A
Plea
for
Understanding

Guy
Longworth1

Warwick
University

April
2009





1.
Introduction.



The
Philosophy
of
Language
seeks
ultimately
to
address
two
questions:
What
are

the
linguistic
facts,
and
in
particular
the
facts
that
determine
what
may
be
said

on
occasion
by
the
use
of
language?
And
how
are
speakers
in
a
position
to
exploit

those
 facts?
 In
 a
 slogan,
 the
 first
 question
 requests
 a
 theory
 of
 meaning,
 the

second
 a
 theory
 of
 understanding.
 As
 Michael
 Dummett
 has
 long
 advocated,
 a

theory
of
meaning
must
engage
properly
with
a
theory
of
understanding
so
that

the
 two
 questions
 ultimately
 receive
 an
 integrated
 answer.2
 However,

historically,
the
second
question
has
been
recessive.
My
brief
in
this
paper
is
to

make
a
mild
plea
in
its
favour,
through
a
preliminary
exploration
of
some
issues

that
arise
when
it
is
brought
to
prominence.


 In
 the
 background
 are
 some
 large
 questions
 about
 the
 proper
 division
 of

labour
between
the
theory
of
meaning
and
the
theory
of
understanding.
Should

we
 view
 linguistic
 understanding
 as
 a
 form
 of
 propositional
 knowledge
 of

independently
discernible
meaning
facts?
Or
is
meaning
more
intimately
related

to
 understanding
 than
 that
 picture
 would
 require,
 so
 that
 facts
 about
 meaning

are
 partly
 absorbed
 into,
 and
 so
 only
 accessible
 through,
 a
 theory
 of

understanding?
 Indeed,
 is
 there
 even
 a
 separable
 question
 for
 the
 theory
 of

meaning
 to
 address,
 or
 is
 understanding
 an
 achievement
 that
 makes
 no

independently
 specifiable
 demands
 upon
 the
 facts?3
 These
 are
 large
 questions,

and
I
shall
not
attempt
to
foreground
them
here.
But
it
is
important
to
recognise

that
a
satisfactory
answer
to
our
opening
questions
must
engage
with
them.


 I
 shall
 begin
 in
 §2
 by
 distinguishing
 some
 varieties
 of
 understanding.
 §3

sketches
an
argument
against
the
view
that
propositional
knowledge
suffices
for



 1

understanding.
 The
 aim
 is
 not
 simply
 to
 support
 that
 conclusion,
 but
 also
 to

suggest
 that
 understanding
 is
 distinguished
 from
 other
 forms
 of
 epistemic

standing
by
its
dependence
upon
a
specific
form
of
integration
of
other
types
of

epistemic
 standing.
 §4
 marks
 a
 further
 distinction,
 between
 what
 I
 shall
 call

intake
 and
 uptake.
 §5
 discusses
 the
 prospects
 of
 two
 accounts
 of
 uptake,
 and

suggests
 some
 desiderata
 on
 a
 unified
 account
 of
 intake
 and
 uptake.
 It
 is
 here

that
the
large
issues
mentioned
above
loom
closest
to
the
surface.
To
reiterate,

my
aim
here
is
not
to
provide
detailed
arguments
for
or
against
specific
positions

or
 desiderata,
 but
 rather
 to
 outline
 some
 central
 issues
 and
 to
 indicate
 some

topics
that
I
think
are
worthy
of
further
reflection.



2.
Some
varieties
of
understanding.



Dummett
distinguishes
two
senses
of
the
verb
‘to
understand’:



…that
 in
 which
 someone
 is
 said
 to
 understand
 a
 word,
 phrase
 or
 sentence,

considered
as
a
type,
and
that
in
which
he
may
be
said
to
understand
a
particular

utterance.
 We
 may
 call
 these
 the
 ‘dispositional’
 and
 the
 ‘occurrent’
 senses
 of
 “to

understand”.
(Dummett,
1993:
58)



Why
 is
 there
 a
 need
 to
 mark
 (or
 to
 keep
 track
 of)
 this
 distinction?
 Dummett

offers
two
sorts
of
reasons.
The
first
adverts
to
a
distinction
putatively
amongst

the
objects
of
understanding.
The
second
adverts
to
a
distinction
amongst
modes

of
understanding.



We
 need
 an
 occurrent
 sense
 of
 “understand”
 for
 two
 reasons:
 indexicality
 and

ambiguity….
 If,
 for
 example,
 I
 hear
 someone
 say
 “There
 is
 a
 sinister
 smell
 here”,

how
much
do
I
need
to
know
about
where
he
is
to
know
what
statement
he
was

making
or
what
thought
he
was
expressing,
in
that
sense
under
which,
if
true,
it
is

true
 absolutely?
 If
 someone
 utters
 an
 ambiguous
 sentence,
 his
 hearers
 may

understand
 it
 in
 a
 particular
 way,
 whether
 as
 he
 intended
 or
 not;
 we
 may
 speak

also,
 not
 only
 of
 how
 the
 speaker
 meant
 it,
 but
 of
 how
 he
 was
 understanding
 it.

(1993:
60)





 2

This
 first
 reason
 resides
 with
 a
 distinction
 between
 what
 a
 type
 of
 expression

means—what
the
standing
meaning
of
the
expression
type
is—and
what
is
said

by
 the
 use
 of
 that
 expression—what
 thought
 is
 expressed
 by
 the
 use
 of
 the

expression
on
an
occasion.
The
second
reason
resides
with
a
distinction
between

possession
 of
 a
 capacity
 to
 understand
 expression
 types
 or
 utterances
 and

proper
exercise
of
that
capacity
on
particular
occasions.
Dummett
focuses
upon

the
 latter
 reason
 in
 response
 to
 what
 he
 takes
 to
 be
 Wittgenstein’s
 refusal
 to

acknowledge
occurrent
understanding:



…it
 is
 difficult
 to
 see
 how
 it
 can
 be
 maintained
 that
 no
 occurrent
 notion
 of

understanding
is
required:
for
it
is
possible
to
be
perplexed
by
a
sentence
on
first

hearing,
through
a
failure
to
take
in
its
structure,
and
to
attain
an
understanding
of

it
on
reflection.
(1993:
103)4



When
the
two
types
of
reason
are
distinguished,
the
need
for
an
at
least
four‐way

distinction
 emerges:
 (i)
 dispositional
 understanding
 of
 standing
 meaning;
 (ii)

occurrent
 understanding
 of
 standing
 meaning;
 (iii)
 dispositional
 understanding

of
what
is
said
in
particular
utterances;
and
(iv)
occurrent
understanding
of
what

is
said.



 To
 see
 the
 need
 for
 (i)–(iv),
 consider
 attending
 to
 an
 utterance
 of
 the

sentence
type
in
(1):



(1)
He
is
too
intelligent
to
expect
us
to
beat.



A
 typical
 response
 to
 an
 utterance
 of
 (1)
 would
 be
 blank
 incomprehension:

absence
 of
 occurrent
 understanding
 even
 of
 the
 standing
 meaning
 of
 the

sentence
 type
 employed.
 On
 reflection,
 however,
 one
 is
 able
 to
 ‘take
 in
 its

structure,
 and
 to
 attain
 understanding’.
 To
 a
 good
 first
 approximation,
 the

standing
meaning
of
(1)
is
given
in
(2):



(2)
 A
 contextually
 determined
 male
 is
 too
 intelligent
 for
 one
 to
 expect
 a

contextually
 specified
 group
 including
 the
 speaker
 to
 beat
 the

contextually
determined
male.



 3

 

Since
this
feature
of
(1)
is
accessible
on
reflection,
it
is
plausible
that
one
anyway

had
 dispositional
 understanding
 of
 the
 sentence
 type.
 Clearly,
 occurrent

understanding
of
the
sentence
type
does
not
suffice
for
occurrent
understanding

of
the
utterance:
for
that,
one
needs
to
grasp
what
was
said
in
the
utterance,
in

the
sense
in
which
what
was
said
determines
truth‐conditions.5
And
for
that,
one

would
 need
 to
 be
 in
 a
 position
 to
 ascertain
 (at
 least)
 the
 referents
 of
 ‘he’
 and

‘us’.6
In
at
least
a
thin
sense,
the
fact
that
one
would
ordinarily
be
able
to
do
this

supports
 the
 appropriateness
 of
 attributing
 dispositional
 understanding
 of
 the

utterance—i.e.
 a
 capacity
 to
 figure
 out
 what
 was
 said
 in
 the
 utterance.
 But
 one

might
hedge
here
if
the
transition
from
occurrent
grasp
of
meaning
to
occurrent

grasp
of
what
is
said
required
the
acquisition
of
specific
cognitive
capacities—for

instance,
 if,
 in
 order
 to
 grasp
 occurrently
 what
 the
 speaker
 said,
 one
 had
 to

acquire
a
capacity
to
think
about
him
through
becoming
perceptually
acquainted

with
the
male
demonstrated
by
the
speaker.7


 A
further
distinction
can
be
drawn
at
this
point
between
the
state
that
is

the
upshot
of
one’s
coming
to
understand
a
particular
utterance,
and
the
episodic

achievement
through
which
one
enters
that
state.
And
‘occurrent
understanding’

is
not
entirely
appropriate
for
use
in
application
to
the
state
rather
than
its
onset,

as
witness
the
oddity
of
combination
of
‘occurrent’
with
other
verbs
for
states,
as

in
 ‘occurrent
 knowledge’,
 ‘occurrent
 belief’,
 etc.8
 However,
 emphasis
 on
 the

distinction
 between
 states
 and
 episodes
 can
 be
 suppressed
 in
 the
 present

context.
 What
 matters
 here
 is
 the
 distinction
 between
 a
 mere
 capacity
 to

understand
on
occasion
and
the
upshots
of
proper
exercise
of
that
capacity
on
an

occasion,
whatever
the
specific
temporal
profile
of
the
latter.9


 I
 propose
 in
 the
 remainder
 to
 focus
 upon
 occurrent
 understanding,
 or

grasp,
 of
 what
 is
 said.
 And
 I
 shall
 prescind,
 as
 far
 as
 is
 practicable,
 from

consideration
 of
 constitutive
 connections
 amongst
 the
 four
 categories,
 except

those
 that
 arise
 due
 to
 occurrent
 understanding
 involving
 the
 exercise
 of

dispositional
 understanding.
 We
 will
 thus
 be
 attending
 to
 phenomena
 at
 the

interface
 between
 understanding
 language
 and
 understanding
 the
 users
 of

language
 whilst
 attempting
 to
 ignore
 issues
 that
 arise
 on
 either
 side
 of
 the

interface.




 4



3.
Understanding
and
knowledge.



Understanding
 what
 someone
 has
 said,
 in
 the
 occurrent
 sense,
 ordinarily
 helps

to
 put
 one
 in
 a
 position
 to
 know
 that
 someone
 has
 produced
 a
 particular

utterance
 and
 thereby
 said,
 with
 one
 or
 another
 type
 of
 force,
 that
 such‐and‐
such.
For
instance,
understanding
what
someone,
say
Florence,
has
said
by
use
of

(1),
where
the
speaker
used
‘he’
to
refer
to
the
World
Chess
Champion
for
2008,

might
help
to
put
one
in
a
position
to
know
that
(3)
or
that
(4):



(3)

Florence
 produced
 an
 utterance
 of
 (1)
 and
 thereby
 asserted
 that

Viswanathan
 is
 too
 intelligent
 for
 one
 to
 expect
 us
 to
 beat
 him

(Viswanathan).



(4)

Florence
 produced
 an
 utterance
 of
 (1)
 and
 thereby
 asked
 whether

Viswanathan
 is
 too
 intelligent
 for
 one
 to
 expect
 us
 to
 beat
 him

(Viswanathan).



The
thin
use
of
saying
involved
here
can
be
understood
as
a
sort
of
determinable

of
 each
 of
 the
 determinate
 forces
 with
 which
 an
 utterance
 can
 be
 produced.
 It

corresponds
with
what
one
might
know
if
one
knew
that
Florence
had
expressed

the
thought
that
Viswanathan
is
disqualified
but
did
not
know
whether
she
had

asserted
 that
 Viswanathan
 is
 disqualified,
 asked
 whether
 he
 is,
 ordered,
 or

optated
 that
 he
 be.
 I
 shall
 ignore
 issues
 arising
 from
 our
 grasp
 of
 the
 forces
 of

utterances
 and
 focus
 on
 our
 engagement
 with
 facts
 like
 that
 stated
 in
 (5),
 with

‘said’
understood
in
the
thin
way.



(5)
 Florence
 produced
 an
 utterance
 of
 (1)
 and
 thereby
 said
 that

Viswanathan
 is
 too
 intelligent
 for
 one
 to
 expect
 us
 to
 beat
 him

(Viswanathan).



In
 what,
 then,
 does
 one’s
 understanding
 of
 Florence’s
 utterance
 consist?
 An

immediate
 hypothesis
 is
 that
 one’s
 understanding
 is
 one’s
 knowing
 that
 (5),
 or



 5

something
similar.
The
immediate
hypothesis
has
the
advantage
that
it
involves

only
 minimal
 departure
 from
 what
 would
 ordinarily
 be
 the
 case
 were
 one
 to

understand
Florence’s
utterance.
But
it
suffers
from
numerous
disadvantages.


 The
hypothesis
can
be
understood
in
at
least
three
ways.
First,
it
can
be

understood
as
embodying
the
claim
that
one’s
understanding
of
an
utterance
is
a

simple
matter
of
one’s
knowing
what
was
said
in
that
utterance
and
so
is
neutral

with
 respect
 to
 any
 more
 specific
 account
 of
 how
 one
 knows
 what
 was
 said.

Second,
it
can
be
understood
as
embodying
the
claim
that
one’s
understanding
of

an
utterance
is
a
brutal
matter
of
one’s
knowing
what
was
said
in
that
utterance

and
 so
 requires
 that
 there
 is
 no
 more
 specific
 account
 of
 how
 one
 knows
 what

was
 said.
 Third,
 it
 can
 be
 understood
 as
 embodying
 the
 claim
 that
 one’s

understanding
 of
 an
 utterance
 is
 an
 unspecified
 matter
 of
 one’s
 knowing
 in
 a

particular
way
what
was
said.



 The
 unspecified
 understanding
 of
 the
 hypothesis,
 with
 its
 uncomfortable

conjunction
of
acceptance
of
the
possibility
of
further
specification
with
refusal

to
 supply
 it,
 can
 be
 rejected
 immediately
 in
 the
 present
 context.
 Reasons
 for

rejecting
 the
 simple
 and
 brutal
 understandings
 are
 a
 little
 less
 straightforward.

To
a
first
approximation,
both
should
be
rejected
due
to
their
respective
failures

appropriately
 to
 distinguish
 understanding
 from
 other
 forms
 or
 ways
 of

knowing,
 either
 through
 failing
 to
 mark
 understanding
 off
 from
 other
 forms
 or

ways
of
knowing,
or
through
marking
understanding
off
in
a
way
that
renders
its

standing
 mysterious.
 I
 shall
 begin
 to
 explain
 those
 failings
 by
 considering
 the

hypothesis
that
understanding
is
a
simple
matter
of
knowing
what
was
said.


 Seeing
things
can
put
one
in
a
position
to
have
propositional
knowledge

about
those
things.
And
we
think
of
seeing
things
as
a
specific
way
in
which
one

can
 be
 put
 in
 a
 position
 to
 know
 about
 those
 things,
 a
 way
 distinct
 from
 being

put
in
a
position
to
know
through
understanding.
The
point
is
not
(yet)
that
an

account
of
understanding
must
underwrite
special
treatment
of
understanding;

but
rather,
that
the
account
of
understanding
must
not
disrupt
special
treatment

of
other
cases.
Yet
the
simple
understanding
of
the
hypothesis
is
consistent
with

cases
 of
 knowledge
 through
 sensory
 perception—for
 instance,
 seeing
 that
 the

game
 has
 begun
 or
 hearing
 that
 the
 clock
 has
 stopped—also
 being
 cases
 of

understanding.
 Hence,
 the
 simple
 understanding
 of
 the
 hypothesis
 fails



 6

appropriately
 to
 distinguish
 understanding
 from
 other
 ways
 we
 have
 of
 being

(or
coming
to
be)
in
a
position
to
know.


 One
response
at
this
point
would
be
to
reject
the
complaint
as
premised

on
a
failure
to
exploit
all
of
the
resources
available
to
the
defender
of
the
simple

hypothesis.
The
hypothesis
is,
not
simply
that
understanding
of
an
utterance
may

be
any
form
of
propositional
knowledge
about
it,
but
also,
more
specifically,
that

it
is
a
matter
of
being
in
a
position
to
have
propositional
knowledge
of
what
was

said
 in
 the
 utterance.
 And,
 the
 response
 continues,
 the
 special
 nature
 of
 the

objects
of
understanding,
that
they
are
facts
concerning
what
was
said,
forces
the

required
distinction
amongst
our
ways
of
being
put
in
a
position
to
know.
For
the

involvement
 of
 what
 is
 not
 sense
 perceptible—i.e.
 content—in
 what
 was
 said

means
that
one
cannot
in
other
specific
ways—i.e.
by
seeing,
hearing,
etc.—come

by
knowledge
concerning
what
was
said.
As
Tyler
Burge
puts
it,



We
 do
 not
 perceive
 the
 contents
 of
 attitudes
 that
 are
 conveyed
 to
 us;
 we

understand
 them.
 We
 perceive
 and
 have
 perceptual
 beliefs
 about
 word

occurrences.
 We
 may
 perceive
 them
 as
 having
 a
 certain
 content
 and
 subject

matter,
but
the
content
is
understood,
not
perceived.
(Burge,
1993:
478)



There
 is
 room
 for
 discussion
 at
 this
 point
 concerning
 the
 understanding
 of
 the

bounds
 of
 the
 (sense‐)
 perceptible
 required
 by
 the
 envisaged
 defence
 of
 the

simple
understanding
of
the
hypothesis.
In
particular,
those
who
wish
to
employ

the
defence
and
who
also
wish
to
endorse
a
view
of
sense
perceptions
as
bearers

of
 propositional
 content
 will
 have
 work
 to
 do
 in
 ensuring
 a
 difference
 in
 the

modes
 of
 engagement
 with
 content
 involved
 in
 perception
 and
 understanding

that
would
make
appropriate
Burge’s
differential
attitude.
And
it
is
not
obvious

that
 making
 out
 the
 required
 distinction
 would
 not
 require
 going
 beyond
 the

simple
hypothesis.
But
a
more
immediate
problem
with
the
envisaged
defence
of

the
simple
hypothesis
is
that,
rather
than
evading
the
need
further
to
specify
the

nature
 of
 understanding,
 it
 positively
 invites
 further
 specification.
 For
 the

distinction
 with
 sense
 perception
 relies,
 not
 upon
 the
 impossibility
 of
 sensory

engagement
 with
 content,
 but
 rather
 upon
 the
 impossibility
 of
 engagement



 7

through
 understanding
 with
 the
 proper
 objects
 of
 sense.
 And
 making
 out
 that

impossibility
would
seem
to
require
a
substantive
account
of
understanding.


 The
 brutal
 understanding
 of
 the
 hypothesis
 has
 the
 resources
 to

distinguish
understanding
from
knowledge
got
through
sense
perception.
On
its

brutal
understanding,
the
hypothesis
provides
a
negative
specification
of
the
way

of
 coming
 to
 know
 characteristic
 of
 understanding,
 according
 to
 which
 there
 is

no
more
specific
characterisation
of
the
way
of
coming
to
know
that
constitutes

understanding.
On
this
view,
what
distinguishes
being
in
a
position
to
know
on

the
basis
of
seeing,
hearing,
etc.,
from
being
in
a
position
to
know
as
a
matter
of

understanding
 is
 that
 in
 the
 former
 cases,
 by
 contrast
 with
 the
 latter,
 it
 is

possible
further
to
specify
the
way
in
which
one
knows.
By
contrast
with
cases
of

knowledge
got
through
seeing,
hearing,
etc.,
a
complete
answer
to
the
question,

how
 one
 knows
 what
 was
 said
 in
 that
 utterance—where
 the
 question

presupposes
that
we
have
an
exhaustive
answer
to
all
sub‐questions
pertaining

to
perceptual
sources,
for
instance
the
question
of
how
you
were
in
a
position
to

know
about
that
utterance
rather
than
this
one—might
be:
‘One
just
does’.


 Although
 it
 is
 plausible
 that
 the
 brutal
 hypothesis
 can
 underwrite
 a

distinction
 between
 understanding
 and
 sense‐perceptual
 sources
 of
 epistemic

position,
it
appears
unable
to
register
a
distinction
between
understanding
and

other
 sources.
 At
 least
 that
 is
 so
 on
 the
 plausible
 view
 that
 with
 respect
 to
 at

least
 certain
 basic
 pieces
 of
 one’s
 a
 priori
 knowledge,
 there
 is
 no
 articulate

answer
to
the
question
of
how
one
knows
them.10
On
that
view
of
basic
a
priori

knowledge,
the
brutal
hypothesis
fails
to
acknowledge
a
genuine
distinction,
by

classifying
 understanding
 together
 with
 any
 way
 of
 having
 non‐perceptual

knowledge—or,
 at
 least,
 with
 all
 ways
 of
 having
 such
 knowledge
 for
 which
 no

articulate
 characterisation
 is
 available.
 And
 the
 immediate
 corollary
 of
 that

failure
 is
 apt
 to
 appear
 even
 more
 pressing.
 By
 classifying
 understanding

together
 with
 basic
 a
 priori
 knowledge,
 it
 treats
 understanding
 as
 a
 way
 of

having
such
knowledge.
And
that
will
seem
to
many
to
count
decisively
against

the
hypothesis.


 The
 consequence
 will
 seem
 decisive
 against
 the
 brutal
 hypothesis
 to

many
theorists,
though
not
to
all.
For
one
prominent
example,
Burge
is
rendered

immune
 to
 the
 present
 charge
 because
 he
 anyway
 holds
 that,
 in
 at
 least
 some



 8

cases,
 our
 knowledge
 of
 what
 was
 said
 is
 a
 priori.
 More
 carefully,
 Burge
 holds

that,
if
we
hive
off
the
distinctive
contribution
of
sense‐perception
in
coming
to

know
 what
 was
 said,
 by
 viewing
 it
 as
 a
 mere
 trigger
 to
 the
 operations
 of
 the

intellectual
 faculty
 involved
 in
 appropriately
 entertaining
 the
 content
 of
 what

was
said,
then
we
can
view
the
source
of
our
knowledge
as
the
proper
operation

of
 the
 intellectual
 faculty
 itself.
 And
 it
 is
 reasonable
 in
 that
 case
 to
 group

knowledge
gained
via
understanding
together
with
other
cases
of
knowledge
got

by
intellection,
and
so
to
view
understanding
as
a
source
of,
or
way
of
having,
a

priori
knowledge.11


 I’ve
 argued
 elsewhere
 that
 Burge’s
 view
 of
 understanding
 should
 not
 be

accepted,
at
 least
 in
full
 generality,
 and
that
 it
should
be
rejected,
in
particular,

for
a
range
of
core
cases
in
which
understanding
puts
one
in
a
position
to
acquire

knowledge
 from
 an
 interlocutor.
 The
 basic
 difficulty
 it
 faces
 is
 that,
 in
 the
 core

cases,
 understanding
 is
 implicated
 in
 making
 available,
 not
 only
 an
 expressed

content,
but
also
its
having
been
expressed
through
an
episode
of
the
production

of
speech
by
a
particular
agent.
It
is
this
function
of
understanding
that
puts
one

in
 a
 position
 to
 know
 who
 said
 what
 and
 to
 know
 vicariously
 on
 the
 basis
 of

testimony
obtained
from
particular
sources.
That
function,
I’ve
argued,
requires

the
integrated
exercise
of
intellectual
faculties
and
sense
perceptual
faculties
so

that
 the
 form
 of
 understanding
 involved
 does
 not
 in
 any
 straightforward
 way

give
 rise
 to
 a
 priori
 knowledge
 of
 what
 is
 said.12
 However,
 even
 if
 we
 accept

Burge’s
account,
there
is
a
more
immediate
difficulty.
Although
Burge’s
account

is
 able
 to
 underwrite
 the
 possibility
 of
 a
 priori
 knowledge
 got
 through

understanding,
 it
 is
 unable—at
 least
 in
 the
 context
 of
 brutalism
 about
 basic
 a

priori
 knowledge—to
 rule
 out
 the
 possibility
 that
 every
 piece
 of
 basic
 a
 priori

knowledge
is
got
through
understanding.


 It
might
be
thought
that,
if
the
account
of
understanding
that
I
proposed

in
 place
 of
 Burge’s
 is
 accepted,
 it
 might
 supply
 resources
 to
 distinguish

understanding
 from
 other
 forms
 or
 ways
 of
 knowing.
 According
 to
 the

alternative
view,
core
cases
of
understanding
are
the
upshot
of,
or
participate
in

the
 upshot
 of,
 integrated
 operations
 of
 sense‐perceptual
 and
 intellectual

faculties.
On
the
basis
of
that
account,
it
might
be
suggested
that
what
is
special

about
 understanding
 is
 just
 that
 it
 is
 the
 upshot
 of
 both
 sense
 perception
 and



 9

intellection.
Although
such
an
account
would
go
beyond
the
simple
identification

of
understanding
with
knowing
what
was
said,
it
would
do
so
by
drawing
only
on

specifications
anyway
implicated
in
characterising
its
component
achievements.


 Second
 thoughts
 serve
 to
 scotch
 the
 suggestion.
 Although
 the
 proposed

account
 is
 able
 to
 distinguish
 understanding
 from
 the
 upshots
 of
 sense

perception
or
intellection,
it
is
unable,
without
supplementation,
to
distinguish
it

from
 other
 cases
 of
 knowledge
 got
 through
 both.
 For
 one
 example,
 it
 appears

unable,
 absent
 supplementation,
 to
 distinguish
 understanding
 from
 ordinary

cases
 of
 knowing
 on
 the
 basis
 of
 sense
 perception,
 where
 this
 involves
 the

application
 of
 concepts—so
 intellection—to
 the
 deliverances
 of
 the
 senses.
 For

another
 example,
 it
 appears
 unable,
 without
 further
 ado,
 to
 distinguish

understanding
 from
 a
 posteriori
 knowledge
 of
 necessities,
 where
 such

knowledge
is
the
upshot
of
integrated
operations—in
typical
cases,
inferentially

integrated
operations—of
intellection
and
perception.


 The
 discussion
 to
 this
 point
 has
 been
 premised
 on
 the
 assumption
 that

basic
 a
 priori
 knowledge
 is
 not
 subject
 to
 further
 specification.
 Perhaps
 that

assumption
 is
 the
 villain.
 Let’s
 suppose,
 then,
 that
 basic
 a
 priori
 knowledge
 is

subject
to
further
specification—perhaps,
for
example,
as
knowledge
got
through

intellection
 or
 reflection.
 Obviously,
 the
 supposition
 is
 subject
 to
 its
 own

explanatory
demands,
in
particular
the
demand
for
an
account
of
the
powers
of

intellection
 and
 reflection.
 But
 even
 supposing
 those
 demands
 discharged,
 the

consequent
 account
 of
 a
 priori
 knowledge
 would
 be
 unable
 to
 save
 the
 brutal

hypothesis.
 Understanding
 would
 be
 not
 only
 special,
 by
 virtue
 of
 its
 simple

distinction
from
other
forms
or
ways
of
knowing,
but
also
an
oddity,
by
virtue
of

the
manner
of
that
distinction.
It
would
be
the
only
form
or
way
of
knowing
not

subject
 to
 further
 specification.
 And
 the
 mystery
 occasioned
 by
 that
 special

standing
 is
 deepened
 by
 the
 observation
 that
 it
 would
 be
 a
 brutal
 way
 of

knowing
time‐bound
contingencies,
e.g.
concerning
who
said
what,
and
when.
By

far
 the
 most
 natural
 view
 at
 this
 point
 is
 that
 no
 obvious
 version
 of
 the

hypothesis
that
understanding
of
an
utterance
is
knowledge
of
what
was
said
in

that
utterance
should
be
accepted.
Rather,
if
understanding
is
a
form
or
way
of

knowing,
then
it
is
a
specific
form
or
way
of
knowing.



 10


 The
 conclusion
 to
 this
 point
 is
 supported
 by
 an
 observation
 of

Christopher
 Peacocke’s.
 Peacocke
 observes
 that
 it
 is
 possible
 to
 know
 what

someone
 has
 said
 in
 a
 particular
 utterance
 without
 understanding
 their

utterance.
For
instance,
someone
in
the
know
might
tell
you
that,
in
producing
a

particular
 utterance,
 Florence
 said
 that
 Viswanathan
 is
 disqualified.
 Supposing

appropriate
 conditions
 are
 met,
 it
 is
 possible
 to
 acquire
 knowledge
 from
 such

testimony.
 Hence,
 one
 might
 acquire
 knowledge
 that
 Florence
 said
 that

Viswanathan
is
disqualified
on
the
basis
of
testimony,
so
independently
of
one’s

understanding
 Florence’s
 utterance
 to
 that
 effect.13
 A
 similar
 result
 can
 be

achieved
by
considering
the
difference
between
merely
coming
to
know,
through

being
 told,
 that
 an
 utterance
 of
 (1)
 says
 that
 (2)
 and
 coming,
 perhaps
 through

engagement
 with
 (2),
 simply
 to
 understand
 an
 utterance
 of
 (1).
 In
 addition
 to

supplying
immediate
support
to
the
conclusion
that
understanding
is
not
simply

knowledge
of
what
was
said,
Peacocke’s
observation
bolsters
an
intervening
step

in
 the
 argument.
 For
 it
 indicates
 that
 understanding
 is
 not
 distinguished
 from

other
 forms
 of
 knowledge
 simply
 by
 virtue
 of
 being
 knowledge
 specifically
 of

what
was
said.
And
it
suggests
that
if
understanding
is
a
form
or
way
of
knowing

what
was
said,
then
it
is
a
peculiarly
immediate
form
or
way.



4.
Intake
and
uptake.



A
natural
hypothesis
at
this
point
would
be
that
understanding
is
a
specific
form

of
 propositional
 knowledge,
 or
 a
 determinate
 way
 of
 having
 the
 determinable,

propositional
 knowledge,
 akin
 to
 other
 specific
 forms,
 or
 ways
 of
 having,

propositional
 knowledge,
 e.g.
 seeing
 that
 such‐and‐such
 and
 remembering
 that

such‐and‐such.
However,
pursuit
of
the
comparison
with
other
specific
forms,
or

ways,
of
knowing
suggests
an
alternative
hypothesis.


 Consider
 seeing
 that
 the
 game
 has
 started.
 If
 we
 accept
 that
 this
 is
 a

specific
form,
or
way,
of
knowing
that
the
game
has
started—in
particular,
that
it

is
a
different
form,
or
way,
of
knowing
from
hearing
that,
or
remembering
that,

the
game
has
started—then
it
is
pressing
to
say
in
what
its
specificity
lies.
And
an

obvious
 answer
 would
 be
 that
 seeing
 that
 the
 game
 has
 started
 is
 a
 matter
 of

knowing,
 by
 seeing,
 that
 the
 game
 has
 started.14
 By
 parity,
 then,
 one
 would



 11

naturally
predict
that,
if
understanding
is
a
specific
form
of
knowing,
then
it
is
a

matter
of
knowing
by
understanding.
And
if
one
understood
the
characterisation

of
the
specific
forms
of
knowing
involved
here
as
going
via
appeal
to
an
episodic

basis
 for
 the
 acquisition
 of
 knowledge—for
 example,
 an
 episode
 of
 seeing
 the

game
 start,
 or
 of
 understanding
 Florence’s
 utterance—then
 it
 might
 appear

natural
 to
 view
 the
 understanding
 of
 an
 utterance,
 not
 as
 the
 output
 of
 an

epistemic
achievement,
but
rather
as
its
episodic
input.


 The
 suggested
 understanding
 of
 the
 structure
 of
 specific
 forms
 of

knowledge
 is
 not
 immediately
 forced.
 For
 one
 might
 view
 the
 ‘know
 by
 φ‐ing’

specification
 as
 indicating
 involvement
 of
 a
 specific
 epistemic
 capacity,
 rather

than
 specific
 input
 to
 a
 general
 epistemic
 capacity.
 For
 present
 purposes,
 we

needn’t
attempt
to
decide
the
issue
between
the
two
understandings,
for
there
is

reason
to
think
that,
whatever
its
precise
role
in
determining
epistemic
standing,

exercises
 of
 dispositional
 understanding
 can
 leave
 a
 mark
 in
 consciousness

independent
 of
 the
 achievement
 of
 epistemic
 standing.
 And
 it
 would
 then
 be

natural
to
view
those
episodes
as
cases
of
understanding.


 A
reason
to
think
that
exercises
of
dispositional
understanding
can
make

a
psychological
difference
independent
of
the
achievement
of
epistemic
standing

is
provided
by
the
possibility
of
rational
withholding
of
belief
about
what
is
said

consistent
 with
 exercise
 of
 understanding
 otherwise
 suitable
 to
 underwrite

knowledge
of
what
is
said.15
The
structure
of
the
case
is
similar
to
an
analogous

case
 for
 seeing.
 In
 that
 case,
 we
 begin
 with
 a
 situation
 in
 which
 one
 sees
 that

such‐and‐such,
 for
 instance
 a
 situation
 in
 which
 one
 sees
 that
 a
 chess
 piece
 is

black.
In
that
situation,
one
knows
by
seeing
that
the
chess
piece
is
black.
Since

knowing
 that
 the
 chess
 piece
 is
 black
 entails
 believing
 that
 the
 chess
 piece
 is

black—at
 least
 modulo
 the
 subject’s
 rationality
 and
 their
 ability
 to
 believe
 that

the
chess
piece
is
black—one
believes
that
the
chess
piece
is
black.
But
one
might

be
 in
 almost
 precisely
 the
 same
 position
 with
 respect
 to
 one’s
 perceptual
 and

epistemic
 standing
 towards
 the
 chess
 piece
 whilst
 withholding
 belief
 that
 the

chess
piece
is
black.
If
one
has
apparently
good
reasons
for
withholding
belief—
perhaps
 one
 has,
 or
 appears
 to
 have,
 good
 reason
 for
 thinking
 that
 one
 is

undergoing
a
brain
manipulation
that
would
make
only
red
chess
pieces
appear

black
 to
 one—then
 one’s
 withholding
 belief
 might
 be
 rationally
 permissible.



 12

Hence,
 one
 might
 rationally
 withhold
 belief
 and,
 so,
 fail
 to
 know
 that
 the
 chess

piece
is
black.
Plausibly,
one
might
nonetheless
see
the
chess
piece,
and
the
chess

piece’s
 colour.
 More
 generally,
 the
 upshot
 of
 exercise
 of
 one’s
 seeing
 capacity

might
have
the
same
potential
to
determine
one’s
epistemic
standing
as
such
an

upshot
 would
 have
 in
 a
 healthy
 doxastic
 environment.
 For
 instance,
 if
 the

apparent
 reason
 for
 withholding
 belief
 were
 extinguished,
 then—ceteris

paribus—it
 is
 plausible
 that
 one
 would
 be
 in
 a
 position
 to
 know
 that
 the
 chess

piece
is
black.



 In
the
case
of
understanding,
we
can
begin
with
a
situation
in
which
one

knows
 on
 the
 basis
 of
 understanding
 that
 Florence
 has
 said
 that
 the
 game
 has

started.
In
this
case,
it
appears
plausible
that
one
might
in
almost
precisely
the

same
 way
 undergo
 an
 exercise
 of
 one’s
 capacity
 to
 understand
 in
 a
 context
 in

which
one
rationally
withholds
belief
from
the
proposition
that
Florence
has
said

that
the
game
has
started.
One
might
still
take
in
Florence’s
saying
that
the
game

has
 started
 even
 if
 apparently
 reasonable
 doubts
 about
 brain
 manipulation

prevented
one
from
making
epistemic
use
of
what
one
took
in.
More
generally,

one
 might
 be
 in
 a
 position
 such
 that,
 if
 one’s
 apparent
 reasons
 for
 withholding

belief
 were
 extinguished,
 then—ceteris
 paribus—one
 would
 be
 in
 a
 position
 to

know
that
Florence
had
said
that
the
game
has
started.16


 I
suggested
that,
given
the
distinction
between
the
non‐epistemic
upshot

of
 exercise
 of
 a
 capacity
 to
 understand
 and
 knowledge
 attained
 on
 the
 basis
 of

that
 exercise,
 it
 would
 be
 natural
 to
 identify
 understanding
 with
 the
 upshot

rather
 than
 the
 knowledge.
 But
 the
 distinction
 between
 upshot
 and
 knowledge

does
not
dictate
adoption
of
that
position
on
the
location
of
understanding.
Given

the
 distinction,
 a
 question
 arises
 as
 to
 the
 function
 of
 knowledge—and,
 in

particular,
the
belief
requirement
on
knowledge—given
that
apparently
one
can

take
in
elements
of
one’s
environment
in
its
absence.
And
a
plausible
answer
to

that
 question—an
 answer
 given
 credence
 by
 reflection
 on
 what
 is
 lacking
 in
 a

subject
who
mistakenly
withholds
belief
in
what
they
take
in—is
that
knowledge

of
 a
 fact
 is
 what
 allows
 one
 to
 exploit
 that
 fact—to
 have
 that
 fact
 serve
 as
 a

reason
for
one—in
one’s
theoretical
and
practical
reasoning.
On
that
view,
what

is
missing,
when
one
withholds
what
would
otherwise
be
reasonable
belief
about

what
 one
 takes
 in,
 is
 a
 capacity
 to
 have
 one’s
 practical
 and
 theoretical
 position



 13

controlled
 by
 how
 things
 are.17
 If
 that
 is
 right,
 then
 exercises
 of
 a
 capacity
 to

understand
that
do
not
result
in
knowledge,
like
exercises
of
a
capacity
to
see
a

black
 chess
 piece’s
 colour
 that
 do
 not
 result
 in
 seeing
 that
 the
 chess
 piece
 is

black,
might
be
thought
to
involve
a
form
of
cognitive
blindness.18
And
we
might

then
rather
identify
understanding
with
a
specific
form
of
openness
to
the
facts

about
what
has
been
said,
rather
than
with
the
type
of
input
that
determines
its

specific
form.


 Again,
 we
 are
 not
 required
 for
 present
 purposes
 to
 take
 a
 stand
 on
 the

precise
 location
 of
 understanding.
 We
 have
 seen
 grounds
 for
 requiring,
 of
 an

account
of
understanding,
that
it
give
accounts
both
of
the
episodes
by
which
one

takes
 in
 what
 is
 said—what
 I
 shall
 refer
 to
 as
 an
 account
 of
 intake

understanding—and
also
of
the
form
of
openness
to
what
one
thereby
takes
in

that
 enables
 one
 to
 exploit
 facts
 about
 what
 is
 said
 in
 one’s
 theoretical
 and

practical
reasoning—what
I
shall
refer
to
as
an
account
of
uptake
understanding.

I
 shall
 turn,
 in
 the
 next
 section,
 to
 the
 question
 of
 the
 form
 of
 uptake

understanding,
in
the
hope
that
addressing
that
question
might
provide
clues
as

to
the
further
specification
of
intake.




5.
Uptake
and
knowledge
of
truth­conditions.



If
 openness
 to
 what
 one
 takes
 in
 through
 understanding
 is
 a
 matter
 of

understanding
that
such‐and‐such,
in
the
way
that
openness
to
what
one
takes
in

through
seeing
is
a
matter
of
seeing
that
such‐and‐such,
then
it
is
too
amorphous

a
subject
matter
to
warrant
focussed
attention.
For
one
can
see
that
a
chess
piece

is
 black
 without
 seeing
 the
 chess
 piece’s
 colour,
 for
 instance
 by
 seeing
 the

colours
of
the
other
chess
pieces
in
a
set.
And
one
can
understand
that
Florence

said,
 in
 a
 demonstrated
 utterance,
 that
 the
 game
 has
 started
 without

understanding
an
utterance
of
Florence’s
to
the
effect
that
the
game
has
started,

for
 instance
 by
 understanding
 testimony
 from
 someone
 other
 than
 Florence.

What
 is
required
is
a
 restriction
to
 the
epistemic
positions
one
can
 occupy
just

through
 exercise
 of
 one’s
 capacity
 to
 understand.
 Put
 another
 way,
 what
 is

wanted
 is
 an
 account
 of
 epistemic
 standing
 that
 would
 be
 (with
 appropriate

modal
qualification)
both
necessary
and
sufficient
for
uptake.



 14


 The
requirement
for
an
account
of
epistemic
standing
that
would
be
both

necessary
and
sufficient
for
uptake
has
obvious
affinities
with
a
requirement
of

Donald
 Davidson’s,
 according
 to
 which
 a
 theory
 of
 meaning
 for
 a
 particular

language
should
‘explicitly
state
something
knowledge
of
which
would
suffice
for

interpreting
 utterances
 of
 speakers
 of
 the
 language
 to
 which
 it
 applies’

(Davidson,
 1976:
 171).
 There
 are
 two
 relevant
 differences
 between
 Davidson’s

formulation
and
ours.
First,
Davidson
seeks
an
account
of
facts,
or
truths,
that
are

exploited
 by
 those
 who
 understand
 utterances,
 rather
 than
 an
 account
 of
 the

way(s)
 in
 which
 those
 facts,
 or
 truths,
 are
 exploited.
 That
 provides
 sufficient

grounds
 for
 Davidson’s
 decision
 not
 to
 join
 us
 in
 requiring
 an
 account
 of

knowledge
that
is
necessary
for
openness
to
what
one
understands,
grounds
that

Davidson
seeks
to
bolster
through
general
scepticism
concerning
the
probity
of

the
 more
 demanding
 aim.19
 Second,
 and
 related,
 Davidson
 seeks
 to
 provide

sufficient
 conditions
 for
 being
 in
 a
 position
 to
 interpret
 (his
 version
 of
 uptake)

through
 a
 statement
 of
 the
 facts,
 or
 truths,
 knowledge
 of
 which
 would
 sustain

ability
to
interpret.
By
contrast,
our
formulation
leaves
open
whether
Davidson’s

aim
 is,
 in
 full
 generality,
 sustainable,
 by
 allowing
 that
 understanding
 might

depend
upon
something
other
than
propositional
(i.e.
stateable)
knowledge.20


 Davidson’s
proposal
for
meeting
his
requirement
is
that
knowledge
of
the

output
 theorem
 of
 an
 interpretative
 truth
 theory
 that
 applies
 to
 an
 utterance,

together
 with
 knowledge
 that
 it
 was
 a
 theorem
 of
 such
 a
 truth
 theory,
 would

suffice
 for
 uptake
 of
 that
 utterance.21
 Let’s
 begin
 by
 considering
 whether

Davidson’s
 proposal
 can
 be
 transposed
 into
 an
 answer
 to
 our
 question
 about

uptake.
So
understood,
it
becomes
the
hypothesis
that
the
knowledge
involved
in

Davidson’s
 proposal
 is
 both
 necessary
 and
 sufficient
 for
 uptake.
 For
 example,

uptake
of
Florence’s
utterance
of
(6)
would
be
a
matter
of
knowing
that
(7),
as

the
 theorematic
 element
 of
 an
 interpretative
 truth
 theory
 covering
 Florence’s

utterance,
u.



(6)
Viswanathan
will
win.



(7)
u
is
true
iff
Viswanathan
will
win.





 15

From
the
perspective
of
our
requirement,
the
hypothesis
has
two
main
benefits

but
suffers
from
at
least
one
critical
flaw.


 The
 first
 main
 benefit
 is
 that
 the
 hypothesis
 sustains
 an
 attractive

requirement
that
I
shall
call
the
transparency
of
understanding.
In
discussing
the

logical
status
of
supposition,
Dummett
notes
that
it
is
not
logically
an
imperative

for,
he
observes,



I
could,
having
said,
‘Think
of
a
number’,
ask
‘Have
you
done
so
yet?’,
but
it

would
be
a
joke
if
I
asked
that
question
having
said,
‘Suppose
the
witness
is

telling
the
truth’.
(Dummett,
1973:
309)22




As
 is
 appropriate,
 Dummett
 doesn’t
 explain
 the
 joke.
 One
 obvious
 source
 of

humour
 is
 the
 inappropriate
 form
 of
 the
 verb.
 In
 order
 for
 supposition
 to
 be

something
one
could
do,
so
something
one
could
be
ordered
do
to,
it
would
need

to
be
able
to
stand
for
the
outcome
of
a
specified
process.
And
that
would
require

the
verb
‘suppose’
to
take
(distinctive23)
progressive
form,
contrary
to
fact.24
But

a
 second
 potential
 source
 is
 brought
 out
 more
 clearly
 by
 the
 imperative,

‘Entertain
the
thought
that
the
witness
is
telling
the
truth’.25
The
second
source

is
 that
 one
 can’t
 understand
 the
 order
 to
 entertain
 the
 thought,
 or
 idly
 to

suppose,
 without
 complying
 thereby
 with
 its
 demand.
 The
 transparency
 of

understanding
is
responsible
for
the
latter
effect,
whereby
one
cannot
in
general

understand
 an
 utterance
 without
 entertaining
 a
 thought
 that
 it
 is
 used
 to

express.
 More
 carefully,
 the
 transparency
 of
 understanding
 is
 the
 requirement

that
one
who
has
uptake
of
the
expression
of
a
particular
thought
is
thereby
in
a

position
to
treat
reasons
for
or
against
accepting
the
thought
itself
as
reasons
for

or
 against
 endorsing
 the
 thought
 registered
 through
 understanding.
 For

instance,
according
to
transparency,
one
who
has
uptake
of
the
expression
of
the

thought
 that
 Viswanathan
 will
 win
 is
 in
 a
 position
 to
 treat
 reasons
 for
 denying

that
 Viswanathan
 will
 win
 as
 reasons
 for
 denying
 what
 they
 understand
 as

having
been
expressed.
In
that
 way,
 what
 is
immediately
before
one’s
mind,
by

virtue
 of
 one’s
 understanding
 of
 an
 utterance,
 is
 the
 (putative)
 subject
 matter

determined
by
the
thought,
rather
than,
for
example,
the
thought
itself
being
the

immediate
object
of
one’s
thinking.



 16


 The
transparency
requirement
is
closely
connected
with
John
McDowell’s

observation
that
our
most
basic
engagements
with
what
speakers
say
are
ways

of
 acquiring
 information
 about
 the
 subject
 matter
 of
 what
 they
 say
 rather
 than

about
 what
 the
 speakers
 have
 said
 or
 believe.26
 It
 is
 weaker
 than
 the

requirement
 that
 all
 thoughts
 be
 transparently
 communicable,
 so
 that
 for
 any

thought
 of
 any
 thinker,
 it
 is
 possible
 for
 another
 thinker
 to
 entertain
 that

thought.
The
latter
requirement
faces
obvious
difficulties
arising
from
the
special

natures
 of
 certain
 indexical
 thoughts.27
 And
 it
 may
 be
 that
 similar
 difficulties

afflict
 the
 less
 demanding
 requirement
 for
 transparency
 of
 understanding.
 In

that
 case,
 or
 on
 other
 grounds,
 one
 might
 consider
 a
 further
 weakening
 to
 the

requirement
that
understanding
the
expression
of
a
thought
with
subject
matter

P
 involves
 entertaining
 a
 thought
 with
 subject
 matter
 P.28
 Further
 wrinkles

might
then
involve
specification
of
additional
conditions
on
the
relation
between

expression
 and
 entertaining.
 The
 requirement
 obviously
 warrants
 further

articulation
and
defence,
but
its
provisional
endorsement
will
be
harmless
in
the

present,
exploratory
context.


 The
 hypothesis
 derived
 from
 Davidson’s
 proposal
 sustains
 transparency

in
 the
 following
 way.
 We
 have
 it
 that
 Florence
 said
 that
 Viswanathan
 will
 win

and
 so
 gave
 expression
 to
 the
 thought
 that
 Viswanathan
 will
 win.
 Hence,

according
 to
 transparency,
 understanding
 Florence’s
 utterance
 must
 involve

entertaining
 the
 thought
 that
 Viswanathan
 will
 win.
 The
 required
 result
 is

secured
 by
 the
 hypothesis
 because
 one
 cannot
 know
 that
 (7)
 without

entertaining
(7),
and
so
without
entertaining
a
thought
of
its
right
hand
side,
to

the
effect
that
Viswanathan
will
win.29


 A
 first
 obvious
 alternative
 to
 the
 present
 hypothesis
 is
 that
 uptake
 is
 a

matter
 of
 knowing
 what
 was
 said
 in
 an
 utterance—for
 instance,
 that
 uptake
 of

what
Florence
said
in
u
is
a
matter
of
knowing
that
what
Florence
said
in
u
was

that
 Viswanathan
 will
 win.
Knowing
 that
is
a
matter
of
knowing
 which
thought

Florence
 expressed
 rather
 than
 a
 matter
 of
 entertaining
 the
 thought
 she

expressed.
To
see
the
difference,
and
also
an
aspect
of
its
importance,
consider

that
 it
 is
 consistent
 with
 knowing
 that
 Florence
 has
 said
 that
 Viswanathan
 will

win
 that
 one
 should
 fail
 to
 think
 in
 accord
 with
 the
 truth
 conditions
 of
 what

Florence
said.
For
instance,
it
is
consistent
with
an
inability
to
take
reasons
for



 17

thinking
 that
 Viswanathan
 did
 not
 win
 as
 reasons
 for
 thinking
 that
 what
 one

took
 Florence
 to
 have
 said
 is
 false.
 Indeed,
 it
 is
 consistent
 with
 apparently

rational
 refusal
 to
 treat
 what
 Florence
 said
 as
 having
 truth‐conditions,
 for
 one

might
 have
 apparent
 grounds
 for
 endorsing
 a
 view
 of
 expressed
 thoughts

according
 to
 which
 they
 do
 not.30
 Notice
 that,
 if
 the
 possibility
 of
 this
 type
 of

block
on
the
appreciation
of
reasons
marks
off
knowledge
of
what
was
said
from

understanding
 proper,
 then
 it
 would
 provide
 an
 at
 least
 partial
 explanation
 for

Peacocke’s
observation
that
one
can
know
what
was
said
without
understanding.

The
 partial
 explanation
 would
 be
 that
 mere
 knowledge,
 unlike
 understanding,

fails
 the
 transparency
 requirement.
 Anyway,
 if
 we
 assume
 the
 transparency

requirement,
 then
 the
 present
 hypothesis
 has
 a
 key
 advantage
 over
 the
 first

obvious
alternative.


 A
second,
related,
benefit
of
the
hypothesis
is
that
it
ensures
what
I
shall

call
 appreciation
 of
 the
 expressive
 connection
 between
 an
 utterance
 and
 the

thought
one
understands
it
to
express.
Appreciation
of
expressive
connection
is
a

matter
of
appreciating
that
reasons
for
or
against
what
one
understands
to
have

been
 expressed
 are
 reasons
 for
 or
 against
 the
 acceptability
 of
 the
 utterance
 in

which
 it
 was
 expressed.
 Appreciation
 is
 sustained
 by
 the
 hypothesis
 because
 if

one
derives
knowledge
of
(7)
from
knowledge
of
an
interpretative
truth‐theory

covering
u,
then
one
is
in
a
position
to
know
 that
 the
truth‐value
 of
u
is
coeval

with
 the
 truth‐value
 of
 the
 thought
 that
 one
 entertains
 on
 the
 basis
 of

understanding.
 One
 is
 therefore
 in
 a
 position
 to
 derive
 reasons
 to
 take
 u
 to
 be

true
(/false)
from
reasons
to
believe
(/deny)
that
Viswanathan
will
win
and
vice

versa.31
 In
 this
 case,
 there
 is
 room
 for
 a
 gap
 to
 open
 up,
 on
 the
 hypothesis,

between
uptake
and
its
derivational
exploitation,
for
someone
might
know
(7)
as

a
 theorem
 of
 an
 interpretative
 truth‐theory
 and
 yet
 have
 apparent
 grounds
 for

rejecting
 the
 derivability
 of
 coeval
 status
 for
 its
 right
 and
 left
 hand
 sides,
 due

perhaps
to
an
idiosyncratic
understanding
of
the
bi‐conditional.32
Following
the

earlier
 suggestion
 about
 Peacocke’s
 observation,
 the
 gap
 here
 might
 help
 to

explain
why
testimonial
knowledge
of
truth‐conditions
appears
not
to
suffice
for

understanding.
 But
 perhaps
 it
 could
 be
 argued
 that
 someone
 with
 an

idiosyncratic
conception
of
the
bi‐conditional
would
nonetheless
be
in
a
position



 18

to
appreciate
an
expressive
connection
between
utterance
and
condition,
despite

their
not
being
in
a
position
properly
to
exploit
what
they
appreciate.


 On
the
assumption
that
transparency
is
to
be
respected,
a
second
obvious

alternative
to
the
present
hypothesis
is
a
view
according
to
which
uptake
of
what

is
said
in
an
utterance
is
a
matter
simply
of
entertaining
an
expressed
thought,

without
entertaining
the
thought
on
the
basis
of
knowing
a
truth‐theorem
for
the

utterance.
Such
a
view
would
obviously
preserve
transparency,
but
at
a
cost.
For

someone
 might
 entertain
 the
 thought
 expressed
 in
 an
 utterance
 without,
 so
 to

speak,
 appreciating
 it
 as
 having
 been
 expressed
 in
 the
 utterance.
 In
 particular,

one
who
entertained
the
thought
expressed
in
an
utterance
might
fail
to
occupy

an
 epistemic
 position
 in
 which
 reasons
 to
 reject
 the
 expressed
 thought
 are

available
to
them
as
reasons
to
reject
the
utterance.33
Hence,
the
hypothesis
has

a
key
advantage
over
the
second
obvious
alternative.


 Although
the
hypothesis
has
important
advantages
over
the
two
obvious

alternatives
 that
 we
 have
 considered,
 it
 also
 suffers
 from
 a
 critical
 flaw.34
 The

flaw
can
be
presented
as
a
dilemma.



 The
 first
 horn
 of
 the
 dilemma
 arises
 from
 the
 demands
 that
 the

hypothesis
 imposes
 upon
 uptake.
 In
 the
 first
 place,
 the
 hypothesis
 secures

transparency
 only
 by
 securing
 more
 than
 transparency
 appears
 to
 demand.
 In

order
to
entertain
the
content
expressed
by
an
utterance,
the
proposal
requires

that
 subjects
 entertain
 a
 richer
 content,
 embedding
 a
 concept
 of
 truth.
 And
 it

might
reasonably
be
denied
that
it
is
a
necessary
condition
on
a
subject’s
having

uptake
 that
 they
 have,
 or
 are
 required
 to
 exercise
 in
 uptake,
 facility
 with
 a

concept
of
truth.35
Moreover,
in
the
second
place,
the
proposal,
as
presented,
is

yet
more
demanding
on
subjects,
since
it
requires
subjects
to
appreciate
that
the

truth‐theorems
 that
 they
 apply
 to
 particular
 utterances
 are
 elements
 in
 an

interpretative
truth‐theory.
Again,
it
might
reasonably
be
doubted
that
uptake
in

general
depends
upon
the
sort
of
reflective
assurance
provided
by
knowledge
of

the
interpretative
status
of
a
truth‐theorem
applying
to
a
particular
utterance.36

The
first
horn
of
the
dilemma,
then,
is
the
claim
that,
as
presented,
the
proposal

is
implausibly
demanding
of
the
capacities,
and
exercises
of
capacities,
involved

in
uptake.



 19


 On
 the
 second
 horn
 of
 the
 dilemma
 is
 the
 claim
 that
 the
 features
 of
 the

hypothesis
found
 problematic
 on
 the
 first
 horn
 are
 not
 optional.
 Obviously,
 the

core
 component
 of
 the
 proposal,
 that
 transparency
 and
 appreciation
 of

expressive
connection
involve
knowledge
of
truth‐theorems,
cannot
be
shorn
of

its
apparently
extraneous
element,
that
it
makes
uptake
depend
upon
exercise
of

a
 concept
 of
 truth.
 And
 the
 hypothesis
 secures
 appreciation
 of
 expressive

connection
 only
 by
 requiring,
 not
 only
 that
 subjects
 know
 truth‐theorems

applying
to
particular
utterances,
but
also
that
they
know
that
the
theorems
are

elements
 in
 an
 interpretative
 truth‐theory.
 Someone
 who
 knew
 only
 the
 bi‐
conditional
 theorems,
 without
 also
 knowing
 their
 pedigree,
 would
 not
 be
 in
 a

position
 to
 treat
 reasons
 for
 rejecting
 (/accepting)
 one
 side
 of
 a
 theorem
 as

reasons
 for
 rejecting
 (/accepting)
 the
 other.
 For
 example,
 someone
 in
 that

position
 might
 view
 reasons
 for
 rejecting
 either
 side
 of
 the
 bi‐conditional
 as

reasons
for
rejecting
the
bi‐conditional
itself.37
The
second
horn
of
the
dilemma,

then,
 involves
 a
 version
 of
 John
 Foster’s
 infamous
 objection
 to
 Davidson’s

proposal,
 according
 to
 which
 knowledge
 of
 what
 is
 in
 fact
 an
 interpretative

truth‐theorem
 covering
 an
 utterance
 does
 not
 suffice
 for
 appreciation
 of
 the

utterance’s
expression
of
content.38



 On
 the
 assumption
 that
 the
 hypothesis
 is
 too
 demanding
 to
 supply
 a

necessary
condition
on
uptake,
the
requirements
that
we
have
discerned
on
an

adequate
 account
 of
 uptake
 might
 appear
 to
 be
 impossible
 to
 meet.
 That
 is,
 it

might
appear
impossible
to
provide
an
account
that
is
less
demanding
than
the

hypothesis,
 and
 yet
 able
 to
 ensure
 both
 transparency
 and
 appreciation
 of

expressive
 connection.
 And
 in
 that
 case,
 one
 might
 be
 inclined
 either
 to
 reject

one
 of
 the
 requirements,
 or
 to
 take
 their
 conjunction
 to
 sustain
 a
 sort
 of

transcendental
 argument
 to
 the
 effect
 that
 the
 demands
 imposed
 by
 the

hypothesis
 are
 appropriate.
 However,
 we
 signalled
 at
 the
 outset
 an
 additional

feature
 of
 the
 hypothesis
 that
 is
 not
 obviously
 a
 mandatory
 component
 of
 any

account
of
uptake:
the
requirement
that
an
account
of
uptake
take
the
form
of
an

account
of
the
content
of
propositional
knowledge.
We
considered,
and
rejected,

one
 alternative
 hypothesis
 that
 involves
 rejection
 of
 the
 view,
 the
 hypothesis

that
uptake
is
a
matter
simply
of
entertaining
an
expressed
thought.
But
having



 20

made
the
requirement
explicit,
it
is
clear
that
there
are
further
alternatives
to
be

explored
before
we
accede
to
one
of
the
hypotheses
we
have
already
considered.


 One
important
alternative,
defended
in
recent
work
by
Ian
Rumfitt,
gives

up
the
view
in
favour
of
a
treatment
of
uptake
as
constituting,
not
propositional

knowledge
about
utterances,
but
rather,
as
he
puts
it,



…a
 second‐order
 cognitive
 capacity:
 [in
 the
 case
 of
 uptake
 of
 assertion‐like

sayings]
 one
 who
 possesses
 it
 is
 in
 a
 capacity
 to
 gain
 new
 knowledge
 from
 old

(Rumfitt,
2005:
444).39



Specifically,




My
 understanding
 an
 utterance
 u
 as
 [assertion‐like]
 saying
 that
 P
 puts
 me
 in
 a

position



(a)
to
know
that
P,
in
the
event
of
my
coming
to
know
that
u
is
true;

(b)
to
know
that
u
is
true,
in
the
event
of
my
coming
to
know
that
P;

(c)
to
know
that
u
is
false,
in
the
event
of
my
coming
to
know
that
not
P;
and

(d)
to
know
that
not
P,
in
the
event
of
my
coming
to
know
that
u
is
false.



Understanding
 a[n
 assertion‐like]
 saying,
 in
 other
 words,
 allows
 knowledge
 to

spread
back
and
forth
between
the
saying’s
content
and
attributions
of
truth
to
it,

and
 between
 that
 content’s
 negation
 and
 attributions
 of
 falsity
 to
 the
 saying

(Rumfitt,
2005:
443).40



Rumfitt’s
 proposal
 has
 two
 main
 advantages
 over
 the
 truth‐theoretic
 proposal.

First,
Rumfitt’s
proposal
directly
sustains
appreciation
of
expressive
connection,

rather
than
running
a
dogleg
through
propositional
knowledge
of
interpretative

truth
 theorems.
 Or,
 rather,
 his
 proposal
 makes
 a
 single
 requirement
 on

understanding
 do
 the
 work
 we
 earlier
 divided
 between
 transparency
 and

appreciation
 of
 expressive
 connection.
 Second,
 and
 closely
 related,
 the
 type
 of

appreciation
 involved
 in
 understanding
 is,
 on
 Rumfitt’s
 account,
 sufficiently

demanding
 that
 it
 apparently
 removes
 the
 need
 for
 the
 sort
 of
 reflective

assurance
 of
 appreciation
 of
 expressive
 connection
 supplied,
 on
 the
 truth‐


 21

theoretic
proposal,
by
knowledge
of
the
interpretative
status
of
theorems.
Both

advantages
 appear
 to
 be
 consequent
 upon
 the
 transition
 to
 a
 view
 of

understanding
 as
 involving
 second‐order
 capacities
 together
 with
 a
 very

demanding
conception
of
the
epistemic
standing
of
those
capacities.


 At
this
point,
a
natural
question
about
Rumfitt’s
proposal
concerns
intake.

What
account
of
intake
would
serve
the
proposal,
in
particular
in
underwriting

someone’s
coming
to
be
in
the
type
of
epistemic
position
characterised
through

(a)–(d)?
 Even
 setting
 aside
 the
 sorts
 of
 issues
 arising
 from
 the
 finitude
 of
 our

capacities
 that
 give
 rise
 to
 a
 concern
 with
 compositionality,
 it
 is
 not
 plausible

that
we
simply
bring
to
bear
on
utterances
prior
knowledge
of
the
sort
described

in
 (a)–(d).
 At
 best,
 we
 might
 have
 such
 knowledge
 about
 the
 sentence
 types

instanced
 in
 particular
 utterances.
 And
 that
 appears
 to
 be
 the
 model
 to
 which

Rumfitt
 wishes
 to
 appeal
 in
 accounting
 for
 the
 onset
 of
 the
 understanding
 of

particular
utterances.
Rumfitt
describes
appreciation
of
the
connections
in
(a)–
(d)
as
akin
to
knowledge
of
derived
rules
of
inference,
in
this
case
as
capacities

derived
from
capacities
with
respect
to
rules
governing
the
contribution
of
sub‐
sentential
 expressions
 to
 sentential
 level
 rules.41
 What
 is
 required
 of
 intake
 in

such
a
context
is
that
it
should
afford
knowledge
about
which
expression
types

are
 instanced
 in
 a
 particular
 utterance.
 In
 effect,
 (a)–(d)
 are
 to
 be
 viewed
 as

derived
 from
 a
 combination
 of
 analogues
 for
 (a)–(d),
 or
 their
 derivational

sources,
 governing
 expression
 types,
 rather
 than
 utterances,
 together
 with

subjects’
 competent
 exercise
 of
 abilities
 to
 recognise
 the
 instancing
 of
 those

expression
types
in
particular
utterances.
It
is
therefore
plausible
that
the
second

component—the
 exercises
 of
 abilities
 to
 recognise
 the
 instancing
 of
 sentence

types—provides
 Rumfitt’s
 account
 of
 intake,
 his
 account
 of
 the
 onset
 of

understanding
of
particular
utterances.



 Although
 Rumfitt
 does
 not
 explicitly
 endorse
 the
 view
 of
 intake
 as

recognition
of
the
instancing
of
sentence
types,
it
is
the
view
apparently
most
in

accord
 with
 the
 derivational
 shape
 of
 his
 proposal.
 And
 the
 appearance
 is

sustained
by
the
fact
that
he
provides
an
explicit
account
of
the
recognition
of
the

instancing
 of
 sentence
 types.
 According
 to
 that
 account,
 recognition
 of
 the

instancing
of
sentence
types
is
a
matter
of
appreciating
the
intentions
with
which

speakers
 make
 some
 of
 the
 noises
 that
 they
 do,
 where
 the
 relevant
 range
 of



 22

intentions
 are
 intentions
 to
 be
 recognised
 as
 having
 produced
 an
 utterance

instancing
one
or
another
specific
type
of
sentence.42


 Rumfitt’s
 proposal
 deserves
 more
 discussion
 than
 I
 can
 afford
 it
 here.

Indeed,
 I
 think
 that
 its
 core,
 or
 something
 close
 to
 that
 core,
 can
 provide
 an

account
 of
 uptake
 that
 is
 quite
 plausible.
 I
 shall
 simply
 note
 and
 set
 aside
 one

difficulty
and
then
all
too
briefly
press
a
second.



 The
difficulty
that
I
wish
simply
to
note
is
that,
as
stated,
the
proposal
is

more
 or
 less
 as
 demanding
 of
 conceptual
 resources
 as
 the
 truth‐theoretic

account
it
is
designed
to
surpass.43
For
on
the
assumption
that
being
in
a
position

to
 know
 that
 an
 utterance
 is
 true
 or
 false
 demands
 possession
 of
 a
 concept
 of

truth
 or
 falsity,
 understanding
 will,
 on
 Rumfitt’s
 account,
 often
 depend
 upon

possession
of
those
concepts.
Moreover,
attainment
of
utterance
understanding

requires,
 on
 Rumfitt’s
 proposal,
 the
 manipulation
 of
 rich
 theoretical

machinery—albeit
 a
 machinery,
 not
 of
 propositions,
 but
 rather
 of
 connections

amongst
 propositions.
 However,
 what
 is
 central
 to
 the
 proposal
 is
 that
 uptake

opens
 a
 conduit
 for
 the
 transmission
 of
 reasons,
 however
 those
 reasons
 are

characterised,
 and
 however
 precisely
 the
 conduit
 is
 opened.
 And
 it
 is
 not

implausible
 to
 suppose
 that
 the
 types
 of
 reasons
 available
 to
 a
 subject
 will

impact
upon
the
type
of
connections
amongst
reasons
accessible
to
the
subject.
If

that
is
right,
then
it
is
plausible
that
more
minimal
analogues
of
(a)–(d)
might
be

provided
 to
 characterise
 the
 understanding
 of
 subjects
 who
 lack
 facility
 with
 a

concept
of
truth.44
And
the
concern
about
the
derivational
machinery
that
must

be
 manipulated
 in
 order
 to
 achieve
 understanding
 is
 readily
 absorbed
 into
 the

following
difficulty.


 The
 difficulty
 that
 I
 wish
 to
 press
 concerns
 the
 interaction
 between

Rumfitt’s
 account
 of
 uptake
 and
 what
 appears
 to
 be
 his
 favoured
 account
 of

intake.
In
the
first
place,
notice
that
neither
Rumfitt’s
account
of
intake,
nor
his

account
 of
uptake,
 sustains
 transparency.
 For
one
 might
 be
 in
 the
 position
that

Rumfitt
describes
as
understanding
and
yet
have
no
view
at
all
about
any
of
the

reasons
that
one’s
understanding
connects.
In
that
case,
one
might
understand
u

without
 entertaining
 a
 thought
 that
 u
 expresses.
 As
 noted,
 Rumfitt
 in
 effect

collapses
 transparency
 and
 appreciation
 of
 expressive
 connection
 into

appreciation
 of
 (a)–(d).
 Accordingly,
 one’s
 occurrent
 understanding
 of
 an



 23

utterance
 need
 have
 no
 impact
 upon
 one’s
 first‐order
 psychology
 aside
 from

one’s
 recognition
 of
 the
 instancing
 of
 sentences
 by
 utterances.
 That
 result

anyway
 appears
 phenomenologically
 off‐key.
 But
 in
 the
 present
 context,
 it
 is

especially
 problematic.
 For
 despite
 one’s
 initial
 failure
 to
 entertain
 a
 thought

expressed
 by
 an
 utterance,
 acquiring
 knowledge
 that
 the
 utterance
 is
 true

immediately
puts
one
in
a
position
to
entertain
that
thought
through
acquisition

of
knowledge
with
the
expressed
thought
as
content.
It
is
as
if
one
engages
with

the
 thought
 expressed
 by
 an
 utterance
 only
 when,
 in
 addition
 simply
 to

understanding
the
utterance,
one
also
acquires
reason
to
endorse
or
to
reject
it.45


 That
 indicates
 an
 oddity
 of
 the
 proposal,
 though
 perhaps
 not
 yet
 an

objection.
 An
 objection
 comes
 into
 view
 when
 one
 reflects
 further
 on
 the

embedded
account
of
intake.
What
is
required
is
an
account
of
what
puts
one
in
a

position
 to
 secure
 uptake,
 so
 what
 enables
 one
 to
 appreciate
 the
 connections

specified
in
(a)–(d).
According
to
the
account
of
intake
that
fits
most
comfortably

with
the
derivational
shape
of
Rumfitt’s
proposal,
what
puts
one
in
that
position

is
 a
 combination
 of
 (i)
 one’s
 recognition
 that
 the
 speaker
 is
 trying
 to
 direct
 an

instance
of
a
sentence
type
at
one
and
one’s
knowledge
of
which
sentence
type

the
 speaker
 is
 trying
 to
 direct
 at
 one46
 and
 (ii)
 one’s
 derivation
 of
 a
 sentential

analogue
 of
 the
 type
 of
 second‐order
 capacity
 characterised
 through
 (a)–(d)

appropriate
 to
 the
 intended
 sentence
 type.
 The
 oddity
 remarked
 above
 turned

on
the
fact
that
this
proposal
appears
to
involve
less
than
is
involved
in
ordinary

understanding
of
utterances.
But
the
proposal
also
seems
to
involve
more
than
is

involved
 in
 ordinary
 engagement
 with
 utterances.
 For
 it
 is
 not
 merely
 off‐key,

but
 false,
 to
 claim
 that
 speakers
 typically
 have
 sufficiently
 detailed
 intentions

concerning
the
types
of
expressions
that
they
use
to
serve
as
appropriate
input

to
the
type
of
derivation
that
Rumfitt
envisages.
What
speakers
typically
intend

is
simply
to
say
that
such‐and‐such,
and
perhaps
to
be
understood
in
accord
with

their
 intentions,
 without
 prejudice
 as
 to
 the
 specific
 linguistic
 means
 by
 which

they
 achieve
 those
 ends.
 And
 competent
 auditors
 are
 typically
 able
 to

understand
 utterances
 despite
 failing
 to
 recognise
 the
 details
 either
 of

expression‐directed
 intentions,
 or
 the
 specifics
 of
 the
 expression
 types
 with

which
they
are
confronted.47



 24


 What
is,
perhaps,
the
most
pressing
difficulty
for
Rumfitt’s
proposal
arises

from
the
burden
imposed
on
uptake
as
a
consequence
of
the
account
of
intake
as

recognition
 of
 the
 instancing
 of
 sentence
 types.
 The
 reason‐connections

discerned
 through
 uptake,
 between
 sentence
 types,
 or
 their
 instancing
 in

utterances,
 and
 thoughts,
 are
 contingent:
 the
 sentence
 types
 could
 have
 been

reason‐connected
with
different
thoughts.
And
it
is
difficult
to
see
how
epistemic

standing
with
respect
to
such
a
structure
could
be
acquired
except
via
something

akin
to
induction
from
cases—in
this
case,
induction
over
cases
in
which
one
was

in
a
position
to
know
both
P
(/not
P)
and
that
u
is
true
(/false).
But
in
that
case,
it

is
 not
 clear
 that
 being
 in
 an
 epistemic
 position,
 so
 derived,
 would
 differ
 in

significant
respects
from
the
position
of
someone
who
knew,
on
similar
inductive

grounds,
an
appropriate
truth
theorem.
In
particular,
it
is
not
clear
that
induction

could
put
one
in
a
position
to
treat
knowledge
that
P
as
putting
one
in
a
position

to
know
that
u
is
true,
rather
than
as
putting
one
in
a
position
to
know
that
either

u
 is
 true
 or
 there
 is
 a
 counter‐example
 to
 the
 inductively
 based
 generalisation.

Moreover,
even
if
it
were
possible
to
achieve
the
required
position
on
the
basis

of
 something
 akin
 to
 induction,
 it
 is
 far
 from
 clear
 that
 ordinary
 speakers

typically
 exploit
 such
 a
 means
 to
 that
 end.
 For
 ordinary
 speakers
 typically
 lack

detailed
appreciation
of
the
evidential
base
required
for
such
induction,
and
they

would
typically
allow
their
apparent
understanding
to
trump
conclusions
drawn

from
such
a
base.
48


 Put
another
way,
if
one
were
in
the
cognitive
position
described
through

(a)–(d),
 then
 one
 would
 be
 in
 a
 better
 position
 than
 someone
 who
 had
 merely

inductive
 knowledge
 of
 a
 relevant
 truth‐theorem.
 But
 it
 is
 not
 clear
 how
 one

could
attain
that
position
on
the
basis
of
a
combination
of
the
sort
of
intake
that

Rumfitt
 appears
 to
 allow
 and
 ordinarily
 ascertained,
 or
 ascertainable,
 facts

concerning
the
contingent
correlations
amongst
the
left
and
right
hand
sides
of

(a)–(d).
 Rumfitt
 seeks
 to
 explain
 knowledge
 of
 the
 type
 of
 reason‐connection

involved
in
his
proposal
by
a
comparison
with
knowledge
of
rules
of
inference
in

logic.
If
I
am
right,
then
the
comparison
limps
at
a
critical
juncture.
What
sustains

the
special
powers
of
appreciation
of
reason‐connections
in
logic
appears
to
be
a

property
 that
 those
 connections
 have
 and
 that
 the
 connections
 involved
 in

Rumfitt’s
proposal
lack:
a
priori
accessibility.49



 25


 

6.
Conclusion.



The
 foregoing
 constitutes
 a
 preliminary
 exploration
 of
 some
 issues
 that
 arise

when
an
attempt
is
made
to
develop
an
account
of
linguistic
understanding.
The

upshot
is
not
yet
an
account
of
understanding,
even
in
sketch
form.
But
I
believe

that
many
of
the
pieces
required
to
develop
at
least
a
sketch
are
now
in
place.
In

particular,
 I
 believe
 that
 an
 account
 of
 uptake
 close
 to
 the
 core
 of
 Rumfitt’s

proposal
may
be
correct.
What
is
required
is
a
way
of
integrating
that
core
with

an
adequate
account
of
intake.
I
shan’t
attempt
to
make
good
on
that
suggestion

now.
 As
 I
 said
 at
 the
 start,
 my
 aim
 here
 is
 to
 make
 a
 mild
 plea
 for
 attention
 to

understanding,
by
advertising
some
major
targets
for
reflection.
And
it
would
be

inappropriate,
given
that
aim,
to
render
further
attention
superfluous.







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1
 Thanks
 for
 very
 helpful
 discussion
 to
 Bill
 Brewer,
 Stephen
 Butterfill,
 Naomi


Eilan,
 Christoph
 Hoerl,
 Hemdat
 Lerman,
 Johannes
 Roessler,
 Sarah
 Sawyer,
 and

especially
 Matthew
 Soteriou.
 This
 paper
 is
 dedicated
 to
 the
 memory
 of
 Nadine

Sheldon
Green.

2
 Dummett
 rarely
 frames
 the
 claim
 in
 the
 strong
 form
 according
 to
 which
 a

theory
 of
 meaning
 should
 be
 a
 theory
 of
 understanding.
 His
 discussions
 of
 the

claim
 invariably
 are
 shaped
 by
 the
 question
 of
 proper
 integration
 of
 theories,

rather
than
the
identity
of
their
targets,
and
are
highly
sensitive
to
the
difficulty

of
 adequately
 specifying
 the
 integration
 requirement.
 See
 e.g.
 Dummett,
 1981,

1991.
For
general
discussion
of
the
integration
requirement,
see
Smith,
1992.

3
See
e.g.
Moore,
1989.
The
issues
here
are
close
relatives
of
questions
about
the


integration
 of
 knowledge
 and
 fact
 pursued
 by
 Peacocke,
 1999,
 and
 questions

about
their
separability
pursued
by
Fine,
2005.

4
The
question
whether
Wittgenstein
refused
to
recognise
an
occurrent
sense
of


‘understand’
is
answered
negatively
in
McDowell,
2009.

5
 The
 need
 for
 an
 additional
 and
 less
 demanding
 notion
 of
 what
 is
 said
 is

defended
in
Travis,
2006.



 30


























































6
In
addition,
one
might
need
to
discern,
not
only
the
referents
of
the
unspecified


subject
 of
 ‘expect’
 and
 the
 anaphoric
 object
 of
 ‘beat’,
 but
 also
 the
 specific

contents
of
‘too’,
‘intelligent’,
‘expect’,
and
‘beat’.
See
e.g.
Travis,
1997.

7
See
Martin,
2002,
for
discussion
of
related
issues.


8
‘Occasioned’
might
be
an
improvement
on
‘occurrent’
in
such
contexts.


9
Consistently
with
my
understanding
of
what
it
takes
for
something
to
be
a
state,


I
needn’t
take
issue
with
Rundle,
2001,
and
Baker
and
Hacker,
2005,
who
argue

that
 what
 we
 have
 labelled
 ‘occurrent
 understanding’
 is
 itself
 a
 form
 of

disposition
or
ability.
Although
Rundle
and
Baker
and
Hacker
take
themselves
to

be
 in
 dispute
 with
 Dummett
 with
 regard
 to
 this
 claim
 about
 occurrent

understanding,
it
is
not
clear
that
Dummett
either
takes,
or
needs
to
take,
a
stand

on
the
issue
in
the
discussion
that
they
target.
And
that
would
be
so
even
on
the

episodic
understanding
of
‘occurrent’,
for
the
onset
of
a
disposition
or
ability
is

an
episode.

10
 For
 a
 discussion
 and
 defence
 of
 this
 view
 of
 basic
 a
 priori
 knowledge,
 see


McFetridge,
1990.

11
Burge,
1993,
1997,
1998,
1999.


12
 Longworth,
 2008b.
 One
 reason
 for
 the
 qualification
 ‘in
 any
 straightforward


way’
is
that
my
disagreement
with
Burge
concerns
only
the
status
of
core
cases

of
 human
 occurrent
 understanding.
 And
 it
 is
 consistent
 with
 the
 a
 posteriori

status
 of
 occurrent
 understanding
 that
 it
 can
 sustain
 acquisition
 (or

transmission)
 of
 a
 priori
 knowledge
 via
 testimony,
 so
 that
 it
 is
 open
 to
 me
 to

endorse
Burge’s
further
claim
that
such
acquisition
(or
transmission)
is
possible.

If
 it
 is
 possible,
 and
 if
 it
 also
 possible
 for
 beings
 other
 than
 us—e.g.
 infinite

beings—to
have
a
priori
knowledge
of
what
is
said,
then
it
may
be
possible
for

humans
to
acquire
from
such
beings
a
priori
knowledge
of
what
is
said.

13
Peacocke,
1976.
See
also
Fricker,
2003.


14
See
e.g.
Williamson,
2000.


15
See
Hunter,
1998;
Longworth,
2008a.


16
 It
 is
 plausible
 to
 view
 the
 possibility
 of
 rational
 withholding
 of
 belief
 as

marking
 a
 line
 between
 a
 kind
 of
 receptivity
 and
 a
 kind
 of
 spontaneity,
 where

that
line
marks
a
boundary
around
the
domain
of
cognition
for
which
a
subject
is



 31


























































responsible.
Since
one
has
at
best
limited
control
over
what
one
takes
in
through

understanding
or
sense
perception,
and
since
the
capacities
that
sub‐serve
that

intake
 are
 fallible,
 allowing
 intake
 to
 encroach
 on
 the
 domain
 of
 spontaneity

would
 have
 the
 potential
 to
 make
 one
 responsible
 for
 errors
 without
 one’s

control.

17
For
discussion
and
defence
of
this
view
of
a
function
of
knowledge
in
rational


psychology,
as
an
enabling
condition
for
the
exploitation
of
factive
reasons,
see

Dancy,
2000,
2008;
Hornsby,
2008;
Hyman,
1999,
2006;
McDowell,
1982,
1994,

1995;
Williamson,
2000.

18
It
may
be
that
this
condition
applies
only
to
creatures
with
a
capacity
to
have


propositional
knowledge,
or
even
creatures
with
a
capacity
to
know
of
the
sort

possessed
 by
 normal
 humans.
 Perhaps,
 for
 example,
 knowledge
 would
 not
 be

required
to
play
this
role
in
creatures
with
a
perception‐desire
psychology.

19
See
e.g.
Davidson,
1984:
125,
1986.


20
 Indeed,
 our
 formulation
 is
 consistent
 with
 the
 required
 epistemic
 standing


being
 content‐less,
 as
 it
 would
 be,
 on
 some
 views,
 if
 it
 were
 a
 form
 of
 purely

practical
knowledge.
See
especially
Moore,
1997.
For
more
general
discussion
of

the
 content
 of
 knowledge‐how
 and
 practical
 knowledge
 see
 Rumfitt,
 2003;

Snowdon,
2003;
Stanley
and
Williamson,
2001.

21
Davidson,
1984.


22
Thanks
to
Matthew
Soteriou
for
reminding
me
about
Dummett’s
observation


and
for
helpful
discussion
of
it.

23
 Some
 speakers
 will
 find
 acceptable
 ‘supposing’,
 ‘believing’,
 etc.,
 but
 without


according
them
a
construal
distinct
from
‘supposes’,
‘believes’,
etc.

24
 The
 closest
 relevant
 process
 in
 the
 case
 of
 supposition
 would
 be
 reasoning


under
the
supposition.

25
Here
and
throughout
I
use
‘entertaining’
as
a
generic,
or
determinable,
for
all


specific,
 or
 determinate,
 ways
 of
 engaging
 with
 a
 thought,
 including
 thinking,

believing,
 knowing,
 etc.
 And
 I
 shall
 assume
 that
 entertaining
 logically
 complex

thoughts
entails
entertaining
their
elementary
component
thoughts,
so
that,
for

example,
entertaining
the
thought
that
if
Viswanathan
will
win,
then
he
will
not



 32


























































be
 disqualified,
 entails
 entertaining
 the
 thought
 that
 Viswanathan
 will
 not
 be

disqualified.

26
See
McDowell,
1980.
For
related
discussion,
see
Burge,
1999;
Hornsby,
1989;


McDowell,
2005.


27
 See
 e.g.
 Dummett,
 1981;
 Frege,
 1918/1956;
 Higginbotham,
 2002;
 Peacocke,


1981,
1997.

28
Two
other
potential
grounds:
(i)
Transparency
embodies
a
controversial
stand


on
the
question
whether
understanding
an
utterance
requires
engaging
a
specific

thought
 expressed
 by
 the
 utterance,
 rather
 than
 a
 thought
 with
 the
 same

reference
 as
 the
 utterance;
 (ii)
 It
 is
 impossible
 transparently
 to
 understand
 an

utterance
 involving
 the
 expression
 of
 expletive
 concepts,
 or
 thick
 ethical

concepts,
that
one
cannot,
or
will
not,
think
with.

29
 Transparency
 is
 lost
 on
 some
 formulations
 of
 Davidson’s
 proposal.
 For

instance,
 one
 of
 Davidson’s
 formulations
 has
 it
 that
 ‘what
 somebody
 needs
 to

know
 is
 that
 some
 T­theory
 for
 L
 states
 that
 …
 (and
 here
 the
 dots
 are
 to
 be

replaced
by
a
T‐theory)’
(Davidson,
1976:
174).
If
that
were
all
somebody
knew,

then
 their
 knowledge
 would
 not
 amount
 to
 entertaining
 the
 thought
 expressed

by
a
target
utterance.
An
improved
formulation
would
add
the
requirement
that

somebody
 must
 know
 that
 …
 (and
 here
 the
 dots
 are
 to
 be
 replaced
 by
 the

appropriate
theorem
of
a
T­theory).

30
See
e.g.
McFarlane,
2003.


31
 This
 is
 to
 run
 together
 two
 aspects
 of
 the
 situation
 that
 might
 otherwise
 be


distinguished:
 (i)
 appreciation
 that
 u
 is
 true
 iff
 the
 thought
 one
 understands
 to

have
 been
 expressed,
 P,
 is
 true
 and
 (ii)
 appreciation,
 via
 transparency,
 that
 the

thought
one
understands
to
have
been
expressed,
P,
is
true
iff
P.

32
For
example,
one
might
have
apparently
reasonable
grounds
for
rejecting
the


general
validity
of
modus
ponens.
See
e.g.
McGee,
1985,
and
for
related
discussion

Williamson,
2003.

33
 The
 concern
 here
 is
 akin
 to
 that
 raised
 earlier
 about
 Burge’s
 account
 of

understanding.
 A
 version
 of
 the
 concern
 is
 developed
 in
 more
 detail
 in

Longworth,
2008b.



 33


























































34
To
reiterate,
these
are
not
disadvantages
of
Davidson’s
proposal
per
se,
for
that


proposal
 concerns
 the
 metaphysics
 of
 the
 expression
 of
 content
 and
 not
 our

modes
of
access
to
the
expression
of
content.

35
A
central
case
for
doubt
about
the
necessity
even
of
facility
with
a
concept
of


truth
 derives
 from
 reflection
 on
 the
 apparent
 possibility
 of
 uptake
 by
 small

children
who
plausibly
lack
facility
with
such
a
concept.
See
Soames,
1989,
2008;

Longworth,
2008a.

36
Cf.
Higginbotham,
1992.


37
 The
 most
 obvious
 case
 would
 be
 one
 in
 which
 a
 subject
 knew
 the
 bi‐
conditional
on
the
basis
of
knowing
the
truth
of
both
sides
of
the
bi‐conditional.

38
See
Foster,
1976.
See
also
Davidson,
1976;
Higginbotham,
1992;
Rumfitt,
1995;


Soames,
1989,
2008;
Wiggins,
1992.

39
 See
 also
 Moore’s
 proposal
 that
 understanding
 is
 (in
 general)
 ‘knowledge
 of


how
to
process
knowledge’
(Moore,
1997:
189).

40
See
also
Rumfitt
1995,
2001.


41
Rumfitt,
2005:
449–451.


42
Rumfitt,
2005:
433–437.


43
Rumfitt
is
under
no
illusion
about
this:
445.


44
 One
 suggestion
 here
 would
 be
 that
 analogues
 of
 (a)–(d)
 might
 be
 framed
 in


terms
of
a
capacity
to
exploit
connections
amongst
acceptance
(/rejection)
of
P

and
trust
(/distrust)
in
u.

45
Compare
the
earlier
discussion
of
the
residue
of
withholding
belief
in
what
one


takes
 in
 through
 understanding.
 On
 Rumfitt’s
 view,
 the
 residue
 would
 be

exhausted
by
awareness
of
the
instancing
of
sentence
types
in
utterances.

46
Rumfitt,
2005:
435.


47
 For
 instance,
 it
 is
 unlikely
 that
 you
 are
 now
 in
 a
 position
 to
 reconstruct
 the


sentence
to
which
this
note
is
appended,
despite
(I
hope)
having
understood
my

use
of
that
sentence.
See
Burge,
1999;
Hornsby,
2005.

48
 Alternatively,
 if
 one
 views
 the
 connections
 between
 sentence
 types
 and

thoughts
as
non‐contingent,
the
burden
will
shift
to
explaining
recognition
of
the

instancing
of
sentence
types
so
construed,
that
is
to
the
derivation
of
(a)–(d)
on

the
basis
of
knowledge
of
their
non‐contingent
sentential
analogues.
Notice
that



 34


























































the
pressure
is
increased
when
one
removes
the
simplifying
assumption
that
the

reason‐connections
 made
 available
 to
 one
 through
 understanding
 concern

utterances,
 rather
 than
 thing
 done
 by
 speakers.
 For
 it
 then
 becomes
 apparent

just
how
contingent
the
reason‐connections
are,
and
how
little
evidence
that
the

connections
 hold
 is
 typically
 available
 to
 ordinary
 auditors.
 For
 discussion
 of

issues
in
this
area,
see
Burge,
1999;
McDowell,
1994.

49
 The
 trade‐off
 between
 austerity
 of
 intake
 and
 extravagance
 of
 resources

required
 for
 uptake
 bears
 comparison
 with
 a
 similar
 situation
 in
 the
 theory
 of

perception.
 Consider,
 for
 example,
 the
 demands
 imposed
 on
 one’s
 ability
 to

attain
 propositional
 knowledge
 about
 ordinary
 objects
 by
 a
 sense‐data
 account

of
sensory
intake.





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