G.R. No.

177960 January 29, 2009

JEFFREY RESO DAYAP, Petitioner,

DECISION

Tinga, J.:

Before us is a petition for review1 on certiorari of the Decision2 dated 17 August 2006 and Resolution3 dated 25 April 2007 by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01179 entitled, Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa R. Sendiong, Elvie H. Sy and Dexie Duran v. Hon. Judge Cresencio
Tan and Jeffrey Reso Dayap.

The case had its origins in the filing of an Information 4 on 29 December 2004 by the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office, Sibulan, Negros Oriental,
charging herein petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap with the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and
Damage to Property. The pertinent portion of the information reads:

That at about 11:55 o’clock in the evening of 28 December 2004 at Brgy. Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive in a reckless and
imprudent manner a 10-wheeler cargo truck with plate number ULP-955, color blue, fully loaded with sacks of coconut shell, registered in the
name of Ruben Villabeto of Sta. Agueda Pamplona, Negros Oriental, thereby hitting an automobile, a Colt Galant with plate number NLD-379
driven by Lou Gene R. Sendiong who was with two female passengers, namely: Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, thus causing the instantaneous death
of said Lou Gene R. Sendiong, less serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy and extensive damage to the above-
mentioned Colt Galant which is registered in the name of Cristina P. Weyer of 115 Dr. V. Locsin St., Dumaguete City, to the damage of the heirs
of the same Lou Gene R. Sendiong and the other two offended parties above-mentioned.

An act defined and penalized by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

On 10 January 2005, before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan, Negros Oriental, petitioner was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to
the charge.5

On 17 January 2005, respondents Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa Sendiong and Dexie Duran filed a motion for leave of court to file an amended
information.6 They sought to add the allegation of abandonment of the victims by petitioner, thus: "The driver of the 10-wheeler cargo truck
abandoned the victims, at a time when said [Lou-Gene] R. Sendiong was still alive inside the car; he was only extracted from the car by the by-
standers."7

On 21 January 2005, however, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the motion to amend the information be
considered withdrawn.8 On 21 January 2003, the MTC granted the withdrawal and the motion to amend was considered withdrawn.9

Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded. Respondents testified for the prosecution. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner sought
leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted. Petitioner filed his Demurrer to Evidence10 dated 15 April 2005 grounded on the
prosecution’s failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he is criminally liable for reckless imprudence, to which respondents filed a
Comment11 dated 25 April 2005.

In the Order12 dated 16 May 2005, the MTC granted the demurrer and acquitted petitioner of the crime of reckless imprudence. The MTC found
that the evidence presented by respondents failed to establish the allegations in the Information. Pertinent portions of the order state:

An examination of the allegations in the information and comparing the same with the evidence presented by the prosecution would reveal that
the evidence presented has not established said allegations. The facts and circumstances constituting the allegations charged have not been
proven. It is elementary in the rules of evidence that a party must prove his own affirmative allegations.

xxxx

Nowhere in the evidence of the prosecution can this Court find that it was the accused who committed the crime as charged. Its witnesses have
never identified the accused as the one who has committed the crime. The prosecution never bothered to establish if indeed it was the accused
who committed the crime or asked questions which would have proved the elements of the crime. The prosecution did not even establish if
indeed it was the accused who was driving the truck at the time of the incident. The Court simply cannot find any evidence which would prove
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is the person responsible for it. There was no evidence on the allegation of the death of Lou
Gene R. Sendiong as there was no death certificate that was offered in evidence. The alleged less serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie
Duran and Elvie Sy were not also proven as no medical certificate was presented to state the same nor was a doctor presented to establish such
injuries. The alleged damage to the [C]olt [G]alant was also not established in any manner as no witness ever testified on this aspect and no
documentary evidence was also presented to state the damage. The prosecution therefore failed to establish if indeed it was the accused who was
responsible for the death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong and the injuries to Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, including the damage to the Colt Galant. The
mother of the victim testified only on the expenses she incurred and the shock she and her family have suffered as a result of the incident. But sad
to say, she could not also pinpoint if it was the accused who committed the crime and be held responsible for it. This Court could only say that the
prosecution has practically bungled this case from its inception.

xxxx

The defense furthermore argued that on the contrary, the prosecution’s [evidence] conclusively show that the swerving of vehicle 1 [the Colt
Galant] to the lane of vehicle 2 [the cargo truck] is the proximate cause of the accident. The court again is inclined to agree with this argument of
the defense. It has looked carefully into the sketch of the accident as indicated in the police blotter and can only conclude that the logical
explanation of the accident is that vehicle 1 swerved into the lane of vehicle 2, thus hitting the latter’s inner fender and tires. Exhibit "7" which is
a picture of vehicle 2 shows the extent of its damage which was the effect of vehicle 1’s ramming into the rear left portion of vehicle 2 causing
the differential guide of vehicle 2 to be cut, its tires busted and pulled out together with their axle. The cutting of the differential guide cause[d]
the entire housing connecting the tires to the truck body to collapse, thus causing vehicle 2 to tilt to its left side and swerve towards the lane of
vehicle 1. It was this accident that caused the swerving, not of [sic] any negligent act of the accused.

xxxx

Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two things—the fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of all the elements of the crime
for which the accused stands charged, and the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. Sad to say, the prosecution has miserably failed
to prove these two things. When the prosecution fails to discharge its burden of establishing the guilt of the accused, an accused need not even
offer evidence in his behalf.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the demurrer is granted and the accused JEFFREY RESO DAYAP is hereby acquitted for insufficiency of
evidence. The bail bond posted for his temporary liberty is also hereby cancelled and ordered released to the accused or his duly authorized
representative.

SO ORDERED.13

Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, 14 alleging that the MTC’s dismissal of the case was done without considering
the evidence adduced by the prosecution. Respondents added that the MTC failed to observe the manner the trial of the case should proceed as
provided in Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court as well as failed to rule on the civil liability of the accused in spite of the evidence presented.
The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Br. 32.

In the order15 dated 23 August 2005, the RTC affirmed the acquittal of petitioner but ordered the remand of the case to the MTC for further
proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. The RTC ruled that the MTC’s recital of every fact in arriving at its conclusions disproved the
allegation that it failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. The records also demonstrated that the MTC conducted the trial of
the case in the manner dictated by Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, except that the defense no longer presented its evidence after the MTC
gave due course to the accused’s demurrer to evidence, the filing of which is allowed under Sec. 23, Rule 119. The RTC however agreed that the
MTC failed to rule on the accused’s civil liability, especially since the judgment of acquittal did not include a declaration that the facts from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the RTC declared that the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and resolved to
remand the issue to the MTC. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan on accused’s acquittal is AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to
the court of origin or its successor for further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. No costs.

SO ORDERED.16

Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration of the RTC order, but these were denied for lack of merit in the order 17 dated 12 September
2005.

Respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals under Rule 42, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179. The appellate court
subsequently rendered the assailed decision and resolution. The Court of Appeals ruled that there being no proof of the total value of the
properties damaged, the criminal case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC and the proceedings before the MTC are

null and void. In so ruling, the appellate court cited Tulor v. Garcia (correct title of the case is Cuyos v. Garcia)18which ruled that in complex
crimes involving reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or physical injuries and damage to property, the jurisdiction of the court to take
cognizance of the case is determined by the fine imposable for the damage to property resulting from the reckless imprudence, not by the
corresponding penalty for the physical injuries charged. It also found support in Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the 1991
Rule 8 on Summary Procedure, which govern the summary procedure in first-level courts in offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence where the imposable fine does not exceed ₱10,000.00. As there was no proof of the total value of the property damaged and
respondents were claiming the amount of ₱1,500,000.00 as civil damages, the case falls within the RTC’s jurisdiction. The dispositive portion of
the Decision dated 17 August 2006 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by Us REMANDING the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial
Region, Branch 32, Negros Oriental for proper disposition of the merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.19

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision, 20 arguing that jurisdiction over the case is determined by the allegations in
the information, and that neither the 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure nor Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 can be the basis
of the RTC’s jurisdiction over the case. However, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in the Resolution
dated 25 April 2007.21 It reiterated that it is the RTC that has proper jurisdiction considering that the information alleged a willful, unlawful,
felonious killing as well as abandonment of the victims.

In the present petition for review, petitioner argues that the MTC had jurisdiction to hear the criminal case for reckless imprudence, owing to the
enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691,22 which confers jurisdiction to first-level courts on offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence. He asserts that the RTC could not have acquired jurisdiction on the basis of a legally unfiled and officially withdrawn
amended information alleging abandonment. Respondents are also faulted for challenging the MTC’s order acquitting petitioner through a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in lieu of an ordinary appeal under Rule 42.

The petition has merit. It should be granted.

The first issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that jurisdiction over the offense charged pertained to the RTC.

Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded with the case on the basis of the Information dated 29 December 2004 charging petitioner only with the
complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, less serious physical injuries and damage to property. The Court of Appeals
however declared in its decision that petitioner should have been charged with the same offense but aggravated by the circumstance of
abandonment of the victims. It appears from the records however that respondents’ attempt to amend the information by charging the aggravated
offense was unsuccessful as the MTC had approved the Provincial Prosecutor’s motion to withdraw their motion to amend the information. The
information filed before the trial court had remained unamended.23 Thus, petitioner is deemed to have been charged only with the offense alleged
in the original Information without any aggravating circumstance.

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who, by reckless imprudence, commits any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. When such
reckless imprudence the use of a motor vehicle, resulting in the death of a person attended the same article imposes upon the defendant the
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

The offense with which petitioner was charged is reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, less serious physical injuries and damage to
property, a complex crime. Where a reckless, imprudent, or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is
committed.24 Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article
3 as "acts or omissions punishable by law" committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa).25 Thus, the penalty imposable upon
petitioner, were he to be found guilty, is prision correccional in its medium period (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years) and maximum period
(4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years).

Applicable as well is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.26 When this case was filed on 29 December 2004,
Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 had already been amended by R.A. No. 7691. R.A. No. 7691 extended the jurisdiction of the first-
level courts over criminal cases to include all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of
fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties including those for civil liability. It explicitly states "that in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof." It follows that criminal cases
for reckless

imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods should fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC and not the
RTC. Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try the same pertained to the MTC and the RTC did not have original jurisdiction over the
criminal case.27 Consequently, the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly taken cognizance of the case and the proceedings before it were
valid and legal.

As the records show, the MTC granted petitioner’s demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of the offense on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the
same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused."28 Such dismissal of a criminal case
by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. 29 But while the
dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal, the same is still reviewable but only by certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. Thus, in such case, the factual findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the reviewing court, and the only legal basis to
reverse and set aside the order of dismissal upon demurrer to evidence is by a clear showing that the trial court, in acquitting the accused,
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment
void.30

Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC the petition for certiorari alleging that the MTC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the
case and failing to consider the evidence of the prosecution in resolving the same, and in allegedly failing to follow the proper procedure as
mandated by the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint. The
MTC’s conclusions were based on facts diligently recited in the order thereby disproving that the MTC failed to consider the evidence presented
by the prosecution. The records also show that the MTC correctly followed the procedure set forth in the Rules of Court.

The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the remand of the case of the matter of civil liability for the reception of
evidence.

We disagree with the Court of Appeals on directing the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings on the civil aspect, as well as with
the RTC in directing a similar remand to the MTC.

The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise
from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. 31 However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist32 or
where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.33

Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case
unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. 34 This is because when the accused
files a demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is
the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and
acquitting the accused, and set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for the
private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case.35

A scrutiny of the MTC’s decision supports the conclusion that the acquittal was based on the findings that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist and that petitioner did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him; hence, petitioner’s civil liability has
been extinguished by his acquittal. It should be noted that the MTC categorically stated that it cannot find any evidence which would prove that a
crime had been committed and that accused was the person responsible for it. It added that the prosecution failed to establish that it was petitioner
who committed the crime as charged since its witnesses never identified petitioner as the one who was driving the cargo truck at the time of the
incident. Furthermore, the MTC found that the proximate cause of the accident is the damage to the rear portion of the truck caused by the
swerving of the Colt Galant into the rear left portion of the cargo truck and not the reckless driving of the truck by petitioner, clearly establishing
that petitioner is not guilty of reckless imprudence. Consequently, there is no more need to remand the case to the trial court for proceedings on
the civil aspect of the case, since petitioner’s acquittal has extinguished his civil liability.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision dated 17 August 2006 and Resolution dated 25 April 2007 in CA-
G.R. SP. No. 01179 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated 16 May 2005 of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan, Negros Oriental in
Criminal Case No. 3016-04 granting the Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap of the offense charged therein is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174659 July 28, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

There are people who are simply incapable of feeling pity or compassion for others.

Ma. Teresa Basario must have felt a dagger deep in her heart when she lost her two-year old son, Christopher, two weeks before Christmas on
December 13, 1999. And again upon being reunited with him some 16 months later when he could neither recognize her nor remember who he
was.

Justice demands that those responsible for this cruel and agonizing separation of mother and child be punished to the full extent of the law.

At about 3:00 p.m. on December 13, 1999, Teresa went with Christopher and her elder sister Zenaida to a McDonald’s outlet in the KP Tower in
Juan Luna St., Binondo, Manila. Teresa and Christopher looked for a vacant table while Zenaida proceeded to order their food. Shortly after
Teresa took her seat, Christopher followed Zenaida to the counter. Barely had Christopher gone from his mother’s sight when she realized that he
had disappeared. She and her sister frantically looked for him inside and outside the premises of the fastfood outlet, to no avail. As their
continued search for the child was futile, they reported him missing to the nearest police detachment.

The following day, Teresa went to several TV and radio stations to inform the public of the loss of Christopher and to appeal for help and
information. Despite the publicity, however, Teresa received no word about Christopher’s whereabouts. Worse, pranksters were gleefully having
a field day aggravating her misery.

On February 25, 2001, Teresa received a call from a woman who sounded like a muslim. The caller claimed to have custody of Christopher and
asked for ₱30,000 in exchange for the boy.

On March 27, 2001, the same muslim-sounding woman called and instructed Teresa to get a recent photo of her son from the Jalal Restaurant at
the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. True enough, when Teresa went there, someone gave her a recent picture of Christopher. She then
contacted the mysterious woman through the cellphone number the latter had previously given her. When the woman instructed her to
immediately board a ship for Mindanao, Teresa reasoned that she had not raised the ransom money yet. They then agreed to conduct the pay off
in the morning of April 7, 2001 at Pitang’s Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.

Teresa sought the help of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). A team was formed and Police Officer (PO)3 1 Juliet
Palafox was designated to act as Teresa’s niece.

Together with the PAOCTF team, Teresa left for Mindanao on April 4, 2001. On April 7, 2001, they arrived in Iligan City and proceeded to the
designated meeting place.1awphi1

At around 8:30 a.m., while Teresa and PO3 Palafox were waiting at Pitang’s Carinderia, two women came. They were Raga Sarapida Mamantak
and Likad Sarapida Taurak. Mamantak approached Teresa and PO3 Palafox and asked who they were waiting for. Teresa replied that they were
waiting for a certain Rocma Bato, the name written at the back of the picture she received in Jalal Restaurant in Manila. She showed the photo to
Mamantak who stated that she knew Bato. Mamantak then told Teresa that she would ask a cousin of Bato if the latter was already in Kapatagan.
Mamantak turned to Taurak, supposedly the cousin of Bato. Taurak came near Teresa and PO3 Palafox and informed them that she had
Christopher. Taurak asked Teresa and PO3 Palafox to come with her but they refused. Taurak reluctantly agreed to leave Mamantak with them
while she fetched Christopher.

Several hours later, in the afternoon of the same day, Taurak returned and told Teresa that Christopher was in a nearby ice plant. She asked
Teresa to go with her but the latter insisted on their agreement that the boy be handed over at the carinderia. Taurak relented, left and came back
after several minutes with Christopher.

Upon seeing her son, Teresa cried and embraced him. However, the child was unmoved. He no longer recognized nor understood her for he could
only speak in the muslim dialect. When asked who he was, the boy gave a muslim name with "Taurak" as surname.

Mamantak and Taurak interrupted Teresa and demanded the ransom money. She answered that her niece had it and pointed to PO3 Palafox.
Thereafter, Mamantak and PO3 Palafox boarded a jeepney which was parked outside, under Taurak’s watchful eyes. Inside the jeepney, PO3
Palafox handed the ransom money to Mamantak. At this juncture, PO3 Palafox gave the pre-agreed signal and the PAOCTF team then closed in
and arrested Mamantak and Taurak.

Christopher relearned Tagalog after a month and gradually began to forget the incident. On the other hand, Teresa almost lost her sanity. At the
time Christopher was kidnapped, she was pregnant with her third child. The child, born very sickly, eventually died.

The sisters Mamantak and Taurak were charged with kidnapping for ransom under the following Information:

That on December 13, 1999 in Binondo, Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
carry away and deprive Christopher Basario, a two-year old minor of his liberty against his will for the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a
demand for ransom was made as a condition for his release amounting to THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱30,000.00) to the damage and
prejudice of Christopher Basario in said amount and such other amount as maybe awarded to him under the provisions of the Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Mamantak and Taurak pleaded not guilty when arraigned. After pre-trial, trial ensued and the parties presented their respective evidence.

In defense, Mamantak and Taurak denied the charges against them. Taurak testified that at the time and date of the alleged kidnapping, she was
peddling wares in Divisoria market, Manila. When she saw Christopher wandering about aimlessly, she talked to him but he did not seem to
understand her. She took the boy under her care and waited for someone to come for him. No one did. As it was already 7:00 p.m., she brought
the boy home with her to the Muslim Center in Quiapo.

The next day, she and her husband took the boy to the nearest police outpost but no one was there so they just brought the boy to their stall. They
opted to keep the boy until his parents could claim him.

On February 17, 2001, Taurak brought the child to Maganding, Sultan Kumander, Lanao del Sur. Sometime later, Teresa contacted her and asked
for Christopher’s picture for confirmation. It was at this point that Taurak arranged a meeting at Pitang’s Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del
Norte on April 7, 2001. She did not bring the boy at first as a precautionary measure. Only after confirming that Teresa was the boy’s mother did
she relinquish custody to her. However, she was shocked when members of the PAOCTF suddenly arrested her. She protested because she was
innocent. There were no charges against her nor was there a warrant for her arrest.

Mamantak corroborated her sister Taurak’s testimony. She claimed that she was at Nunungan, Lanao del Norte on December 13, 1999. At that
time, she did not know the exact whereabouts of Taurak who was in Manila and whom she had not seen for some time. They met again on April
7, 2001 at Pitang’s Carinderia but only by chance. She happened to be there when Taurak came. When Teresa arrived later, Taurak talked to her
and then left, returning after a few hours with Christopher whom Mamantak saw for the first time. Taurak told her that she had found the boy and
was returning him to his mother. Mamantak stayed in the carinderia all the while, waiting for her ride home at 4:00 p.m. She was stunned when
PAOCTF members suddenly arrested her and her sister as she had not committed any crime and there was no warrant for her arrest.

After evaluating the respective evidence of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision2 on November 30, 2004 finding Taurak and Mamantak
guilty as charged:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding both accused LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK and accused RAGA SARAPIDA
[MAMANTAK] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA No. 7659 and both are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Both accused are hereby jointly and severally ordered to pay the Christopher
Basario represented by the mother, [Ma.] Teresa Basario the amount of PHP50,000.00 as compensatory damages and PHP50,000.00 as moral
damages. With costs against the accused.

Both accused are given credit for the preventive imprisonment undergone by them during the pendency of this case.
SO ORDERED.3

Taurak and Mamantak appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a decision4 dated March 31, 2006, the appellate court ruled that the trial court erred in
not considering the demand for ₱30,000 as a demand for ransom. Such circumstance required the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, the
appellate court affirmed the conviction of Taurak and Mamantak with modification amending the penalty from reclusion perpetua to
death.5 Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court certified the case to this Court
and accordingly ordered the elevation of the records.6

We affirm the Court of Appeals, with a modification of penalty.

Kidnapping is defined and punished under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (RA) 7659:

ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive
him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have
been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed.

The crime has the following elements:

(1) the offender is a private individual; not either of the parents of the victim 7 or a public officer who has a duty under the law to
detain a person;8

(2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty;

(3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal and

(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than
three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped
or detained or threats to kill him are made or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public official.

If the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of
extorting ransom, the duration of his detention becomes inconsequential. The crime is qualified and becomes punishable by death even if none of
the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is present. 9

The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it.10 It
includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time.11 And
liberty is not limited to mere physical restraint but embraces one’s right to enjoy his God-given faculties subject only to such restraints necessary
for the common welfare.12

The two-year-old Christopher suddenly disappeared in Binondo, Manila and was recovered only after almost 16 months from Taurak and
Mamantak (both of them private individuals) in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte. During the entire time the boy was kept away from his mother, he
was certainly deprived or restrained of his liberty. He had no means, opportunity or capacity to leave appellants’ custody and return to his family
on his own. He had no choice but to stay with total strangers, go with them to a far away place and learn a culture and dialect alien to him. At
such a very tender age, he was deprived of the liberty to enjoy the company and care of his family, specially his mother.

Taurak unlawfully kept the child under her control and custody and even brought him to Lanao del Norte. She demanded ₱30,000 in exchange for
his return to his mother. On the other hand, Mamantak’s actions (e.g., her presence in the carinderia and her acceptance of the ransom) showed
without doubt that she was aiding her sister and was acting in concert with her. These were the identical factual findings of both the trial and
appellate courts. There is no reason to disturb them as they are sufficiently supported by evidence.

Taurak’s story that she merely gave Christopher refuge was incredible. It was like the apocryphal tale of a man accused of theft of large cattle; his
excuse was that he saw a piece of rope and brought it home not knowing that there was a cow tied to the other end. She never even tried to bring
the boy to the proper authorities or surrender him to the Department of Social Welfare and Development’s social workers in her barangay or in
the city hall at any time during the 16 months he was with her. And how could Teresa have initiated her phone conversations with Taurak when
they were total strangers to each other?

Similarly, Mamantak’s account that she was at Pitang’s Carinderia only by coincidence and that it was only there that she first saw Christopher
invites nothing but disbelief. The unequivocal testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on her role in arranging for the payment of ransom and the
release of the kidnap victim (e.g., confirming the identity of Teresa and demanding and receiving the ransom money) showed otherwise. The
evidence clearly established that Mamantak was a principal in the kidnapping of Christopher.

Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself. 13The trial and appellate courts
correctly ruled that the statements of Taurak and Mamantak did not deserve credence. Moreover, factual findings of the trial court, including its
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight thereof, are accorded great, if not conclusive, value when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.14

The Court of Appeals considered the demand for ₱30,000 as a qualifying circumstance which necessitated the imposition of the death penalty. On
the other hand, the trial court deemed the amount as too measly, compared to what must have been actually spent for the care and subsistence of
Christopher for almost two years. It therefore treated the amount not as ransom but as a reimbursement of expenses incurred for taking care of the
child. (Kidnappers in Mindanao today call it reimbursement for "board-and-lodging.")

Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person that will release him from captivity.15 No
specific form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a bargaining chip in
exchange for the victim’s freedom.16 The amount of and purpose for the ransom is immaterial.

In this case, the payment of ₱30,000 was demanded as a condition for the release of Christopher to his mother. Thus, the Court of Appeals
correctly considered it as a demand for ransom.

One final point of law. While the penalty for kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code17 is death, RA 934618 has banned the death penalty and reduced all death sentences to reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole. Pursuant to this law, we reduce the penalty imposed on appellants from death to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for
parole.

In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the award of ₱50,000 civil indemnity19 was proper. Pursuant to People v.Garalde,20 the award of
₱50,00021 moral damages is increased to ₱200,000 considering the minority of Christopher. Moreover, since the crime was attended by a demand
for ransom, and by way of example or correction, Christopher is entitled to ₱100,000 exemplary damages. 22

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The March 31, 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00729
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak are hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom for which they are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole. They are further ordered to pay, jointly and severally, ₱50,000 civil indemnity, ₱200,000 moral damages and ₱100,000
exemplary damages to their young victim Christopher Basario.

Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 165732 December 14, 2006

SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC., and ADMER PAJARILLO, petitioners,

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. (Safeguard) and Admer Pajarillo (Pajarillo) assailing the
Decision1 dated July 16, 2004 and the Resolution2 dated October 20, 2004 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77462.

On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her
time deposit per advise of the bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding
permit to carry the same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her
firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen
instantly causing her death.

Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved
their right to file a separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its
Decision dated January 19, 2000.3 On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with modification as to the penalty in a Decision 4 dated
July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was made on August 25, 2001.

Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint 5 for damages against Pajarillo for
negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage
committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In their Answer,6 petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangeline's death was not due to Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted only in
self-defense. Petitioners set up a compulsory counterclaim for moral damages and attorney's fees.

Trial thereafter ensued. On January 10, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision,7 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, the heirs of Evangeline Tangco, and against defendants Admer
Pajarillo and Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. ordering said defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the following:

1. ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS (P157,430.00), as actual damages

2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as death indemnity;

3. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral damages;

4. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00), as exemplary damages;

5. THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), as attorney's fees; and

6. costs of suit.

For lack of merit, defendants' counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. 8

The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillo's claim that he merely acted in self-defense. It gave no credence to
Pajarillo's bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to the shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to
the head office and the police authorities. The RTC further ruled that being the guard on duty, the situation demanded that he should have
exercised proper prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo
had already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to proffer proof negating liability in the instant
case.

The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded that
Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that
Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply showed that it
required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only
the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons and property, for the guidance of their servants and employees,
but also the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.

Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On July 16, 2004, the CA issued its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Safeguard Security
Agency, Inc.'s civil liability in this case is only subsidiary under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. No pronouncement as to costs. 9

In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil liability arising from felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had
been found guilty of Homicide in a final and executory judgment and is said to be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly
liable under the provisions of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely
dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense charged and no other; that this is also the civil liability that is deemed
extinguished with the extinction of the penal liability with a pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action might proceed does not exist;
that unlike in civil liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the employment and supervision of
employees is inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
the liability of an employer for the civil liability of their employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.

Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in a Resolution dated October 20, 2004.

Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with the following assignment of errors, to wit:

The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding petitioner Pajarillo liable to respondents for the payment of damages and
other money claims.
 The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it applied Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code in holding petitioner Safeguard
solidarily [sic] liable with petitioner Pajarillo for the payment of damages and other money claims.

The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to find that petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, hence, should be excused from any liability.10

The issues for resolution are whether (1) Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline; and (2) Safeguard should be held solidarily
liable for the damages awarded to respondents.

Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by respondents is based on culpa aquiliana under Article 217611 of the Civil Code, in which case, its
liability is jointly and severally with Pajarillo. However, since it has established that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of Pajarillo, it should be exonerated from civil liability.

We will first resolve whether the CA correctly held that respondents, in filing a separate civil action against petitioners are limited to the recovery
of damages arising from a crime or delict, in which case the liability of Safeguard as employer under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal
Code12 is subsidiary and the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employee is not available to it.

The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only subsidiary.

The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, to wit:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute
it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and in fact filed the same on January 14, 1998.

The CA found that the source of damages in the instant case must be the crime of homicide, for which he had already been found guilty of and
serving sentence thereof, thus must be governed by the Revised Penal Code.

We do not agree.

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex
delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission
complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under
Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action
independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the
offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission or under both causes.13

It is important to determine the nature of respondents' cause of action. The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting the cause of action.14 The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the
party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. 15

The pertinent portions of the complaint read:

7. That Defendant Admer A. Pajarillo was the guard assigned and posted in the Ecology Bank – Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, who
was employed and under employment of Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. hence there is employer-employee relationship between co-
defendants.

The Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. failed to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage to herein plaintiffs.

8. That defendant Admer Pajarillo upon seeing Evangeline Tangco, who brought her firearm out of her bag, suddenly without
exercising necessary caution/care, and in idiotic manner, with the use of his shotgun, fired and burst bullets upon Evangeline M.
Tangco, killing her instantly. x x x

xxxx
 16. That defendants, being employer and the employee are jointly and severally liable for the death of Evangeline M. Tangco.16

Thus, a reading of respondents' complaint shows that the latter are invoking their right to recover damages against Safeguard for their vicarious
responsibility for the injury caused by Pajarillo's act of shooting and killing Evangeline under Article 2176, Civil Code which provides:

ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals,17 we held:

x x x Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are
voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:

"x x x Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal
in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed,
if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in
Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal
case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in
reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law." (Emphasis
supplied)

The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability of Pajarillo in the criminal case but one based on culpa
aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from crime. 18 The source of the obligation sought to be
enforced in the civil case is a quasi-delict not an act or omission punishable by law.

In Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera,19 where the issue involved was whether the civil action filed by plaintiff-appellants is founded on crime or on
quasi-delict, we held:

x x x The trial court treated the case as an action based on a crime in view of the reservation made by the offended party in the
criminal case (Criminal Case No. 92944), also pending before the court, to file a separate civil action. Said the trial court:

It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident of May 10,
1969 constituted a quasi-delict. The Court cannot accept the validity of that assumption. In Criminal Case No. 92944 of this Court,
plaintiffs had already appeared as complainants. While that case was pending, the offended parties reserved the right to institute a
separate civil action. If, in a criminal case, the right to file a separate civil action for damages is reserved, such civil action is to be
based on crime and not on tort. That was the ruling in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964.

We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court is inapplicable to the instant case x x x.

xxxx

In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime
under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party
chooses the latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee, subject to the employer's defense
of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family.

In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants reserved
their right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action
for quasi-delict.20 (Emphasis supplied)

Although the judgment in the criminal case finding Pajarillo guilty of Homicide is already final and executory, such judgment has no relevance or
importance to this case.21 It would have been entirely different if respondents' cause of action was for damages arising from a delict, in which
case the CA is correct in finding Safeguard to be only subsidiary liable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. 22

As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents' cause of action is based on quasi-delict. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
when the injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of
the master or the employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in the supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of
the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, it is incumbent upon petitioners to prove that they exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.

We must first resolve the issue of whether Pajarillo was negligent in shooting Evangeline.

The issue of negligence is factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact, which, as a general rule, we cannot pass
upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law.23 Generally, factual findings of the trial court,
affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. The established exceptions are: (1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) when the
CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on
record. [24]

A thorough review of the records of the case fails to show any cogent reason for us to deviate from the factual finding of the trial court and
affirmed by the CA that petitioner Pajarillo was guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline.

Respondents' evidence established that Evangeline's purpose in going to the bank was to renew her time deposit. 25On the other hand, Pajarillo
claims that Evangeline drew a gun from her bag and aimed the same at him, thus, acting instinctively, he shot her in self-defense.

Pajarillo testified that when Evangeline aimed the gun at him at a distance of about one meter or one arm's length 26he stepped backward, loaded
the chamber of his gun and shot her.27 It is however unimaginable that petitioner Pajarillo could still make such movements if indeed the gun was
already pointed at him. Any movement could have prompted Evangeline to pull the trigger to shoot him.

Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in shooting Evangeline on his mere apprehension that Evangeline will stage a bank robbery.
However, such claim is befuddled by his own testimony. Pajarillo testified that prior to the incident, he saw Evangeline roaming under the fly
over which was about 10 meters away from the bank28 and saw her talking to a man thereat;29 that she left the man under the fly-over, crossed the
street and approached the bank. However, except for the bare testimony of Pajarillo, the records do not show that indeed Evangeline was seen
roaming near the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. In fact, there is no evidence that Pajarillo called the
attention of his head guard or the bank's branch manager regarding his concerns or that he reported the same to the police authorities whose
outpost is just about 15 meters from the bank.

Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of the bank, she could have already apprised herself that Pajarillo, who was posted
outside the bank, was armed with a shotgun; that there were two guards inside the bank30manning the entrance door. Thus, it is quite incredible
that if she really had a companion, she would leave him under the fly-over which is 10 meters far from the bank and stage a bank robbery all by
herself without a back-up. In fact, she would have known, after surveying the area, that aiming her gun at Pajarillo would not ensure entrance to
the bank as there were guards manning the entrance door.

Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself — such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony,
except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside
judicial cognizance.31

That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her gun before entering the bank and was actually in the act of pulling her gun from her bag when
petitioner Pajarillo recklessly shot her, finds support from the contentions raised in petitioners' petition for review where they argued that when
Evangeline approached the bank, she was seen pulling a gun from inside her bag and petitioner Pajarillo who was suddenly beset by fear and
perceived the act as a dangerous threat, shot and killed the deceased out of pure instinct;32 that the act of drawing a gun is a threatening act,
regardless of whether or not the gun was intended to be used against petitioner Pajarillo;33 that the fear that was created in the mind of petitioner
Pajarillo as he saw Evangeline Tangco drawing a gun from her purse was suddenly very real and the former merely reacted out of pure self-
preservation.34

Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of Evangeline is absent, Pajarillo's claim of self-defense cannot be accepted specially when such
claim was uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence other than his testimony which was even doubtful. Pajarillo's apprehension that
Evangeline will shoot him to stage a bank robbery has no basis at all. It is therefore clear that the alleged threat of bank robbery was just a
figment of Pajarillo's imagination which caused such unfounded unlawful aggression on his part.

Petitioners argue that Evangeline was guilty of contributory negligence. Although she was a licensed firearm holder, she had no business bringing
the gun in such establishment where people would react instinctively upon seeing the gun; that had Evangeline been prudent, she could have
warned Pajarillo before drawing the gun and did not conduct herself with suspicion by roaming outside the vicinity of the bank; that she should
not have held the gun with the nozzle pointed at Pajarillo who mistook the act as hold up or robbery.

We are not persuaded.

Safeguard contends that it cannot be jointly held liable since it had adequately shown that it had exercised the diligence required in the selection
and supervision of its employees. It claims that it had required the guards to undergo the necessary training and to submit the requisite
qualifications and credentials which even the RTC found to have been complied with; that the RTC erroneously found that it did not exercise the
diligence required in the supervision of its employee. Safeguard further claims that it conducts monitoring of the activities of its personnel,
wherein supervisors are assigned to routinely check the activities of the security guards which include among others, whether or not they are in
their proper post and with proper equipment, as well as regular evaluations of the employees' performances; that the fact that Pajarillo loaded his
firearm contrary to Safeguard's operating procedure is not sufficient basis to say that Safeguard had failed its duty of proper supervision; that it
was likewise error to say that Safeguard was negligent in seeing to it that the procedures and policies were not properly implemented by reason of
one unfortunate event.

We are not convinced.

Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.

xxxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

xxxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage.

As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by the former. Safeguard is presumed to
be negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee by operation of law. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily
showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee.

In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service records. 35 On
the other hand, due diligence in the supervision of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of
employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations
through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to
ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and
monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who
should regularly report on their supervisory functions.36 To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers
must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.

We agree with the RTC's finding that Safeguard had exercised the diligence in the selection of Pajarillo since the record shows that Pajarillo
underwent a psychological and neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by the St. Martin de Porres Center where no psychoses ideations were
noted, submitted a certification on the Pre-licensing training course for security guards, as well as police and NBI clearances.

The RTC did not err in ruling that Safeguard fell short of the diligence required in the supervision of its employee, particularly Pajarillo. In this
case, while Safeguard presented Capt. James Camero, its Director for Operations, who testified on the issuance of company rules and regulations,
such as the Guidelines of Guards Who Will Be Assigned To Banks, 37 Weapons Training,38 Safeguard Training Center Marksmanship Training
Lesson Plan,39Disciplinary/Corrective Sanctions,40 it had also been established during Camero's cross-examination that Pajarillo was not aware of
such rules and regulations.41 Notwithstanding Camero's clarification on his re-direct examination that these company rules and regulations are
lesson plans as a basis of guidelines of the instructors during classroom instructions and not necessary to give students copy of the same,42 the
records do not show that Pajarillo had attended such classroom instructions.

The records also failed to show that there was adequate training and continuous evaluation of the security guard's performance. Pajarillo had only
attended an in-service training on March 1, 1997 conducted by Toyota Sta. Rosa, his first assignment as security guard of Safeguard, which was
in collaboration with Safeguard. It was established that the concept of such training was purely on security of equipments to be guarded and
protection of the life of the employees.43
It had not been established that after Pajarillo's training in Toyota, Safeguard had ever conducted further training of Pajarillo when he was later
assigned to guard a bank which has a different nature of business with that of Toyota. In fact, Pajarillo testified that being on duty in a bank is
different from being on duty in a factory since a bank is a very sensitive area.44

Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangeline's act of just depositing her firearm for safekeeping, i.e., of immediately shooting her, confirms
that there was no training or seminar given on how to handle bank clients and on human psychology.

Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to show that there were inspectors who go around the bank two times a day to see the daily performance
of the security guards assigned therein, there was no record ever presented of such daily inspections. In fact, if there was really such inspection
made, the alleged suspicious act of Evangeline could have been taken noticed and reported.

Turning now to the award of damages, we find that the award of actual damages in the amount P157,430.00 which were the expenses incurred by
respondents in connection with the burial of Evangeline were supported by receipts. The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of
Evangeline is likewise in order.

As to the award of moral damages, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the spouse, legitimate children and illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Moral damages are awarded
to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by
reason of the defendant's culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus it must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted.45 The intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of
affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender. 46

In this case, respondents testified as to their moral suffering caused by Evangeline's death was so sudden causing respondent Lauro to lose a wife
and a mother to six children who were all minors at the time of her death. In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,47 we awarded one million pesos as moral
damages to the heirs of a seventeen-year-old girl who was murdered. In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,48 we likewise
awarded the amount of one million pesos as moral damages to the parents of a third year high school student and who was also their youngest
child who died in a vehicular accident since the girl's death left a void in their lives. Hence, we hold that the respondents are also entitled to the
amount of one million pesos as Evangeline's death left a void in the lives of her husband and minor children as they were deprived of her love and
care by her untimely demise.

We likewise uphold the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P300,000.00. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages
are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. 49 It is
awarded as a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. In quasi-delict, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence.50

Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may be recovered when, as in the instant case, exemplary damages are awarded.
Hence, we affirm the award of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil liability of petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.
is SOLIDARYand PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178115 July 28, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

JOJO SUMILHIG, RICARDO SUMILHIG alias CARDING SUMILHIG, and PASOT SALOLI, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated July 28, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00187-MIN, which affirmed
with modifications the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) conviction 2 of appellants Jojo Sumilhig (Jojo), Ricardo Sumilhig alias Carding Sumilhig
(Carding), and Pasot Saloli (Pasot) in Criminal Case No. 3(99).

Factual Antecedents

Appellants, together with the accused Eric Enoc, Warlito Montibon and Cio Limama, were charged with double murder and double frustrated
murder in an Amended Information,3 the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about October 31, 1998, inthe Municipality of Kiblawan, Province of Davao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, armed with assortedfirearms, with intent to kill
with treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, simultaneously strafe the house of Eugenio
Santander resulting to death of [Cresjoy] Santander and RollySantander and seriously wounding Marissa Santander and Micel Santander, which
would have caused their death had there been no timely and able medical assistance rendered to them, to the damage and prejudice of the
offended parties.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Only Jojo, Carding and Pasot, who entered separate pleas of "not guilty" during their arraignment, 5 faced trial. The other accused could not be
located and remain at-large to this day.

Factual Antecedents
The prosecution established that onOctober 31, 1998, at around 6:30 p.m., Jerry Masaglang (Jerry), together with Eugenio Santander (Eugenio)
and his son Mario, were in the living room of Eugenio’s house in SitioOverland, Kimlawis, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. Suddenly, they heard gun
bursts and saw six persons firing at the kitchen where members of the Santander family werehaving dinner. Jerry and Mario recognized the
assailants to be the appellants and their co-accused.

The strafing of the kitchen lasted for about two minutes. Before the gunmen dispersed, Jojo shouted, "At last, I have retaliated!" In the aftermath,
the children of Eugenio’s other son Remegio6 Santander (Remegio), 3-year old Cresjoy,7 8-year old Rolly, and teeners Marissa and Micel,
sustained gunshot wounds. Unfortunately, Cresjoy expired while on the way to the hospital while Rolly was pronounced dead-on-arrival. Marissa
sustained gunshot wounds atthe right breast area and left wrist, while Micel was wounded inthe left sternal area and elbow.

Jojo denied involvement in the incident and interposed the defense of alibi. At the time of the incident, he claimed to be in the house of his
parents-in-law in SitioOlogo-o, BarangayTacub, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. He further asserted that it was impossible for him to be at the scene of
the crime on October 31, 1998 since he could not walk briskly due to a gunshot wound he earlier sustained in his left knee and anus. He
maintained that it was only in January 1999 that he was able to walk without the aid of crutches. However, Jojo admitted harboring ill-will
against the Santander clan since he believed that they were the ones responsible for the massacre of his family in February 1998.

Carding, for his part, claimed to be illiterate and unaware of the incident. He contended that at the time of the shooting, he was in Dalmandang,
Tacub, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur, which is four-hours walk away from the crime scene. Pasot, on the other hand, maintained that he was withhis
wife at the house of Pablo Mot in Lampara, Balasiao, Kiblawan, Davao atthe time the crime was committed. Bothclaimed total ignoranceof the
incident.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC convicted the appellants ofthe complex crime of double murder and double frustrated murder and sentenced them to suffer the penalty
of death. It further ordered them to indemnify, jointlyand severally, the heirs of Cresjoy and Rolly the sum of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, and
the surviving victims, Marissa and Micel, the sums of ₱50,000.00 and ₱30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, respectively. 8

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the CA did not find any reason to disturb the findings of the RTC. However, it found merit in appellants’ argument that the crime
committed could not have been a complex crime since the death and injuries complained of did not result from a single act but from several and
distinctacts of shooting. And as treachery was alleged in the Amended Information and sufficiently proven during trial, appellants should be
convicted instead of two counts of murder and two counts of frustrated murder. Thus, in rendering its Decision 9 dated July 28, 2006, the CA
disposed ofthe case as follows:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of appellants Jojo Sumilhig, Alias Carding Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli is affirmed butmodified as
follows –

Appellants Juan "Jojo" Sumilhig, Alias Carding Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli, are found guilty beyondreasonable doubt of:

a. Murder for killing Crisjoy Santander, and x x x are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;

b. Murder for the killing of Rolly Santander, and x x x are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;

c. Frustrated Murder for the shooting of Marissa Santander and x x x are sentenced to suffer an imprisonment ofsix (6) years, four (4)
months and [ten] (10) days of prision mayoras minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporalas maximum; d. Frustrated Murder for the shooting of Micel Santander and x x x are sentenced to suffer an imprisonment
ofsix (6) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayoras minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and twenty
(20) days of reclusion temporalas maximum. All accused are ordered to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Crisjoy Santander
and Rolly Santander the sum of ₱100,000.00 and the surviving victims Marissa Santander and Micel Santander ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.10

Hence, this appeal.

Since there is no more dispute that appellants should not have been convicted of the complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder as the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) already concedes to the same, 11 the only error left from those raised by appellants in their brief is as
follows:
GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY, THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT CONSPIRACY WAS PRESENT AND INFINDING THAT THE CRIMES COMMITTED WERE MURDER AND FRUSTRATED
MURDER.12

It must be noted at the outset that Carding diedon June 24, 2011 during the pendency of this appeal.13 "[I]n view of [this] supervening event, it is
unnecessary for the Court to rule on [Carding’s] appeal. Whether x x x he was guilty of the [crimes] charged has becomeirrelevant since,
following Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, x x x, even assuming [that Carding] had incurred any criminal liability, it was totally
extinguished by his death. Moreover, because [the] appeal was still pending and no final judgment of conviction had been rendered against him
[before] he died, his civil liability arising from the crime, being civil liability ex delicto,was likewise extinguished by his death."14

Appellants’ Arguments

Appellants claim that the RTC erred in relying heavily on the ill-feelings and vendetta Jojo harbored against the Santander family. They contend
that this motive for committing the crime is not a substitute for proof beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, Jojo’salibi that it was impossible for
him to be at the crime scene due to the gunshot wounds in his knee and anus is amply corroborated by a medical prognosis.

Anent Pasot, appellants argue that although the trial court found his claim of total ignorance on almost about everything to beincredulous, still,
his conviction must not rest on the weakness of his defense but on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence.

Appellants likewise question the finding of conspiracyand treachery.

Our Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

True, the RTC noted in its Decision the existence of motive on the part of Jojo for committing the crime as well as Pasot’s incredulous claim of
ignorance on almost about everything. It is well to note, however, that the said court neither based the appellants’ conviction on the existence of
such motive nor on Pasot’s weak defense of ignorance alone, but upon the prosecution witnesses’ identification of appellants as the assailants,
viz:

Assessing the evidence presented by both [P]rosecution and defense, we see a less than glaring hint of vendetta. As part of his defense, the
accused Jojo Sumilhig narrated that his family was massacred by Jerry Santander, brother of Remigio Santander [in] February 1998. Short of
admitting the crime, Sumilhig stated that because of this, he harbored ill feelings not only against Jerry and Carlos Santander but also against
their family. Thus a clear motive for killing the Santander family has been established giving credence to prosecution witnesses’ allegation that
after the strafing Jojo Sumilhig shouted"Nakabalos na ko!" The likelihood of his intention to wipe out the said family became even more
apparent.

Despite his positive assertion that it was the Santanders that killed his family, he did not file any case against them. It was only after he was
arrested that he filed a complaint against Jerry and Carlos Santander.

His alibi likewise failed to meet the stringent requisites of the Rules. Even as Dr. Quirapas appeared determined to rule out the possibility that he
could walk without crutches five months after his discharge, the same was based on general medical prognosis. Such prognostication admits
certain exception[s], as could be gleaned from the testimony of the doctor himself that the healing period may vary depending on the age and
physical condition of the patient. Notably Jojo Sumilhig was then 23 years old.

What was certain was the positive identification made by Jerry Masaglang and Remegio Santander of all of the accused.

The "overkill" by which the accused Pasot Saloli and Carding Sumilhig claimed total ignorance of almost anything only served to arouse
incredulity. Both accused claimed they could not read, write, tell time, day, month or year. Neither could [they] allegedly speak [or] understand
Visayan, which is of common knowledge to be widely spoken in almost every part of Mindanao. Saloli claimed he did not know what day [it]
was when he was testifying, or the day before and after that. Both claimed they did not know the complainants or of the massacre that took place.

xxxx

More importantly, these claims [of] utter ignorance are belied by the evasiveness by which all three accused answered in obvious effort to avoid
criminal responsibility. Behind the façade of ignorance and lack of education lurks a calculating mind. We find [it] difficult to ascribe innocence
to the accused when traces of ingenuity and craftiness characterize their testimonies.
All these observations however become insignificant in the face of the positive and spontaneous identification of the assailants/accused by
credible witnesses Jerry Masaglang and Remigio Santander.15

There is no reason to doubt Jerry and Mario’s identification of the appellants considering that (1) Jerry was just six meters away from them;16 (2)
the moon was bright and Jerry was familiar with all the accused as most of them are his relatives; 17 and, (3) Mario knows Jojoever since he was
small.18 Besides, "[t]ime-tested is the rulethat between the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of the accused,
the former undisputedly [deserve] more credence and [are] entitled to greater evidentiary weight." 19

Anent the respective alibis interposed by appellants, suffice it to say that "[a]libi cannot prevail over the positive identification of a credible
witness."20

There was conspiracy among the accused.

"[C]onspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it."21 It is not
necessary to adduce evidence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. 22"Conspiracy may be shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced
from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such leadto a joint
purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest."23

Here, there is no proof of a previous agreement among the accused but there is a series of events that clearly established conspiracy among them.
First, they were all armed with firearms. Second, they surreptitiously approached the crime scene. Third, when they were within close range of
the intended victims, they simultaneously discharged their firearms. Fourth, they ceased firing at the same time and fled together. Undoubtedly,
their acts before, during and immediately after strafing the house of Eugenio evince their unanimity in design, intent and execution.24 Treachery
attended the commission of the crime.

"There is treachery whenthe offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods orforms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure the execution, without risk to himself arising from [any] defense which the offended party might
make."25

Treachery is evident in this case as the suddenness and unexpectedness of the assault deprived the victims of an opportunity to resist it or offer
any defense of their persons. This is considering that the victims were unaware that they would be attacked by appellants with a hailof bullets
from their firearms fired at close range. Indeed, "[t]he suddenness of the attack, without the slightest forewarning thereof, placed the [victims] x x
x in such a position that they could not have defended themselvesfrom the aggression x x x."26

The crime committed is two counts of

As earlier discussed, treachery attendedthe commission of the crime. This qualifies the killing of Cresjoy and Rolly to murder.

With regard to Marissa and Micel, the Court notes that while the RTC was silent as to the nature of injuries sustained by them, the CA correctly
ruled on the seriousness thereof. The Medico Legal report of Marissa shows that she suffered multiple gunshot wounds in her right breast and left
wrist27 while the Certificate of Treatment/Confinement of Micel states that she sustained gunshot wounds in the area of the sternum and
elbow.28As aptly found by the CA, the girls would have died if not for the timely medical attention provided to them. The crimes committed by
the appellants against them were thus frustrated murders.

The Penalty

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetuato death.1âwphi1With both penalties being
indivisible and there being no aggravating circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the lower of the two penalties which
is reclusion perpetua was properly imposed by the CA on appellants for each count of murder. 29 However, appellants are not eligible for parole.30

As regards the frustrated murders of Marissa and Micel, the penalty lesser by one degree shall be imposed on appellants. 31 Accordingly, the
penalty that must be imposed is reclusion temporalfor each count of frustrated murder. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and in the
absence of modifying circumstances other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium
period of reclusion temporal, which has a range of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayorin any of its periods, the range of which
is from six (6) years,one (1) day to twelve (12)years. The prison term imposed by the CA on appellants must therefore be modified to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayoras minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporalas maximum,
which is within these ranges,32 for each count of frustrated murder.

Awards of Damages
For the murders of Cresjoy and Rolly, the CA correctly held that their heirs are entitled to an award of civil indemnity, however, the amount of
the award must be ₱75,000.00 for each death pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. 33 The awards of moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00
each and exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 each are proper.34 In addition, the heirs of the victims are entitled to temperate
damages in the sum of ₱25,000.00 for each death in lieu of actual damages. 35

For the frustrated murders of Marissa and Micel, the awards of moral and exemplary damages by the CA must be decreased to ₱40,000.00 and
₱20,000.00, respectively for each victim.36 They are likewise entitled to temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 each in lieu of actual
damages.37

All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annumfrom the date of finality of thisjudgment until fully paid. 38

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 00187-MIN which affirmed withmodification the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of DigosCity, Davao del Sur, Branch 19, finding appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of two counts of murder and two counts offrustrated murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONSas follows:

For the murders of Cresjoy Santander and Rolly Santander:

(1) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli shall suffer the prison tenn of reclusion perpetua for each count of murder without
eligibility for parole;

(2) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli shall pay the heirs of the victims the amount of ₱5,000.00 as civil indemnity for the
death of each victim;

(3) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli shall pay the heirs of the victims ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages for each death.

For the frustrated murders of Marissa Santander and Micel Santander:

(1) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each
count of frustrated murder; and,

(2) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli are ordered to pay moral damages and exemplary damages to each of the victims in the
reduced amounts of ₱40,000.00 and ₱25,000.00, respectively.

All amounts of damages awarded shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum commencing from the date of finality of judgment until
fully paid.

Due to the death of Ricardo Swnilhig alias Carding Sumilhig prior to final judgment, his criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto as found
by the Regional Trial Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are extinguished. Consequently, Criminal Case No. 3(99) is ordered dismissed
insofar as Ricardo Sumilhig alias Carding Sumilhig is concerned.

Costs against appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 108395 March 7, 1997

HEIRS OF THE LATE TEODORO GUARING, JR., petitioners,

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 20,
which ordered respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, to pay various amounts in damages to petitioners, the
heirs of the late Teodoro Guaring, Jr.

This case arose from an unfortunate vehicular accident which happened on November 7, 1987, along the North Expressway in San Rafael,
Mexico, Pampanga. Involved in the accident were a Mitsubishi Lancer car driven by Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who died as a result of the mishap,
Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, driven by Angeles Cuevas, and a Toyota Cressida car, driven by Eligio Enriquez. The Mitsubishi Lancer was
heading north, at the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour. Following it was the Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, with Plate No. CVD-584. On the
other hand, the Toyota Cressida was cruising on the opposite lane, bound for Manila.

Petitioners, heirs of Teodoro Guaring, Jr., brought this action for damages, based on quasi delict, in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Their
evidence tended to show that the Rabbit bus tried to overtake Guaring's car by passing on the right shoulder of the road and that in so doing it hit
the right rear portion of Guaring's Mitsubishi Lancer. The impact caused the Lancer to swerve to the south-bound lane, as a result of which it
collided with the Toyota Cressida car coming from the opposite direction.

With Teodoro Guaring, Jr. in the Lancer, seated beside him in front, was Bonifacio Clemente. Riding in the Toyota Cressida driven by Sgt. Eligio
Enriquez was his mother, Dolores Enriquez, who was seated beside him. Seated at the back were his daughter Katherine (who was directly
behind him), his wife Lilian, and his nephew Felix Candelaria.

Killed in the collision were Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who was driving the Lancer, and Dolores Enriquez, who was riding in the Cressida, while
injured were Bonifacio Clemente and the occupants of the Toyota Cressida.

Private respondents, on the other hand, presented evidence tending to show that the accident was due to the negligence of the deceased Guaring.
They claimed that it was Guaring who tried to overtake the vehicle ahead of him on the highway and that in doing so he encroached on the south-
bound lane and collided with the oncoming Cressida of U.S. Air Force Sgt. Enriquez. Private respondents claim that as a result of the collision the
Lancer was thrown back to its lane where it crashed into the Rabbit bus.

On May 16, 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, at fault,
and holding them solidarily liable for damages to petitioners. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering the latter to pay
the former, jointly and severally, the sum of:

1. P500,000.00 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased Teodoro Guaring, Jr.;

2. P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;

3. P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and

4. Costs of suit.

From this judgment, private respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. appealed, contending:

1. The lower court erred in not finding that the proximate cause of the collision was Guaring's negligence in attempting to
overtake the car in front of him.

2. The lower court erred in not holding that PRBL exercised due diligence in the supervision of its employees.

3. The lower court erred in awarding the amount of P500,000.00 in favor of plaintiffs-appellees representing Guaring's loss
of earning capacity.

4. The lower court erred in awarding moral damages in favor of plaintiffs-appellees.

5. The lower court erred in awarding attorney's fees in favor of plaintiffs-appellees.

On December 16, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, setting aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in the civil
action for damages and dismissing the complaint against private respondents Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Cuevas, on the strength of a
decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court at San Fernando, Pampanga, in the criminal case, acquitting the bus driver Angeles Cuevas of
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and double homicide. The appellate court held that since the basis of petitioners' action was
the alleged negligence of the bus driver, the latter's acquittal in the criminal case rendered the civil case based on quasi delict untenable.

Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend that

[1] EVIDENCE IN ONE CASE IS INADMISSIBLE IN ANOTHER CASE AGAINST A PERSON NOT A PARTY IN
THE FIRST CASE AND TO HOLD OTHERWISE IS VIOLATIVE OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.
 [2] THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS WITHOUT FACTUAL FINDINGS AND DID NOT
RESOLVE SQUARELY THE ASSIGNED ERRORS AND IS THEREFORE A VOID JUDGMENT.

[3] ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE, WHETHER ON REASONABLE DOUBT OR NOT,
IS NO BAR TO THE PROSECUTION FOR DAMAGES BASED ON QUASI-DELICT.

The question is whether the judgment in the criminal case extinguished the liability of private respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and
its driver, Angeles Cuevas, for damages for the death of Teodoro Guaring, Jr. In absolving private respondents from liability, the Court of
Appeals reasoned:1

Since the appellee's civil action is predicated upon the negligence of the accused which does not exist as found by the trial
court in the said criminal case, it necessarily follows that the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case carries with it the
extinction of the civil responsibility arising therefrom. Otherwise stated, the fact from which the civil action might arise,
that is, the negligence of the accused, did not exist.

The finding in the criminal case that accused Cuevas was not negligent and the proximate cause of the accident was the act
of deceased Guaring in overtaking another vehicle ahead of him likewise exonerates PRB from any civil liability.

Although it did not say so expressly, the appellate court appears to have based its ruling on Rule 111, §2(b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which provides:

(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.

This provision contemplates, however, a civil action arising from crime, whereas the present action was instituted pursuant to Art. 2176 of the
Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability based on quasi delict. Thus, in Tayag v. Alcantara,2 it was held:

. . . a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c), Section 3, Rule
111 [now Rule 111, §2(b)], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas
the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. .
..

It is noteworthy that the accident in that case also involved a Philippine Rabbit bus and that, as in this case, the acquittal of the bus driver was
based on reasonable doubt. We held that the civil case for damages was not barred since the cause of action of the heirs was based on quasi delict.

Again, in Gula v. Dianala it was held:3

Since the cause of action of plaintiffs-appellants is based on culpa aquiliana and not culpa criminal, thus precluding the
application of the exception in Sec. 3(c) of Rule 111 [now Rule 111, §2(b)], and the fact that it can be inferred from the
criminal case that defendant-accused, Pedro Dianala, was acquitted on reasonable doubt because of dearth of evidence and
lack of veracity of the two principal witnesses, the doctrine in Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113, will not find
application. In that case, the acquittal was not based on reasonable doubt and the cause of action was based on culpa
criminal, for which reason we held the suit for damages barred.

Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi delict, the acquittal of the bus driver will not bar recovery of damages because the
acquittal was based not on a finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held: 4

The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the
facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in
civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De
 Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious
mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and,
where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted
(Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623).

In the present case, the dispositive portion of the decision of the RTC in the criminal case reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court, entertaining reasonable doubt as to his guilt, the accused is hereby acquitted, of the offense of
reckless imprudence resulting to double homicide and damage to property as charged in the Information, without
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.5

It was thus error for the appellate court to skip the review of the evidence in this case and instead base its decision on the findings of the trial
court in the criminal case. In so doing, the appellate court disregarded the fact that this case had been instituted independently of the criminal case
and that petitioners herein took no part in the criminal prosecution. In fact this action was filed below before the prosecution presented evidence
in the criminal action. The attention of the Court of Appeals was called to the decision in the criminal case, which was decided on September 7,
1990, only when the decision of the trial court in this case was already pending review before it (the Court of Appeals).

The appellate court did not even have before it the evidence in the criminal case. What it did was simply to cite findings contained in the decision
of the criminal court. Worse, what the criminal court considered was reasonable doubt concerning the liability of the bus driver the appellate
court regarded as a categorical finding that the driver was not negligent and, on that basis, declared in this case that "the proximate cause of the
accident was the act of deceased Guaring in overtaking another vehicle ahead of him." The notion that an action for quasi delict is separate and
distinct from the criminal action was thus set aside.

This case must be decided on the basis of the evidence in the civil case. This is important because the criminal court appears to have based its
decision, acquitting the bus driver on the ground of reasonable doubt, solely on what it perceived to be the relative capacity for observation of the
prosecution and defense witnesses.6 The prosecution did not call Bonifacio Clemente to testify despite the fact that shortly after the accident he
gave a statement to the police, pinning the blame for the accident on the Philippine Rabbit bus driver. Indeed, the civil case involved a different
set of witnesses. Petitioners presented Eligio Enriquez who was driving the Cressida, and Bonifacio Clemente, who was a passenger in Guaring's
car. Thus, both had full view of the accident

It is unfair to bind petitioners to the result of the criminal action when the fact is that they did not take part therein. That the witnesses presented
on behalf of the petitioners are different from those presented by the prosecution should have brought home to the appellate court the fundamental
unfairness of considering the decision in the criminal case conclusive of the civil case.

Because the Court of Appeals did not consider the evidence in the civil case, this case should be remanded to it so that it may render another
decision in accordance with the law and the evidence. The issues raised by the petitioners are essentially factual and require the evaluation of
evidence, which is the function of the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. They cannot be decided in this
Court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals with instruction to
render judgment with reasonable dispatch in accordance with law and the evidence presented in Civil Case No. 88-43860.

SO ORDERED.