THE SECRETARY OF THE G.R. No.

167707
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL EXECUTIVE Present:
DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI,
REGIONAL TECHNICAL PUNO, C.J.,
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS,QUISUMBING,
LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU,YNARES-SANTIAGO,
REGION VI PROVINCIAL CARPIO,
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURALAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, CORONA,*
AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS,CARPIO MORALES,
DIRECTOR OF LAND AZCUNA,
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY,TINGA,
DEPARTMENT OF TOURISMCHICO-NAZARIO,
SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OFVELASCO, JR.,
PHILIPPINE TOURISMNACHURA,**
AUTHORITY, REYES,
Petitioners, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
- versus -

MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD

TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and
ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and Promulgated:
in behalf of all those similarly situated,
Respondents. October 8, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x

DR. ORLANDO SACAY and G.R. No. 173775

WILFREDO GELITO, joined by
THE LANDOWNERS OF
BORACAY SIMILARLY
SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST,
ANNEX A OF THIS PETITION,
Petitioners,

- versus -

THE SECRETARY OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL TECHNICAL
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
REGION VI, PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
AKLAN,
Respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants
of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.

There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review
on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by
respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling
purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification
of Proclamation No. 1064[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into
reserved forest and agricultural land.

The Antecedents

G.R. No. 167707

Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches
and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is
also home to 12,003 inhabitants[4]who live in the bone-shaped islands three barangays.[5]

On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay

Island,[6] which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.

On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation

No. 1801[8] declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in
the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine
Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-
82[9]dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing
an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801

and PTACircular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied
lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June
12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid
realty taxes on them.[10]

Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular
did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Islandwas classified as a tourist
zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA)
No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered
in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for
declaratory relief. The OSGcountered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public
domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not available
for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised
Forestry Code,[11] as amended.

The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801

and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was
governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable
and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.

During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1)
respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these
parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut
trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50)
years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax
purposes.[12]
 The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether
Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in
Boracay.They decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon
submission of their respective memoranda.[13]

The RTC took judicial notice[14]that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more
particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502
(RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos.
5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.[15] The titles were issued on

August 7, 1933.[16]

RTC and CA Dispositions

On July 14, 1999, the RTCrendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with

a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the
petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay,
in accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and
to have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical
Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the
land.
SO ORDERED.[17]

The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in their
name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTACircular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands
in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition.[18] The Circular itself
recognized private ownership of lands.[19] The trial court cited Sections 87[20] and 53[21] of the
Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only
those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.[22]

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.[23] The Republic then
appealed to the CA.

On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as
follows:
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision
of the lower court.[24]
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a
declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a
forest reserve.

Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.[25] Hence, the present
petition under Rule 45.

G.R. No. 173775

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Proclamation No. 1064[26]classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of
reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96)
hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for
a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-
of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,[27]Wilfredo Gelito,[28] and

other landowners[29] in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition,
mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.[30] They allege that the Proclamation
infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued
possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested
billions of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts
on their lots.[31]

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying

Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island
is deemedagricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first
Public Land Act.[32] Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled
them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

Opposing the petition, the OSGargued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested
right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land
pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are
inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the
executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain
into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order
torelease the lots for disposition.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they
principally involve the same issues on the land classification of BoracayIsland.[33]

Issues

G.R. No. 167707

The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-
82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to
their occupied lands in Boracay Island.[34]

G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:

I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF
OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL
OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR
DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM
PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a,
PD 705?

II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLE?
 III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS
ALIENABLE ANDDISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-
REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?

IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE
PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR
LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC.
4(a) OF RA 6657.

V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE
SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANSFOR PURPOSES OF THE
APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN
BORACAY?[35] (Underscoring supplied)

In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No.
167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their
occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to
secure title under other pertinent laws.

Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain

Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902[36] in relation to Act No. 926,
later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141; [37] (b) Proclamation No.
1801[38] issued by then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 1064[39] issued by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and executive acts.

But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify
lands of the public domain.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
timber.[40]Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands,
and such other classes as may be provided by law,[41] giving the government great leeway for
classification.[42]Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with
one addition: national parks.[43] Of these, onlyagricultural lands may be alienated.[44] Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had neverbeen expressly and
administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land
of the public domain.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that
the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.[45] The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935,
1973, and 1987 Constitutions.[46]

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State.[47] Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either
by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public
domain.[48] Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will be
disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the
plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public
lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing
of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of
ownership.[49]
 Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest
of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to
the Spanish Crown.[50] The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through
the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that all lands that were
not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain.[51]

The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of
1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as
well as possessory claims.[52]

The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law[53] partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law
and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as the method of legalizing
possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were set forth in said
decree.[54] Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory
information title,[55] when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of
ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be
actual, public, and adverse,[56] from the date of its inscription.[57]However, possessory
information title had to be perfected one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or
until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State.[58]

In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on
royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion
especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de
compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.[59]

The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American
rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.[60] By this law, lands of the public domain in the
Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and
timber or forest lands.[61] The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by
means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system).[62] It also provided
the definition by exclusion of agricultural public lands.[63] Interpreting the meaning of agricultural
lands under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:[64]

x x x In other words, that the phrase agricultural land as used in Act No.
926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or
mineral lands. x x x[65](Emphasis Ours)

On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as
the Land Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by which recorded title
becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.[66]

Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which
was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for
judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public
lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling
stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain.[67] Under the Act, open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10)
years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.[68]

On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known
as the second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of
agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos
the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation en concepto
dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.[69]

After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874
on December 1, 1936.To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general law
governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and
mineral lands,[70]and privately owned lands which reverted to the State.[71]
 Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or since July 26,
1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942,[72]which provided
for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
provision was last amended by PD No. 1073,[73]which now provides for possession and
occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[74]

The issuance of PD No. 892[75]on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles
as evidence in land registration proceedings.[76] Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or
grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from
the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered
lands[77] shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act
No. 3344.

On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the
Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of
property.[78] It governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered
lands, including chattel mortgages.[79]

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be
a positive act of the government,such as an official proclamation,[80] declassifying inalienable
public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.[81] In fact, Section 8 of CA No.
141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially delimited
and classified.[82]

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of
the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.[83] To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.[84] There must still be a positive act declaring land
of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application
for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. [85] The
applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.[86]

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report,
statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing
that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a
government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable.Absent such well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private
claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.[87]

Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it,
agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant
to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919)[88] and De Aldecoa v. The
Insular Government (1909).[89] These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is
shown.[90]

Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not
have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural
lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the
manner through which land registration courts would classify lands of the public
domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on
proof presented in each case.

Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had
no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that
time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were
vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. [91] This
was the Courts ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda.
De Palanca v. Republic,[92] in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:

x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be

formally released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to
private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands.
xxxx

Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands andAnkron v.

Government is misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission
on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief
Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public
domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to
make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with
implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. [93]

To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then
necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that
the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case
the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown.[94]

But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument
that all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable
agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the public
domain into agricultural lands.

If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926
would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as
timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State
ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-
entrenched Regalian doctrine.
 The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases
brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial
and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for
judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot
apply to landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to
avail themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and,
by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.

In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land
classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was better
suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite
the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General
admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question belongs to one
class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees
upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is
forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent
and present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have
just said, many definitions have been given for agriculture, forestry, and mineral
lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in
order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable
for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes.
(Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon
the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or
mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be
classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid
growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as
agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be
decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or
future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the
fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the
Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a
particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a
matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of
fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that the land is a
manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is
agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other
 of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions
of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land
shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before
such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural,
forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have intervened,
the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself
what portions of the public domain shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or
mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of
Forestry, supra)[95](Emphasis ours)

Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the
facts of each case, except those that have already became private lands. [96] Act No. 2874,
promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department,
through the President, the exclusiveprerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable
or disposable, mineral or forest.96-aSince then, courts no longer had the authority, whether
express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public domain. [97]

Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in
1933,[98] did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration court of the
propertys land classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then to resolve
if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926
was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having
been filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer
authorized to determine the propertys land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank
on Act No. 926.

We note that the RTCdecision[99] in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of
Deeds of Manila,[100] which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the
sole power to classify lands of the public domain was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old
cases Mapa v. Insular Government,[101]De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,[102] and Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands.[103]

Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The
pertinent issue in Krivenkowas whether residential lots were included in the general classification
of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled
that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution[104] from acquiring agricultural
land, which included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public
domain are automatically deemed agricultural.

Notably, the definition of agricultural public lands mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old
cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa.[105] As
We have already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were decided when the
Executive did not have the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.

Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a
presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued
possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No.
926[106] ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title
in their name.

A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of

Appeals.[107] Collado,citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v.
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:

Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in
pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law
governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and
leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands,
and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to
perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for
the issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands,
for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the
completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands. In
short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to
 public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government;
and that the governments title to public land sprung from the
Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and
the United States. The term public land referred to all lands of the
public domain whose title still remained in the government and are
thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and
excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar
lands.

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of
lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.[108] (Emphasis Ours)

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of
the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public
forest under PD No. 705. The DENR[109] and the National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority[110] certify that BoracayIsland is an unclassified land of the public domain.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public
domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as a mass of lands of
the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the
determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not.Applying PD No.
705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso factoconsidered public
forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.

The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may
seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been
partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a premier
tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island
resort, rather than a forest land.
 Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts
on the island;[111] that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the
implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the islands tourism industry,
do not negate its character as public forest.

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution [112] classifying
lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks,do
not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of
trees and underbrushes.[113] The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry[114] is
particularly instructive:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose
such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its
forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with
grass or planted to crops by kaingincultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do
not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered
by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water
may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like. Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.[115] (Emphasis supplied)

There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or timber land as a
classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of
what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes.[116] At
any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legalstatus of Boracay Island, and not look into its
physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants
and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest
to alienable agricultural land.
 Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural
land. However, private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President
Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation
classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a
tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.

Proclamation No. 1801 or PTACircular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into
an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an
agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to private lands[117] and areas declared as
alienable and disposable[118] does not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably,
Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested
lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:

No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from
the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are declared forest reserves.(Emphasis
supplied)

Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes
that the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA
No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Developments
authority to declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable when it provides:

Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the

Bureau of Forest Development.

Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to
classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify
the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific
limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in
Proclamation No. 1801.
 The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the
declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the
Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA to ensure the
concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the development of the areas tourism
potential with due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the
proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does
not address the areas alienability.[119]

More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four
(64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in
Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island,
Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and
Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it
alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would
likewise be declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly
beyond, the intent of the proclamation.

It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as
alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141[120] provide
that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has
the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and
mineral lands.

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised

the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing
vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive
Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so.[122] Absent
such classification, the land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to
disposition.[123]

Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and
628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer
zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way and
which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.

Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less
unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Islandmade by the President through
Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to existing
vested rights.

Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests
into agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705,
President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul of
Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:

SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall

cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and
private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order
No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted
to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or
mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after
the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account
ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall
have determined by law, the specific limits of the public
domain.

That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the
Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. BoracayIsland still remained an
unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.

In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,[124] the
Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically
state that the islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands
leads to the same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber
land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to
disposition.[125] (Emphasis supplied)
 Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a reclassification of land. If the
land had never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited
reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the Department of
Justice[126] on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in
Section 4(a) is the word reclassification. Where there has been no previous
classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public
domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for
purposes of determining which are needed for forest purposes and which are not]
into permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest uses under the
Revised Forestry Code, there can be no reclassification of forest lands to speak of
within the meaning of Section 4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the
reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting
the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the
public domain, denominated as public forest under the Revised Forestry Code,
which have not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest
purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.[127]

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said
law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA
No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of
ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.[128]

As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not
convert portions of Boracay Islandinto an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified
land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.

Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine
Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the
second element of alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant under
our present Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already
alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law itself.[129] Where the land is
not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer
ownership or possessory rights.[130]

Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural
lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.

We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that
private claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.

The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first
element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private
claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to
convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.

Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession
of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a
tourist spot. They say their continued possession and investments give them a vested right which
cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.

The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not

automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a
title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decide cases
based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand,
private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied
portions in Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable investment in the
island.

One Last Note

The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development
of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and international tourism industry. The Court
also notes that for a number of years, thousands of people have called the island their
home. While the Court commiserates with private claimants plight, We are bound to apply the
law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat
umiral.

All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does
not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess
now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on
their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of
improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they
may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by
homestead[131] or sales patent,[132] subject to the conditions imposed by law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title
to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land
laws. There is one such bill[133] now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill
or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to decide.

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open
up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors
which view the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island
is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest
cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is
as important as economic progress.

To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their promotion and
protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that become
more urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly
observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:[134]

The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public
policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written
much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for
forest preservation, conservation, protection, development and
reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of
any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence
of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill
effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and
lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear.
Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will
hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological
 erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and
destruction to property crops, livestock, houses, and highways not to mention
precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down
in a lumbermans decalogue.[135]

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBINGCONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate Justice