Siy Vs Tamlin

William Anghian Siy Vs.
Alvin Tomlin
G.R. No. 205998. April 24, 2017
Facts:
Petitioner William Anghian Siy filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(RTC) a Complaint for Recovery of Possession with Prayer for Replevin against Tomlin
et al.
In his Complaint, petitioner alleged that he is the owner of a 2007 model Range
Rover with Plate Number ZMG 272 which he purchased from Alberto Lopez III (Lopez)
on July 22, 2009; that in 2010, he entrusted the said vehicle to Ong, a businessman who
owned a second-hand car sales showroom (“Motortrend” in Katipunan, Quezon City) after
the latter claimed that he had a prospective buyer therefor; that Ong failed to remit the
proceeds of the purported sale nor return the vehicle; that petitioner later found out that
the vehicle had been transferred to Chua; that in December, 2010, petitioner filed a
complaint before the Quezon City Police District’s Anti-Camapping Section; that Ong,
upon learning of the complaint, met with petitioner to arrange the return of the vehicle
RTC issued the writ of replevin after posting a bond of 8 million.
Respondent filed an Omnibus Motion seeking to quash the Writ of Replevin,
dismiss the Complaint, and turn over or return the vehicle to him. Respondent claimed
that he is the lawful and registered owner of the subject vehicle, having bought the same
and caused registration thereof in his name on March 7, 2011; that the Complaint should
be dismissed for failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees; that the Complaint is
defective for failing to allege the correct and material facts as to ownership, possession/
detention by defendant, warranty against distraint/ levy/ seizure, and actual value of the
vehicle; and that the implementation of the writ was attended by procedural irregularities.
RTC Denied the Motion so Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari
CA Granted the Petition.
Issue:
Whether the writ of replevin is proper
Ruling:
Petition denied.
“In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either
the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered, and
that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the
same.” “Rule 60 x x x allows a plaintiff, in an action for the recovery of possession
of personal property, to apply for a writ of replevin if it can be shown that he is ‘the
owner of the property’ claimed … or is entitled to the possession thereof.’ The
plaintiff need not be the owner so long as he is able to specify his right to the
possession of the property and his legal basis therefor.”
The SC cited Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Court of Appeals stating that in Sec,
2 par. (a) Rule 60 it is not only the owner who can institute a replevin suit. A person
"entitled to the possession" of the property also can, as provided in the same paragraph
cited by the trial court, which reads:
Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond. — Upon applying for such order the plaintiff must
show . . .
(a) That the plaintiff is the owner of the property claimed,

particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession
thereof
SC further agrees with respondents comment stating that party praying for the
recovery of possession of personal properly must show by his own affidavit or that of
some other person who personally knows the facts that he is the owner of the property
claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof.
From petitioner’s own account, he constituted and appointed Ong as his agent to
sell the vehicle, surrendering to the latter the vehicle, all documents of title pertaining
thereto, and a deed of sale signed in blank, with full understanding that Ong would offer
and sell the same to his clients or to the public. In return, Ong accepted the agency by
his receipt of the vehicle, the blank deed of sale, and documents of title, and when he
gave bond in the form of two guarantee checks worth P4.95 million. All these gave Ong
the authority to act for and in behalf of petitioner. Under the Civil Code on agency,
Art. 1869. Agency may be express, or implied from the acts of the principal, from
his silence or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency, knowing that
another person is acting on his behalf without authority.
Agency may be oral, unless the law requires a specific form.
Art. 1870. Acceptance by the agent may also be express, or implied from his
acts which carry out the agency, or from his silence or inaction according to the
circumstances. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
“The basis of agency is representation and the same may be constituted expressly
or impliedly. In an implied agency, the principal can be bound by the acts of the implied
agent.”
Since Ong was able to sell the subject vehicle to Chua, petitioner thus ceased to
be the owner thereof. Nor is he entitled to the possession of the vehicle; together with his
ownership, petitioner lost his right of possession over the vehicle.
Considering that he was no longer the owner or rightful possessor of the subject
vehicle at the time he filed Complaint for Recovery of Possession in July, 2011, petitioner
may not seek a return of the same through replevin. Quite the contrary, respondent, who
obtained the vehicle from Chua and registered the transfer with the Land Transportation
Office, is the rightful owner thereof, and as such, he is entitled to its possession.
Petitioner cannot be allowed to cut his losses by ostensibly securing the recovery
of the subject vehicle in lieu of its price, which Ong failed and continues to fail to remit.
On the other hand, Ong’s declarations contained in his Affidavit, to the effect that
petitioner remains the owner of the vehicle, and that Chua came into illegal possession
and ownership of the same by unlawfully appropriating the same for himself without
paying for it, are unavailing. Faced with a possible criminal charge for estafa initiated by
petitioner for failing or refusing to remit the price for the subject vehicle, Ong’s declarations
are considered self-serving, that is, calculated to free himself from the criminal charge.
The premise is that by helping petitioner to actually recover his vehicle by insisting that
the same was unlawfully taken from him, instead of remitting its price to petitioner, Ong
expects that he and petitioner may redeem themselves from their bad judgment; for the
petitioner, the mistake of bestowing his full faith and confidence upon Ong, and blindly
surrendering the vehicle, its documents of title, and a deed of sale executed and signed
in blank, to the latter; and for Ong, his failure to remit the proceeds of the sale to petitioner;
and petitioner might then opt to desist from pursuing the estafa and other criminal charges
against him.

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William Anghian Siy Vs.

(a) That the plaintiff is the owner of the property claimed,

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