt, one thing to have an able to shew, and I do not pretend to shew.
immediate conviction of a self-evident If the power of perceiving external objects
axiom ; it is another thing to have an im in certain circumstances, be a part of the
mediate conviction of the existence of what original constitution of the human mind,
we see; but the conviction is equally imme all attempts to account for it will be vain.
diate and equally irresistible in both cases. No other account can be given of the con
No man thinks of seeking a reason to believe stitution of things, but the will of Him that
what he sees; and, before we are capable of made them. As we can give no reason why
reasoning, we put no less confidence in our matter is extended and inert, why the mind
senses than after. The rudest savage is as thinks and is conscious of its thoughts, but
fully convinced of what he sees, and hears, the will of Him who made both ; so I sus
and feels, as the most expert logician. The pect we can give no other reason why, in
constitution of our understanding deter certain circumstances, we perceive external
mines us to hold the truth of a mathematical objects, and in others do not."
axiom as a first principle, from which other The Supreme Being intended that we
truths may be deduced, but it is deduced should have such knowledge of the material
from none; and the constitution of our objects that surround us, as is necessary in
power of perception determines us to hold order to our supplying the wants of nature,
the existence of what we distinctly perceive and avoiding the dangers to which we are
as a first principle, from which other truths constantly exposed; and he has admirably
may be deduced; but it is deduced from fitted our powers of perception to this
none. What has been said of the irresis purpose. [112] If the intelligence we have
tible and immediate belief of the existence of external objects were to be got by
of objects distinctly perceived, I mean only reasoning only, the greatest part of men
to affirm with regard to persons so far ad would be destitute £ for the greatest
vanced in understanding as to distinguish part of men hardly ever learn to reason;
objects of mere imagination from things and in infancy and childhood no man can
which have a real existence. Every man reason: Therefore, as this intelligence of
knows that he may have a notion of Don the objects that surround us, and from
Quixote, or of Garagantua, without any which we may receive so much benefit or
belief that such persons ever existed; and harm, is equally necessary to children and
that of Julius Caesar and Oliver Crom to men, to the ignorant and to the learned,
well, he has not only a notion, but a belief God in his wisdom conveys it to us in a
that they did really exist. [111] But way that puts all upon a level. The inform
whether children, from the time that they ation of the senses is as perfect, and gives
begin to use their senses, make a distinction as full conviction to the most ignorant as to
between things which are only conceived or the most learned.
imagined, and things which really exist,
may be doubted. Until we are able to
make this distinction, we cannot properly CHAPTER VI.
be said to believe or to disbelieve the
existence of anything. The belief of the WHAT i'i IS TO ACCOUNT for A Ph.eNOMENoN
existence of anything seems to suppose a iN NATURE.
notion of existence—a notion too abstract,
perhaps, to enter into the mind of an in AN object placed at a proper distance,
fant. I speak of the power of perception and in a good light, while the eyes are shut,
in those that are adult and of a sound is not perceived at all; but no sooner do
mind, who believe that there are some we open our eyes upon it than we have, as
things which do really exist; and that there it were by inspiration, a certain knowledge
are manythings conceived by themselves, of its existence, of its colour, figure, and
and by others, which have no existence. distance. This is a fact which every one
That such persons do invariably ascribe knows. The vulgar are satisfied with know
existence toeverything which they distinctly ing the fact, and give themselves no trouble
perceive, without seeking reasons or argu about the cause of it: but a philosopher is
ments for doing so, is perfectly evident from impatient to know how this event is pro
the whole tenor of human life. duced, to account for it, or assign its cause.
The account I have given of our percep This avidity to know the causes of things
tion of external objects, is intended as a is the parent of all philosophy, true and
faithful delineation of what every man, come false. Men of speculation place a great
to years of understanding, and capable of part of their happiness in such knowledge.
giving attention to what passes in his own |- see above, p 128, b, note *, and p. 130, b. note *;
mind, may feel in himself. In what man a slote A.-H.
[111, 112]
cii AP. v1 | ACCOUNT OF A PHAENOMENON. 261
Felix qui potwit rerum cognoseere causas, velocity being continued through the third
has always been a sentiment of human second, and having the same addition by
nature. But, as in the pursuit of other gravitation as in any of the preceding, the
kinds of happiness men often mistake the whole velocity at the end of the third second
road, so in none have they more frequently will be thrice as great as at the end of the
done it than in the philosophical pursuit of first, and so on continually.
the causes of things. [113] We may here observe, that the causes
It is a dictate of common sense, that the assigned of this phaenomenon are two: First,
causes we assign of £ ought to That bodies once put in motion retain their
be real, and not fictions of hu imagina velocity and their direction, until it is changed
tion. It is likewise self-evident, that such by some force impressed upon them. Se
causes ought to be adequate to the effects condly, That the weight or gravitation of a
that are conceived to be produced by them. body is always the same. These are laws
That those who are less accustomed to of Nature, confirmed by universal experi
inquiries into the causes of natural appear ence, and therefore are not feigned but true
ances, may the better understand what it causes. Then, they are precisely adequate
is to shew the cause of such appearances, to the effect ascribed to them; they must
or to account for them, I shall borrow a necessarily produce that very motion in
plain instance of a phaenomenon or appear descending bodies which we find to take
ance, of which a full and satisfactory ac place; and neither more nor less. The
count has been given. The phaenomenon account, therefore, given of this phaenom
is this: That a stone, or any heavy body, non, is just and philosophical; no other
falling from a height, continually increases will ever be required or admitted by those
its velocity as it descends; so that, if it who understand this.
acquire a certain velocity in one second of It ought likewise to be observed, that
time, it will have twice that velocity at the the causes assigned of this phaenomenon,
end of two seconds, thrice at the end of are things of which we can assign no cause.
three seconds, and so on in proportion to Why bodies once put in motion continue to
the time. This accelerated velocity in a move—why bodies constantly gravitate to
stone falling must have been observed from wards the earth with the same force–no
the beginning of the world; but the first man has been able to shew : these are facts
person, as far as we know, who accounted confirmed by universal experience, and
for it in a proper and philosophical manner, they must no doubt have a cause; but their
was the famous Galileo, after innumer cause is unknown, and we call them laws
able false and fictitious accounts had been of Nature, because we know no cause of
given of it. them, but the will of the Supreme Being.
He observed, that bodies once put in But may we not attempt to find the cause
motion continue that motion with the same of gravitation, and of other phaenomena,
velocity, and in the same direction, until which we call laws of Nature ? No doubt
they be stopped or retarded, or have the wemay. [115] We know not the limit which
direction of their motion altered, by some has been set to human knowledge, and our
force impressed upon them. This property knowledge of the works of God can never
of bodies is called their inertia, or inac be carried too far. But, supposing gravita
tivity; for it implies no more than that tion to be accounted for, by an aethereal
bodies cannot of themselves change their elastic medium, for instance, this can only be
state from rest to motion, or from motion done, first, by proving the existence and the
to rest. He observed also, that gravity acts elasticity of this medium ; and, secondly,
constantly and equally upon a body, and by shewing that this medium must neces
therefore will give equal degrees of velocity sarily produce that gravitation which bodies
to a body in equal times. From these are known to have. Until this be done,
principles, which are known from experi gravitation is not accounted for, nor is
ence to be fixed laws of nature, Galileo its cause known; and when this is done,
shewed that heavy bodies must descend the elasticity of this medium will be consi
with a velocity uniformly accelerated, as dered as a law of nature whose cause is
by experience they are found to do. [114] unknown. The chain of natural causes has,
For if the body by its gravitation ac not unfitly, been compared to a chain hang
quire a certain velocity at the end of one ing down from heaven: a link that is dis
second, it would, though its gravitation covered supports the links below it, but it
should cease that moment, continue to go on must itself be supported; and that which
with that velocity; but its gravitation con supports it must be supported, until we
tinues, and will in another second give it an come to the first link, which is supported
additional velocity, equal to that which it gave by the throne of the Almighty. Every na
in the first; so that the whole velocity at tural cause must have a cause, until we
the end of two seconds, will be twice as great ascend to the first cause, which is uncaused,
as at the end of one. In like manner, this and operates not by necessity but by will.
I 113-1151
262 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essay II.
By what has been said in this chapter, those of his scholar, Aristotle, and of the
those who are but little acquainted with Peripatetics. The shadows of Plato may
philosophical inquiries, may see what is very well represent the species and phan
meant by accounting for a phaenomenon, tasms of the Peripatetic school, and the
or shewing its cause, which ought to be well ideas and impressions of modern philo
understood, in order to judge of the theories sophers."
by which philosophers have attempted to -
-
account for our perception of external ob * This interpretation of the meaning of Plato's
comparison of the cave exhibits a curious mistake,
jects by the senses. in which Reid is followed by Mr Stewart and many
others, and which, it is remarkable, has never, yet
been detected. In the similitude in question, (which
will be found in the seventh book of the Republic.)
CHAPTER VII. | Plato is supposed to intend an illustration of the
mode in which the shadows or vicarious images of
SENTIMENTs" of PHILosoPHERs AbouT THE external things are admitted into the mind-to
PERCEPTION of ExtERNAL objects; AND,
# in short, an hypothesis of sensitive perceptien.
On this supposition, the identity of the Platonic,
FIRST, of THE THEORY of FATHER MALE Pythagorean, and Peripatetic theories of this pro
cess is inferred. Nothing can, however, be more
BRANCHE.'t groundless than the supposition; nothing more erro
neous than the inference. By his cave, images, and
How the correspondence is carried on shadows, Plato meant simply to illustrate the grand
principle of his philosophy-that the Sensible or Ec
between the thinking principle withinus, and typal world, (phaenomenal, transitory, Žiž»e, 3.
the material world without us, has always **, *.*,) stands to the Noetic or Archetypal, (sub
stantial, permanent, b, ra's 2,) in the same relation
been found a very difficult problem to those of comparative unreality, in which the shadows of the
philosophers who think themselves obliged images of sensible existences themselves, stand to the
to account for every phaenomenon in nature. things of which they are the dim and distant adum
brations. In the language of an illustrious poet
[116] Many philosophers, ancient and “An nescis, quacunque helic sunt, quae hac nocte
modern, have employed their invention to teguntur,
discover how we are made to perceive ex omnia res prorsus veras non esse, sed umbras,
Aut specula, undead vos aliena elucet image?
ternal objects by our senses; and there Terra quidem, et maria alta, atque his circumfluus
appears to be a very great uniformity in aer,
their sentiments in the main, notwithstand Ft quae consistunt exiis, haec omnia tenues
Sunt umbrae, humanos quae tanquam somnia quae.
ing their variations in particular points. dam
Plato illustrates our manner of perceiving Pertingunt animos, fallaci et imagine iudunt,
Nunquam eaden, fluxu semper variata perenni.
the objects of sense, in this manner. He Solautem, Lunaeque globus, fulgentiaque astra
supposes a dark subterraneous cave, in Caetera, sint quamvis meliori praedita vita,
which men lie bound in such a manner Et donata aevo immortali, haec ipsa tamen sunt
AEterni specula, in quae animus, qui est inde profec.
that they can direct their eyes only to one tus,
part of the cave : far behind, there is a Inspiciens,
Ardescit,
'' quodam quasi tactus amore,
erum quoniam heic non perstat et ultra
light, some rays of which come over a wall Nescio quid scquitur secum, tacitusque requirit,
to that part of the cave which is before the Nosse licet circum haec ipsum consistereverum,
Non finem: sedenim esse aliud quid, cujus imago
eyes of our prisoners. A number of per Splendet in iis, quod perse ipsum est, et principium
sons, variously employed, pass between esse
them and the light, whose shadows are seen Omnibus aeternum, ante omnem numerunique diem
que;
by the prisoners, but not the persons them In quo alium Solem atque aliam splendescere Lu.
selves. nam
In this manner, that philosopher con Adspicias, aliosque orbes, alia astra manere,
Terramgue, fluviosque allos, atque aera, et ignem,
ceived that, by our senses, we perceive the Et nemora, atque aliis errare animalia silvie.”
shadows of things only, and not things And as the comparison is misunderstood, so no
thing can be conceived more adverse to the doctrine
themselves. He seems to have borrowed
of Plato than the theory it is supposed to elucidate.
his notions on this subject, from the Pytha Plotinus, indeed, formally refutes, as contrary to the
goreans, and they very probably from Py Platonic, the very hypothesis thus attributed to his
thagoras himself. If we make allowance master. (Enn. IV, 1. vi., cc. i., 3.) The doctrine of
the Platonists on this point has been almost wholly
for Plato's allegorical genius, his sentiments contains
neglected; and the author annong them whose work
its most £ has been
on this subject, correspond very well with so completely overlooked, h by scholars and phi
losophers, that his work is of the rarest, while even
• Sentiment, as here and elsewhere employed by his name is mentioned in no history of philosophy.
Reid, in the meaning of opinion, (sententia,) is not It is here sufficient to state, that the #3xxx, the
to be imitated. There are, undoubtedly, precedents Agye, was exei, the forms representative of external
to be found for such usage in English writers; and, in things, and corresponding to the species sensiles ex
the French and Italian languages, this is one of the presse of the schoolmen, were not held by the Plato
ordinary significations of the word-H mists to be derived from without "rior to the art of
: It is not easy to conceive by what principle the perception, they have a latent but real existence in
order of the history of opinions touching Perception, the soul; and, by the impassive energy of the mind
contained in the nine following chapters, is deter. itself, are elicited into consciousness, on occasion of the
mined. It is not chronological, and it is not systematic. impression (zi,zzis,**62,12zzaziz) made on the exter
Of these theories, there is a very able survey, by M. nal organ, and of the vital form (zaruze, Jöer), in con
Royer Collard, among the fragments of his lectures, sequence thereof, sublimated in the animal life. The
in the third volume of Jouffroy's “Oeuvres de Reid.” verses of Boethius, which have been so frequently
That distinguished philosopher has, however, placed mi understood, contain an accurate statement of the
too great a reliance upon the accuracy of Reid.-H. Platonic theory of perception. After retuting the
| 116)
- - ---,
chap. vii.] SENTIMIENTS ABOUT PERCEPTION. 203
Two thousand years after Plato, Mr pears an unanimity, rarely to be found among
Locke, who studied the operations of the philosophers on such abstruse points."
human mind so much, and with so great If it should be asked, Whether, accord
success, represents our manner of perceiving ing to the opinion of philosophers, we per
external objects, by a similitude very much ceive the images or ideas only, and infer the
resembling that of the cave. “Methinks,” existence and qualities of the external ob
says he, “the understanding is not much ject from what we perceive in the image;
unlike a closet wholly shut from light, with or, whether we really perceive the external
only some little opening left, to let in exter object as well as its image?—the answer
nal visible resemblances or ideas of things to this question is not quite obvious.*
without. Would the pictures coming into On the one hand, philosophers, if we ex
such a dark room but stay there, and lie so cept Berkeley and Hume, believe the ex
orderly as to be found upon occasion, it istence of external objects of sense, and call
would very much resemble the under them objects of perception, though not im
standing of a man, in reference to all objects mediate objects. But what they mean by
of sight, and the ideas of them.” [117] a mediate object of perception I do not find
Plato'ssubterranean cave, and Mr Locke's clearly explained: whether they suit their
dark closet, may be applied with ease to all language to popular opinion, and mean that
the systems of perception that have been we perceive external objects in that figura
invented: for they all suppose that we tive sense in which we say that we perceive
perceive not external objects immediately, an absent friend when we look on his pic
and that the immediate objects of percep ture; or whether they mean that, really,
tion are only certain shadows of the ex and without a figure, we perceive both the
ternal objects. Those shadows or images, external object and its idea in the mind.
which we immediately perceive, were by If the last be their meaning, it would follow
the ancients called species, forms, phan that, in every instance of perception, there
tasius. Since the time of Des Cartes, they is a double object perceived : [l 18] that
have commonly been called ideas, and by I perceive, for instance, one sun in the
Mr Hume, impressions. But all philoso heavens, and another in my own mind.:
phers, from Plato to Mr Hume, agree in But I do not find that they affirm this;
this, That we do not perceive external ob and, as it contradicts the experience of all
jects immediately, and that the immediate mankind, I will not impute it to them.
object of perception must be some image It seems, therefore, that their opinion is,
present to the mind." So far there ap That we do not really perceive the external
object, but the internal only; and that, when
Stoical doctrine of the passivity of mind in this pro they speak of perceiving external objects,
cess, he proceeds:
“Mens est efficiens magis they mean it only in a popular or in a figur
Longe causa potentior, ative sense, as above explained. Several
tlam quae materiaemodo reasons lead me to think this to be the
mpressas patitur notas.
Precedit tamen ercitans opinion of philosophers, beside what is
Ac vires animi movens
Prvo in corpore to,
mentioned above. First, If we do really
Cum vel lux oculos ferit, perceive the external object itself, there
Vel vox aur bus instrepit: seems to be no necessity, no use, for an
Tum mentis vigor excitus
Quas intus species tenet, image of it. Secondly, Since the time of
Ad motus similes vocans, Des Cartes, philosophers have very gene
Notts applicat exteris, rally thought that the existence of external
Introrsumque reconditis
formis miscetimagines.” objects of sense requires proof, and can only
I cannot now do more than indicate the contrast be proved from the existence of their ideas.
of this doctrine to the Peripatetic (1 do not say Arts Thirdly, The way in which philosophers
totelian: theory, and its approximation to the Carte
sian and Leibnitzian hypotheses; which, however, speak of ideas, seems to imply that they
both attempt to explain, what the Platonic did not are the only objects of perception.
how the mind, or hypothesi, above all physical in
taence, is determined, on the presence of the un who held a purer and preciser doctrine of immediate
known reality within the sphere of sense, to call into *: than Reid himself contemplated.-H.
consciousness the representation through which that * Reid himself, like the philos phers in general,
reality is made known to us. I may add, that not really holds, that we do not perceive external things
rerely the Platonists, but sorre of the older Peripa in mediately, if he does not allow us a consciousness
tetics held that the soul virtually contained within it of the non-ego. It matters nºt whether the external
self representative iorms, which were only excited reality be represented in a vertium quid, or in a no
by the external reality; as Theophrastus and The dification of the mind itself; in eit er case, it is not
*istius, to say nothing of the "latonizing Porphyry, known in itself, but in something numerically dif
ferent.-H.
simplicius and Arnmonius Hermiae; and the same
opinion, adopted probably from the latter, by his * Notling can be clearer than would be this answer.
1 u, 11, the Arabian Adelandus, subsequently be -In terception, the external reality, (the mediate
came even the common doctrine of the Moorish object) is only known to us in and through theim
Aristotelians. mediate object, i.e., the representation of which we
I shall afterwards have occasion to notice that are conscious. As criting, and beyond the sphere of
Bacon has also wrested Pla'o's similitude of the cave comiciousness, the external reality is unknown. --H.
from its genuine signification.-H. 1 “Et solem seminum et duplices se ostendere
Thebas!"-H,
• 1 his is not correct. There were philosophers
[117, 118
264 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. LEssAY 11.
Having endeavoured to explain what is thing which he has made, but of every pos
common to philosophers in accounting for sible existence, and of all the relations of
our perception of external objects, we shall things." By a proper purification and
give some detail of their differences. abstraction from the objects of sense, we
The ideas by which we perceive external may be in some measure united to the
objects, are said by some to be the ideas of Deity, and, in the eternal light, be enabled
the Deity; but it has been more generally to discern the most sublime intellectual
thought, that every man's ideas are proper truths.
to himself, and are either in his mind, or These Platonic motions, grafted upon
in his sensorium, where the mind is imme Christianity, probably gave rise to the
diately present. The first is the theory of
sect called Mystics, which, though in its
Malebranche; the second we shall call the spirit and principles extremely opposite to
common theory. the Peripatetic, £
was never extinguished,
With regard to that of Malebranche, it but subsists to this day. [120
seems to have some affinity with the Pla Many of the Fathers of the Christian
tonic notion of ideas," but is not the same. church have a tincture of the tenets of the
Plato believed that there are three eternal Alexandrian school; among others, St
first principles, from which all things have Augustine. But it does not appear, as far
their origin–matter, ideas, and an efficient as I know, that either Plato, or the latter
cause. Matter is that of which all things Platonists, or St Augustine, or the Mysties,
are made, which, by all the ancient philo thought that we perceive the £
of
sophers, was conceived to be eternal. [119] sense in the divine ideas. They had too
Ideas are forms without matter of every mean a notion of our perception of sensible
kind of things which can exist; which forms objects to ascribe to it so high an origin.
were also conceived by Plato to be eternal This theory, therefore, of our perceiving
and immutable, and to be the models or the objects of sense in the ideas of the
patterns by which the efficient cause—that Deity, I take to be the invention of Father
is, the Deity—formed every part of this Malebranche himself. He, indeed, brings
universe. These ideas were conceived to many passages of St Augustine to counte
be the sole objects of science, and indeed nance it, and seems very desirous to have
of all true knowledge. While we are im that Father of his party. But in those
prisoned in the body, we are prone to give passages, though the Father speaks in a
attention to the objects of sense only; but very high strain of God's being the light of
these being individual things, and in a con our minds, of our being illuminated imme
stant fluctuation, being indeed shadows diately by the eternal light, and uses other
rather than realities, cannot be the object similar expressions; yet he seems to apply
of real knowledge. All science is employed those expressions only to our illumination
not about individual things, but about in moral and divine things, and not to the
things universal and abstract from matter. '' of objects by the senses. Mr
Truth is eternal and immutable, and there yle imagines that some traces of this
fore must have for its object eternal and opinion of Malebranche are to be found in
immutable ideas; these we are capable of Amelius the Platonist, and even in Demo
contemplating in some degree even in our critus; but his authorities seem to be
present state, but not without a certain strained."
purification of mind, and abstraction from Malebranche, with a very penetrating
the objects of sense. Such, as far as I am genius, entered into a more minute examin
able to comprehend, were the sublime ation of the powers of the human mind,
notions of Plato, and probably of Pytha than any one before him. He had the advan
Orits. tage of the discoveries made by Des Cartes,
The philosophers of the Alexandrian whom he followed without slavish attach
school, commonly called the latter Plato ment.
mists, seem to have adopted the same sys He lays it down as a principle admitted
tem; but with this difference, that they by all philosophers, and which could not
made the eternal ideas not to be a principle be called in question, that we do not per
distinct from the Deity, but to be in the ceive external objects immediately, but by
divine intellect, as the objects of those con means of images or ideas of them present
ceptions which the divine mind must, from to the mind. “I suppose,” says he, “that
all eternity, have had, not only of every
* And this, though Aristotle asserts the contrary,
* The Platonic theory of tdeas has nothing to do was perhaps also the doctrine of Plato.-H.
with a doctrine of sensitive perception; and its intro f the theory of Malebranche has been vainly
duction into the question is only pregnant with con sought for in the Bible, the Platonists, and the Fathers.
fusion; while, in regard to sensitive perception, the It is, in fact, more clearly enounced in Homer than
peculiar hypothesis of Malebranche, is in fact not only in any of these graver sources.
not similar to, but much farther removed from, the Tales. 2 # *er is is irixfloria, 2.6%rw”,
Platonic than the common Cartesian theory, and of ir'*: &yze rar: ****, * (#2, re.
the Leibnitzian-H. But for anticipations, see Note £11
[119, 120]
*AF. vii.] SENTIMENTS ABOUT EXTERNAL OBJECTS. 265
every one will grant that we perceive not Deity, either in our creation, or occasionally,
the objects that are without us immediately, as there is use for them;" or, fourthly, the
and of themselves." We see the sun, the soul has in itself virtually and eminently, as
stars, and an infinity of objects without us; the schools speak, all the perfections which
and it is not at all likely that the soul sal it perceives in bodies;" or, fifthly, the soul
lies out of the body, and, as it were, takes a is united with a Being possessed of all per
walk through the heavens, to contemplate fection, who has in himself the ideas of all
all those objects. [121] She sees them not, created things.
therefore, by themselves; and the imme This he takes to be a complete enumera
diate object of the mind, when it sees the tions of all the possible ways in which the
sun, for example, is not the sun, but some ideas of external objects may be presented
thing which is intimately united to the to our minds. He employs a whole chapter
soul; and it is that which I call an idea. upon each; refuting the four first, and con
So that by the word idea, I understand firming the last by various arguments.
nothing else here but that which is the im The Deity, being always present to our
mediate object, or nearest to the mind, minds in a more intimate manner than any
when we perceive+ any object.: It ought other being, may, upon occasion of the im
to be carefully observed, that, in order to pressions made on our bodies, discover to us,
the mind's perceiving any object, it is abso as far as he thinks proper, and according
lutely necessary that the idea of that ob to fixed laws, his own ideas of the object;
t be actually present to it. Of this it and thus we see all things in God, or in the
is not possible to doubt. . . . . . . divine ideas.it [122]
The things which the soul perceives are of However visionary this system may ap
two kinds. They are either in the soul, or pear on a superficial view, yet, when we
they are without the soul. Those that are consider that he agreed with the whole tribe
in the soul are its own thoughts—that is to of philosophers in conceiving ideas to be the
say, all its different modifications. [For immediate objects of perception, and that
by these words—thought, manner of think he found insuperable difficulties, and even
ing, or modification of the soul, I under absurdities, in every other hypothesis con
stand in general whatever cannot be in the cerning them, it will not appear so wonder
mind without the mind perceiving it, as its ful that a man of very great genius should
proper sensations, its imaginations, its pure fall into this ; and, probably, it pleased
intellections, or simply its conceptions, its so devout a man the more, that it sets, in
passions even, and its natural inclina the most striking light, our dependence upon
tions.] § The soul has no need of ideas for God, and his continual presence with us.
perceiving these things. But with regard He distinguished, more accurately than
to things without the soul, we cannot per any philosopher had done before, the objects
ceive them but by means of ideas.”*I which we perceive from the sensations in
Having laid this foundation, as a prin our own minds, which, by the laws of
ciple common to all philosophers, and which Nature, always accompany the perception
admits of no doubt, he proceeds to enume of the object. As in many things, so par
rate all the possible ways by which the ideas ticularly in this, he has great merit. For
of sensible objects may be presented to the this, I apprehend, is a key that opens the
mind: Either, first, they come from the way to a right understanding, both of our
bodies which we perceive:" or, secondly, the external senses and of other powers of the
soul has the power of producing them in it mind. The vulgar confound sensation with
self;++ or, thirdly, they are produced by the other powers of the mind, and with their
bjects, b the purposes of life do not
* Rather in or by themselves (par eur mémen.) make a distinction necessary. The con
-H.
+ That is, in the language of philosophers before founding of these in common language, has
heid, “where we have the apprehensive cognition led philosophers, in one period, to make
or consciousness of any object.”-H. those things external which really are sens
: In this definition, all philosophers concur. Des
Cartes, locke, &c., give it in almost the same terms. ations in our own minds; and, in another
-H. period, running, as is usual, into the con
* I have inserted this sentence, omitted by Reid,
from the original, in order to shew in how exten * Opinio's analogous to the second or third, were
save a meaning the term thought was used in the held by the Platonists, by some of the Greek, and
cartesian school See Cartesii Princ, P. i., § 9-H. by many of the Arabian Aristotelians. See. bove, p.
Hence the distinction F£ taken by Maie. 262, note *-H.
branche of idea £ and Feeling, (sentiment,) cor + Something similar to this is hazarded by Des
responding in Principle to our Perception of the Cartes in his Third “ Meditation,” which it is likely
primary, and our Sensation of the secondary qualities. that Malebranche had in his eye.-H.
-H. t it should have been noticed that the Malebranch
* De la Recherche de la Perité. Liv. Ill., Partie ian philosophy is fundamentally Cartesian, and that,
*, ch. 1.-H. -
after i>e la Forge and Geulinx, the doctrine of
- The common Peripatetic doctrine, &c.-H. Divine Assistance, implicitly maintained by Des
# Malebranche refers, 1 presume, to the opinions Cartes, was most ably developed by Malebranche, to
st certain Cartesians. See Gassendi Opera, iii. p. 321. whom it owes, indeed, a principal share of its cel.
brity.-H.
[I21, 122]
trary extreme, to make everything almost from it by the whole diameter of being.
to be a sensation or feeling in our minds. 3dly, Because, if material objects were
It is obvious that the system of Male immediate objects of perception, there could
branche leaves no evidence of the existence be no physical science; things necessary
of a material world, from what we perceive and immutable being the only objects of
by our senses; for the divine ideas, which science. [124] 4'hly, If material things were
are the objects immediately perceived, were perceived by themselves, they would be a
the same before the world was created. true light to our minds, as being the intel
Malebranche was too acute not to discern ligible form of our understandings, and con
this consequence of his system, and too can sequently perfective of them, and, indeed,
did not to acknowledge it. [123] He fairly superior to them.
owns it, and endeavours to make advantage Malebranche's system was adopted by
of it, resting the complete evidence we have many devout people in France of both
of the existence of matter upon the author sexes; but it seems to have had no great
ity of revelation. He shews that the argu currency in other countries. Mr Locke
ments brought by Des Cartes to prove the wrote a small tract against it, which is
existence of a material world, though as found among his posthumous works:" but,
good as any that reason could furnish, are whether it was written in haste, or after
not perfectly conclusive; and, though he the vigour of his understanding was im
acknowledges with Des Cartes that we feel paired by age, there is less of strength and
a strong propensity to believe the existence solidity in it than in most of his writings.
of a material world, yet he thinks this is The most formidable antagonist Male
not sufficient; and that to yield to such branche met with was in his own country
propensities without evidence, is to expose Antony Arnauld, doctor of the Sorbonne,
ourselves to perpetual delusion. He thinks, and one of the acutest writers the Jansenis's
therefore, that the only convincing evidence have to boast of, though that sect has pro
we have of the existence of a material world duced many. Malebranche was a Jesuit
is, that we are assured by revelation that and the antipathy between the Jesuits and
God created the heavens and the earth, Jansenists left him no room to expect
and that the Word was made flesh. He is quarter from his learned antagonist." Those
sensible of the ridicule to which so strange who choose to see this system attacked on
an opinion may expose him among those the one hand, and defended on the other,
who are guided by prejudice; but, for the with subtilty of argument and elegance of
sake of truth, he is willing to bear it. But expression, and on the part of Arnauld
no author, not even Bishop Berkeley, hath with much wit and humour, may find satis
shewn more clearly, that, either upon his faction by reading Malebranche's “Enquiry
own system, or upon the common principles after Truth;"Arnauld's book “Of True and
of philosophers with regard to ideas, we False Ideas;” Malebranche's “Defence;”
have no evidence left, either from reason and some subsequent replies and defences.
or from our senses, of the existence of a In controversies of this kind, the assailant
material world. It is no more than justice commonly has the advantage, if they are
to Father Malebranche, to acknowledge that not unequally matched; for it is easier to
Bishop Berkeley's arguments are to be overturn all the theories of philosophers
found in him in their whole force. upon this subject, than to defend any one
Mr Norris, an English divine, espoused of them. Mr Bayle makes a very just re
the system of Malebranche, in his “Essay mark upon this controversy—that the argu
towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intel ments of Mr Arnauld against the system of
lectual World,” published in two volumes Malebranche, were often unanswerable, but
8°, anno 1701. This author has made a
feeble effort to supply a defect which is to * in answer to focke's “Examination of P. Male
be found not in Malebranche only, but in branche's Opinion,” Leibnitz wrote “Remarks,"
almost all the authors who have treated of which are to be found among his posthumous works,
published by Raspe.-H.
ideas—I mean, to prove their existence.” * Malebranche was not a Jesuit, but a Priest of the
He has employed a whole chapter to prove Oratory; and so little was he either a favourer or
that material things cannot be an immediate favourite of the Jesuits, that, by the Pere de Valois,
he was accused of heresy, by the Pere Hardouin, or
object of perception. His arguments are Atheism. The endeavours of the Jesuits in France to
these : 1st. They are without the mind, and, prohibit the introduction of every form of the Carte
therefore there can be no union between the sian doctrine into the public seminaries of education,
are well known. Malebranche and Arnauld were
object and the perception. 2dly, They are therefore not opposed as Jesuit and Jansenist, and it
disproportioned to the mind, and removed should likewise be remembered that they were both
Cartesians.-H.
* This is incorrect. In almost every system of 1 Independently of his principal hypothesis atto
the Aristotelico-scholastic philosophy, the attempt is gether, the works of Malebranche deserve the most
made to prove the existence of Species; nor is Reid's attentive studv, both on account of the many at
assention true even of ideas in the Cartesian philoso mirable thoughts and observations with which they
phy. In fact, Norris's arguments are all old and abound, and because they are among the few ten
commonplace -11. summate models of philos phical eloq et ce-ti.
| 123, 124]
citar, win. OF THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION, &c. 267
they were capable of being retorted against emotions, as they make their first appear
his own system; and his ingenious antag ance in the soul. By ideas, he means the
onist knew well how to use this defence. 1125] faint images of these in thinking and rea
soning.
Dr Hartley gives the same meaning to
CHAPTER VIII. ideas as Mr Hume does, and what Mr
Hume calls impressions he calls sensations;
oF THE comMos THEoRy of PERCEPTION, conceiving our sensations to be occasioned
AND OF THE &ENTiMENT's of The PERIPA # vibrations of the infinitesimal particles
Tzrics, AND OF DES CARTES. of the brain, and ideas by miniature vibra
tions or vibratiuncles. Such differences
This theory, in general, is, that we per we find among philosophers, with regard to
ceive external objects only by certain images the name of those internal images of objects
which are in our minds, or in the sensorium of sense which they hold to be the imme
to which the mind is immediately present. diate objects of perception."
Philosophers in different ages have differed We shall next give a short detail of the
both in the names they have given to those sentiments of the Peripatetics and Carte
images, and in their notions concerning sians, of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, con
them. It would be a laborious task to cerning them.
enumerate all their variations, and per Aristotle seems to have thought that the
haps would not requite the labour. I shall soul consists of two parts, or rather that
only give a sketch of the principal dif we have two souls—the animal and the ra
ferences with regard to their names and tional ; or, as he calls them, the soul and
their nature. the intellect t To the first, belong the
By Aristotle and the Peripatetics, the senses, memory, and imagination; to the
images presented to our senses were called last, judgment, opinion, belief, and reason
sensible species or forms; those presented ing. The first we have in common with
to the memory or imagination were called brute animals; the last is peculiar to man.
phantasms; and those presented to the The animal soul he held to be a certain
intellect were called intelligible species; form of the body, which is inseparable from
and they thought that there can be no it, and perishes at death. To this soul the
perception, no imagination, no intellection, senses belong; and he defines a sense to be
without species or phantasms." What the that which is capable of receiving the sensi
ancient philosophers called species, sensible ble forms or species of objects, without any
and intelligible, and phantasms, in later of the matter of them; as wax receives the
times, and especially since the time of Des form of the seal without any of the matter
Cartes, came to be called by the common of it. The forms of sound, of colour, of
name of ideas.t. The Cartesians divided
our ideas into three classes—those of sensa * Reid, I may observe in generaf, does not dis
tion, of imagination, and of pure intellection. tinguish, as it especially behoved him to do, between
what were held by philosophers to be the proximate
Of the objects of sensation and imagination, causes of our mental representations, and these
they thought the images are in the brain;: representations themselves as the objects of cognition
-i. e., between what are known in the schools as
but of objects that are incorporeal the the species impressee, and the species expressar. The
images are in the understanding or pure former, to which the name of species, image, idea,
intellect. was often given, in common with the latter, was held
on all hands to be unknown to consciousness, and
Mr Locke, taking the word idea in the generally supposed to be merely certain occuitmotions
same sense as Des Cartes had done before in the organism. The latter, the result determined
by the former, is the mental representation, and
him, to signify whatever is meant by phan the immediate or proper object in perception. Great
tasm, notion, or species, divides ideas into confusion, to those who do not bear this distinction in
those of sensation, and those of reflection; mind, is, however, the consequence of the verbal
ambiguity; and Reid's mis, resentations of the
meaning by the first, the ideas of all corpo doctrine of the philosophers is, in a great measure, to
real objects, whether perceived, remem be traced to this source.-H.
+ This not correct. Instead of two, the animal and
bered, or imagined; by the second, the rational, Aristotle gave to the soul three generic
ideas of the powers and operations of our functions, the vegetable, the animal or sensual, and
minds. [126] What Mr Locke calls ideas, the rational, but whether he supposes these to
constitute three concentric potences, three separate
Mr Hume divides into two distinct kinds, parts, or three distinct souls, has divided his disciples.
impressions and ideas. The difference be He also defines the soul in general, and not, as Reid
twixt these, he says, consists in the degrees supposes, the mere “animal soul, to be the form or
*****xsix of the body -(De Animal. it c 1.) in
of force and liveliness with which they strike tellect (res) he however thought was inorganic; but
upon the mind. Under impressions he com there is some ground for believing that he did not
view this as personal, but harboured an opinion
prehends all our sensations, passions, and which, under various modifications, many of his fol
lowers also held, that the active intellect was com.
• see Note M.-H. mon to all men, immortal and divine. Ki* *** was
* Not merely #. but rnly since the time of tax revo is #6 tes' 2-yev > &#x” du asy or 4xxx r,
1* Cartes. See Note G. - H. £, * *, *, *čarre, * * **** **, *.xx,
: inerrect. See Nore N.-11. bias ,-fi.
| 125, 126]
taste, and of other sensible qualities, are, putting a stop to the progress of knowledge,
in manner, received by the senses." [127] by filling men with a conceit that they
It seems to be a necessary consequence knew everything. [128] It was very fruitful
of Aristotle's doctrine, that bodies are con also in controversies; but, for the most part,
stantly sending forth, in all directions, as they were controversies about words, or
many different kinds of forms without about things of no moment, or things above
matter as they have different sensible qua the reach of the human faculties. And the
lities; for the forms of colour must enter issue of them was what might be expected
by the eye, the forms of sound by the ear, that the contending parties fought, without
and so of the other senses. This, accord gaining or losing an inch of ground, till they
ingly, was maintained by the followers of were weary of the dispute, or their atten
Aristotle, though not, as far as I know, tion was called off to some other subject."
expressly mentioned by himself." They Such was the philosophy of the schools of
disputed concerning the nature of those Europe, during many ages of darkness and
forms of species, whether they were real barbarism that succeeded the decline of the
beings or nonentities; and some held Roman empire; so that there was great
them to be of an intermediate nature be need of a reformation in philosophy as well
tween the two. The whole doctrine of the as in religion. The light began to dawn at
Peripatetics and schoolmen concerning last; a spirit of inquiry sprang up, and
forms, substantial and accidental, and con men got the courage to doubt of the dogmas
cerning the transmission of sensible species of Aristotle, as well as of the decrees of
from objects of sense to the mind, if it be Popes. The most important step in the
at all intelligible, is so far above my com reformation of religion, was to destroy
prehension that I should perhaps do it in the claim of infallibility, which hindered
justice, by entering into it more minutely. men from using their judgment in matters
Malebranche, in his “Recherche de la of religion; and the most important step in
Verite,” has employed a chapter to shew thereformation of philosophy, was to destroy
that material objects do not send forth the authority of which Aristotle had so long
sensible species of their several sensible had peaceable possession. The last had
qualities. been attempted by Lord Bacon and others,
The great revolution which Des Cartes with no less zeal than the first by Luther
produced in philosophy, was the effect of a a-yd Calvin.
superiority of genius, aided by the circum Des Cartes knew well the defects of the
stances of the times. Men had, for more prevailing system, which had begun to lose
than a thousand years, looked ' to Ari its authority. His genius enabled him, and
stotle as an oracle in philosophy. His his spirit prompted him, to attempt a new
authority was the test of truth. The small one. He had applied much to the mathe
remains of the Platonic system were con matical sciences, and had made considerable
fined to a few mystics, whose principles and improvement in them. He wished to in
manner of life drew little attention. The troduce that perspicuity and evidence into
feeble attempts of Ramus, and of some other branches of philosophy which he
others, to make improvements in the sys found in them.
tem, had little effect. The Peripatetic Being sensible how apt we are to be led
doctrines were so interwoven with the whole astray by prejudices of education, he thought
system of scholastic theology, that to dissent the only way to avoid error was to resolve
from Aristotle was to alarm the Church. to doubt of everything, and hold everything
The most useful and intelligible parts, to be uncertain, even those things which
even of Aristotle's writings, were neglected, he had been taught to hold as most certain,
and philosophy was become an art of speak until he had such clear and cogent evidence
ing learnedly, and disputing subtilely, with as compelled his assent. [129]
out producing any invention of use in human In this state of universal doubt, that
life. It was fruitful of words, but barren which first ap to him to be clear and
of works, and admirably contrived for certain, was his own existence. Of this he
drawing a veil over human ignorance, and was certain, because he was conscious that he
thought, that he reasoned, and that he
* See Note M.-H. doubted. He used this argument, there
+ Nor is there valid ground for supposing that such fore, to prove his own existence, Cogito,
an opinion was even implicitly held by the Stagirite. ergo sum. This he conceived to be the first
it was also explicitly repudiated by many of his fol. of all truths, the foundation-stone upon
lowers. See Note #'
# The question in the schools, between those who which the whole fabric of human knowledge
admitted species, was not, whether species, in gene
ral, were real beings or nonentities (which would
have been, did they exist or not,) but whether sen * This is the vulgar opinion in regard to the
si le species were material, immaterial, or of a scholastic philosophy. The few are, however, now
nature between body and spirit-a problem, it must aware that the human mind, though partially, w is
b allowed, sufficiently futile, but not, like the other, never more powerfully developed than during the
self-contradictory-ri. middle ages.-H.
[127-129]
-- *-*-*
chap. viii.] OF THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION, &c. 269
is built, and on which it must rest." And, but may be trusted, when a proper use is
as Archimedes thought that, if he had one made of them.
fixed point to rest his engines upon, he The system of Des Cartes is, with great
could move the earth; so Des Cartes, perspicuity, and acuteness, explained by
charmed with the discovery of one certain himself in his writings, which ought to be
principle, by which he emerged from the consulted by those who would understand it.
state of universal doubt, believed that this The merit of Des Cartes cannot be easily
principle alone would be a sufficient found conceived by those who have not some
ation on which he might build the whole notion of the Peripatetic system, in which
system of science. He seems, therefore, to he was educated. To throw off the preju
have taken no great trouble to examine dices of education, and to create a system of
whether there might not be other first prin nature, totally different from that which
ciples, which, on account of their own light had subdued the understanding of mankind,
and evidence, ought to be admitted by and kept it in subjection for so many cen
every man of sound judgment.t. The love turies, required an uncommon force of mind.
of simplicity so natural to the mind of man, The world which Des Cartes exhibits to
led him to apply the whole force of his mind our view, is not only in its structure very
to raise the fabric of knowledge upon this different from that of the Peripatetics, but
one principle, rather than seek a broader is, as we may say, composed of different
foundation. materials.
Accordingly, he does not admit the evi In the old system, everything was, by a
dence of sense to be a first principle, as he kind of metaphysical sublimation, resolved
does that of consciousness. The argu into principles so mysterious that it may be
ments of the ancient sceptics here occurred a question whether they were words with
to him, that our senses often deceive us, out meaning, or were notions too refined for
and therefore ought never to be trusted on human understanding.
their own authority: that, in sleep, we often All that we observe in nature is, accord
seem to see and hear things which we are ing to Aristotle, a constant succession of
convinced to have had no existence. But the operations of generation and corruption.
that which chiefly led Des Cartes to think[13] ] The principles of generation are mat
that he ought not to trust to his senses, ter and form. The principle of corruption is
without proof of their veracity, was, that he privation. All matural things are produced
took it for granted, as all philosophers had or generated by the union of matter and
done before him, that he did not perceive form; matter being, as it were, the mother,
external objects themselves, but certain and form the father. As to matter, or the
images of them in his own mind, called first matter, as it is called, it is neither
ideas. He was certain, by consciousness, substance nor accident; it has no quality
that he had the ideas of sun and moon, or property; it is nothing actually, but
earth and sea; but how could he be assured everything potentially. It has so strong
that there really existed external objects an appetite for form, that it is no sooner
like to these ideas 2: [130] divested of one form than it is clothed with
Hitherto he was uncertain of everything another, and is equally susceptible of all
but of his own existence, and the existence forms successively. It has no nature, but
of the operations and ideas of his own mind. only the capacity of having any one.
Some of his disciples, it is said, remained at This is the account which the Peripate
this stage of his system, and got the name tics give of the first matter. The other
of Egoists.S. They could not find evidence principle of generation is form, act, perfee
in the subsequent stages of his progress. tion; for these three words signify the same
But Des Cartes resolved not to stop here; thing. But we must not conceive form to
he endeavoured to prove, by a new argu consist in the figure, size, arrangement, or
ment, drawn from his idea of a Deity, the motion of the parts of matter. These, in
existence of an infinitely perfect Being, who deed, are accidental forms, by which things
made him and all his faculties. From the
perfection of this Being, he inferred that he name of Egonisme. But Father Buffier, about the
could be no deceiver; and therefore con same time, and, be it noted, in a work published some
ten years before Hume's “Treatise of i-uman Na
cluded that his senses, and the other facul ture,” talks of it, on hearsay, as the speculation of a
ties he found in himself, are not fallacious, Scotch philosopher:-"Un écrivain cossois a publié,
dit on, un ouvrage pour prouver qu'il n'avoit aucune
evidence de l'existence d'aucun etre que de lui, et
• On the Cartesian doubt, see Note R.-H. encore de lui, eu tant qu'esprit, n'aiant aucune de
-H
i." cannot justly be affirmed of Des Cartes. monstration véritable de l'existence d’aucun corps.”
-Elemens de Metaphysique, #61. Now, we know
t On this point it is probable that Des Cartes and that there is no such work. am aware, however,
Reid are at one. See Notes C and N.-H. that there is some discussion on this point in the
* I am doubtful about the existence of this sup “Memoirs ce. Trevoux,” anno 1713, p. 922; to which
posed sect of Ego'sts. The Chevalier Ramsay, however, I must refer the reader, as I have not that
above a century ago, incidentally speaks of this doc journal at hand-But more of this below, under
trime as an offshoot of Spinozism, and under the p 187.-H.
U130, 131]
270 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essay *
artificial are formed: but every production the other of consciousness; both of them
of Nature has a substantial form," which, things of which we have a distinct appre
joined to matter, makes it to be what it is. hension, if the human mind be capable of
The substantial form is a kind of informing distinct apprehension at all. To the first,
soul, which gives the thing its specific na no qualities are ascribed but extension,
ture, and all its qualities, powers, and figure, and motion; to the last, nothing but
activity. Thus the substantial form of thought, and its various modifications, of
heavy bodies, is that which makes them which we are conscious." He could ob
descend; of light bodies, that which makes serve no common attribute, no resembling
them ascend. The substantial form of feature, in the attributes of body and mind,
gold, is that which gives it its ductility, its and therefore concluded them to be distinct
fusibility, its weight, its colour, and all its substances, and totally of a different nature;
qualities; and the same is to be understood of and that body, from its very nature, is in
every natural production. A change in the animate and inert, incapable of any kind of
accidental form of any body, is alteration thought or sensation, or of producing any
only; but a change in the substantial form change or alteration in itself. [133]
is generation and corruption : it is corrup Des Cartes must be allowed the honour
tion with respect to the substantial form, of of being the first who drew a distinct line
which the body is deprived; it is genera between the material and intellectual world,
tion with respect to the substantial form which, in all the old systems, were so
that succeeds. Thus, when a horse dies blended together that it was impossible to
and turns to dust, the philosophical account say where the one ends and the other be
of the phaenomenon is this:-A certain por gins." How much this distinction hath
tion of the materia prima, which was joined contributed to the improvements of modern
to the substantial form of a horse, is de times, in the philosophy both of body and
prived of it by privation, and in the same of mind, is not easy to say.
instant is invested with the substantial form One obvious consequence of this distinc
of earth. [132] As every substance must tion was, that accurate reflection on the
have a substantial form, there are some of operations of our own mind is the only way
those forms inanimate, some vegetative, to make any progress in the knowledge of
some animal, and some rational. The three it. Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, and
former kinds can only subsist in matter; Hume, were taught this lesson by Des
but the last, according to the schoolmen, is Cartes; and to it we owe their most va
immediately created by God, and infused luable discoveries in this branch of philo
into the body, making one substance with sophy. The analogical way of reasoning
it, while they are united; yet capable of concerning the powers of the mind from the
being disjoined from the body, and of sub properties of body, which is the source of
sisting by itself. almost all the errors on this subject, and
Such are the principles of natural things in which is so natural to the bulk of mankind,
the Peripatetic system. It retains so much was as contrary to the principles of Des
of the ancient Pythagorean doctrine, that Cartes, as it was agreeable to the princi
we cannot ascribe the invention of it solely ples of the old philosophy. We may there
to Aristotle, although he, no doubt, made fore truly say, that, in #: part of philoso
considerable alterations in it. The first phy which relates to the mind, Des Cartes
matter was probably the same in both sys laid the foundation, and put us into that
tems, and was in both held to be eternal.
tract which all wise men now acknowledge
They differed more about form. The Py to be the only one in which we can expect
thagoreans and Platonists held forms or success.
ideas, as they called them, to be eternal, With regard to physics or the philosophy
immutable, and self-existent. Aristotle of body, if Des Cartes had not the merit of
maintained that they were not eternal, nor leading men into the right tract, we must
self-existent. On the other hand, he did allow him that of bringing them out of a
not allow them to be produced, but educed wrong one. The Peripatetics, by assigning
from matter; yet he held them not to be to every species of body a particular sub
actually in the matter from which they are stantial form, which produces, in an un
educed, but potentially only. But these known manner, all the effects we observe
two systems differed less from one another, in it, put a stop to all improvement in this
than that of Des Cartes did from both. branch of philosophy. Gravity and levity,
In the world of Des Cartes we meet with fluidity and hardness, heat and cold, were
two kinds of beings only—to wit, body and qualities arising from the substantial form
mind: the first the object of our senses, of the bodies to which they belonged. Gen
* It is not, owever, to be supposed that the * in the Cartesian language, the term thought in
scholastic doctrine of substanti, F.'cev. any cluded all of which we are conscious - H.
countenance, from the authority of Aristotle, if we + This assertion is true in general; but some io.
law aside his language touching the soul-H. dividual exceptions might be taken-H.
I 132, 133]
char. viii.] OF THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION, &c. 271
eration and corruption, substantial forms initiated in the principles of the Cartesian
and occult qualities, were always at hand, system. But, by degrees, men came to
to resolve every phaenomenon. This phi be sensible that, in revolting from Ari
losophy, therefore, instead of accounting stotle, the Cartesians had gone into the oppo
for any of the phaenomena of Nature, con site extreme; experience convinced them
trived only to give learned names to their that there are qualities in the material
unknown causes, and fed men with the husks world, whose existence is certain though
of barbarous terms, instead of the fruit of their cause be occult. To acknowledge this,
real knowledge. [134] -
is only a candid confession of human ignor
By the spreading of the Cartesian system, ance, than which there is nothing more be
materia prima, substantial forms, and oc coming a philosopher.
cult qualities, with all the jargon of the As all that we can know of the mind must
Aristotelian physics, fell into utter disgrace, be derived from a careful observation of its
and were never mentioned by the followers operations in ourselves; so all that we can
of the new system, but as a subject of ridi know of the material system must be derived
eule, Men became sensible that their un from what can be discovered by our senses.
derstanding had been hoodwinked by those Des Cartes was not ignorant of this; nor
terms. They were now accustomed was his system so unfriendly to observation
to explain the phaenomena of nature, by and experiment as the old system was."
the figure, size, and motion of the particles He made many experiments, and called
of matter, things perfectly level to human earnestly upon all lovers of truth to aid him
understanding, and could relish nothing in in this way; but, believing that all the
philosophy that was dark and unintelligible. phaenomena of the material world are the
Aristotle, after a reign of more than a result of extension, figure, and motion, and
thousand years, was now exposed as an that the Deity always combines these, so as
object of derision even to the vulgar, arrayed to produce the phaenomena in the simplest
in the mock majesty of his substantial forms manner possible, he thought that, from a
and occult qualities. The ladies became few experiments, he might be able to dis
fondof a philosophy which waseasilylearned, cover the simplest way in which the obvious
and required no words too harsh for their phaenomena of nature can be produced by
delicate organs. Queens and princesses, matter and motion only; and that this must
the most distinguished personages of the be the way in which they are actually pro
age, courted the conversation of Des Cartes, duced. His conjectures were ingenious, upon
and became adepts in his philosophy. Wit the principles he had adopted; but they are
ness Christina, Queen of Sweden, and found to be so far from the truth, that they
Elizabeth, daughter of Frederick, King of ought for ever to discourage philosophers
Bohemia, the mother of our Royal Family. from trusting to conjecture in the operations
The last, though very young when IJes of nature. [136]
Cartes wrote his “Principia,” he declares The vortices or whirlpools of subtile
to be the only person he knew, who per matter by which Des Cartes endeavoured
fectly understood not only all his philoso to account for the phaenomena of the ma
phical writings, but the most abstruse of terial world, are now found to be fictions,
his mathematical works. no less than the sensible species of Ari
That men should rush with violence from stotle.t.
one extreme, without going more or less It was reserved for Sir Isaac Newton to
into the contrary extreme, is not to be ex point out clearly the road to the knowledge
Pected from the weakness of human nature. of nature's works. Taught by Lord Bacon
Des Cartes and his followers were not ex to despise hypotheses as the fictions of hu
empted from this weakness; they thought man fancy, he laid it down as a rule of
that extension, figure, and motion, were philosophising, that no causes of natural
sufficient to resolve all the phaenomena of things ought to be assigned but such as can
the material system. To admit other qua be proved to have a real existence. He
lities, whose cause is unknown, was to saw that all the length men can go in ac
return to Egypt, from which they had been counting for phaenomena, is to discover the
so happily delivered. [135] laws of nature according to which they are
When Sir Isaac Newton's doctrine of produced; and, therefore, that the true
gravitation was published, the great objec method of philosophising is this: From
tion to it, which hindered its general recep real facts, ascertained by observation and
tion in Europe for half a century, was, that experiment, to collect by just induction the
gravitation seemed to be an occult quality,
as it could not be accounted for by exten was* That is, the Aristotelic. But Aristotle himself
as declared an advocate of experiment as any
sion, figure, and motion, the known attri whilosopher; and it is not to be imputed to him that
butes of body. They who defended him is authority had subsequently the effect of imped
ing, by being held to supersede, observation.-H.
found it difficult to answer this objection to t Read “the sensible species of the schoolmen."
the satisfaction of those who had been See Note M-H,
[134-136."
laws of Nature, and to apply the laws so The perceptions of sense, he thought, are
discovered, to account for the phaenomena to be referred solely to the union of soul
of Nature. and body. They commonly exhibit to us
Thus, the natural philosopher has the only what may hurt or profit our bodies:
rules of his art fixed with no less precision and rarely, and by accident only, exhibit
than the mathematician, and may be no less things as they are in themselves. It is by
certain when he keeps within them, and observing this, that we must learn to throw
when he deviates from them. And, though off the prejudices of sense, and to attend
the evidence of a law of nature from induc with our intellect to the ideas which are by
tion is not demonstrative, it is the only kind nature implanted in it. By this means we
of evidence on which all the most import shall understand that the nature of matter
ant affairs of human life must rest. does not consist in those things that affect
Pursuing this road without deviation, our senses, such as colour, or smell, or taste;
Newton discovered the laws of our planet but only in this, that it is something ex
ary system, and of the rays of light; and tended in length, breadth, and depth. f138]
gave the first and the noblest examples of The writings of Des Cartes have, in ge
that chaste induction which Lord Bacon neral, a remarkable degree of perspicuity;
could only delineate in theory. and he undoubtedly intended that, in this
How strange is it that the human mind particular, his philosophy should be a per
should have wandered for so many ages, fect contrast to that of Aristotle; yet, in
without falling into this tract ' How much what he has said, in different parts of his
more strange, that, after it has been clearly writings, of our perceptions of external
discovered, and a happy progress made in it, objects, there seems to be some obscurity,
many choose rather to wander in the fairy and even inconsistency; whether owing to
regions of hypothesis ! (137] his having had different opinions on the sub
To return to Des Cartes's notions of the ject at different times, or to the difficulty he
manner of our perceiving external objects, found in it, I will not pretend to say.
from which a concern to do justice to the There are two points, in particular,
merit of that great reformer in philosophy wherein I cannot reconcile him to himself:
has led me to digress, he took it for granted, the first, regarding the place of the ideas
as the old philosophers had done, that what or images of external objects, which are the
we immediately perceive must be either in immediate objects of perception; the second.
the mind itself, or in the brain, to which with regard to the veracity of our externa,
the mind is immediately present. The im Senses.
pressions made upon our organs, nerves, As to the first, he sometimes places the
and brain could be nothing, according to ideas of material objects in the brain, not
his philosophy, but various modifications of only when they are perceived, but when
extension, figure, and motion. There could they are remembered or imagined; and
be nothing in the brain like sound or colour, this has always been held to be the Car
taste or smell, heat or cold; these are sens tesian doctrine;" yet he sometimes says,
ations in the mind, which, by the laws of that we are not to conceive the images or
the union of soul and body, are raised on traces in the brain to be perceived, as if
occasion of certain traces in the brain; and there were eyes in the brain; these traces
although he gives the name of ideas to those are only occasions on which, by the laws of
traces in the brain, he does not think it the union of soul and body, ideas are ex
necessary that they should be perfectly cited in the mind; and, therefore, it is not
like to the things which they represent, necessary that there should be an exact
any more than that words or signs should resemblance between the traces and the
resemble the things they signify. But, things represented by them, any more than
says he, that we may follow the received that words or signs should be exactly like
opinion as far as is possible, we may allow the things signified by them."
a slight resemblance. Thus we know that These two opinions, I think, cannot be
a print in a book may represent houses, reconciled. For, if the images or traces in
temples, and groves; and so far is it from the brain are perceived,: they must be the
being necessary that the print should be
perfectly like the thing it represents, that thing more than a modification of the mund itself
its perfection often requires the contrary:
* But not in Reid's exclusive sense of the word
for a circle must often be represented by an Idea.-H.
ellipse, a square by a rhombus, and so of f The non-negation, in this instance, of an re
other things." . semblance between the material Ideas, or organic
motions in the brain, and the external reality, is one
of the occasional instances of Des Cartes's reticence of .
* But be it observed that Des Cartes did not ailow, his subordinate doctrines, in order to avoid all useless
far less hold, that the mind had any cognizance of tilting against prevalent opinions. Another is his
these organic motions-of these material ideas They sometimes giving to these motions the name of Spe.
were merely the antecedents, established by the law of cies.-H.
union, of the mental idea; which mental idea was no i Which, in Des Cartes doctrine, they are not.-H.
[137, 138]
cuAP. vi.11.] OF THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION, &c. 273
objects of perception, and not the occasions as all the ancient philosophers did, of the
of it only. On the other hand, if they are fallacies of sense. He warns us to throw
only the occasions of our perceiving, they off its prejudices, and to attend only with
are not perceived at all. Des Cartes seems our intellect, to the ideas implanted there.
to have hesitated between the two opinions, By this means we may perceive, that the
or to have passed from the one to the nature of matter does not consist in hard
other." Mr Locke seems, in like manner, ness, colour, weight, or any of those things
to have wavered between the two; some that affect our senses, but in this only, that
times representing the ideas of material it is something extended in length, breadth,
things as being in the brain, but more fre and depth. £The senses, he says,
quently as in the mind itself f [139] are only relative to our present state; they
Neither Des Cartes nor Mr Locke could, exhibit things only as they tend to profit
consistently with themselves, attribute any or to hurt us, and rarely, and by accident
other qualities to images in the brain but only, as they are in themselves."
extension, figure, and motion; for as to It was probably owing to an aversion to
those qualities which Mr Locke distin admit anything into philosophy, of which
guished by the name of secondary qualities, we have not a clear and distinct concep
both philosophers believed them not to be tion, that Des Cartes was led to deny that
long to body at all,+ and, therefore, could there is any substance of matter distinct from
not ascribe them to images in the brain.S those qualities of it which we perceive.t.
Sir Isaac Newton and Dr Samuel Clarke
We say that matter is something extended,
uniformly speak of the species or images of figured, moveable. Extension, figure, mo
material things as being in that part of the bility, therefore, are not matter, but quali
brain called the sensorium, and perceived ties, belonging to this something, which
by the mind there present; but the former we call matter. Des Cartes could not
speaks of this point only incidentally, and relish this obscure something, which is sup
with his usual modesty, in the form of a posed to be the subject or substratum of
query.|| Malebranche is perfectly clear and those qualities; and, therefore, maintained
unambiguous in this matter. According to that extension is the very essence of mat
his system, the images or traces in the ter. But, as we must ascribe extension to
brain are not perceived at all—they are space as well as to matter, he found him
only occasions upon which, by the laws of self under a necessity of holding that space
Nature, certain sensations are felt by us, and matter are the same thing, and differ
and certain of the divine ideas discovered to only in our way of conceiving them; so
our minds. that, wherever there is space there is mat
The second point on which Des Cartes ter, and no void left in the universe. The
seems to waver, is with regard to the credit necessary consequence of this is, that the
that is due to the testimony of our senses. material world has no bounds nor limits.
Sometimes, from the perfection of the He did not, however, choose to call it in
Deity, and his being no deceiver, he infers finite, but indefinite.
that our senses and our other faculties can It was probably owing to the same cause
not be fallacious; and since we seem clearly that Des Cartes made the essence of the
to perceive that the idea of matter comes soul to consist in thought. He would not
to us from things external, which it per allow it to be an unknown something that
fectly resembles, therefore we must con has the power of thinking; it cannot, there
clude that there really exists something fore, be without thought; and, as he con
extended in length, breadth, and depth, ceived that there can be no thought with
having all the properties which we clearly out ideas, the soul must have had ideas in
perceive to belong to an extended thing. its first formation, which, of consequence,
At other times, we find Des Cartes and are innate.:
his followers making frequent complaints, The sentiments of those who came after
Des Cartes, with regard to the nature of
• Des Cartes had only one opinion on the point body and mind, have been various. Many
The difficulty which perplexes Reid arose from his have maintained that body is only a collec
want of a systematic comprehension of the Cartesian tion of qualities to which we give one
philosophy, and his being unaware that, by Ideas,
bes Cartes designated two very different things-viz.,
the proximate bodily antecedent, and the mental • Put see “Principia," 66, sqq.-H.
consequent--H. t See Stewart's “Elements.” I., Note A ; Royer
+ Locke's opinion, if he had a precise one on the Collard's Fragment, VIII.-H.
matter, it is impossible to ascertain. See Note O t The doctrine of Des Cartes, in relation to innate
H. Ideas, has been very generally misunderstood, and
1 see above, p. 205, note *-H. - by no one more than by Locke. , what it really
* Yet Locke expressly denies them to be modifica amounted to, is clearly stated in his strictures on
tions of mind. See Note O.-H. the Program of Regius. Justice has latterly been
| Reid itis is
correct in all says of Newton
he here admitted and done him, among others, by Mr Stewart, in his “Dis:
Clarke; indeed virtually # Clarke sertation," and by M. Laromiguiere, in his “Cours.''
him...elf, in his controversy with Leibnitz... Compare See also the old controversy of De Vries with Röell
Lebntil opera, II., p. 161, and p. 182.-H. on this point-H.
T
[139, 140]
name; and that the notion of a subject of external object which we immediately per
inhesion, to which those qualities belong, ceive, and not a representative image of it
is only a fiction of the mind." [141] only. It is for this reason that they look
Some have even maintained that the soul upon it as perfect lunacy to call in question
is only a succession of related ideas, with the existence of external objects."
out any subject of inhesion.'t It appears, It seems to be admitted as a first prin
by what has been said, how far these no ciple, by the learned and the unlearned, that
tions are allied to the Cartesian system. what is really perceived must exist, and that
The triumph of the Cartesian system to perceive what does not exist is impossible.
over that of Aristotle, is one of the most So far the unlearned man and the philoso
remarkable revolutions in the history of phi pher agree. The unlearned man says-I
losophy, and has led me to dwell longer perceive the external object, and I perceive
upon it than the present subject perhaps it to exist. Nothing can be more absurd
required. The authority of Aristotle was than to doubt of it. The Peripatetic says
now no more. That reverence for hard What I perceive is the very identical form
words and dark notions, by which men's of the object, which came immediately from
understanding had been strangled in early the object, and makes an impression upon
years, was turned into contempt, and every my mind, as a seal does upon wax; and,
thing suspected which was not clearly and therefore, I can have no doubt of the ex
distinctly understood. This is the spirit of istence of an object whose form I perceive.f.
the Cartesian philosophy, and is a more But what says the Cartesian F I perceive
important acquisition to mankind than any not, says he, the external object itself. So
of its particular tenets; and for exerting far he agrees with the Peripatetic, and differs
this spirit so zealously, and spreading it so from the unlearned man. But I perceive
successfully, Des Cartes deserves immortal an image, or form, or idea, in my own
honour. mind, or in my brain. I am certain of the
It is to be observed, however, that Des existence of the idea, because I imme
Cartes rejected a part only of the ancient diately perceive it." But how this idea is
theory, concerning the perception of ex formed, or what it represents, is not self
ternal objects by the senses, and that he evident; and therefore I must find argu
adopted the other part. That theory may ments by which, from the existence of the
be divided into two parts: The first, that idea which I perceive, I can infer the ex
images, species, or forms of external objects, istence of an external object which it re
come from the object, and enter by the presents.
avenues of the senses to the mind; the As I take this to be a just view of the
second part is, That the external object principles of the unlearned man, of the Peri
itself is not perceived, but only the species patetic, and of the Cartesian, so I think
or image of it in the mind. The first part they all reason consequentially from their
Des Cartes and his followers rejected, and several principles: that the Cartesian has
refuted by solid arguments; but the second strong grounds to doubt of the existence of
part, neither he nor his followers have external objects: the Peripatetic very little
thought of calling in question; being per ground of doubt; and the unlearned [143]
suaded that it is only a representative man none at all: and that the difference of
image in the mind of the external object their situation arises from this-that the un
that we perceive, and not the object itself. learned man has no hypothesis; the Peri
And this image, which the Peripatetics patetic leans upon an hypothesis; and the
called a species, he calls an idea, changing Cartesian upon one half of that hypothesis.
the name only, while he admits the thing.: Des Cartes, according to the spirit of his
[142] own philosophy, ought to have doubted of
It seems strange that the great pains both parts of the Peripatetic hypothesis, or to
which this philosopher took to throw off the have given his reasons why he adopted one
prejudices of education, to dismiss all his part, as well as why he rejected the other
former opinions, and to assent to nothing,
till he found evidence that compelled his * This is one of the passages which favour the
assent, should not have led him to doubt of opinion that Reid did suppose the non-ego to be
known in itself as existing, and not only in and
this opinion of the ancient philosophy. It through the ego; for mankind in general believe
is evidently a philosophical opinion; for the that the extended reality, as perceived, is something
vulgar undoubtedly believe that it is the mind, more than a mere internal representation by the
suggested in consequence of the impression
made by an unknown something on the sense. See
* As Locke, (but he is not consistent,) Law, Note C.-H.
Green, Watts, and others. See Cousin, “Cours de + The Peripatetic and the Cartesian held that the
Philosophie," Iome II., Leçon xviii.-H. species or idea was an object of consciousness. If
! Hume eid understood the language he uses, he must hold
t Des Cartes and Reid coincide in doctrine, if that the external and extended reality is an object of
Reid holds that we know the extended and exter. consciousness. But this does not quadrate with his
nal object only, by a conception or subjective modifi doctrine, that we only know extension and figure #
tion of the percipient mind. See Notes N and C.-H. a suggested conception in the mind. See Note C.-H.
[141–148]
cHAP. IX.] OF THE SENTIMENTS OF MR LOCKE. 275
rt; especially, since the unlearned, who my first lights in those studies, as well as
ave the faculty of perceiving objects by my attachment to them.
their senses in no less perfection than He sets out in his essay with a full con
philosophers, and should, therefore, know, viction, common to him with other philo
as well as they, what it is they perceive, sophers, that ideas in the mind are the
have been unanimous in this, that the objects of all our thoughts in every opera
objects they perceive are not ideas in their tion of the understanding. This leads him
own minds, but things external. It might to use the word idea" so very frequently,
have been expected that a philosopher who beyond what was usual in the English
was so cautious as not to take his own ex language, that he thought it necessary, in
istence for granted without proof, would not his introduction, to make this apology:
have taken it for granted without proof, “It being that term,” says he, “which, I
that everything he perceived was only ideas I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever
in his own mind. is the object of understanding when a man
But, if Des Cartes made a rash step in thinks, I have used it to express whatever
this, as I apprehend he did, he ought not is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or
to bear the blame alone. His successors whatever it is which the mind can be em
have still continued in the same track, and, ployed about in thinking; and I could not
after his example, have adopted one part of avoid frequently using it. I presume it
the ancient theory—to wit, that the objects will be granted me, that there are such
we immediately perceive are ideas only. All ideas in men's minds; every man is con
their systems are built on this foundation. scious of them in himself, and men's words
and actions will satisfy him that they are in
others.” [145]
CfIAPTER IX. Speaking of the reality of our knowledge,
he says, “It is evident the mind knows not
of Tiip skNtiMENTS OF MR LOCKE. things immediately, but only by the inter
vention of the ideas it has of them. Our
THE reputation which Locke's “Essay on knowledge, therefore, is real, only so far as
Human Understanding” had at home from there is a conformity between our ideas and
the beginning, and which it has gradually the reality of things. But what shall be
acquired abroad, is a sufficient testimony of here the criterion ? How shall the mind,
its merit. [144] There is, perhaps, no when it perceives nothing but its own ideas,
book of the metaphysical kind that has been know that they agree with things them
so generally read by those who understand selves? This, though it seems not to want
the language, or that is more adapted to difficulty, yet, I think, there be two sorts
teach men to think with precision," and to of ideas that we may be assured agree with
inspire them with that candour and love of things.”
truth which is the genuine spirit of philo We see that Mr Locke was aware, no
sophy. He gave, I believe, the first ex less than Des Cartes, that the doctrine o'
ample in the English language of writing ideas made it necessary, and at the same
on such abstract subjects, with a remarkable time difficult, to prove the existence of *
degree of simplicity and perspicuity; and material world without us; because the
in this he has been happily imitated by mind, according to that doctrine, perceives
others that came after him. No author nothing but a world of ideas in itself. Not
hath more successfully pointed out the only Des Cartes, but Malebranche, Arnauld,
danger of ambiguous words, and the im and Norris, had perceived this difficulty,
portance of having distinct and determin and attempted to remove it with little suc
ate notions in judging and reasoning. His cess. Mr Locke attempts the same thing;
observations on the various powers of the but his arguments are feeble. He even
human understanding, on the use and abuse seems to be conscious of this; for he con
of words, and on the extent and limits of cludes his reasoning with this observation
human knowledge, are drawn from atten -“That we have evidence sufficient to
tive reflection on the operations of his own direct us in attaining the good and avoiding
mind, the true source of all real knowledge the evil, caused by external objects, and
on these subjects; and shew an uncommon that this is the important concern we have
degree of penetration and judgment. But in being made acquainted with them.” This,
he needs no panegyric of mine, and I men indeed, is saying no more than will be
tion these things, only that, when I have granted by those who deny the existence of
occasion to differ from him, I may not be a material world.
thought insensible of the merit of an author As there is no material difference between
whom I highly respect, and to whom I owe
• Locke may be said to have first naturalizes "he
* To #" Locke for precision, is rather too word in English philosophical language, in its Carte
sian extension.-H.
much.-H.
T 2
[144, 145]
Locke and Des Cartes with regard to the Of the authors I have met with, Dr
perception of objects by the senses, there Robert Hook is the most explicit. He was
is the less occasion, in this place, to take one of the most ingenious and active mem
bers of the Royal Society of London at its
notice of all their differences in other points.
They differed about the origin of our ideas. first institution; and frequently read lec
Des Cartes thought some of them were tures to the Society, which were published
innate; the other maintained that there among his posthumous works. [147] In his
are no innate ideas, and that they are all “Lectures upon Light,” $ 7, he makes
derived from two sources—to wit, sensation ideas to be material substances; and thinks
and reflection ; meaning, by sensation, the that the brain is furnished with a proper
operations of our exterial senses; and, by kind of matter for fabricating the ideas of
reflection, that attention which we are each sense. The ideas of sight, he thinks,
capable of giving to the operations of our are formed of a kind of matter resembling
own minds. [146] the Bononian stone, or some kind of phos
They differed with regard te the essence phorus; that the ideas of sound are formed
both of matter and of mind: the British of some matter resembling the chords or
philosopher holding that the real essence of glasses which take a sound from the vibra
both is beyond the reach of human know tions of the air; and so of the rest.
ledge; the other conceiving that the very The soul, he thinks, may fabricate some
essence of mind consists in thought, and hundreds of those ideas in a day; and that,
that of matter in extension, by which he as they are formed, they are pushed farther
made matter and spacenot to differin reality, off from the centre of the brain where the
and no part of space to be void of matter. soul resides. By this means they make a con
Mr Locke explained, more distinctly than tinued chain of ideas, coyled up in the brain :
had been done before, the operations of the the first end of which is farthest removed
mind in classing the various objects of from the centre or seat of the soul, and the
thought, and reducing them to genera and other end is always at the centre, being the
species. He was the first, I think, who last idea formed, which is always present
distinguished in substances what he calls the moment when considered; and, there
the nominal essence—which is only the fore, according as there is a greater number
notion we form of a genus or species, and of ideas between the present sensation or
which we express by a definition—from the thought in the centre and any other, the
real essence or internal constitution of the soul is apprehensive of a larger portion of
thing, which makes it to be what it is." time interposed.
Without this distinction, the subtile dis Mr Locke has not entered into so minute
putes which tortured the schoolmen for so a detail of this manufacture of ideas; but he
many ages, in the controversy between the ascribes to the mind a very considerable
nominalists and realists, could never be hand in forming its own ideas. With re
brought to an issue. He shews distinctly gard to our sensations, the mind is passive,
how we form abstract and general notions, “they being produced in us, only by dif
and the use and necessity of them in rea ferent degrees and modes of motion in our
soning. And as (according to the received animal spirits, variously agitated by ex
principles of philosophers) every notion of ternal objects.” These, however, cease to
our mind must have for its object an idea be as soon as they cease to be perceived;
in the mind itself,' he thinks that we form but, by the faculties of memory and imagin
abstract ideas by leaving out of the idea of ation, “the mind has an ability, when it
an individual everything wherein it differs wills, to revive them again, and, as it were,
from other individuals of the same species to paint them anew upon itself, though
or genus; and that this power of forming some with more, some with less difficulty.”
abstract ideas, is that which chiefly dis As to the ideas of reflection, he ascribes
tinguishes us from brute animals, in whom them to no other cause but to that attention
he could see no evidence of any abstract which the mind is capable of giving to its
ideas. own operations. These, therefore, are
Since the time of Des Cartes, philoso formed by the mind itself. [148] He ascribes
phers have differed much with regard to the likewise to the mind the power of com
share they ascribe to the mind itself, in the pounding its simple ideas into complex ones
fabrication of those representative beings of various forms; of repeating them, and
called ideas, and the manner in which this adding the repetitions together; of dividing
work is carried on. and classing thern; of comparing them,
and, from #: comparison, of forming the
* Locke has no originality in this respect.-H. ideas of their relation; nay, of forming a
t Notion is here used for the apprehension of the general idea of a species or genus, by taking
idea, or representative reality, which Reid supposed from the idea of an individual everything
that all philosophers viewed as something more than
the mere act of knowledge, considered in relation to by which it is distinguished from other in
what was, through it, known or represented.-H. dividuals of the kind, till at last it becomes
[146-148]
cHAP. IX.] OF THE SENTIMENTS OF MR LOCKE. 277
an abstract general idea, common to all the the thing clearly and distinctly. When the
in lividuals of the kind. word idea is taken in this popular sense,
These, I think, are the powers which Mr there can be no doubt of our having ideas in
Locke ascribes to the mind itself in the our minds. To think without ideas would
fabrication of its ideas. Bishop Berkeley, be to think without thought, which is a
as we shali see afterwards, abridged them manifest contradiction."
considerably, and Mr Hume much more. But there is another meaning of the word
The ideas we have of the various quali idea peculiar to philosophers, and grounded
ties of bodies are not all, as Mr Locke upon a philosophical theory, which the vul
thinks, of the same kind. Some of them gar never think of Philosophers, ancient
are images or resemblances of what is really and modern, have maintained that the
in the body; others are not. There are operations of the mind, like the tools of an
certain qualities inseparable from matter; artificer, can only be employed upon objects
such as extension, solidity, figure, mobility. that are present in the mind, or in the
Our ideas of these are real resemblances of brain, where the mind is supposed to reside.
the qualities in the body: and these he [150] Therefore, objects that are distant in
calls primary qualities. But colour, sound, time or place must have a representative in
taste, smell, heat, and cold, he calls second the mind, or in the brain—some image or
ary qualities, and thinks that they are picture of them, which is the object that the
only powers in bodies of producing cer mind contemplates. This representative
tain sensations in us; which sensations image was, in the old philosophy, called a
have nothing resembling them, though they species or phantasm. Since the time of
are commonly thought to be exact resem Des Cartes, it has more commonly been
blances of something in the body. “Thus,” called an idea; and every thought is con
says he, “the idea of heat or light, which ceived to have an idea of its object. As
we receive, by our eye or touch, from the this has been a common opinion among
sun, are commonly thought real qualities philosophers, as far back as we can trace phi
existing in the sun, and something more losophy, it is the less to be wondered at that
than mere powers in it.” they should be apt to confound the opera
The names of primary and secondary tion of the mind in thinking with the idea
qualities were, I believe, first used by Mr or object of thought, which is supposed to
Locke; but the distinction which they ex be its inseparable concomitant."
press, was well understood by Des Cartes, If we pay any regard to the common
and is explained by him in his “Principia,” sense of mankind, thought and the object
Part I., § 69, 70, 71. [149] of thought are different things, and ought
Although no author has more merit than to be distinguished. It is true, thought
Mr Locke, in pointing out the ambiguity of cannot be without an object—for every
words, and resolving, '. that means, many man who thinks inust think of something;
knotty questions, which had tortured the but the object he thinks of is one thing, his
wits of the schoolmen, yet, I apprehend, thought of that object is another thing.
he has been sometimes misled by the ambi They are distinguished in all languages, even
guity of the word idea, which he uses so by the vulgar; and many things may be
often almost in every page of his essay. affirmed of thought—that is, of the opera
In the explication given of this word, we tion of the mind in thinking—which cannot,
took notice of two meanings given to it--a without error, and even absurdity, be af
popular and a philosophical. In the popu firmed of the object of that operation."
lar meaning, to have an idea of anything, From this, I think, it is evident that, if
signifies nothing more than to think of it. the word idea, in a work where it occurs in
Although the operations of the mind are every paragraph, is used without any inti
most properly and naturally, and indeed mation of ' ambiguity of the word, some
most commonly in all vulgar languages, ex times to signify thought, or the operation
pressed by active verbs, there is another of the mind in thinking, sometimes to sig
way of expressing them, less common, but nify those internal objects of thought which
equally well understood. To think of a philosophers suppose, this must occasion
thing, and to have a thought of it; to be confusion in the thoughts both of the au
lieve a thing, and to have a belief of it; to thor and of the readers. I take this to be
see a thing, and have a sight of it; to con the greatest blemish in the “Essay on Hu
ceive a thing, and to have a conception, man Understanding.” I apprehend this is
notion, or idea of it—are phrases perfectly the true source of several paradoxical opin
synonymous. In these phrases, the thought ions in that excellent work, which I shall
means nothing but the act of thinking; the have occasion to take notice of.
belief, the act of believing; and the con Here it is very natural to ask, Whether
ception, notion, or idea, the act of conceiv it was Mr Locke's opinion, that ideas are
ing. To have a clear and distinct idea is,
in this sense, nothing else but to conceive * See Note C.-H.
r149, 150]
the only objects of thought? or, Whether and this idea is the immediate object of my
it is not possible for men to think of things thought when I think of Alexander. That
which are not ideas in the mind?" [151] this was Locke's opinion, and that it has
To this question it is not easy to give a been generally the opinion of philosophers,
direct answer. On the one hand, he says there can be no doubt.
often, in distinct and studied expressions, But, instead of giving light to the ques
that the term idea stands for whatever is tion proposed, it seems to involve it in
the object of the understanding when a man greater darkness.
thinks, or whatever it is which the mind When I think of Alexander, I am told
can be employed about in thinking: that there is an image or idea of Alexander in
the mind perceives nothing but its own my mind, which is the immediate object of
ideas: that all knowledge consists in the this thought. The necessary consequence
perception of the agreement or disagree of this seems to be, that there are two ob
ment of our ideas: that we can have no jects of this thought—the idea, which is in
knowledge farther than we have ideas. the mind, and the person represented by that
These, and many other expressions of the idea; the first, the immediate object of the
like import, evidently imply that every thought, the last, the object of the same
object of thought must be an idea, and can thought, but not the immediate object.
be nothing else. [152] This is a hard saying; for it makes
On the other hand, I am persuaded that every thought of things external to have a
Mr Locke would have acknowledged that double object. Every man is conscious of
we may think of Alexander the Great, or his thoughts, and yet, upon attentive reflec
of the planet Jupiter, and of numberless tion, he perceives no such duplicity in the
things which he would have owned are not object he thinks about. Sometimes men
ideas in the mind, but objects which exist see objects double, but they always know
independent of the mind that thinks of when they do so; and I know of no philo
them." sopher who has expressly owned this dupli
How shall we reconcile the two parts of city in the object of thought, though it iol
this apparent contradiction? All I am able lows necessarily from maintaining that, in
to say, upon Mr Locke's principles, to recon the same thought, there is one object that
cile them, is this, That we cannot think of is immediate and in the mind itself, and
Alexander, or of the planet Jupiter, unless another object which is not immediate, and
we have in our minds an idea—that is, an which is not in the mind."
image or picture of those objects. The Besides this, it seems very hard, or rather
idea of Alexander is an image, or picture, impossible, to understand what is meant by
or representation of that hero in my mind; an object of thought that is not an imme
diate object of thought. A body in motion
* It is to be remembered that Reid means, by may move another that was at rest, by the
Ideas, representative entities different from the cog. medium of a third body that is interposed.
nitive modifications of the mind itself-H.
t On the confusion of this and the four subsequent This is easily understood; but we are unable
paragraphs, see Note C.-Whatever is the immediate to conceive any medium interposed between
object of thought, of that we are necessarily conscious. a mind and the thought of that mind; and,
But of Alexander, for example, as existing, we are
necessarily not conscious. , Alexander, as existing, to think of any object by a medium, seems
cannot, therefore, possibly be an immediate object of to be words without any meaning. There
thought; consequently, if we can be said to think of
Alexander at all, we can only be said to think of him is a sense in which a thing may be said to
mediately, in and through a representation of which be perceived by a medium. Thus any kind
we are conscious; and that representation is the im. of sign may be said to be the medium by
mediate object of thought. It makes no difference
whether this immediate object be viewed as a tertium which I perceive or understand the thing
quid, distinct from the existing reality and from the signified. The sign by custom, or compact,
conscious mind; or whether as a mere modality of or perhaps by nature, introduces the thought
the conscious mind itself-as the mere act of thought
considered in its relation to something beyond the of the thing signified. But here the thing
sphere of consciousness. In neither case, can we be signified, when it is introduced to the
said (be it in the imagination of a possible or the
recollection of a past existence) to know a thing as thought, is an object of thought no less
existing-that is, inmediately; and, therefore, if in immediate than the sign was before. And
these operations we be said to know aught out the there are here two objects of thought, one
mind at all, we can only be said to know it me succeeding another, which we have shewn
diately-in other words, as a mediate object. The
whole perplexity arises from the ambiguity of the is not the case with respect to an idea, and
term object, that term being used both for the exter. the object it represents.
nal reality of which we are here not conscious, and
cannot therefore know in itself, and for the mental * That is, if by object was meant the same thing.
representation which we know in itself, but which is when the term is applied to the external reality,
known only as relativeto the other. Reid chooses to and to its mental representation. Even under the
abolish the former signification, on the supposition Scholastic theory of repeesentation, it was generally
that it only applies to a representative entity differ maintained that the species itself is not an object of
ent from the act of thought. In this supposition, perception, but the external reality through it; a
however, he is wrong; nor does he obtain an imme mode of speaking justly reprehended by the acuter
diate knowledge, even in perception, by merely deny schoolmen.
blame. But in
See Note this respect
C.-H. pec Reid is equally to
the crude hypothesis of representation -H.
T 151 1 52]
caAP. Ix.] OF THE SENTIMENTS OF MR LOCKE. 279
I apprehend, therefore, that, if philoso the word idea, but not with the philosophi
phers will maintain that ideas in the mind cal.
are the only immediate objects of thought, When these two different meanings on
they will be forced to grant that they are the the word idea are confounded in a studied
sole objects of thought, and that it is im explication of it, there is little reason to
Possible for men to think of anything else. expect that they should be carefully dis
[153] Yet, surely, Mr Locke believed that tinguished in the frequent use of it. There
we can think of many things that are not are many passages in the Essay in which,
ideas in the mind; but he seems not to have to make them intelligible, the word idea
perceived, that the maintaining that ideas must be taken in one of those senses, and
in the mind are the only immediate objects many others in which it must be taken in
of thought, must necessarily draw this con the other. It seems probable that the
sequence along with it. author, not attending to this ambiguity of
The consequence, however, was seen by the word, used it in the one sense or the
Bishop Berkeley and Mr Hume, who rather other, as the subject-matter required; and
chose to admit the consequence than to give the far greater part of his readers have done
up the principle from which it follows. the same. [154]
Perhaps it was unfortunate for Mr Locke There is a third sense, in which he uses
that he used the word idea so very fre the word not unfrequently, to signify objects
“nently as to make it very difficult to give of thought that are not in the mind, but
the attention necessary to put it always to external. Of this he seems to be sensible,
the same meaning. And it appears evident and somewhere makes an apology for it.
that, in many places, he means nothing When he affirms, as he does in innumerable
more by it but the notion or conception we places, that all human knowledge consists
have of any object of thought; that is, the in the perception of the agreement or dis
act of the mind in conceiving it, and not the agreement of our ideas, it is impossible to
object conceived.” put a meaning upon this, consistent with
In explaining this word, he says that he his principles, unless he means by ideas
uses it for whatever is meant by phantasm, every object of human thought, whether
notion, species. Here are three synonymes mediate or immediate; everything, in a
to the word idea. The first and last are word, that can be signified by the subject,
very proper to express the philosophical or predicate of a proposition.
meaning of the word, being terms of art in Thus, we see that the word idea has three
the Peripatetic philosophy, and signifying different meanings in the essay; and the
images of external things in the mind, authorseems to have useditsometimesinone,
which, according to that philosophy, are sometimes in another, without being aware
objects of thought. But the word notion is of any change in the meaning. The reader
a word in common language, whose meaning slides easily into the same fallacy, that
agrees exactly with the popular meaning of meaning occurring most readily to his mind
which gives the best sense to what he reads.
* When we contemplate a triangle, we may consider I have met with persons professing no slight
it either as a complement of three sides or of three acquaintance with the “Essay on Human
angles; not that the three sides and the three angles
are possible except through each other, but because Understanding,” who maintained that the
we may in thought view the figure-qua triangle, word idea, wherever it occurs, means
£
in reality one and indivisible-in different relations.
It like manner, we may consider a representative act more than thought ; and that,
of knowledge in two relations—1°, as an actrepresen: where he speaks of ideas as images in the
tative of something, and, 2* as an act cognitive of mind, and as objects of thought, he is not
that representation, although, in truth, these are both
only one indivisible energy–the representation only to be understood as speaking properly, but
existing as known, the cognition being only ible in figuratively or analogically. And, indeed,
a representation. Thus, e.g., in the imagination of I apprehend that it would be no small
a Centaur-the Centaur represented is the Centaur
known, the Centaur known is the Centaur repre advantage to many passages in the book,
sented it is one act under two relations-a relation if they could admit of this interpretation.
to the subject knowing-a relation to the object re
presented. But to a cognitive act considered in these It is not the fault of this philosopher
several relations we may give either different names, alone to have given too little attention to
or we may confound them under one, or we may do the distinction between the operations of
both; and this is actually done; some words express.
ing only one relation, others both or either, and the mind and the objects of those opera
others properly the one but abusively also the other. tions. Although this distinction be familiar
Thus Idea properly denotes an act of thought con to the vulgar, and found in the structure of
sidered in relation to an external something beyond
the sphere of consciousness—a representation; but all languages, philosophers, when they speak
some philosophers, as Locke, abuse it to comprehend of ideas, often confound [155] the two to
the thought also, viewed as cognitive of this represen gether; and their theory concerning ideas
tation. Again, perception, notion, conception, &c.
£ is, unfortunately, obsolete) comprehend has led them to do so; for ideas, being
, or may be used to denote either of the rela supposed to be a shadowy kind of
tions; and it is only by the context that we can ever
£
vaguely discover in which application they are in intermediate between the thought and the
tended. This is unfortunate; but so it is.-H. object of thought, sometimes seem to coa
[153–155]
280 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. LEssay 11
lesce with the thought, sometimes with the tion. They make sensation to be a percep
object of thought, and sometimes to have a tion; and everything we perceive by our
distinct existence of their own. senses to be an idea of sensation. Some
. The same philosophical theory of ideas times they say that they are conscious of
has led philosophers to confound the differ the ideas in their own minds, sometimes
ent operations of the understanding, and that they perceive them." [156]
to call them all by the name of perception." However improbable it may appear that
Mr Locke, though not free from this fault, philosophers who have taken pains to study
is not so often chargeable with it as some the operations of their own minds, should
who came after him. The vulgar give the express them less properly and less dis
name of perception to that immediate know tinctly than the vulgar, it seems really to be
ledge of external objects which we have by the case; and the only account that can be
our external senses.t. This is its proper given of this strange phaenomenon, I take
meaning in our language, though sometimes to be this: that the vulgar seek no theory
it may be applied to other things metaphori to account for the operations of their minds;
cally or analogically. When I think of they know that they see, and hear, and re
anything that does not exist, as of the member, and imagine; and those who think
republic of Oceana, I do not perceive it—I distinctly will express these operations dis
only conceive or imagine it.S When I tinctly, as their consciousness represents
think of what happened to me yesterday, I them to the mind ; but philosophers think
do not perceive but remember it. When they ought to know not only that there are
I am pained with the gout, it is not proper such operations, but how they are per
to say I perceive the pain; I feel it, or am formed ; how they see, and hear, and re
conscious of it: it is not an object of per member, and imagine; and, having invented
ception, but of sensation and of conscious a theory to explain these operations, by
ness." So far, the vulgar distinguish very ideas or images in the mind, they suit their
properly the different operations of the expressions to their theory; and, as a false
mind, and never confound the names of comment throws a cloud upon the text, so
things so different in their nature. But a false theory darkens the phaenomena
the theory of ideas leads philosophers to which it attempts to explain.
conceive all those operations to be of one We shall examine this theory afterwards.
nature, and to give them one name. - They Here I would only observe that, if it is not
are all, according to that theory, the per true, it may be expected that it should lead
ception of ideas in the mind. Perceiving, ingenious men who adopt it to confound the
remembering, imagining, being conscious, operations of the mind with their objects,
are all perceiving ideas in the mind, and and with one another, even where the com
are called perceptions. Hence it is that mon language of the unlearned clearly dis
philosophers speak of the perceptions of tinguishes them. One that trusts to a false
memory, and the perceptions of imagina guide is in greater danger of being led
astray, than he who trusts his own eyes,
• No more than by calling them all by the name though he should be but indifferently ac
of Cognitions, or Acts of Consciouness. There was quainted with the road.
no reason, either from etymology or usage, whyper
ception should not signify the energy of immediately
apprehending, in general; and until Reid limited the
word to our apprehension of an external world, it CHAPTER X.
was, in fact, employed by philosophers, as tanta
inount to an act of consciousness. fe were in need
of a word to express our sensurve cognitions as dis OF THE SENTIMENTS OF Bishop Berkeley.
tinct from our sensitive feelings, (for the term sens
ation involved both,) and, therefore, Reid's restric
tion, though contrary to all precedent, may be ad GEORGE BERKKLEY, afterwards Bishop
mitted; but his criticism of other philosophers for of Cloyne, published his “New Theory of
their employment of the term, in a wider meaning,
is wholly groundless.-H. Vision,” in 1709; his “Treatise concern
+ But not exclusively.-H. ing the Principles of Human Knowledge,” in
t This is not correct-H.
* And why? Simply because we do not, by such 1710; and his “Dialogues between Hylas
an act, know, or apprehend such an object to exist; and Philonous,” in 1713; being then a Fel
we merely represent it. But perception was only low of Trinity College, Dublin. [157] He is
used for such an apprehension. We could say, how
ever, that we perceived (as we could say that we were acknowledged universally to have great
conscious '' the republic of Oceana, as imagined merit, as an excellent writer, and a very
by us, after Harrington.-H. acute and clear reasoner on the most ab
| And this, for the same reason. What is remem.
bered is not and can not be immediately known; stract subjects, not to speak of his virtues
nought but the present mental representation is so as a man, which were very conspicuous:
known ; , and this we could properly say that we
perceived.-H. yet the doctrine chiefly held forth in the
* Because the feeling of pain, though only possible treatises above mentioned, especially in the
through consciousness, is not an act of knowledge.
But it could be properly said, I perceire a feeling of * The connection of the wider signification of the
in. At any rate, the expression 1 perceive a pain, term perception, with the more complex theory of
is as correct as I am conscious of a farm - H. representation, has no foundation-ii.
| 156, 137
chap. x.] OF THE SENTIMENTS OF BISHOP BERKELEY. 28. I
two last, has generally been thought so very great importance for the improvement of
absurd, that few can be brought to think human knowledge, and especially for the
that he either believed it himself, or that defence of religion. Dial. Pref. “If the
he seriously meant to persuade others of its principles which I here endeavour to pro
truth. pagate, are admitted for true, the conse
He maintains, and thinks he has demon quences which I think evidently flow from
strated, by a variety of arguments, ground thence are, that atheism and scepticism
ed on principles of philosophy universally will be utterly destroyed, many intricate
received, that there is no such thing as points made plain, great difficulties solved,
matter in the universe; that sun and moon, several useless parts of science retrenched,
earth and sea, our own bodies, and those of speculation referred to practice, and men
our friends, are nothing but ideas in the reduced from paradoxes to common sense.”
minds of those who think of them, and that In the “Theory of Vision,” he goes no
they have no existence when they are not farther than to assert that the objects of
the objects of thought; that all that is in sight are nothing but ideas in the mind,
the universe may be reduced to two cate granting, or at least not denying, that there
gories—to wit, minds, and ideas in the is a tangible world, which is really external,
mind. -
and which exists whether we perceive it or
But, however absurd this doctrine might not. Whether thereason of this was,that his
appear to the unlearned, who consider the system had not, at that time, wholly opened
existence of the objects of sense as the to his own mind, or whether he thought it
most evident of all truths, and what no man prudent to let it enter into the minds of his
in his senses can doubt, the philosophers readers by degrees, I cannot say. I think
who had been aceustomed to consider ideas he insinuates the last as the reason, in the
as the immediate objects of all thought, had “Principles of Human Knowledge.” [159]
no title to view this doctrine of Berkeley in The “Theory of Vision,” however, taken
so unfavourable a light. by itself, and without relation to the main
They were taught by Des Cartes, and by branch of his system, contains very important
all that came after him, that the existence discoveries, and marks of great genius. He
of the objects of sense is not self-evident, distinguishes more accurately than any that
but requires to be proved by arguments; went before him, between the immediate
and, although Des Cartes, and many others, objects of sight, and those of the other
had laboured to find arguments for this senses which are early associated with them,
purpose, there did not appear to be that He shews that distance, of itself and imme
force and clearness in them which might diately, is not seen; but that we learn to
have been expected in a matter of such im judge of it by certain sensations and per
portance. Mr Norris had declared that, ceptions which are connected with it. This
after all the arguments that had been is a very important observation; and, I
offered, the existence of an external world believe, was first made by this author."
is only probable, but by no means certain. It gives much new light to the operations
[138] Malebranchethoughtit rested upon the of our senses, and serves to account for
authority of revelation, and that the argu many phaenomena in optics, of which the
ments drawn from reason were not perfectly greatest adepts in that science had always
conclusive. Others thought that the argu either given a false account, or acknow
ment from revelation was a mere sophism, ledged that they could give none at all.
because revelation comes to us by our We may observe, by the way, that the
senses, and must rest upon their authority. ingenious author seems not to have attended
Thus we see that the new philosophy to a distinction by which his general asser
had been making gradualapproachestowards tion ought to have been limited. It is true
Berkeley's opinion; and, whatever others that the distance of an object from the eye is
might do, the philosophers had no title to not immediately seen; but there is a certain
look upon it as absurd, or unworthy of a kind of distance of one object from another
firexamination. Several authors attempt which we see immediately. The author
ed to answer his arguments, but with little acknowledges that there is a visible exten
success, and others acknowledged that they sion, and visible figures, which are proper
could neither answer them nor assent to objects of sight; there must therefore be a
them. It is probable the Bishop made but visible distance. Astronomers call it an
few converts to his doctrine; but it is cer gular distance; and, although they measure
tain he made some ; and that he himself
continued, to the end of his life, firmly per should he even waver in regard to any one principle
suaded, not only of its truth," but of its of his doctrine; a doctrine, the speculative result of
which left him, as he confesses, without even a cer.
tainty of his own existence. (See above, p. 129,
* Berkeley's confidence in his idealism was, how note *.). It is Varro who speaks of the creduta
ever, nothing to Fichte's. This philosopher, in one philosopho um natio: but this is to be credulous
of his controversial treatises, imprecates everlasting even in incredulity.-H.
cannation on himself not only should he retract, but * This last statement is inaccurate.-H.
| 158, 159 |
_______
282 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. LEssay 11.

it by the angle, which is made by two lines down; and in this we have not so much
drawn from the eye to the two distant ob reason to admire the strength of Berkeley's
jects, yet it is immediately perceived by genius, as his boldness in publishing to the
sight, even by those who never thought of world an opinion which the unlearned would
that angle. be apt to interpret as the sign of a crazy
He led the way in shewing how we learn intellect. A man who was firmly persuaded
to perceive the distance of an object from of the doctrine universally received by phi
the eye, though this speculation was carried losophers concerning ideas, if he could but
farther by others who came after him. He take courage to call in question the exist
made the distinction between that extension ence of a material world, would easily find
and figure which we perceive by sight only, unanswerable arguments in that doctrine.
and that which we perceive by touch; call {161]. “Some truths there are,” says Berke
ing the first, visible, the last, tangible ex ley, “so near and obvious to the mind, that
tension and figure. He shewed, likewise, a man need only open his eyes to see them.
that tangible extension, and not visible, is Such,” he adds, “I take this important one
the object of geometry, although mathema to be, that all the choir of heaven, and fur
ticians commonly use visible diagrams in niture of the earth—in a word, all those
their demonstrations." [160] bodies which compose the mighty frame
The notion of extension and figure which of the world—have not any subsistence
we get from sight only, and that which we without a mind.” Princ. § 6.
get from touch, have been so constantly The principle from which this important
conjoined from our infancy in all the judg conclusion is obviously deduced, is laid down
ments we form of the objects of sense, in the first sentence of his principles of
that it required great abilities to distin knowledge, as evident; and, indeed, it has
guish them accurately, and to assign to always been acknowledged by philosophers.
each sense what truly belongs to it; “so “It is evident,” says he, “to any one who
difficult a thing it is,” as Berkeley justly takes a survey of the objects of human
observes, “to dissolve an union so early knowledge, that they are either ideas ac
begun, and confirmed by so long a habit.” tually imprinted on the senses, or else such
This point he has laboured, through the as are perceived, by attending to the pas
whole of the essay on vision, with that sions and operations of the mind; or, lastly,
uncommon penetration and judgment which ideas formed by help of memory and imagin
he possessed, and with as great success as ation, either compounding, dividing, or
could be expected in a first attempt upon barely representing, those originally per
so abstruse a subject. ceived in the foresaid ways.”
He concludes this essay, by shewing, in This is the foundation on which the whole
no less than seven sections, the notions system rests. If this be true, then, indeed,
which an intelligent being, endowed with the existence of a material world must be
sight, without the sense of touch, might a dream that has imposed upon all mankind
form of the objects of sense. This specu from the beginning of the world.
lation, to shallow thinkers, may appear to The foundation on which such a fabric
be egregious trifling.'t To Bishop Ber rests ought to be very solid and well esta
keley it appeared in another light, and will blished; yet Berkeley says nothing more for
do so to those who are capable of entering it than that it is evident. If he means that
into it, and who know the importance of it, it is self-evident, this indeed might be a
in solving many of the phaenomena of vision. good reason for not offering any direct argu
He seems, indeed, to have exerted more ment in proof of it. But I apprehend this
force of genius in this than in the main cannot justly be said. , Self-evident propo
branch of his system. sitions are those which appear evident to
In the new philosophy, the pillars by every man of sound understanding who ap
which the existence of a material world was
prehends the meaning of them distinctly,
supported, were so feeble that it did not and attends to them without prejudice. Can
re suire the force of a Samson to bring them this be said of this proposition, That all the
objects of our knowledge are ideas in our
* Properly speak ng, it is neither tangible nor own minds #" I believe that, to any man
visible extension which is the object of g y's
but intelligible, pure, or a priori extension.-H.
+ This, I have no doubt, is in allusion to Priestley. *Totheldealist, it is of perfect indifference whether
That writer had, not very courteously, said, in his this proposition, in Reid’s sense of the expression
“Examination of Reid's Inquiry” “: do not re Ideas, be admitted, or whether it be held that we are
member to have seen a more egregious piece of so conscious of nothing but of the modifications of our
lemn trifting than the chapter which our author calis own minds. For, on the supposition that we can
the ‘Geometry of Visibles, and his account of the know the non-ego only in and through the ego, it
“Idomenians, as heterms thºse imaginary beings who follows, (since we can know nothing immediately of
nad no ideas of substance but from sight."--in a note which we are not conscious, and it being allowed
upon that chapter of “The 1nquiry,” I stated that that we are conscious only of mind,) that it is con
the thought of a Geometry of Visibles was original to tradictory to suppose aught, as known, (i.e., any ob
Berkeley, and I had then no recollection of Reid's ject of knowledge.) to be known otherwise than as a
acknow ent in the present paragraph.-H. | phenomenon of mind-H
[160, 161 ;
chap. x.] OF THE SENTIMENTS OF BISHOP BERKELEY. 283
uninstructed in philosophy, this proposition petition of the same thing, placed often in
will appear very improbable, if not absurd. the same, often in different lights.”
[162] However scanty his knowledge may It was, therefore, necessary to dwell
be, he considers the sun and moon, the earth upon it, and turn it on all sides, till it became
and sea, as objects of it; and it will be difficult familiar; to consider all its consequences,
to persuade him that those objects of his and to obviate every prejudice and pre
knowledge are ideas in his own mind, and possession that might hinder its admittance.
have no existence when he does not think It was even a matter of some difficulty to
of them. If I may presume to speak my fit it to common language, so far as to
own sentiments, I once believed this doc enable men to speak and reason about it
trine of ideas so firmly as to embrace the intelligibly. Those who have entered se
whole of Berkeley's system in consequence riously into Berkeley's system, have found,
of it; till, finding other consequences to after all the assistance which his writings
follow from it, which gave me more unea give, that time and practice are necessary
siness than the want of a material world, to acquire the habit of speaking and think
it came into my mind, more than forty ing distinctly upon it.
years ago, to put the question, What evi Berkeley foresaw the opposition that
dence have I for this doctrine, that all the would be made to his system, from two
objects of my knowledge are ideas in my different quarters: first, from the philos
own mind? From that time to the pre ophers; and, secondly, from the vulgar,
sent I have been candidly and impartially, who are led by the plain dictates of nature.
as I think, seeking for the evidence of this The first he had the courage to oppose
principle, but can find none, excepting the openly and avowedly; the second, he
authority of philosophers. dreaded much more, and, therefore, takes
We shall have occasion to examine its a great deal of pains, and, I think, uses
evidence afterwards. I would at present some art, to court into his party. This
only observe, that all thearguments brought is particularly observable in his “Dia
by Berkeley against the existence of a ma logues.” He sets out with a declaration,
terial world are grounded upon it; and that Dial. 1, “That, of late, he had quitted
he has not attempted to give any evidence several of the sublime motions he had got
for it, but takes it for granted, as other in the schools of the philosophers, for vul
philosophers had done before him. gar opinions,” and assures Hylas, his fel
But, supposing this principle to be true, low-dialogist, “That, since this revolt from
Berkeley's system is impregnable. No metaphysical notions to the plain dictates
demonstration can be more evident than of nature and common sense, he found his
his reasoning from it. Whatever is per understanding strangely enlightened; so
ceived is an idea, and an idea can only that he could now easily comprehend a great
exist in a mind. It has no existence when many things, which before were all mys
it is not perceived; nor can there be any tery and riddle.” [164] Pref. to Dial. “If
thing like an idea, but an idea. his principles are admitted for true, men
So sensible he was that it required no will be reduced from paradoxes to common
laborious reasoning to deduce his system sense.” At the same time, he acknowledges,
from the principle laid down, that he was “That they carry with them a great opposi
afraid of being thought needlessly prolix in tion to the prejudices of philosophers, which
handling the subject, and makes an apology have so far prevailed against the common
for it. Princ. § 22. “To what purpose sense and natural notions of mankind.”
is it,” says he, “to dilate upon that which When Hylas objects to him, Dial. 3,
may be demonstrated, with the utmost evi “You can never persuade me, Philonous,
dence, in a line or two, to any one who is that the denying of matter or corporeal
capable of the least reflection?” [163] But, substance is not repugnant to the universal
though his demonstration might have been sense of mankind”—he answers, “I wish
comprehended in a line or two, he very pru both our opinions were fairly stated, and
dently thought that an opinion which the submitted to the judgment of men who had
world would be apt to look upon as a mon plain common sense, without the prejudices
ster of absurdity, would not be able to make of a learned education. Let me be repre
its way at once, even by the force of a naked sented as one who trusts his senses, who
demonstration. He observes, justly, Dial. thinks he knows the things he sees and
2, “That, though a demonstration be never feels, and entertains no doubt of their ex
so well grounded and fairly proposed, yet istence.—If by material substance is meant
if there is, withal, a strain of prejudice, or only sensible body, that which is seen and
a wrong bias on the understanding, can it felt, (and the unphilosophical part of the
be expected to perceive clearly, and adhere world, I dare say, mean no more,) then I
firmly to the truth? No; there is need of am more certain of matter's existence than
time and pains; the attention must be you or any other philosopher pretend to be.
awakened and detained, by a frequent re If there be anything which makes the
284 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [EssAv II.
generality of mankind averse from the we give one name, and consider as one
notions I espouse, it is a misapprehension thing; these are the immediate objects of
that I deny the reality of sensible things: sense, and these do really exist. As to the
but, as it is you who are guilty of that, and notion that those things have an absolute
mot I, it follows, that, in truth, their aversion external existence, independent of being
is against your notions, and not mine. I perceived by any mind, he thinks [166] that
am content to appeal to the common sense this is no notion of the vulgar, but a refine
of the world for the truth of my notion. I ment of philosophers; and that the notion of
am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to material substance, as a substratum, or sup
believe my senses, and to leave things as I port of that collection of sensible qualities
find them. I cannot, for my life, help to which we give the name of an apple or a
thinking that snow is white and fire hot.” melon, is likewise an invention of philoso
When Hylas is at last entirely converted, phers, and is not found with the vulgar till
he observes to Philonous, “After all, the they are instructed by philosophers. The
controversy about matter, in the strict substance net being an object of sense, the
acceptation of it, lies altogether between vulgar never think of it; or, if they are
you and the philosophers, whose principles, taught the use of the word, they mean no
I acknowledge, are not near so natural, or more by it but that collection of sensible
so agreeable to the common sense of man qualities which they, from finding them con
kind, and Holy Scripture, as yours.” [165] joined in nature, have been accustomed to
Philonous observes, in the end, “That he call by one name, and to consider as one
does not pretend to be a setter up of new thing.
notions; his endeavours tend only to unite, Thus he draws the vulgar opinion near
and to place in a clearer light, that truth to his own; and, that he may meet it half
which was before shared between the vul way, he acknowledges that material things
gar and the philosophers; the former being have a real existence out of the mind of
of opinion, that those things they im this or that person; but the question, says
mediately perceive are the real things; and he, between the materialist and me, is,
the latter, that the things immediately Whether they have an absolute existence
perceived, are ideas which exist only in the distinct from their being perceived by God,
mind; which two things put together do, and exterior to all minds? This, indeed,
in effect, constitute the substance of what he says, some heathens and philosophers
he advances.” And he concludes by ob have affirmed; but whoever entertains no
serving, “That those principles which at tions of the Deity, suitable to the Holy
first view lead to scepticism, pursued to a Scripture, will be of another opinion.
certain point, bring men back to common But here an objection occurs, which it
sense.” required all his ingenuity to answer. It is
These passages shew sufficiently the this: The ideas in my mind cannot be the
author's concern to reconcile his system to same with the ideas of any other mind;
the plain dictates of nature and common therefore, if the objects I perceive be only
sense, while he expresses no concern to ideas, it is impossible that the objects I per
reconcile it to the received doctrines of ceive can exist anywhere, when I do not
philosophers. He is fond to take part with perceive them; and it is impossible that
the vulgar against the philosophers, and to two or more minds can perceive the same
vindicate common sense against their inno object,
vations. What pity is it that he did not To this Berkeley answers, that this ob
carry this suspicion of the doctrine of philo jection presses no less the opinion of the
sophers so far as to doubt of that philoso materialist philosopher than his. But the
phical tenet on which his whole system is difficulty is to make his opinion coincide
built—to wit, that the things immediately with the notions of the vulgar, who are
perceived by the senses are ideas which firmly persuaded that the very identical
exist only in the mind! objects which they perceive, continue to
After all, it seems no easy matter to make exist when they do not perceive them; and
the vulgar opinion and that of Berkeley to who are no less firmly persuaded that, when
meet. And, to accomplish this, he seems ten men look at the sun or the moon, they
to me to draw each out of its line towards all see the same individual object.” [167]
the other, not without some straining. To reconcile this repugnancy, he observes,
The vulgar opinion he reduces to this, Dial. 3–“That, if the term same be taken
that the very things which we perceive by in the vulgar acceptation, it is certain (and
our senses do really exist. This he grants;" not at all repugnant to the principles he
for these things, says he, are ideas in our maintains) that different persons may per
minds, or complexions of ideas, to which ceive the same thing; or the same thing or
idea exist in different minds. Words are
* This is one of the passages that may be brought
'' that Reid did allow to the ego an immediate
a dreal knowledge of the non-ego.-H. * Sec the last note.-H.
[165-167]
of arbitrary imposition; and, since men are tended to, and from which it will be found
used to apply the word same, where no dis difficult, if at all possible, to guard it.
timetion or variety is perceived, and he does The consequence I mean is this—that,
not pretend to alter their perceptions, it although it leaves us sufficient evidence of a
follows that, as men have said before, supreme intelligent mind, it seems to take
several saw the same thing, so they may, away all the evidence we have of other
upon like occasions, still continue to use the intelligent beings like ourselves. What I
same phrase, without any deviation, either call a father, a brother, or a friend, is only
from propriety of language, or the truth of a parcel of ideas in my own mind; and, being
things; but, if the term same be used in the ideas in my mind, they cannot possibly have
acceptation of philosophers, who pretend to that relation to another mind which they have
an abstracted notion of identity, then, to mine, any more than the pain felt by me
according to their sundry definitions of this can be the individual pain felt by another. I
term, (for it is not yet agreed wherein that can find no principle in Berkeley's system,
philosophic identity consists,) it may or which affords me even probable ground to
may not be possible for divers persons to conclude that there are other intelligent
perceive the same thing; but whether phi beings, like myself, in the relations of father,
losophers shall think fit to call a thing the brother, friend, or fellow-citizen. I am left
same or no is, I conceive, of small import alone, as the only creature of God in the
ance. Men may dispute about identity and universe, in that forlorn state of egoism
diversity, without any real difference in into which it is said some of the disciples of
their thoughts and opinions, abstracted from Des Cartes were brought by his philo
names.” sophy." [169]
Upon the whole, I apprehend that Berk Of all the opinions that have ever been
eley has carried this attempt to reconcile advanced by philosophers, this of Bishop
his system to the vulgar opinion farther Berkeley, that there is no material world,
than reason supports him; and he was no seems the strangest, and the most apt to
doubt tempted to do so, from a just appre bring philosophy into ridicule with plain
hension that, in a controversy of this kind, men who are guided by the dictates of nature
the common sense of mankind is the most and common sense. And, it will not, I ap
formidable antagonist. prehend, be improper to trace this progeny
Berkeley has employed much pains and of the doctrine of ideas from its origin, and
ingenuity to shew that his system, if re to observe its gradual progress, till it acquired
ceived and believed, would not be attended such strength that a pious and learned
with those bad consequences in the conduct bishop had the boldness to usher it into the
of life, which superficial thinkers may be apt world, as demonstrable from the principles
to impute to it. His system does not take of philosophy universally received, and as
away or make any alteration upon our plea an admirable expedient for the advance
sures or our pains: our sensations, whether ment of knowledge and for the defence of
agreeable or disagreable, are the same upon religion.
his system as upon any other. These are real During the reign of the Peripatetic phi
things, and the only things that interest us. losophy, men were little disposed to doubt,
{163] They are produced in us according to and much to dogmatize. The existence of
certain laws of nature, by which our con the objects of sense was held as a first prin
duet will be directed in attaining the one, ciple; and the received doctrine was, that
and avoiding the other ; and it is of no the sensible species or idea is the very form
moment to us, whether they are produced of the external object, just separated from
immediately by the operation of some power the matter of it, and sent into the mind that
ful intelligent being upon our minds; or perceives it; so that we find no appearance
by the mediation of some inanimate being of scepticism about the existence of mat
which we call matter. ter under that philosophy.t
The evidence of an all-governing mind, Des Cartes taught men to doubt even of
so far from being weakened, seems to appear those things that had been taken for first
even in a more striking light upon his principles. He rejected it the doctrine of
hypothesis, than upon the common one.
The powers which inanimate matter is sup • In which the soul, like the unhappy Dido
posed to possess, have always been the “semperque relinqui
stronghold of atheists, to which they had Sola sibi, : longam invomitata videtur
ire viam,”-H.
recourse in defence of their system. This This is not the case. It could easily be shewn
fortress of atheism must be most effectually that, in the schools of the middle ages, the arguments
overturned, if there is no such thing as in favour of Idealism were fully understood; and
matter in the universe. In all this the they would certainly have obtained numerous parti;
sans, had it not been seen that such a philosophical
Bishop reasons justly and acutely. But opinion involved a theological heresy touching the
eucharist
there is one uncomfortable consequence of tine.-H This was even recognised by St Augus
his system. which he seems not to have at ! After many of the Peripatetics themselves--H.
[168, 169]
species or ideas coming from objects; but dence as is sufficient to direct us in pur
still maintained that what we immediately suing the good and avoiding the ill we may
perceive, is not the external object, but an receive from external things, beyond which
idea or image of it in our mind. This led we have no concern.
some of his disciples into Egoism, and to dis There is, indeed, a single passage in
believe the existence of every creature in the Locke's essay, which may lead one to con
universe but themselves and their own ideas." jecture that he had a glimpse of that sys
But Des Cartes himself-either from tem which Berkeley afterwards advanced,
dread of the censure of the church, which but thought proper tosuppress it within his
he took great care not to provoke; or to shun own breast. [171] The passage is in Book
the ridicule of the world, which might have 4, c. 10, where, having proved the existence
crushed his system at once, as it did that of of an eternal intelligent mind, he comes
the Egoists;" or, perhaps, from inward to answer those who conceive that matter
conviction—was resolved to support the ex also must be eternal, because we cannot
istence of matter. To do this consistently conceive how it could be made out of
with his principles, he found himself obliged nothing; and having observed that the
to have recourse to arguments that are far creation of mind requires no less power than
fetched, and not very cogent. Sometimes the creation of matter, he adds what fol
he argues that our senses are given us by lows:– “Nay, possibly, if we could eman
God, who is no deceiver; and, therefore, cipate ourselves from vulgar notions, and
we ought to believe their testimony. [170] raise our thoughts, as far as they would
But this argumentis weak; because, accord reach, to a closer contemplation of things,
ing to his principles, our senses testify no we might be able to aim at some dim and
more but that we have certain ideas: and, seeming conception, how matter might at
if we draw conclusions from this testimony, first be made and begin to exist, by the
which the premises will not support, we power of that eternal first Being; but to
deceive ourselves. To give more force to give beginning and being to a spirit, would
this weak argument, he sometimes adds, be found a more inconceivable effect of om
that we have by nature a strong propensity nipotent power. But this being what would
to believe that there is an external world perhaps lead us too far from the notions on
corresponding to our ideas.t. which the philosophy now in the world is
Malebranche thought that this strong built, it would not be pardonable to deviate
propensity is not a sufficient reason for be so far from them, or to inquire, so far as
lieving the existence of matter; and that it grammar itself would authorize, if the com
is to be received as an article of faith, not mon settled opinion opposes it; especially
certainly discoverable by reason. He is in this place, where the received doctrine
aware that faith comes by hearing; and that serves well enough to our present purpose."
it may be said that prophets, apostles, and It appears from this passage-First, That
miracles are only ideas in our minds. But Mr Locke had some system in his mind,
to this he answers, that, though these things perhaps not fully digested, to which we
are only ideas, yet faith turns them into might be led, by raising our thoughts to a
realities; and this answer, he hopes, will closer contemplation of things, and emanci
satisfy those who are not too morose. pating them from vulgar notions; Secondly,
It may perhaps seem strange that Locke, That this system would lead so far from the
who wrote so much about ideas, should not notions on which the philosophy now in the
see those consequences which Berkeley world is built, that he thought proper to
thought so obviously deducible from that keep it within his own breast; Thirdly,
doctrine. Mr. Locke surely was not willing That it might be doubted whether this sys
that the doctrine of ideas should be thought tem differed so far from the common settled
to be loaded with such consequences. He opinion in reality, as it seemed to do in
acknowledges that the existence of a mate words; Fourthly, By this system, we might
rial world is not to be received as a first possibly be enabled to aim at some dim and
principle—nor is it demonstrable; but he seeming conception how matter might at
offers the best arguments for it he can; and first be made and begin to exist; but it
supplies the weakness of his arguments by would give no aid in conceiving how a
this observation—that we have such evi spirit might be made. These are the cha
racteristics of that system which Mr Locke
is: s: above, p. 269, note %, and below, under p. had in his mind, and thought it prudent to
suppress. May they not lead to a probable
t We are only by nature led to believe in the exist
ence of an outer world, because we are by nature led conjecture, that it was the same, or some
to believe that we have an immediate knowledge of thing similar to that of Bishop Berkeley P
it as existing. Now, Des Cartes and the philosophers
in general (is Reid an exception ?) hold that we are • Mr Stewart plausibly supposes that this passage
Jeluded in the latter belief, and yet they argue, on contains rather an anticipation of Boscovich's Theory
the authority of the former, that an external world of Matter, than of Berkeley's Theory of idealism.
exists.-H.
Philosophical Essays, p. 64. But see note F.-H.
[170, 171]
According to Berkeley'ssystem, God's creat lished twenty-four years, or of Berkeley's

ing the material world at such a time, means “Principles of Knowledge,” which had
no more but that he decreed from that time, been published three years.
to produce ideas in the minds of finite spirits, He says he had been ten years firmly
in that order and according to those rules convinced of the non-existence of an ex
which we call the laws of Nature. [172] ternal world, before he ventured to publish
This, indeed, removes all difficulty, in con his book. He is far from thinking, as Ber
ceiving how matter was created; and keley does, that the vulgar are of his opi
Berkeley does not fail to take notice of the nion. If his book should make any con
advantage of his system on that account. verts to his system, (of which he expresses
But his system gives no aid in conceiving little hope, though he has supported it by
how a spirit may be made. It ap * nine demonstrations,) he takes pains to
therefore, that every particular Mr Locke shew that his disciples, notwithstanding
has hinted, with regard to that system which their opinion, may, with the unenlightened,
he had in his mind, but thought it prudent speak of material things in the common
to suppress, tallies exactly with the system style. He himself had scruples of con
of Berkeley. If we add to this, that science about this for some time; and, if
Berkeley's system follows from Mr Locke's, he had not got over them, he must have
by very obvious consequence, it seems rea shut his lips for ever; but he considered
sonable to conjecture, from the passage now that God himself has used this style in
quoted, that he was not unaware of that speaking to men in the Holy Scripture, and
consequence, but left it to those who should has thereby sanctified it to all the faithful;
come after him to carry his principles their and that to the pure all things are pure.
full length, when they should by time be He thinks his opinion may be of great
betterestablished, and able to bear the shock use, especially in religion; and applies it,
of their opposition to vulgar motions. Mr in particular, to put an end to the con
Norris, in his “Essay towards the Theory troversy about Christ's presence in the
of the Ideal or Intelligible World,” pub Sacrament.
lished in 1701, observes, that the material I have taken the liberty to give this
world is not an object of sense; because short account of Collier's book, because I
sensation is within us, and has no object. believe it is rare, and little known. I have
Its existence, therefore, he says, is a collec only seen one copy of it, which is in the
tion of reason, and not a very evident one. University library of Glasgow." . [174]
From this detail we may learn that the
doctrine of ideas, as it was new-modelled
by Des Cartes, looked with an unfriendly CHAPTER XI
aspect upon the material world; and, al
though philosophers were very unwilling to Bishop BERKELEY's sKNTIMENTs of THE
give up either, they found it a very difficult NA't URE OF in EA8.
task to reconcile them to each other. In
this state of things, Berkeley, I think, is I PAss over the sentiments of Bishop
reputed the first who had the daring reso Berkeley, with respect to abstract ideas,
lution to give up the material world alto and with respect to space and time, as
gether, as a sacrifice to the received phi things which may more properly be consi
losophy of ideas. dered in another place. But I must take
But we ought not, in this historical sketch, notice of one part of his system, wherein he
to omit an author of far inferior name,
Arthur Collier, Rector of Langford Magna, * This work, though of extreme rarity, and long
absolutely unknown to the philosophers of this coun
near Sarum. He published a book in 1713, try, had excited, from the first, the attention of the
which he calls “Clavis Universalis; or, a German metaphysicians. A long analysis of it was
given in the “Acta Eruditorum;" it is found quoted
New Inquiry after Truth; being a demon by Bilfinger, and other Lebnitzians; and was sub
stration of the non-existence or impossibility uently translated into German, with controver
of an external world.” His arguments are the sial notes by Professor Eschenbach of Rostock, in his
“Collection of the principal writers who deny the
same in substance with Berkeley's; and he Reality of their own Body and of the whole Corporeal
appears to understand the whole strength of World,” 1756. The late learned Dr Parr had long
the intention of publishing the work of Collier along
his cause. [173] Though he is not deficient with some other rare metaphysical treat ses. He did
in metaphysical acuteness, his style is dis not, however, accomplish his purpose, which in
agreeable, being full of conceits, of new self,volved, likewise, an introductory disquisition by him
coined words, scholastic terms, and per salis”but a complete impression of the “Clavis Univer
and four other tracts, was found, after his
plexed sentences. He appears to be well death; and this having been purchased by Mr Lum
acquainted with Des Cartes, Malebranche, ley, has, by him, been recently published, under the
title-“ Metaphysical Tracts, by English Philoso
and Norris, as well as with Aristotle and hers of the Eighteenth Century,” &c. London:
the schoolmen. But, what is very strange, 837. A very small edition of the “Clavis” had been
it does not appear that he had ever heard printed in Edinburgh, by private subscription, in the
previous year. A Life of Collier has likewise 1*
of Locke's Essay, which had been pub | cently appeared.-H.
[172–174]
288 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [EssAY II.
seems to have deviated from the common an idea for its immediate object. In Ber
opinion about ideas. keley's, the most important objects are
Though he sets out in his principles of known without ideas. In Locke's system,
knowledge, by telling us that it is evident there are two sources of our ideas, sensa
the objects of human knowledge are ideas, tion and reflection. In Berkeley's, sensa
and builds his whole system upon this prin tion is the only source, because of the objects
ciple; yet, in the progress of it, he finds of reflection there can be no ideas. We
that there are certain objects of human know them without ideas. Locke divides
knowledge that are not ideas, but things our ideas into those of substances, modes,
which have a permanent existence. The and relations. In Berkeley's system, there
objects of knowledge, of which we have no are no ideas of substances, or of relations;
ideas, are our own minds, and their various but notions only. And even in the class of
operations, other finite minds, and the modes, the operations of our own minds
Supreme Mind. The reason why there are things of which we have distinct notions;
can be no ideas of spirits and their opera but no ideas.
tions, the author informs us is this, That Weought to do the justice to Malebranche
ideas are passive, inert, unthinking beings;" to acknowledge that, in this point, as well
they cannot, therefore, be the image or as in many others, his system comes nearer
likeness of things that have thought, and to Berkeley's than the latter seems willing
will, and active power; we have notions of to own. That author tells us that there
minds, and of their operations, but not are four different ways in which we come
ideas. We know what we mean by think to the knowledge of things. To know things
ing, willing, and perceiving; we can rea by their ideas, is only one of the four. [176]
son about beings endowed with those He affirms that we have no idea of our
powers, but we have no ideas of them. A own mind, or any of its modifications: that
spirit or mind is the only substance or we know these things by consciousness,
support wherein the unthinking beings or without ideas. Whether these two acute
ideas can exist; but that this substance philosophers foresaw the consequences that
which supports or perceives ideas, should may be drawn from the system of ideas,
itself be an idea, or like an idea, is evidently taken in its full extent, and which were after
absurd. wards drawn by Mr Hume, I cannot pre
He observes, farther, Princip. sect. 142, tend to say. If they did, their regard to
that “all relations, including an act of the religion was too great to permit them to ad
mind, we cannot properly be said to have mit those consequences, or the principles
an idea, but rather a notion of the relations with which they were necessarily connected.
or habitudes between things. [175] But However this may be, if there be so many
if, in the modern way, the word idea is things that may be apprehended and known
extended to spirits, and relations, and acts, without ideas, this very naturally suggests
this is, after all, an affair of verbal con a scruple with regard to those that £ *
cern; yet it conduces to clearness and pro for it may be said, If we can apprehend
priety, that we distinguish things very dif and reason about the world of spirits, with
ferent by different names.” out ideas, Is it not possible that we may
This is an important part of Berkeley's apprehend and reason about a material
system, and deserves attention. We are world, without ideas? If consciousness
led by it to divide the objects of human and reflection furnish us with notions of
knowledge into two kinds. The first is ideas, spirits and of their attributes, without ideas,
which we have by our five senses; they may not our senses furnish us with notions
have no existence when they are not per of bodies and their attributes, without ideas?
ceived, and exist only in the minds of those Berkeley foresaw this objection to his
who perceive them. The second kind of system, and puts it in the mouth of Hylas,
objects comprehends spirits, their acts, and in the following words:—bial. 3, Hylas.
the relations and habitudes of things. Of “If you can conceive the mind of God,
these we have notions, but no ideas. No without having an idea of it, why may not
idea can represent them, or have any simi I be allowed to conceive the existence of
litude to them : yet we understand what matter, notwithstanding that I have no idea
they mean, and we can speak with under of it?” The answer of Philonous is
standing, and reason about them, without “You neither perceive matter objectively,
ideas. as you do an inactive being or idea, nor
This account of ideas is very different know it, as you do yourself, by a reflex act,
from that which Locke has given. In his neither do you immediately apprehend it by
system, we have no knowledge where we similitude of the one or the other, nor yet
have no ideas. Every thought must have collect it by reasoning from that which you
know immediately; all which makes the
• Berkeley is one of the philosophers who really case of matter widely different from that of
held the doctrine of ideas, erroneously, by Reid, at
tributed to all-H. the Deity.”
[175, 176"
cuAP. xi.] BISHOP BERKELEY'S SENTIMENTS OF IDEAS. 289
Though Hylas declares himself satisfied the mind. They are also less dependent
with this answer, I confess I am not : be on the spirit, or thinking substance which
cause, if I may trust the faculties that God perceives them, in that they are excited by
has given me, I do perceive matter objec the will of another and more powerful
tively—that is, something which is extended spirit; yet still they are ideas; and cer
and solid, which may be measured and tainly no idea, whether faint or strong, can
weighed, is the immediateobject of my touch exist, otherwise than in a mind perceiving
and sight." [177] And this object I take to it.” Principles, § 33.
be matter, and not an idea. And, though I From this passage we see that, by the
have been taught by philosophers, that what ideas of sense, the author means sensa
I immediately touch is an idea, and not tions;" and this, indeed, is evident from
matter; yet I have never been able to dis many other passages, of which I shall men
cover this by the most accurate attention tion a few.–Principles, § 5. “Light and
to my own perceptions. colours, heat and cold, extension and figure—
It were to be wished that this ingenious in a word, the things we see and feel—what
author had explained what he means by are they but so many sensations, notions,
ideas, as distinguished from notions. The ideas, or impressions on the sense?—and is
word notion, being a word in common lan it possible to separate, even in thought,
guage, is well understood. All men mean any of these from perception ? For my
by it, the conception, the apprehension, or part, I might as easily divide a thing from
thought which we have of any object of itself.” $ 18. “As for our senses, by
thought. A motion, therefore, is an act them we have the knowledge only of our
of the mind conceiving or thinking of some sensations, ideas, or those things that are
object. The object of thought may be immediately perceived by sense, call them
either something that is in the mind, or what you will;—but they do not inform us
something that is not in the mind. It may that things exist without the mind, or un
be something that has no existence, or perceived, like to those which are per
something that did, or does, or shall exist. ceived.” $ 25. “All our ideas, sensa
But the notion which I have of that ob tions, or the things which we perceive, by
ject, is an act of my mind which really whatever names they may be distinguished,
exists while I think of the object; but has are visibly inactive; there is nothing of
no existence when I do not think of it. power or agency included in them.”
The word idea, in popular language, has This, therefore, appears certain—that,
precisely the same meaning as the word by the ideas of sense, the author meant the
notion. But philosophers have another sensations we have by means of our senses.
meaning to the word idea; and what that I have endeavoured to explain the meaning
meaning is, I think, is very difficult to say. of the word sensation, Essay I., chap. 1,
The whole of Bishop Berkeley's system [p. 229,] and refer to the explication there
depends upon the distinction between no £
of it, which appears to me to be per
tions and ideas; and, therefore, it is worth ectly agreeable to the sense in which Bishop
while to find, if we are able, what those Berkeley uses it."
things are which he calls ideas, as distin As there can be no notion or thought
guished from notions. but in a thinking being; so there can be
For this purpose, we may observe, that no sensation but in a sentient being. [179]
he takes notice of two kinds of ideas—the It is the act or feeling of a sentient being;
ideas of sense, and the ideas of imagina its very essence consists in its being felt.
tion. “The ideas imprinted on the senses Nothing can resemble a sensation, but a
by the Author of Nature,” he says, “are similar sensation in the same or in some
called real things; and those excited in the other mind. To think that any quality in
imagination, being less regular, vivid, and a thing that is inanimate can resemble a
constant, are more properly termed ideas, sensation, is a great absurdity. In all this,
or images of things, which they copy and I cannot but agree perfectly with Bishop
represent. [178] But then our sensations, Berkeley; and I think his notions of sensa
be they never so vivid and distinct, are
nevertheless ideas; that is, they exist in • How it can be, asserted that by ideas of sense
the mind, or are perceived by it as truly Berkeley meant only what Reid did by sensations,
I cannot comprehend. That the former used ideas
as the ideas of its own framing. The ideas of sense and sensations as convertible expressions, is
of sense are allowed to have more reality true. But then Berkeley's sensation was equivalent
to Reid's sensation plus his perception. This is mani
in them—that is, to be more strong, or fest even by the passages adduced in the text. In
derly, and coherent-than the creatures of that from $ v. of the “Principles," Berkeley ex
pressly calls extension and figure sensations. But
it is a fundamental principle of Reid's philosophy,
• Does Reid mean to surrender his doctrine, "hat not only that neither extension nor figure, but that
perception is a conception–that extension and figure none of the primary qualities, are sensations. To
are not known by sense, hut are notions suggested on make a single quotation—“The primary qualities,”
the occasion of sensation? If he does not, his lan he says, “ are neither sensations, nor are they the
guage in the text is inaccurate.--H resemblances of sensations."-Infra, p. 238.-H.
u
177–179]
tion much more distinct and accurate than of sensation are sensations. But philoso
Locke's, who thought that the primary phers may err: let us hear the dictates of
qualities of body are resemblances of our common sense upon this point.
sensations," but that the secondary are not. Suppose I am pricked with a pin, I ask,
That we have many sensations by means Is the pain I feel, a sensation? Undoubtedly
of our external senses, there can be no it is. There can be nothing that resembles
doubt; and, if he is pleased to call those pain in any inanimate being. But I ask
ideas, there ought to be no dispute about again, Is the pin a sensation? To this
the meaning of a word. But, says Bishop question I find myself under a necessity of
Berkeley, by our senses, we have the know answering, that the pin is not a sensation,
ledge only of our sensations or ideas, call nor can have the least resemblance to any
them which you will. I allow him to call sensation. The pin has length and thick
them which he will; but I would have the ness, and figure and weight. A sensation
word only in this sentence to be well weighed, can have none of those qualities. I am not
because a great deal depends upon it. more certain that the pain I feel is a sensa
For, if it be true that, by our senses, we tion, than that the pin is not a sensation;
have the knowledge of our sensations only, yet the pin is an object of sense; and I am
then his system must be admitted, and the as certain that I perceive its figure and
existence of a material world must begiven hardness by my senses, as that I feel pain
up as a dream. No demonstration can be when pricked by it."
more invincible than this. If we have any Having said so much of the ideas of sense
knowledge of a material world, it must be in Berkeley's system, we are next to con
by the senses: but, by the senses, we have sider the account he gives of the ideas of
no knowledge but of our sensations only; imagination. Of these he says, Principles,
and our sensations have no resemblance of § 28-" I find I can excite ideas in my
anything that can be in a material world.t mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the
The only proposition in this demonstration scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more
which admits of doubt is, that, by our senses, than willing; and straightway this or that idea
we have the knowledge of our sensations arises in my fancy; and by the same power
only, and of nothing else. If there are ob it is obliterated, and makes way for another.
jects of the senses which are not sensations, This making and unmaking of ideas, doth
is arguments do not touch them: they may very properly denominate the mind active.
be things which do not exist in the mind, as Thus much is certain, and grounded on
all sensations do; they may be thingsof which, experience. Our sensations,” he says, “are
by our senses, we have notions, though no called real things; the ideas of imagination
ideas; justas, by consciousnessand reflection, are more properly termed ideas, or images
we have notions of spirits and of their oper of things;"+ that is, as I apprehend, they
ations, without ideas or sensations.: [180] are the images of our sensations. ''
Shall we say, then, that, by our senses, It might surely be expected that we should
we have the knowledge of our sensations be well acquainted with the ideas of imagin
only; and that they give us no motion of ation, as they are of our making; yet, after
anything but of our sensations? Perhaps all the Bishop has said about them, I am
this has been the doctrine of philosophers, at a loss to know what they are.
and not of Bishop Berkeley alone, otherwise I would observe, in the first place, with
he would have supported it by arguments. regard to these ideas of imagination—that
Mr Locke calls all the notions we have by they are not sensations; for surely sensation
our senses, ideas of sensation; and in this is the work of the senses, and not of imagin
has been very generally followed. Hence ation; and, though pain be a sensation, the
it seems a very natural inference, that ideas thought of pain, when I am not pained, is
no sensation.
* Here again we have a criticism which proceeds I observe, in the second place—that I can
on the erroneous implication, that Locke meant by
sensation what tend himself did. If for sensation find no distinction between ideas of imagin
we substitute perception, (and by sensation Locke ation and notions, which the author says
denoted both sensation proper and perception proper,) are not ideas. I can easily distinguish be
there remains nothing to censure; for Reid main
tains that “our senses give us a direct and a distinct
notion of the primary qualities, and inform us what * This illustration is taken from Des Cartes. In
they are in themselves "(infra, p. 237;) which is only this graph, the term sensation is again not used
Locke's meaning in other words. The same observa. in the extension given to it by the philosophers in
tion applies to many of the following passages.-H. question - H. -
* See the last note.-H. + Berkeley's real words are-“The ideas imprint
t But, unless that be admitted, which the ratural ed.on the Senses by the Author of Nature are called
conviction of mankind certifies, that we have an real things, and those excited in the Imagination
immediate perception-a consciousness-of external being less regular, vivid and constant, are more pro
and extended existences, it makes no difference, in perly termed ideas or images of things, which they
regard to the conclusion of the Idealist, whether copy and represent. But then our Sensations, be they
what we are conscious of in perception be supposed never so vivid and dist nct, are nevertheless ideas
an entity in the mind, (an idea in Reid's meaning.) that is, they exis in the mind, or are perceived by
or a modification of the mind, (a notion or concep it, as truly as the ideas of its own framming.” Sect
tion.) See above, p. 128, noses *.-H. xxxiii.-H.
| 180, 1811
cHAF. xi.; BISHOP B:RKELEY'S SENTIMENTS OF IDEAS. 29]
tween a motion and a sensation. It is one spirits, of their operations, and of the rela
thing to say, I have the sensation of pain. tions of things—we have no ideas at all ;"
It is another thing to say, I have a notion of we have notions of them, but not ideas; the
pain. The last expression signifies no more ideas we have are those of sense, and those
than that I understand what is meant by the of imagination. The first are the sensa
word pain. The first signifies that I really tions we have by means of our senses, whose
feel pain. But I can find no distinction existence no man can deny, because he is
between the notion of pain and the imagin conscious of them; and whose nature hath
ation of it, or indeed between the notion been explained by this author with great
of anything else, and the imagination of it. accuracy. As to the ideas of imagination,
I can, therefore, give no account of the he hath left us much in the dark. He makes
distinction which Berkeley makes between them images of our sensations; though,
ideas of imagination and notions, which, he according to his own doctrine, nothing can
says, are not ideas. They seem to me per resemble a sensation but a sensation." He
fectly to coincide." seems to think that they differ from sensa
He seems, indeed, to say, that the ideas tions only in the degree of their regularity,
of imagination differ not in kind from those vivacity, and constancy. But this cannot
of the senses, but only in the degree of their be reconciled to the experience of mankind;
regularity, vivacity, and constancy. “They and, besides this mark, which cannot be
are,” says he, “less regular, vivid, and con admitted, he hath given us no other mark
stant.” This doctrine was afterwards greed by which they may be distinguished from
ily embraced by Mr Hume, and makes a notions. Nay, it may be observed, that the
main pillar of his system; but it cannot be very reason he gives why we can have no
reconciled to common sense, to which Bishop ideas of the acts of the mind about its ideas,
Berkeley professes a great regard. For, nor of the relations of things, is applicable
according to this doctrine, if we compare the to what he calls ideas of imagination.
state of a man racked with the gout, with Principles, § 142. “We may not, I think,
his state when, being at perfect ease, he strictly be said to have an idea of an active
relates what he has suffered, the difference being, or of an action, although we may be
of these two states is only this—that, in the said to have a notion of them. I have some
last, the pain is less regular, vivid, and con knowledge or notion of my mind, and its
stant, than in the first. [182] We cannot acts about ideas, in as much as I know or
possibly assent to this. Every man knows understand what is meant by these words.
that he can relate the pain he suffered, not [I will not say that the terms Idea and
only without pain, but with pleasure; and Notion may not be used convertibly, if the
that to suffer pain, and to think of it, are world will have it so. But yet it conduces to
things which totally differ in kind, and not clearness and propriety that we distinguish
in degree only.* things very different by different names.]
We see, therefore, upon the whole, that, It is also to be remarked, that all relations
according to this system, of the most im including an act of the mind, we cannot so
portant objects of knowledge—that is, of properly be said to have an idea, but rather
* Yet the distinction of ideas, strictly so called, and a notion of the relations and habitudes be
notions, is one of the most common and important in
the#: - Nordowe owe it, as has been tweenthings.” From this it follows, that our
asserted, to keley. It was virtually taken by Des imaginations are not properly ideas, but no
Cartes and the Cartesians, in their discrimination of
ideas of imagination and iders of intelligence; it was tions, because theyincludean actof the mind.
in terms windicated against Locke, by Serjeant, Stil [183] For he tells us, in a passage already
lingfleet,. Norris, Z. Mayne, Bishop Brown, and quoted, that they are creatures of the mind,
others; Bonnet signalized it; and, under the con
trast of Anschauungen and Begriffe, it has long been of its own framing, and that it makes and
an established and classical discrimination with the unmakes them as it thinks fit, and from this
ilosophers of Germany. Nay, Reid himself sug. is properly denominated active. If it be a
gests it in the distinction he requires between ima
gination and conception, a distinction which he unfor good reason why we have not ideas, but
tunately did not-carry out, and which Mr Stewart notions only of relations, because they in
still more unhappily again perverted. See below, p. clude an act of the mind, the same reason
371. The terms notion and *tion. (or more cor
rectly concept in this sense, should be reserved must lead us to conclude, that our imagina
to express what we comprehend but cannot picture tions are notions and not ideas, since they
in imagination, such as a relation, a general term,
&c. The word idea, as one prostituted to all mean are made and unmade by the mind as it
ings, it were perhaps better altogether to discard. thinks fit: and, from this, it is properly de
As for the representations of imagination orphan
tasy, I would employ the terms image orphantasm, it .* That is, noactive.:
nominated images of inem in the phantasy. Reid
being distinctly understood" that these terms are ap himself would not say that such could be imagined.
plied to denote the re-presentations, not of our visible
perceptions merely, as the termstaken literally would ! Berkeley does not say so in the meaning sup
£ate, but of our sensible perceptions in general posed.-H -
t Imagination is an ambiguous word; it means

t There is here a confusion between pain considered either the act of imagining, or the product-i.e., the
as a feeting, and as the cognition of a feeling, to image imagined. Of the former, Berkeley held, we
which the philosophers would object - H. can form a motion, but not an idea, in the sense he
[182, 183] U 2
292 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. | Essay 11.
When so much has been written, and so representatives of external objects of sense;
many disputes raised about ideas, it were yet they have neither colour, nor smell, nor
desirable that we knew what they are, and figure, nor motion, nor any sensible quality.
to what category or class of beings they be I revere the authority of philosophers, espe
long. In this we might expect satisfaction cially where they are so unanimous; but
in the writings of Bishop Berkeley, if any until I can comprehend what they mean by
where, considering his known accuracy and ideas, I must thinkandspeak with the vulgar.
precision in the use of words; and it is for In sensation, properly so called, I can
this reason that I have taken so much pains distinguish two things—the mind, or sen
to find out what he took them to be. tient being, and the sensation. Whether
After all, if I understand what he calls the the last is to be called a feeling or an oper-.
ideas of sense, they are the sensations which ation, I dispute not ; but it has no object
we have by means of our five senses; but distinct from the sensation itself. If in
they are, he says, less properly termed ideas. sensation there be a third thing, called an
I understand, likewise, what he calls idea, I know not what it is.
notions; but they, says he, are very differ In perception, in remembrance, and in
ent from ideas, though, in the modera way, conception, or imagination, I distinguish
often called by that name. three things—the mind that operates, the
The ideas of imagination remain, which operation of the mind, and the object of that
are most properly termed ideas, as he says; operation." [185] That the object per
and, with regard to these, I am still very ceived is one thing, and the perception of
much in the dark. When I imagine a lion that object another, I am as certain as I
or an elephant, the lion or elephant is the can be of anything. The same may be
object imagined. The act of the mind, in said of conception, of remembrance, of love
conceiving that object, is the notion, the and hatred, of desire and aversion. In all
conception, or imagination of the object. If these, the act of the mind about its object is
besides the object, and the act of the mind one thing, the object is another thing.
about it, there be something called the idea There must be an object, real or imaginary,
of the object, I know not what it is." distinct from the operation of the mind
If we consult other authors who have about it. F. Now, if in these operations the
treated of ideas, we shall find as little satis idea be a fourth thing different from the
faction with regard to the meaning of this three I have mentioned, I know not what it
£ term. [184] The vulgar is, nor have been able to learn from all that
ave adopted it; but they only mean by has been written about ideas. And if the
it the notion or conception we have of any doctrine of philosophers about ideas con
object, especially our more abstract or gen founds any two of these things which I have
eral notions. When it is thus put to sig mentioned as distinct—if, for example, it
nify the operation of the mind about objects, confounds the object perceived with the
whether in conceiving, remembering, or perception of that object, and represents
perceiving, it is well understood. But phi them as one and the same thing—such doc
losophers will have ideas to be the objects trine is altogether repugnant to all that I am
of the mind's operations, and not the oper able to discover of the operations of my own
ations themselves. There is, indeed, great mind; and it is repugnant to the common
variety of objects of thought. We can sense of mankind, expressed in the struc
think of minds, and of their operations; of ture of all languages.
bodies, and of their qualities and relations.
If ideas are not comprehended under any of
these classes, I am at a loss to comprehend CHAPTER XII.
what they are.
In ancient philosophy, ideas were said to of ThE SENTIMENTS OF MR HUME.
be immaterial forms, which, according to
one system, existed from all eternity; and, Two volumes of the “Treatise of Human
according to another, are sent forth from Nature” were published in 1739, and the
the objects whose form they are.t. In mo third in 1740. The doctrine contained in
dern philosophy, they are things in the this Treatise was published anew in a more
mind, which are the immediate objects of popular form in Mr Hume's “Philosophical
all our thoughts, and which have no exist Essays,” of which there have been various
ence when we do not think of them. They editions. What other authors, from the
are called the images, the resemblances, the
* See Note B.-H.
uses the term; whereas, of the latter, we can form + If there be an imaginary object distinct from the
# idea by merely repeating the imaginatory act.— act of imagination, where does it exist? It cannot
be £i to the mind-for, ex h esi, it is ima
• #" Reid's misconception on this point, see Note ginary; and, if in the mind itself, distinct from the act
of imagination-why, what is this but the very crudest
+ Nothing by the name of idea was sent off from doctrine of species? For Reid's puzzle, see Note B.
objects in the ancient philosophy.-H.
- [184, 185]
CHAP. x11.] OF THE SENTIMIENTS OF MR HUME. 293
time of Des Cartes, had called ideas, this philosophers to beware of hypotheses, espe
author distinguishes into two kinds—to wit, cially when they lead to conclusions which
impressions and ideas; comprehending under contradict the principles upon which all men
the first, all our sensations, passions, and of common sense must act in common life.
emotions; and under the last, the faint The Egoists," whom we mentioned be
images of these, when we remember or fore, were left far behind by Mr Hume;
imagine them. [186] for they believed their own existence, and
He sets out with this, as a principle that perhaps also the existence of a Deity. But
needed no proof, and of which therefore he Mr Hume's system does not even leave him
offers none—that all the perceptions of the a self to claim the property of his impres
human mind resolve themselves into these sions and ideas.
two kinds, impressions and ideas. A system of consequences, however ab
As this proposition is the foundation upon surd, acutely and justly drawn from a few
which the whole of Mr Hume's system principles, in very abstract matters, is of
rests, and from which it is raised with great real utility in science, and may be made
acuteness indeed, and ingenuity, it were to subservient to real knowledge. This merit
be wished that he had told us upon what Mr Hume's metaphysical writings have in
authority this fundamental proposition rests. a great degree.
But we are left to guess, whether it is held We had occasion before to observe, that,
forth as a first principle, which has its since the time of Des Cartes, philosophers,
evidence in itself ; or whether it is to be in treating of the powers of the mind, have,
received upon the authority of philosophers. in many instances, confounded things which
Mr Locke had taught us, that all the the common sense of mankind has always
immediate objects of human knowledge are led them to distinguish, and which have
ideas in the mind. Bishop Berkeley, pro different names in all languages. Thus, in
ceeding upon this foundation, demonstrated, the perception of an external object, all
very easily, that there is no material world. languages distinguish three things—the
And he thought that, for the purposes mind that perceives, the operation of that
both of philosophy and religion, we should mind, which is called perception, and the
find no loss, but great benefit, in the want of ject perceived. + Nothing appears more
of it. But the Bishop, as became his order, evident to a mind untutored by philosophy,
was unwilling to give up the world of spirits. than that these three are distinct things,
He saw very well, that ideas are as unfit to which, though related, ought never to be
rel resent spirits as they are to represent confounded. [188] The structure of all
bodies. Perhaps he saw that, if we per languages supposes this distinction, and is
ceive only the ideas of spirits, we shall find built upon it. Philosophers have intro
the same difficulty in inferring their real duced a fourth thing in this process, which
existence from the existence of their ideas, as they call the idea of the object, which is
we find in inferring the existence of matter supposed to be an image, or representative
from the idea of it; aud, therefore, while he of the object, and is said to be the imme
gives up the material world in favour of the diate object. The vulgar know nothing
system of ideas, he gives up one-half of that about this idea; it is a creature of philo
system in favour of the world of spirits; and sophy,introduced to account for and explain
maintains that we can, without ideas, think, themanner of our perceiving externalobjects.
and s , and reason, intelligibly about
spirits, and what belongs to them. * , in supplement to notes at p 269, supra, in re
Mr Hume shews no such partiality in gard to the pretended, sect of Egoists, there is to be
favour of the world of spirits. He adopts added the following notices, which I did not recol
lect till after that note was set:
the theory of ideas in its full extent; and, Wolf, (Psychologia Rationalis, $38,) after dividing
in consequence, shews that there is neither Idealists into Egoists and Pluralists, says, interalia, of
the former :-" Fuit paucis at hinc annis assecla
matter nor mind in the universe; nothing uidam Malebranchii, Parisiis, qui Egoismum pro
but impressions and ideas. What we call fessus est (quod mirum mihi videfur) asseclasetipse
a body, is only a bundle of sensations; and nactus est.” In his Vernuen/tige Gedanken von Gott,
&c., c. 1, $ 2, he also mentions this allerseitsamate
what we call the mind is only a bundle of Secte There is also an oration by Christopher
thoughts, passions, and emotions, without Matthaeus Pfaff, the Charcellor of Tuebingen
“De Egoismo, nora philosophica haerest,” in 1722
any subject. [187] which I have not seen.-1.hus, what i formerly ha
Some ages hence, it will perhaps be zarded, is still farther confirmed. All is vague and
looked upon as a curious anecdote, that contradictory hearsay in regard to the Egoists. The
French place them in Scotland; the Scotch in Hol
two philosophers of the eighteenth century, land; the Germans in France; and they are variously
of very distinguished rank, were led, by a stated as the immedia e disciples of Des Cartes,
Malcbranche, Spinoza. There is certainly no reason
philosophical hypothesis, one, to disbelieve why an Egoistical Idealism should not have been
the existence of matter, and the other, to explicitly promulgated before Fichte, (whose doctrine,
disbelieve the existence both of matter and however, is not the same;) but I have, as yet, seen
no satistactory grounds on which it can be shewn
of mind. Such an anecdote may not be that this had actually been done.-H.
uninstructive, if it prove a warning to + See Notes B and C.-H.
[184–188]
294 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [EssAv r1.
It is pleasant to observe that, while philo longing to the mind. The main design of
sophers, for more than a century, have been the second book of Locke’s “Essay,” is to
labouring, by means of ideas, to explain shew, that all our simple ideas, without
perception and the other operations of the exception, are derived from the one or the
mind, those ideas have by degrees usurped other, or both of these sources. In doing
the place of perception, object, and even of this, the author is led into some paradoxes,
the mind itself, and have supplanted those although, in general, he is not fond of para
very things they were brought to explain. doxes: And had he foreseen all the con
Des Cartes reduced all the operations of the sequences that may be drawn from his ac
understanding to perception ; and what can count of the origin of our ideas, he would
be more natural to those who believe that probably have examined it more carefully."
they are only different modes of perceiving Mr Hume adopts Locke's account of the
ideas in our own minds P. Locke confounds origin of our ideas; and from that principle
ideas sometimes with the perception of an infers, that we have no idea of substance,
external object, sometimes with the external corporeal or spiritual, no idea of power, no
object itself. In Berkeley's system, the idea other idea of a cause, but that it is something
is the only object, and yet is often con antecedent, and constantly conjoined to that
founded with the perception of it. But, in which we call its effect; and, in a word,
Hume's, the idea or the impression, which that we can have no idea of anything but
is only a more lively idea, is mind, percep our sensations, and the operations of mind
tion, and object, all in one: so that, by the we are conscious of.
term perception, in Mr Hume's system, we This author leaves no power to the mind
must understand the mind itself, all its in framing its ideas and impressions; and,
operations, both of understanding and will, no wonder, since he holds that we have no
and all the objects of these operations. Per idea of power; and the mind is nothing but
ception taken in this sense he divides into that succession of impressions and ideas of
our more lively perceptions, which he calls which we are intimately conscious.
impressions,” and the less lively, which he He thinks, therefore, that our impressions
calls ideas. To prevent repetition, I must arise from unknown causes, and that the
here refer the reader to some remarks made impressions are the causes of their corre
upon this division, Essay I. chap. 1, in the sponding ideas. By this he means no more
explication there given of the words, per but that they always go before the ideas;
ceive, object, impression. [pp. 222, 223,226.] for this is all that is necessary to constitute
Philosophers have differed very much the relation of cause and effect. [190]
with regard to the origin of our ideas, or As to the order and succession of our
the sources whence they are derived. The ideas, he holds it to be determined by three
Peripatetics held that all knowledge is de laws of attraction or association, which he
rived originally from the senses;+ and this takes to be original properties of the ideas,
ancient doctrine seems to be revived by by which they attract, as it were, or asso
some late French philosophers, and by Dr ciate themselves with other ideas which
Hartley and Dr Priestley among the Brit either resemble them, or which have been
ish. [189] Des Cartes maintained, that contiguous to them in time and place, or to
many of our ideas are innate. Locke op which they have the relations of cause and
posed the doctrine of innate ideas with effect.
much zeal, and employs the whole first We may here observe, by the way, that
book of his Essay against it. But he ad the last of these three laws seems to be in
mits two different sources of ideas , the cluded in the second, since causation, ac
operations of our external senses, which he cording to him, implies no more than con
calls sensation, by which we get all our tiguity in time and place.*
ideas of body, and its attributes; and re
Aection upon the operations of our minds, by • At any rate, according to Locke, all our know
which we get the ideas of everything be ledge is a derivation from experience.-H.
+. Mr Hume says- “I do not find that any philo
sopher has attempted to enumerate or class all the
• Mr Stewart (Elem. III. Addenda to vol I. p. principles of Association; a subject, however, that
43) seems to think that the word impression was seems to me very worthy of curiosity. To me there
first introduced as a technical term, into the philo appears to be only three principles of connection
sophy of mind, by Hume. This is not altogether among ideas: Resemblance-Contiguity in time or
correct. For, besides the instances which Mr Stewart place-Cause and Effect."-Essays, vol. ii., p. 24
himself adduces, of the illustration attempted, of the Aristotle, and, after him, many other philosophers,
phaenomena of memory from the analogy of an im had, however, done this, and with even greater success
press and * *ace, words corresponding to impression than Hume himself. Aristotle's reduction is to the
were among the ancients familiarly applied to the pro four following heads:-Proximity in time-conta
£
cesses cf. external imagination, &c., in the guity in place-Resemblance-Contrast. This is
Atomistic, the Platonic, the Aristotelian, and the more correct than Hume's; for Hume's second head
Stoical philosophies; while, among modern psycholo ought to be divided into two; while our connecting
gists, (as Dos Cartes and Gassendi, the term was like
wise in common use - H.
£
e
events in the relation of cause and
, is itself the result of their o! served proximit
t This is an incorrect, at least a too unqualified, in time and contiguity in place; nay, to custom ''
statement.-H. this empirical connection as observed by Reid) does
[189, 190]
------ - - - ------
chap. xiii.] OF THE SENTIMENTS OF ANTHONY ARNAULD. 295
It is not my design at present to shew therefore, that, when they make sensation,
how Mr Hume, upon the principles he has perception, memory, and imagination, to
borrowed from Locke and Berkeley, has, be various modifications of the mind, they
with great acuteness, reared a system of mean no more but that these are things
absolute scepticism, which leaves no rational which can only exist in the mind as their
ground to believe any one proposition, subject. We express the same thing, by
rather than its contrary : my intention in calling them various modes of thinking, or
this place being only to give a detail of the various operations of the mind."
sentiments of philosophers concerning ideas The things which the mind perceives,
since they became an object of speculation, says Malebranche, are of two kinds. They
and concerning the manner of our perceiv are either in the mind itself, or they are
ing external objects by their means. external to it. The things in the mind,
are all its different modifications, its sensa
tions, its imaginations, its pure intellec
CHAPTER XIII. tions, its passions and affections. These
are immediately perceived; we are con
of THE SENTIMENTs of ANThoNY ARNAULD. scious of them, and have no need of ideas
to represent them to us. [192]
IN this sketch of the opinions of philoso Things external to the mind, are either
phers concerning ideas, we must not omit corporeal or spiritual. With regard to the
Anthony Arnauld, doctor of the Sorbonne, last, he thinks it possible that, in another
who, in the year 1683, published his book state, spirits may be an immediate object
“Of True and False Ideas,” in opposition of our understandings, and so be perceived
to the system of Malebranche before men without ideas; that there may be such an
tioned. It is only about ten years since I union of spirits as that they may imme
could find this book, and I believe it is diately perceive each other, and communi
rare." [19]] cate their thoughts mutually, without signs
Though Arnauld wrote before Locke, and without ideas.
Berkeley, and Hume, I have reserved to But, leaving this as a problematical point,
the last place some account of his senti he holds it to be undeniable, that material
ments, because it seems difficult to deter things cannot be perceived immediately,
mine whether he adopted the common theory but only by the mediation of ideas. He
of ideas, or whether he is singular in reject thought it likewise undeniable, that the idea
ing it altogether as a fiction of philoso must be immediately present to the mind,
phers. that it must touch the soul as it were, and
The controversy between Malebranche modify its perception of the object.
and Arnauld necessarily led them to con From these principles we must neces
sider what kind of things ideas are—a point sarily conclude, either that the idea is
upon which other philosophers had very some modification of the human mind, or
generally been silent. Both of them pro that it must be an idea in the Divine
fessed the doctrine universally received: Mind, which is always intimately present
that we perceive not material things imme with our minds. The matter being brought
diately—that it is their ideas that are the to this alternative, Malebranche considers
immediate objects of our thought—and that first all the possible ways such a modifica
it is in the idea of everything that we per tion may be produced in our mind as that
ceive its properties. we call an idea of a material object, taking
It is necessary to premise that both it for granted always, that it must be an
these authors use the word perception, as object perceived, and something different
Des Cartes had done before them, to sig from the act of the mind in perceiving it.
nify every operation of the understand He finds insuperable objections against
ing. t “To think, to know, to perceive, are every hypothesis of such ideas being pro
the same thing,” says Mr Arnauld, chap. duced in our minds; and therefore con
v. def. 2. It is likewise to be observed, cludes, that the immediate objects of per
that the various operations of the mind are ception are the ideas of the Divine Mind.
by both called modifications of the mind. Against this system Arnauld wrote his
Perhaps they were led into this phrase by book “Of True and False Ideas.” He
the Cartesian doctrine, that the essence of does not object to the alternative men
the mind consists in thinking, as that of tioned by Malebranche; but he maintains,
body consists in extension. I apprehend, that ideas are modifications of our minds.
And, finding no other modification of the
Hume himself endeavour to reduce the principle of
Causality altogether-H. See Notes D** and D***. * Modes, or modifications of mind, in the Cartesian
• The treatises of Arnauld in his controversy with school, mean merely what some #:
Malebranche, are to be found in the thirty-eighth
wnturne of his collected works in 4to.-H.
£ by states of mind and include both the
actithe and passive phaenomena of the conscious sub
t Every apprehensive, or strictly cognitive opera. ject. The terms were used by Des Cartes as well “s
tion of the understanding - H. by his disciples.-H.
[191, 192]
------------

human mind which can be called the idea external senses are thought to be the
of an external object, he says it is only best understood, and their objects are the
another word for perception. Chap. v., def. most familiar. Hence we measure other
3. [193] “I take the idea of an object, . powers by them, and transfer to other
and the perception of an object, to be the powers the language which properly be
same thing. I do not say whether there longs to them. The objects of sense must
may be other things to which the name of be present to the sense, or within its
idea may be given. But it is certain that sphere, in order to their being perceived.
there are ideas taken in this sense, and that Hence, by analogy, we are led to say of
these ideas are either attributes or modifi everything when we think of it, that it is
cations of our minds." present to the mind, or in the mind. [194]
This, I think, indeed, was to attack the But this presence is metaphorical, or ana
system of Malebranche upon its weak side, logical only; and Arnauld calls it objec
and where, at the same time, an attack was tive presence, to distinguish it from that
least expected. Philosophers had been so local presence which is required in objects
unanimous in maintaining that we do not that are perceived by sense. But both
perceive external objects immediately,+ being called by the same name, they are
but by certain representative images of confounded together, and those things that
them called ideas, : that Malebranche belong only to real or local presence, are
might well think his system secure upon attributed to the metaphorical.
that quarter, and that the only question to We are likewise accustomed to see objects
be determined was, in what subject those by their images in a mirror, or in water;
ideas are placed, whether in the human or and hence are led, by analogy, to think that
in the divine mind? objects may be presented to the memory or
But, says Mr Arnauld, those ideas are imagination in some similar manner, by
mere chimeras-fictions of philosophers; images, which philosopher have called ideas.
there are no such beings in nature; and, Bysuch prejudices and analogies, Arnauld
therefore, it is to no purpose to inquire conceives, men have been led to believe that
whether they are in the divine or in the hu the objects of memory and imagination
man mind. The only true and real ideas must be presented to the mind by images
are our perceptions, whichS are acknow or ideas; and the philosophers have been
ledged by all philosophers, and by Male more carried away by these prejudices than
branche himself, to be acts or modifications even the vulgar, because the use made of
of our own minds. He does not say that this theory was to explain and account for
the fictitious ideas were a fiction of Male the various operations of the mind—a matter
branche. He acknowledges that they had in which the vulgar take no concern.
been very generally maintained by the He thinks, however, that Des Cartes had
scholastic philosophers, and points out, got the better of these prejudices, and that
very judiciously, the prejudices that had he uses the word idea assignifying the same
led them into the belief of such ideas. thing with perception," and is, therefore,
Of all the powers of our mind, the surprised that a disciple of Des Cartes, and
one who was so great an admirer of him as
* Arnauld did not allow that perceptions and
ideas are really or numerically distinguished—i.e., as Malebranche was, should be carried away
one thing from another thing, not even that they by them. It is strange, indeed, that the
are modally distinguished-ie, as a thing from its two most eminent disciples of Des Cartes
mode. He maintained that they are really identical,
and only rationally discriminated as viewed in dif and his contemporaries should differ so
ferent relations; the indivisible mental modification essentially with regard to his doctrine con.
being called a perception, by reference to the mind or cerning ideas.t.
thinking subject-an idea, by reference to the mediate
object or thing thought. Arnauld everywhere avows I shall not attempt to give the reader an
that he denies ideas only as existences distinct from account of the continuation of this contro
the act itself of perception.-See oeuvres, t. xxxvii. versy between those two acute philosophers,
pp. 187, 198, £
+ Arnauld does not assert against Malebranche, in the subsequent defences and replies; be
“that we perceive external objects immediately"-that cause I have not access to see them. After
is, in themselves, and as existing. He was too accu
rate for this. By an immediate cognition, Reid much reasoning, and some animosity, each
means merely the negation of the intermediation of
any third thing between the reality perceived and * I am convinced that in this interpretation of Des
the percipient mind.-H. Cartes' doctrine, Arnauld is right; for Des caries
1 Idea was not the word by which representative defines mental ideas-those, to wit, of which we are
images, distinct from the percipient act, had been conscious-to be “Cogitationes prout sunt tanquam
commonly called , nor were philosophers at all unani imagines-that is, thoughts considered in their repre
mous in the admission of such vicarious objects. sentative capacity; nor is there any passage to be found
See Notes G, L, M, N, O, &c.-h. in the writings of this philosopher, which, if properly
* That is, Perceptions, (the cognitive acts,) but not understood, warrants the conclusion, that, by ideas in
Ideas, the immediate objects of thoseacts.) The latter the mind, he meant aught distinct from the cognitive
were not acknowledged by Malebranche and all phi act. The double use of the term idea by Des Cartes
losophers to be mere acts or modifications of our own has, however, led Reid and others into a miscon
ininds.-H. ception on this point. See Note N.-H.
| But by a different name.-H. t Reid's own doctrine is far more ambiguous.-H.
[193, 194]
chap. xiii.] OF THE SENTIMENTS OF ANTHONY ARNAULD. 297
continued in his own opinion, and left his Secondly, He supports this popular sense
antagonist where he found him. [195] of the word by the authority of Des Cartes,
Malebranche's opinion of our seeing all who, in his demonstration of the existence
things in God, soon died away of itself; and of God, from the idea of him in our minds,
Arnauld's notion of ideas seems to have defines an idea thus:—“By the word idea,
been less regarded than it deserved, by the I understand that form of any thought, by
philosophers that came after him ;" per the immediate perception of which I am
haps for this reason, among others, that it conscious of that thought; so that I can ex
seemed to be, in some sort, given up by press nothing by words, with understanding,
himself, in his attempting to reconcile it to without being certain that there is in my mind
the common doctrine concerning ideas. the idea of that which is expressed by the
From the account I have given, one words.” This definition seems, indeed, to
would be apt to conclude that Arnauld be of the same import with that which is
totally denied the existence of ideas, in the given by Arnauld. But Des Cartes adds
philosophical sense of that word, and that a qualification to it, which Arnauld, in
he adopted the notion of the vulgar, who quoting it, omits; and which shews that
acknowledge no object of perception but the Des Cartes meant to limit his definition to
external object. But he seems very un the idea then treated of—that is, to the idea
willing to deviate so far from the common of the Deity; and that there are other ideas
track, and, what he had given up with one to which this definition does not apply. [196]
hand, he takes back with the other. For he adds:– “And thus I give the name
For, first, Having defined ideas to be the of idea, not solely to the images painted in
same thing with perceptions, he adds this the phantasy; nay, in this place, I do not
qualification to his definition:– “I do not at all give the name of ideas to those
here consider whether there are other things images, in so far as they are painted in the
that may be called ideas; but it is certain corporeal phantasy that is in some part of
there are ideas taken in this sense." I the brain, but only in so far as they inform
believe, indeed, there is no philosopher who the mind, turning its attention to that part
does not, on some occasions, use the word of the brain.”
idea in this popular sense. Thirdly, Arnauld has employed the whole
of his sixth chapter, to shew that these ways
* The opinion of Arnauld in regard to the nature of speaking, common among philosophers
of ideas was by no means overlooked by su uent
philosophers. It is found fully detailed in almost to wit, that we perceive not things imme
every systematic course or compend of philosophy, diately; that it is their ideas that are the
which appeared for a long time after its first promul. immediate objects of our thoughts; that it is
gation, and in many of these it is the doctrine re
commended as the true. Arnauld's was indeed the in the idea of everything that we perceive is
opinion which latterly prevailed in the Cartesian properties—are not to be rejected, but are
school. From this it passed into other schools. Leib
nits, like Arnauld, regarded ideas, Notions, Repre true when rightly understood. He labours
sentations, as mere modifications of the mind, (what to reconcile these expressions to his own
ty his disciples, were called material ideas, like the definition of ideas, by observing, that every
cerebral ideas of Des Cartes, are out of the question,)
and ro cruder opinion than this has ever subse perception and every thought is necessarily
quently found a footing in any of the German conscious of itself, and reflects upon itself;
***tenas,
“I don't know," says Mr Stewart, “ of any author and that, by this consciousness and reflec
who, prior to Dr Reid, has expressed himself on this tion, it is its own immediate object. Whence
subject with so much jestness and precision as Father he infers, that the idea—that is, the percep
Battier, in the following passage of his Treatise on tion—is the immediate object of perception.
* First Truths:"
** If we confine ourselves to what is intelligible in This looks like a weak attempt to recon
our ot-servations on ideas, we will say, they are no cile two inconsistent doctrines by one who
thing, but mere modifications of the mind as a think
ing being. They are called ideas with regard to the wishes to hold both.t. It is true, that con
otject represented; and perceptions with regard to sciousness always goes along with percep
the faculty representipg. It is manifest that our tion; but they are different operations of
ideas, considered in this sense, are not more distin
guished than motion is from a body moved.’-(P. the mind, and they have their different
511, English Translation.)”-1 1 m. iii. Add to vol. i. objects. Consciousness is not perception,
it, this passage, Bufficr only repeats the doctrine of
p. In
nor is the object of consciousness the object
Arnauld, in Arnauld's own words. of percel tion.: The same may be sad of
idr ibomas Brown, on the other hand, has en
deavoured to shew that this doctrine, (which he • Des Cartes here refers to the other meaning which
identifies with Reid's,) had been long the catholic he gives to the term idea-that is, to denote the
opinion ; and that Reid, in his attack on the Ideal material motion, the organic affection of the brain,
system, only refuted what had been already almost of which the mund is not conscious. Cn Reid's mis
universally exploded. In this attempt he is, how apprehension of the Cartesian doctrine touching this
ever, singularly unfortunate; for, with the excep matter, see Note N-H. -
tion of Crousaz, all the examples he adduces to + Arnauld's attempt is ne ther weak nor inconsist
evince the prevalence of Arnauld's doctrine are only ent. He had, in fact, a clearer vicw of the condi
so many mistakes, so many instances, in fact, which tions of the pro'slem than Reid himself, who has, in
might be alleged in confirmation of the very opposite fact, confound, d two opposite doctrines. Sce Note C.
conclusion, see Edinburgh Review, vol. iii., p. 181
196.-H. # On Reid's error in reducing consciousness to a
#See following note.-H. special faculty, see Note H.-11.
[195, 196]
every operation of mind that has an object. more or less lively and strong. We have
Thus, injury is the object of resentment. reason to ascribe to the all-knowing and
When I resent an injury, I am conscious all-perfect Being distinct conceptions of all
of my resentment—that is, my resentment things existent and possible, and of all their
is the immediate and the only object of my relations; and if these conceptions are called
consciousness; but it would be absurd to his eternal ideas, there ought to be no dis
infer from this, that my resentment is the ute among philosophers about a word.
immediate object of my resentment. [197] 198] The ideas, of whose existence I
Upon the whole, if Arnauld—in conse require the proof, are not the operations of
quence of his doctrine, that ideas, taken any mind, but supposed objects of those
for representative images of external ob operations. They are not perception, re
jects, are a mere fiction of the philosophers membrance, or conception, but things that
—had rejected boldly the doctrine of Des are said to be perceived, or remembered, or
Cartes, as well as of the other philosophers, imagined.
concerning those fictitious beings, and all Nor do I dispute the existence of what
the ways of speaking that imply their ex the vulgar call the objects of perception.
istence, I should have thought him more These, by all who acknowledge their exist
consistent with himself, and his doctrine ence, are called real things, not ideas. But
concerning ideas more rational and more philosophers maintain that, besides these,
intelligible than that of any other author of there are immediate objects of perception
my acquaintance who has treated of the in the mind itself: that, for instance, we
subject." do not see the sun immediately, but an
idea; or, as Mr Hume calls it, an impres
sion in our own minds. This idea is said
CHAPTER XIV. to be the image, the resemblance, the re
presentative of the sun, if there be a sun.
Reflections on The COMMON THEORY Of It is from the existence of the idea that we
IDEAS. must infer the existence of the sun. But
the idea, being immediately perceived, there
AFTER so long a detail of the sentiments can be no doubt, as philosophers think, of
of philosophers, ancient and modern, con its existence.
cerning ideas, it may seem presumptuous In like manner, when I remember, or
to call in question their existence. But no when I imagine anything, all men acknow
hilosophical opinion, however ancient, ledge that there must be something that is
£ generally received, ought to rest remembered, or that is imagined; that is,
upon authority. There is no presumption some object of those operations. The
in requiring evidence for it, or in regulat object remembered must be something that
ing our belief by the evidence we can find. did exist in time past: the object imagined
To prevent mistakes, the reader must may be something that never existed."
again be reminded, that if by ideas are But, say the philosophers, besides these
meant only the acts or operations of our objects which all men acknowledge, there
minds in perceiving, remembering, or ima is a more immediate object which really
gining objects, I am far from calling in exists in the mind at the same time we
question the existence of those acts; we remember or imagine. This object is an
are conscious of them every day and every idea or image of the thing remembered or
hour of life; and I believe no man of a imagined.
sound mind ever doubted of the real exist The first reflection I would make on this
ence of the operations of mind, of which he philosophical opinion is, that it is directly
is conscious. Nor is it to be doubted that, contrary to the universal sense of men who
by the faculties which God has given us, have not been instructed in philosophy.
we can conceive things that are absent, as When we see the sum or moon, we have no
well as perceive those that are within the doubt that the very objects which we im
reach of our senses; and that such concep mediately see are very far distant from us,
tions may be more or less distinct, and and from one another. We have not the
least doubt that this is the sun and moon
* Reid's discontent with Arnaulds opinion-an

which God created some thousands of years
opinion which is stated with great perspicuity by its ago, and which have continued to perform
author-may be used as an argum nt to shew that his their revolutions in the heavens ever since.
own doctrine is, however ambiguous, that of intui [199] But how are we astonished when
tive or immediate perception. (see Note C) Arnauld's
theory is identical with the finer form-of representa the philosopher informs us that we are nuis
tive or mediate perception, and the difficulties of that taken in all this; that the sun and moon
doctrine were not overlooked by his great antagonist.
Arnauldwell objected that, when we see a horse, ac which we see are not, as we imagine, many
cording to Malebranche, what we see is in reality miles distant from us, and from each other,
God, himself; but Malebranche well rejoined, that,
when we see a horse according to Arnauld, what we
*ee is, in reality, only a modification of ourselves.-H. * See Note B.-H
[197 199]
char. xiv.] REFLECTIONS ON THE THEORY OF IDEAS. 299
but that they are in our own mind; that ledged by Mr Hume in his Essay on the
they had no existence before we saw them, Academical or Sceptical Philosophy. “It
and will have none when we cease to per seems evident,” says he, “that men are car
ceive and to think of them; because the ried, by a natural instinct or prepossession,
objects we perceive are only ideas in our to repose faith in their senses; and that,
own minds, which can have no existence a without any reasoning, or even almost be
moment longer than we think of them '" fore the use of reason, we always suppose an
If a plain man, uninstructed in philoso external universe, which depends not on
phy, has faith to receive these mysteries, our perception, but would exist though we
how great must be his astonishment 1 He and every sensible creature were absent or
is brought into a new world, where every annihilated. Even the animal creation are
thing he sees, tastes, or touches, is an idea governed by a like opinion, and preserve this
—a fleeting kind of being which he can con belief of external objectsin all their thoughts,
jure into existence, or can annihilate in the designs, and actions.”
twinkling of an eye. “It seems also evident that, when #men
After his mind is somewhat composed, it follow this blind and powerful instinct of
will be natural for him to ask his philoso nature, they always suppose the very im
phical instructor, Pray, sir, are there then ages presented by the senses to be the ex
no substantial and permanent beings called ternal objects, and never entertain any
the sun and moon, which continue to exist suspicion that the one are nothing but re
whether we think of them or not? presentations of the other. This very table
Here the philosophers differ. Mr Locke, which we see white, and feel hard, is be
and those that were before him, will answer lieved to exist independent of our percep
to this question, that it is very true there tion, and to be something external to the
are substantial and permanent beings called mind which perceives it; our presence be
the sun and moon; but they never appear stows not being upon it; our absence anni
to us in their own person, but by their re hilates it not: it preserves its existence
presentatives, the ideas in our own minds, uniform and entire, independent of the situ
and we know nothing of them but what we ation of intelligent beings who perceive or
can gather from those ideas. contemplate it. [201]
Bishop Berkeley and Mr Hume would “But this universal and primary notion
give a different answer to the question pro of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest
posed. They would assure the querist that philosophy, which teaches us that nothing
it is a vulgar error, a mere prejudice of the can ever be present to the mind, but an
ignorant and unlearned, to think that there image or perception; and that the senses
are any permanent and substantial beings are only the inlets through which these
called the sun and moon; that the heavenly images are received, without being ever
bodies, our own bodies, and all bodies what able to produce any immediate intercourse
soever, are nothing but ideas in our minds; between the mind and the object.”
and that there can be nothing like the ideas It is therefore acknowledged by this phi
of one mind, but the ideas of another mind. losopher, to be a natural instinct or pre
{200] There is nothing in nature but possession, an universal and primary opinion
minds and ideas, says the Bishop;-nay, of all men, a primary instinct of nature, that
says Mr Hume, there is nothing in nature the objects which we immediately perceive
but ideas only; for what we call a mind is by our senses, are not images in our minds,
nothing but a train of ideas connected by but external objects, and that their exist
certain relations between themselves. ence is independent of us and our percep
tion.
In this representation of the theory of
ideas, there is nothing exaggerated or mis In this acknowledgment, Mr Hume in
represented, as far as I am able to judge; deed seems to me more generous, and even
and surely nothing farther is necessary to more ingenuous than Bishop Berkeley, who
shew that, to the uninstructed in philoso would persuade us that his opinion does
phy, it must appear extravagant and vision not oppose the vulgar opinion, but only that
ary, and most contrary to the dictates of of the philosophers; and that the external
common understanding. existence of a material world is a philoso
There is the less need of any farther phical hypothesis, and not the natural dic
proof of this, that it is very amply acknow tate of our perceptive powers. The Bishop
shews a timidity of engaging such an adver
• Whether Reid himself do not virtually hold this sary, as a primary and universal opinion of
last opinion, see Note C. At any rate, it is very in all men. He is rather fond to court its pa
correct to say that the sun, moon, &c., are, or can be,
perceived-by us as existent, and in their real dis tronage. But the philosopherintrepidly gives
tance in the heavens; all that we can be cognisant a defiance to this,antagonist, and seems to
of £ that we are immediately percipient of
glory inaconflict that was worthy of his arm.
the non-ego) is the rays of light emanating from them,
and in contact and relation with our organ of sight. Optat aprum aut fulvum descendere monte
leonem. After all, I suspect that a philo
[...o. 2011
-* - - - - - --------- -
300 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. | Essay 11.

sopher who wages war with this adversary, if material objects were immediate objects
will find himself in the same condition as a of perception, there could be no physical
mathematician who should undertake to science-things necessary and immuable
demonstrate that there is no truth in the being the only object of science.” Answer,
axioms of mathematics. Although things necessary and immutable
A second reflection upon this subject is— be not the immediate objects of perception,
that the authors who have treated of ideas, they may be immediate objects of other
have generally taken their existence for powers of the mind. Fourth, “If material
granted, as a thing that could not be called things were perceived by themselves, they
in question; and such arguments as they would be a true light to our minds, as being
have mentioned incidentally, in order to the intelligible form of our understandings,
prove it, seem too weak to support the con and consequently perfective of them, and
clusion. [202] indeed superior to them.” If I comprehend
Mr Locke, in the introduction to his anything of this mysterious argument, it
Essay, tells us, that he uses the word idea follows from it, that the Deity perceives
to signify whatever is the immediate object nothing at all, because nothing can be supe
of thought; and then adds, “I presume it rior to his understanding, or perfective of
will be easily granted me that there are it. [203]
such ideas in men's minds; every one is There is an argument which is hinted
conscious of them in himself; and men's at by Malebranche, and by several other
words and actions will satisfy him that they authors, which deserves to be more seriously
are in others.” I am indeed conscious of considered. As I find it most clearly ex
perceiving, remembering, imagining; but pressed and most fully urged by Dr Samuel
that the objects of these operations are Clarke, I shall give it in his words, in his
images in my mind, I am not conscious. second reply to Leibnitz, § 4. “The soul,
I am satisfied, by men's words and actions, without being present to the images of the
that they often perceive the same objects things perceived, could not possibly perceive
which I perceive, which could not be, if them. A living substance can only there
those objects were ideas in their own minds. perceive, where it is present, either to the
Mr Norris is the only author I have met
with, who professedly puts the question, cognisable by the similar; but, in his Nicoinachian
Whether material things can be perceived Ethics, he reverts to the doctrine which, in the for.
mer work, he had rejected. With these exceptions,
by us immediately? He has offered four no principle, since the time of Empedocles, by whom
arguments to shew that they cannot. First, it seems first to have been explicitly announced, has
“Material objects are without the mind, been more universally received, than this-that the
relation of knowledge infers an analogy of existence.
and therefore there can be no union between This analogy may be of two degrees. What knotes,
the object and the percipient.” Answer, and what is known, may be either similar or the
same, and, is the principle itself be admitted, the
This argument is lame, until it is shewn to latter alternative is the more philosophical. Without
be necessary that in perception there should entering on details, 1 may here notice some of the
be a union between the object and the per more remarkable results of this principle, in both its
degrees. The general principle, not, indeed, exclu
cipient. Second, “ Material objects are sively, but mainly, determined the admission of a
disproportioned to the mind, and removed representative perception, by disallowing the ibil.
ity of any consciousness, or immediate knowledge of
from it by the whole diameter of Being.” matter, by a nature so different from it as imind;
This argument I cannot answer, because I and, in its two degrees, it determined the various hy
do not understand it." Third, “Because, potheses, by which it was attempted to explain the
possibility of a representative or mediate perception
of the external world. To this principle, in its
*This confession would, of itself, prove how super. lower potence--that what knows must be similar in
ficially Reid was versed in the literature of philo. nature to what is immediately known-we owe the
sophy. Norris's second argument is only the state intentional species of the Aristotehaus, and the ideas
ment of a principle generally assumed by philosophers of Malebranche and Berkeley. From this principle,
-that the relation of knowledge infers a correspond in its higher potence-that what knows must be
ence of nature between the subject knowing, and the identical in nature with what is immediately known
object known. This principle has, perhaps, exerted -there flow the gnostic reasons of the Platonists, the
a more extensive influence on speculation than any pre-existing forms or species of Theophrastus and ihe.
other; and yet it has not been proved, and is incapable mistius, of Adelandus and Avicenna, the (mental)
of proof-nay, is contradicted by the evidence of ideas of Des Cartes and Arnauld, the representations,
consciousness itself. To trace the influence of this sensual ideas, &c. of Leibnitz and wolf, the **
assumption would be, in fact, in a certain sort, to mena of Kant, the states of Brown, and (shah we
write the history of philosophy; for, though this in say ?) the vacillating doctrine of perception held by
fluence has never yet been historically devel ped, it held himself. Mediately, this principle was the
would be easy to shew that the belief, explicit origin of many other famous theories:-of the hier
or implicit, that what knows and what is imme archical gradation of souls or faculties of the Aristo.
diately known must be of an analogous nature, lies telians; of the vehicular media of the Platonists;
at the root of almost every theory of cognition, from of the hypotheses of a common intellect of , sex.
the very earliest to the very latest speculations, in ander, Themistius, Averroes, Cajetanus, and Zabar
the more ancient pl.ilosophy of Greece, three philo ella; of the vision in the deity of Malebranche; and of
sophers (Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, and Alcmaeon) are the tartesian and Leibnitzian coctrines of assistance
found, who professed the opposite doctrine-that the and pre-established harmony. Finally, to this prin
condition £ lies in the contrariety, in the ciple is to be ascribed the refusal of the evidence of con.
natural antithesis, of subject and object. Aristotle, sciousness to the primary fact, the duality of its per
likewise, in his treatise on the Soul, expressly con. ception; and the unitarian schemes of Absolute iden
demns the prevalent opinion, that the similar is only tity, Materialism, and Idealism, are the results.-H.
[202, 203]
oHAP. xiv.] REFLECTIONS ON THE THEORY OF IDEAS, . 301
things themselves, (as the omnipresent God where I sit; but they are perfectly inactive,
is to the whole universe,) or to the images and therefore act not upon the mind. To
of things, as the soul is in its proper senso be perceived, is what logicians call an ex
rium.” ternal denomination, which implies neither
Sir Isaac Newton expresses the same action nor quality in the object perceived."
sentiment, but with his usual reserve, in a Nor could men ever have gone into this
query only. notion, that perception is owing to some
The ingenious Dr Porterfield, in his Essay action of the object upon the mind, were
concerning the motions of our eyes, adopts it not that we are so prone to form our
this opinion with more confidence. His notions of the mind from some similitude
words are: “How body acts upon mind, we conceive between it and body. Thought
or mind upon body, I know not; but this I in the mind is conceived to have some
am very certain of, that nothing can act, or analogy to motion in a body: and, as a body
be acted upon, where it is not ; and there is put in motion, by being acted upon by
fore our mind can never perceive anything some other body; so we are apt to think the
but its own proper modifications, and the mind is made to perceive, by some impulse
various states of the sensorium, to which it it receives from the object. But reasonings,
is present: so that it is not the external drawn from such analogies, ought never to
sun and moon which are in the heavens, be trusted. [205] They are, indeed, the
which our mind perceives, but only their cause of most of our errors with regard to
image or representation impressed upon the the mind. And we might as well conclude,
sensorium. How the soul of a seeing man that minds may be measured by feet and
sees these images, or how it receives those inches, or weighed by ounces and drachms,
ideas, from such agitations in the sensorium, because bodies have those propertiest
I know not; but I am sure it can never I see as little reason, in the second place,
perceive the external bodies themselves, to to believe that in perception the mind acts
which it is not present.” upon the object. To perceive an object is
These, indeed, are great authorities: but, one thing, to act upon it is another; nor is
in matters of philosophy, we must not be the last at all included in the first. To say
guided by authority, but by reason. Dr that I act upon the wall by looking at it, is
Clarke, in the place cited, mentions slightly, an abuse of language, and has no meaning.
as the reason of his opinion, that “nothing Logicians distinguish two kinds of opera
can any more act, or be acted upon when tions of mind: the first kind produces no
it is not present, than it can be where it is effect without the mind; the last does.
not.” [204] And again, in his third The first they call immanent acts, the se
reply to Leibnitz, § 11–“We are sure the cond transitive. All intellectual operations
soil cannot perceive what it is not present belong to the first class; they produce no
to, because nothing can act, or be acted effect upon any external object. But, with
upon, where it is not.” The same reason out having recourse to logical distinctions,
we see is urged by Dr Porterfield. every man of common sense knows, that to
That nothing can act immediately where
it is not, I think must be admitted: for I • This passage, among others that follow, afford
the foundation of an argument, to prove that Reid
agree with Sir Isaac Newton, that power is not original in his doctrine of Perception; but
without substance is inconceivable. It is a that it was borrowed from the speculations of certain
older philosophers, of which he was aware. See
consequence of this, that nothing can be Note S.-H.
acted upon immediately where the agent is + This reasoning, which is not original to Reid,
not present: let this, therefore be granted. (see Note S,) is not clearly or precisely expressed.
n asserting that “an object, in being perceived, does
To make the reasoning conclusive, it is not act at all,” our author cannot mean that it does
farther necessary, that, when we perceive not act upon the organ of sense; for this would not
only be absurd in itself, but in contradiction to his
objects, either they act upon us, or we act own doctrine-“it being,” he says, “a law of our
upon them. This does not appear self-evi nature that we perceive not external objects un
dent, nor have I ever met with any proof less certain impressions be made on the nerves and
brain.” The assertion-" I perceive the walls of the
of it. I shall briefly offer the reasons why I room where 1 sit, but they are perfectly inactive,
think it ought not to be admitted. and, therefore, act not on the mind,” is equally in
When we say that one being acts upon correct in statement. The walls of the room, strictly
so called, assuredly do not act on the mind or on the
another, we mean that some power or force eye; but the walls of the room, in this sense, are, in
is exerted by the agent, which produces, or fact, no object of (visual) perception at all. What
we see in this instance, and what we loosely call the
has a tendency to produce, a change in the walls of the room, is only the light reflected from
thing acted upon. If this be the meaning their surface in its relation to the organ of sight-i e.,
of the phrase, as I conceive it is, there colour; but it cannot be affirmed that the rays of
light do not act on and affect the retina, optic nerve,
appears no reason for asserting that, in and brain. What Aristotle distinguished as the
perception, either the object acts upon the concommitants of sensation-as extension, motion,
mind, or the mind upon the object. position, &c.—are, indeed, perceived without any
relative passion of the sense. But, whatever may
An object, in being perceived, does not be Reid's meaning, it is, at best, vague and inexpli
act at all. I perceive the walls of the room cit.-H.
[204, 205]
think of an object, and to act upon it, are objects immediately, subjoins what fol
very different things. lows :
As we have, therefore, no evidence that, “But this universal and primary opinion
in perception, the mind acts upon the object, of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest
or the object upon the mind, but strong rea philosophy, which teaches us that nothing
sons to the contrary, Dr Clarke's argument can ever be present to the mind but an
against our perceiving external objects im image or perception; and that the senses
mediately falls to the ground. are only the inlets through which these
This notion, that, in perception, the object images are received, without being ever
must be contiguous to the percipient, seems, able to produce any immediate intercourse
with many other £ to be borrowed between the mind and the object. The
from analogy. In all the external senses, table, which we see, seems to diminish as
there must, as has been before observed, be we remove farther from it: but the real
some impression made upon the organ of table, which exists independent of us, suf
sense by the object, or by something coming fers no alteration. [207 | It was, therefore,
from the object. An impression supposes nothing but its image which was present to
contiguity. Hence we are led by analogy the mind. These are the obvious dictates of
to conceive something similar in the opera reason; and noman who reflectsever doubted
tions of the mind. Many philosophers re that the existences which we consider, when
solve almost every operation of mind into we say this house, and that tree, are nothing
impressions and feelings, words manifestly but perceptions in the mind, and fleeting
borrowed from the sense of touch. And it copies and representations of other exist
is very natural to conceive contiguity neces ences, which remain uniform and independ
sary between that which makes the impres ent. So far, then, we are necessitated, by
sion, and that which receives it; between reasoning, to depart from the primary in
that which feels, and that which is felt. [206] stincts of nature, and to embrace a new
And though no philosopher will now pre system with regard to the evidence of our
tend to justify such analogical reasoning as senses.”
this, yet it has a powerful influence upon We have here a remarkable conflict be
the judgment, while we contemplate the tween two contradictory opinions, wherein
operations of our minds, only as they ap all mankind are engaged. On the one side
pear through the deceitful medium of such stand all the vulgar, who are unpractised in
analogical notions and expressions." philosophical reseaches, and guided by the
When we lay aside those analogies, and uncorrupted primary instincts of nature.
reflect attentively upon our perception of On the other side stand all the philoso
the objects of sense, we must acknowledge phers, ancient and modern ; every man,
that, though we are conscious of perceiving without exception, who reflects. In this
objects, we are altogether ignorant how it division, to my great humiliation, I find
is brought about; and know as little how myself classed with the vulgar.
we perceive objects as how we were made. The passage now quoted is all I have
And, if we should admit an image in the found in Mr Hume's writings upon this
mind, or contiguous to it, we know as point: and, indeed, there is more reason
little how perception may be produced by ing in it than I have found in any other
this image as by the most distant object. author; I shall, therefore, examine it min
Why, therefore, should we be led, by a utely.
theory which is neither grounded on evi First, He tells us, that “this universal
dence, nor, if admitted, can explain any one and primary opinion of all men is soon
phenomenon of perception, to reject the destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which
natural and immediate dictates of those teaches us that nothing can ever be pre
perceptive powers, to which, in the conduct sent to the mind but an image or percep
of life, we find a necessity of yielding im tion.”
plicit submission? The phrase of being present to the mind
There remains only one other argument has some obscurity; but I conceive he
that I have been able to find urged against means being an immediate object of thought;
our perceiving external objects immediately. an immediate object, for instance, of per
It is proposed by Mr Hume, who, in the ception, of memory, or of imagination. If
essay already quoted, after acknowledging this be the meaning, (and it is the only
that it is an universal and primary opi pertinent one I can think of) there is no
nion of all men, that we perceive external more in this passage but an assertion of the
proposition to be proved, and an assertion
* It is self-cvident that, if a thing is to be an ob that philosophy teaches it. If this be so,
ject immediately known, it must be known as it
exists. Now, a body must exist in some definite I beg leave to dissent from philosophy till
part of space-in a certain place, it cannot, there she gives me reason for what she teaches.
fore, be immediately known as existing, except it be [208] For, though common sense and my
known in its place. But this supposes the mind to
be immediately present to it in space.-H. external senses demand my assent to their
[206-208]
char. xiv.] REFLECTIONS ON THE THEORY OF IDEAS. 303
dictates upon their own authority, yet phi an argument. Perhaps it was intended
losophy is not entitled to this privilege. only for illustration. The argument, the
But, that I may not dissent from so grave only argument, follows :
a personage without giving a reason, I give The table which we see, seems to dimin
this as the reason of my dissent:-I see ish as we remove farther from it; but the
the sun when he shines; I remember the real table, which exists independent of us
battle of Culloden ;" and neither of these suffers no alteration. It was, therefore,
objects is an image or perception. nothing but its image which was presented
He tells us, in the next place, “That the to the mind. These are the obvious dic
senses are only the inlets through which tates of reason.
these images are received.” To judge of the strength of this argu
I know that Aristotle and the schoolmen ment, it is necessary to attend to a distinc
taught that images or species flow from ob tion which is familiar to those who are con
jects, and are let in by the senses, and strike versant in the mathematical sciences-I
upon the mind; but this has been so effectu mean the distinction between real and ap
ally refuted by Des Cartes, by Malebranche, parent magnitude. The real magnitude of
and many others, that nobody now pretends a line is measured by some known measure
to defend it. Reasonable men consider it of length—as inches, feet, or miles: the
as one of the most unintelligible and un real magnitude of a surface or solid, by
meaning parts of the ancient system. To known measures of surface or of capacity.
what cause is it owing that modern philo This magnitude is an object of touch only,
sophers are so prone to fall back into this and not of sight; nor could we even have
hypothesis, as if they really believed it? had any conception of it, without the sense
For, of this proneness I could give many of touch; and Bishop Berkeley, on that
instances besides this of Mr Huine; and I account, calls it tangible magnitude."
take the cause to be, that images in the Apparent magnitude is measured by the
mind, and images let in by the senses, are angle which an object subtends at the eye.
so nearly allied, and so strictly connected, Supposing two right lines drawn from the
that they must stand or fall together. The eye to the extremities of the object making
old system consistently maintained both : an angle, of which the object is the sub
but the new system has rejected the doc tense, the apparent magnitude is measured
trine of images let in by the senses, hold by this angle. [210] This apparent mag
ing, nevertheless, that there are images in nitude is an object of sight, and not of
the mind; and, having made this unnatural touch. Bishop Berkeley calls it visible
divorce of two doctrines which ought not magnitude.
to be put asunder, that which they have If it is asked what is the apparent mag
retained often leads them back involun nitude of the sun's diameter, the answer
tarily to that which they have rejected. is, that it is about thirty-one minutes of a
Mr Hume surely did not seriously be degree. But, if it is asked what is the
lieve that an image of sound is let in by the real magnitude of the sun's diameter, the
ear, an image of smell by the nose, an answer must be, so many thousand miles,
image of hardness and softness, of solidity or so many diameters of the earth. From
and resistance, by the touch. For, besides which it is evident that real magnitude, and
the absurdity of the thing, which has often apparent magnitude, are things of a different
been shewn, Mr Hume, and all modern nature, though the name of magnitude is
philosophers, maintain that theimages which given to both. The first has three dimen
are the immediate objects of perception sions, the last only two; the first is mea
have no existence when they are not per sured by a line, the last by an angle.
ceived; whereas, if they were let in by the From what has been said, it is evident
senses, they must be, before they are per that the real magnitude of a body must
ceived, and have aseparate existence. [209] continue unchanged, while the body is
Hetell us, farther, that philosophy teaches unchanged. This we grant. But is it
that the senses are unable to produce any likewise evident, that the apparent mag
immediate intercourse between the mind
* The doctrine of Reid-that real magnitude or
and the object. Here, I still require the extension is the object of touch, and of touch alone
reasons that philosophy gives for this; for, is altogether untenable. For, in the first place, mag
to my apprehension, I immediately per nitude appears greater or less in £ to the
ceive external objects, and this, I conceive different size of the tactile organ in di rent subjects;
is the immediate intercourse here meant. thus, an apple is larger to the hand of a child than to
the hand of an adult. Touch, therefore, can, at best,
Hitherto I see nothing that can be called afford a knowledge of the relation of magnitudes, in
proportion to the organ of this or that individual.
But, in the second place, even in the same individual,
• The sun can be no immediate object of conscious the same object appears greater or less, accordin
*ess in perception, but only certain rays in connec it is touched by one part of the body or by another.
tion with the eye. The battle of Culloden can be no On this subject, see weber's “Annotationes de
- * object of - in łlection. but £: theoretone. Auditu et Tactu;" Leipsic,
only a certain representation by the mind itself.-H. 834.-H.
[209, 210]
304 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essav II
nitude must continue the same while the not the real table we see. I admit both the
body is unchanged? So far otherwise, premises in this syllogism, but I deny the
that every man who knows anything of conclusion. The syllogism has what the
mathematics can easily demonstrate, that logicians call two middle terms: apparent
the same individual object, remaining in magnitude is the middle term in the first
the same place, and unchanged, must neces premise; real magnitude in the second.
sarily vary in its apparent magnitude, ac Therefore, according to the rules of logic,
cording as the point from which it is seen the conclusion is not justly drawn from the
is more or less distant; and that its appa premises; but, laying aside the rules of
rent length or breadth will be nearly in a logic, let us examine it by the light of com
reciprocal proportion to the distance of the mon sense.
spectator. This is as certain as the princi Let us suppose, for a moment, that it is
ples of geometry.* the real table we see: Must not this real
We must likewise attend to this—that, table seem to diminish as we remove farther
though the real magnitude of a body is not from it It is demonstrable that it must.
originally an object of sight, but of touch, How then can this apparent diminution bean
yet we learn by experience to judge of the argument that it is not thereal table? [212]
real magnitude in many cases by sight. When that which must happen to the real
We learn by experience to judge of the table, as we remove farther from it, does
distance of a body from the eye within cer-. actually happen to the table we see, it is ab
tain limits; and, from its distance and ap surd to conclude from this, that it is not the
parent magnitude taken together, we learn real table we see." It is evident, therefore,
to judge of its real magnitude. [211] that this ingenious author has imposed upon
And this kind of judgment, by being himself by confounding real magnitude with
repeated every hour and almost every apparent magnitude, and that his argument
minute of our lives, becomes, when we are is a mere sophism.
grown up, so ready and so habitual, that it I observed that Mr Hume's argument
very much resembles the original perceptions not only has no strength to support his con
of our senses, and may not improperly be clusion, but that it leads to the contrary con
called acquired perception. clusion—to wit, that it is the real table we
Whether we call it judgment or acquired see;" for this plain reason, that the table
perception is a verbal difference. But it is we see has precisely that apparent magni
evident that, by means of it, we often dis tude which it is demonstrable the real table
cover by one sense things which are pro must have when placed at that distance.
perly and naturally the objects of another. This argument is made much stronger by
Thus I can say, without impropriety, I hear considering that the real table may be placed
a drum, I hear a great bell, or I hear a successively at a thousand different dis
small bell; though it is certain that the tances, and, in every distance, in a thousand
figure or size of the sounding body is not different positions; and it can be deter
originally an object of hearing. In like mined demonstratively, by the rules of
manner, we learn by experience how a geometry and perspective, what must be its
body of such a real magnitude and at such apparent magnitude and apparent figure, in
a distance appears to the eye. But neither each of those distances and positions. Let
its real magnitude, nor its distance from the table be placed successively in as many
the eye, are properly objects of sight, any of those different distances and different po
more than the form of a drum or the size sitions as you will, or in them all; open
of a bell, are properly objects of hearing. your eyes and you shall see a table pre
If these things be considered, it will ap cisely of that apparent magnitude, and that
pear that Mr Hume's argument hath no apparent figure, which the real table must
force to support his conclusion-nay, that it have in that distance and in that position.
leads to a contrary conclusion. The argu Is not this a strong argument that it is the
ment is this: the table we see seems to di real table you see?"
minish as we remove farther from it; that In a word, the appearance of a visible
is, its apparent magnitude is diminished; object is infinitely diversified, according to
but the real table suffers no alteration—to its distance and position. The visible ap
wit, in its real magnitude; therefore, it is pearances are innumerable, when we con
fine ourselves to one object, and they are
* The whole confusion and difficulty in this mat
multiplied according to the variety of ob
ter arises from not determining what is the true object jects. Those appearances have been mat
in visual-perception. This is not any distant thing, ter of speculation to ingenious men, at least
but merely the rays of light in immediate relation to since the time of Euclid. They have ac
the organ. We therefore, see a different object at
every movement, by which a different complement counted for all this variety, on the suppo
of rays is reflected to the eye. The things from which sition that the objects we see are external,
these rays are reflected are not, in truth, perceived at
all; and to conceive them as objects of perception is
therefore erroneous, and productive of error.-H. * See last note.-H.
[211, 212]
cHAP. xiv.] REFLECTIONS ON THE THEORY OF IDEAS. 305
and not in the mind itself. [213] The rules they are fabricated by the minds itself;
they have demonstrated about the various others that they are produced by externa
projections of the sphere, about the appear objects; others that they are the immediate
ances of the planets in their progressions, operation of the Deity; others say, that
stations, and retrogradations, and all the impressions are the causes of ideas, and
rules of perspective, are built on the suppo that the causes of impressions are unknown:
sition that the objects of sight are external. some think that we have ideas only of ma
They can each of them be tried in thousands terial objects, but none of minds, of their
of instances. In many arts and professions, operations, or of the relations of things;
innumerable trials are daily made; nor others will have the immediate object of
were they ever found to fail in a single in every thought to be an idea: some think
stance. Shall we say that a false supposi we have abstract ideas, and that by this
tion, invented by the rude vulgar, has been chiefly we are distinguished from the brutes;
so lucky in solving an infinite number of others maintain an abstract idea to be an
phaenomena of nature ? This, surely, would absurdity, and that there can be no such
be a greater prodigy than philosophy ever thing: with some they are the immediate ob
exhibited : add to this, that, upon the con jects of thought, with others the only objects.
trary hypothesis—to wit, that the objects of A fourth reflection is, that ideas do not
sight are internal—no account can be given make any of the operations of the mind to
of any one of those appearances, nor any be better understood, although it was pro
physical cause assigned why a visible object bably with that view that they have been
should, in any one case, have one apparent first invented, and afterwards so generally
figure and magnitude rather than another. received.
Thus, I have considered every argument We are at a loss to know how we per
I have found advanced to prove the exist ceive distant objects; how we remember
ence of ideas, or images of external things, things past; how we imagine things that
in the mind; and, if no better arguments can have no existence. Ideas in the mind seem
be found, I cannot help thinking that the to account for all these operations: they are
whole history of philosophy has never fur all by the means of ideas reduced to one
nished an instance of an opinion so unani operation—to a kind of feeling, or imme
Amously entertained by philosophers upon so diate perception of things present and in
slight grounds. contact with the percipient; and feeling is
A. '' reflection I would make upon an operation so familiar that we think it
this subject is, that philosophers, notwith needs no explication, but may serve to ex
standing their unanimity as to the existence plain other operations. [215]
of ideas," hardly agree in any one thing But this feeling, or immediate percep
else concerning them. If ideas be not a tion, is as difficult to be comprehended as
mere fiction, they must be, of all objects of the things which we pretend to explain by
human knowledge, the things we have best it. Two things may be in contact without
access to know, and to be acquainted with: any feeling or perception; there must
yet there is nothing about which men differ therefore be in the percipient a power to
so much. feel or to perceive. How this power is pro
Some have held them to be self-existent, duced, and how it operates, is quite beyond
others to be in the Divine mind, others in the reach of our knowledge. As little can
our own minds, and others in the brain or we know whether this power must be limited
sensorium. I considered the hypothesis of to things present, and in contact with us.
images in the brain, in the fourth chapter Nor can any man pretend to prove that the
of this essay. As to images in the mind, if Being who gave us the power to perceive
anything more is meant by the image of an things present, may not give us the power
object in the mind than the thought of that to perceive things that are distant," to re
object, I know not what it means. [214] member things past, and to conceive things
The distinct conception of an object may, that never exis
in a metaphorical or analogical sense, be Some philosophers have endeavoured to
called an image of it in the mind. But this make all our senses to be only different
image is only the conception of the object, modifications of touch it a theory which
and not the object conceived. It is an act serves only to confound things that are dif
of the Inind, and not the object of that act.* ferent, and to perplex and darken things
Some philosophers will have our ideas, or that are clear. The theory of ideas resembles
a part of them, to be inmate; others will this, by reducing all the operations of the
have them all to be adventitious: some de
rive them from the senses alone; others * An immediate £on of things distant, is a
contradiction in terms.-H.
from sensation and reflection: some think t it an immediate perception be supposed, it can
only be rationally supposed of objects as in contact
with the organs of sense. But, in this case, all the
• This unanimity did not cxist.-H. senses would, as Democritus held, be, in a certain
t See Notes B and C.-H. sort, only modifications of touch.-H.
x
[213–215]
human understanding to the perception of that all men, from the beginning of the
ideas in our own minds. This power of world, believed the existence of these things
perceiving ideas is as inexplicable as any of upon insufficient grounds, and to think that
the powers explained by it: and the con they would be able to place upon a more
tiguity of the object contributes nothing at rational foundation this universal belief of
all to make it better understood; because mankind. But the misfortune is, that all
there appears no connection between con the laboured arguments they have advanced,
tiguity and perception, but what is grounded to prove the existence of those things we
on prejudices drawn from some imagined see and feel, are mere sophisms : Not one
similitude between mind and body, and of them will bear examination.
from the supposition that, in perception, I might mention several paradoxes, which
the object acts upon the mind, or the mind Mr Locke, though by no means fond of para
upon the object. We have seen how this doxes, was led into by this theory of ideas.
theory has led philosophers to confound [217] Such as, that the secondary qualities
those operations of mind, which experience of body are no qualities of body at all, but
teaches all men to be different, and teaches sensations of the mind: That the primary
them to distinguish in common language; qualities of body are resemblances of our
and that it has led them to invent a lan sensations: That we have no notion of dur
guage inconsistent with the principles upon ation, but from the succession of ideas in
which all language is grounded. our minds: That personal identity consists
The last reflection I shall make upon this in consciousness; so that the stime indivi
theory, is—that the natural and necessary dual thinking being may make two or three
consequences of it furnish a just prejudice different persons, and several different think
against it to every man who pays a due re ing beings make one person : That judg
gard to the common sense of mankind. [216] ment is nothing but a perception of the
Not to mention that it led the Pytha agreement or disagreement of our ideas.
goreans and Plato to imagine that we see Most of these paradoxes I shall have oc
only the shadows of external things, and casion to examine.
not the things themselves," and that it gave However, all these consequences of the
rise to the Peripatetic doctrine of sensible doctrine of ideas were tolerable, compared
species, one of the greatest absurdities of with those which came afterwards to be dis
that ancient system, let us only consider the covered by Berkeley and Hume :-That
fruits it has produced since it was new there is no material world: No abstract
modelled by Des Cartes. That great re ideas or notions : That the mind is only a
former in philosophy saw the absurdity of train of related impressions and ideas, with
the doctrine of ideas coming from external out any subject on which they may be im
objects, and refuted it effectually, after it pressed: That there is neither space nor
had been received by philosophers for thou time, body nor mind, but impressions and
sands of years; but he still retained ideas ideas only: And, to sum up all, That there
in the brain and in the mind...+ Upon this is no probability, even in demonstration it
foundation all our modern systems of the self, nor any one proposition more probable
powers of the mind are built. And the tot than its contrary.
tering state of those fabrics, though built These are the noble fruits which have
by skilful hands, may give astrong suspicion grown upon this theory of ideas, since it
of the unsoundness of the foundation. began to be cultivated by skilful hands. It
It was this theory of ideas that led Des is no wonder that sensible men should be
Cartes, and those that followed him, to think disgusted at philosophy, when such wild
it necessary to prove, by philosophical argu and shocking paradoxes pass under its name.
ments, the existence of material objects. However, as these paradoxes have, with
And who does not see that philosophy must great acuteness and ingenuity, been deduced
make a very ridiculous figure in the eyes of by just reasoning from the theory of ideas,
sensible men, while it is employed in muster they must at last bring this advantage, that
ing up metaphysical arguments, to prove positions so shocking to the common sense
that there is a sun and a moon, an earth and of mankind, and so contrary to the decisions
a sea P. Yet we find these truly great men, of all our intellectual powers, will open men's
Des Cartes, Malebranche, Arnauld, and eyes, and break the force of the prejudice
Locke, seriously employing themselves in which hath held them entangled in that
this argument.: theory. [218]
Surely their principles led them to think
CHAPTER XV.
* See above, p.262 col, b, note *-. H
f See Note N.-H. ACC0 UNT OF THE SYSTEM of L'Enhnitz.
t if Reid do not allow that we are immediately
cognitive or conscious of the non-ego, his own doc.
trine of perception differs not from that of other THERE is yet another system concerning
philosophers in the necessity for this proof-H. perception, of which I shall give some ac
[216–218.]
chap. xv.] ACCOUNT OF THE SYSTEM OF LEIBNITZ. 307
count, because of the fame of its author. It bodies as well as minds, to be made up
is the invention of the famous German phi of monads-that is, simple substances, each
losopher Leibnitz, who, while he lived, held of which is, by the Creator, in the begin
the first rank among the Germans in all ning of its existence, endowed with certain
parts of philosophy, as well as in mathe active and perceptive powers. A monad,
maties, in jurisprudence, in the knowledge therefore, is an active substance, simple,
of antiquities, and in every branch both of without parts or figure, which has within
science and of literature. He was highly itself the power to produce all the changes
respected by emperors, and by many kings it undergoes from the beginning of its ex
and princes, who bestowed upon him singu istence to eternity. The changes which
lar marks of their esteem. He was a par the monad undergoes, of what kind soever,
ticular favourite of our Queen Caroline, though they may seem to us the effect of
consort of George II., with whom he con causes operating from without, yet they
tinued his correspondence by letters, after are only the gradual and successive evolu
she came to the crown of Britain, till his tions of its own internal powers, which
death. would have produced all the same changes
The famous controversy between him and and motions, although there had been no
the British mathematicians, whether he or other being in the universe.
Sir Isaac Newton was the inventor of that Every human soul is a monad joined to
noble improvement in mathematics, called an organized body, which organized body
by Newton, the method of fluxions, and by consists of an infinite number of monads,
Leibnitz the differential method, engaged each having some degree of active and of
the attention of the mathematicians in perceptive power in itself. But the whole
Europe for several years. He had likewise machine of the body has a relation to that
a controversy with the learned and judicious monad which we call the soul, which is, as
Dr Samuel Clarke, about several points of it were, the centre of the whole. [220]
the Newtonian philosophy which he dis As the universe is completely filled with
approved. The papers which gave occasion monads, without any chasm or void, and
to this controversy, with all the replies and thereby every body acts upon every other
rejoinders, had the honour to be transmitted body, according to its vicinity or distance,
from the one party to the other, through and is mutually reacted upon by every other
the hands of Queen Caroline, and were body, it follows, says Leibnitz, that every
afterwards published. monad is a kind of living mirror, which re
His authority, in all matters of philoso flects the whole universe, according to its
phy, is still so great in most parts of Ger point of view, and represents the whole
many, that they are considered as bold more or less distinctly.
spirits, and a kind of heretics, who dissent I cannot undertake to reconcile this part
from him in anything. [219] Carolus" of the system with what was before men
Wolfius, the most voluminous writer in tioned—to wit, that every change in a
philosophy of this age, is considered as the monad is the evolution of its own original
great interpreter and advocate of the Leib powers, and would have happened though
nitzian system, and reveres as an oracle no other substance had been created. But,
whatever has dropped from the pen of to proceed.
Leibnitz. This author proposed two great There are different orders of monads,
works upon the mind. The first, which I some higher and others lower. The higher
have seen, he published with the title of orders he calls dominant; such is the hu
“Psychologia Empirica, seu Experiment man soul. The monads that compose the
alis.”+ The other was to have the title of organized bodies of men, animals, and plants,
“Psychologia Rationalis;” and to it he are of a lower order, and subservient to the
refers for his explication of the theory of dominant monads. But every monad, of
Leibnitz with regard to the mind. But whatever order, is a complete substance in
whether it was published I have not learn itself—indivisible, having no parts; inde
ed.: structible, because, having no parts, it can
I must, therefore, take the short account not perish by any kind of decomposition;
I am to give of this system from the writ it can only perish by annihilation, and we
ings of Leibnitz himself, without the light have no reason to believe that God will ever
which his interpreter Wolfius may have annihilate any of the beings which he has
thrown upon it. made.
*
Leibnitz conceived the whole universe, The monads of a lower order may, by a
regular evolution of their powers, rise to a
* His name was Christian.-H.
+ This title is incorrect. It is “Psychologia Em
higher order. They may successively be
pirica methodo scientifica pertractata,” &c. The joined to organized bodies, of various forms
work Fppeared in 1732.-H. and different degrees of perception; but
! It wasp. blished in 1734. Such careless ignorance they never die, nor cease to be in some de
of the most distinguished works on the subject of an
author's speculations, is peculiarly British.-H. gree active and percipient.
x2
[21:9, 220] -
303 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essay ".
This philosopher makes a distinction be lished ; and in his “Principles of Nature
tween perception and what he calls apper and Grace founded in Reason.” I shall
ception. The first is common to all monads, now make a few remarks upon this system.
the last proper to the higher orders, among 1. To pass over the irresistible necessity
which are human souls. [221] of all human actions, which makes a part of
By apperception he understands that de this system, that will be considered in an
gree of perception which reflects, as it were, other place, I observe, first, that the dis
upon itself; by which we are conscious of tinction made between perception and ap
our own existence, and conscious of our perception is obscure and unphilosophical.
perceptions; by which we can reflect upon As far as we can discover, every operation
the operations of our own minds, and can of our mind is attended with consciousness,
comprehend abstract truths. The mind, in and particularly that which we call the per
many operations, he thinks, particularly in ception of external objects; and to speak of
sleep, and in many actions common to us a perception of which we are not conscious,
with the brutes, has not this apperception, is to speak without any meaning.
although it is still filled with a multitude of As consciousness is the only power by
obscure and indistinct perceptions, of which which we discern the operations of our own
we are not conscious. minds, or can form any notion of them, an
He conceives that our bodies and minds operation of mind of which we are not con
are united in such a manner that neither scious, is, we know not what; and to call
has any physical influence upon the other. such an operation by the name of perception,
Each performs all its operations by its own is an abuse of language. No man can per
internal springs and powers; yet the oper ceive an object without being conscious that
ations of one correspond exactly with those he perceives it. No man can think without
of the other, by a pre-established harmony; being conscious that he thinks. What men
just as one clock may be so adjusted as to are not conscious of, cannot therefore, with
keep time with another, although each has out impropriety, be called either perception
its own moving power, and neither receives or thought of any kind. And, if we will
any part of its motion from the other. suppose operations of mind of which we are
So that, according to this system, all our not conscious, and give a name to such
perceptions of external objects would be the creatures of our imagination, that name
same, though external things had never £ signify what we know nothing about."
existed; our perception of them would con 223]
tinue, although, by the power of God, they 2. To suppose bodies organized or un
should this moment be annihilated. We organized, to be made up of indivisible
do not perceive external things because they monads which have no parts, is contrary to
exist, but because the soul was originally so all that we know of body. It is essential
constituted as to produce in itself all its to a body to have parts; and every part of
successive changes, and all its successive a body is a body, and has parts also. No
perceptions, independently of the external number of parts, without extension or figure,
objects. not even an infinite number, if we may use
Every perception or apperception, every that expression, can, by being put together,
operation, in a word, of the soul, is a neces make a whole that has extension and figure,
sary consequence of the state of it imme which all bodies have.
diately preceding that operation; and this 3. It is contrary to all that we know of
state is the necessary consequence of the bodies, to ascribe to the monads, of which
state preceding it; and so backwards, until they are supposed to be compounded, per
you come to its first formation and consti ception and active force. If a philosopher
tution, which produces, successively and thinks proper to say, that a clod of earth
by necessary consequence, all its succes both perceives and has active force, let him
sive states to the end of its existence; bring his proofs. But he ought not to
[222] so that, in this respect;"the soul, and expect that men who have understanding
every monad, may be compared to a watch will so far give it up as to receive without
wound up, which, having the spring of its proof whatever his imagination may sug
motion in itself, by the gradual evolution of gest.
its own spring, produces all the successive 4. This system overturns all authority of
motions we observe in it. our senses, and leaves not the least ground
In this account of Leibnitz's system con to believe the existence of the objects of
cerning monads and the pre-established
harmony, I have kept, as nearly as I could, • The language in which Leibnitz expresses his
to his own expressions, in his “New System doctrine of latent modifications of mind, which,
though out of consciousness, manifest their existence
of the Nature and Communication of Sub in their effects, is objectionable; the doctrine itself is
stances, and of the Union of Soul and not only true but of the very highest importance in
psychology, although it has never-yet been appreci
Body;” and in the several illustrations of ated or even understood by any writer on philosophs
that new system which he afterwards pub in this island.-H.
[221–223]
cHAP. xv.] ACCOUNT OF THE SYSTEM OF LEIBNITZ. 309
sense, or the existence of anything which The Supreme Being has given us some
depends upon the authority of our senses; intelligence of his works, by what our senses
for our perception of objects, according to inform us of external things, and by what
this system, has no dependence upon any our consciousness and reflection inform us
thing external, and would be the same as it concerning the operations of our own minds.
is, supposing external objects had never Whatever can be inferred from these com
existed, or that they were from this moment mon informations, by just and sound reason
annihilated. ing, is true and legitimate philosophy: but
It is remarkable that Leibnitz's system, what we add to this from conjecture is all
that of Malebranche, and the common sys sy urious and illegitimate. [225]
tem of ideas or images of external objects After this long account of the theories
in the mind, do all agree in overturning all advanced by philosophers, to account for
the authority of our senses; and this one our perception of external objects, I hope
thing, as long as men retain their senses, it will appear, that neither Aristotle's theory
will always make all these systems truly of sensible species, nor Malebranche's of
ridiculous. our seeing things in God, nor the common
5. The last observation I shall make theory of our perceiving ideas in our own
upon this system, which, indeed, is equally minds, nor Leibnitz's theory of monads
applicable to all the systems of Perception and a pre-established harmony, give any
1 have mentioned, is, that it is all hypo satisfying account of this power of the mind,
thesis, made up of conjectures and suppo or make it more intelligible than it is
sitions, without proof. The Peripatetics without their aid. They are conjectures,
supposed sensible species to be sent forth and, if they were true, would solve no diffi
by the objects of sense. The moderns sup culty, but raise many new ones. It is,
pose ideas in the brain or in the mind. [224] therefore, more agreeable to good sense
Malebranche supposed that we perceive and to sound philosophy, to rest satisfied
the ideas of the Divine mind. Leibnitz with what our consciousness and attentive
supposed monads and a pre-established har reflection discover to us of the nature of
mony; and these monads being creatures perception, than, by inventing hypotheses,
of his own making, he is at liberty to give to attempt to explain things which are
them what properties and powers his fancy above the reach of human understanding.
may suggest. In like manner, the Indian I believe no man is able to explain how we
philosopher supposed that the earth is sup perceive external objects, any more than
ported by a huge elephant, and that the how we are conscious of those that are
elephant stands on the back of a huge tor internal. Perception, consciousness, me
toise." mory, and imagination, are all original and
Such suppositions, while there is no proof simple powers of the mind, and parts of its
of them offered, are nothing but the fictions constitution. For this reason, though I
of human fancy; and we ought no more have endeavoured to shew that the theories
to believe them, than we believe Homer's of philosophers on this subject are ill
fictions of Apollo's silver bow, or Minerva's grounded and insufficient, I do not attempt
shield, or Venus's girdle. Such fictions in to substitute any other theory in their
poetry are agreer ole to the rules of art : place.
they are intended to please, not to convince. Every man feels that perception gives
But the philosophers would hove us to him an invincible belief of the existence of
believe their fictions, though t're v count that which he perceives; and that this
they give of the phenomena of nat re has belief is not the effect of reasoning, but
commonly no more probability -man the the immediate consequence of perception."
account that Homer gives of the plague in When philosophers have wearied them
the Grecian camp, from Apollo taking his selves and their readers with their specula
station on a neighbouring mountain, and tions upon this subject, they can neither
from his silver bow letting fly his swift strengthen this belief, nor weaken it; nor
arrows into the camp. can they shew how it is produced. It puts
Men then only begin to have a true taste the philosopher and the peasant upon a
in philosophy, when they have learned to level; and neither of them can give any
hold hypotheses in just contempt; and to other reason for believing his senses, than
consider them as the reveries of speculative that he finds it impossible for him to do
men, which will never have any similitude otherwise. [226]
to the works of God.
• In an immediate perception of external things,
• It is a disputed point whether Leibnitz were the belief of their existence would not be a conse
serious in his monadology and pre established har quence of the perception, but be involved in the per
mony.-H. ception itself.-H.
[224–226X
sensation. This quality in the rose is the
CHAPTER XVI. object perceived; and that act of my mind
by which I have the conviction and belief
of SENSATION. of this quality, is what in this case I call
perception."
HAVING finished what I intend, with But it is here to be observed, that the
regard to that act of mind which we call sensation I feel, and the quality in the rose
the perception of an external object, I which I perceive, are both called by the
proceed to consider another, which, by our same name. The smell of a rose is the
constitution, is conjoined with perception, name given to both: so that this name hath
and not with perception only, but with two meanings; and the distisguishing its
many other acts of our minds; and that is different meanings removes all perplexity,
sensation. To prevent repetition, I must and enables us to give clear and distinct
refer the reader to the explication of this answers to questions about which philoso
word given in Essay I., chap. i. phers have held much dispute.t.
Almost all our perceptions have corre Thus, if it is asked, whether the smell
sponding sensations which constantly ac be in the rose, or in the mind that feels it,
company them, and, on that account, are the answer is obvious : That there are two
very apt to be confounded with them. different things signified by the smell of a
Neither ought we to expect that the sens rose; one of which is in the mind, and can
ation, and its corresponding perception, be in nothing but in a sentient being; the
should be distinguished in common lan other is truly and properly in the rose. The
guage, because the purposes of common sensation which I feel is in my mind. The
life do not require it. Language is made mind is the sentient being; and, as the rose
to serve the purposes of ordinary conversa is insentient, there can be no sensation, nor
tion; and we have no reason to expect that anything resembling sensation in it. [228]
it should make distinctions that are not of But this sensation in my mind is occasioned
common use. Hence it happens, that a by a certain quality in the rose, which is
quality perceived, and the sensation cor called by the same name with the sensation,
responding to that perception, often go under not on account of any similitude, but be
the same name. cause of their constant concomitancy.
This makes the names of most of our All the names we have for smells, tastes,
sensations ambiguous, and this ambiguity sounds, and for the various degrees of heat
hath very much perplexed philosophers. It and cold, have a like ambiguity; and what
will be n to give some instances, to has been said of the smell of a rose may be
illustrate the distinction between our sens applied to them. They signify both a sens
ations and the objects of perception. ation, and a quality perceived by means of
When I smell a rose, there is in this that sensation. The first is the sign, the
operation both sensation and perception. last the thing signified. As both are con
The agreeable odour I feel, considered by joined by nature, and as the purposes of
itself, without relation to any external ob common life do not require them to be dis
ject, is merely a sensation. [227] It affects joined in our thoughts, they are both ex
the mind in a certain way; and this affection pressed by the same name: and this am
of the mind may be conceived, withoat a biguity is to be found in all languages, be
thought of the rose, or any other object. cause the reason of it extends to all.
This sensation can be nothing else than it The same ambiguity is found in the
is felt to be. Its very essence consists in names of such diseases as are indicated by
being felt; and, when it is not felt, it is not. a particular painful sensation : such as the
There is no difference between the sensa toothache, the headache. The toothache
- -- - - - -
tion and the feeling of it—they are one and
* This paragraph appears to be an explicit disa
the same thing. It is for this reason that vowal of the doctrine of an intuitive or immediate
we before observed that, in sensation, there perception. If, from a certain sensible feeling, or
is no object distinct from that act of the sensation, (which is itself cognitive of no object,) I am
only determined by my nature to conclude that there
mind by which it is felt—and this holds is some external quality which is the cause of this
true with regard to all sensations. sensation, and if this quality, thus only known as an
inference from its effect, be the object perceived, then
Let us next attend to the perception is perception not an act immediately cognitive of
which we have in smelling a rose. Percep any existing object, and the object perceived is, in
tion has always an external object; and the fact, arcept as an imaginary something, tinknown.
object of my perception, in this case, is that + 1n reference to this and the following paragraphs,
quality in the rose which I discern by the I may observe that the distinction of subjective and
sense of smell. Observing that the agree objective qualities here vaguely attempted, had been
already precisely accomplished by Aristotle, in his
able sensation is raised when the rose is discrimination of raffnrix a reuerwris fatalitates pate.
near, and ceases when it is removed, I am biles,) and ráðn (passiones/. In regard to the car.
tesian distinction, which is equaliy precise, but of
led, by my nature, to conclude some quality which likewise Reid is unaware, see above, p. 205,
to be in the rose, which is the cause of this col b, note *.-H.
[227 , 2281
char. xvi.] OF SENSATION. 3] i.
signifies a painful sensation, which can only Whether these two ingredients are neces
be in a sentient being; but it signifies also sarily connected, is, perhaps, difficult for us
a disorder in the body, which has no simili to determine, there being many necessary
tude to a sensation, but is naturally con connections which we do not perceive to be
nected with it. necessary; but we can disjoin them in
Pressing my hand with force against the thought. They are different acts of the
table, I feel pain, and I feel the table to be mind.
hard. The pain is a sensation of the mind, An uneasy feeling, and a desire, are, in
and there is nothing that resembles it in like manner, the ingredients of malevolent
the table. The hardness is in the table, affections; such as malice, envy, revenge.
nor is there anything resembling it in the The passion of fear includes an uneasy
mind. Feeling is applied to both ; but in sensation or feeling, and an opinion of
a different sense; being a word common to danger; and hope is made up of the con
the act of sensation, and to that of perceiv trary ingredients. When we hear of a
ing by the sense of touch. heroic action, the sentiment which it raises
I touch the table gently with my hand, in our mind, is made up of various ingre
and I feel it to be smooth, hard, and cold. dients. There is in it an agreeable feeling,
These are qualities of the table perceived by a benevolent affection to the person, and a
touch; but I perceive them by means of a judgment or opinion of his merit.
sensation which indicates them. This sens If we thus analyse the various operations
ation not being painful, I commonly give no of our minds, we shall find that many of
attention to it. [229] It carries my thought them which we consider as perfectly simple,
immediately to the thing signified by it, and because we have been accustomed to call
is itself forgot, as if it had never been. But, them by one name, are compounded of more
by repeating it, and turning my attention simple ingredients; and that sensation, or
to it, and abstracting my thought from the feeling, which is only a more refined kind
thing signified by it, I find it to be merely of sensation, makes one ingredient, not
a sensation, and that it has no similitude to only in the perception of external objects,
the hardness, smoothness, or coldness of but in most operations of the mind.
the table, which are signified by it. A small degree of reflection may satisfy
It is indeed difficult, at first, to disjoin us that the number and variety of our sens
things in our attention which have always ations and feelings is prodigious; for, to
been conjoined, and to make that an object omit all those which accompany our appe
of reflection which never was so before ; tites, passions, and affections, our moral
but some pains and practice will overcome sentiments and sentiments of taste, even
this difficulty in those who have got the our external senses, furnish a great variety
habit of reflecting on the operations of their of sensations, differing in kind, and almost
own minds. in every kind an endless variety of degrees.
Although the present subject leads us Every variety we discern, with regard to
only to consider the sensations which we taste, smell, sound, colour, heat, and cold,
have by means of our external senses, yet and in the tangible qualities of bodies, is
it will serve to illustrate what has been said, indicated by a sensation corresponding to
and, I apprehend, is of importance in itself, it.
to observe, that many operations of mind, The most general and the most import
to which we give one name, and which we ant division of our sensations and feelings,
always consider as one thing, are complex is into the agreeable, the disagreeable, and
in their nature, and made up of several the indifferent. Everything we call plea
more simple ingredients: and of these ingre sure, happiness, or enjoyment, on the one
dients sensation very often makes one. Of hand; and, on the other, everything we
this we shall give some instances. call misery, pain, or uneasiness, is sensa
The appetite of hunger includes an un tion or feeling; for no man can for the pre
easy sensation, and a desire of food. Sens sent be more happy or more miserable than
ation and desire are different acts of mind. he feels himself to be. [2.31] He cannot
The last, from its nature, must have an be deceived with regard to the enjoyment
object; the first has no object. These two or suffering of the present moment.
ingredients may always be separated in But I apprehend that, besides the sens
thought—perhaps they sometimes are, in ations that are either agreeable or disagree
reality; but hunger includes both. able, there is still a greater number that
Benevolence towards our fellow-creatures are indifferent." To these we give so little
includes an agreeable feeling; but it includes attention, that they have no name, and are
also a desire of the happiness of others. immediately forgot, as if they had never
The ancients commonly called it desire. been; and it requires attention to the ope
Many modernschuse rather to call it a feel
ing. Both are right: and they only err who * This is a point in dispute among philosophers.
exclude either of the ingredients. [230] -H
T229–2317
rations of our minds to be convinced of their Thirdly, The moderate exercise of all our
existence. rational powers gives pleasure. Fourthly,
For this end we may observe, that, to a Every species of beauty is beheld with
ear, every human voice is distinguish pleasure, and every species of deformity
able from all others. Some voices are plea with disgust; and we shall find all that we
sant, some disagreeable; but the far greater call beautiful, to be something estimable or
part can neither be said to be one nor the useful in itself, or a sign of something that
other. The same thing may be said of is estimable or useful. Fifthly, The bene
other sounds, and no less of tastes, smells, volent affections are all accompanied with
and colours; and, if we consider that our an agreeable feeling, the malevolent with
senses are in continual exercise while we are the contrary. And, sixthly, The highest,
awake, that some sensation attends every the noblest, and most durable pleasure is
object they present to us, and that familiar that of doing well, and acting the part that
objects seldom raise any emotion, pleasant becomes us; and the most bitter and pain
or painful, we shall see reason, besides the ful sentiment, the anguish and remorse of
agreeable and disagreeable, to admit a third a guilty conscience. These observations,
class of sensations that may be called in with regard to the economy of nature in
different. the distribution of our painful and agree
The sensations that are indifferent, are able sensations and feelings, are illustrated
far from being useless. They serve as by the author last mentioned, so elegantly
signs to distinguish things that differ; and and judiciously, that I shall not attempt to
the information we have concerning things say anything upon them after him. [233]
external, comes by their means. Thus, if I shall conclude this chapter by observ
a man had no ear to receive pleasure from ing that, as the confounding our sensations
the harmony or melody of sounds, he would with that perception of external objects
still find the sense of hearing of great which is constantly conjoined with them,
utility. Though sounds give him neither has been the occasion of most of the errors
pleasure nor pain of themselves, they would and false theories of philosophers with re
give him much useful information; and the gard to the senses; so the distinguishing
like may be said of the sensations we have these operations seems to me to be the key
by all the other senses. [232] that leads to a right understanding of both.
As to the sensations and feelings that are Sensation, taken by itself, implies neither
agreeable or disagreeable, they differ much the conception nor belief of any external
not only in degree, but in kind and in dig object. It supposes a sentient being, and
nity. Some belong to the animal part of a certain manner in which that being is
our nature, and are common to us with the affected; but it supposes no more. Per
brutes; others belong to the rational and ception implies an immediate conviction
moral part. The first are more properly and belief of something external-some
called sensations; the last, felings. The thing different both from the mind that
French word sentiment is common to both." perceives, and from the act of perception.
The intention of nature in them is for the Things so different in their nature ought
most part obvious, and well deserving our to be distinguished; but, by our constitu
notice. It has been beautifully illustrated tion, they are always united. Every dif
by a very elegant French writer," in his ferent perception is conjoined with a sensa
“Theorie des Sentimen's A reables.” tion that is proper to it. The one is the
The Author of Nature, in the distribution sign, the other the thing signified. They
of agreeable and painful feelings, hath coalesee in our imagination. They are sig
wisely and benevolently consulted the good nified by one name, and are considered as
of the human species, and hath even shewn one simple operation. The purposes of life
us, by the same means, what tenor of con do not require them to be distinguished.
duct we ought to hold. For, first, The It is the philosopher alone who has occa
painful sensations of the animal kind are sion to distinguish them, when he would
admonitions to avoid what would hurt us; analyse the operation compounded of them.
and the agreeable sensations of this kind But he has no suspicion that there is any
invite us to those actions that are necessary composition in it; and to discover this re
to the preservation of the individual or of quires a degree of reflection which has been
the kind. Secondly, By the same means, too little practised even by philosophers.
nature invites us to moderate bodily exer In the old philosophy, sensation and per
cise, and admonishes us to avoid idleness ception were perfectly confounded. The
and inactivity on the one hand, and exces sensible species coming from the object, and
sive labour and fatigue on the other. impressed upon the mind, was the whole;
and you might call it sensation or percep
• Some French philosophers, since Reid, have
attempted the distinction of sentiment and sensation. tion as you pleased."
h
+ Levesque de Pouilly.-H. * This is not correct; for, in the distinction of the
[232, 233]
CHAP. xv.11.] OF THE OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION. 313
Des Cartes and Locke, attending more any argument to prove their existence. But,
to the operations of their own minds, say, if it is true that by our senses we have not
that the sensations by which we have notice only a variety of sensations, but likewise a
of secondary qualities have no resemblance conception and an immediate natural con
to anything that pertains to body; but they viction of external objects, he reasons from
did not see thatthis might, with equal justice, a false supposition, and his arguments fall
be applied to the primary qualities. [234] to the ground."
Mr Locke maintains, that the sensations we
have from primary qualities are resem
blances of those qualities. This shews how CHAPTER XVII.
grossly the most ingenious men may err
with regard to the operations of their minds. of THE objects of PERCEPTION: AND, FIRST,
OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES.
It must, indeed, be acknowledged, that it is
much easier to have a distinct notion of the
sensations that belong to secondary than The objects of perception are the various
of those that belong to the primary quali qualities of bodies. Intending to treat of
ties." The reason of this will appear in these only in general, and chiefly with a view
the next chapter. to explain the notions which our senses
But, had Mr Locke attended with suffi. give us of them, I begin with the distinction
cient accuracy to the sensationst which he between primary and secondary qualities.
was every day and every hour receiving These were distinguished very early. The
from primary qualities, he would have seen Peripatetic system confounded them, and
that they can as little resemble any quality left no difference. The distinction was again
of an inanimated being as pain can resemble revived by Des Cartes and Locke, and a
a cube or a circle. second time abolished by Berkeley and
What had escaped this ingenious philo Hume. If the real foundation of this dis
sopher, was clearly discerned by Bishop tinction can be pointed out, it will enable us
Berkeley. He had a just notion of sensa to account for the various revolutions in the
tions, and saw that it was impossible that sentiments of philosophers concerning it.
anything in an insentient being could re Every one knows that extension, divisi
semble them; a thing so evident in itself, bility, figure, motion, solidity, hardness,
that it seems wonderful that it should have softness, and fluidity, were by Mr Locke
been so long unknown. called primary qualities of body; and that
But let us attend to the consequence of sound, colour, taste, smell, and heat or cold,
this discovery. Philosophers, as well as the were called secondary qualities. Is there a
Is
vulgar, had been accustomed to comprehend just foundation for this distinction ?
both sensation and perception under one there anything common to the primary
name, and to consider them as one uncom which belongs not to the secondary And
what is it *
pounded operation. Philosophers, even to to
more than the vulgar, gave the name of a real foundation for the distinction; andbe
I answer, That there appears me
it
sensation to the whole operation of the
senses; and all the notions we have of ma is this—that our senses give us a direct and
terial things were called ideas of sensation. a distinct notion of the primary qualities,
are in themselves.t
This led Bishop Berkeley to take one in and inform us what theyqualities,
gredient of a complex operation for the But of the secondary our senses
whole; and, having clearly discovered the ive us They only a relative and obscure notion.
nature of sensation, taking it for granted £ inform us only, that they are
that affect us in a certain manner
that all that the senses present to the mind qualities
is sensation, which can have no resemblance —that is, produce in us a certain sensation;
to anything material, he concluded that but as to what they are in themselves, our
there is no material world. [235] senses leave us in the dark.:
If the senses furnished us with no mate
* On this whole distinction, see Note D. * ...-H.
rials of thought but sensations, his conclu t By the expression, “what they are in themselves,”
sion must be just; for no sensation can give in reference to the primary qualities, and of “rela
tive *otion,” in reference to the secondary, Reid
us the conception of material things, far less cannot mean that the former are known to us abso
lutely and in themselves-that is, out of relation to our
species impressa and species expressa, the distinc cognitive faculties; for he elsewhere admits that all
tion of sensation and perception could be perceived; our knowledge is relative. Farther, if “our senses
but, in point of fact, many even of the Aristotelians, give us a direct and distinct notion of the primary
who admitted species at ail, allowed them only in one qualities, and inform , s what they are in themselves,
cr two of the senses. See Notes D* and M.-H. these qualities, as known, inust resemble, or be iden
• 1 he reader will observe that Reid says, “dis tical with, these qualities as existing-H.
tinct notion of the sensations that belong to the se 1 The distinctions of perception and sensation, and
condary qualities,” and not distinct notion of the of primary, and secondary qualities, may be reduced
secondary qualities themselves.-H. to one higher prime ple. Knowledge is partly oldect
* Here again the reader will observe that the term ire, partly subjective, both these elements are essen
is sensations, and not notions, of the primary quali tial to every cognition, but in every cognition they
ties.-H. are always in the inverse ratio of each other. Now
[234-236]
Every man capable of reflection may sentient. The quality in the rose is some
easily satisfy himself that he has a perfectly thing which occasions the sensation in me;
clear and distinct notion of extension, divisi but what that something is, I know not.
bility, figure, and motion. The solidity of My senses give me no information upon
a body means no more but that it excludes this point. The only notion, therefore, my
other bodies from occupying the same place senses give is this—that smell in the rose is
at the same time Hardness, softness, and an unknown quality or modification, which
fluidity are different degrees of cohesion in is the cause or occasion of a sensation which
the parts of a body. It is fluid when it has I know well. The relation which this un
no sensible cohesion; soft, when the cohe known quality bears to the sensation with
sion is weak; and hard, when it is strong. which nature hathconnected it, is all I learn
Of the cause of this cohesion we are ignor from the sense of smelling ; but this is
ant, but the thing itself we understand per evidently a relative notion. The same rea
fectly, being immediately informed of it by soning will apply to every secondary quality.
the sense of touch. It is evident, therefore, Thus, I think it appears that there is a
that of the primary qualities we have a clear real foundation for the distinction of pri
and distinct notion; we know what they mary from secondary qualities; and that
are, though we may be ignorant of their they are distinguished by this—that of the
causes.
primary we have by our senses a direct and
I observed, farther, that the notion we distinct notion ; but of the secondary only
have of primary qualities is direct, and not a relative notion, which must, because it is
relative only. A relative notion of a thing, only relative, be obscure; they are con
is, strictly speaking, no notion of the thing ceived only as the unknown causes or occa
at all, but only of some relation which it sions of certain sensations with which we
bears to something else. are well acquainted.
Thus, gravity sometimes signifies the tend The account I have given of this distinc
ency of bodies towards the earth ; some tion is founded upon no hypothesis. [238]
times it signifies the cause of that tendency. Whether our notions of primary qualities
When it means the first, I have a direct are direct and distinct, those of the se
and distinct notion of gravity; I see it, and condary relative and obscure, is a matter
feel it, and know perfectly what it is; but of fact, of which every man may have cer
this tendency must have a cause. We give tain knowledge by attentive reflection upon
the same name to the cause; and that cause them. To this reflection I appeal, as the
has been an object of thought and of specu proper test of what has been advanced, and
lation. Now, what notion have we of this proceed to make some reflections on this
cause when we think and reason about it * subject.
It is evident we think of it as an unknown 1. The primary qualities are neither sens
cause, of a known effect. This is a relative ations, nor are they resemblances of sens
notion; and it must be obscure, because it ations. This appears to me self-evident.
gives us no conception of what the thing is, I have a clear and distinct notion of each of
but of what relation it bears to something the primary qualities. I have a clear and
else. Every relation which a thing un distinct notion of sensation. I can com
known bears to something that is known, pare the one with the other; and, when I
may give a relative notion of it; and there do so, I am not able to discern a resembling
are many objects of thought and of dis feature. Sensation is the act or the feeling
course of which our faculties can give no (I dispute not which) of a sentient being.
better than a relative notion. [237] Figure, divisibility, solidity, are neither
Having premised these things to explain acts nor feelings. Sensation supposes a
what is meant by a relative notion, it is evi sentient being as its subject; for a sensa
dent that our notion of primary qualities is tion that is not felt by some sentient being,
not of this kind; we know what they are, is an absurdity. Figure and divisibility
and not barely what relation they bear to supposes a subject that is figured and divi
something else. sible, but not a subject that is sentient.
It is otherwise with secondary qualities. 2. We have no reason to think that any
If you ask me, what is that quality or mo of the secondary qualities resemble any sens
dification in a rose which I call its smell, I ation. The absurdity of this notion has
am at a loss to answer directly. Upon re been clearly shewn by Des Cartes, Locke,
flection, I find, that I have a distinct notion and many modern philosophers. It was a
of the sensation which it produces in my tenet of the ancient philosophy, and is still
mind. But there can be nothing like to by many imputed to the vulgar, but only as
this sensation in the rose, because it is in a vulgar error. It is too evident to need
proof, that the vibrations of a sounding
in perception and the primary qualities, the objective body do not resemble the sensation of sound,
element preponderates, whereas the subjective ele
ment preponderates in sensation and the secondary nor the effluvia of an odorous body the sens
qualities. See Notes D and D + ...-H. ation of smell.
|237,238]
---------> --> -----

cHAP. xv.11.] OF THE OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION. 315
3. The distinctness of our notions of pri But, having a clear and distinct conception
mary qualities prevents all questions and of primary qualities, we have no need, when
disputes about their nature. There are no we think of them, to recall their sensations.
different opinions about the nature of ex When a primary quality is perceived, the
tension, figure, or motion, or the nature of sensation immediately leads our thought to
any primary quality. Their nature is man the quality signified by it, and is itself for
ifest to our senses, and cannot be unknown got. We have no occasion afterwards to
to any man, or mistaken by him, though reflect upon it; and so we come to be as
their causes may admit of dispute. [239] little acquainted with it as if we had never
The primary qualities are the object of felt it. This is the case with the sensations
the mathematical sciences; and the dis of all primary qualities, when they are not
tinctness of our notions of them enables so painful or pleasant as to draw our atten
us to reason demonstratively about them to tion.
a great extent. Their various modifications When a man moves his hand rudely
are precisely defined in the imagination, and against a pointed hard body, he feels pain,
thereby capable of being compared, and their and may easily be persuaded that this pain
relations determined with precision and cer is a sensation, and that there is nothing
tainty. resembling it in the hard body; at the same
It is not so with secondary qualities. time, he perceives the body to be hard and
Their nature not being manifest to the sense, pointed, and he knows that these qualities
may be a subject of dispute. Our feeling belong to the body only. In this case, it is
informs us that the fire is hot; but it does easy to distinguish what he feels from what
not inform us what that heat of the fire is. he perceives.
But does it not appear a contradiction, to Let him again touch the pointed body
say we know that the fire is hot, but we gently, so as to give him no pain; and now
know not what that heat is ? I answer, you can hardly persuade him that he feels
there is the same appearance of contradic anything but the figure and hardness of the
tion in many things that must be granted. body: so difficult it is to attend to the sens
We know that wine has an inebriating qua ations belonging to primary qualities, when
lity; but we know not what that quality is. they are neither pleasant nor painful. They
It is true, indeed, that, if we had not some carry the thought to the external object,
notion of what is meant by the heat of fire, and immediately disappear and are forgot.
and by an inebriating quality, we could Nature intended them only as signs; and
affirm nothing of either with understand when they have served that purpose they
ing. We have a notion of both ; but it is vanish.
only a relative notion. We know that they We are now to consider the opinions
are the causes of certain known effects. both of the vulgar and of philosophers upon
4. The nature of secondary qualities is a this subject. £ As to the former, it
proper subject of philosophical disquisition; is not to be expected that they should make
and in this philosophy has made some pro distinctions which have no connection with
gress. It has been discovered, that the the common affairs of life; they do not,
sensation of smell is occasioned by the therefore, distinguish the primary from the
effluvia of bodies; that of sound by their secondary qualities, but speak of both as
vibration. The disposition of bodies to re being equally qualities of the external ob
flect a particular kind of light, occasions the ject. Of the primary qualities they have a
sensation of colour. Very curious dis distinct notion, as they are immediately and
coveries have been made of the nature of distinctly, perceived by the senses; of the
heat, and an ample field of discovery in secondary, their notions, as I apprehend,
these subjects remains. are confused and indistinct, rather than
5. We may see why the sensations be erroneous. A secondary quality is the
longing to secondary qualities are an object unknown cause or occasion of a well-known
of our attention, while those which belong effect; and the same name is common to
to the primary are not. the cause and the effect. Now, to dis
The first are not only signs of the ob tinguish clearly the different ingredients of a
ject perceived, but they bear a capital part complex motion, and, at the same time, the
in the notion we form of it. [240] We different meanings of an ambiguous word,
conceive it only as that which occasions such is the work of a philosopher; and is not
a sensation, and therefore cannot reflect to be expected of the vulgar, when their
upon it without thinking of the sensation occasions"do not require it.
which it occasions: we have no other mark I grant, therefore, that the notion which
whereby to distinguish it. The thought of the vulgar have of secondary qualities, is
a secondary quality, therefore, always car indistinct and inaccurate. But there seems
ries us back to the sensation which it pro to be a contradiction between the vulgar
duces. We give the same name to both, and the philosopher upon this subject, and
and are apt to confound them together. each charges the other with a gross ah.
f 239–241"
surdity. The vulgar say, that fire is hot, It would seem that, when men began to
and snow cold, and sugar sweet; and that speculate upon this subject, the primary
to deny this is a gross absurdity, and con qualities appeared so clear and manifest
tradicts the testimony of our senses. The that they could entertain no doubt of their
philosopher says, that heat, and cold, and existence wherever matter existed ; but the
sweetness, are nothing but sensations in secondary so obscure that they were at a
our minds; and it is absurd to conceive loss where to place them. They used this
that these sensations are in the fire, or in comparison: as fire, which is neither in the
the snow, or in the sugar. flint nor in the steel, is produced by their
I believe this contradiction, between the collision, so those qualities, though not in
vulgar and the philosopher, is more apparent bodies, are produced by their impulse upon
than real; and that it is owing to an abuse our senses. [243]
of language on the part of the philosopher, This doctrine was opposed by Aristotle."
and to indistinct notions on the part of the He believed taste and colour to be substan
vulgar. The philosopher says, there is no tial forms of bodies, and that their species,
heat in the fire, meaning that the fire has as well as those of figure and motion, are
not the sensation of heat. His meaning is received by the senses.t.
just; and the vulgar will agree with him, In believing that what we commonly
as soon as they understand his meaning: call taste and colour, is something really
But his language is improper; for there is inherent in body, and does not depend upon
really a quality in the fire, of which the its being tasted and seen, he followed nature.
proper name is heat; and the name of heat But, in believing that our sensations of
is given to this quality, both by philosophers taste and colour are the forms or species of
and by the vulgar, much more frequently than those qualities received by the senses, he
to the sensation of heat. [242] This speech followed his own theory, which was an ab
of the philosopher, therefore, is meant by surd fiction." Des Cartes not only shewed
him in one sense; it is taken by the vulgar the absurdity of sensible species received by
in another sense. In the sense in which the senses, but gave a more just and more
they take it, it is indeed absurd, and so intelligible account of secondary qualities
they hold it to be. In the sense in which than had been given before. Mr Locke
he means it, it is true; and the vulgar, as followed him, and bestowed much pains
soon as they are made to understand that upon this subject. He was the first, I
sense, will acknowledge it to be true. They think, that gave them the name of secondary
know, as well as the philosopher, that the qualities,t which has been very generally
fire does not feel heat: and this is all that adopted. He distinguished the sensation
he means by saying there is no heat in the from the quality in the body, which is the
fire." cause or occasion of that sensation, and
In the opinions of philosophers about shewed that there neither is nor can be any
primary and secondary qualities, there have similitude between them.Ş
been, as was before observed, several revo By this account, the senses are acquitted
lutions.t. They were distinguished, long be of putting any fallacy upon us; the sensation
fore the days of Aristotle, by the sect called is real, and no fallacy; the quality in the
Atomists: among whom Democritus made body, which is the cause or occasion of this
a capital figure. In those times, the name sensation, is likewise real, though the nature
of quality was applied only to those we call of it is not manifest to our senses. If we
secondary qualities; the primary, being con impose upon ourselves, by confounding the
sidered as essential to matter, were not sensation with the quality that occasions
called qualities.: That the atoms, which it, this is owing to rash judgment or weak
they held to be the first principles of things, understanding, but not to any false testi
were extended, solid, figured, and movable, mony of our senses.
there was no doubt; but the question was, This account of secondary qualities I take
whether they had smell, taste, and colour?
or, as it was commonly expressed, whether and relationsThus,
sensations in the different forms, positions,
of atoms, he sought the ground of
they had qualities 2 The Atomists main difference of tastes, colours, heat and cold, &c. See
tained, that they had not; that the quali Theophrastus De Sensu, a 65-Aristotle De Anima,
iii. 2.-Galen De Elementis-Simplicius in Phys.
ties were not in bodies, but were something Auscult. libros, f. 119, b.-H.
resulting from the operation of bodies upon * Aristotle admitted that the doctrine in question
our senses.S was true, of colour, taste, &c., as zar' irigyhaw, but
not : them as **** ***. See De Anima
ini. 2.-H.
* All this ambiguity was understood and articu. * This is not really Aristotle's doctrine.-H.
"ately explai ed by former philosophers. See above, t Locke only gave a new meaning to old terms.
notes at pp. 205 and 31", and No e D.-H. The first and second or the primary and secondary
+ See Note D.-H. qualities of Aristotle, denoted a distinction similar
t The Atomists derived the qualitative attributes to, but not identical with, that in question-H.
of things from the quantitative – H. $ He distinguished nothing which had not been
* Still Democritus suppose certain real or ob more |''', discriminated by Aristotle and the
jective causes for the subject we differences of our Cartesians.
[242, 243)
CHAP. xvii.] OF THE OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION. 317
to be very just ; and if Mr Locke had in us, as they are in the snowball, I call
stopped here, he would have left the matter qualities; and, as they are sensations, or
very clear. But he thought it necessary to perceptions in our understandings, I call
introduce the theory of ideas, to explain the them ideas; which ideas, if I speak of
distinction between primary and secondary them sometimes as in the things themselves,
qualities, and by that means, as I think, I would be understood to mean those quali
perplexed and darkened it. ties in the objects which produce them in
When philosophers speak about ideas, we us.” [245]
are often at a loss to know what they mean These are the distinctions which Mr
by them, and may be apt to suspect that Locke thought convenient, in order to dis
they are mere fictions, that have no exist cover the nature of our ideas of the quali
ence. [244] They have told us, that, by the ties of matter the better, and to discourse
ideas which we have immediately from our of them intelligibly. I believe it will be
senses, they mean our sensations." These, difficult to find two other paragraphs in the
indeed, are real things, and not fictions. essay so unintelligible. Whether this is to be
We may, by accurate attention to them, imputed to the intractable nature of ideas,
know perfectly their nature; and, if philo or to an oscitancy of the author, with which
sophers would keep by this meaning of the he is very rarely chargeable, I leave the
word idea, when applied to the objects of reader to judge. There are, indeed, seve
sense, they would at least be more intelli ral other passages in the same chapter, in
gible. Let us hear how Mr Locke explains which a like obscurity appears; but I do
the nature of those ideas, when applied to not chuse to dwell upon them. The con
primary and secondary qualities, Book 2, clusion drawn by him from the whole is,
chap 8, § 7, tenth edition. “To discover that primary and secondary qualities are
the nature of our ideas the better, and to distinguished by this, that the ideas of the
discourse of them intelligibly, it will be con former are resemblances or copies of them,
venient to distinguish them, as they are but the ideas of the other are not resem
ideas, or perceptions in our minds, and as blances of them. Upon this doctrine, I beg
they are modifications of matter in the bodies leave to make two observations.
that cause such perceptions in us, that so First, Taking it for granted that, by the
we may not think (as perhaps usually is ideas of primary and secondary qualities,
done) that they are exactly the images and he means the sensations" they excite in us,
resemblances of something inherent in the I observe that it appears strange, that a
subject; most of those of sensation being, sensation should be the idea of a quality in
in the mind, no more the likeness of some body, to which it is acknowledged to bear
thing existing without us, than the names no resemblance. If the sensation of sound
that stand for them are the likeness of our be the idea of that vibration of the sound
ideas, which yet, upon hearing, they are apt ing body which occasions it, a surfeit may,
to excite in us.” for the same reason, be the idea of a feast.
This way of distinguishing a thing, first, A second observation is, that, when Mr
as what it is; and, secondly, as what it is Locke affirms, that the ideas of primary
not, is, I apprehend, a very extraordinary qualities—that is, the sensations" they raise
way of discovering its nature.t. And if ideas in us—are resemblances of those qualities,
are ideas or perceptions in our minds, and, he seems neither to have given due atten
at the same time, the modifications of mat tion to those sensations, nor to the nature
ter in the bodies that cause such percep of sensation in general. [246]
tions in us, it will be no easy matter to Let a man press his hand against a hard
discourse of them intelligibly. body, and let him attend to the sensation
The discovery of the nature of ideas is he feels, excluding from his thought every
carried on in the next section, in a manner thing external, even the body that is the
no less extraordinary. “Whatsoever the cause of his feeling. This abstraction, in
mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate deed, is difficult, and seems to have been
object of perception, thought, or under little, if at all practised. But it is not im
standing, that I call idea; and the power possible, and it is evidently the only way to
to produce any idea in our mind, I call understand the nature of the sensation. A
quality of the subject wherein that power due attention to this sensation will satisfy
is. Thus, a snowball having the power to
produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and • Here, as formerly, (vide supra, notes at pp. 208
round—the powers to produce those ideas 290, &c.,) Reid will insist on giving a more limited
ing to the term Sensation than Locke did, and
on criticising him by that imposed meaning. The
• The Cartesians, particularly Malebranche, dis Sensation of Locke was equivalent to the Sensation
tinguished the Idea and the Feeling (sentinent, sensa and Perception of Reid. It is to be observed that
tio. Of the primary qualities in their doctrine we Locke did not, like the Cartesians, distinguish the
have Ideas; of the secondary, only Feelings.-H. Idea (corresponding to Reid's Perception) from the
* This and some of the following strictures on Feeling (sentiment, sensitio) corresponding to Reid's
Locke are rather hypercritical.-H. Sensation.-H.
C244-246]
him that it is no more like hardness in a sensations and any quality, primary or
body than the sensation of sound is like secondary, of a substance that is supposed
vibration in the sounding body. to be insentient. Indeed, if it is granted
I know of no ideas but my conceptions; that the senses have no other office but to
and my idea of hardness in a body, is the furnish us with sensations, it will be found
conception of such a cohesion of its parts impossible to make any distinction between
as requires great force to displace them. I primary and secondary qualities, or even to
have both the conception and belief of this maintain the existence of a material world.
quality in the body, at the same time that From the account I have given of the
I have the sensation of pain, by pressing various revolutions in the opinions of philo
my hand against it. The sensation and sophers about primary and secondary qua
perception are closely conjoined by my lities, I think it appears that all the dark
constitution; but I am sure they have no ness and intricacy that thinking men have
similitude; I know no reason why the one found in this subject, and the errors they
should be called the idea of the other, which have fallen into, have been owing to the
does not lead us to call every natural effect difficulty of distinguishing clearly sensa
the idea of its cause. tion from perception—what we feel from
Neither did Mr Locke give due attention what we perceive.
to the nature of sensation in general, when The external senses have a double pro
he affirmed that the ideas of primary qua vince—to make us feel, and to make us
lities—that is, the sensations" excited perceive. They furnish us with a ''
by them—are resemblances of those quali of sensations, some pleasant, others painful,
ties. and others indifferent ; at the same time,
That there can be nothing like sensation they give us a conception and an invincible
in an insentient being, or like thought in belief of the existence of external objects.
an unthinking being, is self-evident, and This conception of external objects is the
has been shewn, to the conviction of all work of nature. The belief of their exist
men that think, by Bishop Berkeley; yet ence, which our senses give, is the work of
this was unknown to Mr Locke. It is an nature; so likewise is the sensation that
humbling consideration, that, in subjects of accompanies it. This conception and be
this kind, self-evident truths may be hid lief which nature produces by means of the
from the eyes of the most ingenious men. senses, we call perception." [248] The
But we have, withal, this consolation, that, feeling which goes along with the percep
when once discovered, they shine by their tion, we call sensation. The perception and
own light: and that light can no more be its corresponding sensation are produced at
put out. [247] the same time. In our experience we never
Upon the whole, Mr Locke, in making find them disjoined. Hence, we are led to
secondary qualities to be powers in bodies consider them as one thing, to give them
to excite certain sensations in us, has given one name, and to confound their different
a just and distinct analysis of what our attributes. It becomes very difficult to
senses discover concerning them; but, in separate them in thought, to attend to each
applying the theory of ideas to them and by itself, and to attribute nothing to it
to the primary qualities, he has been led to which belongs to the other.
say things that darken the subject, and that To do this, requires a degree of attention
will not bear examination. + to what passes in our own minds, and a
Bishop Berkeley having adopted the sen talent of distinguishing things that differ,
timents common to philosophers, concern which is not to be expected in the vulgar,
ing the ideas we have by our senses—to wit, and is even rarely found in philosophers;
that they arealisensations—saw more clearly so that the progress made in a just analysis
the necessary consequence of this doctrine; of the operations of our senses has been
which is, that there is no material world very slow. The hypothesis of ideas, so
no qualities primary or secondary – and, generally adopted, hath, as I apprehend,
consequently, no foundation for any dis greatly retarded this progress, and we might
tinction between them.: He exposed the hope for a quicker advance, if philosophers
absurdity of a resemblance between our could so far humble themselves as to be
lieve that, in every branch of the philosophy
* No; not sensations in Reid's meaning; but Per of nature, the productions of human fancy
cepts-the immediate objects we are conscious of in and conjecture will be found to be dross:
the cognitions of sense.-H.
* The Cartesians did not apply the term ideas to and that the only pure metal that will en
our sensations of the secondary qualities.-H. dure the test, is what is discovered b
t See above, p. 142, note *. The mere distinction patient observation and chaste induction.
of primary and secondary qualities, of perception and
sensation, is of no importance against Idealism, if the
!'" qualities as immediately perceived. (i.e. as * If the conception, like the belief, be subjective
nown to consciousness,) be only conceptions, no in perception, we have no refuge, from idealism in
# *cation.
"tite.--Hi.
of mind itself. See following this doctrine. See above, the notes at pp. 128-139,
183, &c., and Note C.-H.
[247,248]
CHAP. xvi.11.] of other objECTs of PERCEPTION. 319
paradoxes, will be found to be only an abuse

CHAPTER XVIII. of words.
We say that we feel the toothache, not
of other objects of PERCEPTION. that we perceive it. On the other hand, we
say that we perceive the colour of a body,
BasinEs primary and secondary qualities not that we feel it. Can any reason be given
of bodies, there are many other immediate for this difference of phraseology? [250]
objects of perception. Without pretending In answer to this question, I apprehend
to a complete enumeration, I think they that, both when we feel the toothache and
mostly fall under one or other of the follow when we see a coloured body, there is sensa
ing classes. 1st, Certain states or condi tion and perception conjoined. But, in the
tions of our own bodies. 2d, Mechanical toothache, the sensation being very painful,
powers or forces. 3d, Chemical powers. engrosses the attention; and therefore we
4th, Medical powers of virtues. 5th, Vege speak of it as if it were felt only, and not
table and animal powers. [249] perceived: whereas, in seeing a coloured
That we perceive certain disorders in our body, the sensation is indifferent, and draws
own bodies by means of uneasy sensations, no attention. The quality in the body,
which nature hath conjoined with them, will which we call its colour, is the only object
not be disputed. Of this kind are toothache, of attention; and therefore we speak of it
headache, gout, and every distemper and as if it were perceived and not felt. Though
hurt which we feel. The notions which all philosophers agree that, in seeing colour
our sense gives of these, have a strong there is sensation, it is not easy to persuade
analogy to our notions of secondary qualities. the vulgar that, in seeing a coloured body,
Both are similarly compounded, and may when the light is not too strong nor the
be similarly resolved, and they give light to eye inflamed, they have any sensation or
each other. feeling at all.
In the toothache, for instance, there is, There are some sensations, which, though
first, a painful feeling; and, secondly, a they are very often felt, are never attended
conception and belief of some disorder in to, nor reflected upon. We have no con
the tooth, which is believed to be the cause ception of them; and, therefore, in language
of the uneasy feeling." The first of these there is neither any name for them, nor
is a sensation, the second is perception; any form of speech that supposes their
for it includes a conception and belief of an existence. Such are the sensations of colour,
external object. But these two things, and of all primary qualities; and, therefore,
though of different natures, are so con those qualities are said to be perceived, but
stantly conjoined in our experience and in not to be felt. Taste and smell, and heat
our imagination, that we consider them as and cold, have sensations that are often
one. We give the same name to both; for agreeable or disagreeable, in such a degree
the toothache is the proper name of the as to draw our attention; and they are
pain we feel ; and it is the proper name of sometimes said to be felt, and sometimes to
the disorder in the tooth which causes that be perceived. When disorders of the body
pain. If it should be made a question occasion very acute pain, the uneasy sensa
whether the toothache be in the mind that ation engrosses the attention, and they are
‘eels it, or in the tooth that is affected, said to be felt, not to be perceived."
much might be said on both sides, while it There is another question relating to
is not observed that the word has two mean phraseology, which this subject suggests.
ings.' But a little reflection satisfies us, A man says, he feels pain in such a parti.
that the pain is in the mind, and the dis cular part of his body; in his toe for in
order in the tooth. If some philosopher stance. Now, reason assures us that pain
should pretend to have made the discovery being a sensation, can only be in the sen
that the toothache, the gout, the headache, tient being, as its subject—that is, in the
are only sensations in the mind, and that mind. And, though philosophers have dis
it is a vulgar error to conceive that they puted much about the place of the mind;
are distempers of the body, he might defend yet none of them ever placed it in the toe.t.
his system in the same manner as those
who affirm that there is no sound, nor * As already repeatedly observed, the objective
element (perception) and the subjective element
colour, nor taste in bodies, defend that para (feeling, sensation) are always in the inverse ratio
dox. But both these systems, like most of each other. This is a law of which Reid and the
philosophers were not aware.-H.
t Not in the toe exclusively. But, both in ancient
* There is no such perception, properly so called. and modern times, the opinion has been held that
The cognition is merely an inference from the the mind has as much a local presence in the toe as in
feeling; and its-object, at least, only some hypothe the head. I he doctrine, indeed, long generally main
tical representation of a really ignotum quid. Here tained was, that, in relation to the body, the soulis all
the subjective element preponderates so greatly as in the whole, and all in every part. On the question of
almost to extinguish the objective.-H. the seat of the soul, which has been marvellously
* This is not correct. See above, p. 205, col. b perplexed, I cannot enter. I shall only say, in gene
note *, and Note D.-H. ral, that the first condition of the possibility of an
[249, 250]
320 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essav 1:.
What shall we say then in this case? Do Cases sometimes happen, which give
our senses really deceive us, and make us occasion even to the vulgar to distinguish
believe a thing which our reason determines the painful sensation from the disorder
to be impossible 2 [251] I answer, first, which is the cause of it. A man who has had
That, when a man says he has pain in histoe, his leg cut off, many years after feels pain
he is perfectly understood, both by himself in a toe of that leg. The toe has now no
and those who hear him. This is all that existence; and he perceives easily, that the
he intends. He really feels what he and toe can neither be the place nor the subject
all men call a pain in the toe; and there is of the pain which he feels; yet it is the
no deception in the matter. Whether, same feeling he used to have from a hurt
therefore, there be any impropriety in the in the toe; and, if he did not know that his
phrase or not, is of no consequence in com leg was cut off, it would give him the same
mon life. It answers all the ends of speech, immediate conviction of some hurt or dis
both to the speaker and the hearers. order in the toe."
In all languages there are phrases which The same phenomenon may lead the
have a distinct meaning; while, at the philosopher, in all cases, to distinguish sens
same time, there may be something in the ation from perception. We say, that the
structure of them that disagrees with the man had a deceitful feeling, when he felt a
analogy of grammar or with the principles pain in his toe after the leg was cut off;
of philosophy. And the reason is, because and we have a true meaning in saying so.
language is not made either by gramma But, if we will speak accurately, our sensa
rians or philosophers. Thus, we speak of tions cannot be deceitful; they must be
feeling pain, as if pain was something dis what we feel them to be, and can be no
tinct from the feeling of it. We speak of thing else. Where, then, lies the deceit * I
pain coming and going, and removing from answer, it lies not in the sensation, which
one place to another. Such phrases are is real, but in the seeming perception be
meant by those who use them in a sense had of a disorder in his toe. This percep
that is neither obscure nor false. But the tion, which Nature had conjoined with the
philosopher puts them into his alembic, sensation, was, in this instance, fallacious.
reduces them to their first principles, draws The same reasoning may be applied to
out of them a sense that was never meant, every phenomenon that can, with propriety,
and so imagines that he has discovered an be called a deception of sense. As when
error of the vulgar. one who has the jaundice sees a body
I observe, secondly, That, when we con yellow, which is really white ;+ or when a
sider the sensation of pain by itself, with man sees an object double, because his
out any respect to its cause, we cannot say eyes are not both directed to it: in these,
with propriety, that the toe is either the and other like cases, the sensations we have
place or the subject of it. But it ought to are real, and the deception is only in the
be remembered, that, when we speak of pain perception which nature has annexed to
in the toe, the sensati is combined in our them.
thought, with the cause of it, which really is Nature has connected our perception of
in the toe. The cause and the effect are external objects with certain sensations.
combined in one complex notion, and the If the sensation is produced, the corre
same name serves for both. It is the busi sponding perception follows even when there
ness of the philosopher to analyse this com is no object, and in that case is apt to
plex notion, and to give different names to deceive us. [253] In like manner, nature
its different ingredients. He gives the has connected our sensations with certam
name of pain to the sensation only, and the impressions that are made upon the nerves
name of disorder to the unknown cause of and brain; and, when the impression is
it. Then it is evident that the disorder made, from whatever cause, the corre
only is in the toe, and that it would be an sponding sensation and perception imme
error to think that the pain is in it." But diately follow. Thus, in the man who feels
we ought not to ascribe this error to the pain in his toe after the leg is cut off, the
vulgar, who never made the distinction, and nerve that went to the toe, part of which was
who, under the name of pain, comprehend cut off with the leg, had the same impres
both the sensation and its cause.t. [252] sion made upon the remaining part, which,
in the natural state of his body, was caused
immediate, intuitive, or real perception of external
things, which our consciousness assures that we pos as much as the mind, or sentient principle, pervades
sess, is the immediate connection of the cognitive it. We just as much feel in the toe as we think in
rinciple with every part of the corporeal organism. in the head. If (but only if) the latter be a vitium
subreptionis, as Kant thinks, so is the former.-H.
* Only if the toe be considered as a mere material * This illustration is Des Cartes. It correct, it
mass, and apart from an animating principle.-H. only shews that the connection of mind with organ
t that the pain is where it is # is, however, the ization extends from the centre to the circumference
doctrine of common sense. We only feel in as much of the nervous system, and is not limited to any
as we have a body and a soul; we only feel pain in part-H.
the toe in as much as we have such a member, and in t The man does not see the white body at an- H.
[251-253]
cuAP. xviii.] OF OTHER OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION. 32!
by a hurt in the toe: and immediately this not properly act, but are acted upon: they
impression is followed by the sensation and only yield to an impression that is made
Perception which nature connected with it." upon them. It is common in language to
In like manner, if the same impressions express, by active verbs, many changes in
which are made at present upon my optic things wherein they are merely passive :
nerves by the objects before me, could be and this way of speaking is used chiefly
made in the dark, I apprehend that I when the cause of the change is not obvious
should have the same sensations and see to sense. Thus we say that a ship sails,
the same objects which I now see. The im when every man of common sense knows
Pressions and sensations would in such a case that she has no inherent power of motion,
be real, and the perception only fallacious." and is only driven by wind and tide. In
Let us next consider the notions which like manner, when we say that the planets
our senses give us of those attributes of gravitate towards the sun, we mean no more
bodies called powers. This is the more but that, by some unknown power, they are
necessary, because power seems to imply drawn or impelled in that direction.
some activity; yet we consider body as a What has been said of the power of gra
dead inactive thing, which does not act, but vitation may be applied to other mechanical
may be acted upon. powers, such as cohesion, magnetism, elec
Of the mechanical powers ascribed to tricity; and no less to chemical and medical
bodies, that which is called their vis insita powers. By all these, certain effects are
or inertia, may first be considered. By produced, upon the application of one body
this is meant, no more than that bodies to another. [255] Our senses discover the
never change their state of themselves, effect; but the power is latent. We know
either from rest to motion, or from motion there must be a cause of the effect, and we
to rest, or from one degree of velocity or formarelative notion of it from its effect; and
one direction to another. In order to very often the same name is used to signify
produce any such change, there must be the unknown cause, and the known effect.
some force impressed upon them; and the We ascribe to vegetables the powers of
cha 'ge produced is precisely proportioned drawing nourishment, growing and multi
to the force impressed, and in the direction plying their kind. Here likewise the effect
of that force. is manifest, but the cause is latent to sense.
That all bodies have this property, is a These powers, therefore, as well as all the
matter of fact, which we learn from daily other powers we ascribe to bodies, are un
observation, as well as from the most accu known causes of certain known effects. It
rate experiments... [254] Now, it seems is the business of philosophy to investigate
plain, that this does not imply any activity the nature of those powers as far as we are
in body, but rather the contrary. A power able; but our senses leave us in the dark.
in body to change its state, would much We may observe a great similarity in the
rather imply activity than its continuing in notions which our senses give us of second
the same state : so that, although this ary qualities, of the disorders we feel in our
property of bodies is called their vis insita, own bodies, and of the various powers of
or ris inertia, it implies no proper activity. bodies which we have enumerated. They
If we consider, next, the power of gravity, are all obscure and relative notions, being
it is a fact that all the bodies of our pla a conception of some unknown cause of a
netary system gravitate towards each other. known effect. Their names are, for the
This has been fully proved by the great most part, common to the effect and to
Newton. But this gravitation is not con its cause; and they are a proper subject
ceived by that philosopher to be a power of philosophical disquisition. They might,
inherent in bodies, which they exert of therefore, I think, not improperly be called
themselves, but a force impressed upon occult qualities.
them, to which they must necessarily yield. This name, indeed, is fallen into disgrace
Whether this force be impressed by some since the time of Des Cartes. It is said to
subtile aether, or whether it be impressed by have been used by the Peripatetics to cloak
the power of the Supreme Being, or of some their ignorance, and to stop all inquiry into
subordinate spiritual being, we do not know; the nature of those qualities called occult.
but all sound natural philosophy, particu Be it so. Let those answer for this abuse
larly that of Newton, supposes it to be an of the word who were guilty of it. To call a
impressed force, and not inherent in bodies.* thing occult, if we attend to the meaning
So that, when bodies gravitate, they do of the word, is rather modestly to confess
ignorance, than to cloak it. It is to point
* This is a doctrine which cannot be reconciled it out as a proper subject for the investiga
with that of an intuitive or objective perception. tion of philosophers, whose proper business
All here is subjective.-H. it is to better the condition of humanity, by
* That all activity supposes an immaterial or spi
ritual agent, is an ancient doctrine. It is, however, discovering what was before hid from human
only an hypothesis.-H. knowledge. [256.]
[254–256.] Y
322 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [EssAY II.
Were I therefore to make a division of But how do we know that they are qua
the qualities of bodies as they appear to our lities, and cannot exist without a subject?
senses, I would divide them first into those I confess I cannot explain how we know
that are manifest and those that are occult. that they cannot exist without a subject,
The manifest qualities are those which Mr any more than I can explain how we know
Locke calls primary; such as Extension, that they exist. We have the information
Figure, Divisibility, Motion, Hardness, of nature for their existence; and I think
Softness, Fluidity. The nature of these is we have the information of nature that they
manifest even to sense ; and the business of are qualities.
the philosopher with regard to them, is not The belief that figure, motion, and colour
to find out their nature, which is well known, are qualities, and require a subject, must
but to discover the effects produced by their either be a judgment of nature, or it must
various combinations; and, with regard to be discovered by reason, or it must be a
those of them which are not essential to prejudice that has no just foundation. There
matter, to discover their causes as far as are philosophers who maintain that it is a
he is able. mere prejudice; that a body is nothing but
The second class consists of occult quali a collection of what we call sensible quali
ties, which may be subdivided into various ties; and that they neither have nor need
kinds: as, first, the secondary qualities; any subject. This is the opinion of Bishop
secondly, the disorders we feel in our own Berkeley and Mr Hume; and they were
bodies; and, thirdly, all the qualities which led to it by finding that they had not in
we call powers of bodies, whether mechani their minds any idea of substance. 1258]
cal, chemical, medical, animal, or vegetable; It could neither be an idea of sensation nor
or if there be any other powers not compre of reflection.
hended under these heads. Of all these the But to me nothing seems more absurd
existence is manifest to sense, but the nature than that there should be extension without
is occult; and here the philosopher has an anything extended, or motion without any
ample field. thing moved; yet I cannot give reasons for
What is necessary for the conduct of our my opinion, because it seems to me self
animal life, the bountiful Author of Nature evident, and an immediate dictate of my
hath made manifest to all men. But there nature.
are many other choice secrets of Nature, And that it is the belief of all mankind,
the discovery of which enlarges the power appears in the structure of all languages;
and exalts the state of man. These are left in which we find adjective nouns used to
to be discovered by the proper use of our express sensible qualities. It is well known
rational powers. They are hid, not that that every adjective in language must belong
they may be always concealed from human to some substantive expressed or under
knowledge, but that we may be excited to stood—that is, every quality must belong
search for them. This is the proper busi to some subject.
ness of a philosopher, and it is the glory of Sensible qualities make so great a part of
a man, and the best reward of his labour, the furniture of our minds, their kinds are
to discover what Nature has thus con so many, and their number so great, that,
cealed. [257] if prejudice, and not nature, teach us to
ascribe them all to a subject, it must have
a great work to perform, which cannot be
CHAPTER XIX. accomplished in a short time, nor carried
on to the same pitch in every individual.
of MATTER AND or sPACE. We should find not individuals only, but
nations and ages, differing from each other
THE objects of sense we have hitherto in the progress which this prejudice had
considered are qualities. But qualities must made in their sentiments; but we find no
have a subject. We give the names of such difference among men. What one man
matter, material substance, and body, to the accounts a quality, all men do, and ever did.
subject of sensible qualities; and it may be It seems, therefore, to be a judgment of
asked what this matter is. nature, that the things immediately per
I perceive in a billiard ball, figure, colour, ceived are qualities, which must belong to
and motion ; but the ball is not figure, nor a subject; and all the information that our
is it colour, nor motion, nor all these taken senses give us about this subject, is, that
together; it is something that has figure, it is that to which such qualities belong.
and colour, and motion. This is a dictate From this it is evident, that our notion of
of nature, and the belief of all mankind. body or matter, as distinguished from its
As to the nature of this something, I am qualities, is a relative notion;" and I am
afraid we can give little account of it, but
that it has the qualities which our senses * That is-our notion of absolute body is relative.
discover. This is incorrectly expressed. We can know, we can
[257,258]
-
CHAP. xix. } OF MATTER AND OF SPACE. 323
afraid it must always be obscure until men cannot perceive any division of a body.
have other faculties. [259] The parts become too small to be perceived
The philosopher, in this, seems to have by our senses; but we cannot believe that
no advantage above the vulgar; for, as it becomes then incapable of being farther
they perceive colour, and figure, and motion divided, or that such division would make
by their senses as well he does, and both it not to be a body. [260]
are equally certain that there is a subject We carry on the division and subdivision
of those qualities, so the notions which in our thought far beyond the reach of our
both have of this subject are equally ob senses, and we can find no end to it; nay,
scure. When the philosopher calls it a I think we plainly discern that there can
substratum, and a subject of inhesion, those be no limit beyond which the division can
learned words convey no meaning but what not be carried.
every man understands and expresses, by For, if there be any limit to this division,
saying, in common language, that it is a one of two things must necessarily happen:
thing extended, and solid, and movable. either we have come by division to a body
The relation which sensible qualities bear which is extended, but has no parts, and is
to their subject—that is, to body—is not, absolutely indivisible ; or this body is divi
however, so dark but that it is easily dis sible, but, as soon as it is divided, it becomes
tinguished from all other relations. Every no body. Both these positions seem to me
man can distinguish it from the relation absurd, and one or the other is the neces
of an effect to its cause; of a mean to its sary consequence of supposing a limit to the
end; or of a sign to the thing signified by divisibility of matter.
it. On the other hand, if it is admitted that
I think it requires some ripeness of un the divisibility of matter has no limit, it
derstanding to distinguish the qualities of a will follow that no body can be called one
body from the body. Perhaps this dis individual substance. You may as well
tinction is not made by brutes, nor by in call it two, or twenty, or two hundred. For,
fants; and if any one thinks that this dis when it is divided into parts, every part is
tinction is not made by our senses, but by a being or substance distinct from all the
some other power of the mind, I will not other parts, and was so even before the di
dispute this point, provided it be granted vision. Any one part may continue to
that men, when their faculties are ripe, exist, though all the other parts were an
have a natural conviction that sensible qua ihilated.
lities cannot exist by themselves without There is, indeed, a principle long re
some subject to which they belong. ceived as an axiom in metaphysics, which
I think, indeed, that some of the determ I cannot reconcile to the divisibility of mat
Inations we form concerning matter can ter; it is, that every being is one, omne ens
not be deduced solely from the testimony est unum. By which, I suppose, is meant,
of sense, but must be referred to some other that everything that exists must either be
source. one indivisible being, or composed of a de
There seems to be nothing more evident terminate number of indivisible beings.
than that all bodies must consist of parts; Thus, an army may be divided into regi
and that every part of a body is a body, and ments, a regiment into companies, and a
a distinct being, which may exist without the company into men. But here the division
other parts; and yet I apprehend this con has its limit; for you cannot divide a man
clusion is not deduced solely from the testi without destroying him, because he is an
mony of sense: for, besides that it is a individual; and everything, according to
necessary truth, and, therefore, no object this axiom, must be an individual, or made
of sense,” there is a limit beyond which we up of individuals. [261]
That this axiom will hold with regard to
conceive, only what is relative. Our knowledge of an army, and with regard to many other
qualities or phaenomena is necessarily relative; for
these exist only as they exist in relation to our facul things, must be granted; but I require the
tics. The knowledge, or even the conception, of a evidence of its being applicable to all beings
substance in itself, and apart from any qualities in whatsoever.
relation to, and therefore cognisable or conceivable
by, our minds, involves a contradiction. Of such we Leibnitz, conceiving that all beings must
can form only a negative notion; that is, we can
merely conceive it as inconceivable. But to call this ne
have this metaphysical unity, was by this
gative notion a relative notion, is wrong; 18, because led to maintain that matter, and, indeed,
all our (positive) motions are relative, and 2*, because the whole universe, is made up of monads
this is itself a negative notion-i. e., no notion at all that is, simple and indivisible substances.
simply because there is no relation. The same im
proper application of the term relative was also made Perhaps, the same apprehension might
by Reid when speaking of the secondary qualities.-H. lead Boscovich into his hypothesis, which
* It is creditable to Reid that he perceived that seems much more ingenious—to wit, that
the quality of necessity is the criterion which distin
guishes native from adventitious notions or judg
ments. He did not, however, always make the proper plying it to the phaenomena. In none has Kant been
use of it. Leibnitz has the honour of first explicitly #" successful than in this under consideration.
enouncing this criterion, and Kant of first fully ap
Y 2
[259-261]
matter is composed of a definite number of not to enter, at first, into the mind, until it
mathematical points, endowed with certain is introduced by the proper objects of sense,
powers of attraction and repulsion. yet, being once introduced, it remains in
The divisibility of matter without any our conception and belief, though the objects
limit, seems to me more tenable than either which introduced it be removed. We see
of these hypotheses; nor do I lay much no absurdity in supposing a body to be an
stress upon the metaphysical axiom, con nihilated; but the space that contained it
sidering its origin. Metaphysicians thought remains; and, to suppose that annihilated,
proper to make the attributes common to seems to be absurd. It is so much allied
all beings the subject of a science. It to nothing or emptiness, that it seems in
must be a matter of some difficulty to find capable of annihilation or of creation."
out such attributes; and, after racking Space not only retains a firm hold of our
their invention, they have specified three– belief, even when we suppose all the objects
to wit, Unity, Verity, and Goodness; and that introduced it to be annihilated, but it
these, I suppose, have been invented to swells to immensity. We can set no limits
make a number, rather than from any clear to it, either of extent or of duration. Hence
evidence of their being universal. we call it immense, eternal, immovable,
There are other determinations concern and indestructible. But it is only an im
ing matter, which, I think, are not solely mense, eternal, immovable, and indestruc
founded upon the testimony of sense: such tible void or emptiness. Perhaps we may
as, that it is impossible that two bodies apply to it what the Peripatetics said of
‘should occupy the same place at the same their first matter, that, whatever it is, it is
time; or that the same body should be in potentially only, not actually. [263]
different places at the same time; or that When we consider parts of space that
a body can be moved from one place to have measure and figure, there is nothing
another, without passing through the inter we understand better, nothing about which
mediate places, either in a straight course, we can reason so clearly, and to so great
or by some circuit. These appear to be extent. Extension and figure are circum
necessary truths, and therefore cannot be scribed parts of space, and are the object of
conclusions of our senses; for our senses geometry, a science in which human reason
testify only what is, and not what must ne has the most ample field, and can go deeper,
cessarily be." . [262] and with more certainty, than in any other.
We are next to consider our motion of But, when we attempt to comprehend the
Space. It may be observed that, although whole of space, and to trace it to its origin,
space be not perceived by any of our senses we lose ourselves in the search. The pro
when all matter is removed, yet, when we found speculations of ingenious men upon
perceive any of the primary qualities, space this subject differ so widely as may lead
presents itself as a necessary concomitant;+ us to suspect that the line of human under
for there can neither be extension normo standing is too short to reach the bottom
tion, nor figure nor division, nor cohesion of it.
of parts, without space. Bishop Berkeley, I think, was the first
There are only two of our senses by which who observed that the extension, figure, and
the notion of space enters into the mind– space, of which we speak in common lan
to wit, touch and sight. If we suppose a guage, and of which geometry treats, are
man to have neither of these senses, I do originally perceived by the sense of touch
not see how he could ever have any concep only; but that there is a notion of exten
tion of space.: Supposing him to have sion, figure, and space, which may be got
both, until he sees or feels other objects, by sight, without any aid from touch. To
he can have no notion of space. It has distinguish these, he calls the first tangible
neither colour nor figure to make it an extension, tangible figure, and tangible
object of sight: it has no tangible quality space. The last he calls visible.
to make it an object of touch. But other As I think this distinction very import
objects of sight and touch carry the notion ant in the philosophy of our senses, I shall
of space along with them; and not the adopt the names used by the inventor to
notion only, but the belief of it; for a body express it ; remembering what has been
could not exist if there was no space to con already observed—that space, whether tan
tain it. It could not move if there was gible or visible, is not so properly an object
no space. Its situation, its distance, and of sense, as a necessary concomitant of the
every relation it has to other bodies, suppose objects both of sight and touch."
space.
But, though the notion of space seems * His doctrine of space is an example of Reid's
imperfect application of the criterion of necessity.
*See last note-ti. See p. 123, note t. It seemingly required but little to
t See above, p. 124, note +.-H. rise to Kant's view of the conception of space, as an
* Wide supra, p. 123, col, b, notes *, +; and p. a priori or native form of thought.-H.
l * col b, note*.-H. i t See above, p. 124, note t.-H.
[262, 263]
CHAP. xix.] OF MATTER AND OF SPACE.
The reader may likewise be pleased to Berkeley shews to be between the visible
attend to this, that, when I use the names of £ and magnitude of objects, and their
tangible and visible space, I do not mean to tangible figure and magnitude, is in some
adopt Bishop Berkeley's opinion, so far as respects very similar to that which we have
to think that they are really different things, observed between our sensations and the
and altogether unlike. I take them to be primary qualities with which they are con
different conceptions of the same thing; nected. No sooner is the sensation felt,
the one very partial, and the other more than immediately we have the conception
complete; but both distinct and just, as far and belief of the corresponding quality.
as they reach. [204] We give no attention to the sensation; it
Thus, when I see a spire at a very great has not a name; and it is difficult to per
distance, it seems like the point of a bodkin; suade us that there was any such thing.
there appears no vane at the top, no angles. In like manner, no sooner is the visible
But, when I view the same object at a small figure and magnitude of an object seen, than
distance, I see a huge pyramid of several immediately we have the conception and
angles, with a vane on the top. Neither belief of the corresponding tangible figure
of these appearances is fallacious. Each of and magnitude. We give no attention to
them is what it ought to be, and what it the visible figure and magnitude. It is
must be, from such an object seen at such immediately forgot, as if it had never been
different distances. These different appear perceived; and it has no name in common
auces of the same object may serve to illuslanguage ; and, indeed, until Berkeley
trate the different conceptions of space, pointed it out as a subject of speculation,
according as they are drawn from the in and gave it a name, it had none among
formation of sight alone, or as they are philosophers, excepting in one instance,
drawn from the additional information of relating to the heavenly bodies, which are
touch. beyond the reach of touch. With regard
Our sight alone, unaided by touch, gives to them, what Berkeley calls visible magni
a very partial notion of space, but yet a tude was, by astronomers, cased apparent
distinct one. When it is considered accord magnitude.
ing to this partial notion, I call it visible There is surely an apparent magnitude,
space. The sense of touch gives a much and an apparent figure of terrestrial objects,
more complete notion of space; and, when as well as of celestial ; and this is what
it is considered according to this notion, I Berkeley calls their visible figure and mag
call it tangible space. Perhaps there may nitude. But this was never made an object
beintelligent beings of a higher order, whose of thought among philosophers, until that
conceptions of space are much more com author gave it a name, and observed the
plete than those we have from both senses. correspondence and connection between it
Another sense added to those of sight and and tangible magnitude and figure, and how
touch, might, for what I know, give us con the mind gets the habit of passing so in
ceptions of space as different from those we stantaneously from the visible figure as a
can now attain as tangible space is from sign to the tangible figure as the thing
visible, and might resolve many knotty signified by it, that the first is perfectly
points concerning it, which, from the imper forgot as if it had never been perceived.
fection of our faculties, we cannot, by any [266]
labour, untie. Visible figure, extension, and space, may
Berkeley acknowledges that there is an be made a subject of mathematical specula
exact correspondence between the visible tion as well as the tangible. In the visible,
figure and magnitude of objects, and the we find two dimensions only; in the tan
tangible; and that every modification of gible, three. In the one, magnitude is mea
the one has a modification of the other cor sured by angles; in the other, by lines.
responding. He acknowledges, likewise, Every part of visible space bears some pro
that Nature has established such a con portion to the whole; but tangible space
nection between the visible figure and mag being immense, any part of it bears no pro
nitude of an object, and the tangible, that portion to the whole.
we learn by experience to know the tan Such differences in their properties led
gible figure and magnitude from the visible. Bishop Berkeley to think that visible and
And, having been accustomed to do so from tangible magnitude and figure are things
infancy, we get the habit of doing it with totally different and dissimilar, and cannot
such facility and quickness that we think both belong to the same object.
we see the tangible figure, magnitude, and And upon this dissimilitude is grounded
distance of bodies, when, in reality, we only one of the strongest arguments by which his
collect those tangible qualities from the system is supported. For it may be said,
corresponding visible qualities, which are if there be external objects which have a
natural signs of them. [265] real extension and figure, it must be either
The correspondence and connection which tangible extension and figure, or visible, or
£264-266]
both." The last appears absurd; nor was

it ever maintained by any man, that the CHAPTER XX.
same object has two kinds of extension and
figure totally dissimilar. There is then only of THE Ev1DENCE of SENSE, AND of BELIEF
one of the two really in the object ; and the IN GENERAL
other must be ideal. But no reason can be
assigned why the perceptions of one sense THE intention of nature in the powers
should be real, while those of another are which we call the external senses, is evident.
only ideal: and he who is persuaded that They are intended to give us that informa
the objects of sight are ideas only, has tion of external objects which the Supreme
equal reason to believe so of the objects of Being saw to be proper for us in our pre
touch. sent state; and they give to all mankind
This argument, however, loses all its the information necessary for life, without
force, if it be true, as was formerly hinted, reasoning, without any art or investigation
that visible figure and extension are only a on our part. [268]
partial conception, and the tangible figure The most uninstructed peasant has as
and extension a more complete conception distinct a conception and as firm a belief
of that figure and extension which is really of the immediate objects of his senses, as
in the object.'t [267] the greatest philosopher; and with this he
It has been proved very fully by Bishop rests satisfied, giving himself no concern
Berkeley, that sight alone, without any aid how he came by this conception and belief.
from the informations of touch, gives us no But the philosopher is impatient to know
perception, nor even conception of the dis how his conception of external objects, and
tance of any object from the eye. But he his belief of their existence, is produced.
was not aware that this very principle over This, I am afraid, is hid in impenetrable
turns the argument for his system, taken darkness. But where there is no know
from the difference between visible and ledge, there is the more room for conjecture,
tangible extension and figure. For, sup and of this, philosophers have always been
posing external objects to exist, and to have very liberal.
that tangible extension and figure which we The dark eave and shadows of Plato," the
perceive, it follows demonstrably, from the species of Aristotle,f the films of Epicurus,
principle now mentioned, that their visible and the ideas and impressions of modern
extension and figure must be just what we philosophers, are the productions of human
see it to be. fancy, successively invented to satisfy the
The rules of perspective, and of the pro eager desire of knowing how we perceive
jection of the sphere, which is a branch of external objects; but they are all deficient
perspective, are demonstrable. They sup in the two essential characters of a true and
pose the existence of external objects, which philosophical account of the phenomenon:
have a tangible extension and figure; and, for we neither have any evidence of their
upon that supposition, they demonstrate existence, nor, if they did exist, can it be
what must be the visible extension and figure shewn how they would produce perception.
of such objects, when placed in such a posi It was before observed, that there are
tion and at such a distance. two ingredients in this operation of percep
Hence, it is evident that the visible figure tion : first, the conception or notion of the
and extension of objects is so far from being object; and, secondly, the belief of its pre
incompatible with the tangible, that the first sent existence. Both are unaccountable.
is a necessary consequence from the last in That we can assign no adequate cause of
beings that see as we do. The correspond our first conceptions of things, I think, is
ence between them is not arbitrary, like that now acknowledged by the most enlightened
between words and the thing they signify, as philosophers. We know that such is our
Berkeley thought; but it results necessarily constitution, that in certain circumstances
from the nature of the two senses; and this we have certain conceptions; but how they
correspondence being always found in ex are produced we know no more than how
perience to be exactly what the rules of per we ourselves were produced. [269]
spective shew that it ought to be if the senses When we have got the conception of ex
give true information, is an argument of the ternal objects by our senses, we can ana
truth of both. lyse them in our thought into their sim
ple ingredients; and we can compound
* Or neither. And this omitted supposition is the those ingredients into various new forms,
true. For neither sight nor touch give us full and
accurate information in regard to the real extension which the senses never presented. But it is
and figure of objects. See above p. 126, notes *;
and # 303, col. b, note *.-H.
t if tangible figure and extension be only “a more * See § 262, col. b, note *.-H.
complete conception,” &c., it cannot be a cognition * See Note M.-H.
of real figure and extension.-H. + By ideas, as repeatedly noticed, Reid under
stands always certain representative entities distinct
from the knowing mind,
[267–2681
cHAP. xx.] OF THE EVIDENCE OF SENSE, &c. 327
beyond the power of human imagination to Belief, assent, conviction, are words
form any conception, whose simple ingre which I do not think admit of logical defin
dients have not been furnished by nature in a ition, because the operation of mind sig
manner unaccountable to our understanding. nified by them is perfectly simple, and of
We have an immediate conception of the its own kind. Nor do they need to be de
operations of our own minds, joined with a fined, because they are common words, and
a belief of their existence; and this we call well understood.
consciousness." But this is only giving a Belief must have an object. For he
name to this source of our knowledge. It that believes must believe something; and
is not a discovery of its cause. In like man that which he believes, is called the object
her, we have, by our external senses, a of his belief. Of this object of his belief,
conception of external objects, joined with a he must have some conception, clear or ob
belief of their existence; and this we call scure; for, although there may be the most
perception. But this is only giving a name clear and distinct conception of an object
to another source of our knowledge, without without any belief of its existence, there
discovering its cause. can be no belief without conception."
We know that, when certain impressions Belief is always expressed in language by
are made upon our organs, nerves, and a proposition, wherein something is affirmed
brain, certain corresponding sensations are or denied. This is the form of speech
felt, and certain objects are both conceived which in all languages is appropriated to
and believed to exist. But in this train that purpose, and without belief there could
of operations nature works in the dark. be neither affirmation nor denial, nor should
We can neither discover the cause of any we have any form of words to express
one of them, uor any necessary connection either. Belief admits of all degrees, from
of one with another; and, whether they the slightest suspicion to the fullest assur
are connected by any necessary tie, or only ance. These things are so evident to
conjoined in our constitution by the will of every man that reflects, that it would be
heaven, we know not." abusing the reader's patience to dwell upon
That any kind of impression upon a body them.
should be the efficient cause of sensation, ap I proceed to observe that there are many
pears very absurd. Nor can we perceive operations of mind in which, when we
any necessary connection between sensation analyse them as far as we are able, we find
and the conception and belief of an external belief to be an essential ingredient. A man
object. For anything we can discover, we cannot be conscious of his own thoughts,
might have been so framed as to have all without believing that he thinks. He can
the sensations we now have by our senses, not perceive an object of sense, without be
without any impressions upon our organs, lieving that it exists.t. He cannot distinctly
and without any conception of any external remember a past event, without believing
object. For anything we know, we might that it did exist. Belief therefore is an
have been so made as to perceive external ingredient in consciousness, in perception,
objects, without any impressions on bodily and in remembrance. [271]
organs, and without any of those sensa Not only in most of our intellectual oper
tions which invariably accompany percep ations, but in many of the active princi
tion in our present frame. [270] ples of the human mind, belief enters as an
If our conception of external objects be ingredient. Joy and sorrow, hope and
unaccountable, the conviction and belief of fear, imply a belief of good or ill, either pre
their existence, which we get by our senses, sent or in expectation. Esteem, gratitude,
is no less so.: pity, and resentment, imply a belief of cer
tain qualities in their objects. In every
* Here consciousness is made to consist in concep action that is done for an end, there must
tion. But, as Reid could hardly mean that con be a belief of its tendency to that end. So
sciousness conceives (i.e., represents) the operations
about which it is conversant, and is not intuitively large a share has belief in our intellectual
cognisant of them, it would seem that he occasionally
employs conception for knowledge... This is of im
portance in explaining favourably Reid's use of the knowledge. By this, however, I do not, of course,
word Conception in relation to Perception. But then, mean to say that knowledge is not in itself marvel
how vague and vacillating is his language!-H. lous and unaccountable. This statement of Reid
i See p. 257, col, b, note *.-H. again favours the opinion that his doctrine of percep
# If an immediate knowledge of external things tion is not really immediate.-H.
that is, a consciousness of the qualities of the non * is #" here equivalent to knowledge or to
ego-be admitted, the Lelief of their existence follows thought "-H.
of course. On this supposition, therefore, such a t Mr Stewart (Elem. J., ch. iii., p. 146, and Essays,
belief would not be unaccountable; for it would be II., ch. ii., p. 79, sq.) proposes a supplement to this
accounted for by the fact of the knowledge in which doctrine of iteid, in order to explain why we believe
it would necessarily be contained. Our belief, in this in the existence of the qualities of external objects
case, of the existence of external objects, would not when they are not the objects of our perception.
be more inexplicable than our belier that 2+2 = 4. this belief he holds to be the result of experience, in
in both cases it would be sufficient to say, we believe combination with an original principle of our consti
because we know; for belief is only unarcountable tution, whereby we are determined to believe in the
when it is not the consequent or concomitant of permanence of the laws of nature-H
[270,271]
operations, in our active principles, and in kinds of evidence above-mentioned, and,
our actions themselves, that, as faith in perhaps, of some others, which it is unne
things divine is represented as the main cessary here to enumerate, yet I am not
spring in the life of a Christian, so belief in able to find any common nature to which
general is the main spring in the life of aman. they may all be reduced. They seem to
That men often believe what there is no me to agree only in this, that they are all
just ground to believe, and thereby are led fitted by Nature to produce belief in the
into hurtful errors, is too evident to be human mind, some of them in the highest
denied. And, on the other hand, that there degree, which we call certainty, others in
are just grounds of belief can as little be |-various degrees according to circumstances.
doubted by any man who is not a perfect I shall take it for granted that the evi
sceptic. dence of sense, when the proper circum
We give the name of evidence to what stances concur, is good evidence, and a just
ever is a ground of belief. To believe with ground of belief. My intention in this
out evidence is a weakness which every place is only to compare it with the other
man is concerned to avoid, and which every kinds that have been mentioned, that we
man wishes to avoid. Nor is it in a man's may judge whether it be reducible to any of
power to believe anything longer than he them, or of a nature peculiar to itself. [273]
thinks he has evidence. First, It seems to be quite different from
What this evidence is, is more easily felt the evidence of reasoning. All good evi
than described. Those who never reflected dence is commonly called reasonable evi
upon its nature, feel its influence in govern dence, and very justly, because it ought to
ing their belief. It is the business of the govern our belief as reasonable creatures.
logician to explain its nature, and to dis And, according to this meaning, I think the
tinguish its various kinds and degrees; but evidence of sense no less reasonable than
every man of understanding can judge of it, that of demonstration." If Nature give
and commonly judges right, when the evi us information of things that concern us,
dence is fairly laid before him, and his by other means than by reasoning, reason
mind is free from prejudice. A man who itself will direct us to receive that inform
knows nothing of the theory of vision may ation with thankfulness, and to make the
have a good eye; and a man who never best use of it.
speculated about evidence in the abstract But, when we speak of the evidence of
may have a good judgment. [272] reasoning as a particular kind of evidence,
The common occasions of life lead us to it means the evidence of propositions that
distinguish evidence into different kinds, to are inferred by reasoning, from propositions
which we give names that are well under already known and believed. Thus, the
stood; such as the evidence of sense, the evidence of the fifth proposition of the
evidence of memory, the evidence of con first book of Euclid's Elements consists in
sciousness, the evidence of testimony, the this, That it is shewn to be the necessary
evidence of axioms, the evidence of reason consequence of the axioms, and of the pre
ing. All men of common understanding ceding propositions. In all reasoning, there
agree that each of these kinds of evidence must be one or more premises, and a con
may afford just ground of belief, and they clusion drawn from them. And the pre
agree very generally in the circumstances mises are called the reason why we must
that strengthen or weaken them. believe the conclusion which we see to fol
Philosophers have endeavoured, by ana low from them.
lysing the different sorts of evidence, to That the evidence of sense is of a differ
2nd out some common nature wherein they ent kind, needs little proof. No man seeks
all agree, and thereby to reduce them all a reason for believing what he sees or feels;
to one. This was the aim of the school and, if he did, it would be difficult to find
"men in their intricate disputes about the one. But, though he can give no reason
criterion of truth. Des Cartes placed this for believing his senses, his belief remains
criterion of truth in clear and distinct per as firm as if it were grounded on demon
ception, and laid it down as a maxim, that stration.
whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive Many eminent philosophers, thinking it
to be true, is true; but it is difficult to unreasonable to believe when they could not
know what he understands by clear and shew a reason, have laboured to furnish us
distinct perception in this maxim. Mr with reasons for believing our senses; but
Locke placed it in a perception of the agree their reasons are very insufficient, and
ment or disagreement of our ideas, which will not bear examination. Other philoso
perception is immediate in intuitive know
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ledge, and by the intervention of other ideas *** -A totle. Iterizu, a 31' rā, rare, 31&
in reasoning. *** ***, **** **A** *āAxe, reit *****
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t'link, a distinct notion of the different *your tax ****** **** :*
frt. "H sigüzzis iris-zays ixi. 38, aa...-Id.
[272,273]
CHAP. xx.] OF THE EVIDENCE OF SENSE, &c. 329
phers have shewn very clearly the fallacy testifies; but we have no such authority for
of these reasons, and have, as they imagine, believing our senses.
discovered invincible reasons against this be Shall we say, then, that this belief is the
lief; but they have never been able either inspiration of the Almighty ? I think this
to shake it in themselves, or to convince may be said in a good sense; for I take it
others. [274] The statesman continues to to be the immediate effect of our constitu
plod, the soldier to fight, and the merchant tion, which is the work of the Almighty.
to export and import, without being in the But, if inspiration be understood to imply
least moved by the demonstrations that a persuasion of its coming from God, our
have been offered of the non-existence of belief of the objects of sense is not inspira
those things about which they are so seri tion; for a man would believe his senses
ously employed. And a man may as soon, though he had no notion of a Deity. He
by reasoning, pull the moon out of her orbit, who is persuaded that he is the workman
as destroy the belief of the objects of sense. ship of God, and that it is a part of his
Shall we say, then, that the evidence constitution to believe his senses, may
of sense is the same with that of axioms, think that a good reason to confirm his
or self-evident truths 2 I answer, First, belief. But he had the belief before he could
That, all modern philosophers seem to agree give this or any other reason for it.
that the existence of the objects of sense If we compare the evidence of sense with
is not self-evident, because some of them that of memory, we find a great resem
have endeavoured to prove it by subtle rea blance, but still some difference. I remem
soning, others to refute it. Neither of ber distinctly to have dined yesterday with
these can consider it as self-evident. such a company. What is the meaning of
Secondly, I would observe that the word this? It is, that I have a distinct con
ariom is taken by philosophers in such a ception and firm belief of this past event;
sense as that the existence of the objects not by reasoning, not by testimony, but
of sense cannot, with propriety, be called immediately from my constitution. And I
an axiom. They give the name of axiom give the name of memory to that part of
only to self-evident truths, that are neces my constitution by which I have this kind
sary, and are not limited to time and place, of conviction of past events. [276]
but must be true at all times and in all I see a chair on my right hand. What
places. The truths attested by our senses is the meaning of this? It is, that I have,
are not of this kind; they are contingent, by my constitution, a distinct conception
and limited to time and place. and firm belief of the present existence of
Thus, that one is the half of two, is an the chair in such a place and in such a
axiom. It is equally true at all times and position; and I give the name of seeing to
in all places. We perceive, by attending that part of my constitution by which I
to the proposition itself, that it cannot but have this immediate conviction. The two
be true; and, therefore, it is called an eter operations agree in the immediate convic
mal, necessary, and immutable truth. That tion which they give. They agree in this
also, that the things believed are not
there is at present a chair on my right hand,
and another on my left, is a truth attested necessary, but contingent, and limited to
by my senses; but it is not necessary, nor time and place. But they differ in two
eternal, nor immutable. It may not be respects:–First, That memory has some
true next minute; and, therefore, to call itthing for its object that did exist in time
an axiom would, I apprehend, be to deviate past; but the object of sight, and of all the
from the common use of the word. [275] senses, must be something which exists at
Thirdly, If the word axiom be put to present;—and, Secondly, That I see by my
signify every truth which is known imme eyes, and only when they are directed to
diately, without being deduced from any the object, and when it is illuminated. But
antecedent truth, then the existence of the my memory is not limited by any bodily
objects of sense may be called an axiom: organ that I know, nor by light and dark
for my senses give me as immediate con ness, though it has its limitations of another
viction of what they testify, as my under kind."
standing gives of what is commonly called These differences are obvious to all men,
an axiom. and very reasonably lead them to consider
There is, no doubt, an analogy between seeing and remembering as operations spe
the evidence of sense and the evidence of cifically different. But the nature of the
testimony. Hence, we find, in all lan evidence they give, has a great resemblance.
guages, the analogical expressions of the
testimony of sense, of giving credit to our * There is a more important difference than these
senses, and the like. But there is a real omitted. In memory, we cannot possibly be con
difference between the two, as well as a scious or immediately cognisant of any object beyond
similitude. In believing upon testimony, the modifications of the ego itself. In perception, (if
an immediate perception be allowed,) we must -
we rely upon the authority of a person who conscious, or immediately cognisant, of some phaeno
menon of the non-ego.-H.
£274–276]
A like difference and a like resemblance It is no wonder that the pride of philo
there is between the evidence of sense and sophy should lead some to invent vain
that of consciousness, which I leave the theories in order to account for this know
reader to trace. ledge; and others, who see this to be im
As to the opinion that evidence consists practicable, to spurn at a knowledge they
in a perception of the agreement or dis cannot account for, and vainly attempt to
agreement of ideas, we may have occasion throw it off as a reproach to their under
to consider it more particularly in another standing. But the wise and the humble
place. Here I only observe, that, when will receive it as the gift of Heaven, and
taken in the most favourable sense, it may endeavour to make the best use of it.
be applied with propriety to the evidence of
reasoning, and to the evidence of some
axioms. But I cannot see how, in any CHAPTER XXI.
sense, it can be applied to the evidence of
consciousness, to the evidence of memory, OF THE IMPROVEMENT of The sksses,
or to that of the senses.
When I compare the different kinds of Our senses may be considered in two
evidence above-mentioned, I confess, after views: first, As they afford us agreeable
all, that the evidence of reasoning, and that sensations, or subject us to such as are dis
of some necessary and self-evident truths, agreeable; and, secondly, As they give us
seems to be the least mysterious and the information of things that concern us.
most perfectly comprehended; and there In the first view, they neither require nor
fore I do not think it strange that philoso admit of improvement. Both the painful
phers should have endeavoured to reduce all and the agreeable sensations of our external
kinds of evidence to these. [277] senses are given by nature for certain ends;
When I see a proposition to be self-evi and they are given in that degree which is
dent and necessary, and that the subject is the most proper for their end. By dimin
plainlyincluded in the predicate, there seems ishing or increasing them, we should not
to be nothing more that I can desire in order mend, but mar the work of Nature.
to understand why I believe it. And when Bodily pains are indications of some dis
I see a consequence that necessarily follows order or hurt of the body, and admonitions
from one or more self-evident propositions, I to use the best means in our power to pre
want nothing more with regard to my belief vent or remove their causes. As far as this
of that consequence. The light of truth so can be done by temperance, exercise, regi
fills my mind in these cases, that I can men, or the skill of the physician, every man
neither conceive nor desire anything more hath sufficient inducement to do it.
satisfying. When pain cannot be prevented or re
On the other hand, when I remember dis moved, it is greatly alleviated by patience
tinctly a past event, or see an object before and fortitude of mind. While the mind is
my eyes, this commands my belief no less superior to pain, the man is not unhappy,
than an axiom. But when, as a philosopher, though he may be exercised. It leaves no
I reflect upon this belief, and want to trace it sting behind it, but rather matter of triumph
to its origin, I am not able to resolve it into and agreeable reflection, when borne pro
necessary and self-evident axioms, or con perly, and in a good cause. [279] The
clusions that are necessarily consequent Canadians have taught us that even savages
upon them. I seem to want that evidence may acquire a superiority to the most ex
which I can best comprehend, and which cruciating pains; and, in every region of
gives perfect satisfaction to an inquisitive the earth, instances will be found, where a
mind; yet it is ridiculous to doubt; and I sense of duty, of honour, or even of worldly
find it is not in my power. An attempt to interest, have triumphed over it.
throw off this belief is like an attempt to fly, It is evident that nature intended for man,
equally ridiculous and impracticable. in his present state, a life of labour and
To a philosopher, who has been accus toil, wherein he may be occasionally exposed
tomed to think that the treasure of his know to pain and danger; and the happiest man
ledge is the acquisition of that reasoning is not he who has felt least of those evils,
power of which he boasts, it is no doubt but he whose mind is fitted to bear then by
humiliating to find that his reason can lay no real magnanimity.
claim to the greater part of it. Our active and perceptive powers are
By his reason, he can discover certain improved and perfected by use and exercise.
abstract and necessary relations of things; This is the constitution of nature. But,
but his knowledge of what really exists, or with regard to the agreeable and disagree
did exist, comes by another channel, which able sensations we have by our senses, the
is open to those who cannot reason. He is very contrary is an established constitution
led to it in the dark, and knows not how he of nature—the frequent repetition of them
came by it. [278] weakens their force. Sensations at first very
[277–279]
chap. xxi.] OF THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE SENSES. 3.31
disagreeable, by use become tolerable, and learn to distinguish objects by their colour,
at last perfectly indifferent. And those that in the same manner as by their sound,
are at first very agreeable, by frequent re taste, and smell. By this sense, we perceive
petition become insipid, and at last, per visible objects to have extension in two
haps, give disgust. Nature has set limits dimensions, to have visible figure and
to the pleasures of sense, which we cannot magnitude, and a certain angular distance
pass; and all studied gratifications of them, from one another. These, I conceive, are
as it is mean and unworthy of a man, so it the original perceptions of sight." [281]
is foolish and fruitless. By touch, we not only perceive the tem
The man who, in eating and drinking, perature of bodies as to heat and cold,+
and in other gratifications of sense, obeys which are secondary qualities, but we per
the calls of Nature, without affecting deli ceive originally their three dimensions, their
cacies and refinements, has all the enjoy tangible figure and magnitude, their linear
ment that the senses can afford. If one distance from one another, their hardness,
eould, by a soft and luxurious life, acquire softness, or fluidity. These qualities we
a more delicate sensibility to pleasure, it originally perceive by touch only; but, by
must be at the expense of a like sensibility experience, we learn to perceive all or most
to pain, from which he can never promise of them by sight.
exemption, and at the expense of cherishing We learn to perceive, by one sense, what
many diseases which produce pain. originally could have been perceived only
The improvement of our external senses, by another, by finding a connection between
as they are the means of giving us informa the objects of the different senses. Hence
tion, is a subject more worthy of our atten the original perceptions, or the sensations
tion; for, although they are not the noblest of one sense become signs of whatever has
and most exalted powers of our nature, yet always been found connected with them;
they are not the least useful. [280] All and from the sign, the mind passes imme
that we know, or can know, of the material diately to the conception and belief of the
world, must be grounded upon their inform thing signified. And, although the connec
ation; and the philosopher, as well as the tion in the mind between the sign and the
day-labourer, must be indebted to them for thing signified by it, be the effect of custom,
the largest part of his knowledge. this custom becomes a second nature, and
Some of our perceptions by the senses it is difficult to distinguish it from the ori
may be called original, because they require ginal power of perception.
no previous experience or learning; but Thus, if a sphere of one uniform colour
the far greatest part is acquired, and the be set before me, I perceive evidently by my
fruit of experience. eye its spherical figure and its three dimen
Three of our senses—to wit, smell, taste, sions. All the world will acknowledge
and hearing—originally give us only certain that, by sight only, without touching it, I
sensations, and a conviction that these sensa may be certain that it is a sphere; yet it
tions are occasioned by some external object. is no less certain that, by the original power
We give a name to that quality of the ob of sight, I could not perceive it to be a
ject by which it is fitted to produce such a sphere, and to have three dimensions. The
sensation, and connect that quality with the eye originally could only perceive two di
object, and with its other qualities. mensions, and a gradual variation of colour
Thus we learn, that a certain sensation on the different sides of the object.
of smell is produced by a rose; and that It is experience that teaches me that the
quality in the rose, by which it is fitted to variation of colour is an effect of spherical
produce this sensation, we call the smell of convexity, and of the distribution of light
the rose. Here it is evident that the sensa and shade. But so rapid is the progress of
tion is original. The perception that the the thought, from the effect to the cause,
rose has that quality which we call its that we attend only to the last, and can
smell, is acquired. In like manner, we hardly be persuaded that we do not imme
learn all those qualities in bodies which we diately see the three dimensions of the
call their smell, their taste, their sound. sphere. [282]
These are all secondary qualities, and we Nay, it may be observed, that, in this
give the same name to them which we give case, the acquired perception in a maanner
to the sensations they produce; not from effaces the original one; for the sphere is
any similitude between the sensation and seen to be of one uniform colour, though
the quality of the same name, but because originally there would have appeared a
the quality is signified to us by the sensation gradual variation of colour. But that ap
as its sign, and because our senses give us
no other knowledge of the quality but that * Seeabove, p. 123, col. b, note t, and p. 185, col. 3,
it is fit to produce such a sensation. note *.
By the other two senses, we have much # whether heat, cold, &c., be objects of touch or
of a different sense, it is not here the place to inquire.
more ample information. By sight, we
[2:30–282]
parent variation we learn to interpret as original perceptions of sight, but acquired
the effect of light and shade falling upon a by experience, is sufficiently evident from
sphere of one uniform colour. the principles of optics, and from the art of
A sphere may be painted upon a plane, painters, in painting objects of three dimen
so exactly, as to be taken for a real sphere sions, upon a plane which has only two.
when the eye is at a proper distance and And it has been put beyond all doubt, by
in the proper point of view. We say in observations recorded of several persons,
this case, that the eye is deceived, that the who having, by cataracts in their eyes,
appearance is fallacious. But there is no been deprived of sight from their infancy,
fallacy in the original perception, but only have been couched and made to see, after
in that which is acquired by custom. The they came to years of understanding."
variation of colour, exhibited to the eye by Those who have had their eyesight from
the painter's art, is the same which nature infancy, acquire such perceptions so early
exhibits by the different degrees of light that they cannot recollect the time when
falling upon the convex surface of a sphere. they had them not, and therefore make no
In perception, whether original or ac distinction between them and their original
quired, there is something which may be perceptions; nor can they be easily per
called the sign, and something which is suaded that there is any just foundation
signified to us, or brought to our knowledge for such a distinction. [284] In all lan
by that sign. guages men speak with equal assurance of
In original perception, the signs are the their seeing objects to be spherical or cubi
various sensations which are produced by cal, as of their feeling them to be so; nor
the impressions made upon our organs. The do they ever dream that these perceptions
things signified, are the objects perceived of sight were not as early and original as
in consequence of those sensations, by the the perceptions they have of the same ob
original constitution of our nature. jects by touch.
Thus, when I grasp an ivory ball in my This power which we acquire of perceiv
hand, I have a certain sensation of touch. ing things by our senses, which originally
Although this sensation be in the mind and we should not have perceived, is not the
have no similitude to anything material, effect of any reasoning on our part : it is
yet, by the laws of my constitution, it is the result of our constitution, and of the
immediately followed by the conception situations in which we happen to be placed.
and belief, that there is in my hand a hard We are so made that, when two things
smooth body of a spherical figure, and about are found to be conjoined in certain circum
an inch and a half in diameter. This belief stances, we are prone to believe that they
is grounded neither upon reasoning, nor are connected by nature, and will always be
upon experience; it is the immediate effect found together in like circumstances. The
of my constitution, and this I call original belief which we are led into in such cases is
perception." [283] not the effect of reasoning, nor does it arise
In acquired perception, the sign may be from intuitive evidence in the thing believed;
either a sensation, or something originally it is, as I apprehend, the immediate effect of
perceived. The thing signified, is something our constitution. Accordingly, it is strongest
which, by experience, has been found con in infancy, before our reasoning power
nected with that sign. appears—before we are capable of draw
Thus, when the ivory ball is placed be ing a conclusion from premises. A child
fore my eye, I perceive by sight what I who has once burnt his finger in a candle,
before perceived by touch, that the ball is from that single instance connects the pain
smooth, spherical, of such a diameter, and of burning with putting his finger in the
at such a distance from the eye; and to candle, and believes that these two things
this is added the perception of its colour. must go together. It is obvious that this
All these things I perceive by sight, dis part of our constitution is of very great use
tinctly and with certainty. Yet it is cer before we come to the use of reason, and
tain from principles of philosophy, that, if I guards us from a thousand mischiefs, which,
had not been accustomed to compare the without it, we would rush into ; it may
informations of sight with those of touch, sometimes lead us into error, but the good
I should not have perceived these things effects of it far overbalance the ill.
by sight. I should have perceived a circu It is, no doubt, the perfection of a rational
lar object, having its colour gradually more being to have no belief but what is grounded
faint towards the shaded side. But I should on intuitive evidence, or on just reasoning:
not have perceived it to have three dimen but man, I apprehend, is not such a being;
sions, to be spherical, to be of such a linear nor is it the intention of nature that he
magnitude, and at such a distance from the should be such a being, in every period of
eye. That these last mentioned are not his existence. We come into the world
* See above, p. 111, et alibi.-H. * See above, p. 136, note t, and p ise, note *.-H.
[283, 284)
CHAP. xxi.] () F THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE SENSES. 333
without the exercise of reason ; we are improvement, is, by additional organs, or in

merely animal before we are rational crea struments contrived by art. By the inven
tures; and it is necessary for our preserva tion of optical glasses, and the gradual im
tion, that we should believe many things be provement of them, the natural power of
fore we can reason. How then is our belief vision is wonderfully improved, and a vast
to be regulated before we have reason to addition made to the stock of knowledge
regulate it? [285] Has nature left it to be which we acquire by the eye. By speaking
regulated by chance? By no means. It is trumpets and ear-trumpets some improve
regulated by certain principles, which are ment has been made in the sense of hearing.
parts of our constitution; whether they Whether by similar inventions the other
ought to be called animal principles, or in senses may be improved, seems uncertain.
stinctive principles, or what name we give A fourth method by which the informa
to them, is of small moment; but they are tion got by our senses may be improved, is,
eertainly different from the faculty of rea by discovering the connection which nature
son: they do the office of reason while it is hath established between the sensible quali
in its infancy, and must, as it were, be car ties of objects, and their morelatent qualities.
ried in a nurse's arms, and they are leading By the sensible qualities of bodies, I un
strings to it in its gradual progress. derstand those that are perceived immedi
From what has been said, I think it ap ately by the senses, such as their colour,
pears that our original powers of perceiving figure, feeling, sound, taste, smell. The
objects by our senses receive great improve various modifications and various combin
ment by use and habit; and without this ations of these, are innumerable; so that
improvement, would be altogether insuf there are hardly two individual bodies in
ficient for the purposes of life. The daily Nature that may not be distinguished by
occurrences of life not only add to our stock their sensible qualities.
of knowledge, but give additional percep The latent qualities are such as are not
tive powers to our senses; and time gives immediately discovered by our senses; but
us the use of our eyes and ears, as well as discovered sometimes by accident, some
of our hands and legs. times by experiment or observation. The
This is the greatest and most important most important part of our knowledge of
improvement of our external senses. It is bodies is the knowledge of the latent qua
to be found in all men come to years of un lities of the several species, by which they
derstanding, but it is various in different are adapted to certain purposes, either for
persons according to their different occupa food, or medicine, or agriculture, or for the
tions, and the different circumstances in materials or utensils of some art or manu
which they are placed. Every artist re facture. [287]
quires an eye as well as a hand in his own I am taught that certain species of bodies
profession ; his eye becomes skilled in per have certain latent qualities; but how shall
ceiving, no less than his hand in executing, I know that this individual is of such a
what belongs to his employment. species? This must be known by the sen
Besides this improvement of our senses, sible qualities which characterise the species.
which nature produces without our inten I must know that this is bread, and that
tion, there are various ways in which they wine, before I eat the one or drink the
may be improved, or their defects re other. I must know that this is rhubarb,
medied by art. As, first, by a due care of and that opium, before I use the one or the
the organs of sense, that they be in a sound other for medicine.
and natural state. This belongs to the de It is one branch of human knowledge to
partment of the medical faculty. l:now the names of the various species of
Secondly, By accurate attention to the natural and artificial bodies, and to know
objects of sense. The effects of such atten the sensible qualities by which they are
tion in improving our senses, appear in every ascertained to be of such a species, and by
art. The artist, by giving more attention which they are distinguished from one an
to certain objects than others do, by that other. It is another branch of knowledge
means perceives many things in those ob to know the latent qualities of the several
jects which others do not. [286] Those species, and the uses to which they are
who happen to be deprived of one sense, subservient.
frequently supply that defect in a great de The man who possesses both these
gree, by giving more accurate attention to branches is informed, by his senses, of in
the objects of the senses they have. The numerable things of real moment which are
blind have often been known to acquire un hid from those who possess only one, or
common acuteness in distinguishing things neither. This is an improvement in the
by feeling and hearing; and the deaf are information got by our senses, which must
uncommonly quick in reading men's thoughts keep pace with the improvements made in
in their countenance. natural history, in natural philosophy, and
A third way in which our senses admit of in the arts.
[285-287|
33A ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essay n.
It would be an improvement still higher that even in things that seem most evident,
if we were able to discover any connection we ought to withhold assent. [289]
between the sensible qualities of bodies and Among the Peripatetics we find frequent
their latent qualities, without knowing the complaints that the senses often deceive us,
species, or what may have been discovered and that their testimony is to be suspected,
with regard to it. when it is not confirmed by reason, by which
Some philosophers, of the first rate, have the errors of sense may be corrected. This
made attempts towards this noble improve complaint they supported by many com
ment, not without promising hopes of suc monplace instances: such as, the crooked
cess. Thus, the celebrated Linnaeus has appearance of an oar in water; objects being
attempted to point out certain sensible qua magnified, and their distance mistaken, iu
lities by which a plant may very probably a fog; the sun and moon appearing about
be concluded to be poisonous without know a foot or two in diameter, while they are
ing its name or species. He has given se really thousands of miles; a square tower
veral other instances, wherein certain medi being taken at a distanceto be round. These,
cal and economical virtues of plants are and many similar appearances, they thought
indicated by their external appearances. to be sufficiently accounted for from the
Sir Isaac Newton hath attempted to shew fallacy of the senses: and thus the fallacy
that, from the colours of bodies, we may of the senses was used as a decent cover to
form a probable conjecture of the size of conceal their ignorance of the real causes of
their constituent parts, by which the rays such phaenomena, and served the same pur
of light are reflected. [288] pose as their occult qualities and substantial
No man can pretend to set limits to the forms."
discoveries that may be made by human Des Cartes and his followers joined in
genius and industry, of such connections the same complaint. Antony le Grand, a
between the latent and the sensible quali philosopher of that sect, in the first chapter
ties of bodies. A wide field here opens to of his Logic, expresses the sentiments of
our view, whose boundaries no man can the sect as follows: “Since all our senses are
ascertain, of improvements that may here fallacious, and we are frequently deceived
after be made in the information conveyed by them, common reason advises that we
to us by our senses. should not put too much trust-in them, nay,
that we should suspect falsehood in every
thing they represent; for it is imprudence
CHAPTER XXII. and temerity to trust to those who have but
oncedeceived us; and,if they errat any time,
of The FALLACY OF THE SENSES. they may be believed always to err. They
are given by nature for this purpose only
CoMPLAINTs of the fallacy of the senses to warn us of what is useful and what is
have been very common in ancient and in hurtful to us. The order of Nature is per
modern times, especially among the philo verted when we put them to any other
sophers. And, if we should take for granted use, and apply them for the knowledge of
all that they have said on this subject, the truth.”
natural conclusion from it might seem to When we consider that the active part
be, that the senses are given to us by some of mankind, in all ages from the beginning
malignant demon on purpose to delude us, of the world, have rested their most import
rather than that they are formed by the ant concerns upon the testimony of sense,
wise and beneficent Author of Nature, to it will be very difficult to reconcile their
give us true information of things necessary conduct with the speculative opinion so
to our preservation and happiness. generally entertained of the fallaciousness
The whole sect of atomists among the of the senses. [290] And it seems to be
ancients, led by Democritus, and afterwards a very unfavourable account of the work
by Epicurus, maintained that all the quali manship of the Supreme Being, to think
ties of bodies which the moderns call se that he has given us one faculty to deceive
condary qualities—to wit, smell, taste,sound, us—to wit, our senses; and another faculty
colour, heat, and cold—are mere illusions of —to wit, our reason—to detect the fallacy.
sense, and have no real existence.” Plato It deserves, therefore, to be considered,
maintained that we can attain no real know whether the fallaciousness of our senses be
ledge of material things; and that eternal not a common error, which men have been
and immutable ideas are the only objects of led into. from a desire to conceal their igno
real knowledge. The academics and scep rance, or to apologize for their mistakes.
tics anxiously sought for arguments to There are two powers which we owe to
prove the fallaciousness of our senses, in
* A very inaccurate representation of the Peripa.
order to support their favourite doctrine, tetic doctrine touching this matter. In fact, the Ari
* Not correctly stated. See above, p. 316, note %. stotelian doctrine, and that of Reid himself, are
The Epicureans denied the fallacy of Sense.-H. almost the same.-H.
[288–290]
- -- ------
cHAP. xxii.] OF THE FALLACY OF THE SENSES. 335
our external senses-sensation, and the per feit guinea for a true one, he says his senses
ception of external objects. deceived him; but he lays the blame where
It is impossible that there can be any it ought not to be laid: for we may ask him,
fallacy in sensation: for we are conscious of Did your senses give a false testimony of
all our sensations, and they can neither be the colour, or of the figure, or of the im
any other in their nature, nor greater or pression ? No. But this is all that they
less in their degree than we feel them. It testified, and this they testified truly : From
is impossible that a man should be in pain, these premises you concluded that it was a
when he does not feel pain; and when he true guinea, but this conclusion does not
feels pain, it is impossible that his pain follow ; you erred, therefore, not by relying
should not be real, and in its degree what upon the testimony of sense, but by judging
it is felt to be; and the same thing may be rashly from its testimony. [292] Not only
said of every sensation whatsoever. An are your senses innocent of this error, but
agreeable or an uneasy sensation may be it is only by their information that it can be
forgot when it is past, but when it is pre discovered. If you consult them properly,
sent, it can be nothing but what we feel. they will inform you that what you took for
If, therefore, there be any fallacy in our a guinea is base metal, or is deficient in
senses, it must be in the perception of ex weight, and this can only be known by the
ternal objects, which we shall next con testimony of sense.
sider. I remember to have met with a man who
And here I grant that we can conceive thought the argument used by Protestants
powers of perceiving external objects more against the Popish doctrine of transubstan
perfect than ours, which, possibly, beings of a tiation, from the testimony of our senses,
higher order may enjoy. We can perceive inconclusive; because, said he, instances
external objects only by means of bodily or may begiven where several of our senses may
gans; and these are liable to various dis deceive us: How do we know then that
orders, which sometimes affect our powers there may not be cases wherein they all
of perception. The nerves and brain, which deceive us, and no sense is left to detect the
are interior organs of perception, are like fallacy? I begged of him to know an in
wise liable to disorders, as every part of the stance wherein several of our senses deceive
human frame is. [291] us. I take, said he, a piece of soft turf; I
The imagination, the memory, the judging cut it into the shape of an apple; with the
and reasoning powers, are all liable to be essence of apples, I give it the smell of an
hurt, or even destroyed, by disorders of the apple; and with paint, I can give it the skin
body, as well as our powers of perception; and colour of an apple. Here then is a body,
but we do not on this account call them which, if you judge by your eye, by your
fallacious. touch, or by your smell, is an apple.
Our senses, our memory, and our reason, To this I would answer, that no one of
are all limited and imperfect—this is the our senses deceives us in this case. My
lot of humanity: but they are such as the sight and touch testify that it has the shape
Author of our being saw to be best fitted and colour of an apple: this is tree. The
for usin our present state. Superior natures sense of smelling testifies that it has the
may have intellectual powers which we have smell of an apple: this is likewise true, and
not, or such as we have, in a more perfect is no deception. Where then lies the de
degree, and less liable to accidental disor ception ? It is evident it lies in this—that
ders; but we have no reason to think that because this body has some qualities belong
God has given fallacious powers to any of ing to an apple I conclude that it is an apple.
his creatures: this would be to think dis This is a fallacy, not of the senses, but of
honourably of our Maker, and would lay a inconclusive reasoning.
foundation for universal scepticism. Many false judgments that are accounted
The appearances commonly imputed to deceptions of sense, arise from our mistaking
the fallacy of the senses are many and of relative motion for real or absolute motion.
different kinds; but I think they may be These can be no deceptions of sense, because
reduced to the four following classes. by our senses we perceive only the relative
First, Many things called deceptions of motions of bodies; and it is by reasoning
the senses are only conclusions rashly drawn that we infer the real from therelative which
from the testimony of the senses. In these we perceive. A little reflection may satisfy
cases the testimony of the senses is true, us of this. [293]
but we rashly draw a conclusion from it, It was before observed, that we perceive
which does not necessarily follow. We are extension to be one sensible quality of
disposed to impute our errors rather to false bodies, and thence are necessarily led to
information than to inconclusive reasoning, conceive space, though space be of itself
and to blame our senses for the wrong con no object of sense. When a body is re
clusions we draw from their testimony. moved out of its place, the space which it
Thus, when a man has taken a counter filled remains empty till it is filled by some
[291–293]
336 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [EssAv 11.
other body, and would remain if it should state of ignorance, to make the earth the
never be filled. Before any body existed, the fixed place from which they may estimate
space which bodies now occupy was empty the various motions they perceive. The
space, capable of receiving bodies; for no custom of doing this from infancy, and of
body can exist where there is no space to using constantly a language which supposes
contain it. There is space therefore where the earth to be at rest, may perhaps be the
ever bodies exist, or can exist. cause of the general prejudice in favour of
Hence it is evident that space can have this opinion.
no limits. It is no less evident that it is Thus it appears that, if we distinguish
immovable. Bodies placed in it are mov accurately between what our senses really
able, but the place where they were cannot and naturally testify, and the conclusions
be moved; and we can as easily conceive a which we draw from their testimony by
thing to be moved from itself, as one part reasoning, we shall find many of the errors,
of space brought nearer to or removed called fallacies of the senses, to be no fal
farther from another. lacy of the senses, but rash judgments,
The space, therefore, which is unlimited which are not to be imputed to our senses.
and immovable, is called by philosophers Secondly, Another class of errors imputed
absolute space. Absolute or real motion is to the fallacy of the senses, are those which
a change of place in absolute space. we are liable to in our acquired perceptions.
Our senses do not testify the absolute Acquired perception is not properly the
motion or absolute rest of any body. When testimony of those senses which God hath
one body removes from another, this may given us, but a conclusion drawn from what
be discerned by the senses; but whether the senses testify. [295] In our past ex
any body keeps the same part of absolute perience, we have found certain things con
space, we do not perceive by our senses. joined with what our senses testify. We
When one body seems to remove from an are led by our constitution to expect this
other, we can infer with certainty that there conjunction in time to come ; and when
is absolute motion, but whether in the one we have often found it in our experience to
or the other, or partly in both, is not dis happen, we acquire a firm belief that the
cerned by sense. things which we have found thus conjoined,
Of all the prejudices which philosophy are connected in nature, and that one is a
contradicts, I believe there is none so general sign of the other. The appearance of the
as that the earth keeps its place unmoved. sign immediately produces the belief of its
This opinion seems to be universal, till it usual attendant, and we think we perceive
is corrected by instruction or by philoso the one as well as the other.
phical speculation. Those who have any That such conclusions are formed even
tincture of education are not now in danger in infancy, no man can doubt: nor is it less
of being held by it, but they find at first a certain that they are confounded with the
reluctance to believe that there are anti natural and immediate perceptions of sense,
podes; that the earth is spherical, and turns and in all languages are called by the same
round its axis every day, and round the sun name. We are therefore authorized by
every year: they can recollect the time language to call them perception, and must
when reason struggled with prejudice upon often do so, or speak unintelligibly. But
these points, and prevailed at length, but philosophy teaches us, in this, as in many
not without some effort. [294] other instances, to distinguish things which
The cause of a prejudice so very general the vulgar confound. I have therefore
is not unworthy of investigation. But that given the name of acquired perception to
is not our present business. It is sufficient such conclusions, to distinguish them from
to observe, that it cannot justly be called a what is naturally, originally, and imme
fallacy of sense; because our senses testify diately testified by our senses. Whether
only the change of situation of one body in this acquired perception is to be resolved
relation to other bodies, and not its change into some process of reasoning, of which
of situation in absolute space. It is only we have lost the remembrance, as some
the relative motion of bodies that we per philosophers think, or whether it results
ceive, and that we perceive truly. It is from some part of our constitution distinct
the province of reason and philosophy, from from reason, as I rather believe, does not
the relative motions which we perceive, to concern the present subject. If the first
collect the real and absolute motions which of these opinions be true, the errors of ac
produce them. quired perception will fall under the first
All motion must be estimated from some class before mentioned. If not, it makes
point or place which is supposed to be at a distinct class by itself. But whether the
rest. We perceive not the points of abso one or the other be true, it must be
lute space, from which real and absolute observed that the errors of acquired per
motion must be reckoned. And there are ception are not properly fallacies of our
obvious reasons that lead mankind in the Senses.
[294, 295]
*-*
cEAP. xx11.] OF THE FALLACY OF THE SENSES. 337

Thus, when a globe is set before me, I In like manner, if we suppose an infant
perceive by my eyes that it has three di endowed with reason, it would direct him
mensions and a spherical figure. To say to do nothing, till he knew what could be
that this is not perception, would be to done with safety. This he can only know
reject the authority of custom in the use of by experiment, and experiments are danger
words, which no wise man will do : but ous. Reason directs, that experiments that
that it is not the testimony of my sense of are full of danger should not be made with
seeing, every philosopher knows. I see out a very urgent cause. It would there
only a circular form, having the light and fore make the infant unhappy, and hinder
colour distributed in a certain way over it. his improvement by experience.
[296] But, being accustomed to observe Nature has followed another plan. The
this distribution of light and colour only in child, unapprehensive of danger, is led by
a spherical body, I immediately, from what instinct to exert all his active powers, to
I see, believe the object to be spherical, and try everything without the cautious admo
say that I see or perceive it to be spherical. nitions of reason, and to believe everything
When a painter, by an exact imitation of that is told him. Sometimes he suffers by
that distribution of light and colour which his rashness what reason would have pre
I have been accustomed to see only in a vented: but his suffering proves a salutary
real sphere, deceives me, so as to make me discipline, and makes him for the future
take that to be a real sphere which is only a avoid the cause of it. Sometimes he is
painted one, the testimony of my eye is true imposed upon by his credulity; but it is of
—the colour and visible figure of the object infinite benefit to him upon the whole. His
is truly what I see it to be : the error lies activity and credulity are more useful qua
in the conclusion drawn from what I see lities and better instructors than reason
to wit, that the object has three dimensions would be ; they teach him more in a day
and a spherical figure. The conclusion is than reason would do in a year; they furnish
false in this case; but, whatever be the a stock of materials for reason to work upon;
origin of this conclusion, it is not properly they make him easy and happy in a period
the testimony of sense. of his existence when reason could only
To this class we must refer the judg serve to suggest a thousand tormenting
ments we are apt to form of the distance anxieties and fears: and he acts agreeably
and magnitude of the heavenly bodies, and to the constitution and intention of nature
of terrestrial objects seen on high. The even when he does and believes what reason
mistakes we make of the magnitude and would not justify. So that the wisdom and
distance of objects seen through optical goodness of the Author of nature is no less
glasses, or through an atmosphere uncom conspicuous in withholding the exercise of
monly clear or uncommonly foggy, belong our reason in this period, than in bestowing
likewise to this class. it when we are ripe for it. [298]
The errors we are led into in acquired A third class of errors, ascribed to the
perception are very rarely hurtful to us in fallacy of the senses, proceeds from igno
the conduct of life; they are gradually cor rance of the laws of nature.
rected by a more enlarged experience, and The laws of nature (I mean not moral
a more perfect knowledge of the laws of but physical laws) are learned, either from
Nature: and the general laws of our con our own experience, or the experience of
stitution, by which we are sometimes led others, who have had occasion to observe
into them, are of the greatest utility. the course of nature.
We come into the world ignorant of Ignorance of those laws, or inattention
everything, and by our ignorance exposed to them, is apt to occasion false judgments
to many dangers and to many mistakes. The with regard to the objects of sense, especial
regular train of causes and effects, which ly those of hearing and of sight; which
divine wisdom has established, and which false judgments are often, without good
directs every step of our conduct in advanced reason, called fallacies of sense.
life, is unknown, until it is gradually dis Sounds affect the ear differently, accord
covered by experience. [297] ing as the sounding body is before or behind
We must learn much from experience us, on the right hand or on the left, near or
before we can reason, and therefore must be at a great distance. We learn, by the
liable to many errors. Indeed, I apprehend, manner in which the sound affects the ear,
that, in the first part of life, reason would do on what hand we are to look for the sound
us much more hurt than good Were we ing body; and in most cases we judge right.
sensible of our condition in that period, and But we are sometimes deceived by echoes,
capable of reflecting upon it, we snould be or by whispering galleries, or speaking
like a man in the dark, surrounded with trumpets, which return the sound, or alter
dangers, where every step he takes may be its direction, or convey it to a distance with
into a pit. Reason would direct him to sit out diminution.
down, and wait till he could see about him. The deception is still greater, because
z
[296–298]
-
338 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. LEssay II.
more uncommon, which is said to be pro rance of the laws of nature, are more numer
duced by Gastriloquists—that is, persons ous and more remarkable than those of
who have acquired the art of modifying hearing.
their voice, so that it shall affect the ear of the The rays of light, which are the means
hearers, as if it came from another person, of seeing, pass in right lines from the object
or from the clouds, or from under the earth. to the eye, when they meet with no obstruc
I never had the fortune to be acquainted tion; and we are by nature led to conceive
with any of these artists, and therefore can the visible object to be in the direction of
not say to what degree of perfection the art the rays that come to the eye. But the
may have been carried. rays may be reflected, refracted, or inflected
I apprehend it to be only such an im in their passage from the object to the eye,
perfect imitation as may deceive those who according to certain fixed laws of nature,
are inattentive, or under a panic. For, if by which means their direction may be
it could be carried to perfection, a Gastrilo changed, and consequently the apparent
quist would be as dangerous a man in so place, figure, or magnitude of the object.
ciety as was the shepherd Gyges," who, by Thus, a child seeing himself in a mirror,
turning a ring upon his finger, could make thinks he sees another child behind the
himself invisible, and, by that means, from mirror, that imitates all his motions. But
being the king's shepherd, became King of even a child soon gets the better of this de
Lydia. [299] ception, and knows that he sees himself only.
If the Gastriloquists have all been too All the deceptions made by telescopes,
good men to use their talent to the detri microscopes, camera obscuras, magic lan
ment of others, it might at least be expected thorns, are of the same kind, though not so
that some of them should apply it to their familiar to the vulgar. The ignorant may
own advantage. If it could be brought to be deceived by them; but to those who are
any considerable degree of perfection, it acquainted with the principles of optics,
seems to be as proper an engine for draw they give just and true information; and the
ing money by the exhibition of it, as leger laws of nature by which they are produced,
demain or rope-dancing. But I have never are of infinite benefit to mankind.
heard of any exhibition of this kind, and There remains another class of errors,
therefore am apt to think that it is too commonly called deceptions of sense, and
coarse an imitation to bear exhibition, even the only one, as I apprehend, to which that
to the vulgar. name can be given with propriety : I mean
Some are said to have the art of imitat such as proceed from some disorder or pre
ing the voice of another so exactly that in ternatural state, either of the external organ
the dark they might be taken for the person or of the nerves and brain, which are in
whose voice they imitate. I am apt to ternal organs of perception.
think that this art also, in the relations In a delirium or in madness, perception,
made of it, is magnified beyond the truth, as memory, imagination, and our reasoning
wonderful relations are apt to be, and that powers, are strangely disordered and con
an attentive ear would be able to distinguish founded. There are likewise disorders which
the copy from the original. affect some of our senses, while others are
It is indeed a wonderful instance of the sound. Thus, a man may feel pain in his
accuracy as well as of the truth of our senses, toes after the leg is cut off. He may feel a
in things that are of real use in life, that we littleball double by crossing hisfingers. [301]
are able to distinguish all our acquaintance He may see an object double, by not direct
by their countenance, by their voice, and both eyes properly to it. By pressing the
by their handwriting, when, at the same ball of his eye, he may see colours that are
time, we are often unable to say by what not real. By the jaundice in his eyes, he
minute difference the distinction is made; may mistake colours. These are more
and that we are so very rarely deceived in properly deceptions of sense than any of the
matters of this kind, when we give proper classes before mentioned.
attention to the informations of sense. We must acknowledge it to be the lot of
However, if any case should happen, in human nature, that all the human faculties
which sounds produced by different causes are liable, by accidental causes, to be hurt
are not distinguishable by the ear, this may and unfitted for their natural functions,
prove that our senses are imperfect, but not either wholly or in part : but as this imper
that they are fallacious. The ear may not fection is common to them all, it gives no
be able to draw the just conclusion, but it just ground for accounting any of them
is only our ignorance of the laws of sound fallacious.
that leads us to a wrong conclusion. [300] Upon the whole, it seems to have been a
Deceptions of sight, arising from igno common error of philosophers to account
the fallacious. And to this error
* See
dotus Cicero, De Officiis.
is different.-H. The story
ory told by
y Hero they have added another—that one use of
reason is to detect the fallacies of seuse.
[299-301]
CHAP. xxII.] OF THE FALLACY OF THE SENSES. 339
It appears, I think, from what has been knowledge. [302] The wisdom of nature
said, that there is no more reason to account has made the most useful things most com
our senses fallacious, than our reason, our mon, and they ought not to be despised on
memory, or any other faculty of judging that account. Nature likewise forces our
which nature hath given us. They are all belief in those informations, and all the
limited and imperfect; but wisely suited to attempts of philosophy to weaken it are
the present condition of man. We are fruitless and vain.
liable to error and wrong judgment in the I add only one observation to what has
use of them all; but as little in the inform been said upon this subject. It is, that there
ations of sense as in the deductions of seems to be a contradiction between what
reasoning. And the errors we fall into with philosophers teach concerning ideas, and
regard to objects of sense are not corrected their doctrine of the fallaciousness of the
by reason, but by more accurate attention senses. We are taught that the office of
to the informations we may receive by our the senses is only to give us the ideas of
senses themselves. external objects. If this be so, there can
Perhaps the pride of philosophers may be no fallacy in the senses. Ideas can
have given occasion to this error. Reason neither be true nor false. If the senses
is the faculty wherein they assume a supe testify nothing, they cannot give false testi
riority to the unlearned. The informations mony. If they are not judging faculties, no
of sense are common to the philosopher and judgment can be imputed to them, whether
to the most illiterate: they put all men false or true. There is, therefore, a contra
upon a level; and therefore are apt to be diction between the common doctrine con
undervalued. We must, however, be be cerning ideas and that of the fallaciousness
holden to the informations of sense for the of the senses. Both may be false, as I believe
greatest and most interesting part of our they are, but both cannot be true. [303]
ESSAY III.
OF MEMORY.
thing, and that which he remembers is

CHAPTER I. called the object of his remembrance. In
this, memory agrees with perception, but
Thixos obvious AND CERTAIN WITH REGARD differs from sensation, which has no object
to MEMORY. but the feeling itself." [304]
Every man can distinguish the thing re
In the gradual progress of man, from membered from the remembrance of it.
infancy to maturity, there is a certain order We may remember anything which we have
in which his faculties are unfolded, and this seen, or heard, or known, or done, or suf
seems to be the best order we can follow in fered; but the remembrance of it is a par
treating of them. ticular act of the mind which now exists,
The external senses appear first; me and of which we are conscious. To con
mory soon follows—which we are now to found these two is an absurdity, which a
consider. thinking man could not be led into, but by
It is by memory that we have an imme some false hypothesis which hinders him
diate knowledge of things past." The from reflecting upon the thing which he
senses give us information of things only as would explain by it.
they exist in the present moment; and this In memory we do not find such a train
information, if it were not preserved by of operations connected by our constitution
memory, would vanish instantly, and leave as in perception. When we perceive an
us as ignorant as if it had never been. object by our senses, there is, first, some
Memory must have an object. Every impression made by the object upon the
man who remembers must remember some organ of sense, either immediately, or by
means of some medium. By this, an im
• An immediate knowledge of a past thing is a con
tradiction. For we can only know a thing imme. * But have we only such a mediate knowledge of
diately, if we know it in itself, or as existing; but the real object in perception, as we have of the real
what # past cannot be known in itself, for it is non object in memory On Reid's error, touching the
existent.-H. | object of memory, sce, in general, Note B.-H.
Z 2
[302–304]
pression is made upon the nerves and brain, known. I remember the transit of Venus
in consequence of which we feel some sensa over the sun in the year 1769. H. must
tion; and that sensation is attended by that therefore have perceived it at the time it
conception and belief of the external object happened, otherwise I could not now re
which we call perception. These opera member it. Our first acquaintance with
tions are so connected in our constitution, any object of thought cannot be by reinem
that it is difficult to disjoin them in our con brance. Memory can only produce a con
ceptions, and to attend to each without con tinuance or renewal of a former acquaint
founding it with the others. But, in the ance with the thing remembered.
operations of memory, we are free from this The remembrance of a past event is ne
embarrassment; they are easily distin cessarily accompanied with the conviction
guished from all other acts of the mind, and of our own existence at the time the event
the names which denote them are free from happened. I cannot remember a thing
all ambiguity. that happened a year ago, without a con
The object of memory, or thing remem viction as strong as memory can give, that
bered, must be something that is past; as I, the same identical person who now re
the object of perception and of conscious member that event, did then exist. [306]
ness must be something which is present. What I have hitherto said concerning
What now is, cannot be an object of memory, I consider as principles which ap
memory; neither can that which is past pear obvious and certain to every man who
and gone be an object of perception or of will take the pains to reflect upon the oper
consciousness, ations of his own mind. They are facts of
Memory is always accompanied with the which every man must judge by what he
belief of that which we remember, as per feels; and they admit of no other proof
ception is accompanied with the belief of but an appeal to every man's own reflec
that which we perceive, and consciousness tion. I shall therefore take them for
with the belief of that whereof we are con granted in what follows, and shall, first,
scious. Perhaps in infancy, or in a disorder draw some conclusions from them, and
of mind, things remembered may be con then examine the theories of philoso
founded with those which are merely ima phers concerning memory, and concerning
gined; but in mature years, and in a sound duration, and our personal identity, of
state of mind, every man feels that he must which we acquire the knowledge by me
believe what he distinctly remembers, mory.
though he can give no other reason of his
belief, but that he remembers the thing dis
tinctly; whereas, when he merely imagines CHAPTER II.
a thing ever so distinctly, he has no belief
of it upon that account. [305] MEMORY AN ORIGINAL FACULTY.
This belief, which we have from distinct
memory, we account real knowledge, no FIRST, I think it appears, that memory
less certain than if it was grounded on de is an original faculty, given us by the
monstration; no man in his wits calls it in Author of our being, of which we can give
question, or will hear any argument against no account, but that we are so made.
it." The testimony of witnesses in causes The knowledge which I have of things
of life and death depends upon it, and all past, by my memory, seems to me as unac
the knowledge of mankind of past events is countable as an immediate knowledge
built on this foundation. would be of things to come;" and I can
There are cases in which a man's me give no reason why I should have the one
mory is less distinct and determinate, and and not the other, but that such is the will
where he is ready to allow that it may have of my Maker. I find in my mind a distinct
failed him ; but this does not in the least conception, and a firm belief of a series of
weaken its credit, when it is perfectly dis past events; but how this is produced I
tinct. know not. I call it memory, but this is
Memory implies a conception and belief only giving a name to it—it is not an ac
of past duration; for it is impossible that a count of its cause. I believe most firmly,
man should remember a thing distinctly, what I distinctly remember ; but I can
without believing some interval of duration,
more or less, to have passed between the * An immediate knowledge of things to come, is
time it happened, and the present moment; equally a contradiction as an immediate knowledge of
things past. See the first note of last page. But if,
and I think it is impossible to shew how as Reid himself allows, memory depend upon cer.
we could acquire a notion of duration if we past tain enduring affections of the brain, determined by
had no memory. Things remembered as on cognition, it seems a strange assertion, on this
other accounts, that the possibility of a know
must be things formerly perceived or ledge of the future is not more inconceivable than
of a knowledge of the past. Maupertuis, bow. ver,
has advanced a similar doctrine; and some, also, of
* But see below, p. 362.-H. the advocates of animal magnetism.-H.
[305, 306]
=–|-------
"
cIIAP. II.] MEMORY AN ORIGINAL FACULTY. 341
give no reason of this belief. It is the in and the thing that exists, because there is
spiration of the Almighty that gives me no such necessary agreement; and there
this understanding." [307] fore no such agreement can be perceived
When I believe the truth of a mathema either immediately or by a chain of reason
tical axiom, or of a mathematical proposi ing. The thing does not exist necessarily,
tion, I see that it must be so: every man but by the will and power of him that made
who has the same conception of it sees the it; and there is no contradiction follows from
same. There is a necessary and an evident supposing it not to exist.
connection between the subject and the pre Whence I think it follows, that our know
dicate of the proposition; and I have all ledge of the existence of our own thoughts,
the evidence to support my belief which I of the existence of all the material objects
can possibly conceive. . . about us, and of all past contingencies,
When I believe that I washed my hands must be derived, not from a perception of
and face this morning, there appears no ne necessary relations or agreements, but from
cessity in the truth of this proposition. It some other source.
might be, or it might not be. A man may Our Maker has provided other means for
distinctly conceive it without believing it at giving us the knowledge of these things
all. How then do I come to believe it? I means which perfectly answer their end,
remember it distinctly. This is all I can and produce the effect intended by them.
say. This remembrance is an act of my But in what manner they do this, is, I fear,
mind. Is it impossible that this act should beyond our skill to explain. We know our
be, if the event had not happened? I con own thoughts, and the operations of our
fess I do not see any necessary connection minds, by a power which we call conscious
between the one and the other. If any man ness: but this is only giving a name to this
can shew such a necessary connection, then part of our frame. It does not explain its
I think that belief which we have of what fabric, nor how it produces in us an irre
we remember will be fairly accounted for; sistible conviction of its informations. We
but, if this cannot be done, that belief is un perceive material objects and their sensible
acconntable, and we can say no more but qualities by our senses; but how they give
that it is the result of our constitution. us this information, and how they produce
Perhaps it may be said, that the ex our belief in it, we know not. We know
perience we have had of the fidelity of me many past events by memory; but how it
mory is a good reason for relying upon its gives this information, I believe, is inex
testimony. I deny not that this may be a plicable.
reason to those who have had this expe It is well known what subtile disputes
rience, and who reflect upon it. But I be were held through all the scholastic ages,
lieve there are few who ever thought of this and are still carried on about the prescience
reason, or who found any need of it. It of the Deity. [309] Aristotle had taught
must be some very rare occasion that leads that there can be no certain foreknowledge
a man to have recourse to it; and in those of things contingent; and in this he has
who have done so, the testimony of memory been very generally followed, upon no other
was believed before the experience of its grounds, as I apprehend, but that we can
fidelity, and that belief could not be caused not conceive how such things should be
by the experience which came after it. foreknown, and therefore conclude it to be
We know some abstract truths, by com impossible. Hence has arisen an opposi
paring the terms of the proposition which tion and supposed inconsistency between
expresses them, and perceiving some ne divine prescience and human liberty. Some
cessary relation or agreement between them. have given up the first in favour of the last,
It is thus I know that two and three make and others have given up the last in order
five; that the diameters of a circle are all to support the first.
equal. [308]. Mr Locke having discovered It is remarkable that these disputants
this source of knowledge, too rashly con have never apprehended that there is any
cluded that all human knowledge might be difficulty in reconciling with liberty the
derived from it; and in this he has been knowledge of what is past, but only of what
followed very generally—by Mr Hume in is future. It is prescience only, and not
particular. memory, that is supposed to be hostile to
But I apprehend that our knowledge of liberty, and hardly reconcileable to it.
the existence of things contingent can never Yet I believe the difficulty is perfectly
be traced to this source. I know that such equal in the one case and in the other. I
a thing exists, or did exist. This know. admit, that we cannot account for prescience
ledge cannot be derived from the perception of the actions of a free agent. But I main
of a necessary agreement between existence tain that we can as little account for me.
mory of the past actions of a free agent.
* “The inspiration of the Almighty giveth them If any man thinks he can prove that the
understanding "-Job.-H. actions of a free agent cannot be foreknown.
[307-309]
he will find the same arguments of equal
force to prove that the past actions of a free CHAPTER III.
agent cannot be remembered." It is true,
that what is past did certainly exist. It is of Dutt Ation.
no less true that what is future will cer
tainly exist. I know no reasoning from the From the principles laid down in the
constitution of the agent, or from his cir first chapter of this Essay, I think it appears
cumstances, that has not equal strength, that our notion of duration, as well as our
whether it be applied to his past or to his belief of it, is got by the faculty of memory."
future actions. The past was, but now is It is essential to everything remembered
not. The future will be, but now is not. that it be something which is past; and we
The present is equally connected or un cannot conceive a thing to be past, without
connected with both. conceiving some duration, more or less, be
The only reason why men have appre tween it and the present. [311] As soon
hended so great disparity in cases so per therefore as we remember anything, we
fectly like, I take to be this, That the faculty must have beth a notion and a “belief of
of memory in ourselves convinces us from duration. It is necessarily suggested by
fact, that it is not impossible that an in every operation of our memory; and to that
telligent being, even a finite being, should faculty it ought to be ascribed. This is,
have certain knowledge of past actions of therefore, a proper place to consider what
free agents, without tracing them from any is known concerning it.
thing necessarily connected with them. Duration, Extension, and Number, are
[310] But having no prescience in our the measures of all things subject to men
selves corresponding to our memory of what suration. When we apply them to finite
is past, we find great difficulty in admitting things which are measured by them, they
it to be possible even in the Supreme seem of all things to be the most distinctly
Being. conceived, and most within the reach of
A faculty which we possess in some de human understanding.
gree, we easily admit that the Supreme Extension having three dimensions, has
Being may possess in a more perfect degree; an endless variety of modifications, capable
but a faculty which has nothing corre of being accurately defined ; and their
sponding to it in our constitution, we will various relations furnish the human mind
hardly allow to be possible. We are so with its most ample field of demonstrative
constituted as to have an intuitive know reasoning. Duration having only one di
ledge of many things past; but we have no mension, has fewer modifications; but these
intuitive knowledge of the future.t. We are clearly understood—and their relations
might perhaps have been so constituted as admit of measure, proportion, and demon
to have an intuitive knowledge of the future; strative reasoning.
but not of the past; nor would this consti Number is called discrete quantity, be
tution have been more unaccountable than cause it is compounded of units, which are
the present, though it might be much more all equal and similar, and it can only be
inconvenient. Had this been our consti divided into units. This is true, in some
tution, we should have found no difficulty sense, even of fractions of unity, to which
in admitting tha. the Deity may know all we now commonly give the name of num
things future, but very much in admitting ber. For, in every fractional number, the
his knowledge of things that are past. unit is supposed to be subdivided into a
Our original faculties are all unaccount certain number of equal parts, which are
able. Of these memory is one. He only the units of that denomination, and the
who made them, comprehends fully how they fractions of that denomination are only di
are made, and how they produce in us not visible into units of the same denomination,
only a conception, but a firm belief and Duration and extension are not discrete,
assurance of things which it concerns us to but continued quantity. They consist of
know. parts perfectly similar, but divisible without
end.
* This is a marvellous doctrine. The difficulty in In order to aid our conception of the mag
the two cases is not the same. The past, as past, nitude and proportions of the various inter
whether it has been the action of a free agent or not,
is now necessary, and, though we may be unable to vals of duration, we find it necessary to give
understa d how it can be remembered, the supposi a name to some known portion of it, such
tion of its r membrance involves no contradiction.
as an hour, a day, a year. These we con
On the contrary, the future action of a free agent is
ex hypothesi not a necessary event. But an event sider as units, and, by the number of them
cannot be now certainly foreseen, except it is now contained in a larger interval, we form a
certainly to be; and to say that what is certainly to be
is not necessavily to be, stems a contradiction.-H. distinct conception of its magnitude. [312]
+ If by intuitive be meant immediate, such a knowA similar expedient we find necessary to give
ledge is impossi'le in either case; for we can know ---
neither the past nor the future in themselves, but * Reid thus apparently"makes Time an empirical
only in the present-that is, mediately.-H. or generalized notion.-H.
[3 10–312]
cHAP. III.] OF DURATION. 343
us a distinct conception of the magnitudes when there is or can be anything that has
and proportions of things extended. Thus, duration, we can set no bounds to either,
number is found necessary, as a common even in our imagination. They defy all
measure of extension and duration. But limitation. The one swells in our concep
this perhaps is owing to the weakness of our tion to immensity, the other to eternity.
understanding. It has even been disco An eternity past is an object which we
vered, by the sagacity of mathematicians, cannot comprehend; but a beginning of
that this expedient does not in all cases time, unless we take it in a figurative sense,
answer its intention. For there are pro is a contradiction. By a common figure of
portions of continued quantity, which can speech, we give the name of time to those
not be perfectly expressed by numbers; motions and revolutions by which we mea
such as that between the diagonal and side sure it, such as days and years. We can
of a square, and many others. conceive a beginning of these sensible mea
The parts of duration have to other parts sures of time, and say that there was a time
of it the relations of prior and posterior, when they were not, a time undistinguished
and to the present they have the relations by any motion or change; but to say that
of past and future. The notion of past is there was a time before all time, is a con
immediately suggested by memory, as has tradiction.
been before observed. And when we have All limited duration is comprehended in
got the notions of present and past, and of time, and all limited extension in space.
prior and posterior, we can from these These, in their capacious womb, contain all
frame a notion of the future; for the future finite existences, but are contained by none.
is that which is posterior to the present. Created things have their particular place
Nearness and distance are relations equally in space, and their particular place in time;
applicable to time and to place. Distance in but time is everywhere, and spaceatalitimes.
time, and distance in place, are things so They embrace each the other, and have that
different in their nature and so like in their mysterious union which the schoolmen con
relation, that it is difficult to determine ceived between soul and body. The whole
whether the name of distance is applied to of each is in every part of the other.
both in the same, or an anological sense. We are at a loss to what category or class
The extension of bodies which we per of things we ought to refer them. They
ceive by our senses, leads us necessarily to are not beings, but rather the receptacles
the conception and belief of a space which of every created being, without which it
remains immoveable when the body is re could not have had the possibility of exist
moved. And the duration of events which ence. Philosophers have endeavoured to
we remember leads us necessarily to the reduce all the objects of human thought to
conception and belief of a duration which these three classes, of substances, modes,
would have gone on uniformly though the and relations. To which of them shall we
event had never happened." refer time, space, and number, the most
Without space there can be nothing that common objects of thought? [314]
is extended. And without time there Sir Isaac Newton thought that the Deity,
can be nothing that hath duration. This I by existing everywhere and at all times,
think undeniable; and yet we find that ex constitutes time and space, immensity and
tension and duration are not more clear and eternity. This probably suggested to his
intelligible than space and time are dark and great friend, Dr Clarke, what he calls the
£ objects of contemplation. [313] argument a priori for the existence of an
As there must be space wherever any immense and eternal Being. Space and
thing extended does or can exist, and time time, he thought, are only abstract or par
tial conceptions of an immensity and eter
* If Space and Time be necessary Generalizations
nity which forces itself upon our belief.
from experience, this is contrary to Reid's own doc And as immensity and eternity are not
trine, that experience can give us no necessary know substances, they must be the attributes of a
ledge. If, again, they be necessary and original Being who is necessarily immense and
notions, the account of their origin here given, is in
correct. It should have been said that experience is eternal. These are the speculations of men
not the source of their existence, but only the occa of superior genius. But whether they be
sion of their manifestation. On this subject, see,
instar omnium, Cousin on Locke, in his “Cours as solid as they are sublime, or whether
de Philosophie," (t., ii., Leçons 17 and 18.) This they be the wanderings of imagination in a
admirable work has been well translated into Eng
lish, by an American philosopher, Mr. Henry; but region beyond the limits of human under
the eloquence and precision of the author can only standing, I am unable to determine.
be properly appreciated by those who study the work The schoolmen made eternity to be a
in the original language. The reader may, however,
consult likewise Stewart's “Phil hical Essays.” nunc stans—that is, a moment of time that
(Essay ii., chap. 2,) and Royer Collard's “Frag stands still. This was to put a spoke into
ments,” (ar. and x.) These authors, from their more the wheel of time, and might give satisfac
imited acquaintance with the speculations of the Ger
roan philosophers, are, however, less on a level with tion to those who are to be satisfied by
the problem.-H. words without meaning. But I can as
313, 314]
344 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essay 11,
easily believe a circle to be a square as quent step that supposes it to be his do
time to stand still. inft.
Such paradoxes and riddles, if I may so #rom this it is evident that we must
call them, men are involuntarily led into have the conviction of our own continued
when they reason about time and space, existence and identity, as soon as we are
and attempt to comprehend their nature. capable of thinking or doing anything, on
They are probably things of which the hu account of what we have thought, or done,
man faculties give an imperfect and inade or suffered before; that is, as soon as we
quate conception. Hence difficulties arise are reasonable creatures.
which we in vain attempt to overcome, and That we may form as distinct a notion as
doubts which we are unable to resolve. weareableof this phenomenon of the human
Perhaps some faculty which we possess not, mind, it is proper to consider what is meant
is necessary to remove the darkness which by identity in general, what by our own
hangs over them, and makes us so apt to personal identity, and how we are led into
bewilder ourselves when we reason about that invincible belief and conviction which
them. [315] every man has of his own personal identity,
as far as his memory reaches.
Identity in general, I take to be a rela
CHAPTER IV. tion between a thing which is known to
exist at one time, and a thing which is
of identity. known to have existed at another time."
If you ask whether they are one and the
THE conviction which every man has of same, or two different things, every man of
his Identity, as far back as his memory common sense understands the meaning of
es, needs no aid of philosophy to your question perfectly. Whence we may
strengthen it; and no philosophy can weaken infer with certainty, that every man of
it, without first producing some degree of common sense has a clear and distinct no
insanity. tion of identity.
The philosopher, however, may very If you ask a definition of identity, I con
properly consider this conviction as a phae fess I can give none; it is too simple a no
momenon of human nature worthy of his tion to admit of logical definition. I can
attention. If he can discover its cause, an say it is a relation; but I cannot find words
addition is made to his stock of knowledge. to express the specific difference between
If not, it must be held as a part of our ori this and other relations, though I am in no
ginal constitution, or an effect of that con danger of confounding it with any other.
stitution produced in a manner unknown I can say that diversity is a contrary rela
to us. tion, and that similitude and dissimilitude
We may observe, first of all, that this con are another couple of contrary relations,
viction is indispensably necessary to all ex which every man easily distinguishes in his
ercise of reason. The operations of reason, £" from identity and diversity.
whether in action or in speculation, are 317
made up of successive parts. The antece i *evidently that identity supposes
dent are the foundation of the consequent, an uninterrupted continuance of existence.
and, without the conviction that the ante That which hath ceased to exist, cannot be
cedent have been seen or done by me, I the same with that which afterwards begins
could have no reason to proceed to the con to exist; for this would be to suppose a
sequent, in any speculation, or in any being to exist after it ceased to exist, and
active project whatever. to have had existence before it was produced,
There can be no memory of what is past which are manifest contradictions. Con
without the conviction that we existed at tinued uninterrupted existence is therefore
the time remembered. There may be good necessarily implied in identity.
arguments to convince me that I existed Hence we may infer that identity cannot,
before the earliest thing I can remember; in its proper sense, be applied to our pains,
but to suppose that my memory reaches a our pleasures, our thoughts, or any opera
moment farther back than my belief and tion of our minds. The pain felt this day
conviction of my existence, is a contradic is not the same individual pain which I felt
tion. yesterday, though they may be similar in
The moment a man loses this conviction, kind and degree, and have the same cause.
as if he had drunk the water of Lethe, past The same may be said of every feeling and
things are done away; and, in his own of every operation of mind: they are all
belief, he then begins to exist. [316] * Identity is a relation between our cognitions of
Whatever was thought, or said, or done, a thing, and not between...things themselves it
or suffered before that period, may belong would, therefore, have been better in this sentence to
to some other person; but he can never have said, “a relations between a thing as knosen to
exist at one time, and a thing as knoten to exist at
impute it to himself, or take any subse another time."-H.
[315-3177
CHAP. Iv.] OF IDENTITY. 345
successive in their nature, like time itself, convinces him that he existed at the time
no two moments of which can be the same remembered.
Inorilent. Although memory gives the most irre
It is otherwise with the parts of absolute sistible evidence of my being the identical
space. They always are, and were, and person that did such a thing, at such a time,
will be the same. So far, I think, we pro I may have other good evidence of things
ceed upon clear ground in fixing the notion which befel me, and which I do not remem
of identity in general. ber: I know who bare me and suckled me,
It is, perhaps, more difficult to ascertain but I do not remember these events. [319]
with precision the meaning of Personality; It may here be observed, (though the
but it is not necessary in the present sub observation would have been unnecessary if
ject: it is sufficient for our purpose to some great philosophers had not contra
observe, that all mankind place their per dicted it,) that it is not my remembering
sonality in something that cannot be divided, any action of mine that makes me to be
or consist of parts. A part of a person is the person who did it. This remembrance
a manifest absurdity. makes me to know assuredly that I did it;
When a man loses his estate, his health, but I might have done it though I did not
his strength, he is still the same person, remember it. That relation to me, which
and has lost nothing of his personality. If is expressed by saying that I did it, would
he has a leg or an arm cut off, he is the be the same though I had not the least re
same person he was before. The amputated membrance of it. To say that my remem
member is no part of his person, otherwise bering that I did such a thing, or, as some
it would have a right to a part of his choose to express it, my being conscious
estate, and be liable for a part of his en that I did it, makes me to have done it,
gagements; it would be entitled to a share of appears to me as great an absurdity as it
his merit and demerit—which is manifestly would be to say, that my belief that the
absurd. A person is something indivisible, world was created made it to be created.
and is what Leibnitz calls a monad. [318] When we pass judgment on the identity
My personal identity, therefore, implies of other persons besides ourselves, we pro
the continued existence of that indivisible ceed upon other grounds, and determine
thing which I call myself. Whatever this from a variety of circumstances, which
self may be, it is something which thinks, sometimes produce the firmest assurance,
and deliberates, and resolves, and acts, and and sometimes leave room for doubt. The
suffers. I am not thought, I am not action, identity of persons has often furnished mat
I am not feeling; I am something that ter of serious litigation before tribunals of
thinks, and acts, and suffers. My thoughts, justice. But no man of a sound mind ever
and actions, and feelings, change every doubted of his own identity, as far as he
moment—they have no continued, but a distinctly remembered.
successive existence; but that self or I, to The identity of a person is a perfect
which they belong, is permanent, and has the identity; wherever it is real, it admits of no
same relation to all the succeeding thoughts, degrees; and it is impossible that a person
actions, and feelings, which I call mine. should be in part the same, and in part
Such are the notions that I have of my different; because a person is a monad, and
personal identity. But perhaps it may be is not divisible into parts. The evidence of
said, this may all be fancy without reality. identity in other persons besides ourselves
How do you know?—what evidence have does indeed admit of all degrees, from what
you, that there is such a permanent self we account certainty to the least degree of
which has a claim to all the thoughts, probability. But still it is true that the
actions, and feelings, which you call yours? same person is perfectly the same, and can
To this I answer, that the proper evi not be so in part, or in some degree only.
dence I have of all this is remembrance. I For this cause, I have first considered
remember that, twenty yearsago, Iconversed personal identity, as that which is perfect
with such a person; I remember several in its kind, and the natural measure of that
things that passed in that conversation; which is imperfect. [320]
my memory testifies not only that this was We probably at first derive our notion of
done, but that it was done by me who now identity from that natural conviction which
remember it. If it was done by me, I must every man has from the dawn of reason of
have existed at that time, and continued to his own identity and continued existence.
exist from that time to the present: if the The operations of our minds are all succes
identical person whom I call myself, had sive, and have no continued existence. But
not a part in that conversation, my memory the thinking being has a continued exist
is fallacious—it gives a distinct and positive ence; and we have an invincible belief that
testimony of what is not true. Every man it remains the same when all its thoughts
in his senses believes what he distinctly and operations change.
remembers, and everything he remembers Our judgments of the identity of objects
[318–320]
346 ON THE INTELLEUTUAL POWERS. [Essay 111.
of sense seem to be formed much upon the mon language are made consistent with
same grounds as our judgments of the identity, differ from those that are thought
identity of other persons besides ourselves. to destroy it, not in kind, but in number
Wherever we observe great similarity, and degree. It has no fixed nature wher.
we are apt to presume identity, if no reason applied to bodies; and questions about the
appears to the contrary. Two objects ever identity of a body are very often questions
so like, when they are perceived at the same about words. But identity, when applied
time, cannot be the same; but, if they are to persons, has no ambiguity, and admits
presented to our senses at different times, not of d or of more and less. It is
we are apt to think them the same, merely the foundation of all rights and obligations,
from their similarity. and of all accountableness; and the notion
Whether this be a natural prejudice, or of it is fixed and precise. [322]
from whatever cause it proceeds, it cer
tainly appears in children from infancy;
and, when we grow up, it is confirmed in CHAPTER V.
most instances by experience; for werarely
find two individuals of the same species that MR LOCKE's Account of The origiN of our
are not distinguishable by obvious differ IDEAs, AND PARTICULARLY of THE IDEA
ences. of DuRATION,
A man challenges a thief whom he finds
in possession of his horse or his watch, onlyIt was a very laudable attempt of Mr
on similarity. When the watchmaker Locke “to inquire into the original of those
swears that he sold this watch to such a ideas, notions, or whatever you please to
person, his testimony is grounded on simi call them, which a man observes, and is
larity. The testimony of witnesses to the conscious to himself he has in his mind,
identity of a person is commonly grounded and the ways whereby the understanding
on no other evidence. comes to be furnished with them." No
Thus it appears that the evidence we man was better qualified for this investi
have of our own identity, as far back as we gation; and I believe no man ever en
remember, is totally of a different kind from gaged in it with a more sincere love of
the evidence we have of the identity of other truth.
persons, or of objects of sense. The first His success, though great, would, I ap
is grounded on memory, and gives un prehend, have been greater, if he had not
doubted certainty. The last is grounded on too early formed a system or hypothesis
similarity, and on other circumstances, upon this subject, without all the caution
which in many cases are not so decisive as and patient induction, which is necessary
to leave no room for doubt. [321] in drawing general conclusions from facts.
It may likewise be observed, that the The sum of his doctrine I take to be
identity of objects of sense is never perfect. this—“That all our ideas or notions may
All bodies, as they consist of innumerable be reduced to two classes, the simple and
parts that may be disjoined from them by the complex: That the simple are purely
a great variety of causes, are subject to the work of Nature, the understanding
continual changes of their substance, in being merely passive in receiving them :
creasing, diminishing, changing insensibly. That they are all suggested by two powers
When such alterations are gradual, because of the mind-to wit, Sensation and Reflec
language could not afford a different name tion;" and that they are the materials of
for every different state of such a change all our knowledge. That the other class of
able being, it retains the same name, and complex ideas are formed by the under
is considered as the same thing. Thus standing itself, which, being once stored
we say of an old regiment that it did such a with simple ideas of sensation and reflec
thing a century ago, though there now is not tion, has the power to repeat, to compare,
a man alive who then belonged to it. We say and to combine them, even to an almost
a tree is the same in the seed-bed and in the
infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure
forest. A ship of war, which has successively new complex ideas: but that is not in the
changed her anchors, her tackle, her sails, power of the most exalted wit, or enlarged
her masts, her planks, and her timbers, while
she keeps the same name, is the same. * That Locke did not (as even Mr Stewart sup
The identity, therefore, which we ascribe poses) introduce Reflection, either name or thing,
to bodies, whether natural or artificial, is into the philosophy of mind, see Note I. Not
he even the *: explicitly to enunciate Sense
not perfect identity; it is rather some was and Reflection as the two sources of our knowledge;
thing which, for the conveniency of speech, for 1 can shew that this had been done in a far more
we call identity. It admits of a great philosophical manner by some of the schoolmen;
Reflection with them not being merely, as with
change of the subject, providing the change Locke, a source of adventitious, irical, or a pos.
be gradual, sometimes even of a total teriori knowledge, but the mean by which we dia.
change. And the changes which in com which the intellect itself contains.-H. cognitions
close also the native, pure, or a prior
[321, 322]
chap. v.] LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF THE IDEA OF DURATION. 347
understanding, by any quickness or variety which is more common, and therefore more
of thought, to invent or frame one new proper" than the sense which Mr Locke
simple idea in the mind, not taken in by has put upon it, it may be justly said to be
the two ways before-mentioned. [323] That, the only source of all our distinct and ac
as our power over the material world reaches curate notions of things. For, although our
only to the compounding, dividing, and first notions of material things are got by
putting together, in various forms, the the external senses, and our first notions of
matter which God has made, but reaches the operations of our own minds by con
not to the production or annihilation of a sciousness, these first notions are neither
single atom; so we may compound, com simple nor clear. Our senses and our con
pare, and abstract the original and simple sciousness are continually shifting from one
ideas which Nature has given us; but are object to another; their operations are tran
anable to fashion in our understanding any sient and momentary, and leave no distinct
simple idea, not received in by our senses notion of their objects, until they are re
from external objects, or by reflection from called by memory, examined with attention,
the operations of our own mind about them.” and compared with other things.
This account of the origin of all our ideas This reflection is not one power of the
is adopted by Bishop Berkeley and Mr mind; it comprehends many; such as re
Hume; but some very ingenious philoso collection, attention, distinguishing, com
phers, who have a high esteem of Locke's paring, judging. By these powers our minds
Essay, are dissatisfied with it. are furnished not only with many simple
Dr Hutcheson of Glasgow, in his “In and original notions, but with all our notions,
guiry into the Ideas of Beauty and Virtue,” which are accurate and well defined, and
lias endeavoured to shew that these are which alone are the proper materials of
original and simple, ideas, furnished by reasoning. Many of these are neither no
original powers, which he calls the sense of tions of the objects of sense, nor of the
beauty and the moral sense. operations of our own minds, and therefore
Dr Price, in his “Review of the Principal neither ideas of sensation, nor of reflection,
Questions and Difficulties in Morals,” has in the sense that Mr Locke gives to reflec
observed, very justly, that, if we take the tion. But, if any one chooses to call them
words sensation and reflection, as Mr Locke ideas of reflection, taking the word in the
has defined them in the beginning of his more common and proper sense, I have no
excellent Essay, it will be impossible to objection. [325]
derive some of the most important of our Mr Locke seems to me to have used the
ideas from them; and that, by the under word reflection sometimes in that limited
standing—that, is byour judging and reason sense which he has given to it in the defi
ing power—we are furnished with many nition before mentioned, and sometimes to
simple and original notions. have fallen unawares into the common sense
Mr Locke says that, by reflection, he of the word; and by this ambiguity his ac
would be understood to mean “the notice count of the origin of our ideas is darkened
which the mind takes of its own operations, and perplexed.
and the manner of them.” This, I think, we Having premised these things in general
commonly call consciousness; from which, of Mr Locke's theory of the origin of our
indeed, we derive all the notions we have ideas or notions, I proceed to some observ
of the operations of our own minds; and he ations on his account of the idea of dura
often speaks of the operations of our own tion.
minds, as the only objects of reflection. “Reflection,” he says, “upon the train of
When reflection is taken in this confined ideas, which appear one after another in our
sense, to say that all our ideas are ideas minds, is that which furnishes us with the
either of sensation or reflection, is to say idea of succession; and the distance between
that everything we can conceive is either any two parts of that succession, is that we
some object of sense or some operation of call duration.”
our own minds, which is far from being If it be meant that the idea of succession
true. [324] is prior to that of duration, either in time
But the word reflection is commonly used or in the order of nature, this, I think, is
in a much more extensive sense; it is ap impossible, because succession, as Dr Price
plied to many operations of the mind, with justly observes, presupposes duration, and
more propriety than to that of conscious can in no sense be prior to it; and there
ness. We reflect, when we her, or
call to mind what is past, and survey it * This is not correct; and the employment of
with attention. We reflect, when we define, Reflection in another meaning than that of iris-Pech
*** **wré-the reflex knowledge or consciousness
when we distinguish, when we judge, when which the mind has of its own affections—is wholly a
we reason, whether about things material secondary and less proper signification. See Note I.
or intellectual. I may again notice, that Reid vacillates in thernean
ing he gives to the term Reflection. Compare above,
When reflection is taken in this sense, p.232, note *, and below, under p. 516.-H.
[323-325]
348 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [EssAY 111
fore it would be more proper to derive the meaning. [327] But, if we speak philoso
idea of succession from that of duration. phically, the senses do not testify what we
But how do we get the idea of succession? saw, but only what we see; what I saw
It is, says he, by reflecting upon the train last moment I consider as the testimony of
of ideas which appear one after another in sense, though it is now only the testimony
our minds. of memory.
Reflecting upon the train of ideas can be There is no necessity in common life of
nothing butrememberingit, andgiving atten dividing accurately the provinces of sense
tion to what our memory testifies concern and of memory; and, therefore, we assign to
ing it; for, if we did not remember it, we sense, not an indivisible point of time, but
could not have a thought about it. So that that small portion of time which we call the
it is evident that this reflection includes present, which has a beginning, a middle,
remembrance, without which there could be and an end.
no reflection on what is past, and conse Hence, it is easy to see that, though, in
quently no idea of succession. [326] common language, we speak with perfect
It may here be observed, that, if we speak propriety and truth, when we say that we
strictly and philosophically, no kind of suc see a body move, and that motion is an ob
cession can be an object either of the senses ject of sense, yet when, as philosophers, we
or of consciousness; because the operations distinguish accurately the province of sense
of both are confined to the present point of from that of memory, we can no more see
time, and there can be no succession in a what is past, though but a moment ago,
point of time; and on that account the mo than we can remember what is present; so
tion of a body, which is a successive change that, speaking philosophically, it is only by
of place, could not be observed by the senses the aid of memory that we discern motion,
alone without the aid of memory. or any succession whatsoever. We see the
As this observation seems to contradict present place of the body; we remember
the common sense and common language of the successive advance it made to that
mankind, when they affirm that they see a place : the first can then only give us a
body move, and hold motion to be an object conception of motion when joined to the last.
of the senses, it is proper to take notice, that Having considered the account given by
this contradiction between the philosopher Mr. Locke, of the idea of succession, we
and the vulgar is apparent only, and not shall next consider how, from the idea of
real. It arises from this, that philosophers succession, he derives the idea of duration.
and the vulgar differ in the meaning they “The distance,” he says, “between any
put upon what is called the present time, parts of that succession, or between, the
and are thereby led to make a different limit appearance of any two ideas in our minds,
between sense and memory. is that we call duration.”
Philosophers give the name of the pre To conceive this the more distinctly, let
sent to that indivisible point of time, which us call the distance between an idea and
divides the future from the past : but the that which immediately succeeds it, one ele
vulgar find it more convenient in the affairs ment of duration ; the distance between an
of life, to give the name of present to a por idea, and the second that succeeds it, two
tion of time, which extends more or less, elements, and so on : if ten such elements
according to circumstances, into the past or make duration, then one must make dura
the future. Hence we say, the present tion, otherwise duration must be made up of
hour, the present year, the present century, parts that have no duration, which is im
though one point only of these periods can possible. [328]
be present in the philosophical sense. For, suppose a succession of as many
It has been observed by grammarians, ideas as you please, if none of these ideas
that the present tense in verbs is not con have duration, nor any interval of duration
fined to an indivisible point of time, but is be between one and another, then it is
so far extended as to have a beginning, a perfectly evident there can be no interval
middle, and an end; and that, in the most of duration between the first and the last,
copious and accurate languages, these dif how great soever their number be. I con
ferent parts of the present are distinguished clude, therefore, that there must be dura
by different forms of the verb. tion in every single interval or element of
As the purposes of conversation make it which the whole duration is made up.
convenient to extend what is called the pre Nothing indeed, is more certain, than that
sent, the same reason leads men to extend every elementary part of duration Innst
the province of sense, and to carry its limit have duration, as every elementary part of
as far back as they carry the present. Thus extension must have extension.
a man may say, I saw such a person just Now, it must be observed that, in these
now : it would be ridiculous to find fault elements of duration, or single intervals of
with this way of speaking, because it is successive ideas, there is no succession of
authorized by custom, and has a distinct ideas; yet we must conceive them to have
[326–328]
chap. v.] LOCKES ACCOUNT OF THE IDEA OF DURATION. 340
duration; whence we may conclude with If the idea of duration were got merely
certainty, that there is a conception of du by the succession of ideas in our minds,
ration, where there is no succession of ideas that succession must, to ourselves, appear
in the mind. equally quick at all times, because the only
We may measure duration by the suc measure of duration is the number of suc
cession of thoughts in the mind, as we mea ceeding ideas; but I believe every man
sure length by inches or feet; but the notion
capable of reflection will be sensible, that
or idea of duration must be antecedent to at one time his thoughts come slowly and
the mensuration of it, as the notion of heavily, and at another time have a much
length is antecedent to its being measured. quicker and livelier motion. [330]
Mr Locke draws some conclusions from I know of no ideas or notions that have
his account of the idea of duration, which a better claim to be accounted simple and
may serve as a touchstone to discover how original than those of Space and Time. It
far it is genuine. One is, that, if it were is essential both to space and time to be
possible for a waking man to keep only one made up of parts; but every part is similar
idea in his mind without variation, or the to the whole, and of the same nature. Dif
succession of others, he would have no per ferent parts of space, as it has three dimen
ception of duration at all; and the moment sions, may differ both in figure and in mag
he began to have this idea, would seem to nitude; but time having only one dimen
have no distance from the moment he sion, its parts can differ only in magnitude;
ceased to have it. and, as it is one of the simplest objects of
Now, that one idea should seem to have thought, the conception of it must be purely
no duration, and that amultiplication of that the effect of our constitution, and given us
no duration should seem to have duration, by some original power of the mind.
appears to me as impossible as that the The sense of seeing, by itself, gives us
multiplication of nothing should produce the conception and belief of only two dimen
something. [329] sions of extension, but the sense of touch
Another conclusion which the author discovers three; and reason, from the con
draws from this theory is, that the same templation of finite extended things, leads
period of duration appears long to us when us necessarily to the belief of an immensity
the succession of ideas in our mind is quick, that contains them." In like manner, me
and short when the succession is slow. mory gives us the conception and belief of
There can be no doubt but the same finite intervals of duration. From the con
length of duration appears in some circum templation of these, reason leads us neces
stances much longer than in others; the sarily to the belief of an eternity, which
time appears long when a man is impatient comprehends all things that have a begin
under any pain or distress, or when lie is ning and end." Our conceptions, both of
eager in the expectation of some happiness. space and time, are probably partial and
On the other hand, when he is pleased and inadequate,t and, therefore, we are apt to
happy in agreeable conversation, ordelighted lose ourselves, and to be embarrassed in
with a variety of agreeable objects that our reasonings about them.
strike his senses or his imagination, time Our understanding is no less puzzled
flies away, and appears short. when we consider the minutest parts of
According to Mr Locke's theory, in the time and space than when we consider the
first of these cases, the succession of ideas whole. We are forced to acknowledge
is very quick, and in the last very slow. I that in their nature they are divisible with
am rather inclined to think that the very out end or limit; but there are limits be
eontrary is the truth. When a man is racked yond which our faculties can divide neither
with pain, or with expectation, he can the one nor the other.
hardly think of anything but his distress; It may be determined by experiment,
and the more his mind is occupied by that what is the least angle under which an
sole object, the longer the time appears. object may be discerned by the eye, and
On the other hand, when he is entertained what is the least interval of duration that
with cheerful music, with lively conversa may be discerned by the ear. I believe
tion, and brisk sallies of wit, there seems these may be different in different persons:
to be the quickest succession of ideas, but But surely there is a limit which no
the time appears shortest. man can exceed: and what our faculties
I have heard a military officer, a man of can no longer divide is still divisible in it
candour and observation, say, that the time
he was engaged in hot action always ap passing; very long in retrospect. The cause is ob
vious.-fi.
peared to him much shorter than it really * See above, p. 343, note *.-H.
was. Yet I think it cannot be supposed + They are not probably but necessarily partial
that the succession of ideas was then slower and inadequate. For we are unable itively to
than usual." conceive Time or Space, either as infinite. (i. e.,
without limits,) or as not infinite (i.e., as limited."
* in travelling, the time-seems very short while -**.
[329, 330]
350 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essay in.
self, and, by beings of superior perfection, his “Analogy,” with whose sentiments I
may be divided into thousands of parts. perfectly agree.
[331 Identity, as was observed, Chap. IV. of
I'… reason to believe, that a good eye this Essay, supposes the continued existence
in the prime of life may see an object under of the being of which it is affirmed, and
an angle not exceeding half a minute of a therefore can be applied only to things which
degree, and I believe there are some human have a continued existence. While any
eyes still more perfect. But even this de being continues to exist, it is the same being:
gree of perfection will appear great, if we but two beings which have a different be
consider how small a part of the retina of ginning or a different ending of their exist
the eye it must be which subtends an angle ence, cannot possibly be the same. To this
of half a minute. I think Mr Locke agrees.
Supposing the distance between the centre He observes, very justly, that to know
of the eye and the retina to be six or seven what is meant by the same person, we must
tenths of an inch, the subtense of an angle consider what the word person stands for;
of half a minute to that radius, or the and he defines a person to be an intelligent
breadth of the image of an object seen under being, endowed with reason and with con
that angle, will not be above the ten thou sciousness, which last he thinksiuseparable
sandth part of an inch. This shews such from thought.
a wonderful degree of accuracy in the re From this definition of a person, it must
fracting power of a good eye, that a pencil necessarily follow, that, while the intelligent
of rays coming from one point of the object being continues to exist and to be intelli
shall meet in one point of the retina, so as gent, it must be the same person. To say
not to deviate from that point the ten that the intelligent being is the person, and
thousandth part of an inch. It shews, yet that the person ceases to exist, while
likewise, that such a motion of an object as the intelligent : continues, or that the
makes its image on the retina to move the person continues while the intelligent being
ten thousandth part of an inch, is discern ceases to exist, is to my apprehension a
ible by the mind. manifest contradiction. [333]
In order to judge to what degree of ac One would think that the definition of a
curacy we can measure short intervals of person should perfectly ascertain the nature
time, it may be observed that one who has of personal identity, or wherein it consists,
given attention to the motion of a Second though it might still be a question how we
pendulum, will be able to beat seconds for come to know and be assured of our per
a minute with a very small error. When sonal identity.
he continues this exercise long, as for five Mr Locke tells us, however, “that per
or ten minutes, he is apt to err, more even sonal identity—that is, the sameness of a
than in proportion to the time–for this rational being-consists in consciousness
reason, as I apprehend, that it is difficult to alone, and, as far as this consciousness can
attend long to the moments as they pass, be extended backwards to any past action
without wandering after some other object or thought, so far reaches the identity of
of thought. that person. So that, whatever hath the
I have found, by some experiments, that consciousness of present and past actions,
a man may beat seconds for one minute, is the same person to whom they belong.”
without erring above one second in the
whole sixty; and I doubt not but by long #: * See Essay, (Book ii, ch. 27, & 9). The passage
as a quotation in the text, is the sum of
practice he might do it still more accurately. ke's doctrine, but not exactly in his words. Long
From this I think it follows, that the six before Butler, to whom the merit is usually ascribed,
Locke's doctrine of Personal Identity had been
tieth part of a second of time is discernible attacked and refuted. This was done even by his
bv the human mind. [332] earliest critic, John Sergeant, whose words, as he
is an author wholly unknown to all historians of phi
losophy, and his works of the rarest, I shall quote.
He thus argues:-"The former distinction forelaid,
CHAPTER VI. he (Locke) proceeds to make personal identity in man
to consist in the consciousness that we are the same
thinking thing in different times and-places. He
of MR LOCKE's Account of our PERSoNAL proves it, because consciousness is inseparable from
iDENTity. thinking, and, as it seems to him, essential to it.
Perhaps he may have had second thoughts, since he
writ his 19th Chapter, where, $ 4, he thought it
In a long chapter upon Identity and probable that Thinking is but the action, and not the
essence of the soul. is reason here is-‘ Because
Diversity, Mr Locke has made many in 'tis impossible for any to perceive, without perceiving
genious and just observations, and some that he does perceive, which I have shewn above to
which I think cannot be defended. I shall be so far from impossible, that the contrary is such.
only take notice of the account he gives of But, to speak to the point : Consciousness of any
action or other accident we have now, or have had,
our own Personal Identity. His doctrine is nothing but our knowledge that it belonged to us;
upon this subject has been censured by and, since we both segree that we have no.innate
knowledges, it follows, that all, both actual and habi
Bishop Butler, in a short essay subjoined to tual knowledges, which we have, are acquired orac.
| 331-333"
-- ~~~~~-- *-* .
chAP. v1.] LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF OUR PERSONAL IDENTITY. 351

This doctrine hath some strange conse he was conscious of his having been flogged
quences, which the author was aware of, at school, and that when made a general he
Such as, that, if the same consciousness can was conscious of his taking the standard,
be transferred from one intelligent being to but had absolutely lost the consciousness of
another, which he thinks we cannot shew his flogging. [334]
to be impossible, then two or twenty intel These things being supposed, it follows,
ligent beings may be the same person. And from Mr Locke's doctrine, that he who was
if the intelligent being may lose the con flogged at school is the same person who
sciousness of the actions done by him, which took the standard, and that he who took the
surely is possible, then he is not the person standard is the same person who was made
that did those actions; so that one intelli a general. Whence it follows, if there be
gent being may be two or twenty different any truth in logic, that the general is the
persons, if he shall so often lose the con same person with him who was flogged
sciousness of his former'actions. at school. But the general's consciousness
There is another consequence of this does not reach so far back as his flogging—
doctrine, which follows no less necessarily, therefore, according to Mr Locke's doctrine,
though Mr Locke probably did not see it. he is not the person who was flogged.
It is, that a man may be, and at the same Therefore, the general is, and at the same
time not be, the person that did a particular time is not the same person with him who
action. was flogged at school."
Suppose a brave officer to have been Leaving the consequences of this doctrine
fiogged when a boy at school, for robbing to those who have leisure to trace them, we
an orchard, to have taken a standard from may observe, with regard to the doctrine
the enemy in his first campaign, and to have itself
been made a general in advanced life: Sup First, That Mr Locke attributes to con
pose also, which must be admitted to be sciousness the conviction we have of our
possible, that, when he took the standard, past actions, as if a man may now be con
- of what he did twenty years ago.
It is impossible to understand the meaning
cidental to the subject or knower. Wherefore-the of this, unless by consciousness be meant
man, or that thing, which, is to be the knower, must
have had individuality, or personality, from other memory, theonly faculty by which we have an
principles, antecedently to this knowledge, called immediate knowledge of our past actions.t
consciousness: and, cons tly, he will retain his Sometimes, in popular discourse, a man
identity, or continue the same man, or (which is
equivalent) the same person, as long as he has those says he is conscious that he did such a
individuating principles. What those principles are thing, meaning that he distinctly remembers
which constitute this man, or this knowing indivi
dawn, I have shewn above, , , 6.7. It being then that he did it. It is unnecessary, in com
most evident, that a man must be the same, ere he can mon discourse, to fix accurately the limits
Know or be conscious that he is the same, all his between consciousness and memory. This
laborious descants and extravagant, consequences
which are built upon this supposition, that conscious was formerly shewn to be the case with re
ness individuates the person, can need no farther
refutation."
gard to sense and memory ; and, therefore,
distinct remembrance is sometimes called
The same objection was also made by Leibnitz in
his strictures on Locke's Essay. Inter alia, he says sense, sometimes consciousness, without
“Pour ce quiest du soi il sera bon de le distinguer any inconvenience.
de Fapparence du soi et de laconsciosite Le soi fait But this ought to be avoided in philoso
fidentité reelle et physique, et l'apparence du soi,
accompagnée de laverité, yjoint l'identite personelle. phy, otherwise we confound the different
Ainsi ne voulant point dire, que l'identité personelle powers of the mind, and ascribe to one what
nes'étend pas plus loin Quele souvenir, jedirois encore
moins que le soi ou l'identité physique en dépend. really belongs to another. If a man can be
L'identité reele et personellese prouvelle plus certain conscious #.what he did twenty years or
ment qu'il se peut en matière de fait, par la réflexion
résenteet immediate; ellese prouve suffisament pour twenty minutes ago, there is no use for
"ordinaire par notre souvenir d’intervalle ou par le memory, nor ought we to allow that there
temeignage conspirant des autres. Mais si Dieu is any such faculty. [335] The faculties of
changeoit extraordinairment l'identité reele, la per
sonelle demeuroit, pourvu que l'homme conservât consciousness and memory are chiefly dis
tinguished by this, that the first is an im
les apparences d'identité, tant les internes, (c'est a
dire de la conscience,) que les externes, comme celles
qui consistent dans ce qui paroit aux autres. Ainsi mediate knowledge of the present, thesecond
la conscience n'est pas le seul moyen"de constituer an immediate knowledge of the past.:
ridentité personelle, et le rapport d'autrui ou mème When, therefore, Mr Locke's notion of
d'autres marquesy peuvent suppléer. Mais ily a dela
difficulté, s'iise trouve contradiction entre ces diver
ses apparences. conscience se peut taire comme * Compare sur
(Remarques Buffier's
Locke,“Traité
$ 505,)des
whopremieres
makes aVériter."
similar
dans foubli; mais-sielle disoit bien clairment des
choses, qui iussent contraires aux autres apparences, criticism.-H.
on seroit embarassé dans la decision et comme sus. # Locke,
Reid, it will be remembered,
view consciousness does
as a co-ordinate not, with
faculty like
F: quelques fois entre deux, possibilités, celle de memory; but under consciousness he properly com;
*rreur du notre souvenir et celle de quelque decep
tion dans les apparences externes.” prehends the various faculties as so many special
For the best criticism of Locke's doctrine of Perso modifications.-H. - -
nal identity, I may, however, refer the reader to M. + as already

knowledge of thefrequently stated, an immediate
past is contradictory. This ob
Cossin's “Cours de Philosophie," t. ii., Leçon xviii.,
p. 140-198.-H. servation i cannot again repeat. See Note B.-H.
[334, 335]
352 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. LEssAY III.
personal identity is properly expressed, it is fore, if personal identity consisted in con
that personal identity consists in distinct sciousness, it would certainly follow that no
remembrance; for, even in the popular man is the Bame person any two moments
sense, to say that I am conscious of a past of his life; and, as the right and justice of
action, means nothing else than that I dis reward and punishment is founded on per
tinctly remember that I did it. sonal identity, no man could be responsible
Secondly, It may be observed, that, in for his actions.
this doctrine, not only is consciousness con But, though I take this to be the una
founded with memory, but, which is still voidable consequence of Mr Locke's doc
more strange, personal identity is confounded trine concerning personal identity, and
with the evidence which we have of our though some persons may have liked the
personal identity. doctrine the better on this account, I am
It is very true that my remembrance far from imputing anything of this kind to
that I did such a thing is the evidence I Mr Locke. He was too good a man not to
have that I am the identical person who did have rejected with abhorrence a doctrine
it. And this, I am apt to think, Mr Locke which he believed to draw this consequence
meant. But, to say that my remembrance after it. [337]
that I did such a thing, or my conscious Fourthly, There are inany expressions
ness, makes me the person who did it, is, in used by Mr Locke, in speaking of personal
my apprehension, an absurdity too gross to identity, which, to me, are altogether unin
be entertained by any man who attends to telligible, unless we suppose that he con
the meaning of it; for it is to attribute to founded that sameness or identity which we
memory or consciousness, a strange magi ascribe to an individual, with the identity
cal power of producing its object, though which, incommon discourse, isoften ascribed
that object must have existed before the to many individuals of the same species.
memory or consciousness which produced it. When we say that pain and pleasure,
Consciousness is the testimony of one consciousness and memory, are the same in
faculty; memory is the testimony of another all men, this sameness can only mean simi
faculty. And, to say that the testimony is larity, or sameness of kind; but, that the
the cause of the thing testified, this surely pain of one man can be the same individual
is absurd, if anything be, and could not pain with that of another man, is no less
have been said by Mr Locke, if he had not impossible than that one man should be
confounded the testimony with the thing another man; the pain felt by me yester
testified. day can no more be the pain I feel to-day,
When a horse that was stolen is found than yesterday can be this day; and the
and claimed by the owner, the only evidence same thing may be said of every passion
he can have, or that a judge or witnesses and of every operation of the mind. The
can have that this is the very identical horse same kind or species of operation may be
which was his property, is similitude. [336] in different men, or in the same man at
But would it not be ridiculous from this to different times; but it is impossible that the
infer that the identity of a horse consists in same individual operation should be in dif
similitude only * The only evidence I have ferent men, or in the same man at different
that I am the identical person who did such times.
actions is, that I remember distinctly I did - When Mr Locke, therefore, speaks of “the
them; or, as Mr Locke expresses it, I am same consciousness being continued through
conscious I did them. To infer from this, a succession of different substances;” when
that personal identity consists in conscious he speaks of “repeating the idea of a past
ness, is an argument which, if it had any action, with the same consciousness we had
force, would prove the identity of a stolen of it at the first,” and of “the same con
horse to consist solely in similitude. sciousness extending to actions past and to
Thirdly, Is it not strange that the same come”—these expressions are to me unin
ness or identity of a person should consist telligible, unless he means not the same in
in a thing which is continually changing, dividual consciousness, but a consciousness
and is not any two minutes the same P that is similar, or of the same kind.
Our consciousness, our memory, and If our personal identity consists in con
every operation of the mind, are still flow sciousness, as this consciousness cannot be
ing, like the water of a river, or like time the same individually any two moments,
itself. The consciousness I have this but only of the same kind, it would follow
moment can no more be the same conscious that we are not for any two moments the
ness I had last moment, than this moment same individual persons, but the same kind
can be the last moment. Identity can only of persons.
be affirmed of things which have a continued As our consciousness sometimes ceases
existence. Consciousness, and every kind to exist, as in sound sleep, our personal
of thought, is transient and momentary, and identity must cease with it. Mr Locke
has no continued existence; and, there allows, that the same thing cannot have
[336, 337]
on AP. v11.] THEORIES CONCERNING MEMORY.
two beginnings of existence; so that our and which, by being thus preserved, be
identity would be irrecoverably gone every comes the cause of our having Memory.
time we cease to think, if it was but for a Now, such a sort of relict, and, as it were,
a moment." [338] impression, they call Phancy or Imagina
tion.”*
Another passage from Alcinous Of the
CHAPTER VII. Doctrines of Plato, chap. 4, shews the agree
ment of the ancient Platonists and Peripa
*higo Riks CoNCERNING MEMiðft Y tetics in this theory —“When the form or
type of things is imprinted on the mind by
THE common theory of ideas—that is, the organs of the senses, and so imprinted
of images in the brain or in the mind, of as not to be deleted by time, but preserved
all the objects of thought—has been very firm and lasting, its preservation is called
generally applied to account for the facul Memory.” [339]
ties of memory and imagination, as well as Upon this principle, Aristotle imputes the
that of perception by the senses. shortness of memory in children to this
The sentiments of the Peripatetics are cause—that their brain is too moist and soft
expressed by Alexander Aphrodisiensis, to retain impressions made upon it: and
one of the earliest Greek commentators on the defect of memory in old men he imputes,
Aristotle, in these words, as they are trans on the contrary, to the hardness and rigidity
lated by Mr Harris in his “Hermes:”— of the brain, which hinders its receiving
“Now, what Phancy or Imagination is, we any durable impression.*
may explain as follows:–We may conceive This ancient theory of the cause of
tobeformed within us, from the operations of memory is defective in two respects: First,
our senses about sensible objects, some Im If the cause assigned did really exist, it by
pression, as it were, or Picture, in our origi no means accounts for the phaenomenon;
nal Sensorium, being a relict of that motion and, secondly, There is no evidence, nor
caused within us by the external object; a even probability, that that cause exists.
relict which, when the external object is It is probable that in perception some
no longer present, remains, and is still impression is made upon the brain as well
preserved, being, as it were, its Image, as upon the organ and nerves, because all
the nerves terminate in the brain, and be
cause disorders and hurts of the brain are
* It is here proper to insert Reid's remarks on
Personal Identity, as published by Lord Kames, in found to affect our powers of perception
his “Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural when the external organ and nerve are
Religion,” (third edition, p. 204.) These, perhaps,
might have more appropriately found their place in found; but we are totally ignorant of the
the Correspondence of our Author. nature of this impression upon the brain :
“To return to our subject,” says his Lordship,
“Mr Locke, writing on personal identity, has fallen it can have no resemblance to the object
short of his usual accuracy. He inadvertently jumbles perceived, nor does it in any degree ac
together the identity that is nature's work, with
our knowledge of it. Nay, he expresses himselfsome. count for that sensation and perception
times as if identity had no other foundation than which are consequent upon it. These things
that knowledge. I am favoured by Dr Reid with the have been argued in the second Essay, and
following thoughts on personal identity: shall now be taken for granted, to prevent
“All men agree that personality is indivisible; a
rt of a person is an absurdity. A man who loses repetition.
is estate, his health, an arm, or a leg, continues still If the impression upon the brain be insuf
to bethe same person. My personal identity, therefore, ficient to account for the perception of ob
is the continued existence of that indivisible thing
which I call myself. I am not thought; I am not jects that are present, it can as little account
action; I am not feeling; but I think, and act, and for the memory of those that are past.
feel. Thoughts, actions, feelings, change every
moment; but self to which they belong, is perman So that, if it were certain that the im
ent. If it be asked how I know that it is permanent, pressions made on the brain in perception
the answer is, that I know it from memory. Every remain as long as there is any memory of
thing I remember to have seen, or heard, or done, or
suffered, convinces me that I existed at the time the object, all that could be inferred from
remembered. But, though it is from memory that I this, is, that, by the laws of Nature, there
have the knowledge of my personal identity, yet per is a connection established between that im
sonal identity must exist in nature, independent of
memory; otherwise, I should only be the same per pression, and the rememberance of that
son as far as my memory serves me; and what would object. But how the impression contributes
become of my existence during the intervals wherein
my memory has failed me? My rememberance of any
of my actions does not make me to be the person who * The inference founded on these passages, is alto
did the action, but only makes me know that I was gether erroneous. See Note K.-H.
the person who did it. And yet it was Mr Locke's + In this whole statement Reid is wrong. In the
opinion, that my remembrance of an action is what first place, Aristotle did not impute the detect of
makes me to be the person who did it; a pregnant memory in children and old ns to any const tu
instance that even men of the greatest genius may tion of the Brain, for, in his doctrine, the Heart,
sometimes fall into an absurdity. Is it not an obvious and not the Brain, is the primary sensorium in which
corollary, from Mr Locke's opinion, that he never the impression is made. In the second place, the
was born ? He could not remember his birth; and, term impression (rises), is used by Aristotle, in an
therefore, was not the person born at such a place
and at such a time.'"-H
a's", not in a literal signification. See Note K.
[338,339] - ‘: A
*
to this remembrance, we should be quite times covered with rubbish, and on other
ignorant; it being impossible to discover occasions made legible; for the memory of
how thought of any kind should be pro things is often interrupted for a long time,
duced, by an impression on the brain, or and circumstances bring to our recollection
upon any part of the body. [340] what had been long forgot. After all, many
To say that this impression is memory, is things are remembered which were never
absurd, if understood literally. If it is only perceived by the senses, being no objects of
meant that it is the cause of memory, it sense, and therefore which could make no
ought to be shewn how it produces this impression upon the brain by means of the
effect, otherwise memory remains as unac senses.
countable as before. Thus, when philosophers have piled one
If a philosopher should undertake to ac supposition upon another, as the giants piled
count for the force of gunpowder in the the mountains in order to scale the heavens,
discharge of a musket, and then tell us all is to no purpose-memory remains unac
gravely that the cause of this phaenomenon countable; and we know as little how we
is the drawing of the trigger, we should not remember things past, as how we are con
be much wiser by this account. As little scious of the present.
are we instructed in the cause of memory, But here it is proper to observe, that,
by being told that it is caused by a certain although impressions upon the brain give
impression on the brain. For, supposing no aid in accounting for memory, yet it is
that impression on the brain were as neces very probable that, in the human frame,
sary to memory as the drawing of the trigger memory is dependent on some proper state
is to the discharge of the musket, we are or temperament of the brain."
still as ignorant as we were how memory is Although the furniture of our memory
produced; so that, if the cause of memory, bears no resemblance to any temperament
assigned by this theory, did really exist, it of brain whatsoever, as indeed it is impos
does not in any degree account for memory. sible it should, yet nature may have sub
Another defect in this theory is, that jected us to this law, that a certain consti
there is no evidence nor probability that tution or state of the brain is necessary to
the cause assigned does exist; that is, that memory. That this is really the case,
the impression made upon the brain in per many well-known facts lead us to con
ception remains after the object is removed. clude. [342]
That impression, whatever be its nature, It is possible that, by accurate observa
is caused by the impression made by the tion, the proper means may be discovered
object upon the organ of sense, and upon of preserving that temperament of the brain
the nerve. Philosophers suppose, without which is favourable to memory, and of
any evidence, that, when the object is re remedying the disorders of that tempera
moved, and the impression upon the organ ment. This would be a very noble im
and nerve ceases, the impression upon the provement of the medical art. But, if it
brain continues, and is permanent; that is, should ever be attained, it would give no
that, when the cause is removed, the effect aid to understand how one state of the brain
continues. The brain surely does not ap assists memory, and another hurts it.
pear more fitted to retain an impression I know certainly, that the impression
than the organ and nerve. made upon my hand by the prick of a pin
But, granting that the impression upon occasions acute pain. But can any philo
the brain continues after its cause is re sopher shew how this cause produces the
moved, its effects ought to continue while, effect? The nature of the impression is
it continues; that is, the sensation and here perfectly known; but it gives no help
rception should be as permanent as the to understand how that impression affects
impression upon the brain, which is sup the mind; and, if we knew as distinctly that
d to be their cause. But here again state of the brain which causes memory,
the philosopher makes a second supposition, we should still be as ignorant as before how
with as little evidence, but of a contrary that state contributes to memory. We
nature—to wit, that, while the cause re might have been so constituted, for anything
mains, the effect ceases. [341] that I know, that the prick of a pin in the
If this should be granted also, a third hand, instead of causing pain, should cause
must be made–That the same cause which remembrance; nor would that constitution
at first produced sensation and perception, be more unaccountable than the present.
does afterwards produce memory—an opera The body and mind operate on each other,
tion essentially different, both from sensa
tion and perception. * Nothing more was meant by the philosopher in
A fourth supposition must be made question, than that memory is, as Reid himself ad
That this cause, though it be permanent, mits, dependent on a certain state of the brain, and
on some unknown effect determined in it, to which
does not produce its effect at all times; it they gave the metaphorical name-impression, trace,
must be like an inscription which is some type, &c.-H.
[340–342.]
cHAP. v11.] THEORIES CONCERNING MEMORY, 355
according to fixed laws of nature; and it is are laid up when not perceived, and again
the business of a philosopher to discover brought forth as there is occasion, I take
those laws by observation and experiment: this to be popular and rhetorical. [344]
but, when he has discovered them, he must For the author tells us, that when they are
rest in them as facts whose cause is in not perceived, they are nothing, and no
scrutable to the human understanding. where, and therefore can neither be laid up
Mr Locke, and those who have followed in a repository, nor drawn out of it.
him, speak with more reserve than the But we are told, “That this laying up of
ancients," and only incidentally, of impres our ideas in the repository of the memory
sions on the brain as the cause of memory, signifies no more than this, that the mind
and impute it rather to our retaining in our has a power to revive perceptions, which it
minds the ideas got either by sensation or once had, with this additional perception
reflection. annexed to them, that it has had them
This, Mr Locke says, may be done two before.” This, I think, must be understood
ways-“First, By keeping the idea for some literally and philosophically.
time actually in view, which is called con But it seems to me as difficult to revive
templation; Secondly, By the power to re things that have ceased to be anything, as
vive again in our minds those ideas which, to lay them up in a repository, or to bring
after imprinting, have disappeared, or have them out of it. When a thing is once
been, as it were, laid out of sight; and this annihilated, the same thing cannot be again
is memory, which is, as it were, the store produced, though another thing similar to
house of our ideas.” [343] it may. Mr Locke, in another place,
To explain this more distinctly, he imme acknowledges that the same thing cannot
diately adds the following observation : have two beginnings of existence; and that
“But our ideas being nothing but actual things that have different beginnings are
perceptions in the mind, which cease to be not the same, but diverse. From this it
anything when there is no perception of follows, that an ability to revive our ideas
them, this laying up of our ideas in the or perceptions, after they have ceased to be,
repository of the memory signifies no more can signify no more but an ability to create
but this, that the mind has a power, in new ideas or perceptions similar to those we
many cases, to revive perceptions which it had before.
once had, with this additional perception They are said “to be revived, with this
annexed to them, that it has had them additional perception, that we have had them
before; and in this sense it is, that our ideas before.” This surely would be a fallacious
are said to be in our memories, when indeed perception, since they could not have two
they are actually nowhere; but only there beginnings of existence : nor could we be
is an ability in the mind, when it will, to lieve them to have two beginnings of exist
revive them again, and, as it were, paint ence. We can only believe that we had
them anew upon itself, though some with formerly ideas or perceptions very like to
more, some with less difficulty, some more them, though not identically the same. But
lively, and others more obscurely.” whether we perceive them to be the same,
In this account of memory, the repeated or only like to those we had before, this
use of the phrase, as it were, leads one to perception, one would think, supposes a
judge that it is partly figurative; we must remembrance of those we had before, other
therefore endeavour to distinguish the figu wise the similitude or identity could not be
rative part from the philosophical. The perceived.
first, being addressed to the imagination, Another phrase is used to explain this
exhibits a picture of memory, which, to reviving of our perceptions—“The mind,
have its effect, must be viewed at a proper as it were, paints them anew upon itself.”
distance and from a particular point of [345] There may be something figurative
view. The second, being addressed to the in this; but, making due allowance for that,
understanding, ought to bear a near inspec it must imply that the mind, which paints
tion and a critical examination. the things that have ceased to exist, must
The analogy between memory and a re have the memory of what they were, since
pository, and between remembering and every painter must have a copy either before
retaining, is obvious, and is to be found in his eye, or in his imagination and memory.
all languages, it being very natural to ex These remarks upon Mr Locke's account
press the operations of the mind by im of memory are intended to shew that his
taken from things material. But, in : system of ideas gives no light to this faculty,
losophy we ought to draw aside the veil of but rather tends to darken it; as little does
imagery, and to view them naked. it make us understand how we remember,
When, therefore, memory is said to be a and by that means have the certain know
repository or storehouse of ideas, where they ledge of things past.
* This is hardly correct. See Note K.-H. Every man knows what memory is, and
has a distinct notion of it. 2
But
A 2when Mr
[343-345]
356 ON THE INTELLECTUAL P() WERS. [EssAY 111.
Locke speaks of a power to revive in the standing his great judgment and candour,
mind those ideas which, after imprinting, his understanding was entangled by the
have disappeared, or have been, as it were, ambiguity of the word idea, and that most
laid out of sight, one would hardly know of the imperfections of his Essay are owing
this to be memory, if he had not told us. to that cause.
There are other things which it seems to Mr Hume saw farther into the conse
resemble at least as much. I see before quences of the common system eoncerning
me the picture of a friend. I shut my eyes, ideas than any author had done before him.
or turn them another way, and the picture He saw the absurdity of making every object
disappears, or is, as it were, laid out of sight. of thought double, and splitting it into a
I have a power to turn my eyes again to remote object, which has a separate and
wards the picture, and immediately the per permanent existence, and an immediate
ception is revived. But is this memory? object, called an idea or impression, which
No surely; yet it answers the definition as is an image of the former, and has no ex
well as memory itself can do." istence, but when we are conscious of it.
We may observe, that the word percep According to this system, we have no in
tion is used by Mr Locke in too indefinite tercourse with the external world, but by
a way, as well as the word idea. means of the internal world of ideas, which
Perception, in the chapter upon that sub represents the other to the mind.
ject, is said to be the first faculty of the He saw it was necessary to reject one
mind exercised about our ideas. Here we of these worlds as a fiction, and the question
are told that ideas are nothing but percep was, Which should be rejected?—whether
tions. Yet, I apprehend, it would sound all mankind, learned and unlearned, had
oddly to say, that perception is the first feigned the existence of the external world
faculty of the mind exercised about percep without good reason; or whether philoso
tion; and still more strangely to say, that phers had feigned the internal world of ideas,
ideas are the first faculty of the mind ex in order to account for the intercourse of
ercised about our ideas. But why should the mind with the external 2 [347] Mr
not ideas be a faculty as well as perception, Hume adopted the first of these opinions,
if both are the same ** [346] and employed his reason and eloquence in
Memory is said to be a power to revive support of it.
our perceptions. Will it not follow from Bishop Berkeley had gone so far in the
this, that everything that can be remem same track as to reject the material world
bered is a perception? If this be so, it will as fictitious; but it was left to Mr Hume
be difficult to find anything in nature but to complete the system.
perceptions.# According to his system, therefore, im
Our ideas, we are told, are nothing but pressions and ideas in his own mind are
actual perceptions; but, in many places of the only things a man can know or can
the Essay, ideas are said to be the objects conceive. Nor are these ideas representa
of perception, and that the mind, in all its tives, as they were in the old system.
thoughts and reasonings, has no other im There is nothing else in nature, or, at least,
mediate object which it does or can con within the reach of our faculties, to be re
template but its own ideas. Does it not presented. What the vulgar call the per
appear from.this, either that Mr Locke held ception of an external object, is nothing but
the operations of the mind to be the same a strong impression upon the mind. What
thing with the objects of those operations,S we call the remembrance of a past event,
or that he used the word idea sometimes in is nothing but a present impression or idea,
one sense and sometimes in another, with weaker than the former. And what we call
out any intimation, and probably without imagination, is still a present idea, but
any apprehension of its ambiguity ? It is weaker than that of memory.
an article of Mr Hume's philosophy, that That I may not do him injustice, these
there is no distinction between the opera are his words in his “Treatise of Human
tions of the mind and their objects.S. But Nature,” [vol. I.] page 193.
I see no reason to impute this opinion to “We find by experience that, when any
Mr Locke. I rather think that, notwith impression has been present with the mind,
*To some of the preceding strictures on Locke's it again makes its appearance there as an
account of memory, excuses might competently be idea; and this it may do after two different
pleaded.-H. ways, either when in its new appearance it
t This critirism only shews the propriety of the
distinction of perception and percept. Locke and retains a considerable degree of its first
other.philosophers use the word perception, 18, for vivacity and is somewhat intermediate be
the act or faculty of perceiving; 29, for that which is twixt an impression and an-idea, or when it
perceived—the idea in their doctrine; and 3°, for
either or both indifferently.-H. entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect
: See above p. 222, b, note *; p. 280, a note*.-H. idea. The faculty by which we repeat our
. . The term object being then used for the imme
a' olject-viz., that of which we are conscious. impressions in the first manner, is called
the memory, and the other the imagination.”
[346. 347]
©ii A.P. VII.
THEORIES CONCERNING MEMORY. 357
Upon this account of memory and imagi and, last of all, a perfect idea, which we call
nation, I shall make some remarks. [348] imagination : that this figurative meaning
First, I wish to know what we are here agrees best with the last sentence of the
to understand by experience? It is said, period, where we are told that memory and
we find all this by experience; and I con imagination are faculties, whereby we repeat
ceive nothing can be meant by this expe our impresions in a more or less lively
rience but memory—not that memory manner. To repeat an impression is a figur
which our author defines, but memory in ative way of speaking, which signifies making
the common acceptation of the word. Ac. a new impression similar to the former.
cording to vulgar apprehension, memory is If, to avoid the absurdity implied in the
an immediate knowledge of something past. literal meaning, we understand the philo
Our author does not admit that there is sopher in this figurative one, then his defini
any such knowledge in the human mind. tions of memory and imagination, when
He maintains that memory is nothing but stripped of the figurative dress, will amount
a present idea or impression. But, in de to this, That memory is the faculty of
fining what he takes memory to be, he takes making a weak impression, and imagination
for granted that kind of memory which he the faculty of making an impression still
rejects. For, can we find by experience, weaker, after a corresponding strong one.
that an impression, after its first appearanceThese definitions of memory and imagina
to the mind, makes a second and a third, with tion labour under two defects: First, That
different degrees of strength and vivacity, they convey no notion of the thing defined;
if we have not so distinct a remembrance of and, Secondly, That they may be applied to
its first appearance as enables us to know things of a quite different nature from those
it upon its second and third, notwithstand that are defined.
ing that, in the interval, it has undergone When we are said to have a faculty of
a very considerable change ** making a weak impression after a corre
All experience supposes memory; and sponding strong one, it would not be easy
there can be no such thing as experience, to conjecture that this faculty is memory.
without trusting to our own memory, or Suppose a man strikes his head smartly
that of others. So that it appears, from against the wall, this is an impression;
Mr Hume's account of this matter, that he now, he has a faculty by which he can
found himself to have that kind of memory repeat this impression with less force, so
which he acknowledges and defines, by ex as not to hurt him : this, by Mr Hume's
ercising that kind which he rejects. account, must be memory. [350] He
&e ondly, What is it we find by expe has a faculty by which he can just touch
rience or memory # It is, “That, when an the wall with his head, so that the impres
impression has been present with the mind, sion entirely loses its vivacity. This surely
it again makes its appearance there as an must be imagination; at least, it comes as
idea, and that after two different ways.” near to the definition given of it by Mr
If experience informs us of this, it cer Hume as anything I can conceive.
tainly deceives us; for the thing is impos Thirdly, We may observe, that, when we
sible, and the author shews it to be so. are told that we have a faculty of repeating
Impressions and ideas are fleeting, perish our impressions in a more or less lively
able things, which have no existence but manner, this implies that we are the effi
when we are conscious of them. If an im cient causes of our ideas of memory and
pression could make a second and a third imagination; but this contradicts what the
appearance to the mind, it must have a author says a little before, where he proves,
continued existence during the interval of by what he calls a convincing argument,
these appearances, which Mr Hume ac that impressions are the cause of their cor
knowledges to be a gross absurdity. [349] responding ideas. The argument that proves
It seems, then, that we find, by experience, this had need, indeed, to be very con
a thing which is impossible. We are in vincing; whether we make the idea to be
posed upon by our experience, and made to a second appearance of the impression, or a
believe contradictions. new impression similar to the former.
Perhaps it may be said, that these dif If the first be true, then the impression
ferent appearances of the impression are not is the cause of itself. If the second then
to be understood literally, but figuratively; the impression, after it is gone and has no
that the impression is personified, and made existence, produces the idea. Such are the
to appear at different times and in different mysteries of Mr Hume's philosophy.
habits, when no more is meant but that an It may be observed, that the common
impression appears at one time; afterwards system, that ideas are the only immediate
a thing of a middle nature, between an im objects of thought, leads to scepticism with
pression and an idea, which we call memory; regard to memory, as well as with regard to
the objects of sense, whether those ideas
* Sle Note B.-H. are placed in the mind or in the brain.
[218 -350)
Ideas are said to be things internal and comes to pass that perception and memory
present, which have no existence but during are accompanied with belief, while bareima
the moment they are in the mind. The gination is not? Though this belief can
objects of sense are things external, which not be justified upon his system, it ought to
have a continued existence. When it is be accounted for as a phaenomenon of hu
maintained that all that we immediately man nature. [352]
perceive is only ideas or phantasms, how This he has done, by giving us a new
can we, from the existence of those phan theory of belief in general ; a theory which
tasms, conclude the existence of an external suits very well with that of ideas, and seems
world corresponding to them ? to be a natural consequence of it, and which,
This difficult question seems not to have at the same time, reconciles all the belief
occurred to the Peripatetics." Des Cartes that we find in human nature to perfect
saw the difficulty, and endeavoured to find scepticism.
out arguments by which, from the existence What, then, is this belief? It must
of our phantasms or ideas, we might infer either be an idea, or some modification of
the existence of external objects. [351] The an idea; we conceive manythings which we
same course was followed by Malebranche, do not believe. The idea of an object is
Arnauld, and Locke; but Berkeley and the same whether we believe it to exist, or
Hume easily refuted all their arguments, barely conceive it. The belief adds no new
and demonstrated that there is no strength idea to the conception; it is, therefore, no
in them. thing but a modification of the idea of the
The same difficulty with regard to mem thing believed, or a different manner of
ory naturally arises from the system of conceiving it. Hear himself:
ideas; and the only reason why it was not “All the perceptions of the mind are of
observed by philosophers, is, because they two kinds, impressions and ideas, which
give less attention to the memory than to differ from each other only in their different
the senses; for, since ideas are things pre degrees of force and vivacity. Our ideas
sent, how can we, from our having a certain are copied from our impressions, and repre
idea presently in our mind, conclude that an sent them in all their parts. When you
event really happened ten or twenty years would vary the idea of a particular object,
ago, corresponding to it? you can only increase or diminish its force
There is the same need of arguments to and vivacity. If you make any other change
prove, that the ideas of memory are pictures upon it, it represents a different object or
of things that really did happen, as that the impression. The case is the same as in
ideas of sense are pictures of external objects colours. A particular shade of any colour
which now exist. In both cases, it will be may acquire a new degree of liveliness or
impossible to find any argument that has brightness, without any other variation;
real weight. So that this hypothesis leads but, when you produce any other variation,
us to absolute scepticism, with regard to it is no longer the same shade or colour. So
those things which we most distinctly re that, as belief does nothing but vary the
member, no less than with regard to the manner in which we conceive any object, it
external objects of sense. can only bestow on our ideas an additional
It does not appear to have occurred either force and vivacity. An opinion, therefore,
to Locke or to Berkeley, that their system or belief, may be most accurately defined a
has the same tendency to overturn the tes lively idea, related to or associated with a
timony of memory as the testimony of the present impression.”
senses.
This theory of belief is very fruitful of
Mr Hume saw farther than both, and eonsequences, which Mr Hume traces with
found this consequence of the system of his usual acuteness, and brings into the
ideas perfectly corresponding to his aim of service of his system. [353] A great part
establishing universal scepticism. His sys of his system, indeed, is built upon it; and
stem is therefore more consistent than it is of itself sufficient to prove what he
theirs, and the conclusions agree better with calls his hypothesis, “that belief is more
the premises. properly an act of the sensitive than of
But, if we should grant to Mr Hume that the cogitative part of our natures.”
our ideas of memory afford no just ground It is very difficult to examine this ac
to believe the past existence of things which count of belief with the same gravity with
we remember, it may still be asked, How it which it is proposed. It puts one in
* This is not correct. See above, p. 285, note +. mind of the ingenious account given by
To that note I may add, that no orthodox Catholic Martinus Scriblerus of the power of syllo
could be an Idealist. It was only the doctrine of gism, by making the major the male, and
transsubstantiation that prevented Malebranche from
pre-occupying the theory of Berkeley and Collier, the minor the female, which, being coupled
which was in fact his own, with the transcc.ndent by the middle term, generate the conclusion.
reality of a material world left out, as a Prote-tant
hors d'aruvre. This, it is curious, has never been There is surely no science in which men of
observed. See Note P.-H. great parts and ingenuity have fallen into
[351–353]
CHAP. v11.] THEORIES CONCERNING MEMORY. 359
such gross absurdities as in treating of the upon too slight a ground. For I cannot
powers of the mind. I cannot help think perceive that the apprehending an idea
ing that never anything more absurd was more strongly, or taking faster hold of it,
gravely maintained by any philosopher, expresses any other modification of the idea
than this account of the nature of belief, than what was before expressed by its
and of the distinction of perception, memory, strength and vivacity, or even that it ex
and imagination. presses the same modification more pro
The belief of a proposition is an opera perly. Whatever modification of the idea
tion of mind of which every man is con he makes belief to be, whether its vivacity,
scious, and what it is he understands per or some other without a name, to make
fectly, though, on account of its simplicity, perception, memory, and imagination to be
he cannot give a logical definition of it. If the different degrees of that modification,
he compares it with strength or vivacity of is chargeable with the absurdities we have
his ideas, or with any modification of ideas, mentioned.
they are so far from appearing to be one Before we leave this subject of memory,
and the same, that they have not the least it is proper to take notice of a distinction
similitude. which Aristotle makes between memory
That a strong belief and a weak belief and reminiscence, because the distinction
differ only in degree, I can easily compre has a real foundation in nature, though in
hend ; but that belief and no belief should our language, I think, we do not distinguish
differ only in degree, no man can believe them by different names. [355]
who understands what he speaks. For this Memory is a kind of habit which is not
is, in reality, to say that something and always in exercise with regard to things we
nothing differ only in degree; or, that remember, but is ready to suggest them
nothing is a degree of something. when there is occasion. The most perfect
Every proposition that may be the ob degree of this habit is, when the thing pre
ject of belief, has a contrary proposition sents itself to our remembrance spontane
that may be the object of a contrary belief. ously, and without labour, as often as there
The ideas of both, according to Mr Hume, is occasion. A second degree is, when the
are the same, and differ only in degrees of thing is forgot for a longer or shorter time,
vivacity—that is, contraries differ only in even when there is occasion to remember
degree; and so pleasure may be a degree it; yet, at last, some incident brings it to
of pain, and hatred a degree of love. [354] mind without any search. A third degree
But it is to no purpose to trace the absurd is, when we cast about and search for what
ities that follow from this doctrine, for nonewe would remember, and so at last find it
of them can be more absurd than the doc out. It is this last, I think, which Ari
trine itself. stotle calls reminiscence, as distinguished
Every man knows perfectly what it is to from memory.
see an object with his eyes, what it is to Reminiscence, therefore, includes a will
remember a past event, and what it is to to recollect something past, and a search for
conceive a thing which has no existence. it. But here a difficulty occurs. It may
That these are quite different operations of be said, that what we will to remember we
his mind, he is as certain as that sound must conceive, as there can be no will with
differs from colour, and both from taste; out a conception of the thing willed. A
and I can as easily believe that sound, and will to remember a thing, therefore, seems
colour, and taste differ only in degree, as to imply that we remember it already, and
that seeing, and remembering, and imagin have no occasion to search for it. But this
ing, differ only in degree. difficulty is easily removed. When we will
Mr Hume, in the third volume of his to remember a thing, we must remember
“Treatise of Human Nature,” is sensible something relating to it, which gives us a
that his theory of belief is liable to strong relative conception of it; but we may, at
objections, and seems, in some measure, to the same time, have no conception what the
retract it; but in what measure, it is not thing is, but only what relation it bears to
easy to say. He seems still to think that something else. Thus, I remember that a
belief is only a modification of the idea; friend charged me with a commission to be
but that vivacity is not a proper term to executed at such a place; but I have forgot
express that modification. Instead of it, what the commission was. By applying
he uses some analogical phrases, to explain my thought to what I remember concerning
that modification, such as “apprehending it, that it was given by such a person, upon
the idea more strongly, or taking faster such an occasion, in consequence of such a
hold of it.” conversation, I am led, in a train of thought,
There is nothing more meritorious in a to the verything I had forgot, and recol
philosopher than to retract an error upon lect distinctly what the commission was.
conviction; but, in this instance, I hum [356]
bly apprehend Mr Hume claims that merit Aristotle says, that brutes have not re
(354-356."
260 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essay rv
miniscence;" and this I think is probable; the first, without losing or misplacing one.
but, says he, they have memory. It cannot, Brutes certainly may learn much from ex
indeed, be doubted but they have something perience, which seems to imply memory.
very like to it, and, in some instances, in a Yet, I see no reason to think that brutes
very great degree. A dog knows his master measure time as men do, by days, months,
after long absence. A horse will trace backor years; or that they have any distinct
a road he has once gone, as accurately as aknowledge of the interval between things
man; and this is the more strange, that thewhich they remember, or of their distance
train of thought which he had in going mustfrom the present moment If we could not
be reversed in his return. It is very like record transactions according to their dates,
to some prodigious memories we read of, human memory would be something very
where a person, upon hearing an hundred different from what it is, and, perhaps, re
names or unconnected words pronounced, semble more the memory of brutes. [357
can begin at the last, and go backwards to
ESSAY IV.
OF CONCEPTION.
CHAPTER I. remembered that the most simple operations

of the mind cannot be logically defined. To
of coxcEPTION, or sIMPLE APPREHRNsion IN have a distinct notion of them, we must
GENERAL, attend to them as we feel them in our own
minds. He that would have a distinct
Conceiving, imagining, + apprehending, un motion of a scarlet colour, will never attain
derstanding, having a notion of a thing, are it by a definition; he must set it before his
eommon words, used to express that opera eye, attend to it, compare it with the colours
tion of the understanding which the logi that come nearest to it, and observe the
cians call simple apprehension. The having specific difference, which he will in vain
an idea of a thing, is, in common language, attempt to define.” [358]
used in the same sense, chiefly, I think, Every man is conscious that he can con
since Mr Locke's time.: ceive a thousand things, of which he believes
Logicians define Simple Apprehension to nothing at all—as a horse with wings, a
be the bare conception of a thing without mountain of gold; but, although concep
any judgment or belief about it. If this tion may be without any degree of belief,
were intended for a strictly logical definition, even the smallest belief cannot be without
it might be a just objection to it, that con conception. He that believes must have
ception and apprehension are only synony some conception of what he believes.
mous words ; and that we may as well Without attempting a definition of this
define conception by apprehension, as appre operation of the mind, I shall endeavour to
hension by conception; but it ought to be explain some of its properties; consider the
theories about it; and take notice of some
* This is a question which may be differently an mistakes of philosophers concerning it.
swered, according as we attribute a different meaning 1. It may be observed that conception
to the terms employed.-H. enters as an ingredient in every operation
f Imagining should not be confounded with Con
ceiving, &c.; though some philosophers, as Ga-sendi, of the mind. Our senses cannot give us the
have not attended to the distinction. The words belief of any object, without giving some
Conception, Concept, Notion, should be limited to the conception of it at the same time. No man
thought of what cannot be represented in the imagin
ation, as the thought suggested by a general term. can either remember or reason about things
The i.e. bnitzians call th: symbolical in contrast to of which he hath no conception. When
intuitive knowledge. This is the sense in which
conceptio-and conceptus have been i sually and cor we will to exert any of our active powers,
rectly employed. Mr Stewart, on. le other hand, there must be some conception of what we
arbitrarily limits Conception to the reproduction, in will to do. There can be no desire nor
imagination, of an object of sense as actually per
ceived. aversion, love nor hatred, without some con
Elements, vol. I., ch. iii. 1 cannot
ception of the object. We cannot feel pain
enter on a general criticism of Reid's momenclature,
though I may say something more of this in the without conceiving it, though we can con
sequel. See below, under pp. 371,482.-H.
t In this country should be added. Locke only ceive it without feeling it. These things
introduced into English philosophy the term idea in are self-evident.
its Cartesian universality. Prior to him, the word
was only used with us in its Platonic signification. In every operation of the mind, there
before Cartes. David Buchanan, a Scotch philo
sopher, who sojourned in Frence, had, however, em. * We do not define the specific difference, but we
ployed Idea in an equal latitude. See Note G. H. defire by it.-H.
[357, 358]
cIIAF. I.] OF SIMPLE APPREHENSION IN GENERAL. 361
fore, in everything we call thought, there foot or two broad—that is, this is his opinion:
must be conception. When we analyse the and, when we say it is a false notion or a
various operations either of the understand false conception, we mean that it is a false
ing or of the will, we shall always find this opinion. He conceives the city of London
at the bottom, like the caput mortuum of to be like his country village—that is, he
the chemists, or the materia prima of the believes it to be so, till he is better instructed.
Peripatetics; but, though there is no opera He conceives a lion to have horns; that is,
tion of mind without conception, yet it may he believes that the animal which men call
be found naked, detached from all others, a lion, has horns. Such opinions language
and then it is called simple apprehension, or authorizes us to call conceptions; and they
the bare conception of a thing. may be true or false. But bare conception,
As all the operations of our mind are ex or what the logicians call simple apprehen
pressed by language, every one knows that sion, implies no opinion, however slight,
it is one thing to understand what is said, and therefore can neither be true nor false.
to conceive or apprehend its meaning, What Mr Locke says of ideas (by which
whether it be a word, a sentence, or a dis word he very often means nothing but con
course; it is another thing to judge of it, ceptions) is very just, when the word idea
to assent or dissent, to be persuaded or is so understood. Book II., chap. xxxii., § 1.
moved. The first is simple apprehension, “Though truth and falsehood belong in
and may be without the last; but the last propriety of speech only to propositions, yet
cannot be without the first... [359] ideas are often termed true or false (as
2. In bare conception there can neither what words are there that are not used with
be truth nor falsehood, because it neither eat latitude, and with some deviation
affirms nor denies. Every judgment, and rom their strict and proper signification?)
every proposition by which judgment is though I think that when ideas themselves
expressed, must be true or false; and the are termed true or false, there is still some
qualities of true and false, in their proper secret or tacit proposition, which is the
sense, can belong to nothing but to judg foundation of that denomination: as we shall
ments, or to propositions which express see, if we examine the particular occasions
judgment. In the bare conception of a wherein they come to be called true or false;
thing there is no judgment, opinion, or be in all which we shall find some kind of
lief included, and therefore it cannot be affirmation or negation, which is the reason
either true or false. of that denomination; for our ideas, being
But it may be said, Is there anything nothing but bare appearances, or perceptions
more certain than that men may have true in our minds, cannot properly and simply
or false conceptions, true or false appre in themselves be said to be true or false, no
hensions, of things? I answer, that such more than a simple name of anything can
ways of speaking are indeed so common, be said to be true or false.”
and so well authorized by custom, the arbiter It may be here observed, by the way, that,
of language, that it would be presumption in this passage, as in many others, Mr
to censure them. It is hardly possible to Locke uses the word perception, as well as
avoid using them. But we ought to be the word idea, to signify what I call con
upon our guard that we be not misled by ception, or simple apprehension. And in
them, to confound things which, though his chapter upon perception, Book II., chap.
often expressed by the same words, are ix., he uses it in the same sense. Percep
really different. We must therefore re tion, he says, “as it is the first faculty of
member what was before observed, Essay I. the mind, exercised about our ideas, so it
chap. 1–that all the words by which we is the first and simplest idea we have from
signify the bare conception of a thing, are reflection, and is by some called thinking
likewise used to signify our opinions, when in general. . [361] It seems to be that
we wish to express them with modesty and which puts the distinction betwixt the ani
diffidence. And we shall always find, that, mal kingdom and the inferior parts of nature.
when we speak of true or false conceptions, It is the first operation of all our faculties,
we mean true or false opinions. An opinion, and the inlet of all knowledge into our
though ever so wavering, or ever so mo minds.”
destly expressed, must be either true or Mr Locke has followed the example given
false; but a bare conception, which ex by Des Cartes, Gassendi, and other Carte
presses no opinion or judgment, can be sians," in giving the name of perception to
neither. the bare conception of things: and he has
If we analyse those speeches in which been followed in this by Bishop Berkeley,
men attribute truth or falsehood to our
conceptions of things, we shall find in every * Gassendravas not a Cartesian, but an Anti-Car
case, that there is some opinion or judgment tesian, though he adopted several points in his phi
losophy from Pes Cartes-for example, the employ
implied in what they call conception. [360] ment of the term faea not in its Platonic limitation.
A child conceives the moon to be flat, and a
[339-361]
362 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essay 1".
Mr Hume, and many late philosophers, opinion; I know not how to reason with
when they treat of ideas. They have pro him. Why should philosophers confound
bably been led into this impropriety, by thethose operations in treating of ideas, when
common doctrine concerning ideas, which they would be ashamed to do it on other
teaches us, that conception, perception by occasions? To distinguish the various
the senses, and memory, are only different powers of our minds, a certain degree of
ways of perceiving ideas in our own minds." understanding is necessary. And if some,
If that theory be well founded, it will in through a defect of understanding, natural
deed be very difficult to find any specific or accidental, or from unripeness of under
distinction between conception;and percep standing, may be apt to confound different
tion.t. But there is reason to distrust any powers, will it follow that others cannot
philosophical theory when it leads men to clearly distinguish them?
corrupt language, and to confound, under To return from this digression—into which
one name, operations of the mind which the abuse of the word perception, by philo
common sense and common language teach sophers, has led me—it appears evident that
them to distinguish. the bare conception of an object, which
I grant that there are some states of the includes no opinion or judgment, can neither
mind, wherein a man may confound his be true nor false. Those qualities, in their
conceptions with what he perceives or re proper sense, are altogether inapplicable to
members, and mistake the one for the other: this operation of the mind.
as in the delirium of a fever, in some cases 3. Of all the analogies between the opera
of lunacy and of madness, in dreaming, and tions of body and those of the mind, there
perhaps in some momentary transports of is none so strong and so obvious to all man
devotion, or of other strong emotions, which kind as that which there is between paint
cloud his intellectual faculties, and, for a ing, or other plastic arts, and the power of
time, carry a man out of himself, as we conceiving objects in the mind. Hence, in
usually express it. all languages, the words by which thispower
Even in a sober and sound state of mind, of the mind and its various modifications
the memory of a thing may be so very weak are expressed, are analogical, and borrowed
that we may be in doubt whether we only from those arts. [363] We consider this
dreamed or imagined it. power of the mind as a plastic power, by
It may be doubted whether children, which we form to ourselves images of the
when their imagination first begins to work, objects of thought.
can distinguish what they barely conceive In vain should we attempt to avoid this
from what they remember. [362] I have analogical language, for we have no other
been told, by a man of knowledge and ob language upon the subject; yet it is danger
servation, that one of his sons, when he ous, and apt to mislead. All analogical and
began to speak, very often told lies with figurative words have a double meaning;
great assurance, without any intention, as and, if we are not very much upon our
far as appeared, or any consciousness of guard, we slide insensibly from the bor
guilt. From which the father concluded, rowed and figurative meaning into the pri
that it is natural to some children to lie. mitive. We are prone to carry the parallel
I am rather inclined to think that the child between the things compared farther than it
had no intention to deceive, but mistook the will hold, and thus very naturally to fall
rovings of his own fancy"for things which into error.
he remembered.: This, however, I take To avoid this as far as possible in the pre
to be very uncommon, after children can sent subject, it is proper to attend to the
communicate their sentiments by language, dissimilitude between conceiving a thing in
though perhaps not so in a more early the mind, and painting it to the eye, as well
period. as to their similitude. The similitude strikes
Granting all this, if any man will affirm and gives pleasure. The dissimilitude we
that they whose intellectual faculties are are less disposed to observe; but the philo
sound, and sober, and ripe, cannot with sopher ought to attend to it, and to carry it
certainty distinguish what they perceive or always in mind, in his reasonings on this
remember, from what they barely conceive, subject, as a monitor, to warn him against
when those operations have any degree of the errors into which the analogical lan
strength and distinctness, he may enjoy his guage is apt to draw him.
When a man paints, there is some work
* But see above, p. 280, a, notc. * et alibi.-H. done, which remains when his hand is taken
t Yet Reid himself defines Perception, a Conc off, and continues to exist though he should
tion (imagination) accompanied with a belief in the
existence of its object; and Mr Stewart reduces the think no more of it. Every stroke of his
specific difference, at best only a concomitant, to an pencil produces an effect, and this effect is
accidental circumstance, in holding that our im different from his action in making it; for
aginations are themselves conjoined with a tempo it remains and continues to exist when the
rary belief in their objective reality.-H.
: But comware above, p. 340, col. a.-H. action ceases. The action of painting is
| 362, 63.3%
cHAP. 1.] OF SIMPLE APPREHENSION 1N GENERAL, 363
one thing; the picture produced is another is a real image in the mind, which is the
thing. The first is the cause, the second is immediate object of conception, and distinct
the effect. from the act of conceiving it. I beg the
Let us next consider what is done when reader's indulgence to defer what may be
he only conceives this picture. He must said for or against this philosophical opinion
have conceived it before he painted it; for to the next chapter; intending in this only
this is a maxim universally admitted, that to explain what appears to me to belong to
every work of art must first be conceived in this operation of mind, without considering
the mind of the operator. What is this the theories about it. I think it appears,
conception? It is an act of the mind, a kind from what has been said, that the common
of thought. This cannot be denied. [364] language of those who have not imbibed any
But does it produce any effect besides the philosophical opinion upon this subject,
act itself? Surely common sense answers authorizes us to understand the conception
this question in the negative; for every of a thing, and an image of it in the mind,
pne knows that it is one thing to conceive, not as two different things, but as two dif
another thing to bring forth into effect. It ferent expressions, to signify one and the
is one thing to project, another to execute. same thing; and I wish to use common
A man may think for a long time what he words in their common acceptation.
is to do, and after all do nothing. Con 4. Taking along with us what is said in
ceiving, as well as projecting or resolving, the last article, to guard us against the se
are what the schoolmen called immanent acts duction of the analogical language used on
of the mind, which produce nothing beyond this subject, we may observe a very strong
themselves. But painting is a transitive analogy, not only between conceiving and
act, which produces an effect distinct from £in general, but between the dif
the operation, and this effect is the picture. erent kinds of our conceptions, and the
Let this, therefore, be always remembered, different works of the painter. He either
that what is commonly called the image of makes fancy pictures, or he copies from the
a thing in the mind, is no more than the painting of others, or he paints from the
act or operation of the mind in conceiving life; that is, from real objects of art or
it. nature which he has seen. I think our
That this is the common sense of men conceptions admit of a division very similar.
who are untutored by philosophy, appears First, There are conceptions which may
from their language. If one ignorant of the be called fancy pictures. They are com
language should ask, What is meant by monly called creatures of fancy, or of im
conceiving a thing? we should very natur agination. They are not the copies of any
ally answer, that it is having an image of original that exists, but are originals them
it in the mind—and perhaps we could not selves. Such was the conception which
explain the word better. This shews that Swift formed of the island of Laputa, and
conception, and the image of a thing in the of the country of the Lilliputians: Cer
mind, are synonymous expressions. The vantes of Don Quixote and his Squire;
image in the mind, therefore, is not the Harrington of the Government of Oceana;
object of conception, nor is it any effect and Sir Thomas More of that of Utopia.
produced by conception as a cause. It is We can give names to such creatures of
conception itself. That very mode of think imagination, conceive them distinctly, and
ing which we call conception, is by another reason consequentially concerning them,
name called an image in the mind." though they never had an existence. They
Nothing more readily gives the concep were conceived by their creators, and may
tion of a thing than the seeing an image of be conceived by others, but they never
it. Hence, by a figure common in language, existed. We do not ascribe the qualities
conception is called an image of the thing of true or false to them, because they are
conceived. But to shew that it is not a not accompanied with any belief, nor do they
real but a metaphorical image, it is called imply any affirmation or negation. . [366]
an image in the mind. We know nothing Setting aside those creatures of imagina
that is properly in the mind but thought; tion, there are other conceptions, which
and, when anything else is said to be in the may be called copies, because they have an
mind, the expression must be figurative, original or archetype to which they refer,
and signify some kind of thought. [365] and with which they are believed to agree;
I know that philosophers very unani and we call them true or false conceptions,
mously maintain, that in conception there according as they agree or disagree with
the standard to which they are referred.
* We ought, however, to distinguish Imagination These are of two kinds, which have different
and Image, Conception and Concept. Imagination
and Conception ought to be employed in speaking of standards or originals.
the mental modification, one and indivisible, con The first kind is analogous to pictures
sidered as an act; image and Concept, in speaking taken from the life. We have conceptions
of it, considered as a product or immediate object.
H of individual things that really exist, such
£364–366]
364 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. Les-AY v.
as the city of London, or the government false according as they agree or disagree
of Venice. Here the things conceived are with it. Thus, my conception of felony is
the originals; and our conceptions are called true and just, when it agrees with the
true when they agree with the thing con meaning of that word in the laws relating
ceived. Thus, my conception of the city of to it, and in authors who understand the
London is true, when I conceive it to be law. The meaning of the word is the
what it really is. thing conceived; and that meaning is the
Individual things which really exist, conception affixed to it by those who best
being the creatures of God, (though some understand the language.
of them may receive their outward form An individual is expressed in language
from man,) he only who made them knows either by a proper name, or by a general
their whole nature; we know them but in word joined to such circumstances as dis
part, and therefore our conceptions of them tinguish that individual from all others; if
must in all cases be imperfect and inade it is unknown, it may, when an object of
quate; yet they may be true and just, as sense, and within reach, be pointed out to
far as they reach. the senses; when beyond the reach of the
The second kind is analogous to the copies senses, it may be ascertained by a descrip
which the painter makes from pictures done tion, which, though very imperfect, may be
before. Such I think are the conceptions true, and sufficient to distinguish it from
we have of what the ancients called univer every other individual. Hence it is, that,
sals; that is, of things which belong or may in speaking of individuals, we are very little
belong to many individuals. These are in danger of mistaking the object, or tak
kinds and species of things; such as man ing one individual for another. [368]
or elephant, which are species of substances; Yet, as was before observed, our concep
wisdom or courage, which are species of tion of them is always inadequate and lame.
qualities; equality or similitude, which are They are the creatures of God, and there
species of relations." It may be asked are many things belonging to them which
From what original are these conceptions we know not, and which cannot be deduced
formed? And when are they said to be by reasoning from what we know. They
true or false? [367] have a real essence, or constitution of
It appears to me, that the original from nature, from which all their qualities flow:
which they are copied—that is, the thing but this essence our faculties do not com
conceived—is the conception or meaning prehend. They are therefore incapable of
which other men, who understand the definition; for a definition ought to com
language, affix to the same words. prehend the whole mature or essence of the
Things are parcelled into kinds and sorts, thing defined.
not by nature, but by men. The individual Thus, Westminster Bridge is an indi
things we are connected with, are so many, vidual object; though I had never seen
that to give a proper name to every indi or heard of it before, if I am only made
vidual would be impossible. We could to conceive that it is a bridge from West
never attain the knowledge of them that is minster over the Thames, this concep
necessary, nor converse and reason about tion, however imperfect, is true, and is
them, without sorting them according to sufficient to make me distinguish it, when
their different attributes. Those that agree it is mentioned, from every other object
in certain attributes are thrown into one that exists. The architect may have an
parcel, and have a general name given adequate conception of its structure, which
them, which belongs equally to every indi is the work of man; but of the materials,
vidual in that parcel. This common name which are the work of God, no man has an
must therefore signify those attributes adequate conception; and, therefore, though
which have been observed to be common the object may be described, it cannot be
to every individual in that parcel, and no defined.
thing else. Universals are always expressed by gene
That such general words may answer ral words; and all the words of language,
their intention, all that is necessary is, that excepting proper names, are general words;
those who use them should affix the same they are the signs of general concep
meaning or notion—that is, the same con tions, or of some circumstance relating
ception to them. The common meaning is to them. These general conceptions are
the standard by which such conceptions are formed for the purpose of language and
formed, and they are said to be true or reasoning; and the object from which they
are taken, and to which they are intended
* Of all such we can have no adequate imagination. to agree, is the conception which other men
A universal, when represented in imagination, is no
longer adequate, no longer a universal. We, cannot join to the same words; they may, there
have an image of Horse, but only of some individual fore, be adequate, and perfectly agree with
of that species We may, however, have a motion or the thing conceived. This implies no more
conception of it. Sce below, p. 482.-H.
than that men who speak the same language
[367, 368]
-- - - - - - - -
-----------" -> * * **
cita P. 1.] OF SIMPLE APPREHENSION IN GENERAL. 365
may perfectly agree in the meaning of in conversation, and the most acceptable in
many general words. their writings.
Thus mathematicians have conceived The liveliness of our conceptions proceeds
what they call a plane triangle. They from different causes. Some objects, from
have defined it accurately; and, when I their own nature, or from accidental asso
conceive it to be a plane surface, bounded ciations, are apt to raise strong emotions in
by three right lines, I have both a true and the mind. Joy and hope, ambition, zeal,
an adequate conception of it. [369] There and resentment, tend to enliven our con
is nothing belonging to a plane triangle ceptions; disappointment, disgrace, grief,
which is not comprehended in this conception and envy, tend rather to flatten them. Men
of it, or deducible from it by just reasoning. of keen passions are commonly lively and
This definition expresses the whole essence agreeable in conversation; and dispassion
of the thing defined, as every just definition ate men often make dull companions. There
ought to do; but this essence is only what is in some men a natural strengthsand vigour
Mr Locke very properly calls a nominal of mind which gives strength to their con
essence; it is a general conception formed ceptions on all subjects, and in all the occa
by the mind, and joined to a general word sional variations of temper.
as its sign. It seems easier to form a lively concep
If all the general words of a language had tion of objects that are familiar, than of
a precise meaning, and were perfectly un those that are not; our conceptions of visible
derstood, as mathematical terms are, all objects are commonly the most lively, when
verbal disputes would be at an end, and other circumstances are equal. Hence.
men would never seem to differ in opinion, poets not only delight in the description of
but when they differ in reality; but this is visible objects, but find means, by meta
far from being the case. The meaning of phor, analogy, and allusion, to clothe every
most general words is not learned, like that object they describe with visible qualities.
of mathematical terms, by an accurate The lively conception of these makes the
definition, but by the experience we happen object appear, as it were, before our eyes.
to have, by hearing them used in conversa Lord Kames, in his Elements of Criticism,
tion. From such experience, we collect has shewn of what importance it is in
their meaning by a kind of induction; and, works of taste, to give to objects described,
as this induction is, for the most part, lame what he calls ideal presence." To produce
and imperfect, it happens that different per this in the mind, is, indeed, the capital aim
sons join different conceptions to the same of poetical and rhetorical description. It
general word; and, though we intend to carries the man, as it were, out of himself,
give them the meaning which use, the and makes him a spectator of the scene
arbiter of language, has put upon them, described. This ideal presence seems to me,
this is difficult to find, and apt to be mis to be nothing else but a lively conception of
taken, even by the candid and attentive. the appearance which the object would make
Hence, in innumerable disputes, men do not if really present to the eye. [371]
really differ in their judgments, but in the Abstract and general conceptions are
way of expressing them. never lively, though they may be distinct;
Our conceptions, therefore, appear to be and, therefore, however necessary in philo
of three kinds. They are either the concep sophy, seldom enter into poetical descrip
tions of individual things, the creatures of tion without being particularised or clothed
God; or they are conceptions of the mean in some visible dress."
ing of general words; or they are the crea It may be observed, however, that our
tures of our own imagination: and these conceptions of visible objects become more
different kinds have different properties, lively by giving them motion, and more
which we have endeavoured to describe. still by giving them life and intellectual
5. Our conception of things may be strong qualities. Hence, in poetry, the whole crea
and lively, or it may be faint and languid in tion is animated, and endowed with sense
all degrees. These are qualities which pro and reflection.
rly belong to our conceptions, though we Imagination, when it is distinguished
ave no names for them but such as are from conception, seems to me to signify
analogical. Every man is conscious of such one species of conception—to wit, the con
a difference in his conceptions, and finds his
lively conceptions most agreeable, when the
* The 'E,&#2412, Troróa aris, Favrezia, "O-lis,
object is not of such a nature as to give Exxoralia, Visiones, of the ancient Rhetoricians.
pain. [370] fi.
Those who have lively conceptions, com + They thus cease to be aught abstract and general,
and become merely individual representations. . In
monly express them in a lively manner– precise language, they are no longer señuara, but
that is, in such a manner as to raise lively carraguára ; no longer Begriffe, but Anschatrungen :
conceptions and emotions in others. Such no longer notions or concepts, but images. The wor:
** £rticularier ought to have been individualised
persons are the most agreeable companions -H.
i899–371]
-- - -
366 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [EssAY Iv.
ception of visible objects." Thus, in a Sometimes one who has got through the
mathematical proposition, I imagine the first four books of Euclid's “Elements,”
figure, and I conceive the demonstration; and sees the force of the demonstrations,
it would not, I think, be improper to say, finds difficulty in the fifth. What is the
I conceive both ; but it would not be so reason of this ? You may find, by a little
proper to say, I imagine the demonstration. conversation with him, that he has not a
6. Our conceptions of things may be clear, clear and steady conception of ratios, and
distinct, and steady; or they may be ob of the terms relating to them. When the
scure, indistinct, and wavering. The live terms used in the fifth book have become
liness of our conceptions gives pleasure, familiar, and readily excite in his mind a
but it is their distinctness and steadiness clear and steady conception of their mean
that enables us to judge right, and to ing, you may venture to affirm that he will
express our sentiments with perspicuity. be able to understand the demonstrations
If we inquire into the cause, why, among of that book, and to see the force of them.
persons speaking or writing on the same [373]
subject, we find in one so much darkness, If this be really the case, as it seems to
in another so much perspicuity, I believe be, it leads us to think that men are very
the chief cause will be found to be, that much upon a level with regard to mere
one had a distinct and steady concep judgment, when we take that faculty apart
tion of what he said and wrote, and the from the apprehension or conception of the
other had not. Men generally find means things about which we judge; so that a
to express distinctly what they have con sound judgment seems to be the inseparable
ceived distinctly. Horace observes, that companion of a clear and steady apprehen
proper words spontaneously follow distinct sion. And we ought not to consider these
conceptions—“Verbaque provisam remnon two as talents, of which the one may fall to
invita sequuntur.” But it is impossible the lot of one man, and the other to the lot
that a man should distinctly express what of another, but as talents which always go
he has not distinctly conceived. [372] together.
We are commonly taught that perspicuity It may, however, be observed, that some
depends upon a proper choice of words, a of our conceptions may be more subservient
proper structure of sentences, and a proper to reasoning than others which are equally
order in the whole composition. All this clear and distinct. It was before observed,
is very true; but it supposes distinctness in that some of our conceptions are of indi
our conceptions, without which there can vidual things, others of things general and
be neither propriety in our words, nor in abstract. It may happen that a man who
the structure of our sentences, nor in our has very clear conceptions of things in
method. dividually, is not so happy in those of
Nay, 1 apprehend that indistinct con things general and abstract. And this I
ceptions of things are, for the most part, take to be the reason why we find men
the cause, not only of obscurity in writing who have good judgment in matters of
and speaking, but of error in judging. common life, and perhaps good talents for
Must not they who conceive things in the poetical or rhetorical composition, who find
same manner form the same judgment of it very difficult to enter into abstract reas
their agreements and disagreements? Is oning.
it possible for two persons to differ with That I may not appear singular in put
regard to the conclusion of a syllogism who ting men so much upon a level in point of
have the same conception of the premises? mere judgment, I beg leave to support this
Some persons find it difficult to enter opinion by the authority of two very think
into a mathematical demonstration. I be ing men, Des Cartes and Cicero. The
lieve we shall always find the reason to be, former, in his dissertation on Method, ex
that they do not distinctly apprehend it. presses himself to this purpose:—“Nothing
A man cannot be convinced by what he is so equally distributed among men as
does not understand. On the other hand, judgment." Wherefore, it seems reasonable
I think a man cannot understand a de to believe, that the power of distinguishing
monstration without seeing the force of it. what is true from what is false, (which we
I speak of such demonstrations as those properly call judgment or right reason,) is
of Euclid, where every step is set down, and by nature equal in all men; and therefore
nothing left to be supplied by the reader. that the diversity of our opinions does not
arise from one person being endowed with
* It is to be regretted that Reid did not more fully a greater power of reason than another, but
develope the distinction of Imagination and Concep. only from this, that we do not lead our
tion, on which he here and elsewhere inad |
touches. Imagination is not, though in conformity

to the etymology of the term, to be limited to the * “Judgment," bona mens, in the authentic
representation of visible objects. See below, under Latin translation. I cannot, at the moment, lay
[. 482. Neither ought the term conceive to be used hands on my copy of the French original; but, if I
n the extensive sense of understand.-H. recollect aright, it is there le bon sens.-H.
[372,373]
==~~" --~~~~"
~~~~~"--------"
cHAP. 1.] OF SIMPLE APPREHENSION IN GENERAL. 367

thought in the same track, nor attend to this is not an exception; because a parti
the same things.” |cular shade of a colour differs not specifically,
Cicero, in his third book “De Oratore,” but only in degree, from other shades of the
makes this observation—“It is wonderful same colour.
when the learned and unlearned differ so It is proper to observe, that our most
much in art, how little they differ in judg simple conceptions are not those which
ment. For art being derived from Nature, nature immediately presents to us. When
is good for nothing, unless it move and we come to years of understanding, we have
delight Nature.” [374] the power of analysing the objects of nature,
From what has been said in this article, of distinguishing their several attributes
it follows, that it is so far in our power to and relations, of conceiving them one by
write and speak perspicuously, and to reason one, and of giving a name to each, whose
justly, as it is in our power to form clear meaning extends only to that single attri
and distinct conceptions of the subject on bute or relation: and thus our most simple
which we speak or reason. And, though conceptions are not those of any object in
Nature hath put a wide difference between nature, but of some single attribute or rela
one man and another in this respect, yet tion of such objects.
that it is in a very considerable degree in Thus, nature presents to our senses
our power to have clear and distinct appre bodies that are extended in three dimensions,
hensions of things about which we think and solid. By analysing the notion we have
and reason, cannot be doubted. of body from our senses, we form to our
7. It has been observed by many authors, selves the conceptions of extension, solidity,
that, when we barely conceive any object, space, a point, a line, a surface-all which
the ingredients of that conception must are more simple conceptions than that of a
either be things with which we were before body. But they are the elements, as it
acquainted by some other original power of were, of which our conception of a body is
the mind, or they must be parts or attri made up, and into which it may be analysed.
butes of such things. Thus, a man cannot This power of analysing objects we propose
conceive colours if he never saw, nor sounds to consider particularly in another place.
if he never heard. If a man had not a con It is only mentioned here, that what is said
science, he could not conceive what is meant in this article may not be understood so as
by moral obligation, or by right and wrong to be inconsistent with it. [376]
in conduct. 8. Though our conceptions must be con
Fancy may combine things that never fined to the ingredients mentioned in the
were combined in reality. It may enlarge last article, we are unconfined with regard
or diminish, multiply or divide, compound to the arrangement of those ingredients.
and fashion the objects which nature pre Here we may pick and choose, and form
sents; but it cannot, by the utmost effort an endless variety of combinations and com
of that creative power which we ascribe to positions, which we call creatures of the
it, bring any one simple ingredient into its imagination. These may be clearly con
productions which Nature has not framed ceived, though they never existed: and,
and brought to our knowledge by some indeed, everything that is made, must have
other faculty. been conceived before it was made. Every
This Mr Locke has expressed as beauti work of human art, and every plan of con
fully as justly. The dominion of man, in duct, whether in public or in private life,
this little world of his own understanding, must have been conceived before it was
is much the same as in the great world of brought to execution. And we cannot avoid
visible things; wherein his power, however thinking, that the Almighty, before he
managed by art and skill, reaches no farther created the universe by his power, had a
than to compound and divide the materials distinct conception of the whole and of every
that are made to his hand, but can do no part, and saw it to be good, and agreeable
thing towards making the least particle of to his intention.
matter, or destroying one atom that is It is the business of man, as a rational
already in being. [375] The same inability creature, to employ this unlimited power of
will everyone find in himself, to fashion in his conception, for planning his conduct and
understanding any simple idea not received enlarging his knowledge. It seems to be
by the powers which God has given him. peculiar to beings endowed with reason to
I think all philosophers agree in this senti act by a preconceived plan. Brute animals
ment. Mr Hume, indeed, after acknow seem either to want this power, or to have
ledging the truth of the principle in general, it in a very low degree. They are moved
mentions what he thinks a single exception by instinct, habit, appetite, or natural affec:
to it—That a man, who had seen all the tion, according as these principles are stirred
shades of a particular colour except one, by the present occasion. But I see no
might frame in his mind a conception of reason to think that they can propose to
that shade which he never saw. I think themselves a connected plan of life, or form
[374-376]
36# ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [EssAY 1 v.
*
general rules of conduct. Indeed, we see truth more evident to the common sense and
that many of the human species, to whom to the experience of mankind. But, if the
God has given this power, make little use authority of philosophy, ancient and modern,
of it. They act without a plan, as the pas opposes it, as I think it does, I wish not
sion or appetite which is strongest at the to treat that authority so fastidiously as not
time leads them. to attend patiently to what may be said in
9. The last property I shall mention of support of it. [378]
this faculty, is that which essentially dis
tinguishes it from every other power of the
mind; and it is, that it is not employed CHAPTER II.
solely about things which have existence.
I can conceive a winged horse or a centaur, 'th E0ities CoNCERNING CoNCEPTIox.
as easily and as distinctly as I can conceive
a man whom I have seen. Nor does this The theory of ideas has been applied to
distinct conception incline my judgment in the conception of objects, as well as to per
the least to the belief that a winged horse ception and memory. Perhaps it will be
or a centaur ever existed. [377] irksome to the reader, as it is to the writer,
It is not so with the other operations of to return to that subject, after so much has
our minds. They are employed about real been said upon it; but its application to the
existences, and carry with them the belief conception of objects, which could not pro
of their objects. When I feel pain, I am perly have been introduced before, gives a
compelled to believe that the pain that I more comprehensive view of it, and of the
feel has a real existence. When I perceive prejudices which have led philosophers so
external object, my belief of the real unanimously into it.
existence of the object is irresistible. When There are two prejudices which seem to
I distinctly remember any event, though me to have given rise to the theory of ideas
that event may not now exist, I can have in all the various forms in which it has ap
no doubt but it did exist. That conscious peared in the course of above two thousand
ness which we have of the operations of years; and, though they have no support
our own minds, implies a belief of the real from the natural dictates of our faculties,
existence of those operations. or from attentive reflection upon their oper
Thus we see, that the powers of sensa ations, they are prejudices which those who
tion, of perception, of memory, and of con speculate upon this subject are very apt to
sciousness, are all employed solely about be led into by analogy.
objects that do exist, or have existed. But The first is—That, in all the operations of
conception is often employed about objects the understanding, there must be some im
that neither do, nor did, nor will exist. This mediate intercourse between the mind and
is the very nature of this faculty, that its its object, so that the one may act upon the
object, though distinctly conceived, ma other. The second, That, in all the opera
have no existence. Such an object £ tions of understanding, there must be an
a creature of imagination; but this creature object of thought, which really exists while
never was created. we think of it; or, as some philosophers
That we may not impose upon ourselves have expressed it, that which is not cannot
in this matter, we must distinguish between be intelligible.
that act or operation of the mind, which we Had philosophers perceived that these are
call conceiving an object, and the object prejudices grounded only upon analogical
which we conceive. When we conceive reasoning, we had never heard of ideas in
anything, there is a real act or operation of the philosophical sense of that word. [379]
the mind. Of this we are conscious, and The first of these principles has led philo
can have no doubt of its existence. But sophers to think that, as the external
every such act must have an object;" for he objects of sense are too remote to act upon
that conceives must conceive something. the mind immediately, there must be some
Suppose he conceives a centaur, he may image or shadowof them that is present to
have a distinct conception of this object, the mind, and is the immediate object of
though no centaur ever existed. perception. That there is such an imme
I am afraid that, to those who are unac diate object of perception, distinct from
quainted with the doctrine of philosophers the external object, has been very unani
upon this subject, I shall appear in a very mously held by philosophers, though they
ridiculous light, for insisting upon a point have differed much about the name, the
so very evident as that men may barely
*The reader will bear in mind what has been
conceive things that never existed. They
will hardly believe that any man in his wits already said of the limited meaning attached by
Reid to the term Idea, viz., something in, or present
ever doubted of it. Indeed, I know no to the mind, but not a mere modification of the
mind—and his error in supposing that all philosophers
admitted this crude hypothesis. See Notes B, C, L.
* See below, p. 390, and Note P.-H. M, N, O, P, &c.-H.
[377–379.
CHAP. II.] THEORIES CONCERNING CONCEPTION. 369
nature, and the origin of those immediate of one object, which, in perception, is some
objects. thing external that exists; in memory,
We have considered what has been said in something that did exist; and, in concep
the support of this principle, Essay II. chap. tion, may be something that never existed."
14, to which the reader is referred, to But the immediate object of the philo
prevent repetition. sophers, the idea, is said to exist, and to be
I shall only add to what is there said, perceived in all these operations.
That there appears no shadow of reason These principles have not only led philo
why the mind must have an object imme sophers to split objects into two, where
diately present to it in its intellectual oper others can find but one, but likewise have
ations, any more than in its affections and led them to reduce the three operations now
passions. Philosophers have not said that mentioned to one, making memory and con
ideas are the immediate objects of love or ception, as well as perception, to be the per
resentment, of esteem or disapprobation. ception of ideas. But nothing appears more
It is, I think, acknowledged, that persons evident to the vulgar, than that what is
and not ideas, are the immediate objects of only remembered, or only conceived, is not
those affections; persons, who are as far perceived; and, to speak of the perceptions
from being immediately present to the mind of memory, appears to them as absurd as
as other external objects, and, sometimes, to speak of the hearing of sight. [381]
persons who have now no existence, in this In a word, these two principles carry us
world at least, and who can neither act into the whole philosophical theory of ideas,
upon the mind, nor be acted upon by it. and furnish every argument that ever was
The second principle, which I conceive used for their existence. If they are true,
to be likewise a prejudice of philosophers, that system must be admitted with all its
grounded upon analogy, is now to be consequences. If they are only prejudices,
considered. grounded upon analogical reasoning, the
It contradicts directly what was laid down whole system must fall to the ground with
in the last article of the preceding chapter them.
-to wit, that we may have a distinct con It is, therefore, of importance to trace
ception of things which never existed. This those principles, as far as we are able, to
is undoubtedly the common belief of those their origin, and to see, if possible, whether
who have not been instructed in philosophy; they have any just foundation in reason, or
and they will think it as ridiculous to defend whether they are rash conclusions, drawn
it by reasoning, as to oppose it. [380] from a supposed analogy between matter
The philosopher says, Though there and mind.
may be a remote object which does not ex The unlearned, who are guided by the
ist, there must be an immediate object dictates of nature, and express what they
which really exists; for that which is not, are conscious of concerning the operations
cannot be an object of thought. The idea of their own mind, believe that the object
must be perceived by the mind, and, if it which they distinctly perceive certainly
does not exist there, there can be no per exists; that the object which they distinctly
ception of it, no operation of the mind remember certainly did exist, but now may
about it." not; but as to things that are barely con
This principle deserves the more to be ceived, they know that they can conceive a
examined, because the other before men thousand things that never existed, and that
tioned depends upon it; for, although the the bare conception of a thing does not so
last may be true, even if the first was false, much as afford a presumption of its exist
yet, if the last be not true, neither can the ence. They give themselves no trouble to
first. If we can conceive objects which know how these operations are performed, or
have no existence, it follows that there may to account for them from general principles.
be objects of thought which neither act upon But philosophers, who wish to discover
the mind, nor are acted upon by it; because the causes of things, and to account for
that which has no existence can neither act these operations of mind, observing that in
nor be acted upon. other operations there must be not only an
It is by these principles that philosophers agent, but something to act upon, have
have been led to think that, in every act of been led by analogy to conclude that it
memory and of conception, as well as of must be so in the operations of the mind.
perception, there are two objects—the The relation between the mind and its
one, the immediate object, the idea, the conceptions bears a very strong and obvious
species, the form ; the other, the mediate analogy to the relation between a man and
or external object. The vulgar know only his work. Every scheme he forms, every
discovery he makes by his £
* In relation to this and what follows, see above,
is very properly called the work of his mind.
These works of the mind are sometimes
ti", b, note t; p. 278, a, note t , and Note B.
FSee references in preceding note.-H.
[380,3817 Q is
370 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [EssAY Iv.
great and important works, and draw the the same with the materia prima or first
attention and admiration of men. [382] matter of Aristotle, who borrowed this part
It is the province of the philosopher to of his philosophy from his predecessors.
consider how such works of the mind are To us it seems more rational to think
produced, and of what materials they are that the Deity created matter with its qua
composed. He calls the materials ideas. lities, than that the matter of the universe
There must therefore be ideas, which the should be eternal and self-existent. But
mind can arrange and form into a regular so strong was the prejudice of the ancient
structure. Everything that is produced, philosophers against what we call creation,
must be produced of something; and from that they rather chose to have recourse to
nothing, nothing can be produced. this eternal and unintelligible matter, that
Some such reasoning as this seems to me the Deity might have materials to work
upon.
to have given the first rise to the philoso
phical notions of ideas. Those notions were "'. same analogy which led them to
formed into a system by the Pythagoreans, think that there must be an eternal matter of
two thousand years ago; and this system which the world was made, led them also
was adopted by Plato, and embellished with to conclude that there must be an eternal
all the £ of a fine and lofty imagina pattern or model according to which it was
tion. shall, in compliance with custom, made. Works of design and art must be
call it the Platonic system of ideas, though distinctly conceived before they are made.
in reality it was the invention of the Pytha The Deity, as an intelligent Being, about
gorean school." to execute a work of perfect beauty and
The most arduous question which em regularity, must have had a distinct con
ployed the wits of men in the infancy of ception of his work before it was made.
the Grecian ": was-What was the This appears very rational.
origin of the world?—from what principles But this conception, being the work of
and causes did it proceed? To this ques the Divine intellect, something must have
tion very different answers were given in existed as its object. This could only be
the different schools. Most of them appear ideas, which are the proper and immediate
to us very ridiculous. The Pythagoreans, object of intellect. [384]
however, judged, very rationally, from the From this investigation of the principles
order and beauty of the universe, that it or causes of the universe, those philoso
must be the workmanship of an eternal, in phers concluded them to be three in number
telligent, and good being : and therefore —to wit, an eternal matter as the material
they concluded the Deity to be one first cause, eternal ideas as the model or exem
principle or cause of the universe. plary cause, and an eternal intelligent mind
But they conceived there must be more. as the efficient cause.
The universe must be made of something. As to the nature of those eternal ideas,
Every workman must have materials to the philosophers of that sect ascribed to
work upon. That the world should be made them the most magnificent attributes.
out of nothing seemed to them absurd, be They were immutable and uncreated;" the
cause everything that is made must be made object of the Divine intellect before the
of something. world was made; and the only object of
intellect and of science to all intelligent
Nullam reme nihilo gignidivinitus unquam.-LucR. beings. As far as intellect is superior to
De nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti.-PEas.
sense, so far are ideas superior to all the
This maxim never was brought into doubt: objects of sense. The objects of sense
even in Cicero's time it continued to be being in a constant flux, cannot properly
held by all philosophers. [383] What be said to exist. Ideas are the things
matural philosopher (says that author in his which have a real and permanent exist
second book of Divination) ever asserted ence. They are as various as the species of
that anything could take its rise from things, there being one idea of every spe
nothing, or be reduced to nothing? Be cies, but none of individuals. The idea is
cause men must have materials to work the essence of the species, and existed be
upon, they concluded it must be so with fore any of the species was made. It is
the Deity. This was reasoning from analogy. entire in every individual of the species,
From this it followed, that an eternal without being either divided or multiplied.
uncreated matter was another first prin In our present state, we have but an
ciple of the universe. But this matter they imperfect conception of the eternal ideas;
believed had no form nor quality. It was but it is the highest felicity and perfection
of men to be able to contemplate them.
* Ideas in the Platonic, and Ideas in the modern * Whether, in the Platonic system, Ideas are, or
signification, hold, as I have already shewn, little are not, in nt of the Deity, I have already
or no analogy to each other. See above, p. 204, a, #". is, and always has been, a vexata quastle.-
notes + + ; p. 225, b, note *; p. 262, b, note *.-H.
[.382– 3813
cHAP. II.] THEORIES CONCERNING CONCEPTION. 371
While we are in this prison of the body, reasoning, from the beauty and order of the
sense, as a dead weight, bears us down universe, to its being the work of a wise
from the contemplation of the intellectual being, which appears invincible to every
objects; and it is only by a due purifica candid mind, and appeared so to those
tion of the soul, and abstraction from sense, ancient philosophers, is entirely destroyed
that the intellectual eye is opened, and that by the supposition of the existence of a
we are enabled to mount upon the wings of world of ideas, of greater perfection and
intellect to the celestial world of ideas. beauty, which never was made. Or, if the
Such was the most ancient system con reasoning be£ it will apply to the world
cerning ideas, of which we have any account. of ideas, which must, of consequence, have
And, however different from the modern, been made by a wise and good intelligent
it appears to be built upon the prejudices being, and must have been conceived before
we have mentioned—to wit, that in every it was made.
operation there must be something to £ It may farther be observed, that all that
upon; and that even in conception there is mysterious and unintelligible in the Pla
must be an object which really exists. tonic ideas, arises from attributing existence
385 to them. Take away this one attribute, all
For, if those ancient philosophers had the rest, however pompously expressed,
thought it possible that the Deity could are easily admitted and understood.
operate without materials in the formation What is a Platonic idea P It is the
of the world, and that he could conceive essence of a species. It is the exemplar, the
the plan of it without a model, they could model, according to which all the individuals
have seen no reason to make matter and of that species are made. It is entire in
ideas eternal and necessarily existent prin every individual of the species, without be
ciples, as well as the Deity himself. ing multiplied or divided. It was an object
Whether they believed that the ideas of the divine intellect from eternity, and is an
were not only eternal, but eternally, and object of contemplation and of science to
without a cause, arranged in that beautiful every intelligent being. It is eternal, im
and perfect order which they ascribe to this mutable, and uncreated; and, to crown all,
intelligible world of ideas, I cannot say; it not only exists, but has a more real and
but this seems to be a necessary conse permanent existence than anything that
quence of the system : for, if the Deity ever God made.
could not conceive the plan of the world Take this description a together, and it
which he made. without a model which would require an OEdipus to unriddle it.
really existed, that model could not be his But take away the last part of it, and no
work, nor contrived by his wisdom; for, if thing is more easy. It is easy to find five
he made it, he must have conceived it hun things which answer to every
before it was made; it must therefore have article in the description except the last.
existed in all its beauty and order inde Take, for an instance, the nature of a
pendent of the Deity; and this I think circle, as it is defined by Euclid—an object
they acknowledged, by making the model which every intelligent being may conceive
and the matter of this world, first princi distinctly, though no circle had ever existed;
ples, no less than the Deity. it is the exemplar, the model, according to
If the Platonic system be thus understood, which all the individual figures of that
(and I do not see how it can hang together species that ever existed were made; for
otherwise,) it leads to two consequences they are all made according to the nature of a
that are unfavourable to it. circle. [387] It is entire in every individual
First, Nothing is left to the Maker of of the species, without being multiplied or
this world but the skill to work after a divided. For every circle is an entire
model. The model had all the perfection circle; and all circles, in as far as they are
and beauty that appears in the copy, and circles, have one and the same nature. It
the Deity had only to copy after a pattern was an object of the divine intellect from
that existed independent of him. Indeed, all eternity, and may be an object of con
the copy, if we believe those philosophers, templation and of science to every intelli
falls very far short of the original; but this gent being. It is the essence of a species,
they seem to have ascribed to the refracto and, like all other essences, it is eternal,
riness of matter of which it was made. immutable, and uncreated. This means
Secondly, If the world of ideas, without no more but that a circle always was a
being the work of a perfectly wise and good circle, and can never be anything but a
intelligent being, could have so much beauty circle. It is the necessity of the thing,
and perfection, how can we infer from the and not any act of creating power, that
beauty and order of this world, which is makes a circle to be a circle.
but an imperfect copy of the other, that it The nature of every species, whether of
must have been made by a perfectly wise substance, of quality, or of relation, and in
and good being * {386] The force of this general everything which the ancients called
2 p 2
[385-387]
572 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essav iv.
an universal, answers to the description of I take it to have been the opinion of Aris
a Platonic idea, if in that description you totle, that the intelligible forms in the hu
leave out the attribute of existence. man intellect are derived from the sensible
If we believe that no species of things by abstraction, and other operations of the
could be conceived by the Almighty with mind itself. As to the intelligible forms in
out a model that really existed, we must go the divine intellect, they must have had
back to the Platonic system, however mys another origin; but I do not remember that
terious. But, if it be true that the Deity he gives any opinion about them. He cer
could have a distinct conception of things tainly maintained, however, that there is no
which did notexist, and that other intelligent intellection without intelligible species;"
beings may conceive objects which do not no memory or imagination without phan
exist, the system has no better foundation tasms; no perception without sensible
than this prejudice, that the operations of species. Treating of memory, he proposes
mind must be like those of the body. a difficulty, and endeavours to resolve it—
Aristotle rejected the ideas of his master how a phantasm, that is a present object in
Plato as visionary; but he retained the the mind, should represent a thing that is
prejudices that gave rise to them, and there past. [389]
fore substituted something in their place, Thus, I think, it appears that the Per
but under a different name," and of a dif ipatetic system of species and phantasms,
ferent origin. as well as the Platonic system of ideas, is
He called the objects of intellect, intelli grounded upon this principle, that in every
ible species; those of the memory and kind of thought there must be some object
imagination, phantasms; and those of the that really exists; in every operation of the
senses, sensible species. This change of the mind, something to work upon. Whether
name" was indeed very small; for the Greek this immediate object be called an idea with
word of Aristotle [d?...] which we translate Plato,+ or a phantasm or species with Aris
species or form, is so near to the Greek totle—whether it be eternal and uncreated,
word idea, both in its sound and significa or produced by the impressions of external
tion, that, from their etymology, it would objects—is of no consequence in the pre
not be easy to give them different meanings. sent argument. In both systems, it was
[388] Both arederived from the Greek word thought impossible that the Deity could
which signifies to see, and both may signify a make the world without matter to work
vision or appearance to the eye. Cicero, who upon; in both, it was thought impossible
understood Greek well, often translates the that an intelligent Being could conceive
Greek word idea by the Latin word visio. anything that did not exist, but by means
But both words being used as terms of art of a model that really existed.
one in the Platonic system, the other in the The philosophers of the Alexandrian
Peripatetic—the Latin writers generally school, commonly called the latter Plato
borrowed the Greek word idea to express the nists, conceived the eternal ideas of things
Platonic notion, and translated Aristotle's to be in the Divine intellect, and thereby
word, by the words species or forma; and in avoided the absurdity of making them a
this they have been followed in the modern principle distinct from and independent of
languages." the Deity; but still they held them to exist
Those forms or species were called intelli really in the Divine mind as the objects of
gible, to distinguish them from sensible conception, and as the patterns and arche
species, which Aristotle held to be the imme types of things that are made.
diate objects of sense. Modern philosophers, still persuaded that
He thought that the sensible species come of every thought there must be an imme
from the external object, and defined a sense diate object that really exists, have not
to be that which has the capacity to receive deemed it necessary to distinguish by dif
the form of sensible things without the mat ferent names the immediate objects of in
ter; as wax receives the form of a seal with tellect, of imagination, and of the senses,
out any of the matter of it. In like manner, but have given the common name of idea
he thought that the intellect receives the to them all.
forms of things intelligible; and he callsit Whether these ideas be in the sensorium,
the place of forms. -
or in the mind, or partly in the one and
* Reid seems not aware that Plato, and Aristotle partly in the other; whether they exist
in relation to Plato, employed the terms £2, and when they are not perceived, or only when
Bía almost as convertible. In fact, the latter usually
combats the ideal theory of the former by the name * There is even less reason to attribute such a
of thes-e.g., rå 1:2n x*giva, rigsrirara ×e is i. theory to Aristotle in relation to the intellect than
M. Cousin, in a £ and ingenious £ of his in relation to sense and imagination. See even his
* Nouveaur ,” has endeavoured to shew oldest commentator, the Aphrodisian, ITse Fox<s,
that "lato did not apply the two terms indifferently; f. 139, a. In fact, the greater number of those Peri.
and the same has been attempted by Richter. But patetics who admitted species in this crude form for
so many exceptions must be admitted, that, appa the latter, rejected them for the former.-H.
rently, no determinate rule can be established.-H. t See above, p. 262, b, note *.-H.
[388, 3897
-
cHAP. II.] THEORIES CONCERNING CONCEPTION. 373
they are perceived; whether they are the an animal. I know what it is to conceive
workmanship of the Deity or of the mind an image of an animal, and what it is to
itself, or of external natural causes—with conceive an animal; and I can distinguish
regard to these points, different authors the one of these from the other without
seem to have different opinions, and the any danger of mistake. The thing I con
same author sometimes to waver or be ceive is a body of a certain figure and
diffident; but as to their existence, there colour, having life and spontaneous motion.
seems to be great unanimity." [390] The philosopher says, that the idea is an
So much is this opinion fixed in the image of the animal; but that it has neither
minds of philosophers, that I doubt not but body, nor colour, nor life, nor spontaneous
it will appear to most a very strange para motion. This I am notable to comprehend.
dox, or rather a contradiction, that men Thirdly, I wish to know how this idea
should think without ideas. comes to be an object of my thought, when
That it has the appearance of a contra I cannot even conceive what it means;
diction, I confess. But this appearance and, if I did conceive it, this would be no
arises from the ambiguity of the word idea. evidence of its existence, any more than
If theidea of a thing means only the thought my conception of a centaur is of its exist
of it, or the operation of the mind in think ence. Philosophers sometimes say that we
ing about it, which is the most common perceive ideas, sometimes that we are con
meaning of the word, to think without ideas, scious of them. I can have no doubt of
is to think without thought, which is un the existence of anything which I either
doubtedly a contradiction. perceive or of which I am conscious;" but
But an idea, according to the definition I cannot find that I either perceive ideas
given of it by philosophers, is not thought, or am conscious of them.
but an object of thought, which really exists Perception and consciousness are very
and is perceived. Now, whether is it a different operations, and it is strange that
contradiction to say, that a man may think philosophers have never determined by
of an object that does not exist? which of them ideas are discerned. + This
I acknowledge that a man cannot per is as if a man should positively affirm that
ceive an object that does not exist; nor can he perceived an object; but whether by his
he remember an object that did not exist; eyes, or his ears, or his touch, he could not
but there appears to me no contradiction in say.
his conceiving an object that neither does But may not a man who conceives a
nor ever did exist. centaur say, that he has a distinct image of
Let us take an example. I conceive a it in his mind? I think he may. And if he
centaur. This conception is an operation means by this way of speaking what the
of the mind, of which I am conscious, and vulgar mean, who never heard of the phi
to which I can attend. The sole object of it losophical theory of ideas, I find no fault
is a centaur, an animal which, I believe, with it. [392] By a distinct image in the
never existed. I can see no contradiction mind, the vulgar mean a distinct concep
in this.t tion; and it is natural to call it so, on
The philosopher says, I cannot conceive account of the analogy between an image of
a centaur without having an idea of it in a thing and the conception of it. On ac
my mind. I am at a loss to understand count of this analogy, obvious to all man
what he means. He surely does not mean kind, this operation is called imagination,
that I cannot conceive it without conceiving and an image in the mind is only a peri
it. This would make me no wiser. What phrasis for imagination. But to infer from
then is this idea P Is it an animal, half this that there is really an image in the
horse and half man 7 No. Then I am mind, distinct from the operation of con
certain it is not the thing I conceive. Per ceiving the object, is to be misled by an
haps he will say, that the idea is an image analogical expression; as if, from the
of the animal, and is the immediate object phrases of deliberating and balancing things
of my conception, and that the animal is in the mind, we should infer that there is
the mediate or remote object.: 1391] really a balance existing in the mind for
To this I answer–First, I am certain weighing motives and arguments.
there are not two objects of this conception, The analogical words and phrases used
but one only ; and that one is as immediate in all languages to express conception, do,
an object of my conception as any can be. no doubt, facilitate their being taken in a
Secondly, This one object which I con literal sense. But, if we only attend care
ceive, is not the image of an animal—it is
* This is not the case, unless it be admitted that
we are conscious of what we perceive-in other words,
* This, as already once and again stated, is not immediately cognitive of the non-ego.-H.
correct.-H. # But the philosophers did not, like Reid, make
* See above, p. 292, b, note t, and Note B.-H. Consciousness one special faculty, and Perception
: On this, and the subsequent reasoning in the another; nor did they and Reid mean by Perception
present chapter, see Note B.-H. the same thing.-H.
1390–392]
374 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. LEssay Iv.
fully to what we are conscious of in this meant in the literal sense, we must observe,
operation, we shall find no more reason to that the word conception has two meanings.
think that images do really exist in our Properly it signifies that operation of the
minds, than that balances and other me mind which we have been endeavouring to
chanical engines do. explain; but sometimes it is put for the
We know of nothing that is in the mind object of conception, or thing conceived.
but by consciousness, and we are conscious Now, if the question be understood in the
of nothing but various modes of thinking; last of these senses, the object of this con
such as understanding, willing, affection, ception is not an image or resemblance of
passion, doing, suffering. If philosophers a circle; for it is a circle, and nothing can
choose to give the name of an idea to any be an image of itself [394]
mode of thinking of which we are conscious, If the question be – Whether the opera
I have no objection to the name, but that tion of mind in conceiving a circle be an
it introduces a foreign word into our lan image or resemblance of a circle? I think
guage without necessity, and a word that is it is not; and that no two things can be
very ambiguous, and apt to mislead. But, more perfectly unlike, than a species of
if they give that name to i in the thought and a species of fi Nor is it
mind, which are not thought, but only more strange that conception should have
objects of thought, I can see no reason to no resemblance to the object conceived,
think that there are such things in nature. than that desire should have no resem
If they be, their existence and their nature blance to the object desired, or resentment
must be more evident than anything else, to the object of resentment.
because we know nothing but by their I can likewise conceive an individual
means. I may add, that, if they be, we object that really exists, such as St Paul's
can know nothing besides them. For, from Church in London. I have an idea of it;
the existence of images, we can never, by that is, I conceive it. The immediate
any just reasoning, infer the existence of object of this conception is four hundred
anything else, unless perhaps the existence miles distant; and I have no reason to think
of an intelligent Author of them. In this, that it acts upon me, or that I act upon it;
Bishop Berkeley reasoned right. [393] but I can think of it notwithstanding. I
In every work of design, the work must can think of the first year or the last year
be conceived before it is executed—that is, of the Julian period. -
before it exists. If a model, consisting of If, after all, it should be thought that
ideas, must exist in the mind, as the ob images in the mind serve to account for this
ject of this conception, that model is a work faculty of conceiving things most distant in
of design no less than the other, of which time and place, and even things which do
it is the model; and therefore, as a work of not exist, which otherwise would be alto
design, it must have been conceived before gether inconceivable; to this I answer,
it existed. In every work of design, there that accounts of things, grounded upon
fore, the conception must go before the conjecture, have been the bane of true
existence. This argument we applied be philosophy in all ages. Experience may
fore to the Platonic system of eternal and satisfy us that it is an hundred times more
immutable ideas, and it may be applied with probable that they are false than that they
equal force to all the systems of ideas. are true.
If now it should be asked, What is the This account of the faculty of conception,
idea of a circle 2 I answer, It is the con by images in the mind or in the brain,
ception of a circle. What is the immediate will deserve the regard of those who have
object of this conception? The immediate a true taste in philosophy, when it is proved
and the only object of it is a circle. But by solid ents–First, That there are
where is this circle? It is nowhere. If images in the mind, or in the brain, of the
it was an individual, and had a real ex things we conceive Secondly, That there
istence, it must have a place; but, being an is a faculty in the mind of perceiving such
universal, it has no existence, and therefore images. Thirdly, That the perception of
no place. Is it not in the mind of him that such images produces the conception of
conceives it? The conception of it is in things most distant, and even of things that
the mind, being an act of the mind; and in have no existence. And, fourthly, That
common language, a thing being in the the perception of individual images in the
mind, is a figurative expression, signify mind, or in the brain, gives us the concep
ing that the thing is conceived or remem tion of universals, which are the attributes
bered. of many individuals. [395] Until this is
It may be asked, Whether this concep done, the theory of images existing in the
tion is an image or resemblance of a circle? mind or in the brain, ought to be placed in
I answer, I have already accounted for its the same category with the sensible species,
being, in a figurative sense, called the image materia prima of Aristotle, and the vortices
of a circle in the mind. If the question is of Des Cartes.
[393-395]
- - ---------
caap. 111.] MISTAKES CONCERNING CONCEPTION. 375
cians, of simpleapprehension, into Sensation,

CHAPTER III. Imagination, and Pure Intellection, seems
to me very improper in several respects.
MisTAKEs concKRNING concEPTION. First, Under the word sensation, they
include not only what is properly so called,
1. WRITERs on logic, after the example but the perception of external objects by
of Aristotle, divide the operations of the the senses. These are very different opera
understanding into three : Simple Appre tions of the mind; and, although they are
hension, (which is another word for Con commonly conjoined by nature, ' to be
ception,) Judgment, and Reasoning. They carefully distinguished by philosophers.
teach us, that reasoning is expressed by a Secondly, Neithersensation northe percep
syllogism, judgment by a proposition, and tion of external objects, is simple apprehen
simple apprehension by a term only—that sion. Both includejudgmentand belief, which
is, by one or more words which do not are excluded from simple apprehension."
make a full proposition, but only the sub Thirdly, They distinguish imagination
ject or predicate of a proposition. If, by from pure intellection by this, that, in
this they mean, as I think they do, that a imagination, the image is in the brain;+ in
proposition, or even a syllogism, may not pure intellection, it is in the intellect. This
be simply apprehended," I believe this is a is to ground a distinction upon an hypo
mistake. thesis. We have no evidence that there
In all judgment and in all reasoning, are images either in the brain or in the in
conception is included. We can neither telleet. [397]
judge of a proposition, nor reason about it, I take imagination, in its most proper,
unless we conceive or apprehend it. We sense, to signify a lively conception of
may distinctly conceive a proposition, with objects of sight.: This is a talent of im
out judging of it at all. We may have no portance to poets and orators, and deserves
evidence on one side or the other; we may a proper name, on account of its connection
have no concern whether it be true or false. with those arts. According to this strict
In these cases we commonly form no judg meaning of the word, imagination is dis
ment about it, though we perfectly under tinguished from conception as a part from
stand its meaning." the whole. We conceive the objects of the
A man may discourse, or plead, or write, other senses, but it is not so proper to say
for other ends than to find the truth. His that we imagine them. We conceive judg
iearning, and wit, and invention may be ment, reasoning, propositions, and argu
employed, while his judgment is not at all, ments; but it is rather improper to say
or very little. When it is not truth, but that we imagine these things.
some other end he pursues, judgment would This distinction between imagination and
be an impediment, unless for discovering conception, may be illustrated by an ex
the means of attaining his end; and, there ample, which Des Cartes uses to illus
fore, it is laid aside, or employed solely for trate the distinction between imagination
that purpose. [396] - and pure intellection. We can imagine a
The business of an orator is said to be, triangle or a square so clearly as to
to find out what is fit to persuade. This a distinguish them from every other figure.
man may do with much ingenuity, who But we cannot imagine a figure of a thou
never took the trouble to examine whether sand equal sides and angles so clearly. The
it ought to persuade or not. Let it not be best eye, by looking at it, could not distin
thought, therefore, that a man judges of guish it from every figure of more or fewer
the truth of every proposition he utters, or sides. And that conception of its appear
hears uttered. In our commerce with the ance to the eye, which we properly call im
world, judgment is not the talent that bears agination, cannot be more distinct than the
the greatest price; and, therefore, those who appearance itself; yet we can conceive a
are not sincere lovers of truth, lay up this figure of a thousand sides, and even can
talent where it rusts and corrupts, while demonstrate the properties which distinguish
they carry others to market, for which it from all figures of more or fewer sides.
there is greater demand. It is not by the eye, but by a superior fa
2. The division commonly made by logi culty, that we form the notion of a great
* Does Reid here mean, by a hending simply,
apprehending in one simple and indivisible act? * See the last note.-H.
# There is no conception possible without a judg ł But not the image, of which the mind is con
ment affirming its (ideal) existence. There is no scious. By image or idea in the brain, species in
consciousness, in fact, possible without judgment. pressa, &c., was meant only the unknown corporeal
See above, p. 243, a, note *. It is to be observed, antecedent of the known mental consequent, the
that Reid uses con ion in the course of this chap. image or idea in the mind, the species expressa, &c.
ter as convertible with understanding or comprehen Reid here refers principally to the Cartesian doctrine.
sion, and, therefore, as we shall see, in a vaguer or
mere extensive meaning than the philosophers whose t See above, p. 366, a, note *; and, below, unde.
opinion he controverts.-H. p. 482.-H.
[296, 39;
mumber, such as a thousand. And a distinct diately, but rather by the powers of ana
notion of this number of sides not being to lysing and abstraction, that we get the most
be got by the eye, it is not imagined, but simple and the most distinct notions even
it is distinctly conceived, and easily distin of the objects of sense. This will be more
guished from every other number." fully explained in another place. [399]
3. Simple apprehension is commonly re 4. There remains another mistake con
presented as the first operation of the cerning conception, which deserves to be
understanding; and judgment, as being a £ It is—That our conception of
composition or combination of simple appre things is a test of their possibility, so that,
hensions. what we can distinctly conceive, we may
This mistake has probably arisen from the conclude to be possible; and of what is im
taking sensation, and the perception of possible, we can have no conception.
objects by the senses, to be nothing but This opinion has been held by philoso
simple apprehension. They are, very pro phers for more than an hundred years,
bably, the first operations of the mind; but without contradiction or dissent, as far as I
they are not simple apprehensions.t. [398] know; and, if it be an error, it may be of
It is generally allowed, that we cannot some use to inquire into its origin, and the
conceive sounds if we have never heard, causes that it has been so generally re
nor colours if we have never seen; and the ceived as a maxim whose truth could not
same thing may be said of the objects of be brought into doubt.
the other senses. In like manner, we must One of the fruitless questions agitated
have judged or reasoned before we have among the scholastic philosophers in the
the conception or simple apprehension of dark ages" was—What is the criterion of
judgment and of reasoning. truth? as if men could have any other way
Simple apprehension, therefore, though to distinguish truth from error, but by the
it be the simplest, is not the first operation right use of that power of judging which
of the understanding; and, instead of say God has given them.
ing that the more complex operations of Des Cartes endeavoured to put an end to
the mind are formed by compounding sim this controversy, by making it a fundamen
ple apprehensions, we ought rather to say, tal principle in his system, that whatever
that simple apprehensions are got by ana we clearly and distinctly perceive, is true.--
lysing more complex operations. To understand this principle of Des
A similar mistake, which is carried Cartes, it must be observed, that he gave
through the whole of Mr Locke's Essay, the name of perception to every power of
may be here mentioned. It is, that our the human understanding; and in explain
simplest ideas or conceptions are got im ing this very maxim, he tells us that sense,
mediately by the senses, or by conscious imagination, and pure intellection, are only
ness, and the complex afterwards formed different modes of perceiving, and, so the
by compounding them. I apprehend it is maxim was understood by all his followers.:
far otherwise. The learned Dr Cudworth seems also to
Nature presents no object to the senses, have adopted this principle :-‘‘The cri
or to consciousness, that is not complex. terion of true knowledge, says he, is only
Thus, by our senses we perceive bodies of to be looked for in our knowledge and con
various kinds; but every body is a com ceptions themselves: for the entity of all
plex object; it has length, breadth, and theoretical truth is nothing else but elear
thickness; it has figure, and colour, and intelligibility, and whatever is clearly con
various other sensible qualities, which are ceived is an entity and a truth; but that
blended together in the same subject; and which is false, divine power itself cannot
I apprehend that brute animals, who have make it to be clearly and distinctly under
the same senses that we have, cannot sepa stood. [400] A falsehood can never be
rate the different qualities belonging to the clearly conceived or apprehended to be
same subject, and have only a complex true.”—“Eternal and Immutable Mora
and confused notion of the whole. Such lity,” p. 172, &c.
also would be our notions of the objects of This Cartesian maxim seems to me to
sense, if we had not superior powers of have led the way to that now under con
understanding, by which we can analyse sideration, which seems to have been adopted
the complex object, abstract every parti as the proper correction of the former.
cular attribute from the rest, and form a When the authority of Des Cartes declined,
distinct conception of it. men began to see that we may clearly and
So that it is not by the senses imme distinctly conceive what is not true, but
*See above, p. 366, a, note *.-H. * This was more a question with the Greek philo
t. They are not simple apprehensions, in one sense sophers than with the schoolmen.-H.
-that is, the objects are not incomposite. But this t In this he proposed nothing new.-H.
was not the meaning in which the expression was used That is, in Des Cartes' signification of the word,
by the Logicians.-H. different modes of being conscious. See above-h.
[398-400]
CHAP. III.] MISTAKES CONCERNING CONCEPTION. 377
thought, that our conception, though not in the famous Wolfius has given it in the pas
all cases a test of truth, might be a test of sage above quoted, we shall have a short
possibility." road to the determination of every question
This indeed seems to be a necessary con about the possibility or impossibility of
sequence of the received doctrine of ideas; things. We need only look into our own
it being evident that there can be no dis breast, and that, like the Urim and
tinct image, either in the mind or anywhere Thummim, will give an infallible answer.
else, of that which is impossible.t. The If we can conceive the thing, it is possible;
ambiguity of the word conceive, which we if not, it is impossible. And, surely, every
observed, Essay I. chap. 1, and the com man may know whether he can conceive
mon phraseology of saying we cannot con what is affirmed or not.
ceive such a thing, when we would signify Other philosophers have been satisfied
that we think it impossible, might likewise with one half of the maxim of Wolfius.
contribute to the reception of this doctrine. They say, that whatever we can conceive is
But, whatever was the origin of this possible; but they do not say that whatever
opinion, it seems to prevail universally, we cannot conceive is impossible.
and to be received as a maxim. I cannot help thinking even this to be a
“The bare having an idea of the propo mistake, which philosophers have been un
sition proves the thing not to be impossible; warily led into, from the causes before men
for of an impossible proposition there can tioned. My reasons are these :-[402]
be no idea.”—DR SAMUEL CLARKE. 1. Whatever is said to be possible orim
“Of that which neither does nor can possible, is expressed by a proposition.
exist we can have no idea.”–LoRD BoliNG Now, what is it to conceive a proposition ?
BRoke. I think it is no more than to understand
“The measure of impossibility to us is distinctly its meaning.” I know no more
inconceivableness, that of which we can
have no idea, but that reflecting upon it, it * In this sense of the word Conception, I make
appears to be nothing, we pronounce to be bold to say that there is no philosopher who ever
impossible.”—ABERNETHY. [401] held an opinion different from that of our author.
The whole dispute arises from Reid giving a wider
“In every idea is implied the possibility signification to this term than that which it has
of the existence of its object, nothing being nerally received. In his view, it has two mean
clearer than that there can be no idea of ings; in that of the philosophers whom he attacks,
it has only one. To illustrate this, take the proposi
au impossibility, or conception of what can tion-a circle is square. Here we easily understand
not exist.”—Dr PRICE. the meaning of the affirmation, because what is neces
sary to an act of judgment is merely that the subject
“Impossibile est cujus nullam notionem and predicate should be brought into a unity of rela
formare possumus; possibile e contra, cui tion. A judgment is therefore possible, even where
aliqua respondet notio.”—WolfII ONToLo the two terms are contradictory. But the philosophers
never expressed, by the term conception, this under
GIA.: standing of the purport of a proposition. What they
“It is an established maxim in metaphy meant by conception was not the unity of relation,
but the unity or representation, and this unity of
sics, that whatever the mind conceives, in representation they made the criterion of logical pos
cludes the idea of possible existence, or, in sibility. To take the example already given: they
other words, that nothing we imagine is did not say a circle may possibly be square, because
we can understand the meaning of the proposition,
absolutely impossible.”—D. HUMs. a circle is square; but, on the contrary, they said it
It were easy to muster up many other is im ible that a circle can be square, and the pro
respectable authorities for this maxim, and position affirming this is necessarily false, because we
cannot, in consciousness, bring to a unity of repre
I have never found one that called it in sentation the repugnant notions, circle and square
question. that is, conceive the notion of square circle... iteid's
If the maxim be true in the extent which mistake in this matter is so palpable that it is not
more surprising that he should have committed it,
than that so many should not only have followed him
* That is, of logical possibility-the absence of con in the opinion, but even have lauded it as the refuta
tradiction.-H. tion of an important error. To shew how com
* This is rather a strained inference.-ft. pletely Reid mistook the philosophers, it will be suf.
: These are not exactly Wolf's expressions. See ficient to quote a passage from Wolf's vernacular
“ontologia," is 102, 103; “Philosophia Rationalis,” Logic, which I take from the English translation,
** 52, 5*. The same doctrine is held by Tschirn (one, by the by, of the few tolerable versions we have
hausen and others. In so far, however, as it is said of German philosophical works,) published in 1770:
that inconceivability is the criterion of impossibility, “It is carefully to be observed, that we have not
it is manifestly erroneous. Of many contradictories, always the motion of the thing present to us, or in
we are able to conceive neither; but, by the law of view, when we speak or think of it, but are satisfied
thought, called that of Excluded Middle, one of two when we imagine we sufficiently understand what we
contradictories must be admitted-must be true. speak, if we think we recollect that we have had, at
For example, we can neither conceive, on the one another time, the notion which is to be joined to this
hand, an ultimate minimum of space or of time; nor or the other word, and thus we represent to our
can we, on the other, conceive their infinite divisibi selves, as at a distance only, or obscurely, the thing
lity. In like manner, we cannot conceive the abso denoted by the term. -
iute commencernent of time, or the utmost limit of “Hence, it usually happens that, when we combine
space, and are yet equally unable to conceive them words together, to each of which, apart, a meaning
without any commencement or limit. The absurdity or notion answers, we imagine we understant what
that would result from the assertion, that all that is we utter, though that which is denoted by such com.
inconceivable is impossible, is thus obvious; and so bined words be impossible, and consequently can
far Reid's criticism is just, though not new.-H. have no meaning. For that which is impossible is
[401, 402]
378 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [EssAY 1 v.
that can be meant by simple apprehension either the understanding its meaning, or
or conception, when applied to a proposi the judging of its truth. I can understand
tion. The axiom, therefore, amounts to a proposition that is false or impossible, as
this:-Every proposition, of which you un well as one that is true or possible; and I
derstand the meaning distinctly, is possible. find that men have contradictory judgments
I am persuaded that I understand as dis about what is possible or impossible, as well
tinctly the meaning of this proposition, Any as about other things. In what sense then
two sides of a triangle are together equal can it be said, that the having an idea of a
to the third, as of this-Any two sides of a proposition gives certain evidence that it is
triangle are together greater than, the third; possible *
yet the first of these is impossible. If it be said, that the idea of a proposition
Perhaps it will be said, that, though you is an image of it in the mind, I thinkindeed
understand the meaning of the impossible there cannot be a distinct image, either in
proposition, you cannot suppose or conceive the mind or elsewhere, of that which is
it to be true. impossible; but what is meant by the image
Here we are to examine the meaning of of a proposition I am not able to compre
the phrases of supposing and conceiving a hend, and I shall be glad to be informed.
proposition to be true. I can certainly sup 2. Every proposition that is necessarily
pose it to be true, because I can draw con true stands opposed to a contradictory pro
sequences from it which I find to be impos position that is impossible; and he that
sible, as well as the proposition itself. conceives one conceives both. Thus a man
If, by conceiving it to be true, be meant who believes that two and three necessarily
giving some degree of assent to it, how make five, must believe it to be impossible
ever small, this, I confess, I cannot do. that two and three should not make five,
But will it be said that every proposition to He conceives both propositions when he
which I can give any degree of assent, is believes one. Every proposition carries its
possible? This contradicts experience, and, contradictory in its bosom, and both are
therefore, the maxim cannot be true in conceived at the same time. “It is con
this sense. fessed,” says Mr Hume, “that, in all cases
Sometimes, when we say that we cannot where we dissent from any person, we con
conceive a thing to be true, we mean by that ceive both sides of the question; but we
expression, that we judge it to be impossible. can believe only one.” From this, it cer
In this sense I cannot, indeed, conceive tainly follows, that, when we dissent from
it to be true, that two sides of a triangle any person about a necessary proposition,
are equal to the third. I judge it to be we conceive one that is imposible; yet I
impossible. If, then, we understand, in know no philosopher who has made so
this sense, that maxim, that nothing we can much use of the maxim, that whatever we
conceive is impossible, the meaning will conceive is possible, as Mr Hume. A great
be, that nothing is impossible which we part of his peculiar tenets is built upon it;
judge to be possible. But does it not often and, if it is true, they must be true. But
happen, that what one man judges to be he did not perceive that, in the
possible, another man judges to be impos now quoted, the truth of which is evident,
sible * The maxim, therefore, is not true he contradicts it himself. [404]
in this sense. [403] 3. Mathematicians have, in many cases,
I am not able to find any other meaning proved some things to be possible, and
of conceiving a proposition, or of conceiving others to be impossible, which, without
*t to be true, besides these I have men demonstration, would not have been be
tioned. I know nothing that can be meant lieved. Yet I have never found that any
by having the idea of a proposition, but mathematician has attempted to prove a
thing to be possible, because it can be con
nothing at all, and of nothing there can be no idea.
ceived; or impossible, because it cannot be
For instance, we have a motion of gold, as also of conceived." Why is not this maxim applied
iron. But it is impossible that iron can at the same to determine whether it is possible to square
time he gold, consequently, neither can we have any the circle? a point about which very emi
notion of iron-gold , and yet we understand what ment mathematicians have differed. It is
people mean when they mention iron-gold.
“In the instance alleged, it certainly strikes every easy to conceive that, in the infinite series
one, at first, that the expression iron-gold is an empt of numbers, and intermediate fractions,
sound; but yet there area thousand instances in #
it does not so easily strike. For example, when I some one number, integral or fractional,
say a rectilineal two-lined figure, a figure contained may bear the same ratio to another, as the
under two right lines, I am equally well understood
as when I say, a right-lined triangle, a figure con side of a square bears to its diagonal it yet,
tained under three right lines, And it should seem
we had a distinct notion of both figures. However, * All £ in fact, founded on our intui.
as we shew in Geometry that two right lines can tions of space—that is, in common language, on our
never contain space, it is also impossible to form a conceptions of space and its relations.-H.
notion of a rectilineal two-lined figure; and conse + We are able to conceive nothing infinite; and we
a''", that expression is an empty sound."-P. 55. unav suppose, but we cannot conceive, represent, or
imagine, the possibility in question.-H.
[403.404
cHAP. Iv.] OF THE TRAIN OF THOUGHT IN THE MIND. 379
however conceivable this may be, it may be I cannot admit, as an argument, or even as
demonstrated to be impossible. a pressing difficulty, what is grounded on
4. Mathematicians often require us to the supposition that such a thing is possible,
conceive things that are impossible, in order when there is no good evidence that it is
to prove them to be so. This is the case in possible, and, for anything we know, it may,
all their demonstrations ad absurdum. in the nature of things, be impossible.
Conceive, says Euclid, a right line drawn
from one point of the circumference of a
circle to another, to fall without the circle:" CHAPTER IV.
I conceive this–I reason from it, until I
come to a consequence that is manifestly of The TRAIN of Thought IN THE MIND.
absurd; and from thence conclude that the
thing which I conceived is impossible. EveRY man is conscious of a succession
Having said so much to shew that our of thoughts which pass in his mind while he
power of conceiving a proposition is no is awake, even when they are not excited
criterion of its possibility or impossibility, I by external objects. [406]
shall add a few observations on the extent The mind, on this account, may be com
of our knowledge of this kind. pared to liquor in the state of fermentation.
1. There are many propositions which, When it is not in this state, being once at
by the faculties God has given us, we judge rest, it remains at rest, until it is moved by
to be necessary, as well as true. All some external impulse. But, in the state
mathematical propositions are of this kind, of fermentation, it has some cause of motion
and many others. The contradictories of in itself, which, even when there is no im
such propositions must be impossible. Our pulse from without, suffers it not to be at
knowledge, therefore, of what is impossible, rest a moment, but produces a constant
must, at least, be as extensive as our know motion and ebullition, while it continues to
ledge of necessary truth. ferment.
2. By our senses, by memory, by testi There is surely no similitude between
mony, and by other means, we know many motion and thought; but there is an analogy,
things to be true which do not appear to be so obvious to all men, that the same words
necessary. But whatever is true is pos are often applied to both; and many modi
sible. Our knowledge, therefore, of what is fications of thought have no name but such
possible must, at least, extend as far as our as is borrowed from the modifications of
knowledge of truth. [405] motion. Many thoughts are excited by the
3. If a man pretends to determine the senses. The causes or occasions of these
possibility or impossibility of things beyond may be considered as external. But, when
these limits, let him bring proof. I do not such external causes do not operate upon
say that no such proof can be brought. It us, we continue to think from some internal
has been brought in many cases, particu cause. From the constitution of the mind
larly in mathematics. But I say that his itself there isa constantebullition of thought,
being able to conceive a thing, is no proof a constant intestine motion; not only of
that it is possible.t. Mathematics afford thoughts barely speculative, but of senti
many instances of impossibilities in the ments,passions, and affections, which attend
nature of things, which no man would have them.
believed if they had not been strictly de This continued succession of thought has,
monstrated. Perhaps, if we were able to by modern philosophers, been called the
reason demonstratively in other subjects, to imagination." I think it was formerly called
as great extent as in mathematics, we might the fancy, or the phantasy...t. If the old
find many things to be impossible, which name be laid aside, it were to be wished
we conclude without hesitation, to be pos that it had got a name less ambiguous than
sible. that of imagination, a name which had two
It is possible, you say, that God might or three meanings besides.
have made an universe of sensible and ra It is often called the train of ideas. This
tional creatures, into which neither natural may lead one to think that it is a train of
nor moral evil should ever enter. It may bare conceptions; but this would surely be
be so, for what I know. But how do you a mistake. It is made up of many other
know that it is possible? That you can operations of mind, as well as of concep
conceive it, I grant; but this is no proof. tions, or ideas.
* Euclid does not require us to conceive or imagine * By some only, and that improperly.-H.
any such impossibility. The ition to which + The Latin imaginatio, with its modifications in
Reid must refer, is the second of the third Book of the vulgar languages, was employed both in ancient
the Elements.-H. and modern times to express what the Greeks deno
+ Not, certainly, that it is really possible, but that minated parravia. Phantasy, of which Phansy or
it is problematican . . e., involves no con Fancy is a corruption, and now employed in a more
tradiction-violates no law if thought. This latter limited sense, was a common name for Imagination
is that possibility alone in question.-H. with the old English writers.-H.
[405, 406]
380 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS [EssAY 111.
Memory, judgment, reasoning passions, levee. They are all ambitious of his at
affections, and purposes—in a word, every tention: he goes round the circle, bestow
operation of the mind, excepting those of ing a bow upon one, a smile upon another;
sense—is exerted occasionally in this train £ a short question of a third; while a
of thought, and has its share as an ingre fourth is honoured with a particular con
dient: so that we must take the word idea ference; and the greater part have no par
in a very extensive sense, if we make the ticular mark of attention, but go as they
train of our thoughts to be only a train of came. It is true, he can give no mark of
ideas. [407] his attention to those who were not there,
To pass from the name, and consider the but he has a sufficient number for making
thing, we may observe, that the trains of a choice and distinction.
thought in the mind are of two kinds: they In like manner, a number of thoughts
are either such as flow spontaneously, like present themselves to the fancy spontane
water from a fountain, without any exer ously; but, if we pay no attention to them,
tion of a governing principle to arrange nor hold any conference with them, they
them; or they are regulated and directed pass with the crowd, and are immediately
by an active effort of the mind, with some forgot, as if they had never appeared. But
view and intention. those to which we think proper to pay at
Before we consider these in their order, tention, may be stopped, examined, and
it is proper to premise that these two kinds, arranged, for any particular purpose we
however distinct in their nature, are for have in view.
the most part mixed, in persons awake and It may likewise be observed, that a train
come to years of understanding. of thought, which was at first composed by
On the one hand, we are rarely so vacant application and judgment, when it has
of all project and design as to let our been often repeated, and becomes familiar,
thoughts take their own course, without will present itself spontaneously. Thus,
the least check or direction. Or if, at any when a man has composed an air in music,
time, we should be in this state, some object so as to please his own ear, after he has
will present itself, which is too interesting played or sung it often, the notes will
not to engage the attention and rouse the arrange themselves in just order, and it
active or contemplative powers that were requires no effort to regulate their succes
at rest. sion. [409]
On the other hand, when a man is giving Thus we see that the fancy is made up
the most intense application to any specula of trains of thinking—some of which are
tion, or to any scheme of conduct, when he spontaneous, others studied and regulated,
wills to exclude every thought that is fo and the greater part are mixed of both
reign to his present purpose, such thoughts kinds, and take their denomination from that
will often impertinently intrude upon him, which is most prevalent; and that a train
in spite of his endeavours to the contrary, of thought which at first was studied and
and occupy, by a kind of violence, some composed, may, by habit, present itself
part of the time destined to another pur spontaneously. Having premised these
pose. One man may have the command things, let us return to those trains of
of his thoughts more than another man, thought which are spontaneous, which must
and the same man more at one time than be first in the order of nature.
at another. But, I apprehend, in the best When the work of the day is over, and a
trained mind, the thoughts will sometimes man lies down to relax his body and mind,
be restive, sometimes capricious and self he cannot cease from thinking, though he
willed, when we wish to have them most desires it. Something occurs to his fancy;
under command. [408] that is followed by another thing; and so his
It has been observed very justly, that thoughts are carried on from one object to
we must not ascribe to the mind the power another, until sleep closes the scene.
of calling up any thought at pleasure, be In this operation" of the mind, it is not
cause such a call or volition supposes that faculty only that is employed; there are
thought to be already in the mind; for, many that join together in its production.
otherwise, how should it be the object of Sometimes the transactions of the day are
volition ? As this must be granted on the brought upon the stage, and acted over
one hand, so it is no less certain, on the again, as it were, upon this theatre of the
other, that a man has a considerable power imagination. In this case, memory surely
in regulating and disposing his own thoughts. acts the most considerable part, since the
Of this every man is conscious, and I can scenes exhibited are notfictions, butrealities,
no more doubt of it than I can doubt whether which we remember; yet, in this case, the
I think at all.
We seem to treat the thoughts that pre
* The word process might be here preferable.
sent themselves to the fancy in crowds, as Operation would denote that the mind is active in
a great man treats those that attend his associating the train of thought.-H.
[407-409]
chap. iv.] OF THE TRAIN OF THOUGHT IN THE MIND. 381
memory does not act alone, other powers are this natural desire of self-approbation will
employed, and attend upon their proper either produce a noble effort to acquire real
objects. The transactions remembered will worth, which is its proper direction, or it
be more or less interesting; and we cannot will lead into some of those arts of self
then review our own conduct, nor that of deceit, which create a false opinion of
others, without passing some judgment upon worth. [411]
it. This we approve, that we disapprove. A castle-builder, in the fictitious scenes
This elevates, that humbles and depresses of his fancy, will figure, not according to his
us. Persons that are not absolutely indif real character, but according to the highest
ferent to us, can hardly appear, even to the opinion he has been able to form of himself,
imagination, without some friendly or un and perhaps far beyond that opinion. For,
friendly emotion. We judge and reason in those imaginary conflicts, the passions
about things as well as persons in such easily yield to reason, and a man exerts the
reveries. e remember what a man said noblest efforts of virtue and magnanimity,
and did; from this we pass to his designs with the same ease as, in his dreams, he
and to his general character, and frame flies through the air or plunges to the bot
some hypothesis to make the whole con tom of the ocean.
sistent. Such trains of thought we may The romantic scenes of fancy are most
call historical. [410] commonly the occupation of young minds,
There are others which we may call ro not yet so deeply engaged in life as to have
mantic, in which the plot is formed by the their thoughts taken up by its real cares
creative power of fancy, without any regard and business.
to what did or will happen. In these also, Those active powers of the mind, which
the powers of judgment, taste, moral senti are most luxuriant by constitution, or have
ment, as well as the passions and affections, been most cherished by education, im
come in and take a share in the execu patient to exert themselves, hurry the
tion. thought into scenes that give them play;
In these scenes, the man himself com and the boy commences in imagination,
monly acts a ver distinguished part, and according to the bent of his mind, a general
seldom does anything which he cannot ap or a statesman, a poet or an orator.
prove. Here the miser will be generous, When the fair ones become castle-build
the coward brave, and the knave honest. ers, they use different materials; and, while
Mr Addison, in the “Spectator,” calls this the young soldier is carried into the field of
play of the fancy, castle-building. Mars, where he pierces the thickest squad
The young politician, who has turned his rons of the enemy, despising death in all
thoughts to the affairs of government, be its forms, the gay and lovely nymph, whose
comes, in his imagination, a minister of heart has never felt the tender passion, is
state. He examines every spring and wheel transported into a brilliant assembly, where
of the machine of government with the she draws the attention of every eye, and
nicest eye and the most exact judgment. makes an impression on the noblest heart.
He finds a proper remedy for every disorder But no sooner has Cupid's arrow found
of the commonwealth, quickens trade and its way into her own heart, than the whole
manufactures by salutary laws, encourages scenery of her imagination is changed.
arts and sciences, and makes the nation Balls and assemblies have now no charms.
happy at home and respected abroad. He Woods and groves, the flowery bank and
feels the reward of his good administration, the crystal fountain, are the scenes she
in that self-approbation which attends it, frequents in imagination. She becomes an
and is happy in acquiring, by his wise and Arcadian shepherdess, feeding her flock
patriotic conduct,the blessings of the present beside that of her Strephon, and wants no
age, and the praises of those that are to more to complete her happiness. [412]
coine, In a few years the love-sick maid is
It is probable that, upon the stage of transformed into the solicitous mother. Her
imagination, more great exploits have been smiling offspring play around her. She
performed in every age than have been views them with a parent's eye. Her ima
upon the stage of life from the beginning of gination immediately raises them to man
the world. An innate desire of self-appro hood, and brings them forth upon the stage
bation is undoubtedly a part of the human of life. One son makes a figure in the
constitution. It is a powerful spur to army, another shines at the bar; her
worthy conduct, and is intended as such by daughters are happily disposed of in mar
the Author of our being. A man cannot riage, and bring new alliances to the family.
be easy or happy, unless this desire be in Her children's children rise up before her,
some measure gratified. While he con and venerate her grey hairs.
ceives himself worthless and base, he can Thus the spontaneous sallies of famey are
relish no enjoyment. The humiliating, as various as the cares and fears, the de
mortifying sentiment must be removed, and sires and hopes, of man. -
[410–412]
382 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essaw 1 v.
Quicquid agunthomines, votum, timor, ira, voluptas,
motion. Whether the hypothesis of this
Gaudia, discursus:
young philosopher, in turning the watch
These fill up the scenes of fancy, as well spring into a man, or that of the German
as the page of the satirist. Whatever philosopher, in turning a man into a watch
possesses the heart makes occasional ex spring, be the most rational, seems hard to
cursions into the imagination, and acts such determine."
scenes upon that theatre as are agreeable To account for the regularity of our first
to the prevailing passion. The man of thoughts, from motions of animal spirits,
traffic, who has committed a rich cargo to vibrations of nerves, attractions of ideas, or
the inconstant ocean, follows it in his from any other unthinking cause, whether
thought, and, according as his hopes or his mechanical or contingent, seems equally
fears prevail, he is haunted with storms, irrational. [414]
and rocks, and shipwreck; or he makes a If we be not able to distinguish the
happy and a lucrative voyage, and, before strongest marks of thought and design from
his vessel has lost sight of land, he has dis the effects of mechanism or contingency, the
£ of the profit which she is to bring at consequence will be very melancholy; for
er return. it must necessarily follow, that we have no
The poet is carried into the Elysian fields, evidence of thought in any of our fellow
where he converses with the ghosts of men-nay, that we have no evidence of
Homerand Orpheus. Thephilosopher makes thought or design in the structure and go
a tour through the planetary system, or vernment of the universe. If a good period
goes down to the centre of the earth, and or sentence was ever produced without
examines its various strata. In the devout having had any judgment previously em
man likewise, the great objects that possess ployed about it, why not an Iliad or AEneid?
his heart often play in £ imagination: They differ only in less and more; and we
sometimes he is transported to the regions should do injustice to the philosopher of
of the blessed, from whence he looks down Laputa, in laughing at his project of making
with pity upon the folly and the try by the turning of a wheel, if a con
of human life; or he prostrates himself currence of unthinking causes may produce
before the throne of the Most High with a rational train of thought.
devout veneration; or he converses with It is, therefore, in itself highly probable
celestial spirits about the natural and moral to say no more, that whatsoever is regular
kingdom of God, which he now sees only and rational in a train of thought, which
by a faint light, but hopes hereafter to view presents itself spontaneously to a man's
with a steadier and brighter ray. [413] fancy, without any'study, is a copy of what
In persons come to maturity, there is, had been before composed by his own ra
even in these spontaneous sallies of fancy, tional powers, or those of some other person.
some arrangement of thought; and I con We certainly judge so in similar cases.
ceive that it will be readily allowed, that in Thus, in a book I find a train of thinking,
those who have the greatest stock of know which has the marks of knowledge and
ledge, and the best natural parts, even the judgment. I ask how it was produced? It
spontaneous movements of fancy will be is printed in a book. This does not satisfy
the most regular and connected. They me, because the book has no knowledge nor
have an order, connection, and unity, by reason. I am told that a printer printed
which they are no less distinguished from it, and a compositor set the types. Neither
the dreams of one asleep, or the ravings of does this satisfy me. These causes, per
one delirious on the one hand, than from haps, knew very little of the subject. There
the finished productions of art on the other. must be a prior cause of the composition.
How is this regular arrangement brought It was printed from a manuscript. True.
about? It has all the marks of judgment But the manuscript is as ignorant as the
and reason, yet it seems to go before judg printed book. The manuscript was written
ment, and to spring forth £ or dictated by a man of knowledge and
Shall we believe with Leibnitz, that the judgment. This, and this only, will satisfy
mind was originally formed like a watch a man of common understanding; and it
wound up; and that all its thoughts, pur appears to him extremely ridiculous to be
poses, passions, and actions, are effected lieve that such a train of thinking could
by the gradual evolution of the original originally be produced by any cause that
spring of the machine, and succeed each neither reasons nor thinks. [415]
other in order, as necessarily as the motions Whether such a train of thinking be
and pulsations of a watch P printed in a book, or printed, so to speak,
If a child of three or four years were put in his mind, and issue spontaneously from
to account for the phaenomena of a watch, his fancy, it must have been composed with
he would conceive that there is a little man
within the watch, or some other little animal, *The theory of our mental associations owes much
that beats continually, and produces the to the philosophers of the Leibnitzian school.-ft.
[413-415 |
-------------------
cHAP. Iv.] OF THE TRAIN OF THOUGHT IN THE MIND. 383
judgment by himself, or by some other little minds are fired with the discovery;
rational being. they are eager to imitate it, and never at
This, I think, will be confirmed by tracing rest till they can exhibit something of the
the progress of the human fancy as far same kind.
back as we are able. When a child first learns by imitation
We have not the means of knowing how to do something that requires design, how
the fancy is employed in infants. Their does he exult | Pythagoras was not more
time is divided between the employment of happy in the discovery of his famous theo
their senses and sound sleep : so that there rem. He seems then first to reflect upon
is little time left for imagination, and the himself, and to swell with self-esteem. His
materials it has to work upon are probably eyes sparkle. He is impatient to shew his
very scanty. A few days after they are performance to all about him, and thinks
born, sometimes a few hours, we see them himself entitled to their applause. He is
smile in their sleep. But what they smile applauded by all, and feels the same emo
at is not easy to guess; for they do not tion from this applause, as a Roman Con
smile at anything they see, when awake, sul did from a triumph. He has now a
for some months after they are born. It consciousness of some worth in himself. He
is likewise common to see them move their assumes a superiority over those who are
lips in sleep, as if they were sucking. not so wise, and Pays respect to those who
These things seem to discover some are wiser than himself. He attempts
working of the imagination; but there is something else, and is every day reaping
no reason to think that there is any regular new laurels.
train of thought in the mind of infants. As children grow up, they are delighted
By a regular train of thought, I mean with tales, with childish games, with designs
that which has a beginning, a middle, and and stratagems. Everything of this kind
an end, an arrangement of its parts, ac stores the fancy with a new regular train of
cording to some rule, or with some inten thought, which becomes familiar by repeti
tion. Thus, the conception of a design, tion, so that one part draws the whole after
and of the means of executing it ; the con it in the imagination. [417]
ception of a whole, and the number and The imagination of a child, like the hand
order of the parts. These are instances of of a painter, is long employed in copying
the most simple trains of thought that can the works of others, before it attempts any
be called regular. invention of its own.
Man has undoubtedly a power (whether The power of invention is not yet brought
we call it taste or judgment is not of any forth; but it is coming forward, and, like
consequence in the present argument) the bud of a tree, is ready to burst its
whereby he distinguishes between a com integuments, when some accident aids its
position and a heap of materials; between eruption.
a house, for instance, and a heap of stones; There is no power of the understanding
between a sentence and a heap of words; that gives so much pleasure to the owner,
between a picture and a heap of colours. as that of invention, whether it be employed
[416] It does not appear to me that chil in mechanics, in science, in the conduct of
dren have any regular trains of thought life, in poetry, in wit, or in the fine arts.
until this power begins to operate. Those One who is conscious of it, acquires thereby
who are born such idiots as never to shew a worth and importance in his own eye
any signs of this power, shew as little any which he had not before. He looks upon
signs of regularity of thought. It seems, himself as one who formerly lived upon the
therefore, that this power is connected with bounty and gratuity of others, but who has
all regular trains of thought, and may be now acquired some property of his own.
the cause of them. When this power begins to be felt in the
Such trains of thought discover them young mind, it has the grace of novelty
selves in children about two years of age. added to its other charms, and, like the
They can then give attention to the opera youngest child of the family, is caressed
tions of older children in making their beyond all the rest.
little houses, and ships, and other such We may be sure, ..herefore, that, as soon
things, in imitation of the works of men. as children are conscious of this power,
They are then capable of understanding a they will exercise it in such ways as are
little of language, which shews both a suited to their age, and to the objects they
regular train of thinking, and some degree are employed about. This gives rise to
of abstraction. I think we may perceive a innumerable new associations, and regular
distinction between the faculties of children trains of thought, which make the deeper
of two or three years of age, and those of impression upon the mind, as they are its
the most sagacious brutes. They can then exclusive property.
perceive design and regularity in the works I am aware that the power of invention
of others, especially of older children; their is distributed among men more unequally
[416, 417]
384 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essay iv.
than almost any other. When it is able to be not only acquired, but to be made so
produce anything that is interesting to man familiar by frequent repetition, as to pre
kind we call it genius; a talent which is the sent themselves spontaneously when there
lot of very few. But there is, perhaps, a is occasion for them.
lower kind or lower degree of invention that The imagination even of men of good
is more common. However this may be, it parts never serves them readily but in
must be allowed that the power of invention things wherein it has been much exercised.
in those who have it, will produce many A minister of state holds a conference with
new regular trains of thought; and these a foreign ambassador with no greater emo
being expressed in works of art, in writing, tion than a professor in a college prelects to
or in discourse, will be copied by others. his audience. The imagination of each
[418 presents to him what the occasion requires
'. I conceive the minds of children, to be said, and how. Let them change
places, and both would find themselves at a
as soon as they have judgment to distin
guish what is regular, orderly, and connected, loss.
from a mere medley of thought, are fur The habits which the human mind is
nished with regular trains of thinking by capable of acquiring by exercise are won
these means. derful in many instances; in none more
First and chiefly, by copying what they wonderful than in that versatility of imagin
see in the works and in the discourse of ation which a well-bred man acquires by
others. Man is the most imitative of all being much exercised in the various scenes
animals; he not only imitates with inten of life. In the morning he visits a friend
tion, and purposely, what he thinks has any in affliction. Here his imagination brings
grace or beauty, but even without intention, forth from its store every topic of consola
he is led, by a kind of instinct, which it is tion; everything that is agreeable to the
difficult to resist, into the modes of speaking, laws of friendship and sympathy, and no
thinking, and acting, which he has been ac thing that is not so. From thence he drives
customed to see in his early years. The to the minister's levee, where imagination
more children see of what is regular and readily suggests what is proper to be said
beautiful in what is presented to them, the or replied to every man, and in what man
more they are led to observe and to imitate ner, according to the degree of acquaint
it. ance or familiarity, of rank or dependence,
This is the chief part of their stock, and of opposition or concurrence of interests, of
descends to them by a kind of tradition confidence or distrust, that is between them.
from those who came before them; and we Nor does all this employment hinder him
shall find that the fancy of most men is from carrying on some design with much
furnished from those they have conversed artifice, and endeavouring to penetrate into
with, as well as their religion, language, the views of others through the closest dis
and manners. guises. From the levee he goes to the
Secondly, By the additions or innovations House of Commons, and speaks upon the
that are properly their own, these will be affairs of the nation; from thence to a ball
greater or less, in proportion to their study or assembly, and entertains the ladies. His
and invention; but in the bulk of mankind imagination puts on the friend, the courtier,
are not very considerable. the patriot, the fine gentleman, with more
Every profession and every rank in life, ease, than we put off one suit and put on
has a manner of thinking, and turn of fancy another. [420]
that is proper to it; by which it is character This is the effect of training and exer
ised in comedies and works of humour. cise. For a man of equal parts and know
The bulk of men of the same nation, of the ledge, but unaccustomed to those scenes of
same rank, and of the same occupation, are public life, is quite disconcerted when first
cast as, it were, in the same mould. This brought into them. His thoughts are put
mould itself changes gradually, but slowly, to flight, and he cannot rally them.
by new inventions, by intercourse with There are feats of imagination to be
strangers, or by other accidents." [419] learned by application and practice, as won
The condition of man requires a longer derful as the feats of balancers and rope
infancy and youth than that of other ani dancers, and often as useless.
mals; for this reason, among others, that When a man can make a hundred verses
almost every station in civil society requires standing on one foot, or play three or four
a multitude of regular trains of thought, to games at chess at the same time without
seeing the board, it is probable he hath
“* Non ad rationem sedad similitudinem compo spent his life in acquiring such a feat. How
nimur," says Seneca; and Schiller ever, such unusual phaenomena shew what
“Man-he is aye an imitative creature, habits of imagination may be acquired.
And he who is the foremost leads the flock.”
There would be no end of quotations to the same When such habits are acquired and per
effect.-H.
fected, they are exercised without any labo
[418-420]
caar. iv.] OF THE TRAIN OF THOUGHT IN THE MIND. 385
rious effort; like the habit of playing upon the “ Iliad P” Was there no more effort
an instrument of music. There are innu in the composition than there is in telling a
merable motions of the fingers upon the well-known tale, or singing a favourite
stops or keys, which must £ directed in song * This cannot be believed. [422]
one particular train or succession. There Granting that some happy thought first
is only one arrangement of those motions suggested the design of singing the wrath of
that is right, while there are ten thousand Achilles, yet, surely, it was a matter of
that are wrong, and would spoil the music. judgment and choice where the narration
The musician thinks not in the least of the should begin and where it should end.
arrangement of those motions; he has a dis Granting that the fertility of the poet's
tinct idea of the tune, and wills to play it. imagination suggested a variety of rich ma
The motions of the fingers arrange them terials, was not judgment necessary to select
selves so as to answer his intention. what was proper, to reject what was im
In like manner, when a man speaks upona proper, to arrange the materials into a just
subject with which he is acquainted, there is composition, and to adapt them to each
a certain arrangement of his thoughts and other, and to the design of the whole P
words necessary to make his discourse sen No man can believe that Homer's ideas,
sible, pertinent, and grammatical. In every merely by certain sympathies and antipa
sentence there are more rules of grammar, thies, by certain attractions and repulsions
logic, and rhetoric, that may be transgressed, inherent in their natures, arranged them
than there are words and letters. He selves according to the most perfect rules of
speaks without thinking of any of those epic poetry; and Newton's, according to
rules, and yet observes them all, as if they the rules of mathematical composition.
were all in his eye. [421] I should sooner believe that the poet,
This is a habit so similar to that of a after he invoked his muse, did nothing at
player on an instrument, that I think both all but listen to the song of the goddess.
must be got in the same way—that is, by Poets, indeed, and other artists, must make
much practice, and the power of habit. their works appear natural; but nature is
When a man speaks well and methodi the perfection of art, and there can be no
cally upon a subject without study and with just imitation of nature without art. When
perfect ease, I believe we may take it for the building is finished, the rubbish, the
granted that his thoughts run in a beaten scaffolds, the tools and engines are carried
track. There is a mould in his mind out of sight; but we know it could not have
which has been formed by much practice, or been reared without them.
by study—for this very subject, or for some The train of thinking, therefore, is capable
other so similar and analogous that his of being guided and directed, much in the
discourse falls into this mould with ease, same manner as the horse we ride. The
and takes its form from it. horse has his strength, his agility, and his
Hitherto we have considered the opera mettle in himself; he has been taught cer
tions of fancy that are either spontaneous, tain movements, and many useful habits,
or, at least, require no laborious effort to that make him more subservient to our
guide and direct them, and have endeav purposes and obedient to our will; but to
oured to account for that degree of regu accomplish a journey, he must be directed
larity and arrangement which is found even by the rider. -
in them. The natural powers of judgment In like manner, fancy has its original
and invention, the pleasure that always powers, which are very different in different
attends the exercise of those powers, the persons; it has likewise more regular mo
means we have of improving them by imi tions, to which it has been trained by along
tation of others, and the effect of practice course of discipline and exercise, and by
and habits, seem to me sufficiently to which it may, extempore, and without much
account for this phaenomenon, without sup effort, produce things that have a consid
posing any unaccountable attractions of ideas erable degree of beauty, regularity, and
by which they arrange themselves. design. [423]
But we are able to direct our thoughts inBut the most perfect works of design are
never extemporary. Our first thoughts are
a certain course, so as to perform a destined
task. reviewed; we place them at a proper dis
Every work of art has its model framed tance; examine every part, and take a
in the imagination. Here the “Iliad” of complex view of the whole. By our criti
Homer, the “Republic” of Plato, the cal faculties, we perceive this part to be
“Principia” of Newton, were fabricated. redundant, that deficient; here is a want
of nerves, there a want of delicacy : this is
Shall we believe that those works took the
form in which they now appear of them obscure, that too diffuse. Things are mar:
selves?—that the sentiments, the manners, shalled anew, according to a second and
and the passions arranged themselves at more deliberate judgment; what was def
once in the mind of Homer, so as to form cient, is supplied; what was dislocated, is
2 o
[421–428]
386 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essav Iv.
put in joint; redundances are lopped off, First, I observe, with regard to this
and the whole polished. theory, that, although it is true that the
Though poets, of all artists, make thethought of any object is apt to lead us to
the thought of its cause or effect, of things
highest claim to inspiration; yet, if we be
lieve Horace, a competent judge, no pro contiguous to it in time or place, or of
duction in that art can have merit which things resembling it, yet this enumeration
has not cost such labour as this in the of the relations of things which are apt to
birth. | lead us from one object to another, is very
* Vos of inaccurate.
Pompilius sanguis, carmen reprehendite quod non
The enumeration is too large upon his
Mulfa dies, et multa litura coercuit, atque
Perfectum decies non castigavit ad unguem."own principles; but it is by far too scanty in
reality. Causation, according to his philo
The conclusion I would draw from all sophy, implies nothing more than a con
that has been said upon this subject is, stant conjunction observed between the
That everything that is regular in that cause and the effect, and, therefore, conti
train of thought which we call fancy or guity must include causation, and his three
imagination, from the little designs and rinciples of attraction are reduced to two.
reveries of children to the grandest pro 425]
ductions of human genius, was originally But when we take all the three, the enu
the offspring of judgment or taste, applied meration is, in reality, very incomplete.
with some effort greater or less. What Every relation of things has a tendency,
one person composed with art and judg | more or less, to lead the thought, in a
ment, is imitated by another with great thinking mind, from one to the other; and
ease. What a man himself at first com not only every relation, but every kind of
osed with pains, becomes by habit so contrariety and opposition. What Mr
amiliar as to offer itself spontaneously to Hume says—that contrariety may perhaps
his fancy afterwards. But nothing that is be considered as a mixture “ of causation
regular was ever at first conceived without and resemblance”—I can as little compro
design, attention, and care. [424] hend as if he had said that figure may per
I shall now make a few reflections upon a haps be considered as a mixture of colour
theory which has been applied to account and sound.
for this successive train of thought in the Our thoughts pass easily from the end
mind. It was hinted by Mr Hobbes, but to the means; from any truth to the evi
has drawn more attention since it was dis dence on which it is founded, the conse
tinctly explained by Mr Hume. quences that may be drawn from it, or the
That author" thinks that the train of use that may be made of it. From a part
thought in the mind is owing to a kind of we are easily led to think of the whole, from
attraction which ideas have for other ideas a subject to its qualities, or from things
that bear certain relations to them. He related to the relation. Such transitions in
thinks the complex ideas—which are the thinking must have been made thousands
common subjects of our thoughts and rea of times by every man who thinks and
soning-are owing to the same cause. The reasons, and thereby become, as it were,
relations which produce this attraction of beaten tracks for the imagination.
ideas, he thinks, are these three only—to Not only the relations of objects to each
wit, causation, contiguity in time or place, other influence our train of thinking, but
and similitude. He asserts that these are the relation they bear to the present tem
the only general principles that unite ideas. per and disposition of the mind; their re
And having, in another place, occasion to lation to the habits we have acquired,
take notice of contrariety as a principle of whether moral or intellectual; to the com
connection among ideas, in order to recon pany we have kept, and to the business in
cile this to his system, he tells us gravely, which we have been chiefly employed. The
that contrariety may perhaps be considered same event will suggest very different re
as a mixture of causation and resemblance. flections to different persons, and to the
That ideas which have any of these three same person at different times, according
relations do mutually attract each other, so as he is in good or bad humour, as he is
that one of them being presented to the lively or dull, angry or pleased, melaneholy
fancy, the other is drawn along with it or cheerful.
this he seems to think an original property Lord Kames, in his “Elements of Criti
of the mind, or rather of the ideas, and cism,” and Dr Gerard, in his “Essay on
therefore inexplicable.t. Genius,” have given a much fuller and
juster ation of the causes that in
* He should have said this author, for Hume is fluence our train of thinking, and I have
referred to.-H.
* See above, p. 294, b, note t. The history of the
doctrine of Association has never yet been at all able speculations on this matter are wholly unknown.
adcquately developed. Some of the most remark Of these I can, at present, say nothing.-H. 8ee
Notes D = *, D = **. [424, 425]
- * ------~~~~"-- *------ ~~~"--- -
cIIAP. Iv.] OF THE TRAIN OF THOUGHT IN THE MIND. 387

nothing to add to what they have said on It cannot be denied, that the state of the
this subject. body has an influence upon our imagination,
Secondly, Let us consider how far this according as a man is sober or drunk, as
attraction of ideas must be resolved into he is fatigued or refreshed. Crudities and
original qualities of human nature. [426] indigestion are said to give uneasy dreams,
I believe the original principles of the and have probably a like effect upon the
mind, of which we can give no account but waking thoughts. Opium gives to some
that such is our constitution, are more in persons pleasing dreams and pleasing im
number than is commonly thought. But aginations when awake, and to others such
we ought not to multiply them without as are horrible and distressing.
necessity. These influences of the body upon the
That trains of thinking, which, by fre mind can only be known by experience, and
quent repetition, have become familiar, I believe we can give no account of them.
should spontaneously offer themselves to Nor can we, perhaps, give any reason why
our fancy, seems to require no other origi we must think without ceasing while we are
mal quality but the power of habit." awake. I believe we are likewise origi
In all rational thinking, and in all rational nally disposed, in imagination, to pass from
discourse, whether serious or facetious, the any one object of thought to others that are
thought must have some relation to what contiguous to it in time or place. This, I
went before. Every man, therefore, from think, may be observed in brutes and in
the dawn of reason, must have been accus idiots, as well as in children, before any
tomed to a train of related objects. These habit can be acquired that might account
please the understanding, and, by custom, for it. The sight of an object is apt to
become like beaten tracks which invite the suggest to the imagination what has been
traveller.
seen or felt in conjunction with it, even
As far as it is in our power to give a when the memory of that conjunction is
direction to our thoughts, which it is un gone.
doubtedly in a great degree, they will be Such conjunctions of things influence not
directed by the active principles common only the imagination, but the belief and the
to men-by our appetites, our passions, our passions, especially in children and in
affections, our reason, and conscience. And brutes; and perhaps all that we call memory
that the trains of thinking in our minds are in brutes is something of this kind.
chiefly governed by these, according as one They expect events in the same order and
or another prevails at the time, every man succession in which they happened before;
will find in his experience. and by this expectation, their actions and
If the mind is at any time vacant from passions, as well as their thoughts, are re
every passion and desire, there are still gulated. [428] A horse takes fright at
some objects that are more acceptable to the place where some object frighted him
us than others. The facetious man is before. We are apt to conclude from this
pleased with surprising similitudes or con that he remembers the former accident.
trasts; the philosopher with the relations But perhaps there is only an association
of things that are subservient to reasoning; formed in his mind between the place and
the merchant with what tends to profit; the passion of fear, without any distinct
and the politician with what may mend the remembrance.
state.
Mr Locke has given us a very good
A good writer of comedy or romance can chapter upon the association of ideas; and
feign a train of thinking for any of the per by the examples he has given to illustrate
sons of his fable, which appears very natu this doctrine, I think it appears that very
ral, and is approved by the best judges.
Now, what is it that entitles such a fiction
: associations may beformed at once
not of ideas to ideas only, but of ideas to
to approbation ? Is it that the author has passions and emotions; and that strong as
given a nice attention to the relations of sociations are never formed at once, but
causation, contiguity, and similitude in the when accompanied by some strong passion
ideas; (427]"Ti: £ the le: or emotion. I believe this must be resolved
part of its merit. But the chief part con into the constitution of our nature.
sists in this, that it corresponds perfectly Mr Hume's opinion—that the complex
with the general character, the rank, the ideas, which are the common objects of
habits, the present situation and passions of discourse and reasoning, are formed by those
the person. If this be a just way of judging original attractions of ideas to which he
in criticism, it follows necessarily, that the ascribes the train of thoughts in the mind
circumstances last mentioned have the chief will come under consideration in another
influence in suggesting our trains of thought. place. -
To put an end to our remarks upon this

* We can as well explain Habit by Association, theory of Mr Hume, I think he has real
as Association by Habit-ii.
merit in bringing this curious2subject
C2
under
[426-428]
388 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [EssAv v.
the view of philosophers, and carrying it a times through the more regular and sober
certain length. But I see nothing in this walks of science and philosophyl
the ory that should hinder us to conclude, The various objects which he surveys,
that everything in the trains of our thought, according to their different degrees of beauty
which bears the marks of judgment and and dignity, raise in him the lively and
reason, has been the product of judgment agreeable emotions of taste. Illustrious
and reason previously exercised, either by human characters, as they pass in review,
the person himself, at that or some former clothed with their moral qualities, touch his
time, or by some other person. The at heart still more deeply. They not only
traction of ideas will be the same in a man's awaken the sense of beauty, but excite the
second thoughts upon any subject as in his sentiment of approbation, and kindle the
first. Or, if some change in his circum glow of virtue.
stances, or in the objects about him, should While he views what is truly great and
make any change in the attractions of his glorious in human conduct, his soul catches
ideas, it is an equal chance whether the the divine flame, and burns with desire to
second be better than the first, or whether emulate what it admires. 1430]
they be worse. But it is certain that The human imagination is an ample
every man of judgment and taste will, upon theatre, upon which everything in human
a review, correct that train of thought which life, good or bad, great or mean, laudable
first presented itself. If the attractions of or base, is acted.
ideas are the sole causes of the regular In children, and in some frivolous minds,
arrangement of thought in the fancy, there it is a mere toy-shop. And in some, who
is no use for judgment or taste in any com exercise their memory without their judg
position, nor indeed any room for their ment, its furniture is made up of old scraps
operation. [429] of knowledge, that are thread-bare and
There are other reflections, of a more worn out.
practical nature and of higher importance, In some, this theatre is often occupied by
to which this subject leads. ghastly superstition, with all her train of
I believe it will be allowed by every man, Gorgons, and Hydras, and Chimaeras dire.
that our happiness or misery in life, that Sometimes it is haunted with all the infernal
our improvement in any art or science which demons, and made the forge of plots, and
we profess, and that our improvement in rapine, and murder. Here everything that
real virtue and goodness, depend in a very is black and detestable is first contrived, and
great degree on the train of thinking that a thousand wicked designs conceived that
occupies the mind both in our vacant and are never executed. Here, too, the furies
in our more serious hours. As far, there act their part, taking a severe though secret
fore, as the direction of our thoughts is in vengeance upon the self-condemned criminal.
our power, (and that it is so in a great How happy is that mind in which the light
measure, cannot be doubted) it is of the last of real knowledge dispels the phantoms of
importance to give them that direction which superstition; in which the belief and rever
is most subservient to those valuable pur ence of a perfect all-governing mind casts
OSes.
out all fear but the fear of acting wrong;
What employment can he have worthy in which serenity and cheerfulness, inno
of a man, whose imagination is occupied cence, humanity, and candour, guard theim
only about things low and base, and grovels agination against the entrance of every un
in a narrow field of mean, unanimating, and hallowed intruder, and invite more amiable
uninteresting objects, insensible to those and worthier guests to dwell !
finer and more delicate sentiments, and There shall the Muses, the Graces, and
blind to those more enlarged and nobler the Virtues fix their abode; for everything
views which elevate the soul, and make it that is great and worthy in human conduct
conscious of its dignity. must have been conceived in the imagina
How different from him whose imagina tion before it was brought into act. And
tion, like an eagle in her flight, takes a wide many great and good designs have been
prospect, and observes whatever it presents, formed there, which, for want of power and
that is new or beautiful, grand or important; opportunity, have proved abortive.
whose rapid wing varies the scene every The man whose imagination is occupied
moment, carrying him sometimes through by these guests, must be wise; he must be
the fairy regions of wit and fancy, some good; and he must be happy. [431]
[429–431]
cHAP. 1.] OF GENERAL WORDS. 389
ESSAY V.
OF ABSTRACTION.
neath, or in the waters under the earth, is

CHAPTER I. an individual."
How comes it to pass, then, that, in all
of GENERAL WoRps, languages, general words make the greatest
part of the language, and proper names but
THE words we use in language are either a very small and inconsiderable part of it.
general words or proper names. Proper This seemingly strange phaenomenon may,
names are intended to signify one individual I think, be easily accounted for by the fol
only. Such are the names of men, king lowing observations :
doms, provinces, cities, rivers, and of every First, Though there be a few individuals
other creature of God, or work of man, that are obvious to the notice of all men,
which we choose to distinguish from all and, therefore, have proper names in all
others of the kind, by a name appropriated languages—such as the sun and moon, the
to it. All the other words of language are earth and sea-yet the greatest part of the
general words, not appropriated to signify things to which we think fit to give proper
any one individual thing, but equally related names, are local; known perhaps to a vil
to many. lage or to a neighbourhood, but unknown to
Under general words, therefore, I com the greater part of those who speak the
prehend not only those which logicians call same language, and to all the rest of man
general terms—that is, such general words kind. The names of such things being con
as may make the subject or the predicate fined to a corner, and having no names
of a proposition, but likewise their auxiliaries answering to them in other languages, are
or accessories, as the learned Mr Harris not accounted a part of the language, any
calls them; such as prepositions, conjunc. more than the customs of a particular ham
tions, articles, which are "all general words, let are accounted part of the law of the
though they cannot properly be called gene nation. [433]
ral terms. For this reason, there are but few proper
In every language, rude or polished, names that belong to a language. It is
general words make the greatest part, and next to be considered why there must be
proper names the least. Grammarians many general words in every language.
have reduced all words to eight or nine Secondly. It may be observed, that every
classes, which are called parts of speech. individual object that falls within our view
Of these there is only one—to wit, that of has various attributes; and it is by them
nouns—wherein proper names are found. that it becomes useful or hurtful to us.
[432] All pronouns, verbs, participles, ad We know not the essence of any individual
object; all the knowledge we can attain of
verbs, articles, prepositions, conjunctions, and
interjections, are general words. Of nouns, it, is the knowledge of its attributes—its
all adjectives are general words, and the quantity, its various qualities, its various
greater part of substantives. Every sub relations to other things, its place, its
stantive that has a plural number, is a gene situation, and motions. It is by such attri
ral word; for no proper name can have a butes of things only that we can communi
plural number, because it signifies only one cate our knowledge of them to others. By
individual. In all the fifteen books of their attributes, our hopes or fears for them
Euclid's Elements, there is not one word are regulated; and it is only by attention
that is not general; and the same may be to their attributes that we can make them
said of many large volumes. subservient to our ends; and therefore we
At the same time, it must be acknowledged, give names to such attributes.
that all the objects we perceive are individ Now, all attributes must, from their
uals. Every object of sense, of memory, nature, be expressed by general words, and
or of consciousness, is an individual object. are so expressed in all languages. In the
All the good things we enjoy or desire, and ancient philosophy, attributes in general
all the evils we feel or fear, must come from were called by two names which express
individuals; and I think we may venture to
say, that every creature which God has made, * This Boethius has well expressed:-" Onnequad
in the heavens above, or in the earth be est, to quodest, singulare est."-ri.
[432, 433]
390 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essay w
their nature. They were called universals, Nor is it only substances that we thus
because they might belong equally to many form into classes. We do the same with
individuals, and are not confined to one. regard to qualities, relations, actions, affec
They were also called predicables, because tions, passions, and all other thin
whatever is predicated, that is, affirmed or When a class is very large, it is divided
denied of one subject, may be of more, and into subordinate classes in the same man
therefore is an universal, and expressed by ner. [435] The higher class is called a
a general word. A predicable therefore genus or kind: the lower a species or sort
signifies the same thing as an attribute, with of the higher. Sometimes a species is still
this difference only, that the first is Latin, subdivided into subordinate species; and
the last English." The attributes we find this subdivision is carried on as far as is
either in the creatures of God or in the found convenient forthe purpose of language,
works of men, are common to many indi or for the improvement of knowledge.
duals. We either find it to be so, or pre In this distribution of things into genera
sume it may be so, and give them the same and species, it is evident that the name of
name in every subject to which they belong. the species comprehends more attributes
There are not only attributes belonging than the name of the genus. The species
to individual subjects, but there are likewise comprehends all that is in the genus, and
attributes of attributes, which may be called those attributes likewise which distinguish
secondary attributes. Most attributes are that species from others belonging to the
capable of different degrees and different same genus; and the more subdivisions we
modifications, which must be expressed by make, the names of the lower become still
general words. [434] the more comprehensive in their significa
Thus it is an attribute of many bodies to tion, but the less extensive in their appli
Demoved; but motion may be in an endless cation to individuals.
variety of directions. It may be quick or Hence it is an axiom in logic—that the
slow, rectilineal or curvilineal; it may be more extensive any general term is, it is the
equable, or accelerated, or retarded. less comprehensive; and, on the contrary,
As all attributes, therefore, whether pri the more comprehensive, the less ertensive.
mary or secondary, are expressed by general Thus, in the following series of subordinate
words, it follows that, in every proposition general terms-Animal-Man-French
we express in language, what is affirmed or man–Parisian, every subsequent term com
denied of the subject of the proposition must prehends in its signification all that is in
be expressed by general words: and that the preceding, and something more; and
the subject of the proposition may often be every antecedent term extends to more
a general word, will appear from the next individuals than the subsequent.
observation. Such divisions and subdivisions of things
Thirdly, The same faculties by which we into genera and species with general names.
distinguish the different attributes belong are not confined to the learned and polished
ing to the same subject, and give names languages; they are found in those of the
to them, enable us likewise to observe, rudest tribes of mankind. From which we
that many subjects agree in certain attri learn, that the invention and the use of
butes while they differ in others. By this general words, both to signify the attributes
means we are enabled to reduce individuals of things, and to signify the genera and
which are infinite, to a limited number of species of things, is not a subtile invention
classes, which are called kinds and sorts; of philosophers, but an operation which all
and, in the scholastic language, genera and men perform by the light of common sense.
species. Philosophers may speculate about this ope
Observing many individuals to agree in ration, and reduce it to canons and aphor
certain attributes, we refer them all to one isms; but men of common understanding,
class, and give a name to the class. This without knowing anything of the philosophy
name comprehends in its signification not of it, can put it in practice, in like manner
one attribute only, but all the attributes as they can see objects, and make good use
which distinguish that class; and by affirm of their eyes, although they know nothing
ing this name of any individual, we affirm of the structure of the eye, or of the theory
it to have all the attributes which charac of vision. [436]
terise the class : thus men, dogs, horses, Every genus, and every species of things,
elephants, are so many different classes of may be either the subject or the predicate
animals. In like manner we marshal other of a proposition-nay, of innumerable pro
substances, vegetable and inanimate, into positions; for every attribute common to
classes. the genus or species may be affirmed of it;
and the genus may be affirmed of every
.* They are both Latin, or both English. The only species, and
individual £ it :
toboth
genus and ies of every
difference is, that the one is of technical, the other
of popular application, and that the former expresses
as potential what the latter does as actual.-H. Thus, of man it may be affirmed, that he
[434–436]
cHAP. II.] OF GENERAL CONCEPTIONS. 391
is an animal made up of body and mind; that shall spring from them through all
that he is of few days, and full of trouble; future generations.
that he is capable of various improvements But the similitude falls short in this re
in arts, in knowledge, and in virtue. In a spect, that time and accidents, not in our
word, everything common to the species power, must concur to disclose the contents
may be affirmed of man; and of all such of the seed, and bring them into our view;
propositions, which are innumerable, man whereas the contents of a general proposi
is the subject. tion may be brought forth, ripened, and
Again, of every nation and tribe, and of exposed to view at our pleasure, and in an
every individual of the human race that is, instant.
or was, or shall be, it may be affirmed that Thus the wisdom of ages, and the most
they are men. In all such propositions, sublime theorems of science, may be laid
which are innumerable, man is the predi up, like an Iliad in a nut-shell, and trans
cate of the proposition. mitted to future generations. And this
We observed above an extension and a noble purpose of language can only be ac
comprehension in general terms; and that, complished by means of general words
in any subdivision of things, the name of annexed to the divisions and subdivisions of
the lowest species is most comprehensive, things. [438]
and that of the highest genus most exten What has been said in this chapter, I
sive. I would now observe, that, by means think, is sufficient to shew that there can be
of such general terms, there is also an ex no language, not so much as a single pro
tension and comprehension of propositions, position, without general words; that they
which is one of the noblest powers of lan must make the greatest part of every lan
guage, and fits it for expressing, with great guage; and that it is by them only that
ease and expedition, the highest attainments language is fitted to express, with wonder
in knowledge, of which the human under ful ease and expedition, all the treasures
standing is capable. of human wisdom and knowledge.
When the predicate is a genus or aspecies,
the proposition is more or less comprehen
sive, according as the predicate is. Thus, CHAPTER II.
when I £ this seal is gold, by this
single proposition I affirm of it all the pro of GENERAL CONCEPTIONs.
perties which that metal is known to have.
When I say of any man that he is a As general words are so necessary in
mathematician, this appellation compre language, it is natural to conclude that there
hends all the attributes that belong to must be general conceptions, of which they
him as an animal, as a man, and as one are the signs.
who has studied mathematics. When I Words are empty sounds when they do
say that the orbit of the planet Mercury not signify the thoughts of the speaker;
is an ellipsis, I thereby affirm of that and it is only from their signification that
orbit all the properties which Apollonius they are denominated gene al. Every word
and other geometricians have discovered, that is spoken, considered merely as a sound,
or may discover, of that species of figure. is an individual sound. And it can only be
[437] called a general word, because that which it
Again, when the subject of a proposition signifies is general. Now, that which it
is a genus or a species, the proposition is signifies, is conceived by the mind both of
more or less extensive, according as the the speaker and hearer, if the word have a
subject is. Thus, when I am taught that distinct meaning, and be distinctly under
the three angles of a plane triangle are stood. It is, therefore, impossible that
equal to two right angles, this properly ex words can have a general signification, un
tends to every species of plane triangle, and less there be conceptions in the mind of
to every individual plane triangle that did, the speaker and of the hearer, of things
or does, or can exist. that are general. It is to such that I give
It is by means of such extensive and the name of general conceptions; and it
comprehensive propositions, that human ought to be observed, that they take this
knowledge is condensed, as it were, into a denomination, not from the act of the mind
size adapted to the capacity of the human in conceiving, which is an individual act,
mind, with great addition to its beauty, but from the object or thing conceived,
and without any diminution of its distinct which is general.
ness and perspicuity. We are, therefore, here to consider
General propositions in science may be whether we have such general conceptions,
compared to the seed of a plant, which, and how they are formed. [439]
according to some philosophers, has not To begin with the conceptions expressed
only the whole future plant inclosed within by general terms—that is, by such general
it, but the seeds of that plant, and the plants words as may be the subject or the predi
[437-439]
392 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essay v.
cate of a proposition. They are either that we distinctly conceive about them. It
attributes of things, or they are genera or is true, we conceive a subject to which the
species of things. attributes belong; but of this subject, when
It is evident, with respect to all the indi its attributes are set aside, we have but an
viduals we are acquainted with that we have obscure and relative" conception, whether it
a more clear and distinct conception of their be body or mind.
attributes than of the subject to which those This was before observed with regard to
attributes belong. bodies, Essay II. chap. 19, (p. 322] to
Take, for instance, any individual body which we refer; and it is-no less evident
we have access to know-what conception do with to minds. What is it we call a
we form of it? Every man may know this mind? It is a thinking, intelligent, active
from his consciousness. He will find that being. Granting that thinking, intelli
he conceives it as a thing that has length, gence, and activity, are attributes of mind,
breadth, and thickness, such a figure and I want to know what the thing or being is
such a colour; that it is hard, or soft, or to which these attributes belong? To this
fluid; that it has such qualities, and is fit question I can find no satisfying answer.
for such purposes. If it is a vegetable, he The attributes of mind, and particularly its
may know where it grew, what is the form operations, we know clearly; but of the
of its leaves, and flower, and seed. If an thing itself we have only an obscure no
animal, what are its natural instincts, its tion. [441]
manner of life, and of rearing its young. Nature teaches us that thinking and
Of these attributes, belonging to this indi reasoning are attributes, which cannot exist
vidual and numberless others, he may without a subject; but of that subject I be
surely have a distinct conception; and he lieve the best notion we can form implies
will find words in language by which he can little more than that it is the subject of such
clearly and distinctly express each of them. attributes.
If we consider, in like manner, the con Whether other created beings may have
ception we form of any individual person of the knowledge of the real essence of created
our acquaintance, we shall find it to be made things, so as to be able to deduce their at
up of various attributes, which we ascribe to tributes from their essence and constitution,
him; such as, that he is the son of such a or whether this be the prerogative of him
man, the brother of such another; that he who made them, we cannot tell; but it is
has such an employment or office; has such a knowledge which seems to be quite be
a fortune; that he is tall or short, well or yond the reach of the human faculties.
ill made, comely or ill favoured, young or We know the essence of a triangle, and
old, married or unmarried; to this we may from that essence can deduce its properties.
add his temper, his character, his abilities, It is an universal, and might have been
and perhaps some anecdotes of his history. conceived by the human mind though no
Such is the conception we form of indi individual triangle had ever existed. It has
vidual persons of our acquaintance. By only what Mr Locke calls a nominal essence,
such attributes we describe them to those which is expressed in its definition. But
who know them not; and by such attri everything that exists has a real essence,
butes historians give us a conception of the which is above our comprehension; and,
personages of former times. Nor is it pos therefore, we cannot deduce its properties
sible to do it in any other way. [440] or attributes from its nature, as we do in
All the distinct knowledge we have or the triangle. We must take a contrary
can attain of any individual is the know road in the knowledge of God’s works, and
ledge of its attributes; for we know not satisfy ourselves with their attributes as
the essence of any individual. This seems facts, and with the general conviction that
to be beyond the reach of the human facul there is a subject to which those attributes
ties. belong.
Now, every attribute is what the ancients Enough, I think, has been said, to shew,
called an universal. It is, or may be, com not only that we may have clear and dis
mon to various individuals. There is no tinct conceptions of attributes, but that
attribute belonging to any creature of God they are the only things, with regard to
which may not belong to others; and, on individuals, of which we have a clear and
this account, attributes, in all languages, are distinct conception.
expressed by general words. The other class of general terms are those
It appears, likewise, from every man's that signify the genera and species into
experience, that he may have as clear and which we divide and subdivide things. And,
distinct a conception of such attributes as if we be able to form distinct conceptions of
we have named, and of innumerable others, attributes, it cannot surely be denied that
as he can have of any individual to which we may have distinct conceptions of genera
they belong.
Indeed, the attributes of individuals is all * See above, p. 322, note.-H.
[4 40, 441 J
CHAP. II.] OF GENERAL CONCEPTIONS. 393
and species; because they are only collec ter of dispute, with regard to a monstrous
tions of attributes which we conceive to birth of a woman, whether it was a man or
exist in a subject, and to which we give a not. Although this be, in reality, a ques
general name. [442] If the attributes tion about the meaning of a word, it may
comprehended under that general name be be of importance, on account of the privi
distinctly conceived, the thing meant by the leges which laws have annexed to the human
name must be distinctly conceived. And character. To make such laws perfectly
the name may justly be attributed to every precise, the definition of a man would be
individual which has those attributes. necessary, which I believe legislators have
Thus, I conceive distinctly what it is to seldom or never thought fit to give. It is,
have wings, to be covered with feathers, to indeed, very difficult to fix a definition of
lay eggs. Suppose then that we give the so common a word; and the cases wherein
name of bird to every animal that has these it would be of any use so rarely occur, that
three attributes. Here undoubtedly my perhaps it may be better, when they do
conception of a bird is as distinct as my occur, to leave them to the determination
notion of the attributes which are common of a judge or of a jury, than to give a defi
to this species: and, if this be admitted to nition, which might be attended with un
be the definition of a bird, there is nothing foreseen consequences.
I conceive more distinctly. If I had never A genus or species, being a collection of
seen a bird, and can but be made to under attributes conceived to exist in one subject,
stand the definition, I can easily apply it to a definition is the only way to prevent any
every individual of the species, without addition or diminution of its ingredients in
danger of mistake. the conception of different persons; and
When things are divided and subdivided when there is no definition that can be
by men of science, and names given to the appealed to as a standard, the name will
genera and species, those names are defined. hardly retain the most perfect precision in
Thus, the genera and species of plants, and its signification.
of other natural bodies, are accurately de From what has been said, f conceive it
fined by the writers in the various branches is evident that the words which signify
of natural history; so that, to all future genera and species of things have often as
generations, the definition will convey a dis precise and definite a signification as any
tinct notion of the genus or species defined. words whatsoever; and that, when it is
There are, without doubt, many words otherwise, their want of precision is not
signifying genera and species of things, owing to their being general words, but to
which have a meaning somewhat vague and other causes. [444]
indistinct; so that those who speak the Having shewn that we may have a per
same language do not always use them in fectly clear and distinct conception of the
the same sense. But, if we attend to the meaning of general terms, we may, I think,
cause of this indistinctness, we shall find take it £ granted, that the same may be
that it is not owing to their being general said of other general words, such as prepo
terms, but to this, that there is no defini sitions, conjunctions, articles. My design
tion of them that has authority. Their at present being only to shew that we have
meaning, therefore, has not been learned general conceptions no less clear and dis
by a definition, but by a kind of induction, tinct than those of individuals, it is sufficient
by observing to what individuals they are for this purpose, if this appears with regard
applied by those who understand the lan to the conceptions expressed by general
We learn by habit to use them as terms. To conceive the meaning of a
we see others do, even when we have not a general word, and to conceive that which it
precise meaning annexed to them. A man signifies, is the same thing. We conceive
may know that to certain individuals they distinctly the meaning of general terms,
may be applied with propriety; but whether therefore we conceive £ that which
they can be applied to certain other indivi they signify. But such terms do not sig
duals, he may be uncertain, either from nify any individual, but what is common to
want of good authorities, or from having many individuals; therefore, we have a
contrary authorities, which leave him in distinct conception of things common to
doubt. [443] many individuals—that is, we have distinct
Thus, a man may know that, when he general conceptions.
applies the name of beast to a lion or a We must here beware of the ambiguity
tiger, and the name of bird to an eagle or of the word conception, which sometimes
a turkey, he speaks properly. But whether signifies the act of the mind in conceiving,
a bat be a bird or a beast, he may be uncer sometimes the thing conceived, which is the
tain. If there was any accurate definition object of that act. If the word be taken
of a beast and of a bird, that was of suffi
cient authority, he could be at no loss. **This last should be called Concept, which was a
It is said to have been sometimes a mat term in use with the old English philosophers.-H.
[442–444]
394 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [EssAY v.
in the first sense, I acknowledge that every abstraction--that is, distinguishing in his
act of the mind is an individual act; the conception the colour, wherein those two
universality, therefore, is not in the act of objects agree, from the other qualities
the mind, but in the object or thing con wherein they disagree.
ceived. The thing conceived is an attri It seems, therefore, that we cannot
bute common to many subjects, or it is a generalise without some degree of abstrac
£uals.
or species common to many indivi tion; but I apprehend we may abstract
without generalising. For what hinders
Suppose I conceive a triangle—that is, a me from attending to the whiteness of the
plain figure, terminated by three right paper before me, without applying that
lines. He that understands this definition colour to any other object. The whiteness
distinctly, has a distinct conception of a of this individual object is an abstract con
triangle. But a triangle is not an indivi ception, but not a general one, while applied
dual; it is a species. #. act of my under to one individual only. These two opera
standing in conceiving it is an individual tions, however, are subservient to each
act, ' has a real existence; but the thing other; for the more attributes we observe
conceived is general, and cannot exist with and distinguish in any one individual, the
out other attributes, which are not included more agreements we shall discover between
in the definition. [445] it and other individuals.
Every triangle that really exists must A third operation of the understanding,
have a certain length of sides and measure by which we form abstract conceptions, is
of angles; it must have place and time. the combining into one whole a certain
But the definition of a triangle includes number of those attributes of which we
neither existence nor any of those attri have formed abstract notions, and giving a
butes; and, therefore, they are not included name to that combination. It is thus we
in the conception of a triangle, which can form abstract notions of the genera and
not be accurate if it comprehend more than species of things. These three operations
the definition. we shall consider in order.
Thus, I think, it appears to be evident, With regard to abstraction, strictly so
that we have general conceptions that are called, I can perceive nothing in it that is
clear and distinct, both of attributes of difficult either to be understood or practised.
things, and of genera and species of things. What can be more easy than to distinguish
the different attributes which we know to
belong to a subject P In a man, for in
CHAPTER III. stance, to distinguish his size, his com
plexion, his age, his fortune, his birth, his
OF GENERAL CONCEPTIONS FORMED by profession, and twenty other things that
ANALYSING OBJECTS, belong to him. To think and speak of
these things with understanding, is surely
WE are next to consider the operations within the reach of every man endowed
of the understanding, by which we are with the human faculties. [447]
enabled to form general conceptions. There may be distinctions that require
These appear to me to be three:-First, nice discernment, or an acquaintance with
The resolving or analysing a subject into the subject that is not common. Thus, a
its known attributes, and giving a name to critic in painting may discern the style of
each attribute, which name shall signify Raphael or Titian, when another man
that attribute, and nothing more. could not. A lawyer may be acquainted
Secondly, The observing one or more with many distinctions in crimes, and con
such attributes to be common to many sub tracts, and actions, which never occurred
jects. The first is by philosophers called to a man who has not studied law. One
abstraction; the second may be called man may excel another in the talent of dis
generalising; but both are commonly in tinguishing, as he may in memory or in
cluded under the name of abstraction. reasoning; but there is a certain degree of
It is difficult to say which of them goes this talent, without which a man would
first, or whether they are not so closely have no title to be considered as a reason
connected that neither can claim the prece able creature.
dence. For, on the one hand, to perceive an It ought likewise to be observed, that
agreement between two or more objects in attributes may, with perfect ease, be dis
the same attribute, seems to require no tinguished and disjoined in our conception,
thing more than to compare them together. which cannot be actually separated in the
[446] A savage, upon seeing snow and subject. Thus, in a body, I can distinguish
chalk, would find no difficulty in perceiv its solidity from its extension, and its weight
ing that they have the same colour. Yet, from both. In extension I can distinguish
on the other hand, it seems impossible that length, breadth, and thickness; yet none of
he should observe this agreement without these can be separated from the body, or
[445–447]
cHAP. III.] CONCEPTIONS FORMED BY ANALYSING OBJECTS. 395
from one another. There may be attri same sense. On this account, if one should
butes belonging to a subject, and inseparable say that the whiteness of this sheet is the
from it, of which we have no knowledge, whiteness of another sheet, every man per
and consequently no conception; but this ceives this to be absurd ; but when he says
does not hinder our conceiving distinctly both sheets are white, this is true and per
those of its attributes which we know. fectly understood. The conception of white
Thus, all the properties of a circle are ness implies no existence; it would remain
inseparable from the nature of a circle, the same though everything in the universe
and may be demonstrated from its defini that is white were annihilated. [449]
tion; yet a man may have a perfectly It appears, therefore, that the general
distinct notion of a circle, who knows very names of qualities, as well as of other at
few of those properties of it which mathe tributes, are applicable to many individuals
maticians have demonstrated ; and a circle in the same sense, which cannot be if there
probably has many properties which no be not general conceptions signified by such
mathematician ever dreamed of. nannes,
It is therefore certain that attributes, If it should be asked, how early, or at

which in their nature are absolutely inse what period of life men begintoform general
parable from their subject and from one conceptions? I answer, As soon as a child
another, may be disjoined in our conception; can say, with understanding, that he has
one cannot exist without the other, but one two brothers or two sisters—as soon as he
can be conceived without the other. can use the plural number—he must have
Having considered abstraction, strictly general conceptions; for no individual can
so called, let us next consider the operation have a plural number.
of generalising, which is nothing but the As there are not two individuals in nature
observing one or more attributes to be that agree in everything, so there are very
common to many subjects. [448] few that do not agree in some things. We
If any man can doubt whether there be take pleasure from very early years in ob
attributes that are really common to many serving such agreements. One great branch
individuals, let him consider whether there of what we call wit, which, when innocent,
be not many men that are above six feet gives pleasure to every good-natured man,
high, and many below it; whether there consists in discovering unexpected agree
be not many men that are rich, and many ments in things. The author of Hudibras
more that are poor; whether there be not could discern a property common to the
many that were born in Britain, and many morning and a boiled lobster—that both
that were born in France. To multiply turn from black to red. Swift could see
instances of this kind, would be to affront the something common to wit and an old cheese.
reader's understanding. It is certain, there Such unexpected agreements may shew wit:
fore, that there are innumerable attributes but there are innumerable agreements of
that are really common to many individuals; things which cannot escape the notice of
and if this be what the schoolmen called the lowest understanding; such as agree
universale a parte rei, we may affirm with ments in colour, magnitude, figure, features,
certainty that there are such universals. time, place, age, and so forth. These agree
There are some attributes expressed by ments are the foundation of so many com
£ words, of which this may seem more mon attributes, which are found in the
oubtful. Such are the qualities which are rudest languages.
inherent in their several subjects. It may The ancient philosophers called these
be said that every subject hath its own universals, or predicables, and endeavoured
qualities, and that which is the quality of to reduce them to five classes—to wit,
one subject cannot be the quality of another Genus, Species, Specific Difference, Pro
subject. Thus the whiteness of the sheet perties, and Accidents. Perhaps there may
of paper upon which I write, cannot be the be more classes of universals or attributes
whiteness of another sheet, though both are for enumerations, so very general, are sel
called white. The weight of one guinea is dom complete: but every attribute, common
not the weight of another guinea, though to several individuals, may be expressed by
both are said to have the same weight. a general term, which is the sign of a
To this I answer, that the whiteness of general conception. [450]
this sheet is one thing, whiteness is another; How prone men are to form general con
the conceptions signified by these two forms ceptions we may see from the use of meta
of speech are as different as the expressions. phor, and of the other figures of speech
The first signifies an individual quality unded on similitude. Similitude is no
really existing, and is not a general con thing else than an agreement of the objects
ception, though it be an abstract one: the compared in one or more attributes, and
second signifies a general conception, which if there be no attribute common to both,
implies no existence, but may be predicated there can be no similitude.
of everything that is white, and in the The similitudes and analogies between
[418-430]
396 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [EssAY v.
the various objects that nature presents to its colour is one attribute, which I signify
us, are infinite and inexhaustible. They by calling it white; its flgure is another.
not only please, when displayed by the poet which is signified by calling it spherical,
or wit in works of taste, but they are highly the firm cohesion of its parts is signified by
useful in the ordinary communication of our calling it hard; its recoiling, when it strikes
thoughts and sentiments by language. In a hard body, is signified by its being called
the rude languages of barbarous nations, elastic; its origin, as being part of the tooth
similitudes and analogies supply the want of of an elephant, is signified by calling it
proper words to express men's sentiments, ivory; and its use by calling it a billiard ball.
so much that in such languages there is The words by which each of those attri
hardly a sentence without a metaphor; and, butes is signified, have one distinct meaning,
if we examine the most copious and polished and in this meaning are applicable to many
languages, we shall find that a great pro individuals. They signify not any indivi.
portion of the words and phrases which are dual thing, but attributes common to many
accounted the most proper, may be said to individuals; nor is it beyond the capacity
be the progeny of metaphor. of a child to understand them perfectly, and
As foreigners, who settle in a nation as to apply them properly to every individual
their home, come at last to be incorporated in which they are found.
and lose the denomination of foreigners, so As it is by analysing a complex object
words and phrases, at first borrowed and into its several attributes that we acquire
figurative, by long use become denizens in our simplest abstract conceptions, it may be
the language, and lose the denomination of proper to com this analysis with that
figures of speech. When we speak of the which a chemist makes of a compounded
extent of knowledge, the steadiness of virtue, body into the ingredients which enter into
the tenderness of affection, the perspicuity its composition; for, although there be such
of expression, no man conceives these to be an analogy between these two operations,
metaphorical expressions; they are as pro that we give to both the name of analysis
per as any in the language: yet it appears or resolution, there is, at the same time, so
upon the very face of them, that they great a dissimilitude in some respects, that
must have been metaphorical in those who we may be led into error, by applying to one
used them first; and that it is by use and what belongs to the other. [452]
prescription that they have lost the deno It is obvious that the chemical analysis
mination of figurative, and acquired a # is an operation of the hand upon matter,
by various material instruments. The an
to be considered as proper words. This
observation will be found to extend to a alysis we are now explaining, is purely an
great part, perhaps the greatest part of the operation of the understanding, which re
words of the most perfect languages. Some quires no material instrument, nor produces
times the name of an individual is given to any change upon any external thing; we
a general conception, and thereby the in shall, therefore, call it the intellectual or
dividual in a manner generalised; as when mental analysis.
the Jew Shylock, in Shakespeare, says– In the chemical analysis, the compound
“A Daniel come to judgment; yea, a body itself is the subject analysed. A sub
Daniel !” In this speech, “a Daniel” is ject so imperfectly known that it may be
an attribute, or an universal. The character compounded of various ingredients, when
of Daniel, as a man of singular wisdom, to our senses it appears perfectly simple;"
is abstracted from his person, and considered and even when we are able to analyse it
as capable of being attributed to other per into the different ingredients of which it is
sons. [451] composed, we know not how or why the
Upon the whole, these two operations of combination of those ingredients produces
abstracting and generalising appear com such a body.
mon to all men that have understanding. Thus, pure sea-salt is a body, to appear
The practice of them is, and must be, fami ance as simple as any in nature. Every the
liar to every man that uses language; but least particle of it, discernible by our senses,
it is one thing to practise them, and another is perfectly similar to every other particle in
to explain how they are performed; as it is all its qualities. The nicest taste, the quick
one thing to see, another to explain how we est eye, can discern no mark of its being
see. The first is the province of all men, made up of different ingredients; yet, by
and is the natural and easy operation of the the chemical art, it can be analysed into an
faculties which God hath given us. The acid and an alkali, and can be again pro
second is the province of philosophers, and, duced by the combination of those two in
though a matter of no great difficulty in it £ But how this combination pro
self, has been much perplexed by the ambi uces sea-salt, no man has been able to dis
uity of words, and still more by the cover. The ingredients are both as unlike
ypotheses of philosophers.
Thus, when I consider a billiard ball, *Something seems wanting in this clause.-H.
[451 *32]
--~~
onAP. II.] CONCEPTIONS FORMED BY ANALYSING OBJECTS 397

the compound as any bodies we know. No predilection for a hypothesis; but to a man
man could have guessed, before the thing who seeks truth without prejudice or pre
was known, that sea-salt is compounded of possession, it is a very wide and difficult
those two ingredients; no man could have step, and he will never pass from the one
guessed that the union of those two ingre to the other, without evidence not only that
ients should produce such a compound as the thing may be, but that it really is.
sea-salt. Such, in many cases, are the 2. As far as I am able to judge, this,
phaenomena of the chemical analysis of a which it is said may be, cannot be. That
compound body. [453] a complex idea should be made up of simple
If we consider the intellectual analysis of ideas; so that to a ripe understanding re
an object, it is evident that nothing of this flecting upon that idea, there should be no
kind can happen; because the thing ana appearance of composition, nothing similar
lysed is not an external object imperfectly to the simple ideas of which it is com
known; it is a conception of the mind it pounded, seems to me to involve a contra
self. And, to suppose that there can be diction. The idea is a conception of the
anything in a conception that is not con mind. If anything more than this is meant
ceived, is a contradiction. by the idea, I know not what it is ; and I
The reason of observing this difference wish both to know what it is, and to have
between those two kinds of analysis is, that proof of its existence. Now, that there
some philosophers, in order to support their should be anything in the conception of an
systems, have maintained that a complex object which is not conceived, appears to
idea may have the appearance of the most me as manifest a contradiction as that
perfect simplicity, and retain no similitude there should be an existence which does
of any of the simple ideas of which it is not exist, or that a thing should be con
eompounded; just as a white colour may ceived and not conceived at the same time.
appear perfectly simple, and retain no But, say these philosophers, a white
similitude to any of the seven primary colour is produced by the composition of
colours of which it is compounded; or as a the primary colours, and yet has no resem
chemical composition may appear perfectly blance to any of them. I grant it. But
simple, and retain no similitude to any of what can be inferred from this with regard
the ingredients. to the composition of ideas? To bring this
From which those '' have drawn argument home to the point, they must
this important conclusion, that a cluster of say, that because a white colour is com
the ideas of sense, properly combined, may pounded of the primary colours, therefore
make the idea of a mind; and that all the the idea of a white colour is compounded of
ideas which Mr Locke calls ideas of re the ideas of the primary colours. This
flection, are only compositions of the ideas reasoning, if it was admitted, would lead
which we have by our five senses. From to innumerable absurdities. An opaque
this the transition is easy, that, if a proper fluid may be compounded of two or more
composition of the ideas of matter may pellucid fluids. Hence, we might infer,
make the idea of a mind, then a proper with equal force, that the idea of an opaque
composition of matter itself may make a fluid may be compounded of the idea of two
mind, and that man is only a piece of or more pellucid fluids. [455]
matter curiously formed. Nature's way of compounding bodies,
In this curious system, the whole fabric and our way of compounding ideas, are so
rests upon this foundation, that a complex different in many respects, that we cannot
idea, which is made up of various simple reason from the one to the other, unless it
ideas, may appear to be perfectly simple, can be found that ideas are combined by
and to have no marks of composition, be fermentations and elective attractions, and
cause a compound body may appear to our may be analysed in a furnace by the force
senses to be perfectly simple. of fire and of menstruums. Until this dis
Upon this fundamental proposition of covery be made, we must hold those to be
this system I beg leave to make two re simple ideas, which, upon the most atten
marks. [454] tive reflection, have no appearance of com
1. Supposing it to be true, it affirms only position ; and those only to be the ingre
what may be. We are, indeed, in most dients of complex ideas, which, by attentive
cases very imperfect judges of what may reflection, can be perceived to be contained
be. But this we know, that, were we ever in them.
so certain that a thing may be, this is no If the idea of mind and its operations,
good reason for believing that it really is. may be compounded of the ideas of matter
A may-be is a mere hypothesis, which may and its qualities, why may not the idea of
furnish matter of investigation, but is not matter be compounded of the ideas of
entitled to the least degree of belief. The mind? There is the same cvidence for the
transition from what may be to what really last may-be as for the first. And why may
is, is familiar and easy to those who have a not the idea of sound be compounded of the
[453-455]
ideas of colour; or the idea of colour of animal, vegetable, and inanimate produc
those of sound * Why may not the idea of tions, has formed many individuals that
wisdom be compounded of ideas of folly; agree in many of their qualities and attri
or the idea of truth of ideas of absurdity? butes, we are led by natural instinct to
But we leave these mysterious may-bes to expect their agreement in other qualities,
them that have faith to receive them. which we have not had occasion to perceive.
[457] Thus, a child who has once burnt
his finger, by putting it in the flame of one
CHAPTER IV. candle, expects the same event if he puts it
in the flame of another candle, or in any
of GENERAL CONCEPTIONS FORMED BY COM flame, and is thereby led to think that the
BINATION, quality of burning belongs to all flame.
This instinctive induction is not justified
As, by an intellectual analysis of objects, by the rules of logic, and it sometimes leads
we form general conceptions of single attri men into harmless mistakes, which expe
butes, '' of all conceptions that enter rience may afterwards correct; but it pre
into the human mind, are the most simple,) serves us from destruction in innumerable
so, by combining several of these into one dangers to which we are exposed.
parcel, and giving a name to that combina The reason of taking notice of this prin
tion, we form general conceptions that may ciple in human nature in this place is, that
be very complex, and, at the same time, the distribution of the productions of na
very distinct [456] ture into genera and species becomes, on
Thus, one who, by analysing extended account of this principle, more generally
objects, has got the simple notions of a useful.
point, a line, straight or curve, an angle, a The physician expects that the rhubarb
surface, a solid, can easily conceive a plain which has never yet been tried will have
surface, terminated by four equal straight like medical virtues with that which he has
lines, meeting in four points at right angles. prescribed on former occasions. Two par
To this species of figure he gives the name cels of rhubarb agree in certain sensible
of a square. In like manner, he can con qualities, from which agreement they are
ceive a solid terminated bysix equal squares, both called by the same general name
and give it the name of a cube. A square, rhubarb. Therefore it is expected that
a cube, and every name of mathematical they will agree in their medical virtues.
figure, is a general term, expressing a com And, as experience has discovered certain
plex general conception, made by a certain virtues in one parcel, or in many parcels,
combination of the simple elements into we presume, without experience, that the
which we analyse extended bodies. same virtues belong to all parcels of rhubarb
Every mathematical figure is accurately that shall be used.
defined, by enumerating the simple ele If a traveller meets a horse, an ox, or a
ments of which it is formed, and the man sheep, which he never saw before, he is
ner of their combination. The definition under no apprehension, believing these ani
contains the whole essence of it. And mals to be of a species that is tame and in
every property that belongs to it may be offensive. But he dreads a lion or a tiger,
deduced by demonstrative reasoning from because they are of a fierce and ravenous
its definition. It is not a thing that species.
exists, for then it would be an individual; We are capable of receiving innumerable
but it is a thing that is conceived without advantages, and are exposed to innumer
regard to existence. able dangers, from the various productions
A farm, a manor, a parish, a county, a of nature, animal, vegetable, and inanimate.
kingdom, are complex general conceptions, The life of man, if an hundred times longer
formed by various combinations and modi than it is, would be insufficient to learn
fications of inhabited territory, under cer from experience the useful and hurtful qua
tain forms of government. lities of every individual production of na
Different combinations of military men ture taken singly. [458]
form the notions of a company, a regiment, The Author of Nature hath made pro
an army. vision for our attaining that knowledge of
The several crimes which are the objects his works which is necessary for our subsist
of criminal law, such as theft, murder, ence and preservation, partly by the consti
robbery, piracy, what are they but certain tution of the productions of nature, and partly
combinations of human actions and inten by the constitution of the human mind.
tions, which are accurately defined in For, first, In the productions of nature,
criminal law, and which it is found con great numbers of individuals are made so
venient to comprehend under one name, like to one another, both in their obvious
and consider as one thing? and in their more occult qualities, that we
When we observe that nature, in her are not only enabled, but invited, as it were,
[456–458)
-"
cúAP. iv.] CONCEPTIONS FORMED BY COMBINATION. 399
to reduce them into classes, and to give a fect and complete. They are nothing but
general name to a class; a name which is what the author conceived, and what he can
common to every individual of the class, express by language, so as to convey his
because it comprehends in its signification conception perfectly to men like himself.
those qualities or attributes only that are Although such works are indeed complex
common to all the individuals of that class. general conceptions, they do not so properly
Secondly, The human mind is so framed, belong to our present subject. They are
that, from the agreement of individuals in more the objects of judgment and of taste,
the more obvious qualities by which we than of bare conception or simple appre
reduce them into one class, we are naturally hension. 1460]
led to expect that they will be found to To return, therefore, to those complex
agree in their more latent qualities—and in conceptions which are formed merely by
this we are seldom disappointed. combining those that are more simple.
We have, therefore, astrong and rational Nature has given us the power of combin
inducement, both to distribute natural sub ing such simple attributes, and such a num
stances into classes, genera and species, ber of them as we find proper; and of
under general names, and to do this with all giving one name to that combination, and
the accuracy and distinctness we are able. considering it as one object of thought.
For the more accurate our divisions are The simple attributes of things, which
made, and the more distinctly the several fall under our observation, are not so nume
species are defined, the more securely we rous but that they may all have names in a
may rely that the qualities we find in one or copious language. But to give names to
in a few individuals will be found in all of all the combinations that can be made of
the same species. two, three, or more of them, would be im
Every species of natural substances which possible. The most copious languages have
has a name in language, is an attribute of names but for a very small part.
many individuals, and is itself a combination It may likewise be observed, that the
of more simple attributes, which we observe combinations that have names are nearly,
to be common to those individuals. [459 though not perfectly, the same in the dif
We shall find a great part of the wo ferent languages of civilized nations that
of every language-nay, I apprehend, the have intercourse with one another. Hence
far greater part—to signify combinations of it is, that the Lexicographer, for the most
more simple general conceptions, which part, can give words in one language answer
men have found proper to be bound up, as ing perfectly, or very nearly, to those of
it were, in one parcel, by being designed by another; and what is written in a simple
fone inflne. style in one language, can be translated al
Some general conceptions there are, which most word for word into another."
may more properly be called compositions From these observations we may con
or works than mere combinations. Thus, clude that there are either certain common
one may conceive a machine which never principles of human nature, or certain com
existed. He may conceive an air in music, mon occurrences of human life, which dis
a poem, a plan of architecture, a plan of pose men, out of an infinite number that
government, a plan of conduct in public or might be formed, to form certain combina
in private life, a sentence, a discourse, a tions rather than others.
treatise. Such compositions are things Mr Hume, in order to account for this
conceived in the mind of the author, not phaenomenon, has recourse to what he calls
individuals that really exist; and the same the associating qualities of ideas; to wit,
general conception which the author had, causation, contiguity in time and place, and
may be communicated to others by language. similitude. He conceives—“That one of
Thus, the “Oceana” of Harrington was the most remarkable effects of those associa
conceived in the mind of its author. The ting qualities, is the complex ideas which
materials of which it is composed are things are the common subjects of our thoughts.
conceived, not things that existed. His That this also is the cause why languages
senate, his popular assembly, his magis so nearly correspond to one another; Nature
trates, his elections, are all conceptions of in a manner pointing out to every one those
his mind, and the whole is one complex ideas which are most proper to be united
conception. And the same may be said of into a complex one.” [461]
every work of the human understanding. I agree with this ingenious author, that
Very different from these are the works Nature in a manner points out those simple
of God, which we behold. They are works ideas which are most proper to be united
of creative power, not of understanding into a complex one: but Nature does this,
only. They have a real existence. Our not solely or chiefly by the relations between
best conceptions of them are partial and the simple ideas of contiguity, causation,
* This is only : true of the words relative to
imperfect. But of the works of the human
objects of sense.-H.
understanding our conception may be per
[459–461]
causation, and resemblance; but rather by If, on the other hand, any man of emi
the fitness of the combinations we make, to nence, through vanity or want of judgment,
aid our own conceptions, and to convey should invent new words, to express com
them to others by language easily and binations that have neither beauty nor
agreeably. utility, or which may as well be expressed
The end and use of language, without in the current language, his authority may
regard to the associating qualities of ideas, give them currency for a time with servile
will lead men that have common under imitators or blind admirers; but the judi
standing to form such complex notions as cious will laugh at them, and they will soon
are proper for expressing their wants, their lose their credit. So true was the observa
thoughts, and their desires: and in every tion made by Pomponius Marcellus, an
language we shall find these to be the com ancient grammarian, to Tiberius Caesar:
plex notions that have names. “You, Caesar, have power to make a man
In the rudest state of society, men must a denizen of Rome, but not to make a word
have occasion to form the general notions of a denizen of the Roman language.”
man, woman, father, mother, son, daughter, Among nations that are civilized, and
sister, brother, neighbour, friend, enemy, have intercourse with one another, the most
and many others, to express the common necessary and useful arts will be common;
relations of one person to another. the important parts of human knowledge
If they are employed in hunting, they will be common; their several languages
must have general terms to express the will be fitted to it, and consequently to one
various implements and operations of the another. [463]
chase. Their houses and clothing, however New inventions of general use give an
simple, will furnish another set of general easy birth to new complex motions and new
terms, to express the materials, the work names, which spread as far as the inven
manship, and the excellencies and defects tion does. How many new complex notions
of those fabrics. If they sail upon rivers have been formed, and names for them
or upon the sea, this will give occasion to a invented in the languages of Europe, by the
great number of general terms, which other modern inventions of printing, of gun
wise would never have occurred to their powder, of the mariner's compass, of opti
thoughts. cal glasses? The simple ideas combined
The same thing may be said of agricul in those complex notions, and the associat
ture, of pasturage, of every art they prac ing qualities of those ideas, are very an
tise, and of every branch of knowledge they cient; but they never produced those com
attain. The necessity of general terms for plex notions until there was use for them.
communicating our sentiments is obvious; What is peculiar to a nation in its cus
and the invention of them, as far as we find toms, manners, or laws, will give occasion
them necessary, requires no other talent to complex notions and words peculiar to
but that degree of understanding which is the language of that nation. Hence it is
common to men. . . [462] easy to see why an impeachment, and an
The notions of debtor and creditor, of attainder, in the English language, and
profit and loss, of account, balance, stock ostracism in the Greek language, have not
on hand, and many others, are owing to names answering to them in other lan
commerce. The notions of latitude, longi guages.
tude, course, distance, run, and those of I apprehend, therefore, that it is utility,
ships, and of their various parts, furniture, and not the associating qualities of the ideas,
and operations, are owing to navigation. that has led men to form only certain com
The anatomist must have names for the binations, and to give names to them in
various similar and dissimilar parts of the language, while they neglect an infinite
human body, and words to express their number that might be formed.
figure, position, structure, and use. The The common occurrences of life, in the
physician must have names for the various intercourse of men, and in their occupa
diseases of the body, their causes, symp tions, give occasion to many complex no
toms, and means of cure. tions. We see an individual occurrence,
The like may be said of the grammarian, which draws our attention more or less,
the logician, the critic, the rhetorician, the and may be a subject of conversation.
moralist, the naturalist, the mechanic, and Other occurrences, similar to this in many
every man that professes any art or science. respects, have been observed, or may be
When any discovery is made in art or in expected. It is convenient that we should
nature,which requires newcombinations and be able to speak of what is common to
new words to express it properly, the in them all, leaving out the unimportant cir
vention of these is easy to those who have
a distinctnotion of the thingtobe expressed;
** “Tu, Caesar, civitatem.dare potes hominibus,
and such words will readily be adopted, and verbis non potes." See Suetonius De Illust-Gram
receive the public sanction. mat., c. 22.-H.
[462,468]
-
oHAP. Iv.] CONCEPTIONS FORMED BY COMBINATION. 401
cumstances of time, place, and persons. general names to the various species of na
This we can do with great ease, by giving tural substances; but, in combining the
a name to what is common to all those attributes which are included under the
individual occurrences. Such a name is a specific name, we are more aided and di
£ aid to language, because it compre rected by nature than in forming other com
ends, in one word, a great number of binations of mixed modes and relations. In
simple notions, which it would be very the last, the ingredients are brought to
tedious to express in detail. [464] gether in the occurrences of life, or in the
Thus, men have formed the complex actions or thoughts of men. But, in the
notions of eating, drinking, sleeping, walk first, the ingredients are united by nature in
ing, riding, running, buying, selling, plough many individual substances which God has
ing, sowing, a dance, a feast, war, a battle, made. We form a general notion of those
victory, triumph; and others, without attributes wherein many individuals
number. We give a specific name to this combina
Such things must frequently be the sub tion, which name is common to all sub
ject of conversation; and, if we had not a stances having those attributes, which
more compendious way of expressing them either do or may exist. The specific nam."
than by a detail of all the simple notions comprehends neither more nor fewer attri
they comprehend, we should lose the benefit butes than we find proper to put into its
of speech. definition. It comprehends not time, nor
The different talents, dispositions, and place, nor even existence, although there
habits of men in society, being interesting can be no individual without these.
to those who have to do with them, will in This work of the understanding is abso
every language have general names—such lutely necessary for speaking intelligibly of
as wise, foolish, knowing, ignorant, plain, the productions of nature, and for reaping
cunning. In every operative art, the tools, the benefits we receive, and avoiding the
instruments, materials, the work produced, dangers we are exposed to from them. The
and the various excellencies and defects of individuals are so many, that to give a
these, must have general names. proper name to each would be beyond the
The various relations of persons, and of £ of language. If a good or bad qua
things which cannot escape the observation ity was observed in an individual, of how
of men in society, lead us to many complex small use would this be, if there was not a
general notions; such as father, brother, species in which the same quality might be
friend, enemy, master, servant, property, expected ! [466]
theft, rebellion. Without some general knowledge of the
The terms of art in the sciences make qualities of natural substances, human life
another class of general names of complex could not be preserved. And there can be
notions; as in mathematics, axiom, defini no general knowledge of this kind without
tion, problem, theorem, demonstration. reducing them to species under specific
I do not attempt a complete enumeration names. For this reason, among the rudest
even of the classes of complex general con nations, we find names for fire, water, earth,
ceptions. Those I have named as a speci air, mountains, fountains, rivers; for the
men, I think, are mostly comprehended kinds of vegetables they use; of animals
under what Mr Locke calls mixed modes they hunt or tame, or that are found useful
and relations; which, he justly observes, or hurtful.
have names given them in lan e, in Each of those names signifies in general
preference to innumerable others that might a substance having a certain combination of
be formed; for this reason only, that they attributes. The name, therefore, must be
are useful for the purpose of communicat common to all substances in which those
ing our thoughts by £ [465] attributes are found.
In all the languages of mankind, not only Such general names of substances being
the writings and discourses of the learned, found in all vulgar languages, before philo
but the conversation of the vulgar, is almost sophers began to make accurate divisions
entirely made up of general words, which and less obvious distinctions, it is not to be
are the signs of general conceptions, either expected that their meaning should be more
simple or complex. And in every language, precise than is necessary for the common
we find the terms signifying complex no P urposes As theofknowledge
life. of nature advances,
tions to be such, and only such, as the use
of language requires. more species of natural substances are
There remains a very large class of com observed, and their useful qualities dis
plex general terms, on which I shall make covered. In order that this important part
some observations; I mean those by which of human knowledge may be communicated,
we name the species, genera, and tribes of and handed down to future generations, it
natural substances. is not sufficient that the species have names.
It is utility, indeed, that leads us to give Such is the fluctuating state of language,
2 p.
[464–466]
402 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. | Essay v
that a general name will not always retain have accounted the parent and the progeny
the same precise signification, unless it have of the same species. The differences among
a definition in which men are disposed to Naturalists, with regard to the species of
acquiesce. these two kingdoms, are very inconsider
There was undoubtedly a great fund of able, and may be occasioned by the changes
natural knowledge among the Greeks and produced by soil, climate, and culture, and
Romans in the time of Pliny. There is a sometimes by monstrous productions, which
great fund in his Natural History; but are comparatively rare.
much of it is lost to us—for this reason In the inanimate kingdom we have not
among others, that we know not what the same means of dividing things into
species of substance he means by such a species, and, therefore, the limits of species
Imaine. seem to be more arbitrary. But, from the
Nothing could have prevented this loss progress already made, there is ground to
but an accurate definition of the name, by hope that, even in this kingdom, as the
which the species might have been distin knowledge of it advances, the various
guished from all others as long as that name species may be so well distinguished and
and its definition remained. [467] defined as to answer every valuable pur
se.
To prevent such loss in future times,
modern philosophers have very laudably When the species are so numerous as to
attempted to give names and accurate defin burden the memory, it is greatly assisted
itions of all the known species of sub by distributing them into genera, the genera
stances wherewith the bountiful Creator into tribes, the tribes into orders, and the
hath enriched our globe. orders into classes.
This is necessary, in order to form a Such a regular distribution of natural
copious and distinct language concerning substances, by divisions and subdivisions,
them, and, consequently, to facilitate our has got the name of a system.
knowledge of them, and to convey it to It is not a system of truths, but a system
future generations, of general terms, with their definitions;
Every species that is known to exist and it is not only a great help to memory,
ought to have a name; and that name but facilitates very much the definition of
ought to be defined by such attributes as the terms. For the definition of the genus
serve best to distinguish the species from is common to all the species of that genus,
all others. and so is understood in the definition of
Nature invites to this work, by having each species, without the trouble of repeti
formed things so as to make it both easy tion. In like manner, the definition of a
and important. tribe is understood in the definition of every
For, first, We perceive numbers of indi genus, and every species of that tribe; and
vidual substances so like in their obvious the same may be said of every superior
qualities, that the most unimproved tribes division. [469]
of men consider them as of one species, and The effect of such a systematical distri
give them one common name. bution of the productions of Nature is seen
Secondly, The more latent qualities of in our systems of zoology, botany, and min
substances are generally the same in all eralogy; in which a species is commonly
the individuals of a species; so that what, defined accurately in a line or two, which,
by observation or experiment, is found in without the systematical arrangement, could
a few individuals of a species, is presumed hardly be defined in a page.
and commonly found to belong to the With regard to the utility of systems of
whole. By this we are enabled, from par this kind, men have gone into contrary ex
ticular facts, to draw general conclusions. tremes; some have treated them with con
This kind of induction is, indeed, the mas tempt, as a mere dictionary of words;
ter-key to the knowledge of Nature, without others, perhaps, rest in such systems as all
which we could form no general conclu that is worth knowing in the works of
sions in that branch of philosophy. Nature.
And, thirdly, By the very constitution On the one hand, it is not the intention
of our nature, we are led, without reason of such systems to communicate all that is
ing, to ascribe to the whole species what known of the natural productions which
we have found to belong to the individuals. they describe. The properties most fit for
It is thus we come to know that fire burns defining and distinguishing the several
and water drowns; that bodies gravitate species, are not always those that are most
and bread nourishes. 1468] useful to be known. To discover and to
The species of two of the kingdoms of communicate the uses of natural substances
Nature—to wit, the animal and the vege in life and in the arts, is, no doubt, that
table—seem to be fixed by Nature, by the part of the business of a naturalist which is
power they have of producing their like. the most important; and the systematical
And, in these, men, in all ages and nations, arrangement of them is chiefly to be valued
[467–469].
cHAP. v.] OF NAMES GIVEN 'ro GENERAL NOTIONS. 403
for its subserviency to this end. This every The attempt was grand, and worthy of a
judicious naturalist will grant. man of genius.
But, on the other hand, the labour is not The formation of such systems, therefore,
to be despised, by which the road to an use of the various productions of Nature, in
ful and important branch of knowledge is stead of being despised, ought to be ranked
made easy in all time to come; especially among the valuable improvementsof modern
when this labour requires both extensive ages, and to be the more esteemed that its
knowledge and great abilities. utility reaches to the most distant future
The talent of arranging properly and times, and, like the invention of writing,
defining accurately, is so rare, and at the serves to embalm a most important branc
same time so useful, that it may very justly of human knowledge, and to preserve it from
be considered as a proof of real genius, and being corrupted or lost. [47]]
as entitled to a high degree of praise. There
is an intrinsic beauty in arrangement, which
captivates the mind, and gives pleasure, CHAPTER V.
even abstracting from its utility; as in most
other things, so in this particularly, Nature OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE NAMES GIVEN
has joined beauty with utility. The arrange To OUR GENERAL Notions.
ment of an army in the day of battle is a
grand spectacle. The same men crowded HAviNg now explained, as well as I am
in a fair, have no such effect. It is not able, those operations of the mind by which
more strange, therefore, that some men we analyse the objects which nature pre
spend their days in studying systems of sents to our observation, into their simple
Nature, than that other men employ their attributes, giving a general name to each, and
lives in the study of languages. The most by which we combine any number of such
important end of those systems, surely, is attributes into one whole, and give a general
to form a copious and an unambiguous lan name to that combination, I shall offer some
guage concerning the productions of Nature, observations relating to our general notions,
by which every useful discovery concerning whether simple or complex.
them may be communicated to the present, I apprehend that the names given to
and transmitted to all future generations, them by modern philosophers, have contri
without danger of mistake. [470] buted to darken our speculations about them,
General terms, especially such as are and to render them difficult and abstruse.
complex in their signification, will never We call them general notions, concep
keep one precise meaning, without accurate tions, ideas. The words notion and con
definition; and accurate definitions of such ception, in their proper and most common
terms can in no way be formed so easily and sense, signify the act or operation of the
advantageously as by reducing the things mind in conceiving an object. In a figura
they signify into a regular system. tive sense, they are sometimes put for the
Very eminent men in the medical profes object conceived. And I think they are
sion, in order to remove all ambiguity in rarely, if ever, used in this figurative sense,
the names of diseases, and to advance the except when we speak of what we call
healing art, have, of late, attempted to re general notions or general conceptions. The
duce into a systematical order the diseases word idea, as it is used in modern times,
of the human body, and to give distinct has the same ambiguity.
names and accurate definitions of the seve Now, it is only in the last of these senses,
ral species, genera, orders, and classes, into and not in the first, that we can be said to
which they distribute them; and I appre have general notions or conceptions. The
hend that, in every art and science, where generality is in the object conceived, and
the terms of the art have any ambiguity not in the act of the mind by which it is
that obstructs its progress, this method will conceived. Every act of the mind is an in
be found the easiest and most successful for dividual act, which does or did exist. [472]
the remedy of that evil. But we have power to conceive things which
It were even to be wished that the gene neither do nor ever did exist. We have
ral terms which we find in common lan power to conceive attributes without regard
guage, as well as those of the arts and to their existence. The conception of such
sciences, could be reduced to a systematical an attribute is a real and individual act of
arrangement, and defined so as that they the mind; but the attribute conceived is
might be free from ambiguity; but, per common to many individuals that do or may
haps, the obstacles to this are insurmount exist. We are too apt to confound an ob
able. I know no man who has attempted it ject of conception with the conception of
but Bishop Wilkins in his Essay towards a
real character and a philosophical language." countryman Dalgarno i and from Dalgarno it is
highly’ probable that Wilkins borrowed the idea.
But even Dalgarno was not the first who conceived
* in this attempt Wilkins was preceded by our the project.-H.
2 p 2
[470-472]
404 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. LEssAY v.
that object. But the danger of doing this said to have been made by Cicero; but
must be much greater when the object of even his authority could not give it cur
conception is called a conception. rency, until long after his time. It came
The Peripatetics gave to such objects of at last to be used, and the schoolmen fell
conception the names of universals, and of into much the same opinions concerning
predicables. Those names had no ambi essences, as the Platonists held concerning
guity, and I think were much more fit to ideas. The essences of things were held to
express what was meant by them than the be uncreated, eternal, and immutable.
names we use. Mr Locke distinguishes two kinds of
It is for this reason that I have so often essence, the real and the nominal. By the
used the word attribute, which has the same real essence, he means the constitution of
meaning with predicable. And, for the same an individual, which makes it to be what it
reason, I have thought it necessary repeat is. This essence must begin and end with
edly to warn the reader, that when, in com the individual to which it belongs. It is
pliance with custom, I speak of general not, therefore, a Platonic idea. But what
notions or general conceptions, I always Mr Locke calls the nominal essence, is the
mean things conceived, and not the act of constitution of a species, or that which
the mind in conceiving them. makes an individual to be of such a species;
The Pythagoreans and Platonists gave and this is nothing but that combination of
the name of ideas to such general objects of attributes which is signified by the name of
conception, and to nothing else. As we the species, and which we conceive without
borrowed the word idea from them, so that regard to existence. [474]
it is now familiar in all the languages of The essence of a species, therefore, is
Europe, I think it would have been happy what the Platonists called the idea of the
if we had also borrowed their meaning, and species.
had used it only to signify what they meant If the word idea be restricted to the
by it. I apprehend we want an unambigu meaning which it bore among the Plato
ous word to distinguish things barely con mists and Pythagoreans, many things which
ceived from things that exist. If the word Mr Locke has said with regard to ideas
idea was used for this purpose only, it would will be just and true, and others will not.
be restored to its original meaning, and It will be true that most words (in
supply that want. deed all general words) are the signs of
We may surely agree with the Platonists ideas; but proper names are not: they
in the meaning of the word idea, without signify individual things, and not ideas. It
adopting their theory concerning ideas. We will be true not only that there are general
need not believe, with them, that ideas are and abstract ideas, but that all ideas are
eternal and self-existent, and that they general and abstract. It will be so far
have a more real existence than the things from the truth, that all our simple ideas
we see and feel. [473] are got immediately, either from sensation
They were led to give existence to ideas, or from consciousness, that no simple
from the common prejudice that everything idea is got by either, without the co-opera
which is an object of conception must tion of other powers. The objects of sense,
really exist; and, having once given exist of memory, and of consciousness, are not
ence to ideas, the rest of their mysterious ideas but individuals; they must be anal
system about ideas followed of course; for ysed by the understanding into their simple
things merely conceived have neither be ingredients, before we can have simple
ginning nor end, time nor place; they are ideas; and those simple ideas must be
subject to no change; they are the patterns again combined by the understanding, in
and exemplars according to which the distinct parcels, with names annexed, in
Deity made everything that he made; for order to give us complex ideas. It will be
the work must be conceived by the artificer probable not only that brutes have no ab
before it is made. stract ideas, but that they have no ideas at all.
... These are undeniable attributes of the I shall only add that the learned author
ideas of Plato; and, if we add to them that of the origin and progress of language, and,
of real existence, we have the whole myste perhaps, his learned friend, Mr Harris, are
rious system of Platonic ideas. Take away the only modern authors I have met with
the attribute of existence, and suppose who restrict the word idea to this meaning.
them not to be things that exist, but Their acquaintance with ancient philosophy
things that are barely conceived, and all led them to this. What pity is it that a
the mystery is removed; all that remains word which, in ancient philosophy, had a
is level to the human understanding. distinct meaning, and which, if kept to
The word essence came to be much used that meaning, would have been a real ac
among the schoolmen, and what the Pla quisition to our language, should be used
tonists called the idea of a species, they by the moderns in so vague and ambiguous
called its essence. The word essentia is a manner, that it is more apt to perplex
[473,474]
cHAP. v1.] - OPINIONS ABOUT UNIVERSALS. 465
and darken our speculations, than to convey no science, no truth; that all is uncertain
useful knowledge : opinion.
From all that has been said about ab Plato, and his masters of the Pythagorean
stract and general conceptions, I think we school, yielded this with regard to objects
may draw the following conclusions con of sense, and acknowledged that there could
cerning them. [475] be no science or certain knowledge con
First, That it is by abstraction that the cerning them. But they held that there
mind is furnished with all its most simple are objects of intellect of a superior order
and most distinct notions. The simplest and nature, which are permanent and im
objects of sense appear both complex and mutable. These are ideas, or universal
indistinct, until by abstraction they are natures, of which the objects of sense are
analysed into their more simple elements; only the images and shadows. -
and the same may be said of the objects of To these ideas they ascribed, as I have
memory and of consciousness. already observed, the most magnificent
Secondly, Our most distinct complex attributes. Of man, of a rose, of a circle,
notions are those that are formed by com and of every species of things, they believed
pounding the simple notions got by abstrac that there is one idea or form, which ex
tion. isted from eternity, before any individual of
Thirdly, Without the powers of abstract the species was formed; that this idea is
ing and generalising, it would be impossible the exemplar or pattern, according to which
to reduce things into any order and method, the Deity formed the individuals of the
by dividing them into genera and species. species; that every individual of the species
Fourthly, Without those powers there participates of this idea, which constitutes
could be no definition ; for definition can its essence; and that this idea is likewise
only be applied to universals, and no indi an object of the human intellect, when, by
vidual can be defined. due abstraction, we discern it to be one in
Fifthly, Without abstract and general all the individuals of the species.
motions there can neither be reasoning nor Thus the idea of every species, though
lan -
one and immutable, might be considered in
Sirthly, As brute animals shew no signs three different views or respects: first, As
of being able to distinguish the various having an eternal existence before there
attributes of the same subject; of being was any individual of the species; secondly,
able to class things into genera and species; As existing in every individual of that spe
to define, to reason, or to communicate cies, without division or multiplication, and
their thoughts by artificial signs, as men making the essence of the species; and,
do-I must think, with Mr Locke, that they thirdly, Asan object of intellect and ofscience
have not the powers of abstracting and in man. [477]
generalising, and that, in this particular, Such I take to be the doctrine of Plato,
nature has made a specific difference be as far as I am able to comprehend it. His
tween them and the human species. disciple Aristotle rejected the first of these
views of ideas as visionary, but differed
little from his master with regard to the
CHAPTER VI. two last. He did not admit the existence
of universal natures antecedent to the ex
opinions of Philosophers AbouT istence of individuals: but he held that
UNIVERSAL8. every individual consists of matter and
form; that the form (which I take to be
In the ancient philosophy, the doctrine of what Plato calls the idea) is common to all
universals—that is, of #. which we ex the individuals of the species; and that the
human intellect is fitted to receive the forms
press by general terms—makesagreat figure.
The ideas of the Pythagoreans and Pla of things as objects of contemplation. Such
tonists, of which so much has been already profound speculations about the nature of
said, were universals. [476] All science is universals, we find even in the first ages of
employed about universals as its object. It philosophy." I wish I could make them
was thought that there can be no science, more intelligible to myself and to the reader.
unless its object be something real and The division of universals into five
immutable; and therefore those who paid classes—to wit, genus, species, specific
homage to truth and science, maintained difference, properties, and accidents—is
that ideas or universals have a real and likewise very ancient, and I conceive was
immutable existence. borrowed by the Peripatetics from the
The sceptics, on the contrary, (for there Pythagorean school.t.
were sceptical philosophers in those early * Different philosophers have maintained that
days,) maintained that all things are mu Aristotle was a Realist, a Conceptualist, and a No
minalist, in the strictest sense.-H.
table and in a perpetual fluctuation; and, + This proceeds on the supposition that the 'up
from this principle, inferred that there is posititious Pythagorean treatises are genuine.-H.
L475-477]
Porphyry has given us a very distinct “ Human Nature,” chap 5, § 6–“It is
treatise upon these, as an introduction to plain, therefore,” says he, “that there is no
Aristotle's categories. But he has omitted thing universal but names.” And in his
the intricate metaphysical questions that “Leviathan,” part i chap 4, “There being
were agitated about their nature: such as, nothing universal but names, proper names
whether genera and species do really exist bring to mind one thing only; universals
in nature, or whether they are only con recall any one of many.”
ceptions of the human mind. If they exist Mr Locke, according to the division be
in nature, whether they are corporeal or fore mentioned, I think, may be accounted
incorporeal; and whether they are inherent a Conceptualist. He does not maintain
in the objects of sense, or disjoined from that there are things that are universal;
them. These questions, he tells us, for but that we have general or universal ideas
brevity's sake, he omits, because they are which we form by abstraction; and this
very profound, and require accurate discus power of forming abstract and general ideas,
sion. It is probable that these questions he conceives to be that which makes the
exercised the wits of the philosophers till chief distinction in point of understanding,
about the twelfth century. [478] between men and brutes. [479]
About that time, Roscelinus or Rusce Mr Locke's doctrine about abstraction
linus, the master of the famous Abelard, has been combated by two very powerful
introduced a new doctrine-that there is antagonists, Bishop Berkeley and Mr Hume,
nothing universal but words or names. who have taken up the opinion of the Nom
For this, and other heresies, he was much inalists. The former thinks, “That the
persecuted. However, by his eloquence opinion that the mind hath a power of form
and abilities, and those of his disciple Abe ing abstract ideas or notions of things, has
lard, the doctrine spread, and those who had a chief part in rendering speculation
followed it were called Nominalists." His intricate and perplexed, and has occasioned
antagonists, who held that there are things innumerable errors and difficulties in almost
that are really universal, werecalled Realists. all parts of knowledge.” That “abstract
The scholastic philosophers, from the be ideas are like a fine and subtile net, which
ginning of the twelfth century, were divided has miserably perplexed and entangled the
into these two sects. Some few took a minds of men, with this peculiar circum
middle road between the contending parties. stance, that by how much the finer and
That universality which the Realists held more curious was the wit of any man, by
to be in things themselves, Nominalists in so much the deeper was he like to be en
names only, they held to be neither in things snared, and faster held therein.” That,
nor in names only, but in our conceptions. “among all the false principles that have
On this account they were called Concep obtained in the world, there is none hath a
tualists: but, being exposed to the batteries more wide influence over the thoughts of
of both the opposite parties, they made no speculative men, than this of abstract gene
great figure.t. ral ideas.”
When the sect of Nominalists was like The good bishop, therefore, in twenty
to expire, it received new life and spirit four pages of the introduction to his “Prin
from Occam, the disciple of Scotus, in the ciples of Human Knowledge,” encounters
fourteenth century. Then the dispute about this principle with a zeal proportioned to
universals, a parte rei, was revived with his apprehension of its malignant and ex
the greatest animosity in the schools of tensive influence.
Britain, France, and Germany, and carried That the zeal of the sceptical philosopher
on, not by arguments only, but by bitter against abstract ideas was almost equal to
reproaches, blows, and bloody affrays, until that of the bishop, appears from his words,
the doctrines of Luther and the other Re “Treatise of Human Nature,” Book 1.
formers turned the attention of the learnedpart i. § 7:—“A very material question
world to more important subjects. has been started concerning abstract or
After the revival of learning, Mr Hobbes general ideas—whether they be general or
adopted the opinion of the Nominalists.: particular, in the mind's conception of them.
A great philosopher" (he means Dr Berke
* Abelard was not a Nominalist like Roscelinus; ley) “has disputed the received opinion in
but held a doctrine, intermediate between absolute
Nominalism and Realism, corresponding to the this particular, and has asserted that all
opinion since called Conceptualism. A flood# general ideas are nothing but particular ones
has been thrown upon Abelard's doctrines, by M.
Cousin's introduction to his recent publication of annexed to a certain term, which gives them
# unedited works of that illustrious thinker. a more extensive signification, and makes
t The later Nominalists, of the school of Occam, them recall, upon occasion, other individuals
w: really Conceptualists in our sense of the term. which are similar to them. As I look upon
# Hobbes this to be one of the greatest and most
is justly said by Leibnitz to have been valuable discoveries that have been made
r Nominalibus nominalior. They were really
onceptualists.-H. of late years in the republic of letters, I
[478,479 |
cHAP. v1.] OPINIONS ABOUT UNIVERSALS. 407
shall here endeavour to confirm it by some capacity of being attributed to a subject.
arguments, which, I hope, will put it beyond The name of predicables, which was given
all doubt and controversy.” [480] them in ancient philosophy, is that which
I shall make an end of this subject, with most properly expresses their nature.
some reflections on what has been said upon 2. I think it must be granted, in the
it by these two eminent philosophers. second place, that universals cannot be the
1. First, I apprehend that we cannot, objects of imagination, when we take that
with propriety, be said to have abstract and word in its strict and proper sense. “I
general ideas, either in the popular or in the find,” says Berkeley, “I have a faculty of
philosophical sense of that word. In the imagining or representing to myself the
popular sense, an idea is a thought; it is ideas of those particular things I have per
the act of the mind in thinking, or in con ceived, and of variously compounding and
ceiving any object. This act of the mind dividing them. I can imagine a man with
is always an individual act, and, therefore, two heads, or the upper parts of a man
there can be no general idea in this sense. joined to the body of a horse. I can imagine
In the philosophical sense, an idea is an the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself,
image in the mind, or in the brain, which, abstracted or separated from the rest of the
in Mr Locke's system, is the immediate ob body. But then, whatever hand or eye I
ject of thought; in the system of Berkeley imagine, it must have some particular shape
and Hume, the only object of thought. I or colour. Likewise, the idea of a man that
believe there are no ideas of this kind, and, I frame to myself must be either of a white,
therefore, no abstract general ideas. In or a black, or a tawny; a straight or a
deed, if there were really such images in crooked; a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized
the mind or in the brain, they could not man.”
be general, because everything that really I believe every man will find in himself
exists is an individual. Universals are what this ingenious author found—that he
neither acts of the mind, nor images in the cannot imagine a man without colour, or
mind. stature, or shape. [482]
As, therefore, there are no general ideas Imagination, as we before observed, pro
in either of the senses in which the word perly signifies a conception of the appear
idea is used by the moderns, Berkeley and ance an object would make to the eye if
Hume have, in this question, an advantage actually seen." An universal is not an
over Mr Locke; and their arguments against object of any external sense, and therefore
him are good ad hominem. They saw cannot be imagined; but it may be dis
farther than he did into the just conse tinctly conceived. When Mr Pope says,
quences of the hypothesis concerning ideas, “The proper study of mankind is man,” I
which was common to them and to him; conceive his meaning distinctly, though I
and they reasoned justly from this hypo neither imagine a black or a white, a
thesis when they concluded from it, that crooked or a straight man. The distinction
there is neither a material world, nor any between conception and imagination is real,
such power in the human mind as that of though it be too often overlooked, and the
abstraction. [481] words taken to be synonimous. I can con
A triangle, in general, or any other uni ceive a thing that is impossible,t but I
versal, might be called an idea by a Plato cannot distinctly imagine a thing that is
nist; but, in the style of modern philo impossible. I can conceive a proposition or
sophy, it is not an idea, nor do we ever a demonstration, but I cannot imagine
ascribe to ideas the properties of triangles. either. I can conceive understanding and
It is never said of any idea, that it has will, virtue and vice, and other attributes of
three sides and three angles. We do not mind, but I cannot imagine them. In like
speak of equilateral, isosceles, or sealene manner, I can distinctly conceive uni
ideas, nor of right-angled, acute-angled, or versals, but I cannot imagine them.:
obtuse-angled ideas. And, if these attri As to the manner how we conceive uni
butes do not belong to ideas, it follows, versals, I confess my ignorance. I know
necessarily, that a triangle is not an idea. not how I hear, or see, or remember, and
The same reasoning may be applied to as little do I know how I conceive things
every other universal. that have no existence. In all our original
Ideas are said to have a real existence in
the mind, at least while we think of them; * See above, p. 366, a, note.-H.
but universals have no real existence. * See above, p. 377, b, note.-H.
+ Imagination and Conception are distinguished,
When we ascribe existence to them, it is but the latter ought not to be used in the vague and
not an existence in time or place, but exist extensive signification of Reid. The discrimination
in question is best made in the German language of
ence in some individual subject; and this £ where the terms Begriffs (Conceptions)
existence means no more but that they are are strongly contrasted with Anschauungen (Intui
truly attributes of such a subject. Their tions), Bilden ''. &c. See above, p. 360, a, note
t; p. 365, b, note t. The reader may compare
existence is nothing but predicability, or the Stewart's “Elements," i. p. 196.-H.
[480–482]
408 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Ess4Y v.
faculties, the fabric and manner of operation framing the forementioned abstract idea, in
is, I apprehend, beyond our comprehension, as much as all that is perceived is not
and perhaps is perfectly understood by him considered.” It may here be observed,
only who made them. that he who considers Peter so far forth as
-
But we ought not to deny a fact of which man, or so far forth as animal, must con
we are conscious, though we know not how ceive the meaning of those abstract general
it is brought about. And I think we may words man and animal, and he who con
be certain that universals are not conceived ceives the meaning of them has an abstract
by means of images of them in our minds, general conception. [484]
because there can be no image of an uni From these eoncessions, one would be
versal. apt to conclude that the Bishop thinks that
3. It seems to me, that on this question we can abstract, but that we cannot frame
Mr Locke and his two antagonists have abstract ideas; and in this I should agree
divided the truth between them. He saw with him. But I cannot reconcile his con
very clearly, that the power of forming ab cessions with the general principle he lays
stract and general conceptions is one of the down before. “To be plain,” says he, “I
most distinguishing powers of the human deny that I can abstract one from another,
mind, and puts a specific difference between or conceive separately those qualities which
man and the brute creation. But he did it is impossible should exist so separated.”
not see that this power is perfectly irrecon This appears to me inconsistent with the
cileable to his doctrine concerning ideas. concessions above mentioned, and incon
1483] sistent with experience.
His opponents saw this inconsistency; If we can consider a figure merely as
but, instead of rejecting the hypothesis of triangular, without attending to the parti
ideas, they explain away the power of ab cular quality of the angles or relation of the
straction, and leave no specific distinction sides, this, I think, is conceiving separately
between the human understanding and that things which cannot exist so separated :
of brutes. for surely a triangle cannot exist without
4. Berkeley," in his reasoning against a particular quality of angles and relation
abstract general ideas, seems unwillingly of sides. And it is well known, from ex
or unwarily to grant all that is necessary perience, that a man may have a distinct
to support abstract and general concep conception of a triangle, without having
tions.
any conception or knowledge of many of
“A man,” he says, “may consider a the properties without which a triangle
figure merely as triangular, without attend cannot exist.
ing to the particular qualities of the angles, Let us next consider the Bishop's notion
or relations of the sides. So far he may of generalising." He does not absolutely
abstract. But this will never prove that deny that there are general ideas, but only
he can frame an abstract general inconsist that there are abstract general ideas. “An
ent idea of a triangle.” idea,” he says, “which, considered in it
If a man may consider a figure merely self, is particular, becomes general, by be
as triangular, he must have some concep ing made to represent or stand for all other
tion of this object of his consideration; for particular ideas of the same sort. To make
no man can consider a thing which he does this plain by an example: Suppose a geo
not conceive. He has a conception, there metrician is demonstrating the method of
fore, of a triangular figure, merely as such. cutting a line in two equal parts. He
I know no more that is meant by an abstract draws, for instance, a black line, of an inch
general conception of a triangle. in length. This, which is in itself a parti
He that considers a figure merely as tri cular line, is, nevertheless, with regard to
angular, must understand what is meant by its signification, general; since, as it is
the word triangular. If, to the conception there used, it represents all particular lines
he joins to this word, he adds any particu whatsoever; so that what is demonstrated
lar quality of angles or relation of sides, he of it, is demonstrated of all lines, or, in
misunderstands it, and does not consider other words, of a line in general. And as
the figure merely as triangular. Whence, that particular line becomes general by be
I think, it is evident, that he who considers ing made a sign, so the name line, which,
a figure merely as triangular must have the taken absolutely, is particular, by being a
conception of a triangle, abstracting from sign, is made general.” [485]
any quality of angles or relation of sides. Here I observe, that when a particular
The Bishop, in like manner, grants, idea is made a sign to represent and stand
“That we may consider Peter so far forth for all of a sort, this supposes a distinction
as man, or so far forth as animal, without of things into sorts or species. To be of a
sort implies having those attributes which
* On Reid's criticism of Berkeley, see Stewart,
(Elements, II, p. 110, sq.)-H. * Sec Stewart, (Elements, 11 p. 128)-H.
[183-485]
__ _ _-_--- ** **
CHAP. VI.] OPINIONS ABOUT UNIVERSALS. 409
characterise the sort, and are common to yond the reach of persons of weak under
all the individuals that belong to it. There standing; but there are innumerable which
cannot, therefore, be a sort without general are not beyond the reach of children. It
attributes, nor can there be any conception is impossible to learn language without
of a sort without a conception of those acquiring general conceptions; for there
general attributes which distinguish it. The cannot be a single sentence without them.
conception of a sort, therefore, is an ab I believe the forming these, and being able
stract general conception. to articulate the sounds of language, make
The particular idea cannot surely be made up the whole difficulty that children find in
a sign of a thing of which we have no con learning language at first.
ception. I do not say that you must have But this difficulty, we see, they are able
an idea of the sort, but surely you ought to overcome so early as not to remember
to understand or conceive what it means, the pains it cost them. They have the
when you make a particular idea a repre strongest inducement to exert all their
sentative of it; otherwise your particular labour and skill, in order to understand
idea represents, you know not what. and to be understood; and they no doubt
When I demonstrate any general pro do so. [487]
perty of a triangle, such as, that the three The labour of forming abstract notions, is
angles are equal to two right angles, I must the labour of learning to speak, and to
understand or conceive distinctly what is understand what is spoken. As the words
common to all triangles. I must distinguish of every language, excepting a few proper
the common attributes of all triangles from names, are general words, the minds of
those wherein particular triangles may differ. children are furnished with general con
And, if I conceive distinctly what is common ceptions, in proportion as they learn the
to all triangles, without confounding it with meaning of general words. I believe most
what is not so, this is to form a general con men have hardly any general notions but
ception of a triangle. And without this, it those which are expressed by the general
is impossible to know that the demonstra words they hear and use in conversation.
tion extends to all triangles. The meaning of some of these is learned
The Bishop takes particular notice of this by a definition, which at once conveys a
argument, and makes this answer to it — distinct and accurate general conception.
“Though the idea I have in view, whilst The meaning of other general words we
I make the demonstration, be, for instance, collect, by a kind of induction, from the
that of an isosceles rectangular triangle, way in which we see them used on various
whose sides are of a determinate length, I occasions by those who understand the
may nevertheless be certain that it extends language. Of these our conception is often
to all other rectilinear triangles, of what less distinct, and in different persons is
sort or bigness soever; and that because perhaps not perfectly the same.
neither the right angle, nor the equality or “Is it not a hard thing,” says the Bishop,
determinate length of the sides, are at all “that a couple of children cannot prate to
concerned in the demonstration.” [486] gether of their sugar-plumbs and rattles,
But, if he do not, in the idea he has in and the rest of their little trinkets, till they
view, clearly distinguish what is common have first tacked together numberless in
to all triangles from what is not, it would consistencies, and so formed in their minds
be impossible to discern whether something abstract general ideas, and annexed them
that is not common be concerned in the to every common name they make use of ?”
demonstration or not. In order, therefore, However hard a thing it may be, it is an
to perceive that the demonstration extends evident truth, that a couple of children,
to all triangles, it is necessary to have a even about their sugar-plumbs and their
distinct conception of what is common to rattles, cannot prate so as to understand
all triangles, excluding from that concep and be understood, until they have learned
tion all that is not common. And this is to conceive the meaning of many general
all I understand by an abstract general words—and this, I think, is to have general
conception of a triangle. conceptions.
Berkeley catches an advantage to his side 5. Having considered the sentiments of
of the question, from what Mr. Locke ex Bishop Berkeley on this subject, let us
presses (too strongly indeed) of the difficulty next attend to those of Mr Hume, as they
of framing abstract general ideas, and the are expressed Part I. § 7, “Treatise of
pains and skill necessary for that purpose. Human Nature.” He agrees perfectly
From which the Bishop infers, that a thing with the Bishop, “That all general ideas
so difficult cannot be necessary for com are nothing but particular ones annexed to
munication by language, which is so easy a certain term, which gives them a more
and familiar to all sorts of men. extensive signification, and makes them
There may be some abstract and general recall, upon occasion, other individuals which
conceptions that are difficult, or even be are similar to them. [488] A particular
[486-488]
idea becomes general, by being annexed to of a populous nation. I never saw an in
a general term; that is, to a term, which, dividual of that nation; and, if I can trust
from a customary conjunction, has a rela my consciousness, the general term does
tion to many other particular ideas, and not lead me to imagine one individual of
readily recalls them in the imagination. the sort as a representative of all others.
Abstract ideas are therefore in themselves Though Mr Hume, therefore, undertakes
individual,however they maybecomegeneral much, yet, if he could prove all he under
in their representation. The image in the takes to prove, it would by no means be
mind is only that of a particular object, sufficient to shew that we have no abstract
though the application of it in our reason general conceptions.
ing be the same as if it was universal.” Passing this, let us attend to his argu
Although Mr Hume looks upon this to ments for proving this extraordinary posi
be one of the greatest and most valuable tion, that it is impossible to conceive any
discoveries that has been made of late years quantity or quality, without forming a pre
in the republic of letters, it appears to be cise notion of its degree.
no other than the opinion of the nominal The first argument is, that it is impossi
ists, about which so much dispute was ble to distinguish things that are not ac
held from the beginning of the twelfth tually separable. “The precise length of
century down to the Reformation, and a line is not different or distinguishable
which was afterwards supported by Mr from the line.” [490]
Hobbes. I shall briefly consider the argu I have before endeavoured to shew, that
ments by which Mr Hume hopes to have things inseparable in their nature may be
put it beyond all doubt and controversy. distinguished in our conception. And we
First, He endeavours to prove, by three need go no farther to be convinced of this,
arguments, that it is utterly impossible to than the instance here brought to prove
conceive any quantity or quality, without the contrary. The precise length of a line,
forming a precise notion of its degrees. he says, is not distinguishable from the
This is indeed a great undertaking; but, line. When I say, This is a line, I say and
if he could prove it, it is not sufficient for mean one thing. When I say, It is a line
his purpose—for two reasons. of three inches, I say and mean another
First, Because there are many attributes thing. If this be not to distinguish the
of things, besides quantity and quality; and precise length of the line from the line, I
it is incumbent upon him to prove that it know not what it is to distinguish.
is impossible to conceive any attribute, Second argument.—“Every object of
without forming a precise notion of its sense—that is, every impression—is an in
degree. Each of the ten categories of dividual, having its determinate degrees of
Aristotle is a genus, and may be an attri quantity and quality. But whatever is
bute. And, if he should prove of two of true of the impression is true of the idea,
them—to wit, quantity and quality—that as they differ in nothing but their strength
there can be no general conception of them; and vivacity.”
there remain eight behind, of which this The conclusion in this argument is, in
must be proved. [489] deed, justly drawn from the premises. If
The other reason is, because, though it it be true that ideas differ in nothing from
were impossible to conceive any quantity objects of sense, but in strength and viva
or quality, without forming a precise notion city, as it must be granted that all the ob
of its degree, it does not follow that it is jects of sense are individuals, it will eer
impossible to have a general conception tainly follow that all ideas are individuals.
even of quantity and quality. The con Granting, therefore, the justness of this
ception of a pound troy is the conception conclusion, I beg leave to draw two other
of a quantity, and of the precise degree of conclusions from the same premises, which
that quantity; but it is an abstract general will follow no less necessarily.
conception notwithstanding, because it may First, If ideas differ from the objects of
be the attribute of many individual bodies, sense only in strength and vivacity, it will
and of many kinds of bodies. He ought, follow, that the idea of a lion is a lion of
therefore, to have proved that we cannot less strength and vivacity. And hence may
conceive quantity or quality, or any other arise a very important question, Whether
attribute, without joining it inseparably to the idea of a lion may not tear in pieces,
some individual subject. and devour the ideas of sheep, oxen, and
This remains to be proved, which will be horses, and even of men, women, and
found no easy matter. For instance, I children P
conceive what is meant by a Japanese as Secondly, If ideas differ only in strength
distinctly as what is meant by an English and vivacity from the objects of sense, it
man or a Frenchman. It is true, a Japan will follow that objects merely conceived,
ese is neither quantity nor quality, but it are not ideas; for such objects differ from
is an attribute common to every individual the objects of sense in respects of a very
[489, 490]
cHAP. v1.] OPINIONS ABOUT UNIVERSALS. 411
different nature from strength and vivacity. custom of this kind, the hearing of that
[491] Every object of sense must have a name revives the idea of one of these ob
real existence, and time and place. But jects, and makes the imagination conceive
things merely conceived may neither have it, with all its circumstances and propor
existence, nor time nor place; and, there tions.” But, along with this idea, there is
fore, though there should be no abstract a readiness to survey any other of the indi
ideas, it does not follow that things abstract viduals to which the name belongs, and to
and general may not be conceived. observe that no conclusion be formed con
The third argument is this:—“It is a trary to any of them. If any such conclu
principle generally received in philosophy, sion is formed, those individual ideas which
that everything in nature is individual; and contradict it immediately crowd in upon us,
that it is utterly absurd to suppose a tri and make us perceive the falsehood of the
angle really existent which has no precise proposition. If the mind suggests not al
proportion of sides and angles. If this, ways these ideas upon occasion, it proceeds
therefore, be absurd in fact and reality, it from some imperfection in its faculties;
must be absurd in idea, since nothing of and such a one as is often the source of
which we can form a clear and distinct false reasoning and sophistry.
idea is absurd or impossible.” This is, in substance, the way in which
I acknowledge it to be impossible that a he accounts for what he calls “the fore
triangle should really exist which has no going paradox, that some ideas are parti
precise proportion of sides and angles; and cular in their mature, but general in their
impossible that any being should exist representation.” Upon this account I shall
which is not an individual being; for, I make some remarks. [493]
think, a being and an individual being 1. He allows that we find a resemblance
mean the same thing: but that there can among several objects, and such a resem
be no attributes common to many indivi blance as leads us to apply the same name
duals I do not acknowledge. Thus, to to all of them. This concession is suffi
many figures that really exist it may be cient to shew that we have general concep
common that they are triangles; and to tions. There can be no resemblance in
many bodies that exist it may be common objects that have no common attribute;
that they are fluid. Triangle and fluid areand, if there be attributes belonging in com
not beings, they are attributes of beings. mon to several objects, and in man a fa
As to the principle here assumed, that culty to observe and conceive these, and to
nothing of which we can form a clear and give names to them, this is to have general
conceptions.
distinct idea is absurd or impossible, I refer
to what was said upon it, chap. 3, Essay I believe, indeed, we may have an indis
IV. It is evident that, in every mathema tinct perception of resemblance without
tical demonstration, ad absurdum, of which knowing wherein it lies. Thus, I may see
kind almost one-half of mathematics con a resemblance between one face and an
sists, we are required to suppose, and, con other, when I cannot distinctly say in what
sequently, to conceive, a thing that is im feature they resemble; but, by analysing
possible. From that supposition we reason, the two faces, and comparing feature with
until we come to a conclusion that is not feature, I may form a distinct notion of
only impossible but absurd. From this we that which is common to both. A painter,
infer that the proposition supposed at first being accustomed to an analysis of this kind,
is impossible, and, therefore, that its con would have formed a distinct notion of this
tradictory is true. [492] resemblance at first sight; to another man
As this is the nature of all demonstra it may require some attention.
tions, ad absurdum, it is evident, (I do not There is, therefore, an indistinct notion
say that we can have a clear and distinct of resemblance when we compare the objects
idea,) but that we can clearly and distinctly only in gross: and this I believe brute ani
conceive things impossible. mals may have. There is also a distinct
The rest of Mr Hume's discourse upon notion of resemblance when we analyse the
this subject is employed in explaining how objects into their different attributes, and
an individual idea, annexed to a general perceive them to agree in some while they
term, may serve all the purposes in reason differ in others. It is in this case only that
ing which have been ascribed to abstract we give a name to the attributes wherein
general ideas. they agree, which must be a common name,
“When we have found a resemblance because the thing signified by it is common.
among several objects that often occur to Thus, when I compare cubes of different
us, we apply the same name to all of them, matter, I perceive them to have this attri
whatever differences we may observe in the bute in common, that they are compre
degrees of their quantity and quality, and hended under six equal squares, and this
whatever other differences may appear attribute only is signified by applying the
among them. After we have acquired a name of cube to them all. When I com
[491–493]
pare clean linen with snow, I perceive them to the ground. To me it appears, that
to agree in colour; and when I apply the when a general term is well understood, it is
name of white to both, this name signifies only by accident if it suggest some indi
neither snow nor clean linen, but the attri vidual of the kind; but this effect is by no
bute which is common to both. means constant.
2. The author says, that when we have I understand perfectly what mathemati
found a resemblance among several objects, cians call a line of the fifth order; yet I
we apply the same name to all of them. never conceived in my imagination any one
[494] of the kind in all its circumstances and pro
It must here be observed, that there are portions. Sir Isaac Newton first formed a
two kinds of names which the author seems distinct general conception of lines of the
to confound, though they are very different third order; and afterwards, by great labour
in nature, and in the power they have in and deep penetration, found out and de
language. There are proper names, and scribed the particular species comprehended
there are common names or appellatives. under that general term. According to Mr
The first are the names of individuals. The Hume's theory, he must first have been
same proper name is never applied to acquainted with the particulars, and then
several individuals on account of their simi have learned by custom to apply one
litude, because the very intention of a pro general name to all of them.
per name is to distinguish one individual The author observes, “That the idea of
from all others; and hence it is a maxim an equilateral triangle of an inch perpen
in grammar that proper names have no dicular, may serve us in talking of a figure,
plural number. A proper name signifies a rectilinear figure, a regular figure, a tri
nothing but the individual whose name it ":
and an equilateral triangle.”
is; and, when we apply it to the individual, answer, the man that uses these general
we neither affirm nor deny anything con terms either understands their meaning,
cerning him. or he does not. If he does not understand
A common name or appellative is not the their meaning, all his talk about them will
name of any individual, but a general term, be found only without sense, and the par
signifying something that is or may be ticular idea mentioned cannot enable him
common to several individuals. Common to speak of them with understanding. If
names, therefore, signify common attri he understands the meaning of the general
butes. Thus, when I apply the name of terms, he will find no use for the particular
son or brother to several persons, this sig idea.
nifies and affirms that this attribute is 4. He tells us gravely, “That in a globe
common to all of them. of white marble the figure and the colour
From this, it is evident that the apply are undistinguishable, and are in effect the
ing the same name to several individuals same.” [496] How foolish have mankind
on account of their resemblance, can, in been to give different names, in all ages
consistence with grammar and common andinall languages, to things undistinguish
sense, mean nothing else than the express able, and in effect the same? Henceforth,
ing, by a general term, something that is in all books of science and of entertainment,
common to those individuals, and which, we may substitute figure for colour, and
therefore, may be truly affirmed of them all. colour for figure. By this we shall make
3. The author says, “It is certain that numberless curious discoveries, without
we form the idea of individuals whenever danger of error." [497]
we use any general term. The word raises
up an individual idea, and makes the ima * The whole controversy of Nominalism and Con
gination conceive it, with all its particular ceptualism is founded on the ambiguity of the terms
employed. The opposite parties are substantially at
circumstances and proportions.” one. Had our British philosophers been aware of
This fact he takes a great deal of pains to the Leibnitzian distinction of Intuitive and symbol
account for, from the effect of custom. cal knowledge; and had we, like the Germans,
different terms, like Begriff and Anschauteng, to de
[495] note different kinds of thought, there would have
But the fact should be ascertained before been as little difference of opinion in regard to the
nature of general notions in this country as in the
we take pains to account for it. I can see Empire. With us, Idea, Notion, Conception, &c.
no reason to believe the fact ; and I think are confounded, or
in different senses.
*'' by different philosophers
must put the reader on his
a farmer can talk of his sheep and his black guard against Dr Thomas Brown's speculations on
cattle, without conceiving, in his imagina this subject. His own doctrine of universals, in so
tion, one individual, with all its circum can far as it is poculiar, is self-contradictory; and nothing
be more erroneous than his statement of the doc.
stances and proportions. If this be true, ": held by others, especially by the Nominalists.
the whole of his theory of general ideas falls
[494–497]
CHAP. 1.] OF JUDGMENT IN GENERAL. 413
ESSAY WH.
OF JUDGMENT
CHAPTER I. tial to it to be expressed by words or signs.

A tacit testimony is a contradiction : but
of JUDGMENT IN GENERAL.
there is no contradiction in a tacit judgment;
it is complete without being expressed.
JUDGING is an operation of the mind so In testimony a man pledges his veracity
familiar to every man who hath understand for what he affirms; so that a false testi
ing, and its name is so common and so well mony is a lie: but a wrong judgment is not
understood, that it needs no definition. a lie; it is only an error.
As it is impossible by a definition to give I believe, in all languages, testimony and
a notion of colour to a man who never saw judgment are expressed by the same form
colours; so it is impossible by any defini of speech. A proposition affirmative or
tion to give a distinct notion of judgment to negative, with a verb in what is called the
a man who has not often judged, and who indicative mood, expresses both. To dis
is not capable of reflecting attentively upon tinguish them by the form of speech, it
this act of his mind. The best use of a de would be necessary that verbs should have
finition is to prompt him to that reflection; two indicative moods, one for testimony,
and without it the best definition will be apt and another to express judgment. [499]
to mislead him. I know not that this is found in any lan
The definition commonly given of judg guage. And the reason is—not surely that
ment, by the more ancient writers in logic, the vulgar cannot distinguish the two, for
was, that it is an act of the mind, wherely every man knows the difference between a
one thing is affirmed or denied of another. lie and an error of judgment—but that, from
I believe this is as good a definition of it as the matter and circumstances, we can easily
can be given. Why I prefer it to some see whether a man intends to give his tes
later definitions, will afterwards appear. timony, or barely to express his judgment.
Without pretending to give any other, I Although men must have judged in many
shall make two remarks upon it, and then cases before tribunals of justice were
offer some general observations on this erected, yet it is very probable that there
subject. [498] were tribunals before men began to specu
1. It is true that it is by affirmation or late about judgment, and that the word may
denial that we express our judgments; but be borrowed from the practice of tribunals.
there may be judgment which is not ex As a judge, after taking the proper evidence,
pressed. It is a solitary act of the mind, passes sentence in a cause, and that sent
and the expression of it by affirmation or ence is called his judgment, so the mind,
denial is not at all essential to it. It may with regard to whatever is true or false,
be tacit, and not expressed. Nay, it is passes sentence, or determines according to
well known that men may judge contrary the evidence that appears. Some kinds of
to what they affirm or deny; the definition evidence leave no room for doubt. Sent
therefore must be understood of mental af ence is passed immediately, without seek
firmation or denial, which indeed is only ing or hearing any contrary evidence,
another name for judgment. because the thing is certain and notorious.
2. Affirmation and denial is very often In other cases, there is room for weighing
the expression of testimony, which is a dif evidence on both sides, before sentence is
ferent act of the mind, and ought to be passed. The analogy between a tribunal
distinguished from judgment. of justice, and this inward tribunal of the
A judge asks of a witness what he knows mind, is too obvious to escape the notice of
of such a matter to which he was an eye any man who ever appeared before a judge.
or ear-witness. He answers, by affirming And it is probable that the word judgment,
or denying something. But his answer as well as many other words we use in speak
does not express his judgment; it is his ing of this operation of mind, are grounded
testimony. Again, I ask a man his opinion on this analogy.
in a matter of science or of criticism. His Having premised these things, that it
answer is not testimony; it is the expres may be clearly understood what I mean by
sion of his judgment. judgment, I proceed to make some general
Testimony is a social act, and it is essen observations concerning it.
[498,499]
4l 4 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essay v1.
First, Judgment is an act of the mind, understanding, judgment necessarily accom
specifically different from simple apprehen panies all sensation, perception by the
sion, or the bare conception of a thing." senses, consciousness, and memory, but not
It would be unnecessary to observe this, if conception."
some philosophers had not been led by their I restrict this to persons come to theyears
theories to a contrary opinion. [500] of understanding, because it may be a ques
Although there can be no judgment with tion, whether infants, in the first period of
out a conception of the things about which life, have any judgment or belief at all."
we judge, yet conception may be without any The same question may be put with regard
judgment.t Judgment can be expressed to brutes and some idiots. This question
by a proposition only, and a proposition is is foreign to the present subject; and I say
a complete sentence; but simple apprehen nothing here about it, but speak only of
sion may be expressed by a word or words, persons who have the exercise of judg
which make no complete sentence. When ment.
simple apprehension is employed about a In them it is evident that a man who
proposition, every man knows that it is one feels pain, judges and believes that he is
thing to apprehend a proposition—that is, really ': The man who perceives an
to conceive what it means—but it is quite object, believes that it exists, and is what
another thing to judge it to be true or false. he distinctly perceives it to be ; nor is it in
It is self-evident that every judgment his power to avoid such judgment. And
must be either true or false but simple the like may be said of memory, and of
apprehension, or conception, can neither be consciousness. Whether judgment ought
true nor false, as was shewn before. to be called a necessary concomitant of
One judgment may be contradictory to these operations, or rather a part or in
another; and it is impossible for a man to ient of them, I do not dispute; but it
have two judgments at the same time, which is certain that all of them are accompanied
he perceives to be contradictory. But con with a determination that something is
tradictory propositions may be conceived: true or false, and a consequent belief. If
at the same time without any difficulty. this determination be not judgment, it is
That the sun is greater than the earth, and an operation that has got no name: for it
that the sun is not greater than the earth, is not simple apprehension, neither is it
are contradictory propositions. He that reasoning; it is a mental affirmation or
apprehends the meaning of one, apprehends negation ; it may be expressed by a propo
the meaning of both. But it is impossible sition affirmative or negative, and it is
for him to judge both to be true at the same accompanied with the firmest belief. These
time. . He knows that, if the one is true, are the characteristics of judgment; and I
the other must be false. For these reasons, must call it judgment, till I can find another
I hold it to be certain that judgment and name to it.
simple apprehension are acts of the mind The judgments we form are either of
specifically different. things necessary, or of things contingent.
Secondly, There are notions or ideas that That three times three is nine, that the
ought to be referred to the faculty of judg whole is greater than a part, are judg
ment as their source; because, if we had ments about things necessary. [502] Our
not that faculty, they could not enter into assent to such necessary propositions is not
our minds; and to those that have that grounded upon any operation of sense, of
faculty, and are capable of reflecting upon memory, or of consciousness, nor does it
its operations, they are obvious and familiar. require their concurrence; it is unaccom
Among these we may reckon the notion panied by any other operation but that of
of judgment itself; the notions of a propos conception, which must accompany all judg
ition—of its subject, predicate, and copula; ment; we may therefore call this judgment
of affirmation and negation, of true and of things necessary pure judgment. Our
false; of knowledge, belief, disbelief, opi judgment of things contingent must always
nion, assent, evidence. From no source rest upon some other operation of the mind,
could we acquire these notions, but from such as sense, or memory, or consciousness,
reflecting upon our judgments. Relations or credit in testimony, which is itself
of things make one great class of our notions grounded upon sense.
or ideas; and we cannot have the idea of That I now write upon a table covered
any relation without some exercise of judg with green cloth, is a contingent event,
ment, as will appear afterwards. [561] which I judge to be most undoubtedly true.
Thirdly, In persons come to years of My judgment is grounded upon my percep
tion, and is a necessary concomitant or in
its*Which,
subjectivehowever, implies
reality—an *: a judgment
| igment affiaa's gredient of my perception. That I dined
last note,
375, a, note £-H.and above, p. 243,, a, note *,
ve, p. * and p.
-
* In so far as there can be Consciousness, there

+See above, p. 377, b, note.-H must be Judgment.-H.
[500–502 |
cHAP. 1.] OF JUDGMENT IN GENERAL. 415
with such a company yesterday, I judge to speaking of these faculties, they conclude
be true, because I remember it; and my that it does not accompany them; that they
judgment necessarily goes along with this are only different modes of simple appre
remembrance, or makes a part of it. hension, or of acquiring ideas; and that it
There are many forms of speech in com is no part of their office to judge. [504]
mon language which shew that the senses, I apprehend the same cause has led Mr
memory and consciousness, are considered Locke into a motion of judgment which I
as judging faculties. We say that a man take to be peculiar to him. He thinks that
judges of colours by his eye, of sounds by the mind has two faculties conversant about
his ear. We speak of the evidence of sense, truth and falsehood. First, knowledge;
the evidence of memory, the evidence of and, secondly, judgment. In the first, the
consciousness. Evidence is the ground of perception of the agreement or disagree
judgment; and when we see evidence, it is ment of the ideas is certain. In the second,
impossible not to judge. it is not certain, but probable only.
When we speak of seeing or remember According to this notion of judgment, it
ing anything, we, indeed, hardly ever add is not by judgment that I perceive that two
that we judge it to be true. But the rea and three make five; it is by the faculty of
son of this appears to be, that such an knowledge. I apprehend there can be no
addition would be mere superfluity of knowledge without judgment, though there
speech, because every one knows that may be judgment without that certainty
what I see or remember, I must judge to which we commonly call knowledge.
be true, and cannot do otherwise. Mr Locke, in another place of his Essay,
And, for the same reason, in speaking of tells us, “That the notice we have by our
anything that is self-evident or strictly de senses of the existence of things without us,
monstrated, we do not say that we judge though not altogether so certain as our in
it to be true. This would be superfluity tuitive knowledge, or the deductions of our
of speech, because every man knows that we reason about abstract ideas, yet is an as
must judge that to be true which we hold surance that deserves the name of know
self-evident or demonstrated. [503] ledge.” I think, by this account of it, and
When you say you saw such a thing, or by his definitions before given of knowledge
that you distinctly remember it, or when and judgment, it deserves as well the name
you say of any proposition that it is self of judgment.
evident, or strictly demonstrated, it would That I may avoid disputes about the
be ridiculous after this to ask whether you meaning of words, I wish the reader to un
judge it to be true; nor would it be less derstand, that I give the name of judgment
ridiculous in you to inform us that you do. to every determination of the mind con
It would be a superfluity of speech of the cerning what is true or what is false. This,
same kind as if, not content with saying I think, is what logicians, from the days of
that you saw such an object, you should Aristotle, have called judgment. Whether
add that you saw it with your eyes. it be called one faculty, as I think it has
There is, therefore, good reason why, in always been, or whether a philosopher
speaking or writing, judgment should not chooses to split it into two, seems not very
be expressly mentioned, when all men know material. And, if it be granted that, by our
it to be necessarily implied; that is, when senses, our memory, and consciousness, we
there can be no doubt. In such cases, we not only have ideas or simple apprehen
barely mention the evidence. But when sions, but form determinations concerning
the evidence mentioned leaves room for what is true and what is false—whether
doubt, then, without any superfluity or tau these determinations ought to be called
tology, we say we judge the thing to be so, knowledge or judgment, is of small moment.
because this is not implied in what was said [505]
before. A woman with child never says, The judgments grounded upon the evi
that, going such a journey, she carried her dence of sense, of memory, and of conscious
child along with her. We know that, while ness, put all men upon a level. The phi
it is in her womb, she must carry it along losopher, with regard to these, has no pre
with her. There are some operations of rogative above the illiterate, or even above
mind that may be said to carry judgment the savage.
in their womb, and can no more leave it Their reliance upon the testimony of
behind them than the pregnant woman can these faculties is as firm and as well
leave her child. Therefore, in speaking of grounded as his. His superiority is in
such operations, it is not expressed. judgments of another kind—in judgments
Perhaps this manner of speaking may about things abstract and necessary. And
have led philosophers into the opinion that, he is unwilling to give the name of judg
in perception by the senses, in memory, ment to that wherein the most ignorant
and in consciousness, there is no judgment and unimproved of the species are his
at all. Because it is not mentioned in equals. -
[503–505]
416 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [EssAY v1.
But philosophers have never been able These operations are allied to each other,
to give any definition of judgment, which and therefore I bring them under one ob
does not apply to the determinations of servation. They are more allied to cur
our senses, our memory, and conscious rational nature than those mentioned in the
ness, nor any definition of simple appre last observation, and therefore are consi
hension which can comprehend those deter dered by themselves.
minations. That I may not be mistaken, it may be
Our judgments of this kind are purely observed that I do not say that abstract
the gift of Nature, nor do they admit of notions, or other accurate notions of things,
improvement by culture. The memory of after they have been formed, cannot be
one man may be more tenacious than that barely conceived without any exercise of
of another; but both rely with equal assur judgment about them. I doubt not that
ance upon what they distinctly remember. they may : but what I say is, that, in their
One man's sight may be more acute, or his formation in the mind at first, there must
feeling more delicate, than that of another; be some exercise of judgment. [507]
but both give equal credit to the distinct It is impossible to distinguish the different
testimony of their sight and touch. attributes belonging to the same subject,
And, as we have this belief by the con without judging that they are really different
stitution of our nature, without any effort and distinguishable, and that they have that
of our own, so no effort of ours can over relation to the subject which logicians ex
turn it. press, by saying that they may be predicated
The sceptic may perhaps persuade him of it. We cannot generalise, without judg
self, in general, that he has no ground to ing that the same attribute does or may be
believe his senses or his memory: but, in long to many individuals. It has been
particular cases that are interesting, his shewn that our simplest general notions
disbelief vanishes, and he finds himself are formed by these two operations of dis
under a necessity of believing both. [506] tinguishing and generalising ; judgment
These judgments may, in the strictest therefore is exercised informing the simplest
sense, be called judgments of nature. Na general notions.
ture has subjected us to them, whether we In those that are more complex, and
will or not. They are neither got, nor can which have been shewn to be formed by
they be lost by any use or abuse of our combining the more simple, there is another
faculties; and it is evidently necessary for act of the judgment required; for such
our preservation that it should be so. For, combinations are not made at random, but
if belief in our senses and in our memory for an end; and judgment is employed in
were to be learned by culture, the race of fitting them to that end. We form complex
men would perish before they learned this general notions for conveniency of arrang
lesson. It is necessary to all men for their ing our thoughts in discourse and reasoning;
being and preservation, and therefore is and, therefore, of an infinite number of com
unconditionally given to all men by the binations that might be formed, we choose
Author of Nature. only those that are useful and necessary.
I acknowledge that, if we were to rest That judgment must be employed in
in those judgments of Nature of which we dividing as well as in distinguishing, ap
now speak, without building others upon pears evident. It is one thing to divide a
them, they would not entitle us to the deno subject properly, another to cut it in pieces.
mination of reasonable beings. But yet Hoc non est dividere, sed frangere rem, said
they ought not to be despised, for they are Cicero, when he censured an improper
the foundation upon which the grand super division of Epicurus. Reason has discovered
structure of human knowledge must be rules of division, which have been known
raised. And, as in other superstructures to logicians more than two thousand years.
the foundation is commonly overlooked, so There are rules likewise of definition of
it has been in this. The more sublime no less antiquity and authority. A man
attainments of the human mind have at may no doubt divide or define properly with
tracted the attention of philosophers, while out attending to the rules, or even without
they have bestowed but a careless glance knowing them. But this can only be when
upon the humble foundation on which the he has judgment to perceive that to be right
whole fabric rests. in a particular case, which the rule de
A fourth observation is, that some exer termines to be right in all cases.
cise of judgment is necessary in the forma I add in general, that, without some de
tion of all abstract and general conceptions, gree of judgment, we can form no accurate
whether more simple or more complex; in and distinct notions of things; so that one
dividing, in defining, and, in general, in province of judgment is, to aid us in form
forming all clear and distinct conceptions ing clear and distinct conceptions of things,
of things, which are the only fit materials which are the only fit materials for reason
of reasoning. -
ing. [508]
[506–508]
chap. 1.] OF JUDGMIENT IN GENERAL. 417
This will probably appear to be a paradox expressed by a proposition, and a proposi
to philosophers, who have always considered tion must be conceived before we can judge
the formation of ideas of every kind as be of it. If, therefore, we cannot conceive the
longing to simple apprehension; and that meaning of a proposition without a previous
the sole province of judgment is to put them exercise of judgment, it follows that judg
together in affirmative or negative proposi ment must be previous to the conception of
tions; and therefore it requires some con any proposition, and at the same time that
firmation.
the conception of a proposition must be pre
First, I think it necessarily follows, from vious to all judgment, which is a contra
what has been already said in this observa diction.
tion. For if, without some degree of judg The reader may please to observe, that
ment, a man can neither distinguish, nor I have limited what I have said to distinct
divide, nor define, nor form any general conception, and some degree of judgment;
notion, simple or complex, he surely, with and it is by this means I hope to avoid this
out some degree of judgment, cannot have labyrinth of absurdity and contradiction.
in his mind the materials necessary to The faculties of conception and judgment
reasoning. have an infancy and a maturity as man has.
There cannot be any proposition in lan What I have said is limited to their mature
guage which does not involve some general state. I believe in their infant state they
conception. The proposition, that I exist, are very weak and indistinct; and that, by
which Des Cartes thought the first of all imperceptible degrees, they grow to ma
truths, and the foundation of all knowledge, turity, each giving aid to the other, and
cannot be conceived without the conception receiving aid from it. But which of them
of existence, one of the most abstract general first began this friendly intercourse, is be
conceptions. A man cannot believe his own yond my ability to determine. It is like
existence, or the existence of anything he the question concerning the bird and the
sees or remembers, until he has so much egg. [510]
judgment as to distinguish things that really In the present state of things, it is true
exist from things which are only conceived. that every bird comes from an egg, and
He sees a man six feet high; he conceives every egg from a bird; and each may be
a man sixty feet high : he judges the first said to be previous to the other. But, if
object to exist, because he sees it; the we go back to the origin of things, there
second he does not judge to exist, because must have been some bird that did not
he only conceives it. Now, I would ask, come from any egg, or some egg that did
Whether he can attribute existence to the
not come from any bird.
first object, and not to the second, without In like manner, in the mature state of
knowing what existence means? It is im man, distinct conception of a proposition
possible. supposes some previous exercise of judg
How early the notion of existence enters ment, and distinct judgment supposes dis
into the mind, I cannot determine; but it tinct conception. Each may truly be said
must certainly be in the mind as soon as to come from the other, as the bird from
we can affirm of anything, with understand the egg, and the egg from the bird. But,
ing, that it exists. (509] if we trace back this succession to its origin
In every other proposition, the predicate,—that is, to the first proposition that was
at least, must be a general notion—a pre ever conceived by the man, and the first
dicable and an universal being one and the judgment he ever formed—I determine no
same. Besides this, every proposition either thing about them, nor do I know in what
affirms or denies. And no man can have
order, or how, they were produced, any
a distinct conception of a proposition, who more than how the bones grow in the
does not understand distinctly the meaning womb of her that is with child.
of affirming or denying. But these are very The first exercise of these faculties of
general conceptions, and, as was before conception and judgment is hid, like the
observed, are derived from judgment, as sources of the Nile, in an unknown region.
their source and origin. The necessity of some degree of judg
I am sensible that a strong objection may ment to clear and distinct conceptions of
be made to this reasoning, and that it may things, may, I think, be illustrated by this
seem to lead to an absurdity or a contra similitude.
diction. It may be said, that every judg An artist, suppose a carpenter, cannot
ment is a mental affirmation or negation. work in his art without tools, and these
If, therefore, some previous exercise of tools must be made by art. The exercise
judgment be necessary to understaud what of the art, therefore, is necessary to make
is meant by affirmation or negation, the the tools, and the tools are necessary to the
exercise of judgment must go before any exercise of the art. There is the same
judgment which is absurd. appearance of contradiction, as in what I
In like manner, every judgment may be have advanced concerning the2 necessity
E of
[309,510]
418 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essay v1.
some degree of judgment, in order to form but to some other faculty which the child
clear and distinct conceptions of things. has not yet attained.
These are the tools we must use in judging First, then, the man can easily distin
and in reasoning, and without them must guish the body from the surface which
make very bungling work; yet these tools terminates it; this the child cannot do.
cannot be made without some exercise of Secondly, The man can perceive that this
judgment [511] surface is made up of six planes of the same
The necessity of some degree of judg figure and magnitude; the child cannot
ment in forming accurate and distinct no discover this. Thirdly, The man perceives
tions of things will farther appear, if we that each of these planes has four equal
consider attentively what notions we can sides and four equal angles; and that the
form, without any aid of judgment, of the opposite sides of each plane and the oppo
objects of sense, of the operations of our site planes are parallel.
own minds, or of the relations of things. It will surely be allowed, that a man of
To begin with the objects of sense. It ordinary judgment may observe all this in
is acknowledged, on all hands, that the first a cube which he makes an object of con
notions we have of sensible objects are got templation, and takes time to consider;
by the external senses only, and probably that he may give the name of a square to
before judgment is brought forth; but these a plane terminated by four equal sides and
first notions are neither simple, nor are four equal angles; and the name of a cube
they accurate and distinct: they are gross to a solid terminated by six equal squares:
and indistinct, and, like the chaos, a rudis all this is nothing else but analysing the
indigestaque moles. Before we can have figure of the object presented to his senses
any distinct notion of this mass, it must be into its simplest elements, and again com
analysed; the heterogeneous parts must be pounding it of those elements.
separated in our conception, and the simple By this analysis and composition two
elements, which before lay hid in the com effects are produced. First, From the one
mon mass, must first be distinguished, and complex object which his senses presented,
then put together into one whole. though one of the most simple the senses
In this way it is that we form distinct can present, he educes many simple and
notions even of the objects of sense; but distinct notions of right lines, angles, plain
this process of analysis and composition, by surface, solid, equality, parallelism; notions
habit, becomes so easy, and is performed which the child has not yet faculties to
so readily, that we are apt to overlook it, attain. Secondly, When he considers the
and to impute the distinct notion we have cube as compounded of these elements, put
formed of the object to the senses alone; together in a certain order, he has them,
and this we are the more prone to do and not before, a distinct and scientific
because, when once we have distinguished notion of a cube. The child neither con
the sensible qualities of the object from ceives those elements, nor in what order
one another, the sense gives testimony to they must be put together in order to make
each of them. a cube; and, therefore, has no accurate
You perceive, for instance, an object notion of a cube which can make it a sub
white, round, and a foot in diameter. Iject of reasoning. [513]
grant that you perceive all these attributes Whence I think we may conclude, that
of the object by sense; but, if you had not the notion which we have from the senses
been able to distinguish the colour from alone, even of the simplest objects of sense,
the figure, and both from the magnitude, is indistinct and incapable of being either
your senses would only have given you one described or reasoned upon, until it is ana
complex and confused notion of all these lysed into its simple elements, and con
mingled together. sidered as compounded of those elements.
A man who is able to say with under If we should apply this reasoning to more
standing, or to determine in his own mind, complex objects of sense, the conclusion
that this object is white, must have distin would be still more evident. A dog may be
guished whiteness from other attributes. taught to turn a jack, but he can never be
If he has not made this distinction, he does taught to have a distinct notion of a jack.
not understand what he says. [512] He sees every part as well as a man ; but
Suppose a cube of brass to be presented the relation of the parts to one another
at the same time to a child of a year old and to the whole, he has not judgment to
and to a man. The regularity of the figure comprehend.
will attract the attention of both. Both A distinct notion of an object, even of
have the senses of sight and of touch in sense, is never got in an instant; but the
equal perfection; and, therefore, if any sense performs its office in an instant. Time
thing be discovered in this object by the is not required to see it better, but to analyse
man, which cannot be discovered by the it, to distinguish the different parts, and their
child, it must be owing, not to the senses, relation to one another and to the whole.
[511–513]
-----------------------"
cHAP. 1.] OF JUDGMENT IN GENERAL. 419
Hence it is that, when any vehement even to trample upon mathematical demon
passion or emotion hinders the cool applica stration. [515]
tion of judgment, we get no distinct notion The fundamental articles of his system
of an object, even though the sense be long are, that all the perceptions of the human
directed to it. A man who is put into a mind are either impressions or ideas, and
panic, by thinking he sees a ghost, may that ideas are only faint copies of impres
stare at it long without having any distinct sions. The idea of a right line, therefore, is
notion of it; it is his understanding, and only a faint copy of some line that has been
not his sense, that is disturbed by his horror. seen, or felt by touch; and the faint copy
If he can lay that aside, judgment immedi cannot be more perfect than the original.
ately enters upon its office, and examines Now of such right lines, it is evident that
the length and breadth, the colour, and the axioms of geometry are not precisely
£ and distance of the object. Of these, true; for two lines that are straight to our
while his panic lasted, he had no distinct sight or touch may include a space, or they
notion, though his eyes were open all the may meet in more points than one. If,
time. therefore, we cannot form any notion of a
When the eye of sense is open, but that straight line more accurate than that which
of judgment shut by a panic, or any violent we have from the senses of sight and touch,
emotion that engrosses the mind, we see geometry has no solid foundation. If, on
things confusedly, and probably much in the the other hand, the geometrical axioms are
same manner that brutes and perfect idiots precisely true, the idea of a right line is not
#514
and infants before the use of judgment. copied from any impression of sight or touch,
but must have a different origin and a more
#. are, therefore, notions of the objects perfect standard.
of sense which are gross and indistinct, and As the geometrician, by reflecting only
there are others that are distinct and scienti upon the extension and figure of matter,
fic. The former may be got from the senses forms a set of notions more accurate and
alone, but the latter cannot be obtained with scientific than any which the senses exhi
out some degree of judgment. bit, so the natural philosopher, reflecting
The clear and accurate notions which upon other attributes of matter, forms
geometry presents to us of a point, a right another set, such as those of density, quan
line, an angle, a square, a circle, of ratios tity of matter, velocity, momentum, fluidity,
direct and inverse, and others of that kind, elasticity, centres of gravity, and of oscilla
can find no admittance into a mind that has tion. These notions are accurate and
not some degree of judgment. They are scientific; but they cannot enter into a
not properly ideas of the senses, nor are mind that has not some degree of judg
they got by compounding ideas of the ment, nor can we make them intelligible to
senses, but by analysing the ideas or no children, until they have some ripeness of
tions we get by the senses into their simplest understanding.
elements, and again combining these ele In navigation, the notions of latitude,
ments into various accurate and elegant longitude, course, leeway, cannot be made
forms, which the senses never did nor can intelligible to children; and so it is with
exhibit. regard to the terms of every science, and
Had Mr Hume attended duly to this, it of every art about which we can reason.
ought to have prevented a verybold attempt, They have had their five senses as perfect
which he has prosecuted through fourteen as men for years before they are capable
pages of his “Treatise of Human Nature,” of distinguishing, comparing, and perceiv
to prove that geometry is founded upon ideas ing the relations of things, so as to be able
that are not exact, and axioms that are not to form such notions. They acquire the
precisely true. intellectual powers by a slow progress, and
A mathematician might be tempted to by imperceptible degrees; and by means
think that the man who seriously under of them, learn to form distinct and accurate
takes this has no great acquaintance with notions of things, which the senses could
geometry; but I apprehend it is to be im never have imparted. [516]
puted to another cause, to a zeal for his own Having said so much of the notions we
system. We see that even men of genius get from the senses alone of the objects of
may be drawn into strange paradoxes, by sense, let us next consider what notions we
an attachment to a favourite idol of the can have from consciousness alone of the
understanding, when it demands so costly a operations of our minds.
sacrifice. Mr Locke very properly calls conscious
We Protestants think that the devotees ness an internal sense. It gives the like
of the Roman Church pay no small tribute immediate knowledge of things in the mind
to her authority when they renounce their that is, of our own thoughts and feelings
five senses in obedience to her decrees. Mr as the senses give us of things external.
Hume's devotion to his system carries him There is this difference, however, that an
[514–516] 2 E 2
external object may be at rest, and the tion to that which is employed about the
sense may be employed about it for some operations of our minds, without any
time. But the objects of consciousness authority, as I think, from custom, the
are never at rest: the stream of thought arbiter of language. For, surely, I may
flows like a river, without stopping a mo reflect upon what I have seen or heard, as
ment; the whole train of thought passes in well as upon what I have thought." The
succession under the eye of consciousness, word, in its proper and common meaning,
which is always employed about the present. is equally applicable to objects of sense,
But is it consciousness that analyses com and to objects of consciousness.t. He has
plex operations, distinguishes their different likewise confounded reflection with con
ingredients, and combines them in distinct sciousness, and seems not to have been
parcels under general names? This surely aware that they are different powers, and
is not the work of consciousness, nor can it appear at very different periods of life:
be performed without reflection," recollect If that eminent philosopher had been
ing and judging of what we were conscious aware of these mistakes about the meaning
of, and distinctly remember. This reflec of the word reflection, he would, I think,
tion does not appear in children. Of all have seen that, as it is by reflection upon
the powers of the mind, it seems to be of the operations of our own minds that we
the latest growth, whereas consciousness is can form any distinct and accurate notions
coeval with the earliest. H. of them, and not by consciousness without
Consciousness, being a kind of internal reflection, so it is by reflection upon the
sense, can no more give us distinct and objects of sense, and not by the senses
accurate notions of the operations of our without reflection, that we can form dis
minds, than the external senses can give tinct notions of them. Reflection upon any
of external objects. Reflection upon the thing, whether external or internal, makes
operations of our minds is the same kind of it an object of our intellectual powers, hy
operation with that by which we form dis which we survey it on all sides, and form
tinct notions of external objects. They such judgments about it as appear to be
differ not in their nature, but in this only, just and true.
that one is employed about external, and I proposed, in the third place, to consi
the other about internal objects; and both der our notions of the relations of things:
may, with equal propriety, be called reflec and here I think, that, without judg
tion. [517]
Mr Locke has restricted the word reflec
ment,
tions,
we cannot have any notion of - -
#
here are two ways in which we get the
* See above, p. 2.2, a, note *.-H. notion of relations. The first is, by com
t See above, p.239, b-As a corollary of this truth, paring the related objects, when we have
Mr Stewart makes the following observations, in
which he is supported by every competent authority before had the conception of both. By this
in education. The two northern universities have comparison, we perceive the relation, either
long withdrawn themselves from the reproach of immediately, or by a process of reasoning.
placing Physics last in their curriculum of arts. In
that of Edinburgh, no order is prescribed; but in St That my foot is longer than my finger, I
Andrew's and Glasgow, the class of Physics still stands perceive immediately; and that three is
after those of Mental Philosophy. This absurdity is, the half of six. This immediate perception
it is to be observed, altogether of a modern intro.
duction. For, when our Scottish universities were is immediate and intuitive judgment. That
founded, and long after, the philosophy of mind was the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle
taught by the Professor of Physics. “I apprehend,”
says Mr Stewart, “that the study of the mind should are equal, I perceive by a process of reason
form the last branch of the cducation of youth ; an ing, in which it will be acknowledged there
order which nature herself seems to point out, by is judgment.
what I have already remarked with respect to the
developement of our faculties. After the under. Another way in which we get the notion
standing is well stored with particular facts, and of relations (which seems not to have occur
has been conversant with particular scientific pur
suits, it will be enabled to speculate concerning its red to Mr Locke) is, when, by attention to
own powers with additional advantage, and will run one of the related objects, we perceive or
no hazard in indulging too far in such inquiries. judge that it must, from its nature, have a
Nothing can be more absurd, on this as well as on
many other accounts, than the common practice certain relation to something else, which
which is followed in our universities, [in some only,] before, perhaps, we never thought of; and
of beginning a course of philosophical education with thus our attention to one of the related ob
the study of Logic. If this order were completely re
versed; and if the study of Logic were delayed till
after the mind of the student was well stored with * See note before last, and note at p. 347, b.-H.
particular facts in Physics, in Chemistry, in Natural f Mr Stewart makes a curious mistatement of the
and Civil History, his attention might be led with meaning attached by Reid to the word Reflection, if
the most important advantage, and without any dan this passage and others are taken into account.-See
ger to his power of observation, to an examination Elements, I. p. 106, note t.-H.
of his own faculties, which, besides opening to him # Consciousness and Reflection cannot be analysed
a new and pleasing field of speculation, would enable into different powers. Reflection is only, in 1-ocke's
him to form an estimate of his own powers, of the meaning of the word, (and this is the more correct.)
£ he has made, of the habits he has formed
and of the farther improvements of which his mind
Consciousness, concentrated by an act of Will on the
haenomena of mind-i.e., internal Attention; in
is susceptible.”-H. eid's, what is it but Attention in general *-H.
[517]
CHAP. II.] OF COMMON SENSE. 42]
jects produces the notion of a correlate, and

of a certain relation between them. [518] CHAPTER II.
Thus, when I attend to colour, figure,
weight, I cannot help judging these to be of comMoN sexsk."
qualities which cannot exist without a sub
ject; that is, something which is coloured, TiE word sense, in common language,
figured, heavy. If I had not perceived such seems to have a different meaning from that
things to be qualities, I should never have which it has in the writings of philosophers;
had any notion of their subject, or of their and those different meanings are apt to be
relation to it. confounded, and to occasion embarrassment
By attending to the operations of think and error.
ing, memory, reasoning, we perceive or Not to go back to ancient philosophy upon
judge that there must be something which this point, modern philosophers consider
thinks, remembers, and reasons, which we sense as a power that has nothing to do with
call the mind. When we attend to any judgment. Sense they consider as the power
change that happens in Nature, judgment by which we receive certain ideas or im
informs us that there must be a cause of pressions from objects; and judgment as
this change, which had power to produce the power by which we compare those
it; and thus we get the notions of cause ideas, and perceive their necessary agree
and effect, and of the relation between ments and disagreements. [520]
them. When we attend to body, we per The external senses give us the idea of
ceive that it cannot exist without space; colour, figure, sound, and other qualities of
hence we get the notion of space, (which is body, primary or secondary. Mr Locke
neither an object of sense nor of conscious gave the name of an internal sense to con
ness,) and of the relation which bodies sciousness, because by it we have the ideas
have to a certain portion of unlimited space, of thought, memory, reasoning, and other
as their place. operations of our own minds. Dr Hutche
I apprehend, therefore, that all our no son of Glasgow, conceiving that we have
tions of relations may more properly be simple and original ideas which cannot be
ascribed to judgment as their source and imputed either to the external senses or to
origin, than to any other power of the consciousness, introduced other internal
mind. We must first perceive relations senses; such as the sense of harmony, the
by our judgment, before we can conceive sense of beauty, and the moral sense.
them without judging of them; as we must Ancient philosophers also spake of internal
first perceive colours by sight, before we senses, of which memory was accounted one.
can conceive them without seeing them. I But all these senses, whether external or
think Mr Locke, when he comes to speak internal, have been represented by philo
of the ideas of relations, does not say that sophers as the means of furnishing our
they are ideas of sensation or reflection, minds with ideas, without including any
but only that they terminate in, and are kind of judgment. Dr Hutcheson defines
concerned about, ideas of sensation or re a sense to be a determination of the mind
fleetion. [519] to receive any idea from the presence of an
The notions of unity and number are so object independent on our will.
abstract, that it is impossible they should “By this term (sense) philosophers, in
enter into the mind until it has some degree general, have denominated those faculties
of judgment. We see with what difficulty, in consequence of which we are liable to
and how slowly, children learn to use, with feelings relative to ourselves only, and from
understanding, the names even of small which they have not pretended to draw any
numbers, and how they exult in this acqui conclusions concerning the nature of things;
sition when they have attained it. Every whereas truth is not relative, but absolute
number is conceived by the relation which and real.–(Dr Priestly’s “Examination of
it bears to unity, or to known combinations Dr Reid,” &c., p. 123.)
of units; and upon that account, as well On the contrary, in common language,
as on account of its abstract nature, all sense always implies judgment. A man of
distinct notions of it require some degree sense is a man of judgment. Good sense
of judgment. is good judgment. Nonsense is what is
In its proper place, I shall have occasion evidently contrary to right judgment. Com
to shew that judgment is an ingredient in mon sense is that degree of judgment which
all determinations of taste, in all moral is common to men with whom we can con
determinations, and in many of our pas verse and transact business.
sions and affections. So that this opera Seeing and hearing, by philosophers, are
tion, after we come to have any exercise of called senses, because we have ideas by
judgment, mixes with most of the operations
of our minds, and, in analysing them, cannot * On Common Sense, name and thing, see Note A.
be overlooked without confusion and error.
[518–520]
* Oft have you hinted to your brother Peer,
them; by the vulgar they are called senses, A certain truth, which many buy too dear:
because we judge by them. We judge of Something there is more needful than expense,
colours by the eye; of sounds by the ear: And something previous ev'n to taste-'tis sense.
Good sense, which only is the gift of heaven,
of beauty and deformity by taste; of right And, though no science, fairly worth the seven;
and wrong in conduct, by our moral sense A light which in yourself you must perceive,
or conscience. [52]] Jones and Le Notre have it not to give.”
Sometimes philosophers, who represent This inward light or sense is given by
it as the sole province of sense to furnish heaven to different persons in different de
us with ideas, fall unawares into the popu grees. There is a certain degree of it which
lar opinion that they are judging faculties. is necessary to our being subjects of law and
Thus Locke, Book IV. chap. 2:—“And of government, capable of managing our own
this, (that the quality or accident of colour affairs, and answerable for our conduct
doth really exist, and hath a being without towards others : this is called common
me,) the greatest assurance I can possibly sense, because it is common to all men with
have, and to which my faculties can attain, whom we can transact business, or call to
is the testimony of my eyes, which are the account for their conduct.
proper and sole judges of this thing.” The laws of all civilised nations distin
This popular meaning of the word sense guish those who have this gift of heaven,
is not peculiar to the English language. from those who have it not. The last may
The corresponding words in Greek, Latin, have rights which ought not to be violated,
and, I believe,in all the European languages, but, having no understanding in themselves
have the same latitude. The Latin words to direct their actions, the laws appoint them
sentire, sententia, sensa," sensus, from the to be guided by the understanding of others.
last of which the English word sense is It is easily discerned by its effects in men's
borrowed, express judgment or opinion, and actions, in their speeches, and even in their
are applied indifferently to objects of exter looks; and when it is made a question
mal sense, of taste, of morals, and of the whether a man has this natural gift or not,
understanding. a judge or a jury, upon a short conversation
I cannot pretend to assign thereason why with him, can, for the most part, determine
a word, which is no term of art, which is the question with great assurance.
familiar in common conversation, should The same degree of understanding which
have so different a meaning in philosophical makes a man capable of acting with com
writings. I shall only observe, that the mon prudence in the conduct of life, makes
philosophical meaning corresponds perfectly him capable of discovering what is true and
with the account which Mr Locke and other what is false in matters that are self-evident,
modern philosophers give of judgment. For, and which he distinctly apprehends. [523]
if the sole province of the senses, external All knowledge, and all science, must be
and internal, be to furnish the mind with built upon principles that are self-evident;
the ideas about which we judge and reason, and of such principles every man who has
it seems to be a natural consequence, that common sense is a competent judge, when
the sole province of judgment should be to he conceives them distinctly. Hence it is,
compare those ideas, and to perceive their that disputes very often terminate in an
necessary relations. appeal to common sense.
These two opinions seem to be so con While the parties agree in the first prin
nected, that one may have been the cause ciples on which their arguments are ground
of the other. I apprehend, however, that, ed, there is room for reasoning; but when
if both be true, there is no room left for anyone denies what to the other appears too
knowledge or judgment, either of the real evident to need or to admit of proof, rea
existence of contingent things, or of their soning seems to be at an end; an appeal is
contingent relations. made to common sense, and each party is
To return to the popular meaning of the left to enjoy his own opinion.
word sense. I believe it would be much There seems to be no remedy for this,
more difficult to find good authors who never nor any way left to discuss such appeals,
use it in that meaning, than to find such unless the decisions of common sense can
as do. [522] be brought into a code in which all reason
We may take Mr Pope as good authority able men shall acquiesce. This, indeed, if
for the meaning of an English word. He it be possible, would be very desirable, and
uses it often, and, in his “Epistle to the would supply a desideratum in logic; and
Earl of Burlington,” has made a little de why should it be thought impossible that
scant upon it. reasonable men should agree in things that
are self-evident?
All that is intended in this chapter is to
* What does sensa mean? Is it an erratum, or explain the meaning of common sense, that
does he refer to sensa, once only, I believe, employed
by Cicero, and interpreted by Nonius Marcellus, as it may not be treated, as it has been by
“quae sentiuntur?”-H. some, as a new principle, or as a word with
[521-523]
cHAP. II.] OF COMMON SENSE. 423
out any meaning. I have endeavoured to It is well known that Lord Shaftesbury
shew that sense, in its most common, and gave to one of his Treatises the title of
therefore its most proper meaning, signifies * Sensus Communis; an Essay on the
judgment, though philosophers often use it Freedom of Wit and Humour, in a Letter
in another meaning. From this it is natural to a Friend;” in which he puts his friend in
to think that common sense should mean mind of a free conversation with some of
common judgment; and so it really does. their friends on the subjects of morality
What the precise limits are which divide and religion. Amidst the different opinions
common judgment from what is beyond it started and maintained with great life and
on the one hand, and from what falls short ingenuity, one or other would, every now and
of it on the other, may be difficult to de then, take the liberty to appeal to common
termine; and men may agree in the mean sense. Every one allowed the appeal; no
ing of the word who have different opinions one would offer to call the authority of the
about those limits, or who even never court in question, till a gentleman whose
thought of fixing them. This is as intel good understanding was never yet brought
ligible as, that all Englishmen should mean in doubt, desired the company, very gravely,
the same thing by the county of York, that they would tell him what common
though perhaps not a hundredth part of Sense was.
them can point out its precise limits. [524] “If,” said he, “ by the word sense, we
Indeed, it seems to me, that common were to understand opinion and judgment,
sense is as unambiguous a word and as well and by the word common, the generality or
understood as the county of York. We any considerable part of mankind, it would
finditin innumerable places in good writers; be hard to discover where the subject of
we hear it on innumerable occasions in con common sense could lie; for that which
versation; and, as far as I am able to judge, was according to the sense of one part of
always in the same meaning. And this is mankind, was against the sense of another.
Probably the reason why it is so seldom And if the majority were to determine com
defined or explained. mon sense, it would change as often as
Dr Johnson, in the authorities he gives, men changed. That in religion, common
to shew that the word sense signifies under sense was as hard to determine as catholic
standing, soundness of faculties, strength of or orthodor. What to one was absurdity,
natural reason, quotes Dr Bentley for what to another was demonstration.
may be called a definition of common sense, “In policy, if plain British or Dutch
though probably not intended for that pur sense were right, Turkish and French must
pose, but mentioned accidentally: “God certainly be wrong. And as mere non
hath endowed mankind with power and sense as passive obedience seemed, we
abilities, which we call natural light and found it to be the common sense of a great
reason, and common sense.” party amongst ourselves, a greater party
It is true that common sense is a popular in Europe, and perhaps the greatest part
and not a scholastic word; and by most of of all the world besides. As for morals,
those who have treated systematically of the difference was still wider; for even the
the powers of the understanding, it is only philosophers could never agree in one and
occasionally mentioned, as it is by other the same system. And some even of our
writers. But I recollect two philosophical most admired modern philosophers had
writers, who are exceptions to this remark. fairly told us that virtue and vice had no
One is Buffier, who treated largely of com other law or measure than mere fashion and
mon sense, as a principle of knowledge, vogue.” [526] -
above fifty years ago. The other is Bishop This is the substance of the gentleman's
Berkeley, who, I think, has laid as much speech, which, I apprehend, explains the
stress upon common sense, in opposition to meaning of the word perfectly, and contains
the doctrines of philosophers, as any philo all £ been said or can be said against
sopher that has come after him. If the the authority of common sense, and the
reader chooses to look back to Essay II. propriety of appeals to it.
chap. 10, he will be satisfied of this, from As there is no mention of any answer
the quotations there made for another pur immediately made to this speech, we might
pose, which it is unnecessary here to repeat. be apt to conclude that the noble author
Men rarely ask what common sense is; adopted the sentiments of the intelligent
because every man believes himself pos gentleman whose speech he recites:... But
sessed of it, and would take it for an imput the contrary is manifest, from the title of
ation upon his understanding to be thought Sensus Communis given to his Essay, from
unacquainted with it. Yet I remember his frequent use of the word, and from the
two very eminent authors who have put whole tenor of the Essay.
this question; and it is not improper to hear The author appears to have a double in
their sentiments upon a subjectso frequently tention in that Essay, corresponding to the
mentioned, and so rarely canvassed. [525] double title prefixed to it. One intention
[524–526]
is, to justify the use of wit, humour, and understanding would, at first sight, perceive
ridicule, in discussing annong friends the to be so; and then goes on to this purpose.
gravest subjects. “I can very well sup “What is it that makes these questions
pose,” says he, “men may be frighted ridiculous * Wherein does this ridicule
out of their wits; but I have no apprehen precisely consist? It will, perhaps, be
sion they should be laughed out of them. replied, that it consists in this, that they
I can hardly imagine that, in a pleasant shock common sense. But what is this
way, they should ever be talked out of their same common sense ? It is not the first
love for society, or reasoned out of humanity notions that all men have equally of the
and common sense.” same things. [528] This common sense,
The other intention, signified by the title which is always and in all places the same;
Sensus Communis, is carried on hand in which prevents inquiry; which makes in
hand with the first, and is to shew that quiry in some cases ridiculous; which, in
common sense is not so vague and uncertain stead of inquiring, makes a man laugh
a thing as it is represented to be in the whether he will or not; which puts it out
sceptical speech before recited. “I will of a man's power to doubt: this sense,
try,” says he, “what certain knowledge or which only waits to be consulted—which
assurance of things may be recovered in shews itself at the first glance, and imme
that very way, (to wit, of humour,) by diately discovers the evidence or the absurd
which all certainty, you thought, was lost, ity of a question—is not this the same that
and an endless scepticism introduced.”[527] I call my ideas?
He gives some criticisms upon the word “Behold, then, those ideas or general
sensus communis in Juvenal, Horace, and notions, which it is not in my power either
Seneca; and, after shewing, in a facetious to contradict or examine, and by which I
way throughout the treatise, that the fun examine and decide in every case, insomuch
damental principles of morals, of politics, of that I laugh instead of answering, as often
criticism, and of every branch of knowledge, as anything is proposed to me, which is evi
are the dictates of common sense, he sums dently contrary to what these immutable
up the whole in these words:– “That some ideas represent.”
moral and philosophical truths there are I shall only observe upon this passage,
so evident in themselves that it would be that the interpretation it gives of Des
easier to imagine half mankind run mad, Cartes' criterion of truth, whether just or
and joined precisely in the same species of not, is the most intelligible and the most
folly, than to admit anything as truth favourable I have met with.
which should be advanced against such I beg leave to mention one passage from
natural knowledge, fundamental reason, Cicero, and to add two or three from late
and common sense.” And, on taking leave, writers, which shew that this word is not
he adds:– “And now, my friend, should become obsolete, nor has changed its
you find I had moralised in any tolerable meaning.
manner, according to common sense, and “De Oratore,” lib. 3.-“Omnes enim
without canting, I should be satisfied with tacito quodam sensu, sine ulla arte aut
my performance.” ratione, in artibus ac rationibus, recta ac
Another eminent writer who has put the prava dijudicant. Idque cum faciant in
question what common sense is, is Fenelon, picturis, et in signis, et in aliis operibus, ad
the famous Archbishop of Cambray. quorum intelligentiam a natura minus hab
That ingenious and pious author, having ent instrumenti, tum multo ostendunt magis
had an early prepossession in favour of the in verborum, numerorum, vocumque judi
Cartesian philosophy, made an attempt to cio; quod ea sint in communibus infixa
establish, on a sure foundation, the meta sensibus; neque earum rerum quemquam
hysical arguments which Des Cartes had funditus natura voluit expertem.”
invented to prove the being of the Deity. “Hume's “Essays and Treatises,” vol.
For this purpose, he begins with the Carte I. p. 5.—“But a philosopher who proposes
sian doubt. He proceeds to find out the only to represent the common sense of
truth of his own existence, and then to ex mankind in more beautiful and more engag
amine wherein the evidence and certainty ing colours, if by accident he commits a
of this and other such primary truths con mistake, goes no farther, but, renewing his
sisted. This, according to Cartesian prin appeal to common sense, and the natural
ciples, he places in the clearness and dis sentiments of the mind, returns into the
tinctness of the ideas. On the contrary, right path, and secures himself from any
he places the absurdity of the contrary pro dangerous illusion.” [529]
positions, in their being repugnant to his ume’s “Enquiry concerning the Prin
clear and distinct ideas. ciples of Morals,” p. 2.-“Those who have
To illustrate this, he gives various ex refused the reality of moral distinctions may
amples of questions manifestly absurd and be ranked among the disingenuous dis
ridiculous, which every man of common putants. The only way of converting an
{527–529]
CHAP. II.] OF COMMON SENSE. 425
antagonist of this kind is to leave him to together in speech and in writing, they are
himself: for, finding that nobody keeps up inseparable in their nature.
the controversy with him, it is probable he We ascribe to reason two offices, or two
will at last, of himself, from mere weariness, degrees. The first is to judge of things
come over to the side of common sense and self-evident; the second to draw conclusions
reason.” that are not self-evident from those that
Priestley's “ Institutes,” Preliminary are. The first of these is the province, and
Essay, vol. i. p. 27-‘‘Because common the sole province, of common sense; and,
sense is a sufficient guard against many therefore, it coincides with reason in its
errors in religion, it seems to have been whole extent, and is only another name for
taken for granted that that common sense one branch or one degree of reason. Per
is a sufficient instructor also, whereas in haps it may be said, Why then should you
fact, without positive instruction, men would give it a particular name, since it is acknow
naturally have been mere savages with ledged to be only a degree of reason ? It
respect to religion; as, without similar in would be a sufficient answer to this, Why
struction, they would be savages with re do you abolish a name which is to be found
spect to the arts of life and the sciences. in the language of all civilized nations, and
Common sense can only be compared to a has acquired a right by prescription ? Such
judge; but what can a judge do without an attempt is equally foolish and ineffectual.
evidence and proper materials from which Every wise man '' be apt to think that
to form a judgment?” a name which is found in all languages as
Priestley's “Examination of Dr Reid,” far back as we can trace them, is not with
&c. page 127.-“But should we, out of out some use. 1531]
complaisance, admit that what has hitherto But there is an obvious reason why this
been called judgment may be called sense, degree of reason should have a name ap
it is making too free with the established propriated to it; and that is, that, in the
signification of words to call it common greatest part of mankind, no other degree of
sense, which, in common acceptation, has reason is to be found. It is this degree
long been appropriated to a very different that entitles them to the denomination of
thing—viz., to that capacity for judging of reasonable creatures. It is this degree of
common things that persons of middling reason, and this only, that makes a man
capacities are capable of.” Page 129.—“I capable of managing his own affairs, and
should, therefore, expect that, if a man was answerable for his conduct towards others.
so totally deprived of common sense as not There is therefore the best reason why it
to be able to distinguish truth from false should have a name appropriated to it.
hood in one case, he would be equally in These two degrees of reason differ in
capable of distinguishing it in another.” other respects, which would be sufficient to
[530] entitle them to distinct names.
From this cloud of testimonies, to which The first is purely the gift of Heaven.
hundreds might be added, I apprehend, And where Heaven has not given it, no
that whatever censure is thrown upon those education can supply the want. The se
who have spoke of common sense as a prin cond is learned by practice and rules, when
ciple of knowledge, or who have appealed to the first is not wanting. A man who has
it in matters that are self-evident, will fall common sense may be taught to reason.
light, when there are so many to share in But, if he has not that gift, no teaching will
it. Indeed, the authority of this tribunal make him able either to judge of first prin
is too sacred and venerable, and has pre ciples or to reason from them.
scription too long in its favour to be now I have only this farther to observe, that
wisely called in question. Those who are the province of common sense is more ex
disposed to do so, may remember the shrewd tensive in refutation than in confirmation.
saying of Mr Hobbes—“When reason is A conclusion drawn by a train of just rea
against a man, a man will be against rea soning from true principles cannot possibly
son.” This is equally applicable to com contradict any decision of common sense,
mon sense. because truth will always be consistent
From the account I have given of the with itself. Neither can such a conclu
meaning of this term, it is easy to judge sion receive any confirmation from com
both of the proper use and of the abuse mon sense, because it is not within its juris
of it. diction.
It is absurd to conceive that there can be But it is possible that, by setting out
any opposition between reason and com from false principles, or by an error in
mon sense." It is indeed the first-born of reasoning, a man may be led to a conclu
Reason; and, as they are commonly joined sion that contradicts the decisions of com
mon sense. In this case, the conclusion
* See above, p. 100, b, note t; and Mr Stewart's is within the jurisdiction of common sense,
* Elements," ii. p. 92.-H. though the reasoning on which it was
[530, 531]
grounded be not; and a man of common calling knowledge a faculty, any more than
sense may fairly reject the conclusion with for calling opinion a faculty.
out being able to shew the error of the rea Neither do I think that knowledge is
soning that led to it. [532] confined within the narrow limits which
Thus, if a mathematician, by a process Mr Locke assigns to it; because the far
of intricate demonstration, in which some greatest part of what all men call human
false step was made, should be brought to knowledge, is in things which neither ad
this conclusion, that two quantities, which mit of intuitive nor of demonstrative proof.
are both equal to a third, are not equal to I have all along used the word judgment
each other, a man of common sense, with in a more extended sense than Mr Locke
out pretending to be a judge of the demon does in the passage above-mentioned. I
stration, is well entitled to reject the con understand by it that operation of mind by
clusion, and to pronounce it absurd. which we determine, concerning anything
that may be expressed by a proposition,
whether it be true or false. Every propo
CHAPTER III. sition is either true or false; so is every
judgment. A proposition may be simply
sENTIMENTs of PHILosopherts CoNCERNING conceived without judging of it. But when
JUDGMENT. there is not only a conception of the pro
position, but a mental affirmation or nega
A DIFFERENCE about the meaning of a tion, an assent or dissent of the understand
word ought not to occasion disputes among ing, whether weak or strong, that is judg
philosophers; but it is often very proper to ment.
take notice of such differences, in order to I think that, since the days of Aristotle,
prevent verbal disputes. There are, in logicians have taken the word in that sense,
deed, no words in language more liable to and other writers, for the most part,
ambiguity than those by which we express though there are other meanings, which
the operations of the mind; and the most there is no danger of confounding with this.
candid and judicious may sometimes be led [534]
into different opinions about their precise We may take the authority of Dr Isaac
meaning. atts, as a logician, as a man who under
I hinted before what I take to be a pecu stood English, and who had a just esteem
liarity in Mr Locke with regard to the of Mr Locke's Essay. Logic. #: page
meaning of the word judgment, and men 5–“Judgment is that operation of the
tioned what, I apprehend, may have led mind, wherein we join two or more ideas
him into it. But let us hear himself, Essay, together by one affirmation or negation;
book iv. chap. 14:-“The faculty which that is, we either affirm or deny this to be
God has given to man to supply the want that. So: this tree is high; that horse is not
of clear and certain knowledge, where that swift; the mind of man is a thinking being;
cannot be had, is judgment; whereby the mere matter has no thought belonging to it;
mind takes its ideas to agree or disagree; God is just; good men are often miserable in
or, which is the same, any proposition to this world, a righteous governor will make
be true or false, without perceiving a de a difference betwixt the evil and the good;
monstrative evidence in the proofs. Thus which sentences are the effect of judgment,
the mind has two faculties conversant about and are called propositions.” And, Part II.
truth and falsehood. First, Knowledge, chap. ii. § 9-‘‘The evidence of sense is,
whereby it certainly perceives, and is un when we frame a proposition according to
doubtedly satisfied of, the agreement or the dictate of any of our senses. So we
disagreement of any ideas. Secondly, judge that grass is green; that a trumpet
Judgment, which is the putting ideas to gives a pleasant sound; that fire burnswood;
gether, or separating them from one an water is soft ; and iron hard.”
other in the mind, when their certain agree In this meaning, judgment extends to
ment or disagreement is not perceived, but every kind of evidence, probable or certain
presumed to be so.” [533] and to every degree of assent or dissent.
Knowledge, I think, sometimes signifies It extends to all knowledge as well as to all
things known; sometimes that act of the opinion; with this difference only, that in
mind by which we know them. And in like knowledge it is more firm and steady, like
manner opinion sometimes signifies things a house founded upon a rock. In opinion
believed; sometimes the act of the mind it stands upon a weaker foundation, and is
by which we believe them. But judgment more liable to be shaken and overturned.
is the faculty which is exercised in both These differences about the meaning of
these acts of the mind. In knowledge, we words are not mentioned as if truth was on
judge without doubting; in opinion, with one side and error on the other, but as an
some mixture of doubt. But I know no apology for deviating, in this instance, from
authority, besides that of Mr Locke, for the £ of Mr Locke, which is, for
[532–534]
cHAP. III.] SENTIMENTS CONCERNING JUDGMENT. 427
the most part, accurate and distinct; and object of the understanding when a man
because attention to the different meanings thinks, or whatever the mind can be em
that are put upon words by different authors, ployed about in thinking. Here there is no
is the best way to prevent our mistaking room left for objects of the mind that are
verbal differences for real differences of not ideas. The same definition is often
opinion. repeated throughout the Essay. Some
The common theory concerning ideas times, indeed, the word immediate is added,
naturally leads to a theory concerning as in the passage now under consideration;
judgment, which may be a proper test of its but there is no intimation made that it ought
truth; for, as they are necessarily con to be understood when it is not expressed.
nected, they must stand or fall together. Now, if it had really been his opinion that
Their connection is thus expressed by Mr there are objects of thought which are not
Locke, Book IV. chap. 1–“Since the ideas, this definition, which is the ground
mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, work of the whole Essay, would have been
hath no other immediate object but its own very improper, and apt to mislead his
ideas, which it alone does or can con reader.
template, it is evident that our knowledge is Secondly, He has never attempted to
only conversant about them. Knowledge shew how there can be objects of thought
then seems to me to be nothing but the which are not immediate objects; and,
perception of the connection and agreement, indeed, this seems impossible. For, what
or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of ever the object be, the man either thinks of
our ideas. In this alone it consists.” [535] it, or he does not. There is no medium
There can only be one objection to the between these. If he thinks of it, it is an
justice of this inference; and that is, that immediate object of thought while he thinks
the antecedent proposition from which it is of it. If he does not think of it, it is no
inferred seems to have some ambiguity; object of thought at all. Every object of
for, in the first clause of that proposition, thought, therefore, is an immediate object
the mind is said to have no other immediate of thought, and the word immediate, joined
object but its own ideas; in the second, to objects of thought, seems to be a mere
that it has no other object at all; that it expletive.
does or can contemplate ideas alone." Thirdly, Though Malebranche and Bishop
If the word immediate in the first clause Berkeley believed that we have no ideas of
be a mere expletive, and be not intended to minds, or of the operations of minds, and
limit the generality of the proposition, then that we may think and reason about them
the two clauses will be perfectly consistent, without ideas, this was not the opinion of
the second being only a repetition or expli Mr Locke. He thought that there are
cation of the first; and the inference that ideas of minds, and of their operations, as
our knowledge is only conversant about well as of the objects of sense; that the
ideas will be perfectly just and logical. mind perceives nothing but its own ideas,
But, if the word immediate in the first and that all words are the signs of ideas.
clause be intended to limit the general pro A fourth reason is, That to suppose that
position, and to imply that the mind has he intended to limit the antecedent proposi
other objects besides its own ideas, though tion by the word immediate, is to impute to
no other immediate objects, then it will not him a blunder in reasoning, which I do not
be true that it does or can contemplate ideas think Mr Locke could have committed;
alone; nor will the inference be justly for what can be a more glaring paralogism
drawn that our knowledge is only conversant than to infer that, since ideas are partly,
about ideas. though not solely, the objects of thought, it
Mr Locke must either have meant his is evident that all our knowledge is only
antecedent proposition, without any limita conversant about them. If, on the con
tion by the word immediate, or he must trary, he meant that ideas are the only ob
have meant to limit it by that word, and to jects of thought, then the conclusion drawn
signify that there are objects of the mind is perfectly just and obvious; and he might
which are not ideas. very well say, that, since it is ideas only that
The first of these suppositions appears to the mind does or can contemplate, it is evi
me most probable, for several reasons. dent that our knowledge is only conversant
[536] about them. [537]
First, Because, when he purposely de As to the conclusion itself, I have only
fines the word idea, in the introduction to to observe, that, though he extends it only to
the Essay, he says it is whatsoever is the what he calls knowledge, and not to what
* In reference to the polemic that follows, see, for he calls judgment, there is the same reason
a solution, what has been said above in regard to the for extending it to both.
ambiguity of the term object, and Note B. ln regard
to the doctrine of Ideas, as held by the philosophers, It is true of judgment, as well as of
see above, and Note C, &c.-H. knowledge, that it can only be conversant
[533–537] about objects of the mind, or about things
which the mind can contemplate. Judg idea be taken in the meaning which it had
ment, as well as knowledge, supposes the at first among the Pythagoreans and Pla
conception of the object about which we tonists, and if by knowledge be meant only
judge; and to judge of objects that never abstract and general knowledge, (which I
were nor can be objects of the mind, is evi believe Mr Locke had chiefly in his view,)
dently impossible. I think the proposition is true, that such
This, therefore, we may take for granted, knowledge consists solely in perceiving the
that, if knowledge be conversant about ideas truth of propositions whose subject and
only, because there is no other object of the predicate are ideas. [539]
mind, it must be no less certain that judg By ideas here I mean things conceived
ment is conversant about ideas only, for abstractly, without regard to their existence.
the same reason. We commonly call them abstract notions,
Mr Locke adds, as the result of his rea abstract conceptions, abstract ideas—the
soning, “Knowledge, then, seems to me to Peripatetics called them universals; and
be nothing but the perception of the con the Platonists, who knew no other ideas,
nection and agreement, or disagreement called them ideas without addition.
and repugnancy, of any of our ideas. In Such ideas are both subject and predicate
this alone it consists.” in every proposition which expresses ab
This is a very important point, not only stract knowledge.
on its own account, but on account of its The whole body of pure mathematics is
necessary connection with his system con an abstract science; and in every mathe
cerning ideas, which is such as that both matical proposition, both subject and pre
must stand or fall together; for, if there is dicate are ideas, in the senseabove explained.
any part of human knowledge which does Thus, when I say the side of a square is not
not consist in the perception of the agree commensurable to its diagonal-in this
ment or disagreement of ideas, it must fol proposition the side and the diagonal of a
low that there are objects of thought and square are the subjects, (for, being a rela
of contemplation which are not ideas. tive proposition, it must have two subjects.)
1538] A square, its side, and its diagonal, are
This point, therefore, deserves to be care ideas, or universals; they are not indivi
fully examined. With this view, let us duals, but things predicable of many indi
first attend to its meaning, which, I think, viduals. Existence is not included in their
can hardly be mistaken, though it may definition, nor in the conception we form of
need some explication. them. The predicate of the proposition is
Every point of knowledge, and every commensurable, which must be an univer
judgment, is expressed by a proposition, sal, as the predicate of every proposition is
wherein something is affirmed or denied of so. In other branches of knowledge, many
the subject of the proposition. abstract truths may be found, but, for the
By perceiving the connection or agree most part, mixed with others that are not
ment of two ideas, I conceive, is meant per abstract.
ceiving the truth of an affirmative proposi I add, that I apprehend that what is strictly
tion, of which the subject and predicate are called demonstrative evidence, is to be found
ideas. In like manner, by perceiving the in abstract knowledge only. This was the
disagreement and repugnancy of any two opinion of Aristotle, of Plato, and, I think,
ideas, I conceive is meant perceiving the of all the ancient philosophers; and I be
truth of a negative proposition, of which lieve in this they judged right. It is true,
both subject and predicate are ideas. This we often meet with demonstration in astro
I take to be the only meaning the words mony, in mechanics, and in other branches
can bear, and it is confirmed by what Mr of natural philosophy; but, I believe, we
Locke says in a passage already quoted in shall always find that such demonstrations
this chapter, that “the mind, taking its are grounded upon principles of supposi
ideas to agree or disagree, is the same as tions, which have neither intuitive nor
taking any proposition to be true or false.” demonstrative evidence. [540]
Therefore, if the definition of knowledge Thus, when we demonstrate that the
given by Mr Locke be a just one, the sub path of a projectile in vacuo is a parabola,
ject, as well as the predicate of every pro we suppose that it is acted upon with the
position, by which any point of knowledge same force and in the same direction
is expressed, must be an idea, and can be through its whole path by gravity. This is
nothing else; and the same must hold of not intuitively known, nor is it demon
every proposition by which judgment is strable; and, in the demonstration, we rea
expressed, as has been shewn above. son from the laws of motion, which are
Having ascertained the meaning of this principles not capable of demonstration,
definition of human knowledge, we are but grounded on a different kind of evidence.
next to consider how far it is just. Ideas, in the sense above explained, are
First, I would observe that, if the word creatures of the mind; they are fabricated
[538–540.]
CHAP. III.] SENTIMENTS CONCERNING JUDGMENT. 429
by its rational powers; we know their truly be affirmed. Thus, to be above fifty
nature and their essence—for they are wears of age is an attribute or idea. This
nothing more than they are conceived to attribute may be in, or affirmed of, fifty
be;—and, because they are perfectly known, different individuals, and be the same in
we can reason about them with the highest all, without division or multiplication.
degree of evidence. I think that not only every species, but
And, as they are not things that exist, every genus, higher or lower, and every
but things conceived, they neither have attribute considered abstractly, is an idea.
place nor time, nor are they liable to These are things conceived without regard to
change. existence; they are universals, and, there
When we say that they are in the mind, fore, ideas, according to the ancient mean
this can mean no more but that they are ing of that word. 1542]
conceived by the mind, or that they are It is true that, after the Platonists en
objects of thought. The act of conceiving tered into disputes with the Peripatetics, in
them is, no doubt, in the mind; the things order to defend the existence of eternal
conceived have no place, because they have ideas, they found it prudent to contract the
not existence. Thus, a circle, considered line of defence, and maintained only that
abstractly, is said figuratively to be in the there is an idea of every species of natural
mind of him that conceives it; but in no things, but not of the genera, nor of things
other sense than the city of London or the artificial. They were unwilling to multiply
kingdom of France is said to be in his beings beyond what was necessary; but
mind when he thinks of those objects. in this, I think, they departed from the
Place and time belong to finite things that genuine principles of their system.
exist, but not to things that are barely con The definition of a species is nothing
ceived. They may be objects of concep but the definition of the genus, with the
tion to intelligent beings in every place and addition of a specific difference; and the
at all times. Hence the Pythagoreans and division of things into species is the work
Platonists were led to think that they are of the mind, as well as their division into
eternal and omnipresent. If they had ex genera and classes. A species, a genus, an
istence, they must be so; for they have no order, a class, is only a combination of at
relation to any one place or time, which tributes made by the mind, and called by
they have not to every place and to every one name. There is, therefore, the same
time. reason for giving the name of idea to every
The natural prejudice of mankind, that attribute, and to every species and genus,
what we conceive must have existence, led whether higher or lower : these are only
those ancient philosophers to attribute ex more complex attributes, or combinations
istence to ideas; and by this they were led of the more simple. And, though it might
into all the extravagant and mysterious be improper, without necessity, to multiply
parts of their system. When it is purged beings which they believed to have a real
of these, I apprehend it to be the only in existence, yet, had they seen that ideas
telligible and rational system concerning are not things that exist, but things that
ideas. [54]] are conceived, they would have appre
I agree with them, therefore, that ideas hended no danger nor expense from their
are immutably the same in all times and number.
places; for this means no more but that a Simple attributes, species and genera,
circle is always a circle, and a square always lower or higher, are all things conceived
a square. without regard to existence; they are uni
I agree with them that ideas are the pat versals; they are expressed by general
terns or exemplars by which everything words; and have an equal title to be called
was made that had a beginning : for an by the name of ideas.
intelligent artificer must conceive his work I likewise agree with those ancient phi
before it is made; he makes it according to losophers that ideas are the object, and the
that conception; and the thing conceived, sole object, of science, strictly so called
before it exists, can only be an idea. that is, of demonstrative reasoning.
I agree with them that every species of And, as ideas are immutable, so their
things, considered abstractly, is an idea; agreements and disagreements, and all their
and that the idea of the species is in every relations and attributes, are immutable.
individual of the species, without division All mathematical truths are immutably
or multiplication. This, indeed, is expressed true. Like the ideas about which they are
somewhat mysteriously, according to the conversant, they have no relation to time
manner of the sect; but it may easily be or place, no dependence upon existence or
explained. change. That the angles of a plane tri
Every idea is an attribute; and it is a angle are equal to two right angles always
common way of speaking to say, that the was, and always will be, true, though no
attribute is in every subject of which it may triangle had ever existed. [543]
[541–543]
430 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS [Essaw v.
The same may be said of all abstract idea is not an object of thought, it is thought
truths: on that account they have often itself. It is the act of the mind by which
been called eternal truths; and, for the we conceive any object. And it is evident
same reason, the Pythagoreans ascribed that this could not be the meaning which
eternity to the ideas about which they are Mr Locke had in view in his definition of
conversant. They may very properly be knowledge.
called necessary truths; because it is im 2. A second meaning of the word idea is
possible they should not be true at all times that which Mr Locke gives in the intro
and in all places. duction to his Essay, when he is making an
Such is the nature of all truth that can apology for the frequent use of it –“It be
be discovered, by perceiving the agreements ing that term, I think, which serves best to
and disagreements of ideas, when we take stand for whatsoever is the object of the
that word in its primitive sense. And that understanding when a man thinks, or what
Mr Locke, in his definition of knowledge, ever it is which a man can be employed
had chiefly in his view abstract truths, we about in thinking.”
may be led to think from the examples he By this definition, indeed, everything that
gives to illustrate it. can be the object of thought is an idea.
But there is another great class of truths, The objects of our thoughts may, I think,
which are not abstract and necessary, and, be reduced to two classes.
therefore, cannot be perceived in the The first class comprehends all those
ments and disagreements of ideas. £ objects which we not only can think of, but
are all the truths we know concerning the which we believe to have a real existence:
real existence of things—the truth of our such as the Creator of all things, and all
own existence—of the existence of other his creatures that fall within our notice.
things, inanimate, animal, and rational, and [545] I can think of the sun and moon,
of their various attributes and relations. the earth and sea, and of the various animal,
These truths may be called contingent vegetable, and inanimate productions with
truths. I except only the existence and which it hath pleased the bountiful Creator
attributes of the Supreme Being, which is to enrich our globe. I can think of myself,
the only necessary truth I know regarding of my friends and uaintance. I think
existence. of the author of the Essay with highesteem.
All other beings that exist depend for These, and such as these, are objects of the
their existence, and all that belongs to it, understanding which we believe to have real
upon the will and power of the first cause: existence.
therefore, neither their existence, nor their A second class of objects of the under
nature, nor anything that befalls them, is standing which a man may be employed
necessary, but contingent. about in thinking, are things which weeither
But, although the existence of the Deity believe never to have existed, or which we
be necessary, I apprehend we can only de think of without regard to their existence.
duce it from contingent truths. The only Thus, I can think of Don Quixote, of
arguments for the existence of a Deity the Island of Laputa, of Oceana, and of
which I am able to comprehend, are ground Utopia, which I believe never to have ex
edupon the knowledge of my own existence, isted. Every attribute, every species, and
and the existence of other finite beings. every genus of things, considered abstractly,
But these are contingent truths. [544] without any regard to their existence or
I believe, therefore, that by perceiving non-existence, may be an object of the
agreements and disagreements of ideas, no understanding.
contingent truth whatsoever can be known, To this second class of objects of the
nor the real existence of anything, not even understanding, the name of idea does very
our own existence, nor the existence of a properly belong, according to the primitive
Deity, which is a necessary truth. Thus I sense of the word, and I have already con
have endeavoured to shew what knowledge sidered what knowledge does and what
may, and what cannot be attained, by per does not consist in perceiving the agree
ceiving the agreements and disagreements ments and disagreements of such ideas.
of ideas, when we take that word in its But, if we take the word idea in so ex
primitive sense. tensive a sense as to comprehend, not only
We are, in the next place, to consider, the second, but also the first class of objects
whether knowledge consists in perceiving the of the understanding, it will undoubtedly
agreement or disagreement of ideas, taking be true that all knowledge consists in per
ideas in any of the senses in which the word ceiving the agreements and disagreements
is used by Mr Locke and other modern of ideas: for it is impossible that there can
philosophers. be any knowledge, any judgment, any
i. Very often the word idea is used so, opinion, true or false, which is not employed
that to have the idea of anything is a peri about the objects of the understanding.
phrasis for conceiving it. In this sense, an But whatsoever is an object of the under
[544, 545]
CHAP. III.] SENTIMENTS CONCERNING JUDGMENT. 431
standing is an idea, according to this second Pythagoreans and Platonists to think that
meaning of the word. he could not conceive the plan of the world
Yet I am persuaded that Mr Locke, in he was to make without eternal ideas really
his definition of knowledge, did not mean existing as patterns to work by ; and that
that the word idea should extend to all those this theory, when its necessary consequences
things which we commonly consider as ob are fairly pursued, leads to absolute scep
jects of the understanding. [546] ticism, though those consequences were not
Though Bishop Berkeley believed that seen by most of the philosophers who have
sun, moon, and stars, and all material things, adopted it.
are ideas, and nothing but ideas, Mr Locke I have no intention to repeat what nas
nowhere professes this opinion. He be before been said upon those points; but
lieved that we have ideas of bodies, but not only, taking ideas in this sense, to make
that bodies are ideas. In like manner, he some observations upon the definition which
believed that we have ideas of minds, but Mr Locke £ of knowledge.
not that minds are ideas. When he in First, If all knowledge consists in per
quired so carefully into the origin of all our ceiving the agreements and disagreements
ideas, he did not surely mean to find the of ideas—that is, of representative images of
origin of whatsoever may be the object of things existing in the mind—it obviously
the understanding, nor to resolve the origin follows that, if there be no such ideas, there
of everything that may be an object of can be no knowl So that, if there
understanding into sensation and reflec should be found reason for giving up
tion. this philosophical hypothesis, all knowledge
3. Setting aside, therefore, the two mean must go along with it.
ings of the word idea, before mentioned, as I hope, however, it is not so : and that,
meanings which Mr Locke could not have though this hypothesis, like many others.
in his view in the definition he gives of should totter and fall to the ground, know
knowledge, the only meaning that could be ledge will continue to stand firm upon a
intended in this place is that which I before more permanent basis. [548]
called the philosophical meaning of the The cycles and epicycles of the ancient
word idea, which hath a reference to the astronomers were for a thousand years
theory commonly received about themanner thought absolutely necessary to explain
in which the mind perceives external objects, the motions of the heavenly bodies. Yet
and in which it remembers and conceives now, when all men believe them to have
objects that are not present to it. It is a very been mere fictions, astronomy has not fallen
ancient opinion, and has been very generally with them, but stands upon a more rational
received among philosophers, that we can foundation than before. Ideas, or images
not perceive or think of such objects im of things existing in the mind, have, for a
mediately, but by the medium of certain longer time, been thought necessary for
images or representatives of them really explaining the operations of the understand
existing in the mind at the time. ing. If they should likewise at last be
To those images the ancients gave the found to be fictions, human knowledge and
name of species and phantasms. Modern judgment would suffer nothing by being
philosophers have given them the name of disen from an unwieldy hypothesis.
ideas. “”Tis evident,” says Mr Locke, Mr Locke surely did not look upon the ex
book iv., chap. 4, “the mind knows not things istence of ideas as a philosophical hypo
immediately, but only by the intervention thesis. He thought that we are conscious
of the ideas it has of them.” And in the of their existence, otherwise he would not
same paragraph he puts this question: have made the existence of all our know
“How shall the mind, when it perceives ledge to depend upon the existence of ideas.
nothing but its own ideas, know that they Secondly, Supposing this hypothesis to
agree with things themselves?” [547] be true, I agree with Mr Locke that it is
This theory I have already considered, an evident and necessary consequence that
in treating of perception, of memory, and our knowledge can be conversant about
of conception. The reader will there find ideas only, and must consist in perceiving
the reasons that lead me to think that it their attributes and relations. For nothing
has no solid foundation in reason, or in can be more evident than this, that all
attentive reflection upon those operations knowledge, and all judgment and opinion,
of our minds; that it contradicts the im must be about things which are or may be
mediate dictates of our natural faculties, immediate objects of our thought. What
which are of higher authority than any cannot be the object of thought, or the
theory; that it has taken its rise from the object of the mind in thinking, cannot be
same prejudices which led all the ancient the object of knowledge or of opinion.
philosophers to think that the Deity could Everything we can know of any object,
not make this world without some eternal must be either some attribute of the object,
matter to work upon, and which led the or some relation it bears to some other
[546–548]
432 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essax v1.
object or objects. By the agreements and ness of life, he found himself under a neces
disagreements of objects, I apprehend Mr sity of believing with the vulgar. His
Locke intended to express both their attri “Treatise of Human Nature” is the only
butes and their relations. If ideas then be system to which the theory of ideas leads;
the only objects of thought, the consequence and, in my apprehension, is, in all its parts,
is necessary, that they must be the only the necessary consequence of that theory.
objects of knowledge, and all knowledge Mr Locke, however, did not see all the
must consist in perceiving their agreements consequences of that theory; he adopted it
and disagreements—that is, their attributes without doubt or examination, carried along
and relations. by the stream of philosophers that went
The use I would make of this conse before him ; and his judgment and good
quence, is to shew that the hypothesis must sense have led him to say manythings, and
be false, from which it necessarily follows. to believe many things, that cannot be re
For if we have any knowledge of things conciled to it.
that are not ideas, it will follow no less He not only believed his own existence,
evidently, that ideas are not the only objects the existence of external things, and the
of our thoughts. [549] existence of a Deity; but he has shewn
Mr Locke has pointed out the extent and very justly how we come by the knowledge
limits of human knowledge, in his fourth of these existences.
book, with more accuracy and judgment It might here be expected that he should
than any philosopher had done before; but have pointed out the agreements and dis
he has not confined it to the agreements agreements of ideas from which these exist
and disagreements of ideas. And I cannot ences are deduced; but this is impossible,
help thinking that a great part of that book and he has not even attempted it.
is an evident refutation of the principles Our own existence, he observes, we know
laid down in the beginning of it. intuitively; but this intuition is not a percep
Mr Locke did not believe that he himself tion of the agreement or disagreement of
was an idea; that his friends and acquaint ideas; for the subject of the proposition, I
ance were ideas; that the Supreme Being, exist, is not an idea, but a person.
to speak with reverence, is an idea; or The knowledge of external objects of
that the sun and moon, the earth and the sense, he observes, we can have only bysensa
sea, and other external objects of sense, are tion. This sensation he afterwards expresses
ideas. He believed that he had some cer more clearly by the testimony of our senses,
tain knowledge of all those objects. His which are the proper and sole judges of this
knowledge, therefore, did not consist solely thing, whose testimony is the greatest assur
in perceiving the agreements and disagree ance we can possibly have, and to which
ments of his ideas; for, surely, to perceive our faculties can attain. This is perfectly
the existence, the attributes, and relations agreeable to the common sense of mankind,
of things, which are not ideas, is not to per and is perfectly understood by those who
ceive the agreements and disagreements of never heard of the theory of ideas. Our
ideas. And, if things which are not ideas be senses testify immediately the existence,
objects of knowledge, they must be objects of and many of the attributes and relations of
thought. On the contrary, if ideas be the external material beings; and, by our con
only objects of thought, there can be no stitution, we rely with assurance upon their
knowledge, either of our own existence, or testimony, without seeking a reason for
of the existence of external objects, or of doing so. This assurance, Mr Locke ac
the existence of a Deity. knowledges, deserves the name of know
This consequence, as far as concerns the ledge. But those external things are not
existence of external objects of sense, was ideas, nor are their attributes and relations
afterwards deduced from the theory of ideas the agreements and disagreements of ideas,
by Bishop Berkeley with the clearest evi but the agreements and disagreements of
dence; and that author chose rather to things which are not ideas. [551]
adopt the consequence than to reject the To reconcile this to the theory of ideas,
theory on which it was grounded. But, Mr Locke says, That it is the actual receiv
with regard to the existence of our own ing of ideas from without that gives us notice
minds, of other minds, and of a Supreme of the existence of those external things.
Mind, the Bishop, that he might avoid the This, if understood literally, would lead
consequence, rejected a part of the theory, us back to the doctrine of Aristotle, that
and maintained that we can think of minds, our ideas or species come from without
of their attributes and relations, without from the external objects, and are the image
ideas. [550] or form of those objects. But Mr Locke,
Mr Hume saw very clearly the conse I believe, meant no more by it, but that
quences of this theory, and adopted them our ideas of sense must have a cause, and
in his speculative moments; but candidly that we are not the cause of them our
acknowledges that, in the common busi selves.
[549–551]
cHAP. III.] SENTIMENTS CONCERNING JUDGMENT. 433
Bishop Berkeley acknowledges all this, which we can have any judgment or
and shews very clearly that it does not opinion.
afford the least shadow of reason for the This necessary consequence of the com
belief of any material object—nay, that mon doctrine of ideas Mr Hume saw, and
there can be nothing external that has any has made evident in his “Treatise of
resemblance to our ideas but the ideas of Human Nature;” but the use he made of
other minds. it was not to overturn the theory with which
It is evident, therefore, that the agree it is necessarily connected, but to overturn
ments and disagreements of ideas can give all knowledge, and to leave no ground to
us no knowledge of the existence of any believe anything whatsoever. If Mr Locke
material thing. If any knowledge can be had seen this consequence, there is reason
attained of things which are not ideas, that to think that he would have made another
knowledge is a perception of agreements use of it. [553]
and disagreements; not of ideas, but of That a man of Mr Locke's judgment and
things that are not ideas. penetration did not perceive a consequence
As to the existence of a deity, though so evident, seems indeed very strange; and
Mr Locke was aware that Des Cartes, and I know no other account that can be given of
many after him, had attempted to prove it it but this—that the ambiguity of the word
merely from the agreements and disagree idea has misled him in this, as in several
ments of ideas; yet “he thought it an other instances. Having at first defined
ill way of establishing that truth, and si ideas to be whatsoever is the object of the
lencing Atheists, to lay the whole stress of so understanding when we think, he takes it
important a point upon that sole founda very often in that unlimited sense; and so
tion.” And, therefore, he proves this everything that can be an object of thought
point, with great strength and solidity, from is an idea. At other times, he uses the
our own existence, and the existence of the word to signify certain representative images
sensible parts of the universe. [552] By of things in the mind, which philosophers
memory, Mr Locke says, we have the have supposed to be immediate objects of
knowledge of the past existence of several thought. At other times, things conceived
things. But all conception of past exist abstractly, without regard to their exist
ence, as well as of external existence, is ence, are called ideas. Philosophy is much
irreconcileable to the theory of ideas; be indebted to Mr Locke for his observations
cause it supposes that there may be imme on the abuse of words. It is pity he did
diate objects of thought, which are not ideas not apply these observations to the word
presently existing in the mind. idea, the ambiguity and abuse of which has
I conclude, therefore, that, if we have very much hurt his excellent Essay.
any knowledge of our own existence, or of There are some other opinions of philo
the existence of what we see about us, or of sophers concerning judgment, of which I
the existence of a Supreme Being, or if think it unnecessary to say much.
we have any knowledge of things past by Mr Hume sometimes adopts Mr Locke's
memory, that knowledge cannot consist in opinion, that it is the perception of the
perceiving the agreements and disagree agreement or disagreement of our ideas;
ments of ideas. sometimes he maintains that judgment and
This conclusion, indeed, is evident of reasoning resolve themselves into concep
itself. For, if knowledge consists solely in tion, and are nothing but particular ways
the perception of the agreement or disagree of conceiving objects; and he says, that an
ment of ideas, there can be no knowledge of opinion or belief may most accurately be
any proposition, which does not express defined, a lively idea related to or associated
some agreement or disagreement of ideas; with a present impression.—Treatise of Hu
consequently, there can be no knowledge of man Nature, vol. I. page 172.
any proposition, which expresses either the I have endeavoured before, in the first
existence, or the attributes or relations of chapterof this Essay, to shew that judgment
things, which are not ideas. If, therefore, is an operation of mind specifically distinct
the theory of ideas be true, there can be no from the bare conception of an object. I have
knowledge of anything but of ideas. And, also considered his notion of belief, intreating
on the other hand, if we have any know of the theories concerning memory. [554]
ledge of anything besides ideas, that theory Dr Hartley says—“That assent and dis
must be false. sent must come under the notion of ideas,
There can be no knowledge, no judgment being only those very complex internal
or opinion about things which are not im feelings which adhere by association to such
mediate objects of thought. This I take to clusters of words as are called propositions
be self-evident. If, therefore, ideas be the in general, or affirmations and negations in
only immediate objects of thought, they particular.”
must be the only things in nature of which This, if I understand its meaning, agrees
we can have any knowledge, and about with the opinion of Mr Hume, above men
[552–554] 2 F
434 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essaw v1.
tioned, and has therefore been before con Propositions of the last kind, when they
sidered. are used in matters of science, have con
Dr Priestly has given another definition monly been called arioms; and on what
of judgment –“It is nothing more than ever occasion they are used, are called first
the perception of the universal concurrence, principles, principles of common sense, com
or the perfect coincidence of two ideas; or mon notions, self-evident truths. Cicero
the want of that concurrence or coinci calls them natura judicia, judicia communi
dence.” This, I think, coincides with Mr bus hominum sensibus infira. Lord Shaftes
Locke's definition, and therefore has been bury expresses them by the words, natural
already considered. knowledge, fundamental reason, and common
There are many particulars which deserve sense. [556]
to be known, and which might very properly What has been said, I think, is sufficient
be considered in this Essay on judgment: to distinguish first principles, or intuitive
concerning the various kinds of propositions judgments, from those which may be as
by which our judgments are expressed; cribed to the power of reasoning; nor is it
their subjects and predicates; their con a just objection against this distinction, that
versions and oppositions: but as these are there may be some judgments concerning
to be found in every system of logic, from which we may be dubious to which elass
Aristotle down to the present age, I think they ought to be referred. There is a real
it unnecessary to swell this Essay with the distinction between persons within the
repetition of what has been said so often. house, and those that are without; yet it
The remarks which have occurred to me may be dubious to which the man belongs
upon what is commonly said on these points, that stands upon the threshold.
as well as upon the art of syllogism; the The power of reasoning—that is, of draw
utility of the school logic, and the improve ing a conclusion from a chain of premises
ments that may be made in it, may be found may with some propriety be called an art.
in a “Short Account of Aristotle's Logic, “All reasoning,” says Mr Locke, “is
with Remarks,” which Lord Kames has search and casting about, and requires
honoured with a place in his “Sketches of pains and application.” It resembles the
the History of Man.” [555] power of walking, which is acquired by use
and exercise. Nature prompts to it, and
has given the power of acquiring it; but
CHAPTER IV. must be aided by frequent exercise before
we are able to walk. After repeated efforts,
of PIRs'T PRINCIPLES IN GENERAL. much stumbling, and many falls, we learn
to walk; and it is in a similar manner that
ONE of the most important distinctions of we learn to reason.
our judgments is, that some of them are But the power of judging in self-evident
intuitive, others grounded on argument. propositions, which are clearly understood,
It is not in our power to judge as we may be compared to the power of swallow
will. The judgment is carried along neces ing our food. It is purely natural, and there
sarily by the evidence, real or seeming, fore common to the learned and the un
which appears to us at the time. But, in learned, to the trained and the untrained.
propositions that are submitted to our It requires ripeness of understanding, and
judgment, there is this great difference freedom from prejudice, but nothing else.
some are of such a nature that a man of I take it for granted that there are self
ripe understanding may apprehend them evident principles. Nobody, I think, de
distinctly, and perfectly understand their nies it. And if any man were so sceptical
meaning, without finding himself under any as to deny that there is any proposition
necessity of believing them to be true or that is self-evident, I see not how it would
false, probable or improbable. The judg be possible to convince him by reasoning.
ment remains in suspense, until it is in But yet there seems to be great difference
clined to one side or another by reasons or of opinions among philosophers about first
arguments. - principles. What one takes to be self-evi
But there are other propositions which dent, another labours to prove by argu
are no sooner understood than they are be ments, and a third denies altogether. [557]
lieved. The judgment follows the appre Thus, before the time of Des Cartes, it
hension of them necessarily, and both are was taken for a first principle, that there is
equally the work of nature, and the result a sun and a moon, an earth and sea, which
of our original powers. There is no search really exist, whether we think of them or
ing for evidence, no weighing of arguments; not. Des Cartes thought that the exist
the proposition is not deduced or inferred ence of those things ought to be proved by
from another ; it has the light of truth in argument ; and in this he has been follow
itself, and has no occasion to borrow it ed by Malebranche, Arnauld, and Locke.
from another. They have all laboured to prove, by ver
£
CHAP. Iv.] OF FIRST PRINCIPLES IN GENERAL. 435
weak reasoning, the existence of external that support it, and of those that support
objects of sense; and Berkeley and Hume, them, as far back as we can go. But we
sensible of the weakness of their arguments, cannot go back in this track to infinity.
have been led to deny their existence alto Where then must this analysis stop 3 It
gether. is evident that it must stop only when we
The ancient philosophers granted, that come to propositions which support all that
all knowledge must be grounded on first are built upon them, but are themselves
principles, and that there is no reasoning supported by none—that is, to self-evident
w thout them. The Peripatetic philosophy propositions.
was redundant rather than deficient in first Let us again consider a synthetical proof of
principles. Perhaps the abuse of them in any kind, where we begin with the premises,
that ancient system may have brought and pursue a train of consequences, until we
them into discredit in modern times; for, come to the last conclusion or thing to be
as the best things may be abused, so that proved. Here we must begin, either with
abuse is apt to give a disgust to the thing self-evident propositions or with such as have
itself; and as one extreme often leads into been already proved. When the last is the
the opposite, this seems to have been the case, the proof of the propositions, thus as
case in the respect paid to first principles sumed, is a part of our proof; and the
in ancient and modern times. proof is deficient without it. Suppose then
Des Cartes thought one principle, express the deficiency supplied, and the proof com
ed in one word, cogito, a sufficient foundation pleted, is it not evident that it must set out
for his whole system, and asked no more. with self-evident propositions, and that the
Mr Locke seems to think first principles whole evidence must rest upon them P So
of very small use. Knowledge consisting, that it appears to be demonstrable that,
according to him, in the perception of the without first principles, analytical reasoning
agreement or disagreement of our ideas; could have no end, and synthetical reason
when we have clear ideas, and are able to ing could have no beginning; and that
compare them together, we may always fa every conclusion got by reasoning must
bricate first principles as often as we have rest with its whole weight upon first princi
occasion for them. Such differences we find ples, as the building does upon its founda
among philosophers about first principles. tion. [559]
It is likewise a question of some moment, 2. A second proposition is, That some
whether the differences among men about first principles yield conclusions that are
first principles can be brought to any issue # certain, others such as are probable, in va
When in disputes one man maintains that rious degrees, from the highest probability
to be a first principle which another denies, to the lowest.
commonly both parties appeal to common In just reasoning, the strength or weak
sense, and so the matter rests. Now, is mess of the conclusion will always corre
there no way of discussing this appeal Is spond to that of the principles on which it is
there no mark or criterion, whereby first grounded.
principles that are truly such, may be dis In a matter of testimony, it is self-evi
tinguished from those that assume the cha dent that the testimony of two is better
racter without a just title P I shall humbly than that of one, supposing them equal in
offer in the following propositions what character, and in their means of knowledge;
appears to me to be agreeable to truth in yet the simple testimony may be true, and
these matters, always ready to change my that which is preferred to it may be false.
opinion upon conviction. £) When an experiment has succeeded in
1. First, I hold it to be certain, and even several trials, and the circumstances have
demonstrable, that all knowledge got by been marked with care, there is a self-evi
reasoning must be built upon first princi dent probability of its succeeding in a new
ples." trial; but there is no certainty. The pro
This is as certain as that every house bability, in some cases, is much greater
must have a foundation. The power of than in others; because, in some cases, it
reasoning, in this respect, resembles the is much easier to observe all the circum
mechanical powers or engines; it must stances that may have influence upon the
have a fixed point to rest upon, otherwise event than in others. And it is possible
it spends its force in the air, and produces that, after many experiments made with
no effect. care, our expectation may be frustrated in
When we examine, in the way of ana a succeeding one, by the variation of some
lysis, the evidence of any proposition, either circumstance that has not, or perhaps
we find it self-evident, or it rests upon one could not be observed.
Sir Isaac Newton has laid it down as a
or more propositions that support it. The
same thing may be said of the propositions first principle in natural philosophy, that a
property which has been found in all bodies
* So Aristotle, plurics.-H. upon which we have had access to make
2 F2
[558, 559]
436 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. | Essay v1.
experiments, and which has always been ledge in which this method has been followed
found in its quantity to be in exact propor —to wit, mathematics and natural philoso
to the quantity of matter in every body, is phy; in mathematics, as far back as we have
to be held as an universal property of mat books. It is in this science only, that, for
ter. [560] more than two thousand years since it be
This principle, as far as I know, has gan to be cultivated, we find no sects, no
never been called in question. The evi contrary systems, and hardly any disputes;
dence we have, that all matter is divisible, or, if there have been disputes, they have
movable, solid, and inert, is resolvable ended as soon as the animosity of par
into this principle; and, if it be not true, ties subsided, and have never been again
we cannot have any rational conviction that revived. The science, once firmly esta
all matter has those properties. From the blished upon the foundation of a few axioms
same principle that great man has shewn and definitions, as upon a rock, has grown
that we have reason to conclude that all from age so age, so as to become the loftiest
bodies gravitate towards each other. and the most solid fabric that human rea
This principle, however, has not that son can boast."
kind of evidence which mathematical axioms Natural philosophy, till less than two
have. It is not a necessary truth, whose hundred years ago, remained in the same
contrary is impossible; nor did Sir Isaac fluctuating state with the other sciences.
ever conceive it to be such. And, if it Every new system pulled up the old by
should ever be found, by just experiments, the roots. The system-builders, indeed,
that there is any part in the composition of were always willing to accept of the aid
some bodies which has not gravity, the of first principles, when they were of their
fact, if duly ascertained, must be admitted side; but, finding them insufficient to sup
as an exception to the general law of gra port the fabric which their imagination had
vitation. raised, they were only brought in as auxi
In games of chance, it is a first principle liaries, and so intermixed with conjectures,
that every side of a die has an equal chance and with lame inductions, that their sys
to be turned up; and that, in a lottery, tems were like Nebuchadnezzar's image,
every ticket has an equal chance of being whose feet were partly of iron and partly
drawn out. From such first principles as of clay.
these, which are the best we can have in Lord Bacon first delineated the only so
such matters, we may deduce, by demon lid foundation on which natural philoso
strative reasoning, the precise degree of phy can be built; and Sir Isaac Newton
probability of every event in such games. reduced the principles laid down by Bacon
But the principles of all this accurate into three or four axioms, which he calls
and profound reasoning can never yield a regulae philosophandi. From these, toge
certain conclusion, it being impossible to ther with the phenomena observed by the
supply a defect in the first principles by any senses, which he likewise lays down as
accuracy in the reasoning that is grounded first principles, he deduces, by strict rea
upon them. As water, by its gravity, can soning, the propositions contained in the
rise no higher in its course than the foun third book of his “Principia,” and in his
tain, however artfully it be conducted; so “Optics;” and by this means has raised a
no conclusion of reasoning can have a fabric in those two branches of natural
greater degree of evidence than the first philosophy, which is not liable to be shaken
principles from which it is drawn.
From these instances, it is evident that,
|' doubtful disputation, but stands im
movable upon the basis of self-evident
as there are some first principles that yield principles. [562]
conclusions of absolute certainty, so there This fabric has been carried on by the
are others that can only yield probable con accession of new discoveries; but is no
clusions; and that the lowest degree of more subject to revolutions.
probability must be grounded on first prinThe disputes about materia prima, sub
ciples as well as absolute certainty." stantial forms, Nature's abhorring a va
[561] cuum, and bodies having no gravitation
3. A third proposition is, That it would in their proper place, are now no more.
contribute greatly to the stability of human The builders in this work are not put to the
knowledge, and consequently to the im necessity of holding a weapon in one hand
provement of it, if the first principles upon while they build with the other; their
which the various parts of it are grounded whole employment is to carry on the work.
were pointed out and ascertained. Yet it seems to be very probable, that, if
We have ground to think so, both from natural philosophy had not been reared upon
facts, and from the nature of the thing. this solid foundation of self-evident princi
There are two branches of human know ples, it would have been to this day a field
* Compare Stewart's “Elements," ii. p. 38-h. * See Stewart's “Elements," ii. p. 43.-H.
[560, 562]
–- -
- - - ------- ----------. -
---, -----|--
cHAP. Iv.] OF FIRST PRINCIPLES IN GENERAL. 437
of battle, wherein every inch of ground laid down by Aristotle and repeated by
would have been disputed, and nothing fixed every writer in dialectics. [564
and determined. And we may observe by the way, that
I acknowledge that mathematics and na the reason why logicians have been so una
tural philosophy, especially the former, nimous in determining the rules of reason
have this advantage of most other sciences, ing, from Aristotle down to this day, seems
that it is less difficult to form distinct and to be, that they were by that great genius
determinate conceptions of the objects raised, in a scientific manner, from a few
about which they are employed; but, as definitions and axioms. It may farther be
this difficulty is not insuperable, it affords observed, that, when men differ about a
a good reason, indeed, why other sciences deduction, whether it follows from certain
should have a longer infancy; but no rea premises, this I think is always owing to
son at all why they may not at last arrive their differing about some first principle.
at maturity, by the same steps as those of I shall explain this by an example.
quicker growth. Suppose that, from a thing having begun
The facts I have mentioned may there to exist, one man infers that it must have
fore lead us to conclude, that, if in other had a cause; another man does not admit
branches of philosophy the first principles the inference. Here it is evident, that the
were laid down, as has been done in ma first takes it for a self-evident principle, that
thematics and natural philosophy, and the everything which begins to exist must have
subsequent conclusionsgrounded upon them, a cause. The other does not allow this to
this would make it much more easy to dis be self-evident. Let them settle this point,
tinguish what is solid and well supported and the dispute will be at an end.
from the vain fictions of human fancy. [563] Thus, I think, it appears, that, in matters
But, laying aside facts, the nature of the of science, if the terms be properly explained,
thing leads to the same conclusion. the first principles upon which the reason
For, when any system is grounded upon ing is grounded be laid down and exposed
first principles, and deduced regularly from to examination, and the conclusions re
them, we have a thread to lead us through gularly deduced from them, it might be
the labyrinth. The judgment has a distinct expected that men of candour and capacity,
and determinate object. The heterogeneous who love truth, and have patience to ex
parts being separated, can be examined each amine things coolly, might come to unani
by itself. mity with regard to the force of the deduc
The whole system is reduced to axioms, tions, and that their differences might be
definitions, and deductions. These are ma reduced to those they may have about first
terials of very different nature, and to be principles.
measured by a very different standard; and 4. A fourth proposition is, That Nature
it is much more easy to judge of each, taken hath not left us destitute of means whereby
by itself, than to judge of a mass wherein the candid and honest part of mankind may
they are kneaded together without distinc be brought to unanimity when they happen
tion. Let us consider how we judge of each to differ about first principles. [565]
of them. When men differ about things that are
First, As to definitions, the matter is very taken to be first principles or self-evident
easy. They relate only to words, and differ truths, reasoning seems to be at an end.
ences about them may produce different Each party appeals to common sense. When
ways of speaking, but can never produce one man's common sense gives one deter
different ways of thinking, while every man mination, another man's a contrary deter
keeps to his own definitions. mination, there seems to be no remedy but
But, as there is not a more plentiful source to leave every man to enjoy his own opinion.
of fallacies in reasoning than men's using This is a common observation, and, I be
the same word sometimes in one sense and lieve, a just one, if it be rightly understood.
at other times in another, the best means It is in vain to reason with a man who
of preventing such fallacies, or of detecting denies the first principles on which the rea
them when they are committed, is defi soning is grounded. Thus, it would be in
nitions of words as accurate as can be vain to attempt the proof of a proposition
given. in Euclid to a man who denies the axioms.
Secondly, As to deductions drawn from Indeed, we ought never to reason with men
principles granted on both sides, I do not who deny first principles from obstinacy
see how they can long be a matter of dis and unwillingness to yield to reason.
pute among men who are not blinded by But is it not possible, that men who really
prejudice or partiality; for the rules of love truth, and are open to conviction, may
reasoning by which inferences may be drawn differ about first principles?
from premises have been for two thousand I think it is possible, and that it cannot,
years fixed with great unanimity. No man without great want of charity, be denied to
pretends to dispute the rules of reasoning be possible.
[563–565]
When this happens, every man who be The ancient sceptical system furnishes a
lieves that there is a real distinction between remarkable instance of this truth. That
truth and error, and that the faculties which system, of which Pyrrho" was reputed the
God has given us are not in their nature father, was carried down, through a succes
fallacious, must be convinced that there is sion of ages, by very able and acute philo
a defect or a perversion of judgment on sophers, who taught men to believe nothing
the one side or the other. at all, and esteemed it the highest pitch of
A man of candour and humility will, in human wisdom to withhold assent from
such a case, very naturally suspect his own every proposition whatsoever. It was sup
judgment. so far as to be desirous to enter ported with very great subtilty and learning,
into a serious examination, even of what as we see from the writings of Sextus Eul
he has long held as a first principle. He piricus, the only author of that sect whose
will think it not impossible, that, although writings have come down to our age. The
his heart be upright, his judgment may have assault of the sceptics against all science
been perverted, by education, by authority, seems to have been managed with more art
by party zeal, or by some other of the com and address than the defence of the dog
mon causes of error, from the influence of matists.
which neither parts nor integrity exempt Yet, as this system was an insult upon the
the human understanding. [566] common sense of mankind, it died away of
In such a state of mind, so amiable, and itself; and it would be in vain to attempt
so becoming every good man, has Nature to revive it. The modern scepticism is very
left him destitute of any rational means by different from the ancient, otherwise it would
which he may be enabled, either to correct not have been allowed a hearing; and, when
his judgment if it be wrong, or to confirm it has lost the grace of novelty, it will die
it if it be right 2 away also, though it should never be refuted.
I hope it is not so. I hope that, by the The modern scepticism, I mean that of
means which nature has furnished, con Mr Hume, is built upon principles which
troversies about first principles may be were very generally maintained by philo
brought to an issue, and that the real lovers sophers, though they did not see that they
of truth may come to unanimity with regard led to scepticism. Mr Hume, by tracing,
to them. with great acuteness and ingenuity, the con
It is true that, in other controversies, sequences of principles commonly received,
the process by which the truth of a propo has shewn that they overturn all knowledge,
sition is discovered, or its falsehood detected, and at last overturn themselves, and leave
is, by shewing its necessary connection with the mind in perfect suspense.
first principles, or its repugnancy to them 2. Secondly, We may observe that opin
It is true, likewise, that, when the contro ions which contradict first principles, are
versy is, whether a preposition be itself a distinguished, from other errors, by this:
first principle, this process cannot be ap That they are not only false but absurd;
plied. The truth, therefore, in controversies and, to discountenance absurdity, Nature
of this kind, labours under a peculiar dis hath given us a particular emotion—to wit,
advantage. But it has advantantages of that of ridicule—which seems intended for
another kind to compensate this. this very purpose of putting out of counte
1. For, in the first place, in such con nance what is absurd, either in opinion or
troversies, every man is a competent judge; practice. [568]
and therefore it is difficult to impose upon This weapon, when properly applied, cuts
mankind. with as keen an edge as argument. Nature
To judge of first principles, requires no hath furnished us with the first to expose
more than a sound mind free from preju absurdity; as with the last to refute error.
dice, and a distinct conception of the question. Both are well fitted for their several offices,
The learned and the unlearned, the phi and are equally friendly to truth when pro
losopher and the day-labourer, are upon a perly used.
level, and will pass the same judgment, Both may be abused to serve the cause
when they are not misled by some bias, or of error; but the same degree of judgment
taught to renounce their understanding which serves to detect the abuse of argu
from some mistaken religious principle. ment in false reasoning, serves to detect the
In matters beyond the reach of common abuse of ridicule when it is wrong directed.
understanding, the many are led by the Some have, from nature, a happier talent
few, and willingly yield to their authority. for ridicule than others; and the same
But, in matters of common sense, the few thing holds with regard to the talent of
must yield to the many, when local and reasoning. Indeed, I conceive there is
temporary prejudices are removed. No hardly any absurdity, which, when touched
man is now moved by the subtle arguments with the pencil of a Lucian, a Swift, or a
of Zeno against motion, though, perhaps, he Woltaire, would not be put out of counte
knows not how to answer them. [567] nance, when there is not some religious
[566–568]
CHAP. iv.] OF FIRST PRINCIPLES IN GENERAL. 439
panie, or very powerful prejudice, to blind Thus the faculties of consciousness, of

the understanding. memory, of external sense, and of reason,
But it must be acknowledged that the are all equally the gifts of nature. No good
emotion of ridicule, even when most natu reason can be assigned for receiving the
ral, may be stifled by an emotion of a con testimony of one of them, which is not of
trary nature, and cannot operate till that equal force with regard to the others. The
is removed. greatest sceptics admit the testimony of
Thus, if the notion of sanctity is annexed consciousness, and allow that what it testi
to an object, it is no longer a laughable fies is to be held as a first principle. If,
matter; and this visor must be pulled off therefore, they reject the immediate testi.
before it appears ridiculous. Hence we mony of sense or of memory, they are
see, that notions which appear most ridicu guilty of an inconsistency. [570] .
lous to all who consider them coolly and in Secondly, A first principle may admit of
differently, have no such appearance to a proof ad absurdum.
those who never thought of them but under In this kind of proof, which is very com
the impression of religious awe and dread. mon in mathematics, we suppose the con
Even where religion is not concerned, tradictory proposition to be true. We trace
the novelty of an opinion to those who are the consequences of that supposition in a
too fond of novelties; the gravity and train of reasoning; and, if we find any of
solemnity with which it is introduced; the its necessary consequences to be manifestly
opinion we have entertained of the author; absurd, we conclude the supposition from
its apparent connection with principles which it followed to be false; and, there.
already embraced, or subserviency to in fore its contradictory to be true.
terests which we have at heart; and, above There is hardly any proposition, especially
all, its being fixed in our minds at that time of those that may claim the character of
of life when we receive implicitly what we first principles, that stands alone and un
are taught—may cover its absurdity, and connected. It draws many others along
fascinate the understanding for a time. with it in a chain that cannot be broken.
[569] He that takes it up must bear the burden
But, if ever we are able to view it naked, of all its consequences; and, if that is too
and stripped of those adventitious circum heavy for him to bear, he must not pretend
stances from which it borrowed its import to take it up.
ance and authority, the natural emotion of Thirdly, I conceive that the consent of
ridicule will exert its force. An absurdity ages and nations, of the learned and un
can be entertained by men of sense no longer learned, ought to have great authority with
than it wears a mask. When any man is regard to first principles, where every man
found who has the skill or the boldness to is a competent judge.
pull off the mask, it can no longer bear the Our ordinary conduct in life is built upon
light; it slinks into dark corners for a while, first principles, as well as our speculations
and then is no more heard of, but as an ob in philosophy; and every motive to action
ject of ridicule. supposes some belief. When we find a
Thus I conceive, that first principles, general agreement among men, in principles
which are really the dictates of common that concern human life, this must have
sense, and directly opposed to absurdities great authority with every sober mind that
in opinion, will always, from the constitu loves truth.
tion of human nature, support themselves, It is pleasant to observe the fruitless
and gain rather than lose ground among pains which Bishop Berkeley takes to shew
mankind. that his system of the non-existence of a
3. Thirdly, It may be observed, that, al material world did not contradict the senti
though it is contrary to the nature of first ments of the vulgar, but those only of the
principles to admit of direct or apodictical philosophers.
Proof; yet there are certain ways of reason with good reason he dreaded more to
ing even about them, by which those that oppose the authority of vulgar opinion in a
are just and solid may be confirmed, and matter of this kind, than all the schools of
those that are false may be detected. It philosophers [571]
may here be proper to mention some of the Here, perhaps, it will be said, What has
topics from which we may reason in matters authority to do in matters of opinion ? Is
of this kind. truth to be determined by most votes? Or
First, It is a good argument ad hominem, is authority to be again raised out of its
if it can be shewn that a first principle grave to tyrannise over mankind?
which a man rejects, stands upon the same I am aware that, in this age, an advo
footing with others which he admits: for, cate for authority has a very unfavourable
when this is the case, he must be guilty of plea ; but I wish to give no more to author
an inconsistency who holds the one and ity than is its due.
rejects the other. Most justly do we honour the names of
[569–571]
those benefactors to mankind who have con let us not disdain to take that aid from the
tributed more or less to break the yoke of authority of other competent judges, which
that authority which deprives men of the a mathematician thinks it necessary to take
natural, the unalienable right of judging in that science which, of all sciences, has
for themselves; but, while we indulge a least to do with authority.
just animosity against this authority, and In a matter of common sense, every man
against all who would subject us to its is no less a competent judge than a mathe
tyranny, let us remember how common the matician is in a mathematical demonstra
folly is, of going from one faulty extreme tion; and there must be a great presump
into the opposite. tion that the judgment of mankind, in such
Authority, though a very tyrannical mis a matter, is the natural issue of those facul
tress to private judgment, may yet, on some ties which God hath given them. Such a
occasions, be a useful handmaid. This is judgment can be erroneous only when there
all she is entitled to, and this is all I plead is some cause of the error, as general as the
in her behalf. error is. When this can be shewn to be the
The justice of this plea will appear by case, I acknowledge it ought to have its due
putting a case in a science, in which, of all weight. But, to suppose a general devia
sciences, authority is acknowledged to have tion from truth among mankind in things
least weight. self-evident, of which no cause can be
Suppose a mathematician has made a assigned, is highly unreasonable. [573]
discovery in that science which he thinks Perhaps it may be thought impossible
important; that he has put his demonstra to collect the general opinion of men upon
tion in just order; and, after examining it any point whatsoever; and, therefore, that
with an attentive eye, has found no flaw in this authority can serve us in no stead in
it, I would ask, Will there not be still in examining first principles. But I appre
his breast some diffidence, some jealousy, hend that, in many cases, this is neither
lest the ardour of invention may have made impossible nor difficult.
him overlook some false step? This must Who can doubt whether men have uni
be granted. [572] versally believed the existence of a mate
He commits his demonstration to the ex rial world Who can doubt whether men
amination of a mathematical friend, whom have universally believed that every change
he esteems a competent judge, and waits that happens in nature must have a cause ?
with impatience the issue of his judgment. Who can doubt whether men have uni
Here I would ask again, Whether the verdict versally believed, that there is a right and
of his friend, according as it is favourable a wrong in human conduct; some things
or unfavourable, will not greatly increase or that merit blame, and others that are en
diminish his confidence in his own judgment? titled to approbation?
Most certainly it will, and it ought. The universality of these opinions, and
If the judgment of his friend agree with of many such that might be named, is suf
his own, especially if it be confirmed by two ficiently evident, from the whole tenor of
or three able judges, he rests secure of his human conduct, as far as our acquaintance
discovery without farther examination; but, reaches, and from the history of all ages
if it be unfavourable, he is brought back and nations of which we have any records.
into a kind of suspense, until the part that There are other opinions that appear to
is suspected undergoes a new and a more be universal, from what is common in the
rigorous examination. structure of all languages.
I hope what is supposed in this case is Language is the express image and pic
agreeable to nature, and to the experience ture of human thoughts; and from the
of candid and modest men on such occa picture we may draw some certain conclu
sions; yet here we see a man's judgment, sions concerning the original.
even in a mathematical demonstration, con We find in all languages the same parts
scious of some feebleness in itself, seeking of speech; we find nouns, substantive and
the aid of authority to support it, greatly adjective; verbs, active and passive, in
strengthened by that authority, and hardly their various tenses, numbers, and moods.
able to stand erect against it, without some Some rules of syntax are the same in all
new aid. languages.
Society in judgment, of those who are Now, what is common in the structure
esteemed fair and competent judges, has of languages, indicates an uniformity of
effects very similar to those of civil society: opinion in those things upon which that
it gives strength and courage to every indi structure is grounded. [574]
vidual; it removes that timidity which is The distinction between substances, and
as naturally the companion of solitary judg the qualities belonging to them; between
ment, as of a solitary man in the state of thought and the being that thinks; be
nature, tween thought and the objects of thought;
* Let us judge for ourselves, therefore; but is to be found in the structure of all lan
[572-571)
char. v.] FIRST PRINCIPLES OF CONTINGENT TRUTHS. 441
And, therefore, systems of philo them on all sides.” What was said in the
sophy, which abolish those distinctions, wage last chapter is intended both to shew the
war with the common sense of mankind. importance of this inquiry, and to make it
We are apt to imagine that those who more easy.
formed languages were no metaphysicians: But, in order that such an inquiry may be
but the first principles of all sciences are actually made, it is necessary that the first
the dictates of common sense, and lie open principles of knowledge be distinguished
to all men; and every man who has con from other truths, and presented to view,
sidered the structure of language in a phi that they may be sifted and examined on
losophical light, will find infallible proofs that all sides. In order to this end, I shall
those who have framed it, and those who attempt a detail of those I take to be such,
use it with understanding have the power and of the reasons why I think them entitled
of making accurate distinctions, and of form to that character. . [576]
ing general conceptions, as well as philoso If the enumeration should appear to some
phers. Nature has given those powers to redundant, to others deficient, and to others
all men, and they can use them when occa both-if things which I conceive to be first
sions require it, but they leave it to the principles, should to others appear to be
philosophers to give names to them, and to vulgar errors, or to be truths which derive
descant upon their nature. In like manner, their evidence from other truths, and there
nature has given eyes to all men, and they fore not first principles – in these things
can make good use of them; but the struc every man must judge for himself. I shall
ture of the eye, and the theory of vision, is rejoice to see an enumeration more perfect
the business of philosophers. in any or in all of those respects; being
Fourthly, Opinions that appear so early persuaded that the agreement of men of
in the minds of men that they cannot be judgment and candour in first principles
the effect of education or of false reason would be of no less consequence to the ad
ing, have a good claim to be considered as vancement of knowledge in general, than
first principles. Thus, the belief we have, the agreement of mathematicians in the
that the persons about us are living and in axioms of geometry has been to the ad
telligent beings, is a belief for which, per vancement of that science.
haps, we can give some reason, when we The truths that fall within the compass
are able to reason; but we had this belief of human knowledge, whether they be self
before we could reason, and before we could evident, or deduced from those that are
learn it by instruction. It seems, there self-evident, may be reduced to two classes.
fore, to be an immediate effect of our con They are either necessary and immutable
stitution. -
truths, whose contrary is impossible; or
The last topic I shall mention is, when they are contingent and mutable, depend
an opinion is so necessary in the conduct of ing upon some effect of will and power,
life, that, without the belief of it, a man which had a beginning, and may have an
must be led into a thousand absurdities in end.
practice, such an opinion, when we can That a cone is the third part of a cylin
give no other reason for it, may safely be der of the same base and the same altitude,
taken for a first principle. [575] is a necessary truth. It depends not upon
Thus I have endeavoured to shew, that, the will and power of any being. It is im
although first principles are not capable of mutably true, and the contrary impossible.
direct proof, yet differences, that may hap That the sun is the centre about which the
pen with regard to them among men of earth, and the other planets of our system,
candour, are not without remedy; that perform their revolutions, is a truth; but
Nature has not left us destitute of means it is not a necessary truth. It depends
by which we may discover errors of this upon the power and will of that Being who
kind; and that there are ways of reason made the sun and all the planets, and who
ing, with regard to first principles, by which gave them those motions that seemed best
those that are truly such may be distin to him.
guished from vulgar errors or prejudices. If all truths were necessary truths, there
would be no occasion for different tenses in
the verbs by which they are expressed.
CHAPTER V. What is true in the present time, would be
true in the past and future; and there
The first PRINCIPLES OF CONTINGENT would be no change or variation of anything
Titutiis, in nature.
We use the present tense in expressing
“SURELY,” says Bishop Berkeley, “it is necessary truths; but it is only because
a work well deserving our pains to make there is no flexion of the verb which in
a strict inquiry concerning the first princi cludes all times. When I say that three
ples of knowledge; to sift and examine is the half of six, I use the present tense
[575, 576]
only; but I mean to express not only what one instance of this kind-namely—that,
now is, but what always was, and always will from the existence of things contingent and
be; and so every proposition is to be under mutable, we can infer the existence of an
stood by which we mean to express a neces immutable and eternal cause of them.
sary truth. Contingent truths are of an As the minds of men are occupied much
other nature. As they are mutable, they Inore about truths that are contingent than
may be true at one time, and not at an about those that are necessary, I shall first
other; and, therefore, the expression of endeavour to point out the principles of the
them must include some point or period of former kind.
time. [577] 1. First, then, I hold, as a first principle,
If language had been a contrivance of the existence of everything of which I am
philosophers, they would probably have conscious.
given some flexion to the indicative mood Consciousness is an operation of the
of verbs, which extended to all times past,
understanding of its own kind, and cannot
present, and future; for such a flexion only
be logically defined. The objects of it are
would be fit to express necessary proposi our present pains, our pleasures, our hopes,
tions, which have no relation to time. But our fears, our desires, our doubts, our
there is no language, as far as I know, in thoughts of every kind; in a word, all the
which such a flexion of verbs is to be found. passions, and all the actions and operations
Because the thoughts and discourse of men of our own minds, while they are present.
are seldom employed about necessary truths, We may remember them when they are
but commonly about such as are contin past; but we are conscious of them only
gent, languages are fitted to express the while they are present.
last rather than the first. When a man is conscious of pain, he is
The distinction commonly made between certain of its existence; when he is con
abstract truths, and those that express mat scious that he doubts or believes, he is
ters of fact, or real existences, coincides in certain of the existence of those operations.
a great measure, but not altogether, with But the irresistible conviction he has of
that between necessary and contingent the reality of those operations is not the
truths. The necessary truths that fall effect of reasoning; it is immediate and
within our knowledge are, for the most part, intuitive. The existence therefore of those
abstract truths. We must except the ex passions and operations of our minds, of
istence and nature of the Supreme Being, which we are conscious, is a first principle,
which is necessary. Other existences are which nature requires us to believe upon
the effects of will and power. They had a her authority. [579]
beginning, and are mutable. Their nature If I am asked to prove that I cannot be
is such as the Supreme Being was pleased deceived by consciousness—to prove that it
to give them. Their attributes and rela is not a fallacious sense-I can find no proof.
tions must depend upon the nature God has I cannot find any antecedent truth from
given them, the powers with which he has which it is deduced, or upon which its evi
endowed them, and the situation in which dence depends. It seems to disdain any
he hath placed them. such derived authority, and to claim my
The conclusions deduced by reasoning assent in its own right.
from first principles, will commonly be ne If any man could be found so frantic as
cessary or contingent, according as the to deny that he thinks, while he is conscious
principles are from which they are drawn. of it, I may wonder, I may laugh, or I may
On the one hand, I take it to be certain, pity him, but I cannot reason the matter
that whatever can, by just reasoning, be with him. We have no common principles
inferred from a principle that is necessary, from which we may reason, and therefore
must be a necessary truth, and that no can never join issue in an argument.
contingent truth can be inferred from prin This, I think, is the only principle of
ciples that are necessary." [578] common sense that has never directly been
Thus, as the axioms in mathematics are called in question." It seems to be so firmly
all necessary truths, so are all the conclu rooted in the minds of men, as to retain its
sions drawn from them; that is, the whole authority with the greatest scepties. Mr
body of that science. But from no mathe Hume, after annihilating body and mind,
matical truth can we deduce the existence time and space, action and causation, and
of anything; not even of the objects of the even his own mind, acknowledges the reality
science,
of the thoughts, sensations, and passions of
On the other hand, I apprehend there which he is conscious.
are very few cases in which we can, from * it could not £ becalled in question. For,
principles that are contingent, deduce truths in doubting the fact of his consciousness, the sceptie
that are necessary. I can only recollect must at leas' affirm the fact of his doubt; but to
affirm a doubt, is to affirm the consciousness of it;
the doubt would, therefore, be self-contradictory
* See Stewart's “Elements," ii. p. 38. i.e., annihilate itself.-H.
[577–579]
cHAP. v.] FIRST PRINCIPLES OF CONTINGENT TRUTHS. 443
No philosopher has attempted, by any consciousness and reflection, which are often
hypothesis, to account for this consciousness improperly confounded"
of our own thoughts, and the certain know The first is common to all men at all
ledge of their real existence which accom times; but is insufficient of itself to give us
panies it. By this they seem to acknow clear and distinct notions of the opera
ledge that this at least is an original power tions of which we are conscious, and of
of the mind; a power by which we not only their mutual relations and minute distinc
have ideas, but original judgments, and the tions. The second-to wit, attentive reflec
knowledge of real existence. tion upon those operations, making them
I cannot reconcile this immediate know objects of thought, surveying them atten
ledge of the operations of our own minds tively, and examining them on all sides—is
with Mr Locke's theory, that all know so far from being common to all men, that it
ledge consists in perceiving the agreement is the lot of very few. The greatest part
and disagreement of ideas. What are the of men, either through want of capacity, or
ideas, from whose comparison the knowledge from other causes, never reflect attentively
of our own thoughts results? Or what are upon the operations of their own minds.
the agreements or disagreements which con The habit of this reflection, even in those
vince a man that he is in pain when he whom nature has fitted for it, is not to be at
feels it 2 [580] tained without much pains and practice.
Neither can I reconcile it with Mr Hume's We can know nothing of the immediate
theory, that to believe the existence of any objects of sight, but by the testimony of our
thing, is nothing else than to have a strong eyes; and I apprehend that, if mankind
and lively conception of it; or, at most, had found as great difficulty in giving at
that belief is only some modification of the tention to the objects of sight, as they find
idea which is the object of belief. For, not in attentive reflection upon the operations
to mention that propositions, not ideas, are of their own minds, our knowledge of the
the object of belief, in all that variety of first might have been in as backward a state
thoughts and passions of which we are con as our knowledge of the last.
scious we believe the existence of the weak But this darkness will not last for ever.
as well as of the strong, the faint as well as Light will arise upon this benighted part of
the lively. No modification of the opera the intellectual globe. When any man is
tions of our minds disposes us to the least so happy as to delineate the powers of the
doubt of their real existence. human mind as they really are in nature,
As, therefore, the real existence of our men that are free from prejudice, and cap
thoughts, and of all the operations and feel able of reflection, will recognise their own
ings of our own minds, is believed by all features in the picture; and then the wonder
men—as we find ourselves incapable of will be, how things so obvious could be so
doubting it, and as incapable of offering any long wrapped up in mystery and darkness;
proof of it—it may justly be considered as a how men could be carried away by false
first principle, or dictate of common sense. theories and conjectures, when the truth
But, although this principle rests upon was to be found in their own breasts if they
no other, a very considerable and import had but attended to it.
ant branch of human knowledge rests upon 2. Another first principle, I think, is,
it. That the though's of which I am conscious,
For from this source of consciousness is are the thoughts of a being which I call
derived all that we know, and indeed all MysELF, my MIND, my PERson. [582]
that we can know, of the structure and of The thoughts and feelings of which we are
the powers of our own minds; from which conscious are continually changing, and the
we may conclude, that there is no branch thought of this moment is not the thought
of knowledge that stands upon a firmer of the last; but something which I call my
foundation; for surely no kind of evidence self, remains under this change of thought.
can go beyond that of consciousness. This self has the same relation to all the
How does it come to pass, then, that in successive thoughts I am conscious of—they
this branch of knowledge there are so many are all my thoughts; and every thought
and so contrary systems? so many subtile which is not my thought, must be the
controversies that are never brought to an thought of some other person.
issue 2 and so little fixed and determined ? If any man asks a proof of this, I confess
Is it possible that philosophers should differ I can give none; there is an evidence in the
most where they have the surest means of proposition itself which I am unable to re
agreement—where everything is built upon sist. Shall I think that thought can stand
a species of evidence which all men ac by itself without a thinking being? or that
uiesce in, and hold to be the most certain? ideas can feel pleasure or pain? My nature
£ dictates to me that it is impossible.
This strange phaenomenon may, I think,
be accounted for, if we distinguish between * Compare above, pp. 239, b, 258, a-H.
[580-582]
And that nature has dictated the same to an idea, may not chew the cud upon that
all men, appears from the structure of all kind of food which the schoolmen call second
languages : for in all languages men have intentions."
expressed thinking, reasoning, willing, lov 3. Another first principle I take to be—
ing, hating, by personal verbs, which, from That-those things did really happen which I
their nature, require a person who thinks, distinctly remember. [584]
reasons, wills, loves, or hates. From which This has one of the surest marks of a first
it appears, that men have been taught by principle ; for no man ever pretended to
nature to believe that thought requires a prove it, and yet no man in his wits calls it
thinker, reason a reasoner, and love a lover. in question: the testimony of memory, hike
Here we must leave Mr Hume, who con that of consciousness, is immediate ; it
ceives it to be a vulgar error, that, besides claims our assent upon its own authority.*
the thoughts we are conscious of, there is a Suppose that a learned counsel, in defence
mind which is the subject of those thoughts. of a client against the concurring testimony
If the mind be anything else than impres of witnesses of credit, should insist upon a
sions and ideas, it must be a word without new topic to invalidate the testimony.
a meaning. The mind, therefore, accord “Admitting,” says he, “the integrity of
ing to this philosopher, is a word which the witnesses, and that they distinctly re
signifies a bundle of perceptions; or, when member what they have given in evidence
he defines it more accurately—“It is that it does not follow that the prisoner is guilty.
succession of related ideas and impressions, It has never been proved that the most
of which we have an intimate memory and distinct memory may not be fallacious.
consciousness.” Shew me any necessary connection between
I am, therefore, that succession of related that act of the mind which we call memory,
ideas and impressions of which I have the and the past existence of the event remem
intimate memory and consciousness. bered. No man has ever offered a shadow
But who is the I that has this memory of argument to prove such a connection;
and consciousness of a succession of ideas yet this is one link of the chain of proof
and impressions? Why, it is nothing but against the prisoner ; and, if it have no
that succession itself. [583] strength, the whole proof falls to the ground:
Hence, I learn, that this succession of until this, therefore, be made evident—until
ideas and impressions intimately remembers, it can be proved that we may safely rest
and is conscious of itself. I would wish to upon the testimony of memory for the truth
be farther instructed, whether the impres of past events—no judge or jury can justly
sions remember and are conscious of the take away the life of a citizen upon so
ideas, or the ideas remember and are con doubtful a point.”
scious of the impressions, or if both remem I believe we may take it for granted, that
ber and are conscious of both ? and whether this argument from a learned counsel would
the ideas remember those that come after have no other effect upon the judge or jury,
them, as well as those that were before them? than to convince them that he was dis
These are questions naturally arising from ordered in his judgment. Counsel is allowed
this system, that have notyet been explained. to plead everything for a client that is fit to
This, however, is clear, that this succes persuade or to move; yet I believe no
sion of ideas and impressions, not only re counsel ever had the boldness to plead this
members and is conscious, but that it judges, topic. And for what reason ? For no other
reasons, affirms, denies—nay, that it eats reason, surely, but because it is absurd.
and drinks, and is sometimes merry and Now, what is absurd at the bar, is so in the
sometimes sad. philosopher's chair. What would be ridi
If these things can be ascribed to a suc culous, if delivered to a jury of honest sen
cession of ideas and impressions, in a con sible citizens, is no less so when delivered
sistency with common sense, I should be gravely in a philosophical dissertation.
very glad to know what is nonsense. Mr Hume has not, as far as I remember,
The scholastic philosophers have been directly called in question the testimony of
wittily ridiculed, by representing them as
disputing upon this question-Numchimaera * All this criticism of Hume proceeds upon the
Bombinans in vacuo possit comedere secun erroneous hypothesis that he was a Dogmatist. He
was a Sceptic-that is, he accepted the £ *s
das intentiones 2 and I believe the wit of serted by the prevalent Dogmatism; and only shewed
man cannot invent a more ridiculous ques that such and such conclusions were, on these prin
ciples, inevitable. The absurdity was not Hume's, but
tion. But, if Mr Hume's philosophy be Locke's. This is the kind of criticism, however,
admitted, this question deserves to be with which Hume is generally assailed.-H.
treated more gravely : for if, as we learn + The datum of M does not stand upon the
same ground as the datum of simple Consciousness.
from this philosophy, a succession of ideas In so far as memory is consciousness, it cannot be
and impressions may eat, and drink, and denied We cannot, without contradiction, deny the
be merry, I see no good reason why a fact of memory as a present consciousness; but we
may, without contradiction, suppose that the past
chimera, which, if not the same is of kin to given therein, is only an illusion of the present--if.
[583,584]
clap. v.] FIRST PRINCIPLES OF CONTINGENT TRUTHS. 445
memory; but he has laid down the premises 4. Another first principle is, Our own per
by which its authority is overturned, leav sonal identity and continued existence, as
ing it to his reader to draw the conclu
Jar back as we remember anything distinctly.
sión. [585] This we know immediately, and not
He labours to shew that the belief or
by reasoning. It seems, indeed, to be a
assent which always attends the memory part of the testimony of memory. Every
and senses is nothing but the vivacity of thing we remember has such a relation to
those perceptions which they present. He ourselves as to imply necessarily our ex
shews very clearly, that this vivacity gives istence at the time remembered. And
no ground to believe the existence of ex there cannot be a more palpable absurdity
ternal objects. And it is obvious that it than that a man should remember what
can give as little ground to believe the past happened before he existed. He must
existence of the objects of memory. therefore have existed as far back as he re
Indeed the theory concerning ideas, so members anything distinctly, if his memory
generally received by philosophers, destroys be not fallacious. This principle, there
all the authority of memory, as well as the fore, is so connected with the last mention
authority of the senses. Des Cartes, Ma ed, that it may be doubtful whether both
lebranche, and Locke, were aware that this ought not to be included in one. Let
theory made it necessary for them to find every one judge of this as he sees reason.
out arguments to prove the existence of ex The proper notion of identity, and the sen
ternal objects, which the vulgar believe timents of Mr Locke on this subject, have
upon the bare authority of their senses; been considered before, under the head of
but those philosophers were not aware that Memory. [587]
this theory made it equally necessary for 5. Another first principle is, That those
them to find arguments to prove the exist things do really exist which we distinctly
ence of things past, which we remember, perceive by our senses, and are what we
and to support the authority of memory. perceive them to be.
All the arguments they advanced to sup It is too evident to need proof, that all
port the authority of our senses, were easily men are by nature led to give implicit faith
refuted by Bishop Berkeley and Mr Hume, to the distinct testimony of their senses,
being indeed very weak and inconclusive. long before they are capable of any bias
And it would have been as, easy to answer from prejudices of education or of philo
every argument they could have brought, sophy.
consistent with their theory, to support the How came we at first to know that there
authority of memory. are certain beings about us whom we call
For, according to that theory, the im father, and mother, and sisters, and bro
mediate object of memory, as well as of thers, and nurse ? Was it not by the
every other operation of the understanding, testimony of our senses? How did these
is an idea present in the mind. And, from persons convey to us any information or
the present existence of this idea of me instruction? Was it not by means of our
mory I am left to infer, by reasoning, that, senses 2
six months or six years ago, there did ex It is evident we can have no communi
ist an object similar to this idea. [586] cation, no correspondence or society with
But what is there in the idea that can any created being, but by means
of our
lead me to this conclusion ? What mark senses. And, until we rely upon their testi
does it bear of the date of its archetype 2 mony, we must consider ourselves as being
Or what evidence have I that it had an alone in the universe, without any fellow
archetype, and that it is not the first of its creature, living or inanimate, and be left to
kind? converse with our own thoughts.
Perhaps it will be said, that this idea or Bishop Berkeley surely did not duly con
image in the mind must have had a cause. sider that it is by means of the material
I admit that, if there is such an image in world that we have any correspondence
the mind, it must have had a cause, and a with thinking beings, or any knowledge of
cause able to produce the effect; but what their existence; and that, by depriving us
can we infer from its having a cause ? Does of the material world, he deprived us, at
it follow that the effect is a type, an image, the same time, of family, friends, country,
a copy of its cause ? Then it will follow, and every human creature; of every object
that a picture is an image of the painter, of affection, esteem, or concern, except our
and a coach of the coachmaker. selves.
A past event may be known by reasoning: The good Bishop surely never intended
but that is not remembering it. When I this. He was too warm a friend, too zeal
remember a thing distinctly, I disdain ous a patriot, and too good a Christian, to
equally to hear reasons for it or against it. be capable of such a thought. He was not
And so I think does every man in his aware of the consequences of his system,
senses. and therefore they ought not to be imputed
[585–58%
446 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [EssAv v1.
to him; but we must impute them to the believe their existence as philosophers have
system itself. It stifles every generous and to believe the existence of ideas, while they
social principle. [588] hold them to be the immediate objects of
When I consider myself as speaking to perception."
men who hear me, and can judge of what 6. Another first principle, I think, is,
I say, I feel that respect which is due to That we have some degree of power over
such an audience. I feel an enjoyment in our actions, and the determinations of our
a reciprocal communication of sentiments will.
with candid and ingenious friends; and my All power must be derived from the
soul blesses the Author of my being, who fountain of power, and of every good gift.
has made me capable of this manly and Upon His good pleasure its continuance de
rational entertainment. pends, and it is always subject to his con
But the Bishop shews me, that this is trol.
all a dream ; that I see not a human face; Beings to whom God has given any de
that all the objects I see, and hear, and gree of power, and understanding to direct
handle, are only the ideas of my own mind; them to the proper use of it, must be ac
ideas are my only companions. Cold com countable to their Maker. But those who
pany, indeed! Every social affection freezes are intrusted with no power can have no
at the thought ! account to make; for all good conduct con
But, my Lord Bishop, are there no minds sists in the right use of power; all bad
left in the universe but my own P conduct in the abuse of it.
Yes, indeed; it is only the material To call to account a being who never was
world that is annihilated; everything else intrusted with any degree of power, is an
remains as it was. absurdity no less than it would be to call
This seems to promise some comfort in to account an inanimate being. We are
my forlorn solitude. But do I see those sure, therefore, if we have any account to
minds 2 No. Do I see their ideas? No. make to the Author of our being, that we
Nor do they see me or my ideas. They must have some degree of power, which,
are, then, no more to me than the inhabit as far as it is properly used, entitles us to
ants of Solomon's isles, or of the moon ; his approbation; and, when abused, renders
and my melancholy solitude returns. Every us obnoxious to his displeasure. [590]
social tie is broken, and every social affec It is not easy to say in what way we first
tion is stifled. get the notion or idea of power. It is
This dismal system, which, if it could be neither an object of sense nor of conscious
believed, would deprive men of every social ness. We see events, one succeeding an
comfort, a very good Bishop, by strict and other; but we see not the power by which
accurate reasoning, deduced from the prin they are produced. We are conscious of
ciples commonly received by philosophers the operations of our minds; but power is
concerning ideas. The fault is not in the not an operation of mind. If we had no
reasoning, but in the principles from which notions but such as are furnished by the
it is drawn. external senses, and by consciousness, it
All the arguments urged by Berkeley and seems to be impossible that we should ever
Hume, against the existence of a material have any conception of power. Accord
world, are grounded upon this principle ingly, Mr Hume, who has reasoned the
that we do not perceive external objects most accurately upon this hypothesis, denies
themselves, but certain images or ideas in that we have any idea of power, and clearly
our own minds." But this is no dictate of refutes the account given by Mr Locke of
common sense, but directly contrary to the the origin of this idea.
sense of all who have not been taught it by But it is in vain to reason from a hypo
philosophy. [589] thesis against a fact, the truth of which
We have before examined the reasons every man may see by attending to his own
given by philosophers to prove that ideas, thoughts. It is evident that all men, very
and not external objects, are the immediate early in life, not only have an idea of power,
objects of perception, and the instances but a conviction that they have some de
given to prove the senses fallacious. With gree of it in themselves; for this conviction
out repeating what has before been said is necessarily implied in many operations
upon those points, we shall only here ob of mind, which are familiar to every man,
serve, that, if external objects be perceived and without which no man can act the part
immediately, we have the same reason to of a reasonable being.
First, It is implied in every act of voli
* Idealism, as already noticed, rests equally well, tion. “Volition, it is plain,” says Mr
if not better, on the hypothesis that what we perceive Locke, “is an act of the mind, knowingly
(or are conscious of in perception) is only a modifica.
tion of mind, as on the hypothesis that, in perception,
we are conscious of a representative, entity distinct * Philosophers admitted that we are conscious of
from mind as from the external reality.-H. these: does Reid admit this of external objects?-H.
[588-590]
oHAP. v.] FIRST PRINCIPLES OF CONTINGENT TRUTHS. 447
exerting that dominion which it takes itself must trust his faculties, and take for granted
to have over any part of the man, by em the very thing in question. [592]
ploying it in, or withholding it from any If a man's honesty were called in ques
particular action.” Every volition, there tion, it would be ridiculous to refer it to the
fore, implies a conviction of power to do the man's own word, whether he be honest or
action willed. A man may desire to make not. The same absurdity there is in at
a visit to the moon, or to the planet Jupi tempting to prove, by any kind of reasoning,
ter; but nothing but insanity could make probable or demonstrative, that our reason
him will to do so. And, if even insanity is not fallacious, since the very point in
produced this effect, it must be by making question is, whether reasoning may be
him think it to be in his power. trusted.
Secondly, This conviction is implied in If a sceptic should build his scepticism
all deliberation ; for no man in his wits de upon this foundation, that all our reasoning
liberates whether he shall do what he be and judging powers are fallacious in their
lieves not to be in his power. Thirdly, nature, or should resolve at least to with
The same conviction is implied in every hold assent until it be proved that they are
resolution or purpose formed in consequence not, it would be impossible by argument
of deliberation. A man may as well form to beat him out of this stronghold; and he
a resolution to pull the moon out of her must even be left to enjoy his scepticism.
sphere, as to do the most insignificant action Des Cartes certainly made a false step in
which he believes not to be in his power. this matter, for having suggested this doubt
The same thing may be said of every pro among others—that whatever evidence he
mise or contract wherein a man plights his might have from his consciousness, his
faith; for he is not an honest man who senses, his memory, or his reason, yet
promises what he does not believe he has possibly some malignant being had given
power to perform. [591] him those faculties on purpose to impose
As these operations imply a belief of upon him; and, therefore, that they are not
some degree of power in ourselves; so there to be trusted without a proper voucher.
are others equally common and familiar, To remove this doubt, he endeavours to
which imply a like belief with regard to prove the being of a Deity who is no de
others. ceiver; whence he concludes, that the facul
When we impute to a man any action or ties he had given him are true and worthy
omission, as a ground of approbation or of to be trusted.
blame, we must believe he had power to do It is strange that so acute a reasoner did
otherwise. The same is implied in all not perceive that in this reasoning there is
advice, exhortation, command, and rebuke, evidently a begging of the question.
and in every case in which we rely upon his For, if our faculties be fallacious, why
fidelity in performing any engagement or may they not deceive us in this reasoning as
executing any trust. well as in others ? And, if they are not to
It is not more evident that mankind have be trusted in this instance without a voucher,
a conviction of the existence of a material why not in others? [593]
world, than that they have the conviction Every kind of reasoning for the veracity
of some degree of power in themselves and of our faculties, amounts to no more than
in others; every one over his own actions, taking their own testimony for their vera
and the determinations of his will—a con city; and this we must do implicitly, until
viction so early, so general, and so inter God give us new faculties to sit in judg
woven with the whole of human conduct, ment upon the old; and the reason why
that it must be the natural effect of our Des Cartes satisfied himself with so weak
constitution, and intended by the Author of an argument for the truth of his faculties,
our being to guide our actions. most probably was, that he never seriously
It resembles our conviction of the ex doubted of it.
istence of a material world in this respect If any truth can be said to be prior to all
also, that even those who reject it in specu others in the order of nature, this seems
lation, find themselves under a necessity of to have the best claim.; because, in every
being governed by it in their practice; and instance of assent, whether upon intuitive,
thus it will always happen when philosophy demonstrative, or probable evidence, the
contradicts first principles. truth of our faculties is taken for granted,
7. Another first principle is–That the and is, as it were, one of the premises on
natural faculties, by which we distinguish which our assent is grounded."
truth from error, are not fallacious. If any How then come we to be assured of this
man should demand a proof of this, it is
impossible to satisfy him. For, suppose it * There is a presumption in favour of the veracity
should be mathematically demonstrated, of the primary data of consciousness. This can only
be rebutted by shewing that these facts are contradic
this would signify nothing in this case; tory. Scepticism attempts to shew this on the prin
because, to judge of a demonstration, a man cipies which Dogmatism postulates.-H.
[591-593]
448 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. Less Av v1.
fundamental truth on which all others rest? ticism, that their scepticism lies in generals,
Perhaps evidence, as in many other respects while in particulars they are no less dog
it resembles light, so in this also—that, as matical than others.
light, which is the discoverer of all visible 8. Another first principle relating to ex
objects, discovers itself at the same time, istence, is, That there is life and intelligence
so evidence, which is the voucher for all in our fellow-men with whom we converse.
truth, vouches for itself at the same time. As soon as children are capable of asking
This however, is certain, that such is a question, or of answering a question, as
the constitution of the human mind, that soon as they shew the signs of love, of re
evidence discerned by us, forces a corre sentment, or of any other affection, they
sponding degree of assent. And a man must be convinced that those with whom
who perfectly understood a just syllogism, they have this intercourse are intelligent
without believing that the conclusion follows beings [595]
from the premises, would be a greater mon It is evident they are capable of such in
ster than a man born without hands or tercourse long before they can reason.
feet. Every one knows that there is a social in
We are born under a necessity of trust. tercourse between the nurse and the child
ing to our reasoning and judging powers; before it is a year old. It can, at that age,
and a real belief of their being fallacious understand many things that are said to it.
cannot be maintained for any considerable It can by signs ask and refuse, threaten
time by the greatest sceptic, because it is and supplicate. It clings to its nurse in
doing violence to our constitution. It is danger, enters into her grief and joy, is hap
like a man's walking upon his hands, a feat py in her soothing and caresses, and un
which some men upon occasion can exhibit; happy in her displeasure. That these
but no man ever made a long journey in things cannot be without a conviction in
this manner. Cease to admire his dexte the child that the nurse is an intelligent
rity, and he will, like other men, betake being, I think must be granted.
himself to his legs. [594] Now, I would ask how a child of a year
We may here take notice of a property old comes by this conviction ? Not by rea
of the principle under consideration, that soning surely, for children do not reason at
seems to be common to it with many other that age. Nor is it by external senses, for
first principles, and which can hardly be life and intelligence are not objects of the
found in any principle that is built solely external senses.
upon reasoning; and that is, that in most By what means, or upon what occasions,
men it produces its effect without ever being Nature first gives this information to the
attended to, or made an object of thought. infant mind, is not easy to determine. We
No man ever thinks of this principle, unless are not capable of reflecting upon our own
when he considersthe grounds of scepticism; thoughts at that period of life; and before
yet it invariably governs his opinions, we attain this capacity, we have quite for
When a man in the common course of got how or on what occasion we first had
life gives credit to the testimony of his this belief; we perceive it in those who are
senses, his memory, or his reason, he does born blind, and in others who are born
not put the question to himself, whether deaf; and therefore Nature has not con
these faculties may deceive him; yet the nected it solely either with any object of
trust he reposes in them supposesan inward sight, or with any object of hearing. When
conviction, that, in that instance at least, we grow up to the years of reason and re
they do not deceive him. flection, this belief remains. No man thinks
It is another property of this and of many of asking himself what reason he has to be
first principles, that they force assentin par lieve that his neighbour is a living creature.
ticular instances, more powerfully than He would be not a little surprised if another
when they are turned into a general propo person should ask him, so absurd a ques
sition. Many sceptics have denied every tion ; and perhaps could not give any rea
general principle of science, excepting per son which would not equally prove a watch
haps the existence of our present thoughts; or a puppet to be a living creature.
yet these men reason, and refute, and prove, But, though you should satisfy him of the
they assent and dissent in particular cases. weakness of the reasons he gives for his be
They use reasoning to overturn all reason lief, you cannot make him in the least
ing, and judge that they ought to have no doubtful. This belief stands upon another
judgment, and see clearly that they are foundation than that of reasoning; and
blind. Many have in general maintained therefore, whether a man can give good
that the senses are fallacious, yet there reasons for it or not, it is not in his power
never was found a man so sceptical as not to shake it off [596]
to trust his senses in particular instances Setting aside this natural conviction, I
when his safety required it; and it may be believe, the best reason we can give to
observed of those who have professed scep prove that other men are living and intelli
[594-596]
chap. v.] FIRST PRINCIPLES OF CONTINGENT TRUTHS. 449
gent, is, that their words and actions indi could make the child leap and dance for
cate like powers of understanding as we joy.
are conscious of in ourselves. The very It is not by experience surely that we
same argument applied to the works of na learn the expression of music; for its opera
ture, leads us to conclude that there is an tion is commonly strongest the first time we
intelligent Author of nature, and appears hear it. One air expresses mirth and festi
equally strong and obvious in the last case vity—so that, when we hear it, it is with
as in the first; so that it may be doubted difficulty we can forbear to dance; another
whether men, by the mere exercise of rea is sorrowful and solemn. One inspires with
soning, might not as soon discover the ex tenderness and love; another with rage and
istence of a Deity, as that other men have fury.
life and intelligence. “Hear how Timotheus varied lays surprise,
The knowledge of the last is absolutely And bid alternate passions fall and rise;
While at each change, the son of Lybian Jove
necessary to our receiving any improve Now burns with glory, and then melts with love.
ment by means of instruction and example; Now his fierce eyes with sparkling fury glow,
and, without these means of improvement, Now sighs steal out, and tears begin to flow.
Persians and Greeks, like turns of Nature, found,
there is no ground to think that we should Aud the world's victor stood subdu'd by sound."
ever be able to acquire the use of our rea
soning powers. This knowledge, therefore, It is not necessary that a man have studied
must be antecedent to reasoning, and there either music or the passions, in order to his
fore must be a first principle. feeling these effects. The most ignorant
It cannot be said that the judgments we and unimproved, to whom Nature has given
form concerning life and intelligence in a good ear, feel them as strongly as the
other beings are at first free from error. most knowing. [598]
But the errors of children in this matter The countenance and gesture have an
iie on the safe side; they are prone to at expression no less strong and natural than
tribute intelligence to things inanimate. the voice. The first time one sees a stern
These errors are of small consequence, and and fierce look, a contracted brow, and a
are gradually corrected by experience and menacing posture, he concludes that the
ripe judgment. But the belief of life and person is inflamed with anger. Shall we
intelligence in other men, is absolutely ne say, that, previous to experience, the most
cessary for us before we are capable of hostile countenance has as agreeable an
reasoning; and therefore the Author of appearance as the most gentle and benign P
our being hath given us this belief antece This surely would contradict all experience;
dently to all reasoning. for we know that an angry countenance
9. Another first principle I take to be, will fright a child in the cradle. Who has
That certain features of the countenance, not observed that children, very early, are
sounds of the voice, and gestures of the body, able to distinguish what is said to them in
indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of jest from what is said in earnest, by the
tone of the voice, and the features of the
mind. [597]
That many operations of the mind have face? They judge by these natural signs,
their natural signs in the countenance, voice, even when they seem to contradict the arti
and gesture, I suppose every man will ad ficial.
mit. Omnis enim mous animi, says Cicero, If it were by experience that we learn
suum quemdam habet a natura vultum, et the meaning of features, and sound, and
vacem et gestum. The only question is, gesture, it might be expected that we should
recollect the time when we first learned
whether we understand the signification of
those signs, by the constitution of our na those lessons, or, at least, some of such a
ture, by a kind of natural perception simi multitude.
lar to the perceptions of sense; or whether Those who give attention to the opera
we gradually learn the signification of such tions of children, can easily discover the
signs from experience, as we learn that time when they have their earliest notices
smoke is a sign of fire, or that the freezing from experience—such as that flame will
of water is a sign of cold * I take the first burn, or that knives will cut. But no
to be the truth. man is able to recollect in himself, or to
It seems to me incredible, that the no observe in others, the time when the expres
tions men have of the expression of features, sion of the face, voice, and gesture, were
voice, and gesture, are entirely the fruit of learned. -
experience. Children, almost assoon as born, Nay, I apprehend that it is impossible

may be frighted, and thrown into fits by a that this should be learned from experi
ence,
threatening or angry tone of voice. I knew
a man who could make an infant cry, by When we see the sign, and see the thing
whistling a melancholy tune in the same signified always conjoined with it, expe
or in the next room; and again, by alter rience may be the instructor, and teach us
ing his key, and the strain of his music, how that sign is to be interpreted. But
2 G
£397, 598]
how shall experience instruct us when we scenes of plays, without any recitation, and
see the sign only, when the thing signified yet could be perfectly understood.
is invisible? Now, this is the case here : And here it deserves our notice, that, al
the thoughts and passions of the mind, as though it required much study and practice
well as the mind itself, are invisible, and in the pantomimes to excel in their art,
therefore their connection with any sensible yet it required neither study nor practice in
sign cannot be first discovered by expe the spectators to understand them. It was
perience; there must be some earlier source a natural language, and therefore under
of this knowledge. [599] stood by all men, whether Romans, Greeks,
Nature seems to have given to men a or barbarians, by the learned and the un
faculty or sense, by which this connection learned.
is perceived. And the operation of this Lucian relates, that a king, whose domi
sense is very analogous to that of the ex nions bordered upon the Euxine Sea, hap
ternal senses. pening to be at Rome in the reign of Nero,
When I grasp an ivory ball in my hand, and having seen a pantomime act, begged
I feel a certain sensation of touch. In the him of Nero, that he might use him in his
sensation there is nothing external, nothing intercourse with all the nations in his
corporeal. The sensation is neither round neighbourhood; for, said he, I am obliged
nor hard; it is an act of feeling of the to employ I don't know how many inter
mind, from which I cannot, by reasoning, preters, in order to keep a correspondence
infer the existence of any body. But, by with neighbours who speak many languages,
the constitution of my nature, the sensation and do not understand mine; but this fel
carries along with it the conception and be low will make them all understand him.
lief of a round hard body really existing in For these reasons, I conceive, it must be
my hand. granted, not only that there is a connection
In like manner, when I see the features established by Nature between certain signs
of an expressive face, I see only figure and in the countenance, voice, and gesture, and
colour variously modified. But, by the the thoughts and passions of the mind; but
constitution of my nature, the visible ob also, that, by our constitution, we under
ject brings along with it the conception stand the meaning of those signs, and from
and belief of a certain passion or sentiment the sign conclude the existence of the thing
in the mind of the person. signified. [601 |
In the former case, a sensation of touch 10. Another first principle appears to
is the sign, and the hardness and roundness me to be–That there is a certain regard
of the body I grasp is signified by that sen due to human testimony in matters of fact,
sation. In the latter case, the features of and even to human authority in matters of
the person is the sign, and the passion or opinion.
sentiment is signified by it. Before we are capable of reasoning about
The power of natural signs, to signify testimony or authority, there are many
the sentiments and passions of the mind, is things which it concerns us to know, for
seen in the signs of dumb persons, who can which we can have no other evidence. The
make themselves to be understood in a con wise Author of nature hath planted in the
siderable degree, even by those who are human mind a propensity to rely upon this
wholly inexperienced in that language. evidence before we can give a reason for
It is seen in the traffic which has been fre doing so. This, indeed, puts our judgment
quently carried on between people that have almost entirely in the power of those who
no common acquired language. They can £ about us in the first period of life; but
buy and sell, and ask and refuse, and shew a this is necessary both to our preservation
friendly or hostile disposition by natural and to our improvement. If children were
signs. [600] so framed as to pay no regard to testimony
It was seen still more in the actors or to authority, they must, in the literal
among the ancients who performed the sense, perish for lack of knowledge. It is
gesticulation upon the stage, while others not more necessary that they should be fed
recited the words. To such a pitch was before they can feed themselves, than that
this art carried, that we are told Cicero they should be instructed in many things
and Roscius used to contend whether the before they can discover them by their own
orator could express anything by words, judgment.
which the actor could not express in dumb But, when our faculties ripen, we find
show by gesticulation; and whether the reason to check that propensity to yield to
same sentence or thought could not be act testimony and to authority, which was so
ed in all the variety of ways in which the necessary and so natural in the first period
orator could express it in words. of life. We learn to reason about the re
But the most surprising exhibition of gard due to them, and see it to be a childish
this kind, was that of the pantomimes weakness to lay more stress upon them than
among the Romans, who acted plays, or than reason justifies. Yet, I believe, to
[599–601"
onAP. v.] FIRST PRINCIPLES OF CONTINGENT TRUTHS. 451
the end of life, most men are more apt to go us no wiser with regard to what is to
into this extreme than into the contrary; come,
and the natural propensity still retains some This is one of those principles which,
force. when we grow up and observe the course of
The natural principles, by which our nature, we can confirm by reasoning. We
judgments and opinions are regulated before perceive that Nature is governed by fixed
we come to the use of reason, seem to be no laws, and that, if it were not so, there could
less necessary to such a being as man, than be no such thing as prudence in human
those natural instincts which the Author of conduct; there would be no fitness in any
nature hath given us to regulate our actions means to promote an end; and what, on
during that period. [602] one occasion, promoted it, might as pro
11. There are many events depending bably, on another occasion, obstruct it.
upon the will of man, in which there is a But the principle is necessary for us be
self-evident probability, greater or less, ac fore we are able to discover it by reasoning,
cording to circumstances. and therefore is made a part of our consti
There may be in some individuals such a tution, and produces its effects before the
degree of frenzy and madness, that no use of reason.
man can say what they may or may not do. This principle remains in all its force
Such persons we find it necessary to put when we come to the use of reason; but
under restraint, that as far as possible they we learn to be more cautious in the appli
may be kept from doing harm to themselves cation of it. We observe more carefully
or to others. They are not considered as the circumstances on which the past event
reasonable creatures, or members of society. depended, and learn to distinguish them
But, as to men who have a sound mind, we from those which were accidentally con
depend upon a certain degree of regularity joined with it.
in their conduct; and could put a thousand In order to this, a number of experi
different cases, wherein we could venture, ments, varied in their circumstances, is
ten to one, that they will act in such a way, often necessary. Sometimes a single ex
and not in the contrary. periment is thought sufficient to establish a
If we had no confidence in our fellow-men general conclusion. Thus, when it was
that they will act such a part in such cir once found, that, in a certain degree of cold,
cumstances, it would be impossible to live quicksilver became a hard and malleable
in society with them. For that which metal, there was good reason to think that
makes men capable of living in society, and the same degree £ will always produce
uniting in a political body under government, this effect to the end of the world. [604]
is, that their actions will always be regu I need hardly mention, that the whole
lated, in a great measure, by the common fabric of natural philosophy is built upon
principles of human nature. this principle, and, if it be taken away,
It may always be expected that they must tumble down to the foundation.
will regard their own interest and reputa Therefore the great Newton lays it down
tion, and that of their families and friends; as an axiom, or as one of his laws of philo
that they will repel injuries, and have some sophising, in these words, Effectuum natur
sense of good offices; and that they will alium ejusdem generis easdem esse causas.
have some regard to truth and justice, so This is what every man assents to, as soon
far at least as not to swerve from them as he understands it, and no man asks a
without temptation. reason for it. It has, therefore, the most
It is upon such principles as these, that genuine marks of a first principle.
all political reasoning is grounded. Such It is very remarkable, that, although all
reasoning is never demonstrative; but it our expectation of what is to happen in the
may have a very great degree of probability, course of nature is derived from the belief
especially when applied to great bodies of of this principle, yet no man thinks of ask
men. [603] ing what is the ground of this belief.
12. The last principle of contingent truths Mr Hume, I think, was the first" who
I mention is, That, in the phaenomena of put this question; and he has shewn clearly
nature, what is to be, will probably be like and invincibly, that it is neither grounded
to what has been in similar circumstances." upon reasoning, nor has that kind of intui
We must have this conviction as soon as tive evidence which mathematical axioms
we are capable of learning anything from have. It is not a necessary truth.
experience; for all experience is grounded He has endeavoured to account for it
upon a belief that the future will be like upon his own principles. It is not my
the past. Take away this principle, and business, at present, to examine the account
the experience of an hundred years makes he has given of this universal belief of man
* Compare above, “Inquiry," c. vi. $24, 8tewart's * Hume was not the first: but on the various
pini L.the g i of this expectancy, 1
* Elements", i. p. 205. “ Phil phical Essays,"
74, sq.-H. cannot touch.-H.
602–604] 2 G 2
452 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS [Essav v1.
kind; because, whether his account of it be Mr Hume hath discovered, as he appre
just or not, (and I think it is not,) yet, as hends, a weak side, even in mathematical
this belief is universal among mankind, and axioms; and thinks that it is not strictly
is not grounded upon any antecedent rea true, for instance, that two right lines can
soning, but upon the constitution of the cut one another in one point only.
mind itself, it must be acknowledged to be The principle he reasons from is, That
a first principle, in the sense in which I every simple idea is a copy of a preceding
use that word. impression; and therefore in its precision
I do not at all affirm, that those I have and accuracy, can never go beyond its ori
mentioned are all the first principles from ginal. From which he reasons in this man
which we may reason concerning contingent ner: No man ever saw or felt a line so
truths. Such enumerations, even when straight that it might not cut another,
made after much reflection, are seldom per equally straight, in two or more points.
fect. [605] Therefore, there can be no idea of such a
line.
The ideas that are most essential to geo
CHAPTER VI. metry—such as those of equality, of a
straight line, and of a square surface, are far,
FIRs.T PRINCIPLEs or NECESSARY TRUThs. he says, from being distinct and deter
minate; and the definitions destroy the
ABoUT most of the first principles of ne pretended demonstrations. Thus, mathe
cessary truths there has been no dispute, matical demonstration is found to be a rope
and therefore it is the less necessary to of sand.
dwell upon them. It will be sufficient to I agree with this acute author, that, if
divide them into different classes; to men we could form monotion of points, lines, and
tion some, by way of specimen, in each surfaces, more accurate than those we see
class; and to make some remarks on those and handle, there could be no mathematical
of which the truth has been called in ques demonstration.
tion. But every man that has understanding,
They may, I think, most properly be by analysing, by abstracting, and compound
divided according to the sciences to which ing the rude materials exhibited by his
they belong. senses, can fabricate, in his own mind,
1. There are some first principles that those elegant and accurate forms of mathe
may be called grammatical. such as, That matical lines, surfaces, and solids. [607]
every adjective in a sentence must belong to If a man finds himself incapable of form
some substantive expressed or understood; ing a precise and determinate notion of the
That every complete sentence must have a figure which mathematicians call a cube,
verb. he not only is no mathematician, but is in
Those who have attended to the struc
capable of being one. But, if he has a pre
ture of language, and formed distinct no cise and determinate notion of that figure,
tions of the nature and use of the various
he must perceive that it is terminated by six
parts of speech, perceive, without reasoning, mathematical surfaces, perfectly square and
that these, and many other such principles, perfectly equal. He must perceive that
are necessarily true. these surfaces are terminated by twelve
2. There are logical axioms: such as, mathematical lines, perfectly straight and
That any contexture of words which does not perfectly equal, and that those lines are ter
make a proposition, is neither true nor false; minated by eight mathematical points.
That every proposition is either true or When a man is conscious of having these
false; That no proposition can be both true conceptions distinct and determinate, as
and false at the same time; That reasoning every mathematician is, it is in vain to bring
in a circle proves nothing; That whatever metaphysical arguments to convince him
may be truly affirmed of a genus, may be that they are not distinct. You may as well
truly affirmed of all the species, and all the bring arguments to convince a man racked
individuals belonging to that genus. [606] with pain that he feels no pain.
3. Everyone knows there are mathematical Every theory that is inconsistent with our
axioms." Mathematicians have, from the having accurate notions of mathematical
days of Euclid, very wisely laid down the lines, surfaces, and solids, must be false.
axioms or first principles on which they Therefore it follows, that they are not copies
reason. And the effect which this appears of our impressions.
to have had upon the stability and happy The Medi Venus is not a copy of the
progress of this science, gives no small en block of marble from which it was made.
couragement to attempt to lay the founda It is true, that the elegant statue was
tion of other sciences in a similar manner, formed out of the rude block, and that, too,
as far as we are able.
by a manual operation, which, in a literal
see stewart's “ Elements," ii. p. 38, sq.--H. sense, we may call abstraction. Mathe
[605-607]
-a ---------------------
chAP. vi.] FIRST PRINCIPLES OF NECESSARY TRUTHS. 453
matical motions are formed in the under I do not maintain that taste, so far as it
standing by an abstraction of another kind. is acquired, or so far as it is merely animal,
out of the rude perceptions of our senses. can be reduced to principles. But, as far
As the truths of natural philosophy are as it is founded on judgment, it certainly may.
not necessary truths, but contingent, de The virtues, the graces, the muses, have
pending upon the will of the Maker of the a beauty that is intrinsic. It lies not in
world, the principles from which they are the feelings of the spectator, but in the
deduced must be of the same nature, and, real excellence of the object. If we do not
therefore, belong not to this class. [608] perceive their beauty, it is owing to the de
4. I think there are axioms, even in fect or to the perversion of our faculties.
matters of taste. Notwithstanding the And, as there is an original beauty in cer
variety found among men, in taste, there tain moral and intellectual qualities, so
are, I apprehend, some common principles, there is a borrowed and derived beauty
even in matters of this kind. I never heard in the natural signs and expressions of
of any man who thought it a beauty in a such qualities.
human face to want a nose, or an eye, or to The features of the human face, the mo
have the mouth on one side. How many dulations of the voice, and the proportions,
ages have passed since the days of Homer ! attitudes, and gesture of the body, are all
Yet, in this long tract of ages, there never natural expressions of good or bad quali
was found a man who took Thersites for a ties of the person, and derive a beauty or
beauty. a deformity from the qualities which they
The fine arts are very properly called the express.
arts of taste, because the principles of both Works of art express some quality of
are the same; and, in the fine arts, we find the artist, and often derive an additional
no less agreement among those who practise beauty from their utility or fitness for their
them than among other artists. end.
No work of taste can be either relished Of such things there are some that
or understood by those who do not agree ought to please, and others that ought to
with the author in the principles of taste. displease. If they do not, it is owing to
Homer and Virgil, and Shakspeare and some defect in the spectator. But what
Milton, had the same taste; and all men has real excellence will always please
who have been acquainted with their writ those who have a correct judgment and a
ings, and agree in the admiration of them, sound heart. [610]
must have the same taste. The sum of what has been said upon
The fundamental rules of poetry and this subject is, that, setting aside the
music, and painting, and dramatic action and tastes which men acquire by habit and
eloquence, have been always the same, and fashion, there is a natural taste, which is
will be so to the end of the world. partly animal, and partly rational. With
The variety we find among men in matters regard to the first, all we can say is,
of taste, is easily accounted for, consistently that the Author of nature, for wise rea
with what we have advanced. sons, has formed us so as to receive plea
There is a taste that is acquired, and a sure from the contemplation of certain
taste that is natural. This holds with re objects, and disgust from others, before
spect both to the external sense of taste and we are capable of perceiving any real ex
the internal. Habit and fashion have a cellence in one or defect in the other.
powerful influence upon both. But that taste which we may call ration
Of tastes that are natural, there are some al, is that part of our constitution by
that may be called rational, others that are which we are made to receive pleasure
merely animal. from the contemplation of what we con
Children are delighted with brilliant and ceive to be excellent in its kind, the plea
gaudy colours, with romping and noisy sure being annexed to this judgment, and
mirth, with feats of agility, strength, or regulated by it. This taste may be true
cunning; and savages have much the same or false, according as it is founded on a
tas'e as children. [609 true or false judgment. And, if it may be
But there are tastes that are more intel true or false, it must have first principles.
lectual. It is the dictate of our rational na 5. There are also first principles in mo
ture, that love and admiration are misplaced rals.
when thereis no intrinsic worth in the object. That an unjust action has more demerit
In those operations of taste which are ra than an ungenerous one : That a generous
tional, we judge of the real worth and ex action has more merit than a merely just
cellence of the object, and our love or one : That no man ought to be blamed for
admiration is guided by that judgment. In what it was not in his power to hinder : That
such operations there is judgment as well we ought not to do to others what we would
as feeling, and the feeling depends upon think unjust or unfair to be done to us in
the judgment we form of the object. like circumstances. These are moral axioms,
[608–610]
and many others might be named which ap It is not more evident that two and twe
pear to me to have no less evidence than make four, than it is that figure cannot
those of mathematics. exist, unless there be something that is
Some perhaps may think that our de figured, nor motion without something that
terminations, either in matters of taste or is moved. I not only perceive figure and
in morals, ought not to be accounted ne motion, but I perceive them to be qualities.
cessary truths: That they are grounded They have a necessary relation to some
upon the constitution of that faculty which thing in which they exist as their subject.
we call taste, and of that which we call The difficulty which some philosophers have
the moral sense or conscience; which fa found in admitting this, is entirely owing to
culties might have been so constituted as the theory of ideas. A subject of the sen
to have given determinations different, or sible qualities which we perceive by our
even contrary to those they now give : senses, is not an idea either of sensation or
That, as there is nothing sweet or bitter of consciousness; therefore say they, we
in itself, but according as it agrees or dis have no such idea. Or, in the style of Mr
agrees with the external sense called taste; Hume, from what impression is the idea of
so there is nothing beautiful or ugly in it substance derived ? It is not a copy of any
self, but according as it agrees or dis impression; therefore there is no such idea.
agrees with the internal sense, which we The distinction between sensible quali
also call taste; and nothing morally good ties, and the substance to which they belong,
or ill in itself, but according as it agrees and between thought and the mind that
or disagrees with our moral sense. [611] thinks, is not the invention of philosophers;
This indeed is a system, with regard to it is found in the structure of all languages,
morals and taste, which hath been supported and therefore must be common to all men
in modern times by great authorities. And who speak with understanding. And I
if this system be true, the consequence believe no man, however sceptical he may
must be, that there can be no principles, be in speculation, can talk on the common
either of taste or of morals, that are neces affairs of life for half an hour, without say
sary truths. For, according to this system, ing things that imply his belief of the reality
all our determinations, both with regard to of these distinctions.
matters of taste, and with regard to morals, Mr Locke acknowledges, “That we can
are reduced to matters of fact-I mean to not conceive how simple ideas of sensible
such as these, that by our constitution we qualities should subsist alone; and there
have on such occasions certain agreeable fore we suppose them to exist in, and to be
feelings, and on other occasions certain dis supported by, some common subject.” In
agreeable feelings. his Essay, indeed, some of his expressions
But I cannot help being of a contrary seem to leave it dubious whether this belief,
opinion, being persuaded t a man who that sensible qualities must have a subject,
determined that polite behaviour has great be a true judgment or a vulgar prejudice.
deformity, and that there is great beauty [613] But in his first letter to the Bishop
in rudeness and ill-breeding, would judge of Worcester, he removes this doubt, and
wrong, whatever his feelings were. quotes many of his Essay, to shew
In like manner, I cannot help thinking that he neither denied nor doubted of the
that a man who determined that there is existence of substances, both thinking and
more moral worth in cruelty, perfidy, and material; and that he believed their ex
injustice, than in generosity, justice, pru istence on the same ground the Bishop
dence, and temperance, would judge wrong, did—to wit, “on the repugnancy to our
whatever his constitution was. conceptions, that modes and accidentsshould
And, if it be true that there is judgment subsist by themselves.” He offers no proof
in our determinations of taste and of morals, of this repugnancy; mor, I think, can any
it must be granted that what is true or proof of it be given, because it is a first
false in morals, or in matters of taste, is principle.
necessarily so. For this reason, I have It were to be wished that Mr Locke, who
ranked the first principles of morals and of inquired so accurately and so laudably into
taste under the class of necessary truths. the origin, certainty, and extent of human
6. The last class of first principles I shall knowledge, had turned his attention more
mention, we may call metaphysical. particularly to the origin of these two
I shall particularly consider three of these, opinions which he firmly believed; to wit,
because they have been called in question that sensible qualities must have a subject
by Mr Hume. [612] which we call body, and that thought must
The first is, That the qualities which we have a subject which we call mind. A due
perceive by our senses must have a subject, attention to these two opinions which go
which we call body, and that the thoughts vern the belief of all men, even of scepties
we are conscious of must have a subject, in the practice of life, would probably have
which we call mind. led him to perceive, that sensation and
[611-613]
cHAP. v1.] FIRST PRINCIPLES OF NECESSARY TRUTHS. 45.5
consciousness are not the only sources of that have been urged by philosophers, in the
human knowledge; and that there are prin way of abstract reasoning, to prove that
ciples of belief in human nature, of which things which beginto exist must havea cause.
we can give no other account but that they One is offered by Mr Hobbes, another
necessarily result from the constitution of by Dr Samuel Clarke, another by Mr Locke.
our faculties; and that, if it were in our Mr Hume, in his “Treatise of Human
power to throw off their influence upon our Nature,” has examined them all;" and, in
practice and conduct, we could neither my opinion, has shewn that they take for
speak nor act like reasonable men. granted the thing to be proved; a kind of
We cannot give a reason why we believe false reasoning, which men are very apt to
even our sensations to be real and not fal fall into when they attempt to prove what
lacious; why we believe what we are con is self-evident. [615]
scious of ; why we trust any of our natural It has been thought, that, although this
faculties. We say, it must be so, it cannot principle does not admit of proof from
be otherwise. This expresses only a strong abstract reasoning, it may be proved from
belief, which is indeed the voice of nature, experience, and may be justly drawn by
and which therefore in vain we attempt to induction, from instances that fall within
resist. But if, in spite of nature, we resolve our observation.
to go deeper, and not to trust our faculties, I conceive this method of proof will leave
without a reason to shew that they cannot us in great uncertainty, for these three
be fallacious, I am afraid, that, seeking to reasons :
become wise, and to be as gods, we shall 1st, Because the proposition to be proved
become foolish, and, being unsatisfied with is not a contingent but a necessary proposi
the lot of humanity, we shall throw off com tion. It is not that things which begin to
Inon sense, exist commonly have a cause, or even that
The second metaphysical principle I men they always in fact have a cause; but that
tion is—That whatever begins to exist, must they must have a cause, and cannot begin
have a cause which produced it." [614] to exist without a cause.
Philosophy is indebted to Mr Hume in Propositions of this kind, from their
this respect among others, that, by calling nature, are incapable of proof by induction.
in question many of the first principles of Experience informs us only of what is or
human knowledge, he hath put speculative has been, not of what must be ; and the
men upon inquiring more carefully than was conclusion must be of the same nature with
done before into the nature of the evidence the premises."
upon which they rest. Truth can never For this reason, no mathematical propo
suffer by a fair inquiry; it can bear to be sition can be proved by induction. Though
seen naked and in the fullest light; and the it should be found by experience in a thou
strictest examination will always turn out sand cases, that the area of a plane triangle
in the issue to its advantage. I believe Mr is equal to the rectangle under the altitude
Hume was the first who ever called in and half the base, this would not prove that
question whether things that begin to exist it must be so in all cases, and cannot be
must have a cause. otherwise; which is what the mathematician
With regard to this point, we must hold affirms.:
one of these three things, either that it is In like manner, though we had the most
an opinion for which we have no evidence, ample experimental proof that things which
and which men have foolishly taken up have begun to exist had a cause, this would
without ground; or, secondly, That it is not prove that they must have a cause.
capable of direct proof by argument; or, Experience may shew us what is the esta
thirdly, That it is self-evident, and needs no blished course of nature, but can never shew
proof, but ought to be received as an axiom, what connections of things are in their
which cannot, by r ble men, be called nature ry.
in question. 2dly, General maxims, grounded on ex
The first of these suppositions would put perience, have only a degree of probability
an end to all philosophy, to all religion, to proportioned to the extent of our experience,
all reasoning that would carry us beyond and ought always to be understood so as to
the objects of sense, and to all prudence in leave room for exceptions, if future expe
the conduct of life. rience shall discover any such. [616]
As to the second supposition, that this The law of gravitation has as full a proof
principle may be proved by direct reason from experience and induction as any prin
ing, I am afraid we shall find the proof ciple can be supposed to have. Yet, if any
extremely difficult, if not altogether im philosopher should, by clear experiment,
possible.
I know only of three or four arguments * Vol. i. p. 144-146.-H.
* See t'. 627; and “Active Powers,” p. 31,
.# below, “Essays on the Active Powers," p. 30,
*q-ri.
and above, p. 323, a, note *.-H.
# So Aristotle.-H.
[6 14-61 6]
shew that there is a kind of matter in some variety of absurd and contradictory causes
bodies which does not gravitate, the law assigned, some one would have had recourse
of gravitation ought to be limited by that to this hypothesis.
exception. They could conceive the world to arise
Now, it is evident that men have never from an egg, from a struggle between love
considered the principle of the necessity of and strife, between moisture and drought,
causes, as a truth of this kind which may between heat and cold; but they never sup
admit of limitation or exception; and there posed that it had no cause. We know not
fore it has not been received upon this kind any atheistic sect that ever had recourse
of evidence. to this topic, though by it, they might have
3dly, I do not see that experience could evaded every ' that could be
satisfy us that every change in nature act brought against them, and answered all
ually has a cause. objections to their system.
In the far greatest part of the changes in But rather than adopt such an absurdity,
nature that fall within our observation, the they contrived some imaginary cause—such
causes are unknown; and, therefore, from as chance, a concourse of atoms, or neces
experience, we cannot know whether they sity—as the cause of the universe. 1613;
have causes or not. The accounts which philosophers have
Causation is not an object of sense. The given of particular phaenomena, as well as
only experience we can have of it, is in the of the universe in general, proceed upon
consciousness we have of exerting some the same principle. That every phaeno
power in ordering our thoughts and actions. mehon must have a cause, was always taken
But this experience is surely too narrow a for granted. Nil tierpius physico, says
foundation for a general conclusion, that Cicero, quam fieri sine causa quieguam
all things that have had or shall have a be dicere. Though an Academic, he was dog
ginning, must have a cause. matical in this. And Plato, the father of
For these reasons, this principle cannot the Academy, was no less so. “II*, r*
be drawn from experiance, any more than ** ***,x* * * *x" : it is impos
from abstract reasoning. sible that anything should have its origin
The third supposition is—That it is to be without a cause.”—TIMAEUs.
admitted as a first or self-evident principle. I believe Mr Hume was the first who
Two reasons may be urged for this. ever held the contrary." This, indeed, he
1. The universal consent of mankind, not avows, and assumes the honour of the dis
of philosophers only, but of the rude and un covery. “It is,” says he, “a maxim in
learned vulgar. philosophy, that whatever begins to exist,
Mr Hume, as far as I know, was the first must have a cause of existence. This is
that ever expressed any doubt of this prin commonly taken for granted in all reason
ciple." And when we consider that he has re ings, without any proof given or demanded.
jected £, principle of human knowledge, It is supposed to be founded on intuition,
excepting that of consciousness, and has not and to be one of those maxims which,
even spared the axioms of mathematics, though they may be denied with the lips,
his authority is of small weight. [617] it is impossible for men in their hearts
Indeed, with regard to first principles, really to doubt of. But, if we examine
there is no reason why the opinion of a this maxim by the idea of knowledge above
philosopher should have more authority explained, we shall discover in it no mark
than that of another man of common sense, of such intuitive certainty.” The meaning
who has been accustomed to judge in such of this seems to be, that it did not suit with
cases. The illiterate vulgar are competent his theory of intuitive certainty, and, there
judges; and the philosopher has no preroga fore, he excludes it from that privilege.
tive in matters of this kind; but he is more The vulgar adhere to this maxim as
liable than they to be misled by a favourite firmly and universally as the philosophers.
system, especially if it is his own. Their superstitions have the same origin
Setting aside the authority of Mr Hume, as the systems of philosophers—to wit, a
what has philosophy been employed in desire to know the causes of things. Felix
since men first began, to philosophise, but qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas, is the
in the investigation of the causes of things? universal sense of men; but to say that
This it has always professed, when we trace anything cau happen without a cause, shocks
it to its cradle. It never entered into any the common sense of a savage.
man's thought, before the philosopher we This universal belief of mankind is easily
have mentioned, to put the previous ques accounted for, if we allow that the neces
tion, whether things have a cause or not ? sity of a cause of every event is obvious to
Had it been thought possible that they the rational powers of a man. But it is
might not, it may be presumed that, in the impossible to account for it otherwise. It
* Hume was Lot the first.-H. * See last note.-H.
[617,618]
-- - -- - --------
chAP v1.] FIRST PRINCIPLES OF NECESSARY TRUTHS. 457
cannot be ascribed to education, to systems previous question, whether there was any
of philosophy, or to priesteraft. One cause of the event, and whether it happened
would think that a philosopher who takes without a cause.
it to be a general delusion or prejudice, Surely, upon Mr Hume's principles, a
would endeavour to shew from what causes great deal might be said upon this point;
in human nature such a general error may and, if the matter is to be determined by
take its rise. But I forget that Mr Hume past experience, it is dubious on which side
might answer upon his own principles, that the weight of argument might stand. But
since things may happen without a cause we may venture to say, that, if Mr Hume
this error and delusion of men may be uni had been of such a jury, he would have laid
versal without any cause. [619] aside his philosophical principles, and acted
2. A second reason why I conceive this according to the dictates of common pru
to be a first principle, is, That mankind not dence.
only assent to it in speculation, but that the Many passages might be produced, even
practice of life is grounded upon it in the in Mr Hume's philosophical writings, in
most important matters, even in cases where which he, unawares, betrays the same in
experience leaves us doubtful; and it is ward conviction of the necessity of causes
impossible to act with common prudence if which is common to other men. I shall
we set it aside. mention only one, in the “Treatise of Hu.
In great families, there are so many bad man Nature,” and in that part of it where
things done by a certain personage, called he combats this very principle :—“As to
Nobody, that it is proverbial that there is those impressions,” says he, “which arise
a Nobody about every house who does a from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in
great deal of mischief; and even where my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by hu
there is the exactest inspection and govern man reason; and it will always be impos
ment, many events will happen of which no sible to decide with certainty whether they
other author can be found; so that, if we arise immediately from the object, or are
trustmerely to experiencein this matter, No produced by the creative power of the mind,
body will be found to be a very active person, or are derived from the Author of our
and to have no inconsiderable share in the being.”
management of affairs. But whatever coun Ainong these alternatives, he never
tenance this system may have from experi thought of their not arising from any
ence, it is too shocking to common sense to cause." [621
impose upon the most ignorant. A child The arguments which Mr Hume offers to
knows that, when his top, or any of his play prove that this is not a self-evident prin
things, are taken away, it must be done by ciple, are three. First, That all certainty
somebody. Perhaps it would not be diffi arises from a comparison of ideas, and a
cult to persuade him that it was done by discovery of their unalterable relations,
some invisible being, but that it should be none of which relations imply this proposi
done by nobody he cannot believe. tion, That whatever has a beginning must
Suppose a man's house to be broke open, have a cause of existence. This theory of
his money and jewels taken away. Such certainty has been examined before.
things have happened times innumerable The second argument is, That whatever
without any apparent cause; and were he we can conceive is possible. This has like
only to reason from experience in such a wise been examined.
case, how must he behave He must put The third argument is, That what we call
in one scale the instances wherein a cause a cause, is only something antecedent to,
was found of such an event, and in the other and always conjoined with, the effect. This
scale the instances where no cause was is also one of Mr Hume's peculiar doctrines,
found, and the preponderant scale must which we may have occasion to consider
determine whether it be most probable that afterwards. It is sufficient here to observe,
there was a cause of this event, or that that we may learn from it that night is the
there was none. Would any man of com cause of day, and day the cause of night:
mon understanding have recourse to such for no two things have more constantly
an expedient todirect hisjudgment? [620] followed each other since the beginning of
Suppose a man to be found dead on the the world.
highway, his skull fractured, his body The [third and] last metaphysical prin
pierced with deadly wounds, his watch and ciple I mention, which is opposed by the
money carried off. The coroner's jury sits same author, is, That design and intelli
upon the body; and the question is put, gence in the cause may be inferred, with
What was the cause of this man's death ?– certainty, from marks or signs of it in the
was it accident, or felo de se, or murder by effect.
persons unknown P Let us suppose an
* See above, p. 444, no'e". It is the triumph of
adept in Mr Hume's philosophy to make scepticism to shew that speculation and practice are
one of the jury, and that he insists upon the irreconcilable.-H.
[619–621]
Intelligence, design, and skill, are not Perhaps some may think that this prin
objects of the external senses, nor can we ciple may be learned either by reasoning or
be conscious of them in any person but our by experience, and therefore that there is
selves. Even in ourselves, we cannot, with no ground to think it a first principle.
propriety, be said to be corscious of the If it can be shewn to be got by reasoning,
natural or acquired talents we possess. We by all, or the greater part of those who are
are conscious only of the operations of mind governed by it, I shall very readily ac
in which they are exerted. Indeed, a man knowledge that it ought not to be esteemed
comes to know his own mental abilities, a first principle. But I apprehend the con
just as he knows another man's, by the trary appears from very convincing argu
effects they produce, when there is occasion Inents.
to put them to exercise. First, The principle is too universal to
A man's wisdom is known to us only by be the effect of reasoning. It is common
the signs of it in his conduct; his eloquence to philosophers and to the vulgar; to the
by the signs of it in his speech. In the same learned and to the most illiterate; to the
manner, we judge of his virtue, of his forti civilized and to the savage. And of those
tude, and of all his talents and virtues. 1622] who are governed by it, not one in ten
Yet it is to be observed, that we judge of thousand can give a reason for it.
men's talents with as little doubt or hesita Secondly, We find philosophers, ancient
tion as we judge of the immediate objects and modern, who can reason excellently in
of sense. subjects that admit of reasoning, when they
One person, we are sure, is a perfect have occasion to defend this principle, not
idiot; another, who feigns idiocy to screen offering reasons for it, or any medium of
himself from punishment, is found, upon proof, but appealing to the common sense
trial, to have the understanding of a man, of mankind; mentioning particular instan
and to be accountable for his conduct. We ces, to make the absurdity of the contrary
perceive one man to be open, another cun opinion more apparent, and sometimes
ning; one to be ignorant, another very using the weapons of wit and ridicule, which
knowing; one to be slow of understanding, are very proper weapons for refuting ab
another quick. Every man forms suc surdities, but altogether improper in points
judgments of those he converses with; and that are to be determined by reasoning.
the common affairs of life depend upon such To confirm this observation, I shall quote
judgments. We can as little avoid them as two authors, an ancient and a modern, who
we can avoid seeing what is before our eyes. have more expressly undertaken the defence
From this it appears, that it is no less a of this principle than any others I remem
part of the human constitution, to judge of ber to have met with, and whose good
men's characters, and of their intellectual sense and ability to reason, where reasoning
powers, from the signs of them in their is proper, will not be doubted. [624]
actions and discourse, than to judge of cor The first is Cicero, whose words, (lub, i.
poreal objects by our senses; that such cap. 13. De Divinatione,) may be thus
judgments are common to the whole human translated.
race that are endowed with understanding; “Can anything done by chance have all
and that they are absolutely necessary in the marks of design Four dice may by
the conduct of life. chance turn up four aces; but do you think
Now, every judgment of this kind we that four hundred dice, thrown by chance,
form, is only a particular application of the will turn up four hundred aces F. Colours
general principle, that intelligence, wisdom, thrown upon canvas without design may
and other mental qualities in the cause, have some similitude to a human face; but
may be inferred from their marks or signs do you think they might make as beautiful
in the effect. a picture as that of the Coan Venus? A
The actions and discourses of men are hog turning up the ground with his nose
effects, of which the actors and speakers may make something of the form of the let
are the causes. The effects are perceived ter A.; but do you think that a hog might
by our senses; but the causes are behind describe on the ground the Andromache of
the scene. We only conclude their exist Ennius * Carneades imagined that, in the
ence and their degrees from our observa stone quarries at Chios, he found, in a stone
tion of the effects. that was split, a representation of the head
From wise conduct, we infer wisdom in of a little Pan, or sylvan deity. I believe he
the cause; from brave actions, we infer might find a figure not unlike; but surely not
courage; and so in other cases. [623] such a one as you would say had been formed
This inference is made with perfect secu by an excellent sculptor like Scopas. For
rity by all men. We cannot avoid it; it so, verily, the case is, that chance never
is necessary in the ordinary conduct of perfectly imitates design.” Thus Cicero."
life; it has therefore the strongest marks of * See also Cicero "de Natura deorum," i. i. e.
being a first principle. 37.-H.
[622-624]
cRAF. vi. FIRST PRINCIPLES OF NECESSARY TRUTHS. 459
Now, in all this discourse, I see very anything be more ridiculous and against all
good sense, and what is apt to convince reason, than to ascribe the production of
every unprejudiced mind; but I see not in men to the first fruitfulness of the earth,
the whole a single step of reasoning. It is without so much as one instance or experi
barely an appeal to every man's common ment in any age or history to countenance
sense.
so monstrous a supposition? The thing is
* Let us next see how the same point is at first sight so gross and palpable, that no
handled by the excellent Archbishop Tillot discourse about it can make it more appa
son. (1st Sermon, vol. i.) rent. And yet these shameful beggars of
“For I appeal to any man of reason, principles, who give this precarious account
whether anything can be more unreasonable of the original of things, assume to them
than obstinately to im£ an effect to chance selves to be the men of reason, the great
which carries in the face of it all the argu wits of the world, the only cautious and wary
ments and characters of design? Was ever persons, who hate to be imposed upon, that
any considerable work, in which there was must have convincing evidence for every
required a great variety of parts, and an thing, and can admit nothing without a clear
orderly and regular adjustment of these demonstration for it. [626]
parts, done by chance? Will chance fit In this passage, the excellent author takes
means to ends, and that in ten thousand what I conceive to be the proper method of
instances, and not fail in any one?' [625] refuting an absurdity, by exposing it in dif
How often might a man, after he had jumbled ferent lights, in which every man of common
a set of letters in a bag, fling them out upon understanding conceives it to be ridiculous.
the ground before they would fall into an And, although there is much good sense, as
exact poem, yea, or so much as make a well as wit, in the passage I have quoted, I
good discourse in prose? And may not a cannot find one medium of proof in the
little book be as easily made as this great whole.
volume of the world? How long might a I have met with one or two respectable
man sprinkle colours upon canvass with a authors who draw an argument from the
careless hand, before they would make the doctrine of chances, to shew how impro
exact picture of a man? And is a man bable it is that a regular arrangement of
easier made by chance than his picture ? parts should be the effect of chance, or that
How long might twenty thousand blind men, it should not be the effect of design.
which should be sent out from the remote I do not object to this reasoning; but I
parts of England, wander up and down be would observe that the doctrine of chances
fore they would all meet upon Salisbury | is a branch of mathematics little more than
plains, andfall into rank and file in the exact an hundred years old. But the conclusion
order of an army? And yet this is much drawn from it has been held by all men from
more easy to be imagined than how the the beginning of the world. It cannot,
innumerable blind parts of matter should therefore, be thought that men have been
rendezvous themselves into a word. A man led to this conclusion by that reasoning.
that sees Henry VII.'s chapel at West Indeed, it may be doubted whether the first
minster might, with as good reason, main principle upon which all the mathematical
tain, (yea, and much better, considering the reasoning about chances is grounded, is
vast difference between that little structure more self-evident than this conclusion drawn
and the huge fabric of the world,) that it from it, or whether it is not a partieular
was never contrived or built by any man, instance of that general conclusion.
but that the stones did by chance grow into We are next to consider whether we may
thosecurious figures into which we see them not learn this truth from experience, That
to havebeen cut and graven; and that, upon effects which have all the marks and tokens
a time, (as tales usually begin,) the mate of design, must proceed from a designing
rials of that building—the stone, mortar, cause. [627]
timber, iron, lead, and glass-happily met I apprehend that we cannot learn this
together, and very fortunately ranged them truth from experience for two reasons.
selves into that delicate order in which we First, Because it is a necessary truth,
see them now, so close compacted that it not a contingent one. It agrees with the
must be a very great chance that parts them experience of mankind since the beginning
- What would the world think of a of the world, that the area of a triangle is
man that should advance such an opinion equal to half the rectangle under its base
as this, and write a book for it? If they and perpendicular. It agrees no less with
would do him right, they ought to look upon experience, that the sun rises in the east
him as mad. But yet he might maintain and sets in the west. So far as experience
this opinion with a little more reason than goes, these truths are upon an equal footing.
any man can have to say that the world was But every man perceives this distinction
made by chance, or that the first men grew between them—that the first is a necessary
out of the earth, as plants do now; for, can truth, and that it is impossible it should not
[625–627]
be true; but the last is not necessary, but dom, power, and ess, in the consti
contingent, depending upon the will of Him tution and government of the world, is, of
who made the world. As we cannot learn all arguments that have been advanced for
from experience that twice three must ne the being and providence of the Deity, that
cessarily make six, so neither can we learn which in all ages has made the strongest
from experience that certain effects must impression upon candid and thinking minds;
proceed from a designing and intelligent an argument, which has this peculiar ad
cause. Experience informs us only of what vantage, that it gathers strength as human
has been, but never of what must be." knowledge advances, and is more convincing
Secondly, It may be observed, that ex at present than it was some centuries ago.
perience can shew a connection between a King Alphonsus might say, that he could
sign and the thing signified by it, in those contrive a better planetary system than that
cases only where both the sign and thing which astronomers held in his day." That
signified are perceived and have always system was not the work of God, but the
been perceived in conjunction. But, if there fiction of men. [629]
be any case where the sign only is per But since the true system of the sun,
ceived, experience can never shew its con moon, and planets, has been discovered, no
nection with the thing signified. Thus, for man, however atheistically disposed, has
example, thought is a sign of a thinking pretended to shew how a better could be
principle or mind. But how do we know contrived.
that thought cannot be without a mind P. If When we attend to the marks of good
any man should say that he knows this by contrivance which appear in the works of
experience, he deceives himself. It is im God, every discovery we make in the con
possible he can have any experience of this; stitution of the material or intellectual
because, though we have an immediate system becomes a hymn of praise to the
knowledge of the existence of thought in great Creator and Governor of the world.
ourselves by consciousness, yet we have no And a man who is possessed of the genuille
immediate knowledge of a mind. The mind spirit of philosophy will think it impiety to
is not an immediate object either of sense contaminate the divine workmanship, by
or of consciousness. We may, therefore, mixing it with those fictions of human fancy,
justly conclude, that the necessary con called theories and hypotheses, which will
nection between thought and a mind, or always bear the signatures of human folly,
thinking being, is not learned from expe no less than the other does of divine wis
rience. [628] dom.
The same reasoning may be applied to I know of no person who ever called in
the connection between a work excellently question the principle now under our consi
fitted for some purpose, and design in the deration, when it is applied to the actions
author or cause of that work. One of these and discourses of men. For this would be to
—to wit, the work—may be an immediate deny that we have any means of discerning
object of perception. But the design and a wise man from an idiot, or a man that is
purpose of the author cannot be an imme illiterate in the highest degree from a man
diate object of perception; and, therefore, of knowledge and learning, which no man
experience can never inform us of any con has the effrontery to deny.
nection between the one and the other, far But, in all ages, those who have been
less of a necessary connection. unfriendly to the principles of religion, have
Thus, I think, it appears, that the prin made attempts to weaken the force of the
ciple we have been considering—to wit, argument for the existence and perfec
that from certain signs or indications in the tions of the Deity, which is founded on this
effect, we may infer that there must have principle. That argument has got the name
been intelligence, wisdom, or other intel of the argument from final causes; and as
lectual or moral qualities in the cause, is a the meaning of this name is well understood,
principle which we get, neither by reason we shall use it.
ing nor by experience; and, therefore, if it The argument from final causes, when re
be a true principle, it must be a first prin duced to a syllogism, has these two premises:
ciple. There is in the human understand –First, That design and intelligence in the
ing a light, by which we see immediately cause, may, with certainty, be inferred from
the evidence of it, when there is occasion marks or signs of it in the effect. This is
to apply it. the principle we have been considering, and
. Of how great importance this principle
is in common life, we have already observed. * Alphonso X. of Castile. He flourished in the
thirteenth century-a great mathematician and as
And I need hardly mention its importance tronomer. To him we owe the Alphonsine Tables.
in natural theology. His saying was not so pious and philosophical as Reid
The clear marks and signatures of wis states; but that, “Had he been present with God
at the creation, he could have supplied some useful
hints towards the better ordering of the universe."
*See above p. 615; and “Active Powers," p. 31.-H. -H.
[628. 829]
char. vi.] FIRST PRINCIPLES OF NECESSARY TRUTHS. 461
we may call it the major proposition of the Hume, who puts an argument in the mouth
argument. The secon', which we call the of an Epicurean, on which he seems to lay
minor proposition, is, That there are in fact great stress.
the clearest marks of design and wisdom in The argument is, That the universe is a
the works of nature; and the conclusion is, singular effect, and, therefore, we can draw
That the works of nature are the effects no conclusion from it, whether it may have
of a wise and intelligent Cause. One must been made by wisdom or not."
either assent to the conclusion, or deny one If I understand the force of this argu
or other of the premises. [630] ment, it amounts to this, That, if we had
Those among the ancients who denied a been accustomed to see worlds produced,
God or a Providence, seem to me to have some by wisdom and others without it, and
yielded the major proposition, and to have had observed that such a world as this
denied the minor; conceiving that there which we inhabit was always the effect of
are not in the constitution of things such wisdom, we might then, from past experi
marks of wise contrivance as are sufficient ence, conclude that this world was made
to put the conclusion beyond doubt. This, by wisdom; but, having no such experi
I think, we may learn, from the reasoning ence, we have no means of forming any
of Cotta the academic, in the third book of conclusion about it.
Cicero, of the Nature of the Gods. That this is the strength of the argument
The gradual advancement made in the appears, because, if the marks of wisdom
knowledge of nature, hath put this opinion seen in one world be no evidence of wisdom,
quite out of countenance. the like marks seen in ten thousand will
When the structure of the human body give as little evidence, unless, in time past,
was much less known than it is now, the we perceived wisdom itself cot.joined with
famous Galen saw such evident marks of the tokens of it; and, from their perceived
wise contrivance in it, that, though he had conjunction in time past, conclude that, al
been educated an Epicurean, he renounced though, in the present world, we see only
that system, and wrote his book of the use one of the two, the other must accompany
of the parts of the human body, on purpose it. [632]
to convince others of what appeared so clear Whence it appears that this reasoning of
to himself, that it was impossible that such Mr Hume is built on the supposition that
admirable contrivance should be the effect our inferring design from the strongest
of chance. marks of it, is entirely owing to our past
Those, therefore, of later times, who are experience of having always found these
dissatisfied with this argument from final two things conjoined. But I hope I, have
causes, have quitted the stronghold of the made it evident that this is not the case.
ancient atheists, which had become un And, indeed, it is evident that, according
tenable, and have chosen rather to make a to this reasoning, we can have no evidence
defence against the major proposition. of mind or design in any of our fellow
inen.
Des Cartes seems to have led the way in
this, though he was no atheist. But, having How do I know that any man of my ac
invented some new arguments for the being quaintance has understanding " I never
of God, he was, perhaps, led to disparage saw his understanding. I see only cer
those that had been used before, that he tain effects, which my judgment leads
might bring more credit to his own. Or me to conclude to be marks and tokens
perhaps he was offended with the Peripa of it.
tetics, because they often mixed final causes But, says the sceptical philosopher, you
with physical, in order to account for the can conclude nothing from these tokens, un
phaenomena of nature. [631] less past experience has informed you that
He maintained, therefore, that physical such tokens are always joined with under
causes only should be assigned for phaeno standing. Alas! sir, it is impossible I can
mena; that the philosopher has nothing to ever have this experience. The understand
do with final causes; and that it is pre ing of another man is no immediate object
sumption in us to pretend to determine for of sight, or of any other faculty which God
what end any work of nature is framed. hath given me; and unless I can conclude
Some of those who were great admirers of its existence from tokens that are visible, I
Des Cartes, and followed him in many have no evidence that there is understand
£ differed from him in this, particu ing in any man.
arly Dr Henry More and the pious Arch It seems, then, that the man who main
bishop Fenelon , but others, after the ex tains that there is no force in the argument
ample of Des Cartes, have shewn a contempt from final causes, must, if he will be con
of all reasoning from final causes. Among sistent, see no evidence of the existence of
these, I think, we may reckon Maupertuis any intelligent being but himself.
and Buffon. But the most direct attack
has been made upon this principle by Mr * See Stewart's “Elements," ii. p. 579.-H.
[630-632] -
and in his topics he points out many of the
CHAPTER VII. first principles of probable reasoning.
As long as the philosophy of Aristotle
oPINIONs, ANCIENT AND MoDERN, ABOUT prevailed, it was held as a fixed point, that
First PRiMciple.8. all proof must be drawn from principles
already known and granted.
I KNow no writer who has treated ex We must observe, however, that, in that
pressly of first principles before Aristotle; philosophy, manythings were assumed as
but it is probable that, in the ancient Py first principles, which have no just claim
thagorean school, from which both Plato to that character: such as, that the earth
and Aristotle borrowed much, this subject is at rest; that nature abhors a vacuum ;
had not been left untouched. [633] that there is no change in the heavens above
Before the time of Aristotle, considerable the sphere of the moon; that the heavenly
progress had been made in the mathema bodies move in circles, that being the most
tical sciences, particularly in geometry. perfect figure; that bodies do not gravitate
The discovery of the forty-seventh pro in their proper place; and many others.
position of the first book of Euclid, and of The Peripatetic philosophy, therefore,
the five regular solids, is, by antiquity, instead of being deficient in first principles,
ascribed to Pythagoras himself; and it is was redundant; instead of rejecting those
impossible he could have made those dis that are truly such, it adopted, as first
coveries without knowing many other pro principles, many vulgar prejudices and rash
positions in mathematics. Aristotle men judgments: and this seems in general to
tions the incommensurability of the diagonal have been the spirit of ancient philosophy."
of a square to its side, and gives a hint of It is true, there were among the ancients
the manner in which it was demonstrated. sceptical philosophers, who professed to have
We find likewise some of the axioms of no principles, and held it to be the greatest
geometry mentioned by Aristotle as axioms, virtue in a philosopher to withhold assent,
and as indemonstrable principles of mathe and keep his judgment in a perfect equil
matical reasoning. brium between contradictory opinions. But,
It is probable, therefore, that, before the though this sect was defended by some per
time of Aristotle, there were elementary sons of great erudition and acuteness, it died
treatises of geometry, which are now lost; of itself, and the dogmatic philosophy of
and that in them the axioms were distin Aristotle obtained a complete triumph over
guished from the propositions which require it. [635]
l roof.
To suppose that so perfect a system as What Mr Hume says of those who are
sceptical with regard to moral distinctions
that of Euclid's “Elements” was produced seems to have had its accomplishment in
by one man, without any preceding model the ancient sect of Sceptics. “The only
or materials, would be to suppose Euclid way,” says he, “ of converting antagonists
more than a man. We ascribe to him as of this kind is to leave them to themselves;
much as the weakness of human under for, finding that nobody keeps up the con
standing will permit, if we suppose that the troversy with them, it is probable they will
inventions in geometry, which had been at last of themselves, from mere weariness,
made in a tract of preceding ages, were by come over to the side of common sense and
him not only carried much farther, but reason.”
digested into so admirable a system that Setting aside this small sect of the Scep
his work obscured all that went before it, tics, which was extinct many ages before the
and made them be forgot and lost. authority of Aristotle declined, I know of
Perhaps, in like manner, the writings of no opposition made to first principles among
Aristotle with regard to first principles, and the ancients. The disposition was, as has
with regard to many other abstract subjects, been observed, not to oppose, but to mul
may have occasioned the loss of what had tiply them beyond measure.
been written upon those subjects by more Men have always been prone, when they
ancient philosophers. [634] leave one extreme, to run into the opposite;
Whatever may be in this, in his second and this spirit, in the ancient philosophy, to
book upon demonstration, he has treated multiply first principles beyond reason, was
very fully of first principles; and, though he a strong presage that, when the authority
has not attempted any enumeration of them, of the Peripatetic system was at an end,
he shews very clearly that all demonstra
tion must be built upon truths which are
evident of themselves, but cannot be de * The Peripatetic philosophy did not assume any
such principles as original and self-evident; but pro
monstrated. His whole doctrine of syllo £ establish them all upon induction and gene
gisms is grounded upon a few axioms, from ralization. In practice its induction of instances
which he endeavours to demonstrate the might be imperfect, and its generalization from par
ticulars rash; but in theory, at least, it was correct.
rules of syllogism in a mathematical way; -Hi.
[633–635)
cHAP. VII.] OPINIONS ABOUT FIRST PRINCIPLES. 463
the next reigning system would diminish which ought to be adopted for the same
their number beyond reason. reason. But he did not see this to be ne
This, accordingly, happened in that great cessary, conceiving that, upon this one first
revolution of the philosophical republic principle, he could support the whole fabric
brought about by Des Cartes. That truly of human knowledge.
£ reformer in philosophy, cautious to To proceed to the conclusion of Des
oid the snare in which Aristotle was Cartes's enthymeme. From the existence
taken, of admitting things as first principles of his thought he infers his own existence.
too rashly, resolved to doubt of everything, Here he assumes another first principle,
and to withhold his assent, until it was forced not a contingent, but a necessary one; to
by the clearest evidence." wit, that, where there is thought, there
Thus Des Cartes brought himself into must be a thinking being or mind.
that very state of suspense which the an Having thus established his own exist
cient Sceptics recommended as the highest ence, he proceeds to prove the existence of
perfection of a wise man, and the only road a supreme and infinitely perfect Being;
to tranquillity of mind. But he did not and, from the perfection of the Deity, he
remain long in this state; his doubt did infers that his senses, his memory, and the
not arise from despair of finding the truth, other faculties which God had given him,
but from caution, that he might not be im are not fallacious.
posed upon, and embrace a cloud instead of Whereas other men, from the beginning
a goddess. [636] of the world, had taken for granted, as a first
His very doubting convinced him of his principle, the truth and reality of what they
own existence; for that which does not exist perceive by their senses, and from thence
can neither doubt, nor believe, nor reason. inferred the existence of a Supreme Author
Thus he emerged from universal scepti and Maker of the world, Des Cartes took
cism by this short enthymeme, Cogito, ergo a contrary course, conceiving that the tes
st&n. timony of our senses, and of all our facul
This enthymeme consists of an antece ties, excepting that of consciousness, ought
dent proposition, I think, and a conclusion not to be taken for granted, but to be
drawn from it, therefore I earist. proved by argument.
If it should be asked how Des Cartes Perhaps some may think that Des Car
came to be certain of the antecedent proposi tes meant only to admit no other first prin
tion, it is evident that for this he trusted to ciple of contingent truths besides that of
the testimony of consciousness. He was con consciousness; but that he allowed the axi
scious that he thought, and needed no other oms of mathematics, and of other necessary
argument. truths, to be received without proof. [638]
So that the first principle which he adopts But I apprehend this was not his inten
in this famous enthymeme is this, That those tion; for the truth of mathematical axioms
doubts, and thoughts, and reasonings, of must depend upon the truth of the faculty
which he was conscious, did certainly exist, by which we judge of them. If the faculty
and that his consciousness put their exist be fallacious, we may be deceived by trust
ence beyond all doubt. ing to it. Therefore, as he supposes that
It might have been objected to this first all our faculties, excepting consciousness,
principle of Des Cartes, How do you know may be fallacious, and attempts to prove
that your consciousness cannot deceive you? by argument that they are not, it follows
You have supposed that all you see, and that, according to his principles, even ma
hear, and handle, may be an illusion. Why, thematical axioms require proof. Neither
therefore, should the power of conscious did he allow that there are any necessary
ness have this prerogative, to be believed truths, but maintained, that the truths
implicitly, when all our other powers are which are commonly so called, depend up
supposed fallacious? on the will of God. And we find his fol
'o this objection I know no other answer lowers, who may be supposed to under
that can be made but that we find it im stand his principles, agree in maintaining,
possible to doubt of things of which we are that the knowledge of our own existence is
conscious. The constitution of our nature the first and fundamental principle from
forces this belief upon us irresistibly. which all knowledge must be deduced by
This is true, and is sufficient to justify one who proceeds regularly in philosophy.
Des Cartes in assuming, as a first principle, There is, no doubt, a beauty in raising a
the existence of thought, of which he was large fabric of knowledge upon a few first
conscious. [637] principles. The stately fabric of mathema
He ought, however, to have gone farther tical knowledge, raised upon the foundation
in this track, and to have considered whe of a few axioms and definitions, charms
ther there may not be other first principles every beholder. Des Cartes, who was well
acquainted with this beauty in the mathe
* On the Cartesian doubt, see Note R.-H. matical sciences, seems to have been am.
[636–638]
464 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essay vi.
bitious to give the same beautiful simplicity Both, indeed, owe so much to Male
to his system of philosophy; and therefore branche, that, if we take out of his system
sought only one first principle as the founda the peculiarities of our seeing all things in
tion of all our knowledge, at least of con God, and our learning the existence of an
tingent truths. external world from divine revelation, what
And so far has his authority prevailed, remains is just the system of Bishop Berke
that those who came after him have ley. I make this observation, by the way,
almost universally followed him in this in justice to a foreign author, to whom
track. This, therefore, may be considered British authors seem not to have allowed
as the spirit of modern philosophy, to allow all that is due."
of no first principles of contingent truths Mr Hume hath adopted Bishop Berke
but this one, that the thoughts and opera ley's arguments against the existence of
tions of our own minds, of which we are matter, and thinks them unanswerable.
conscious, are self-evidently real and true; We may observe, that this great meta
but that everything else that is coutingent physician, though in general he declares in
is to be proved by argument. favour of universal scepticism, and there
The existence of a material world, and fore may seem to have no first principles at
of what we perceive by our senses, is not all, yet, with Des Cartes, he always acknow
self-evident, according to this philosophy. ledges the reality of those thoughts and
Des Cartes founded it upon this argument, operations of mind of which we are con
that God, who hath given us our senses, scious.t. So that he yields the antecedent
and all our faculties, is no deceiver, and of Des Cartes's enthymeme cogito, but
therefore they are not fallacious. [639] denies the conclusion ergo sum, the mind
I endeavoured to shew that, if it be not being, according to him, nothing but that
admitted as a first principle, that our facul train of impressions and ideas of which we
ties are not fallacious, nothing else can be are conscious.
admitted; and that it is impossible to prove Thus, we see that the modern philosophy,
this by argument, unless God should give us of which Des Cartes may justly be ac
new faculties to sit in judgment upon the old. counted the founder, being built upon the
Father Malebranche agreed with Des ruins of the Peripatetic, has a spirit quite
Cartes, that the existence of a material opposite, and runs into a contrary extreme.
world requires proof; but, being dissatisfied The Peripatetic not only adopted as first
with Des Cartes's argument from the per principles those which mankind have always
fection of the Deity, thought that the only rested upon in their most important trans
solid proof is from divine revelation. actions, but, along with them, many vulgar
Arnauld, who was engaged in controversy prejudices; so that this system was founded
with Malebranche, approves of his anta upon a wide bottom, but in many parts
gonist in offering an argument to prove the unsound. The modern system has nar
existence of the material world, but objects rowed the foundation so much, that every
to the solidity of his argument, and offers superstructure raised upon it appears top
other arguments of his own. heavy.
Mr Norris, a great admirer of Des Cartes From the single principle of the exist
and of Malebranche, seems to have thought ence of our own thoughts, very little, if any
all the arguments offered by them and by thing, can be deduced by just reasoning,
Arnauld to be weak, and confesses that we especially if we suppose that all our other
have, at best, only probable evidence of the faculties may be fallacious.
existence of the material world. Accordingly, we find that Mr Hume was
Mr Locke acknowledges that the evidence not the first that was led into scepticism by
we have of this point is neither intuitive the want of first principles. For, soon after
nor demonstrative; yet he thinks it may Des Cartes, there arose a sect in France
be called knowledge, and distinguishes it called Egoists, who maintained that we
by the name of sensitive knowledge; and, have no evidence of the existence of any
as the ground of this sensitive knowledge, thing but ourselves.: [641]
he offers some weak arguments, which would Whether these egoists, like Mr Hume,
rather tempt one to doubt than to believe.
At last, Bishop Berkeley and Arthur * If I rocollect aright. (I write this note as a dis
Collier, without any knowledge of each tance from books,) Locke explicitly anticipates the
Berkeleian idealism in his “ £ of Father
other, as far as appears by their writings, Malebranche's Opinion." This was also done oy
undertook to prove, that there neither is Bayle. In fact, Malebranche, and many others be.
nor can be a material world. The excel fore him, would inevitably have become idealists.
lent style and elegant composition of the had they not been Catholics. But an idealist, as t
have already observed, no consistent Catholic could
former have made his writings to be known h See above, p. 285, note t, and p. 33s, note *.
2nd read, and this system to be attributed f See above, p. 442, b, not".-H.
to him only, as if Collier had never ex .# * * * * * * and p. 89 is b, note
isted. [640]
[639-641]
cHAP. vii.] OPINIONS ABOUT FIRST PRINCIPLES. 465
believed themselves to be nothing but a train concerning axioms or first principles, I

of ideas and impressions, or to have a more know none that went before him, though
permanent existence, I have not learned, he has been very generally followed in both.
having never seen any of their writings; nor His definition of knowledge, that it con
do I know whether any of this sect did write sists solely in the perception of the agree
in support of their principles. One would ment or disagreement of our ideas, has been
think they who did not believe that there already considered. But supposing it to be
was any person to read, could have little just, still it would be true, that some agree
inducement to write, unless they were ments and disagreements of ideas must be
prompted by that inward monitor which immediately perceived; and such agree
Persius makes to be the source of genius ments or disagreements, when they are
and the teacher of arts. There can be no
expressed by affirmative or negative propo
doubt, however, of the existence of such a sitions, are first principles, because their
sect, as they are mentioned by many truth is immediately discerned as soon as
authors, and refuted by some, particularly they are understood.
by Buffier, in his treatise of first principles. This, I think, is granted by Mr Locke,
Those Egoists and Mr Hume seem to book 4, chap. 2. “There is a part of our
me to have reasoned more consequentially knowledge,” says he, “which we may call
from Des Cartes' principle than he did him intuitive. In this the mind is at no pains
self; and, indeed, I cannot help thinking, of proving or examining, but perceives the
that all who have followed Des Cartes'
truth as the eye does light, only by being
method, of requiring proof by argument of directed toward it. And this kind of know
everything except the existence of their ledge is the clearest and most certain that
own thoughts, have escaped the abyss of human frailty is capable of This part of
scepticism by the help of weak reasoning knowledge is irresistible, and, like bright
and strong faith more than by any other sunshine, forces itself immediately to be
means. And they seem to me to act more perceived, as soon as ever the mind turns
consistently, who, having rejected the first its view that way.” [643]
principles on which belief must be grounded, He farther observes—“That this intui
have no belief, than they, who, like the tive knowledge is necessary to connect all
others, rejecting first principles, must yet the steps of a demonstration."
have a system of belief, without any solid From this, I think, it necessarily follows,
foundation on which it may stand. that, in every branch of knowledge, we
The philosophers I have hitherto men must make use of truths that are intuitively
tioned, after the time of Des Cartes, have known, in order to deduce from them such
all followed his method, in resting upon the as require proof.
truth of their own thoughts as a first But I cannot reconcile this with what he
principle, but requiring arguments for the says, § 8, of the same chapter:—“The
proof of every other truth of a contingent necessity of this intuitive knowledge in every
nature; but none of them, excepting Mr step of scientifical or demonstrative reason
Locke, has expressly treated of first princi ing gave occasion, I imagine, to that mis
ples, or given any opinion of their utility or taken axiom, that all reasoning was ex pre
inutility. We only collect their opinion cognitis et praeconcessis, which, how far it is
from their following Des Cartes in requir mistaken, I shall have occasion to shew
ing proof, or pretending to offer proof of more at large, when I come to consider
the existence of a material world, which propositions, and particularly those proposi
surely ought to be received as a first princi tions which are called maxims, and to shew
ple, if anything be, beyond what we are that it is by a mistake that they are sup
conscious of [642] posed to be the foundation of all our know
I proceed, therefore, to consider what
ledge and reasonings.”
Mr Locke has said on the subject of first I have carefully considered the chapter
principles or maxims.
I have not the least doubt of this author's on maxims, which Mr Locke here refers to;
and, though one would expect, from the
candour in what he somewhere says, that quotation last made, that it should run con
his essay was mostly spun out of his own trary to what I have before delivered con
thoughts. Yet, it is certain, that, in many cerning first principles, I find only two or
of the notions which we are wont to ascribe
three sentences in it, and those chiefly inci
to him, others were before him, particularly dental, to which I do not assent; and I am
Des Cartes, Gassendi, and Hobbes. Nor always happy in agreeing with a philoso
is it at all to be thought strange, that inge pher whom I so highly respect.
nious men, when they are got into the He endeavours to shew that axioms or
same track, should hit upon the same intuitive truths are not innate."
things. * See Stew-rt's “Elements," ii. p. 49.-H.
But, in the definition which he gives of + He does more. He attempts to shew that they
knowledge in general, and in his notions are all generalizations from experience; whereas ex
[642, 643] 2 h
To this I agree. I maintain only, that Locke has given it, if it at all merited his
when the understanding is ripe, and when notice. These are identical propositions;
we distinctly apprehend such truths, we they are trifling, and surfeited with truth.
immediately assent to them. . [644] No knowledge can be derived from them.
He observes, that self-evidence is not Having mentioned how far I agree with
peculiar to those propositions which pass Mr Locke concerning maxims or first prin
under the name of axioms, and have the ciples, I shall next take notice of two or
dignity of axioms ascribed to them. three things, wherein I cannot agree with
I grant that there are innumerable self him.
evident propositions, which have neither In the seventh section of this chapter, he
dignity nor utility, and, therefore, deserve says, That, concerning the real existence of
not the name of axioms, as that name is all other beings, besides ourselves and a
commonly understood to imply not only first cause, there are no maxims.
self-evidence, but some degree of dignity or I have endeavoured to shew that there
utility. That a man is a man, and that a are maxims, or first principles, with regard
man is not a horse, are self-evident propo to other existences. Mr Locke acknowledges
sitions; but they are, as Mr Locke very that we have a knowledge of such existences,
justly calls them, trifling propositions. Til which, he says, is neither intuitive nor de
lotson very wittily says of such propositions, monstrative, and which, therefore, he calls
that they are so surfeited with truth, that sensitive knowledge. It is demonstrable,
they are good for nothing; and as they de and was long ago demonstrated by Aristotle,
serve not the name of axioms, so neither that every proposition to which we give a
do they deserve the name of knowledge. rational assent, must either have its evi
He observes, that such trifling self-evi dence in itself, or derive it from some ante
dent propositions as we have named are not cedent proposition. And the same thing
derived from axioms, and therefore that all may be said of the antecedent proposition.
our knowledge is not derived from axioms. As, therefore, we cannot go back to ante
I grant that they are not derived from cedent propositions without end, the evi
axioms, because they are themselves self dence must at last rest upon propositions,
evident. But it is an abuse of words to call one or more, which have their evidence in
them knowledge, as it is, to call them themselves—that is, upon first principles.
axioms; for no man can be said to be the As to the evidence of our own existence,
wiser or more knowing for having millions of and of the existence of a first cause, Mr
them in store. Locke does not say whether it rests upon
He observes, that the particular propo first principles or not. But it is manifest,
sitions contained under a general axiom are from what he has said upon both, that it
no less self-evident than the general axiom, does. [646]
and that they are sooner known and under With regard to our own existence, says
stood. Thus, it is as evident that my hand he, we perceive it so plainly and so cer
is less than my body, as that a part is less tainly that it neither needs nor is capable
than the whole; and I know the truth of of any proof. This is as much as to say
the particular proposition sooner than that that our own existence is a first principle;
of the general. for it is applying to this truth the very
This is true. A man cannot perceive the definition of a first principle.
truth of a general axiom, such as, that a He adds, that, if I doubt, that very doubt
part is less than the whole, until he has the makes me perceive my own existence, and
general notions of a part and a whole formed will not suffer me to doubt of that. If I
in his mind; and, before he has these feel pain, I have as certain perception of
general notions, he may perceive that his my existence as of the pain I feel.
hand is less than his body. [645] Here we have two first principles plainly
A great part of this chapter on maxims implied—First, That my feeling pain, or
is levelled against a notion, which, it seems, being conscious of pain, is a certain evidence
some have entertained, that all our know of the real existence of that pain; and,
ledge is derived from these two maxims secondly, That pain cannot exist without a
to wit, whatever is, is ; and it is impossible mind or being that is pained. That these
Jor the same thing to be, and not to be." are first principles, and incapable of proof,
This I take to be a ridiculous notion, Mr Locke acknowledges. And it is certain,
justly deserving the treatment which Mr that, if they are not true, we can have no
evidence of our own existence; for, if we
may feel pain when no pain really exists, or
perience only affords the occasions on which the if pain may exist without any being that is
native (not innate) or a priori cognitions, virtually
:#"
ence.
the mind, actually manifest their exist pained, then it is certain that our feeling
pain can give us no evidence of our ex
*These are called, the principle of Identity, and the istence.
principle of Contradiction, or, more properly, Non
contradiction.-H. Thus, it appears that the evidence of our
[644-646]
cHAP. v11.] OPINIONS ABOUT FIRST PRINCIPLES, 467
own existence, according to the view that calls “Regulae Philosophandi,” and in his
Mr Locke gives of it, is grounded upon two “Phaenomena,” the first principles which he
of those first principles which we had occa assumes in his reasoning.
sion to mention. Nothing, therefore, could have been more
If we consider the argument he has given unluckily adduced by Mr Locke to support
for the existence of a first intelligent cause, his aversion to first principles, than the ex
it is no less evident that it is grounded upon ample of Sir Isaac Newton, who, by laying
other two of them. The first, That what down the first principles upon which he rea
begins to exist must have a cause of its ex sons in those parts of natural philosophy
istence; and the second, That an unintelli which he cultivated, has given a stability to
gent and unthinking being cannot be the that science which it never had before, and
cause of beings that are thinking and in which it will retain to the end of the world.
telligent. Upon these two principles, he I am now to give some account of a philo
argues, very convincingly, for the existence sopher, who wrote expressly on the subject
of a first intelligent cause of things. And, of first principles, after Mr Locke.
if these principles are not true, we can have Pere Buffier, a French Jesuit, first pub
no proof of the existence of a first cause, lished his “Traité des premiers Veritez, et
either from our own existence, or from the de la Source de nos Jugements,” in 8vo, if
existence of other things that fall within our I mistake not, in the year 1724. It was
view. [647] afterwards published in folio, as a part of
Another thing advanced by Mr Locke his “Cours des. Sciences.” Paris, 1732.
apon this subject is, that no science is or He defines first principles to be proposi
hath been built upon maxims. tions so clear that they can neither be
Surely Mr Locke was not ignorant of proved nor combated by those that are more
geometry, which hath been built upon clear.
maxims prefixed to the elements, as far back The first source of first principles he men
as we are able to trace it." But, though tions, is, that intimate conviction which
they had not been prefixed, which was a every man has of his own existence, and of
matter of utility rather than necessity, yet what passes in his own mind. Some philo
it must be granted that every demonstra sophers, he observes, admitted these as first
tion in geometry is grounded either upon principles, who were unwilling to admit any
propositions formerly demonstrated, or upon others; and he shews the strange conse
self-evident principles. quences that follow from this system.
Mr Locke farther says, that maxims are A second source of first principles he
not of use to help men forward in the ad makes to be common sense; which, he ob
vancement of the sciences, or new dis serves, philosophers have not been wont to
coveries of yet unknown truths; that New consider. He defines it to be the disposi
ton, in the discoveries he has made in his tion which Nature has planted in all men,
never-enough-to-be-admired book, has not or the far greater part, which leads them,
been assisted by the general maxims—what when they come to the use of reason, to form
ever is, is ; or, the whole is greater than a a common and uniform judgment upon
part; or the like. objects which are not objects of conscious
I answer, the first of these is, as was be ness, nor are founded on any antecedent
fore observed, an identical trifling proposi judgment. [649]
tion, of no use in mathematics, or in any He mentions, not as a full enumeration,
other science. The second is often used by but as a specimen, the following principles
Newton, and by all mathematicians, and of common sense.
many demonstrations rest upon it. In 1. That there are other beings and other
general, Newton, as well as all other mathe men in the universe, besides myself.
maticians, grounds his demonstrations of 2. That there is in them something that
mathematical propositions upon the axioms is called truth, wisdom, prudence; and that
laid down by Euclid, or upon propositions these things are not purely arbitrary.
which have been before demonstrated by 3. That there is something in me which
help of those axioms. [648] I call intelligence, and something which is
But it deservesto be particularly observed, not that intelligence, which I call my body;
that Newton, intending, in the third book of and that these things have different pro
his “Principia,” to give a more scientific rties.
form to the physical part of astronomy, 4. That all men are not in a conspiracy
which he had at first composed in a popular to deceive me and impose upon my ere
form, thought proper to follow the example dulity.
of Euclid, and to lay down first, in what he 5. That what has not intelligence cannot
produce the effects of intelligence, nor can
pieces of matter thrown together by chance
* Compare Stewart's “Elements," ii. pp. 38, 43,
196. On this subject, “satius est silere quam parum form any regular work, such as a clock or
dicere.”-H. watch.
2 is 2
[647–649]
468 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS.
[EssAv v1.
He explains very particularly the several honour of being the first, as far as I know,
parts of his definition of common sense, after Aristotle, who has given the world a
and shews how the dictates of common just treatise upon first principles.
sense may be distinguished from common
I'
Some late writers, particularly Dr Os
prejudices; and then enters into a particular wald, Dr Beattie, and Dr Campbell, have
consideration of the primary truths that been led into a way of thinking somewhat
concern being in general; the truths that similar to that of Buffier; the two former,
concern thinking beings; those that concern as I have reason to believe, without any in
body; and those on which the various tercourse with one another, or any know
branches of human knowledge are grounded. ledge of what Buffier had wrote on the sub
I shall not enter into a detail of his sen ject. Indeed, a man who thinks, and who
timents on these subjects. I think there is is acquainted with the philosophy of Mr
more which I take to be original in this Hume, will very naturally be led to appre
treatise than in most books of the meta hend, that, to support the fabric of human
physical kind I have met with ; that many knowledge, some other principles are neces
of his notions are solid; and that others, sary than those of Des Cartes and Mr
which I cannot altogether approve, are Locke. Buffier must be acknowledged to
ingenious. [650] have the merit of having discovered this,
The other writers I have mentioned, before the consequences of the Cartesian
after Des Cartes, may, I think, without system were so fully displayed as they have
impropriety, be called Cartesians. For, been by Mr Hume. But I am apt to think
though they differ from Des Cartes in some that the man who does not see this now,
things, and contradict him in others, yet must have but a superficial knowledge of
they set-out from the same principles, and these subjects."
follow the same method, admitting no other The three writers above mentioned have
first principle with regard to the existence my highesteem and affection as men; but
of things but their own existence, and the I intend to say nothing of them as writers
existence of those operations of mind of upon this subject, that I may not incur the
which they are conscious, and requiring censure of partiality. Two of them have
that the existence of a material world, and been joined so closely with me in the anim
the existence of other men and things, adversions of a celebrated writer,t that
should be proved by argument. we may be thought too near of kin to give
This method of philosophising is common our testimony of one another.
to Des Cartes, Malebranche, Arnauld,
Locke, Norris, Collier, Berkeley, and Hume;
and, as it was introduced by Des Cartes, I CHAPTER VIII.
call it the Cartesian system, and those who
follow it Cartesians, not intending any dis oF PRETUDICEs, THE CAUSEs of ERRoR.
respect by this term, but to signify a parti
cular method of philosophising common to OUR intellectual powers are wisely fitted
them all, and begun by Des Cartes. by the Author of our nature for the disco
Some of these have gone the utmost very of truth, as far as suits our present
length in scepticism, leaving no existence state. Error is not their natural issue, any
in nature but that of ideas and impressions. more than disease is of the natural structure
Some have endeavoured to throw off the of the body. Yet, as we are liable to vari
belief of a material world only, and to leave ous diseases of body from accidental causes,
us ideas and spirits. All of them have external and internal; so we are, from like
fallen into very gross paradoxes, which can causes, liable to wrong judgments. [652]
never sit easy upon the human understand Medical writers have endeavoured to end
ing, and which, though adopted in the merate the diseases of the body, and to re
closet, men find themselves under a ne duce them to a system, under the name of
cessity of throwing off and disclaiming when nosology; and it were to be wished that we
they enter into society. had also a nosology of the human under
Indeed, in my judgment, those who have standing.
reasoned most acutely and consequentially When we know a disorder of the body,
upon this system, are they that have gone we are often at a loss to find the proper
deepest into scepticism. remedy; but in most cases the disorders of
Father Buffier, however, is no Cartesian the understanding point out their remedies
in this sense. He seems to have perceived so plainly, that he who knows the one must
the defects of the Cartesian system while know the other.
it was in the meridian of its glory, and to Many authors have furnished useful ma
have been aware that a ridiculous scepticism terials for this purpose, and some have en
is the natural issue of it, and therefore deavoured to reduce them to a system. I
nobly attempted to lay a broader founda
tion for human knowledge, and has the *See Note A.-H. f Priestley.-H.
[650–632)
–- - - -
on AP. viii.] OF PREJUDICES, THE CAUSES OF ERROR. 469
like best the general division given of them judgment rests, and the opinion we have of
by Lord Bacon, in his fifth book “De Aug the judgment and candour of those who
mentis Scientiarum,” and more fully treated differ from us, or agree with us The
in his “ Novum Organum.” He divides modest man, conscious of his own fal
them into four classes—idola tribus, idola libility in judging, is in danger of giving
specus, idola fori, and idola theatri. The too much to authority; the arrogant of
names are perhaps fanciful; but I think giving too little. [654]
the division judicious, like most of the pro In all matters belonging to our cog
ductions of that wonderful genius. And as nizance, every man must be determined by
this division was first made by him, he may his own final judgment, otherwise he does
be indulged the privilege of giving names not act the part of a rational being.
to its several members. Authority may add weight to one scale;
I propose in this chapter to explain the but the man holds the balance, and judges
several members of this division, according what weight he ought to allow to authority.
to the meaning of the author, and to give If a man should even claim infallibility,
instances of each, without confining myself we must judge of his title to that preroga
to those which Lord Bacon has given, and tive. If a man pretend to be an ambassa
without pretending to a complete enumera dor from heaven, we must judge of his
tion. credentials. No claim can deprive us of
Toevery bias of the understanding, by which this right, or excuse us for neglecting to
a man may be misled in judging, or drawn exercise it.
into error, Lord Bacon gives the name of As, therefore, our regard to authority
an idol. The understanding, in its natural may be either too great or too small, the
and best state, pays its homage to truth bias of human nature seems to lean to the
only. The causes of error are considered first of these extremes; and I believe it is
by him as so many false deities, who receive good for men in general that it should do so.
the homage which is due only to truth. When this bias concurs with an indiffer.
[653] ence about truth, its operation will be the
A. The first class are the idola tribus. more powerful.
These are such as beset the whole human The love of truth is natural to man, and
species ; so that every man is in danger strong in every well-disposed mind. But
from them. They arise from principles of it may be overborne by party zeal, by
the human constitution, which are highly vanity, by the desire of victory, or even by
useful and necessary in our present state; laziness. When it is superior to these, it
but, by their excess or defect, or wrong is a manly virtue, and requires the exer
direction, may lead us into error. cise of industry, fortitude, self-denial, can
As the active principles of the human dour, and openness to conviction.
frame are wisely contrived by the Author As there are persons in the world of so
of our being for the direction of our ac mean and abject a spirit that they rather
tions, and yet, without proper regulation choose to owe their subsistence to the
and restraint, are apt to lead us wrong, so charity of others, than by industry to ac
it is also with regard to those parts of our quire some property of their own; so there
constitution that have influence upon our are many more who may be called mere
opinions. Of this we may take the follow beggars with regard to their opinions.
ing instances: Through laziness and indifference about
1. First,-Men are prone to be led too truth, they leave to others the drudgery of
much by authority in their opinions. digging for this commodity; they can have
In the first part of life, we have no other enough at second hand to serve their occa
guide; and, without a disposition to receive sions. Their concern is not to know what
implicitly what we are taught, we should is true, but what is said and thought on
be incapable of instruction, and incapable such subjects; and their understanding,
of improvement. like their clothes, is cut according to the
When judgment is ripe, there are many fashion. [655]
things in which we are incompetent judges. This distemper of the understanding has
In such matters, it is most reasonable to taken so deep root in a great part of man
rely upon the judgment of those whom we kind, that it can hardly be said that they
believe to be competent and disinterested. use their own judgment in things that do
The highest court of judicature in the not concern their temporal interest. Nor is
nation relies upon the authority of lawyers it peculiar to the ignorant; it infects all
and physicians in matters belonging to ranks. We may guess their opinions when
their respective professions. we know where they were born, of what
Even in matters which we have access parents, how educated, and what company
to know, authority always will have, and they have kept. These circumstances de
ought to have, more or less weight, in pro termine their opinions in religion, in polities.
portion to the evidence on which our own and in philosophy.
[653–655
*- : -- - - -
470 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. LEssAY v1.
2. A second general prejudice arises from row motions, which a more extensive inter
a disposition to measure things less known course would have.cured.
and less familiar, by those that are better 3. Men are often led into error by the
known and more familiar. love of simplicity, which disposes us to re
This is the foundation of analogical rea duce things to few principles, and to con
soning, to which we have a great proneness ceive a greater simplicity in nature than
by nature, and to it indeed we owe a great there really is." [657]
part of our knowledge. It would be absurd To love simplicity, and to be pleased with
to lay aside this kind of reasoningaltogether, it wherever we find it, is no imperfection,
and it is difficult to judge how far we may but the contrary. It is the result of good
venture upon it. The bias of human nature taste. We cannot but be pleased to ob
is to judge from too slight analogies. serve, that all the changes of motion pro
The objects of sense engross our thoughts duced by the collision of bodies, hard, soft,
in the first part of life, and are most fami or elastic, are reducible to three simple
liar through the whole of it. Hence, in all laws of motion, which the industry of phi
ages men have been prone to attribute the losophers has discovered.
human figure and human passions and frail When we consider what a prodigious
ties to superior intelligences, and even to variety of effects depend upon the law of
the Supreme Being. gravitation; how many phaenomena in the
There is a disposition in men to mate earth, sea, and air, which, in all preceding
rialize everything, if I may be allowed the ages, had tortured the wits of philosophers,
expression ; that is, to apply the notions we and occasioned a thousand vain theories,
have of material objects to things of another are shewn to be the necessary consequences
nature. Thought is considered as analogous of this one law; how the whole system of
to motion in a body; and as bodies are put sun, moon, planets, primary and secondary,
in motion by impulses, and by impressions and comets, are kept in order by it, and
made upon them by contiguous objects, we their seeming irregularities accounted for
sre apt to conclude that the mind is made and reduced to accurate measure—the sim
to think by impressions made upon it, and plicity of the cause, and the beauty and
that there must be some kind of contiguity variety of the effects, must give pleasure to
between it and the objects of thought. every contemplative mind. By this noble
Hence the theories of ideas and impressions discovery, we are taken, as it were, behind
have so generally prevailed. [656] the scene in this great drama of nature,
Because the most perfect works of human and made to behold some part of the art of
artists are made after a model, and of ma the divine Author of this system, which,
terials that before existed, the ancient phi before this discovery, eye had not seen, nor
losophers universally believed that the world ear heard, nor had it entered into the heart
was made of a pre-existent uncreated matter; of man to conceive.
and many of them, that there were eternal There is, without doubt, in every work
and uncreated models of every species of of nature, all the beautiful simplicity that is
things which God made. consistent with the end for which it was
The mistakes in common life, which are made. But, if we hope to discover how
owing to this prejudice, are innumerable, nature brings about its ends, merely from
and cannot escape the slightest observation. this principle, that it operates in the simplest
Men judge of other men by themselves, or and best way, we deceive ourselves, and
by the small circle of their acquaintance. forget that the wisdom of nature is more
The selfish man thinks all pretences to be above the wisdom of man, than man's wis
nevolence and public spirit to be mere dom is above that of a child.
hypocrisy or self-deceit. The generous and If a child should sit down to contrive how
open-hearted believe fair pretences too a city is to be fortified, or an army arranged
easily, and are apt to think men better than in the day of battle, he would, no doubt,
they really are. The abandoned and pro conjecture what, to his understanding, ap
fligate can hardly be persuaded that there peared the simplest and best way. But
is any such thing as real virtue in the world. could he ever hit upon the true way? No
The rustic forms his notions of the man surely. When he learns from fact how
ners and characters of men from those of these effects are produced, he will then see
his country village, and is easily duped when how foolish his childish conjectures were.
he comes into a great city. [658]
It is commonly taken for granted, that We may learn something of the way in
this narrow way of judging of men is to be which nature operates from fact and ob
cured only by an extensive intercourse with servation; but, if we conclude that it ope
men of different ranks, professions, and rates in such a manner, only because to our
nations; and that the man whose acquaint
ance has been confined within a narrow
"ircle, must have many prejudices and nar
:*" Inquiry," ch. vii. # 3, above, p. 206, sqq
[656–658]
cHAP. viii.] OF PREJUDICES, THE CAUSES OF ERROR. 471
understanding that appears to be the best The evidence from reason that could be
and simplest manner, we shall always go produced for those systems was next to no
wrong. thing, and bore no proportion to the ground
It was believed, for many ages, that all they gained in the belief of men; but they
the variety of concrete bodies we find on were simple and regular, and reduced thin
this globe is reducible to four elements, of to a few principles; and this supplied their
which they are compounded, and into which want of evidence.
they may be resolved. It was the simpli Of all the systems we know, that of Des
city of this theory, and not any evidence Cartes was most remarkable for its sim
from fact, that made it to be so generally plicity." Upon one proposition, I think,
received; for the more it is examined, we he builds the whole fabric of human know
find the less ground to believe it. ledge. And from mere matter, with a
The Pythagoreans and Platonists were certain quantity of motion given it at first,
carried farther by the same love of sim he accounts for all the phaenomena of the
plicity. Pythagoras, by his skill in mathe material world.
matics, discovered, that there can be no The physical part of this system was
more than five regular solid figures, ter mere hypothesis. It had nothing to re
minated by plain surfaces, which are all commend it but its simplicity; yet it had
similar and equal; to wit, the tetrahedron, force enough to overturn the system of
the cube, the octahedron, the dodecahedron, Aristotle, after that system had prevailed
and the eicosihedron. As nature works in for more than a thousand years.
the most simple and regular way, he thought The principle of gravitation, and other
that all the elementary bodies must have attracting and repelling forces, after Sir
one or other of those regular figures; and Isaac Newton had given the strongest evi
that the discovery of the properties and dence of their real existence in nature, were
relations of the regular solids would be a rejected by the greatest part of Europe for
key to open the mysteries of nature. half a century, because they could not be
This notion of the Pythagoreans and accounted for by matter and motion. So
Platonists has undoubtedly great beauty much were men enamoured with the sim
and simplicity. Accordingly it prevailed, plicity of the Cartesian system. . [660]
at least, to the time of Euclid. He was Nay, I apprehend, it was this love of
a Platonic philosopher, and is said to have simplicity, more than real evidence, that led
wrote all the books of his “Elements” in Newton himself to say, in the preface to his
order to discover the properties and rela “Principia,” speaking of the phaenomena
tions of the five regular solids. This ancient of the material world—“Nam multa me
tradition of the intention of Euclid in writing movent ut nonnihil suspicer, ea omnia ex
his “Elements,” is countenanced by the viribus quibusdam pendere posse, quibus
work itself. For the last books of the corporum particulae, per causas nondum
“Elements” treat of the regular solids, and cognitas, vel in se mutuo impelluntur, et
all the preceding are subservient to the secundum figuras regulares cohaerent, vel
last. [659] ab invicem fugantur et recedunt.” For
So that this most ancient mathematical certainly we have no evidence from fact,
work, which, for its admirable composition, that all the phaenomena of the material
has served as a model to all succeeding world are produced by attracting or repell
writers in mathematics, seems, like the two ing forces.
first books of Newton's “Principia,” to With his usual modesty, he proposes it
have been intended by its author to exhibit only as a slight suspicion; and the ground
the mathematical principles of natural phi of this suspicion could only be, that he saw
sophy. that many of the phaenomena of nature de
It was long believed, that all the qualities pended upon causes of this kind ; and there
of bodies," and all their medical virtues, fore was disposed, from the simplicity of
were reducible to four-moisture and dry nature, to think that all do.
ness, heat and cold; and that there are When a real cause is discovered, the
only four temperaments of the hulaan body— same love of simplicity leads men to attri
the sanguine, the melancholy, the bilious, bute effects to it which are beyond its pro
and the phlegmatic. The chemical system, Vince,
of reducing all bodies to salt, sulphur, and A medicine that is found to be of great
mercury, was of the same kind. For how use in one distemper, commonly has its
many ages did men believe, that the division virtues multiplied, till it becomes a panacea.
of all the objects of thought into ten cate Those who have lived long, can recollect
gories, and of all that can be affirmed or many instances of this. In other branches
denied of anything, into five universals or of knowledge, the same thing often happens.
predicables, were perfect enumerations? When the attention of men is turned to any
... on the qualitates primae of the Peripatetics. * See above, p. 206, b, note t.-H.
[659, 660]
particular cause, by discovering it to have The experience of all ages shews how
remarkable effects, they are in great danger prone ingenious men have been to invent
of extending its influence, upon slight evi hypotheses to explain the phaenomena of
dence, to things with which it has no con Nature; how fond, by a kind of anticipa
nection. Such prejudices arise from the tion, to discover her secrets. Instead of a
natural desire of simplifying natural causes, slow and gradual ascent in the scale of na
and of accounting for many phaenomena tural causes, by a just and copious induc
from the same principle. [661] tion, they would shorten the work, and, by
4. One of the most copious sources of a flight of genius, get to the top at once.
error in philosophy is the misapplication of This gratifies the pride of human under
our noblest intellectual power to purposes for standing; but it is an attempt beyond our
which it is incompetent. force, like that of Phaeton to guide the
Of all the intellectual powers of man, chariot of the sun.
that of invention bears the highest price. When a man has laid out all his inge
It resembles most the power of creation, nuity in fabricating a system, he views it
and is honoured with that name. with the eye of a parent; he strains phae
We admire the man who shews a supe nomena to make them tally with it, and
riority in the talent of finding the means of make it look like the work of Nature.
accomplishing an end; who can, by a happy The slow and patient method of induc
combination, produce an effect, or make a tion, the only way to attain any knowledge
discovery beyond the reach of other men; of Nature's work, was little understood
who can draw important conclusions from until it was delineated by Lord Bacon, and
circumstances that commonly pass unob has been little followed since. It humbles
served; who judges with the greatest saga the pride of man, and puts him constantly in
city of the designs of other men, and the mind that his most ingenious conjectures
consequences of his own actions. To this with regard to the works of God are pitiful
superiority of understanding we give the and childish. [663]
name of genius, and look up with admira There is no room here for the favourite
tion to everything that bears the marks of it. talent of invention. In the humble method
Yet this power, so highly valuable in it of information, from the t volume of
self, and so useful in the conduct of life, Nature we must receive our knowledge
may be misapplied; and men of genius, in of Nature. Whatever is beyond a just in
all ages, have been prone to apply it to pur terpretation of that volume is the work of
poses for which it is altogether incompe man; and the work of God ought not to be
tent. contaminated by any mixture with it.
The works of men and the works of To a man of genius, self-denial is a diffi
Nature are not of the same order. The cult lesson in philosophy as well as in reli
force of genius may enable a man perfectly gion. To bring his fine imaginations and
to comprehend the former, and see them to most ingenious conjectures to the fiery trial
the bottom. What is contrived and exe of experiment and induction, by which the
cuted by one man may be perfectly under greater part, if not the whole, will be
stood by another man. With great proba found to be dross, is a humiliating task.
bility, he may from a part conjecture the This is to condemn him to dig in a mine,
whole, or from the effects may conjecture when he would fly with the wings of an
the causes; because they are effects of a eagle.
wisdom not superior to his own. [662]. In all the fine arts, whose end is to
But the works of Nature are contrived please, genius is deservedly supreme. In
and executed by a wisdom and power in the conduct of human affairs, it often does
finitely superior to that of man; and when wonders; but in all inquiries into the con
men attempt, by the force of genius, to dis stitution of Nature, it must act a subor
cover the causes of the phaenomena of Na dinate part, ill-suited to the superiority it
ture, they have only the chance of going boasts. It may combine, but it must not
wrong more ingeniously. Their conjectures fabricate. It may collect evidence, but
may appear very probable to beings no must not supply the want of it by conjec
wiser than themselves; but they have no ture. It may display its powers by putting
chance to hit the truth. They are like the Nature to the question in well-contrived
conjectures of a child how a ship of war is | experiments, but it must add nothing to her
built, and how it is managed at sea. answers.
Let the man of genius try to make an 5. In avoiding one ertreme, men are very
animal, even the meanest; to make a plant, apt to rush into the opposite.
or even a single leaf of a plant, or a feather Thus, in rude ages, men, unaccustomed
of a bird; he will find that all his wisdom to search for natural causes, ascribe every
and sagacity can bear no comparison with uncommon appearance to the immediate
the wisdom of Nature, nor his power with interposition of invisible beings; but when
the power of Nature. | philosophy has discovered natural causes of
[661-663)
cuAF viii.] OF PREJUDICES, THE CAUSES OF ERROR. 473
many events, which, in the days of ignor fined to a certain track by his profession or
ance, were ascribed to the immediate opera manner of life, is very apt to judge wrong
tion of gods or daemons, they are apt to when he ventures out of that track. He is
think that all the phaenomena of Nature apt to draw everything within the sphere of
may be accounted for in the same way, and his profession, and to judge by its maxims
that there is no need of an invisible Maker of things that have no relation to it.
and Governor of the world. [664] The mere mathematician is apt to apply
Rude men are, at first, disposed to ascribe measure and calculation to things which do
intelligence and active power to everything not admit of it. Direct and inverse ratios
they see move or undergo any change. have been applied by an ingenious author to
“Savages,” says the Abbé Raynal, “where measure human affections, and the moral
ever they see motion which they cannot worth of actions. An eminent mathemati
account for, there they suppose a soul.” cian" attempted to ascertain by calculation
When they come to be convinced of the the ratio in which the evidence of facts
folly of this extreme, they are apt to run must decrease in the course of time, and
into the opposite, and to think that every fixed the period when the evidence of the
thing moves only as it is moved, and acts facts on which Christianity is founded shall
as it is acted upon. become evanescent, and when in conse
Thus, from the extreme of superstition, quence no faith shall be found on the earth.
the transition is easy to that of atheism; I have seen a philosophical dissertation,
and from the extreme of ascribing activity published by a very good mathematician,
to every part of Nature, to that of exclud wherein, in opposition to the ancient divi
ing it altogether, and making even the deter sion of things into ten categories, he main
minations of intelligent beings, the links of tains that there are no more, and can be no
one fatal chain, or the wheels of one great more than two categories, to wit, data and
machine. quasita.t
The abuse of occult qualities in the Peri The ancient chemists were wont to ex
patetic philosophy led Des Cartes and his plain all the mysteries of Nature, and even
followers to reject all occult qualities, to of religion, by salt, sulphur, and mercury.
pretend to explain all the phaenomena of Mr Locke, I think, mentions an eminent
Nature by mere matter and motion, and musician, who believed that God created
even to fix disgrace upon the name of occult the world in six days, and rested the se
quality. venth, because there are but seven notes in
6. Men's judgments are often perverted music. I knew one of that profession, who
by their affections and passions. This is thought that there could be only three parts
so commonly observed, and so universally in harmony—to wit, bass, tenor, and treble
acknowledged, that it needs no proof nor —because there are but three persons in the
illustration. Trinity. [666]
B. The second class of idols in Lord The learned and ingenious Dr Henry
Bacon's division are the idola specus. More having very elaborately and methodi
These are prejudices which have their cally compiled his “Enchiridium Metaphy
origin, not from the constitution of human sicum,” and “Enchiridium Ethicum,”
nature, but from something peculiar to the found all the divisions and subdivisions of
individual. both to be allegorically taught in the first
As in a cave objects vary in their appear chapter of Genesis. Thus even very inge
ance according to the form of the cave and mious men are apt to make a ridiculous
the manner in which it receives the light, figure, by drawing into the track in which
Lord Bacon conceives the mind of every their thoughts have long run, things alto
man to resemble a cave, which has its par gether foreign to it.:
ticular form, and its particular manner of Different persons, either from temperor
being enlightened; and, from these circum from education, have different tendencies of
stances, often gives false colours and a delu understanding, which, by their excess, are
sive appearance to objects seen in it." [665] unfavourable to sound judgment.
For this reason he gives the name of idola Some have an undue admiration of anti
specus to those prejudices which arise from quity, and contempt of whatever is modern;
the particular way in which a man has been others go as far into the contrary extreme.
trained, from his being addicted to some It may be judged, that the former are per
particular profession, or from something
particular in the turn of his mind. * Craig.-H.
+ Reid refers to his uncle, James Gregory, Profes
A man whose thoughts have been con sor of Mathematics in St Andrew's and Edinburgh.
See above, p. 68, b, ..-H. - -
* If Bacon took his simile of the cave.from Plato, + “Musicians think our souls are harmonies;
he has perverted it from its proper meaning; for, in Physicians hold that they complexions be
the Platonic signification, the idola specus should Epicures make them swarms of atomies,
denote the prejudices of the species, and not of the Which do by chance into the body flee.
individual-that is, express what Bacon denominates Sir John Davies, in the first and second lines, al
by idola tribus.-H. ludes to Aristoxenus and Galen.-H. -
[664–666]
sons who value themselves upon their ac It was a grand and noble project of
quaintance with ancient authors, and the Bishop Wilkins" to invent a philosophical
latter such as have little knowledge of this language, which should be free from the
kind. imperfections of vulgar languages. Whether
Some are afraid to venture a step out of the this attempt will ever succeed, so far as to
beaten track, and think it safest to go with be generally useful, I shall not pretend to
the multitude; others are fond of singulari determine. The great pains taken by that
ties, and of everything that has the air of excellent man in this design have hitherto
paradox. produced no effect. Very few have ever
Some are desultory and changeable in entered minutely into his views; far less
their opinions; others unduly tenacious. have his philosophical language and his real
Most men have a predilection for the tenets character been brought into use. [668]
of their sect or party, and still more for He founds his philosophical language and
their own inventions. real character upon a systematical division
C. The idola fori are the fallacies arising and subdivision of all the things which may
Jrom the imperfections and the abuse of lan be expressed by language; and, instead of
guage, which is an instrument of thought the ancient division into ten categories, has
as well as of the communication of our made forty categories, or summa genera.
thoughts. [667] But whether this division, though made by
Whether it be the effect of constitution a very comprehensive mind, will always suit
or of habit, I will not take upon me to de the various systems that may beintroduced,
termine; but, from one or both of these and all the real improvements that may be
causes, it happens that no man can pursue made in human knowledge, may be doubted.
a train of thought or reasoning without the The difficulty is still greater in the sub
use of language. Words are the signs of divisions; so that it is to be feared that
our thoughts; and the sign is so associated this noble attempt of a great genius will
with the thing signified, that the last can prove abortive, until philosophers have the
hardly present itself to the imagination, same opinions and the same systems in the
without drawing the other along with it. various branches of human knowledge.
A man who would compose in any lan There is more reason to hope that the
£ think in that language. If he languages used by philosophers may be
thinks in one language what he would ex gradually improved in copiousness and in
press in another, he thereby doubles his distinctness; and that improvements in
labour; and, after all, his expressions will knowledge and in language may go hand in
have more the air of a translation than of hand and facilitate each other. £ I fear
an original. the imperfections of language can never be
This shews that our thoughts take their perfectly remedied while our knowledge is
colour in some degree from the language imperfect.
we use; and that, although language ought However this may be, it is evident that
always to be subservient to thought, yet the imperfections of language, and much
thought must be, at some times and in some more the abuse of it, are the occasion of
degree, subservient to language. many errors; and that in many disputes
As a servant that is extremely useful and which have engaged learned men, the differ
necessary to his master, by degrees acquires ence has been partly, and in some wholly,
an authority over him, so that the master about the meaning of words.
must often yield to the servant, such is the Mr Locke found it necessary to employ a
case with regard to language. Its inten fourth part of his “Essay on Human Un
tion is to be a servant to the understanding; derstanding” about words, their various
but it is so useful and so necessary that we kinds, their imperfection and abuse, and
cannot avoid being sometimes led by it when the remedies of both; and has made many
it ought to follow. We cannot shake off observations upon these subjects well worthy
this impediment—we must drag it along of attentive perusal. [669]
with us; and, therefore, must direct our D. The fourth class of prejudices are the
course, and regulate our pace, as it permits. idola theatri, by which are meant prejudices
Language must have many imperfections arising from the systems or seets in which
when applied to philosophy, because it was we have been trained, or which we have
not made for that use. In the early periods adopted.
of society, rude and ignorant men use cer A false system once fixed in the mind,
tain forms of speech, to express their wants, becomes, as it were, the medium through
their desires, and their transactions with which we see objects: they receive a tine
one another. Their language can reach no ture from it, and appear of another colour
farther than their speculations and notions; than when seen by a pure light.
and, if their notions be vague and ill-defined, Upon the same subject, a Platonist, a
the words by which they express them must
be so likewise. * See above, p. 403, note.-H.
[667-669]
cHAP. viii.] OF PREJUDICES, THE CAUSES OF ERROR. 475
Peripatetic, and an Epicurean, will think other hand, diseases of that kind, when they
differently, not only in matters connected happen by accident, are apt to induce the
with his peculiar tenets, but even in things temperament that is suited to them—there
remote from them. is something analogous to this in the dis
A judicious history of the different sects eases of the understanding. [670]
of philosophers, and the different methods of A certain complexion of understanding
philosophising, which have obtained among may dispose a man to one system of opinions
mankind, would be of no small use to direct more than to another; and, on the other
men in the search of truth. In such a hand, a system of opinions, fixed in the mind
history, what would be of the greatest mo by education or otherwise, gives that com
ment is not so much a minute detail of the plexion to the understanding which is suited
dogmata of each sect, as a just delineation to them.
of the spirit of the sect, and of that point It were to be wished, that the different
of view in which things appeared to its systems that have prevailed could be classed
founder. This was perfectly understood, according to their spirit, as well as named
and, as far as concerns the theories of mo from their founders. Lord Bacon has dis
rals, is executed with great judgment and tinguished false philosophy into the sophis
candour by Dr Smith in his theory of moral tical, the empirical, and the superstitious,
sentiments. and has made judicious observations upon
As there are certain temperaments of the each ofthese kinds. But I apprehend this sub
body that dispose a man more to one class ject deserves to be treated more fully by such
of diseases than to another, and, on the a hand, if such a hand can be found. [671]
E, SSAY V II.
OF REASONING.
CHAPTER I. and the proposition or propositions from

which it is inferred, the premises. [672]
of REAsoNING IN GENERAL, AND OF Reasoning may consist of many steps;
DEMONSTRAtion, the first conclusion being a premise to a
| second, that to a third, and so on, till we
The power of reasoning is very nearly come to the last conclusion. A process
allied to that of judging; and it is of little consisting of many steps of this kind, is so
consequence in the common affairs of life easily distinguished from judgment, that it
to distinguish them nicely. On this account, is never called by that name. But when
the same name is often given to both. We there is only a single step to the conclusion,
include both under the name of reason." the distinction is less obvious, and the pro
The assent we give to a proposition is called cess is sometimes called judgment, some
judgment, whether the proposition be self times reasoning.
evident, or derive its evidence by reasoning It is not strange that, in common dis
from other propositions. course, judgment and reasoning should not
Yet there is a distinction between rea be very nicely distinguished, since they are
soning and judging. Reasoning is the pro in some cases confounded even by logicians.
cess by which we pass from one judgment We are taught in logic, that judgment is
to another, which is the consequence of it. expressed by one proposition, but that rea
Accordingly our judgments are distinguished soning requires two or three. But so
into intuitive, which are not grounded upon various are the modes of speech, that what
any preceding judgment, and discursive, in one mode is expressed by two or three
which are deduced from some preceding propositions, may, in another mode, be ex
judgment by reasoning. pressed by one. Thus I may say, God is
In all reasoning, therefore, there must be good; therefore good men shall be happy.
a proposition inferred, and one or more from This is reasoning, of that kind which logi.
which it is inferred. And this power of cians call an enthymeme, consisting of an
inferring, or drawing a conclusion, is only antecedent proposition, and a conclusion
another name for reasoning; the proposi drawn from it." But this reasoning may
tion inferred being called the conclusion, * The enthymene is a mere abbreviation of expres
* see stewart. “Elements," ii. p. 12-H. sion; in the mental process there is no ellipsis. By
[670–672.]
476 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [EssAY vu.
be expressed by one proposition, thus: The exercise of reasoning on various sub
Because God is good, good men shall be jects not only strengthens the faculty, but
happy. This is what they call a causal furnishes the mind with a store of materials.
proposition, and therefore expresses judg Every train of reasoning, which is familiar,
ment; yet the enthymeme, which is reason becomes a beaten track in the way to £
ing, expresses no more. others. It removes many obstacles whic
Reasoning, as well as judgment, must be lay in our way, and smooths many roads
true or false : both are grounded upon evi which we may have occasion to travel in
dence which may be probable or demonstra future disquisitions,
tive, and both are accompanied with assent When men of equal natural parts apply
or belief. [673] their reasoning power to any subject, the
The power of reasoning is justly accounted man who has reasoned much on the same
one of the prerogatives of human nature; or on similar subjects, has a like advantage
because by it many important truths have over him who has not, as the mechanic
been and may be discovered, which with who has store of tools for his work, has of
out it would be beyond our reach; yet it him who has his tools to make, or even to
seems to be only a kind of crutch to a invent.
limited understanding. We can conceive In a train of reasoning, the evidence of
an understanding, superior to human, to every step, where nothing is left to be sup
which that truth appears intuitively, which plied by the reader or hearer, must be in
we can only discover by reasoning. For mediately discernible to every man of ripe
this cause, though we must ascribe judg understanding who has a distinct compre
ment to the Almighty, we do not ascribe hension of the premises and conclusion, and
reasoning to him, because it implies some who compares them together. To be able
defect or limitation of understanding. Even to comprehend, in one view, a combination
among men, to use reasoning in things that of steps of this kind, is more difficult, and
are self-evident, is trifling ; like a man seems to require a £ natural ability.
going upon crutches when he can walk In all, it may be much improved by habit.
upon his legs. But the highest talent in reasoning is the
What reasoning is, can be understood invention of proofs; by which, truths re
only by a man who has reasoned, and who mote from the premises are brought to light.
is capable of reflecting upon this operation In all works of understanding, invention
of his own mind. We can define it only by has the highest praise: it requires an ex
synonymous words or phrases, such as in tensive view of what relates to the subject, *
ferring, drawing a conclusion, and the like. and a quickness in discerning those affinities
The very motion of reasoning, therefore, can and relations which may be subservient to
enter into the mind by no other channel the purpose.
than that of reflecting upon the operation In all invention there must be some end
of reasoning in our own minds; and the in view ; and sagacity in finding out the
notions of premises and conclusion, of a road that leads to this end, is, I think, what
we call invention. In this chiefly, as I ap
syllogism and all its constituent parts, of
an enthymeme, sorites, demonstration, pa prehend, and in clear and distinct concep
ralogism, and many others, have the same tions, consists that superiority of under
origin. standing which we call genius. [675]
It is nature, undoubtedly, that gives us In every chain of reasoning, the evidence
the capacity of reasoning. When this is of the last conclusion can be no greater than
wanting, no art nor education can supply it. that of the weakest link of the chain, what
But this capacity may be dormant through ever may be the strength of the rest.
life, like the seed of a plant, which, for want The most remarkable distinction of rea
of heat and moisture, never vegetates. This sonings is, that some are probable, others
is probably the case of some savages. demonstrative.
Although the capacity be purely the gift In every step of demonstrative reason
of nature, and probably given in very dif ing, the inference is necessary, and we per
ferent degrees to different persons; yet the ceive it to be impossible that the conclusion
power of reasoning seems to be got by habit, should not follow from the premises. In
as much as the power of walking or running. probable reasoning, the connection between
Its first exertions we are not able to recol the premises and the conclusion is not neces
lect in ourselves, or clearly to discern in sary, nor do we perceive it to be impossible
others. They are very feeble, and need to that the first should be true while the last
be led by example, and supported by autho is false.
rity. By degrees it acquires strength, Hence, demonstrative reasoning has no
chiefly by means of imitation and exer degrees, nor can one demonstration be
cise. [674] stronger than another, though, in relation
*th"e, Aristotle also meant something very dif. to our faculties, one may be more easily
ferent from what is vulgarly supposed.-H comprehended than another. Every de.
[6:3-673]
onAP. ..] OF REASONING, AND OF DEMONSTRATION. 477
monstration gives equal strength to the con respect of its magnitude, it has a certain
clusion, and leaves no possibility of its being ratio to every quantity of the kind. The
false. ratios of quantities are innumerable, such
It was, I think, the opinion of all the as, a half, a third, a tenth, double, triple.
ancients, that demonstrative reasoning can [677] All the powers of number are in
be applied only to truths that are necessary, sufficient to express the variety of ratios.
and not to those that are contingent. In For there are innumerable ratios which
this, I believe, they judged right. Of all cannot be perfectly expressed by numbers,
created things, the existence, the attributes, such as, the ratio of the side to the diagonal
and, consequently, the relations resulting of a square, or of the circumference of a circle
from those attributes, are contingent. They to the diameter. Of this infinite variety of
depend upon the will and power of Him who ratios, every one may be clearly conceived
made them. These are matters of fact, and and distinctly expressed, so as to be in no
admit not of demonstration. danger of being mistaken for any other.
The field of demonstrative reasoning, Extended quantities, such as lines, sur
therefore, is the various relations of things faces, solids, besides the variety of relations
abstract, that is, of things which we con they have in respect of magnitude, have no
ceive, without regard to their existence. less variety in respect of figure; and every
Of these, as they are conceived by the mind, mathematical figure may be accurately
and are nothing but what they are conceived defined, so as to distinguish it from all
to be, we may have a clear and adequate others.
comprehension. Their relations and attri There is nothing of this kind in other
butes are necessary and immutable. They objects of abstract reasoning. Some of
are the things to which the Pythagoreans them have various degrees; but these are
and Platonists gave the name of ideas. I not capable of measure, nor can be said to
would beg leave to borrow this meaning of have an assignable ratio to others of the
the word idea from those ancient philoso kind. They are either simple, or com
phers, and then I must agree with them, pounded of a few indivisible parts; and
that ideas are the only objects about which therefore, if we may be allowed the expres
we can reason demonstratively. [676] sion, can touch only in few points. But
There are many even of our ideas about mathematical quantities being made up of
which we can carry on no considerable train parts without number, can touch in innu
of reasoning. Though they be ever so well merable points, and be compared in innu
defined and perfectly comprehended, yet merable different ways.
their agreements and disagreements are few, There have been attempts made to mea
and these are discerned at once. We may sure the merit of actions by the ratios of
go a step or two in forming a conclusion the affections and principles of action from
with regard to such objects, but can go no which they proceed. This may perhaps,
farther. There are others, about which we in the way of analogy, serve to illustrate
may, by a long train of demonstrative rea what was before known; but I do not think
soning, arrive at conclusions very remote any truth can be discovered in this way.
and unexpected. There are, no doubt, degrees of benevolence,
The reasonings I have met with that can self-love, and other affections; but, when
be called strictly demonstrative, may, I we apply ratios to them, I apprehend we
think, be reduced to two classes. They are have no distinct meaning.
either metaphysical, or they are mathe Some demonstrations are called direct,
matical. others indirect. The first kind leads directly
In metaphysical reasoning, the process is to the conclusion to be proved. Of the
always short. The conclusion is but a step indirect, some are called demonstrations ad
or two, seldom more, from the first principle absurdum. In these, the proposition con
or axiom on which it is grounded, and the tradictory to that which is to be proved is
different conclusions depend not one upon demonstrated to be false, or to lead to an
another. absurdity; whence it follows, that its con
It is otherwise in mathematical reason tradictory—that is, the proposition to be
ing. Here the field has no limits. One proved—is true. This inference is grounded
proposition leads on to another, that to a upon an axiom in logic, that of two contra
third, and so on without end. dictory propositions, if one be false, the
If it should be asked, why demonstrative other must be true." [678]
reasoning has so wide a field in mathema Another kind of indirect demonstration
tics, while, in other abstract subjects, it is proceeds by enumerating all the supposi
confined within very narrow limits, I con tions that can possibly be made concerning
ceive this is chiefly owing to the nature of the proposition to be proved, and then
quantity, the object of mathematics.
Every quantity, as it has magnitude, and * This is called the principle of Excluded Middle
is divisible into parts without end, so, in viz., between two contradictories.-H.
[676–678]
478 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. | Essay v11.
demonstrating that all of them, excepting capable of demonstration. The relation of
that which is to be proved, are false; whence other modes may certainly be perceived, as
it follows, that the excepted supposition is well as those of number and extension; and
true. Thus, one line is proved to be equal I cannot see why they should not be cap
to another, by proving first that it cannot be able of demonstration, if due methods were
eater, and then that it cannot be less: for thought on to examine or pursue their
it must be either greater, or less, or equal; agreement or disagreement.”
and two of these suppositions being demon He afterwards gives, as instances, two
strated to be false, the third must be true. propositions, as moral propositions of which
All these kinds of demonstration are usedwe may be as certain as of any in mathe
in mathematics, and perhaps some others. matics; and considers at large what may
They have all equal strength. The direct have given the advantage to the ideas of
demonstration is preferred where it can be quantity, and made them be thought more
had, for this reason only, as I apprehend, capable of certainty and demonstration.[680]
because it is the shortest road to the con Again, in the 12th chapter of the same
clusion. The nature of the evidence, and book, S7, 8:—“This, I think, I may say,
its strength, is the same in all : only we that, if other ideas that are the real as well
are conducted to it by different roads. as nominal essences of their several species
were pursued in the way familiar to mathe
maticians, they would carry our thoughts
CHAPTER II. farther, and with greater evidence and
clearness, than possibly we are apt to ima
Wheth ER MORALITY be CAPABLE of gine. This gave me the confidence to
DEMiossination, advance that conjecture which I suggest,
chap iii.—viz., That morality is capable of
What has been said of demonstrative demonstration as well as mathematics.”
reasoning, may help us to judge of an opi From these passages, it appears that this
nion of Mr Locke, advanced in several places opinion was not a transient thought, but
of his Essay—to wit, “That morality is what he had revolved in his mind on dif
capable of demonstration as well as mathe ferent occasions. He offers his reasons for
matics.” it, illustrates it by examples, and considers
In book III., chap. 11, having observed at length the causes that have led men to
that mixed modes, especially those belong think mathematics more capable of demon
ing to morality, being such combinations of stration than the principles of morals.
ideas as the mind puts together of its own Some of his learned correspondents, par
choice, the signification of their names ticularly his friend Mr Molyneux, urged
may be perfectly and exactly defined, he and importuned him to compose a system
adds—[679] - of morals according to the idea he had ad
Sect. 16. “Upon this ground it is that I vanced in his Essay; and, in his answer to
am bold to think that morality is capable of these solicitations, he only pleads other oc
demonstration as well as mathematics; since cupations, without suggesting any change of
the precise real essence of the things moral his opinion, or any great difficulty in the
words stand for may be perfectly known, execution of what was desired.
and so the congruity or incongruity of the The reason he gives for this opinion is
things themselves be certainly discovered, ingenious; and his regard for virtue, the
in which consists perfect knowledge. Nor highest prerogative of the human species,
let any one object, That the names of sub made him fond of an opinion which seemed
stances are often to be made use of in mo to be favourable to virtue. and to have a
rality, as well as those of modes, from just foundation in reason.
which will arise obscurity; for, as to sub We need not, however, beafraid that the
stances, when concerned in moral dis interest of virtue may suffer by a free and
courses, their divers natures are not so candid examination of this question, or in
much inquired into as supposed: v. g. When deed of any question whatever. For the
we say that man is subject to law, we mean interests of truth and of virtue can never
nothing by man but a corporeal rational be found in opposition. Darkness and error
creature: what the real essence or other may befriend vice, but can never be favour
qualities of that creature are, in this case, able to virtue. [681]
is no way considered.” Those philosophers who think that our
Again, in book IV., ch. iii., § 18:—“The determinations in morals are not real judg
idea of a Supreme Being, whose workman ments—that right and wrong in human con
ship we are, and the idea of ourselves, being duct are only certain feelings or sensations
such as are clear in us, would, I suppose, in the person who contemplates the action
if duly considered and pursued, afford such —must reject Mr Locke's opinion without
foundation of our duty and rules of action examination. For, if the principles of mo
as might place morality among the sciences rals be not a matter of judgment, but of
[679-6sl]
chap. II.] WHETHER MORALITY BE DEMONSTRABLE. 479
feeling only, there can be no demonstration It ought, however, to be remembered,

of them; nor can any other reason be given that, as was before observed, the relations
for them, but that men are so constituted of things abstract, perceivable by us, ex
by the Author of their being as to contem cepting those of mathematical quantities,
plate with pleasure the actions we call vir are few, and, for the most part, immediately
tuous, and with disgust those we call vicious. discerned, so as not to require that train
It is not, therefore, to be expected that of reasoning which we call demonstration.
the philosophers of this class should think Their evidence resembles more that of
this opinion of Mr Locke worthy of ex mathematical axioms than mathematical
amination, since it is founded upon what propositions.
they think a false hypothesis. But if our This appears in the two propositions
determinations in morality be real judg given as examples by Mr Locke. The first
ments, and, like all other judgments, be follows immediately from the definition of
either true or false, it is not unimportant injustice; the second from the definition of
to understand upon what kind of evidence government. Their evidence may more
those judgments rest. properly be called intuitive than demon
The argument offered by Mr Locke, strative. And this I apprehend to be the
to shew that morality is capable of demon case, or nearly the case, of all abstract
stration, is, “That the precise real essence truths that are not mathematical, for the
of the things moral words stand for, may be reason given in the last chapter. . [683]
perfectly known, and so the congruity or The propositions which I think are pro
incongruity of the things themselves be perly called moral, are those that affirm
perfectly discovered, in which consists per some moral obligation to be, or not to be
fect knowledge.” incumbent on one or more individual per
It is true, that the field of demonstration sons. To such propositions, Mr Locke's
is the various relations of things conceived reasoning does not apply, because the sub
abstractly, of which we may have perfect jects of the proposition are not things whose
and adequate conceptions. And Mr Locke, real essence may be perfectly known. They
taking all the things which moral words are the creatures of God; their obligation
stand for to be of this kind, concluded that results from the constitution which God
morality is as capable of demonstration as hath given them, and the circumstances
mathematics. in which he hath placed them. That an
I acknowledge that the names of the individual hath such a constitution, and is
virtues and vices, of right and obligation, placed in such circumstances, is not an
of liberty and property, stand for things abstract and necessary, but a contingent
abstract, which may be accurately defined, truth. It is a matter of fact, and, there
or, at least, conceived as distinctly and fore, not capable of demonstrative evidence,
adequatelyas mathematical quantities. And which belongs only to necessary truths.
thence, indeed, it follows, that their mutual The evidence which every man hath of
relations may be perceived as clearly and his own existence, though it be irresistible,
certainly as mathematical truths. [682] is not demonstrative. And the same thing
Of this Mr Locke gives two pertinent may be said of the evidence which every
examples. The first-“Where there is no man hath, that he is a moral agent, and
property, there is no injustice, is,” says he, under certain moral obligations. In like
“a proposition as certain as any demon manner, the evidence we have of the exist
stration in Euclid.” ence of other men, is not demonstrative;
When injustice is defined to be a viola nor is the evidence we have of their being
tion of property, it is as necessary a truth, endowed with those faculties which make
that there can be no injustice where there them moral and accountable agents.
is no property, as that you cannot take If man had not the faculty given him by
from a man that which he has not. God of perceiving certain things in conduct
The second example is, “That no to be right, and others to be wrong, and of
government allows absolute liberty.” This perceiving his obligation to do what is right,
is a truth no less certain and necessary. and not to do what is wrong, he would not
Such abstract truths I would call meta be a moral and accountable being.
physical rather than moral. We give the If man be endowed with such a faculty,
name of mathematical to truths that ex there must be some things which, by this
press the relations of quantities considered faculty, are immediately discerned to be
abstractly; all other abstract truths may right, and others to be wrong; and, there
be called metaphysical. But if those men fore, there must be in morals, as in other
tioned by Mr Locke are to be called moral sciences, first principles which do not de
truths, I agree with him that there are rive their evidence from any antecedent
many such that are necessarily true, and principles, but may be said to be intuitively
that have all the evidence that mathemati discerned. -
cal truths can have. Moral truths, therefore, may be divided

[682,.683]
into two classes—to wit, such as are self Thus, a magistrate knows that it is his
evident to every man whose understanding duty to promote the good of the community
and moral faculty are ripe, and such as are which hath intrusted him with authority;
deduced by reasoning from those that are and to offer to prove this to him by reason.
self-evident. If the first be not discerned ing, would be to affront him. But whether
without reasoning, the last never can be so such a scheme of conduct in his office, or
by any reasoning. [684] another, may best serve that end, he may
If any man could say, with sincerity, that in many cases be doubtful. I believe, in
he is conscious of no obligation to consult such cases, he can very rarely have demon
his own present and future happiness; to strative evidence. His conscience deter
be faithful to his engagements; to obey his mines the end he ought to pursue, and he
Maker; to injure no man; I know not has intuitive evidence that his end is good;
what reasoning, either probable or demon but prudence must determine the means
strative, I could use to convince him of any of attaining that end; and prudence can
moral duty. As you cannot reason in very rarely use demonstrative reasoning,
mathematics with a man who denies the but must rest in what appears most proba
axioms, as little can you reason with a man ble.
in morals who denies the first principles of I apprehend, that, in every kind of duty
morals. The man who does not, by the light we owe to God or man, the case is similar
of his own mind, perceive some things in that is, that the obligation of the most
conduct to be right, and others to be wrong, general rules of duty is self-evident; that
is as incapable of reasoning about morals the application of those rules to particular
as a blind man is about colours. Such a actions is often no less evident; and that,
man, if any such man ever was, would be when it is not evident, but requires reason
no moral agent, nor capable of any moral ing, that reasoning can very rarely be of
obligation. the demonstrative, but must be of the pro
Some first principles of morals must be bable kind. Sometimes it depends upon
immediately discerned, otherwise we have the temper, and talents, and circumstances
no foundation on which others can rest, or of the man himself; sometimes upon the
from which we can reason. character and circumstances of others;
Every man knows certainly, that, what he sometimes upon both; and these are things
approves in other men, he ought to do in which admit not of demonstration. [686]
like circumstances, and that he ought not to Every man is bound to employ the talents
do what he condemns in other men. Every which God hath given him to the best pur
man knows that he ought, with candour, to pose: but if, through accidents which he
use the best means of knowing his duty. could not foresee, or ignorance which was
To every man who has a conscience, these invincible, they be less usefully employed
things are self-evident. They are imme than they might have been, this will not be
diate dictates of our moral faculty, which is imputed to him by his righteous Judge.
a part of the human constitution; and every It is a common and a just observation,
man condemns himself, whether he will or that the man of virtue plays a surer game
not, when he knowingly acts contrary to in order to obtain his end than the man of
them. The evidence of these fundamental the world. It is not, however, because he
principles of morals, and of others that reasons better concerning the means of
might be named, appears, therefore, to me attaining his end; for the children of this
to be intuitive rather than demonstrative. world are often wiser in their generation
The man who acts according to the dic than the children of light. But the reason
tates of his conscience, and takes due pains of the observation is, that involuntary
to be rightly informed of his duty, is a per errors, unforeseen accidents, and invincible
fect man with regard to morals, and merits ignorance, which affect deeply all the con
no blame, whatever may be the imperfec cerns of the present world, have no effect
tions or errors of his understanding. He upon virtue or its reward.
who knowingly acts contrary to them, is In the common occurrences of life, a man
conscious of guilt, and self-condemned. of integrity, who hath exercised his moral
Every particular action that falls evidently faculty in judging what is right and what
within the fundamental rules of morals, is is wrong, sees his duty without reasoning,
evidently his duty; and it requires no rea as he sees the highway. The cases that
soning to convince him that it is so. [685] require reasoning are few, compared with
Thus, I think it appears, that every man those that require none; and a man may
of common understanding knows certainly, be very honest and virtuous who cannot
and without reasoning, the ultimate ends reason, and who knows not what demon
he ought to pursue, and that reasoning is stration means.
necessary only to discover the most proper The power of reasoning, in those that
means of attaining them ; and in this, in have it, may be abused in morals, as in
deed, a good man may often be in doubt. other matters. To a man who uses it with
[684–6863
CHAP. III.] OF PROBABLE REASONING. 48}
an upright heart, and a single eye to find A man cannot be bound and perfectly free
what is his duty, it will be of great use; at the same time. I think no man will
but when it is used to justify what a man call these moral truths; but they are neces
has a strong inclination to do, it will only sary truths, and as evident as any in mathe
serve to deceive himself and others. When matics. Indeed, they are very nearly allied
a man can reason, his passions will reason, to the two which Mr Locke gives as in
and they are the most cunning sophists we stances of moral propositions capable of
meet with. demonstration. Of such abstract proposi
If the rules of virtue were left to be dis tions, I think it may more properly be said
covered by demonstrative reasoning, or by that they have the evidence of mathemati
reasoning of any kind, sad would be the cal axioms, than that they are capable of
condition of the far greater part of men, demonstration.
who have not the means of cultivating the There are propositions of another kind,
power of reasoning. As virtue is the busi which alone deserve the name of moral pro
ness of all men, the first principles of it are positions. They are such as affirm some
written in their hearts, in characters so thing to be the duty of persons that really
legible that no man can pretend ignorance exist. These are not abstract propositions;
of them, or of his obligation to practise and, therefore, Mr Locke's reasoning does
them. [687] not apply to them. The truth of all such
Some knowledge of duty and of moral propositions depends upon the constitution
obligation is necessary to all men. With and circumstances of the persons to whom
out it they could not be moral and account they are applied.
able creatures, nor capable of being mem Of such propositions, there are some that
bers of civil society. It may, therefore, are self-evident to every man that has a
be presumed that Nature has put this conscience; and these are the principles
knowledge within the reach of all men. from which all moral reasoning must be
Reasoning and demonstration are weapons drawn. They may be called the axioms of
which the greatest part of mankind never morals. But our reasoning from these
was able to wield. The knowledge that is axioms to any duty that is not self-evident
necessary to all, must be attainable by all. can very rarely be demonstrative. Nor is this
We see it is so in what pertains to the any detriment to the cause of virtue, because
natural life of man. to act against what appears most probable
Some knowledge of things that are useful in a matter of duty, is as real a trespass
and things that are hurtful, is so necessary against the first principles of morality, as
to all men, that without it the species would to act against demonstration; and, because
soon perish. But it is not by reasoning he who has but one talent in reasoning, and
that this knowledge is got, far less by de makes the proper use of it, shall be ac
monstrative reasoning. It is by our senses, cepted, as well as he to whom God has
by memory, by experience, by information; given ten. [689]
means of knowledge that are open to all
men, and put the learned and the unlearned,
those who can reason and those who can CHAPTER III.
not, upon a level.
It may, therefore, be expected, from the of PROBABLE REASONING.
analogy of nature, that such a knowledge
of morals as is necessary to all men should THE field of demonstration, as has been
be had by means more suited to the abili observed, is necessary truth : the field of
ties of all men than demonstrative reason probable reasoning is contingent truth—not
ing is. - what necessarily must be at all times, but
This, I apprehend, is in fact the case. what is, or was, or shall be.
When men's faculties are ripe, the first No contingent truth is capable of strict
principles of morals, into which all moral demonstration; but necessary truths may
£ may be resolved, are perceived sometimes have probable evidence.
intuitively, and in a manner more analogous Dr Wallis discovered many important
to the perceptions of sense than to the con mathematical truths, by that kind of induc
clusions of demonstrative reasoning. [688] tion which draws a general conclusion from
Upon the whole, I agree with Mr Locke, particular premises. This is not strict de
that propositions expressing the congruities monstration, but, in some cases, gives as
and incongruities of things abstract, which full conviction as demonstration itself; and
moral words stand for, may have all the a man may be certain, that a truth, is de
evidence of mathematical truths. But this monstrable before it ever has been demon
is not peculiar to things which moral words strated. In other cases, a mathematical
stand for. It is common to abstract pro proposition may have such probable evi
positions of every kind. For instance, you dence from induction or analogy as en
cannot take from a man what he has not. courages the mathematician to investigate
2 I
[687–689]
its demonstration. But still the reasoning, dence, and is opposed to certainty: so that
proper to mathematical and other necessary what is certain is more than probable, and
truths, is demonstration; and that which is what is only probable is not certain. Phi
proper to contingent truths, is probable losophers consider probable evidence, not
reasoning. as a degree, but as a species of evidence,
These two kinds of reasoning differ in which is opposed, not to certainty, but to
other respects. In demonstrative reason another species of evidence, called demon
ing, one argument is as good as a thousand. stration.
One demonstration may be more elegant Demonstrative evidence has no degrees;
than another; it may be more easily com but probable evidence, taken in the philo
prehended, or it may be more subservient sophical sense, has all degrees, from the
to some purpose beyond the present. On very least to the greatest, which we call
any of these accounts it may deserve a certainty.
preference: but then it is sufficient by it That there is such a city as Rome, I am
self; it needs no aid from another; it can as certain as cf any proposition in Euclid;
receive none. To add more demonstrations but the evidence is not demonstrative, but
of the same conclusion, would be a kind of of that kind which philosophers call pro
tautology in reasoning; because one de bable. Yet, in common language, it would
monstration, clearly comprehended, gives sound oddly to say, it is probable there is
all the evidence we are capable of receiv such a city as Rome, because it would
ing [690] imply some degree of doubt or uncertainty.
The strength of probable reasoning, for Taking probable evidence, therefore, in
the most part, depends not upon any one the philosophical sense, as it is opposed to
argument, but upon many, which unite demonstrative, it may have any degrees of
their force, and lead to the same conclusion. evidence, from the least to the greatest.
Any one of them by itself would be insuf I think, in most cases, we measure the
ficient to convince; but the whole taken degrees of evidence by the effect they have
together may have a force that is irresistible, upon a sound understanding, when com
so that to desire more evidence would be prehended clearly and without prejudice.
absurd. Would any man seek new argu Every degree of evidence perceived by the
ments to prove that there were such persons mind, produces a proportioned degree of
as King Charles I. or Oliver Cromwell? assent or belief. The judgment may be in
Such evidence may be compared to a rope perfect suspense between two contradictory
made up of many slender filaments twisted opinions, when there is no evidence for
together. The rope has strength more either, or equal evidence for both. The
than sufficient to bear the stress laid upon least preponderancy on one side inclines the
it, though no one of the filaments of which judgment in proportion. Belief is mixed
it is composed would be sufficient for that with doubt, more or less, until we come
purpose. to the highest degree of evidence, when
It is a common observation, that it is all doubt vanishes, and the belief is firm
unreasonable to require demonstration for and immovable. This degree of evidence,
things which do not admit of it. It is no the highest the human faculties cau attain,
less unreasonable to require reasoning of we call certainty. [692]
any kind for things which are known with Probable evidence not only differs in kind
out reasoning. All reasoning must be from demonstrative, but is itself of different
grounded upon truths which are known kinds. The chief of these I shall mention,
without reasoning. In every branch of real without pretending to make a complete
knowledge there must be first principles enumeration.
whose truth is known intuitively, without The first kind is that of human testimony,
reasoning, either probable or demonstrative. upon which the greatest part of human
They are not grounded on reasoning, but knowledge is built.
all reasoning is grounded on them. It has The faith of history depends upon it, as
been shewn, that there are first principles well as the judgment of solemn tribunals,
of necessary truths, and first principles of with regard to men's acquired rights, and
contingent truths. Demonstrative reason with regard to their guilt or innocence,
ing is grounded upon the former, and pro when they are charged with crimes. A
bable reasoning upon the latter. great part of the business of the judge, of
That we may not be embarrassed by the counsel at the bar, of the historian, the
ambiguity of words, it is proper to observe, critic, and the antiquarian, is to canvass
that there is a popular meaning of probable and weigh this kind of evidence; and no
evidence, which ought not to be confounded man can act with common prudence in the
with the philosophical meaning, above ex ordinary occurrences of life, who has not
plained. [691] some competent judgment of it.
In common language, probable evidence The belief we give to testimony, in many
is considered as an inferior degree of evi cases, is not solely grounded upon the vera
[690–692]
cHAP. III.] OF PROBABLE REASONING. 483
city of the testifier. In a single testimony, no society among mankind. If men were
we consider the motives a man might have as much disposed to hurt as to do good, to
to falsify. If there be no appearance of lie as to speak truth, they could not live to
any such motive, much more if there be gether; they would keep at as great dis
motives on the other side, his testimony has tance from one another as possible, and the
weight independent of his moral character. race would soon perish [694]
If the testimony be circumstantial, we con We expect that men will take some care
sider how far the circumstances agree to of themselves, of their family, friends, and
gether, and with things that are known. reputation; that they will not injure others
It is so very difficult to fabricate a story without some temptation ; that they will
which cannot be detected by a judicious have some gratitude for good offices, and
examination of the circumstances, that it some resentment of injuries.
acquires evidence by being able to bear Such maxims with regard to human con
such a trial. There is an art in detecting duct, are the foundation of all political rea
false evidence in judicial proceedings, well soning, and of common prudence in the con
known to able judges and barristers; so duct of life. Hardly can a man form any
that I believe few false witnesses leave the project in public or in private life, which
/ barWhen
without suspicion of their guilt.
there is an agreement of many
does not depend upon the conduct of other
men, as well as his own, and which does not
witnesses, in a great variety of circum go upon the supposition that men will act
stances, without the possibility of a previous such a part in such circumstances. This
concert, the evidence may be equal to that evidence may be probable in a very high
of demonstration. [693] degree; but can never be demonstrative.
A second kind of probable evidence, is The best concerted project may fail, and
the authority of those who are good judges wise counsels may be frustrated, because
of the point in question. The supreme some individual acted a part which it would
court of judicature of the British nation, is have been against all reason to expect.
often determined by the opinion of lawyers Another kind of probable evidence, the
in a point of law, of physicians in a point of counterpart of the last, is that by which we
medicine, and of other artists, in what re collect men's characters and designs from
lates to their several professions. And, in their actions, speech, and other external
the common affairs of life, we frequently signs.
rely upon the judgment of others, in points We see not men's hearts, nor the prin
of which we are not proper judges our ciples by which they are actuated ; but
selves. there are external signs of their principles
A third kind of probable evidence, is that and dispositions, which, though not certain,
by which we recognise the identity of things may sometimes be more trusted than their
and persons of our acquaintance. That two professions; and it is from external signs
swords, two horses, or two persons, may be that we must draw all the knowledge we
so perfectly alike as not to be distinguish can attain of men's characters.
able by those to whom they are best known, The next kind of probable evidence I
cannot be shewn to be impossible. But we mention, is that which mathematicians call
learn either from nature, or from experience, the probability of chances.
that it never happens; or so very rarely, We attribute some events to chance, be
that a person or thing, well known to us, is cause we know only the remote cause which
immediately recognised without any doubt, must produce some one event of a num
when we perceive the marks or signs by ber; but know not the more immediate
which we were in use to distinguish it from cause which determines a particular event
all other individuals of the kind. of that number in preference to the others.
This evidence we rely upon in the most 695]
important affairs of life; and, by this evi I think all the chances about which werea- .
dence, the identity, both of things and of son in mathematics are of this kind. Thus,
persons, is determined in courts of judica in throwing a just die upon a table, we say
ture. -
it is an equal chance which of the six sides
A fourth kind of probable evidence, is shall be turned up ; because neither the
that which we have of men's future actions person who throws, nor the bystanders,
and conduct, from the general principles of know the precise measure of force and di
action in man, or from our knowledge of the rection necessary to turn up any one side
individuals. rather than another. There are here, there
Notwithstanding the folly and vice that fore six events, one of which must happen;
are to be found among men, there is a certain and as all are supposed to have equal pro
degree of prudence and probity which we bability, the probability of any one side
rely upon in every man that is not insane. being turned up, the ace, for instance, is as
If it were not so, no man would be safe in one to the remaining number, five.
the company of another, and there could be The probability of turning up two aces
(693-695.] 2 12
with two dice is as oneto thirty-five; because been able to observe, such things have
| here there are thirty-six events, each of always happened in such circumstances, and
which has equal probability. such bodies have always been found to have
Upon such principles as these, the doc such properties. These are matters of fact,
trine of chances has furnished a field of de attested by sense, memory, and testimony,
monstrative reasoning of great extent, al just as the few facts which the vulgar know
though the events about which this reason are attested to them.
ing is employed be not necesssary, but con And what conclusions does the philoso.
tingent, and be not certain, but probable. pher draw from the facts he has collected ?
This may seem to contradict a principle They are, that like events have happened
before advanced, that contingent truths are in former times in like circumstances, and
not capable of demonstration; but it does will happen in time to come; and these con
not : for, in the mathematical reasonings clusions are built on the very same ground
about chance, the conclusion demonstrated, on which the simple rustic concludes that
is not, that such an event shall happen, but the sun will rise to-morrow. [697]
that the probability of its happening bears Facts reduced to general rules, and the
such a ratio to the probability of its failing; consequences of those general rules, are all
and this conclusion is necessary upon the that we really know of the material world.
suppositions on which it is grounded. And the evidence that such general rules
The last kind of probable evidence I shall have no exceptions, as well as the evidence
mention, is that by which the known laws that they will be the same in time to come
of Nature have been discovered, and the as they £ been in time past, can never
effects which have been produced by them be demonstrative. It is only that species
in former ages, or which may be expected of evidence which philosophers call probable.
in time to come. General rules may have exceptions or limit
The laws of Nature are the rules by which ations which no man ever had occasion to
the Supreme Being governs the world. We observe. The laws of nature may be changed
deduce them only from facts that fall within by him who established them. But we are
our own observation, or are properly attested led by our constitution to rely upon their
by those who have observed them. [696] continuance with as little doubt as if it was
The knowledge of some of the laws of demonstrable.
nature is necessary to all men in the con I pretend not to have made a complete
duct of life. These are soon discovered enumeration of all the kinds of probable
even by savages. They know that fire evidence; but those I have mentioned are
burns, that water drowns, that bodies gra sufficient to shew, that the far greatest part,
vitate towards the earth. They know that and the most interesting part of our know
day and night, summer and winter, regu ledge, must rest upon evidence of this kind;
larly succeed each other. As far back as and that many things are certain for which
their experience and information reach, we have only that kind of evidence which
they know that these have happened regu philosophers call probable.
larly; and, upon this ground, they are led,
by the constitution of human nature, to ex
pect that they will happen in time to come, CHAPTER IV.
in like circumstances,
The knowledge which the philosopher oF MR HUME's scEPTICISM witH REGARD To
attains of the laws of Nature differs from REASON.
that of the vulgar, not in the first principles
on which it is grounded, but in its extent IN the “Treatise of Human Nature,”
and accuracy. He collects with care the book I. part iv. § 1, the author undertakes
phaenomena that lead to the same conclu to prove two points:–First, That all that
sion, and compares them with those that is called human knowledge (meaning de
seem to contradict or to limit it. He ob monstrative knowledge) is only probability:
serves the circumstances on which every and, secondly, That this probability, when
phaenomenon depends, and distinguishes duly examined, evanishes by degrees, and
them carefully from those that are accident leaves at last no evidence at all ; so that,
ally conjoined with it. He puts natural in the issue, there is no ground to believe
bodies in various situations, and applies anyone proposition rather than its contrary;
them to one another in various ways, on and “all those are certainly fools who reason
purpose to observe the effect; and thus ac or believe anything.” [698]
quires from his senses a more extensive According to this account, reason, that
knowledge of the course of Nature in a short boasted prerogative of man, and the light of
time, than could be collected by casual ob his mind, is an ignis fatuus, which misleads
servation in many ages. the wandering traveller, and leaves him at
But what is the result of his laborious last in absolute darkness.
researches It is, that, as far as he has How unhappy is the condition of man,
[696–698)
cHAP. Iv.] OF MR HUME'S SCEPTICISM ABOUT REASON. 485
born under a necessity of believing contra and assurance of truth which an infallible
dictions, and of trusting to a guide who con being has—I think ought to be granted. It
fesses herself to be a false one ! becomes a fallible being to be modest, open
It is some comfort, that this doctrine can to new light, and sensible that, by some
never be seriously adopted by any man in false bias, or by rash judging, he may be
his senses. And after this author had misled. If this be called a degree of scep
shewn that “all the rules of logic require a ticism, I cannot help approving of it, being
total extinction of all belief and evidence,” persuaded that the man who makes the best
he himself, and all men that are not insane, use he can of the faculties which God has
must have believed many things, and yielded given him, without thinking them more per
assent to the evidence which he had ex fect than they really are, may have all the
tinguished. belief that is necessary in the conduct of
This, indeed, he is so candid as to acknow life, and all that is necessary to his accept
ledge. “He finds himself absolutely and ance with his Maker. [700]
necessarily determined, to live and talk and It is granted, then, that human judg
act like other people in the common affairs ments ought always to be formed with an
of life. And since reason is incapable of humble sense of our fallibility in judging.
dispelling these clouds, most fortunately it This is all that can be inferred by the
happens, that nature herself suffices to that rules of logic from our being fallible. And
purpose, and cures him of this philosophical if this be all that is meant by our know
inelancholy and delirium.” See § 7. ledge degenerating into probability, I know
This was surely a very kind and friendly no person of a different opinion.
interposition of nature; for the effects of But it may be observed, that the author
this philosophical delirium, if carried into here uses the word probability in a sense
life, must have been very melancholy. for which I know no authority but his own.
But what pity is it, that nature, (what Philosophers understand probability as op
ever is meant by that personage,) so kind posed to demonstration; the vulgar as
in curing this delirium, should be so cruel opposed to certainty; but this author un
as to cause it. Doth the same fountain derstands it as opposed to infallibility, which
send forth sweet waters and bitter? Is it no man claims.
not more probable, that, if the cure was the One who believes himself to be fallible
work of nature, the disease came from may still hold it to be certain that two and
another hand, and was the work of the two make four, and that two contradictory
philosopher ? [699] propositions cannot both be true. He may
To pretend to prove by reasoning that believe some things to be probable only,
there is no force in reason, does indeed look and other things to be demonstrable, with
like a philosophical delirium. It is like a out making any pretence to infallibility.
man's pretending to see clearly, that he If we use words in their proper meaning,
himself and all other men are blind. it is impossible that demonstration should
A common symptom of delirium is, to degenerate into probability from the imper
think that all other men are fools or mad. fection of our faculties. Our judgment can
This appears to have been the case of our not change the nature of the things about
author, who concluded, “That all those are which we judge. What is really demon
certainly fools who reason or believe any stration, : still be so, whatever judgment
thing.” we form concerning it. It may, likewise,
Whatever was the cause of this delirium, be observed, that, when we mistake that for
it must be granted that, if it was real and demonstration which really is not, the con
not feigned, it was not to be cured by rea sequence of this mistake is, not that de
soning; for what can be more absurd than monstration degenerates into probability,
to attempt to convince a man by reasoning but that what we took to be demonstration
who disowns the authority of reason. It is no proof at all; for one false step in a
was, therefore, very fortunate that Nature demonstration destroys the whole, but can
found other means of curing it. not turn it into another kind of proof.
It may, however, not be improper to [701]
inquire, whether, as the author thinks, it Upon the whole, then, this first conclu
was produced by a just application of the sion of our author, That the fallibility of
rules of logic, or, as others may be apt to human judgment turns all knowledge into
think, by the misapplication and abuse of probability, if understood literally, is absurd;
them. but, if it be only a figure of speech, and
First, Because we are fallible, the author means no more but that, in all our judg
infers that all knowledge degenerates into ments, we ought to be sensible of our falli
probability. bility, and ought to hold our opinions with
That man, and probably every created that modesty that becomes fallible crea
being, is fallible; and that a fallible being tures—which I take to be what the author
cannot have that perfect comprehension meant—this, I think, nobody denies, nor
[699-701]
was it necessary to enter into a laborious object can subsist under a decrease repeated
proof of it. in infinitum.
One is never in greater danger of trans “When I reflect on the natural fallibil
gressing against the rules of logic than in ity of my judgment, I have less confidence
attempting to prove what needs no proof. in my opinions than when I only consider
Of this we have an instance in this very the objects concerning which I reason. And
case; for the author begins his proof, that when I proceed still farther, to turn the seru
all human judgments are fallible, with af tiny against every successive estimation I
firming that some are infallible. make of my faculties, all the rules of logic
“In all demonstrative sciences,” says require a continual diminution, and at last
he, “the rules are certain and infallible; a total extinction of belief and evidence.”
but when we apply them, our fallible and This is the author's Achillean argument
uncertain faculties are very apt to depart against the evidence of reason, from which
from them, and fall into error.” he concludes, that a man who would govern
He had forgot, surely, that the rules of his belief by reason must believe nothing at
demonstrative sciences are discovered by all, and that belief is an act, not of the co
our fallible and uncertain faculties, and gitative, but of the sensitive part of our
have no authority but that of human judg nature. [703]
ment. If they be infallible, some human If there be any such thing as motion,
judgments are infallible; and there are many (said an ancient Sceptic,") the swift-footed
in various branches of human knowledge Achilles could never overtake an old man
which have as good a claim to infallibility in a journey. For, suppose the old man to
as the rules of the demonstrative sciences. set out a thousand paces before Achilles,
We have reason here to find fault with and that, while Achilles has travelled the
our author for not being sceptical enough, thousand paces, the old man has gone five
as well as for a mistake in reasoning, when hundred; when Achilles has gone the five
he claims infallibility to certain decisions of hundred, the old man has gone two hun
the human faculties, in order to prove that dred and fifty; and when Achilles has
all their decisions are fallible. gone the two hundred and fifty, the old
The second point which he attempts to man is still one hundred and twenty-five
prove is, That this probability, when duly before him. Repeat these estimations in
examined, suffers a continual diminution, infinitum, and you will still find the oldman
and at last a total extinction. foremost ; therefore Achilles can never
The obvious consequence of this is, that overtake him; therefore there can be no
no fallible being can have good reason to such thing as motion.
believe anything at all; but let us hear the The reasoning of the modern Sceptic
proof. [702] against reason is equally ingenious, and
, “In every judgment, we ought to cor equally convincing. Indeed, they have a
rect the first judgment derived from the great similarity.
nature of the object, by another judgment If we trace the journey of Achilles two
derived from the nature of the understand thousand paces, we shall find the very
ing. Beside the original uncertainty inher point where the old man is overtaken. But
ent in the subject, there arises another, this short journey, by dividing it into an
derived from the weakness of the faculty infinite number of stages, with correspond
which judges. Having adjusted these two ing estimations, is made to appear infinite.
uncertainties together, we are obliged, by In like manner, our author, subjecting
our reason, to add a new uncertainty, de every judgment to an infinite number of
rived from the possibility of error in the successive probable estimations, reduces
estimation we make of the truth and fidelity the evidence to nothing.
of our faculties. This is a doubt of which, To return then to the argument of the
if we would closely pursue our reasoning, modern Sceptic. I examine the proof of a
we cannot avoid giving a decision. But theorem of Euclid. It appears to me to be
this decision, though it should be favour strict demonstration. But I may have
able to our preceding judgment, being overlooked some fallacy; therefore I ex
founded only on probability, must weaken amine it again and again, but can find no
still farther our first evidence. The third flaw in it. I find all that have examined
uncertainty must, in like manner be criti it agree with me. I have now that evidence
cised by a fourth, and so on without end. of the truth of the proposition which I and
“Now, as every one of these uncertainties all men call demonstration, and that belief
takes away a part of the original evidence, of it which we call certainty. [704]
it must at last be reduced to nothing. Let Here my sceptical friend interposes, and
our first belief be ever so strong, it must in assures me, that the rules of logic reduce
fallibly perish, by passing through so many
examinations, each of which carries off citer, Sceptic.-H.
* Zeno Eleates., He is improperly
p y called,* simpli
somewhat of its force and vigour. No finite
1702-704]
oHAP. Iv.] OF MR HUME'S SCEPTICISM ABOUT REASON. 487
this demonstration to no evidence at all. trary opinion; nor can I imagine how an
I am willing to hear what step in it he thinks ingenicus author could impose upon himself
fallacious, and why. He makes no objec so grossly; for surely he did not intend to
tion to any part of the demonstration, but impose upon his reader.
pleads my fallibility in judging. I have After repeated examination of a propo
made the proper allowance for this already, sition of Euclid, I judge it to be strictly
by being open to conviction. But, says he, demonstrated; this is my first judgment.
there are two uncertainties, the first inherent But, as I am liable to err from various
in the subject, which I have already shewn causes, I consider how far I may have been
to have only probable evidence; the second misled by any of these causes in this judg
arising from the weakness of the faculty ment. My decision upon this second point
that judges. I answer, it is the weakness of is favourable to my first judgment, and
the faculty only that reduces this demonstra therefore, as I apprehend, must strengthen
tion to what you call probability. You it. To say that this decision, because it is
must not therefore make it a second uncer only probable, must weaken the first evi
tainty; for it is the same with the first. dence, seems to me contrary to all rules of
To take credit twice in an account for logie, and to common sense.
the same article is not agreeable to the The first judgment may be compared to
rules of logic. Hitherto, therefore, there the testimony of a credible witness; the
is but one uncertainty—to wit, my fallibility second, after a scrutiny into the character
in judging. of the witness, wipes off every objection
But, says my friend, you are obliged by that can be made to it, and therefore surely
reason to add a new uncertainty, derived must confirm and not weaken his testi
from the possibility of error in the estima mony. [706]
tion you make of the truth and fidelity of But let us suppose, that, in another case,
your faculties. I answer I examine my first judgment upon some
This estimation is ambiguously ex point, and find that it was attended with
pressed; it may either mean an estimation unfavourable circumstances, what, in rea
of my liableness to err by the misapplica son, and according to the rules of logic,
tion and abuse of my faculties; or it may ought to be the effect of this discovery P
mean an estimation of my liableness to err The effect surely will be, and ought to
by conceiving my faculties to be true and be, to make me less confident in my first
faithful, while they may be false and falla judgment, until I examine the point anew
cious in themselves, even when applied in in more favourable circumstances. If it
the best manner. I shall consider this be a matter of importance, I return to
estimation in each of these senses. weigh the evidence of my first judgment.
If the first be the estimation meant, it is If it was precipitate before, it must now be
true that reason directs us, as fallible crea deliberate in every point. If, at first, I
tures, to carry along with us, in all our was in passion, I must now be cool. If I
judgments, a sense of our fallibility. It is had an interest in the decision, I must
true also, that we are in greater danger of place the interest on the other side.
erring in some cases, and less in others; It is evident that this review of the sub
and that this danger of erring may, accord ject may confirm my first judgment, not
ing to the circumstances of the case, admit withstanding the suspicious circumstances
of an estimation, which we ought likewise that attended it. Though the judge was
to carry along with us in every judgment biassed or corrupted, it does not follow that
we form. [705] the sentence was unjust. The rectitude of
When a demonstration is short and plain; the decision does not depend upon the cha
when the point to be proved does not racter of the judge, but upon the nature of
touch our interest or our passions; when the case. From that only, it must be deter
the faculty of judging, in such cases, has mined whether the decision be just. The
acquired strength by much exercise—there is circumstances that rendered it suspicious
less danger of erring; when the contrary are mere presumptions, which have no force
circumstances take place, there is more. against direct evidence.
In the present case, every circumstance Thus, I have considered the effect of this
is favourable to the judgment I have formed. estimation of our liableness to err in our
There cannot be less danger of erring in first judgment, and have allowed to it all
any case, excepting, perhaps, when I judge the effect that reason and the rules of logic
of a self-evident axiom. permit. In the case I first supposed, and
The Sceptic farther urges, that this deci in every case where we can discover no
sion, though favourable to my first judg cause of error, it affords a presumption in
ment, being founded only on probability, favour of the first judgment. In other
must still weaken the evidence of that judg cases, it may afford a presumption against
ment. it. But the rules of logic require, that we
Here I cannot help being of a quite con should not judge by presumptions, where
[705, 7067
we have direct evidence. The effect of an If the man proceed in this order. I grant,
unfavourable presumption should only be, that his second judgment will, with good
to make us examine the evidence with the reason, bring down the first from supposed
greater care. [707] infallibility to fallibility; and that his third
The sceptic urges, in the last place, that judgment will, in some degree, either
this estimation must be subjected to another strengthen or weaken the first, as it is cor
estimation, that to another, and so on, in in rected by the second.
Jinitum ; and as every new estimation takes But every man of understanding proceeds
away from the evidence of the first judg in a contrary order. When about to judge
ment, it must at last be totally annihilated. in any particular point, he knows aiready
I answer, first, It has been shewn above, that he is not infallible. He knows what
that the first estimation, supposing it un are the cases in which he is most or least
favourable, can only afford a presumption liable to err. The conviction of these thi
against the first judgment; the second, is always present to his mind, and influences
upon the same supposition, will be only the the degree of his assent in his first judg
presumption of a presumption; and the ment, as far as to him appears reasonable.
third, the presumption that there is a pre If he should afterwards find reason to
sumption of a presumption. This infinite suspect his first judgment, and desires to
series of presumptions resembles an infinite have all the satisfaction his faculties can
series of quantities, ecreasing in geome give, reason will direct him not to form
trical proportion, which amounts only to a such a series of estimations upon estima
finite sum. The infinite series of stages of tions, as this author requires, but to examine
Achilles's journey after the old man, amounts the evidence of his first judgment carefully
only to two thousand paces; nor can this and coolly; and this review may very reason
infinite series of presumptions outweigh one ably, according toits result, eitherstrengthen
solid argument in favour of the first judg or weaken, or totally overturn his first
ment, supposing them all to be unfavour judgment. 1709]
able to it. his infinite series of estimations, there
Secondly, I have shewn, that the estima fore, is not the method that reason directs,
tion of our first judgment may strengthen in order to form our judgment in any case.
it; and the same thing may be said of all the It is introduced without necessity, without
subsequent estimations. It would, there any use but to puzzle the understanding,
fore, be as reasonable to conclude, that the and to make us think, that to judge, even
first judgment will be brought to infallible in the simplest and plainest cases, is a mat
certainty when this series of estimations is ter of insurmountable difficulty and endless
wholly in its favour, as that its evidence labour; just as the ancient Sceptic, to make
will be brought to nothing by such a series a journey of two thousand paces appear
supposed to be wholly unfavourable to it. endless, divided it into an infinite number
But, in reality, one serious and cool re of stages.
examination of the evidence by which our But we observed, that the estimation
first judgment is supported, has, and in which our author requires, may admit of
reason ought to have more forcetostrengthen another meaning, which, indeed, is more
or weaken it, than an infinite series of such agreeable to the expression, but inconsist
estimations as our author requires. ent with what he advanced before.
Thirdly, I know no reason nor rule in By the possibility of error in the estima
logic, that requires that such a series of tion of the truth and fidelity of our faculties,
estimations should follow every particular may be meant, that we may err by esteem
judgment. [708] ing our faculties true and faithful, while they
A wise man, who has practised reasoning, may be false and fallacious, even when used
knows that he is fallible, and carries this according to the rules of reason and logic.
conviction along with him in every judg If this be meant, I answer, first, That
ment he forms. He knows likewise that the truth and fidelity of our faculty of judg
he is more liable to err in some cases than ing is, and must be taken for granted in
in others. He has a scale in his mind, by every judgment and in every estimation.
which he estimates his liableness to err, and If the sceptic can seriously doubt of the
by this he regulates the degree of his assent truth and fidelity of his faculty of judging
in his first judgment upon any point. when properly used, and suspend his judg
The author's reasoning supposes, that a ment upon that point till he finds proof, his
man, when he forms his first judgment, scepticism admits of no cure by reasoning,
conceives himself to be infallible; that by a and he must even continue in it until he
second and subsequent judgment, he dis have new faculties given him, which shall
covers that he is not infallible; and that by have authority to sit in judgment upon the
a third judgment, subsequent to the second, old. Nor is there any need of an endless
he estimates his liableness to err in such a succession of doubts upon this subject; for
case as the present. the first puts an end to all judgment and
[707-709"
-
chAP. Iv.] OF MR HUME'S SCEPTICISM ABOUT REASON. 489
reasoning, and to the possibility of convic sensitive than of the cogitative part of our
tion by that means. The sceptic has here nature.” [711]
got possession of a stronghold, which is im We have before considered the first part
pregnable to reasoning, and we must leave of this hypothesis, Whether our reasoning
him in possession of it till Nature, by other about causes be derived only from custom ?
means, makes him give it up, [710] The other part of the author's hypothesis
Secondly, I observe, that this ground of here mentioned is darkly expressed, though
scepticism, from the supposed infidelity of the expression seems to be studied, as it is
our faculties, contradicts what the author put in Italics. It cannot, surely, mean
before advanced in this very argument—to that belief is not an act of thinking. It is
wit, that “the rules of the demonstrative not, therefore, the power of thinking that
sciences are certain and infallible, and that he calls the cogitative part of our nature.
truth is the natural effect of reason, and Neither can it be the power of judging, for
that error arises from the irruption of other all belief implies judgment; and to believe
causes.” a proposition means the same thing as to
But, perhaps, he made these concessions judge it to be true. It seems, therefore, to
unwarily. He is, therefore, at liberty to be the power of reasoning that he calls the
retract them, and to rest his scepticism upon cogitative part of our nature.
this sole foundation, That no reasoning can If this be the meaning, I agree to it in
prove the truth and fidelity of our faculties. part. The belief of first principles is not
Here he stands upon firm ground; for it is an act of the reasoning power; for all rea
evident that every argument offered to soning must be grounded upon them. We
prove the truth and fidelity of our faculties, judge them to be true, and believe them
takes for granted the thing in question, and without reasoning. But why this power of
is, therefore, that kind of sophism which judging of first principles should be called
logicians call petitio principii. the sensitive part of our nature, I do not
All we would ask of this kind of sceptic understand.
is, that he would be uniform and consistent, As our belief of first principles is an act
and that his practice in life do not belie his of pure judgment without reasoning; so
profession of scepticism, with regard to the our belief of the conclusions drawn by rea
fidelity of his faculties; for the want of faith, soning from first principles, may, I think, be
as well as faith itself, is best shewn b called an act of the reasoning faculty.
works. If a sceptic avoid the fire as muc [712
as those who believe it dangerous to go #. the whole, I see only two conclu
into it, we can hardly avoid thinking his sions that can be fairly drawn from this
scepticism to be feigned, and not real. profound and intricate reasoning against
Our author, indeed, was aware, that reason. The first is, That we are fallible
neither his scepticism nor that of any other in all our judgments and in all our reason
person, was able to endure this trial, and, ings. The second, That the truth and
therefore, enters a caveat against it. fidelity of our faculties can never be proved
“Neither I,” says he, “nor any other per by reasoning; and, therefore, our belief of
son was ever sincerely and constantly of it cannot be founded on reasoning. If the
that opinion. Nature, by an absolute and last be what the author calls his hypothesis,
uncontrollable necessity, has determined us I subscribe to it, and think it not an hypo
to judge, as well as to breathe and feel. My thesis, but a manifest truth; though I con
intention, therefore,” says he, “in display ceive it to be very improperly expressed, by
ing so carefully the arguments of that fan saying that belief is more properly an act
tastic sect, is only to make the reader sen of the sensitive than of the cogitative part
sible of the truth of my hypothesis, that all of our nature." [713]
our reasonings concerning causes and effects,
are derived from nothing but custom, and too* often
In the preceding strictures, the
assailed as a Dogmatist. See
* is again
... p. 444
that belief is more properly an act of the note *.-H.
[710–713]
ESSAY VIII.
OF TASTE.
CHAPTER I. may distinguish the agreeable emotion it

produces in us, from the quality of the ob
of TASTE IN GENERAL, ject which causes that emotion. When I
hear an air in music that pleases me, I say,
THAT power of the mind by which we it is fine, it is excellent. This excellence is
are capable of discerning and relishing the not in me; it is in the music. But the
beauties of Nature, and whatever is excel pleasure it gives is not in the music; it is
lent in the fine arts, is called taste. in me. Perhaps I cannot say what it is in
The external sense of taste, by which we the tune that pleases my ear, as I cannot
distinguish and relish the various kinds of say what it is in a sapid body that pleases my
food, has given occasion to a metaphorical palate; but there is a quality in the sapid
application of its name to this internal body which pleases my palate, and I call it
power of the mind, by which we perceive a delicious taste; and there is a quality in
what is beautiful and what is deformed or the tune that pleases my taste, and I call it
defective in the various objects that we a fine or an excellent air.
contemplate. This ought the rather to be observed,
Like the taste of the palate, it relishes because it is become a fashion among mo
some things, is disgusted with others; with dern philosophers, to resolve all our percep
regard to many, is indifferent or dubious; tions into mere feelings or sensations in the
and is considerably influenced by habit, by person that perceives, without anything
associations, and by opinion. These obvious corresponding to those feelings in the ex
analogies between external and internal ternal object. [715] According to those
taste, have led men, in all ages, and in philosophers, there is no heat in the fire,
all or most polished languages," to give the no taste in a sapid body; the taste and the
name of the external sense to this power of heat being only in the person that feels
discerning what is beautiful with pleasure, them." In like manner, there is no beauty
and what is ugly and faulty in its kind with in any object whatsoever; it is only a sens
disgust. [714] ation or feeling in the person that per
In treating of this as an intellectual ceives it.
power of the mind, I intend only to make The language and the common sense of
some observations, first on its nature, and mankind contradict this theory. Even those
then on its objects. who hold it, find themselves obliged to use
1. In the external sense of taste, we are a language that contradicts it. I had occa
led by reason and reflection to distinguish sion to £ that there is no solid founda
between the agreeable sensation we feel, and tion for it when applied to the secondary
the quality in the object which occasions it. qualities of body; and the same arguments
Both have the same name, and on that ac shew equally, that it has no solid foundation
count are apt to be confounded by the vulgar, when applied to the beauty of objects, or to
and even by philosophers. The sensation any of those qualities that are perceived by
I feel when I taste any sapid body is in my * taste.
mind; but there is a real quality in the ut, though some of the qualities that
body which is the cause of this sensation. please a good taste resemble the secondary
These two things have the same name in qualities of body, and therefore may be
language, not from any similitude in their called occult qualities, as we only feel their
nature, but because the one is the sign of effect, and have no more knowledge of the
the other, and because there is little occa cause, but that it is something which is
sion in common life to distinguish them. adapted by nature to produce that effect
This was fully explained in treating of the this is not always the case.
secondary qualities of bodies. The reason Our judgment of beauty is in many cases
cf taking notice of it now is, that the in more enlightened. A work of art may
ternal power of taste bears a great analogy appear beautiful to the most ignorant, even
in this respect to the external. to a child. It pleases, but he knows not
When a beautiful object is before us, we
* But see, above, p. 205, b, note *, and p. 310, b,
* This is hardly correct.-H. note +..-H.
[714, 715]
* - -
CHAP, 1.] OF TASTE IN GENERAL. 49]
why. To one who understands it perfectly, and uncorrupted, and of the simple produc
and perceives how every part is fitted with tions of nature they relish the things that
exact judgment to its end, the beauty is not are most wholesome.
mysterious; it is perfectly comprehended; In like manner, our internal taste ought
and he knows wherein it consists, as well to be accounted most just and perfect, when
as how it affects him. we are pleased with things that are most
2. We may observe, that, though all the excellent in their kind, and displeased with
tastes we perceive by the palate are either the contrary. The intention of nature is
agreeable or disagreeable, or indifferent; no less evident in this internal taste than
yet, among those that are agreeable, there in the external. Every excellence has a
is great diversity, not in degree only, but in real beauty and charm that makes it an
kind. And, as we have not generical names agreeable object to those who have the
for all the different kinds of taste, we dis faculty of discerning its beauty; and this
tinguish them by the bodies in which they faculty is what we call a good taste.
are found. [716] A man who, by any disorder in his mental
In like manner, all the objects of our powers, or by bad habits, has contracted a
internal taste are either beautiful, or dis relish for what has no real excellence, or
agreeable, or indifferent; yet of beauty there what is deformed and defective, has a de
is a great diversity, not only of degree, but praved taste, like one who finds a more
of kind. The beauty of a demonstration, agreeable relish in ashes or cinders than in
the beauty of a poem, the beauty of a palace, the most wholesome food. As we must ac
the beauty of a piece of music, the beauty knowledge the taste of the palate to be de
of a fine woman, and many more that might praved in this case, there is the same reason
be named, are different kinds of beauty; to think the taste of the mind depraved in
and we have no names to distinguish them the other.
but the names of the different objects to There is therefore a just and rational
which they belong. taste, and there is a depraved and corrupted
As there is such diversity in the kinds of taste. For it is too evident, that, by bad
beauty as well as in the degrees, we need education, bad habits, and wrong associa
not think it strange that philosophers have tions, men may acquire a relish for masti
gone into different systems in analysing it, ness, for rudeness, and ill-breeding, and for
and enumerating its simple ingredients. many other deformities. To say that such
They have made many just observations on a taste is not vitiated, is no less absurd than
the subject; but, from the love of simplicity, to say, that the sickly girl who delights in
have reduced it to fewer principles than the eating charcoal and tobacco-pipes, has as
nature of the thing will permit, having had just and natural a taste as when she is in
in their eye some particular kinds of beauty, perfect health. -
while they overlooked others. 4. The force of custom, of fancy, and of

There are moral beauties as well as na casual associations, is very great both upon
tural; beauties in the objects of sense, and the external and internal taste. An Eski
in intellectual objects; in the works of men, ' can regale himself with a draught of
and in the works of God; in things inani whāle-oil, and a Canadian can feast upon a
mate, in brute animals, and in rational dog. A Kamschatkadale lives upon putrid
beings; in the constitution of the body of fish, and is sometimes reduced to eat the
man, and in the constitution of his mind. bark of trees. The taste of rum, or of green
There is no real excellence which has not tea, is at first as nauseous as that of ipeca
its beauty to a discerning eye, when placed cuan, to some persons, who may be brought
in a proper point of view; and it is as diffi by use to relish what they once found so
cult to enumerate the ingredients of beauty disagreeable. [718]
as the ingredients of real excellence. When we see such varieties in the taste
3. Thetaste of the palate may be accounted of the palate produced by custom and as
most just and perfect, when we relish the sociations, and some, perhaps, by constitu
things that are fit for the nourishment of tion, we may be the less surprised that the
the body, and are disgusted with things of same causes should produce like varieties
a contrary nature. The manifest intention in the taste of beauty ; that the African
of nature in giving us this sense, is, that should esteem thick lips and a flat nose;
we may discern what it is fit for us to eat that other nations should draw out their
and to drink, and what it is not. Brute ears, till they hang over their shoulders:
animals are directed in the choice of their that in one nation ladies should paint their
food merely by their taste. [717] Led by faces, and in another should make them
this guide, they choose the food that nature shine with grease.
intended for them, and seldom make mis 5. Those who conceive that there is no
takes, unless they be pinched by hunger, or standard in nature by which taste may be
deceived by artificial compositions. In in regulated, and that the common proverb,
fants likewise the taste is commonly sound “That there ought to be no dispute about
[716–718]
492 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [EssAY vin.
taste,” is to be taken in the utmost latitude, No reason can be given why all man
go upon slender and insufficient ground. kind should express themselves thus, but that
The same arguments might be used with they believe what they say. It is there
equal force against any standard of truth. fore contrary to the universal sense of
Whole nations by the force of prejudice mankind, expressed by their language, that
are brought to believe the grossest absurdi beauty is not really in the object, but is
ties; and why should it be thought that the merely a feeling in the person who is said
taste is less capable of being perverted than to perceive it. Philosophers should be very
the judgment? It must indeed be acknow cautious in opposing the common sense
ledged, that men differ more in the faculty of mankind; for, when they do, they rarely
of taste than in what we commonly call miss going wrong. [720]
judgment; and therefore it may be expected Our judgment of beauty is not indeed a
that they should be more liable to have their dry and unaffecting judgment, like that of
taste corrupted in matters of beauty and a mathematical or metaphysical truth. By
deformity, than their judgment in matters the constitution of our nature, it is accom
of truth and error. panied with an agreeble feeling or emotion,
If we make due allowance for this, we for which we have no other name but the
shall see that it is as easy to account for sense of beauty. This sense of beauty, like
the variety of tastes, though there be in the perceptions of our other senses, implies
nature a standard of true beauty, and con not only a feeling, but an opinion of some
sequently of good taste, as it is to account quality in the object which occasions that
for the variety and contrariety of opinions, feeling.
though there be in nature a standard of In objects that please the taste, we always
of truth, and, consequently, of right judg judge that there is some real excellence,
ment. [719] some superiority to those that do not
6. Nay, if we speak accurately and please. In some cases, that superior ex
strictly, we shall find that, in every opera cellence is distinctly perceived, and can
tion of taste, there is judgment implied. be pointed out; in other cases, we have
When a man pronounces a poem or a only a general notion of some excellence
palace to be beautiful, he affirms something which we cannot describe. Beauties of the
of that poem or that palace; and every former kind may be compared to the
affirmation or denial expresses judgment. primary qualities perceived by the external
For we cannot better define judgment, than senses; those of the latter kind, to the
by saying that it is an affirmation or denial secondary.
of one thing concerning another. I had 7. Beauty or deformity in an object, re
occasion to shew, when treating of judg sults from its nature or structure. To per
ment, that it is implied in every perception ceive the beauty, therefore, we must per
of our external senses. There is an imme ceive the nature or structure from which it
diate conviction and belief of the existence results. In this the internal sense differs
of the quality perceived, whether it be from the external. Our external senses
colour, or sound, or figure; and the same may discover qualities which do not depend
thing holds in the perception of beauty or upon any antecedent perception. Thus, I
deformity. can hear the sound of a bell, though I never
If it be said that the perception of beauty perceived anything else belonging to it.
is merely a feeling in the mind that per But it is impossible to perceive the beauty
ceives, without any belief of excellence in of an object without perceiving the object,
the object, the necessary consequence of or, at least, conceiving it. On this account,
this opinion is, that when I say Virgil's Dr Hutcheson called the senses of beauty
“Georgics” is a beautiful poem, I mean not and harmony reflex or secondary senses,
to say anything of the poem, but only some because the beauty cannot be perceived
thing concerning myself and my feelings. unless the object be perceived by some other
Why should I use a language that expresses power of the mind. Thus, the sense of
the contrary of what I mean? harmony and melody in sounds supposes
My language, according to the necessary the external sense of hearing, and is a kind
rules of construction, can bear no other of secondary to it. A man born deaf may
meaning but this, that there is something be a good judge of beauties of another kind,
in the poem, and not in me, which I call but can have no notion of melody or har
beauty. Even those who hold beauty to mony. The like may be said of beau
be merely a feeling in the person that per ties in colouring and in figure, which can
ceives it, find themselves under a necessity never be perceived without the senses by
of expressing themselves as if beauty were which colour and figure are perceived.
solely a quality of the object, and not of [721]
the percipient. [719–721]
oHAP. II.] OF NOVELTY. 493
what is new this moment, may be familiar

CHAPTER II. to the same person some time hence. When
an object is first brought to our know
of THE oBJECTs of TAstE; AND, FIRsr, of ledge, it is new, whether it be agreeable
Novel.T.Y. or not.
It is evident, therefore, with regard to

A PHILosophical analysis of the objects novelty, (whatever may be said of other
of taste is like applying the anatomical knife objects of taste,) that it is not merely a
to a fine face. The design of the philoso sensation in the mind of him to whom the
pher, as well as of the anatomist, is not to thing is new ; it is a real relation which
gratify taste, but to improve knowledge. the thing has to his knowledge at that
The reader ought to be aware of this, that time.
he may not entertain an expectation in But we are so constituted, that what is
which he will be disappointed. new to us commonly gives pleasure upon
By the objects of taste, I mean those that account, if it be not in itself disagree
qualities or attributes of things which are, able. It rouses our attention, and occa
by Nature, adapted to please a good taste. sions an agreeable exertion of our facul
Mr Addison, and Dr Akenside after him, ties.
have reduced them to three—to wit, novelty, The pleasure we receive from novelty in
grandeur, and beauty. This division is objects has so great influence in human
sufficient for all I intend to say upon the life, that it well deserves the attention of
subject, and therefore I shall adopt it– philosophers; and several ingenious authors
observing only, that beauty is often taken :-particularly Dr Gerard, in his “Essay on
in so extensive a sense as to comprehend Taste”—have, I think, successfully account
all the objects of taste; yet all the authors ed for it, from the principles of the human
I have met with, who have given a division constitution. [723]
of the objects of taste, make beauty one We ean perhaps conceive a being so
species. made, that his happiness consists in a con
I take the reason of this to be, that we tinuance of the same unvaried sensations or
have specific names for some of the quali feelings, without any active exertion on his
ties that please the taste, but not for all; part. Whether this be possible or not, it
and therefore all those fall under the gene is evident that man is not such a being;
ral name of beauty, for which there is no his good consists in the vigorous exertion
specific name in the division. of his active and intellective powers upon
There are, indeed, so many species of their proper objects; he is made for action
beauty, that it would be as difficult to enu and progress, and cannot be happy without
merate them perfectly, as to enumerate all it; his enjoyments seem to be given by
the tastes we perceive by the palate. Nor Nature, not so much for their own sake, as
does there appear to me sufficient reason to encourage the exercise of his various
for making, as some very ingenious authors powers. That tranquillity of soul in which
have done, as many different internal senses some place human happiness, is not a dead
as there are different species of beauty or rest, but a regular progressive motion.
deformity. [722] Such is the constitution of man by the
The division of our external senses is appointment of Nature. This constitution
taken from the organs of perception, and is perhaps a part of the imperfection of our
not from the qualities perceived. We have nature; but it is wisely adapted to our
not the same means of dividing the inter state, which is not intended to be stationary,
mal; because, though some £, of beauty but progressive. The eye is not satiated
belong only to objects of the eye, and others with seeing, nor the ear with hearing;
to objects of the ear, there are many which something is always wanted. Desire and
we cannot refer to any bodily organ; and hope never cease, but remain to spur us on
therefore I conceive every division that has to something yet to be acquired; and, if
been made of our internal senses to be in they could cease, human happiness must
some degree arbitrary. They may be made end with them. That our desire and hope
more or fewer, according as we have dis be properly directed, is our part; that they
tinct names for the various kinds of beauty can never be extinguished, is the work of
and deformity; and I suspect the most Nature.
copious languages have not names for them It is this that makes human life so busy
all. a scene. Man must be doing something,
Novelty is not properly a quality of the good or bad, trifling or important; and he
thing to which we attribute it, far less is must vary the employment of his facul
it a sensation in the mind to which it is ties, or their exercise will become languid,
new; it is a relation which the thing has and the pleasure that attends it sicken of
to the knowledge of the person. What is course.
new to one man, may not be so to another; The notions of enjoyment, and of activity,
[722, 723]
494 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essay v1.11.
considered abstractly, are no doubt very
different, and we cannot perceive a necessary
connection between them. But, in our con CHAPTER III.
stitution, they are so connected by the
wisdom of Nature, that they must go hand of GRAN of UR
in hand; and the first must be led and

supported by the last. [724] THE qualities which please the taste are
An object at first, perhaps, gave much not more various in themselves than are
pleasure, while attention was directed to it the emotions and feelings with which they
with vigour. But attention cannot be long affect our minds.
confined to one unvaried object, nor can it Things new and uncommon affect us with
be carried round in the same narrow circle. a pleasing surprise, which rouses and invi
Curiosity is a capital principle in the human gorates our attention to the object. But
constitution, and its food must be what is this emotion soon flags, if there is nothing
in some respect new. What is said of the but novelty to give it continuance, and
Athenians may, in some degree, be applied leaves no effect upon the mind.
to all mankind, That their time is spent The emotion raised by grand objects is
in hearing, or telling, or doing some new awful, solemn, and serious.
thing. Of all objects of contemplation, the Su
Into this part of the human constitution, preme Being, is the most grand. His
I think, we may resolve the pleasure we eternity, his immensity, hisirresistible power,
have from novelty in objects. his infinite knowledge and unerring wisdom,
Curiosity is commonly strongest in child his inflexible justice and rectitude, his su
ren and in young persons, and accordingly preme government, conducting all the
novelty pleases them most. In all ages, in movements of this vast universe to the no
proportion as novelty gratifies curiosity, and blest ends and in the wisest manner--are
occasions a vigorous exertion of any of our objects which fill the utmost capacity of the
mental powers in attending to the new ob soul, and reach farbeyondits comprehension.
ject, in the same proportion it gives plea The emotion which this grandest of all
sure. In advanced life, the indolent and objects raises in the human mind, is what
inactive have the strongest passion for news, we call devotion; a serious recollected tem
as a relief from a painful vacuity of thought. per, which inspires magnanimity, and dis
But the pleasurederived from new objects, poses to the most heroic acts of virtue. [726]
in many cases, is not owing solely or chiefly The emotion produced by other objects
to their being new, but to some other cir which may be called grand, though in an
cumstance that gives them value. The new inferior degree, is, in its nature and in its
fashion in dress, furniture, equipage, and effects, similar to that of devotion. It dis
other accommodations of life, gives plea poses to seriousness, elevates the mind
sure, not so much, as I apprehend, because above its usual state, to a kind of enthusi
it is new, as because it is a sign of rank, asm, and inspires magnanimity, and a con
and distinguishes a man from the vulgar. tempt of what is mean.
In some things novelty is due, and the Such, I conceive, is the emotion which
want of it a real imperfection. Thus, if an the contemplation of grand objects raises in
author adds to the number of books with us. We are next to consider what this
which the public is already overloaded, we grandeur in objects is.
expect from him something new; and, if he To me it seems to be nothing else but
says nothing but what has been said before such a degree of excellence, in one kind or
in as agreeable a manner, we are justly another, as merits our admiration.
disgusted. [725] There are some attributes of mind which
When novelty is altogether separated have a real and intrinsic excellence, com
from the conception of worth and utility, it pared with their contraries, and which, in
makes but a ": impression upon a truly every degree, are the natural objects of
correct taste. Every discovery in nature, esteem, but, in an uncommon degree, are ob
in the arts, and in the sciences, has a real jects of admiration. We put a value upon
value, and gives a rational pleasure to a them because they are intrinsically valuable
good taste. But things that have nothing and excellent.
to recommend them but novelty, are fit The spirit of modern philosophy would
only to entertain children, or those who are indeed lead us to think, that the worth and
distressed from a vacuity of thought. This value we put upon things is only a sensation
quality of objects may therefore be com in our minds, and not anything inherent in
pared to the cypher in arithmetic, which the object; and that we might have been so
adds greatly to the value of significant constituted as to put the highest value upon
figures; but, when put by itself, signifies the things which we now despise, and to
nothing at all. despise the qualities which we now highly
esteem.
[724-726 |
cHAP. III.] OF GRANDEUR. 495
It gives me pleasure to observe, that Dr Cartes down to Mr Hume, who put the
Price, in his “Review of the Questions finishing stroke to it, by making truth and
concerning Morals,” strenuously opposes error to be feelings of the mind, and belief
this opinion, as well as that which resolves to be an operation of the sensitive part of
moral right and wrong into a sensation in our nature.
the mind of the spectator. That judicious To return to our subject, if we hearken
author saw the consequences which these to the dictates of common sense, we must be
opinions draw after them, and has traced convinced that there is real excellence in
them to their source—to wit, the account some things, whatever our feelings or our
given by Mr Locke, and adopted by the gen constitution be.
erality of modern philosophers, of the ori It depends no doubt upon our constitu
gin of all our ideas, which account he shews tion, whether we do or do not perceive ex
to be very defective. [727] cellence where it really is : but the object
This proneness to resolve everything into has its excellence from its own constitution,
feelings and sensations, is an extreme into and not from ours.
which we have been led by the desire of The common judgment of mankind in this
avoiding an opposite extreme, as common matter sufficiently appears in the language
in the ancient philosophy. of all nations, which uniformly ascribes ex
At first, me are prone by nature and by cellence, grandeur, and beauty to the object,
habit to give all their attention to things and not to the mind that perceives it. And
external. Their notions of the mind, and I believe in this, as in most other things,
its operations, are formed from some analogy we shall find the common judgment of man
they bear to objects of sense; and an ex kind and true philosophy not to be at va
termal existence is ascribed to things which riance.
are only conceptions or feelings of the Is not power in its nature more excel
mind. lent than weakness; knowledge than igno
This spirit prevailed much in the philo rance; wisdom than folly; fortitude than
sophy both of Plato and of Aristotle, and pusillanimity?
produced the mysterious notions of eternal Is there no intrinsic excellence in self
and self-existent ideas, of materia prima, of command, in generosity, in public spirit?
substantial forms, and others of the like Is not friendship a better affection of mind
nature,
From the time of Des Cartes, philosophy 729
# hatred, a noble emulation than envy P
took a contrary turn. That great man dis #! us suppose, if possible, a being so
covered, that manythings supposed to have constituted as to have a high respect for
an external existence, were only conceptions ignorance, weakness, and folly; to venerate
or feelings of the mind. This track has cowardice, malice, and envy, and to hold
been pursued by his successors to such an the contrary qualities in contempt; to have
extreme as to resolve everything into sens an esteem for lying and falsehood; and to
ations, feelings, and ideas in the mind, and love most those who imposed upon him,
to leave nothing external at all. and used him worst. Could we believe
The Peripatetics thought that heat and such a constitution to be anything else than
cold which we feel to be qualities of external madness and delirium ? It is impossible.
objects. The moderns make heat and cold We can as easily conceive a constitution,
to be sensations only, and allow no real by which one should perceive two and three
quality of body to be called by that name: to make fifteen, or a part to be greater than
and the same judgment they have formed the whole.
with regard to all secondary qualities. Every one who attends to the operations
So far Des Cartes and '' Locke went. of his own mind will find it to be certainly
Their successors being put into this track true, as it is the common belief of mankind,
of converting into feelings things that were that esteem is led by opinion, and that every
believed to have an externalexistence, found person draws our esteem, as far only as he
that extension, solidity, figure, and all the appears either to reason or fancy to be
rimary qualities of body, are sensations or amiable and worthy.
eelings of the mind; and that the material There is therefore a real intrinsic excel
world is a phaenomenon only, and has no lence in some qualities of mind, as in power,
existence but in our mind. [728] knowledge, wisdom, virtue, magnanimity.
It was then a very natural progress to con These, in every degree, merit esteem; but
ceive, that beauty, harmony, and grandeur, in an uncommon degree they merit admir
the objects of taste, as well as right and ation; and that which merits admiration
wrong, the objects of the moral faculty, are we call grand.
nothing but feelings of the mind. In the contemplation of uncommon ex
Those who are acquainted with the cellence, the mind feels a noble enthusiasm,
writings of modern philosophers, can easily which disposes it to the imitation of what it
trace this doctrine of feelings, from Des admires.
[727–729]
496 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [EssAY v1.11.
When we contemplate the character of And said, Thus far extend, thus farthy bounds,
This be thy just circumference, O world.”
Cato—his greatness of soul, his superiority
to pleasure, to toil, and to danger; his ar When we contemplate the world of Epi
£ zeal for the liberty of his country; curus, and conceive the universe to be a
when we see him standing unmoved in mis fortuitous jumble of atoms, there is nothing
fortunes, the last pillar of the liberty of grand in this idea. The clashing of atoms
Rome, and falling nobly in his country's by blind chance has nothing in it fit to raise
ruin—who would not wish to be Cato rather our conceptions, or to elevate the mind.
than Caesar in all his triumph : [730] But the regular structure of a vast system
Such a spectacle of a great soul strug of beings, produced by creating power, and
gling with misfortune, Seneca thought not governed by the best laws which perfect
unworthy of the attention of Jupiter him wisdom and goodness could contrive, is a
self, “Ecce spectaculum Deo dignum, ad spectacle which elevates the understanding,
quod respiciat Jupiter suo operi intentus, and fills the soul with devout admiration.
vir fortis cum mala fortuna compositus.” A great work is a work of great power,
As the Deity is, of all objects of thought, great wisdom, and great goodness, well con
the most grand, the descriptions given in trived for some important end. But power,
holy writ of his attributes and works, even wisdom, and goodness, are properly the at
when clothed in simple expression, are tributes of mind only. They are ascribed to
acknowledged to be sublime. The expres the work figuratively, but are really inherent
sion of Moses, “And God said, Let there in the author: and by the same figure, the
be light, and there was light,” has not grandeur is ascribed to the work, but is
escaped the notice of Longinus, a Heathen properly inherent in the mind that made it.
critic, as an example of the sublime. Some figures of speech are so natural and
What we call sublime in description, or so common in all languages, that we are led
in speech of any kind, is a proper expres to think them literal and proper expressions.
sion of the admiration and enthusiasm which Thus an action is called brave, virtuous,
the subject produces in the mind of the generous; but it is evident, that valour,
speaker. If this admiration and enthu virtue, generosity, are the attributes of per
siasm appears to be just, it carries the sons only, and not of actions. In the action
hearer along with it involuntarily, and by considered abstractly, there is neither val
a kind of violence rather than by cool con our, nor virtue, nor generosity. The same
viction : for no passions are so infectious as action done from a different motive may
those which hold of enthusiasm. deserve none of those epithets. [732] The
But, on the other hand, if the passion of change in this case is not in the action, but
the speaker appears to be in no degree jus in the agent; yet, in all languages.generosity
tified by the subject or the occasion, it pro and other moral qualities are ascribed to
duces in the judicious hearer no other emo actions. By a figure, we assign to the effect
tion but ridicule and contempt. a quality which is inherent only in the
The true sublime cannot be produced cause,
solely by art in the composition; it must By the same figure, we ascribe to a work
take its rise from grandeur in the subject, that grandeur which properly is inherent in
and a corresponding emotion raised in the the mind of the author.
mind of the speaker. A proper exhibition When we consider the “Iliad” as the
of these, though it should be artless, is work of the poet, its sublimity was really
irresistible, like fire thrown into the midst in the mind of Homer. He conceived
of combustible matter. [731] great characters, great actions, and great
When we contemplate the earth, the sea, events, in a manner suitable to their nature,
the planetary system, the universe, these and with those emotions which they are
are vast objects; it requires a stretch of naturally fitted to produce; and he conveys
imagination to grasp them in our minds. his conceptions and his emotions by the
But they appear truly grand, and merit the most proper signs. The grandeur of his
highest admiration, when we consider them thoughts is reflected to our eye by his work,
as the work of God, who, in the simple and, therefore, it is justly called a grand
style of scripture, stretched out the heavens, work.
and laid the foundation of the earth; or, in When we consider the things presented
the poetical language of Milton– to our mind in the “Iliad” without regard
* In his hand to the poet, the grandeur is properly in
He took the golden compasses, prepard Hector and Achilles, and the other great
In God's eternal store, to circumscribe
This universe and all created things. personages, human and divine, brought
One foot he centr'd, and the other turn'd upon the stage.
Round thro' the vast profundity obscure; Next to the Deity and his works, we ad
mire great talents and heroic virtue in men,
* Better translated-" Be there light, and light whether represented in history or in fiction.
there was "-H. The virtues of Cato, Aristides, Socrates,
[730–732]
CHAP. III.] OF GRANDEUR, 497
Marcus Aurelius, are truly grand. Extra All figurative speech presents something of
ordinary talents and genius, whether in this kind; and the beauty of poetical lan
poets, orators, philosophers, or lawgivers, are guage seems to be derived in a great mea
objects of admiration, and therefore grand. sure from this source.
We find writers of taste seized with a kind Of all figurative language, that is the most
of enthusiasm in the description of such common, the most natural, and the most
personages. agreeable, which either gives a body, if we
What a grand idea does Virgil give of the may so speak, to things intellectual, and
power of eloquence, when he compares the clothes them with visible qualities; or which,
tempest of the sea, suddenly calmed by the on the other hand, gives intellectual qualities
command of Neptune, to a furious sedition to the objects of sense.
in a great city, quelled at once by a man of To beings of more exalted faculties, intel
authority and eloquence. [733] lectual objects may, perhaps, appear to most
“Sic ait, ac dicto citius tumida aequora placat: advantage in their naked simplicity. But
Ac veluti magno in populo, si forte coorta est we can hardly conceive them but by means
Seditio, saevitgue animis ignobile vulgus;
Jamgue faces et saxa volant, furor arma ministrat; of somy analogy they bear to the objects of
sense. The names we give them are almost
Turn pietate gravem, et meritis, si forte virum quem
Conspexcre, silent, arrectisque auribus adstant.all metaphorical or analogical.
Ille regit dictis animos, et fora mulcet.
Sic cunctus pelagi cecidit fragor." Thus, the names of grand and sublime, as
well as their opposites, mean and low, are
The wonderful genius of Sir Isaac New evidently borrowed from the dimensions of
ton, and his sagacity in discovering the laws body; yet, it must be acknowledged, that
of Nature, is admirably expressed in that many things are truly grand and sublime,
short but sublime epitaph by Pope : to which we cannot ascribe the dimensions
“Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night; of height and extension.
God said, Let Newton be-and all was light.”
Some analogy there is, without doubt, be
Hitherto we have found grandeur only in tween greatness of dimension, which is an
qualities of mind; but, it may be asked, Is object of external sense, and that grandeur
there no real grandeur in material objects? which is an object of taste. On account of
It will, perhaps, appear extravagant to this analogy, the last borrows its name from
deny that there is; yet it deserves to be the first ; and, the name being common,
considered, whether all the grandeur we leads us to conceive that there is something
ascribe to objects of sense be not derived common in the nature of the things. [735]
from something intellectual, of which they But we shall find many qualities of mind,
are the effects or signs, or to which they bear denoted by names taken from some quality
some relation or analogy. of body to which they have some analogy,
Besides the relations of effect and cause, without anything common in their nature.
of sign and thing signified, there are innu Sweetness and austerity, simplicity and
merable similitudes and analogies between duplicity, rectitude and crookedness, are
things of very different nature, which lead names common to certain qualities of mind,
us to connect them in our imagination, and and to qualities of body to which they have
to ascribe to the one what properly belongs some analogy; yet he would err greatly who
to the other. ascribed to a body that sweetness or that
Every metaphor in language is an instance simplicity which are the qualities of mind.
of this; and it must be remembered, that a In like manner, greatness and meanness
very great part of language, which we now are names common to qualities perceived
account proper, was originally metaphorical; by the external sense, and to qualities
for the metaphorical meaning becomes the perceived by taste; yet he may be in an
proper, as soon as it becomes the most error, who ascribes to the objects of sense
usual ; much more, when that which was at that greatness or that meanness which is
first the proper meaning falls into disuse. only an object of taste.
[734] As intellectual objects are made more
The poverty of language, no doubt, con level to our apprehension by giving them a
tributes in part to the use of metaphor; visible form; so the objects of sense are
and, therefore, we find the most barren and dignified and made more august, by ascrib
uncultivated languages the most metaphori ing to them intellectual qualities which have
cal. But the most copious language may some analogy to those they really possess.
be called barren, compared with the fertility The sea rages, the sky lowers, the meadows
of human conceptions, and can never, with smile, the rivulets murmur, the breezes
out the use of figures, keep pace with the whisper, the soil is grateful or ungrateful
variety of their delicate modifications. such expressions are so familiar in common
But another cause of the use of metaphor language, that they are scarcely accounted
is, that we find pleasure in discovering rela poetical or figurative; but they give a kind
tions, similitudes, analogies, and even con of dignity to inanimate objects, and make
trasts, that are not obvious to every eye. our conception of them more agreeable.
733–735] 2 K.
498 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essay v III.
When we consider matter as an inert, sciences; beauties in actions, in affections,
extended, divisible, and movable substance, and in characters.
there seems to be nothing in these qualities In things so different and so unlike is
which we can callgrand; and when we ascribe there any quality, the same in all, which we
grandeur to any portion of matter, however may call by the name of beauty ? What
modified, may it not borrow this quality can it be that is common to the thought of
from something intellectual, of which it is a mind and the form of a piece of matter,
the effect, or sign, or instrument, or to to an abstract theorem and a stroke of wit?
which it bears some analogy? or, perhaps, I am indeed unable to conceive any qua
because it produces in the mind an emotion lity in all the different things that are called
that has some resemblance to that admira beautiful, that is the same in them all.
tion which truly grand objects raise? [736] There seems to be no identity, nor even
A very elegant writer on the sublime and similarity, between the beauty of a theorem
beautiful," makes everything grand or sub and the beauty of a piece of music, though
lime that is terrible. Might he not be led both may be beautiful. The kinds of beauty
to this by the similarity between dread and seem to be as various as the objects to which
admiration? Both are grave and solemn it is ascribed.
passions; both make a strong impression But why should things so different be
upon the mind; and both are very infec called by the same name? This cannot be
tious. But they differ specifically, in this without a reason. If there be nothing com
respect, that admiration supposes some un mon in the things themselves, they must
common excellence in its object, which have some common relation to us, or to
dread does not. We may admire what we something else, which leads us to give them
see no reason to dread; and we may dread the same name. [738]
what we do not admire. In dread, there is All the objects we call beautiful agree in
nothing of that enthusiasm which naturally two things, which seem to concur in our
accompanies admiration, and is a chief in sense of beauty. First, When they are
gredient of the emotion raised by what is perceived, or even imagined, they produce
truly grand or sublime. a certain agreeable emotion or feeling in the
Upon the whole, I humbly apprehend mind; and, secondly, Thisagreeable emotion
that true grandeur is such a degree of ex is accompanied with an opinion or belief of
cellence as is fit to raise an enthusiastical their having some perfection or excellence
admiration; that this grandeur is found, belonging to them.
originally and properly, in qualities of mind; Whether the pleasure we feel in contem
that it is discerned, in objects of sense, only plating beautiful objects may have any ne
by reflection, as the light we perceive in the cessary connection with the belief of their
moon and planets is truly the light of the excellence, or whether that pleasure be con
sun ; and that those who look for grandeur joined with this belief, by the good pleasure
in mere matter, seek the living among the only of our Maker, I will not determine.
dead. The reader may see Dr Price's sentiments
If this be a mistake, it ought, at least, to upon this subject, which merit considera
be granted, that the grandeur which we tion, in the second chapter of his “Review
perceive in qualities of mind, ought to have of the Questions concerning Morals.”
a different name from that which belongs Though we may be able to conceive these
properly to the objects of sense, as they are two ingredients of our sense of beauty dis
very different in their nature, and produce joined, this affords no evidence that they
very different emotions in the mind of the have no necessary connection. It has in
spectator. [737] deed been maintained, that whatever we can
conceive, is possible: but I endeavoured,
in treating of conception, to shew, that this
CHAPTER IV. opinion, though very common, is a mistake.
There may be, and probably are, many
OF Beauty, necessary connections of things in nature,
which we are too dim-sighted to discover.
BEAUTY is found in things so various The emotion produced by beautiful ob
and so very different in nature, that it is jects is gay and pleasant. It sweetens and
difficult to say wherein it consists, or what humanises the temper, is friendly to every
there can be common to all the objects in benevolent affection, and tends to allay
which it is found. sullen and angry passions. It enlivens the
Of the objects of sense, we find beanty in mind, and disposes it to other agreeable
colour, in sound, in form, in motion. There emotions, such as those of love, hope, and
are beauties of speech, and beauties of joy. It gives a value to the object, ab
thought; beauties in the arts, and in the stracted from its utility.
In things that may be possessed as pro
* Burke.-H. perty, beauty greatly enhances the price.
[736–788:
cHAP Iv.] OF BEAUTY. 499
A beautiful dog or horse, a beautiful coach bitter, denote the sensations in our minds,
or house, a beautiful picture or prospect, is to which, perhaps, there is no resemblance
valued by its owner and by others, not only in the objects which excite these ideas in
for its utility, but for its beauty. [739] us; however, we generally imagine other
If the beautiful object be a person, his wise. Were there no mind, with a sense
company and conversation are, on that ac of beauty, to contemplate objects, I see not
count, the more agreeable, and we are dis how they could be called beautiful.”
posed to love and esteem him. Even in a There is no doubt an analogy between
perfect stranger, it is a powerful recom the external senses of touch and taste, and
mendation, and disposes us to favour and the internal sense of beauty. This analogy
think well of him, if of our own sex, and led Dr Hutcheson, and other modern phi
still more if of the other. losophers, to apply to beauty what Des
“There is nothing,” says Mr Addison, Cartes and Locke had taught concerning
“that makes its way more directly to the soul the secondary qualities perceived by the
than beauty, which immediately diffuses a external senses.
secret satisfaction and complacence through Mr Locke's doctrine concerning the se
the imagination, and gives a finishing to condary qualities of body, is not so much
anything that is great and uncommon. an error in judgment as an abuse of words.
The very first discovery of it strikes the He distinguished very properly between
mind with an inward joy, and spreads a the sensations we have of heat and cold,
cheerfulness and delight through all its and that quality or structure in the body
faculties.” which is adapted by Nature to produce
As we ascribe beauty, not only to per those sensations in us. He observed very
sons, but to inanimate things, we give the justly, that there can be no similitude be
name of love or liking to the emotion, which tween one of these and the other. They
beauty, in both these kinds of objects, have the relation of an effect to its cause,
produces. It is evident, however, that but no similitude. This was a very just
liking to a person is a very different affec and proper correction of the doctrine of the
tion of mind from liking to an inanimate Peripatetics, who taught, that all our sens
thing. The first always implies benevo ations are the very form and image of the
lence; but what is inanimate cannot be the quality in the object by which they are
object of benevolence. The two affections, produced. [741]
however different, have a resemblance in What remained to be determined was,
some respects; and, on account of that whether the words, heat and cold, in com
resemblance, have the same name. And mon language, signify the sensations we
perhaps beauty, in these two different kinds feel, or the qualities of the object which
of objects, though it has one name, may be are the cause of these sensations. Mr
as different in its nature as the emotions Locke made heat and cold to signify only
which it produces in us. the sensations we feel, and not the qualities
Besides the agreeable emotion which which are the cause of them. And in this,
beautiful objects produce in the mind of I apprehend, lay his mistake. For it is
the spectator, they produce also an opinion evident, from the use of language, that hot
or judgment of some perfection or excel and cold, sweet and bitter, are attributes of
lence in the object. This I take to be a external objects, and not of the person who
second ingredient in our sense of beauty, perceives them. Hence, it appears a mon
though it seems not to be admitted by strous paradox to say, there is no heat in
modern philosophers. [740] the fire, no sweetness in sugar; but, when
The ingenious Dr Hutcheson, who per explained according to Mr Locke's meaning,
ceived some of the defects of Mr Locke's it is only, like most other paradoxes, an
system, and made very important improve abuse of words."
ments upon it, seems to have been carried The sense of beauty may be analysed in
away by it, in his notion of beauty. In a manner very similar to the sense of sweet
his “Inquiry concerning Beauty,” $ 1, ness. It is an agreeable feeling or emotion,
“Let it be observed,” says he, “that in the accompanied with an opinion or judgment
following papers, the word beauty is taken of some excellence in the object, which is
for the idea raised in us, and the sense of fitted by Nature to produce that feeling.
beauty for our power of receiving that idea.” The feeling is, no doubt, in the mind,
And again—“Only let it be observed, that, and so also is the judgment we form of the
by absolute or original beauty, is not under object: but this judgment, like all others,
stood any quality supposed to be in the must be true or false. If it be a true judg
object which should, of itself, be beautiful, ment, there is some real excellence in the
without relation to any mind which per object. And the use of all languages shews
ceives it: for beauty, like other names of that the name of beauty belongs to this ex
sensible ideas, properly denotes the per
ception of some mind; so cold, hot, sweet, * See above, p. 205, b, note - H.
* is e.
[739–741]
5{}() ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS [Essay viri.
tellence of the object, and not to the feel are numberless beauties, which, on account
ings of the spectator. of our ignorance, we are unable to perceive.
To say that there is, in reality, no beauty Superior beings may see more than we ; but
in those objects in which all men perceive He only who made them, and, upon a re
beauty, is to attribute to man fallacious view, pronounced them all to be very good,
senses. But we have no ground to think can see all their beauty.
so disrespectfully of the Author of our Our determinations with regard to the
being; the faculties he hath given us are beauty of objects, may, I think, be distin
not fallacious; nor is that beauty which guished into two kinds; the first we may
he hath so liberally diffused over all the call instinctive, the other rational.
works of his hands, a mere fancy in us, but Some objects strike us at once, and ap
a real excellence in his works, which express pear beautiful at first sight, without any re
the perfection of their Divine Author. flection, without our being able to say why
We have reason to believe, not only that we call them beautiful, or being able to spe
the beauties we see in nature are real, and cify any perfection which justifies our judg
not fanciful, but that there are thousands ment. Something of this kind there seems
which our faculties are too dull to perceive. to be in brute animals, and in children
We see many beauties, both of human and before the use of reason; nor does it end
divine art, which the brute animals are in with infancy, but continues through life.
capable of perceiving; and superior beings In the plumage of birds and of butterflies,
may excel us as far in their discernment of in the colours and form of flowers, of shells,
true beauty as we excel the brutes. [742] and of many other objects, we perceive a
The man who is skilled in painting or beauty that delights; but cannot say what
statuary sees more of the beauty of a fine it is in the object that should produce that
picture or statue than a common specta emotion.
tor. The same thing holds in all the fine The beauty of the object may in such
arts. The most perfect works of art have cases be called an occult quality. We know
a beauty that strikes even the rude and ig well how it affects our senses; but what it
norant; but they see only a small part of is in itself we know not. But this, as well
that beauty which is seen in such works by as other occult qualities, is a proper subject
those who understand them perfectly, and of philosophical disquisition; and, by a care
can produce them. ful examination of the objects to which Na
This may be applied, with no less justice, ture hath given this amiable quality, we
to the works of Nature. They have a may perhaps discover some real excellence
beauty that strikes even the ignorant and in the object, or, at least, some valuable
inattentive. But the more we discover of purpose that is served by the effect which
their structure, of their mutual relations, it produces upon us.
and of the laws by which they are governed, This instinctive sense of beauty, in differ
the greater beauty, and the more delightful ent species of animals, may differ as much
marks of art, wisdom, and goodness, we as the external sense of taste, and in each
discern. species be adapted to its manner of life. By
Thus the expert anatomist sees number this perhaps the various tribes are led to
less beautiful contrivances in the structure associate with their kind, to dwell among
of the human body, which are unknown to certain objects rather than others, and to
the ignorant. construct their habitation in a particular
Although the vulgar eye sees much beauty manner. [744]
in the face of the heavens, and in the various There seem likewise to be varieties in
motions and changes of the heavenly bodies, the sense of beauty in the individuals of the
the expert astronomer, who knows their same species, by which they are directed in
order and distances, their periods, the orbits the choice of a mate, and in the love and
they describe in the vast regions of space, care of their offspring.
and the simple and beautiful laws by which “We see,” says Mr Addison, “that
their motions are governed, and all the every different species of sensible creatures
appearances of their stations, progressions, has its different notions of beauty, and that
and retrogradations, their eclipses, occulta each of them is most affected with the
tions, and transits are produced—sees a beauties of its own kind. This is nowhere
beauty, order, and harmony reign through more remarkable than in birds of the same
the whole planetary system, which delights shape and proportion, where we often see
the mind. The eclipses of the sun and the mate determined in his courtship by the
moon, and the blazing tails of comets, single £ or tincture of a feather, and
which strike terror into barbarous nations, never discovering any charms but in the
furnish the most pleasing entertainment to colour of its own species.”
his eye, and a feast to his understanding. * Scit thalamo servare fidem, sanctasque weretur
[743] Connubiil ; non illum in pectore candor
Sollicitat niveus; neque pravurn accendit amo
In every part of Nature's works, there rena
[742-744]
OF BEAUTY. 50]
cHAP. v.]
Splendida lamugo, vel honesta in vertice crista; may often happen, that a judgment of the
Purpureusvenitor pennarum; ast agmina late beauty of an object, which was at first
Foeminea explorat cautus, rnaculasque requirit
Cognatas, paribusque interiita crpora guttis: merely instinctive, shall afterwards become
Ni faceret, pictis sylvam circum undique inons. rational, when we discover some latent per
tris
Confusam aspiceres vulgo, partusque biformes, fection of which that beauty in the object is
Et genus ambiguum, et veneris monumenta ne a sign.
fandae.
As the sense of beauty may be distin
“Hinc merula in nigro se oblectat nigra marito; guished into instinctive and rational; so I
Hinc socium lasciva petit philomela canorum, think beauty itself may be distinguished into
Agnoscitgue pare, son'tus; hunc noctua tetram
Canitiem alarum, et glaucos miratur ocellos. original and derived.
Nempe sibi semper constat, crescitaue quotannis As some objects shine by their own light,
Lucida progenies, castos contessa parentes: and many more by light that is borrowed
Were novo exultat, plumasque decora juventus
Explicat ad solem, patrisque coloribus ardet." and reflected ; so I conceive the lustre of
beauty in some objects is inherent and
In the human kind there are varieties in original, and in many others is borrowed
the taste of beauty, of which we can no and reflected.
more assign a reason than of the variety of There is nothing more common in the
their features, though it is easy to perceive sentiments of all mankind, and in the lan
that very important ends are answered by guage of all nations, than what may be
both. These varieties are most observable called a communication of attributes; that
in the judgments we form of the features of is, transferring an attribute, from the sub
the other sex; and in this the intention of ject to which it properly belongs, to some
nature is most apparent. [745] related or resembling subject.
As far as our determinations of the com The various objects which nature pre
parative beauty of objects are instinctive, sents to our view, even those that are most
they are no subject of reasoning or of criti different in kind, have innumerable simili
cism; they are purely the gift of nature, tudes, relations, and analogies, which we
and we have no standard by which they may contemplate with pleasure, and which lead
be measured. us naturally to borrow words and attributes
But there are judgments of beauty that from one object to express what belongs to
may be called rational, being grounded on another. The greatest part of every lan
some agreeable quality of the object which is guage under heaven is made up of words
distinctly conceived, and may be specified. borrowed from one thing, and applied to
This distinction between a rational judg something supposed to have some relation
ment of beauty and that which is instinc or analogy to their first signification. 1747]
tive, may be illustrated by an instance. The attributes of body we ascribe to mind,
In a heap of pebbles, one that is remark and the attributes of mind to material ob
able for brilliancy of colour and regularity jects. To inanimate things we ascribe life,
of figure, will be picked out of the heap by a and even intellectual and moral qualities.
child. He perceives a beauty in it, puts a And, although the qualities that are thus
value upon it, and is fond of the property of made common belong to one of the subjects
it. For this preference, no reason can be in the proper sense, and to the other meta
given, but that children are, by their con phorically, these different senses are often
titution, fond of brilliant colours, and of so mixed in our imagination, as to produce
regular figures. the same sentiment with regard to both.
Suppose again that an expert mechanic It is therefore natural, and agreeable to
views a well constructed machine. He sees the strain of human sentiments and of
all its parts to be made of the fittest mate human language, that in many cases the
rials, and of the most proper form; no beauty which originally and properly is in
thing superfluous, nothing deficient; every the thing signified, should be transferred
part adapted to its use, and the whole fitted to the sign; that which is in the cause to
in the most perfect manner to the end for the effect; that which is in the end to the
which it is intended. He pronounces it to means; and that which is in the agent to
be a beautiful machine. He views it with the instrument.
the same agreeable emotion as the child If what was said in the last chapter of
viewed the pebble; but he can give a reason the distinction between the grandeur which
for his judgment, and point out the particu we ascribe to qualities of mind, and that
lar perfections of the object on which it is which we ascribe to material objects, be
grounded. [746] well founded, this distinction of the beauty
Although the instinctive and the rational of objects will easily be admitted as per
sense of beauty may be perfectly distin fectly analagous to it. I shall therefore
guished in speculation, yet, in passing judg only illustrate it by an example.
ment upon particular objects, they are of en There is nothing in the exterior of a man
so mixed and confounded, that it is difficult more lovely and more attractive than per
to assign to each its own province. Nay, it fect good breeding. But what is this good
[745 747]
502 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [EssAY v11.1
breeding ? It consists of all the external fitted by its nature to please a good taste
signs of due respect to our superiors, con that is, every real perfection and excellence
descension to our inferiors, politeness to all in the objects we contemplate. [749]
with whom we converse or have to do, In a poem, in a picture, in a piece of
joined in the fair sex with that delicacy of music, it is real excellence that pleases a
outward behaviour which becomes them. good taste. In a person, every perfection
And how comes it to have such charms in of the mind, moral or intellectual, and every
the eyes of all mankind; for this reason perfection of the body, gives pleasure to the
only, as I apprehend, that it is a natural spectator, as well as to the owner, when
sign of that temper, and those affections there is no envy nor malignity to destroy
and sentiments with regard to others, and that pleasure.
with regard to ourselves, which are in It is, therefore, in the seale of perfection
themselves truly amiable and beautiful. and real excellence that we must look for
This is the original, of which good breed what is either grand or beautiful in objects.
ing is the picture; and it is the beauty of What is the proper object of admiration is
the original that is reflected to our sense grand, and what is the proper object of love
by the picture. The beauty of good breed and esteem is beautiful.
ing, therefore, is not originally in the ex This, I think, is the only motion of beauty
ternal behaviour in which it consists, but is that corresponds with the division of the
derived from the qualities of mind which it objects of taste which has been generally
expresses. And though there may be good received by philosophers. And this con
breeding without the amiable qualities of nection of beauty with real perfection, was
mind, its beauty is still derived from what a capital doctrine of the Socratic school.
it naturally expresses. [748] It is often ascribed to Socrates, in the dia
Having explained these distinctions of logues of Plato and of Xenophon.
our sense of beauty into instinctive and We may, therefore, take a view, first, of
rational, and of beauty itself into original those qualities of mind to which we may
and derived, I would now proceed to give justly and rationally ascribe beauty, and
a general view of those qualities in objects, then of the beauty we perceive in the objects
to which we may justly and rationally of sense. We shall find, if I mistake not,
ascribe beauty, whether original or derived. that, in the first, original beauty is to be
But here some embarrassment arises found, and that the beauties of the second
from the vague meaning of the word beauty, class are derived from some relation they
which I had occasion before to observe. bear to mind, as the signs or expressions
Sometimes it is extended, so as to include of some amiable mental quality, or as the
everything that pleases a good taste, and effects of design, art, and wise contrivance.
so comprehends grandeur and novelty, as As grandeur naturally produces admira
well as what in a more restricted sense is tion, beauty naturally produces love. We
called beauty. At other times, it is even may, therefore, justly ascribe beauty to those
by good writers confined to the objects of qualities which are the natural objects of
sight, when they are either seen, or remem love and kind affection.
bered, or imagined. Yet it is admitted by Of this kind chiefly are some of the moral
all men, that there are beauties in music; virtues, which, in a peculiar manner, con
that there is beauty as well as sublimity in stitute a lovely character. Innocence, gem
composition, both in verse and in prose; tleness, condescension, humanity, natural
that there is beauty in characters, in affee affection, public spirit, and the whole train
tions, and in actions. These are not ob of the soft and gentle virtues: these qualities
jects of sight; and a man may be a good are amiable from their very nature, and on
judge of beauty of various kinds, who has account of their intrinsic worth. [750]
not the faculty of sight. There are other virtues that raise admira
To give a determinate meaning to a word tion, and are, therefore, grand; such as
so, variously extended and restricted, I magnanimity, fortitude, self-command, su
know no better way than what is suggested periority to pain and labour, superiority to
by the common division of the objects of pleasure, and to the smiles of Fortune as
taste into novelty, grandeur, and beauty. well as to her frowns.
Novelty, it is plain, is no quality of the These awful virtues constitute what is
new object, but merely a relation which it most grand in the human character; the
has to the knowledge of the person to whom gentle virtues, what is most beautiful and
it is new. Therefore, if this general divi lovely. As they are virtues, they draw the
sion be just, every quality in an object that approbation of our moral faculty; as they
pleases a good taste, must, in one degree are becoming and amiable, they affect our
or another, have either grandeur or beauty. sense of beauty.
It may still be difficult to fix the precise Next to the amiable moral virtues, there
limit betwixt grandeur and beauty; but are many intellectual talents which have an
they must together comprehend everything intrinsic value, and draw our love and esteem
f : 48–750
chAP. Iv.] OF BEAUTY. 503
to those who possess them. Such are, In every species of animals, we perceive
knowledge, good sense, wit, humour, cheer by visible signs their instincts, their appe
fulness, good taste, excellence in any of the tites, their affections, their sagacity. Even
fine arts, in eloquence, in dramatic action; in the inanimate world, there are many
and, we may add, excellence in every art of things analogous to the qualities of mind;
peace or war that is useful in society. so that there is hardly anything belonging
There are likewise talents which we refer to mind which may not be represented by
to the body, which have an original beauty images taken from the objects of sense;
and comeliness; such as health, strength, and, on the other hand, every object of
and agility, the usual attendants of youth; sense is beautified, by borrowing attire from
skill in bodily exercises, and skill in the the attributes of mind.
mechanic arts. These are real perfections Thus, the beauties of mind, though invi
of the man, as they increase his power, and sible in themselves, are perceived in the
render the body a fit instrument for the objects of sense, on which their image is
mind. impressed.
I apprehend, therefore, that it is in the If we consider, on the other hand, the
moral and intellectual perfections of mind, qualities in sensible objects to which we
and in its active powers, that beauty origin ascribe beauty, I apprehend we shall find
ally dwells; and that from this as the foun in all of them some relation to mind, and
tain, all the beauty which we perceive in the greatest in those that are most beau
the visible world is derived. [751] tiful.
This, I think, was the opinion of the When we consider inanimate matter
ancient philosophers before-named; and it abstractly, as a substance endowed with
has been adopted by Lord Shaftesbury and the qualities of extension, solidity, divisi
Dr Akenside among the moderns. bility, and mobility, there seems to be
* Mind, mind alone, bear witness, earth and heav'n! nothing in these qualities that affects our
The living fountains in itself contains
Of beauteous and sublime. Here hand in hand sense of beauty. But when we contem
Si paramount the graces. Here enthron'd, plate the globe which we inhabit, as fitted
Celestial Venus, with divinest airs, by its form, by its motions, and by its fur
Invites the soul to never-fading joy."-Akenside.
niture, for the habitation and support of an
But neither mind, nor any of its qualities infinity of various orders of living creatures,
or powers, is an immediate object of per from the lowest reptile up to man, we have
ception to man. We are, indeed, imme a glorious spectacle indeed! with which
diately conscious of the operations of our the grandest and the most beautiful strue
own mind; and every degree of perfection tures of human art can bear no compa
in them gives the purest pleasure, with a rison.
proportional degree of self-esteem, so flat The only perfection of dead matter is its
tering to self-love, that the great difficulty being, by its various forms and qualities,
is to keep it within just bounds, so that we so admirably fitted for the purposes of ani
may not think of ourselves above what we mal life, and chiefly that of man. It fur
ought to think. nishes the materials of every art that tends
Other minds we perceive only through to the support or the embellishment of
the medium of material objects, on which human life. By the Supreme Artist, it is
their signatures are impressed. It is organized in the various tribes of the veget
through this medium that we perceive life, able kingdom, and endowed with a kind of
activity, wisdom, and every moral and in life; a work which human art cannot imi
tellectual quality in other beings. The tate, nor human understanding compre
signs of those qualities are immediately hend. [753]
perceived by the senses; by them the qua In the bodies and various organs of the
lities themselves are reflected to our under animal tribes, there is a composition of
standing ; and we are very apt to attribute matter still more wonderful and more mys
to the sign the beauty or the grandeur terious, though we see it to be admirably
which is properly and originally in the adapted to the purposes and manner of life
things signified. of every species. But in every form, unor
The invisible Creator, the Fountain of ganized, vegetable, or animal, it derives its
all perfection, hath stamped upon all his beauty from the purposes to which it is
works signatures of his divine wisdom, subservient, or from the signs of wisdom
power, and benignity, which are visible to or of other mental qualities which it ex
all men. The works of men in science, in hibits.
the arts of taste, and in the mechanical The qualities of inanimate matter, in
arts, bear the signatures of those qualities which we perceive beauty, are—sound,
of mind which were employed in their pro colour, form, and motion; the first an ob
duction. Their external behaviour and ject of hearing, the other three of sight:
conduct in life expresses the good or bad which we may consider in order.
qualities of their mind. [752] In a single note, sounded by a very fine
[751–753]
501. ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [EssAY v111.
voice, there is a beauty which we do not shew, that the beauty of harmony is derived
perceive in the same note, sounded by a bad from the relation it has to agreeable affec
voice or an imperfect instrument. I need tions of mind.
not attempt to enumerate the perfections With regard to melody. I leave it to the
in a single note, which give beauty to it. adepts in £ science of music, to determine
Some of them have names in the science of whether music, com according to the
music, and there perhaps are others which established rules of harmony and melody,
have no names. But I think it will be can be altogether void of expression; and
allowed, that every quality which gives whether music that has no expression can
beauty to a single note, is a sign of some have any beauty. To me it seems, that
perfection, either in the organ, whether it every strain in melody that is agreeable, is
be the human voice or an instrument, or in an imitation of the tones of the human
the execution. The beauty of the sound voice in the expression of some sentiment
is both the sign and the effect of this per or passion, or an imitation of some other ob
fection; and the perfection of the cause is ject in nature; and that music, as well as
the only reason we can assign for the beauty poetry, is an imitative art. [755]
of the effect. The sense of beauty in the colours, and
In a composition of sounds, or a piece of in the motions of inanimate objects, is, I
music, the beauty is either in the harmony, believe, in some cases instinctive. We see
the melody, or the expression. The beauty that children and savages are pleased with
of expression must be derived, either from brilliant colours and sprightly motions. In
the beauty of the thing expressed, or from persons of an improved and rational taste,
the art and skill employed in expressing it there are many sources from which colours
properly. and motions may derive their beauty. They,
In harmony, the very names of concord as well as the forms of objects, admit of
and discord are metaphorical, and suppose regularity and variety. The motions pro
some analogy between the relations of sound, duced by machinery, indicate the perfection
to which they are figuratively applied, and or imperfection of the mechanism, and may
the relations of minds and affections, which be better or worse adapted to their end, and
they originally and properly signify. [754] from that derive their beauty or deformity.
As far as I can judge by my ear, when The colours of natural objects, are com
two or more persons, of a good voice and monly signs of some good or bad quality in
ear, converse together in amity and friend the object; or they may suggest to the
ship, the tones of their different voices are imagination something agreeable or dis
concordant, but become discordant when agreeable.
they give vent to angry passions; so that, In dress and furniture, fashion has a con
without hearing what is said, one may know siderable influence on the preference we give
by the tones of the different voices, whether to one colour above another.
they quarrel or converse amicably. This, A number of clouds of different and ever
indeed, is not so easily perceived in those changing hue, seen on the ground of a serene
who have been taught, by good-breeding, azure sky, at the going down of the sun,
to suppress angry tones of voiee, even when present to the eye of every man a glorious
they are angry, as in the lowest rank, who spectacle. It is hard to say, whether we
express their angry passions without any should call it grand or beautiful. It is both
restraint. in a high degree. Clouds towering above
When discord arises occasionally in con clouds, variously tinged, according as they
versation, but soon terminates in perfect approach nearer to the direct rays of the
amity, we receive more pleasure than from sun, enlarge our conceptions of the regions
perfect unanimity. In like manner, in the above us. They give us a view of the fur
harmony of music, discordant sounds are niture of those regions, which, in an un
occasionally introduced, but it is always in clouded air, seem to be a perfect void; but
order to give a relish to the most perfect are now seen to contain the stores of wind
concord that follows. and rain, bound up for the present, but to
Whether these analogies, between the be poured down upon the earth in due sea
harmony of a piece of music, and harmony son. Even the simple rustic does not look
in the intercourse of minds, be merely fanci upon this beautiful sky, merely as a show
ful, or have any real foundation in fact, I to please the eye, but as a happy omen of
submit to those who have a nicer ear, and fine weather to come.
have applied it to observations of this kind. The proper arrangement of colour, and of
If they have any just foundation, as they light and shade, is one of the chief beauties
seem to me to have, they serve to account of painting; but this beauty is greatest,
for the metaphorical application of the when that arrangement gives the most dis
names of concord and discord to the rela tinct, the most natural, and the most agree
tions of sounds; to account for the pleasure able image of that which the painter intend
we have from harmony in music; and to ed to represent. [756]
[754–756]
chAP. iv.] OF BEAUTY. 505
If we consider, in the last place, the stinct, recommends to his attention. By

beauty of form or figure in inanimate ob degrees, he becomes a critic in beauties of
jects, this, according to Dr Hutcheson, re this kind, and can give a reason why he
sults from regularity, mixed with variety. prefers one to another. In every species,
Here, it ought to be observed, that regu he sees the greatest beauty in the plants or
larity, in all cases, expresses design and flowers that are most perfect in their kind–
art: for nothing regular was ever the work which have neither suffered from unkindly
of chance; and where regularity is joined soil nor inclement weather; which have not
with variety, it expresses design more been robbed of their nourishment by other
strongly. Besides, it has been justly ob plants, nor hurt by any accident. When he
served, that regular figures are more easily examines the internal structure of those
and more perfectly comprehended by the productions of Nature, and traces them
mind than the irregular, of which we can from their embryo state in the seed to their
never form an adequate conception. maturity, he sees a thousand beautiful con
Although straight lines and plain surfaces trivances of Nature, which feast his under
have a beauty from their regularity, they standing more than their external form
admit of no variety, and, therefore, are delighted his eye.
beauties of the lowest order. Curve lines Thus, every beauty in the vegetable
and surfaces admit of infinite variety, joined creation, of which he has formed any ra
with every degree of regularity; and, there tional judgment, expresses some perfection
fore, in many cases, excel in beauty those in the object, or some wise contrivance in
that are straight. its Author. [758]
But the beauty arising from regularity In the animal kingdom, we perceive still
and variety, must always yield to that which greater beauties than in the vegetable. Here
arises from the fitness of the form for the we observe life, and sense, and activity,
end intended. In everything made for an various instincts and affections, and, in
end, the form must be adapted to that end: many cases, great sagacity. These are
and everything in the form that suits the attributes of mind, and have an original
end, is a beauty; everything that unfits it beauty.
for its end, is a deformity. As we allow to brute animals a thinking
The forms of a pillar, of a sword, and of principle or mind, though far inferior to
a balance are very different. Each may that which is in man; and as, in many of
have great beauty; but that beauty is de their intellectual and active powers, they
rived from the fitness of the form and of very much resemble the human species,
the matter for the purpose intended. [757] their actions, their motions, and even their
Were we to consider the form of the earth looks, derive a beauty from the powers of
itself, and the various furniture it contains, thought which they express.
of the inanimate kind; its distribution into There is a wonderful variety in their
land and sea, mountains and valleys, rivers manner of life; and we find the powers they
and springs of water, the variety of soils possess, their outward form, and their in
that cover its surface, and of mineral and ward structure, exactly adapted to it. In
metallic substances laid up within it, the air every species, the more perfectly any indi
that surrounds it, the vicissitudes of day vidual is fitted for its end and manner of
and night, and of the seasons: the beauty life, the greater is its beauty.
of all these, which indeed is superlative, In a race-horse, everything that expresses
consists in this, that they bear the most agility, ardour, and emulation, gives beauty
lively and striking impression of the wisdom to the animal. In a pointer, acuteness of
and goodness of their Author, in contriving scent, eagerness on the game, and tractable
them so admirably for the use of man, and ness, are the beauties of the species. A
of their other inhabitants. sheep derives its beauty from the fineness
The beauties of the vegetable kingdom and quantity of its fleece; and in the wild
are far superior to those of inanimate mat animals, every beauty is a sign of their
ter, in any form which human art can give perfection in their kind.
it. Hence, in all ages, men have been fond It is an observation of the celebrated
to adorn their persons and their habitations Linnaeus, that, in the vegetable kingdom,
with the vegetable productions of nature. the poisonous plants have commonly a lurid
The beauties of the field, of the forest, and disagreeable appearance to the eye, of
and of the flower-garden, strike a child long which he gives many instances. I appre
before he can reason. He is delighted with hend the observation may be extended to
what he sees; but he knows not why. This the animal kingdom, in which we commonly
is instinct, but it is not confined to child see something shocking to the eye in the
hood; it continues through all the stages of noxious and poisonous animals.
life. It leads the florist, the botanist, the The beauties which anatomists and phy
philosopher, to examine and compare the siologists describe in the internal structure
objects which Nature, by this powerful in of the various tribes of an mals; in the
[757,758]
506 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essay v1.1.
organs of sense, of nutrition, and of motion, Here I observe, that, as the colour of the
are expressive of wise design and contriv body is very different in different climates,
ance, in fitting them for the various kinds every nation preferring the colour of its
of life for which they are intended. [759] climate, and as, among us, one man prefers
Thus, I think, it appears that the beauty a fair beauty, another a brunette, without
which we perceive in the inferior animals, being able to give any reason for this pre
is expressive, either of such perfections as ference; this diversity of taste has no stand
their several natures may receive, or ex ard in the common principles of human
pressive of wise design in Him who made nature, but must arise from something that
them, and that their beauty is derived from is different in different nations, and-in dif
the perfections which it expresses. ferent individuals of the same nation.
But of all the objects of sense, the most I observed before, that fashion, habit.
striking and attractive beauty is perceived associations, and perhaps some peculiarity
in the human species, and particularly in of constitution, may have great influence
the fair sex. upon this internal sense, as well as upon
Milton represents Satan himself, in sur the external. Setting aside the judgments
veying the furniture of this globe, as struck arising from such causes, there seems to
with the beauty of the first happy pair. remain nothing that, according to the com
“Two of far nobler shape, erect and tall, mon judgment of mankind, can be called
Godlike erect! with native honour clad beauty in the colour of the species, but
In naked majesty, seem'd lords of all.
And worthy seem’d, for in thir looks divine, what expresses perfect health and liveli
The image of their glorious Maker, shone ness, and in the fair sex softness and deli
Truth, wisdom, sanctitude severe and pure; cacy; and nothing that can be called deform
Severe, but in true filial freedom plac'd,
Whence true authority in man ; though both ity but what indicates disease and decline.
Not equal, as their sex not equal seem’d, And if this be so, it follows, that the beauty
For contemplation he, and valour form'd,
For softness she, and sweet attractive grace.” of colour is derived from the perfections
which it expresses. This, however, of all
In this well-known passage of Milton, the ingredients of beauty, is the least. [761]
we see that this great poet derives the The next in order is form, or proportion
beauty of the first pair in Paradise from of parts. The most beautiful form, as the
those expressions of moral and intellectual author thinks, is that which indicates deli
qualities which appeared in their outward cacy and softness in the fair sex, and in the
form and demeanour.
male either strength or agility. The beau
The most minute and systematical ac ty of form, therefore, lies all in expression.
count of beauty in the human species, and The third ingredient, which has more
particularly in the fair sex, I have met power than either colour or form, he calls
with, is in “Crito; or, a Dialogue on expression, and observes, that it is only the
Beauty,” said to be written by the author expression of the tender and kind passions
of “Polymetis,” and republished by Dods that gives beauty; that all the cruel and
ley in his collection of fugitive pieces. unkind ones add to deformity; and that, on
[760] this account, good nature may very justly
I shall borrow from that author some be said to be the best feature, even in the
observations, which, I think, tend to shew finest face. Modesty, sensibility, and
that the beauty of the human body is sweetness, blended together, so as either
derived from the signs it exhibits of some to enliven or to correct each other, give al
perfection of the mind or person. most as much attraction as the passions are
All that can be called beauty in the capable of adding to a very pretty face.
human species may be reduced to these It is owing, says the author, to the great
four heads: colour, form, expression, and force of pleasingness which attends all the
grace. The two former may be called the kinder passions, that lovers not only seem,
body, the two latter the soul of beauty. but really are, more beautiful to each other
The beauty of colour is not owing solely than they are to the rest of the world; be
to the natural liveliness of flesh-colour and cause, when they are together, themost pleas
red, nor to the much greater charms they ing passions are more frequently exerted in
receive from being properly blended toge each of their faces than they are in either
ther; but is also owing, in some degree, to before the rest of the world. There is then,
the idea they carry with them of good as a French author very well expresses it,
health, without which all beauty grows a soul upon their countenances, which does
languid and less engaging, and with which not appear when they are absent from one
it always recovers an additional strength another, or even in company that lays a re
and lustre. This is supported by the autho straint upon their features,
rity of Cicero. Venustas et pulchritudo There is a great difference in the same
corporis secerni non potest a valetudine. face, according as the person is in a better
* Spence, under the name ot sir Harry Feau. or a worse humour, or more or less lively.
mont-li.
| The best complexion, the finest features,
[759-761]
cHAP. Iv.] OF BEAUTY. 507
and the exactest shape, without anything to me to be just, we may, I think, conclude,
of the mind expressed in the face, is insipid that grace, as far as it is visible, consists of
and unmoving. The finest eyes in the those motions, either of the whole body, or
world, with an excess of malice or rage in of a part or feature, which express the most
them, will grow shocking. The passions rfect propriety of conduct and sentiment
can give beauty without the assistance of in an amiable character.
colour or form, and take it away where Those motions must be different in dif
these have united most strongly to give it; ferent characters; they must vary with
and therefore this part of beauty is greatly every variation of emotion and sentiment;
superior to the other two. [762] they may express either dignity or respect,
The last and noblest part of beauty is confidence or reserve, love or just resent
grace, which the author thinks undefin ment, esteem or indignation, zeal or indif
able. ference. Every passion, sentiment, or emo
Nothing causes love so generally and ir tion, that in its nature and degree is just
resistibly as grace. Therefore, in the my and proper, and corresponds perfectly with
thology of the Greeks and Romans, the the character of the person, and with the oc
Graces were the constant attendants of casion, is what may we call the soul of grace.
Venus the goddess of love. Grace is like The body or visible part consists of those
the cestus ...' same goddess, which was emotions and features which give the true
supposed to comprehend everything that and unaffected expression of this soul. [764]
was winning and engaging, and to create Thus, I think, all the ingredients of
love by a secret and inexplicable force, like human beauty, as they are enumerated and
that of some magical charm. described by this ingenious author, termi
There are two kinds of grace—the majes nate in expression: they either express
tic and the familiar; the first more com some perfection of the body, as a part of the
manding, the last more delightful and en man, and an instrument of the mind, or
gaging. The Grecian painters and sculp some amiable quality or attribute of the
tors used to express the formermost strongly mind itself.
in the looks and attitudes of their Miner It cannot, indeed, be denied, that the
vas, and the latter in those of Venus. This expression of a fine countenance may be
distinction is marked in the description of unnaturally disjoined from the amiable qua
the personages of Virtue and Pleasure in lities which it naturally expresses: but we
the ancient fable of the Choice of Hercules. presume the contrary till we have clear evi
* Graceful, but each with different grace they move, dence; and even then we pay homage to
This striking sacred awe, that softer winning love.” the expression, as we do to the throne when
In the persons of Adam and Eve in Pa it happens to be unworthily filled.
radise, Milton has made the same distinc Whether what I have offered to shew,
tion that all the beauty of the objects of sense
* For contemplation he, and valour formed, is borrowed, and derived from the beauties
For softness she, and sweet attractive grace.” [76] of mind which it expresses or siggests to
Though grace be so difficult to be defined, the imagination, be well-founded or not, I
there are two things that hold universally hope this terrestrial Venus will not be
with relation to it. First, There is no deemed less worthy of the homage which
grace without motion; some genteel or has always been paid to her, by being con
pleasing motion, either of the whole body ceived more nearly allied to the celestial
or of some limb, or at least some feature. than she has commonly been represented.
Hence, in the face, grace appears only on To make an end of this subject, tase
those features that are movable, and change seems to be progressive as man is. Child
with the various emotions and sentiments ren, when refreshed by sleep, and at ease
of the mind, such as the eyes and eye from pain and hunger, are disposed to at
brows, the mouth and parts adjacent. tend to the objects about them ; they are
When Venus appeared to her son AEneas pleased with brilliant colours, gaudy orna
in disguise, and, after some conversation ments, regular forms, cheerful counte
with him, retired, it was by the grace of nances, noisy mirth and glee. Such is
her notion in retiring that he discovered the taste of childhood, which we must con
her be to truly a goddess. clude to be given for wise purposes. A
“Dixit, et avertens rosea cervice refulsit, great part of the happiness of that period
Ambrosiaeque comae divinum vertice odorem
£ pedes vest's defluxit ad imos; of life is derived from it; and, therefore, it
vera incessu patuit dea. Ille, ubi matrem ought to be indulged. It leads them to
Agnovit,” &c. attend to objects which they may afterwards
A second observation is, That there can find worthy of their attention. It puts them
be no grace with impropriety, or that no upon exerting their infant faculties of body
thing can be graceful that is not adapted to and mind, which, by such exertions, are
the character and situation of the person. daily strengthened and improved. [765]
From these observations, which appear As they advance in years and in under
[726–765.]
508 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [EssAv v1.11.
starling, other beauties attract their atten ought to be proportioned to the merit of the
tion, which, by their novelty or superiority, object. When it is not grounded on real
throw a shade upon those they formerly ad worth, it must be the effect of constitution,
mired. They delight in feats of agility, or of some habit, or casual association. A
strength, and art; they love those that ex fond mother may see a beauty in her dar
cel in them, and strive to equal them. In ling child, or a fond author in his work. “
the tales and fables they hear, they begin to which the rest of the world are blind.
discern beauties of mind. Some characters such cases, the affection is pre-engas ,
and actions appear lovely, others give dis and, as it were, bribes the judgment, to
gust. The intellectual and moral powers make the object worthy of that affection.
begin to open, and, if cherished by '' For the mind cannot be easy in Putting a
able circumstances, advance gradually in value upon an object beyond what it con
strength, till they arrive at that degree ceives to be due. When affection is not
of perfection to which human nature, in its carried away by some natural or acquired
present state, is limited. bias, it naturally is and ought to be led by
In our progress from infancy to maturity, the judgment. [766]
our faculties open in a regular order ap
pointed by Nature; the meanest first, those As, in the division which I have followed
of more dignity in succession, until the mo of our intellectual powers, I mentioned
ral and rational powers finish the man. Moral Perception and Consciousness, the
Every faculty furnishes new notions, brings reader may expect that some reason should
new beauties into #iew, and enlarges the be given, why they are not treated of in
province of taste; so that we may say, this place.
there is a taste of childhood, a taste of As to Consciousness, what I think neces
youth, and a manly taste. Each is beau sary to be said upon it has been already
tiful in its season; but not so much so, said, Essay vi., chap. 5. As to the faculty
when carried beyond its season. Not that of moral perception, it is indeed a most im
the man ought to dislike the things that portant part of human understanding, and
please the child or the youth, but to put well worthy of the most attentive considera
less value upon them, compared with other tion, since without it we could have no con
beauties, with which he ought to be ac ception of right and wrong, of duty and
quainted. moral obligation, and since the first princi
Our moral and rational powers justly ples of morals, upon which all moral rea
claim dominion over the whole man. Even soning must be grounded, are its immediate
taste is not exempted from their authority; dictates; but, as it is an active as well as
it must be subject to that authority in an intellectual power, and has an immediate
every case wherein we pretend to reason or relation to the other active powers of the
dispute about matters of taste; it is the voice mind, I apprehend that it is proper to defer
of reason that our love or our admiration the consideration of it till these be explained.
[766]
13 MY 54
E. R. Wr 10

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> /.249 & . .

INTELLECTUAL POWERS OF MAN.

HIS C () LLECTED WRITINGS -

s1 R WILLIAM HAMILTON, BART.

AND WITH THE FOOT NOTES

ESSAYS ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS OF MAN.

CHAPTER I. Explication of Words, -

Ii. Principles taken for granted,

V. Of the pr means of Knowing the operations of the Mind,

VIII. Of Social [and Solitary] operations of Mind.

ESSAY II.-OF THE PoweRs we HAVE By MEANs of our ExTERNAL SENses.

. Of the Organs of Sense, - • - 245

What it is to Account for a Phaenomenon in Nature,

Bishop Berkel's entinents of the nature of Ideas,"~

. Reflections on the Common Theory of Ideas,

Of the Objects of Perception ; and first, of Primary and Second

. Of other objects o Perception, - -

Of Matter and of Space, - * -

Of the Evidence of Sense, and of Belief in general,

CHAPrER I. Things obvious and certain with regard to Memory, 339

ESSAY IV.-OF CoNCEPTION.

CHAPTER I. Of Conception, or Simple Apprehension in general, 360

ESSAY W.–OF ABSTRACTION.

CHAPTER I. of General Words, - - - - 389

ESSAY WI.-OF JUDGMENT.

CHAPTER I. of Judgment in general, .02& - - - 413

ESSAY WIL–Of Reasoning.

Chapt ER I. Of Reasoning in general, and of Demonstration, - 475

ESSAY WIII.—OF TAsTE.

Chapter I. of Taste in general, • - - - - 490

INTELLECTUAL POWERS OF MAN.

BY THOMAS REID, D.D., F.R.S.E.,

* Who hath put wisdom in the inward parts "-jou.

MY DEAR FRIENDs,--I know not to differed in opinion, and debated them

than twenty years, in Lectures to a large one reader is a superfluous repetition, to

INTELLECTUAL POWERS OF MAN.

CHAPTER I. the sake of those who are less conversant

other kinds of thought—all which we are there is no absurdity in supposing a bein

actions, are common to all languages. oPERATIONs of The MIND.

It may be observed that, without appre simple apprehensions, notions, or ideas.

reasoning. It is not simple apprehension, By the first, I understand such operations

cHAP. VIII.] OF SOCIAL OPERATIONS OF MIND.

OF THE POWERS WE HAVE BY MEANS OF OUR

CHAPTER I. to other powers which are thought to re

any sense is perfectly sound, and has the

understanding equal or superior to that to make mathematics and logic, natural

cHAP. Iv.] FALSE CONCLUSIONS, &c. 253

observed, first, That we know that such vi

ci, AP. Iv.] FALSE CONCLUSIONS, &c. 257

it is an insult to common sense ? It appears, therefore, that the clear and

260 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. [Essay 11.

282 ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. LEssay 11.

According to Berkeley'ssystem, God's creat lished twenty-four years, or of Berkeley's