Frequently Asked Questions

on the
Anti-Wiretapping Law and Related Issues
Based on the full text of the message to the nation delivered by President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo on 27 June 2005 “to set the record straight” on “the issue of
the tape recordings,” the President admitted that:

 In 2004, while Congress was still canvassing the votes, she “had
conversations with many people, including a Comelec official” as she was
“anxious to protect [her] votes;”

 She regretted her telephone call and recognized that making the call was a
“lapse in judgment;” and

 Her intent was “not to influence the outcome of the election … [as] the
election had already been decided and the votes counted.”

Room 116 Alumni Center Annex, Magsaysay Avenue, UP Campus

Diliman, Quezon City 1101, Philippines
Tel. (63-2) 92-5132; Email flag@flag.com.ph
Although she referred to “the issue of the tape recordings,” the President did not
address the existence of the alleged “Gloria-Garci” tapes, and did not admit that
she was a party to any conversation with then Comelec Commissioner
Garcillano. While she admitted having spoken to “a Comelec official,” she did
not mention the official by name or position.

In effect, the President neither confirmed nor denied—

– That she had a conversation with then Comelec Commissioner

Garcillano;

– That this conversation was taped and/or wiretapped; and

– That she either authorized or did not authorize the

recording/wiretapping.

Assuming, however, that the Comelec official referred to in the President’s

message is a Comelec commissioner, under the law, Comelec Commissioners are
covered by the canons of judicial ethics:

“The Chairman and members of the Commission [on Elections] shall be

subject to the canons of judicial ethics in the discharge of their functions.”i

Since party-litigants and lawyers are prohibited from engaging in any ex parte
communication with the judge trying their case, FLAG believes the same rule
applies to a presidential candidate calling a Comelec Commissioner. FLAG
believes it is improper for a Chief Executive to call a Comelec Commissioner
while Congress is still canvassing the votes, especially where the discussion
concerns her votes as a presidential candidate in that election. It is the same as a
party approaching a judge while the case is pending, and asking the judge about
the outcome of the case. It is not an excuse to say that “the election had already
been decided and the votes counted” since the winning candidates for President
and Vice-President had not yet been proclaimed by Congress.

Furthermore, under R.A. 6713, The Code of Conduct of Public Officers and
Employees, the President and other public officers are duty-bound to—

• “Uphold public interest over personal interest;”ii

• “Refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, public safety and public interest;”iii

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 • “Remain true to the people at all times [and] … act with justness and
sincerity;”iv and

• “Commit themselves to the democratic way of life and values.”v

As Justice Irene Cortez explained in her book “The Philippine Presidency: A Study
of Executive Power,”vi

“Originally, the functions of the Commission [on Elections] were

performed by one of the executive departments under the president’s
control. The Constitution was amended [in 1940] and the independence of
the Commission on Elections safeguarded in order to eliminate politics
from the enforcement and administration of laws having to do with the
conduct of elections.”

If a member of the executive department who impinges, interferes or intrudes

into the Comelec’s independence is accountable to the people for violating the
Constitution, the same should apply with greater force when the Chief Executive
is the one who impugns the Comelec’s independence. To paraphrase the
Supreme Court in Villena v. Secretary,vii the Chief Executive is “… the authority in
the Executive Department [and] assumes the corresponding responsibility.”

What is the anti-wiretapping law and why was it enacted?

Congress passed the Anti-Wiretapping Law, R.A. 4200, in 1965. The law seeks to
punish wiretapping and other related violations of the right to privacy of
communication. It also intends to stop the practice by officers of the government
of spying on one another—a "most obnoxious instrument of oppression or
arbitrary power."viii The law also declares inadmissible such illegally obtained
recordings in civil, criminal, administrative and legislative hearings or
investigations.

Does the Anti-Wiretapping Law prohibit the recording of all

communications?

No.

The law prohibits the recording and interception only of private

communications. The law does not prohibit the recording of public speeches by
members of the audience, or other forms of "public" communication such as
press conferences, interviews, and board meetings that are openly recorded. The

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law expressly punishes those who secretly record or intercept private
conversations and communications. By private conversations and
communications, the law simply refers to communication between persons
privately made:ix

Senator TAŇADA. As I have said, Your Honor, the purpose of this bill is
to prevent the tape recording or interception of a communication between
one person and another--not between a speaker and a public. Because
precisely, the speaker speaks so that the public may know what he has in
mind, and there should be no objection to tape recording that speech. But
what we want to protect is the communication between private
individuals.

Senator DIOKNO. Then, will it be possible to clarify this? Would Your

Honor have any objection to clarifying Section 1 as indicating
communication or spoken word between private individuals?

Senator TAŇADA. Well, if you believe that that is necessary, although I

believe that the very purpose and objective of the bill, as may be seen from
the different provisions of the bill, clearly indicate that intention—and that
is the tape recording of private conversations or communications between
one person and another.

Senator DIOKNO. Privately made.

Senator TAŇADA. Yes.

The Supreme Court, in Navarro v. Court of Appeals,x distinguished between

private and public communications. In this case, the tape recording captured a
heated conversation between a policeman and a reporter which later led to the
violent death of the reporter, and which took place at the police station in the
presence of several people. The Court held that the conversation was not a
private communication, and therefore was admissible in evidence in the
homicide case filed against the policeman for the reporter's death, even if the
policeman did not authorize the recording.

"Indeed, Jalbuena’s testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had

made. It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No.
4200, which prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative.
[quotation from R.A. 4200 omitted] x x x

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 "Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of
private communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro
and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.”xi

The law does not prohibit the recording of all private communications, but
provides a limited and narrowly drawn exception for law enforcers. The law
provides that police and other law enforcement agencies may wiretap private
communications but—

—law enforcers must first secure a court order; and

—only in cases involving crimes against national security under the

Revised Penal Code (treason, espionage, rebellion or sedition) and
kidnapping. The law further says that in cases involving rebellion,
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion,
sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, there
must be prior proof that rebellion or acts of sedition have actually been or
are being committed.xii

The law does not prohibit the recording of private communications that are
authorized by ALL parties. These recordings are admissible in evidence and the
person/s who made the recording are not liable.
Thus, a person who attaches an answering machine to his telephone, and records
a message inviting callers to leave a message after the tone, would not be
covered by the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

The consent or authorization need not be express as long as it is evident from the
circumstances. What is essential, however, is that ALL the parties to the private
conversation expressly or impliedly consent to its being recorded.

If one party to the communication authorizes the recording, but the other party
does not, the party who recorded the conversation is liable for prosecution for
violating R.A. 4200:

“’[E]ven a (person) privy to a communication who records his private

conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator’ under … R.A. 4200.”xiii.

What offenses are punished by the Anti-Wiretapping Law?

The law punishes the following acts:

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  Wiretapping or using any other device or arrangement to secretly
overhear, intercept or record a private communication or spoken word,
except where the same is done pursuant to a court order and complies
with all the conditions imposed by section 3 of R.A. 4200;xiv

 Possessing any tape, wire, disc or other record, or copies, of an illegally

obtained recording of a private communication, knowing that it was
illegally obtained;xv

 Replaying an illegally obtained recording for another person, or

communicating its contents, or furnishing transcripts of the
communication, whether complete or partial.xvi

 Acts of peace officers (law enforcement agents) in violation of section 3 of

R.A. 4200 on the proper procedure for securing and implementing a court
order authorizing the wiretapping of a private communication.xvii

The law also makes persons who "wilfully or knowingly aid, permit or cause to
be done” the acts described above, equally liable as direct participants to the
illegal wiretap or secret recording.xviii

What must be proven to sustain a charge of wiretapping or using

any other device or arrangement to secretly overhear, intercept or
record a private communication?

The prosecution must prove that a wiretap or other device was actually used to
secretly overhear, intercept or record a private communication without a court
order.

The issue of whether or not the prosecution has the burden of proving that a
recording/wiretapped communication was not authorized by all the parties is an
open question.

While Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada, during the Senate deliberations on R.A. 4200,
expressed the view that the absence of authority by all the parties to the
communication was a matter of defense,xix jurisprudence now holds that the
prosecution has the burden of proving a negative essential element:xx

“Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays

such burden upon the prosecution. The absence of such license and legal
authority constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal
possession of firearm, and every ingredient or essential element of an

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offense must be shown by the prosecution by proof beyond reasonable
doubt.

X X X

“It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an essential

ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of a firearm. The information
filed against appellant in Criminal Case No. 3558 of the lower court (now
G.R. No. 27681) specifically alleged that he had no 'license or permit to
possess' the .45 caliber pistol mentioned therein. Thus it seems clear that it
was the prosecution's duty not merely to allege that negative fact but to
prove it. This view is supported by similar adjudicated cases. In U.S. vs.
Tria, 17 Phil. 303, the accused was charged with 'having criminally
inscribed himself as a voter knowing that he had none of the qualifications
required to be a voter.’ It was there held that the negative fact of lack of
qualification to be a voter was an essential element of the crime charged
and should be proved by the prosecution. In another case (People vs.
Quebral, 68 Phil. 564) where the accused was charged with illegal practice
of medicine because he had diagnosed, treated and prescribed for certain
diseases suffered by certain patients from whom he received monetary
compensation, without having previously obtained the proper certificate
of registration from the Board of Medical Examiners, as provided in
Section 770 of the Administrative Code, this Court held that if the subject
of the negative averment like, for instance, the act of voting without the
qualifications provided by law is an essential ingredient of the offense
charged, the prosecution has the burden of proving the same, although in
view of the difficulty of proving a negative allegation, the prosecution,
under such circumstance, need only establish a prima facie case from the
best evidence obtainable. In the case before Us, both appellant and the
Solicitor General agree that there was not even a prima facie case upon
which to hold appellant guilty of the illegal possession of a firearm. …

X X X

“... As this Court summed up the doctrine in People v. Macagaling [G.R.

Nos. 109131-33. October 3, 1994]:

"We cannot see how the rule can be otherwise since it is the
inescapable duty of the prosecution to prove all the ingredients of
the offense as alleged against the accused in an information, which
allegations must perforce include any negative element provided
by the law to integrate that offense. We have reiterated quite
recently the fundamental mandate that since the prosecution must

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 allege all the elements of the offense charged, then it must prove by
the requisite quantum of evidence all the elements it has thus
alleged."

What must be proven to sustain a charge of possessing a tape, wire,

disc or other record, or copies of an illegally obtained recording of
a private communication?

R.A. 4200 requires that the accused knowingly possesses the illegally obtained
recording. The Congressional Record indicates that the word knowingly refers
to “knowing that [the recording] was secured by illegal means”:xxi

Senator RODRIGO. … In like manner, under this bill, only the persons
who actually do the wire tapping or the ones who conspire are the ones
penalized. Let us say that a person who does not have any participation
in the wire tapping gets hold of the tape and uses it. Will Your Honor
agree to an amendment that a person that uses that tape, knowing that it
was secured by illegal means, be likewise penalized?

Senator TAŇADA. I was contemplating to introduce an amendment

along that line by providing in addition to the amendment already
introduced by the committee which makes evidence obtained by wire
tapping inadmissible, that it shall be penalized when used knowingly or
an evidence obtained by wire tapping should be penalized.

The Revised Rules on Evidence define personal knowledge as facts derived from
one’s own perception.xxii To sustain a conviction for “knowingly possessing an
illegally obtained recording,” it is FLAG’s position that the prosecution must
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, (1) that an illegal wiretap actually took place;
(2) that the recording in the possession of the accused emanates from that illegal
wiretap; and (3) that the accused knew, i.e., had personal knowledge, that the
recording was obtained illegally. To hold otherwise would mean that persons
could be convicted based on hearsay.xxiii FLAG believes this would violate the
rights of an accused to be presumed innocent, to a fair trial, and other basic
rights.

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What must be proven to sustain a charge of replaying an illegally
obtained recording for another person, or communicating its
contents, or furnishing transcripts of the communication, whether
complete or partial?

It is FLAG’s position that the prosecution must prove that the accused acted with
personal knowledge that the recording was illegally obtained. If the crime of
possessing an illegally obtained recording requires that the accused knew (i.e.,
had personal knowledge) that it was illegally obtained, equal protection
demands that the crime of replaying or airing the recording should also bear the
same requirements. It is FLAG’s position, therefore, that the prosecution must
prove that the accused had personal knowledge that the recording was illegally
obtained when he replayed or aired it.

Does a person who has, listens to, distributes or replays, a copy of

the alleged “Gloria-Garci” recording violate R.A. 4200?

To violate R.A. 4200, there must first be proof that (1) an illegal wiretap actually
occurred; (2) that the recording listened to, replayed or distributed emanates
from that illegal wiretap; and (3) that the person who listened to, replayed or
distributed the recording knew (i.e., had personal knowledge) that the recording
was illegally obtained.

In FLAG’s view, a third party’s claim that the recording was wiretapped is not
enough to constitute a violation of R.A. 4200, since that is hearsay.

Can a person be arrested without a warrant for possessing or

playing or distributing the alleged “Gloria-Garci” recording?

For a person to be validly arrested without a warrant, that person must be

caught in the act of committing or attempting to commit a crime, or when a
crime has just been committed and the arresting officer has personal knowledge
that that person probably committed that crime.xxiv

Applied to R.A. 4200, law enforcement agents can only arrest a person without a
warrant if they have probable cause based on personal knowledge that the
person to be arrested possesses or plays or distributes the recording knowing
that it was illegally obtained. Thus, even if the police have probable cause to
believe that a person possesses the alleged “Gloria-Garci” recordings, it is
FLAG’s position that they cannot arrest that person unless they also have

9
probable cause that that person has personal knowledge that the recording in
his possession was illegally obtained.

Can the media be prohibited from airing voice recordings that are
allegedly illegally obtained?

Freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom to assemble and petition
the government for redress of grievances are founded on the need to discuss
publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or
punishment. That is why our courts have consistently rejected any prior
restraint on the communication of views and free exchange of information on
matters of public concern. It is only when a clear and present danger exists that
the State has the right to prevent or limit these freedoms:

“It may be observed at the outset that what is involved in the instant case
is a prior and direct restraint on the part of the respondent Judge upon the
exercise of speech and of expression by petitioners. The respondent Judge
has restrained petitioners from filming and producing the entire proposed
motion picture. . . xxx Because of the preferred character of the constitutional
rights of freedom of speech and of expression, a weighty presumption of invalidity
vitiates measures of prior restraint upon the exercise of such freedoms. The
invalidity of a measure of prior restraint does not, of course, mean that no
subsequent liability may lawfully be imposed upon a person claiming to
exercise such constitutional freedoms…xxx There was…no "clear and
present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy that private
respondent could lawfully assert.”xxv

The Government’s attempts to stop the media from airing the alleged “Gloria-
Garci” tapes are a form of prior restraint. The Gloria-Garci tapes refer to an
alleged conversation between two public officials—the President and a
COMELEC commissioner—regarding the national elections, where acts of
electoral fraud were supposedly discussed. The conversation between two
public officials relates to a matter of public interest and concern. Under the
circumstances, FLAG believes that it is unlawful for Government to impose any
form of prior restraint on the media to prevent them from airing the recordings.
As the Supreme Court held in Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong:xxvi

“…The right of privacy or "the right to be let alone," like the right of free
expression, is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's
privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a
public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be
published about him constitute matters of a public character. Succinctly

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 put, the right of privacy cannot be invoked to resist publication and
dissemination of matters of public interest. The interest sought to be
protected by the right of privacy is the right to be free from ‘unwarranted
publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and
activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public
concern.’"

In what kinds of proceedings are illegally obtained recordings of

private communications inadmissible?

R.A. 4200 provides that illegally obtained recordings of private communications

are inadmissible in civil, criminal, administrative and/or legislative hearings or
investigations. Not even the existence of such recordings may be admitted into
evidence.

Are illegally obtained voice recordings admissible in

impeachmentxxvii proceedings?

Section 4 of R.A. 4200 expressly declares that illegally obtained recordings are
inadmissible “in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing
or investigation.”

Impeachment proceedings are, in the words of Justice Puno in his Separate

Opinion in Francisco v. House of Representatives,xxviii “sui generis” and possess both
political and non-political aspects. In this case (a petition seeking to prevent the
House of Representatives from transmitting to the Senate the Articles of
Impeachment against Chief Justice Hilario Davide for improper use of the
Judiciary Development Fund), Justice Puno, after tracing the origin and nature of
impeachment in England and the United States, commented on the nature of
impeachment in the Philippines, thus:

“The historiography of our impeachment provisions will show that they

were liberally lifted from the U.S. Constitution. Following an originalist
interpretation, there is much to commend to the thought that they are
political in nature and character. The political character of impeachment
hardly changed in our 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. … All these
provisions confirm the inherent nature of impeachment as political.

“Be that as it may, the purity of the political nature of impeachment has
been lost. …

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 “I therefore respectfully submit that there is now a commixture of
political and judicial components in our reengineered concept of
impeachment. It is for this reason and more that impeachment
proceedings are classified as sui generis. … “xxix

Impeachment, being in a class of its own, is therefore neither a judicial, nor quasi-
judicial, nor legislative nor administrative proceeding. Hence, there appears to
be no legal bar to the admissibility of wiretapped recordings in impeachment
proceedings.

Since the law does not prohibit the use of illegally obtained recordings in
impeachment proceedings, following the canon of statutory construction
expressio unius est exclusio alterius (that which is expressly mentioned implies the
exclusion of all others, or, in simple terms, that which is not expressly prohibited
by law is allowed), it follows that these recordings may be used in impeachment
proceedings if Congress, sitting as the impeachment court, allows it under its
rules.xxx

Assuming that a voice recording is admissible in evidence under

R.A. 4200, how is it duly authenticated in civil, criminal and
administrative cases?

The Supreme Court requires that ---

“A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that

he personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape played in court
was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of
the persons such are claimed to belong.”xxxi

This ruling is consistent with Rule 11, Section 1 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence,
which provides that “audio, photographic and video evidence of events, acts or
transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be shown, presented or
displayed to the court and shall be identified, explained or authenticated by the
person who made the recording or by some other person competent to testify on
the accuracy thereof.”xxxii

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What are the penalties for violating the Anti-Wire Tapping Law?

The direct participants to the wiretapping, and any one who aids, permits or
causes the violation are, upon conviction, punished by imprisonment of not less
than six months nor more than six years. If the offender is a public official at the
time of the offense, he shall suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification from public office. If the offender is a foreigner, he shall be
subject to deportation.xxxiii

Quezon City, Philippines, 29 June 2005.

JOSE MANUEL I. DIOKNO

Chair

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i
Sec. 6, Chapter 2, Subtitle C, Title II-Other Bodies, Book V, Executive Order No. 292, The
Administrative Code of 1987, as amended; Sec. 58, Article VII, The Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines as Amended.
ii
Section 2.
iii
Section 4(c).
iv
Section 4(c).
v
Section 4(g).
vi
University of the Philippines Law Center, 1966, p. 100 (emphasis supplied).
vii
67 Phil. 451 (1939).
viii
Explanatory Note, Senate Bill No. 9 introduced by Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada, 5 January
1962; see also Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 31, 10 March 1964, p. 573.
ix
Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, 12 March 1964, p. 626.
x
G.R. No. 121087, 26 August 1999.
xi
Navarro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121087, 26 August 1999.
xii
Only law enforcement agents may apply for a court order to conduct a wiretap or similar
form of secretly overhearing and recording private communications, but the court may only
issue such an order in cases involving--
A. The following felonies penalized under the Revised Penal Code:
1. Treason;
2. Espionage;
3. Provoking war and disloyalty in case of war;
4. Piracy and mutiny in the high seas;
5. Rebellion, inciting to rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion;
6. Sedition, inciting to sedition, conspiracy and proposal to commit sedition; and
7. Kidnapping; and
B. Violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and other offenses against
national security.
The Anti-Wiretapping Law also requires that a court order shall only be issued upon written
application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses,
and a showing that (a) there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes
enumerated above has been, is being or is about to be committed; (b) that in cases involving
rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit
sedition, and inciting to sedition, there must be prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition
as the case may be, have actually been or are being committed; (c) that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction of any person for,
or to the solution of, or to the prevention of any of such crimes; and (d) that there are no other
means readily available for obtaining such evidence. [RA 4200, sec. 1, 1st and 2nd paragraphs]
The law, therefore, provides for a very narrow exception for law enforcement agents to obtain
court orders to conduct wiretapping or related acts.
xiii
Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590, 596 (1995).
xiv
Section 1, R.A. 4200.
xv
2nd paragraph, Section 1, R.A. 4200.
xvi
2nd paragraph, Section 1, R.A. 4200.
xvii
Section 2, R.A. 4200.
xviii
Section 2, R.A. 4200.
xix
Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 31, 10 March 1964, p. 586:
 Senator GANZON. … For some more clarificatory questions. On page 1, line 2, do I
understand from the gentleman from Quezon that the authority may be oral or
written?
Senator TAŇADA. Well, it could be.
Senator GANZON. It could be. Now, who will prove that there is no such authority
oral or written?
Senator TAŇADA. No, it is the defense already of the accused.
Senator GANZON. Now, the defense will prove that he is authorized. But need not
the prosecution prove at the first stage of the prosecution that as a matter of fact no
such authority has been given?
Senator TAŇADA. It is just like prosecuting one for possession of opium without
license. The prosecution does not have to prove license.
Senator GANZON. I am just trying to clarify.
Senator TAŇADA. In my opinion, it is the defense that must prove that he is
authorized. It is very hard to establish neglect.
xx
People v. Solayao, G.R. No. 119220, 20 September 1996 (footnotes omitted); see also People v.
Macagaling, G.R. Nos. 109131-33, 3 October 1994.
xxi
Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 31, 10 March 1964, p. 577.
xxii
Section 36, Rule 130, Revised Rules on Evidence.
xxiii
A declaration related by a person other than the declarant himself.
xxiv
Rule 113, Section 5 (a) and (b), Revised Rules of Court.
xxv
AYER Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, G.R. No. L-82380, 29 April 1988 (footnotes omitted).
xxvi
G.R. No. L-82380, 29 April 1988 (footnotes omitted).
xxvii
Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution lists the grounds upon which the President,
the Vice-President, Members of the Supreme Court, Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman, may be validly impeached: culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public
trust.
xxviii
G.R. No. 160261, 10 November 2003.
xxix
Emphasis supplied.
xxx
Articles VI, paragraph 2 of the Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Trials in the Senate of the
Philippines, used during the impeachment of then President Joseph E. Estrada, grants the
Senate President or the Chief Justice the power to “rule on all questions of evidence,
including … admissibility.” The same article further states that the Rules of Court “shall apply
insofar as they are applicable;” and the Rules of Evidence and procedure “shall be liberally
construed.” [emphasis supplied].
xxxi
Navarro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121087, 26 August 1999.
xxxii
A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, which took effect on 1 August 2001.
xxxiii
Section 2, R.A. 4200.