Vda de Chua vs.

CA
GR No. 70909, January 5, 1994

FACTS:

Roberto Lim Chua, during his lifetime, lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A.
Vallejo from 1970-1981. The couple had two illegitimate children, Roberto Rafson Alonzo and
Rudyard Pride Alonzo, all surnamed Chua. Roberto died intestate in Davao City on May 28,
1992. Vallejo filed on July 2, 1992 with RTC-Cotabato a petition for declaration of guardianship
of the two child and their properties worth P5,000,000.00.

Antonietta Garcia Vda De Chua, the petitioner, filed a motion alleging that she was the true wife
of Roberto. However, according to Vallejo, she is not the surviving spouse of the latter but a
pretender to the estate since the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman and
died a bachelor.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is indeed the true wife of Roberto Chua.

HELD:

The court ruled that petitioner was not able to prove her status as wife of the decedent. She
could not produce the original copy or authenticated copy of their marriage
certificate. Furthermore, a certification from the Local Civil Registrar was presented that no
such marriage contract between petitioner and Roberto Chua was ever registered with them,
attested by Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged person to have solemnized the alleged marriage,
that he has not solemnized such alleged marriage.

Hence, it is clear that petitioner failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the
lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which she failed to
produce.
Bonilla Vs aranza

RELOVA, J.:
This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of Appeals for final determination pursuant
to Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
As found by the Court of Appeals:
"x x x On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for
the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary
in her favor. The petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 8432, was opposed by the appellees Amparo
Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes, Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on the
following grounds:
"(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the
will within twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules
of Court;
"(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property
after death and was not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a will;
"(3) The alleged holographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced,
otherwise it would produce no effect, as held in Gan v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509; and
"(4) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as
required by law.
"The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the case with another case (Sp. Proc. No.
8275). Their motion was granted by the court in an order dated April 4, 1977.
"On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation of the cases, the appellees moved again to
dismiss the petition for the probate of the will. They argued that:
"(1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an instruction as to the management
and improvement of the schools and colleges founded by decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla; and
"(2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike
ordinary wills.
"Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss was denied by the court in its order of
February 23, 1979.
"The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the order was contrary
to law and settled pronouncements and rulings of the Supreme Court, to which the appellant in
turn filed an opposition. On July 23, 1979, the court set aside its order of February 23, 1979 and
dismissed the petition for the probate of the will of Ricardo B. Bonilla. The court said:
'. . . It is our considered opinion that once the original copy of the holographic will is lost, a copy
thereof cannot stand in lieu of the original.
'In the case of Gan vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that 'in the matter of
holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as the material
proof of authenticity of said wills.'
'MOREOVER, this Court notes that the alleged holographic will was executed on January 25,
1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. In view of the lapse of more than 14 years
from the time of the execution of the will to the death of the decedent, the fact that the original of
the will could not be located shows to our mind that the decedent had discarded before his death
his allegedly missing Holographic Will.
Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an appeal to the Court of Appeals in
which it is contended that the dismissal of appellant's petition is contrary to law and well-settled
jurisprudence.
On July 7, 1980, appellees moved to forward the case to this Court on the ground that the appeal
does not involve question of fact and alleged that the trial court committed the following
assigned errors:
"I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A LOST HOLOGRAPHIC WILL
MAY NOT BE PROVED BY A COPY THEREOF;
"II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECEDENT HAS
DISCARDED BEFORE HIS DEATH THE MISSING HOLOGRAPHIC WILL;
"III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT's WILL."
The only question here is whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be
proved by means of a photostatic copy. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of
holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has been
proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one identifying witness is
required and, if no witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three
identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed
and no other copy is available, the will can not be probated because the best and only evidence is
the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between
sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But a photostatic copy or
xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the
standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gan vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, the Court ruled that
"the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the
bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be
presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material
proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved
by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar
means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and
tested before the probate court." Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed
holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the
deceased can be determined by the probate court.
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979, denying appellant's motion
for reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of the Order dated July 23, 1979, dismissing her
petition to approve the will of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla, is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Acting C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez, and Gutierrez,

THELMA M. ARANAS v. TERESITA V. MERCADO, GR No. 156407, 2014-01-15
Facts:
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate
Thelma filed... a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio's
estate
The RTC granted the petition
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio... indicated...
that at the time of his death, Emigdio had "left no real properties but only personal
properties"
Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory
Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the inventory
Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory... he RTC issued... an order finding and
holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be
included
Teresita... sought the reconsideration of the order... on the ground that one of the real
properties affected... had already been sold to Mervir Realty... the RTC denied the motion
for reconsideration... stating that there was no cogent reason for the reconsideration, and
that the movants' agreement as heirs to submit to the RTC the issue of what properties
should be included or excluded... from the inventory already estopped them from
questioning its jurisdiction to pass upon the issue.
the CA partly granted the petition for certiorari
The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the petition for certiorari because the
order of the RTC directing a new inventory of properties was interlocutory... the sale by
Emigdio and Teresita had transferred the ownership... to Mervir Realty because the deed of
absolute sale... had been notarized
Issues:
Did the CA p... roperly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in
the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by sale
Ruling:
The appeal is meritorious.
Was the CA correct in its conclusion?
The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in reaching its
conclusion, ignored the law and the facts that had fully warranted the assailed orders of the
RTC.
every executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all
the real and personal estate of the deceased... which has come into his possession or
knowledge.
The usage of the word all... demands the inclusion of all the real and personal properties of
the decedent in the inventory.
Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no properties
appearing to belong to... the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of
their being in the possession of another person or entity.
the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence relevant
to the procedure for preparing the inventory by the administrator.
Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor of Mervir Realty
was a notarized instrument did not sufficiently justify the exclusion from the inventory of the
properties involved. A notarized deed of sale only enjoyed the presumption of regularity in...
favor of its execution, but its notarization did not per se guarantee the legal efficacy of the
transaction under the deed... the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;
REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision