EN BANC

[G.R. No. 152048. April 7, 2009.]

FELIX B. PEREZ and AMANTE G. DORIA, petitioners, vs.

PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY and JOSE
LUIS SANTIAGO, respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J p:

Petitioners Felix B. Perez and Amante G. Doria were employed by

respondent Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company (PT&T) as shipping
clerk and supervisor, respectively, in PT&T's Shipping Section, Materials
Management Group. (Why are they petitioners?)

Acting on an alleged unsigned letter regarding anomalous transactions at

the Shipping Section, respondents formed a special audit team to investigate the
matter. It was discovered that the Shipping Section jacked up the value of the
freight costs for goods shipped and that the duplicates of the shipping
documents allegedly showed traces of tampering, alteration and
superimposition. (Who are the respondents?)

On September 3, 1993, petitioners were placed on preventive suspension

for 30 days for their alleged involvement in the anomaly. 1 Their suspension was
extended for 15 days twice: first on October 3, 1993 2 and second on October 18,
1993. 3

On October 29, 1993, a memorandum with the following tenor was issued
by respondents:

In line with the recommendation of the AVP-Audit as presented in his report

of October 15, 1993 (copy attached) and the subsequent filing of criminal charges
against the parties mentioned therein, [Mr. Felix Perez and Mr. Amante Doria are]
hereby dismissed from the service for having falsified company documents. 4
(emphasis supplied)
 On November 9, 1993, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal suspension
and illegal dismissal. 5 They alleged that they were dismissed on November 8,
1993, the date they received the above-mentioned memorandum.

(What were issues before Labor Arbiter?)

The labor arbiter found that the 30-day extension of petitioners' suspension
and their subsequent dismissal were both illegal. He ordered respondents to pay
petitioners their salaries during their 30-day illegal suspension, as well as to
reinstate them with backwages and 13th month pay.

The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision

of the labor arbiter. It ruled that petitioners were dismissed for just cause, that they
were accorded due process and that they were illegally suspended for only 15 days
(without stating the reason for the reduction of the period of petitioners' illegal
suspension). 6

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its January 29, 2002
decision, 7 the CA affirmed the NLRC decision insofar as petitioners' illegal
suspension for 15 days and dismissal for just cause were concerned. However, it
found that petitioners were dismissed without due process. DSAEIT

Petitioners now seek a reversal of the CA decision. They contend that

there was no just cause for their dismissal, that they were not accorded due process
and that they were illegally suspended for 30 days.

(What was the nature of the petition?)

(What is/are issues before the Court?)

We rule in favor of petitioners.

RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE JUST

CAUSE AND TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS

The CA, in upholding the NLRC's decision, reasoned that there was
sufficient basis for respondents to lose their confidence in petitioners 8 for
allegedly tampering with the shipping documents. Respondents emphasized the
importance of a shipping order or request, as it was the basis of their liability to a
cargo forwarder. 9

We disagree.

Reason No. 1.

Factual Reasons

Without undermining the importance of a shipping order or request, we find

respondents' evidence insufficient to clearly and convincingly establish the
facts from which the loss of confidence resulted. 10 Other than their bare
allegations and the fact that such documents came into petitioners' hands at some
point, respondents should have provided evidence of petitioners' functions, the
extent of their duties, the procedure in the handling and approval of shipping
requests and the fact that no personnel other than petitioners were involved. There
was, therefore, a patent paucity of proof connecting petitioners to the alleged
tampering of shipping documents.

The alterations on the shipping documents could not reasonably be attributed

to petitioners because it was never proven that petitioners alone had control of or
access to these documents. Unless duly proved or sufficiently substantiated
otherwise, impartial tribunals should not rely only on the statement of the employer
that it has lost confidence in its employee. 11

Legal Reasons

Willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer
or duly authorized representative is a just cause for termination. 12 However, in
General Bank and Trust Co. v. CA, 13 we said:

First

[L]oss of confidence should not be simulated. It should not be used as a

subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified. Loss of confidence
may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the
contrary. It must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify an earlier action
taken in bad faith.
 Second

The burden of proof rests on the employer to establish that the dismissal is
for cause in view of the security of tenure that employees enjoy under the
Constitution and the Labor Code. The employer's evidence must clearly and
convincingly show the facts on which the loss of confidence in the employee may
be fairly made to rest. 14 It must be adequately proven by substantial evidence. 15
Respondents failed to discharge this burden.

Third

Respondents' illegal act of dismissing petitioners was aggravated by their

failure to observe due process. To meet the requirements of due process in the
dismissal of an employee, an employer must furnish the worker with two written
notices: (1) a written notice specifying the grounds for termination and giving to
said employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side and (2) another written
notice indicating that, upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds have
been established to justify the employer's decision to dismiss the employee. 16

Petitioners were neither apprised of the charges against them nor given a
chance to defend themselves. They were simply and arbitrarily separated from
work and served notices of termination in total disregard of their rights to due
process and security of tenure. The labor arbiter and the CA correctly found that
respondents failed to comply with the two-notice requirement for terminating
employees.

Petitioners likewise contended that due process was not observed in the
absence of a hearing in which they could have explained their side and refuted the
evidence against them.

Conflict of Provisions

There is no need for a hearing or conference. We note a marked difference

in the standards of due process to be followed as prescribed in the Labor Code and
its implementing rules. The Labor Code, on one hand, provides that an employer
must provide the employee ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself
with the assistance of his representative if he so desires:
 ART. 277. Miscellaneous provisions. — . . .

(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and

their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause
and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code,
the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be
terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination
and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself
with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with
company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the
Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall
be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of
his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission. The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid
or authorized cause shall rest on the employer. (emphasis supplied)

The omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code, on the other hand, require
a hearing and conference during which the employee concerned is given the
opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence
presented against him: 17

Section 2. Security of Tenure. — . . .

(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of

due process shall be substantially observed:

For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article

282 of the Labor Code:

(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or

grounds for termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within
which to explain his side.

(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with

the assistance of counsel if he so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the
charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him.

(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating

that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify his termination. (emphasis supplied)
 Which one should be followed? Is a hearing (or conference) mandatory in
cases involving the dismissal of an employee? Can the apparent conflict between
the law and its IRR be reconciled?

At the outset, we reaffirm the time-honored doctrine that, in case of conflict,

the law prevails over the administrative regulations implementing it. 18 The
authority to promulgate implementing rules proceeds from the law itself. To be
valid, a rule or regulation must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of
the enabling statute. 19 As such, it cannot amend the law either by abridging or
expanding its scope. 20 (Cite NCC, Article ___)

Interpretation of Law

Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code provides that, in cases of termination for a
just cause, an employee must be given "ample opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself." Thus, the opportunity to be heard afforded by law to the employee
is qualified by the word "ample" which ordinarily means "considerably more than
adequate or sufficient." 21 In this regard, the phrase "ample opportunity to be
heard" can be reasonably interpreted as extensive enough to cover actual hearing or
conference. To this extent, Section 2 (d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book
VI of the Labor Code is in conformity with Article 277 (b).

Nonetheless, Section 2 (d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of

the Labor Code should not be taken to mean that holding an actual hearing or
conference is a condition sine qua non for compliance with the due process
requirement in termination of employment. The test for the fair procedure
guaranteed under Article 277 (b) cannot be whether there has been a formal
pretermination confrontation between the employer and the employee. The "ample
opportunity to be heard" standard is neither synonymous nor similar to a formal
hearing. To confine the employee's right to be heard to a solitary form narrows
down that right. It deprives him of other equally effective forms of adducing
evidence in his defense. Certainly, such an exclusivist and absolutist interpretation
is overly restrictive. The "very nature of due process negates any concept of
inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation." 22

The standard for the hearing requirement, ample opportunity, is couched in

general language revealing the legislative intent to give some degree of flexibility
or adaptability to meet the peculiarities of a given situation. To confine it to a
single rigid proceeding such as a formal hearing will defeat its spirit.

Significantly, Section 2 (d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of

the Labor Code itself provides that the so-called standards of due process outlined
therein shall be observed "substantially", not strictly. This is a recognition that
while a formal hearing or conference is ideal, it is not an absolute, mandatory or
exclusive avenue of due process.

An employee's right to be heard in termination cases under Article 277 (b) as

implemented by Section 2 (d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the
Labor Code should be interpreted in broad strokes. It is satisfied not only by a
formal face to face confrontation but by any meaningful opportunity to controvert
the charges against him and to submit evidence in support thereof.

A hearing means that a party should be given a chance to adduce his

evidence to support his side of the case and that the evidence should be taken into
account in the adjudication of the controversy. 23 "To be heard" does not mean
verbal argumentation alone inasmuch as one may be heard just as effectively
through written explanations, submissions or pleadings. 24 Therefore, while the
phrase "ample opportunity to be heard" may in fact include an actual hearing, it is
not limited to a formal hearing only. In other words, the existence of an actual,
formal "trial-type" hearing, although preferred, is not absolutely necessary to
satisfy the employee's right to be heard.

This Court has consistently ruled that the due process requirement in cases
of termination of employment does not require an actual or formal hearing. Thus,
we categorically declared in Skipper's United Pacific, Inc. v. Maguad: 25

The Labor Code does not, of course, require a formal or trial type
proceeding before an erring employee may be dismissed. (emphasis supplied)

Use of Jurisprudence

In Autobus Workers' Union v. NLRC, 26 we ruled:

The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential

elements of due process. Due process of law simply means giving opportunity to be
heard before judgment is rendered. In fact, there is no violation of due process
even if no hearing was conducted, where the party was given a chance to explain
his side of the controversy. What is frowned upon is the denial of the opportunity to
be heard.

xxx xxx xxx

A formal trial-type hearing is not even essential to due process. It is enough

that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a
fair decision can be based. This type of hearing is not even mandatory in cases of
complaints lodged before the Labor Arbiter. (emphasis supplied)

In Solid Development Corporation Workers Association v. Solid

Development Corporation, 27 we had the occasion to state:

[W]ell-settled is the dictum that the twin requirements of notice and hearing
constitute the essential elements of due process in the dismissal of employees. It is
a cardinal rule in our jurisdiction that the employer must furnish the employee
with two written notices before the termination of employment can be effected: (1)
the first apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought; and (2) the second informs the employee of the employer's
decision to dismiss him. The requirement of a hearing, on the other hand, is
complied with as long as there was an opportunity to be heard, and not necessarily
that an actual hearing was conducted.

In separate infraction reports, petitioners were both apprised of the

particular acts or omissions constituting the charges against them. They were also
required to submit their written explanation within 12 hours from receipt of the
reports. Yet, neither of them complied. Had they found the 12-hour period too
short, they should have requested for an extension of time. Further, notices of
termination were also sent to them informing them of the basis of their dismissal.
In fine, petitioners were given due process before they were dismissed. Even if no
hearing was conducted, the requirement of due process had been met since they
were accorded a chance to explain their side of the controversy. (emphasis
supplied)

Our holding in National Semiconductor HK Distribution, Ltd. v. NLRC

28 is of similar import:
 That the investigations conducted by petitioner may not be considered
formal or recorded hearings or investigations is immaterial. A formal or trial type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process, the
requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy. It is deemed
sufficient for the employer to follow the natural sequence of notice, hearing and
judgment.

The above rulings are a clear recognition that the employer may provide an
employee with ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the
assistance of a representative or counsel in ways other than a formal hearing. The
employee can be fully afforded a chance to respond to the charges against him,
adduce his evidence or rebut the evidence against him through a wide array of
methods, verbal or written.

After receiving the first notice apprising him of the charges against him, the
employee may submit a written explanation (which may be in the form of a
letter, memorandum, affidavit or position paper) and offer evidence in support
thereof, like relevant company records (such as his 201 file and daily time records)
and the sworn statements of his witnesses. For this purpose, he may prepare his
explanation personally or with the assistance of a representative or counsel. He
may also ask the employer to provide him copy of records material to his defense.
His written explanation may also include a request that a formal hearing or
conference be held. In such a case, the conduct of a formal hearing or conference
becomes mandatory, just as it is where there exist substantial evidentiary disputes
29 or where company rules or practice requires an actual hearing as part of
employment pretermination procedure. To this extent, we refine the decisions we
have rendered so far on this point of law.

This interpretation of Section 2 (d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of

Book VI of the Labor Code reasonably implements the "ample opportunity to be
heard" standard under Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code without unduly restricting
the language of the law or excessively burdening the employer. This not only
respects the power vested in the Secretary of Labor and Employment to
promulgate rules and regulations that will lay down the guidelines for the
implementation of Article 277 (b). More importantly, this is faithful to the mandate
of Article 4 of the Labor Code that "[a]ll doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of [the Labor Code], including its implementing
rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor."
Summary of Ponencia

In sum, the following are the guiding principles in connection with the
hearing requirement in dismissal cases:

(a) "ample opportunity to be heard" means any meaningful

opportunity (verbal or written) given to the employee to answer the charges
against him and submit evidence in support of his defense, whether in a
hearing, conference or some other fair, just and reasonable way.

(b) a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only when

requested by the employee in writing or substantial evidentiary disputes exist
or a company rule or practice requires it, or when similar circumstances
justify it.

(c) the "ample opportunity to be heard" standard in the Labor Code

prevails over the "hearing or conference" requirement in the implementing
rules and regulations.

PETITIONERS WERE ILLEGALLY

SUSPENDED FOR 30 DAYS

An employee may be validly suspended by the employer for just cause

provided by law. Such suspension shall only be for a period of 30 days, after which
the employee shall either be reinstated or paid his wages during the extended
period. 30

In this case, petitioners contended that they were not paid during the two
15-day extensions, or a total of 30 days, of their preventive suspension.
Respondents failed to adduce evidence to the contrary. Thus, we uphold the
ruling of the labor arbiter on this point.

Where the dismissal was without just or authorized cause and there was no
due process, Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, mandates that the
employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time the compensation was not paid up to
the time of actual reinstatement. 31 In this case, however, reinstatement is no
longer possible because of the length of time that has passed from the date of the
incident to final resolution. 32 Fourteen years have transpired from the time
petitioners were wrongfully dismissed. To order reinstatement at this juncture will
no longer serve any prudent or practical purpose. 33

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the

Court of Appeals dated January 29, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 50536 finding
that petitioners Felix B. Perez and Amante G. Doria were not illegally
dismissed but were not accorded due process and were illegally suspended for
15 days, is SET ASIDE. The decision of the labor arbiter dated December 27,
1995 in NLRC NCR CN. 11-06930-93 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that petitioners should be paid their separation pay in lieu
of reinstatement.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Carpio Morales,

Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro and Peralta, JJ., concur.

Austria-Martinez, J., I certify that J. Martinez voted for the ponencia of J.

Corona. - RSP

Velasco, Jr., J., Pls. see separate concurring and dissenting opinion.

Brion, J., with concurring opinion.

Separate Opinions

VELASCO, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in my esteemed colleague's well-written ponencia, except in one

issue, to which I hereby register my dissent.

In gist, the facts as contained in the ponencia show that Felix B. Perez and
Amante G. Doria were dismissed by the Philippine Telegraph and Telephone
Company without a hearing or conference for a series of allegedly anomalous
transactions.

The only issue covered by my dissent is, are Perez and Doria entitled to a
hearing or conference as mandated by Section 2 (b), Rule XXIII, Implementing
Rules of Book V of the Labor Code?
 The ponencia resolved this in the negative and held that Sec. 2 (b), Rule
XXIII, Implementing Rules of Book V, 1 by requiring a hearing, went beyond the
terms and provisions of the Labor Code, particularly Article 277 (b) thereof that
merely requires the employer to provide employees with ample opportunity to be
heard and to defend themselves with the assistance of their representatives if they
so desire. The ponencia, however, conceded that a formal hearing or conference
becomes mandatory only when requested by the employee in writing or substantial
evidentiary disputes exist or a company rule or practice requires it or when similar
circumstances justify. I submit that the actual hearing or conference is mandatory
in ALL dismissal cases for the following reasons:

(1) Art. 277(b) of the Labor Code provides that:

(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and

their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause
and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code,
the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be
terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination
and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself
with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with
company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the
Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall
be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of
his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission. The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid
or authorized cause shall rest on the employer. (Emphasis supplied.)

The aforequoted provision states that employees are to be given "ample"

opportunity to be heard and defend themselves. However, the word "ample" is
vague and not defined in the said provision. Since the meaning of this word is
unclear, then it should be given a liberal construction to favor labor. "Ample"
means "considerably more than adequate or sufficient." 2 Ample opportunity can
be construed to be broad enough to encompass an actual hearing or conference. To
be sure, opportunity to be heard does not exclude an actual or formal hearing since
such requirement would grant more than sufficient chance for an employee to be
heard and adduce evidence. In this sense, I believe there is no discrepancy between
Art. 277 and the Implementing Rule in question.
 The Implementing Rules thus makes available for employees a considerably
or generously sufficient opportunity to defend themselves through a hearing or
conference. In Tanala v. NLRC, we said that:

With respect to the issue of whether petitioner was denied due process in the
administrative procedure entailed in his dismissal, we agree with the labor arbiter
that petitioner was indeed denied procedural due process therein. His dismissal
was not preceded by any notice of the charges against him and a hearing thereon.
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of
due process in cases of dismissal of employees. The purpose of the first
requirement is obviously to enable the employee to defend himself against the
charge preferred against him by presenting and substantiating his version of the
facts.

Contrary to the findings of the NLRC, the notice of preventive suspension

cannot be considered as an adequate notice. Even the fact that petitioner submitted
a written explanation after the receipt of the order of suspension is not the "ample
opportunity to be heard" contemplated by law. Ample opportunity to be heard is
especially accorded to the employee sought to be dismissed after he is informed of
the charges in order to give him an opportunity to refute such accusations levelled
against him.

Furthermore, this Court has repeatedly held that to meet the requirements of
due process, the law requires that an employer must furnish the worker sought to
be dismissed with two written notices before termination of employment can be
legally effected, that is, (1) a notice which apprises the employee of the particular
acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice,
after due hearing, which informs the employee of the employer's decision to
dismiss him. 3 (Emphasis supplied.)

(2) The ponencia seems to underscore the absence of any mention of an

"actual hearing" in Art. 277 (b). It is conceded that there is no explicit mention of
an actual hearing or conference in said legal provision. As earlier discussed, the
requisite hearing is captured in the phrase "ample opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires." Even if
the phrase "actual hearing" is not specified in Art. 277 (b), the same thing is true
with respect to the second written notice informing the employee of the employer's
decision which is likewise unclear in said provision. Thus, the fact that Art. 277 (b)
does not expressly mention actual hearing in Art. 277 (b) does not bar the Secretary
of Labor from issuing a rule (Sec. 2 [d] [ii], Rule I, Implementing Rules of Book
VI of the Labor Code) implementing the provision that what really is meant is an
actual hearing or conference. It should be noted that the Secretary of Labor also
issued a rule on the need for a second written notice on the decision rendered in the
illegal dismissal proceedings despite the silence of Art. 277 (b) on the need for a
written notice of the employer's decision.

(3) The majority opinion cites the rule in statutory construction that in
case of discrepancy between the basic law and its implementing rules, the basic
law prevails. In the case at bar, said principle does not apply because precisely
there is no clear-cut discrepancy between Art. 277 (b) of the Labor Code and Sec. 2
(b), Rule XXIII, Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code. To the extent
of being repetitive the phrase "ample opportunity to be heard" can be construed to
cover an actual hearing. This way, Sec. 2 (b), Rule XXIII does not conflict with nor
contravene Art. 277 (b).

(4) Art. 4 of the Labor Code states that "all doubts in the implementation
and interpretation of the provisions of [the Labor Code], including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor." Since the
law itself invests the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) the power to
promulgate rules and regulations to set the standard guidelines for the realization
of the provision, then the Implementing Rules should be liberally construed to
favor labor. The Implementing Rules, being a product of such rule-making power,
has the force and effect of law. Art. 277 of the Labor Code granted the DOLE the
authority to develop the guidelines to enforce the process. In accordance with the
mandate of the law, the DOLE developed Rule I, Sec. 2(d) of the Implementing
Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code which provides that:

(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of

due process shall be substantially observed:

For termination of employment based on just causes defined in Article 282

of the Labor Code:

(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or

grounds for termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within
which to explain his side.

(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with

the assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to respond to the
charge, present his evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him.
 (iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating
that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify his termination.

In any case, the standards of due process contained in Sec. 2(b), Rule XXIII,
Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code, and now in Sec. 2 (d) (ii), Rule
I, Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code, do not go beyond the terms
and provisions of the Labor Code. The Implementing Rules merely encapsulates a
vague concept into a concrete idea. In what forum can an employer provide
employees with an ample opportunity to be heard and defend themselves with the
assistance of a representative? This situation can only take place in a formal
hearing or conference which the Implementing Rules provides. The employees
may only be fully afforded a chance to respond to the charges made against them,
present their evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against them in a formal
hearing or conference. Therefore, in my humble opinion, there is no discrepancy
between the law and the rules implementing the Labor Code.

(5) In addition, the hearing or conference requirement in termination

cases finds support in the long standing jurisprudence in Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations, wherein we declared that the right to a hearing is one of the
cardinal primary rights 4 which must be respected even in cases of administrative
character. We held:

There are cardinal rights which must be respected even in proceedings of

this character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the
right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence
in support thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his
case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

This Court has recognized even the right of students to a summary

proceeding, in which (a) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and
cause of any accusation against them; (b) they shall have the right to answer the
charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if they so desire; (c) they shall
be informed of the evidence against them; (d) they shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf; and (e) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case. 5
 If administrative cases recognized that the right to a hearing is a "cardinal
primary right" and students are afforded the opportunity to defend themselves by
allowing them to answer the charges through their counsel and by adducing their
evidence to rebut the charges, what more for employees or laborers in the private
sector who are specifically protected by the Constitution's social justice provision?
It would be unjust to the laborers if they are not afforded the same chance given to
students or even to employees in administrative cases.

(6) Removing the right of employees to a hearing prior to termination

would deprive them the opportunity to adduce their evidence. Notice can be taken
of the limited opportunity given to the employees by the directive in the first
written notice that embodies the charges. More often than not, the directive is only
for the employees to explain their side without affording them the right to present
evidence. Furthermore, a hearing gives employees the chance to hire the services
of counsel whose presence is beneficial to employees during hearings because the
counsel knows the intricacies of the law and the strategies to defend the client —
something with which a lay person is most assuredly not familiar. A mere first
notice is not sufficient enough for employees to assemble evidence for their
defense. Most often, the first notice merely serves as or is limited to a general
notice which cites the company rules that were allegedly violated by the employees
without explaining in detail the facts and circumstances pertinent to the charges
and without attaching the pieces of evidence supporting the same. Lastly, the
holding of an actual hearing will prevent the railroading of dismissal of employees
as the employers are obliged to present convincing evidence to support the charges.
All in all, the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages in holding an actual
hearing.

(7) The indispensability of a hearing is advantageous to both the

employer and the employee because they are given the opportunity to settle the
dispute or resort to the use of alternative dispute resolution to deflect the filing of
cases with the NLRC and later the courts. It is important that a hearing is
prescribed by the law since this is the best time that the possibility of a
compromise agreement or a settlement can be exhaustively discussed and entered
into. During this hearing, the relations of the parties may not be that strained and,
therefore, they are more likely receptive to a compromise. Once dismissal is
ordered by the employer, the deteriorated relationship renders the possibility of an
amicable settlement almost nil. Thus, a hearing can help the parties come up with a
settlement that will benefit them and encourage an out-of-court settlement which
would be less expensive, creating a "win-win" situation for them. Of course the
compromise agreement, as a product of the settlement, should be subscribed and
sworn to before the labor official or arbiter.

(8) Recent holdings of this Court have explained the propriety and
necessity of an actual hearing or conference before an employee is dismissed. In
King of Kings Transport, Inc. v. Mamac, 6 reiterated in R.B. Michael Press v.
Galit, 7 we explained that the requirement of a hearing or conference is a necessary
and indispensable element of procedural due process in the termination of
employees, thus:

To clarify, the following should be considered in terminating the services of

employees:

(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain
the specific causes or grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the
employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a
reasonable period. "Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means
every kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees to enable
them to prepare adequately for their defense. This should be construed as a period
of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the employees
an opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult a union official or
lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise against
the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare
their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the
facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the
employees. A general description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice
should specifically mention which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which
among the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged against the employees.

(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and
conduct a hearing or conference wherein the employees will be given the
opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses to the charge against them; (2)
present evidence in support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented
against them by the management. During the hearing or conference, the employees
are given the chance to defend themselves personally, with the assistance of a
representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover, this conference or hearing
could be used by the parties as an opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.

(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the

employers shall serve the employees a written notice of termination indicating that:
(1) all circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been
considered; and (2) grounds have been established to justify the severance of their
employment. 8

(9) Lastly, a liberal interpretation of Art. 277 (b) of the Labor Code would
be in keeping with Art. XIII of the Constitution which dictates the promotion of
social justice and ordains full protection to labor. The basic tenet of social justice is
that "those who have less in life must have more in law." Social justice commands
the protection by the State of the needy and the less fortunate members of society.
This command becomes all the more firm in labor cases where security of tenure is
also an issue. In Rance v. NLRC, we declared that: ASICDH

It is the policy of the state to assure the right of workers to "security of

tenure" (Article XIII, Sec. 3 of the New Constitution, Section 9, Article II of the
1973 Constitution). The guarantee is an act of social justice. When a person has no
property, his job may possibly be his only possession or means of livelihood.
Therefore, he should be protected against any arbitrary deprivation of his job.
Article 280 of the Labor Code has construed security of tenure as meaning that
"the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just
cause or when authorized by" the code (Bundoc v. People's Bank and Trust
Company, 103 SCRA 599 [1981]). Dismissal is not justified for being arbitrary
where the workers were denied due process (Reyes v. Philippine Duplicators, Inc.,
109 SCRA 489 [1981]) and a clear denial of due process, or constitutional right
must be safeguarded against at all times (De Leon v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 100 SCRA 691 [1980]). 9

Between an employer and an employee, the latter is oftentimes on the losing

or inferior position. Without the mandatory requirement of a hearing, employees
may be unjustly terminated from their work, effectively losing their means of
livelihood. The right of persons to their work is considered a property right which
is well within the meaning of the constitutional guarantee. 10 Depriving employees
their job without due process essentially amounts to a deprivation of property
without due process.

We have applied social justice even to cases of just dismissal to grant

equitable relief to laborers who were validly dismissed. We also termed social
justice as "compassionate" justice. 11 Thus, the State should always show
compassion and afford protection to those who are in most need — the laborers.
Knowing that poverty and gross inequality are among the major problems of our
country, then laws and procedures which have the aim of alleviating those
problems should be liberally construed and interpreted in favor of the
underprivileged. Thus, social legislations, such as the Labor Code, should be
liberally construed to attain its laudable objectives. 12

BRION, J., concurring:

I fully concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Associate Justice

Renato C. Corona. I add these views on the specific issue of whether actual hearing
is a mandatory requirement in a termination of employment situation.

The petitioners' position that a formal hearing should be an absolute

requirement whose absence signifies the non-observance of procedural due process
is an unduly strict view and is not at all what procedural due process requires. This
is not the intent behind the Labor Code whose pertinent provision reads:

ART. 277.

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and

their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just or authorized cause
and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code,
the employer shall furnish the workers whose employment is sought to be
terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination
and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with
the assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with company
rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to the guidelines set by the
Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall
be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of
his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission. The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid
or authorized cause shall rest on the employer.

The Secretary of Labor and Employment may suspend the effects of the
termination pending resolution of the dispute in the event of prima facie finding by
the appropriate official of the Department of Labor and Employment before whom
such dispute is pending that the termination may cause a serious labor dispute or
is in implementation of a mass layoff. (as amended by Republic Act No. 6715)

Historical Roots
 At its most basic, procedural due process is about fairness in the mode of
procedure to be followed. It is not a novel concept, but one that traces its roots in
the common law principle of natural justice.

Natural justice connotes the requirement that administrative tribunals,

when reaching a decision, must do so with procedural fairness. If they err, the
superior courts will step in to quash the decision by certiorari or prevent the error
by a writ of prohibition. 1 The requirement was initially applied in a purely judicial
context, but was subsequently extended to executive regulatory fact-finding, as the
administrative powers of the English justices of the peace were transferred to
administrative bodies that were required to adopt some of the procedures
reminiscent of those used in a courtroom. Natural justice was comprised of two
main sub-rules: audi alteram partem 2 — that a person must know the case
against him and be given an opportunity to answer it; and nemo judex in sua cause
debe esse 3 — the rule against bias. Still much later, the natural justice principle
gave rise to the duty to be fair to cover governmental decisions which cannot be
characterized as judicial or quasi-judicial in nature. 4

While the audi alteram partem rule provided for the right to be notified of
the case against him, the right to bring evidence, and to make argument — whether
in the traditional judicial or the administrative setting — common law maintained
a distinction between the two settings. "An administrative tribunal had a duty to
act in good faith and to listen fairly to both sides, but not to treat the question as if
it were a trial. There would be no need to examine under oath, nor even to examine
witnesses at all. Any other procedure could be utilized which would obtain the
information required, as long as the parties had an opportunity to know and to
contradict anything which might be prejudicial to their case." 5

In the U.S., the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution 6 provides the
guarantee for procedural due process, and has used a general balancing formula
to identify the procedural guarantees appropriate to a particular context. 7 In
Mathews v. Eldridge, 8 Justice Powell articulated this approach when he said:

In recent years this Court increasingly has had occasion to consider the
extent to which due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to the
deprivation of some type of property interest even if such hearing is provided
thereafter. In only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly, has the Court ruled that a hearing
closely approximating a judicial trial is necessary. In other cases requiring some
type of pretermination hearing as a matter of constitutional right, the Court has
spoken sparingly about the requisite procedures. [Our] decisions underscore the
truism that "[d]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception
with a fixed content, unrelated to time, place and circumstances. [Due process]
is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands." Accordingly, the resolution of the issue whether the administrative
procedures provided here are constitutionally sufficient requires analysis of the
governmental and private interests that are affected. More precisely, our prior
decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest
that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.

Thus, the U.S. approach is to calibrate the procedural processes to be

observed in administrative cases based on specifically defined parameters.

Significantly in the U.S., the same common law root that gave rise to the
concept of natural justice and the duty to be fair, branched out into the doctrine of
fair procedure applicable to specific private sector actors due to their
overwhelming economic power within certain fields (e.g., professional
associations, unions, hospitals, and insurance companies). The doctrine requires
notice and hearing, 9 but to an extent slightly less than procedural due process;
thus, when an association has clearly given a person the benefit of far more
procedural protections than he would have been entitled to from a government
entity, he has received the benefit of fair procedure and has no cause of action for
the mildly adverse action that resulted. 10

Philippine Due Process Requirement

Article III, Section 1 of the Philippine Constitution contains the

constitutional guarantee against denial of due process, 11 and is a direct transplant
from an American root — the Bill of Rights of the American Constitution. 12 As in
the U.S., our jurisprudence has distinguished between the constitutional guarantee
of due process that applies to state action, and the statutory due process guarantee
under the Labor Code that applies to private employers. 13 The Labor Code
provision, quoted above, is implemented under the Rules Implementing the Labor
Code which provides that —
 (d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of
due process shall be substantially observed:

For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article

282 of the Labor Code:
(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or
grounds for termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within
which to explain his side.
(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with
the assistance of counsel, if he so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the
charge, present his evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him.
(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating
that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify his termination.

For termination of employment as defined in Article 283 of the Labor Code,

the requirement of due process shall be deemed complied with upon service of a
written notice to the employee and the appropriate Regional Office of the
Department of Labor and Employment at least thirty days before effectivity of the
termination, specifying the ground or grounds for termination.

If the termination is brought about by the completion of a contract or phase

thereof, or by failure of an employee to meet the standards of the employer in the
case of probationary employment, it shall be sufficient that a written notice is
served the employee within a reasonable time from the effective date of
termination. 14

Jurisprudence has expounded on the guarantee and its implementation by

reiterating that the employer must furnish the worker to be dismissed with two
written notices before termination of employment can be effected: a first written
notice that informs the worker of the particular acts or omissions for which his or
her dismissal is sought, and a second written notice which informs the worker of
the employer's decision to dismiss him. 15 Between these two notices, the worker
must be afforded ample opportunity to be heard in the manner the ponencia has
very ably discussed.

The Confusion and Submission

 Apparently, confusion has resulted in construing what "ample opportunity to
be heard" requires because the implementing rules of the Labor Code themselves
require that there be an actual hearing despite the clear text of the Labor Code that
only requires ample opportunity to be heard.

I submit that in the absence of a clear legislative intent that what is intended
is an actual hearing, the Court cannot construe the statutory procedural due process
guaranty as an absolute requirement for an actual hearing in the way that at least
two cases, namely King of Kings of Transport, Inc. v. Mamac 16 and R.B. Michael
Press v. Galit 17 now require.

a. Historical Reason.

Procedural due process cannot be read completely dissociated from its roots.
While the concept of procedural fairness that it embodies originated as a
requirement in judicial proceedings, the concept has been extended to procedures
that were not strictly judicial as regulatory fact-finding was devolved and delegated
to administrative tribunals. The devolution was driven by need; it was beyond the
capability of the courts to attend to the ever-increasing demands of regulation as
society became increasingly complex. As discussed above, a trial-type procedure is
not an absolute necessity in administrative due process. In fact, in the U.S., not
every administrative decision-making requires a hearing. 18 As the U.S. Supreme
Court stated in the Mathews ruling we quoted above: "[d]ue process, unlike some
legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances. [Due process] is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands." 19 [Italics supplied]

b. Philippine Procedural Due Process Developments.

Our Constitution does not expressly define the principles that embody due
process, as it is a concept intended to counterbalance a flexible power of state —
police power. Early on, jurisprudence has recognized distinctions between
procedural due process in judicial proceedings and in administrative proceedings.

In a long line of cases starting with Banco Español v. Palanca, 20 the

requirements of procedural due process in judicial proceedings have been defined.
21 In these proceedings, the quantum of evidence that the prosecution must meet in
criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt, 22 while in civil cases the
standard has been described as "preponderance of evidence". 23 The requirements
of procedural due process in administrative proceedings have been similarly
defined in the early case of Ang Tibay v. CIR. 24 The proof required in these
proceedings is the lower standard of "substantial evidence". 25

The quantum of evidence required in these proceedings impacts on their

hearing requirements. While both judicial and administrative proceedings require a
hearing and the opportunity to be heard, they differ with respect to the hearing
required before a decision can be made. In criminal cases where a constitutional
presumption of innocence exists, procedural judicial due process requires that
judgment be rendered upon lawful hearing where factual issues are tested through
direct and cross-examination of witnesses to arrive at proof beyond reasonable
doubt. In civil cases, evidentiary hearings are likewise a must to establish the
required preponderance of evidence. 26 Administrative due process, on the other
hand, requires that the decision be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties concerned.
27 Thus, substantial reasons justify the variance in the hearing requirements for
these proceedings.

c. Due Process in the Private Employment Setting.

Separately from the requirement of due process when State action is

involved, the Constitution also guarantees security of tenure to labor, 28 which the
Labor Code implements by requiring that there be a just or authorized cause before
an employer can terminate the services of a worker. 29 This is the equivalent of
and what would have satisfied substantive due process had a State action been
involved. The equivalent of procedural due process is detailed under Article 277 of
the Labor Code, heretofore quoted, which requires notice and ample opportunity to
be heard, both of which are fleshed out in the Implementing Rules of Book VI and
in Rule XXIII of Department Order No. 9, Series of 1997, of the Department of
Labor.

Thus, from the concept of due process being a limitation on state action, the
concept has been applied by statute in implementing the guarantee of security of
tenure in the private sector. In Serrano v. NLRC, 30 we had the occasion to draw
the fine distinction between constitutional due process that applies to governmental
action, and the due process requirement imposed by a statute as a limitation on the
exercise of private power. Noting the distinctions between constitutional due
process and the statutory duty imposed by the Labor Code, the Court thus
decided in Agabon v. NLRC 31 to treat the effects of failure to comply differently.

d. No Actual Hearing Requirement in the Labor Code.

 That an actual hearing in every case is not intended by the Labor Code in
dismissal situations is supported by its express wording that only requires an
"ample opportunity to be heard", not the "hearing or conference" that its
implementing rules require.

The "ample opportunity" required to be provided by the employer is similar

in character to the process required in administrative proceedings where, as
explained above, an actual hearing is not an absolute necessity. To be sure, it
cannot refer to, or be compared with, the requirements of a judicial proceeding
whose strict demands necessarily require a formal hearing.

"Judicial declarations are rich to the effect that the essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times
and in all circumstances essential to due process, the requirements of which are
satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side in the controversy." 32 In Arboleda v. NLRC, 33 we held that:

The requirement of notice and hearing in termination cases does not

connote full adversarial proceedings as elucidated in numerous cases decided by
this Court. Actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only for clarification
or when there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give
vague testimonies. This is a procedural right that the employee must ask for since
it is not an inherent right, and summary proceedings may be conducted thereon.

To the same effect is the following statement of Mr. Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno, albeit in a dissenting opinion, in Agabon: "[t]his is not to hold that a trial-
type proceeding is required to be conducted by employers. Hearings before the
employers prior to the dismissal are in the nature of and akin to administrative due
process which is free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements", citing
Mr. Justice Laurel's dictum in the landmark Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations. We have even held in China Banking Corporation v. Borromeo 34 that
no formal administrative investigation is necessary in the process of dismissing an
employee where the employee expressly admitted his infraction. All that is needed
is to inform the employee of the findings of management.

The identity of the actor should not also be lost on us in considering the
"ample opportunity" requirement. Judicial and quasi-judicial processes are
undertaken by the state, while the dismissal action the Labor Code regulates is
undertaken by a private sector employer. A distinction between these actors ought
to be recognized and given a proper valuation in considering the processes required
from each. Due process in the private realm does not address an all-powerful State
clothed with police power and the powers of taxation and eminent domain; it
merely addresses a private sector-employer who, constitutionally, shares the same
responsibility with the worker for industrial peace, and who is also entitled to
reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth. 35 Proportionality
with the power sought to be limited dictates that due process in its flexible
signification be applied to a private sector dismissal situation, ensuring only that
there is fairness at all times so that the constitutional guarantee of security of
tenure is not defeated. Thus, the required processes in a private sector dismissal
situation should, at the most, be equivalent to those required in administrative
proceedings; whether an actual hearing would be required should depend on the
circumstances of each case.

Last but not the least, reasonableness and practicality dictate against an
actual hearing requirement in every case of dismissal. There are simply too many
variables to consider in the private sector dismissal situation — ranging from the
circumstances of the employer, those of the employee, the presence of a union, and
the attendant circumstances of the dismissal itself — so that a hard and fast actual
hearing requirement may already be unreasonable for being way beyond what the
statutory procedural due process requirement demands. Such a requirement can
also substantially tie-up management operations and defeat the efficiency, growth
and the profits that management and employees mutually need.

To recapitulate, the "ample opportunity to be heard" the Labor Code

expressly requires does not mean an actual hearing in every dismissal action by the
employer; whether an actual hearing would be required depends on the
circumstances of each case as each particular situation demands. Thus, the
identical rulings in King of Kings of Transport, Inc. vs. Mamac 36 and R.B.
Michael Press vs. Galit 37 that an actual hearing is a mandatory requirement in
employee dismissal should now be read with our present ruling in mind. The
Department of Labor and Employment should as well be on notice that this ruling
is the legally correct interpretation of Rule I, Section (2) (d) (ii) of Book VI of the
Rules to Implement the Labor Code.

Footnotes

1. Records, pp. 70-71.

2. Id., pp. 72-73.
 3. Id., pp. 74-75.
4. Id., p. 76.
5. Id., p. 39.
6. Decision penned by Commissioner Ireneo B. Bernardo, and concurred in by
Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier and Commissioner Joaquin A. Tanodra. TIADCc
7. Decision of the Court of Appeals, penned by Associate Justice (now retired
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) Ruben T. Reyes, and concurred in by Associate Justices
Renato C. Dacudao and Mariano C. del Castillo of the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals.
8. Rollo, p. 34.
9. Records, p. 107.
10. Commercial Motors Corporation v. Commissioners, et al., G.R. No. 14762, 10
December 1990, 192 SCRA 191, 197. HEDaTA
11. Santos v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-76991, October 28, 1988, 166 SCRA 759, 765. De
Leon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 52056, October 30, 1980, 100 SCRA 691, 700.
12. LABOR CODE, Book VI, Title 1, Art. 282 (c).
13. G.R. No. L-42724, 9 April 1985, 135 SCRA 569, 578.
14. Imperial Textile Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 101527, 19 January 1993, 217
SCRA 237, 244-245.
15. Starlite Plastic Industrial Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 78491, 16 March 1989, 171
SCRA 315, 324. TSIDEa
16. Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, Book VI, Rule 1, Sec. 2 (a) and
(c).
17. Section 2 (d), Rule I, Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code.
18. See Conte v. Palma, 332 Phil. 20 (1996) citing Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center
v. Garcia, Jr., G.R. No. 115381, 23 December 1994, 239 SCRA 386.
19. Id. citing Lina Jr. v. Cariño, G.R. No. 100127, 23 April 1993, 221 SCRA 515.
20. Implementing rules and regulations may not enlarge, alter or restrict the
provisions of the law they seek to implement; they cannot engraft additional requirements not
contemplated by the legislature (Pilipinas Kao, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 423 Phil. 834 [2001]).
aCHcIE
21. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW COLLEGIATE INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED, p. 74, 1993 edition.
22. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
23. Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 52789, 19 December 1980, 101
SCRA 752.
In the landmark case on administrative due process, Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 635 [1940]), this Court laid down seven cardinal primary rights:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the
right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. . . . (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented. . . .
24. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
G.R. No. 168498, 16 June 2006, 491 SCRA 213.
25. G.R. No. 166363, 15 August 2006, 498 SCRA 639.
26. 353 Phil. 419 (1998).
 27. G.R. No. 165995, 14 August 2007, 530 SCRA 132.
28. 353 Phil. 551 (1998).
29. See Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (Brennan
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974)
(Marshall J., dissenting). ASaTHc
30. Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, Book V, Rule XXIII, Sec. 9, as
amended by Department of Labor and Employment Order No. 9 (1997).
31. Agabon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, 17 November 2004, 442 SCRA 573, 610.
32. Panday v. NLRC, G.R. No. 67664, 20 May 1992, 209 SCRA 122, 126-127.
33. Sealand Service, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 90500, 5 October 1990, 190 SCRA 347,
355.

VELASCO, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:

1. Now only Sec. 2(d)(ii), Rule I, Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor
Code remains, as amended by Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003. HDIATS
2. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 74 (1993).
3. G.R. No. 116588, January 24, 1996, 252 SCRA 314, 320-321.
4. 69 Phil. 635, 641-644 (1940).
5. Guzman v. National University, No. L-68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 699, 706-
707. SEcITC
6. G.R. No. 166208, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 116.
7. G.R. No. 153510, February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 23.
8. King of Kings Transport, Inc., supra at 125-126.
9. No. L-68147, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 279, 284-285. EcHIDT
10. Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Court of Appeals, No. L-38482, June 18,
1976, 71 SCRA 470, 480.
11. Tanala, supra note 3, at 320.
12. Manahan v. Employees' Compensation Commission, No. L-44899, April 22,
1981, 104 SCRA 198, 202. aAcHCT

BRION, J., concurring:

1. See: Jones, D.P. and De Villars A., Principles of Administrative Law (1985 ed.),
pp. 148-149.
2. Literally, "let the other side be heard".
3. "No one can be the judge in his own cause".
4. Supra note 1, pp. 157-160, citing Ridge v. Baldwin, [1963] 2 All E.R. 66 (H.L.)
5. Supra note 1, p. 200.
6. UNITED STATES Constitution, 14th Amendment.
7. See: Gunther, Constitutional Law, (11th ed.), pp. 583-585. DEICaA
8. 425 U.S. 319 (1976).
9. See: Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 22 Cal. 4th 1060 (2000).
10. Dougherty v. Haag, 165 Cal. App. 4th 315 (2008).
 11. No person shall be denied the right to life, liberty or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
12. Supra note 6.
13. Serrano v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117040, January 27, 2000, 323 SCRA 44; Agabon v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, Nov. 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 573. TAcDHS
14. Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code, Rule 1, Section 2, as
amended by Department Order No. 10, series of 1997.
15. Tiu v. NLRC, G.R. No. 83433, November 12, 1992, 215 SCRA 540; see also:
Serrano and Agabon cases, supra note 13.
16. G.R. No. 166208, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 116.
17. G.R. No. 153510, February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 23. CIHTac
18. Supra note 7.
19. Supra note 8.
20. 37 Phil. 921 (1918).
21. The requirements of due process in judicial proceedings are as follows: 1) an
impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;
2) jurisdiction lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant and over the property which is
the subject matter of the proceeding; 3) an opportunity to be heard afforded to the defendant; and
4) judgment rendered upon lawful hearing.
22. People v. Berroya, G.R. No. 122487, December 12, 1997, 283 SCRA 111.
23. Supreme Transliner, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125356,
November 21, 2001, 370 SCRA 41. HDTCSI
24. 69 Phil. 635 (1940); the observance of due process in administrative proceedings
requires the following: (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested
to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof; (2) the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented; (3) the decision must be supported by evidence; (4) the evidence must be
substantial; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence present at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) the administrative body or any of
its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; and (7) the administrative body
should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.
25. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. See Domasig v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
No. 118101, September 16, 1996, 261 SCRA 779. ATHCac
26. See People v. Dapitan, G.R. No. 90625, May 23, 1991, 197 SCRA 378, citing
People v. Castillo, 76 Phil. 72 (1946); Banco Español de Filipino v. Palanca, supra at note 20;
Macabingkil v. Yatco, 21 SCRA 150 (1967); Apurillo v. Garciano, 28 SCRA 1054 (1969); Shell
Company of the Philippines, Ltd. v. Enage, 49 SCRA 416 (1973); Lorenzana v. Cayetano, 68
SCRA 485 (1975).
27. Cuenca v. Atas, G.R. No. 146214, October 5, 2007, 535 SCRA 48; Alliance of
Democratic Free Labor Organization v. Laguesma, G.R. No. 108625, March 11, 1996, 254
SCRA 565.
28. CONSTITUTION, Article XIII, Section 3, par. 2.
29. LABOR CODE, Article 279.
30. Supra note 13.
31. G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 573.
32. NEECO III v. NLRC, G.R. No. 157603, June 23, 2005, 461 SCRA 169.
33. G.R. No. 119503, February 11, 1999, 303 SCRA 38.
34. G.R. No. 156515, October 19, 2004, 440 SCRA 621.
35. CONSTITUTION, Article XIII, Section 3, pars. 3 and 4. AEIDTc
36. Supra note 16.
37. Supra note 17.