ERNEST HENRY MINING

High Wall and Rock Fall Management

2009

Tuesday, 5 May 2009

 OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION
ROCKFALL HAZARD MANAGEMENT AT EHM
• Challenges in a steep, deep pit
• Monitoring Techniques
• Radar as a critical monitoring tool
• Fully automated prism monitoring system
• Using all the available technology
CASE STUDIES
• How to manage a 1Mt rockfall
• Multiple bench scale failures
• Small Scale Rockfall Hazard Management
• Rockfall Risk Rating System
• Managing the statistics
 ERNEST HENRY

• Third largest copper deposit in Australia

• Large-scale open pit mining operation
• Ernest Henry Mine Pty Ltd (EHM) -100% Xstrata
• Approximately 600 employees based locally in
Cloncurry and FIFO from Townsville or Brisbane
 LOCATION

To Century Project

r
ve
Ri
To N rry
orth nc u
e rn T Lake C l o v er
errit Ri
o Julius
ry
MOUNT
Water
pipeline N
rdt
ROSE BEE

hh a
GEORGE FISHER
DUGALD RIVER
ERNEST HENRY
HILTON Leic BAR
KLY CLONCURRY Julia Creek
WAY
MOUNT ISA HIGH To Towns
vi lle
Mica Creek Power Station
NORQEB ELOISE
Transmission Line
LA
ND
Malbon SB
OR
OU
GH McKinlay
HI
GH
Gas pipeline W
Duchess AY

Kynuna

SELWYN
Dajarra PHOSPHATE HILL

CANNINGTON
To
W
int
on
Gas OSBORNE
pipeline
0 50 100 km
 PIT DESIGN

DESIGN PARAMETERS:
• Current Pit depth is 450m final depth >500m
• Inter ramp slope angle 65 degrees
• 12m mining benches
• Combination of single, double and triple stack benches
• Structurally complex
• 11 Geotechnical Domains
• High strength rock >80MPa
• Highly variable rock strength

SO FAR THIS YEAR:

• 146m3 Shotcrete
• 6004m cable bolts and shear pins
• 1786m short drainholes
• 3600m of long drainholes
COMPLEX GEOTECHNICAL
DOMAINS
 ISSUES

SLOPE/ BATTER SCALE INSTABILITY:

• Batter angle
• Pore pressure
• Structural control
• Weak rock mass

ROCK FALL RISK:

• Rock mass condition
• Weathering
• Unravelling
• Crest retention
 JOURNEY

Working group set up November 2007

Previous Site Visits to identify best practise:

• Marvel Loch, WA
• KCGM, WA
• Argyle, WA
• Savage River, TAS
 WORKING GROUP

OBJECTIVES AND TARGETS:

• Eliminate all Human rock fall interaction therefore eliminating the risk of serious injury
from rock fall
• Avoid disruption in the production process and potential crusher starvation as a result
of rock fall
• To provide status updates to management and employees on current and future
practises on rock fall management at EHM
• To ensure all EHM employees and contractors are fully informed of best practice
techniques with regard to rock falls and their duties
 WORKING GROUP

CONSISTS OF KEY STAKEHOLDERS FROM ALL AREAS, INCLUDING:

• Management
• Geotechnical Engineers
• Supervisors
• Surveyors
• Operations personnel
• Safety Reps
• Monthly meetings
• Identifies initiatives and actions
• Assigns accountability
• Monitors and tracks effectiveness
 COMMUNICATION &
AWARENESS

EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION IS CRITICAL:

• High wall risk management training is included
in orientation and induction training

• Safety Meeting presentations

• Comprehensive daily geotechnical input at

daily production meetings with regard to
rock fall risk areas

• Bollards, Geotechnical Exclusion zones

• High wall stickers – Do Not Park Under Highwall in

all vehicles
 AUDITS AND INSPECTIONS

HEALTH SAFETY & TRAINING PLAY

A PROACTIVE ROLE IN MANAGING
ROCKFALL RISKS:

• High wall risk management training

• Regular presentations to crews and

staff

• Weekly ‘high wall audits’ which include

participation from every department
to ensure compliance with high wall
safety procedures, exclusion zones,
vehicles, etc
ERNEST HENRY MINING

Slope Stability & Monitoring

2009

Tuesday, 5 May 2009

 RADAR MONITORING

• Utilising two Groundprobe SSR-X

radars to monitor all ‘high risk’
areas
• Radar monitoring is the preferred
method for wall displacement
monitoring.
• Provides continuous real time
monitoring
• Proven effectiveness in
mitigating risk associated with
slope scale rock mass failure
• Effectively used to manage risk
and identify multiple bench scale
failures at EHM
 RADAR MONITORING

BELOW:
SSR-X LONG RANGE RADAR

ABOVE:
SSR SLOPE STABILITY RADAR
 RADAR MONITORING

N
SSR-X LONG RANGE COVERAGE

• >800m Range

• High Resolution at long range

• Improved definition of
potential failures

SSR COVERAGE

• Short Range
• Contingency for critical monitoring
Inc
rea
s in
gd
isp
lac
e me
nt w
it h
tim
e
RADAR MONITORING

Displacement (mm)
 RADAR MONITORING

600t stage 8 South Wall

failure:
• This failure
occurred during critical
monitoring.
Accelerated • Failure was predicted
movement with correct exclusions
and procedures
followed.
• Radar shows movement
immediately before
failure

Radar performs a scan every 15-20mins at stage 8. One pixel is 8m2 and
accelerated movement is indicated by colour changes to the pixel
 RADAR MONITORING

South Wall acceleration

detected prior to 1Mt
failure August 2008
EHM OPEN PIT WALL
STABILITY
MANAGEMENT -TARP
EHM OPEN PIT WALL
STABILITY
MANAGEMENT -TARP
 FULLY AUTOMATED PRISM
MONITORING

EHM Employs ‘SOFT

ROCK SOLUTIONS’
Automated Slope
Monitoring System:
• 100% automated prism
monitoring system
• Use of ‘Autoslope’
application software
package to
electronically control
robotic total stations
• Quikslope software
manages data with
Autoslope to provide a
fully automated system
for prism displacement
monitoring
PRISM MONITORING
 PRISM MONITORING

EHM PRISM MONITORING SITE PROCEDURE:

• Daily Review of Quikslope:
• Each prism is reviewed daily for movement by the Geotechnical Engineer
• Movement of >2mm reported in daily Radar and Prism Monitoring Report
• If the system’s performance reads 0%, Survey shall be notified to check the
equipment.
• This check shall be completed within 12 hours of zero detection.

DETECTED PRISM MOVEMENT

• Prism movement cannot be considered authentic until a thorough review of all
graphical tools is complete
• The Geotechnical engineer or appointed personnel shall consult with Survey to
check the validity of the prism’s movement
• Field Check of Prism
• The Geotechnical engineer or appointed personnel shall conduct a field check to
ascertain the structure in which the prism is monitoring
• The Geotechnical engineer or appointed personnel shall closely monitor the prism
for the following 24 hours and then continue to monitor daily if there is no further
movement
 PRISM MONITORING

RECORD KEEPING AND RECORDING:

• If accelerated prism movement is detected the Geotechnical
Engineer shall conduct a risk assessment to determine the
appropriate controls to eliminate risk to mine personnel and
infrastructure.

• Notification of displacement >10mm will be by e-mail and

discussion at either the morning or afternoon production meeting

• All movement will be recorded into the Stability Spreadsheet and

per the EHM Ground Control Management Plan
 OTHER MONITORING
TECHNIQUES

WIRELINE EXTENSOMETES
• Connected to local alarm system
RESISTANCE WIRELINE EXTENSOMETERS
• Data collected with handheld readout device
PHOTOGRAPHIC RECORDS
• Used to record and compare the appearance
of wall sections over time
 STRUCTURAL MAPPING &
DATABASE
CONSOLIDATION
A comprehensive structural database exists for Ernest Henry Mine pit. A
structural geologist consultant was commissioned in 2005 and again in
January 2009 to audit the geotechnical structural database. As a result of this
the following actions were taken:

• Existing structural data consolidated and organised,

• Vulcan fault model wireframes updated,

• Sirovision mapping continuing,

• Ongoing pit wall mapping with implementation of a new mapping program,

• Geotechnical technicians have been trained in the use of Sirovision

 TECHNOLOGY

Sirovision is used in EHM Open Pit to model large scale structure in 3D

SIROVISION AND MAPTEK
ISITE SCANNING
SIROVISION AND MAPTEK
ISITE SCANNING
SIROVISION AND MAPTEK
ISITE SCANNING
 SIROVISION AND MAPTEK
ISITE SCANNING
Data collected is combined with hands-on pit wall mapping…
 SIROVISION AND MAPTEK
ISITE SCANNING
… Extrapolated and combined with
DDH data…
PIT MAPPING
DATABASE
 SIROVISION AND MAPTEK
ISITE SCANNING
… And interpreted to develop a mine wide structural database.
 MAPTEK ISITE SCANS

The data is consolidated and combined with

new data from Maptek ‘Isite’ scans for analysis
and assessment of risk associated with large Modelled fault
structures
scale wedge failure.
This information is also used to develop
remediation blasting designs post failure. Isite scan cross section

Shear pins -
reinforcement design

Planar/wedge failure
 MAPTEK ISITE SCANS

Combined use of
Sirovision, Maptek
Isite scanning
technology and
manual survey pick-
ups to design a
remedial blast and
additional rock
reinforcement
requirements
following a major
rockfall.
ERNEST HENRY MINING

South Wall Failure - Case Study

2009

Tuesday, 5 May 2009

 PREDICTIVE
MODELLING- 3DEC
FINITE ELEMENT MODEL
FACTOR OF SAFETY
DETERMINATION
 STAGE 7 SOUTH WALL
INSTABILITY

Area 1: Area 2:
- Rate of movement: 1.0 - Rate of movement: 1.5 mp Area of
mm/day average mm/day average. South Ra
detected
- 2.5 cm of accumulated - 5 cm of accumulated movement
deformation in 2 weeks deformation in 2 weeks
- Approximately 400,000 -Approximately
tons 1,000 ,000 tons
2030
Area
limited by
1998 significant
structures
1982

N
1958
 STAGE 7 SOUTH WALL
INSTABILITY

Area 2

Area 1
STAGE 7 SOUTH WALL
INSTABILITY

H RAM P
SOUT Area of
detected
movement
1958

Intersectio
n between
fault planes
and pit

N
 CASE STUDY
SOUTH WALL FAILURE
AUG 2008

Displacement graph indicates

moderate acceleration.

24 hour displacement
accelerated from 7mm per day
to 9mm per day.
 Accumulative Slope Displacement ( mm)
20
/0
2232 /05 /2 0
/0 5 08

-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
2725 /05 /2/2000813:
28 /05 5 /2 08 1:29
/ 1 5
3/005 /22 000808 6:433
31 /05 008 135:09
/
1 /0 2 1 :0
2//0065/2/2 0008 8:582
3/06/2 0 008 0:39
4/06/20 088 126:24
5/06/20 0 18 :16
6 0 8 2 :0

and 1754-106
66/0/06/20 008 13:559
6
7/0 /2/200 08 109:25
6 8 :4

Blasting 1958-203
88/0/06/20008 11:079
9/06/2/20 08 76:47
0 :
1100 /60/2008828:543
11 /066 /2 08 3:29
/0 6 /2 0 0 13 5
1122 /0 /2 00088 4::404
1 /066 /2 08 19: 5
/ 0
133 /0 2 0 08 0:10 1 5

and 1754-109
14 /066 /2 08 10:4 6

Blasting Stg 6 presplit

/0 /2 000 5 7

Blasting 1958-207
1155 /06 /2 008825::419
1 /0 6 /2 08 0 9
1 6 /06 /2 000 10:22

Blasting 1954-210
176 /066 /2 008811::254
/0 /2 0 6 9
1818 /06 /2 0008826::409
1/906 6/2/2 008 1 1:384
19 /06 00 08 2:2
20 /06 /2 08 1 3:40
/0 /2 0 8 0
2121 /06 /2 00088 8::021
2 /06 6 /2 08 22: 2
Blasting 1946-215 P/S

222 /0 /2 0 00813:416
23 /066 /2 008 1 3:42
2 /0 /2 0 0 8 1
244 /066/2 008828::144
25 /06 /2 008 13:26
/0 /2 0 08 4 6

and 1982-208
2626 /06 /2 008 26::405
/0 6 / 08 1 8

Blasting 1946-202
2277 /06 /2 20 00811::09
28 /066 /2 08 3:29
Blasting 1742-111
and 1742-111 P/S

29/06 //2 0000817:312

30 /062 00 8 27:5 5
1//006 //22 008 183:467
2/07/2 008 1 :27
8 6
3 7/20 0 1 :3
4 /07 0 088 1 4:469

Time
5//007//220 0 131::34
7 0 8 4
66/07/20 08 9:52
7//007/2/20008 88:032
7
8/0 /200 088 2:57
7 2 :5
and 1934-207 P/S

99/0/07/20008 1 0:453
10 7/ /20 8 4:1
11/07 /220 008 7:442
AUG 2008

Blasting 1958-208

11 /07 0 8 11:1
14/07 /2/2 008 19:196
/0 0 2
1155 /07 /200088 6::401
16 /077 /2 00823:34
Blasting 1946-216,1946-215 P/S

18/07 //22 0008 4:373

/0 8 4
2109 /07 /20008 22::526
21 /077 /2 0821: 6
0
CASE STUDY

22/07 //2 0008 2:210

24/07 /220088 173:430
25 /07 00 18 :12
Blasting 1934-210

/ /2 8
Blasting 1922-214

2626 /007 /2 00823::27

Radar Data for EHM SW Corner Stage 7

/0 7 /2 00 5 43
2727 /70 /2 0 0088 9::002
28/07 7 /2 08 0:05
/0 /2 00 15 4
3219 /70 /20008 8 6::107
0 2
1//0077/2/2 08 112:180
2/08/200088 :23
4/08/20 0 137:28
SOUTH WALL FAILURE

5/80/200 088 11::12

8 0 2 1
66/0/08/20 80 132:352
7/0 8/2/20 8 6:30
Blasting 1934-202

8/08/200 0088 0:43

Blasting 1922-216
Blasting 1934-207

9 9/ 8/2 08 19:56
10/080/8/2000813::316
1 /08 20 087:4 1
121 /08/2 0008 2 2:180
/08 /2 08 10:3
/2 0 08 5:08
08 9:22
3:5 9
8
 CASE STUDY
SOUTH WALL FAILURE
AUG 2008
South ramp crack monitoring – Wireline Extensometers

120
m 30
m
 CASE STUDY
SOUTH WALL FAILURE
AUG 2008

PRISM MONITORING
• Prism monitoring
showed significant
displacement during
4 weeks prior to
failure
PRISM MONITORING
 PRISM MONITORING

Using prisms previous location, 5 points of vibration monitoring are in

place to analyse the effect of blasting to the wall
 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FAILURE 24th – 25th AUG 2008

Sunday 24th
• 7.30am – Orange alarm triggered 6mm over 4 hours over 2 pixels. Trigger 3 exclusion
zone classed as absolutely no entry zone. South ramp bunded. EX010 relocated out of
exclusion zone. Preparations made for expected red alarm.

• 2.00pm – Red alarm triggered 10mm over 4 hours over 2 pixels. TARP trigger 4
procedures followed. Entire pit and underground mine evacuated. Meeting took place
at hard stand to assess where we could safely mine. Digging commenced in
1934-214, prep commenced on the 1958-208 shot, Underground operations
recommenced. New red alarm set at 7mm over one hour over two pixels.

• 9.30pm – Red alarm triggered. Evacuation already complete. New orange alarm set at
30mm over 2 hours over 5 pixels and new red alarm set at 50mm over two hours over
5 pixels (based on past failure in stage 6).
 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Monday 25th

• 1.00am – Orange alarm triggered. Evacuation already complete.

• 1.30am – Dust noticed coming off slope.

• 1.40am – Barminco evacuated UG to fire decline

• 2.00am – Fired decline

• 2.15am – Red alarm activated.

• 2.15am – Slope failure commenced.

• 3.30am – Barminco cleared to re enter UG

 STAGE 8 CUTBACK

Cutback
specifically
designed
to follow
the plane
of the
major fault.
 RECENT FAILURES

• 600t stage 8 south

wall failure March
2009:
• Significant wall
acceleration was
Extent of movement
identified 24hrs
area prior to failure.
Failure
• Area had been
evacuated
following Orange
radar alarm
activation during
nightshift.
• Red alarm was
activated 7:10am
4 dayshift the
2 3
1 following day.
• Failure occurred
7:15am.
RECENT FAILURES
RECENT FAILURES

• 15,000t failure East

Wall March 2009:
• Significant wall
acceleration was
identified 24hrs prior to
failure.
• Area had been
evacuated and bund
constructed to contain
expected volume of
failure.
• Failure occurred 1:30pm
dayshift.
• Trigger 3 rating had
been assigned to area to
communicate high risk
rating and expectation of
failure.
 EAST WALL FAILURE

RISK OF RAMP LOSS – CRITICAL ACCESS

TO STAGE 8 CUTBACK
Masked structures
Critical ramp modelled via Isite
access to Stage 8 scan
cutback
Previously
modelled structure

Isite scan taken

24hrs after failure

Shear pins design

ERNEST HENRY MINING

Rock Fall Risk

2009

Tuesday, 5 May 2009

 5 POINTS THAT
CONTRIBUTE TO HUMAN
ROCKFALL INTERACTIONS

2. Mining
Interactions

4. Rock Mass
condition

3. Rocks loose
at face or
crest

5. Full
catch
Benches.

1. People
Exposure
 REDUCING EXPOSURE

• Task Elimination (60% reduction)

• 20m exclusion zone at high walls
• No parking of vehicles under the high wall
• Bunding/ exclusion zones
• Dual shotcrete pumps
• No need for operator to stand in 20m exclusion zone
• Extended poly for grouting
• No need to park cement truck under high wall
• Remote drilling
• All cable bolts drilled with remote drill rig
 POTENTIAL ROCKFALLS

A: Scaling, chaining,
shotcrete, cable bolts

B: Cable bolting, scaling,

shotcrete, prism and radar
monitoring

C: Radar monitoring,
remediation blasting

D: Full berms?? Ramp

down to cleanup, remedial
blasting, catch fences,
bunding, exclusion zones.
POTENTIAL ROCKFALLS
 POTENTIAL ROCKFALLS

EHM employs both active and passive

rockfall protection systems:
• Crests are shotcreted and cable
bolted
• All batters are scaled
• Large windrows are left in place on
berms
• Wall meshing.
• Proposals for rock fences
 ROCKFALL RISK RATING
SYSTEM
• The Rockfall Risk Rating System (Hoek, 2006) is applied to all areas of
EHM pit.
• Modified version of the RHRS developed by the Oregon State Highway
Division in the United States.
• The system takes into account slope height, catchment, exposure of
personnel, rock structure, block size / volume of rock, climate, and
rockfall history.
• Can only be regarded as semi-quantitative
• Does not include recommendations on actions to be taken for different
ratings.
• Decisions on remedial action for a specific slope depend upon many
factors such as practicality, access, equipment and budget.
• However, based on experience at EHM and industry standards the
following rating ranges have been adopted.
0 – 200 Low risk
201 – 400 Moderate risk
> 401 High risk
ROCKFALL RISK RATING
SYSTEM
EHM ROCKFALL HAZARD
RATING
31 March 2008

2094

1994

1902
1742

1934

1982

Tuesday, 5 May 2009

 GEOTECHNICAL DOMAIN
BASED
RISK ASSESSMENT
PROJECT

• A ‘Geotechnical Hazard Rating System’ is used to qualitatively

define the degree of risk associated with the geotechnical hazards
identified in a particular Geotechnical Domain.

• A hazard rating is determined to define the degree of risk

associated with each Geotechnical Domain.

• This type of pit wall auditing/geotechnical risk assessment is

performed in addition to standard risk assessments/ JSA’s.
 GEOTECHNICAL DOMAIN
BASED
RISK ASSESSMENT
PROJECT

• Provides a standardised approach for collecting and characterising pit slope audit
data

• Easy-to-use basis for examining the data collected

• Identifies areas of pit slopes that require specific levels of attention – require a
more detailed quantitative assessment (high risk areas)

• Provides a tool for rapidly assessing workplace safety and risk:

• Comply with statutory requirements

• Identify hazards, e.g. potential instability
• Assesses the risk (severity and probability of occurrence)
associated with these hazards
 GEOTECHNICAL DOMAIN
BASED
RISK ASSESSMENT
PROJECT

• A specific weighting is assigned to each parameter depending on their

degree of influence and an area/domain can be qualitatively categorised with
regard to geotechnical risk.

• These parameters are the preliminary empirical tools for defining high risk
areas. Once an area is recognised as high risk through this procedure, a
more detailed quantitative assessment is performed.

• Detailed quantitative assessments are included for each mining block in the
Monthly Mine Plan.

• This type of qualitative assessment leads to determination of the requirement

for a quantitative assessment for high risk areas.
 HAZARD RATING
PARAMETERS

Pit wall depth/ RL

• What is the degree of weathering if any?
• Is there any indication of stress damage?

Failure history, response and seismic potential

Surface and ground water management

• Have deep depressurization holes been drilled?
• Have shallow drain holes been drilled?

Blasting performance

Geology, rock mass properties, known structures and bedding

• What is the risk associated with the structure?
• How well understood is the structure/failure mechanism?
 HAZARD RATING
PARAMETERS

Rock fall potential and mitigation

Geotechnical data analyses and models

• Has a geotechnical stability analysis been performed for the area?

Geotechnical design methods

• Have geotechnical constraints been adhered to at the design level?

Monitoring and early warning systems

• Are they in place? Are they required?

Evacuation procedures and effectiveness

Vertical separation between stages

 STATISTICS

Causes of Rockfalls 04-09 (Percentage)

2%
17%
30% Unknown Cause
Weathering
Blasting
Seismic Event
Poor housekeeping
18%
Rain / wind
7% mining interaction
Machinery vibration
3%
3%
20%
WET SEASON EHM
THANKYOU