Que V CA

10/22/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 467
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Que vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 150739. August 18, 2005.
SPOUSES BENIGNO QUE and ERLINDA QUE, and ADELA

URIAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
FLORENCIO A. RUIZ, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC Br. 24, Cabugao,
Ilocos Sur, and ISABEL COSTALES, respondents.
Actions; Courts; Judgments; Under Section 1, Rule 38, of the Rules of

Court, the Court may grant relief from judgment only “ when a judgment or
final order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken against a party in
any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.” —
Under Section 1, Rule 38 (“Section 1”), the court may grant relief from
judgment only “[w]hen a judgment or final order is entered, or any other
proceeding is taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence x x x.” In their petition for relief from
judgment in the trial court, petitioners contended that judgment was entered
against them through “mistake or fraud” because they were allegedly under
the impression that Atty. Ranot had prepared and filed “the necessary
pleading.” This is not the fraud or mistake contemplated under Section 1. As
used in that provision, “mistake” refers to mistake of fact, not of law, which
relates to the case. “Fraud,” on the other hand, must be extrinsic or
collateral, that is, the kind which prevented the aggrieved party from having
a trial or presenting his case to the court. Clearly, petitioners’ mistaken
assumption that Atty.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
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VOL. 467, AUGUST 18, 2005 359
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001669c62605d40594387003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/18
Ranot had attended to his professional duties is neither mistake nor fraud.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Negligence; Under Section 1,
Rule 38, of the Rules of Court, “ negligence” must be excusable and
generally imputable to the party because it is imputable to the counsel, it is
binding on the client.—Under Section 1, the “negligence” must be
excusable and generally imputable to the party because if it is imputable to
the counsel, it is binding on the client. To follow a contrary rule and allow a
party to disown his counsel’s conduct would render proceedings indefinite,
tentative, and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing
counsel. What the aggrieved litigant should do is seek administrative
sanctions against the erring counsel and not ask for the reversal of the
court’s ruling.
Same; Same; Same; For a claim of counsel’s negligence to prosper,
nothing short of clear abandonment of the client’s cause must be shown.—
For a claim of counsel’s gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear
abandonment of the client’s cause must be shown. Here, what petitioners’
first, second, and third counsels did was fail to file the Answer, file a belated
and defective motion for reconsideration or new trial, and belatedly and
erroneously file a petition for relief from judgment, respectively. While
these acts and omissions can plausibly qualify as simple negligence, they do
not amount to gross negligence to justify the annulment of the proceedings
below.
Same; Same; Same; In essence, procedural due process is simply the
opportunity to be heard. Petitioners were afforded such opportunity. Thus
petitioners were served a copy of the complaint and the summonses and
given 15 days to file their Answer.—In essence, procedural due process is
simply the opportunity to be heard. Petitioners were afforded such
opportunity. Thus, petitioners were served a copy of the complaint and the
summonses and given 15 days to file their Answer. While there is no
showing from the records when petitioners received their copy of the 18
May 2000 Order declaring them in default, there is no dispute that Urian
was present at the hearing when the trial court issued that Order in open
court. Petitioners were also served a copy of the trial court’s Decision of 6
September 2000 from which they had 15 days to appeal, seek
reconsideration, or new trial. Indeed, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration or new trial albeit belatedly and without complying with
360
proper formalities. Plainly, there was no denial of due process to petitioners.
Property; Wills and Succession; The Code of Civil Procedure requires

that wills must be submitted to the proper court for probate otherwise the
same shall not pass either real or personal property.—Under the Spanish
Civil Code, the law governing Lorenzo’s alleged will, all wills must be
executed in writing except when the testator takes part in any military
operation or when any warlike operation is imminent or when the testator is
in danger of shipwreck. In such cases, the testator can execute the will orally
in the presence of at least two witnesses. Failure to comply with these
formalities renders the will void. Furthermore, the Code of Civil Procedure
requires that wills must be submitted to the proper court for probate
otherwise the same shall not pass either real or personal property.
Same; Same; Prescription; While it does not appear that respondent
had registered the land in her name, her uninterrupted possession of Lot No.
6023 for nearly 40 years (beyond the 30-year extraordinary acquisitive
prescription), coupled with the performance of acts of ownership, such as
payment of real estate taxes, suffices to prove her ownership by prescription.
—Respondent has been in continuous possession of Lot No. 6023 in the
concept of an owner after Lorenzo died in 1960 until the spouses Que
removed her from that property shortly before respondent filed her
complaint in February 2000. While it does not appear that respondent had
registered the land in her name, her uninterrupted possession of Lot No.
6023 for nearly 40 years (beyond the 30-year extraordinary acquisitive
prescription), coupled with the performance of acts of ownership, such as
payment of real estate taxes, suffices to prove her ownership by prescription.
Actions; Judgments; As an equitable remedy, a petition for relief from
judgment is available only as a last recourse, when the petition has no other
remedy.—As an equitable remedy, a petition for relief from judgment is
available only as a last recourse, when the petitioner has no other remedy.
This is not true here because petitioners had at their disposal other remedies
which they in fact availed of, albeit belatedly or defectively, such as when
they filed their motion for reconsideration or new trial in the trial court. As
the Court of Appeals held: [A] “Petition for Relief from Judgment” is not a
general utility tool in the procedural workshop. The relief granted
361
VOL. 467, AUGUST 18, 2005 361
under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is of equitable character and is allowed

only when there is no other available or adequate remedy. It is not regarded
with favor. The judgment rendered will not be disturbed where the
complainant has or by exercising proper diligence would have had an
adequate remedy at law. If the complainant lost a remedy at law from an
adverse judgment by his x x x negligence, such inequitable conduct

precludes him from relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. x x x
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Mallari & Mallari Law Office for petitioners.
Jose R. Jimenez for respondent I. Costales.
Mallares and Associates Law Offices collaborating counsel for
private respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
1 2
This is a petition for review of the Court of Appeals’ Decision
dated 26 June 2001 and its Resolution dated 8 November 2001. The
26 June 2001 Decision dismissed petitioners’ petition while the 8
November 2001 Resolution denied their motion for reconsideration.
The F acts
Since 1960, respondent Isabel Arrieta-Costales (“respondent”) has

been occupying as owner a parcel of land in Sta.
_______________
1 Although the petition is captioned “Petition for Certiorari,” it was filed under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. (now Associate Justice of this
Court), with Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Perlita J. Tria-Tirona,
concurring.
362

Monica, Magsingal, Ilocos Sur measuring 7,033 square meters.

Designated as Lot No. 6023, the property was originally owned by
one Lorenzo Cariño (“Lorenzo”) who died in 1960. In 1997,
respondent declared the property in her name for taxation purposes.
Petitioner Adela Urian (“Urian”) is Lorenzo’s grandniece, being
the adopted daughter of Lorenzo’s nephew Gonzalo Cariño
(“Gonzalo”), son of Lorenzo’s brother Mariano Cariño.
In February 2000, respondent filed a complaint against Urian

3
and
petitioners Benigno Que and Erlinda Que (“spouses Que”) in the
Regional Trial Court, Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, Branch 24 (“trial court”)
for “Annulment of Quitclaim[,] Ownership, Possession and
Damages” (“Civil Case No. 503-KC”). Respondent claimed that she
is Lorenzo’s granddaughter and as such, she inherited Lot No. 60234
from him. Respondent sought the annulment of a Deed of Quitclaim
5
dated 17 June 1999 and a handwritten Acknowledgment dated 2
July 1999, both signed by one Isabel Arrieta (“Arrieta”). Under the
Deed of Quitclaim, Arrieta “renounce[d] all [her] rights, interests,
participation, title and possession” over Lot No. 6023 to the spouses
Que while in the Acknowledgment, Arrieta confirmed receiving
P30,000 from Urian. Respondent alleged that she did not sign these
documents. Respondent also prayed that the trial court declare her
owner of Lot No. 6023 and order petitioners to pay damages.
When respondent filed her Complaint, the spouses Que had taken
possession of Lot No. 6023. The spouses Que also declared the land
in their name for tax purposes.
After petitioners received the complaint with the summonses on
21 March 2000, they hired the services of one Atty. Ronnie Ranot
(“Atty. Ranot”). However, Atty. Ranot failed to
_______________
3 Urian and the spouses Que are referred to as “petitioners.”

4 CA Rollo, p. 35.
5 Ibid., p. 34. The trial court referred to this document as “Acknowledgment
Letter/Receipt” (Rollo, p. 84).
363
VOL. 467, AUGUST 18, 2005 363

file petitioners’ Answer. On 4 May 2000, respondent moved to

declare petitioners in default. During the hearing of respondent’s
motion on 18 May 2000, only Urian appeared and manifested that
Atty. Ranot was still preparing the Answer. The trial court found
Urian’s manifestation unmeritorious and issued an Order in open
court declaring petitioners in default. In its Order of 15 June 2000,
the trial court granted respondent’s motion to present her evidence
ex parte and scheduled the presentation of evidence on 20 June
2000. Respondent presented her evidence accordingly, and the case
was submitted for judgment.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
On 6 September 2000, the trial court rendered judgment in

respondent’s favor, the dispositive portion of which provides:
“WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and

against the defendants, as follows:
1. Adjudging the plaintiff as the true and absolute owner of Lot 6023,
located at Brgy. Sta. Monica, Magsingal, Ilocos Sur and entitled to
the exclusive possession thereof;
2. Declaring the Deed of Quitclaim and the Acknowledgment
Letter/Receipt of no legal force and effect whatsoever and ordering
the de[f]endant [s]pouses Benigno and Erlinda Que to vacate the
land and restore the peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiff;
3. Ordering the Municipal Assessor of Magsingal, Ilocos Sur to
recall/[cancel] the Tax Declaration in the name of [s]pouses
Benigno and Erlinda Que and to restore the tax declaration in the
name of plaintiff Isabel Costales; and
4. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally to pay plaintiff,
P10,000.00 as and for [a]ttorney’s fees, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary damages and the costs of this
6
suit.
_______________
6 Rollo, p. 84.
364

Urian received a copy of the trial court’s Decision on 15 September

2000. The records do not show when the spouses Que received
theirs. On 10 October 2000, petitioners, through a new counsel, Atty.
Benjamin Bateria (“Atty. Bateria”), sought reconsideration or new
trial. Petitioners blamed their previous counsel for the non-filing of
their Answer. Petitioners attached to their motion a Deed of
Adjudication With Sale in which Urian, as alleged sole heir of
Gonzalo, adjudicated to herself Lot No. 6023 and sold it to the
spouses Que. Petitioners claimed that in his last will and testament,
Lorenzo devised Lot No. 6023 to Gonzalo.
The trial court denied petitioners’ motion in its Order of 17
November 2000. The trial court held that as to Urian, its Decision
had become final because although she received a copy of its
Decision on 15 September 2000, the motion for reconsideration or
new trial was filed only on 10 October 2000. As to the spouses Que,
the trial court held that the motion was pro forma since no affidavit
of merit accompanied the motion. Nor did the trial court find merit
in the Deed of Adjudication With Sale. The trial court noted that
during the conciliation proceedings at the Office of the Municipal
Mayor of Magsingal, Ilocos Sur, the spouses Que relied solely on
the Acknowledgment and Deed of Quitclaim as basis for their claim
7
of ownership of Lot No. 6023.
On 18 December 2000, petitioners, represented this time by one
Atty. Oliver Cachapero (“Atty. Cachapero”), filed with the trial court
a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure (“Rules”). Petitioners claimed that their failure to
file an Answer and to seek reconsideration or new trial on time was
due to the excusable negligence of their previous counsels.
Petitioners also invoked “mistake and fraud” as they were allegedly
under the impression that Atty. Ranot had prepared and filed “the
necessary pleading or that the necessary pleading to vacate the judg-
_______________
7 Ibid., pp. 102-105.
365
VOL. 467, AUGUST 18, 2005 365

ment and secure new trial was prepared x x x and filed x x x.” This
time, petitioners submitted a joint affidavit of merit where they again
invoked the Deed of Adjudication With Sale.
In its Order of 27 December 2000, the trial court denied the
petition for relief from judgment. The trial court held that the
negligence of their counsels bound petitioners. On the Deed of
Adjudication With Sale, the trial court reiterated its finding in the
Order of 17 November 2000 (denying petitioners’ motion for
8
reconsideration or new trial) that it has no merit.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals to
set aside the trial court’s 27 December 2000 Order. Petitioners
contended that: (1) the trial court should have required respondent to
file an Answer to their petition instead of dismissing it outright; (2)
their previous counsels’ negligence denied them due process hence
they should not be bound by it; and (3) the Deed of Quitclaim is not
incompatible with the Deed of Adjudication With Sale as the former
9
merely “strengthens” the spouses Que’s ownership of Lot No. 6023.
The Court of Appeals’ Ruling
In its Decision of 26 June 2001, the Court of Appeals denied due

course to and dismissed petitioners’ petition. The Court of Appeals
held that the trial court did not err in outrightly dismissing the
petition for relief from judgment for insufficiency in form and
substance under Section 4, Rule 38. The appellate court further held
that petitioners filed their petition for relief from judgment beyond
the 60-day period under Section 3, Rule 38. The Court of Appeals
also noted that the Rules allow a petition for relief from judgment
only when there is no other available remedy and not when litigants,
like petitioners, lose a remedy by negligence.
On petitioners’ claim that their counsels’ negligence should not
bind them, the Court of Appeals held:
_______________
8 Ibid., pp. 106-110.

9 CA Rollo, pp. 2-21.
366

The Petitioners heaped vituperation on their counsel for the latter’s

ineptitude and betrayal of Petitioners[’] trust and confidence for not filing
the appropriate pleading to relieve the Petitioners of their having been
declared in default. But then, the Petitioners were not themselves blameless.
They were duty-bound to make periodic inquiries from their counsel o[n]
the status of their case and as to whether the appropriate pleading had
already been filed and the resolution of the Respondent Court, if any, on
their pleadings x x x. If the Petitioners failed to do so and, as it turned out,
their counsel failed to prepare and file the appropriate pleading, then the
Petitioners cannot complain. They are bound by their ineptitude as well as
their counsel’s. x x x
It bears stressing that the Respondent Court came out with its Decision
only on September 6, 2000 or after the lapse of more than three (3) months
after it issued its Order [of 18 May 2000] declaring the Petitioners in
default. In fine, the Petitioners had more than ample time to file the
10
appropriate pleadings before the appropriate Court.
11
Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend that—
(I) Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of

discretion in the appreciation of facts and failed to
appreciate that [the] Petition for Relief from judgment arose
from a default order taken against petitioners due to [the]
negligence of petitioners[’] counsel; [and]
(II) Respondent Court of Appeals fail[ed] to notice certain
relevant facts that will justify a different conclusion that
petitioners should not lose their case and [their] property
12
through technicality.
In reversal of their earlier stance in the Court of Appeals, petitioners

no longer question the procedure the trial court followed in denying
their petition for relief from judgment. Instead, they now claim that
since that petition was an “off
_______________
10 Rollo, pp. 33-34.

11 Filed by petitioners’ newest counsel, Atty. Rodrigo E. Mallari of Mallari &
Mallari Law Office.
12 Rollo, p. 14.
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VOL. 467, AUGUST 18, 2005 367

shoot” of the trial court’s Order declaring them in default for their
counsel’s negligence, petitioners seek excuse from such negligence
to avoid being deprived of property without due process of law.
Petitioners also raise new matters regarding the merits of the trial
13
court’s Decision of 6 September 2000.
The Issue
The issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing

petitioners’ petition.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Petitioners are not Entitled to Relief from J udgment
The Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that petitioners are not
entitled to relief from judgment because their petition was
insufficient in form and substance, filed late, and improperly availed
of.
_______________
13 Rollo, pp. 16-19. Petitioners contend that: (1) there is no proof on record
showing that the person who signed the Acknowledgment and the Deed of Quitclaim,
Arrieta, and respondent are one and the same person; (2) respondent failed to
corroborate her son’s testimony that her signatures in the Deed of Quitclaim and
Acknowledgment were forged; (3) respondent failed to present any proof of her
filiation with Lorenzo; (4) the Deed of Quitclaim was not marked and presented in
evidence; (5) respondent presented only a tax payment receipt and not the tax
declaration to prove her ownership over Lot No. 6023; and (6) the trial court erred in
annulling the spouses Que’s tax declaration over Lot No. 6023 as it was not presented
in evidence.
368

Petitioners Failed to Prove Fraud,

Mistake, or Excusable Negligence
14
Under Section 1, Rule 38 (“Section 1”), the court may grant relief
from judgment only “[w]hen a judgment or final order is entered, or
any other proceeding is taken against a party in any court through
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence x x x.” In their
petition for relief from judgment in the trial court, petitioners
contended that judgment was entered against them through “mistake
or fraud” because they were allegedly under the impression that
Atty. Ranot had prepared and filed “the necessary pleading.” This is
not the fraud or mistake contemplated under Section 1. As used in
that provision, “mistake”
15
refers to mistake of fact, not of law, which
relates to the case. “Fraud,” on the other hand, must be extrinsic or
collateral, that is, the kind which prevented the aggrieved party from
16
having a trial or presenting his case to the court. Clearly,
petitioners’ mistaken assumption that Atty. Ranot had attended to his
professional duties is neither mistake nor fraud.
On the other hand, what petitioners appear to be claiming in this
petition is that this Court should reverse the Court of Appeals and
remand the case to the trial court for new trial on the ground that
their previous counsels’ negligence constitutes “excusable
negligence” under Section 1.
This claim is similarly without merit.
_______________
14 Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings.—When a

judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against
a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may
file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or
proceeding be set aside.
15 See Agan v. Heirs of Sps. Andres Nueva and Diosdada Nueva, G.R. No. 155018,
11 December 2003, 418 SCRA 421.
16 Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96141, 2 October 1991, 202 SCRA 228.
369
VOL. 467, AUGUST 18, 2005 369

Under Section 1, the “negligence” must be excusable and generally

imputable to the party because if it is imputable to the counsel, it is
17
binding on the client. To follow a contrary rule and allow a party to
disown his counsel’s conduct would render proceedings indefinite,
tentative, and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of
18
replacing counsel. What the aggrieved litigant should do is seek
administrative sanctions against the erring counsel and not ask for
19
the reversal of the court’s ruling.
Petitioners nevertheless seek exemption from the above rule
because their counsels’ negligence allegedly deprived them of their
day in court and, if the ruling of the Court of Appeals stands, they
will suffer deprivation of property without due process of law.
Admittedly, this Court has relaxed the rule on the binding effect
of counsel’s negligence and allowed a litigant another chance to
present his case “(1) where [the] reckless or gross negligence of
counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when [the
rule’s] application will result in outright deprivation of the client’s
20
liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of justice so require.”
None of these exceptions obtains here.
For a claim of counsel’s gross negligence to prosper, nothing 21
short of clear abandonment of the client’s cause must be shown.
Here, what petitioners’ first, second, and third coun-
_______________
17 See Insular Life Savings and Trust Company v. Runes, Jr., G.R. No. 152530, 12
August 2004, 436 SCRA 317.
18 Aguila v. Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, G.R. No. L-48335, 15
April 1988, 160 SCRA 352.
19 See Villa Rhecar Bus v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. L-78936, 7 January 1988, 157
SCRA 13.
20 Sarraga, Sr. v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, 442 Phil. 55; 393
SCRA 566 (2002).
21 See People’s Homesite & Housing Corp. v. Tiongco, 120 Phil. 1264; 12 SCRA
471 (1964). Reported as PHHC v. Tiongco and Escasa.
370

sels did was fail to file the Answer, file a belated and defective
motion for reconsideration or new trial, and belatedly and
erroneously file a petition for relief from judgment, respectively.
While these acts and omissions can plausibly qualify as simple

negligence, they do not amount to gross negligence to justify the
annulment of the proceedings below.
22
In Legarda v. Court of Appeals, where the Court initially held
that the counsel’s failure to file pleadings at the trial court and later
on appeal amounted to gross negligence, the Court, on respondent’s
motion, granted reconsideration and applied the general rule binding
the litigant to her counsel’s negligence. The Court noted that the
proceedings which led to the filing of the petition in that case “were
not attended by any irregularity.” The same observation squarely
applies here. Neither can petitioners rely on Boyer-Roxas v. Court of
23
Appeals because there, as here, the Court held that the petitioners’
counsel was not grossly negligent.
Nor were petitioners denied procedural due process. In essence,
24
procedural due process is simply the opportunity to be heard.
Petitioners were afforded such opportunity. Thus, petitioners were
served a copy of the complaint and the summonses and given 15
days to file their Answer. While there is no showing from the
records when petitioners received their copy of the 18 May 2000
Order declaring them in default, there is no dispute that Urian was
present at the hearing when the trial court issued that Order in open
court. Petitioners were also served a copy of the trial court’s
Decision of 6 September 2000 from which they had 15 days to
appeal, seek reconsideration, or new trial. Indeed, petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration or new trial albeit belatedly and
_______________
22 G.R. No. 94457, 18 March 1991, 195 SCRA 418 (Decision); 345 Phil. 890; 280
SCRA 642 (1997) (Resolution).
23 G.R. No. 100866, 14 July 1992, 211 SCRA 470.
24 Villaruel, Jr. v. Fernando, G.R. No. 136726, 24 September 2003, 412 SCRA 54.
371
VOL. 467, AUGUST 18, 2005 371

without complying with proper formalities. Plainly, there was no

denial of due process to petitioners.
But even assuming that the lapses of petitioners’ counsels
amount to gross negligence denying petitioners their day in court,
petitioners’ contention that if we sustain the Court of Appeals they
will be deprived of property is baseless.
The spouses Que anchor their claim of ownership to Lot No.
6023 on the Deed of Adjudication With Sale Urian executed in their
25
favor and on the Deed of Quitclaim. Urian’s claim of ownership
over Lot No. 6023 is in turn based on Lorenzo’s alleged
testamentary disposition devising Lot No. 6023 to her adoptive

parent, Gonzalo. As proof of such testa-mentary disposition,
26
petitioners submitted an affidavit,
_______________
25 Petitioners first invoked the Deed of Adjudication With Sale in their motion for
reconsideration or new trial in the trial court. In the conciliation proceedings which
preceded the filing of Civil Case No. 503-KC, petitioners relied solely on the Deed of
Quitclaim dated 17 June 1999 and the Acknowledgment dated 2 July 1999.
26 Eusebia’s affidavit, written in the Ilocano dialect, reads (CA Rollo, p. 59):
Siac ni Eusebia Carino, balasang, a cabsat ni Lorenzo Carino, baro quet pada nga agnaed quen
tubo iti ili a Magsingal, Iloco[s] Sur, Filipinas [unintelligible] agpada nga addaan ti umisu a
tawen.
Agsipud ta saan unay nga adu ti sanicua day toy Dios ti alluadna a cabsat a Lorenzo Carino,
quet saannan a quinalicagumanen nga indalan ti husgado [unintelligible] corte ngem cas
casapulan ti linteg ti panagsapatac a toy agdama nga laoagco quet isu ti quinapudno:
1. Inbilin di cabsatco a Lorenzo Carino a ti sangca disso a dagana iti lugar managan Tarudtud Lote No.
6023 nga addaan ti calaoana a 7033 nga daguiti aglaolaona quet cucua met laeng daguiti Carino’s quen
daguiti Arrieta’s quen Segui’s Quet ti nasao a daga quet maipataguicoa quenni caanacanmi a Gonzalo
Carino nga anac da cabsatco a Mariano Carino quen ipagmi a Nieves
372

dated 20 October 1940, of Lorenzo’s sister Eusebia Cariño

(“Eusebia”).
The Court finds Eusebia’s affidavit insufficient to support
petitioners’ claims.
Under the Spanish Civil Code, the law governing Lorenzo’s
27
alleged will, all wills must be executed in writing except when the
testator takes part in any military operation or when any warlike
28 29
operation is imminent or when the testator is in danger of
30
shipwreck. In such cases, the testator can execute the will orally in
31
the presence of at least two witnesses. Failure to comply with these
32
formalities renders the will void. Furthermore, the Code of Civil
Procedure requires that wills must be submitted to the proper court
for
_______________
Farinas Carino a saan quetdi a maibilbilang ti cacabsatna.
x x x x
Quet nasaocon daytoy palaoag, isu ti pudpudno nga saoc, quet isu ti nadalos quen nalatac
apanagpanunutco quet isu a nadispunerco daytoy nasasao a cocuana. [I]tedco dayto a saan quet
a maigapu panangbutbuteng oenno ayayo no di quet magtaud ti sibubuquel a naquemco.
Quet ti quinapudnona tapno mapapati daytoy palaoagco adtoy a firmaac tapno addanto laeng
agservi iti isuamin a casapulanna ita ditoy Magsingal, Ilocos Sur, Filipinas, 20 ti mabilang ti
Octobre 1940. (Emphasis supplied)
27 Articles 688, 694-695, 706, 716 and 722, SPANISH CIVIL CODE. This
requirement is now provided in Article 804 of the Civil Code, thus: “Every will must
be in writing and executed in a language or dialect known to the testator.”
28 Article 720, SPANISH CIVIL CODE.
29 Who must be a crew or passenger of a man-of-war or merchantman.
30 Article 731 in relation to Article 720, Ibid.
31 Articles 720 and 731, Ibid.
32 Article 687, Ibid.
373
VOL. 467, AUGUST 18, 2005 373

probate otherwise the same shall not pass either real or personal
33
property.
Here, petitioners neither presented a copy of Lorenzo’s will nor
proved its oral execution under the circumstances provided in the
Spanish Civil Code. Petitioners similarly make no claim that
Lorenzo’s will was allowed in probate. Thus, not only is there no
proof that Lorenzo executed a will, there is also no basis to hold that
such will, if indeed executed, passed Lot No. 6023 to Gonzalo.
Significantly, Eusebia did not state in her affidavit that Lorenzo
executed a will. What Eusebia stated was that Lorenzo “instructed”
(inbilin) that Lot No. 6023 should be inherited by Gonzalo. This, if
any, merely indicates Lorenzo’s intent to devise that piece of realty
to Gonzalo but does not prove his execution of a will instituting
Gonzalo as heir to Lot No. 6023.
On the Deed of Quitclaim, the Court finds no reason to disturb
the trial court’s finding that respondent’s signature in that document
was forged.
In contrast, respondent has been in continuous possession of Lot
No. 6023 in the concept of an owner after Lorenzo died in 1960 until
the spouses Que removed her from that property shortly before
respondent filed her complaint in February 2000. While it does not
appear that respondent had registered the land in her name, her
uninterrupted possession of Lot No. 6023 for nearly 40 years
34
(beyond the 30-year extraordinary acquisitive prescription ),
coupled with the performance of
_______________
33 Section 625 states: “No will shall pass either the real or personal estate, unless it
is proved and allowed in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme
Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be
conclusive as to its due execution.” The presentation of the will under this provision
is mandatory (Guevara v. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 [1943]). Section 625 is substantially
reiterated in Section 1, Rule 75 of the Rules of Court.
34 Article 1137, CIVIL CODE provides: “Ownership and other real rights over
immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted ad
374

acts of ownership, such as payment of real estate taxes, suffices to

35
prove her ownership by prescription.
The Petition for Relief from Judgment

was Filed Out of Time
Aside from petitioners’ failure to prove any of the grounds for

granting relief from judgment, they also sought relief belatedly. We
quote with approval the Court of Appeals’ ruling:
[T]he “Petition for Relief” filed by the Petitioners with the Respondent
Court was filed beyond the reglementary period provided for in Section 3,
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, quoted, infra:
“SEC. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification.—A petition provided for
in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty
(60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other
proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or
final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied
with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied
upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action
or defense, as the case may be. x x x
As stated in the Order of the Respondent Court, x x x the Petitioner

Adela Urian received a copy of the Decision of the Respondent [Court], on
September 15, 2000. Indeed, on the face of the Petition, the Petitioners
admitted that the Petitioner Adela Urian received a copy of the Decision of
the Respondent Court on said date. However, the said Petitioner filed her
“Petition for Relief” with the Respondent Court only on December 18,
2000. By then, the sixty (60)-day period
_______________
verse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.”
35 See Republic v. Court of Appeals, 216 Phil. 500; 131 SCRA 532 (1984), reported as Rep.
of the Phil. v. Court of Appeals (Second Div.), et al.; Samson v. Court of Appeals, 225 Phil. 153;
141 SCRA 194 (1986).
375
VOL. 467, AUGUST 18, 2005 375

provided for under the said Rule had already elapsed. Case law has it that
the periods provided for by the Rules are fixed, inextendible and never
interrupted and if the Petition is filed beyond the period provided for by the
Rules, the Petition cannot be entertained and must be dismissed[.]
xxx
While it may be true that the Petitioner Adela Urian filed, on October 12,
2000 a “Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial,” however, the same did
not suspend the running of the period under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court
because it was filed beyond the period therefor[.] x x x
Insofar as the Petitioners Benigno Que, et al., are concerned, they merely
alleged, in their Petition, that they received a copy of the Decision of the
Respondent at a much later date than September 15, 2000 without, however,
specifying the date when they, in fact, received the Decision of the
Respondent Court[.]
xxx
We are not impervious [to] the claim of the Petitioners Benigno Que, in
their “Joint Affidavit of Merit” that they filed their “Petition for Relief from
Judgment” seasonably. But such an allegation is merely a conclusion and
not a sufficient showing that their Petition was filed within the period
36
provided for in Rule 38 of the Rules. (Emphasis in the original)
Relief from Judgment not Proper
Lastly, as an equitable remedy, a petition for relief from judgment is

available only as a last recourse, when the petitioner has no other
37
remedy. This is not true here because petitioners had at their
disposal other remedies which they in fact availed of, albeit
belatedly or defectively, such as when they filed their motion for
reconsideration or new trial in the trial court. As the Court of
Appeals held:
_______________
36 Rollo, pp. 30-32.

37 Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169; 256 SCRA 158 (1996); Ibabao v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-74848, 20 May 1987, 150 SCRA 76.
376

[A] “Petition for Relief from Judgment” is not a general utility tool in the
procedural workshop. The relief granted under Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court is of equitable character and is allowed only when there is no other
available or adequate remedy. It is not regarded with favor. The judgment
rendered will not be disturbed where the complainant has or by exercising
proper diligence would have had an adequate remedy at law. If the
complainant lost a remedy at law from an adverse judgment by his x x x
negligence, such inequitable conduct precludes him from relief under Rule
38
38 of the Rules of Court. x x x
On the New Matters Petitioners Raise
On petitioners’ allegations concerning the merits of the trial court’s

Decision of 6 September 2000, petitioners are barred from doing in
this appeal what they failed to do in the trial court, that is, present
39
their case. In any event, none of petitioners’ contentions has merit.
_______________
38 Rollo, p. 32.
39 (1) Respondent, Isabel Arrieta-Costales, and the signatory of the
Acknowledgment dated 2 July 1999 and the Deed of Quitclaim dated 17 June 1999,
Isabel Arrieta, are one and the same person, the latter name being respondent’s
maiden name; (2) respondent appointed her son as her attorney-in-fact to testify on
her behalf because of advanced age; (3) respondent’s failure to present evidence to
prove her filiation with Lorenzo does not affect her title over Lot No. 6023 which she
acquired through acquisitive prescription; (4) although the Deed of Quitclaim dated
17 June 1999 was not presented in evidence, respondent attached a copy in her
Complaint. Also, petitioners never denied the existence of such document, having
invoked it as basis for the spouses Que’s claim of ownership over Lot No. 6023 in the
conciliation proceedings which preceded the filing of Civil Case No. 503-KC; (5)
respondent’s presentation of the tax payment receipt instead of the tax declaration
does not negate her title over Lot No. 6023 as either of these documents suffices to
corroborate her claim of ownership; and (6) the spouses Que do not deny having
declared Lot No. 6023 in their name for tax purposes, thus the trial court did not err in
ordering the cancellation of such tax declaration.
377
VOL. 467, AUGUST 18, 2005 377

Philippine National Bank vs. Heirs of Estanislao Militar and
Deogracias Militar
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision

dated 26 June 2001 and the Resolution dated 8 November 2001 of
the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago

and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Note.—The mere lapse of the statutory period of thirty (30) years

of open, continuous and exclusive possession of disposable public
land automatically transforms the same into private property and
vests title on the possessor. (Cabuay, Jr. vs. Malvar, 389 SCRA 493
[2002])
——o0o——
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10/22/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 467

358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

SPOUSES BENIGNO QUE and ERLINDA QUE, and ADELA

Actions; Courts; Judgments; Under Section 1, Rule 38, of the Rules of

VOL. 467, AUGUST 18, 2005 359

Que vs. Court of Appeals

360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Que vs. Court of Appeals

proper formalities. Plainly, there was no denial of due process to petitioners.

Property; Wills and Succession; The Code of Civil Procedure requires

VOL. 467, AUGUST 18, 2005 361

Que vs. Court of Appeals

under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is of equitable character and is allowed

adverse judgment by his x x x negligence, such inequitable conduct

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Since 1960, respondent Isabel Arrieta-Costales (“respondent”) has

362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Monica, Magsingal, Ilocos Sur measuring 7,033 square meters.

In February 2000, respondent ﬁled a complaint against Urian

3 Urian and the spouses Que are referred to as “petitioners.”

VOL. 467, AUGUST 18, 2005 363

ﬁle petitioners’ Answer. On 4 May 2000, respondent moved to

The Trial Court’s Ruling

On 6 September 2000, the trial court rendered judgment in

“WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and

364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Urian received a copy of the trial court’s Decision on 15 September

7 Ibid., pp. 102-105.

VOL. 467, AUGUST 18, 2005 365

The Court of Appeals’ Ruling

In its Decision of 26 June 2001, the Court of Appeals denied due

8 Ibid., pp. 106-110.

366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Petitioners heaped vituperation on their counsel for the latter’s

(I) Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of

In reversal of their earlier stance in the Court of Appeals, petitioners

10 Rollo, pp. 33-34.

VOL. 467, AUGUST 18, 2005 367

The issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing

The Court’s Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Petitioners are not Entitled to Relief from J udgment

368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Petitioners Failed to Prove Fraud,

14 Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings.—When a

VOL. 467, AUGUST 18, 2005 369

Under Section 1, the “negligence” must be excusable and generally

370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

While these acts and omissions can plausibly qualify as simple

VOL. 467, AUGUST 18, 2005 371

without complying with proper formalities. Plainly, there was no

testamentary disposition devising Lot No. 6023 to her adoptive

372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

dated 20 October 1940, of Lorenzo’s sister Eusebia Cariño

Farinas Carino a saan quetdi a maibilbilang ti cacabsatna.

VOL. 467, AUGUST 18, 2005 373

374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

acts of ownership, such as payment of real estate taxes, sufﬁces to