H N P D i s c u s s i o n P a p e R

Exploratory Study on Active Pharmaceutical

Ingredient Manufacturing for Essential Medicines

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(HNP) of the World Bank’s Human Development Network. The papers
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unpolished results on HNP topics to encourage discussion and debate.
Janet Bumpas and Ekkehard Betsch
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E-mail: feedback@worldbank.org September 2009
EXPLORATORY STUDY ON ACTIVE PHARMACEUTICAL
INGREDIENT MANUFACTURING FOR
ESSENTIAL MEDICINES

JANET BUMPAS, EKKEHARD BETSCH

SEPTEMBER 2009
 Health, Nutrition and Population (HNP) Discussion Paper
This series is produced by the Health, Nutrition, and Population Family (HNP) of the
World Bank's Human Development Network. The papers in this series aim to provide a
vehicle for publishing preliminary and unpolished results on HNP topics to encourage
discussion and debate. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the author(s) and should not be attributed in any manner to the
World Bank, to its affiliated organizations or to members of its Board of Executive
Directors or the countries they represent. Citation and the use of material presented in this
series should take into account this provisional character. For free copies of papers in this
series please contact the individual author(s) whose name appears on the paper.

Enquiries about the series and submissions should be made directly to the Editor, Homira
Nassery (HNassery@worldbank.org). Submissions should have been previously
reviewed and cleared by the sponsoring department, which will bear the cost of
publication. No additional reviews will be undertaken after submission. The sponsoring
department and author(s) bear full responsibility for the quality of the technical contents
and presentation of material in the series.

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 Health, Nutrition and Population (HNP) Discussion Paper

EXPLORATORY STUDY ON ACTIVE PHARMACEUTICAL INGREDIENT

MANUFACTURING FOR ESSENTIAL MEDICINES

Funded by a grant from DFID under the Medicines Transparency Alliance pilot program

Abstract: Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API) of good quality are core to the
manufacturing of effective and safe essential drugs. The price of APIs is the main cost
driver for manufacturing. Only a limited number of large manufacturers of finished
pharmaceutical products have their own API manufacturing capabilities, and none of
them can make all required APIs in-house. The majority of manufacturers, including all
those located in Sub-Saharan Africa (with the exception of one company in South Africa)
have to buy all APIs in the open market. The paper tries to make the structures of the
API market more transparent, trying to determine how difficult it is for small
manufacturers in developing countries to navigate the global API market and ensure that
they get a quality product at a fair price. It also looks into the competitiveness of the
market, trying to assess the risk that manufacturers or traders monopolize parts of the API
market for essential medicines with low commercial attractiveness. The author confirms
the initial assumption that the API market provides a challenge in particular to small
manufacturers, who have limited means to verify the quality of the APIs they are buying.
One potential way to address this problem would be to broaden the WHO
Prequalification system to include APIs for drugs that are on the WHO Model List for
Essential Medicines.

Keywords: essential medicines, essential drugs, prequalification, API (Active

Pharmaceutical Ingredients), local manufacturing of pharmaceuticals

Disclaimer: The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in the paper are
entirely those of the authors, and do not represent the views of the World Bank, its
Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.

Correspondence Details: Janet Bumpas, 3302 Folsom Street, San Francisco, CA,
USA, tel +1-202-340-6767, email jbumpas@mba1998.hbs.edu;
Ekkehard Betsch, The World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20433,USA,
tel +1-202-458-2175, fax +1-202-522-3234, email ebetsch@worldbank.org;
Andreas Seiter, The World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20433,USA, tel
+1-202-473-3629, fax +1-202-522-3234, email: aseiter@worldbank.org

iii
Table of Contents

Executive Summary ........................................................................................................ 8

Objective ......................................................................................................................... 9
Methods ........................................................................................................................ 10
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing: Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients and Final
Formulations ................................................................................................................. 10
Manufacturing moves to India and China ...................................................................... 12
Regulation of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient industry ............................................... 14
The African Final Formulations Pharmaceutical Market................................................. 19
Two challenges for APIs in Developing Countries: ........................................................ 21
Recommendations: ....................................................................................................... 24
Appendix One: List of Interviewees .............................................................................. 29
Appendix Two: China ................................................................................................... 30
Appendix Three: India .................................................................................................. 33
Appendix Four: Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient Price Volatility ................................. 37
Appendix Five: Specific Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient Markets .............................. 38
Endnotes ....................................................................................................................... 45

List of Tables
Table 1: API production by country............................................................................... 12
Table 2: Scope of authority for Regulatory Agencies .................................................... 14
Table 3: Application of Q7 to API Manufacturing ........................................................... 18
Table 4: Growth in Indian API Industry .......................................................................... 29
Table 5: Indian Firm Exports ......................................................................................... 34
Table 6: Indian Firm Imports.......................................................................................... 34
Table 7: Notified Prices of Bulk Drugs ........................................................................... 35

List of Figures
Figure 1: API Producers ............................................................................................... 11
Figure 2: Assessment of API manufacturing costs by region ........................................ 13
Figure 3: Indian and Chinese DMF Submissions .......................................................... 16
Figure 4: Estimated Pharmaceutical Market in Sub-Saharan Africa.............................. 19
Figure 5: Appropriate international responses based on market competitiveness and
public involvement in market ......................................................................................... 26

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v
Acknowledgement
This paper was prepared under an “Externally Financed Output” agreement with DFID as
part of the activities related to the MeTA pilot. Medicines Transparency Alliance
(MeTA) is a multi-stakeholder alliance working to improve access and affordability
of medicines for the one-third of the world’s population unable to access essential
medicines due to high cost or local unavailability.

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List of Acronyms

Acronym Definition

ACT Artemisinin-based Combination Therapy

ANDA Abbreviated New Drug Application
API Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient
ARV Anti-Retro Viral
cGMP current Good Manufacturing Practice
CHAI Clinton HIV / AIDS Initiative
DMF Drug Master File
EDMF European Drug Master File
GDF Global Drug Facility
GLC Green Light Committee
GMP Good Manufacturing Practices
IFC International Finance Corporation
ISO International Standards Organization
MMSS Malaria Medicines Supply Service
MNC Multi National Corporation
MSF Médecins Sans Frontières
NAFDAC National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control
(Nigeria)
NDA New Drug Application
OTC Over The Counter
PEPFAR President’s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief
PIC/S The Pharmaceutical Inspection Convention and Pharmaceutical
Inspection Co-operation Scheme
PQ Prequalification
PZQ Praziquantel
SFDA State Food and Drug Administration (China)
SOE State-Owned Enterprise (China)
SRA Stringent Regulatory Authority
TRIPS Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
USFDA United States Food and Drug Administration
WHO World Health Organization
WTO World Trade Organization

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Executive Summary

Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs) are integral components of both the

quality and the cost of pharmaceutical goodsa. Equality of access for developing
country final formulators to high quality essential medicine APIs should be pursued
as a public health goal. This requires looking at the API market from a sustainability
and quality perspective as well as from a price perspective. As every specific API
market is diverse, each API market should be examined individually to determine if
it is competitive with affordable prices. If it is not, specific market’s problems
should be articulated so that corrective action that can be taken.

Pharmaceutical manufacturing occurs in two general steps. First, firms convert raw
materials into APIs. Then, firms create final formulations by mixing APIs and
excipients (other non-active ingredients), pressing the mixture into tablets, or
filling capsules or preparing solutions, and then packaging the product for the
consumer market. For the purposes of this paper, final formulations will refer to the
second stage of pharmaceutical manufacturing and not the entire process.

Firms either sell APIs on the open market (“merchant market”) or use them to do
their own final formulations manufacturing. Firms that manufacture both APIs and
final formulations will usually still buy and sell APIs on the merchant market.

Generally speaking, the API market is very competitive with many producers. As a
result, API manufacturers specialize and target their manufacturing based on a
combination of the market opportunities and firm skills. Driven by lower costs, API
manufacturing has slowly been shifting from the historical leaders in Western
countries to newer firms in India and China.

Several regulatory authorities are involved to ensure that firms manufacture APIs
and final formulations in a quality manner. The geographic location of the
manufacturer and market as well as the financing source determines which
regulatory agencies are involved. APIs that are intended for final formulations in
sub-Saharan Africa are often less regulated due to weaker national regulatory
agencies and cost-sensitive markets.

For example, sub-Saharan Africa has many final formulators, mostly in South Africa,
Nigeria, Kenya, and Ghana. Firms here produce almost $1B in final formulations per
annum and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) expects this number to
grow. Most of these final formulation manufacturers, with the prominent exception
of South Africa, manufacture non-complex, high volume, essential products, such as
basic analgesics, simple antibiotics, antimalarial drugs, and vitamins. They tend not
to manufacture more complex / expensive drugs because the demand for more
expensive drugs is weak, cheaper drugs have lower working capital requirements,
and Over The Counter (OTC) branded drugs have a higher profit potential.

a On average, 40-50% of the cost of goods sold for generic oral solids comes from APIs

8
A large question for the global public health community (including donors, technical
assistance agencies and pharmaceutical manufacturers) therefore is where these
final formulators procure APIs and how they ensure quality. Oftentimes, Sub-
Saharan African final formulators outside South Africa procure unregulated APIs
from India and China because they themselves operate in cost-sensitive and under-
regulated markets. These firms can find that navigating global API markets is
challenging.

API markets operate relatively efficiently. However, lack of transparency in the

market and an insufficiency of manufacturers are two potential challenges that may
impede equality of access to quality APIs for small final formulators in developing
countries. API manufacturers may leave a market when market prices move too
low, markets are too small, or economies of scale leave only a few dominant firms.

In order to improve the probability that a well-intentioned final formulator in low-

and middle-income countries (LMIC) in general, and sub-Saharan Africa in
particular, can successfully procure high quality APIs at a low cost, the global
community should:
 Train LMIC final formulators in selection, due diligence and procurement of APIs
 Improve and strengthen API regulatory capacity.
 Move forward with the WHO initiative to prequalify APIs.
 Work for healthy, sustainable, competitive API markets through procurement
tactics.
 Increase API market transparency.

Drug manufacturers need to be partners in this endeavor and make some changes
as well. These include gaining regulatory approvals, learning API procurement
skills and acquiring testing facilities.

Further analysis and study is required to determine the best course of action.

Objective

This exploratory study was carried out to provide an overview over the present
status of the API industry, in particular in India and China. It is also intended to
identify risks to the supply of affordable, high quality APIs required for the
manufacture of essential drugs by local generics manufacturers in countries without
API production, particularly in but not limited to Africa. Funding for this study was
provided by the Medicines Transparency Alliance.

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Methods

This four week project was completed between May and June 2009. Both secondary
research and interviews with industry leaders and analysts were conducted to
identify key drivers and fragilities in the API market. Appendix One contains a list of
interviewees.

Pharmaceutical Manufacturing: Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients

and Final Formulations

Pharmaceutical manufacturing occurs in two general steps. First, firms convert raw
materials into Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs). API production is a highly
sophisticated, technically demanding chemical and biochemical fermentation
and/or synthesis process. APIs constitute a significant portion of the total cost for a
drug. For example, on average, 40-50% of the cost of goods sold for generic oral
solids comes from APIs.1 Commodity API manufacturing tends to be a high-volume,
low-margin business where economies of scale play an important role. The average
commodity API profit margin is less than 10%. In fact, many large bulk API
exporters from India work with a 3% margin on exported products.2

The second step in pharmaceutical manufacturing is the final formulation of the

drugs. Unlike the chemical business of API production, final formulations belong to
the manufacturing sector. During this process, firms first mix APIs and excipients
(other non-active ingredients), then either press the mixture into pills and tablets or
prepare powders for solutions or filling of capsules, and finally, package the product
for the public or private market. For the purposes of this paper, final formulations
will only refer to this second phase of pharmaceutical manufacturing and not the
entire process. Final formulations require different skills and equipment than does
API manufacturing. Economies of scale matter, but less so than for API
manufacturingb as manufacturers can produce fifty or more final formulations in a
single plant with adaptable equipment.33 Profit margins for final formulations
average 20-30%.4

Firms either sell APIs on the open market (“merchant market”) or use them to do
their own final formulations manufacturing. In 2005, the total world API market
was $76B and growing at an average annual rate of 8.2% (with generics growing at
10.9%). Forty one percent of APIs were sold in the merchant market and generics
comprised 43.5% of the total merchant market. In 2005, final formulating firms in
North America purchased 42% of APIs sold in the merchant market (75% of which

b This is true for most drugs. However, cGMP requires that some drugs be manufactured in separate
facilities. For example, Beta-Lactams (a broad class of antibiotics that include penicillin derivatives,
amoxicillin and ampicillin), would taint other products and therefore requires dedicated
manufacturing, processing and primary packing (both at the API and final formulations level).

10
were branded), firms in Western Europe purchased 19% (62% of which were
branded), and firms in Asia purchased 21% (35% of which were branded).5

Firms that manufacture both APIs and final formulations will still buy and sell APIs
on the merchant market - one firm cannot possibly manufacture every API it needs
to manufacture all its final formulations6 and a broad portfolio of APIs does not
usually translate into economies of scale.7 Furthermore, the API division of an
integrated firm tends to be oriented towards the external API market. For example,
Dr. Reddy’s, an Indian firm that manufactures both APIs and final formulations,
charges internal pricing on its APIs (e.g. if the final formulations division of Dr.
Reddy’s wants to use an API manufactured at a Dr. Reddy’s plant, it will have to pay
the API division an internal transfer price). The API team receives bonuses for
profitability so, if they can get a higher price by selling on the merchant market, the
company incentives are structured for them to consider this.8 Matrix Laboratories,
(an Indian firm that is currently becoming a wholly-owned subsidiary of Mylan
Pharmaceuticals, a US firm)9 that manufactures both APIs and final formulations for
HIV drugs provides another example. Matrix also sells some of the HIV APIs it
manufactures to Indian final formulation competitors.10

In general, the API market is very competitive and has many producers. Figure 1,
below11, breaks down the number of firm by geography and level of sophistication.
These 2,056 firms have 3,700 manufacturing sites globally.12

With so many API producers, API manufacturers have specialized and target their
manufacturing based on a combination of the market opportunities and firm skills.
Some examples of targeting strategies follow (list is non-exhaustive):

11
  Timing patent expirations: APIs for drugs that have recently come off
patent in developed countries. Firms can often achieve high profit margin
with these drugs. As more and more firms pick up the newly off-patent drug,
the cost will slowly fall back to marginal production cost.
 Mastering complex manufacturing: Complex APIs for drugs in developed
countries are often difficult for firms to manufacture and provide a barrier to
entry.
 Exploiting gaps in the patent coverage: As an innovator firm must register
its drug in a country to receive patent protection, some firms can exploit gaps
in a drug’s patent coverage.
 Targeting major program drugs: APIs for major program drugs (e.g.
HIV/AIDS, TB, and Malaria) for developing countries often have significant
international funding. As firms needs to have WHO PQ or Stringent
Regulatory Authority (SRA) approval to qualify, this limits competition while
allowing firms to get large-volume orders.
 Competing in generic bulk drugs: APIs for older drugs sold in developing
countries usually have few barriers to entry and firms can operate on thin
margins while still achieving significant revenues through scale.

Manufacturing moves to India and China

API manufacturing has slowly been shifting from the historical leaders in Western
countries to newer firms in India and China. This trend will continue as the Indian
and Chinese API industries are growing at nearly 19.3% and 17.6% annually.13
While Italy still remains the world market leader in APIs destined to sectors such as
cardiovascular or the central nervous system, China leads in anti-infective APIs with
approximately 43% of world market share.14 Table 115 below summarizes the
manufacturing and export of APIs from India and China.

Table 1: Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient production by country

Country Total API Generic API Exported APIs as
Production Production % of Total API
India $2.0B $1.8B 75%
China $4.4B $4.2B 77%

Lower production costs in India and China drive much of this growth. For example,
to develop, test, manufacture and market a generic medicine in India costs 20-40%
of what it costs in the West.16 Indian and Chinese advantages typically come from:

 Lower labor, infrastructure, transportation and equipment costs: If a typical

Western API company has an average wage index of 100, this index is as low as
10 for the typical Indian API firm and 8 for a Chinese one, respectively. Not even
the higher productivity of a Western company (due to the higher average
automation level of the manufacturing processes) can annul the labor cost

12
 difference.17 Figure 2,18 below, shows some of these differences. Additionally,
India and China have lower electricity, coal, and water costs.19 Indian and
Chinese firms are also embedded in a network of raw materials and
intermediary suppliers and so have lower shipping and transaction costs for raw
materials. Firms is these two countries often use less expensive equipment,
leading to a lower depreciation cost.

 Fewer environmental regulations: Currently, Indian and Chinese firms have

fewer environmental regulations regarding the buying, handling, and disposing
of toxic chemicals, which lead to lower direct costs for these businesses.
However, as India and China increase environmental stringency, firms will have
to bear more of these costs.
 Larger scale manufacturing: The IFC estimates that a factory making tablets in
blister packaging needs to manufacture around 1.0–1.5 billion tablets per year to
be said to be operating at scale. Indian and Chinese firms have often reached
scale when firms in other countries have not. For example, the IFC estimates
that a third of the 30–40 percent cost disadvantage that a leading Ghanaian final
formulations manufacturer suffers versus high-scale Indian manufacturers is
attributable to scale. 20
 Lower barriers to market entry: Market contestability in India and China is
discussed in detail in section 6.

As a generalization, Chinese firms have tended to focus on the earlier raw materials
stage whereas Indian firms have tended to focus more on the final API
manufacturing stage. In many cases, a Chinese firm will make the raw material for a
pharmaceutical product and then sell it to an Indian firm who will then convert the
raw material into an API. Then, either the same firm, another Indian firm, a global
Multinational Corporation (MNC) or a final formulator in a developing country will
convert the API into a final formulation product ready for the market. However, the

13
situation is rapidly evolving as both China and India gain new manufacturing skills.

Not surprisingly, while many Western API firms have been winding down and/or
consolidating their manufacturing capacity, many firms in India and China have
been increasing capacity to meet the growing demand. Indian firms interviewed
were not concerned about physical manufacturing capacity as a limiting factor. In
fact, if demand increases at a faster than expected pace, a good Indian API
manufacturer can build a new plant and get required regulatory approval in about
18 months.21

More information on China and India and their API manufacturing capabilities can
be found in Appendixes Two and Three.

Regulation of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient industry

Several regulatory authorities can be involved in ensuring that firms manufacture

APIs and final formulations in a quality manner. Table 2, below, shows that the
financing source as well as the geography of the manufacturer and market
determines which regulatory agencies are involved. Currently, the agency that
regulates the final formulation has the most power in keeping low quality APIs away
from consumers.

Table 2: Scope of authority for Regulatory Agencies

API Final Financing Minimum required Minimum
producing formulation source regulatory required
country producing authority for API regulatory
country authority for final
formulation
1 Local Local Local Local government Local government
2 International Local Local International Local government
Producer producing country
and local
government
3 International International Local International International
producer producer producing country producing country
and local and local
government government
4 Any Any Inter- WHO PQ or SRA WHO PQ or SRA
national
assistance

In the first case, if the API and final formulation are locally manufactured and
financed, the local regulatory authority is the only regulatory body involved. If this
scenario occurs in e.g., the United States, then only the USFDA regulates. If this
scenario occurs in e.g., Nigeria, then only the National Agency for Food and Drug
Administration and Control (NAFDAC) regulates the drug.

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In the second case, an international producer from e.g., China manufactures an API
and sells it to a final formulator in e.g., the United States. The API will be subject to
the regulatory authorities in China and the API manufacturer will have to produce it,
at a minimum, with the quality standards enforced by the Chinese authorities.
However, the US can require that for importation, it meets USFDA standards as well.

The USFDA uses Drug Master Files (DMFs) to regulate APIs by stipulating that a final
formulator manufacturing according to USFDA guidelines can only buy APIs from
firms with an approved US Drug Master File (US-DMF). An API manufacturer
submits a US-DMF to the USFDA with complete information on an API, including
information on facilities, processes, and articles used in manufacturing. The USFDA,
however, will not review the DMF until the final formulator files a New Drug
Application (NDA), Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) or ANDA
supplement with the USFDA which requests use of this API in a finished
formulation. Once a final formulator files, the USFDA schedules a Pre Approval
Inspection of the API manufacturer and reviews the API manufacturer’s DMF. If a
final formulator does not file to use the API, the USFDA assigns the DMF a number
when it receives the DMF but does not review it.22 The USFDA does not approve
DMFs, just ANDAs/NDAs that contain a DMF.

Case Study: USFDA issues warning letters to Ranbaxy Laboratories and an

Import Alert for Drugs from two Ranbaxy plants in India citing
manufacturing deficiencies. In September 2008, the USFDA issued warning
letters to Indian manufacturer Ranbaxy as it was concerned about deviations
from U.S. current Good Manufacturing Practice (cGMP). The Import Alert
allows U.S. officials to detain any API and finished drug products
manufactured at these facilities (over 30 different generic drugs) at the U.S.
border. In addition, until Ranbaxy resolved the noted deficiencies and came
into compliance with U.S. cGMP requirements, the USFDA recommended
denial for any NDAs and ANDAs that list the cited Ranbaxy plants.23

Case Study: Baxter recalls heparin. In January and February 2008, Baxter, a
US pharmaceutical firm which manufactures approximately 50% of the US
heparin products, voluntarily recalled its heparin due to nearly 350 reported
adverse events, including 19 deaths. Upon the initial recall, Baxter and the
USFDA revealed that the recalled heparin products contained a contaminated
API. The tainted API, imported from Changzhou SPL China, contained a
heparin-like contaminant that was structurally similar to heparin and not
recognized in the solution until the FDA developed special testing for it. In
March 2008, the FDA announced that they had identified the contaminant to
be an altered form of an oversulfated chondroitin sulfate which is not a
natural byproduct of the heparin manufacturing process.24 In April 2008, the
US government held hearings25 and determined the cause to be non-sterile
equipment, lack of following proper procedures, and lack of expertise.26

15
To have an API appear in a drug marketed in Europe, API manufactures need to
submit an EDMF (European Drug Master File). API manufacturers also pursue
DMFs as the market views them as a sign of quality and they can boost global sales.
Figure 327, below shows DMF submissions by Indian and Chinese API manufacturers
in recent years and illustrates the recent and stark boom in Indian API manufacture.

If Nigeria imports an API from China, then NAFDAC will determine whether they
will accept the Chinese approval of the API or require a different standard. Many
developing countries do not have the resources to start inspections in foreign
countries. The USFDA categorizes regulatory agencies in three categories: well-
resourced, under-resourced, and no-resourced (ratings are confidential).28 The
USFDA, for example, is considered well-resourced with an approximately $2B
annual budget. Furthermore, with their cost-conscious markets, African countries
often do not have the political will / economic resources to follow the USFDA
standards. Oftentimes, therefore, governments accept the Chinese standards.
However, firms in Nigeria can always, at the manufacturers’ discretion, pursue SRA
approvals and use this as a sign of quality to help win business (if consumers are
willing to pay for quality) in either local Nigerian markets or export markets.

Case Study: China executes top food and drug regulator for taking bribes
to approve untested medicine. In July 2007, Beijing's No. 1 Intermediate
People's Court convicted Zheng Xiaoyu of taking bribes in cash and gifts
worth more than 6.49 million yuan (US$832,000) while he was director of
the State Food and Drug Administration. Those bribes allowed eight
companies to circumvent drug approval standards — including an antibiotic
blamed for at least 10 deaths. 29

Yan Jiangying, deputy policy director of the State Food and Drug
Administration said, “As a developing country, China’s current food and drug
safety situation is not very satisfactory because supervision of food and drug
safety started late. Its foundation is weak, so the supervision of food and

16
 drug safety is not easy.”30

The fourth case involves drugs financed by an international body. For example, if
the government of Nigeria purchases HIV/AIDS drugs paid for with money from The
Global Fund, The Global Fund will insist that WHO Prequalification (PQ) or an SRA is
involved in the drug regulation. Or if the NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)
purchases drugs for use by MSF teams working in a country, MSF will use its own
quality control procedure based on WHO Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP)
compliance. MSF uses its own inspectors to conduct GMP audits yet also takes into
consideration outcomes of WHO PQ, ICH inspections or PIC/S.31

WHO Pre-Qualification
The World Health Organization started its PQ program in 2001 to ensure that final
formulations purchased with UN monies would be of acceptable quality. Only firms
that have passed a WHO PQ assessment can bid on UN tenders. WHO, NGOs, and
national regulatory authorities use GMP standards to assess manufacturers; the
difference is often in the stringency with which the regulatory authorities apply
GMP standards. As a result, WHO PQ of a final formulator is an indicator to the
market of quality.

Traditionally, WHO PQ just applied to final formulations. Part of the PQ process

required final formulators to use GMP procedures to acquire APIs. This
theoretically ensures a quality API. However, in the late 1990s, WHO became more
concerned about the quality of APIs, especially following an incident in 1995 and
1996 when more than 100 children died in Haiti following ingestion of cough-and-
cold syrup containing a counterfeit excipient: a Chinese chemical company sold
diethylene glycol labeled as glycerin to the cough syrup manufacturer. The WHO
Expert Committee on Specifications for Pharmaceutical Preparations responded by
identifying several activities to control and ensure safe trade of starting materials
for pharmaceutical products. In May 1999, The World Health Assembly adopted the
Revised Drug Strategy resolution (WHA52.19) which requested WHO to prepare a
new WHO Scheme for the Certification of Pharmaceutical Starting Materials Moving
in International Commerce, which WHO released in 2001.32

The WHO Expert Committee on Specifications for Pharmaceutical Preparations

discussed the need for WHO PQ of APIs at its fortieth and forty first meetings
(October 2005 and 2006, respectively). The WHO PQ Program then drafted an API
PQ procedure, which the Expert Committee endorsed in principle at its forty second
meeting (October 2007), and adopted at its forty-third meeting (October 2008),
subject to approval by WHO Legal Counsel.33

While the procedures for WHO API PQ have been approved, WHO does not currently
have the resources to implement them. WHO is currently gathering donor support
for API PQ. The first wave of APIs will be for priority essential medicines, neglected
diseases, antimalarials, and TB drugs. Drugs like paracetamol (which are easy to

17
manufacture and have many API sources) and drugs for chronic diseases will not be
as high a priority.34

WHO is also gathering donor support for an initiative to harmonize regulatory

agencies across regional blocks in Africac and an initiative regarding the quality of
drugs for neglected diseases, a category often hampered because these drugs are
not a high priority for developing country regulatory bodies and not much is known
about them.35

The International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements

for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use
The regulatory authorities of the US, Europe, and Japan along with research-based
industry representatives have come together under the International Conference on
Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for
Human Use (ICH) to reduce duplicate testing and coordinate technical guidelines
and requirements for product registration. ICH guidelines have been adopted as law
in several countries, but are only used as guidance for the USFDA. In 1998, the ICH
released Q7: Good Manufacturing Practice Guide for Active Pharmaceutical
Ingredients. Table 3,36 below, shows what stages the Q7 guidelines are used in the
pharmaceutical manufacturing process.

Table 3: Application of Q7 to API Manufacturing

Type of Application of Q7 to steps (shown in grey) used in this type of
Manufacturi manufacturing
ng
Chemical Production of Introduction of Production of Isolation Physical
Manufacturing the API Starting the API Starting Intermediate(s) and processing, &
Material Material into purification packaging
process
API derived Collection of Cutting, mixing, Introduction of Isolation Physical
from plant or organ, fluid, and/or initial the API Starting and processing, &
animal sources tissue, or plants processing / Material into purification packaging
extractions process
Herbal extracts Collection of Cutting and Further Physical
used as API plants initial extraction processing, &
extraction packaging
Biotechnology: Establishment Maintenance of Cell culture Isolation Physical
fermentation/ of master & working cell and/or and processing, &
cell culture working cell bank fermentation purification packaging
bank
“Classical” Establishment Maintenance of Introduction of Isolation Physical
fermentation to of cell bank the cell bank the cells into and processing, &
produce an API fermentation purification packaging

cThere are six regional blocks in Africa: the Southern African Development Community (SADC), East
African Community (EAC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Countries can belong to
multiple blocks.

18
The Pharmaceutical Inspection Convention and Pharmaceutical Inspection Co-
operation Scheme
The Pharmaceutical Inspection Convention and Pharmaceutical Inspection Co-
operation Scheme (jointly referred to as PIC/S) includes Argentina, Australia,
Canada, Iceland, Israel, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Norway, Singapore, South Africa,
Switzerland and the countries of the European Union (except Bulgaria, Latvia,
Luxembourg and Slovenia).37 Historically, The Global Fund also considered PIC/S
members as SRAs, but eliminated this option as of July 1, 2009.38

The African Final Formulations Pharmaceutical Market

In 2006, The IFC estimated the Sub-Saharan Africa pharmaceutical market to be

worth $3.8 billion. Local final formulators created 25-30% of this value, or
approximately $1B. While 37 Sub-Saharan African countries have some
pharmaceutical production, South Africa dominated the sector with over 70% of the
region’s annual pharmaceutical production. Nigeria, Kenya, and Ghana together
represent another 20%. Nigeria and Ghana focus more on local consumption
whereas Kenya exports 35-40% of manufacturer’s sales. 39 Figure 440 provides
more detail:

The sector is also growing: The IFC estimated that 40% of the cumulative $1.6-
$2.9B projected investment in health care in the region between 2007 and 2016 will
be invested in generic final formulation manufacturing. And the Sub-Saharan
African governments and regional bodies support developing Africa’s production.
For example, the African Union’s 2007– 2015 health strategy stated that “African
Union Member States need to embark on local production of pharmaceuticals and

19
other health commodities.” 41

Most sub-Saharan African final formulation manufacturers, outside of South Africa,

manufacture non-complex, high volume, essential products, such as basic analgesics,
simple antibiotics, anti-malarial drugs, and vitamins.42 This can be attributed to the
following factors:

 Demand for more expensive drugs is not fully developed. While many African
manufacturers could make higher end products, consumers may not purchase
them.43 In these markets, many consumers are extremely price-conscious.
Furthermore, the African markets for antihypertensives and antidiabetics are
unregulated and fragmented with each country procuring from local
manufacturers. Market intelligence for these small markets can be scarce,
making it difficult for a manufacturer to pursue a market.44 Further research is
required, however, to determine the degree of importance of these variables.
 Cheaper drugs have lower working capital requirement. The price of an API
may deter small final formulators. Oftentimes these firms are relatively new and
have small capital bases. The six month lag between purchasing an API and then
selling the subsequent final formulation requires a working capital investment.
Therefore, firms may be attracted more to drugs where the API cost is relatively
small compared with more complex drugs where the APIs can costs thousands of
dollars per kilo. However, this capital investment may not be so large as to be
insurmountable.
 Over the Counter (OTC) branded drugs have higher profit potential. Many
manufacturers of OTC drugs brand their drugs and enjoy high margins with good
marketing. Other drugs, such as many antibiotics, require physicians to inject it.
As the patient may not even know the brand, the manufacturer cannot position
these prescription drugs with a high price. As a result, most generic final
formulators have branded generics such as paracetamol in an attempt for their
version to be perceived as a higher quality option, and hence a higher priced
drug. For example, in Bangladesh, various brands of ciprofloxacin range from
$0.07 to $0.20 per unit but various dexamethasone eye drops range from $0.34
to $1.29 per 5ml.45

A large question for the public health community therefore is where these final
formulators are procuring APIs and how quality is ensured. Oftentimes, Sub-
Saharan African final formulators procure unregulated APIs from India and China.
For example, one Ghanaian final formulator estimated that less than 30% of the APIs
imported from India and China to Ghana come from facilities with WHO GMP or SRA
approval.46 African final formulators tend to procure unregulated APIs for two
reasons:

 Cost-sensitive under-regulated markets: In most sub-Saharan African

countries, with the notable exception of South Africa final formulator firms
operate in a looser regulatory environment where WHO GMP or SRA approvals

20
 are not required. Local final formulation firms in these countries can produce
pharmaceuticals according to the less stringent local requirements or self-select
to get these certifications. However, if they are not required, the incremental
costs of obtaining these certifications can price them out of the local market. The
increased costs attributable to:
o Manufacturing costs: Manufacturers often have to make costly
improvements to facilities to bring them and keep them to WHO GMP or
SRA levels, often including renovation of production facilities, familiarity
with qualification requirements and processes, and a dossier of product
efficacy and safety tests that meets with regulatory bodies’ requirements.
Furthermore, the costs of obtaining WHO GMP or SRA approvals are
relatively higher for firms with small volumes.
o Increased API costs: APIs from certified facilities can command a 20-
100% price premium. This premium gap, however, is product dependent
(more steps usually result in a higher premium)47 and is shrinking as
more suppliers achieve certification.48 In cost-sensitive markets, the
average consumer is often unwilling to pay a premium.
o Supply chain rigidity: A final formulator working with WHO GMP or SRA
approved procedures usually will only have a few approved API
manufacturers to supply it (adding a new API supplier requires about six
months, is costly, and requires updates to regulatory authorities).
Therefore, a final formulator might not shift API suppliers easily. As a
result, some final formulators may not be able or willing to switch if, for
example, another firm offers the API for 5% less49 or they may have
difficulties finding a particular API if the API market moves quickly.
Larger final formulation firms, however, usually have the volume and
relationships to be able to secure APIs.50 Appendix Four details recent
API price volatility.
 Lack of technical knowledge: Many newer, smaller African final formulators do
not have the technical knowledge to successfully maneuver the international API
markets.

Two challenges for APIs in Developing Countries:

In general, the global API market is an efficient market based on commodities.

However, two potential challenges may impede equality of access to quality APIs for
small final formulators in developing countries.

1. Transparency: Small local final formulating firms procuring APIs on the global
merchant market, usually from API-manufacturing firms located in either India or
China, can find that navigating the market is challenging, especially when procuring
non-WHO GMP or SRA approved APIs. Furthermore, as historically, Chinese API
manufacturers could not directly export but had to go through a state-owned
trading company, many Chinese API manufacturers still use such trading
companies.51 As a result, some firms may use a trader or merchant intermediary

21
such as Helm AG, Indukern Chemie AG, or GMP Pharma Trading AG, to source APIs.
Unfortunately, these traders were not interested in being interviewed for this
exploratory study, which implies a tendency towards non-transparency. It would
add value to the discussion of quality APIs, however, to continue to attempt to
include the point of view of these traders.

For example, when F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. procure APIs on the global merchant
market, they use USFDA audits along with internal F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. audits
focusing on the supply chain, facilities, and technical processes to validate the
quality of an API manufacturer directly. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. prefer to work
directly with the manufacturer as direct contact with a manufacturer affords more
transparency to the supply chain. A manufacturer will always know the process
better, be able to do necessary quality control checks directly, and has an appointed
quality person on staff who can provide any requested certification. 52

Many smaller final formulators without the resources and experience of F.

Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. may find it appealing to rely on a trader to source APIs. If
so, the final formulator should evaluate both the supplier and the channel.

2. Ensuring API manufacturers stay in the market: When API manufacturers no

longer view the API market worth competing in, they may leave the market, and
then final formulators may not be able to find the low-cost, high-quality API they
used to procure. Possible causes for API manufacturers to leave a market include:

Market price moves too low: API manufacturers are finding their margins
squeezed and are under tremendous pressure to produce more for less or leave
the market. Final formulators continuously push for lower API prices as they
face incredible price competition themselves, to the point of sometime focusing
more on market share than on profitability.53 At the same time, raw material
prices and environmental costs are rising. For example, Piramel Healthcare in
India recently left the ibuprofen API market as they could not compete;54 three
producers in China now manufacture it.55

However, the normal laws of supply and demand dictate that, excluding other
factors, APIs priced too low should rise, and, once it reaches profitable levels
again, API manufacturers will re-enter the space. This dynamic is often
observed within the antibiotics market in China. 56

Each API market, however, is not just one market but two: some manufacturers
targeting regulated markets with approved facilities and higher cost APIs and
other manufacturers targeting unregulated markets with fewer quality
mechanisms put in place (and sometimes the same manufacturer may operate in
the two markets with two separate plants). Final formulators, often under
incredible price pressures, and are more and more willing to take risks with less
established companies. These decisions impact the API market. Usually within a

22
 market segment, higher quality manufacturers exit first, leaving the market to
monopolists or lower quality manufacturers.57

 Small markets: API manufacturers may be hesitant to dedicate capacity to a

small or declining market. In general, an API manufacturer would not be
interested in a small / declining market if either all of its capacity was fully
utilized for other products (and the manufacturer determined it was not wise to
build more capacity at that moment) or if the manufacturing of the required API
could not easily fit it into its production schedule (e.g. the API requires larger
than normal changeover of production lines or a different technology). As such,
some neglected disease APIs and small market APIs still get overlooked. For
example:
o Chinese firms, with their heritage as SOEs (State Owned Enterprises) are
driven by large volumes and often not interested in smaller niche
markets, unless it is a high value product.58
o If a small volume final formulator is committed to a single API
manufacturer due to regulatory filing requirements, then the final
formulator may face an abrupt and unreconcilable discontinuation of
APIs when the API manufacturer leaves the field.59
o If the API demand volume is very small, many API manufacturers will not
be interested due to change-over times and higher costs associated with
smaller scale production. The final formulator, in this case, will still be
able to find the API, but the cost may be prohibitive. 60

Case Study: Aventis re-enters eflornithine market: Aventis, a French

pharmaceutical firm, manufactured eflornithine to treat trypanosomiasis
(sleeping sickness), a disease which affected approximately 500,000 people
in 36 African countries. Aventis halted its production in 1999 because it did
not consider it a profitable drug. In 2001, after Médecins Sans Frontières
petitioned WHO to take a position, Aventis resumed production and agreed
to donate $5M worth of eflornithine per year for five years. Aventis agreed
that after those first five years, they would start a technology transfer with
technical assistance to any capable manufacturer willing to continue
production on their own. By September 2005, WHO identified two
manufacturers (one in India and one in Texas), both of which were
investigating inexpensive ways of producing eflornithine. Treating
trypanosomiasis received a huge boon when eflornithine was also shown to
be an effective facial hair growth inhibiting agent, with a large potential
market among women in developed countries. The development of the hair
removal market partly encouraged Aventis to re-start the manufacture of
eflornithine and allowed it to once again become available for use in
trypanosomiasis .61

 Economies of scale: These economies of scale function relative to the market

size – one market may be only large enough to sustain one manufacturer while

23
 another market could sustain hundreds. Once an API manufacturer has
achieved a significant economy of scale on a small market, it often does not make
sense for any other manufacturer to enter. As a result, the scaled manufacturers
can become monopolists and charge higher prices. However, these higher prices
could draw new competitors into the market, unless the API firm can prevent it
by taking advantage of its size to control the raw materials or some other aspect
of the market.

There are a couple of reasons why normal economies of scale rules do not
always apply to APIs, such as:
o Chinese firms often lack commercial sophistication and market
intelligence; they are also opaque in their own transactions. Therefore if
it is anticipated that a product will sell in high volumes, new entrants will
quickly scale-up to become the largest in an attempt to drive everyone
else out of the market without knowing what other firms are doing. This
can result in over-production for many products.62
o Lower quality manufacturers can force higher quality manufacturers out
of the market by entering a space on an aggressive scale while cutting
some quality corners.

Recommendations:

The following should be maintained as a public health goal: A sustainable and

competitive high quality API market that developing country final formulators can
access for all essential drugs. This requires looking at the market with an eye
towards sustainability, quality and price. In order to accomplish this, the following
actions are recommended:

Recommendations for Global Partners

1. Train Sub-Saharan African Final Formulators: Global partners should help

train final formulators in developing countries to assess API quality and the best
way to demand / obtain higher quality APIs. Just like Western buyers, African
buyers must do their due diligence when procuring APIs. African final
formulators should have a solid quality assurance system, understand
requirements, and institute written SOPs so that they are able to maintain
appropriate quality standards and environmental requirements.63

2. Raise API regulatory capacity: Increased regulatory capacity and stringency

helps everyone: the public benefits through greater drug safety; the
manufacturers benefit as it makes them more internationally competitive.
 API producing countries: Global partners should work with the regulatory
agencies in China and India to ensure regular contact with international
agencies (such as the WHO) and SRAs (such as the USFDA) in order to
increase their regulatory capacity.

24
  Developing countries: Increased regulatory stringency in these countries
will deter manufacturers facing cost sensitive markets to meet demand by
supplying low quality APIs. However, increased regulatory stringency is not
just an issue of training and capacity building, but it is also increased political
will. Specific areas to consider include:64
 National and regional legislation on medicinal products should be
extended to cover starting materials.
 Key parties in the chain – producers, traders, forwarders, tenderers,
brokers – must be authorized for their activities by the competent health
authority of the country in which each activity occurs.
 Strengthening GMP capacity to inspect.

3. Work for healthy, sustainable, competitive API markets when procuring:

Sometimes pricing and commodity security can be in conflict. Low prices are
often achieved through single-firm contracting (to get scale) and negotiating
reduced short-term prices. Commodity security can be achieved through the
existence of multiple manufacturers that provide a secure supply of existing
products, pricing schemes which provide space for manufacturers to invest in
R&D for future products, and development and maintenance of competitive
markets.

The approach to each API should be specific to its intended final formulations
and market characteristics. If an API market already has product competition,
better access could be encouraged through price reductions via purchaser
leverage, e.g. bulk-purchasing. The Global Drug Facility for first-line TB drugs is
a good example of an international effort in this area. If an API market only has
limited suppliers, commodity security could be encouraged via advance
purchase firm contracting and tailoring contract terms and length so as to
encourage a longer-term competitive environment. The Global Alliance for
Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) and the Green Light Committee (GLC) for
multi-drug resistant tuberculosis (MDR TB) are examples.65 Figure 566, below,
illustrates a potential framework that could be used to identify appropriate
interventions.

25
 Figure 5: Appropriate international responses based on market competitiveness
and public involvement in market.

Appendix Five details more information on the competitiveness of some specific

drugs/APIs and international responses to these product situations, but more
research is required in this area.

There are many ways to impact individual API markets. Below is a list of options
though further study is required to determine which mechanism would be most
appropriate for which API.67 In general, procurement procedures that foster
competition / lower pricing through the basic principles of transparency, quality,
and sustainable markets with multiple manufacturers should be utilized. Also,
existing mechanisms should be optimized rather than creating duplicate channels.

 Pooled demand: the fewer the buyers and the larger the percentage of their
respective market shares in terms of value, the greater their influence in
negotiating prices with producers. A less fragmented purchasing base can
also make the market more predictable, and predictability is conducive to
more cost-efficient manufacturing, the savings of which may be passed onto
buyers. Clearer demand can also create incentives for additional suppliers to
enter the market.
 Bulk purchasing: less sophisticated than, but similar to, pooled demand.
 Competitive tendering that allocates shares to multiple manufacturers.
 Long-term agreements.
 Providing product financing or guaranteeing financing.
 Offering professionally managed procurement services.

26
  Helping to reduce risk when selling to Africa: Some Chinese and Indian firms
may be concerned about payment terms and the ability to pay in Africa. This
risk results in higher prices and hesitation to sell.68
 Signaling predictable demand to manufacturers to incentivize them to enter
/ stay in the market.

Regardless of the mechanism chosen, supply and demand changes in the market
should be monitored in order to determine whether the market remains healthy
enough for multiple suppliers to enter into and maintain manufacturing capacity.

A concrete process goal could be to identify approximately twenty critical APIs and
then identify a sustainable number of suppliers for each. While further work is
required to identify potential mechanisms, the global partners should then make a
concerted effort to work with these suppliers to encourage them to stay in the
market.

4. Increase market transparency: API markets are often fragmented and

undocumented, creating additional risk and cost for manufacturers. Identifying
who manufactures which final formulations on the ground in developing
countries is challenging. finding information regarding who manufactures the
APIs behind these final formulations is even more difficult. Many regulatory
documents keep APIs confidential. No public database exists that tracks API
manufacturers and quality assessments. And while many organizations will
show up at trade shows, final formulators may still find it challenging to sift
through the market to find a good API manufacturer.69 The following actionable
items would improve market transparency:

 Better demand forecasting

o Predictable forecasting makes a market more attractive to
manufacturers.
o Demand may increase with better forecasting as countries better
understand epidemiological need.
 Collecting and disseminating transparent pricing & quality information
which allows purchasers to compare suppliers.
 Compiling and sharing country experiences and best practices in policy
change, procurement, financing, subsidies and delivery.

While an all-inclusive registry would be an enormous task and potentially futile

in fast-moving markets, global partners should join hands to start a global
repository for information on manufacturers, the products they make, and their
regulatory approvals. Many international agencies have started such a list for
products in their area of work, but it has yet to be collated and made public.70

5. Investigate WHO activities in API quality: WHO is gathering donor support for
several initiatives which could increase API quality and access. These initiatives

27
 deserve further investigation to see if a partnership approach or support would
be appropriate.

Recommendations for drug manufacturers/final formulators

6. Gain regulatory approvals: Small manufacturers could improve their public

image through increasing their quality assurance measures. Producing APIs
without some form of regulatory approval is a dangerous public health threat.
Firms could consider (in increasing levels of stringency) self-assessments, WHO
GMP, WHO PQ, PIC/s approval, or SRA approval.

7. Learn API procurement skills: Just as final formulators from developed

countries have trained procurement staff who understand the global API market,
final formulators in developing countries should have staff that can understand
and manage their engagement in the global API market.

8. Acquire testing facilities: All final formulators must have access to suitably
equipped analytical testing laboratories in order to control incoming materials
and final products.71

28
Appendix One: List of Interviewees

Global Pharmaceutical Manufacturers

 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. Juergen Knoebel.

Indian API Manufacturers

 Aurobindo. Ramaprasada Reddy, CEO.
 Cipla. Amar Lulla. Joint Managing Director and Director.
 Dr. Reddy’s.
 Hetero Drugs. Mr. Narsa Reddy, Director.
 IPCA. Premchand Godha. Managing Director.
 Nicholas Piramel. Nandina Piramel. Executive Director.

Pharmaceutical Associations
 Bulk Drug Manufacturers Association (India).
 Indian Pharmaceutical Association. Dilip Shah. Secretary General.
 PhRMA. Mark Paxton. Associate VP, International Regulatory Affairs.

US Government
 US Department of Commerce. Vince Suneja. Director, Pharmaceuticals and
Medical Devices.
 USFDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER). Justina Molzon.
Associate Director for International Affairs.

NGOs, Universities, International Organizations and Consultancies

 Clinton Foundation. David Ripin. Scientific Director, Drug Access Program.
 HLSP. Cheri Grace. Lead Specialist, Access to Medicines.
 Howard University. Joseph Fortunak.
 PharmaVantage. Susan Capie. CEO.
 Research Institute for Industrial Pharmacy, South Africa. Theo Dekker.
 Thomson Reuters. Kate Kuhrt. Director, Generics and API Intelligence.
Healthcare & Science.
 World Health Organization. Dr. Lembit Rago. WHO Coordinator of Quality
Assurance and Safety for Medicines.

29
Appendix Two: China

China has a large and vibrant pharmaceutical sector. In 2007, the Chinese
pharmaceutical market, excluding traditional Chinese medicines, was $ 15.6 billion,
or 2% of the global market. The API market in 2005 was nearly $5.7B72 and it has
been growing rapidly at 15-19% per annum. China has 4,682 API and final
formulator manufacturers,73 3,101 of which are certified GMP (Good Manufacturing
Practices) by the SFDA (the State Food and Drug Administration). Ninety-seven
percent of products are generic copies, and 70% are made by local manufacturers.74

Although the Chinese marketplace is rapidly evolving and highly diverse, Chinese
firms tend to work more with raw materials, intermediates and APIs. Chinese firms
are very strong in fermentation. APIs account for 84% of China’s pharmaceutical
exports.75 Chinese firms produce 1,500 APIs, with a volume of about 732,000 metric
tons.76

The Chinese API industry is small-scale and fragmented even though each of the top
20 exported APIs has more than 50% global market share. For example, in 2006,
only two manufacturers were among the top 500 national Chinese enterprises and
pharmaceutical firm sales were less than 25% of the average sales of the top 500
Chinese companies and less than 1% of Pfizer’s sales. While the top 10 global
pharmaceutical firms contributed 44% of the global sales in 2006, the top 10
Chinese pharmaceutical firms contributed only 14% of China sales in 2006. 77

However, the industry is rapidly consolidating. For example, the number of API
manufacturers has decreased by 50% since 199978 due to industry consolidation
and firms leaving as they were unable to meet increasingly strict quality and
environmental standards.

Chinese firms are rapidly advancing but still need to overcome the following
barriers to play a larger role in the global economy:

 Technical skills: Skills and standards among Chinese manufacturers vary

widely. Some Chinese firms’ plants, equipment, and skills rival Western
companies while others lag. While the chemistry being handled becomes more
sophisticated each year, 79 on average, China still lags behind global standards in
complexity of products manufactured. For example, in China, the API to Final
Formulation price ratio is 1:3. In India it is 1:5.2 and in developed countries it is
1:10. 80

 Transition to market economy: Chinese firms continue to move away from the
traditional SOE (state-owned enterprise) focus on volume sales towards private
firms focused on profit. In 2006, 36% of the firms were government owned,
35% privately owned and 29% foreign-funded.81 This transition provides
challenges for production decisions. In the past, a planned economy meant the

30
 government dictated what factories produced and where their products were
sold, and subsidized operations. But as the economy shifts to a market economy,
subsidies have been reduced or withdrawn, leaving manufacturers responsible
for portfolio management and production decisions.82 Without accurate market
information or a culture of making production decisions based on market
realities, firms often duplicate production. For example, in a consolidating
market, the SFDA has approved 1,600 generics in 2002, 6,100 in 2003, and more
than 8,000 in 2004/5. For levofloxacin hydrochloride injection, there were 145
approvals alone.83

 Transparency: Historically, manufacturers could not directly export products

but had to work with a state owned trading company. Now manufacturers can
sell directly on the international market, but many still prefer to work with a
trading company. Because of this, buyers often have a hard time seeing all the
way up the chain to the manufacturer in order to evaluate it.84

 Regulatory stringency: The SFDA is becoming increasingly stringent and

forcing low quality manufacturers out of the market. The SFDA is based on the
USFDA (United States Food and Drug Administration)85 and continues its
cooperation with the US. For example, in December 2007, the SFDA and USFDA
signed an agreement to strengthen cooperation between the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services and the SFDA, to establish three USFDA satellite
outposts in China, and to have SFDA agents accompany their FDA counterparts
during GMP inspections in China.86

However, gaps still exists. SFDA officials acknowledge that responsibility for
food and drug safety involves as many as 17 government agencies, ranging from
the Ministry of Health, which sets hygienic standards, to the Public Security
Bureau, which has the power to investigate criminal cases. This fragmented
authority has created overlapping jurisdictions in which no single agency
exercises ultimate responsibility.87

Also, chemical companies that make products as diverse as fertilizers and

industrial solvents are neither certified nor inspected by Chinese drug
regulators, yet export chemical intermediaries for pharmaceuticals. The New
York Times interviewed Wang Siqing, managing director of the Changzhou
Yabang Pharmaceutical Company in 2007. Mr. Siqing estimated that uncertified
chemical companies make half the active pharmaceutical ingredients sold in
China. The New York Times identified at least 1,300 Chinese chemical
companies advertising compounds destined for pharmaceuticals on internet
trading sites. And the results can be devastating. In the mid-1990s, a Chinese
chemical company sold diethylene glycol labeled as glycerin to a cough syrup
manufacturer. This resulted in nearly 100 child deaths in Haiti. In 2006, at least
138 Panamanians died or were disabled after another Chinese chemical
company sold the same poisonous ingredient mixed into cold medicine.88

31
 Environmental regulation. China has historically been criticized for lax
environmental protection. For example, a November 2003 New York Times
article entitled “Toxins Are Part of Cost of Boom in China’s Exports” documented
major violations of toxic waste regulations at Zhejiang Hisun, an FDA-approved
manufacturer in Taizhou, which resulted in the death of employees and illness
among the local population.89 Increasingly, China is toughening environmental
protection.

 Communication: Language continues to be a barrier.90

 Intellectual Property (IP): Although Chinese companies are becoming better

informed about intellectual property issues and expectations, most Chinese
firms do not have a legal staff devoted to patent searches.91 There appears to be
little understanding of the official IP policy and IP enforcement is weak. While
China’s central government has largely followed through on its WTO (World
Trade Organization) IP commitments, the local levels often lack the will and
ability to enforce the policy.92

 Counterfeits: China has a thriving counterfeit medicine industry--a big

headache for western drug makers and public health authorities around the
world.93 In the second half of 2008, the SFDA launched an electronic tracking
network pilot program. Starting in 2009, all pharmaceuticals and biologics sold
in China will eventually be marked with its barcode tags. The new tracking
system will lay the groundwork for a rapid response to any adverse events
triggered by drugs or devices and help crack down on poorly made or
counterfeit products. 94

32
Appendix Three: India

The Indian pharmaceutical industry is a vibrant, rapidly growing and evolving

industry with both APIs and final formulations.

While Chinese firms historically tended to manufacture high volume, low complexity
APIs such as paracetamol, Indian firms tended to focus on lower volume, more
complex APIs.95 (The paracetamol market has consolidated to three producers in
China with large economies of scale.96) The ferocious competition between the two
countries continues and, over the last few years, as the Indian industry has not been
able to keep pace with the Chinese prices and as the Chinese continue to catch up in
technology skills, several Indian firms have shut down some business lines, let the
business go to Chinese firms and then moved on to more complex products.97

Indian API manufacturers have also been investing and acquiring firms in China.98
For example, Matrix Laboratories in India (which is currently being wholly taken
over by Mylan Pharmaceuticals in the US) recently took a 60% stake in Mchem
Group, a China-based manufacturer of chemicals, intermediates and APIs.99
Dishman Pharmaceuticals & Chemicals, another Indian firm has an office in Wuxi
that both sources and looks for opportunities to partner with Chinese
manufacturing organizations.100 In 2006, Dishman also planned to invest $10M to
build an API manufacturing facility near Shanghai.101

Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7, below102, give detailed data on Indian firms sales, exports, and
imports.

33
34
35
36
Appendix Four: Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient Price Volatility

In 2008-2009, API pricing has experienced higher than normal volatility.103

Multipurpose API manufacturers can change product lines in a matter of days or
weeks. Therefore, if the margin on one API gets too low, for whatever reason, an
API manufacturer can shift away from making it. This volatility is due to:

 Volatility in the cost of raw materials. Firms use a variety of raw materials to
create an API. Some raw materials are:
o Crude Oil: For example, paracetamol is derived from coal tar or crude oil.
o Agricultural products: For example, one API from Piramal Health Care
in India is based on the price of yams in China.104
o Commodities: For example, yellow phosphorous is used in some APIs.
The price increased from $900 per ton in June 2005 to $9,000 per ton in
June 2008.105
As the price of these input costs varies, so does the API final price. The impact of
the raw materials on price varies per API.
 Increasing regulatory standards: Regulatory agencies in both China and India
are raising standards and, in some cases, forcing manufacturers who cannot
meet these quality requirements to leave the market.106
 Country risk: Chinese firms manufacture many raw materials and this
concentration in one country increases the country risk. For example, for the six
months before the 2009 Olympics, the Chinese government restricted the
amount of waste water firms could produce in order to have a cleaner
environment for the Olympics. This forced raw material firms to cut back and
some prices rose up to 300%. As prices changed so rapidly, many final
formulators were forced to pay and lock in a price at the time of order, not at the
time of delivery. As a result, companies stockpiled, there were shortages, and
then as supply came back on-line, prices dropped, but not to the pre-Olympic
level.107
 Increasing environmental protection: As countries like China become more
concerned with environmental protection, the cost of manufacturing both the
raw materials and the APIs increases. Also, increased environmental costs favor
larger manufacturers who can allocate these costs across a larger volume.108

API price volatility is expected to decline as fluctuations from the Olympics fade, but
volatility due to exchange rates, oil prices, etc. will still remain.109

37
Appendix Five: Specific Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient Markets

The API market is not one uniform market, but varies dramatically by product and
quality level. Therefore, while some API markets function quite efficiently, others
may be less straight-forward. This appendix details some sample API markets and
is in no means exhaustive. Further study of each is required.

Neglected Disease Drugs

Praziquantel
Praziquantel (PZQ) is a drug for controlling schistosomiasis. In 2009, DFID
investigated scaling up treatment of schistosomiasis, since health need for the drug
far exceeded the available PZQ supply. DFID determined that donor financing, rather
than an industry supply constraint, was the bottleneck to scale up of PZQ provision.
They felt that additional PZQ supply – at least 100M extra tablets - could be made
available quickly if financing were made available.110

In 2007, 163M tablets of PZQ were sold. The Schistosomiasis Control Initiative
purchased 50% of this for distribution in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Tanzania,
Uganda, and Zambia, the Chinese market purchased 30%, and Egypt, Brazil and a
collection of smaller countries purchased the remainder.111

The patent on PZQ has expired and competition has driven down the purchase price
for the 600mg tablet to 8 cents by 2009. Shin Poong (Korea) is the only vertically
integrated manufacturer, manufacturing both the API and the finished product in
tablet form. The other formulators purchase their APIs from one of the API
manufacturers: Shin Poong (Korea), HaSun, Nan Jing, Hallochem Pharma (China),
Kingland Chemicals (China), Chuming Pharmaceutical (China), Nantong Chem-Tech
(China), Hangzhou Minsheng (China) and Shanghai Pharma (China). Manufacturers
on the formulation side include: Shin Poong (Korea), CIPLA (India), E. Merck
(Germany), EIPICO (Egypt), BDH Industries Limited (India), Sinochem Jiangsu
Corporation (China), and Purepharma (India). In addition, two Tanzanian
companies have begun to develop PZQ using low cost raw materials from China and
Korea. In 1993, Shin Poong was known to be the largest global producer of PZQ,
however current market shares for the producers are unknown. 112

Insecurity regarding the sustainability of donor financing for PZQ purchase has
decreased this market’s attractiveness from a producer’s standpoint. DFID is
concerned that E. Merck’s generous commitment to donate 20M tablets per year
may decrease countries’ finance allocation to PZQ purchase, effectively decreasing
market size. DFID would prefer sending a signal of predictable financing to
maintain secure and competitive supply.113

38
Program Drugs (HIV/AIDS, TB, and Malaria)

The markets for program drugs are relatively centralized, well-managed and
growing. Large financing agencies such as The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and
Malaria (Global Fund); The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)
and UNITAID manage most of the capital to assist developing countries to buy
program drugs. These international financing agencies require that governments
which use their funds to procure drugs, purchase only drugs that have an
international certification, either WHO PQ or approval from an SRA.
Currently, local Sub-Saharan manufacturers capture only a small share of the donor
market (estimated to amount to a total between $750 million and $1 billion). As of
April 2007, only two Sub-Saharan African manufacturers (South Africa’s Aspen
Pharmacare and Sandoz Pty) had WHO prequalified products, and these two Sub-
Saharan African manufacturers produced only 11 of the 248 WHO prequalified HIV,
TB, and malaria medicines. While several manufacturers in the region are seeking
prequalification, it is a difficult process, and one that is relatively more expensive for
a smaller manufacturer.114 Furthermore, once a firm achieves these certifications, it
is not guaranteed business but rather only becomes eligible to apply for a tender
where the firm may be, for example, one of eight firms applying.115

The API market for these drugs is relatively robust. Most concerns revolve around
quality standards more than the supply of the API. Possible situations where the
supply of APIs for HIV/AIDS, TB, or malaria may be impacted include:
 Tender cycle issues: Many international tenders work on annual or biannual
cycles. When a firm wins a tender, it is locked into a price and given a volume
estimate. In some cases, the volume is guaranteed; in other cases it is just an
estimate. This uncertainty is a challenge.
 Supply Chain timing risks: When a final formulator submits a tender, they will
get a price estimate from their API supplier but may not be able to lock in that
price. The formulator may have to wait from six months to a year between
submitting a tender and winning it. However, API firms do not like to hold price
quotations firm longer than 1-2 months due to currency fluctuations, changes in
export subsidies and tight controls on foreign currency.116 Final formulators will
incorporate this risk in their pricing. There have been cases where final
formulators have won tenders and then had difficulty in supplying at the
tendered price due to increased API prices.117
 End-market predatory pricing: Due to the competitive nature of some drug
markets, some final formulators may prices below where the market can
sustain.118

A risk is that many developing country governments are pushing for local
manufacturing of ARV drugs. This could open this space up to non-prequalified
manufacturers. In general, if the quality of the final formulator is in question, the
quality of the API manufacturer is even more questionable.

39
Anti-HIV drugs
Approximately 900,000 people are currently on ARV therapy worldwide, 500,000 of
whom are in developed countries. While Indian firms supply the API or the finished
product for less than half of the total, they supply a much larger percentage of the
product to patients in developing countries. Additionally as developing countries
continue to scale-up treatment, in the near-term, many of these APIs will come from
India, while Chinese and South African suppliers are also on the horizon. This will
make the marketplace more competitive generally, at least for the older ARVs.119

On the other hand, the market for newer ARVs is likely to become less competitive
over time, since TRIPS (Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights) implementation in major producing countries like India will make
generic copying of patented products illegal. The result is likely to be bifurcation of
the market for ARVs, with single-source products on the one hand and competitively
supplied products on the other.120

Many international organizations and NGOs are working within this space to ensure
access to quality drugs. Examples include UNAIDS, PEPFAR, UNITAID, the Global
Fund, and the Clinton Foundation.

Case Study: Clinton Foundation and HIV/AIDS drugs: When the Clinton
Foundation’s HIV/AIDS team, the Clinton HIV/AIDS Initiative (CHAI), decided
to tackle access to HIV/AIDS drugs, approximately 70,000 people were being
treated in the developing world. Manufacturers could not get scale
economies in production and charged high prices for the drugs. CHAI
worked both with African and Caribbean governments to obtain intentions to
purchase large orders if final formulation manufacturers offered lower
prices, as well as with final formulators, offering them a much larger and
less-volatile market for AIDS drugs in return for lower prices based on the
projected higher volume. While brand-name pharmaceutical companies
were not interested, some generic manufacturers in India and South Africa
were. The Foundation worked with these firms to bring costs down and, in
the words of President Clinton “was (able) to get them to go from what I call
a ‘jewelry-store model’ to a ‘grocery-store model’—from a high-profit, low-
volume, uncertain-payment business to a low-margin, high-volume, certain-
payment business.”121 Yusuf Hamied, chair of Cipla, said that his firm was
attracted to the foundation's plan because it ensured high-volume,
predictable contracts in developing countries, which were otherwise seen as
non-commercial markets.122

Case Study: The Global Fund launches a Voluntary Procurement

Program: In 2007, the board of the Global Fund mandated the Global Fund
to address drug procurement challenges with a new voluntary procurement
program. This pooled procurement recognizes that individual countries,
particularly smaller countries, buying Global Fund-financed drugs often have
little leverage from a costing perspective.123 When operationalized, this

40
 program may have some interesting possibilities for products that are
usually purchased in small volumes.

Anti-TB drugs

The Global Alliance for TB Drug Development reported in 2000 that the world spent
$470M on first- and second-line TB drugs. An estimated 30% of that was in the
public/tender market, and 13% came from international donor assistance.124

First-line TB drugs
The standard "short" course treatment for TB is isoniazid, rifampicin, pyrazinamide,
and ethambutol for two months and then isoniazid and rifampicin alone for a
further four months. The first-line TB drug cost is about $10 per patient for the
entire course. No new first-line TB drugs have been brought to the market in the
past 40 years and all the drugs are currently off-patent, therefore pricing should be
close to production costs and the market competitive.

The Global Drug Facility (GDF), an initiative of WHO and the Stop TB Partnership,
determined that the 2002 total first-line anti-TB drug market size was $341-
$384M, and the public/tender market was approximately $66M.125

The GDF aims to increase purchasing leverage through creating and pooling
demand, helping to standardize treatment regimens, and providing some financing.
And since the market is already competitive, the one-third price reductions that GDF
has achieved (on average) are less than what can be achieved by programs focused
on increasing access to drugs supplied by a single source.126

Second-line TB drugs
Second-line TB drugs include aminoglycoside; antibiotics such as amikacin or
kanamycin; polypeptide antibiotics such as capreomycin, pyrazinamide,
ethambutol; fluoroquinolones such as moxifloxacin, rifabutin, cycloserine;
thioamides such as prothionamide or ethionamide; PAS; macrolides such as
clarithromycin, linezolid; high-dose INH; interferon-γ; thioridazine; and meropenem
and clavulanic acid.127 Challenges with second-line TB drugs include the fact that
most of these drugs have only one supplier for each (as they can be technically
challenging to reverse engineer and/or are on patent). This makes competitive
tendering challenging and results in increased purchasing leverage and/or securing
differential pricing agreements as one of the few options to increase price / access.
128

WHO’s Green Light Committee (GLC) pools demand, structures partnerships and
negotiates on behalf of countries in a situation where demand is small and
extremely fragmented. Recognizing the differing market structures for MDR TB
drugs, GLC tailors its supplier approach to the market situation. For drugs that can
be competitively sourced, a GDF type bulk purchasing approach is used. For drugs

41
that are single-sourced or patented, a negotiation approach is used, based on quality
and price criteria, while longer-term, more competitive supply options are sought.
To maintain a competitive marketplace and ensure sustainable supply, GLC, utilizing
GDF as a procurement agent, awards a large percentage of its tender to the quality-
assured company with the lowest-priced drug, and a proportional percentage to one
or a few of the remaining quality manufacturers. GLC also looks for opportunities to
induce new suppliers to enter the market, thereby increasing competition. This was
done successfully with manufacturers of capreomycin and cycloserine, both
formerly exclusively produced by Eli Lilly, as well as with a third drug known as
PAS. GLC’s strategy has increased supply and decreased the price of quality-assured
MDR TB drugs. GLC has managed to achieve 85 - 99% reductions on US prices of the
14 products procured for GLC-endorsed projects. Drugs for an entire 2-year course
of therapy now cost US$ 500 - 1500.129

Antimalarials

Several families of drugs are used to treat malaria. Chloroquine was the anti-
malarial drug of choice as it is very cheap and effective. However, increasing
chloroquine resistance has made chloroquine, quinine and amodiaquine less
effective. Extracts of the plant Artemisia Annua (A. Annua), containing the
compound artemisinin or semi-synthetic derivatives offer over 90% efficacy rates.
Since 2001, WHO has recommended using Artemisinin-based Combination Therapy
(ACT) as first-line treatment for uncomplicated malaria in areas experiencing
resistance to older medications. While numerous countries, including most African
nations, have adopted the change in their official malaria treatment policies, cost
remains a major barrier to ACT implementation as ACTs cost up to twenty times as
much as older medications. It has been estimated that 80% of ACT cost is tied up in
the API.130

The high cost is partially due to ACT supply not meeting demand. Demand is high -
one estimate suggests 300-500M cases of malaria in Sub-Saharan Africa and,
assuming 60% of these cases are appropriate for ACT, this means a total demand of
treatment for 180-300M cases. Supply is lagging since enough raw material was
available in 2006 to generate only 20-30 million treatment doses. A primary driver
of this shortage is demand uncertainty: there is an 18 month lag between planting
seeds and getting final products to the market. Usually, in demand uncertainty
situations, producers adhere to the most conservative demand, and manufacturers
who might otherwise enter production of ACTs do not. In 2007, there were few
manufacturers: 6 producers of raw materials (3 in Vietnam, 2 in India, 1 in China)
and 12 producers of ACT finished product of differing combinations (4 in Europe, 7
in Asia, 1 in Africa).131

The following international initiatives are currently in place to address these market
challenges:132
 Affordable Medicines Facility – malaria (AMFm): The AMFm is a brand
new innovative financing mechanism, housed in the Global Fund, which aims

42
 to expand access to ACTs by providing a prepayment to ACT manufacturers
that will act as a credit when private, public and not-for-profit buyers make
their purchases for eligible countries. In 2008, MSF issued a statement
warning that unless AMFm preparedness planning includes API
manufacturers, the AMFm could increase demand of ACT to the point of
creating a global artesimin shortage.133 A Roll Back Malaria technical paper,
adopted the same day as the MSF warning, noted that given the planting
cycle of the A. Annua, decisions on the surface areas that need to be planted
will need to be made before the end of 2008 in order for planting to begin in
early 2009, and also noted the potential for a global shortage.134 UNITAID is
leading development of a more detailed forecast of ACT demand and supply
for Phase 1 roll-out of the AMFm, which began in April 2009.
 WHO / Novartis Partnership: WHO and Novartis have partnered to provide
Coartem (artemether-lumefantrine, a patented combination) at ‘cost’ pricing
of $2.40 per adult for 10 years. WHO reduces risks and costs for Novartis by
providing expert reviews, funding and technical assistance to make the
product better suited for target market, monitoring leakage, assisting with
collecting pharmacovigilance and post-marketing surveillance data, and by
reducing the transaction costs. WHO also forecasts demand and provides a
credit fund to help countries pay for Coartem.
 The Global Fund: The Global Fund committed $30M from 2001-2006 for
African countries to purchase ACTs in the first three proposal rounds. In the
fourth round of Global Fund applications, there was a sharp increase in
approvals that included funding for ACT treatments, leading to approved
funding for 122M treatments. This has shifted the primary problem from a
financing shortage to a supply shortage.
 Malaria Medicines Supply Service (MMSS): The MMSS service has recently
been formed in WHO to try and address the ACT challenges. MMSS will
incorporate the following functions:
o Financing: MMSS plans to work with countries to get firm support for
virtual pooling of funds through pledges and other means; to explore
other options to negotiate concessionary pricing or other favorable
terms from suppliers using a bilateral negotiation/firm contracting
approach; establish a resource mapping exercise and, if necessary,
explore a time-limited purchase fund for ACT (preferably within
existing structures), given the critical need for market stimulation and
rapid expansion.
o Supply chain management: demand forecasting, support for fast-
tracking in-country registration, pre-qualification of manufacturers /
products, a database on sources and prices; and technical support on
procurement planning.
o Technical tools.
o Provision of global information products.

43
Non Program Drugs

Paracetamol
Paracetamol, derived from coal tar, is one of the most important non steroid anti-
inflammatory drugs. Chinese paracetamol exports, valued at $44.8M, have
increased 13% year-on-year to 12,557 tons during the first quarter of 2009. The
average export price stood at US$3.6 per kilogram during this quarter, with a year-
on-year growth of 5%.135 Africa imported $6M of this, which is a 15.7% increase
from the year before. Exports to Nigeria alone increased 41.3% to US$3.4 million.136

While China has more than 100 paracetamol exporters, they are hampered by out-
of-date manufacturing processes. Excessive production capacity and low product
quality make it difficult for Chinese paracetamol producers to expand into high-end
markets outside of China. Without access to new markets, China’s domestic
paracetamol manufacturers have been forced to grab market share through a price
war137

Although 30-40% of the world’s total paracetamol final formulations are made in
China, many African firms make it as well. African final formulators can also find
many paracetamol API sources.

44
Endnotes
wb344397
C:\Users\wb344397\Desktop\API Exploratory Study FINAL September.docx
9/8/2009 2:08:00 PM

1 Contract Pharma. API Manufacturing: How will changes in India and China affect the outsourcing of
APIs? George Karris. September 2002.
2 Interview with Nazmul Hassan. CEO. Beximco Pharmaceuticals. Bangladesh. February 2007.
3 International Society for Pharmaceutical Engineering website:

http://www.gmp1st.com/3point1.htm. Accessed June 2009.

4 Interview with Nazmul Hassan. CEO. Beximco Pharmaceuticals. Bangladesh. February 2007.
5 Competition in the World APIs Market. Chemical Pharmaceutical Association (Italy). 2006. As

referenced in The Changing Fortunes of APIs. Patricia Van Arnum. Pharmaceutical Technology
Europe. October 1, 2007.
6 Interview with Mr. Amar Lulla, Joint Managing Director and Director, Cipla. May 2009.
7 Interview with Nandina Piramel. Executive Director. Piramel Health Care. India. May, 2009.
8 Interview with Dr. Reddys staff during API plant tour. May 2009.

9 Mylan Announces Successful Matrix Delistng Offer. Reuters:

http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS33210+01-Jun-2009+PRN20090601 June 2001.
Last accessed July 2009.
10 Interview with Joseph M. Fortunak, Associate Professor, Chemistry and Pharmaceutical Sciences,

Howard University. May 2009.

11 Interview with Kate Kuhrt. Newport Strategies, a Thomson Business. June 2009.
12 ibid.
13 Competition in the World APIs Market. Chemical Pharmaceutical Association (Italy). 2006. As

referenced in The Changing Fortunes of APIs. Patricia Van Arnum. Pharmaceutical Technology
Europe. October 1, 2007.
14 East Vs West In The Battle For APIs. Dr. Alberto Mangia, MD and General Manager. Poli Industria

Chimica SpA. Chemicals and Raw Materials. 2007.

15 ibid.
16 The Next Big Thing: India and China Hold Great Pharmaceutical Promise. The Economist. June 18,

2005.
17 East Vs West In The Battle For APIs. Dr. Alberto Mangia, MD and General Manager. Poli Industria

Chimica SpA. Chemicals and Raw Materials. 2007.

18 The PharmaNetwork Website: http://www.thepharmanetwork.com/api.html. Accessed June 2009
19 Interview with Nandina Piramel. Executive Director. Piramel Health Care. India. May, 2009.
20 The Business of Health in Africa. IFC. December 2007.
21 ibid.
22 Interview with Sue Capie. CEO. PharmaVantage. June 2009.
23 FDA Issues Warning Letters to Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. Essentialdrugs.org. September 19,

2008.
24 Manufacturer Recalls of Heparin Products. Creighton University Health Matters. May 2008.
25 Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.

http://archives.energycommerce.house.gov/cmte_mtgs/110-oi-hrg.042908.Heparin.shtml. Last
accessed July 2009.
26 Heparin Contamination – More than Just OSCS. Heparin Deaths.

http://heparindeaths.blogspot.com/2009/03/heparin-contamination-more-than-just.html. Last
accessed July 2009.
27 India and China: Emerging Generic Strategies. Presentation by Cynthia Dowd Greene. Vice

President Industry Research. Newport Strategies. March 2006.

28 Interview with Justina Molzon. Associate Director for International Programs 
 Center for Drug

Evaluation and Research/USFDA. July 2009.

29 China To Execute Chief Food Inspector. CBS News. May 29, 2007.

45
30 China executes the former head of its food and drug agency. The New York Times. July 10, 2007.
31 MSF website. Last accessed July 2009.
32 WHO Expert Committee on Specifications for Pharmaceutical Preparations - WHO Technical

Report Series, No. 917 - Thirty-eighth Report Annex 3: WHO pharmaceutical starting materials
certification scheme (SMACS): guidelines on implementation. World Health Organization. 2003.
33 WHO Expert Committee on Specifications for Pharmaceutical Preparations. World Health

Organization. 2009.
34 ibid.
35 ibid.
36 ICH Harmonized Tripartite Guideline: Good Manufacturing Practice Guide for Active

Pharmaceutical Ingredients – Q7. International Conference on Harmonization of Technical

Rquirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use. November 10, 2000.
37 PIC/S website: http://www.picscheme.org/members.php. Last accessed July 2009.
38 Revised Global Fund Quality Assurance Policy for Pharmaceutical Products. Consultative Meeting

of the Global Fund with Manufacturers of ARVs, Anti-TB and Anti Malarial Products. The Global
Fund. February 5, 2009.
39 The Business of Health in Africa. IFC. December 2007.
40 ibid.
41 ibid.
42 ibid.
43 Interview with Kate Kuhrt. Newport Strategies, a Thomson Business. June 2009.
44 Interview with David H. Brown Ripin, Scientific Director, Drug Access Program, Clinton

Foundation HIV/AIDS Initiative. May 2009.

45 Therapeutic drug use in Bangladesh: policy versus practice. Indian Journal of Medical Ethics.

2008.
46 Interview with Paul A. Lartey, CEO, LaGray Chemical Company, Ghana. June 2009.
47 Interview with Kate Kuhrt. Newport Strategies, a Thomson Business. June 2009.
48 Interview with Premchand Godha, Managing Director and Pranay Godha, Executive Director. IPCA

Laboratories. India. May 2009.

49 Interview with David H. Brown Ripin, Scientific Director, Drug Access Program, Clinton

Foundation HIV/AIDS Initiative. May 2009.

50 ibid.
51 Interview with Sue Capie. CEO. PharmaVantage. June 2009.
52 Interview with Juergen Knoebel. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. July 2009.
53 Threats and Opportunities for the Generics API Industry. Kate Kuhrt. Newport Strategies.
54 Interview with Nandina Piramel. Executive Director. Piramel Health Care. India. May, 2009.
55 Interview with Sue Capie. CEO. PharmaVantage. June 2009.
56 ibid.
57 Interview with Joseph M. Fortunak, Associate Professor, Chemistry and Pharmaceutical Sciences,

Howard University. May 2009.

58 Interview with Sue Capie. CEO. PharmaVantage. June 2009.
59 Interview with David H. Brown Ripin, Scientific Director, Drug Access Program, Clinton

Foundation HIV/AIDS Initiative. May 2009.

60 ibid.
61 Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eflornithine. Accessed June 2009.
62 Interview with Sue Capie. CEO. PharmaVantage. June 2009.
63 Interview with Juergen Knoebel. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. July 2009.
64 World Health Organization website:

http://www.who.int/medicines/publications/qa_starter/en/index1.html Accessed June 2009.

65 Global Health Partnership Impact on Commodity Pricing and Security. DFID. 2007.
66 ibid.
67 ibid.
68 Interview with Sue Capie. CEO. PharmaVantage. June 2009.

46
69 Interview with David H. Brown Ripin, Scientific Director, Drug Access Program, Clinton
Foundation HIV/AIDS Initiative. May 2009.
70 ibid.
71 World Health Organization website:

http://www.who.int/medicines/publications/qa_starter/en/index1.html Accessed June 2009.

72 Competition in the World APIs Market. Chemical Pharmaceutical Association (Italy). 2006. As

referenced in The Changing Fortunes of APIs. Patricia Van Arnum. Pharmaceutical Technology
Europe. October 1, 2007.
73 Public Sector Production: Local Production and Generic Manufacturing – China Perspective. Sun

Jing. WHO, China. Presentation in New Delhi, India. 10-14 Nov 2008.
74 Chinese API Industry Aims To Close The Competitiveness Gap With India. Chemical Market

Reporter. April 2005.

75 Public Sector Production: Local Production and Generic Manufacturing – China Perspective. Sun

Jing. WHO, China. Presentation in New Delhi, India. 10-14 Nov 2008.
76 Western Manufacturers Buy in China. ICIS.com. June 07, 2004.
77 Public Sector Production: Local Production and Generic Manufacturing – China Perspective. Sun

Jing. WHO, China. Presentation in New Delhi, India. 10-14 Nov 2008.
78 India and China: Emerging Generic Strategies. Presentation by Cynthia Dowd Greene. Vice

President Industry Research. Newport Strategies. March 2006.

79 Western Manufacturers Buy in China. ICIS.com. June 07, 2004.
80 Public Sector Production: Local Production and Generic Manufacturing – China Perspective. Sun

Jing. WHO, China. Presentation in New Delhi, India. 10-14 Nov 2008.
81 ibid.
82 Chinese API Industry Aims To Close The Competitiveness Gap With India. Chemical Market

Reporter. April 2005.

83 Public Sector Production: Local Production and Generic Manufacturing – China Perspective. Sun

Jing. WHO, China. Presentation in New Delhi, India. 10-14 Nov 2008.
84 Interview with Sue Capie. CEO. PharmaVantage. June 2009.
85 Chinese API Industry Aims To Close The Competitiveness Gap With India. Chemical Market

Reporter. April 2005.

86 China's 2009 Regulatory Changes Will Affect Makers of Drugs, APIs and Devices. PharmAsia News.

January 6, 2009.
87 China executes the former head of its food and drug agency. The New York Times. July 10, 2007.
88 Chinese Chemicals Flow Unchecked Onto World Drug Market. The New York Times. October 31,

2007.
89 Western Manufacturers Buy in China. ICIS.com. June 07, 2004.
90 Chinese API Industry Aims To Close The Competitiveness Gap With India. Chemical Market

Reporter. April 2005.

91 ibid.
92 Gordon R. Orr. ‘What executives are asking about China’, McKinsey Quarterly, 2005. As quoted in A

Briefing Paper for DFID: Update on China and India and Access to Medicines. Cheri Grace. November
2005.
93 The Next Big Thing: India and China Hold Great Pharmaceutical Promise. The Economist. June 18,

2005.
94 China's 2009 Regulatory Changes Will Affect Makers of Drugs, APIs and Devices. PharmAsia News.

January 6, 2009.
95 Interview with Premchand Godha, Managing Director and Pranay Godha, Executive Director. IPCA

Laboratories. India. May 2009.

96 Interview with Sue Capie. CEO. PharmaVantage. June 2009.
97 Interview with Mr. Amar Lulla, Joint Managing Director and Director, Cipla. May 2009.
98 The Contenders: Indian API producers make their mark on the global market. Chemical Market

Reporter. October 31, 2005.

99 ibid.
100 ibid.

47
101 Indian Firms Add API Plan in China, JV in Japan. Chemical Week. January 25, 2006.
102 Bulk Drug Manufacturers Association (India) data from website:
http://www.bdmai.org/statistics.html. Accessed June 2007
103 Interview with D.G. Shah. Secretary General. Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance. India. May 2009.
104 Interview with Nandina Piramel. Executive Director. Piramel Health Care. India. May, 2009.
105 Chinese Raw Material Costs Stifle Production. In-Pharma Technologist. June 12, 2008.
106 ibid.
107 Interview with Kate Kuhrt. Newport Strategies, a Thomson Business. June 2009.
108 Interview with Mark Paxton, Associate VP, International Regulatory Affairs, PhRMA. May 2009.
109 ibid.
110 Options for DFID Support to Schistosomiasis Control Through Financing Praziquantel Purchase.

DFID. Draft version March 2009.

111 ibid.
112 ibid.
113 ibid.
114 The Business of Health in Africa. IFC. December 2007.
115 ibid.
116 Interview with Sue Capie. CEO. PharmaVantage. June 2009.
117 Interview with David H. Brown Ripin, Scientific Director, Drug Access Program, Clinton

Foundation HIV/AIDS Initiative. May 2009.

118 ibid.
119 Global Health Partnership Impact on Commodity Pricing and Security. DFID. 2007.
120 ibid.
121 ‘This Is Not Charity’ Jonathan Rauch.

http://www.jonathanrauch.com/jrauch_articles/bill_clinton_reinvents_philanthropy/ Accessed June

2009.
122 Clinton Foundation Announces Details of Deal To Cut Prices of Generic Antiretrovirals in Africa,

Caribbean. Global Health Reporting. October 2003.

123 Global Fund website http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/procurement/vpp/ Last accessed July

2009.
124 Global Health Partnership Impact on Commodity Pricing and Security. DFID. 2007.
125 ibid.
126 ibid.
127 Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tuberculosis_treatment. Last accessed July 2009.
128 Global Health Partnership Impact on Commodity Pricing and Security. DFID. 2007.
129 ibid.
130 Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaria#Treatment. Last accessed July 2009.
131 Global Health Partnership Impact on Commodity Pricing and Security. DFID. 2007.
132 ibid.

133 MSF comments on AMFm proposal by Global Fund Board. 31 Oct 2008 [e-drug]:
http://www.essentialdrugs.org/edrug/archive/200811/msg00014.php Last accessed July 2009.
134 Roll Back Malaria. Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient Requirements for the Manufacture of ACTs:
Position Paper. Technical Paper No. RBM/WG/2008/TP.1, adopted on 31 OCT 2008
135 China’s domestic paracetamol manufacturers engage in price war. Alex Shaw, Pharmaceutical

Manufacturing News. May 18, 2009.

136 ibid.
137 ibid.

48
 D O C U M E N T O D E T R A B A J O

La gestión de los hospitales en América Latina

Resultados de una encuesta realizada en cuatro países

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