VOL. 257, MAY 29, 1996 149: Concept Builders, Inc. vs. NLRC

7/20/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 257
VOL. 257, MAY 29, 1996 149

Concept Builders, Inc. vs. NLRC
*
G.R. No. 108734. May 29, 1996.
CONCEPT BUILDERS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, (First
Division) and Norberto Marabe, Rodolfo Raquel, Cristobal
Riego, Manuel Gillego, Palcronio Giducos, Pedro Aboigar,
Norberto Comendador, Rogelio Salut, Emilio Garcia, Jr.,
Mariano Rio, Paulina Basea, Alfredo Albera, Paquito Salut,
Domingo Guarino, Romeo Galve, Dominador Sabina, Felipe
Radiana, Gavino Sualibio, Moreno Escares, Ferdinand
Torres, Felipe Basilan, and Ruben Robalos, respondents.
Corporation Law; Doctrine of Piercing the Veil of Corporate

Fiction; The separate and distinct personality of a corporation is
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
150
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
merely a fiction created by law for convenience and to promote

justice; When the notion of separate juridical personality is used to
defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend
crime, or is used as a device to defeat the labor laws, this separate
personality of the corporation may be disregarded or the veil of
corporate fiction pierced.—It is a fundamental principle of
corporation law that a corporation is an entity separate and
distinct from its stockholders and from other corporations to
which it may be connected. But, this separate and distinct
personality of a corporation is merely a fiction created by law for
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000164b597c4fb215adc6c003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/15
convenience and to promote justice. So, when the notion of

separate juridical personality is used to defeat public convenience,
justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime, or is used as a device
to defeat the labor laws, this separate personality of the
corporation may be disregarded or the veil of corporate fiction
pierced. This is true likewise when the corporation is merely an
adjunct, a business conduit or an alter ego of another corporation.
Same; Same; Some probative factors of identity that will
justify the application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.
—The conditions under which the juridical entity may be
disregarded vary according to the peculiar facts and
circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be
accurately laid down, but certainly, there are some probative
factors of identity that will justify the application of the doctrine
of piercing the corporate veil, to wit: “1. Stock ownership by one or
common ownership of both corporations. 2. Identity of directors
and officers. 3. The manner of keeping corporate books and
records. 4. Methods of conducting the business.”
Same; Same; “Instrumentality Rule,” Explained.—The SEC
en banc explained the “instrumentality rule” which the courts
have applied in disregarding the separate juridical personality of
corporations as follows: “Where one corporation is so organized
and controlled and its affairs are conducted so that it is, in fact, a
mere instrumentality or adjunct of the other, the fiction of the
corporate entity of the ‘instrumentality’ may be disregarded. The
control necessary to invoke the rule is not majority or even
complete stock control but such domination of finances, policies
and practices that the controlled corporation has, so to speak, no
separate mind, will or existence of its own, and is but a conduit
for its principal. It must be kept in mind that the control must be
shown to have been exercised at the time the acts complained of
took place. Moreover, the control and breach of duty must
proximately cause the injury or unjust loss
151
VOL. 257, MAY 29, 1996 151
for which the complaint is made.”

Same; Same; Test in determining the applicability of the
doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction.—The test in
determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of
corporate fiction is as follows: “1. Control, not mere majority or
complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of
finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the

transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to this
transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of
its own; 2. Such control must have been used by the defendant to
commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory
or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and unjust act in
contravention of plaintiff’s legal rights; and 3. The aforesaid
control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or
unjust loss complained of. The absence of any one of these
elements prevents ‘piercing the corporate veil.’ In applying the
‘instrumentality’ or ‘alter ego’ doctrine, the courts are concerned
with reality and not form, with how the corporation operated and
the individual defendant’s relationship to that operation.”
Same; Same; The question of whether a corporation is a mere
alter ego, a mere sheet or paper corporation, a sham or a
subterfuge is purely one of fact.—Thus, the question of whether a
corporation is a mere alter ego, a mere sheet or paper corporation,
a sham or a subterfuge is purely one of fact.
Labor Law; Writs of Execution; Sheriffs; Pleadings and
Practice; Should the losing party, his agent or representative,
refuse or prohibit the Sheriff or his representative entry to the
place where the property subject of execution is located or kept, the
judgment creditor may apply to the NLRC or the Labor Arbiter
concerned for a break-open order.—In view of the failure of the
sheriff, in the case at bar, to effect a levy upon the property
subject of the execution, private respondents had no other
recourse but to apply for a break-open order after the third-party
claim of HPPI was dismissed for lack of merit by the NLRC. This
is in consonance with Section 3, Rule VII of the NLRC Manual of
Execution of Judgment which provides that: “Should the losing
party, his agent or representative, refuse or prohibit the Sheriff or
his representative entry to the place where the property subject of
execution is located or kept, the judgment creditor may apply to
the Commission or Labor Arbiter concerned for a break-open
order.”
152

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Law Firm of Araullo & Raymundo for petitioner.
Ciriaco S. Cruz for private respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil

may be pierced when a corporation is just but the alter ego
of a person or of another corporation. Where badges of
fraud exist; where public convenience is defeated; where a
wrong is sought to be justified thereby, the corporate fiction
or the notion of legal entity should come to naught. The law
in these instances will regard the corporation as a mere
association of persons and, in case of two corporations,
merge them into one.
Thus, where a sister corporation is used as a shield to
evade a corporation’s subsidiary liability for damages, the
corporation may not be heard to say that it has a
personality separate and distinct from the other
corporation. The piercing of the corporate veil comes into
play.
This special civil action ostensibly raises the question of
whether the National Labor Relations Commission
committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued a
“break-open order” to the sheriff to be enforced against
personal property found in the premises of petitioner’s
sister company.
Petitioner Concept Builders, Inc., a domestic
corporation, with principal office at 355 Maysan Road,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, is engaged in the construction
business. Private respondents were employed by said
company as laborers, carpenters and riggers.
On November, 1981, private respondents were served
individual written notices of termination of employment by
petitioner, effective on November 30, 1981. It was stated in
the individual notices that their contracts of employment
had expired and the project in which they were hired had
been completed.
153
VOL. 257, MAY 29, 1996 153

Public respondent found it to be, the fact, however, that at

the time of the termination of private respondent’s
employment, the project in which they were hired had not
yet been finished and completed. Petitioner had to engage
the services of sub-contractors whose workers performed
the functions of private respondents.
Aggrieved, private respondents filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and non-payment of
their legal holiday pay, overtime pay and thirteenth-month

pay against petitioner.
On December
1
19, 1984, the Labor Arbiter rendered
judgment ordering petitioner to reinstate private
respondents and to pay them back wages equivalent to one
year or three hundred working days.
On November 27, 1985, the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) dismissed the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner on the ground that2
the
said decision had already become final and executory.
On October 16, 1986, the NLRC Research and
Information Department made the finding that3 private
respondents’ back wages amounted to P199,800.00.
On October 29, 1986, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of
execution directing the sheriff to execute the Decision,
dated December 19, 1984. The writ was partially satisfied
through garnishment of sums from petitioner’s debtor, the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, in the
amount of P81,385.34. Said amount was turned over to the
cashier of the NLRC.
On February 1, 1989, an Alias Writ of Execution was
issued by the Labor Arbiter directing the sheriff to collect
from herein petitioner the sum of P117,414.76,
representing the balance of the judgment award, and to
reinstate private respondents to their former positions.
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 11-12.

2 Id., at 12.
3 Ibid.
154

On July 13, 1989, the sheriff issued a report stating that he

tried to serve the alias writ of execution on petitioner
through the security guard on duty but the service was
refused on the ground that petitioner no longer occupied
the premises.
On September 26, 1986, upon motion of private
respondents, the Labor Arbiter issued a second alias writ of
execu-tion.
The said writ had not been enforced by the special
sheriff because, as stated in his progress report, dated
November 2, 1989:
1. All the employees inside petitioner’s premises at

355 Maysan Road, Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
claimed that they were employees of Hydro Pipes
Philippines, Inc. (HPPI) and not by respondent;
2. Levy was made upon personal properties he found
in the premises;
3. Security guards with high-powered guns prevented
him from
4
removing the properties he had levied
upon.
The said special sheriff recommended that a “break-open

order” be issued to enable him to enter petitioner’s
premises so that he could proceed with the public auction
sale of the aforesaid personal properties on November 7,
1989.
On November 6, 1989, a certain Dennis Cuyegkeng filed
a third-party claim with the Labor Arbiter alleging that the
properties sought to be levied upon by the sheriff were
owned by Hydro (Phils.), Inc. (HPPI) of which he is the
Vice-President.
On November 23, 1989, private respondents filed a
“Motion for Issuance of a Break-Open Order,” alleging that
HPPI and petitioner corporation were owned by the same
incorporator/stockholders. They also alleged that petitioner
temporarily suspended its business operations in order to
evade its legal obligations to them and that private
respondents were willing to post an indemnity bond to
answer for any damages which petitioner and HPPI may
suffer because of the issuance
_______________
4 Rollo, p. 14.
155
VOL. 257, MAY 29, 1996 155

of the break-open order.

In support of their claim against HPPI, private
respondents presented duly certified copies of the General
Informations Sheet, dated May 15, 1987, submitted by
petitioner to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the General Information Sheet, dated May 15,
1987, submitted by HPPI to the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
The General Information Sheet submitted by the

petitioner revealed the following:
“1. Breakdown of Subscribed Capital

Name of Amount
Stockholder Subscribed
HPPI P6,999,500.00
Antonio W. Lim 2,900,000.00
Dennis S. 300.00
Cuyegkeng
Elisa C. Lim 100,000.00
Teodulo R. Dino 100.00
Virgilio O. Casino 100.00
2. Board of Directors
Antonio W. Lim Chairman
Dennis S. Member
Cuyegkeng
Elisa C. Lim Member
Teodulo R. Dino Member
Virgilio O. Casino Member
3. Corporate Officers
Antonio W. Lim President
Dennis C. Assistant to the President
Cuyegkeng
Elisa O. Lim Treasurer
Virgilio O. Casino Corporate
Secretary
4. Principal Office
355 Maysan Road
5
Valenzuela, Metro Manila.”
_______________
5 Rollo, pp. 16-17.
156

On the other hand, the General Information Sheet of HPPI

revealed the following:
“1. Breakdown of Subscribed Capital

Name of Amount
Stockholder Subscribed
Antonio W. Lim P400,000.00
Elisa C. Lim 57,700.00
AWL Trading 455,000.00
Dennis S. 40,100.00
Cuyegkeng
Teodulo R. Dino 100.00
Virgilio O. 100.00
Casino
2. Board of
Directors
Antonio W. Lim Chairman
Elisa C. Lim Member
Dennis S. Member
Cuyegkeng
Virgilio O. Member
Casino
Teodulo R. Dino Member
3. Corporate
Officers
Antonio W. Lim President
Dennis S. Assistant to the
Cuyegkeng President
Elisa C. Lim Treasurer
Virgilio O. Corporate
Casino Secretary
4. Principal Office
6
355 Maysan Road, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.”
On February 1, 1990, HPPI filed an Opposition to private

respondents’ motion for issuance of a break-open order,
contending that HPPI is a corporation which is separate
and distinct from petitioner. HPPI also alleged that the two
corporations are engaged in two different kinds of
businesses, i.e., HPPI is a manufacturing firm while
petitioner was then engaged in construction.
_______________
6 Id., at 17-18.
157
VOL. 257, MAY 29, 1996 157

On March 2, 1990, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order

which denied private respondents’ motion for break-open
order.
Private respondents then appealed to the NLRC. On
April 23, 1992, the NLRC set aside the order of the Labor
Arbiter, issued a break-open order and directed private
respondents to file a bond. Thereafter, it directed the
sheriff to proceed with the auction sale of the properties
already levied upon. It dismissed the third-party claim for
lack of merit.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was
denied by the NLRC in a Resolution, dated December 3,
1992.
Hence, the resort to the present petition.
Petitioner alleges that the NLRC committed grave abuse
of discretion when it ordered the execution of its decision
despite a third-party claim on the levied property.
Petitioner further contends, that the doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil should not have been applied in this case,
in the absence of any showing that it created HPPI in order
to evade its liability to private respondents. It also
contends that HPPI is engaged in the manufacture and
sale of steel, concrete and iron pipes, a business which is
distinct and separate from petitioner’s construction
business. Hence, it is of no consequence that petitioner and
HPPI shared the same premises, the same 7
President and
the same set of officers and subscribers.
We find petitioner’s contention to be unmeritorious.
It is a fundamental principle of corporation law that a
corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its
stockholders 8and from other corporations to which it may
be connected. But, this separate and distinct personality of
a corporation is merely a fiction 9
created by law for
convenience and to promote justice. So, when the notion of
separate juri-
_______________
7 Rollo, pp. 7-8.
8 Emilio Cano Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 13

SCRA 290 (1965); Yutivo Sons Hardware Company v. Court of Tax
Appeals, 1 SCRA 160 (1961).
9 Laguna Transportation Company, Inc. v. Social Security
158

dical personality is used to defeat public convenience,

justify wrong, protect fraud or defend
10
crime, or is used as a
device to defeat the labor laws, this separate personality
of the corporation may11 be disregarded or the veil of
corporate fiction pierced. This is true likewise when the
corporation is merely an adjunct, 12
a business conduit or an
alter ego of another corporation.
The conditions under which the juridical entity may be
disregarded vary according to the peculiar facts and
circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be
accurately laid down, but certainly, there are some
probative factors of identity that will justify the application
of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, to wit:
“1. Stock ownership by one or common ownership of

both corporations.
2. Identity of directors and officers.
3. The manner of keeping corporate books and
records.
13
4. Methods of conducting the business.”
The SEC en banc explained the “instrumentality rule”

which the courts have applied in disregarding the separate
juridical personality of corporations as follows:
“Where one corporation is so organized and controlled and its

affairs are conducted so that it is, in fact, a mere instrumentality
or adjunct of the other, the fiction of the corporate entity of the
‘instrumentality’ may be disregarded. The control necessary to
invoke the rule is not majority or even complete stock control but
such domination of finances, policies and practices that the
controlled corporation has, so to speak, no separate mind, will or
existence of its own, and is but a conduit for its principal. It must
be kept in mind that
_______________
System, 107 SCRA 833 (1960).
10 La Campana Coffee Factory, Inc. Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa La

Campana (KMM), 93 Phil. 160 (1953).
11 Sulo ng Bayan, Inc. v. Araneta, 72 SCRA 347 (1976).
12 Tan Boon Bee and Co. v. Jarencio, 163 SCRA 205 (1988).
13 4 Minn. L. Rev., pp. 219-227; cited in R. Lopez, The Corporation Code of the
Philippines, Annotated p. 19 (1994).
159
VOL. 257, MAY 29, 1996 159

the control must be shown to have been exercised at the time the
acts complained of took place. Moreover, the control and breach of
duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss for which
the complaint is made.”
The test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of

piercing the veil of corporate fiction is as follows:
“1. Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but

complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and
business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so
that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the
time no separate mind, will or existence of its own;
2. Such control must have been used by the defendant to
commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a
statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and
unjust act in contravention of plaintiff’s legal rights; and
3. The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately
cause the injury or unjust loss complained of.
The absence of any one of these elements prevents ‘piercing the

corporate veil.’ In applying the ‘instrumentality’ or ‘alter ego’
doctrine, the courts are concerned with reality and not form, with
how the corporation operated14 and the individual defendant’s
relationship to that operation.”
Thus, the question of whether a corporation is a mere alter

ego, a mere sheet or paper 15corporation, a sham or a
subterfuge is purely one of fact.
In this case, the NLRC noted that, while petitioner
claimed that it ceased its business operations on April 29,
1986, it filed an Information Sheet with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on May 15, 1987, stating that its
office address is at 355 Maysan Road, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. On the other hand, HPPI, the third-party
claimant, submitted on the same day, a similar information
sheet stating that its office address
_______________
14 1 Fletcher Cyc. Corp., p. 490; Avelina G. Ramoso et al. v. General

Credit Corporation et al., SEC AC No. 295, October 6, 1992.
15 Phoenix Safety Inc., Co. v. James, 28 Ariz. 514, 237, p. 958.
160

is at 355 Maysan Road, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Furthermore, the NLRC stated that:
“Both information sheets were filed by the same Virgilio O. Casiño

as the corporate secretary of both corporations. It would also not
be amiss to note that both corporations had the same president,
the same board of directors, the same corporate officers, and
substantially the same subscribers.
From the foregoing, it appears that, among other things, the
respondent (herein petitioner) and the third-party claimant
shared the same address and/or premises. Under this
circumstances, (sic) it cannot be said that 16
the property levied
upon by the sheriff were not of respondents.
Clearly, petitioner ceased its business operations in order

to evade the payment to private respondents of back wages
and to bar their reinstatement to their former positions.
HPPI is obviously a business conduit of petitioner
corporation and its emergence was skillfully orchestrated
to avoid the financial liability that already attached to
petitioner corporation.
The facts in this case are17 analogous to Claparols v.
Court of Industrial Relations, where we had the occasion
to rule:
“Respondent court’s findings that indeed the Claparols Steel and

Nail Plant, which ceased operation of June 30, 1957, was
SUCCEEDED by the Claparols Steel Corporation effective the
next day, July 1, 1957 up to December 7, 1962, when the latter
finally ceased to operate, were not disputed by petitioners. It is
very clear that the latter corporation was a continuation and
successor of the first entity x x x. Both predecessors and successor
were owned and controlled by petitioner Eduardo Claparols and
there was no break in the succession and continuity of the same
business. This ‘avoiding-the-liability’ scheme is very patent
considering that 90% of the subscribed shares of stocks of the
Claparols Steel Corporation (the second corporation) was owned
by respondent x x x Claparols himself, and all the assets of the
dissolved Claparols Steel and Nail Plant were turned over to the
emerging Claparols Steel Corporation.
_______________
16 Rollo, pp. 19-20.

17 65 SCRA 613 (1975).
161
VOL. 257, MAY 29, 1996 161

It is very obvious that the second corporation seeks the

protective shield of a corporate fiction whose veil in the present
case could, and should, be pierced as it was deliberately and
maliciously designed to evade its financial obligation to its
employees.”
In view of the failure of the sheriff, in the case at bar, to

effect a levy upon the property subject of the execution,
private respondents had no other recourse but to apply for
a break-open order after the third-party claim of HPPI was
dismissed for lack of merit by the NLRC. This is in
consonance with Section 3, Rule VII of the NLRC Manual
of Execution of Judgment which provides that:
“Should the losing party, his agent or representative, refuse or

prohibit the Sheriff or his representative entry to the place where
the property subject of execution is located or kept, the judgment
creditor may apply to the Commission or Labor Arbiter concerned
for a break-open order.”
Furthermore, our perusal of the records shows that the

twin requirements of due notice and hearing were complied
with. Petitioner and the third-party claimant were given
the opportunity to submit evidence in support of their
claim. Hence, the NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion when it affirmed the break-open order issued by
the Labor Arbiter.
Finally, we do not find any reason to disturb the rule
that factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies supported by
substantial evidence are binding on this Court and are
entitled to great respect,
18
in the absence of showing of grave
abuse of a discretion.
_______________
18 Maya Farms Employees Organization v. National Labor Relations

Commission, 239 SCRA 508 (1994); Capitol Industrial Construction
Groups v. National Labor Relations Commission, 221 SCRA 469 (1993);
Sunset View Condominium Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 228 SCRA 466 (1993).
162

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the

assailed resolutions of the NLRC, dated April 23, 1992 and
December 3, 1992, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Kapunan,

JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed, resolutions affirmed.
Notes.—A corporation is an entity separate and distinct

from its stockholders and from other corporations to which
it may be connected. (Philippine Veterans Investment
Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA
669 [1990])
When valid ground exists, the legal fiction that a
corporation is an entity with a juridical personality
separate and distinct from its members or stockholders
may be disregarded. (Guatson International Travel and
Tours, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 230
SCRA 815 [1994])
The basic rule is still that which can be deduced from
the Court’s pronouncement in Sunio v. National Labor
Relations Commission, i.e., that mere ownership by a single
stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of
the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself sufficient
ground for disregarding the separate corporate personality.
(Santos vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 254
SCRA 673 [1996])
Personal liability where the employer corporation is no
longer existing and is unable to satisfy the judgment in
favor of the employee, the officer should be held liable for
acting on behalf of the corporation. (Valderrama vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, 256 SCRA 466
[1996])
——o0o——
163
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7/20/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 257

VOL. 257, MAY 29, 1996 149

CONCEPT BUILDERS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE

Corporation Law; Doctrine of Piercing the Veil of Corporate

150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Concept Builders, Inc. vs. NLRC

merely a fiction created by law for convenience and to promote

convenience and to promote justice. So, when the notion of

VOL. 257, MAY 29, 1996 151

Concept Builders, Inc. vs. NLRC

for which the complaint is made.”

finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the

152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil

VOL. 257, MAY 29, 1996 153

Public respondent found it to be, the fact, however, that at

their legal holiday pay, overtime pay and thirteenth-month

1 Rollo, pp. 11-12.

154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On July 13, 1989, the sheriff issued a report stating that he

1. All the employees inside petitioner’s premises at

The said special sheriff recommended that a “break-open

VOL. 257, MAY 29, 1996 155

of the break-open order.

The General Information Sheet submitted by the

“1. Breakdown of Subscribed Capital

5 Rollo, pp. 16-17.

156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On the other hand, the General Information Sheet of HPPI

“1. Breakdown of Subscribed Capital

On February 1, 1990, HPPI filed an Opposition to private

VOL. 257, MAY 29, 1996 157

On March 2, 1990, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order

7 Rollo, pp. 7-8.

8 Emilio Cano Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 13

158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

dical personality is used to defeat public convenience,

“1. Stock ownership by one or common ownership of

The SEC en banc explained the “instrumentality rule”

“Where one corporation is so organized and controlled and its

System, 107 SCRA 833 (1960).

10 La Campana Coffee Factory, Inc. Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa La

VOL. 257, MAY 29, 1996 159

The test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of

“1. Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but

The absence of any one of these elements prevents ‘piercing the

Thus, the question of whether a corporation is a mere alter

14 1 Fletcher Cyc. Corp., p. 490; Avelina G. Ramoso et al. v. General

160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

is at 355 Maysan Road, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

“Both information sheets were filed by the same Virgilio O. Casiño

Clearly, petitioner ceased its business operations in order

“Respondent court’s findings that indeed the Claparols Steel and

16 Rollo, pp. 19-20.

VOL. 257, MAY 29, 1996 161

It is very obvious that the second corporation seeks the