Review of Accounting and Finance: Article Information
Review of Accounting and Finance: Article Information
Review of Accounting and Finance: Article Information
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10,1 Auditors’ going-concern
judgments: rigid, adaptive,
or both?
30
Andrew J. Rosman
University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut, USA
Abstract
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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine when auditors’ decision behavior is rigid and
adaptive in the going-concern judgment. Because rigid behavior has been found to produce
inappropriate outcomes, understanding when decision behavior is rigid or adaptive can lead to
improved decision making.
Design/methodology/approach – An experiment is conducted using cases based on real
companies to produce information search traces as dependent measures that are studied in the
ill-structured and structured parts of the going-concern task.
Findings – Auditors are adaptive in ill-structured tasks and rigid in structured tasks as predicted by
theory. Evidence of flawed decision making commonly found in studies of fixation and related concepts
was not found.
Research limitations/implications – The findings suggest the importance of explicitly
accounting for task structure when studying decision behavior in situated contexts. Future
research could assess whether task structure similarly impacts behavior in non-auditing contexts.
Practical implications – Researchers and practitioners have long been concerned about
inappropriate rigid behavior. This paper helps practitioners better understand when rigid or
adaptive behavior is likely to occur to improve decision making.
Originality/value – Taking a novel approach to reconcile two well established but conflicting bodies
of literature by focusing on “when” not “whether” people are rigid or adaptive, this paper resolves a
long-standing paradox. The implication for the literature is that reframing the question and directly
measuring behavior demonstrates that individuals are neither rigid nor adaptive, but can be both as
they follow behavior that is consistent with the demands of the task when the demands are defined in
terms of task structure.
Keywords Auditors, Decision making, Cognition, Individual behaviour, Going concern value
Paper type Research paper
I. Introduction
Research on fixation and related concepts in the cognitive and Gestalt psychology
literatures focuses on whether decision makers learn rigid decision behaviors
(i.e. persistently use a previously developed approach to solving a problem) or
adaptive decision behaviors (i.e. modify their decision processes to changes in
information), and generally find the former in accounting and other contexts (Ashton,
1976; Barnes and Webb, 1986; Bloom et al., 1984; Chang and Birnberg, 1977; Dearborn
and Simon, 1958). But, might experienced decision makers also learn adaptive
behaviors, and might some rigid behavior be appropriate? While the empirical evidence
Review of Accounting and Finance suggests otherwise, some question the research focus used to derive that evidence.
Vol. 10 No. 1, 2011
pp. 30-45 Gibbins and Jamal (1993, p. 453) observed that research “has led to theory development
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited [. . .] of the persons who carry out a specific kind of task rather than a theory of the task
1475-7702
DOI 10.1108/14757701111113802 itself [. . .].” They, therefore, propose “shifting the focus more toward the task setting
to which they may adapt.” Similarly, others warn that research that fails to consider the Auditors’
environment or setting will miss important determinants of performance since going-concern
environmental factors affect motivation, knowledge, and ability (Libby and Luft, 1993).
One way to shift the focus from the individual to the task setting in which decision judgments
makers learn is to reframe the research question to ask what is it about novel (routine)
situations that would cause decision makers to learn to be adaptive (rigid) and when is
being adaptive (rigid) appropriate? In other words, rather than ask whether individuals’ 31
behavior is rigid or adaptive the question becomes under what conditions or when will
individuals learn to be rigid or adaptive? To investigate how task setting may affect how
rigid and adaptive behaviors are learned, this paper uses theories of situated cognition
and adaptive behavior to examine the role of task structure in determining rigid and
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Rosman et al., 1994, 1999; Turner, 1976; Walsh, 1988). Task structure is the extent
to which the components of a task are well organized, interrelated, and understood
(Abdolmohammadi, 1999; Bowrin, 1998; Prawitt, 1995) and can be defined in terms of the
number of constraints left unspecified by the initial problem statement (Reitman, 1965).
Structured tasks are well organized and understood so they typically are handled in
a routine or rigid way because it is appropriate to persistently apply the same schema.
Ill-structured tasks “have not been encountered in quite the same form” so that “no
predetermined and explicit set of ordered responses exist in the organization”
(Mintzberg et al., 1976, p. 246). That is, by definition ill-structured tasks are novel and are
more likely to be approached by the decision maker in a flexible or adaptive way because
the decision maker understands that persistent and stable schemas would produce
flawed decisions (Elsbach et al., 2005).
Consistent with the Gestalt psychologists’ studies about insight, most studies
concluded that experienced decision makers, when confronted with an ill-structured
problem, will tend to rigidly rely on their prior domain-specific knowledge, rather than
adjust their behaviors to the specific information presented in problems. Examples
include study of chess masters (Chase and Simon, 1973), bridge champions (Frensch and
Sternberg, 1989), physicists (Chi et al., 1981), and tax consultants (Marchant et al., 1991).
From these and other studies have come warnings about rigidity and its analogues,
selective perception (Dearborn and Simon, 1958), perceptual screens (Cyert and March,
1963), functional fixedness (Katz, 1982), tunnel vision (Mason and Mitroff, 1981),
collective blindness (Turner, 1976), escalation of commitment (Staw, 1981), and
commitment to the status quo (Geletkanycz and Black, 2001).
Perhaps, the most widely cited study among those listed above is one on functionally
trained decision makers (Dearborn and Simon, 1958), which found that when experts’
domain-specific knowledge does not efficiently map onto the structure of a decision task,
they tend to display a “departmental” bias; that is, functionally trained decision makers
(e.g. those employed in the marketing department) will tend to identify organizational
problems in terms of their specific functional experiences, regardless of the nature of the
problem.
Notwithstanding this extensive literature, another well-established body of research
shows that individuals have the capacity to adapt behaviors in the short term to respond
to unique contexts, to create new knowledge to solve problems over the intermediate
period, and to evolve to a new way of thinking through learning over a longer period
of time (Newell and Simon, 1972; Simon, 1981). Moreover, characteristics of tasks,
including setting and structure, are critical in understanding human behavior.
Analyzing the demands of task environments enables researchers to examine both Auditors’
whether and when individuals adapt. going-concern
A well-structured task can engender appropriate rigid decision processes because
decision makers, who have had repeated experience with that task structure, should judgments
recognize that their domain-specific knowledge efficiently (at minimum cost) maps onto
the structure of the decision task (Shanteau, 1992; Stewart et al., 1997). That is, because
well-structured decision tasks have few unspecified constraints, the domain-specific 33
knowledge learned by experienced decision makers should prompt them to cut short
information search and rigidly (but appropriately) jump to solutions used in the past
without much conscious thought. In contrast, ill-structured tasks should engender
appropriate non-rigid decision behaviors because they are not as constraining.
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Nonetheless, few studies explicitly account for task structure when analyzing decision
behavior other than performance. This omission may be because the focus of most studies
is on the question of whether experienced decision makers display rigid decision behaviors,
rather than on when, or under what task conditions, rigid behaviors are appropriate
(Gibbins and Jamal, 1993; Libby and Luft, 1993). Therefore, the many warnings about
rigidity that frequently appear in the literature may be an artifact of the research design.
may be that only those who have learned or acquired domain knowledge in ill-structured
tasks are able to “invent new procedures” to fit the challenge of ill-structured tasks
(Holyoak, 1991, p. 310 emphasis added). Thus, being exposed to ill-structured situated
contexts is critical to developing the ability to adapt.
Consistent with Holyoak (1991), chess masters (Chase and Simon, 1973), bridge
playing experts (Frensch and Sternberg, 1989), and physicists (Chi et al., 1981), who
rely primarily on a mastery of routinized knowledge, are routine experts. In contrast,
various types of business functional experts, including marketing decision makers
(Beyer et al., 1997) are adaptive experts. The latter acquire their expertise from repeated
exposure to complex tasks in ill-structured (unbounded) learning environments, each
with some degree of underlying structure, but clearly with a moderate to high degree of
ill structure.
Adaptive experts use a combination of rigid and non-rigid decision processes
depending upon the mix of ill-structured and well-structured informational cues
contained in the decision task (Holyoak, 1991). Routine experts, on the other hand,
inappropriately apply routine (fixated or rigid) decision processes to ill-structured tasks
and settings because they are more bound to procedural knowledge, and thus are less
aware of unspecified constraints in that task. Thus, it follows that individuals should
follow similar procedures across structured tasks because the task structure requires
continued use of the same routine response. In contrast, individuals should adapt
procedures across ill-structured tasks, which demand different responses.
Should the evaluation in stage 1 suggest substantial doubt about viability, then before
issuing a final report, the auditor must judge how effective management’s plans are for
addressing the firm’s core problems. This stage, which results in an audit opinion, is
bounded by the findings of the evaluation stage (i.e. the need to consider management’s
plan arises solely in reaction to a finding of substantial doubt in the first stage). For
instance, if liquidity is the area of concern, the auditor analyzes and tests viability with
respect to liquidity only. Because rules and procedures limit the actions that can be taken
by the auditor, this second (“opinion”) stage is thus constrained and well structured. Put
differently, stage 2 is well defined because the problems that might affect the type of
opinion to be issued have been defined in stage 1, and in turn, they lead to clearly
articulated steps to assess the ability of management to mitigate the problems[1].
Building upon the theoretical frameworks of situated cognition and adaptive
behavior and the task analysis of the going-concern judgment, I hypothesize that:
H1. Auditors will use adaptive decision processes for ill-structured situations
(evaluative stage).
H2. Auditors will use rigid decision processes for well-structured situations
(opinion stage).
V. Experiment
Sample and task description
The sample consists of 23 auditors from international accounting firms who had
attained the status of senior or manager to help ensure that each had expertise with the
going-concern task. The experiment required about 60 minutes to complete and was
presented in the field via search monitor, which is menu-driven software well suited for
investigating information acquisition because it unobtrusively and completely records
all information acquired by the user (Biggs et al., 1993).
The experiment included data from six companies that were extracted from
public documents. Using real companies was intended to help ensure external validity,
although fictitious names were used. Case order was varied across participants to
minimize an order effect. Each session began with a practice session to allow
participants to become familiar with the task.
Each case began with a description of the company. The second screen listed ten
categories of information and then requested the selection of one category. Auditors
could select from five categories of financial information (profitability, liquidity,
financial leverage, inventory turnover, and capital intensity). Each measure had three
RAF years of data. Seven pieces of strategic information were also available (e.g. biographies
10,1 of the president/CEO, senior vice presidents, and vice presidents; market demand;
competition; description of products; and description of any patents) consistent with
studies that have shown the importance of non-financial information in going-concern
judgments (Parker et al., 2005).
information was. Two finer grained, within-subject measures (same financial and same
strategic), are also used. These two additional sameness measures are consistent with
the taxonomy offered by Payne and Bettman (2004) relating to measures of selectivity,
and are constructed using the following three steps.
In step 1, “same financial” was constructed by determining whether a cue from one of
the five categories of financial information (e.g. capital intensity) was acquired for one
of the two near-bankrupt companies. If no cue was acquired, then the measure was
scored a “0”. If at least one cue was acquired, then the measure was scored a “1.” In step 2,
the scores for each company were subtracted. In step 3, the absolute value of each
difference scores was obtained and then summed over each of the five categories.
Absolute values were used since the direction of a difference does not matter as described
previously for the “amount” scores. Rather, what matters is only that a difference
occurred. A score of “1” implies non-rigidity or adaptation (i.e. the auditor approached
the two companies differently, rather than automatically acquiring the same category of
information). For example, the auditor may have judged that a particular category of
financial information contained cues salient to one company, but not to another.
To illustrate, assume that an individual acquired at least one cue in the liquidity and
leverage categories for the first company, and at least one cue in the profitability,
liquidity, and capital intensity categories for the second company (see Appendix 1).
A score of “1” would be assigned to profitability for Company 2, to liquidity for both
companies, to leverage for Company 1, and to capital intensity for Company 2. All other
category/company combinations would be assigned a score of “0.” Difference scores
would be calculated and then the absolute value would be obtained. The absolute value
scores would be summed across the five categories to produce the metric for data
analysis. In this example, the absolute value of “1” would be scored for profitability,
leverage, and capital intensity, whereas liquidity and inventory turnover would receive
a score of “0.” The sum of the absolute value of difference scores is three, which is the
value used for data analysis. A similar analysis was conducted using the five categories
of strategic information (management, market demand, competition, description of
products, and patents) to obtain a metric for each participant for “same strategic.”
Because auditors proceed to the opinion stage of the going-concern task and seek
additional information only when they conclude in the evaluation stage that there is
substantial doubt about the entity’s viability, the within-subject analysis used in the
opinion stage is performed on a reduced set of participants (i.e. those who expressed
substantial doubt in the evaluation stage). In contrast, the within-subject analysis used
in the evaluation stage is performed for all participants.
Measures in the second stage are constructed to be similar to those in the first stage.
The opinion stage measure similar to amount of information acquired in the evaluation
stage is the number or amount of mitigating factors identified by participants.
The opinion stage measures similar to “sameness” measures in the evaluation stage
are based on the characteristics of the mitigating factors identified previously in SAS 59:
financial, strategic, past, future, consistent with or not consistent with SAS 59.
The calculation of the sameness measures in the opinion stage is similar for the opinion
stage (see the illustration in the Appendix 2). In sum, there are four measures of rigidity
in the evaluation stage (amount and same for financial and strategic) and seven
measures of rigidity in the opinion stage.
VI. Results
Table I presents the within-subject results of the paired t-tests that address H1 for the
ill-structured evaluation stage. H1 states that auditors will exhibit adaptive behavior in
this stage of the going-concern task because the ill-structured nature of this task lends
itself to adaptive behavior. Each t-test analyzes whether the difference in the means is
statistically different from zero. Statistically significant differences provide evidence of
adaptive behavior.
n Mean difference SE t pa
differences provide evidence of adaptive behavior, which would not be consistent with H2.
The variable in stage 2 that most closely resembles the amount variable in stage 1 is
shown in Table II as “amount (no. of mitigating factors).” It is a count of mitigating
factors. The amount variable is statistically significant overall, which suggests adaptive
behavior that is not consistent with the expectation in H2. One of the other variables in
Table II, which resembles the sameness measures in Table I, is statistically significant
(same SAS 59 yes (t ¼ 2.45 and p ¼ 0.04)) and another is marginally significant (same
strategic (t ¼ 1.96 and p ¼ 0.08)). Otherwise, the remaining four paired t-tests are not
statistically significant. However, a Bonferroni family-wise error correction to adjust
p-values for same SAS 59 yes and same strategic would produce non-statistically
significant results. Therefore, after the Bonferroni correction, the p-values for only the
amount (number of mitigating factors) variable would remain statistically significant.
n Mean difference SE t pa
Notes
1. The paper has described the going-concern judgment task using terminology and procedures
consistent with generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) in the USA because the
participants in this study are auditors in the USA who follow these standards. A review of the
comparable international standards (IFAC, 2009) describes essentially the same stages as
under US standards. For example, in paragraph 16 of ISA 570, the standard discusses what the
auditor should do once events or conditions are found that “may cast significant doubt on the
entity’s ability to continue as a going concern” including the evaluation of mitigating factors.
That is, like US GAAS, ISA 570 specifically considers two stages, one in which substantial
doubt is identified and a subsequent stage in which the event of condition that raised doubt is
then investigated to see if it can be mitigated.
2. This study is interested in differences in acquisition behavior across the companies rather
than in the direction of differences. Therefore, the absolute value of the difference scores is
used since it does not matter whether a higher or lower amount of information was acquired Auditors’
for company one compared with company two, but rather what matters is only that
a difference occurred. A non-zero score for any of the two “amount” measures implies that the going-concern
auditor demonstrated non-rigidity (flexibility) in the acquisition of information for the two judgments
companies in the experiment.
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1. Profitability 0 1 21 1
2. Liquidity 1 1 0 0
3. Financial leverage 1 0 1 1
4. Inventory turnover 0 0 0 0
5. Capital intensity 0 1 21 1
Table AI. Total 3
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