Reclamation - Manila Bay

EN BANC
ERNESTO FRANCISCO, JR., G. R. No. 154117

Petitioner,
- versus - Present:
OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A. PUNO, C.J.,

DESIERTO, JOSEPH EJERCITO QUISUMBING,*
ESTRADA, MARIANO Z. YNARES-SANTIAGO,
VELARDE, FRANKLIN M. CARPIO,
VELARDE, ROBERT C. CORONA,
NACIANCENO, REY DIVINO S. CARPIO MORALES,
DAVAL-SANTOS, SOLEDAD S. CHICO-NAZARIO,
MEDINA-CUE, PATRICK B. VELASCO, JR.,
GATAN, LUIS V. MEDINA-CUE, NACHURA,
SILVESTRE A. DE LEON, RAMON LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
V. DUMAUAL, RUBEN A. DE BRION,**
OCAMPO, MARIANO A. PERALTA,
BENEDICTO II, GREGORIO R. BERSAMIN,
VIGILAR, LUIS JUAN L. VIRATA, DEL CASTILLO, and
CESAR E. A. VIRATA, MANUEL B. ABAD, JJ.
ZAMORA, JR., RONALDO B.
ZAMORA, FRISCO F. SAN Promulgated:
JUAN and ARSENIO B. YULO October 2, 2009
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to review and set aside the Resolution[1] issued by
the Office of the Ombudsman dated November 16, 2001 dismissing, for lack of
evidence, the case filed by petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. (hereinafter,
petitioner); and the Order,[2] likewise issued by said Office, dated June 24,
2002 denying, for lack of merit, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Page 1 of 78
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS.
On 16 April 2001, petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit docketed as OMB-

0-01-0577 with the Office of the Ombudsman, alleging that the following
respondents, by their individual acts and/or by conspiring and confederating with
one another, have committed the offenses/acts enumerated hereunder:
a) For violation of Republic Act No. 7080, otherwise known as an

Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, specifically
Section 2, in relation to Section 1, sub-paragraph d(1), (3) and (6),
as amended, by Republic Act No. 7659[:]
1. Joseph Ejercito Estrada former President of the

Republic of the Philippines
2. Mariano Bro. Mike Z. Velarde
3. Franklin M. Velarde
4. Gregorio R. Vigilar former Secretary of
[Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH)] and
Chairman, [Toll Regulatory
Board (TRB)]
5. Mariano E. Benedicto II Executive Director, TRB
6. Ramon V. Dumaual former Officer-in-Charge,
TRB
7. Frisco San Juan former Chairman, [Public
Estates Authority (PEA)]
8. John Does and Jane Does
b) For violation of Section 3(a) of [Republic Act No. 3019:]
1. Joseph Ejercito Estrada

2. Gregorio R. Vigilar
3. Mariano E. Benedicto
4. Ramon V. Dumaual
5. Frisco San Juan
c) For violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019:
Page 2 of 78
2. Mariano Brother Mike Z. Velarde
5. Mariano E. Benedicto II
6. Ramon V. Dumaual
7. Ruben de Ocampo
8. Frisco San Juan
9. Arsenio B. Yulo former Chairman and
[General] Manager, PEA
10. Robert Nacianceno former [Metro Manila
Development Authority
(MMDA)] Manager and
Chairman, Paraaque City
Appraisal Committee
(PCAC)
11. Patrick B. Gatan DPWH Representative,
PCAC Member
12. Luis V. Medina-Cue Pasay City Assessor,
PCAC Member
13. Soledad V. Medina-Cue Paraaque City Assessor,
PCAC Member
14. Rey Divino Daval-Santos OIC Paraaque City
Engineers Office, PCAC
Member
15. Silvestre de Leon Paraaque City Treasurer,
PCAC Member
16. Ronaldo B. Zamora former Executive Secretary
17. Luis J. L. Virata
18. Manuel B. Zamora, Jr.
19. Cesar E.A. Virata
d) For violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019;

5. Mariano E. Benedicto, II
6. Ramon V. Dumaual
7. Ruben de Ocampo
Page 3 of 78
8. Frisco San Juan
9. Ronaldo B. Zamora
e) For violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019;
f) For violation of Section 3(j) of R.A. 3019;

3. Mariano E. Benedicto, II
4. Frisco San Juan
[g] For violation of Section 7(a) and (d) of R.A. 6713;
1. Ronaldo B. Zamora[3]
On May 31, 1990, during the administration of President Corazon Aquino, the
Republic of the Philippines, through the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB),[4] granted the
Public Estates Authority (PEA) a Toll Operation Certificate to construct,
rehabilitate, maintain and operate a toll expressway, namely, (a) Seaside Drive at
Paraaque to C-6 at Bacoor, Cavite; and (b) Expressway Extension to
Noveleta/Kawit.
On February 3, 1994, during the administration of President Fidel Ramos,

Renong Berhad, Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA), and the PEA entered into a
Page 4 of 78
Memorandum of Understanding to jointly undertake the implementation of the
tollway project.[5]
On December 27, 1994, also during the administration of President Ramos,

Renong Berhad, MARA and the PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement to
develop and operate as a toll road the R-1 Expressway Extension. The entire project
became known as the MCTE Project.[6]
On August 17, 1995, Renong Berhad, MARA, PEA and United Engineers
(Malaysia) Berhad entered into a Novation Agreement whereby Renong Berhad
assigned to United Engineers (Malaysia) Berhad (UEM) its rights, liabilities and
obligations under the Joint Venture Agreement.[7]
On July 26, 1996, the Republic of the Philippines, acting through the TRB,
PEA and UEM-MARA Philippines Corporation (UMPC) entered into a Toll
Operations Agreement (TOA)[8] for the design, construction, operation and
maintenance of the MCTE project, which covered the Manila-Cavite Toll
Expressway, the R-1 Expressway, the C-5 Link Expressway, and the R-1
Expressway Extension. President Fidel Ramos approved the TOA on the same day,
July 26, 1996. Under the terms of the TOA:
1. UEM-MARA shall design and construct the expressways covered by

the TOA;
2. TRB shall ensure the availability and assume responsibility for the
acquisition of the lands required for the right of way including the costs
for procuring the area for the right of way;
3. PEA shall operate and maintain the expressways; and
4. PEA shall advance the funds necessary for the acquisition of the Right
of Way subject to reimbursement by the Republic of the Philippines.[9]
On August 9, 1997, the TRB approved the original alignment for the C-5
link. On the basis of this alignment, the TRB issued notices to the owners of all
properties affected, some of which either belonged to AMVEL Land Corporation
(AMVEL) or were part of joint venture agreements between AMVEL and the
property owners. Private respondent Mariano Z. Velarde is the Chairman of
AMVEL while private respondent Franklin M. Velarde is the Executive Vice
President.
Page 5 of 78
Among those property owners to whom TRB sent notices were the following:
a. Mariano Z. Velarde;
b. Asuncion de Jugo;
c. Cornelia Medina;
d. Rosario Medina; and
e. Silvestre Medina.[10]
Under the Memorandum of Agreement[11] (MOA) between PEA and the

Republic of the Philippines through the TRB and the DPWH, the obligations of PEA
and TRB/DPWH with respect to the acquisition of the right-of-way were set
forth. Under the MOA, the parties agreed that PEA shall have the following
obligations:
1. To pay the purchase price of the lots to be expropriated for right of

way as determined and requested by TRB/DPWH, x x x
2. To pay the expenses incurred in the relocation or eviction of squatters
for the right-of-way requirements, subject to TRB/DPWHs repayment
x x x;
3. The total amount to be disbursed in the acquisition of right-of-way and
the additional expenses incurred in the relocation and eviction of
squatters shall not exceed the amount borrowed under the loan
agreement.[12]
On the other hand, TRB shall have the following obligations:
1. To identify and locate the lots to be acquired for the right-of-way;

2. To negotiate with individual owners of the lands their purchase price
in accordance with Executive Order No. 329 dated July 11, 1988,
Executive Order No. 368 dated August 24, 1989 and Executive Order
No. 369 dated September 14, 1989;
3. To cause the removal and/or relocation of the squatters that may
hinder the construction of the expressway;
4. To prepare the necessary documents between the TRB/DPWH and the
lot owners and owners of improvements;
5. To cause the cancellation of the Certificate of Title in the name of
individual lot owners; [and]
6. To certify to the PEA that the lots for payment are free from all
encumbrances and liens in accordance with the TOA.
Page 6 of 78
It was pursuant to this MOA that the TRB identified and negotiated with the
owners of the properties affected by the construction of the Tollway Project C-5
Link Expressway. Among the properties affected by the Tollway Project were
properties owned or held by AMVEL Land Development Corporation (AMVEL),
namely:
Land No. Landowner TCT No. Affected Area

(sq m)
Lot 1-A Corazon & Cornelia Medina 33989 1,520
Lot 1-B AMVEL Land Development 33989 6,583
Corp. (AMVEL)
Lot 2-A AMVEL 33988 6,062
Lot B-3-1 ADV Realty Corp. 122510 2,153
Lot 1 AMVEL 33550 6,643
Lot 2-B AMVEL 31446 3,908
Lot 2-C-1 AMVEL 31460 3,813
Lot 2-D-1 Ma. Asuncion de Jugo 113793 753
Lot 2-F-1 Rona Agustines 113796 2,973
Lot 1 Julieta Evangelista, et al. 122378 5,229
Lot 3-A E. Tirona, et al. 133990 16,543
Lot 2-B AMVEL 31988 16,313
Lot 4-A Tirona, et al. 133991 7,075
Total 79,568
Pursuant to the MOA, the TRB requested the Paraaque City Appraisal
Committee (PCAC) of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA)
to appraise the affected properties. This Appraisal Committee was created by virtue
of Executive Order No. 329 dated July 11, 1988 as amended by Executive Order No.
369 dated August 24, 1989 specifically for the purpose of determining the fair
valuation of properties to be purchased or acquired for development and
infrastructure projects for public use.[13]
On April 21, 1998, PCAC issued Resolution Nos. 98-5,[14] 98-6[15] and 98-
7[16] appraising properties along Dr. A. Santos Avenue as follows:
Page 7 of 78
1. All lots abutting Dr. A. Santos Avenue at TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P25,000.00) per sq. m.;
2. All lots interior of Dr. A. Santos Avenue particularly along Palasan and
Calang-Calangan, Bgy. San Dionisio at TWENTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P20,000.00) per sq. m.;
3. All untitled lots abutting Dr. A. Santos Avenue at SEVENTEEN

THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P17,500.00) per sq. m.; and
4. All untitled lots interior of Dr. A. Santos Avenue along Palasan and Calang-
Calangan at FOURTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P14,000.00) per sq. m.[17]
On May 6, 1998, the PCAC transmitted copies of Resolution Nos. 98-5, 98-6, 98-
7 to the TRB.[18]
On May 7, 1998, the TRB, through its Resolution No. 98-26, approved the
acquisition of properties affected by the C-5 Link in accordance with the PCAC
appraisals.[19]
On May 8, 1998, the TRB, through Ramon V. Dumaual, made Payment

Instructions[20] to PEA to pay AMVELs property at P20,000.00 per sq. m. pursuant
to the PCAC Recommendation.
On April 28, 1998, PEA received a copy of the Memorandum from then
President Fidel Ramos, dated April 27, 1998, regarding the Request of Bro. Mike
Velarde Re: DPWH Road Right of Way Payments/Settlement on C-5 (PEA-Renong
Berhad). The Memorandum contained the handwritten marginal note of then
President Fidel V. Ramos directing the DPWH to Fast-Track the remaining issues
NLT April 30, 1998 re the C5-Coastal Road Project in order to alleviate heavy traffic
congestion in the area. At that time, one of the remaining issues was the payment of
the purchase price of AMVEL lands for the right of way, which was then fixed
at P20,000.00 per sq. m.[21]
Page 8 of 78
To determine further the fair market value of the affected lands, the matter
was referred to three independent appraisers, namely: Asian Appraisal, Inc.; Royal
Asia Appraisal Corporation, and Cuervo Appraisal, Inc.
On October 6, 1998, Asian Appraisal, Inc. submitted its Appraisal

Report[22] on the affected lands. It determined the fair market value
at P422,622,000.00 for 130,848 sq. m., or P3,229.87 per sq. m.
In its letters dated October 19 and 20, 1998, AMVEL questioned the valuation
and sought a reconsideration of said appraisal. In reply thereto, the TRB, in its letter
dated October 20, 1998, informed AMVEL that it would commission another private
appraisal company to determine the true market value of the properties in the area.
On December 28, 1998, Royal Asia Appraisal Corporation submitted its

Appraisal Report[23] on the affected lands. It determined the fair market value
at P4,395,179,000.00 for 319,398 sq. m., or P13,760.82 per sq. m.
In a letter[24] dated November 8, 1998, AMVEL also questioned the valuation

of Royal Asia and claimed that it was not realistically indicative of the prevailing
market value of the properties. To break the impasse, AMVEL proposed that a third
appraisal be conducted to which then Secretary of the DPWH, respondent Gregorio
Vigilar, agreed.For this purpose, Cuervo Appraisers, Inc. was engaged to conduct a
third appraisal.
On December 9, 1998, AMVEL complained of the long-delayed payment for

its lands while other landowners adjoining [their] property also affected by the C-5
road right-of-way have already been paid at a price of P25,000.00 per sq. m.[25]
In his reply dated December 29, 1998, respondent Vigilar took exception to
the claim of AMVEL that there was long-delayed payment, considering that several
appraisals of the affected properties were made. In the same letter, he proposed that
the average of the three (3) private appraisals be used as a final valuation.
On January 11, 1999, Cuervo Appraisers, Inc. submitted its Fair Market Value
Appraisal[26] of the affected lands. It determined the fair market value
at P4,531,752,000 for 251,764 sq. m., or P18,000 per sq. m.
Page 9 of 78
Further negotiations ensued between the parties. Finally, a consensus was
reached to fix the price by averaging the four appraisals done by MMDA, Royal
Asia, Asian Appraisal, and Cuervo.
On January 15, 1999, the TRB, through its Resolution No. 99-02,[27] approved
the purchase price of P1,221,799,804.00 for the acquisition of a total area of 79,598
sq. m.The average price per sq. m., as approved by the TRB, was P15,350.00.
On February 17, 1999, respondent Joseph E. Estrada, then President of the

Republic of the Philippines, issued Administrative Order No. 50 entitled Prescribing
the Guidelines for the Acquisition of Certain Parcels of Private Land for Public Use
including the Right of Way, Easement of Several Public Infrastructure Projects.
On March 30, 1999, respondent Estrada issued two (2) Memoranda to

respondent Benedicto, the Executive Director of TRB. The first
Memorandum[28] states:
You are hereby directed to proceed with right of way acquisition of

properties covered by the TRB Resolution #99-02 dated January 15, 1999,
subject to existing laws, rules and regulations.
The second Memorandum[29] states:
The contracts for acquisition of the right of way at the C-5 Link of
the Manila-Cavite Toll Expressway, stated in Resolution No. 99-02 of the
Toll Regulatory Board, is hereby approved, subject to compliance with
existing laws, rules and regulations.
Further, you are directed to submit to this office a certification,

stating that the said contracts are above board, that due diligence has been
complied with, that these contracts are free from all defects and that the
terms of the contract are the most advantageous to the government.
On March 30, 1999, TRB transmitted to PEA the Deeds of Absolute Sale
executed by TRB and AMVEL as well as the other parties represented by
Page 10 of 78
AMVEL. TRB advised PEA that it shall immediately inform PEA of the approval
by the President, and that, in the meantime, PEA should take note of the Deed of
Sale and prepare for the eventual payment of the properties in accordance with the
TOA and the MOA.[30]
On April 5, 1999, the TRB, in compliance with the Memorandum of the

President dated March 30, 1999 and pursuant to its express obligations under the
MOA to certify to PEA that the lots to be acquired were free from all liens and
encumbrances, issued its Compliance and Certification[31] stating that the Deed of
Sale between the Republic of the Philippines and AMVEL Land Development
Corp., dated March 30, 1999 was above-board; that due diligence had been complied
with in the negotiation and execution thereof; that to the best of our knowledge, the
same are free from defects and that the terms thereof are not disadvantageous to the
Government.
Based on such Compliance and Certification issued by the TRB, PEA paid
fifty percent (50%) of the purchase price to AMVEL.[32]
On April 8, 1999, respondent Benedicto sent a memorandum[33] to the TRB

informing it that:
a. The parties executed three (3) deeds of sale on [March 30, 1999];
b. The amounts for the right of way acquisition were those stated in
the TRBs Resolution No. 99-02;
c. Total amount payable of P1,221,766,640 actually lower by

33,244 from the Board approved amount of P1,221,799,884. [34]
On April 29, 1999, or after nearly a year of negotiations for the purchase of
the properties subject of the Right of Way and upon receipt of the required
documentation, PEA released the balance of the purchase price for the AMVEL
properties.[35]
II. PETITIONERS ALLEGATIONS
Page 11 of 78
Petitioner, in his complaint-affidavit[36] filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, alleges irregularities in the above-mentioned transactions. In
particular, petitioner contends that the government acquisition of the AMVEL lands
took place in just two and a half working days, considering that it was Holy Tuesday
on March 30, 1999, the date that respondent Estrada issued the Memorandum to
TRB and PEA to proceed with the acquisition of lands for the right-of-way of the C-
5 Link of the MCTE Project, and PEA immediately released on April 5, 1999 fifty
percent (50%) of the total purchase price. He points out that Holy Wednesday was a
half-working day, and what followed was a long holiday, commencing on Holy
Thursday and ending on Easter Sunday.[37] Petitioner alleges that it was due to the
personal intervention of respondent Estrada and his close association with
respondent Mariano Velarde that AMVEL was able to close this deal. In his 183-
page petition, he alleges:
65. Respondent Mike Velarde received a P685,892,495.00 windfall

from the government for a property which he acquired for almost
nothing! His only capital was his closeness to respondent Estrada and the
tremendous amount of influence he wielded in the latters
administration. Of course, all of these he owes to his mostly impoverished
flock who voted for respondent Estrada after Brother Mike endorsed him
as tiyak yon.[38]
Petitioner claims that the nine (9) parcels of land sold by AMVEL to the
government, subject of his complaint, were outrageously overpriced. He alleges that
the Transfer Certificates of Title covering said parcels of land and their
corresponding areas, declared market values, assessed values and selling prices are
as follows:[39]
Transfer Area Declared Assessed Selling Price

Certificate (sq. Market Value Value (Pesos)
of Title meters) (Pesos) (Pesos)
140389 2,153 1,507,100 301,420 33,059,315
140388 6,643 4,650,100 930,020 102,003,265
131446 3,908 1,914,920 382,980 60,007,340
140402 3,813 1,868,370 373,670 58,548,615
140396 9,427 6,598,900 1,319,780 144,751,585
140397 44,669 31,268,300 6,253,660 685,892,495
140404 753 368,970 73,790 11,562,315
140405 2,973 1,456,770 291,350 45,650,415
140408 5,299 2,562,210 512,440 81,366,145
Page 12 of 78
79,638 52,195,640 10,439,110 1,222,841,490
recTotal
Petitioner likewise claims that based on the 1999 tax declarations, AMVEL
sold parcels of land, which were undeveloped agricultural lands and salt-making
beds (salinar)but which had been reclassified as residential, to the government at a
price which was more than 2,300% percent of their total declared market value and
11,700% percent of their total assessed value.[40]
Petitioner asserts that the purchase price for right-of-way acquisition should
be the equivalent of the zonal value plus ten (10%) percent thereof, based on
Administrative Order No. 50,[41] which respondent Estrada issued on February 17,
1999 and was made effective immediately. Since the zonal value of the subject
parcels of land was set the year before at Four Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P4,500.00) per sq. m. by the Department of Finance,[42] the purchase price should
have been Four Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty Pesos (P4,950.00) only, for a total
purchase price of Three Hundred Ninety-Four Million Two Hundred-Eight
Thousand and One Hundred Pesos only (P394,208,100.00).He claims that the price
that the government paid (P15,355.00 per sq. m.) was 310% of the zonal value.[43]
Petitioner argues that [by] not following the guidelines set by Administrative
Order No. 50, the government was defrauded of the staggering amount of
[P828,633,390.00] and burdened with the payment of interest. The government was
made to pay in full when the guidelines set by said Administrative Order provided
that, should the landowner refuse to accept the purchase price, the government would
be mandated to initiate expropriation proceedings and deposit only ten (10%)
percent of the offered amount.[44]
Petitioner notes that even respondent Estrada chose not to follow the
guidelines prescribed by Administrative Order No. 50 by directing TRB to proceed
with the acquisition and approving [AMVELs] Deeds of Sale. He alleges that there
was no legal impediment to its application because the Deeds of Sale for the
AMVEL acquisitions were executed long after the effectivity date of Administrative
Order No. 50.[45]
Page 13 of 78
Petitioner questions the findings of the government appraisal body, MMDA-
PCAC, that the subject parcels of land have already been developed, and that these
were classified as commercial lands. He relies on a document found among the
records of the Legal Office of the Presidential Management Staff[46] that states that
the lands were formerly salt-making beds (SALINAR) which are not suitable for
residential or commercial purposes; that AMVEL merely covered these salt factories
with trash and other low-grade filling materials; that the properties did not even have
access to the highway .. [until] AMVEL built a bridge from said properties to Dr. A.
Santos Avenue when it was already negotiating with the government; and that
AMVEL knew beforehand about the proposed highway when it acquired the
properties at a purchase price of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) per sq. m.,
properties that were later sold to the government at Fifteen Thousand Three Hundred
Fifty-Five Pesos (P15,355.00) per sq. m.[47]
The rest of petitioners allegations were summarized by respondent Office of

the Ombudsman in the questioned Resolution,[48] which summary we find to be
succinct and hereby quote in part below:
The complainant points out that much earlier, in March 1996, the
heirs of a certain Andres Buenaventura filed an action for annulment of
title and reconveyance against the Tirona-Medina families before the
RTC-Paranaque, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-0141. The Buenaventura
heirs claimed that they were rightful owners of the parcel of land covered
by TCT No. 14729. The Buenaventura heirs caused the annotation of a
Notice of Lis Pendens on TCT No. 14729. This notice of Lis Pendens was
carried over to the subdivided lots covered by TCT Nos. 133988, 133990
and 133991.
On 06 November 1998, AMVEL submitted to the TRB what it

claimed to be a Decision dated 29 October 1998 of the Court of Appeals
First Division in CA-G.R. No. 54402, which supposedly affirmed the
Decision of the RTC-Paranaque dismissing the case filed by the
Buenaventura heirs. The purported Court of Appeals Decision was signed
by Associate Justices Oswaldo Agcaoili, Fidel Purisima and Corona Ibay-
Somera.
The complainant alleges that the supposed 28 October 1998

Decision was falsified and non-existent. In fact, the records of the Court
of Appeals show that, on 22 February 1999, its Docket was instructed to
Page 14 of 78
(a)wait result of the investigation of NBI as per instructions of J.
Valdez. However, based on the same records, nothing was heard or
mentioned again about the result of the said NBI investigation.
Notwithstanding the attempt to defraud the government with the

submission of the falsified and non-existent Court of Appeals Decision,
TRB did not charge AMVEL and, instead, proceeded with the execution
of the Deeds of Sale on 30 March 1999.
The complainant further alleges that the original projected cost of

the right-of-way for the MCTE Project at the time the Toll Operation
Agreement between the government and the foreign investor, Renong
Berhad, was being deliberated in late 1995, was P900 million
only. However, by the time the Toll Operation Agreement was approved
by the Office of the President on 26 July 1996, the cost of the right-of-
way acquisition had already risen to P1.7 billion.
The Toll Operation Agreement dated 26 July 1996 itself, in

paragraph 5.04 thereof, likewise provides that the Grantee (PEA) shall
advance the funds necessary for the acquisition of the Right of Way except
land to be reclaimed subject to a limit of [P1.7 million] and such funds
shall be reimbursed by the Grantor to the Grantee.
As late as October 1998, UEM-MARA Philippines Corporation

(UMPC), the local subsidiary of UEM Berhad and a signatory to the Toll
Operation Agreement, in a report to the Board of Investments entitled
Manila Cavite Toll Expressway Project-Project Description October
1998, reported in its Summary of Project Costs that the total right-of-way
cost is only P1.7 billion. This is broken down as follows: C-5 Link
Expressway, P1.356 billion; and R-1 Extension Expressway, P344
million. UMPC further reported that TRB on the other hand will be
responsible for the acquisition of the right-of-way which will be financed
by PEA in accordance to the terms and conditions of NEDA as stipulated
in the TOA.
Also, under the aforesaid NEDA Board Resolution No. 2, the

Malaysian government agency, Majilis Amanah Rakyat (MARA) and
Renong Berhads construction affiliate, United Engineers Berhad (UEB),
were supposed to advance P900 million of the P1.7 billion cost of right-
of-way acquisition to be guaranteed by the national government. Further,
MARA and UEB would secure foreign currency denominated loans for
the P900 million that they were willing to advance.
Page 15 of 78
It appears that the project proponents did not even comply with the
aforesaid condition for NEDAs approval of the project. The Malaysian
firms were no longer made to advance the sum of P900 million.
Instead, on 5 December 1997, a Loan Agreement was executed

among PEA, as borrower, the Republic of the Philippines, as guarantor,
and a syndicate of local and foreign banks, namely, Solid bank
Corporation, Far East Bank and Trust Company (now part of the Bank of
the Philippine Islands), Asian bank Corporation, Chinatrust (Phils.)
Commercial Bank Corporation, Australia and New Zealand Banking
Group Limited, Standard Chartered Bank, The Bank of Nova Scotia
(Manila Offshore Branch), The Development [Bank] of Singapore Ltd.,
and Bank of America (hereinafter collectively referred to as the lender
banks).
The Lead Arranger for the loan was Exchange Capital Corporation,
which is majority-owned by respondents Luis J. L. Virata and Manuel B.
Zamora, Jr. [The] Co-Lead Arrangers were FEB Investments, Inc. and
SolidBank.
As earlier mentioned, TRB sent notices of acquisition to the

landowners of the parcels of land that would be affected by the C-5 Link
sometime in 1997. Thereafter, the TRB Officer-in-Charge requested the
Paranaque City Appraisal Committee to appraise the said parcels of
land. Thus, the City Appraisal Committee came out with Resolution No.
98-5 dated 21 April 1998 with bloated appraisals of said properties.
Complainant asseverates that in what appears to be an attempt to

legitimize the bloated appraisal made by the Paraaque City Appraisal
Committee on 21 April 1998, on 7 May 1998, TRB and PEA entered into
a Memorandum of Agreement which, among others, explicitly provides
that TRB shall identify and locate the lots of land sought to be acquired
for the right-of-way and negotiate with the individual owners of the land
the purchase price in accordance with Executive Order No. 329 dated July
11, 1998, Executive Order No. 368 dated August 24, 1989 and Executive
Order NO. 269 dated September 4, 1989. These Executive Orders were
even made part of the Memorandum of Agreement.
The complainant points out that seven (7) months after respondent
Mike Velarde got his P1,222,841,490.00, on 23 November 1999,
respondent Estrada, together with respondents Ronaldo B. Zamora, then
Executive Secretary, Gregorio R. Vigilar, then Public Works and
Page 16 of 78
Highways Secretary, and Frisco San Juan, then PEA Chairman, gave his
imprimatur and approval to the proposal of a four (4) month-old, P15
million company, the Coastal Road Corporation (CRC), to take over
UMPC and the P7.73 billion MCTE Project (including the 800-hectare
reclamation project along Manila Bay going towards Cavite). This is now
the subject of a separate case before the Ombudsman entitled Ernesto B.
Francisco, Jr. vs. Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al., docketed as OMB Case
NO. 0-00-1758.
Complainant Francisco further points out that the beneficial owners

of CRC are respondents Luis J. L. Virata and Manuel B. Zamora,
Jr. Respondent Luis J. L. Virata is also CRCs President and Chief
Executive Officer, while respondent Cesar E.A. Virata is CRCs Chairman
of the Board and is also a beneficial owner of CRC to the extent of ten
(10%) [percent] of its equity.
Also, on 23 November 1999, respondent Estrada, in the presence

of respondents Ronaldo B. Zamora, Gregorio R. Vigilar and Frisco San
Juan, gave his imprimatur and approval to CRCs proposal to de-prioritize
the construction of the C-5 Link Expressway, on the one hand, and to
prioritize the R-1 Expressway Extension, on the other. This was done
despite the lack of the requisite evaluation and approval of the TRB Board
and the fact that CRC does not have the requisite financial and technical
capability and track record to take over the MCTE Project. Worse, the de-
prioritization of the C-5 Link despite the P1.85 billion already spent for
right-of-way acquisitions caused the government tremendous losses in
terms of the interest on the dollar-denominated loan used to fund the said
acquisitions.
Respondents LUIS J. L. VIRATA and MANUEL B. ZAMORA,

JR. had another reason for pushing the prioritization of the R-1
Expressway Extension. Respondents wanted to expedite the development
of the Caylabne Bay Resort in Ternate, Cavite. In the words of respondent
Luis J. L. Virata, the Caylabne Bay Resort will be developed into a top-
quality resort . . . with a whole bunch of a Mediterranean-looking
buildings and with a first-class resort operation. In an interview with Mr.
Philip Cu-Unjieng, which appeared in the 7 February 1999 issue of the
Philippine Star, respondent Virata himself had categorically admitted how
critical is the R-1 Expressway Extension to the development of the
Caylabne Bay Resort.
Page 17 of 78
The real problem is that under UMPCs project timetable, the
construction schedule of the C-5 Link Expressway was set from March
1997 to September 1999, while that of the R-1 Extension was set almost
near the same period, from October 1997 to September 1999. Thus, the
idea is for both expressways to be constructed and finished almost at the
same time. However, by October 1998, both were already delayed by
eighteen (18) months and fourteen (14) months, respectively. Instead of
correcting the problem, the government allowed respondent Luis J. L.
Virata and Manuel B. Zamora, J. to take over the project despite their lack
of financial and technical capability to do so. They even tried to borrow
from public funds from the Development Bank of the Philippines to
finance their acquisition of UEM Berhads share in UMPC.
Respondents Mariano Z. Velarde, Franklin M. Velarde, Luis Juan L. Virata,

Cesar E.A. Virata, Manuel Zamora, Jr., Ronaldo Zamora, Mariano E. Benedicto II,
Frisco F. San Juan, Ruben A. de Ocampo, and Ramon V. Dumaual filed individual
Counter-Affidavits; while respondents Robert C. Nacianceno, Reydivino Bernabe
Daval-Santos, Soledad Samonte Medina-Cue, Patrick Beltran Gatan, Luis Vicente
Medina-Cue, and Silvestre San Agustin de Leon, all members of PCAC, filed a Joint
Counter-Affidavit.Respondents Joseph Estrada and Arsenio Yulo were ordered to
file their counter-affidavits, but they did not file any.
Based on its findings of fact, the Office of the Ombudsman resolved to dismiss
the case for lack of evidence.[49]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[50] on January 14, 2002, alleging

that serious errors of law and/or irregularities had been committed prejudicial to his
interest, as follows:
1. The Ombudsman did not conduct fact-finding in the instant case

and pursue investigation requested by the complainant.
2. The Ombudsman did not issue the subpoena duces
tecum requested by the complainant as would afford the
complainant the chance to file a reply-affidavit.
3. The inhibition of Desierto came too late since he had already
prejudged the case.
4. The Ombudsman did not act on the motion for the inhibition of
Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. At any
Page 18 of 78
rate, Gervacio, out of delicadeza or sense of decency, should have
voluntarily inhibited himself.
5. The Overall Deputy Ombudsman does not have authority to
approve the dismissal of the instant case.
6. The Ombudsman took at their face value the arguments of, and
interpretation of the law by, the respondents, on the one hand, and
totally disregarded the evidence of complainant, on the other.
7. In their haste to dismiss the instant case, Desierto and Gervacio
did not consider additional evidence submitted by the
complainant. [51]
Respondent Office of the Ombudsman denied petitioners Motion for

Reconsideration in an Order[52] dated June 24, 2002.
III. ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors against the questioned

Resolution and Order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman:
The respondent Ombudsman committed a serious error of law in ruling

that the transaction/negotiation for the purchase of affected lands was
consummated as early as May 1998 and that Administrative Order No.
50 finds no application to the already perfected contract between TRB
and AMVEL.
II
The respondent Ombudsman committed a serious error of law and

grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, in
concluding, without basis in fact, that respondents complied with the
prescribed procedure in determining a fair and reasonable valuation of
the properties in question and in not finding that respondents committed
plunder and/or graft.
III
Page 19 of 78
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
not finding that respondents committed plunder and/or graft when they
changed the original alignment of the Sucat Interchange which
increased the affected land area of Amvel from 63,629 sq. mtrs. to
80,256 sq. mtrs. or a difference of 16,897 sq. mtrs. which was sold to
the government for about P259,115,495.00.
IV

not finding that respondents committed plunder and/or graft when
respondent Mike Velarde made a billion-peso killing from the
transaction.

not finding that respondents committed graft when they proceeded with
the transaction despite the fact that 44,699 sq. mtrs. of land sold to the
government did not have a clean title at the time of sale.
VI

not finding that respondents committed plunder and graft when they
bloated the cost of the road-right-of-way and depleted the proceeds of
the US$68.6 Million loan for right-of-way acquisition.
VII

Page 20 of 78
not finding that respondents committed graft when they de-prioritized
the R-1 Expressway Extension over that of the C-5 Link Expressway.
VIII
The respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he deliberately did not
conduct fact-finding to gather more evidence in the case below despite
repeated requests by the complainant.
IX
The respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he deliberately failed
to act on motions to issue subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum
to further strengthen the case.
The Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction when he failed to act on the motion for the
inhibition of Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio,
Jr. Likewise, Overall Deputy Ombudsman Gervacio committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he failed to
voluntarily inhibit himself out of delicadeza or a sense of decency.
IV. THEORY OF RESPONDENTS
A. COMMENT OF RESPONDENTS ROBERT C.

NACIANCENO, REYDIVINO B. DAVAL-SANTOS,
SILVESTRE S.A. DE LEON, PATRICK B. GATAN,
SOLEDAD S. MEDINA-CUE, AND LUIS V.
MEDINA-CUE
The case docketed as OMB-0-01-0577 is primarily an action to hold them

accountable for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, on account of their approval, in 1998, of PCAC Resolution No. 9805
... as the same resolution had been allegedly used to justify the alleged over-pricing
Page 21 of 78
and related graft and corrupt practices of other respondents in connection with the
acquisition of lands by the national government, in 1999, for the right of way of the
C-5 Link of the Manila-Cavite Toll Expressway Project.
Respondents were charged in their respective [capacities] as the Chairman

and members of the [PCAC] created under [Executive] Order No. 329, as amended
by Executive Order No. 369, primarily for the determination of the reasonable
compensation to be paid to properties that will be affected by public works and
projects in Paraaque City.[53]
Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, under which respondents are charged, provides:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. (Underscoring
supplied by respondents.)
Respondents claim that they are neither alleged nor shown to be, as they in
fact are not, officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.[54]
Respondents assert that PCAC Resolution No. 98-5 is recommendatory in

nature, and that the adoption of the recommendations was within the prerogative and
discretion of the implementing officers, most of all Fidel V. Ramos, then the
President of the Republic at the time of issuance of said resolution.
Respondents note that the alleged acts of plunder and graft and corrupt
practices attributed to the other respondents have been shown to have transpired
during the incumbency of respondent Joseph E. Estrada as President of the Republic,
and after the issuance of said PCAC Resolution No. 98-5.[55]
Respondents further argue as follows:
Page 22 of 78
[PCAC] had undertaken diligently and carefully the study and
evaluation of the properties that will be affected by the C-5 Link
Expressway in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque City, taking cognizance
of the sale of comparable property, the applicable BIR Zonal Value, the
opinion solicited from the residents of the properties near the subject
parcels of land, the condition or status of the parcels of land, the presence
of other buildings and structure near the vicinity of the properties, and the
consequential damages to the owners of the affected
properties. And, contrary to the allegation of petitioner, the BIR Zonal
Value (6th Revision) which took effect on February 2, 1998 provides
for P20,000.00 per sq. m. value for commercial land along Dr. A.
Santos Avenue; and P30,000.00 per sq. m. value for Commercial land
along Ninoy Aquino Avenue; furthermore, while the allegations of the
complainant that the zonal value of the residential regular (RR) lands in
Dr. A. Santos Avenue, San Dionisio, Paraaque City, was fixed by the
Department of Finance at P4,500.00 per sq. m. just a year before the
AMVEL sale, the same department has fixed the zonal value of
commercial land along Dr. A. Santos Avenue, Brgy. San Dionisio,
Paraaque City at P20,000.00 and along Ninoy Aquino Avenue at
P30,000.00 per sq. m. Paraaque City Ordinance No. 97-08, prescribes the
land use plan and the zoning of the Municipality of Paraaque, [and]
provides that the lands along Dr. A. Santos Avenue is classified as within
C-3 high intensity commercial zone.[56] (Emphasis added)
[The] valuation of the subject properties is justified, and shown to be

consonant and consistent with existing accepted appraisal practice and
procedures in the appraisal of properties, considering that:
a) The appraisal of the properties was based on such factors as

location, accessibility, selling prices of comparable
properties, opinion of people living within the vicinity of the
subject properties, the amenities present like water,
electricity, transportation and communication with the
vicinity of the property and the status or condition of the
parcels of land. The Committee has noted that the parcels of
land have been developed to mean a great change in its
former condition as salt beds or Salinas and the complainant
has acknowledged this truth in his complaint when he stated
that the former salt beds are filled up or covered by filling
materials;
Page 23 of 78
b) During the ocular inspection conducted by the technical
committee tasked to inspect the subject properties, these
parcels of land were already filled and developed.
c) Ordinance No. 98-08, which prescribed the land use plan

and zoning of the Municipality of Paraaque, provides that
Barangay San Dionisio where subject properties are located,
is within C-3 high intensity commercial zone.[57]
B. COMMENT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS

MARIANO Z. VELARDE AND FRANKLIN M.
VELARDE
Private respondents Velarde allege that the transactions involving the

purchase of the subject nine (9) parcels of land were perfected before Administrative
Order No. 50 came into effect. The sale was perfected on May 8, 1998, almost a year
before the issuance of Administrative Order No. 50, when the TRB sent a letter to
the PEA instructing the latter to prepare the checks representing payments for the
subject properties.[58]
Private respondents Velarde aver that Amvel never questioned the amount of
the purchase price, gave its imprimatur to the purchase price set by TRB, and the
last thing to be done was the actual receipt of the checks in payment thereof by
Amvel. Unfortunately, however, Amvel was not paid. Instead, TRB conducted a
series of appraisals of the subject property.
As of December 9, 1998, Amvel wrote to the DPWH Secretary, asking that it

be paid the purchase price set by the PCAC as directed by TRB. [59] In a letter dated
January 20, 1999, TRB informed Amvel that it was willing to purchase the latters
properties at a price arrived at by adopting a formula close to averaging all four (4)
appraisals obtained from the PCAC, as well as the three (3) private appraisal
companies.[60] Thereafter, TRB issued Resolution No. 99-02 on January 15, 1999
approving the purchase of the subject properties in the aggregate amount
of P1,221,799,804.00.[61]
Page 24 of 78
On April 22, 1999, Amvel was able to receive full payment of the agreed
purchase price, but the amount received was P1,221,766,640.00.[62]
Private respondents argue that the subject properties were not overpriced. The
properties were zoned and classified as commercial areas, not agricultural or
residential.Massive development and improvement works were immediately carried
out and introduced after these properties were acquired by Amvel through purchase
or joint venture agreements.[63]
Private respondents cited several factors why a higher appraisal value than the
one eventually used should be adopted, and these are:
a. The PCAC, as early as April 21, 1998 (way before the election of
respondent Estrada to the presidency in the May 10, 1998 elections), had
already fixed the price of the properties on the site, along with those found
in the area: between P20,000.00 and P25,000.00 per sq. m.
b. In 1997, the site was appraised at P18,000.00 per sq. m., and a portion of
the same with an area of 49,316 sq. m. covered by TCT No. 133550 was
given a development loan accommodation by Metrobank in the amount
of P550,000,000.00.
c. The current Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) zonal valuation appraised

the vicinity at P25,000.00 per sq. m.
Private respondents claim that the other properties affected by the C-5 Link
Project adjacent to and near the vicinity of the site were acquired and paid for by the
government at P25,000.00 per sq. m. in accordance with the MMDA
appraisal.[64] For the subject properties, the government was able to save P4,645.00
per sq. m.[65]
The private appraisal companies were engaged by TRB and not Amvel. The
final purchase price was imposed upon Amvel by the government, and respondents
Velarde had no hand in fixing the said amount. Private respondents Velarde merely
acted within the bounds of their duties and powers as officers of Amvel. It was only
Page 25 of 78
natural that they would negotiate for an amount most advantageous to the said
company. The fact that the purchase price of the subject properties considerably
plummeted would certainly negate the allegation that respondent Mariano Z.
Velarde exerted influence on respondent Estrada or any other public officer for that
matter.
Furthermore, private respondents aver that, except for a small portion, Amvel
acquired the properties at prices ranging from not less than P7,500.00 per sq. m. to
as high as P9,000.00 per sq. m. Petitioner thus failed to take into consideration the
significant incidental expenses for the acquisition, consolidation, improvement and
development of the subject properties.
Private respondents claim that the re-alignment of the C-5 Link Project has
actually resulted in the significant reduction and decrease of the affected areas, that
is, from the original 12 hectares to 7.9 hectares. Hence, petitioner completely erred
in claiming that the realignment had actually resulted in a greater profit to
Amvel. The subject property, measuring 79,568 sq. m., was just 34.28% of the total
area of the site, which was 232,078 sq. m.
To provide a background of the transactions leading to the purchase by the

government of the subject properties, private respondents gave its version of the
antecedent facts, as follows:
a. As early as June 1994, a company by the name of ADV Realty had set
its sights in developing [a] large expanse of undeveloped parcels of raw
lands around the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and in
Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque City into a commercial and business
park by entering into various joint venture agreements with several
landowners, particularly the Medina-Tirona family.[66]
b. A large amphitheater would also be constructed to serve as a multi-

purpose complex that would principally serve as the venue for the
weekly prayer meetings and healing sessions of the members of the El
Shaddai Movement of which herein respondent Mariano Z. Velarde is
the Servant Leader.
c. In order to consolidate the whole area, joint ventures were likewise

forged with the other landowners of the adjacent properties who were
Page 26 of 78
all prominent families of Paraaque City (e.g.,Medina-Evangelista,
Balinghasay and Santos). More importantly, for those properties that
were not available for joint venture, ADV Realty acquired them by
purchase.
d. In 1996, development efforts were immediately poured and instituted

into the properties in accordance with the master plan and the business
development concepts for the area. In 1997, ADV Realty was able to
consolidate a 23-hectare property and pre-development operations
thereon were in full blast. ADV Realtys name was then changed into
Amvel Land Development Corporation.
e. However, Amvel was notified by the government, through the TRB, in

the last quarter of 1997 that the site will be affected by the C-5 Link
Project. Ex-president Fidel V. Ramos was still the incumbent president
at that time.
f. Upon examining the proposed alignment of the aforesaid project,

Amvel was surprised to find out that it would cut across right at the
center of the site. This would render the whole property unattractive to
prospective investors as the C-5 Link Project would block all possible
ingress to and egress from the property, making accessibility a major
concern.
g. This would entail a re-evaluation and a radical change in the master

plan of the commercial and business park. Once the C-5 Link Project
would be constructed, the remaining property of Amvel would be
divided into two (2) portions. Both portions would be enclosed by the
proposed C-5 Link Project and the rivers found on the north and west
side of the property.
h. Even other property owners in the area, most notably the SM Holdings
Property and ADELFA Property, Inc., also raised objections to the C-5
link Project as the original plan of the said Project posed serious threat
to their respective developmental plans for their properties.
i. As a result, Amvel, along with SM Holdings Property and ADELFA

Property, Inc., negotiated for the re-alignment of the C-5 Link Project.
j. As a consequence thereof, Amvel was constrained to construct another

bridge as a passageway for the portion located at the southern side of
the property. To accomplish such a task, Amvel was forced to purchase
the property where the bridge would be constructed.
Page 27 of 78
k. The final re-alignment plan that was jointly prepared by Amvel, SM
Prime Holdings and ADELFA Properties, Inc. and duly approved by
the TRB, had actually and in reality resulted in the substantial reduction
of the portion of the site that would be affected by the C-5 Link
Project. From the original area of TWELVE (12) hectares, it was
reduced to only 7.9 hectares.
l. Had Amvel really intended to capitalize on the business opportunity

brought about by the C-5 Link Project, as wrongfully alleged by
petitioner, it could have proposed a re-alignment plan that would
consume a larger portion of the site.
Private respondents argue that the subject properties were not bought by
Amvel for the purpose of selling them to the government, in the light of the proposed
construction of the C-5 Link Project. After Amvel and TRB finally agreed on the
terms of the sale, all the portions of the site that were caught along the path of the C-
5 Link Project were sold to the government.[67] These properties are described in the
following table:
TCT Original Previous owner Date of JVA/ Size sold

No. Size (sq m) Purchase to govt.
140397 122,694 Emmanuel Tirona, Ma. (JVA with ADV 44,669
140396 10,099 Aurora T. Mercado, Realty) 9,427
Rosario T. Medina and November
Corazon T. Medina 16, 1994
140388 49,316 Josefina, Adelaida, Jose Purchased by 6,643
and Teofilo, all ADV realty on
surnamed Balinghasay January 23 1998.
140389 15,721 Balinghasays Purchased, by 2,153
ADV Realty on
January 21, 1997
140402 3,813 Arcadio C. Santos Purchased by 3,813
ADV realty on
September 12,
1997
131446 3,908 Victor B. Santos Purchased by 3,908
ADV Realty in
1997
140404 2 parcels Ma. Asuncion Jugo, JVA with ADV 753
140405 19,543 sq m Jose Ramon L. Santos Realty on May 27, 2,973
and Rona S. Agustines 1997
Page 28 of 78
140408 62,448 Leonor Crisostomo, Land 5,229
Julieta, Amelia, Development
Elizabeth, Angela Agreement with
Katrina and Kristina ADV Realty on
Isabela, all surnamed December 19,
Medina 1996
The properties acquired by the government that were previously owned by (1)
Emmanuel Tirona, Ma. Aurora T. Mercado, Rosario T. Medina and Corazon T.
Medina; (2) Ma. Asuncion Jugo, Jose Ramon L. Santos and Rona S. Agustines; and
(3) Leonor Crisostomo, Julieta, Amelia, Elizabeth, Angela Katrina and Kristina
Isabela, all surnamed Medina, were all part and parcel of larger tracts of land that
were subject of several joint venture agreements. The remaining portions were
developed in accordance with the undertaking of Amvel under said agreements.
In a Memorandum of Agreement[68] dated February 2, 2000 entered into by

Emmanuel Tirona, Ma. Aurora T. Mercado, Rosario T. Medina and Corazon T.
Medina, and Amvel, the latter paid the former the amount of P320,000,000.00 as
their share of the purchase price paid by the government in acquiring the portion of
the property subject of the Development Joint Venture Agreement (with a Lease
Clause) entered into by the same parties.
Private concrete roads were already constructed within the vicinity and
modern drainage systems were already installed therein. More than one (1) million
cubic meters of soil were deposited on the site to raise its elevation above the highest
flood level recorded in the area, appropriately compacted with the use of heavy
equipment as required in a business/commercial land use.
If Amvel had an advance information that the C-5 Link Project would traverse
a portion of the site way back in 1996, then it should have only focused its sight and
poured its resources on the 79,568 sq. m. of land affected by the said Project by
simply purchasing only to the extent of the same. Because of the intrusion of the C-
5 Link Project into its property, Amvel had to re-evaluate and change the master
plan to conform to the significant changes in the shape and configuration of the site,
which was destructively broken into two parts by the C-5 Link Project. That the C-
5 Link Project greatly reduced the viability and marketability of the intended
commercial and business park is beyond cavil, as the construction of the C-5 Link
Page 29 of 78
Project would leave Amvel with a property enclosed or bounded by a highway and
rivers without any access, thereby forcing it to incur major additional costs and
expenses to build the necessary bridges and access roads to connect the remaining
portions to the Ninoy Aquino Avenue.
Amvel, as a consequence of the Project, likewise incurred delays in

introducing the needed developments it undertook to infuse into the property, subject
of the Land Development Agreement it entered into with the Medina family. The
amount of P10,000,000.00 was paid by Amvel to the Medina family as penalty for
the aforementioned delay.[69]
Respondents Velarde allege that they had no participation whatsoever in the

preparation of the fabricated CA Decision[70] dated October 29, 1998
in Buenaventura-Santiago, et al. v. Sps. Medina, et al., docketed as CA G.R. No. CV
54402. Amvel received a copy of said decision on November 25, 1998. After
receiving the same, Amvel immediately furnished a copy to the TRB and the
Register of Deeds of Paraaque City, to have the same annotated on the Transfer
Certificates of Title covering the parcels of land subject of the aforesaid case. When
Amvel tried to secure a certified true copy of the said decision from the CA, as
required by the Register of Deeds and the TRB, it discovered that the case was still
pending for resolution and no such decision had been promulgated. Amvel sent a
letter dated February 8, 1999 to the Register of Deeds of Paraaque City to explain
what happened and request that the annotations already made on the titles be
immediately canceled.[71] On the same date, Amvel sent a letter to the TRB
informing the latter of its discovery that the alleged decision was spurious. [72] Amvel
requested that the CA conduct a full-blown investigation regarding the matter.
C. COMMENT OF RESPONDENT DUMAUAL[73]
Respondent Dumaual was Officer-in-Charge of the TRB from November 28,

1997 to September 8, 1998.
In his statement of the facts, he pointed out that the alignment of the C-5 Link
Expressway project was revised on April 1998 because, during the discussion with
AMVEL on the acquisition of right-of-way (ROW) for the revised alignment, it was
found that an area between the south slip road and the main C-5 Link would not be
Page 30 of 78
acquired for ROW, which in effect would have produced a pocket with limited
use.[74]
On September 16, 1998, a Memorandum was sent by respondent to the Board

suggesting that the south slip road be located nearer to the main C-5 Link to
maximize use of real estate. As of that date, TRB was still unable to formalize the
transaction with AMVEL and to pay the latter. Respondent Dumaual, despite due
diligence, was unable to determine the veracity of the relevant titles submitted for
payment. He wrote to the TRB about the problems with the titles and recommended
that said properties be expropriated.He was relieved as OIC of TRB on September
8, 1998 and had no more personal knowledge regarding the other allegations of
petitioner.[75]
D. COMMENT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT

VIGILAR
Private respondent Vigilar raises the following grounds for the dismissal of
the petition:
1. The petition is not the proper remedy. Petitioner cannot invoke
Rule 45 to question the subject resolution and order of the
Ombudsman.
2. The petition fails to raise any question of law.
3. In any case, the Office of the Ombudsman acted correctly, on the

basis of evidence presented, in dismissing the complaint considering
that
a. Private respondent Vigilar, being the ex-officio chairman of

the TRB during the relevant period, was in no position to be
legally responsible for the TRBs acquisition of AMVELs
properties.
b. The transaction between the TRB and AMVEL concerning

the right-of-way for the C-5 Link was perfected before the
promulgation of Administrative Order No. 50.
c. The transaction between the TRB and AMVEL concerning

the right-of-way for the C-5 Link is valid, regular, and
Page 31 of 78
complies faithfully with Executive Order No. 132, the law
governing at the time the contract of sale was perfected. The
said purchase was not grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.
d. The evidence does not support a finding of probable cause

for the crime of plunder against private respondent Vigilar.
e. The evidence does not support a finding of probable cause

for violation of Section 3 (A), (E), (G) and (J) of Republic
Act 3019 against private respondent Vigilar.
f. The petition, like petitioners complaint before the

Ombudsman, is built on malicious half-truths, hearsay and
even fabricated evidence.
Private respondent Vigilar avers that he only exercised administrative

supervision over the TRB under the provisions of Sec. 38, Ch. 7, Book IV of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987; and that he acted in good faith, relying on the
recommendation of the technical officers of the TRB, and cites Arias v.
Sandiganbayan[76] to support this averment.
He asserts that as early as May 7, 1998, the TRB had already approved the
properties to be affected by the C-5 Link based on the PCAC recommendation
of P20,000 per sq. m., and such approval was made in accordance with Executive
Order No. 132, the law then prevailing. Unfortunately, the TRB had limited funds,
so, hoping for a lower price, it started negotiations with the property owners,
including AMVEL. The TRB and AMVEL agreed subsequently that the price
should be adjusted by hiring independent appraisers and getting the average of the
values to be determined by these independent appraisers and the values stated in the
PCAC resolutions. Later, on January 15, 1999, in keeping with that agreement, the
TRB approved the new, substantially reduced purchase price of P15,350.00 per sq.
m. More than a month later, on February 17, 1999, Administrative Order No. 50 was
promulgated setting new standards for the determination of the fair and reasonable
value of private lands that would be expropriated for government infrastructure
projects. This Administrative Order was intended to supplant Executive Order No.
132.
Page 32 of 78
Private respondent alleges that it is a basic fact that a contract of sale is
perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the
object of the contract and upon the price (Article 1475 [1], Civil Code). Therefore,
at the time TRB and AMVEL agreed as to the process for determining the purchase
price, the contract of sale was already perfected.
The requisites for a valid price in a contract of sale are: (1) it must be real; (2)
it must be in money or its equivalent; and (3) it must be certain or ascertainable at
the time of the perfection of the contract (Articles 1471, 1458, 1468, 1469 and 1473,
Civil Code).[77] Under Article 1469, price is considered certain if it be so with
reference to another thing certain, or that the determination thereof be left to the
judgment of a specified person or persons. Said article further provides: Even before
the fixing of the price by the designated third party, a contract of sale is deemed to
be perfected and existing.
Private respondent Vigilar avers that from the time AMVEL agreed sometime
in the middle of 1998 that the price would be the average of the values stated in the
independent appraisers reports and the PCAC resolutions, the government could no
longer re-negotiate for a lower price. Thus, even before the TRB approved the price
at P15,350.00 per sq.m. on January 15, 1999, the price had already become certain. It
was immaterial that the Deeds of Sale were signed later. The execution of these
Deeds of Sale was a mere formality; it was meant to document a contract that had
been perfected earlier.[78]
Private respondent claims that applying Administrative Order No. 50

retroactively to the contract between the TRB and AMVEL violates Article 4 of the
Civil Code, which provides that [l]aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided. Administrative Order No. 50 does not state that it is exempt
from this rule; it does not provide for retroactive effect.
Petitioner has not shown that private respondent Vigilar, as Secretary of the
DPWH and concurrent TRB chairman, amassed any ill-gotten wealth to warrant a
charge of plunder. Petitioner does not allege that private respondent Vigilar received
any money or derived any benefit, of any kind, from the right-of-way acquisition of
the affected lands.
Page 33 of 78
Regarding the allegation that he violated Sec. 3 (a) of R.A. No. 3019, private
respondent points out that it is not clear whether he was accused of being the public
official who persuaded, induced, or influenced another public officer to perform an
act in violation of rules and regulations; or the one who was so persuaded, induced,
or influenced. Petitioner likewise failed to prove that the elements of violation of
Section 3 (a), (e), (g) and (j) of Rep. Act No. 3019 have been committed by private
respondent Vigilar. Thus, petitioners case against him is inadequate.
Private respondent argues that petitioner likewise failed to prove

conspiracy. He states that a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. [79] He
cites the well-settled rule that conspiracy must be proven as clearly as the
commission of the offense itself.[80]
Petitioner alleges that respondents Estrada, Ronaldo Zamora, and Vigilar gave
their imprimatur to the takeover by the Coastal Road Corporation of the UMPC, as
well as the de-prioritization of the construction of the C-5 Link when, on November
23, 1999, they were present in a photo-op that took place in Malacanang. Private
respondent avers that the photo-op was staged by Cavite government officials to
show their constituents that the MCTE Project was being fast-tracked. Respondents
merely graced the occasion in response to requests made by these local
officials. They could not be taken to court simply because of this; otherwise, it would
be guilt by photograph, which was contrary to plain and common sense.[81]
Private respondent points out petitioners reliance on a certain executive

summary[82] to support the latters allegation that the subject transaction was grossly
anomalous.This document, according to private respondent, has absolutely no
evidentiary value, as its origin is unknown, and it is unsigned. As regards petitioners
submission of a Special Report dated August 16, 2000 from the Philippine Daily
Inquirer as evidence, private respondent points out that newspaper and magazine
articles are hearsay twice removed and have no evidentiary value
whatsoever. Private respondent Vigilar cites in support of this contention the
decision laid down by this Court in People v. Woolcock, et al.[83]
E. COMMENT OF RESPONDENT OFFICE OF

THE OMBUDSMAN
Page 34 of 78
Public respondent raises the following grounds for the denial of the instant
petition:
1. The assailed resolution and order of the public respondent are not
appealable under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2. Petitioner has not adduced sufficient evidence to show that the

transactions involving the purchase of the AMVEL lands under
Executive Order No. 132, Series of 1937 are unlawful or irregular.
3. Whether under Administrative Order No. 50, Series of 1999 or

Executive Order No. 132, Series of 1937, respondents substantially
complied with the prescribed procedure in determining a fair and
reasonable valuation of the properties in question while exercising
the power of eminent domain.
4. There is no law or particular rule that prohibits the re-alignment of

the C-5 Link Project.
5. There is nothing unlawful or irregular in getting a reasonable return

on investment; neither is there evidence of bloating of prices.
6. Petitioners assertion that TCT No. 140397 (formerly TCT No. (S-
14729) 876474) comprising fifty-six (56%) percent of the total area
sold by AMVEL to the government was not a clean title is rendered
moot and academic by the Court of Appeals Decision dated 21 April
1999 and the Memorandum of Agreement executed by and between
the contending parties.
7. The public respondent cannot act on complaints based on mere

speculations and conjectures.
8. Matters that are left to the exercise of wisdom and discretion of the
Office of the Ombudsman are not appealable under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and absent any jurisdictional
infirmity, the Ombudsmans determination of probable cause, or the
lack of it, deserves great respect and finality.
According to public respondent, the law on sales contemplates the

consummation of the sales transaction at the moment there is a meeting of minds of
Page 35 of 78
the parties thereto, upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the
price.[84] In the case at bar, the meeting of the minds for the purchase of AMVEL
properties occurred on May 8, 1998, the date TRB instructed PEA to pay the checks
for the properties expropriated through the mode of voluntary sales. Public
respondent alleges:
Significantly, the purchase transactions over the subject properties

are negotiated ones. On 9 August 1997, notices of acquisition were sent by
TRB to the affected landowners. In view of the acceptance by AMVEL of
the amount offered by the government during the negotiation process, no
expropriation proceeding was initiated in court. Upon appraisal by the
[PCAC], the parties successfully arrived into an agreement as to the value
or purchase price of the affected properties on or before 08 May 1998, as
evidenced by a letter sent by respondent Ramon V. Dumaual, Officer-in-
Charge, Toll Regulatory Board, to the Public Estates Authority, instructing
the latter to prepare the checks representing payments for the subject
properties. It is therefore clear that the governing law at that given time
was still Executive Order No. 132, Series of 1937, and not Administrative
Order No. 50, which took effect on 17 February 1999.[85]
Public respondent Ombudsman contends that in claiming that the subject

properties were overpriced, petitioner failed to consider that the transactions were
entered into by the State in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, which
necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or private right of the
people. Public respondent asserts that [the] appraisal or assessment of the property
subject of the taking is not based solely on the market value or zonal valuation made
thereof by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).[86]
Administrative Order No. 50, which petitioner believes should have been
followed, provides the following standards for the assessment of the value of the
land:
SECTION 3.Standards for the Assessment of the Value of the Land

Subject of Expropriation Proceeding. x x x
(a) The classification and use for which the property is suited;
(b) The developmental costs for improving the land;
Page 36 of 78
(c) The value declared by the owners;
(d) The current selling price of similar lands in the vicinity;
(e) The reasonable disturbance compensation for the removal and/or
demolition of certain improvements on the land and for the value
of improvements thereon;
(f) The size, shape or location, tax declaration and zonal valuation of
the land;
(g) The price of the land as manifested in the ocular findings, oral as
well as documentary evidence presented; and
(h) Such facts and events so as to enable the affected property owners
to have sufficient funds to acquire similarly-situated lands of
approximate areas as those required from them by the government,
and thereby rehabilitate themselves as early as possible.
Executive Order No. 132 issued on December 27, 1937, on the other hand,
laid down the following procedure:
(i) The Director of the Bureau of Public Works, City or District

Engineer or other officials concerned shall make the necessary
negotiations with [the] owner of the property needed for public use with
a view to having it donated, or sold to the government at not to exceed
the assessed valuation prior to the investigation and survey of the project.
(j) If the negotiation fails, the officials concerned shall

forthwith and by formal notification submit the matter to an Appraisal
Committee which is hereby created and which shall be composed of the
Provincial Treasurer, as Chairman, and the District Engineer and the
District Auditor, as members, of the province where the land is located. If
the property is situated in a chartered city the Appraisal Committee shall
be composed of the City Treasurer, as Chairman and the City Engineer
and City Auditor, as members thereof. x x x
Public respondent contends that there was sufficient compliance with the
guidelines and prescribed procedure set forth in both issuances. The referral to
PCAC for the determination of the fair market value of the properties was in
order. PCACs appraisal of P20,000.00 per sq. m. was a result of several factors:
assessing the location accessibility; selling prices of comparable properties; the
Page 37 of 78
amenities present like water, electricity, transportation and communication within
the vicinity; and the status or condition of the parcels of land. TRBs act of subjecting
the properties to another round of appraisal by independent appraisal companies was
but a manifestation that it was protecting the governments interests by ensuring that
it would not be put to a disadvantageous position by the appraisal recommended by
PCAC. The result of the appraisals conducted by the three independent appraisal
companies led TRB to come up with an average appraisal in the amount
of P15,355.00 per sq. m. in purchasing AMVELs properties. The amount was below
the original recommendation of PCAC to purchase AMVELs properties
at P20,000.00 per sq. m. The determination of this just compensation price was fair
and reasonable.
The Zonal Valuation (6th Revision) that took effect on February 2, 1997 fixed
the amount of P4,500.00 per sq. m. as valuation of the residential regular (RR) lands
situated on Dr. A. Santos Avenue, San Dionisio, Paraaque City. Commercial land
along the same place was fixed at P20,000.00 per sq. m. and along Ninoy Aquino
International Airport at P30,000.00 per sq. m. The affected AMVEL properties were
classified by Ordinance No. 97-08 as within the C-3 high-intensity commercial zone.
Public respondent claims that the Appraisal Committees created under E.O.
132 are endowed with special technical knowledge, skills, expertise and training on
the subject of appraisal; that the discretion given to the authorities on this matter is
of such wide latitude that the Court will not interfere therewith, unless it is apparent
that it is being used as a shield to a fraudulent transaction; and that government
agencies or bodies dealing with basically technical matters deserve to be
disentangled from undue interference from the courts, and so from the Ombudsman
as well (Concerned Officials of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
[MWSS] v. Vasquez,[87] citing Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Deputy Executive
Secretary[88]).[89]
Public respondent further contends:
[The] final re-alignment plan duly approved by the TRB resulted in

the substantial reduction of the area traversed by the C-5 Link Project from
the original area of twelve (12) hectares to only 7.9 hectares, and only after
averaging the appraisals of government and private appraisers. This factual
Page 38 of 78
circumstance indicated prudence on the part of private respondent PEA and
TRB officials in effecting the power of eminent domain, as they gave due
regard to the rights of the landowners thereof. Again, the reduction in the
expropriated private lands upon consideration of the rights of the
landowners may not be criminally actionable absent any showing of
irregularity aliunde.
xxx
There are well-observed rules in the field of real estate. Judicial

notice may be taken of a cardinal rule, which is likewise of common
knowledge, that the value of real property appreciates over time and at a
rate which depends on the extent of development of the area where the land
is situated. Thus, the price sold at any given time does not mean that the
same price would be utilized for a subsequent sale thereof, especially
where the property has undergone development or has been converted into
land for commercial purposes. [Even] petitioner concedes that AMVEL
developed the lands which were sold to the government. Thus, it was but
reasonable for the price of the lands to have appreciated. Besides, private
respondents Velarde and/or AMVEL being engaged in real estate business,
it is only natural for them to ensure that profits are obtained on top of their
investments, or even speculate, for that matter. As declared by this
Honorable Court in the case of Tatad vs. Garcia, Jr., in all cases where a
party enters into a contract with the government, he does so, not out [of]
charity and not to lose money, but to gain pecuniarily.[90]
xxx
In relation to petitioners allegation that the bloated cost of right-of-

way (ROW) project depleted the proceeds of the US $68.6 Million loan for
the right of way acquisition, the public respondent finds the said allegation
vague and without factual basis. The amount of loan proceeds was not a
factor that should be considered in appraising the value of the subject
properties.[91] (Emphasis ours)
F. COMMENT OF RESPONDENTS RONALDO B.

ZAMORA, MANUEL B. ZAMORA, JR., CESAR
E.A. VIRATA, AND LUIS L. VIRATA
1. Petition should be dismissed as Petitioner is guilty of forum-

shopping
Page 39 of 78
Private respondents allege that petitioner admits that he previously filed a
complaint[92] with respondent Office of the Ombudsman against respondents
Ronaldo B. Zamora, Manual B. Zamora, Jr., and Luis J. L. Virata (OMB Case No.
0-00-1758); however, he did not attach a copy of said complaint to his petition filed
before this Court. Said complaint was dismissed by the Ombudsman. Petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration in said case was still pending as of the time of the filing
of the Comment. Private respondents conclude that petitioner had filed multiple suits
involving the very same issues against respondents, and he merely rehashed the very
same charges and allegations in the second complaint. This, according to private
respondents, was forum shopping, defined by this Court in Gatmaytan v. Court of
Appeals,[93] as the institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings grounded on
the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition.
Both complaints filed by petitioner are grounded on the same causes and
allegations surrounding the purported illegality of the transfer of the Coastal Road
Project to the Coastal Road Corporation. Respondents contend further:
[Petitioner] simultaneously and successively availed himself of

several judicial remedies by filing two (2) separate complaints against
herein respondents, all substantially founded on the same essential facts
and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues. Petitioner
obviously did this to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision
if not in one case or one court or tribunal, then in another.[94]
2. Petition does not raise any question of law.
Private respondents submit that a question of law exists when there is a doubt or
controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and there is a question
of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts. They
further submit that [one] test is whether the appellate court can determine the issue
raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case it is a question of
law; otherwise it will be a question of fact. The question must not involve the
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented.[95]
Page 40 of 78
3. Petition, on its face, does not raise any credible factual issue in
respect to the dismissal of the complaint against respondents.
Petitioner failed to controvert the findings of fact and law made by the
Ombudsman in his assailed Resolution. Furthermore, the Ombudsman, in
its Resolution dated July 16, 2001 in OMB Case No. 00-00-1758, comprehensively
passed upon the very same allegations of petitioner in OMB Case No. 0-001-00577.
Petitioners allegations in his complaint are contradictory. On the one hand, he

claims that the de-prioritization of the C-5 Link Expressway and the prioritization
of the R-1 Expressway Extension would benefit Caylabne Bay Resort. On the other
hand, complainant himself alleges that the de-prioritization of the C-5 Link
Expressway will result in a minimal increase in vehicle volume along the R-1
Expressway. Clearly then, no appreciable benefit would result if Coastal Road
Corporation indeed pushed for the de-prioritization of the C-5 Link Expressway
because the alleged benefit to Caylabne Bay Resort would be negated by the revenue
loss due to minimal increase in the vehicular volume along the entire expressway. [96]
4. The petition, like petitioners complaint before the Ombudsman, is

anchored on hearsay evidence twice removed.
Private respondents allege that in building a case against them regarding the
purported de-prioritization of the C-5 Link Expressway, petitioner quotes
extensively from the February 7, 1999 article from the Philippine
Star newspaper. They contend that [it] is elementary that newspaper and magazine
articles are hearsay twice removed and have no evidentiary value whatsoever.[97]
G. COMMENT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT RUBEN

A. DE OCAMPO[98]
Private respondent Ruben de Ocampo (de Ocampo) argues that the dismissal by
the public respondent of the complaint in the proceedings a quo should be
sustained in totobecause:
1. Petitioner fails to raise distinct and pure questions of law in the

instant petition which omission is fatal to his appeal
Page 41 of 78
by certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
2. The petitioner has no legal standing to institute the charges with the
Office of the Ombudsman for alleged violations of Sec.2 in relation
to Sec. 1 sub-paragraph d(1), (3) and (6) of R.A. 7080, and Sec. 3
sub-paragraph (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.
3. The facts as alleged in the complaint-affidavit and herein petition

for review do not constitute the commission of any offense on the
part of respondent De Ocampo and no evidence whatsoever was
presented against respondent De Ocampo to support the allegations
in petitioners complaint-affidavit.
De Ocampo avers that he held the position of Public Utility Regulation Officer
II at the Toll Regulatory Board, a position rated at Salary Grade-15, and one that
was neither managerial nor supervisorial in nature. As such, he neither had
recommendatory nor decision-making powers or functions as regards the TRB.
De Ocampo contends that petitioner lacks the required personal knowledge of

facts constitutive of the charges in the latters Complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Petitioner failed to allege the means by which he supposedly came to
be acquainted with the material facts stated in his Complaint. According to him:
It is patent and undeniable that Petitioner was never privy to the

contracts and communications alleged in his Complaint and in this Petition
for Review. Nowhere in the records does it appear that Petitioner ever
participated in any of the transactions referred to. Petitioners conclusions
are merely hearsay and should therefore be disregarded. x x x [99]
De Ocampo cites Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 6770, The Ombudsman Act of
1989, which states:
SECTION 20.Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct

the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission
complained of if it believes that:
Page 42 of 78
(1) The complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or
quasi-judicial body;
(2) The complaint pertains to a matter outside the jurisdiction of the

Office of the Ombudsman;
(3) The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad

faith;
(4) The complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the

subject matter of the grievance; or
(5) The complaint was filed after one (1) year from the occurrence
of the act or omission complained of.
In this case, de Ocampo alleges that petitioner failed to show any interest in
or show proof of personal knowledge of the transactions as investigated by the Office
of the Ombudsman, and has neither alleged nor proven that his rights have been
violated or that he has been put at a disadvantage by the consummation of the
assailed transactions through any act or omission of de Ocampo.[100]
Furthermore, private respondent contends:
[The] acts complained of by Petitioner occurred more than one (1)

year prior to the institution of the original Complaint before the Office of
the Ombudsman on 16 April 2001. The last assailed transaction, more
specifically, the act of then President Estrada in granting his imprimatur
and approval to CRCs proposal to deprioritize the construction of the C-5
Link Expressway and to prioritize the R-1 Expressway Extension, was
consummated on 23 November 1999 or at least one (1) year and four (4)
months prior to the filing of the Complaint. The above-quoted Sec. 20 par.
5 of R.A. 6770 clearly states that The Office of the Ombudsman may not
conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission
of if it believes that The complaint was filed after one year from the
occurrence of the act or omission complained of. Considering the length
of time which elapsed between the act complained of and the filing of the
Complaint, the Office of the Ombudsman should not have even considered
the charges put forth by Petitioner. In any event, the Complaint was
Page 43 of 78
correctly and cogently dismissed by the Ombudsman for utter lack of
merit. x x x [101]
H. COMMENT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT

FRISCO F. SAN JUAN
Private respondent Frisco F. San Juan (San Juan) raises the following
arguments in his Comment:
I. The petition must be dismissed outright as it does not raise pure

questions of law or cite any special and important reasons for its
allowance under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
II. In any case, respondent Ombudsman did not commit any reversible
error or grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners complaint a
quo, in that:
a. Petitioner completely failed to establish the existence of any of

the elements of plunder in order for the complaint to prosper as
against respondent San Juan or any of his co-respondents.
b. Nor was petitioner able to establish any violation by respondent

San Juan of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On the
contrary, the acquisition of the AMVEL Properties for the
governments tollway project was neither disadvantageous to the
government nor did it give any unwarranted benefits, advantages
or preference to any party.
c. Petitioner failed to otherwise specify any act or behavior on the

part of Respondent San Juan which constitutes a breach of the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Behavior for public officials and
employees.
d. Petitioners other imputations and insinuations of anomalies in

respect of the subject expressway construction are equally
baseless and purely speculative accusations of wrongdoing on
respondents part.
e. Given the patently baseless and utterly deficient complaint for

plunder, graft, etc., the additional fact-finding proceedings which
Page 44 of 78
petitioner sought to have in the case would have added nothing
to petitioners cause against respondents.[102]
San Juan, the Chairman of the PEA from July 1998 to February 2001,
submits that a petition for review on certiorari, under the mode of appeal
provided by Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is required to raise
only questions of law which shall be distinctly set forth in the petition, the
Honorable Court not being a trier of facts.Thus, in certiorari proceedings under
Rule 45, the findings of fact below as well as the conclusions on the credibility
of witnesses are generally not disturbed, the question before the court being
limited to questions of law.[103]
According to San Juan, Rule 45 likewise provides that for the petitions to
be filed under it to be allowed, there must be special and important reasons
therefor, as when the court a quo has decided a question of substance not
heretofore determined by the Honorable Court, or has decided it in any way
probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions thereof; or when
the court a quo has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of
proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by a lower court as to call for
the exercise of the power of supervision of this Court.
San Juan contends that at the heart of all the purported serious errors of
law raised by petitioner are essentially factual questions, which petitioner would
have the Honorable Court resolve. Thus, San Juan avers that petitioner asks that
this Honorable Court determine:
if based on the appraisals of the properties involved, the right-of-way

acquisitions were overpriced;
if the purchase of the subject properties had been consummated on 7 May
1998 ;
if there was compliance with the procedure for the valuation of the
properties involved;
if respondents amassed wealth from the subject transaction as to be liable
for plunder;
Page 45 of 78
if President Estrada intervened in the purchase of the right-of-way and the
payment thereof;
if the titles transferred to the Republic were clean;
and so on.
San Juan concludes from the above that all these questions require an
appreciation of the evidence and an examination of the probative value of the proofs
presented to determine the truth or falsity of the factual claims of the parties below;
these are thus factual questions.
As regards petitioners allegations of plunder, San Juan notes that nowhere in

the complaint was it alleged that respondent San Juan or any of his co-respondents
received any art of the purchase price for the lands purchased by the Government
from AMVEL from the right of way.[104] The initiative of the TRB not only in
renegotiating the purchase price and in causing the re-appraisal of the properties by
three (3) appraisers but also in successfully reducing the purchase price cannot be
the product of, and is in fact inconsistent with, respondents supposed connivance or
collusion with AMVEL.
San Juan further alleges that the negotiation, perfection and execution of the
Deed of Sale of the lands in question between TRB and Amvel were all done without
the participation or involvement of PEA, as it was never involved in the
renegotiation efforts. This is consistent with the terms of the TOA and the MOA,
where the responsibility for acquiring the lands, the negotiation with its individual
owners and the preparation of the necessary documents including the cancellation of
the titles in the name of the individual lot owners and the transfer thereof in the name
of the government were all vested in TRB without the intervention of PEA.
San Juan alleges that the following steps were taken to ensure the regularity
of the questioned transaction:
1. Prior to the full payment of the purchase price to the sellers, TRB
ensured that the Deeds of Sale were executed by authorized
signatories, with the required Board resolutions and Special Powers
of Attorney and duly notarized.
Page 46 of 78
2. TRB likewise made certain that the real estate taxes covering the
remaining quarters of the year and the documentary stamp taxes due
on the transactions equivalent to 1.5% of the purchase price were
shouldered and paid for by AMVEL with the corresponding tax
clearance duly issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; and that
all titles to the properties were clean and transferred in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines before the balance of the purchase
price was fully paid.
3. Other than paying the purchase price for the properties, the
Government did not pay any expenses for notarization, taxes and
transfer fees, registration and processing of the transfer of titles to
the Republic of the Philippines and clearing the properties of
occupants and their relocation.
San Juan concludes that contrary to petitioners claims, AMVEL never

received a windfall from the government for which it acquired for almost nothing. In
truth, apart from receiving a purchase price reduced to the extent of P370 million,
AMVEL was required to pay, as it did, expenses normally shouldered by a seller all
these on top of what petitioner himself recognized as developments undertaken by
AMVEL on the properties prior to their acquisition by the government.[105]
San Juan contends that tax declarations, which petitioner presented as

evidence of the alleged overpriced purchase price of the properties, are neither proof
of the true market value of properties nor conclusive evidence of their value, but
only enable the assessor to identify the same for their assessment levels.[106]
Furthermore, San Juan alleges that the acquisition cost of a property cannot
be the sole basis for determining its fair value; the current value of similar properties
and their actual or potential uses must be considered together with other factors.[107]
Regarding petitioners insistence that Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 50

should have been applied, San Juans averments are summarized below:
1. A.O. No. 50 would have no application to the contract between TRB

and AMVEL which had been priorly perfected on May 7, 1998.
Page 47 of 78
2. The Zonal valuation (6th Division) which took effect on February 2,
1997, fixing the amount of P4,500/sq m as valuation of the affected
properties, refers to residential regular (RR) lands situated in Dr. A.
Santos Avenue, San Dionisio, Paranaque City. The commercial lands
along same place was fixed at P20,000.00/ sq m and along Ninoy
Aquino International Airport at P30,000/00 per sq m. The affected
AMVEL properties were classified by Ordinance No. 97-08 as within
the C-3 high intensity commercial zone.
3. A.O. No. 50 does not in any way prohibit the conduct of a negotiated
sale which is more expeditious and less expensive for the Government
than engaging in a protracted expropriation proceedings over the
properties with the owners thereof. The purported costs in terms of
time, resources and money will not necessarily result in savings for the
Government.
4. Even in expropriation proceedings, just compensation for the

properties must be determined. And by just compensation is meant a
fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of
the indemnity x x x the market value of the land taken x x x being the
sum of money which a person desirous, but not compelled to buy, and
an owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price
to be given and received for such property. Thus, to determine just
compensation, the parties must add to the market value, the
consequential damages. (Tuason v. LTA, 31 SCRA 413) In the present
case, the final valuation agreed upon by the TRB and AMVEL, upon
consideration of the market value as determined by four (4) independent
appraisers, constitutes such just compensation that is not only fair to the
seller but to the Government as well.
5. The Honorable Court itself had occasion to observe that protracted

expropriation proceedings do not only mean delay and difficulty for the
Government, it also results in the citizen losing faith in the Government
and in its readiness to pay for what it appropriates. x x x
In this case, the properties affected by the right-of-way involve

numerous owners. Thus, in pursuing a negotiated sale instead of opting
for expropriation proceedings and arriving at a mutually acceptable
acquisition price in consideration for the transfer of clean and
unencumbered titles to the Republic, the Government did not suffer any
losses, contrary to petitioners claims.[108]
Page 48 of 78
San Juan claims that neither the TRB nor PEA could have aborted the
purchase of the AMVEL properties based on the alleged falsification of the Court of
Appeals Decision dated October 29, 1998. These properties were essential for the
Tollway Project a fact which petitioner himself concedes is a reasonable, necessary
and urgent public work. Thus, the TRB, more so PEA, could not have simply re-
arranged the project plans and decided not to acquire the AMVEL properties. In fact,
it is absurd to even suggest that PEA could override the decision to build a cheaper
and faster expressway traversing the AMVEL properties. Not only did the AMVEL
properties have the most advantageous access to the NAIA, their development was
the easiest to implement, because they had already been cleared of squatters and
other occupants.[109]
As for San Juans purported approval of the take-over of the Tollway Project
by the Coastal Road Corporation (CRC), San Juan states that there is simply no basis
for this claim, for the following reasons:
a. At the end of 1999, the Malaysian counterpart could no longer fund the
project due to currency regulations. After CRC offered to take over the
interest of Renong-Berhad, PEA in fact required it so show proof of its
financial and technical capability. When respondent San Juans term as
PEA chairman ended, CRC had not yet submitted the PEA
requirements. Consequently, respondent San Juan could not have given
my approval to de-prioritize the C-5 project and to prioritize the R-1
Expressway extension as allegedly proposed by CRC. Other than his
bare allegations, petitioner has not presented any proof to show that
respondent San Juan and the other respondents have turned-over the
project to CRC and acceded to its proposal to de-prioritize C-5 project
and to prioritize the R-1 Expressway Extensions.
b. x x x [The] Ombudsman had already dismissed a related complaint by

the same petitioner when he similarly questioned the transfer and
takeover of the Project to CRC. Thus, in a Resolution dated 16 July
2001, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for plunder and
violation of RA 3019 filed by the herein petitioner against Joseph
Estrada and other respondents for the transfer and take-over of the
MCTE Project to CRC.[110]
Page 49 of 78
San Juan also claims that in asserting that the acquisition price arrived at for
the questioned transaction exceeded the limit of P1.7 billion for the right-of-way
purchase, petitioner ignores that the landowners of the affected properties are
entitled to just compensation for the taking of their properties. San Juan contends
that such just compensation is not based on the budget of the government for the
project, but is the fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure
of the indemnity x x x the market value of the land taken x x x being the sum of
money which a person desirous, but not compelled to buy, and an owner, wiling, but
not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received for such
property. San Juan further contends that petitioner has not otherwise shown how the
entire MCTE Project could be achieved within the said limit of P1.7 billion.[111]
V. ISSUES
The following issues were raised in the petition as well as in respondents

respective Comments:
A. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for using the wrong
mode of appeal and for raising questions of fact
B. Whether or not public respondent Office of the Ombudsman committed

serious errors of law as well as grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned Resolution and
Order
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Whether or not petition should be dismissed for using

the wrong mode of appeal and for raising questions of
fact
Respondents Office of the Ombudsman, Mariano Z. Velarde, Franklin M.

Velarde, Gregorio R. Vigilar, Ronaldo B. Zamora, Manuel B. Zamora Jr., Cesar E.A.
Virata, Luis L. Virata, and Frisco F. San Juan contend that a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before this
Honorable Court is not the proper mode of appeal in questioning any final order or
Page 50 of 78
resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman; thus, the instant petition should be
outrightly dismissed motu proprio.
Section 1 of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring

to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other
courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
Private respondents Velarde aver that the courts referred to in the provision
quoted above are the courts that compose the integrated judicial system and do not
include quasi-judicial bodies or agencies such as the Office of the
Ombudsman.[112] They claim that the proper mode of appeal in questioning the final
judgment, order, or resolution of quasi-judicial bodies or agencies is provided
under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1 of said Rule states:
Section 1. Scope.. This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments

or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments,
final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in
the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the
Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land
Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics
Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National
Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under
Republic Act No. 6557, Government Service Insurance System,
Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board,
Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of
Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and
voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.
To support their contention that Rule 43 applies to this case, private

respondents rely on the Courts ruling in Fabian v. Desierto,[113] which provides:
Page 51 of 78
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a
petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders
of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments
and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be
brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review,
under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely
formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate
procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should

apply only to "ordinary" quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the Office of
the Ombudsman which is a "high constitutional body." We see no reason
for this distinction for, if hierarchical rank should be a criterion, that
proposition thereby disregards the fact that Rule 43 even includes the
Office of the President and the Civil Service Commission, although the
latter is even an independent constitutional commission, unlike the Office
of the Ombudsman which is a constitutionally-mandated but statutorily-
created body. (Emphasis ours.)
Public respondent Ombudsman likewise argues that petitioner has taken the
wrong mode of appeal, citing the rule as laid down by this Court in Tirol v. del
Rosario,[114]which states:
Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 provides that orders, directives and

decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are appealable to the
Supreme Court via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, in Fabian v.
Desierto, we declared that Section 27 is unconstitutional since it expanded
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, without its advice and consent, in
violation of Article VI, Section 30 of the Constitution. Hence, all appeals
from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases may
be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
True, the law is silent on the remedy of an aggrieved party in case

the Ombudsman found sufficient cause to indict him in criminal or non-
administrative cases. We cannot supply such deficiency if none has been
provided in the law. We have held that the right to appeal is a mere
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed
by, and in accordance with, the provisions of law. Hence, there must be a
law expressly granting such privilege. The Ombudsman Act specifically
Page 52 of 78
deals with the remedy of an aggrieved party from orders, directives and
decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. As we
ruled in Fabian, the aggrieved party is given the right to appeal to the Court
of Appeals. Such right of appeal is not granted to parties aggrieved by
orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, like finding
probable cause to indict accused persons.
Public respondent avers that no information has been filed with either
the Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial Court; and not only did petitioner resort to
the wrong mode of appeal, he also raised factual issues in his petition, which are not
proper grounds for appeal under the rule. Public respondent further avers that an
error in the choice or mode of appeal is one of the grounds for the dismissal of the
appeal under Section 5, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. [115] This,
aggravated by improper grounds raised on appeal, has rendered the instant petition
dismissible.
Although we agree with private respondents Velarde that a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 is not the proper remedy for parties seeking relief from
final judgments, orders, or resolutions of quasi-judicial bodies or agencies like the
Office of the Ombudsman, as has been repeatedly held by this Court,[116] we find
that the remedy of appeal under Rule 43 posited by private respondents Velarde is
not proper either. This Court subsequently held that under the ruling in Fabian, all
appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases may
be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.[117] Said remedy, therefore, is not applicable to cases involving criminal
or non-administrative charges filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, which is
the situation in the case before us now. As we further stated in Tirol v. Del Rosario:
[An] aggrieved party is not without recourse where the finding of

the Ombudsman as to the existence of probable cause is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Page 53 of 78
In Fabian v. Desierto,[118] the case was dismissed and remanded to the Court
of Appeals. This case being criminal and not administrative in nature, however, the
conclusion in Fabian is not applicable.
Thus, due to the nature of this case and the allegations involving grave abuse
of discretion committed by the Office of the Ombudsman, it should have been filed
under Rule 65, and not Rule 45, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
This Court had already provided this remedy in Nava v. Commission on

[119]
Audit, wherein we held:
The remedy availed of by petitioner is erroneous. Instead of a

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
filed with this Court the present petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court pursuant to the
provisions of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770.
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only judgments or final

orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court and other courts, whenever authorized by law, may
be the subject of an appeal by certiorari to this Court. It does not include
resolutions of the Ombudsman on preliminary investigations in criminal
cases. Petitioner's reliance on Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 is misplaced.
Section 27 is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule
45 is taken from a decision in an administrative disciplinary action. It
cannot be taken into account where an original action for certiorari under
Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an
incident in a criminal action. In other words, the right to appeal is not
granted to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman
in criminal cases, like the case at bar. Such right is granted only from
orders or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases.
An aggrieved party is not left without any recourse. Where the

findings of the Ombudsman as to the existence of probable cause is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may file a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis ours.)
Again, in Flores v. Office of Ombudsman,[120] we ruled as follows:
Page 54 of 78
x x x The instant petition was captioned as a petition for review
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, the
arguments raised refer to alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by
the Office of the Ombudsman. In determining the nature of an action,
it is not the caption, but the averments in the petition and the
character of the relief sought, that are controlling. Accordingly, we
are compelled to consider the instant petition as one under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
This case involves a significant amount of money that was already released
by the government to a private institution, AMVEL, as purchase price for the road
right-of-way in a major infrastructure project that was undertaken by the former and
that naturally affected the general public. Therefore, even if this case was
erroneously filed as shown above, and may be dismissed outright under the rules,
the Court deems it appropriate to brush aside technicalities of procedure, as this
involves matters of transcendental importance to the public;[121] and to consider the
petition as one for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[122]
Respondents argue further that the petition should be instantly dismissed for
failing to raise purely questions of law. As may be gleaned from petitioners
assignment of errors, this Court is being asked to determine the following, which
involve questions of fact:
1. Whether or not Administrative Order No. 50, s. 1999 is applicable to

the sale of the subject properties in this case;
2. Whether or not private respondents complied with the prescribed
procedure in determining a fair and reasonable valuation of the subject
properties;
3. Whether or not respondents bloated the purchase price;
4. Whether or not respondents changed the original alignment of the Sucat
Interchange, which resulted in an increase in the size of the AMVEL
property sold to the government;
5. Whether or not respondent Mariano Z. Velarde made a killing in the
sale of the subject properties;
Page 55 of 78
6. Whether or not a portion of the subject properties did not have a clean
title at the time they were sold to the government;
7. Whether or not the cost of the right-of-way was bloated, which led to
the depletion of the proceeds of the US$68.6 Million loan for the right-
of-way acquisition; and
8. Whether or not respondents de-prioritized the R-1 Expressway
Extension over the C-5 Link Expressway.
It is settled that this Court is not a trier of facts[123] and its jurisdiction is limited
to errors of law. As we held in Tirol v. Commission on Audit, There is a question of
law in any given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts. A question of fact arises when the doubt or difference arises as
to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.[124]
Moreover, in Medina v. City Sheriff, Manila,[125] we have stated:
For this petition to be granted, it must be shown that the respondent

appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction and not mere errors of judgment, for certiorari is not a remedy
for errors of judgment, which are correctible by appeal.
B. Whether or not public respondent Office of the

Ombudsman committed serious errors of law as well
as grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned
Resolution and Order
In the case now before us, petitioner wants this Court to review the evidence
that was already thoroughly studied by public respondent Ombudsman and passed
upon in the questioned Resolution.[126] Thus, public respondent found that:
The uncontroverted facts clearly show that Administrative Order

No. 50 was issued on February 17, 1999, while the transaction/ negotiation
for the purchase of affected lands was consummated as early as May
1998. As correctly pointed out by respondents, the governing law is
Executive Order No. 132, (E.O. No. 132) issued on December 27, 1937,
which laid down the following procedure:
Page 56 of 78
a) The Director of the Bureau of Public Works, City
or District Engineer or other officials concerned shall make
the necessary negotiations with owner of the property
needed for public use with a view to having it donated, or
sold to the government at not to exceed the assessed
valuation prior to the investigation and survey of the project.
b) If the negotiation fails, the officials concerned shall

forthwith and by formal notification submit the matter to an
Appraisal Committee which is hereby created and which
shall be composed of the Provincial Treasurer, as Chairman,
and the District Engineer and the District Auditor, as
members, of the province where the land is located. If the
property is situated in a chartered city the Appraisal
Committee shall composed (sic) of the City Treasurer, as
Chairman and the City Engineer and City Auditor, as
members. x x x
A perusal of the guidelines as well as the documentary evidence on

the transaction reveals that respondents complied with the prescribed
procedure in determining a fair and reasonable valuation of the properties
in question. The referral for the determination of the fair market value of
the properties to [the] Paranaque City Appraisal Committee which
recommended the payment of P20,000.00 per sq. m. thereof was in
order. The appraisal was a result of several [factors] ranging from
assessing the location accessibility, selling prices of comparable
properties, the amenities present like water, electricity, transportation and
communication within the vicinity and the status or condition of the
parcels of land. TRBs act of subjecting the properties to another round of
appraisal, this time, by three independent appraisal companies is a
manifestation that TRB had made sure that the Government would not be
put in a disadvantageous position in view of a very high appraisal
recommended by PCAC. Clearly, the result of the appraisals conducted
by the three (3) independent appraiser companies led TRB to come up
with an average appraisal in the amount of P15,355.00 per square [meter]
in purchasing AMVELs property. The amount is far below the original
recommendation of PCAC to purchase AMVELs property at P20,000.00
per sq. m.
Page 57 of 78
Complainant merely relied on Administrative Order No. 50 issued
by respondent Estrada and on the fact that the valuation must be based on
zonal valuation fixed by BIR at P4,000.00 per sq. m. a year prior to the
sale.
As earlier stated, Administrative Order No. 50 finds no application

to the already perfected contract between TRB and AMVEL. On the Zonal
Valuation (6th Revision) that took effect on February 2, 1997 whereby it
fixed the amount of P4,500.00 per sq. m. as valuation of the affected
properties however refers to residential regular (RR) lands situated in Dr.
A. Santos Avenue, San Dionisio, Paranaque City. The commercial lands
along same place was fixed at P20,000.00 per sq. m. and along Ninoy
Aquino International Airport at P30,000.00 per sq. m. The affected
AMVEL properties were classified by Ordinance No. 97-08, pages 32, 33,
34 as within the C-3 high intensity commercial zone. The properties in
question being within commercial zone, PCAC properly recommended
valuation of P20,000.00 is justified (sic). We agree with the PCAC that
the appraisal of a property is not limited only to the zonal valuation by the
BIR. As correctly pointed out by respondents Nacianceno, Daval-Santos,
Medina-Cue and de Leon, the appraisal of properties are also based on
location, accessibility, selling prices of comparable properties, the
amenities present like water, electricity, transportation and
communication, etc. In fact, in Administrative Order No. 50, zonal
valuation is only one of the many factors being considered in the payment
of just compensation.
Complainant also anchored his complaint on two (2) Memoranda

dated March 30, 1999, from then President Estrada x x x.
xxx
We find no circumstance to consider the two (2) Memoranda

anomalous or irregular. The approval of the Deeds of Sale between TRB
and AMVEL by respondent Estrada was in pursuance to the provisions of
P.D. 1112.
It may not be amiss to state that the transaction between TRB and
AMVEL was consummated as early as May 1998 during the
administration of former President Fidel V. Ramos. The payment of the
purchase price was only delayed as the TRB conducted a re-appraisal of
the property until the new administration of respondent Estrada in June
Page 58 of 78
1998. It was only in January 1999 that TRB, then having come out with a
new price per sq. m. after averaging the appraisal of the three (3)
independent appraisers and of PCAC, approved the purchase price of
P1,221,799,806.00 for the acquisition of AMVELs property totaling
79,598 per sq. m. at P15,350.00. This delay in the determination of the
consideration did not affect the already perfected contract as the
consideration thereof was already determined or determinable. The events
negate complainants claim that the transaction was concluded in just 2
working days. The insinuation that respondent Estrada favored AMVEL
in approving the purchase of subject properties . . . has no basis. If indeed
AMVEL persuaded respondent Estrada to act on its favor, then AMVEL
could have pushed for the acquisition of the properties not at P15,350.00
but at P20,000.00 per sq. m. Besides, the valuation of P15,355.00 per sq.
m. paid to AMVEL is much lower than the advertised price of the
properties adjacent to AMVEL pegged at least P19,000.00to P55,000.00
per sq. m. x x x Further, [with] respondents Velarde and/or AMVEL,
being engaged in business, it is natural that they engage in profit scheme
(sic) which in this case appears justified.
While there was a complete payment in favor of AMVEL of the

purchase price of P1,221,766,640.00 within one (1) month from the time
respondent Estrada approved the transaction, we find the same not
anomalous. The several [Deeds] of Sale executed by the parties, TRB and
AMVEL, stipulate that fifty (50%) percent of the purchase price shall be
paid upon execution of the contract. The other fifty (50%) percent upon
issuance by the Register of Deeds of the corresponding Transfer
Certificate of Title covering the properties in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines.
In the crime of Plunder, the following elements must exist:
2. A public officer acquires wealth by himself or in connivance

with another person;
3. The acquisition of the wealth was obtained through the
means described in Section 1 (d).
In the instant case, the alleged ill-gotten wealth consisting of the

overpriced purchase price of the properties affected by C-5 Link, was
allegedly obtained by respondents by taking undue advantage of their
official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the Filipino People.
Page 59 of 78
We find no evidence to support complainants claim of the existence
of ill-gotten wealth. The purchase price of P1,221,799,804 paid to
AMVEL could not be considered as ill-gotten wealth as said amount is a
consideration of a legally entered Deeds (sic) of Sale. There is no evidence
that public respondents benefited/profited or had taken shares with private
respondents in the transaction.
Complainant contends that public and private [respondents] acts

constitute also violation of Section 3(a), (e), (g), (h) and (j) of Republic
Act 3019, as amended.
We find no evidence to support said allegation.
In reference to Section 3(a), there is no sufficient evidence showing

that respondents, especially respondent Estrada, induced or influenced
anybody to perform an act in violation of rules and regulation
(sic). Neither was there proof of a violation of any rules or regulations
promulgated by competent authority. Administrative Order No. 50 cannot
be considered as the rule violated since it finds no applications (sic) on the
questioned transaction.
Insofar as Section 3(e) is concerned, there was no showing that the

government suffered undue injury when the AMVEL properties were
purchased at P15,355.00 per sq. m. As earlier pointed out, complainant
relied on the valuation of P4,500.00 per sq. m. fixed by the BIR when the
said valuation applies to regular residential land and not to commercial
lots fixed at least P20,000.00 per sq. m. The P15,355.00 per square meter
[price] is relatively low compared to that recommended by PCAC and
contained at BIR Zonal Valuation which was P20,000.00 per sq. m.
Referring to Section 3(g), there was no basis to conclude that the

contract was grossly disadvantageous to the government. On the contrary,
the government was able to save money when it decided to purchase the
questioned properties at P15,355.00 per sq. m. and not at P20,000.00.
Section 3(j) has no application in the instant case as it pertains to

the granting of a license, permit or benefit. Assuming as it does, it
established a record that the affected properties were purchased from
persons or [entities] who were legally authorized to sell or own the same
in accordance with the applicable laws, rules and regulations.
Page 60 of 78
We find no evidence that the elements of Section 3(h) exist. The
provision requires that there must be an actual intervention in the
transaction for financial or pecuniary interest by public respondent. While
there was an intervention by public respondents the same were in
pursuance to the exercise official duties. Neither public respondents have
direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest with AMVEL.
Considering that the crimes imputed against the respondents were

not shown to exist, conspiracy could not likewise be appreciated. It is a
well settled ruled that conspiracy must be proven as clearly as the
commission of the offense itself.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
SO RESOLVED.[127]
Upon Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner, respondent Office of the

Ombudsman issued an Order,[128] the pertinent portions of which are quoted below:
There is no truth to the allegation that the Ombudsman deliberately

failed to order the conduct of fact-finding investigation. To conduct a fact-
finding investigation is a question addressed to the sound discretion of the
Ombudsman and not therefore as a matter of right. When the instant
complaint was filed complainant attached voluminous documents which
when evaluated was sufficient in form and substance to conduct
preliminary investigation. To that matter, there is no need to conduct fact-
finding activities as the compliant already reached the formal stage of
investigation to determine whether or not probable cause exists to charge
respondents. In the same manner, the request for subpoena duces tecum
cannot be demanded as a matter of policy for every [case] filed before this
Office. From the very beginning it is the duty of the complainant to
present complete and ample evidence to support his allegation and not to
rely on the coercive processes of this Office lest to be accused of being a
tool for every complainants crusade and be labeled as engaged in fishing
evidence.
[Complainant] questions the inhibition of the Honorable

Ombudsman. We view however the same inhibition a prudent exercise of
Page 61 of 78
impartiality. Prudence dictates that the Honorable Ombudsman himself
should inhibit to clear any suspicion that he would engage in any
retaliatory [act] against the complainant in view of the impeachment case
filed by the latter. Far from the accusation that the Honorable Ombudsman
prejudged the case as well as the members of the Panel, we submit that
the resolution was arrived [at] after a painstaking appreciation of the
available evidence of the complainant and respondents.
As a consequence of the inhibition of the Honorable Ombudsman,

the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, Hon. Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. had to
perform the duties of the Ombudsman and assumed and took charge of the
disposition of the case. This finds support under Section 8 of R.A. 6770,
otherwise known as Ombudsman Act of 1989. On the contrary,
complainant failed to cite the particular provision of law allegedly violated
when the Overall Deputy Ombudsman approved the dismissal of the
case. In the same manner we find the insinuations of the complainant
against the Overall Deputy Ombudsman baseless much more sufficient to
affect or disturb whatever findings we have in our resolution.
Complainant alleges that his evidence were totally disregarded. He

forgot however, that respondents have evidence too. Notwithstanding
with the voluminous documents complainant submitted, this Office has to
weigh the evidentiary value and credibility of the evidence as well as the
arguments of both parties. It so happened that in the appreciation thereof,
we gave credence to the evidence of the other parties. That judgment
cannot be put as an issue that would warrant the reversal of our decision.
In general, the Motion for Reconsideration failed to advance new

arguments that would warrant the reversal of the questioned
Resolution. There was no new evidence submitted by the complainant to
warrant a second look of our resolution. The supposed documents he
attached in the Motion were already passed upon and examined by this
Office. Lastly, complainant miserably failed to point out specifically the
findings or conclusion of the resolution which was contrary to law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for

Reconsideration of the complainant is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Page 62 of 78
We find no cogent reason to weigh all over again the evidence in this case and
to reverse the findings of the public respondent quoted above. This is because, as we
held in Tirol v. COA:
[This] Court ordinarily does not interfere with the discretion of the
Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with
the appropriate courts. This rule is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise the
functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by immeasurable
petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by
the Office of the of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before
it, in as much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped
if they would be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part
of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.[129]
More recently, we had occasion to pass upon a similar case, the core issue of
which was whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing petitioners' complaint against the respondents. In that case, we ruled in
the negative and, accordingly, dismissed the petition.[130] Thus, we held:
We cannot overemphasize the fact that the Ombudsman is a

constitutional officer duty bound to "investigate on its own, or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient." The raison d 'etre for its creation
and endowment of broad investigative authority is to insulate it from the
long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals'
offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials,
and through the execution of official pressure and influence, quash, delay,
or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed
by public officers.
In Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) v.

Desierto, we dwelt on the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman,
to wit:
Page 63 of 78
The prosecution of offenses committed by public
officers is vested primarily in the Office of the Ombudsman.
It bears emphasis that the Office has been given a wide
latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers under the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman
Act of 1989). This discretion is all but free from legislative,
executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the Office is
insulated from any outside pressure and improper influence.
Indeed, the Ombudsman is empowered to determine

whether there exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime
has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information
with the appropriate courts. The Ombudsman may thus
conduct an investigation if the complaint filed is found to be
in the proper form and substance. Conversely, the
Ombudsman may also dismiss the complaint should it be
found insufficient in form or substance.
Unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so,

the Court will refrain from interfering with the exercise of the
Ombudsman's powers, and respect the initiative and
independence inherent in the latter who, beholden to no one,
acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the
integrity of public service.
The pragmatic basis for the general rule was explained in Ocampo
v. Ombudsman:
The rule is based not only upon respect for the

investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon
practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts
will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions
assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to
complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the
courts would be extremely swamped if they would be
compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of
the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to
Page 64 of 78
file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by private
complainants.
From the foregoing, it is crystal clear that we do not interfere with

the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers
vested by the Constitution. In short, we do not review the Ombudsman's
exercise of discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint except
when the exercise thereof is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.[131]
In the recent case Lazatin v. Ombudsman,[132] this Court held that the question
of whether the Ombudsman correctly ruled that there was enough evidence to
support a finding of probable cause pertains to a mere error of judgment. The Court
further held:
It must be stressed that certiorari is a remedy meant to correct only
errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. This has been emphasized
in First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, to
wit:
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of

facts and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem beyond the
ambit of appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review
does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of
the parties and to weigh the probative value thereof. It does
not include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation
of evidence. Any error committed in the evaluation of
evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be
remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one which
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An
error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was
issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or
in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only
by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be
issued to cure errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the
evidence of the parties, or its conclusions anchored on the
said findings and its conclusions of law. It is not for this Court
to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility
Page 65 of 78
of the witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the court a
quo.[133]
Even if the issues involved here are factual, petitioner invokes the power of
the Court to reverse the decision of the Ombudsman by alleging that the latter acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. However,
as in Morong Water District v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman,[134] we find that:
[The] Order and the Resolution of the Ombudsman are based on

substantial evidence. In dismissing the complaint of petitioner, we cannot
say that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion so as to call
for the exercise of our supervisory powers over him. This court is not a
trier of facts. As long as there is substantial evidence in support of the
Ombudsman's decision, that decision will not be overturned.
As regards petitioners insistence that the Office of the Ombudsman should

have conducted a fact-finding investigation and issued subpoena duces tecum as
requested, we find that the Ombudsmans action not to issue the same was not made
in grave abuse of discretion.[135] We have previously ruled regarding this matter in
this wise:
If the Ombudsman may dismiss a complaint outright for lack of

merit, it necessarily follows that it is also within his discretion to determine
whether the evidence before him is sufficient to establish probable cause.
Thus, petitioners may not compel the Ombudsman to order the
production of certain documents, if in the Ombudsman's judgment
such documents are not necessary in order to establish the guilt, or
innocence, of the accused.
It has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to

interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory powers. xxx
[It] is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of

discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint
filed before it. Such initiative and independence are inherent in the
Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people
and preserver of the integrity of the public service.
Page 66 of 78
The rationale underlying the Court's policy of non-interference was
laid down in Ocampo v.Ombudsman and reiterated in the more recent case
of Venus v. Desierto, to wit:
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the
courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same
way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they would be
compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or
prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court
or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.[136]
Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.[137] We do not find this situation to be present in the instant case
so as to merit a reversal of the questioned Resolution and Order issued by respondent
Office of the Ombudsman.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Ombudsman in
OMB-0-01-0577 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 67 of 78
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 191109 July 18, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the PHILIPPINE RECLAMATION

AUTHORITY (PRA),Petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF PARANAQUE, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, on pure
questions of law, assailing the January 8, 2010 Order1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 195,
Parafiaque City (RTC), which ruled that petitioner Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) is a
government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC), a taxable entity, and, therefore, . not exempt
from payment of real property taxes. The pertinent portion of the said order reads:
In view of the finding of this court that petitioner is not exempt from payment of real property taxes,
respondent Parañaque City Treasurer Liberato M. Carabeo did not act xxx without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the warrants of levy on the subject properties.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is dismissed. The Motion for Leave to File and Admit Attached
Supplemental Petition is denied and the supplemental petition attached thereto is not admitted.
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is a government corporation created by virtue of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1084 (Creating the Public Estates Authority, Defining its Powers and Functions,
Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes) which took effect on February 4,
1977 to provide a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation of lands, and the administration
and operation of lands belonging to, managed and/or operated by, the government with the object of
maximizing their utilization and hastening their development consistent with public interest.
On February 14, 1979, by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 525 issued by then President Ferdinand
Marcos, PEA was designated as the agency primarily responsible for integrating, directing and
coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government.
On October 26, 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued E.O. No. 380 transforming PEA
into PRA, which shall perform all the powers and functions of the PEA relating to reclamation activities.
By virtue of its mandate, PRA reclaimed several portions of the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila
Bay, including those located in Parañaque City, and was issued Original Certificates of Title (OCT
Nos. 180, 202, 206, 207, 289, 557, and 559) and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT Nos. 104628,
7312, 7309, 7311, 9685, and 9686) over the reclaimed lands.
Page 68 of 78
On February 19, 2003, then Parañaque City Treasurer Liberato M. Carabeo (Carabeo) issued
Warrants of Levy on PRA’s reclaimed properties (Central Business Park and Barangay San Dionisio)
located in Parañaque City based on the assessment for delinquent real property taxes made by then
Parañaque City Assessor Soledad Medina Cue for tax years 2001 and 2002.
On March 26, 2003, PRA filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction against Carabeo before the RTC.
On April 3, 2003, after due hearing, the RTC issued an order denying PRA’s petition for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order.
On April 4, 2003, PRA sent a letter to Carabeo requesting the latter not to proceed with the public
auction of the subject reclaimed properties on April 7, 2003. In response, Carabeo sent a letter stating
that the public auction could not be deferred because the RTC had already denied PRA’s TRO
application.
On April 25, 2003, the RTC denied PRA’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction for
being moot and academic considering that the auction sale of the subject properties on April 7, 2003
had already been consummated.
On August 3, 2009, after an exchange of several pleadings and the failure of both parties to arrive at
a compromise agreement, PRA filed a Motion for Leave to File and Admit Attached Supplemental
Petition which sought to declare as null and void the assessment for real property taxes, the levy
based on the said assessment, the public auction sale conducted on April 7, 2003, and the Certificates
of Sale issued pursuant to the auction sale.
On January 8, 2010, the RTC rendered its decision dismissing PRA’s petition. In ruling that PRA was
not exempt from payment of real property taxes, the RTC reasoned out that it was a GOCC under
Section 3 of P.D. No. 1084. It was organized as a stock corporation because it had an authorized
capital stock divided into no par value shares. In fact, PRA admitted its corporate personality and that
said properties were registered in its name as shown by the certificates of title. Therefore, as a GOCC,
local tax exemption is withdrawn by virtue of Section 193 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160 Local
Government Code (LGC) which was the prevailing law in 2001 and 2002 with respect to real property
taxation. The RTC also ruled that the tax exemption claimed by PRA under E.O. No. 654 had already
been expressly repealed by R.A. No. 7160 and that PRA failed to comply with the procedural
requirements in Section 206 thereof.
Not in conformity, PRA filed this petition for certiorari assailing the January 8, 2010 RTC Order based
on the following GROUNDS
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER IS LIABLE TO PAY REAL
PROPERTY TAX ON THE SUBJECT RECLAIMED LANDS CONSIDERING
THAT PETITIONER IS AN INCORPORATED INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE NATIONAL

GOVERNMENT AND IS, THEREFORE, EXEMPT FROM PAYMENT OF REAL PROPERTY TAX
UNDER SECTIONS 234(A) AND 133(O) OF REPUBLIC ACT 7160 OR THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CODE VIS-À-VIS MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY V. COURT OF APPEALS.
II
Page 69 of 78
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT RECLAIMED LANDS ARE
PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND, HENCE, EXEMPT FROM REAL PROPERTY TAX.
PRA asserts that it is not a GOCC under Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code. Neither is it a GOCC under Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
because it is not required to meet the test of economic viability. Instead, PRA is a government
instrumentality vested with corporate powers and performing an essential public service pursuant to
Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code. Although it has a capital stock
divided into shares, it is not authorized to distribute dividends and allotment of surplus and profits to
its stockholders. Therefore, it may not be classified as a stock corporation because it lacks the second
requisite of a stock corporation which is the distribution of dividends and allotment of surplus and
profits to the stockholders.
It insists that it may not be classified as a non-stock corporation because it has no members and it is
not organized for charitable, religious, educational, professional, cultural, recreational, fraternal,
literary, scientific, social, civil service, or similar purposes, like trade, industry, agriculture and like
chambers as provided in Section 88 of the Corporation Code.
Moreover, PRA points out that it was not created to compete in the market place as there was no
competing reclamation company operated by the private sector. Also, while PRA is vested with
corporate powers under P.D. No. 1084, such circumstance does not make it a corporation but merely
an incorporated instrumentality and that the mere fact that an incorporated instrumentality of the
National Government holds title to real property does not make said instrumentality a GOCC. Section
48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 recognizes a scenario where a piece of
land owned by the Republic is titled in the name of a department, agency or instrumentality.
Thus, PRA insists that, as an incorporated instrumentality of the National Government, it is exempt
from payment of real property tax except when the beneficial use of the real property is granted to a
taxable person. PRA claims that based on Section 133(o) of the LGC, local governments cannot tax
the national government which delegate to local governments the power to tax.
It explains that reclaimed lands are part of the public domain, owned by the State, thus, exempt from
the payment of real estate taxes. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public
use or public service. While the subject reclaimed lands are still in its hands, these lands remain public
lands and form part of the public domain. Hence, the assessment of real property taxes made on said
lands, as well as the levy thereon, and the public sale thereof on April 7, 2003, including the issuance
of the certificates of sale in favor of the respondent Parañaque City, are invalid and of no force and
effect.
On the other hand, the City of Parañaque (respondent) argues that PRA since its creation consistently
represented itself to be a GOCC. PRA’s very own charter (P.D. No. 1084) declared it to be a GOCC
and that it has entered into several thousands of contracts where it represented itself to be a GOCC.
In fact, PRA admitted in its original and amended petitions and pre-trial brief filed with the RTC of
Parañaque City that it was a GOCC.
Respondent further argues that PRA is a stock corporation with an authorized capital stock divided
into 3 million no par value shares, out of which 2 million shares have been subscribed and fully paid
up. Section 193 of the LGC of 1991 has withdrawn tax exemption privileges granted to or presently
enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including GOCCs.
Hence, since PRA is a GOCC, it is not exempt from the payment of real property tax.
Page 70 of 78
THE COURT’S RULING
The Court finds merit in the petition.
Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 defines a GOCC as
follows:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. – x x x x
(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-
stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary
in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or,
where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one
(51) percent of its capital stock: x x x.
On the other hand, Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code defines a
government "instrumentality" as follows:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. –– x x x x
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not
all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through
a charter. x x x
From the above definitions, it is clear that a GOCC must be "organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation" while an instrumentality is vested by law with corporate powers. Likewise, when the law
makes a government instrumentality operationally autonomous, the instrumentality remains part of the
National Government machinery although not integrated with the department framework.
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not
necessarily become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but
also corporate powers.
Many government instrumentalities are vested with corporate powers but they do not become stock
or non-stock corporations, which is a necessary condition before an agency or instrumentality is
deemed a GOCC. Examples are the Mactan International Airport Authority, the Philippine Ports
Authority, the University of the Philippines, and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. All these government
instrumentalities exercise corporate powers but they are not organized as stock or non-stock
corporations as required by Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code.
These government instrumentalities are sometimes loosely called government corporate entities. They
are not, however, GOCCs in the strict sense as understood under the Administrative Code, which is
the governing law defining the legal relationship and status of government entities.2
Correlatively, Section 3 of the Corporation Code defines a stock corporation as one whose "capital
stock is divided into shares and x x x authorized to distribute to the holders of such shares dividends
x x x." Section 87 thereof defines a non-stock corporation as "one where no part of its income is
distributable as dividends to its members, trustees or officers." Further, Section 88 provides that non-
stock corporations are "organized for charitable, religious, educational, professional, cultural,
Page 71 of 78
recreational, fraternal, literary, scientific, social, civil service, or similar purposes, like trade, industry,
agriculture and like chambers."
Two requisites must concur before one may be classified as a stock corporation, namely: (1) that it
has capital stock divided into shares; and (2) that it is authorized to distribute dividends and allotments
of surplus and profits to its stockholders. If only one requisite is present, it cannot be properly classified
as a stock corporation. As for non-stock corporations, they must have members and must not distribute
any part of their income to said members.3
In the case at bench, PRA is not a GOCC because it is neither a stock nor a non-stock corporation. It
cannot be considered as a stock corporation because although it has a capital stock divided into no
par value shares as provided in Section 74 of P.D. No. 1084, it is not authorized to distribute dividends,
surplus allotments or profits to stockholders. There is no provision whatsoever in P.D. No. 1084 or in
any of the subsequent executive issuances pertaining to PRA, particularly, E.O. No. 525,5 E.O. No.
6546 and EO No. 7987 that authorizes PRA to distribute dividends, surplus allotments or profits to its
stockholders.
PRA cannot be considered a non-stock corporation either because it does not have members. A non-
stock corporation must have members.8 Moreover, it was not organized for any of the purposes
mentioned in Section 88 of the Corporation Code. Specifically, it was created to manage all
government reclamation projects.
Furthermore, there is another reason why the PRA cannot be classified as a GOCC. Section 16, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows:
Section 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or
established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic
viability.
The fundamental provision above authorizes Congress to create GOCCs through special charters on
two conditions: 1) the GOCC must be established for the common good; and 2) the GOCC must meet
the test of economic viability. In this case, PRA may have passed the first condition of common good
but failed the second one - economic viability. Undoubtedly, the purpose behind the creation of PRA
was not for economic or commercial activities. Neither was it created to compete in the market place
considering that there were no other competing reclamation companies being operated by the private
sector. As mentioned earlier, PRA was created essentially to perform a public service considering that
it was primarily responsible for a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation, administration and
operation of lands belonging to the government with the object of maximizing their utilization and
hastening their development consistent with the public interest. Sections 2 and 4 of P.D. No. 1084
reads, as follows:
Section 2. Declaration of policy. It is the declared policy of the State to provide for a coordinated,
economical and efficient reclamation of lands, and the administration and operation of lands belonging
to, managed and/or operated by the government, with the object of maximizing their utilization and
hastening their development consistent with the public interest.
Section 4. Purposes. The Authority is hereby created for the following purposes:
(a) To reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, by dredging, filling or other
means, or to acquire reclaimed land;
Page 72 of 78
(b) To develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any
and all kinds of lands, buildings, estates and other forms of real property, owned, managed,
controlled and/or operated by the government.
(c) To provide for, operate or administer such services as may be necessary for the efficient,
economical and beneficial utilization of the above properties.
The twin requirement of common good and economic viability was lengthily discussed in the case of
Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals,9 the pertinent portion of which reads:
Third, the government-owned or controlled corporations created through special charters are those
that meet the two conditions prescribed in Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution.
The first condition is that the government-owned or controlled corporation must be established for the
common good. The second condition is that the government-owned or controlled corporation must
meet the test of economic viability. Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
SEC. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or
established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic
viability.
The Constitution expressly authorizes the legislature to create "government-owned or controlled

corporations" through special charters only if these entities are required to meet the twin conditions of
common good and economic viability. In other words, Congress has no power to create government-
owned or controlled corporations with special charters unless they are made to comply with the two
conditions of common good and economic viability. The test of economic viability applies only to
government-owned or controlled corporations that perform economic or commercial activities and
need to compete in the market place. Being essentially economic vehicles of the State for the common
good — meaning for economic development purposes — these government-owned or controlled
corporations with special charters are usually organized as stock corporations just like ordinary private
corporations.
In contrast, government instrumentalities vested with corporate powers and performing governmental
or public functions need not meet the test of economic viability. These instrumentalities perform
essential public services for the common good, services that every modern State must provide its
citizens. These instrumentalities need not be economically viable since the government may even
subsidize their entire operations. These instrumentalities are not the "government-owned or controlled
corporations" referred to in Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, the Constitution imposes no limitation when the legislature creates government instrumentalities
vested with corporate powers but performing essential governmental or public functions. Congress
has plenary authority to create government instrumentalities vested with corporate powers provided
these instrumentalities perform essential government functions or public services. However, when the
legislature creates through special charters corporations that perform economic or commercial
activities, such entities — known as "government-owned or controlled corporations" — must meet the
test of economic viability because they compete in the market place.
This is the situation of the Land Bank of the Philippines and the Development Bank of the Philippines
and similar government-owned or controlled corporations, which derive their incometo meet operating
expenses solely from commercial transactions in competition with the private sector. The intent of the
Page 73 of 78
Constitution is to prevent the creation of government-owned or controlled corporations that cannot
survive on their own in the market place and thus merely drain the public coffers.
Commissioner Blas F. Ople, proponent of the test of economic viability, explained to the Constitutional
Commission the purpose of this test, as follows:
MR. OPLE: Madam President, the reason for this concern is really that when the government creates
a corporation, there is a sense in which this corporation becomes exempt from the test of economic
performance. We know what happened in the past. If a government corporation loses, then it makes
its claim upon the taxpayers' money through new equity infusions from the government and what is
always invoked is the common good. That is the reason why this year, out of a budget of P115 billion
for the entire government, about P28 billion of this will go into equity infusions to support a few
government financial institutions. And this is all taxpayers' money which could have been relocated to
agrarian reform, to social services like health and education, to augment the salaries of grossly
underpaid public employees. And yet this is all going down the drain.
Therefore, when we insert the phrase "ECONOMIC VIABILITY" together with the "common good," this
becomes a restraint on future enthusiasts for state capitalism to excuse themselves from the
responsibility of meeting the market test so that they become viable. And so, Madam President, I
reiterate, for the committee's consideration and I am glad that I am joined in this proposal by
Commissioner Foz, the insertion of the standard of "ECONOMIC VIABILITY OR THE ECONOMIC
TEST," together with the common good. 1âwphi1
Father Joaquin G. Bernas, a leading member of the Constitutional Commission, explains in his
textbook The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary:
The second sentence was added by the 1986 Constitutional Commission. The significant addition,
however, is the phrase "in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic
viability." The addition includes the ideas that they must show capacity to function efficiently in
business and that they should not go into activities which the private sector can do better. Moreover,
economic viability is more than financial viability but also includes capability to make profit and
generate benefits not quantifiable in financial terms.
Clearly, the test of economic viability does not apply to government entities vested with corporate
powers and performing essential public services. The State is obligated to render essential public
services regardless of the economic viability of providing such service. The non-economic viability of
rendering such essential public service does not excuse the State from withholding such essential
services from the public.
However, government-owned or controlled corporations with special charters, organized essentially

for economic or commercial objectives, must meet the test of economic viability. These are the
government-owned or controlled corporations that are usually organized under their special charters
as stock corporations, like the Land Bank of the Philippines and the Development Bank of the
Philippines. These are the government-owned or controlled corporations, along with government-
owned or controlled corporations organized under the Corporation Code, that fall under the definition
of "government-owned or controlled corporations" in Section 2(10) of the Administrative Code.
[Emphases supplied]
This Court is convinced that PRA is not a GOCC either under Section 2(3) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code or under Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. The
facts, the evidence on record and jurisprudence on the issue support the position that PRA was not
organized either as a stock or a non-stock corporation. Neither was it created by Congress to operate
Page 74 of 78
commercially and compete in the private market. Instead, PRA is a government instrumentality vested
with corporate powers and performing an essential public service pursuant to Section 2(10) of the
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code. Being an incorporated government instrumentality,
it is exempt from payment of real property tax.
Clearly, respondent has no valid or legal basis in taxing the subject reclaimed lands managed by PRA.
On the other hand, Section 234(a) of the LGC, in relation to its Section 133(o), exempts PRA from
paying realty taxes and protects it from the taxing powers of local government units.
Sections 234(a) and 133(o) of the LGC provide, as follows:
SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax – The following are exempted from payment of the real
property tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except
when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person.
xxxx
SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. – Unless otherwise
provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays
shall not extend to the levy of the following:
xxxx
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kinds on the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, and local government units. [Emphasis supplied]
It is clear from Section 234 that real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines (the Republic)
is exempt from real property tax unless the beneficial use thereof has been granted to a taxable
person. In this case, there is no proof that PRA granted the beneficial use of the subject reclaimed
lands to a taxable entity. There is no showing on record either that PRA leased the subject reclaimed
properties to a private taxable entity.
This exemption should be read in relation to Section 133(o) of the same Code, which prohibits local
governments from imposing "taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its
agencies and instrumentalities x x x." The Administrative Code allows real property owned by the
Republic to be titled in the name of agencies or instrumentalities of the national government. Such
real properties remain owned by the Republic and continue to be exempt from real estate tax.
Indeed, the Republic grants the beneficial use of its real property to an agency or instrumentality of
the national government. This happens when the title of the real property is transferred to an agency
or instrumentality even as the Republic remains the owner of the real property. Such arrangement
does not result in the loss of the tax exemption, unless "the beneficial use thereof has been granted,
for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person."10
The rationale behind Section 133(o) has also been explained in the case of the Manila International
Airport Authority,11 to wit:
Section 133(o) recognizes the basic principle that local governments cannot tax the national
government, which historically merely delegated to local governments the power to tax. While the 1987
Page 75 of 78
Constitution now includes taxation as one of the powers of local governments, local governments may
only exercise such power "subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide."
When local governments invoke the power to tax on national government instrumentalities, such power
is construed strictly against local governments. The rule is that a tax is never presumed and there
must be clear language in the law imposing the tax. Any doubt whether a person, article or activity is
taxable is resolved against taxation. This rule applies with greater force when local governments seek
to tax national government instrumentalities.
Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed against the taxpayer claiming the exemption.
However, when Congress grants an exemption to a national government instrumentality from local
taxation, such exemption is construed liberally in favor of the national government instrumentality. As
this Court declared in Maceda v. Macaraig, Jr.:
The reason for the rule does not apply in the case of exemptions running to the benefit of the
government itself or its agencies. In such case the practical effect of an exemption is merely to reduce
the amount of money that has to be handled by government in the course of its operations. For these
reasons, provisions granting exemptions to government agencies may be construed liberally, in favor
of non tax-liability of such agencies.
There is, moreover, no point in national and local governments taxing each other, unless a sound and
compelling policy requires such transfer of public funds from one government pocket to another.
There is also no reason for local governments to tax national government instrumentalities for
rendering essential public services to inhabitants of local governments. The only exception is when
the legislature clearly intended to tax government instrumentalities for the delivery of essential public
services for sound and compelling policy considerations. There must be express language in the law
empowering local governments to tax national government instrumentalities. Any doubt whether such
power exists is resolved against local governments.
Thus, Section 133 of the Local Government Code states that "unless otherwise provided" in the Code,
local governments cannot tax national government instrumentalities. As this Court held in Basco v.
Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation:
The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control
the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in
the federal government. (MC Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)
This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local governments.
"Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire absence of power on
the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States
(Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed that no state or political subdivision can
regulate a federal instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal
responsibilities, or even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them." (Antieau, Modern
Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, emphasis supplied)
Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what local
authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool for
regulation." (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42)
Page 76 of 78
The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (McCulloch v.
Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity which
has the inherent power to wield it. [Emphases supplied]
The Court agrees with PRA that the subject reclaimed lands are still part of the public domain, owned
by the State and, therefore, exempt from payment of real estate taxes.
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part, as follows:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least 60 per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-
five years, and under such terms and conditions as may provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of waterpower,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
Similarly, Article 420 of the Civil Code enumerates properties belonging to the State:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth. [Emphases supplied]
Here, the subject lands are reclaimed lands, specifically portions of the foreshore and offshore areas
of Manila Bay. As such, these lands remain public lands and form part of the public domain. In the
case of Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and AMARI Coastal Development Corporation,12 the Court
held that foreshore and submerged areas irrefutably belonged to the public domain and were
inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to disposition and further declared no
longer needed for public service. The fact that alienable lands of the public domain were transferred
to the PEA (now PRA) and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEA’s name did not
automatically make such lands private. This Court also held therein that reclaimed lands retained their
inherent potential as areas for public use or public service.
As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide, with
authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency charged
with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold
by PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of other alienable
lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public domain. Only when qualified
private parties acquire these lands will the lands become private lands. In the hands of the government
agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable of disposable lands of the public domain, these
lands are still public, not private lands.
Furthermore, PEA's charter expressly states that PEA "shall hold lands of the public domain" as well
as "any and all kinds of lands." PEA can hold both lands of the public domain and private lands. Thus,
Page 77 of 78
the mere fact that alienable lands of the public domain like the Freedom Islands are transferred to PEA
and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEA's name does not automatically make such lands
private.13
Likewise, it is worthy to mention Section 14, Chapter 4, Title I, Book III of the Administrative Code of
1987, thus:
SEC 14. Power to Reserve Lands of the Public and Private Dominion of the Government.-
(1)The President shall have the power to reserve for settlement or public use, and for specific public
purposes, any of the lands of the public domain, the use of which is not otherwise directed by law. The
reserved land shall thereafter remain subject to the specific public purpose indicated until otherwise
provided by law or proclamation.
Reclaimed lands such as the subject lands in issue are reserved lands for public use. They are
properties of public dominion. The ownership of such lands remains with the State unless they are
withdrawn by law or presidential proclamation from public use.
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of Manila
Bay are part of the "lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other natural resources" and
consequently "owned by the State." As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be alienated,"
unless they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain. The mere reclamation of these
areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially
classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession.
Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if the law has
reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.
As the Court has repeatedly ruled, properties of public dominion are not subject to execution or
foreclosure sale.14Thus, the assessment, levy and foreclosure made on the subject reclaimed lands by
respondent, as well as the issuances of certificates of title in favor of respondent, are without basis.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The January 8, 2010 Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 195, Parañaque City, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. All reclaimed properties owned by the
Philippine Reclamation Authority are hereby declared EXEMPT from real estate taxes. All real estate
tax assessments, including the final notices of real estate tax delinquencies, issued by the City of
Parañaque on the subject reclaimed properties; the assailed auction sale, dated April 7, 2003; and the
Certificates of Sale subsequently issued by the Parañaque City Treasurer in favor of the City of
Parañaque, are all declared VOID.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRLA MENDOZA

Associate justice
WE CONCUR:
Page 78 of 78

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EN BANC

ERNESTO FRANCISCO, JR., G. R. No. 154117

OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A. PUNO, C.J.,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

On 16 April 2001, petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit docketed as OMB-

a) For violation of Republic Act No. 7080, otherwise known as an

1. Joseph Ejercito Estrada former President of the

b) For violation of Section 3(a) of [Republic Act No. 3019:]

1. Joseph Ejercito Estrada

c) For violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019:

1. Joseph Ejercito Estrada

d) For violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019;

1. Joseph Ejercito Estrada

e) For violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019;

f) For violation of Section 3(j) of R.A. 3019;

1. Joseph Ejercito Estrada

[g] For violation of Section 7(a) and (d) of R.A. 6713;

On February 3, 1994, during the administration of President Fidel Ramos,

On December 27, 1994, also during the administration of President Ramos,

1. UEM-MARA shall design and construct the expressways covered by

Under the Memorandum of Agreement[11] (MOA) between PEA and the

1. To pay the purchase price of the lots to be expropriated for right of

On the other hand, TRB shall have the following obligations:

1. To identify and locate the lots to be acquired for the right-of-way;

Land No. Landowner TCT No. Affected Area

3. All untitled lots abutting Dr. A. Santos Avenue at SEVENTEEN

On May 8, 1998, the TRB, through Ramon V. Dumaual, made Payment

On October 6, 1998, Asian Appraisal, Inc. submitted its Appraisal

On December 28, 1998, Royal Asia Appraisal Corporation submitted its

In a letter[24] dated November 8, 1998, AMVEL also questioned the valuation

On December 9, 1998, AMVEL complained of the long-delayed payment for

On February 17, 1999, respondent Joseph E. Estrada, then President of the

On March 30, 1999, respondent Estrada issued two (2) Memoranda to

You are hereby directed to proceed with right of way acquisition of

The second Memorandum[29] states:

Further, you are directed to submit to this office a certification,

On April 5, 1999, the TRB, in compliance with the Memorandum of the

On April 8, 1999, respondent Benedicto sent a memorandum[33] to the TRB

c. Total amount payable of P1,221,766,640 actually lower by

II. PETITIONERS ALLEGATIONS

65. Respondent Mike Velarde received a P685,892,495.00 windfall

Transfer Area Declared Assessed Selling Price

The rest of petitioners allegations were summarized by respondent Office of

On 06 November 1998, AMVEL submitted to the TRB what it

The complainant alleges that the supposed 28 October 1998

Notwithstanding the attempt to defraud the government with the

The complainant further alleges that the original projected cost of

The Toll Operation Agreement dated 26 July 1996 itself, in

As late as October 1998, UEM-MARA Philippines Corporation

Also, under the aforesaid NEDA Board Resolution No. 2, the

Instead, on 5 December 1997, a Loan Agreement was executed

As earlier mentioned, TRB sent notices of acquisition to the

Complainant asseverates that in what appears to be an attempt to

Complainant Francisco further points out that the beneficial owners

Also, on 23 November 1999, respondent Estrada, in the presence

Respondents LUIS J. L. VIRATA and MANUEL B. ZAMORA,

Respondents Mariano Z. Velarde, Franklin M. Velarde, Luis Juan L. Virata,

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[50] on January 14, 2002, alleging

1. The Ombudsman did not conduct fact-finding in the instant case