G & M PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. ROMIL V.

CUAMBOT
G.R. No. 162308
November 22, 2006

FACTS: Cuambot was an overseas worker who was deployed to Saudi Arabia to work as a car body builder in Al Waha Workshop in Unaizah City,
by petitioner G & M Philippines. He left the country; however, respondent did not finish his contract and returned to the Philippines barely six months
later. He filed a complaint in the NLRC against his recruitment agency, herein petitioner, for unpaid wages, withheld salaries, refund of plane ticket
and repatriation bond, later amended to include illegal dismissal, claim for the unexpired portion of his employment contract, actual, exemplary and
moral damages, and attorney’s fees.

Cuambot narrated that he began working for Mohd Al Motairi, the President and General Manager of the Al WahaWorkshop, on January 8, 1995.
Along with his Filipino co-workers, he was subjected to inhuman and unbearable working conditions, to wit:

1. [He] was required to work from 7:00 o’clock in the morning to 10:00 o’clock in the evening every day, except Friday, or six (6) hours overtime
work daily from the usual eight (8) working hours per day.

2. [He] was never paid x x x his monthly basic salary of 1,200 [Riyals] including his overtime pay for the six (6) hours overtime work he rendered
every working day during his work in Saudi Arabia except for the amount of 100 [Riyals] given every month for his meal allowance;

3. [He] was subjected to serious insult by respondent Muthiri every time he asked or demanded for his salary; and,

4. [S]ome of complainants letters that were sent by his family were not given by respondent Muthiri and/or his staff x x x.

When Cuambott asked Motairi for his salary, he was told that since a huge sum had been paid to the agency for his recruitment and deployment, he
would only be paid after the said amount had already been recovered. He was also told that his salary was only 800 Saudi Riyals (SAR) per month,
in contrast to the SAR1200 that was promised him under the contract.

Petitioner, in defense, presented copies of 7 pay slips issued in favor of Cuambot. Cuambot countered that his signatures in the pay slips were
forged and further claims that he never got his salaries except only for the SAR100 as monthly allowance. G&M to counter the allegation of forgery,
claimed that there was a great possibility that Cumabot had changed his signature while abroad so that he could file a complaint for illegal dismissal
upon his return.

ISSUES
1. whether or not the respondent’s signatures are mere forgeries
2. whether respondent executed the resignation letter

HELD:

The petitioner’s attempts at establishing its case are not enough to convince the court of the veracity of its claims. Amongst other things, the
petitioner failed to submit the original copies of the pay slips and the resignation letter to prove that they were actually penned by respondent, they
failed to submit an original copy of the employment contract to prove that they had actually given a copy of such to respondent for him to sign, and a
cursory look at the resignation letter and the handwritten payslips show that they were written by one person.

Indeed, the rule is that all doubts in the implementation and the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, in order to give
effect to the policy of the State to “afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or
creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers,” and to “assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining,
security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.

It is a well-settled doctrine, that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be
tilted in favor of the latter. It is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the
evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in the former’s favor. The policy is to extend the doctrine to a greater
number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid
and protection of labor.

Moreover, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. The reason for the rule is that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records,
remittances and other similar documents – which will show that overtime, differentials, service incentive leave, and other claims of workers have
been paid – are not in the possession of the worker but in the custody and absolute control of the employer. Thus, the burden of showing with legal
certainty that the obligation has been discharged with payment falls on the debtor, in accordance with the rule that one who pleads payment has the
burden of proving it. Only when the debtor introduces evidence that the obligation has been extinguished does the burden shift to the creditor, who is
then under a duty of producing evidence to show why payment does not extinguish the obligation In this case, petitioner was unable to present
ample evidence to prove its claim that respondent had received all his salaries and benefits in full.

Petition denied for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners

Facts:

Petitioner Jhorizaldy Uy was hired by respondent Centro Ceramica Corporation as full-time sales executive under probationary employment for 6
months. Uy alleged that on February 19, 2002 after their weekly sales meeting, he was informed by his superior, Sales Supervisor Richard Agcaoili,
that he was to assume a new position in the marketing department, to which he replied that he will think it over. That same day, he was summoned
by Sy and Garcia for a closed-door meeting during which Sy informed him of the termination of his services due to “insubordination” and advised him
to turn over his samples and files immediately. Petitioner further narrated that on February 22, 2002, he turned over company samples, accounts and
receivables to Agcaoili. Thereafter, he did not report for work anymore. Thereafter, Uy received a memo from respondent company stating his failure
to meet the quota for sales executive. With this, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the respondent company. Labor Arbiter
Salinas dismissed petitioner’s complaint on the basis of his finding that it was petitioner who opted not to report for work. Petitioner appealed to the
NLRC which reversed the Labor Arbiter’s ruling. Respondents elevated the case to the CA which reversed the NLRC and dismissed petitioner’s
complaint. Hence, this instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner was dismissed by the respondents or voluntarily severed his employment by abandoning his job.

Held:

Petitioner Uy was dismissed by the respondent company. In this case, the evidence on record suggests that petitioner did not resign; he was orally
dismissed by Sy. It is this lack of clear, valid and legal cause, not to mention due process, that made his dismissal illegal, warranting reinstatement
and the award of backwages. Moreover, the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal just three weeks later is difficult to reconcile with voluntary
resignation. Had petitioner intended to voluntarily relinquish his employment after being unceremoniously dismissed by no less than the company
president, he would not have sought redress from the NLRC and vigorously pursued this case against the respondents. When there is no showing of
a clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers it a case of illegal dismissal. Furthermore, Article 4 of the Labor
Code expresses the basic principle that all doubts in the interpretation and implementation of the Labor Code should be interpreted in favor of the
workingman.
SCA Hygiene Products Corporation Employees Association-FFW vs. SCA Hygiene Products Corporation,
G.R. No. 182877; 9 August 2010

Facts:

SCA Hygiene Products Corporation (“the company”) conducted a company-wide job evaluation which led the company to adopt 8 new job grade
levels. Consequently, the company informed 22 daily paid rank-and-file employees (or “the 22 employees”) that their positions had been classified as
Job Grade Level 2. The Monthly Employees Union then demanded that the 22 employees be given promotion increase and salary increase since
they were placed on a higher job grade level, which amounted to a promotion. The Daily Employees Union also asked that the 22 employees be
given the benefits of a monthly paid rank-and-file employee since Job Grade Level 2 positions were meant for monthly paid rank-and-file employees.
The company failed to respond so both unions submitted their grievances for mediation. When the parties failed to settle, they submitted the case for
voluntary arbitration. The unions insisted that the 22 employees were entitled to conversion increase since Job Grade Level 2 positions were meant
for monthly paid rank-and-file employees. They argued that it was the company’s practice to give a promotion increase every time an employee’s
rank was converted to a higher job grade level. They added that those converted from Job Grade Level 2 positions to Job Grade Level 3 positions
were granted the benefits concomitant to their new positions. The company countered that the 22 employees were not promoted since they
continued to occupy the same positions they were occupying before the job evaluation, and they were not given additional duties and
responsibilities. It added that those employees converted to Job Grade Level 3 positions were entitled to salary and benefits increase because they
were classified as managerial employees upon conversion, while the 22 employees remained in the rank-and-file. The Voluntary Arbitrator ruled in
favor of the unions and awarded conversion increase. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the company.

Issue:

Whether or not the 22 daily paid rank-and-file employees were promoted after their positions were converted from Job Grade Level 1 to Job Grade
Level 2; and

(2) Whether or not the 22 daily paid rank-and-file employees were entitled to conversion and promotion increase.

Held:

The hiring, firing, transfer, demotion, and promotion of employees have been traditionally identified as a management prerogative subject to
limitations found in the law, a collective bargaining agreement, or in general principles of fair play and justice. This is a function associated with the
employer’s inherent right to control and manage effectively its enterprise. Thus, the Court has recognized and affirmed the prerogative of
management to implement a job evaluation program or a re-organization for as long as it is not contrary to law, morals or public policy. In this case,
the unions failed to show that the company acted in bad faith in implementing the job evaluation program. There was no showing that it was intended
to circumvent the law and deprive the 22 daily paid rank-and-file employees of the benefits they were supposed to receive. The job evaluation
program was undertaken to streamline respondent’s operations and to place its employees in their proper positions or groupings. The Collective
Bargaining Agreements of the parties merely provided the procedure for the implementation of the job evaluation and did not guarantee any
adjustment in the salaries of the employees. What transpired was only a promotion in nomenclature. Therefore, the 22 daily paid rank-and file
employees were not entitled to any conversion or promotion increase. Of primordial consideration is not the nomenclature or title given to the
employee, but the nature of his functions. Based on the 8 new job grade levels, employees in Job Grade Level 1 and those in Job Grade Level 2
were both categorized as rank-and-file employees. They continued to occupy the same positions they were occupying before the job evaluation.
Their job titles remained the same and they were not given additional duties and responsibilities. There was also no evidence to show that Job
Grade Level 1 was confined to daily paid rank-and file employees while Job Grade Level 2 was confined monthly paid rank-and-file employees, such
that when a conversion from Job Grade Level 1 to Job Grade Level 2 took place, a promotion automatically ensued. The Voluntary Arbitrator’s
finding that Job Grade Level 2 positions were mostly occupied by monthly paid rank-and-file employees implied that some daily paid rank-and-file
employees also occupied that position. Thus, a mere conversion from Job Grade Level 1 position to Job Grade Level 2 position did not automatically
make a daily paid rank-and-filer a monthly paid one with a concomitant conversion and promotion increase. The unions’ allegation that it had been a
long-standing company practice to grant a conversion or promotion increase every time an employee’s rank is converted to a higher job grade level
was not substantiated. The instances they cited showed a clear intent on the part of the company to promote the employees concerned. The job
titles and positions of such employees had changed and they had assumed additional duties and responsibilities. Those who were elevated to Job
Grade Level 3 positions were rightfully given the additional benefits since they had become managerial employees. The same cannot be said of the
22 daily paid rank-and-file employees
G.R. No. 173882 February 15, 2012

Julie’s Bakeshop and/or Edgar Reyes, Petitioners,

FACTS: Julie’s Bakeshop and/or Edgar Reyes (Reyes) assail the decision of the CA which reversed the Resolutions of the NLRC and ordered
petitioners to reinstate respondents Henry Arnaiz (Arnaiz), Edgar Napal (Napal) and Jonathan Tolores (Tolores) and to pay them their backwages for
having been constructively dismissed, as well as their other monetary benefits.

THE CASE: Reyes hired respondents as chief bakers in his three franchise branches of Julie’s Bakeshop in Sibalom and San Jose, Antique.
Respondents filed separate complaints against petitioners for underpayment of wages, payment of premium pay for holiday and rest day, service
incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, cost of living allowance (COLA) and attorney’s fees. These complaints were later on consolidated.
Subsequently, in a memorandum dated February 16, 2000, Reyes reassigned respondents as utility/security personnel tasked to clean the
outside vicinity of his bakeshops and to maintain peace and order in the area. Upon service of the memo, respondents, however, refused
to sign the same and likewise refused to perform their new assignments by not reporting for work.

LABOR ARBITER: expressed dismay over respondents’ lack of good faith in negotiating a settlement. The Labor Arbiter denounced the way
respondents dealt with Atty. Delicana during their discussions for a possible settlement since respondents themselves later on informed the said
tribunal that at the time of the said discussions, they no longer considered Atty. Delicana as their counsel. Despite this, the Labor Arbiter still required
the parties to submit their respective position papers. And as respondents’ position paper was filed late and no evidence was attached to prove the
allegations therein, the Labor Arbiter resolved to dismiss the complaints.

NLRC overruled the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and held that the burden of proof lies on herein petitioners as Reyes admitted being the employer
of Tolores. Hence, petitioners not Tolores, had the duty to advance proof. With respect to Arnaiz and Napal, the NLRC noted that since their alleged
employer was not impleaded, said respondents’ cases should be remanded to the Labor Arbiter, and tried as new and separate cases.
NLRC (MR) found merit in respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration. The NLRC ruled that respondents’ demotion in rank from chief bakers to
utility/security personnel is tantamount to constructive dismissal which entitles them to the reliefs available to illegally dismissed
employees. NLRC ratiocinated that the employer bears the burden of proving that the employees received their wages and benefits. In this case,
however, no proof of such payment was presented by the petitioners.

NLRC (MR NANAMAN), in its Resolution dated December 18, 2003, again reconsidered its own ruling and held that respondents were not
dismissed, either actually or constructively, but instead willfully disobeyed the return to work order of their employer. The NLRC upheld petitioners’
prerogative to transfer respondents if only to serve the greater interest, safety and well-being of the buying public by forestalling irregular acts of said
employees. The NLRC then put the blame on respondents for disobeying the lawful orders of their employer, noting that it was the same attitude
displayed by them in their dealings with their counsel, Atty. Delicana, in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter.

CA ruled that respondents were constructively dismissed since their designation from chief bakers to utility/security personnel is
undoubtedly a demotion in rank which involved “a drastic change in the nature of work resulting to a demeaning and humiliating work
condition.” Further, respondents could not be held guilty of abandonment of work as this was negated by their immediate filing of complaints to
specifically ask for reinstatement.

ISSUE:

WAS THE TRANSFER/REASSIGNMENT OF RESPONDENTS TO ANOTHER POSITION WITHOUT DIMINUTION IN PAY AND OTHER
PRIVILEGES TANTAMOUNT TO CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL?

HELD:

The Court of Appeals is correct in reviewing the findings of the National Labor Relations Commission.
( reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed
from the time their compensation was withheld up to the time of their actual reinstatement, should be granted)
The transfer/reassignment of respondents constitutes constructive dismissal.
We have held that management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work
assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of
employees, work supervision, lay off of workers and discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. The exercise of management prerogative, however,
is not absolute as it must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor.
In constructive dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of proving that the transfer of an employee is for just or valid ground, such
as genuine business necessity. The employer must demonstrate that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the
employee and that the transfer does not involve a demotion in rank or a diminution in salary and other benefits. “If the employer fails to
overcome this burden of proof, the employee’s transfer is tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal.”

In this case, petitioners insist that the transfer of respondents was a measure of self-preservation and was prompted by a desire to protect the health
of the buying public, claiming that respondents should be transferred to a position where they could not sabotage the business pending resolution of
their cases. According to petitioners, the possibility that respondents might introduce harmful substances to the bread while in the performance of
their duties as chief bakers is not imaginary but real as borne out by what Tolores did in one of the bakeshops in Culasi, Antique where he was
assigned as baker.
This postulation is not well-taken. On the contrary, petitioners failed to satisfy the burden of proving that the transfer was based on just or valid
ground. Petitioners’ bare assertions of imminent threat from the respondents are mere accusations which are not substantiated by any proof. This
Court is proscribed from making conclusions based on mere presumptions or suppositions. An employee’s fate cannot be justly hinged upon
conjectures and surmises.
The act attributed against Tolores does not even convince us as he was merely a suspected culprit in the alleged sabotage for which no investigation
took place to establish his guilt or culpability. Besides, Reyes still retained Tolores as an employee and chief baker when he could have dismissed
him for cause if the allegations were indeed found true. In view of these, this Court finds no compelling reason to justify the transfer of
respondents from chief bakers to utility/security personnel. What appears to this Court is that respondents’ transfer was an act of
retaliation on the part of petitioners due to the former’s filing of complaints against them, and thus, was clearly made in bad faith. In fact,
petitioner Reyes even admitted that he caused the reassignments due to the pending complaints filed against him.
“[D]emotion involves a situation in which an employee is relegated to a subordinate or less important position constituting a reduction to
a lower grade or rank, with a corresponding decrease in duties and responsibilities, and usually accompanied by a decrease in salary.“
Although there was no diminution in pay, there was undoubtedly a demotion in titular rank. One cannot deny the disparity between the duties and
functions of a chief baker to that of a utility/security personnel tasked to clean and manage the orderliness of the outside premises of the bakeshop.
Respondents were even prohibited from entering the bakeshop. The change in the nature of their work undeniably resulted to a demeaning and
humiliating work condition.
Respondents cannot be faulted for refusing to report for work as they were compelled to quit their job due to a demotion without any just cause.
Moreover, we have consistently held that a charge of abandonment is inconsistent with the filing of a complaint for constructive
dismissal. Respondents’ demand to maintain their positions as chief bakers by filing a case and asking for the relief of reinstatement belies
abandonment.
Manila Pavilion owned and operated by ACESITE (PHILS.) HOTEL CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs Henry Delada Respondent.
G.R. No. 189947

Facts:

Delada was the Union President of the Manila Pavilion Supervisors Association at MPH originally assigned as Head Waiter of Rotisserie then
reassigned him as Head Waiter of Seasons Coffee Shop but respondent declined the inter-outlet transfer and instead asked for a grievance meeting
on the matter, pursuant to their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). He also requested his retention as Head Waiter of Rotisserie while the
grievance procedure was ongoing. The Mgt. denied the request and he kept on reporting to Rotisserie.
MPH sent him several memoranda requiring him to explain in writing why he should not be penalized for the following offenses gross insubordination
etc. Delada persistently rebuffed orders for him to report to his new assignment.
While respondent’s Complaint is pending MPH citing security and safety reasons, placed respondent on a 30-day preventive suspension. Thereafter
found Delada guilty imposing the penalty of 90-day suspension.

Issue:

W/N MP retained the authority to continue with the administrative case against Delada for insubordination and willful disobedience of the transfer
order.

Held:

We rule that petitioner Manila Pavilion Hotel had the authority to continue with the administrative proceedings for insubordination and willful
disobedience against Delada and to impose on him the penalty of suspension. Consequently, petitioner is not liable to pay back wages and other
benefits for the period corresponding to the penalty of 90-day suspension.
First, it must be pointed out that the basis of the 30-day preventive suspension imposed on Delada was different from that of the 90-day penalty of
suspension. The 30-day preventive suspension was imposed by MPH on the assertion that Delada might sabotage hotel operations if preventive
suspension would not be imposed on him. On the other hand,
the penalty of 90-day suspension was imposed on respondent as a form of disciplinary action. It was the outcome of the administrative proceedings
conducted against him.
Preventive suspension is a disciplinary measure resorted to by the employer pending investigation of an alleged malfeasance or misfeasance
committed by an employee.[7] The employer temporarily bars the employee from working if his continued employment poses a serious and imminent
threat to the life or property of the employer or of his co-workers.
the penalty of suspension refers to the disciplinary action imposed on the employee after an official investigation or administrative hearing is
conducted.[9] The employer exercises its right to discipline erring employees pursuant to company rules and regulations.[10] Thus, a finding of
validity of the penalty of 90-day suspension will not embrace the issue of the validity of the 30-day preventive suspension. In any event, petitioner no
longer assails the ruling of the CA on the illegality of the 30-day preventive suspension.
St. Michael’s Institute vs. Santos, GR No. 145280

FACTS

Petitioner is a learning institute in Bacoor, Cavite with Fr. Victorino as Director and Blanco as the Principal and respondents Santos, Magcamit and
Rosarda were regular classroom teachers. The respondents’ service with the school was interrupted when each of them was served a notice of
termination of employment. On August 10, 1993, there held a rally, organized and participated in by faculty members, parents and some students of
petitioner school aimed at calling the attention of the school administration to certain grievances relative to substandard school facilities and the
economic demands of teachers and other employees of St. Michael’s Institute.

The school principal sent each of the respondents identical memoranda requiring them to explain their acts. The investigation committee created by
the petitioner school principal found that respondents had led and actively participated in the said rally, in which they denounced the Director of the
Institute without justification and consequently recommended their termination from service. The respondents then filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against the petitioners.

The Labor Arbiter found and declared that there was just cause for the dismissal of the respondents’ complaints since they were guilty of dereliction
of duty and insubordination. The NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and held that the respondents had been illegally dismissed. The
Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the NLRC.

ISSUE

Whether or not the conduct of the respondents warranted their dismissal from their employment.

RULING

We agree with the appellate court's conclusion that, under the attendant factual antecedents, the dismissal meted out on the respondents for
dereliction of duty for one school day and denouncing school authority, appears to be too harsh a penalty. It must be noted that the respondents are
being held liable for a first time offense and, in the case of respondent Santos, despite long years of unblemished service.

Even when an employee is found to have transgressed the employer's rules, in the actual imposition of penalties upon the erring employee, due
consideration must still be given to his length of service and the number of violations committed during his employment. Where a penalty less
punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may have been committed by the employee ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe such as
dismissal from employment. Moreover, the facts, as further established on appeal in the NLRC, paint out a picture that the respondents were singled
out by the petitioners apparently for being officers of the teachers' union which they formed, despite the fact that several other teachers also joined
the August 10, 1993 rally.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLOR GUTIERREZ Y TIMOD
[G.R. No. 124439. February 5, 2004]

FACTS:

With the promises of jobs abroad unfulfilled, complainants decided to verify if the accused was a licensed recruiter. Upon learning from the POEA
that she was not so licensed, they proceeded to the Philippine Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) to execute their respective affidavits. The investigator
confirmed with the POEA that the accused was not licensed or authorized to recruit overseas contract workers. The accused was arrested on an
entrapment operation.

In her defense, the accused claimed that as an “employee” of a duly licensed agency who was tasked to recruit and offer job placements
abroad, she could not be held liable for illegal recruitment. She admitted that she had no authority to recruit in her personal capacity, but that her
authority emanated from a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) and a Certification issued by a licensed agency. At the time complainants applied for
overseas employment, the accused was “employed” as a Marketing Directress of Sarifudin Manpower and General Services, a duly licensed agency
with License No. OS-91-LB-61193-NL issued by the Department of Labor and Employment.[58] A Special Power of Attorney (SPA) from Sarifudin,
dated May 1, 1994, states that she was authorized. Accused Flor Gutierrez filed the present appeal seeking the reversal of her conviction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the conviction of the accused should be upheld even though she is licensed recruiter.

HELD:

Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur, namely: (1) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one
to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes either any activity within the meaning of “recruitment and
placement” defined under Art. 13(b), or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code. Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code
defines “recruitment and placement” as “any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons, shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

The crime becomes Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale when the two elements concur, with the addition of a third element: the recruiter
committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group. As found by the trial court, the evidence on record, notably
appellant’s own version, indicates that she was running her own labor recruitment business.

Appellant cannot escape liability by claiming that she was not aware that before working for her employer in the recruitment agency, she
should first be registered with the POEA. Illegal recruitment in large scale is malum prohibitum, not malum in se. Good faith is not a defense. As
appellant committed illegal recruitment against three or more persons, she is liable for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale.
G.R. No. 177498 : January 18, 2012

STOLT-NIELSEN TRANSPORTATION GROUP, INC. AND CHUNG GAI SHIP MANAGEMENT, Petitioners,
v. SULPECIO MEDEQUILLO, JR., Respondent.

FACTS:

Sulpecio Medequillo (respondent) filed a complaint before the Adjudication Office of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
against the petitioners for illegal dismissal under a first contract and for failure to deploy under a second contract. He prayed for actual, moral and
exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees for his illegal dismissal and in view of the Petitioners bad faith in not complying with the Second
Contract.

The case was transferred to the Labor Arbiter of the DOLE upon the effectivity of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.

The parties were required to submit their respective position papers before the Labor Arbiter. However, petitioners failed to submit their respective
pleadings despite the opportunity given to them.

Labor Arbiter Vicente R. Layawen rendered a judgmentfinding that the respondent was constructively dismissed by the petitioners. The Labor Arbiter
found the first contract entered into by and between the complainant and the respondents to have been novated by the execution of the second
contract. In other words, respondents cannot be held liable for the first contract but are clearly and definitely liable for the breach of the second
contract.

The petitioners appealed the adverse decision before the National Labor Relations Commission assailing that they were denied due process, that
the respondent cannot be considered as dismissed from employment because he was not even deployed yet and the monetary award in favor of the
respondent was exorbitant and not in accordance with law.

NLRC affirmed with modification the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC upheld the finding of unjustified termination of contract for failure on
the part of the petitioners to present evidence that would justify their non-deployment of the respondent.

The petitioners filed a Petition forCertioraribefore the Court of Appeals. Finding no grave abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the
Decision of the labor tribunal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the first employment contract between petitioners and the private respondent is different from and independent of the second
contract subsequently executed upon repatriation of respondent to Manila which justifies termination of respondent?

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is sustained.

CIVIL LAW

Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the obligation by a subsequent one which extinguishes or modifies
the first, either by changing the object or principal conditions, or, by substituting another in place of the debtor, or by subrogating a third person in the
rights of the creditor. In order for novation to take place, the concurrence of the following requisites is indispensable:

1. There must be a previous valid obligation,

LABOR LAW

Equally settled is the rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are
generally accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts when supported by substantial evidence,i.e., the amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.But these findings are not infallible. When there is a showing that they
were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record, they may be examined by the courts.In this case, there was no showing of any
arbitrariness on the part of the lower courts in their findings of facts. Hence, we follow the settled rule.
LABOR LAW

The POEA Standard Employment Contract provides that employment shall commence upon the actual departure of the seafarer from the airport or
seaport in the port of hire.We adhere to the terms and conditions of the contract so as to credit the valid prior stipulations of the parties before the
controversy started. Else, the obligatory force of every contract will be useless. Parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been
expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.

We rule that distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the commencement of the employer-employee
relationship. The perfection of the contract, which in this case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent
agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions therein. The commencement of the employer-employee
relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before the start of
any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations,
the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or
refused to be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.

DENIED
G.R. No. 174158 : June 27, 2011
WILLIAM ENDELISEO BARROGA, Petitioner, v. DATA CENTER COLLEGE OF THE PHILIPPINES and WILFRED BACTAD, Respondents.

FACTS:

On November 11, 1991, William Barroga was employed as an Instructor in Data Center College Laoag City branch in Ilocos Norte. On June 6, 1992,
he was transferred University of Northern Philippines (UNP) in Vigan, Ilocos Sur where the school had a tie-up program. Petitioner was informed that
in addition to his monthly salary, a P1,200.00 allowance for board and lodging during his stint as instructor in UNP-Vigan would be given. In 1994, he
was recalled to Laoag campus. On October 3, 2003, petitioner he was again transferred to Data Center College Bangued, Abra branch as Head for
Education/Instructor due to an urgent need for an experienced officer and computer instructor thereat. Petitioner declined to accept his transfer to
Abra citing the deteriorating health condition of his father and the absence of additional remuneration to defray expenses for board and lodging.

On November 10, 2003, petitioner filed a Complaint for constructive dismissal against respondents. Petitioner alleged that his proposed transfer to
Abra constitutes a demotion in rank and diminution in pay and would cause personal inconvenience and hardship. He argued that although he was
being transferred to Abra branch supposedly with the same position he was then holding in Laoag branch as Head for Education, he later learned
through a Memorandumfrom the administrator of Abra branch that he will be re-assigned merely as an instructor, thereby relegating him from an
administrative officer to a rank-and-file employee. Moreover, the elimination of his allowance for board and lodging will result to an indirect reduction
of his salary which is prohibited by labor laws.

For their part, respondents claimed that they were merely exercising their management prerogative to transfer employees for the purpose of
advancing the school interests. They argued that petitioner refusal to be transferred to Abra constitutes insubordination. They claimed that petitioner
appointment as instructor carries a proviso of possible re-assignments to any branch or tie-up schools as the school necessity demands.
Respondents argued that petitioner designation as Head for Education in Laoag branch was merely temporary and that he would still occupy his
original plantilla item as instructor at his proposed assignment in Abra branch. Respondents denied liability to petitioner monetary claims.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing the Complaint for lack of merit. The NLRC affirmed the LA decision but it found petitioner to be
entitled to overload honorarium and ordered Data Center College of the Philippines, to pay the complainant the sum of P73,730.39 representing
overload honorarium.

Both parties eventually filed petitions for certiorari before the CA. Respondentspetition for certiorari was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94205, which
is not subject of the instant review. On the other hand, petitioner filed on April 7, 2006, a Petition for Certiorari with the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 93991 assailing the NLRC finding that no constructive dismissal existed. Realizing his failure to attach the requisite affidavit of service of the
petition upon respondents, petitioner filed on April 27, 2006, an Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion to admit the attached affidavit of service and
registry receipt in compliance with the rules.

On May 15, 2006, the CA dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 93991 for failure to state material dates as to when the petitioner received the
assailed decision dated August 25, 2005 and when he filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof and for failing to attach the initiatory pleadings and
the respondentsMotion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated August 25, 2005. Petitioner motion for reconsideration was likewise dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving due course to the petition despite petitioner
substantial compliance with the requisite formalities?

HELD: The decision of the Court of Appeal is set aside.

REMEDIAL LAW

The three material dates which should be stated in the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are the dates when the notice of the judgment was
received, when a motion for reconsideration was filed and when the notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration was received. These dates
should be reflected in the petition to enable the reviewing court to determine if the petition was filed on time. Indeed, petitioner petition before the CA
stated only the date of his receipt of the NLRC Resolution denying his motion for partial reconsideration. It failed to state when petitioner received the
assailed NLRC Decision and when he filed his partial motion for reconsideration. However, this omission is not at all fatal because these material
dates are reflected in petitioner Partial Motion for Reconsideration attached as Annex "N" of the petition. In Acaylar, Jr. v. Harayo, the Court held that
failure to state these two dates in the petition may be excused if the same are evident from the records of the case. It was further ruled by this Court
that the more important material date which must be duly alleged in the petition is the date of receipt of the resolution of denial of the motion for
reconsideration. In the case at bar, petitioner has duly complied with this rule.

REMEDIAL LAW
Petitioner failure to attach respondent motion for reconsideration to the assailed NLRC decision is not sufficient ground for the CA to outrightly
dismiss his petition. The issue that was raised in respondentsmotion for reconsideration is the propriety of the NLRC grant of overload honorarium in
favor of petitioner. This particular issue was not at all raised in petitioner petition for certiorari with the CA, therefore, there is no need for petitioner to
append a copy of this motion to his petition. Besides, as already mentioned, the denial of respondentsmotion for reconsideration has been assailed
by respondents before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94205. At any rate, the Rules do not specify the documents which should be appended
to the petition except that they should be relevant to the judgment, final order or resolution being assailed. Petitioner is thus justified in attaching the
documents which he believed are sufficient to make out a prima facie case.

LABOR LAW

Despite the mistake of the CA in instantly dismissing the case, herein instant petition still merits dismissal based on substantial grounds. After a
careful review of the records and the arguments of the parties, there is no sufficient basis to conclude that petitioner re-assignment amounted to
constructive dismissal.

Constructive dismissal is quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, or because of a demotion in rank
or a diminution of pay. It exists when there is a clear act of discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer which becomes unbearable for the
employee to continue his employment.Petitioner alleges that the real purpose of his transfer is to demote him. Petitioner further argues that his re-
assignment will entail an indirect reduction of his salary or diminution of pay considering that no additional allowance will be given to cover for board
and lodging expenses. He claims that such additional allowance was given in the past and therefore cannot be discontinued and withdrawn without
violating the prohibition against non-diminution of benefits.

These allegations are bereft of merit.

Petitioner was originally appointed as instructor in 1991 and was given additional administrative functions as Head for Education during his stint in
Laoag branch. He did not deny having been designated as Head for Education in a temporary capacity for which he cannot invoke any tenurial
security. Hence, being temporary in character, such designation is terminable at the pleasure of respondents who made such appointment.Moreover,
respondentsright to transfer petitioner rests not only on contractual stipulation but also on jurisprudential authorities. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
both relied on the condition laid down in petitioner employment contract that respondents have the prerogative to assign petitioner in any of its
branches or tie-up schools as the necessity demands. In any event, it is management prerogative for employers to transfer employees on just and
valid grounds such as genuine business necessity.

Petitioner contention that his re-assignment was tainted with bad faith cannot be given credit. As a matter of fact, respondents suggested that
petitioner take an indefinite leave of absence to attend to his ailing father. Also, during the time when respondents directed all its administrative
officers to submit courtesy resignations, petitioner letter of resignation was not accepted. This bolsters the fact that respondents never intended to
get rid of petitioner. In fine, petitioner assertions of bad faith on the part of respondents are purely unsubstantiated conjectures.

The Court agrees with the Labor Arbiter that there was no violation of the prohibition on diminution of benefits. Indeed, any benefit and perks being
enjoyed by employees cannot be reduced and discontinued, otherwise, the constitutional mandate to afford full protection to labor shall be
offended.But the rule against diminution of benefits is applicable only if the grant or benefit is founded on an express policy or has ripened into a
practice over a long period which is consistent and deliberate.

Petitioner failed to present any other evidence that respondents committed to provide the additional allowance or that they were consistently granting
such benefit as to have ripened into a practice which cannot be peremptorily withdrawn. Moreover, there is no conclusive proof that petitioner basic
salary will be reduced as it was not shown that such allowance is part of petitioner basic salary. Hence, there will be no violation of the rule against
diminution of pay enunciated under Article 100 of the Labor Code.