Al., Jimmy Martin, Menrado Allawan, Margarito: (G.R. No. 122728. February 13, 1997)
Al., Jimmy Martin, Menrado Allawan, Margarito: (G.R. No. 122728. February 13, 1997)
Al., Jimmy Martin, Menrado Allawan, Margarito: (G.R. No. 122728. February 13, 1997)
DECISION
MELO, J.:
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the
Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused
to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the
conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time
limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part
of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not
only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional
guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of
Right (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative
of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be
deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case
at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long
delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a
painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-
ranking government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double
standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the
five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn
statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly
did not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking
and grueling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the
preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and
alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial
legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years,
which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation
should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary
investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True but the absence of a
preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented
a device for setting back time.
Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman in the instant case has failed to
discharge its duty mandated by the Constitution "to promptly act on complaints
filed in any form or manner against public officials and employees of the
government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof."
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary duty. It is
nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters
involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or
discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already
taken in the exercise of either (Rules of Court in the Philippines, Volume III by
Martin, 4th Edition, page 233).
It is correct, as averred in the comment that in the performance of an official
duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed
by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other. However, this rule
admits of exceptions such as in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion,
manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority (Kant Kwong vs. PCGG, 156
SCRA 222, 232 [1987]).
Here, the Office of the Ombudsman, due to its failure to resolve the criminal
charges against petitioner for more than six years, has transgressed on the
constitutional right of petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of
the cases against him, as well as the Ombudsman's own constitutional duty to
act promptly on complaints filed before it. For all these past 6 years, petitioner
has remained under a cloud, and since his retirement in September 1994, he
has been deprived of the fruits of his retirement after serving the government
for over 42 years all because of the inaction of respondent Ombudsman. If we
wait any longer, it may be too late for petitioner to receive his retirement
benefits, not to speak of clearing his name. This is a case of plain injustice which
calls for the issuance of the writ prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to give DUE COURSE to the petition
and to GRANT the same. Ombudsman Cases No. MIN-3-90-0671, MIN-90-
0132, MIN-90-0133, MIN-90-0138, MIN-90-0188, MIN-90-0189, MIN-90-0190,
MIN-90-0191, and MIN-90-0192 are ordered DISMISSED. The Office of the
Ombudsman is further directed to issue the corresponding clearance in favor of
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Francisco, and Panganiban,
JJ., concur.