(Larry Madaras, James SoRelle) Taking Sides Clash (B-Ok - Xyz)
(Larry Madaras, James SoRelle) Taking Sides Clash (B-Ok - Xyz)
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Clashing Views in
Critical Thinking and Reflection questions to provoke further examination of the issue. This new section
also features Is There Common Ground?—designed to explore the different perspectives of the issue—
plus Additional Resources for readings or Web sites that further the debate.
By requiring students to analyze contradictory positions and reach considered judgments, Taking
Sides actively develops students’ critical thinking skills. It is this development of critical thinking skills
that is the ultimate purpose of each of the volumes in the widely acclaimed Taking Sides program.
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Volume 1
The Colonial Period to Reconstruction
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FIFTEENTH EDITION
SoRelle
Larry Madaras James M. SoRelle
Clashing Views in
Larry Madaras
Howard Community College
and
James M. SoRelle
Baylor University
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EDITORS
Larry Madaras
Howard Community College
and
James M. SoRelle
Baylor University
vi
S ince 1985, our aim has been to create an effective instrument to enhance class-
room learning and to foster critical thinking in the subject area of United States
history. Historical facts presented in a vacuum are of little value to the educational
process. For students, whose search for historical truth often concentrates on when
something happened rather than on why, and on specific events rather than on
the significance of those events, Taking Sides is designed to offer an interesting and
valuable departure. The understanding arrived at based on the evidence that
emerges from the clash of views encourages the reader to view history as an inter-
pretive discipline, not one of rote memorization. The success of the past 14 edi-
tions of Taking Sides: Clashing Views in United States History has encouraged us to
remain faithful to its original objectives and methods, but previous users of this
reader will notice several changes in the format of this new edition.
As in previous editions, the 17 issues and 34 essays that follow are arranged
in chronological order and can be incorporated easily into any American history
survey course. Each issue has an Introduction, which sets the stage for the debate
that follows in the pro and con selections and provides historical and methodo-
logical background to the problem that the issue examines. For this new edition,
each introduction has been expanded to focus more intentionally on alternative
perspectives that are applicable to the question at hand in order to demonstrate
that these issues contain a level of complexity that cannot be addressed fully in
a simple Yes/No format. Additionally, each introduction is accompanied by a set
of student-focused Learning Outcomes which are designed to highlight what
knowledge the reader should take away from reading and studying the issue.
The traditional Postscript from previous editions has been replaced by
several new features. First, there are several questions that relate to the learn-
ing outcomes and to the material in the preceding essays that are designed to
stimulate Critical Thinking and Reflection. Second, Is There Common Ground?
attempts to encourage students to think more deeply about the issue by high-
lighting points shared by scholars on the subject at hand and tying the read-
ings to alternative perspectives within the debate. Third, Additional Resources
offers a brief annotated bibliography of important books and essays relating to
the issue. Also, Internet site addresses (URLs), which should prove useful as
starting points for further research, have been provided on the Internet Refer-
ences page that accompanies each unit opener.
Another new feature to this edition is the Topic Guide, a list of topics cov-
ered in the issues comprising this volume. At the back of the book, as in previ-
ous editions, is a listing of all the contributors to this volume with a brief
biographical sketch of each of the authors whose views are debated here.
vii
issues and the new social history, which depicts a society that benefited from
the presence of Native Americans, African Americans, women, and workers of
various racial and ethnic backgrounds. With this in mind, we present six new
issues: Was the Settlement of Jamestown a Fiasco? (Issue 2); Was Conflict
Between Europeans and Native Americans Inevitable? (Issue 3); Was the Salem
Witchcraft Hysteria a Product of Women’s Search for Power? (Issue 4); Was the
Constitution of the United States Written to Protect the Economic Interests of
the Upper Classes? (Issue 7); Did Alexander Hamilton’s Policies Lay the Foun-
dation for America’s Economic Growth in the Early National Period? (Issue 8);
and Are Historians Wrong to Consider the War Between the States a “Total
War”? (Issue 15).
Larry Madaras
Emeritus, Howard Community College
James M. SoRelle
Baylor University
ix
NO: Carl Degler, from Out of Our Past: The Forces That Shaped
Modern America, 2nd ed. (Harper Collins Publishers, 1959,
1970) 137
Professor T. H. Breen maintains that “the colonists’ shared experiences as
consumers provided them with the cultural resources needed to develop
a bold new form of political protest”—the nonimportation agreements
which provided “a necessary if not causal link” to the break with England.
Professor Carl N. Degler argues that the American Revolution was a
political rebellion led by a group of reluctant revolutionaries who opposed
parliament’s attempt to impose taxes without the consent of the colonists.
NO: Alfred A. Cave, from “Abuse of Power: Andrew Jackson and the
Indian Removal Act of 1830,” The Historian (Winter 2003) 215
Robert V. Remini insists that President Andrew Jackson demonstrated a
genuine concern for the welfare of Native Americans by proposing a
voluntary program that would remove the Five Civilized Tribes west of the
Mississippi River where they could avoid dangerous conflict with white
settlers and preserve their heritage and culture. Alfred A. Cave accuses
Andrew Jackson of abusing his power as president by failing to adhere to
the letter of the Indian Removal Act by transforming a voluntary program
into a coercive one and by ignoring the provisions in his own removal
treaties that promised protection to the various southern tribes.
Contributors 427
Issue 1: Did the Chapter 1: The First Chapter 1: The First Chapter 1: The Collision
Chinese Discover Civilizations of North Civilizations of North of Cultures
America? America America Chapter 2:
Chapter 2: Old Chapter 2: Old Transplantations and
Worlds, New Worlds Worlds, New Worlds, Borderlands
(1400–1600) 1400–1600
xvi
Issue 5: Was There a Chapter 5: The Chapter 5: The Chapter 4: The Empire
Great Awakening in Mosaic of Eighteenth- Mosaic of Eighteenth- in Transition
Mid-Eighteenth-Century Century America Century America,
America? (1689–1771) 1689–1768
Chapter 6: Toward Chapter 6: Toward
the War for American the War for American
Independence Independence,
(1754–1776) 1754–1776
Issue 7: Was the Chapter 8: Crisis and Chapter 8: Crisis and Chapter 6: The
Constitution of the Constitution Constitution, Constitution and the
United States Written (1776–1789) 1776–1789 New Republic
to Protect the Economic Chapter 7: The
Interests of the Upper Jeffersonian Era
Classes?
Issue 8: Did Alexander Chapter 8: Crisis and Chapter 8: Crisis and Chapter 5: The
Hamilton’s Policies Lay Constitution Constitution, American Revolution
the Foundation for (1776–1789) 1776–1789
America’s Economic Chapter 9: The Early Chapter 9: The Early
Growth in the Early Republic (1789–1824) Republic, 1789–1824
National Period? Chapter 10: The Chapter 10: The
Opening of America Opening of America,
(1815–1850) 1815–1850
(Continued)
Issue 9: Did Andrew Chapter 8: Crisis and Chapter 9: The Early Chapter 9: Jacksonian
Jackson’s Removal Policy Constitution Republic, 1789–1824 America
Benefit Native (1776–1789) Chapter 11: The Rise
Americans? of Democracy,
1824–1840
Issue 10: Did the Chapter 17: Chapter 10: The Chapter 7: The
Industrial Revolution Reconstructing the Opening of America, Jeffersonian Era
Provide More Economic Union (1865–1877) 1815–1850
Opportunities for
Women in the 1830s?
Issue 11: Was Chapter 12: The Fires Chapter 12: The Chapter 12: Antebellum
Antebellum Temperance of Perfection Fires of Perfection, Culture and Reform
Reform Motivated (1820–1850) 1820–1850
Primarily by Religious
Moralism?
Issue 12: Was the Chapter 14: Western Chapter 14: Western Chapter 13: The
Mexican War an Exercise Expansion and the Expansion and the Impending Crisis
in American Rise of the Slavery Rise of Slavery,
Imperialism? Issue (1820–1850) 1820–1850
Issue 13: Was John Chapter 15: The Chapter 15: The Chapter 12: Antebellum
Brown an Irrational Union Broken Union Broken, Culture and Reform
Terrorist? (1850–1861) 1850–1861 Chapter 13: The
Chapter 16: Total War Chapter 16: Total Impending Crisis
and the Republic War and the Republic,
(1861–1865) 1861–1865
Issue 14: Was Slavery Chapter 15: The Chapter 15: The Chapter 14: The Civil
the Key Issue in the Union Broken Union Broken, War
Sectional Conflict (1850–1861) 1850–1861
Leading to the Civil Chapter 16: Total Chapter 16: Total
War? War and the Republic War and the Republic,
(1861–1865) 1861–1865
Issue 15: Are Historians Chapter 16: Total Chapter 16: Total Chapter 14: The Civil
Wrong to Consider the War and the Republic War and the Republic, War
War Between the States (1861–1865) 1861–1865
a “Total War”?
Issue 16: Was Abraham Chapter 15: The Chapter 15: The Chapter 13: The
Lincoln America’s Union Broken Union Broken, Impending Crisis
Greatest President? (1850–1861) 1850–1861 Chapter 14: The Civil
Chapter 16: Total Chapter 16: Total War
War and the Republic War and the Republic,
(1861–1865) 1861–1865
T his topic guide suggests how the selections in this book relate to the subjects
covered in your course. You may want to use the topics listed on these pages to
search the Web more easily. On the following pages a number of Web sites have
been gathered specifically for this book. They are arranged to reflect the issues of
this Taking Sides reader. You can link to these sites by going to http://www.mhhe
.com/cls.
All issues and their articles that relate to each topic are listed below the bold-
faced term.
Biography Political
8. Did Alexander Hamilton’s Policies Lay 6. Was the American Revolution Largely a
the Foundation for America’s Economic Product of Market-Driven Consumer Forces?
Growth in the Early National Period? 7. Was the Constitution of the United States
9. Did Andrew Jackson’s Removal Policy Written to Protect the Economic Interests
Benefit Native Americans? of the Upper Classes?
13. Was John Brown an Irrational Terrorist? 8. Did Alexander Hamilton’s Policies Lay
16. Was Abraham Lincoln America’s Greatest the Foundation for America’s Economic
President? Growth in the Early National Period?
9. Did Andrew Jackson’s Removal Policy
Benefit Native Americans?
Economics 11. Was Antebellum Temperance Reform
2. Was the Settlement of Jamestown a Fiasco? Motivated Primarily by Religious
6. Was the American Revolution Largely a Moralism?
Product of Market-Driven Consumer Forces? 12. Was the Mexican War an Exercise in
7. Was the Constitution of the United States American Imperialism?
Written to Protect the Economic Interests 13. Was John Brown an Irrational Terrorist?
of the Upper Classes? 14. Was Slavery the Key Issue in the Sectional
8. Did Alexander Hamilton’s Policies Lay Conflict Leading to the Civil War?
the Foundation for America’s Economic 15. Are Historians Wrong to Consider the War
Growth in the Early National Period? Between the States a “Total War”?
10. Did the Industrial Revolution Provide 16. Was Abraham Lincoln America’s Greatest
More Economic Opportunities for Women President?
in the 1830s? 17. Did Reconstruction Fail as a Result of
14. Was Slavery the Key Issue in the Sectional Racism?
Conflict Leading to the Civil War?
Religion
Global 5. Was There a Great Awakening in Mid-
1. Did the Chinese Discover America? Eighteenth-Century America?
(Continued)
xix
11. Was Antebellum Temperance Reform 17. Did Reconstruction Fail as a Result of
Motivated Primarily by Religious Racism?
Moralism?
War and Diplomacy
Social
3. Was Conflict Between Europeans and
2. Was the Settlement of Jamestown a Native Americans Inevitable?
Fiasco? 12. Was the Mexican War an Exercise in
4. Was the Salem Witchcraft Hysteria a American Imperialism?
Product of Women’s Search for Power? 14. Was Slavery the Key Issue in the Sectional
9. Did Andrew Jackson’s Removal Policy Conflict Leading to the Civil War?
Benefit Native Americans? 15. Are Historians Wrong to Consider the War
10. Did the Industrial Revolution Provide Between the States a “Total War”?
More Economic Opportunities for Women
in the 1830s?
11. Was Antebellum Temperance Reform Women
Motivated Primarily by Religious 4. Was the Salem Witchcraft Hysteria a
Moralism? Product of Women’s Search for Power?
13. Was John Brown an Irrational Terrorist? 10. Did the Industrial Revolution Provide
14. Was Slavery the Key Issue in the Sectional More Economic Opportunities for Women
Conflict Leading to the Civil War? in the 1830s?
Schools of Thought
Three predominant schools of thought have emerged in American history
since the first graduate seminars in history were given at The Johns Hopkins
University in Baltimore in the 1870s. The progressive school dominated the
professional field in the first half of the twentieth century. Influenced by the
reform currents of Populism, progressivism, and the New Deal, these histori-
ans explored the social and economic forces that energized America. The pro-
gressive scholars tended to view the past in terms of conflicts between groups,
and they sympathized with the underdog.
The post-World War II period witnessed the emergence of a new group of
historians who viewed the conflict thesis as overly simplistic. Writing against
the backdrop of the Cold War, these neoconservative, or consensus, historians
argued that Americans possess a shared set of values and that the areas of
agreement within our nation’s basic democratic and capitalistic framework are
more important than the areas of disagreement.
xxi
rationale behind the war between the United States and Mexico in 1846.
Walter Nugent argues that President James K. Polk was an imperialist moti-
vated to use the power of the presidency to force Mexico to cede California
and the current Southwest to the United States. Graebner contends that
President Polk pursued an aggressive (but not imperialistic) policy that would
force Mexico to recognize U. S. annexation of Texas and to sell New Mexico
and California to its northern neighbor without starting a war.
Two issues cover topics relating to the Civil War and its consequences. In
Issue 14, Charles B. Dew and Marc Egnal debate the causes of the Civil War. Dew
employs the words of white southerners whose job it was to promote the cause of
secession following Abraham Lincoln’s election by appealing to their audiences’
commitment to the preservation of slavery and the doctrine of white supremacy.
Egnal argues that the decision of Lower South states to secede from the Union
was determined by an economically-based struggle between residents with strong
ties to the North and Upper South who embraced an entrepreneurial outlook, on
one hand, and those who were largely isolated from the North and who opposed
the implementation of a diversified economy, on the other hand.
Issue 15 assesses the validity of characterizing the American Civil War as a
“total war.” Mark Neely challenges the argument that the War Between the
States accurately represented a “total war” because the North did not fully mobi-
lize its resources nor engage in centralized planning and state intervention to
defeat the Confederacy. James McPherson, however, strongly disagrees with
Neely and insists that the twin goals of restoring the Union and freeing the
slaves required the United States to conduct a “total war” on its opponent.
With the end of slavery, one of the most controversial questions con-
fronting those responsible for reconstructing the nation following the war
involved the future of African Americans. Perhaps no other period of Ameri-
can history has been subjected to more myths than has this postwar era. Even
though most scholars today recognize that Reconstruction did not achieve its
most enlightened economic and social goals, they differ in their explanations
about the source of this failure. In Issue 17, LeeAnna Keith relates the details
of the Colfax massacre, an assault carried out by white Louisianans to elimi-
nate Radical Republican rule in their state which had empowered local African
Americans. The military attack on the Grant Parish courthouse in Colfax on
Easter Sunday 1973, Keith says, was directed toward removing the all-black
militia unit guarding the courthouse and reinstituting white supremacy in the
Pelican State. Heather Cox Richardson, on the other hand, argues that the
failure of Radical Reconstruction was primarily a consequence of a national
commitment to a free-labor ideology that opposed an expanding central gov-
ernment that legislated rights to African Americans that other citizens had
acquired through hard work.
Politics in America
The American people gave legitimacy to their revolution through the estab-
lishment of a republican form of government. The United States has operated
under two constitutions: the first established the short-lived confederation
from 1781 to 1789; the second was written in 1787 and remains in effect over
two hundred years later. In Issue 7, Howard Zinn describes the founders as
members of an economic elite who desired a stronger central government to
protect their property rights. Gordon Wood stresses social and ideological,
not economic, motivations. Wood argues that the Federalists were upper-
class aristocrats who, at both the Philadelphia and the state ratifying conven-
tions, employed “democratic” language to argue that the new national
government was as democratic as the Confederation government it would
replace.
Alexander Hamilton was one of the most significant leaders of the early
national period. Issue 8 explores Hamilton’s skills as the primary architect of
the nation’s economic policies. John Steele Gordon views Hamilton as the
person most responsible for the powerful national economy we enjoy today.
Joyce Appleby disagrees with Gordon and argues that Thomas Jefferson, rather
than simply acquiescing to Hamilton’s policies, democratized Hamilton’s
accomplishments, dismantled the Federalist fiscal program, reduced taxes, and
freed money and credit from national control.
No discussion of American politics is complete without examining some
of the individuals who have served as president of the United States. Andrew
Jackson’s leadership already has been discussed above in connection with his
policy toward the removal of Native Americans from the southeastern United
States (Issue 9). In Issue 16, Philip Shaw Paludan and M. E. Bradford debate
Abraham Lincoln’s presidential legacy. Paludan contends that Lincoln deserves
to be recognized as the nation’s greatest president for facing the unparalleled
challenges associated with the Civil War, preserving the Union, and freeing
the slaves. M. E. Bradford characterizes Lincoln as a cynical politician whose
abuse of authority as president and commander-in-chief during the Civil War
marked a serious departure from the republican goals of the Founding Fathers
and established the prototype for the “imperial presidency” of the twentieth
century.
Conclusion
The process of historical study should rely more on thinking than on memo-
rizing data. Once the basics of who, what, when, and where are determined,
historical thinking shifts to a higher gear. Analysis, comparison and contrast,
evaluation, and explanation take command. These skills not only increase
our knowledge of the past but also provide general tools for the comprehen-
sion of all the topics about which human beings think.
The diversity of a pluralistic society, however, creates some obstacles to
comprehending the past. The spectrum of differing opinions on any particular
subject eliminates the possibility of quick and easy answers. In the final analy-
sis, conclusions often are built through a synthesis of several different inter-
pretations, but, even then, they may be partial and tentative.
The study of history in a pluralistic society allows each citizen the oppor-
tunity to reach independent conclusions about the past. Since most, if not all,
historical issues affect the present and future, understanding the past becomes
essential to social progress. Many of today’s problems have a direct connection
with the past. Additionally, other contemporary issues may lack obvious direct
antecedents, but historical investigation can provide illuminating analogies.
At first, it may appear confusing to read and to think about opposing historical
views, but the survival of our democratic society depends on such critical
thinking by acute and discerning minds.
Virtual Jamestown
This site includes a digital archive of primary sources along with a re-creation of
early European settlements.
www.virtualjamestown.org
xxviii
YES: Gavin Menzies, from 1421: The Year China Discovered America
(William Morrow, 2003)
NO: Robert Finlay, from “How Not to (Re)Write World History:
Gavin Menzies and the Chinese Discovery of America,” Journal of
World History 15 ( June 2004, pp. 229–242)
Learning Outcomes
After reading this issue, you should be able to:
• Explore the kinds of arguments historians use to support their
conclusions
• Evaluate the evidence provided by scholars with two very dif-
ferent notions of historical truth
• Consider evidence that challenges the traditional views of
New World discovery
• Understand the nature of the challenge to a Eurocentric per-
spective of historical development
• Realize that historians do not always agree on what happened
in the past
ISSUE SUMMARY
YES: Gavin Menzies surmises that between 1421 and 1423 a Chi-
nese fleet spent four months exploring the Pacific coastline of
North America and leaving behind substantial evidence to support
his contention that the Chinese discovered America long before the
arrival of European explorers.
NO: Robert Finlay accuses Menzies of ignoring the basic rules of
historical study and logic to concoct an implausible interpretation
of Chinese discovery based upon a misreading of Chinese impe-
rial policy, misrepresentation of sources, and conjecture that has
no evidentiary base.
From 1421: The Year China Discovered America by Gavin Menzies (William Morrow, 2003),
pp. 19, 33, 37–38, 42–43, 199–200, 201–204, 206–210 (excerpts). Copyright © 2003 by Gavin
Menzies. Reprinted by permission of HarperCollins Publishers.
ships built with softwood planking, rowed by oarsmen and only suitable for
island-hopping in the calm of a Mediterranean summer. The biggest Venetian
galleys were some 150 feet long and 20 feet wide and carried at best 50 tons of
cargo. In comparison, Zhu Di’s treasure ships were ocean-going monsters built
of teak. The rudder of one of these great ships stood 36 feet high—almost as
long as the whole of the flagship the Niña in which Columbus was later to set
sail for the New World. Each treasure ship could carry more than two thou-
sand tons of cargo and reach Malacca in five weeks, Hormuz in the Persian
Gulf in twelve. They were capable of sailing the wildest oceans of the world, in
voyages lasting years at a time. That so many ships were lost on the Chinese
voyages of discovery testifies not to any lack of strength in their construction
but rather to the perilous, uncharted waters they explored, from rocky coasts
and razor-sharp coral reefs to the ice-strewn oceans of the far north and far
south. Venetian galleys were protected by archers; Chinese ships were armed
with gunpowder weapons, brass and iron cannon, mortars, flaming arrows
and exploding shells that sprayed excrement over their adversaries. In every
single respect—construction, cargo capacity, damage control, armament,
range, communications, the ability to navigate in the trackless ocean and to
repair and maintain their ships at sea for months on end—the Chinese were
centuries ahead of Europe. Admiral Zheng He would have had no difficulty
in destroying any fleet that crossed his path. A battle between this Chinese
armada and the other navies of the world combined would have resembled
one between a pack of sharks and a shoal of sprats.
By the end of the middle watch—four in the morning—the last provisions
had been lashed down and the armada weighed anchor. A prayer was said to
Shao Lin, Taoist goddess of the sea, and then, as their red silk sails slowly filled,
the ships, resembling great houses, gathered way before the winds of the north-
east monsoon. As they sailed out across the Yellow Sea, the last flickering lights
of Tanggu faded into the darkness while the sailors clustered at the rails, strain-
ing for a last sight of their homeland. In the long months they would spend
travelling the oceans, their only remaining links to the land would be memories,
keepsakes and the scented roses many brought with them, growing them in pots
and even sharing their water rations with them. The majority of those seamen at
the rails would never see China again. Many would die, many others would be
shipwrecked or left behind to set up colonies on foreign shores. . . .
him to the Pacific coast of modern Canada. The California current would then
have taken over, sweeping the fleet southwards down the western seaboard of
the United States to Panama. From there, the north equatorial current would
carry a square-rigged ship back across the Pacific towards the Philippines. The
whole round trip, before the wind and current all the way, would have been
about sixteen thousand nautical miles. At an average of 4.8 knots, the voyage
would have taken some four months, matching the date of Zhou Man’s return
to Nanjing in October. My surmise . . . was that squadrons of ships from the
main fleet were detached to establish colonies along the Pacific coast from
California down to Ecuador.
I began the search for corroboration that Zhou Man’s fleet had indeed
reached the Pacific coast of North America. The first European to explore that
coast was Hernando de Alarcón in 1540. Having sought fame and fortune in
New Spain, he left Acapulco on 9 May of that year in command of a fleet sup-
porting the conquistador Coronado’s expedition to New Mexico. Alarcón first
charted the peninsula of Bahía California, and then California itself. I knew
that he was the first European to chart it, for neither Columbus nor any of the
other early explorers reached any part of the west coast of North America, so
any map of the Pacific coast pre-dating Alarcón’s voyage would be powerful
evidence that he was not the first to reach it.
Such evidence does exist in the form of the Waldseemüller world map, a
beautifully coloured large map published in 1507 and the first to chart latitude
and longitude with precision. Originally owned by Johannes Schöner (1477–
1547), a Nuremberg astronomer and geographer, it had long been thought
lost and was only rediscovered in 1901 in the castle of Wolfegg in southern
Germany. It remained there in relative obscurity until 2001, when in a blaze
of publicity the US Library of Congress acquired it from Prince Johannes
Waldburg-Wolfegg for ten million dollars. The man who drew the map, Martin
Waldseemüller (c. 1470–1518), was German-born and one of the foremost
cosmographers—combining the study of geography and astronomy—of his
era. . . .
The Pacific coast of America is strikingly drawn on the Waldseemüller
chart and the latitudes correspond to those of Vancouver Island in Canada
right down to Ecuador in the south. This is completely consistent with a car-
tographer aboard a ship sailing down the Pacific coast, but not charting the
coast in great detail. Oregon is clearly identifiable, and several very old wrecks
have been discovered there on the beach at Neahkahnie. One was of teak with
a pulley for hoisting sails made of caeophyllum, a wood unique to south-east
Asia. The wood has yet to be carbon-dated, but if it proves to be from the early
fifteenth century it will provide strong circumstantial evidence that one of
Zhou Man’s junks was wrecked in Neahkahnie Bay. Some examiners of the
wreckage there claim to have found paraffin wax, which was used by Zheng
He’s fleet to desalinate sea-water for the horses.
Even without finds from wrecked junks, the Pacific coasts of Central and
South America are full of evidence of Chinese voyages. The Asiatic chickens
found from Chile to California . . . and many other flora and fauna were car-
ried across the globe by the Chinese fleets. On my first visit to California many
years ago, I remember coming across a bank of beautiful camellia roses (Rosa
laevigata). It was a still summer’s evening and their lovely fragrance filled the
air around me. In 1803, European settlers found a beautiful fragrant rose grow-
ing wild; they named it the Cherokee Rose. Yet it was indigenous to south-east
China and had been illustrated in a twelfth-century Chinese pharmacopoeia.
‘When and by what means it reached America is one of the unsolved problems
of plant introductions,’ but it was a common practice for sailors aboard Zheng
He’s junks to keep pots of roses, their scent an enduring reminder of home.
The Chinese also took plants and seeds home with them. Amaranth, a native
North American grain with a high protein content, was brought from America
to Asia in the early fifteenth century, as of course was maize—brought to the
Philippines and seen there by Magellan. Coconuts, native to the South Pacific,
were found by the first Europeans on the Pacific coasts of Costa Rica, Panama
and Ecuador and on Cocos Island west of Costa Rica. The carriers of grain from
the Americas to Asia, of roses and chickens from China to the Americas, and
coconuts from the South Pacific to Ecuador can only have been the Chinese.
San Francisco and Los Angeles are clearly depicted at the correct latitudes
on the Waldseemüller chart, and I was certain that Zhou Man must have sailed
down that coast. Crossing such an enormous expanse of ocean after two years
at sea must have left some of his junks in bad condition and in urgent need of
repair. Even the best-built ships could not remain at sea for such long peri-
ods without suffering at least some damage from storms and the pounding
of the waves. At the very least they would have required running repairs and
careening—scraping the barnacles from their hulls—and the most badly dam-
aged might well have been cannibalized to repair the others. If so, the remains
of these wrecked ships should have been found off the coast of California, just
as other wrecks had been in Australia and other parts of the globe.
My enquiries into strange wrecks on the coast of California drew a blank,
but I did discover that museums there held substantial quantities of Ming blue
and white ceramics. The accepted wisdom is that these items were brought to
California in the holds of Spanish galleons, but a number of medieval Chinese
anchors have been found off the California coast, and these are unlikely to
have been brought by Spanish ships. I began to question seriously the prov-
enance of the Ming porcelain; had it really been brought by the Spanish?
Medieval Chinese porcelain can be dated by its cobalt content: the greater the
amount of iron in the cobalt, the deeper blue the glaze. The dark cobalt of the
Mongol era came from Persia, also ruled by the Mongols, but Zhu Di’s father
sealed the Chinese borders after he drove out the Mongols in 1368 and Persian
cobalt was no longer available. However, Zhu Di reopened the frontiers and
restored trade along the Silk Road through Asia allowing Persian cobalt to be
imported once more. The period when Chinese pale blue porcelain was pro-
duced and used in Ming China is thus limited, and the colour of the porcelain
held by Californian museums would indicate whether or not it was made dur-
ing this period in China’s history.
I was certain that a great treasure fleet had discovered the Pacific coasts
of North and South America, but my researches failed to uncover conclusive
evidence such as the wreck of a Chinese junk. In the hope that others might
have found traces I had missed, I decided to ‘go public’ on the issue in a lecture
at the Royal Geographical Society in London in March 2002. It was broadcast
around the world; within forty-eight hours reports began to come in from
California, drawing my attention to the wreck of a medieval Chinese junk
buried under a sandbank in the Sacramento River off the north-east corner of
San Francisco Bay. My first reaction was to discount the reports—the site was
more than a hundred miles from open sea and the discovery seemed too good
to be true—but over the next few days more e-mails describing the same junk
continued to arrive. As soon as I had carried out some preliminary research,
I discovered that the prevailing north-easterly winds on this coast could have
blown a junk straight across the bay and into the Sacramento River. Six cen-
turies ago the river was broader and deeper than today, for deforestation has
reduced rain- and snowfall in the area causing the water level to fall. It was
indeed possible, if not probable, that a junk entering San Francisco Bay would
have been driven by the winds into the Sacramento River.
Dr John Furry of the Natural History Museum of Northern California
first became aware of the junk twenty years ago when he read an account of
the strange armour that once had been found in its hold (the wreck was then
evidently less deeply buried in sand and silt than it is now). The armour was
of an unusual metal (native Americans did not know how to forge metal) and
curiously silver-grey in colour. It was shown to a local expert who is said to
have identified it as of medieval Chinese origin. Dr Furry’s attempts to pursue
the story met a brick wall—the expert had died in the intervening years, and
the armour had been lent to a local school and was now lost—but he was suf-
ficiently intrigued to begin investigating the wreck-site.
The site was covered with a 40-foot layer of the accumulated sand and
silt of centuries, so Dr Furry began by taking magnetometer readings of the
area. These showed a strong magnetic anomaly outlining a buried object
85 feet long and 30 feet wide, very similar in size and shape to the trading
junks that accompanied Zheng He’s fleets. Core samples were then extracted
from the site. The fragments of wood brought up were carbon-dated to 1410,
indicating that the junk was built in that year, ‘a period that included a
maritime highpoint for the ancient Chinese’, as local newspapers laconically
reported.
The evidence from the carbon-dating encouraged Dr Furry to drill again
with more sophisticated equipment. This yielded much larger samples includ-
ing further pieces of wood and a compacted 80lb mass of millions of black
seeds. He sent fragments of the wood and the seeds to China for analysis, and
according to Dr Furry, the Chinese Academy of Forestry have provisionally
identified the wood as Keteleria, a conifer native to south-east China but not to
North America. In the Middle Ages, the Chinese cultivated Keteleria for ship-
building. Dr Furry also told me that Dr Zhang Wenxu, a former professor at the
Chinese Agricultural University in Beijing and the leading Chinese expert on
ancient seeds, had provisionally identified four different types of seeds in the
black mass brought up from the wreck-site. Three were native to both China
and North America, but the other was found only in China. Most interesting
of all, however, was Dr Furry’s further discovery of rice grains and the body of
a beetle among the material raised. Rice, indigenous to Africa and China, was
unknown in the Americas in the fifteenth century. Further analysis of the rice
and the beetle is being carried out as I write, but to date no written reports on
the analysis of the wood or the seeds have been received from China.
I now had little doubt that the site contained the wreck of a Chinese
junk; it was exactly the evidence I had been looking for. It seemed highly
improbable that the crew would have drowned when the junk grounded on
the sandbank in the Sacramento River. It was far more likely that they had
come ashore onto the lush, fertile lands of the valley. Their first task would
have been to rescue as much rice as possible from the holds of the ship. Much
would have been needed to meet their short-term food requirements, but they
would also have set some aside as seed and planted it in a suitable location—
the floodplain of the Sacramento River.
It has long been claimed that rice was introduced to West Africa by
Europeans and then to the Americas by the Spanish, but Professor Judith A.
Carney of the University of California has argued that this thesis is fundamen-
tally flawed. It is widely accepted that the Chinese made a major contribu-
tion to developing agriculture in the rich soils of California, particularly the
cultivation of rice in the swamplands of the lower Sacramento. By the 1870s,
75 percent of the farmers in California were of Chinese origin. ‘The Chinese
actually taught the American farmer how to plant, cultivate and harvest.’ But
were these Chinese working in the fields and plantations of the Sacramento
Valley all part of the great nineteenth-century waves of immigration into the
United States, or could some have been descendants of settlers left on the
banks of the Sacramento by Zhou Man in 1423? I found a clue to this mystery
in an unlikely source.
In 1874, Stephen Powers, an official inspector appointed by the gov-
ernment of California who had spent years collecting data on the languages
of the tribes of California, published an article claiming that he had found
linguistic evidence of a Chinese colony on the Russian River in California,
some seventy miles north-west of the Sacramento junk. Powers also claimed
that diseases brought by European settlers had decimated this Chinese colony
as well as the other Indian people of California, ‘[the] remittent fever which
desolated the Sacramento valleys in 1833 and reduced these great plains from
a condition of remarkable populousness to one of almost utter silence and
solitude . . . there was scarcely a human being left alive’. Powers’ report was
badly received by his government employers, and although he courteously
and bravely attempted to maintain his position, his official report, published
in 1877, is a watered-down version of his claims. Nonetheless, it makes for
fascinating reading.
Quite apart from his claim of a Chinese colony based on linguistic evidence,
Powers described Chinese settlers as having intermarried with local Indians over
centuries. Their descendants were paler than the people of the coast, and,
unlike other Indian tribes, the older generation had magnificent beards while
the women ‘are as proud of their black hair as the Chinese’. Rather than skins,
women wore ‘a single garment in the shape of a wool sack, sleeveless and
gathered at the neck, more or less white once’. They were ‘simple, friendly,
peaceable and inoffensive’. After death, ‘they generally desire like the Chinese
to be buried in the ancestral soil of their tribe’. Again like the Chinese, but
unlike other hunter-gatherer tribes of North America, the peoples around the
Sacramento and Russian Rivers were sedentary: ‘at least four fifths of their diet
was derived from the vegetable kingdom . . . They knew the qualities of all
herbs, shrubs, leaves, having a command of much greater catalogue of [botani-
cal] names than nine tenths of Americans.’ Their ancestors’ legacy could also
be seen in pottery beautifully formed in classic Chinese shapes, whereas the
‘[modern] Indian merely picks up a boulder of trap [a dark, igneous rock] or
greenstone and beats out a hollow leaving the outside rough’. The ancestors of
the Sacramento and Russian River tribes also used ‘long, heavy knives of obsid-
ian or jasper’ their descendants, Powers found, no longer knew how to make.
And while the ancestors had fashioned elegant tobacco pipes from serpentine,
their descendants made use of simple wooden ones. They had also ‘developed
a Chinese inventiveness’ in devising methods of snaring wildfowl using decoy
ducks—a Chinese custom, but one not found among the Indians. Like the
Chinese, they ate snails, slugs, lizards and snakes, and built large middens of
clam shells.
On the eastern side of San Francisco Bay, some seventy miles south of the
site of the Sacramento junk, there is a small, stone-built village with low walls.
In 1904, Dr John Fryer, Professor of Oriental Languages at University College,
Berkeley, California, stated, ‘This is undoubtedly the work of Mongolians . . .
The Chinese would naturally wall themselves in, as they do in all their towns
in China.’ This accords with Powers’s succinct description of Chinese people
who had created a colony and then intermarried with native Americans.
It certainly seems that Zhou Man’s fleet left a settlement in California.
Were they the first to cultivate rice in the Americas? And was the wealth of
blue and white Ming porcelain found in California really brought by Spanish
galleons, as conventional wisdom has it, or was it carried in the holds of the
junks of Zhou Man’s fleet? . . .
After emerging from the bay, Zhou Man’s fleet would have been carried
southwards by the wind and current to New Mexico. The Waldseemüller map
shows the coast with reasonable accuracy, charted just as one would expect
from a ship passing by, but there is a gap at the latitude of the Gulf of Tehuante-
pec in Guatemala, as if the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans met there, which of
course is not the case. This is consistent with the Chinese having sailed into
the Gulf, but finding it too shallow to proceed, turning back and then drawing
what they could see from the entrance: water stretching away for miles in front
of them, marking an apparent opening between North and South America.
I made the assumption that they had sailed beyond the isthmus of
Panama, clearly shown on the Waldseemüller, and then been driven back
across the Pacific towards China by the winds and current, as one would expect
with a square-rigged sailing ship. But on their way down that coast they would
have been swept across the Gulf of California and could have made a landfall
on the Mexican coast somewhere near Manzanillo in the modern province of
Colima. Here a spectacular volcano, the Colima, some 12,700 feet high and
clearly visible for miles out to sea, would have attracted them.
I n 1421: The Year China Discovered America (2002), Gavin Menzies aspires to
rewrite world history on a grand scale. He maintains that four Chinese fleets,
comprising twenty-five to thirty ships and at least 7,000 persons each, visited
every part of the world except Europe between 1421 and 1423. Trained by Zheng
He, the famous eunuch-admiral, Chinese captains carried out the orders of Zhu
Di (r. 1402–1424), the third Ming emperor, to map coastlines, settle new territo-
ries, and establish a global maritime empire. According to Menzies, proof of the
passage of the Ming fleets to the Americas, Australia, New Zealand, and Polynesia
is overwhelming and indisputable. His “index of supporting evidence” includes
thousands of items from the fields of archaeology, cartography, astronomy, and
anthropology; his footnotes and bibliography include publications in Chinese,
French, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, German, Arabic, and Hebrew.
Menzies claims that Chinese mariners explored the islands of Cape
Verde, the Azores, the Bahamas, and the Falklands; they established colonies
in Australia, New Zealand, British Columbia, California, Mexico, Puerto Rico,
and Rhode Island; they introduced horses to the Americas, rice to California,
chickens to South America, coffee to Puerto Rico, South American sloths to
Australia, sea otters to New Zealand, and maize to the Philippines. In addition,
Chinese seamen toured the temples and palaces of the Maya center of Palenque
in Mexico, hunted walruses and smelted copper in Greenland, mined for lead
and saltpeter in northern Australia, and established trading posts for diamonds
along the Amazon and its tributaries.
Inasmuch as Menzies believes that he has collected a veritable mountain
of evidence, he is not disheartened by skepticism about some of his astonish-
ing assertions. As he told People Magazine (24 February 2003) after 1421 hit the
New York Times bestseller list, “[t]here’s not one chance in a hundred million
that I’m wrong!” He regards his investigation as an ongoing project: a website
(www.1421.tv) provides yet more evidence, . . . , and a team of researchers cur-
rently is assisting him in combing medieval Spanish and Portuguese docu-
ments for added proof of his contentions. . . .
Menzies is contemptuous of professional historians who ignore evidence
of Chinese influence in the Americas, “presumably because it contradicts the
From Journal of World History by Robert Finlay, vol. 15, no. 2, June 2004, pp. 229–42 (refs.
omitted). Copyright © 2004 by University of Hawaii Press. Reprinted by permission.
14
accepted wisdom on which not a few careers have been based.” He explains
that he has uncovered information that has eluded many eminent historians of
China, even though it was right before their eyes, “only because I knew how to
interpret the extraordinary maps and charts that reveal the course and the extent
of the voyages of the great Chinese fleets between 1421 and 1423.” A former
submarine commander in the British Royal Navy, he has sailed in the wake of
Christopher Columbus, Ferdinand Magellan, and James Cook, hence he recog-
nizes that those mariners, who navigated with copies of Chinese maps in hand,
were themselves merely sailing in the backwash of Zheng He’s fleets.
Menzies intends his work for the general reader, and his style is vigorous,
clear, and informal. Most strikingly, he makes his own search for evidence of
the Ming fleets the narrative framework for recounting their achievements. He
describes his frustrations and triumphs as he travels everywhere following “an
elusive trail of evidence,” sometimes discouraged but never defeated. He also
brings his narrative to life by recounting his own experiences in places visited
by the fleets of Zheng He, including savoring rum toddies and roast lobster on
Guadeloupe beaches, braving the dangers of the Great Barrier Reef of Australia,
and rounding the Cape of Good Hope into the South Atlantic. The underlying
message of these frequent vignettes is that the author’s astonishing conclu-
sions are validated by the unique personal experience he brings to his research
as well as by his transparent account of how he struggled toward those conclu-
sions. This approach makes for a lively, engaging work that surely will attract
many readers who otherwise would never open a 500-page tome on Chinese
maritime enterprise and European exploration.
The good news conveyed by 1421 is that there are big bucks in world
history: Menzies received an advance of £500,000 ($825,000) from his British
publisher, whose initial printing runs to 100,000 copies. The bad news is that
reaping such largesse evidently requires producing a book as outrageous as
1421. Menzies flouts the basic rules of both historical study and elementary
logic. He misrepresents the scholarship of others, and he frequently fails to
cite those from whom he borrows. He misconstrues Chinese imperial policy,
especially as seen in the expeditions of Zheng He, and his extensive discus-
sion of Western cartography reads like a parody of scholarship. His allega-
tions regarding Nicolò di Conti (c. 1385–1469), the only figure in 1421 who
links the Ming voyages with European events, are the stuff of historical fic-
tion, the product of an obstinate misrepresentation of sources. The author’s
misunderstanding of the technology of Zheng He’s ships impels him to depict
voyages no captain would attempt and no mariner could survive, including
a 4,000-mile excursion along the Arctic circle and circumnavigation of the
Pacific after having already sailed more than 42,000 miles from China to West
Africa, South America, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines.
Portraying himself as an innocent abroad, forthrightly seeking truths the
academic establishment has disregarded or suppressed, Menzies in fact is less
an “unlettered Ishmael” than a Captain Ahab, gripped by a mania to bend
everything to his purposes. His White Whale is Eurocentric historiography,
which celebrates Columbus . . . and Vasco da Gama . . . without realizing
they merely aped the epic deeds of the Chinese. More generally, Menzies, in
absolution from Pope Eugenius IV (r. 1431–1447) for having converted to Islam.
As instructed by the pope, Conti told the story of his travels to the humanist
Poggio Bracciolini (1380–1459), who incorporated it into his De Varietate For-
tunae, completed in 1448. His account was widely read, for Conti provided the
best source of information on the East, especially India and Southeast Asia,
that Europe had received since Marco Polo’s Travels (c. 1298).
Conti is essential to Menzies’s argument since he represents the sole
vehicle by which Chinese geographical knowledge reached the West. Much of
1421 is devoted to interpreting European maps in the light of that knowledge,
and without Conti as “the crucial link” in the chain of evidence, the central
thesis of the book collapses.
To establish the relevance of Conti, Menzies splices into one quota-
tion a passage from Poggio and another from Pero Tafur (c. 1410–c. 1484), a
Spaniard who met Conti at Mt. Sinai (Egypt) in 1437, when the Venetian was
planning to return home. Poggio refers to large Indian ships, with five sails,
many masts, and hull compartments. Since only Chinese ships possessed the
latter, it is generally assumed that Conti actually described Chinese vessels,
evidently without knowing their origins. Tafur writes of ships “like very large
houses” [como casas muy grandes], with ten or more sails and large cisterns of
water inside, that delivered cargo to Mecca. Neither Poggio nor Tafur refer to
Calicut in connection with the large ships, to Chinese vessels visiting India,
or to the fleet of Zheng He; neither chronicler provides a date for Conti’s stay
in Calicut. Still, Menzies takes for granted that Conti was in Calicut in 1421
when the Ming armada anchored there, and since both Conti and Ma Huan
describe similar scenes in Calicut, Menzies surmises that Conti must have met
the Chinese chronicler in that port.
Based on these presumptions, Menzies creates an incredible scenario: he
declares that Conti boarded Zheng He’s junks for their voyages to the Cape
Verde Islands, Brazil, Patagonia, Australia, New Zealand, North America, and
Mexico. Moreover, after the fleet returned to Southeast Asia and China in late
1423, Conti dashed home to Venice, where in 1424 he was “debriefed” by the
Infante Dom Pedro of Portugal (d. 1449), older brother of Prince Henry (1394–
1460), the so-called “Navigator,” and where Conti handed over copies of
Chinese charts produced during the great voyage. Those charts, Menzies
asserts, formed the basis for all subsequent European maps that showed
lands across the Atlantic, including, inter alia, the Pizzigano map (1424),
the (disputed) Vinland map (1420–1440?), the Cantino planisphere (1502),
and the Waldseemuller maps (1507, 1513). Furthermore, Conti’s information
prompted Prince Henry to secretly dispatch settlers to Puerto Rico in 1431,
where (Menzies suggests) they perhaps found evidence of a previous Chinese
colony. European copies of Ming charts also explain Columbus’s ambition to
voyage across the Ocean Sea, Magellan’s conviction that he could sail around
South America, and Cook’s alleged “discovery” of Australia.
Even though “The Travels of Nicolò di Conti” is silent about the global
journey of the Venetian—one wonders why he kept that thrilling news from
Poggio—Menzies repeatedly claims the document proves that Conti “sailed
with the Chinese fleet from India to Australia and China.” Thus with no more
warrant than a passing mention by Poggio and Tafur of large ships in the
Indian Ocean, Menzies concocts a scenario in which Conti tours the world
on Zheng He’s junks, collecting information that transforms European car-
tography and inspires European overseas expansion. In a book bloated with
extravagant arguments, Menzies’s assertions regarding Poggio’s well-known
text stand out for their obdurate distortion of evidence.
Menzies’s claims regarding the fleet’s “missing years” and Conti’s global
cruise clearly cannot be sustained. The author’s proof for the presence of
the Ming argosy in new lands also lacks substance. In his first two chap-
ters, he lays the groundwork for his claims when describing Zheng He’s fleet
before its departure from Nanjing. Although the portrait lacks any documen-
tation, it provides the foundation for virtually all the evidence Menzies later
cites for Chinese exploration. His depiction, then, does not represent mere
scene setting aimed at engaging the reader—a rhetorical tactic that perhaps
does not call for footnotes—but assumptions read back into the narrative
itself. In effect, the author stocks the ships on their exodus from China with
the very items that will confirm that the mariners reached their far-flung
destinations.
Thus while no evidence survives of the garb worn by Zheng He’s sailors,
Menzies describes them as wearing long white robes because legends and folk-
lore from Australia and the New World speak of visits from white-robed aliens.
Although sources are silent on the presence of women in the fleet, Menzies
assumes that many prostitutes were aboard because the colonies supposedly
founded during the voyages required Chinese mates for the men. In like fash-
ion, he infers that many coops of Asiatic chickens were loaded on the junks (as
“valuable presents for foreign dignitaries,”) because the presence of chickens
in the New World is a central part of his proof of the passage of the Ming fleets.
Since Central American natives used chicken entrails for divination, Menzies
presumes they were “indoctrinated” in the practice by the fowl-bearing colo-
nists of Zheng He.
There is no evidence for masons and stone carvers in Zheng He’s flo-
tilla, but Menzies believes they were aboard because no one else could have
carved the numerous stone markers supposedly left behind by the fleets in
the Cape Verde Islands and other landing spots, and they must have built the
“pyramids” and astronomical “observation platforms” found just about every-
where else. The latter, Menzies claims, were needed by Chinese astronomers,
indispensable passengers in the fleet since they had to carry out the (undocu-
mented) imperial command to detect “guiding stars” in order to “correctly
locate the new territories.” Teak was not used in building Zheng He’s fleets,
as sources supposedly consulted by Menzies make clear, yet he regards any
appearance of teak in marine excavations as marking the presence of the Ming
vessels. It is highly unlikely that the Chinese junks (or any ships at any time)
carried specially carved stones for ballast, as Menzies imagines, yet he elabo-
rately describes how the mariners built a slipway to refloat grounded junks
at Bimini in the Bahamas, the evidence for which is “tongued and grooved”
rectangular rocks found underwater there—ballast, the author declares, from
the Ming ships.
Zheng He’s armada almost certainly included some horses used by the
admiral and other high commanders. Menzies claims, however, that thousands
of horses were transported, many being used to stock the Americas and to
explore the interior of Australia. At sea for months at a time, the mariners
allegedly nourished the horses with boiled, mashed rice and with water dis-
tilled from seawater, “using paraffin wax or seal blubber for fuel.” Although
Needham states that there is no evidence that the Chinese knew how to desal-
inate seawater, Menzies asserts that a ship wrecked off the Oregon coast is
reported to have carried paraffin wax, hence he regards the rumor as implicit
verification of his contentions about both desalination and hordes of junk-
journeying steeds.
The seamen, prostitutes, and eunuchs were kept in fresh fish at sea by
“trained otters, working in pairs to herd shoals into the nets . . .” These marve-
lous creatures, alas, remain unheralded in any document, but since some wild
ones “have been seen swimming in the fjords of South Island” (New Zealand),
Menzies infers that their forbearers must have jumped Zheng He’s ships there.
Chinese shar-peis must have sailed with the Ming flotilla because an animal
resembling the dog appears in a Mexican painting discovered in the nine-
teenth century. One audacious shar-pei, Menzies proposes, absconded from
the junks in the Falklands and mated with an indigenous fox, giving birth to
a now-extinct animal called a warrah—DNA results, the author promises, will
be posted on the website.
Menzies also goes beyond his portrait of Zheng He’s armada in Nanjing
to point to evidence deriving from its global adventures. He suggests that
the Chinese captured a few giant South American sloths (or mylodons) in
Patagonia. This deduction arises from the author’s notion that a “dog-headed
man” depicted on the Piri Reis map of 1513—which, of course, Menzies regards
as based upon a copy of a Chinese map from Conti’s collection—is in fact a
mylodon, an animal (he assumes) that Zheng He’s captains desired for the
emperor’s zoo. He further supposes that one of the sloths aroused itself enough
to escape Chinese incarceration in Australia because a stone carving near
Brisbane (he thinks) looks something like the Patagonian beast.
It is impossible to keep track of how many self-confirming assumptions are
at work in such citations of alleged evidence. Piling supposition upon supposi-
tion, Menzies never considers a question that he does not beg: every argument in
1421 springs from the fallacy of petitio principii. The author’s “trail of evidence”
is actually a feedback loop that makes no distinction between premise and proof,
conjecture and confirmation, bizarre guess and proven fact.
Thus just as Menzies describes the junks as supplied with all the parapher-
nalia that will prove they sailed where he contends, he also reconstructs the
routes of the voyages by treating European maps, supposedly based on Conti’s
cache, as the by-product of those very voyages. This inevitably leads to some
curious conclusions. Since the Waldseemüller map of 1507 seems to show an
open sea passage between the Arctic Circle and Eurasia from the Barents Sea
to the Bering Straits, a distance of more than 4,000 miles, Menzies concludes
that the route was surveyed by a Ming fleet taking a shortcut home after its
exploration of Greenland, boldly going where no eunuch had gone before.
The author, however, does not discuss this epic voyage except to observe that
the Waldseemüller map proves it took place.
Similarly, since Menzies believes that the Chinese first navigated around
South America and that the Piri Reis map is proof of that achievement, he
declares that the map does not show a landlocked Atlantic, with an eastward
extension of the Americas linking up with the peninsula of Southeast Asia,
but, rather, “what appears to be ice connecting the tip of South America to
Antartica.” Rivaling his mistreatment of Poggio’s “Travels,” Menzies makes
this claim even though his own reproductions of the Piri Reis chart patently
contradict it. Not only that, Piri Reis himself states the contrary, for he noted
on his map that Spanish and Portuguese explorers “have found out that coasts
encircle this sea [that is, the Atlantic], which has thus taken the form of a
lake. . . .” Menzies does not think it necessary to inform his readers of this
evidence.
Unfortunately, this reckless manner of dealing with evidence is typical
of 1421, vitiating all its extraordinary claims: the voyages it describes never
took place, Chinese information never reached Prince Henry and Columbus,
and there is no evidence of the Ming fleets in newly discovered lands. The
fundamental assumption of the book—that Zhu Di dispatched the Ming fleets
because he had a “grand plan,” a vision of charting the world and creating a
maritime empire spanning the oceans—is simply asserted by Menzies without
a shred of proof. It represents the author’s own grandiosity projected back onto
the emperor, providing the latter with an ambition commensurate with the
global events that Menzies presumes 1421 uniquely has revealed, an account
that provides evidence “to overturn the long-accepted history of the Western
world.” It is clear, however, that textbooks on that history need not be rewrit-
ten. The reasoning of 1421 is inexorably circular, its evidence spurious, its
research derisory, its borrowings unacknowledged, its citations slipshod, and
its assertions preposterous.
Still, it may have some pedagogical value in world history courses. Assign-
ing selections from the book to high-schoolers and undergraduates, it might
serve as an outstanding example of how not to (re)write world history. . . .
Additional Resources
Despite the harsh response by historians to the work of Gavin Menzies, it is
worth noting that China did possess a powerful naval force in the fifteenth
century. The most respected scholarly work on Chinese maritime history is
Louise Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas: The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon
Throne, 1405–1433 (Simon & Schuster, 1994).
Suggestions regarding the influence of Norse settlements in the Ameri-
cas are presented in David Goudsward, Ancient Stone Sites of New England
and the Debate Over Early European Explorations (MacFarland, 2006). The era
of European exploration during the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth
22
23
Learning Outcomes
After reading this issue, you should be able to:
• Critically analyze whether the settlement of Jamestown was
a complete “fiasco” or an eventual successful model for other
English colonies to follow.
• Explore how the introduction of Indians, Blacks (both slaves
and free), and women changes earlier interpretations of colo-
nial history.
• Explore how the work of archeologists and scientists change
our interpretation of history.
ISSUE SUMMARY
24
25
26
27
From American Slavery, American Freedom by Edmund S. Morgan (W.W. Norton, 1975). Copy-
right © 1975 by W. W. Norton. Reprinted by permission.
28
land was not great. The Indians were no match for English weapons. More-
over, since the Indians could afford to give up the land around Jamestown
as well as Henrico without seriously endangering their own economy, they
made no concerted effort to drive the English out. Although Indian attacks
may have prevented the English from getting a crop into the ground in time
for a harvest in the fall of 1607, the occasional Indian raids thereafter cannot
explain the English failure to grow food in succeeding years. How, then, can
we account for it?
The answer that comes first to mind is the poor organization and direc-
tion of the colony. The government prescribed by the charter placed full pow-
ers in a council appointed by the king, with a president elected by the other
members. The president had virtually no authority of his own; and while the
council lasted, the members spent most of their time bickering and intriguing
against one another and especially against the one man who had the experi-
ence and the assurance to take command. The names of the councillors had
been kept secret (even from themselves) in a locked box, until the ships carry-
ing the first settlers arrived in Virginia. By that time a bumptious young man
named John Smith had made himself unpopular with Captain Christopher
Newport (in command until their arrival) and with most of the other gentle-
men of consequence aboard. When they opened the box, they were appalled
to find Smith’s name on the list of councillors. But during the next two years
Smith’s confidence in himself and his willingness to act while others talked
overcame most of the handicaps imposed by the feeble frame of government.
It was Smith who kept the colony going during those years. But in doing so he
dealt more decisively with the Indians than with his own quarreling country-
men, and he gave an initial turn to the colony’s Indian relations that was not
quite what the company had intended. . . .
In their relations to the Indians, as in their rule of the settlers, the new
governing officers of the colony were ruthless. The guerrilla raids that the two
races conducted against each other became increasingly hideous, especially on
the part of the English. Indians coming to Jamestown with food were treated
as spies. Gates had them seized and killed “for a Terrour to the Reste to cawse
them to desiste from their subtell practyses.” Gates showed his own subtle prac-
tices by enticing the Indians at Kecoughtan (Point Comfort) to watch a display
of dancing and drumming by one of his men and then “espyeinge a fitteinge
oportunety fell in upon them putt fyve to the sworde wownded many others
some of them beinge after fownde in the woods with Sutche extreordinary
Lardge and mortall wownds that itt seemed strange they Cold flye so far.” It
is possible that the rank and file of settlers aggravated the bad relations with
the Indians by unauthorized attacks, but unauthorized fraternization seems
to have bothered the governors more. The atrocities committed against the
queen of the Paspaheghs, though apparently demanded by the men, were
the work of the governing officers, as were the atrocities committed against
the Englishmen who fled to live with the Indians.
John Smith had not had his way in wishing to reduce the Indians to sla-
very, or something like it, on the Spanish model. But the policy of his succes-
sors, though perhaps not with company approval, made Virginia look far more
like the Hispaniola of Las Casas than it did when Smith was in charge. And the
company and the colony had few benefits to show for all the rigor. At the end
of ten years, in spite of the military discipline of work gangs, the colonists were
still not growing enough to feed themselves and were still begging, bullying,
and buying corn from the Indians whose lands they scorched so deliberately.
We cannot, it seems, blame the colony’s failures on lax discipline and diffusion
of authority. Failures continued and atrocities multiplied after authority was
made absolute and concentrated in one man.
Another explanation, often advanced, for Virginia’s early troubles, and
especially for its failure to feed itself, is the collective organization of labor in
the colony. All the settlers were expected to work together in a single com-
munity effort, to produce both the food and the exports that would make the
company rich. Those who held shares would ultimately get part of the profits,
but meanwhile the incentives of private enterprise were lacking. The work a
man did bore no direct relation to his reward. The laggard would receive as
large a share in the end as the man who worked hard.
The communal production of food seems to have been somewhat modi-
fied after the reorganization of 1609 by the assignment of small amounts of
land to individuals for private gardens. It is not clear who received such allot-
ments, perhaps only those who came at their own expense. Men who came at
company expense may have been expected to continue working exclusively
for the common stock until their seven-year terms expired. At any rate, in
1614, the year when the first shipment of company men concluded their
service, Governor Dale apparently assigned private allotments to them and to
other independent “farmers.” Each man got three acres, or twelve acres if he
had a family. He was responsible for growing his own food plus two and a half
barrels of corn annually for the company as a supply for newcomers to tide
them over the first year. And henceforth each “farmer” would work for the
company only one month a year.
By this time Gates and Dale had succeeded in planting settlements at
several points along the James as high up as Henrico, just below the falls. The
many close-spaced tributary rivers and creeks made it possible to throw up a
palisade between two of them to make a small fortified peninsula. Within the
space thus enclosed by water on three sides and palisaded on the fourth, the
settlers could build their houses, dig their gardens, and pasture their cattle. It
was within these enclaves that Dale parceled out private allotments. Digni-
fied by hopeful names like “Rochdale Hundred” or “Bermuda City,” they were
affirmations of an expectation that would linger for a century, that Virginia
was about to become the site of thriving cities and towns. In point of fact,
the new “cities” scarcely matched in size the tiny villages from which Powha-
tan’s people threatened them. And the “farmers” who huddled together on the
allotments assigned to them proved incapable of supporting themselves or the
colony with adequate supplies of food.
At first it seemed to sympathetic observers that they would. Ralph Hamor,
in an account of the colony published in 1615, wrote, “When our people were
fedde out of the common store and laboured jointly in the manuring of the
ground and planting corne, glad was that man that could slippe from his labour,
nay the most honest of them in a generall businesse, would not take so much
faithfull and true paines in a weeke, as now he will doe in a day, neither cared
they for the increase, presuming that howsoever their harvest prospered, the
generall store must maintain them, by which meanes we reaped not so much
corne from the labours of 30 men, as three men have done for themselves.”
According to John Rolfe, a settler who had married John Smith’s fair
Pocahontas, the switch to private enterprise transformed the colony’s food
deficit instantly to a surplus: instead of the settlers seeking corn from the Indi-
ans, the Indians sought it from them. If so, the situation did not last long.
Governor Samuel Argall, who took charge at the end of May, 1617, bought
600 bushels from the Indians that fall, “which did greatly relieve the whole
Colonie.” And when Governor George Yeardley relieved Argall in April, 1619,
he found the colony “in a great scarcity for want of corn” and made immediate
preparations to seek it from the Indians, If, then, the colony’s failure to grow
food arose from its communal organization of production, the failure was not
overcome by the switch to private enterprise.
Still another explanation for the improvidence of Virginia’s pioneers is
one that John Smith often emphasized, namely, the character of the immi-
grants. They were certainly an odd assortment, for the most conspicuous
group among them was an extraordinary number of gentlemen. Virginia, as
a patriotic enterprise, had excited the imagination of England’s nobility and
gentry. The shareholders included 32 present or future earls, 4 countesses, and
3 viscounts (all members of the nobility) as well as hundreds of lesser gentle-
men, some of them perhaps retainers of the larger men. Not all were content
to risk only their money. Of the 105 settlers who started the colony, 36 could
be classified as gentlemen. In the first “supply” of 120 additional settlers, 28
were gentlemen, and in the second supply of 70, again 28 were gentlemen.
These numbers gave Virginia’s population about six times as large a proportion
of gentlemen as England had.
Gentlemen, by definition, had no manual skill, nor could they be
expected to work at ordinary labor. They were supposed to be useful for “the
force of knowledge, the exercise of counsell”; but to have ninety-odd wise
men offering advice while a couple of hundred did the work was inauspicious,
especially when the wise men included “many unruly gallants packed thether
by their friends to escape il destinies” at home.
What was worse, the gentlemen were apparently accompanied by the
personal attendants that gentlemen thought necessary to make life bearable
even in England. The colony’s laborers “were for most part footmen, and such
as they that were Adventurers brought to attend them, or such as they could
perswade to goe with them, that never did know what a dayes worke was.”
Smith complained that he could never get any real work from more than thirty
out of two hundred, and he later argued that of all the people sent to Virginia,
a hundred good laborers “would have done more than a thousand of those
that went.” Samuel Argall and John Rolfe also argued that while a few gentle-
men would have been useful to serve as military leaders, “to have more to
wait and play than worke, or more commanders and officers than industrious
labourers was not so necessarie.”
The company may actually have had little choice in allowing gentlemen
and their servants to make so large a number of their settlers. The gentle-
men were paying their own way, and the company perhaps could not afford
to deny them. But even if unencumbered by these volunteers, the colony
might have foundered on the kind of settlers that the company itself did want
to send. What the company wanted for Virginia was a variety of craftsmen.
Richard Hakluyt had made up a list for Walter Raleigh that suggests the degree
of specialization contemplated in an infant settlement: Hakluyt wanted both
carpenters and joiners, tallow chandlers and wax chandlers, bowstave pre-
parers and bowyers, fletchers and arrowhead makers, men to rough-hew pike-
staffs and other men to finish them. In 1610 and again in 1611 the Virginia
Company published lists of the kind of workers it wanted. Some were for
building, making tools, and other jobs needed to keep the settlers alive, but
the purpose of staying alive would be to see just what Virginia was good for
and then start sending the goods back to England. Everybody hoped for gold
and silver and jewels, so the colony needed refiners and mineral men. But
they might have to settle for iron, so send men with all the skills needed to
smelt it. The silk grass that Hariot described might produce something like
silk, and there were native mulberry trees for growing worms, so send silk
dressers. Sturgeon swam in the rivers, so send men who knew how to make
caviar. And so on. Since not all the needed skills for Virginia’s potential prod-
ucts were to be found in England, the company sought them abroad: glass-
makers from Italy, millwrights from Holland, pitch boilers from Poland, vine
dressers and saltmakers from France. The settlers of Virginia were expected to
create a more complex, more varied economy than England itself possessed.
As an extension of England, the colony would impart its variety and health
to the mother country.
If the company had succeeded in filling the early ships for Virginia with
as great a variety of specialized craftsmen as it wanted, the results might con-
ceivably have been worse than they were. We have already noticed the effect of
specialization in England itself, where the division of labor had become a source
not of efficiency but of idleness. In Virginia the effect was magnified. Among
the skilled men who started the settlement in 1607 were four carpenters, two
bricklayers, one mason (apparently a higher skill than bricklaying), a black-
smith, a tailor, and a barber. The first “supply” in 1608 had six tailors, two gold-
smiths, two refiners, two apothecaries, a blacksmith, a gunner (i.e., gunsmith?),
a cooper, a tobacco pipe maker, a jeweler, and a perfumer. There were doubtless
others, and being skilled they expected to be paid and fed for doing the kind
of work for which they had been hired. Some were obviously useful. But others
may have found themselves without means to use their special talents. If they
were conscientious, the jeweler may have spent some time looking for jewels,
the goldsmiths for gold, the perfumer for something to make perfume with.
But when the search proved futile, it did not follow that they should or would
exercise their skilled hands at any other tasks. It was not suitable for a perfumer
or a jeweler or a goldsmith to put his hand to the hoe. Rather, they could join
the gentlemen in genteel loafing while a handful of ordinary laborers worked
at the ordinary labor of growing and gathering food.
The laborers could be required to work at whatever they were told to; but
they were, by all accounts, too few and too feeble. The company may have
rounded them up as it did in 1609 when it appealed to the mayor of London
to rid the city of its “swarme of unnecessary inmates” by sending to Virginia
any who were destitute and lying in the streets.
The company, then, partly by choice, partly by necessity, sent to the
colony an oversupply of men who were not prepared to tackle the work
essential to settling in a wilderness. In choosing prospective Virginians, the
company did not look for men who would be particularly qualified to keep
themselves alive in a new land. The company never considered the prob-
lem of staying alive in Virginia to be a serious one. And why should they
have? England’s swarming population had had ample experience in moving
to new areas and staying alive. The people who drifted north and west into
the pasture-farming areas got along, and the lands there were marginal, far
poorer than those that awaited the settlers of tidewater Virginia. Though
there may have been some farmers among the early settlers, no one for whom
an occupation is given was listed as a husbandman or yeoman. And though
thirty husbandmen were included in the 1611 list of men wanted, few came.
As late as 1620 the colony reported “a great scarcity, or none at all” of “hus-
bandmen truely bred,” by which was meant farmers from the arable regions.
In spite of the experience at Roanoke and in spite of the repeated starving
times at Jamestown, the company simply did not envisage the provision of
food as a serious problem. They sent some food supplies with every ship but
never enough to last more than a few months. After that people should be
able to do for themselves.
The colonists were apparently expected to live from the land like England’s
woodland and pasture people, who gave only small amounts of time to their
small garden plots, cattle, and sheep and spent the rest in spinning, weaving,
mining, handicrafts, and loafing. Virginians would spend their time on the
more varied commodities of the New World. To enable them to live in this
manner, the company sent cattle, swine, and sheep: and when Dale assigned
them private plots of land, the plots were small, in keeping with the expecta-
tion that they would not spend much time at farming. The company never
intended the colony to supply England with grain and did not even expect that
agricultural products might be its principal exports. They did want to give sugar,
silk, and wine a try, but most of the skills they sought showed an expectation
of setting up extractive industries such as iron mining, smelting, salt-making,
pitch making, and glassmaking. The major part of the colonists’ work time was
supposed to be devoted to processing the promised riches of the land for export;
and with the establishment of martial law the company had the means of see-
ing that they put their shoulders to the task.
Unfortunately, the persons charged with directing the motley work force
had a problem, quite apart from the overload of gentlemen and specialized
craftsmen they had to contend with. During the early years of the colony they
could find no riches to extract. They sent back some cedar wood, but lumber
was too bulky a product to bear the cost of such long transportation to mar-
ket. Sassafras was available in such quantities that the market for it quickly
collapsed. The refiners found no gold or silver or even enough iron to be worth
mining. Silk grass and silk proved to be a will-o’-the-wisp.
The result was a situation that taxed the patience both of the leaders and
of the men they supervised. They had all come to Virginia with high expecta-
tions. Those who came as servants of the company had seven years in which
to make their employers rich. After that they would be free to make themselves
rich. But with no prospect of riches in sight for anybody, it was difficult to keep
them even at the simple tasks required for staying alive or to find anything else
for them to do.
The predicament of those in charge is reflected in the hours of work they
prescribed for the colonists, which contrast sharply with those specified in the
English Statute of Artificers. There was no point in demanding dawn-to-dusk
toil unless there was work worth doing. When John Smith demanded that
men work or starve, how much work did he demand? By his own account,
“4 hours each day was spent in worke, the rest in pastimes and merry exercise.”
The governors who took charge after the reorganization of 1609 were equally
modest in their demands. William Strachey, who was present, described the
work program under Gates and De la Warr in the summer of 1610:
It is to be understood that such as labor are not yet so taxed but that easily
they perform the same and ever by ten of the clock they have done their
morning’s work: at what time they have their allowances [of food] set out
ready for them, and until it be three of the clock again they take their
own pleasure, and afterward, with the sunset, their day’s labor is finished.
The Virginia Company offered much the same account of this period.
According to a tract issued late in 1610, “the setled times of working (to effect
all themselves, or the Adventurers neede desire) [require] no more pains then
from sixe of clocke in the morning untill ten and from two of the clocke in
the afternoone till foure.” The long lunch period described here was spelled
out in the Lawes Divine, Morall and Martiall. If we calculate the total hours
demanded of the work gangs between the various beatings of the drum, they
come to roughly five to eight hours a day in summer and three to six hours
in winter. And it is not to be supposed that these hours refer only to work
done in the fields and that the men were expected to work at other tasks like
building houses during the remainder of the day. The Laws indicate that at the
appointed hours every laborer was to repair to his work “and every crafts man
to his occupation, Smiths, Joyners, Carpenters, Brick makers, etc.” Nor did
military training occupy the time not spent in working. The Laws provided for
different groups to train at different times and to be exempt from work during
the training days. Although colonists and historians alike have condemned
the Laws as harsh, and with reason, the working hours that the code prescribed
sound astonishingly short to modern ears. They certainly fell way below those
demanded at the time in English law; and they seem utterly irrational in a
chronically starving community.
To have grown enough corn to feed the colony would have required only
a fraction of the brief working time specified, yet it was not grown. Even in their
free time men shunned the simple planting tasks that sufficed for the Indians.
And the very fact that the Indians did grow corn may be one more reason why
the colonists did not. For the Indians presented a challenge that Englishmen
were not prepared to meet, a challenge to their image of themselves, to their
self-esteem, to their conviction of their own superiority over foreigners, and
especially over barbarous foreigners like the Irish and the Indians.
If you were a colonist, you knew that your technology was superior to the
Indians’. You knew that you were civilized, and they were savages. It was evi-
dent in your firearms, your clothing, your housing, your government, your reli-
gion. The Indians were supposed to be overcome with admiration and to join
you in extracting riches from the country. But your superior technology had
proved insufficient to extract anything. The Indians, keeping to themselves,
laughed at your superior methods and lived from the land more abundantly
and with less labor than you did. They even furnished you with the food that
you somehow did not get around to growing enough of yourselves. To be thus
condescended to by heathen savages was intolerable. And when your own peo-
ple started deserting in order to live with them, it was too much. If it came to
that, the whole enterprise of Virginia would be over. So you killed the Indians,
tortured them, burned their villages, burned their cornfields. It proved your
superiority in spite of your failures. And you gave similar treatment to any of
your own people who succumbed to the savage way of life. But you still did not
grow much corn. That was not what you had come to Virginia for.
By the time the colony was ten years old and an almost total loss to the
men who had invested their lives and fortunes in it, only one ray of hope had
appeared. It had been known, from the Roanoke experience, that the Indians
grew and smoked a kind of tobacco; and tobacco grown in the Spanish West
Indies was already being imported into England, where it sold at eighteen shil-
lings a pound. Virginia tobacco had proved, like everything else, a disappoint-
ment; but one of the settlers, John Rolfe, tried some seeds of the West Indian
variety, and the result was much better. The colonists stopped bowling in the
streets and planted tobacco in them—and everywhere else that they could
find open land. In 1617, ten years after the first landing at Jamestown, they
shipped their first cargo to England. It was not up to Spanish tobacco, but it
sold at three shillings a pound.
To the members of the company it was proof that they had been right
in their estimate of the colony’s potential. But the proof was bitter. Tobacco
had at first been accepted as a medicine, good for a great variety of ailments.
But what gave it its high price was the fact that people had started smoking
it for fun. Used this way it was considered harmful and faintly immoral. Peo-
ple smoked it in taverns and brothels. Was Virginia to supplement England’s
economy and redeem her rogues by pandering to a new vice? The answer, of
course, was yes. But the men who ran the Virginia Company, still aiming at
ends of a higher nature, were not yet ready to take yes for an answer.
From The Jamestown Project by Karen Ordahl Kupperman (Belknap Press, 2007). Copyright ©
2007 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Reprinted by permission of Harvard
University Press.
37
origin story by placing the Virginia colony within its true context. By examin-
ing the maelstrom of previous plans and experiences that converged on the
James, we can see the genuine accomplishment that emerged from the appar-
ent wreckage wrought by the planters, and the efforts of the rank and file who
largely brought it about.
In fact, through a decade’s trial and error, Jamestown’s ordinary settlers
and their backers in England figured out what it would take to make an Eng-
lish colony work. This was an enormous accomplishment achieved in a very
short period of time, a breakthrough that none of the other contemporaneous
ventures was able to make. The ingredients for success—widespread ownership
of land, control of taxation for public obligations through a representative
assembly, the institution of a normal society through the inclusion of women,
and development of a product that could be marketed profitably to sustain
the economy—were beginning to be put in place by 1618 and were in full
operation by 1620, when the next successful colony, Plymouth, was planted.
Thus the Pilgrims were able to be relatively successful (after a disastrous first
year) because they had studied Jamestown’s record and had learned its lessons.
Jamestown was not just the earliest English colony to survive; its true priority
lies in its inventing the archetype of English colonization. All other successful
English colonies followed the Jamestown model.
England was a laggard in overseas ventures. By 1606, when the Virginia Com-
pany was organized and plans for the colony were laid, English merchants
in collaboration with political leaders had begun to establish a role for their
nation in the newly opening trades around the Atlantic, the Mediterranean,
and in the East. In these endeavors they were attempting to emulate, and often
intrude on, the Spanish and Portuguese, united under the Spanish crown since
1580, who were the pioneers in creating the connections and bases through
which trading operations were carried on.
New Spain was almost a century old when Jamestown was founded, and
French traders had established firm partnerships with Indian nations in the fur
trade along the St. Lawrence to the north. Spanish ships had scouted Chesa-
peake Bay repeatedly before concluding that the region would not repay the
effort required to sustain settlement. The Spanish had planted St. Augustine
on the Florida coast, and this, not Jamestown, was actually the first permanent
European colony within the future United States; it was settled in 1565, almost
half a century before Jamestown. And Santa Fe in New Mexico was founded
shortly after Jamestown.
By 1607 English fishermen had been visiting the Newfoundland Banks
and the New England coast for a century or more, and they built temporary
settlements there, but no permanent English presence existed. In the last dec-
ades of the sixteenth century, a time when England and Spain were at war,
English ships participated enthusiastically in privateering—licensed piracy
against Spanish fleets traveling from the Caribbean to Seville. In the 1580s Sir
Walter Ralegh’s colony at Roanoke, within the Outer Banks of North Carolina,
was initially designed to serve as a base for those patriotic privateers.
The first group of settlers sent to Roanoke in 1585 conformed to the clas-
sic model: a group of young men under military authority. Their governor was
Captain Ralph Lane. As always with such a design, Lane found the settlers,
whom he characterized as the “wylde menn of myne owene nacione,” hard
to control and motivate. By the end of the colony’s first winter, relationships
with the coastal Carolina Algonquians, on whom they depended for food, had
broken down completely. They deserted the site early the next summer, and
Lane scorned the whole enterprise, writing that “the discovery of a good mine
by the goodnesse of God, or a passage to the Southsea, or someway to it, and
nothing els can bring this country in request to be inhabited by our nation.”
Ralegh and his associates did not give up on Roanoke. In fact, they were
the first to try the successful model. In 1587 they sent a new colony composed
of families under civil government, and each family was promised a large
estate to own in the new land. They were intended to settle on Chesapeake
Bay near where Jamestown would eventually be planted; the Lane colony’s
explorations had convinced them that this would be a better location from
which good commodities could be produced. But this plan had no lasting
influence, for the colony was abandoned, and the planters became famous
as the Lost Colonists of Roanoke. Ralegh, meanwhile, was overwhelmed by
other commitments and, ultimately, by loss of his favored status at court. So
although Roanoke’s failure only temporarily dampened English enthusiasm
for establishing American colonies, Jamestown had to learn its lessons anew.
England’s late entry into the American sweepstakes spawned myriad ven-
tures. The stark dichotomy of Jamestown and Plymouth would have been unin-
telligible to contemporaries. Virginia was one of many attempts, now largely
forgotten, all up and down the coast as far north as the Arctic Circle and south
into the Caribbean, floated by English promoters in the last years of Queen
Elizabeth’s reign and the early years under James I, who succeeded her in 1603.
But colonization was expensive and had to be financed by private enterprise.
In the absence of any sure source of return on that investment, America took
last place in most promoters’ minds, after endeavors in the Mediterranean,
Africa, and the East, where profits were much more certain. The voyages actu-
ally sent out were a fraction of the number of schemes proposed by that class
of people who became known as “projectors”—those who made a career out
of spinning projects.
English venturers were very conscious of being newcomers in all these
places where they sought a foothold, and the keynote of their activities was
improvisation. Everywhere they went, they necessarily employed trial and
error—and error often predominated. Promoters laid plans, but the ordinary
people who carried them out, often very young men and women, were the
ones who had to deal with realities on the ground and who ultimately founded
a successful colony. Many involved in early-seventeenth-century America—
Indians, Europeans, and Africans—had had experience of other Atlantic and
Mediterranean regions before they came together on the James River. Often
their experience was as captives, or as individuals left behind when the ships
on which they had arrived departed hurriedly in the face of dangers ranging
from armed resistance to violent Atlantic storms. Those who could improvise
were the ones who survived. And the knowledge of transatlantic others gained
from these people informed planning and responses on all sides when Europe-
ans attempted to create bases in America. All players brought vast experience,
some relevant and some irrelevant, to the changed situations that European
ventures created; and they drew on this experience, for good or ill, when con-
fronted by the necessity of making choices.
such a project was worthwhile. In the space of about a decade, some people,
mainly those actually in Virginia, figured out what it would take and how to
raise the revenue necessary to sustain English backers’ interest. The results
continued to be messy, and many people suffered. But the outlines of a genu-
inely American society, with all its virtues and defects, first emerged along the
James.
So, why does Virginia look so bad? One reason was its site, which proved to be
a very poor choice for promoting the well-being of the people who tried to live
there. The period during which both Roanoke and Jamestown were founded
was a time of environmental crisis that made establishing thriving settlements
even more difficult than it should have been. Alonso Suárez de Toledo urged
Spain’s King Philip II not to worry about other Europeans trying to settle on
North America’s east coast: “What would happen to foreigners there who must
bring their subsistence from a great distance to an inhospitable coast? The land
itself would wage war on them.” Jamestown was notoriously unhealthy, and
the colonists made it more unwholesome by the way they operated their little
society. The Spanish never attacked them, and their relationships with Chesa-
peake area Indians were crucial to the life of the settlement.
Another reason for Jamestown’s bad reputation lies in the nature of the
records, which consist largely of complaints, special pleading, and excuses sent
by colonists back to their patrons in England. Most of the surviving records,
not surprisingly, were produced by leaders on both sides of the Atlantic. The
migrants had been sent over with notoriously unrealizable goals: to find a
good source of wealth, preferably precious metals, or a passage to the Pacific
and the riches of Asia. Prominent men in the colony, faced with the problem
of explaining why they were not sending back the rich products investors
demanded, or why they had not found the passage to the Pacific, could not
speak the simple truth: that getting started is extremely difficult, and they
would need support for many years just to become established before any valu-
able products could be expected. Investors in the seventeenth century looked
to the next quarterly report as much as those in the twenty-first, and they had
the choice of many other potential ventures from which the returns were more
secure. Had they known that Virginia would absorb money over many years
with no profit, the colony would have been abandoned at the outset—as so
many others were. From the company’s point of view, the colony was nothing
but a drain on its resources, eating up huge amounts of money in supplies and
new settlers without ever repaying the backers’ investment, much less return-
ing a profit.
The colonists, for their part, desperately wrote letter after letter explain-
ing that colonization was hard, that they had to get set up before they could
become self-sustaining, and that they needed support while they did that.
Once they were established, then there would be time to make the efforts
required to find a source of profit; but it was foolish and counterproductive to
pressure them to do it at the beginning. One unspoken message ran through
all these reports: Please do not abandon us. Unable to tell the truth in the
early struggling years—or even to be sure what the truth was—colonial leaders
blamed one another, and especially the rank and file, who were character-
ized in much of the correspondence as “the scum of the earth.” Elites did
not know how to organize and motivate them for the necessary work; they
simply blamed the men for not acting as they wanted them to. Difficulties in
controlling the colonists exacerbated the worsening relationship between the
settlers and the Indians on whom they depended, though the leaders blamed
the Indians on whom they had intruded for not supporting the colony with
food as they wished.
But these same records, if we read beyond the surface noise of complaint
and charge and countercharge, demonstrate that some people on the ground
were drawing on the Atlantic and Mediterranean experience many had brought
to the colony and were improvising relationships with the people and the land
that finally achieved a measure of stability and growth in the colony. Often
it was just this sort of improvisation, undertaken by ordinary people, that
made elites nervous brought forth their accusations of malfeasance. Whereas
many of the leaders whose vitriol figures so prominently in the records left
the Chesapeake to promote and participate in other ventures after a few years,
ordinary colonists were the ones who set about the task of building families
and family farms. The other ventures attempted in the first decade of the sev-
enteenth century all failed. The truly remarkable thing about Jamestown is
that it somehow survived through years of hardship and discouragement until
a few settlers finally embarked on the course to success at the end of the 1610s.
This book is an examination of the various kinds of experiences and back-
grounds that came together in the Jamestown project to make this improbable
survival—and the evolution of the successful archetype—possible. . . .
Underneath the flurry of charges and countercharges, and with new kinds
of evidence becoming available, one can see signs that normal patterns were
increasingly possible as colonists made lives for themselves. Archaeological
investigation has demonstrated that the colonists really were engaged in the
kinds of diversified production that the company kept calling for, and that
this engagement actually intensified after company control ended. As Ralph
Hamor had testified, a genuine town was begun to the east of the fort in about
1618; a trained surveyor laid out twelve-acre lots for “James Cittie” in the
early 1620s, and settlers were soon moving out beyond the confines of the city
to the island’s eastern end. Moreover, they had started building in brick. All
the leading colonists lived clustered together in the “New Town.” Archaeolo-
gists have uncovered signs of extensive mercantile activity and have excavated
the workshop of gunsmith John Jackson, who took pity on Richard Frethorne
in Jamestown. Foundations of shops specializing in pottery making, brew-
ing, and apothecary work have also been unearthed. Governor Wyatt and
George Sandys fostered the beginning of some industries; the great period of
varied production on the island occurred after 1625 and continued through
the 1630s. John Harvey, who arrived in 1623 after three years in Guiana and
became governor in 1628, particularly pushed for such development.
Moreover, documentary excavations have discovered records of genuine
communities composed of families growing up away from Jemestown—near
the mouth of the James River and upriver close to the falls, and on the Eastern
Shore, where Thomas Savage had taken up residence and established a family.
These communities, like contemporary Plymouth in New England, increas-
ingly resembled English country villages. The census ordered in 1624 as part
of the royal investigation revealed that the planters who had been in America
the longest were most likely to have families. Although the planned college
never materialized, Bernard Symmes, one of the separatist puritans in Virginia,
endowed the first free school in English America in 1634.
As we draw conclusions about the nature of Virginia’s founding years,
Bernard Symmes presents a challenge to received wisdom. It is a shock to
learn that that the first English commitment to provide free education was
in Virginia. Moreover, the Virginia Company’s great planned effort to carry
Christianity to the Indians, with contributions from many people on both
sides of the Atlantic, was unique. Nothing on that scale was thought of again
until the creation of formal organizations such as the Society for the Propaga-
tion of the Gospel at the end of the seventeenth century.
Because attention then focused on the revocation of the Virginia Com-
pany’s charter and charges against the leadership, the first lesson of the great
attack of 1622—that Chesapeake Algonquians might welcome an English pres-
ence for the “book of the world” but would resist attempts to introduce the
“book of the spirit”—was lost, as it had been with the sixteenth-century Jesuit
mission and Don Luis/Paquiquineo’s rejection of Christianity. Instead colo-
nists drew conclusions about the Indians’ fundamental nature and foresaw a
future of separation more than convergence.
The colonists’ level of engagement in economic pursuits, together with
their growing ability to produce a marketable tobacco crop, also led to the
1622 rupture as the Chesapeake Algonquians came to understand how threat-
ening a fully established and expanding English presence would be to their
traditional life and its necessary land base. It would have been extremely diffi-
cult to predict in 1617 that the colony would grow so dramatically in the com-
ing years. Thus it was not their stupidity and fecklessness but the beginnings
of colonists’ success that led Opechancanough to try to extirpate them. The
1630s saw a massive English migration into the Chesapeake, overwhelming
Indian attempts to control the terms of relationships.
The Chesapeake remained a dangerous place for newcomers, and
many died in their first few years, the seasoning period. Those who survived
to finish their terms of servitude joined or helped to establish the com-
munities growing up along the James or on the Eastern Shore. Some men
who had been able to establish themselves early on added incrementally
to their acreage by paying ser vants’ passage over; in gaining the fifty-acre
headright for each servant, they laid the foundation for future large plan-
tations. But in these decades most farms were a few hundred acres or less.
For the fortunate ones who survived the early years and were able to marry,
been deemed a dismal tale of failure. Even the most severe martial law could
not force colonists to thrive and lead productive lives. But, as John Smith
explained to this readers, the Jamestown experience had produced a funda-
mental understanding about human psychology. Devolution—transfer of
control to America—and fostering initiative on colonists’ own account were
the answer to all those questions about how to motivate people and create
new societies. The key to building English societies abroad, however messy
and incomplete, was discovered in Virginia and all successful colonies hence-
forth followed its model.
47
Additional Resources
Five review essays are indispensable for students who are willing to tackle the
latest scholarship. See Edmund S. Morgan and Marie Morgan, “Our Shaky
Beginnings,” The New York Review of Books (April 26, 2007); Alan Taylor, “The
Other Founding,” The New York Republic (September 24, 2007); Jill Lepore, “Our
Town,” The New Yorker (April 2, 2007). Laurie L. Mielke, “A Tale Both Old and
New: Jamestown at 400,” The American Quarterly (March 2008); and Natalie
Zacek, “Review of Kupperman and Kelv . . . ,” William and Mary Quarterly
( July 2007).
Two popular essays on Jamestown celebrating the 400th anniversary
are “America at 400: How Jamestown Made Us Who We Are,” Time Magazine
(May 7, 2007) and “The First Americans: What Really Happened at James-
town,” U.S. News and World Report (January 29–February 5, 2007).
For the latest scholarship which embraces both a multi-ethnic and glo-
bal perspective see the essays on The Atlantic World and Virginia 1550–1624,
ed., Peter C. Mancall (University of North Carolina Press, 2007) which had its
origins in a conference held at the Omohundro Institute of Early American
History and Culture held in Williamsburg, VA, March 4–7, 2004. See also Tim
Hashaw, The Birth of Black America: The First African Americans and the Pursuit of
Freedom at Jamestown (Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2007).
Professor Edmund S. Morgan’s American Slavery, American Freedom:
The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia (Norton, 1975) remains the classic text on
seventeenth-century Virginia even 30 years after it was first published. Recently,
several books on Jamestown have been written which supplement but do not
necessarily replace Morgan’s narrative. In 1994, William M. Kelso, director of
archeology for the Jamestown Rediscovery Project, oversaw the unearthing of
the original Jamestown site. Not only was the palisade uncovered which sur-
rounded the village, but also included were seven hundred thousand artifacts
of human skeletons, dogs, armor, tools, and even a fancy silver “ear picker.”
Kelso’s Jamestown the Buried Truth (University of Virginia Press, 2006) believes
that the seeds of democracy lay not at Plymouth Rock, but rather are buried
at Jamestown.
The merger between anthropology and history has caused historians to
take a more sympathetic view of the early colonists’ worldview and lifestyle
48
49
YES: Kevin Kenny, from Peaceable Kingdom Lost: The Paxton Boys
and the Destruction of William Penn’s Holy Experiment (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2009)
NO: Cynthia J. Van Zandt, from Brothers Among Nations: The Pur-
suit of Intercultural Alliances in Early America, 1580–1660 (Oxford
University Press, 2008)
Learning Outcomes
After reading this issue, you should be able to:
• Understand the variety of responses between European colo-
nists to the New World and Native Americans.
• Summarize William Penn’s vision of Pennsylvania.
• Describe the differing world views held by Europeans and
Native Americans regarding the concept of property.
• Identify the goals of the Paxton Boys.
• Discuss the nature of trade alliances in the colonial Chesapeake.
• Explain the ultimate reason for the failure of colonial trade
alliances between Europeans and various Native American
tribes.
ISSUE SUMMARY
50
51
52
53
From Peaceable Kingdom Lost: The Paxton Boys and the Destruction of William Penn’s Holy Experi-
ment by Kenny, Kevin, (Oxford University Press, 2009). Copyright © 2009 by Oxford Univer-
sity Press. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press (USA).
54
had slaughtered the fourteen Indians sheltering inside, including the eight
children. After the massacres, the Paxton Boys claimed that Conestoga Indian-
town was theirs by right of conquest. Some of them tried to settle on the site of
the abandoned town, but provincial officials tore down their cabins and drove
them off. The Paxton Boys did not succeed in their goal of seizing land, but
by annihilating the Conestoga Indians they repudiated the utopian vision laid
down by William Penn when he founded Pennsylvania eighty years before.
Inspired by Quaker principles of compassion and tolerance, Penn saw
his colony as a “holy experiment” in which Christians and Indians could live
together in harmony. He referred to this ideal society as the “Peaceable King-
dom.” The nineteenth-century Quaker artist Edward Hicks produced a series of
allegorical paintings of the Peaceable Kingdom, juxtaposing a theme from the
Book of Isaiah with Penn’s meetings with the Delaware Indians. In pursuit of
this harmonious vision, Penn treated the Indians in his province with unusual
respect and decency. The Conestogas called him “Onas” and the Delawares
knew him as “Miquon”; both words mean “feather,” referring to the mysteri-
ous new quill pen wielded at treaty negotiations. The Conestogas conferred
the name Onas on Penn’s children and grandchildren as well, in the hope that
they might embody his benign spirit.
Yet for all Penn’s decency, his holy experiment rested firmly on colonial-
ist foundations. There would have been no Pennsylvania, after all, had he not
received a gift of 29 million acres from Charles II in 1681—a gift that made
him the largest individual landlord in the British Empire. Within his immense
charter, Penn purchased land from Indians fairly and openly. But he did not
do so simply out of benevolence. He needed to free the land of prior titles so
that he could sell it to settlers and begin to recoup the vast expenses incurred
in setting up his colony. As an English landlord, Penn naturally believed that
land could be privately owned by individuals and that its occupants could
permanently relinquish their title in return for money or goods. This idea
ran counter to the ethos of Pennsylvania’s Indians, who held their land in
tribal trusts rather than as individuals and used it to sustain life rather than to
make a profit. Indians often sold the same piece of land on multiple occasions,
transferring rights of use and occupancy rather than absolute ownership. Penn
wanted harmony with Indians, but he also needed to own their land outright.
His holy experiment, therefore, never properly took root. But it left an endur-
ing legacy: Pennsylvania did not fight its first war against Indians until the
1750s, when the Delawares and Shawnees, driven ever westward as they lost
their land, launched devastating attacks on the province.
William Penn’s holy experiment, already in decline by the time of his
death in 1718, disintegrated gradually over the next few decades and collapsed
during the Indian wars of the 1750s and 1760s. His son Thomas reverted to
Anglicanism, casting off the Quaker faith that sustained his father’s humane
benevolence. Thomas Penn and his brothers continued to negotiate with
Indians, but, unhampered by religious scruples, they did not hesitate to use
fraud and intimidation. In 1737 they swindled the Delawares out of a tract
of land almost as big as Rhode Island in a sordid transaction known as the
“Walking Purchase.” Although William Penn’s legacy ensured that relations
in the “wild woods and uncultivated waste of America,” as Locke put it, “left
to nature, without any improvement, tillage or husbandry”? European settlers
had the opportunity to seize this “waste” land for themselves; indeed, they
were morally obliged to do so, provided they respected the property rights of
other colonists. William Penn found this idea anathema. He had roo much
respect for Indians to treat them in this way, and he protected their interests
as well as his own by decreeing that settlers could acquire land only through
his government rather than by direct purchase or seizure. For the Paxton Boys,
on the other hand, the idea of seizing Indian land made perfect sense. They
were not in the habit of reading John Locke in their spare time; their actions
were driven not by political theory but by a desperate desire for land and safety
during wartime. They scorned the property rights of other colonists, from the
proprietary government downward.
The Paxton Boys used violence as their sale tactic. Locke, by contrast, had
argued that violence toward Indians was unnecessary because English claims to
American land already rested on impregnable economic and religious grounds.
For the same reason, Indians deserved no compensation for idle land lost to
industrious settlers. In practice this model of peaceful dispossession never
worked; it was a smokescreen for forcing Indians off the land. The Paxton
Boys pushed the logic of displacement to its most brutal extreme. Nobody was
arrested or prosecuted after the massacres, which encouraged other settlers to
behave in similar ways. The result was wave after wave of violence on the fron-
tier, culminating in total war against Indians during the American Revolution.
The Paxton Boys’ brutality was anomalous as late as 1763, in Pennsylvania at
least; by the time of the American Revolution, it had become commonplace.
During the Revolution waging total war against Indians became an act of
patriotism. The anti-Indian campaigns of the Revolutionary War enacted the
brutal logic of the Paxton Boys on a devastating scale. Now the violence was
systematic rather than sporadic. In 1779 General John Sullivan led an expedi-
tion up the Susquehanna River to Iroquoia, where he waged a scorched-earth
campaign against the Six Nations, destroying forty Iroquois villages, including
the sacred ceremonial center of Onondaga. Pennsylvania militiamen similarly
devastated the Ohio country. At the end of the war Britain transferred to the
United States most of North America east of the Mississippi and south of Can-
ada. Because four of the Iroquois nations had fought on the British side, the
Iroquois confederacy forfeited all territory to which it laid claim. The United
States assumed sovereignty over this vast expanse of Indian land by right of
conquest.
A few years before the Revolution the Penn family gave exclusive use of
the farm at Conestoga Indiantown to an Anglican minister named Thomas
Barton as a reward for his years of service to the proprietary interest. Barton
had outspokenly defended the Paxton Boys in a pamphlet published directly
after the massacres, yet he had no sympathy for the idea that Conestoga Indi-
antown rightfully belonged to them. The Paxton Boys, he noted, “took pos-
session of this Farm—built Cabbins and settled upon it under the ridiculous
notion of a right by Conquest.” Yet this “ridiculous notion” was fast becoming
ubiquitous on the frontier even as Barton wrote. When the newly founded
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography published his letter in 1880, the
editors noted that the Paxton Boys had believed “they stood in the same posi-
tion of a nation who conquered its neighbors and enemies by force of arms.”
The editors also observed that “only a few years later this idea was carried to
a successful conclusion by our patriotic forefathers.” This statement was not
intended ironically or critically. The Paxton Boys did more than declare an
end to Pennsylvania’s Peaceable Kingdom. They ushered in the new order that
reached fruition during the American Revolution.
. . . In the opening decades of the eighteenth century Pennsylvania
forged an alliance with the powerful Iroquois confederacy, which claimed the
small Indian nations of Pennsylvania as “tributaries” by right of conquest. The
Iroquois invariably claimed to have defeated the ancestors of the subordinate
nations in battle; although details of a decisive military victory were often
lacking, they backed up the claim with elaborate diplomacy and the threat of
force. The Iroquois sometimes required the subject nations to pay a tribute in
the form of wampum (beads made from polished shells, woven onto strings
or belts and used for currency and ceremonial purposes) or other gifts. More
important, they denied their tributaries two fundamental rights: the power
to buy or sell land and the power to go to war. Pennsylvania’s emerging alli-
ance with the Iroquois, which gave both parties leverage against the colony of
New York, hastened the dispossession of the Delaware Indians, most of whom
moved across the Susquehanna River to the Ohio country.
. . . [T]he French and Indian War . . . set against the back-drop of the larger
imperial conflict that engulfed North America between 1754 and 1763, . . . orig-
inated in the Ohio country, triggered in part by Virginian adventurers led by
George Washington. When a British expedition under General Edward Braddock
suffered catastrophic defeat near the French stronghold of Fort Duquesne in
1755, the western Delawares, led by three remarkable brothers, Shingas, Pis-
quetomen, and Tamaqua, went to war against Pennsylvania. By the end of the
year Teedyuscung, the self-styled king of the eastern Delawares, had joined the
campaign. In 1756 Pennsylvania took the fateful step of going to war for the
first time in its history. The declaration of war, which included scalp bounties
for Indians, signaled the collapse of the Peaceable Kingdom and provoked a cri-
sis among Pennsylvania’s small but influential faction of strict pacifist Quakers,
led by Israel Pemberton Jr., who supported the Delawares’ efforts to negotiate a
peace with Pennsylvania. The treaty negotiations, combined with the conquest
of Fort Duquesne, brought the fighting in Pennsylvania to an end in 1758. But
memories of the French and Indian War died hard among frontier settlers, who
blamed the Quakers for failing to provide adequate defense and harbored deep
suspicions about local Indians, including the Conestogas.
No sooner had the French and Indian War ended with the first Peace
of Paris in 1763 than the great Indian uprising known as Pontiac’s War
began. . . . After the massacres at Conestoga Indiantown and Lancaster, sev-
eral hundred Paxton Boys marched on Philadelphia, threatening to sack the
city. Due in large part to the efforts of Benjamin Franklin, the rebels chose
to write down their grievances rather than proceed with their march. They
submitted two documents, the Declaration and the Remonstrance, castigating
the provincial government for its policies regarding Indians during wartime.
Only one of their grievances was redressed before the American Revolution:
the restoration in 1764 of scalp bounties for Indians killed or captured during
wartime, which had been discontinued in 1758, when the Pennsylvania phase
of the French and Indian War ended. But the Paxton Boys won a larger victory,
escaping unpunished after exterminating a group of Indians who lived under
the protection of the government.
The Paxton crisis unleashed an extraordinary exchange of pamphlets in
Philadelphia. . . . The debate went beyond the massacres and the march on
Philadelphia to address the fundamental question of how Pennsylvania ought
to be governed. The Penn family, as proprietary governors of the province,
controlled the executive branch; the Quaker party dominated the Assembly.
From the mid-1750s onward the two branches were locked in disagreement,
especially when it came to funding military defense. From the perspective of
frontier settlers, the government seemed callously indifferent. In the politi-
cal crisis triggered by the Paxton Boys, the Quaker party and its supporters
squared off against an uneasy coalition of Presbyterians and Anglicans, ‘who
rallied to the proprietary interest. Franklin’s Narrative of the Late Massacres,
attacking the Paxton Boys, Presbyterianism, and the Penn family, triggered a
pamphlet war in 1764 that culminated in his ill-conceived proposal for royal
government in Pennsylvania. Only twelve years later Franklin was at the fore-
front of the patriotic movement to rid the American colonies of monarchy. Yet
he was consistent throughout this period in his contempt for archaic forms of
power and privilege; he merely broadened his focus by 1776 to include George
III as well as the Penns.
. . . After the Conestoga massacres the frontier descended into anarchy.
John Penn’s Quaker critics insisted that his failure to pursue the Paxton Boys
had undermined the reputation of the provincial government and given
carte blanche to like-minded frontier settlers, thereby threatening to provoke
another Indian war. When the Fort Stanwix Treaty of 1768 cleared the way for
large-scale settlement in Pennsylvania west of the Allegheny mountains, vio-
lent seizure of Indian land became the norm rather than the exception. Hav-
ing disappeared from view for almost six years after the Conestoga massacres,
the Paxton Boys reemerged in 1769. They offered their services as mercenar-
ies to the Susquehannah Company, a Connecticut land speculation venture
intent on planting a colony in the Wyoming Valley of northern Pennsylvania.
Lazarus Stewart, who led the attack on the Lancaster workhouse in 1763,
brought a group of Paxton Boys into the Wyoming Valley, where they finally
acquired the land they had long been fighting for. As the American Revolution
approached, the Paxton Boys cast themselves as Yankee patriots doing battle
against the arch-Tory Thomas Penn. They fought their last battle in July 1778,
when an army of loyalists and Iroquois Indians invaded the Wyoming Valley.
The Paxton Boys died as patriots—of a sort—fighting Indians over land. The
Indians won the fight that day, but they could not hope to prosper in the
world the Paxton Boys had helped create. Wholesale destruction of Indian
culture came later in the Peaceable Kingdom than in other American colonies,
bur Pennsylvania was the gateway to the west—and hence to the future.
From Brothers Among Nations: The Pursuit of Intercultural Alliances in Early America by Cynthia
J. Van Zandt, (Oxford University Press, 2008). Copyright © 2008 by Oxford University Press.
Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press (USA).
60
great stresses of Jamestown’s early years and in part because of their careful
monitoring of their connection with the powerful Powhatans. But over the
years English colonists remembered the Susquehannocks and kept an eye on
other Europeans’ relations with them. In the twenty years after the first Smith-
Susquehannock meeting, the English had few recorded dealings with them.
Instead, the Susquehannocks made intermittent contact with French and
Dutch colonists priests and traders and chose to pursue alliances alternately
with New France and New Netherland.
The Susquehannocks’ comparatively widespread contact with Europe-
ans of different ethnicities resulted from their geographical position, which
was almost in the center of the array of European colonial settlements on the
east coast from the Chesapeake to the Saint Lawrence. It also resulted from
two other factors. The first was the Susquehannock nation’s size and strength.
They were an Iroquoian speaking people and, like the members of the Huron
and Haudenosaunee Five Nations confederacies, were more populous and
militarily more powerful than most of the Algonquian peoples living near
European settlements. The second, which helps to explain why the Susque-
hannocks had wide-ranging contacts with Europeans, was the fact that their
network of alliances and enemies coincided in the early seventeenth century
with the spread of European colonial settlement. For instance the Susquehan-
nocks’ ongoing enmity with members of the Five Nations Iroquois, or Haude-
nosaunee especially the Mohawks and the Senecas, was directly responsible for
the Susquehannocks’ choices in their dealings with French, Dutch, Swedish,
and English colonists and traders. Furthermore, the changing nature of the
Susquehannock–Five Nations rivalries also affected the Susquehannocks’ rela-
tions with Algonquian peoples throughout the eastern seaboard. During the
first half of the seventeenth century, the Susquehannocks played a crucial role,
culturally, politically, and geographically, between Algonquians, lroquoians,
and Europeans. . . .
Because they were within relatively easy reach of Dutch and French colo-
nial settlements, the Susquehannocks turned their attention first to them. In
the summer of 1615 Samuel de Champlain first learned that the Susquehan-
nocks could be impressive allies. That August, Champlain and Huron warriors
were gathering their resources in order to attack the Onondagas. While they
were still engaged in preparations, the Hurons received news from their allies,
the Susquehannocks, who sent word that they would provide five hundred
men to fight with the Hurons and Champlain against the Onondagas and that
they desired friendship and an alliance with the French. The Susquehannocks
also explained to the French that the Five Nations made war on them periodi-
cally and received assistance from the Dutch.
For the Susquehannocks to join in the upcoming strike against the
Onondagas would satisfy two important requirements of alliance. First, it
would fulfill their obligations to their existing Huron allies. Second, it would
enable the Susquehannocks to extend their alliance networks to include
Samuel de Champlain and the French newcomers. Champlain and his men
must have seemed ideal new allies to the Susquehannocks because they
already had sided with the Hurons against the Five Nations Iroquois and could
provide both significant military assistance and new trade goods. In the end,
the Susquehannocks apparently did not arrive in time for the attack on the
Onondagas, but their offer is revealing of how Native American alliance and
information networks functioned in the early colonial era and demonstrates
that the Susquehannocks were well aware of colonial developments from Iro-
quoia to the Chesapeake Bay. . . .
Claiborne came to Virginia about five years after the Susquehannocks
offered to fight with the Hurons and Champlain’s forces against the Ononda-
gas. When he arrived in the colony in 1621, he came with an appointment
from James I as the colony’s surveyor. Significantly, he came with good con-
nections in the Virginia Company and at court and would use them both in
the colony and in England in order to set up an extraordinary intercultural
trade venture. It is also noteworthy that Claiborne arrived in Virginia on the
eve of the final collapse of the Powhatan–English alliance. This too would
bring important consequences for Claiborne’s trading activities only a few
years later.
In the period leading up to the 1622 Powhatan attack, English colo-
nial policy increasingly attempted to undermine the Powhatan paramount
chiefdom. Colonial officials sought every means they could to drive a wedge
between the Powhatans and their allied nations. Recognizing that Wahunso-
nacock and his successor, Opechancanough, had the strongest hold on mem-
ber nations that were geographically closest to the Powhatans, English colonial
leaders focused on luring the more distant member nations away from the
Powhatan alliance altogether. Although English efforts before 1622 were never
completely successful at breaking up the Powhatan paramount chiefdom, the
policy had the effect of increasing the degree of attention English colonial
leaders paid to the areas farther from the James River.
The Powhatans’ 1622 surprise attack did not succeed in destroying the
colony of Virginia. However, it did stop English colonial expansion to the west
for the foreseeable future, with the additional consequence of prompting Eng-
lish colonists working in intercultural trade to look to the northeast and the
Chesapeake Bay as the best route for expansion. They discovered a flourishing
exchange there. Indeed, John Pory reported that nearly a hundred European
traders were active in the Chesapeake Bay intercultural commerce in the early
1620, William Claiborne was one of those who quicklysaw the promise of join-
ing the English traders’ push to the north.
Having survived the 1622 Powhatan attack, Claiborne found his per-
sonal circumstances in the colony steadily improving in several ways. In the
aftermath of the attack James I rescinded the Virginia Company’s charter and
made Virginia the first English royal colony in North America. The new impe-
rial structure meant changes in Jamestown, and Claiborne was appointed a
member of the new Governor’s Council and received additional land grants as
partial payment for his new office. These land grants were in addition to the
two hundred acres he had received in partial payment of his services as colony
surveyor; his first grants were for lands on the eastern shore.
Moreover, Claiborne also had land on the western shore at Kecoughtan,
which, by the early 1630s, he was able to use as an auxiliary base for his trading
enterprise. Before then, however, his trade path toward the Susquehannocks
was cleared as he obtained greater public power in Virginia and another colo-
nial office. In 1625 he became secretary of the colony and received trading
licenses as a result of his new office. William Claiborne was well positioned to
move into the fur trade.
The following year Claiborne began making tangible moves toward
developing trade contacts to the north, and the Susquehannocks began to
focus their alliance-seeking efforts farther south than in previous years. Thus,
they began to move toward each other in search of new intercultural allies.
Armed with his new trading licenses, Claiborne set out on an exploratory trip
to the Chesapeake Bay. He stopped to check on his property at Accomack on
the way, where he discovered that squatters had taken up residence. Instead
of having them either arrested or evicted, Claiborne realized that they might
offer him just the additional assistance he would need in developing a thriving
trade on the Chesapeake Bay if he were able to find suitable Native American
trading partners. Thus Claiborne allowed the squatters to stay at Accomack.
Within five years they would move to form a new community and provide
crucial support for the Virginia side of the Claiborne-Susquehannock trade
relationship.
Also in 1626, very near the time that Claiborne was exploring the pos-
sibilities for a trade on the Chesapeake Bay, a delegation of Susquehannocks
explored the possibilities for a trade alliance with the colonists at the new
Dutch West India Company colony of New Netherland. Although Dutch trad-
ers and explorers had been active in North America since the first decade of
the seventeenth century, it was not until the 1620s that a Dutch colony was
attempted under the sponsorship of the West India Company. . . .
In the end, the Dutch–Susquehannock alliance did not flourish in 1626
or 1627. The timing was not right for New Netherland’s colonial officials. Lit-
tle did they know it, but they needed to act quickly to secure a place as the
Susquehannocks’ premier European ally. They had lost a valuable opportunity,
one with ramifications beyond a single trading season. Soon the Susquehan-
nocks found themselves entertaining a proposition from a different European
ally. The following year William Claiborne received a trading license from
Virginia. He was just in time.
Claiborne pursued his hopes of moving further into the fur trade again
the next year, in 1628, when he sailed to the Chesapeake on an exploratory
voyage. He saw real opportunities for finding a niche in the intercultural fur
exchange in Virginia’s northern reaches because New Netherland abandoned
Fort Nassau on the Delaware in 1628, choosing for the moment to concen-
trate its resources on building up the colony’s Manhattan center. As the Dutch
pulled back to the Hudson, Claiborne began lining up the necessary colonial
approvals to press outward.
On January 31, 1629/1630, Virginia’s governor and council granted Clai-
borne a commission to trade with the Susquehannocks until April 1. This was
quite a limited trading license, though not an unusual one. The fur trading
season would eventually stretch from March to June each year. In the Chesa-
peake Bay region, early English accounts reported that most Indian nations
there were not yet accustomed to trading furs each year, and so the “trading
season” was not yet a standard intercultural market period. Claiborne’s 1629
license may also have been intentionally brief, intended to give him only
enough time to prove whether such a venture was likely to succeed.
Having secured a trading license from Virginia and faced with the news
that the Dutch settlement on the Delaware was no longer a competitor, William
Claiborne established his first base in the Chesapeake region. He selected a
small island in the north of the bay, near the mouth of the Susquehanna River,
and called it Palmer’s Island. This was an ideal preliminary meeting place for
Claiborne’s initial negotiations with the Susquehannocks. Ultimately, it was
not large enough to support a full-time settlement, with all of the necessary
supplies for trade and defense, but it was a strategic, neutral meeting ground,
and Claiborne made sure he secured Palmer’s Island from the outset.
Later the same year, several events affected intercultural alliances in the
Chesapeake. The first was the threat of a new colony. After New Netherland
pulled away from its settlement on the Delaware (at least temporarily), another
English venturer appeared on the scene. Cecil Calvert, Lord Baltimore, stopped
in Jamestown after having visited Newfoundland, where he had originally
intended to establish a haven for English Catholics. Lord Baltimore found the
Chesapeake more inviting, and his visit threw the Virginia colonists into an
uproar.
Panicking at the thought that Baltimore might try to move in on their
colony, Virginia’s leaders quickly sent William Claiborne to England to inter-
vene on the colony’s behalf and prevent Baltimore from creating another Eng-
lish Chesapeake plantation. Having survived a catastrophic Powhatan attack,
epidemic disease, and years of malnutrition and economic failure, Virginia was
finally operating on steadier footing. Yet it now appeared endangered from an
entirely new direction: It was under threat from an English lord and a Roman
Catholic, one with long-standing connections at court.
If William Ciaiborne seemed to Virginia’s leaders to be an ideal choice
to plead their case back home in England, the mission provided him with
the perfect opportunity to put the financial elements of his trading plan into
place. In this, Claiborne was remarkably like Isaac Allerton, who at nearly the
same time was working to secure a new patent for Plymouth Colony while
expanding his own trade contacts and arranging for additional financing for
his growing ventures. Claiborne did much the same thing in 1629. He argued
against Baltimore’s plans and put forward Virginia’s primacy to the region.
However, while in England on behalf of the Virginia Colony, he also laid the
foundations for his own expansion plan.
With an eye toward cornering the best market on the eastern seaboard
south of the Saint Lawrence, Claiborne approached a firm of English investors
with experience in speculating in North American trade. He established a part-
nership with William Cloberry and partners. Cloberry had already invested
in the North American fur trade and had connections with the Kirk brothers,
who seized Quebec from New France and held it as an English colony for two
years. Accordingly, Cloberry knew how lucrative the North American fur trade
could be; he needed only to be persuaded that the Chesapeake could offer
consequences that would extend well beyond European control. Instead, Balti-
more based his determination more on a sense of his power in England and in
relation to colonists in Virginia. Nevertheless, it was a bad decision. As a result,
his colony faced war with the Susquehannocks for nearly two more decades,
and the legacy of those early years of conflict would reverberate throughout
the 1670s.
The experiment at Kent Island did not fail because English alliances with
native peoples collapsed. They did not. The Susquehannock–Claiborne alli-
ance ended after fewer than ten years because of intra-English competition
for favored status with the Susquehannocks. In the end, Kent Island could not
survive the failure of competing English colonial interests to set aside their
opposing claims. It was not an intercultural breakdown.
On the contrary, the Susquehannock–Claiborne alliance was extraordi-
narily successful. In the early seventeenth century, rivalries between Europe-
ans, even those from the same general culture, played as important a role
in shaping North America as rivalries between cultures did. In the context
of early seventeenth-century North America the offer of alliance could come
from any direction, and any new collaborative effort could be immediately
challenged by Europeans or Native Americans who were threatened by the
new alignment of interests.
The Susquehannocks’ search for a reliable European ally and trading
partner in the 1620s and 1630s was twice thwarted by internal European
power struggles. First, the proposed Susquehannock–Dutch alliance was pre-
vented from becoming more fIrmly established in 1626, a fact that enabled
Claiborne to push himself as the Susquehannocks’ primary European ally. Ten
years later, intra-European conflict impeded the Susquehannocks again when
Lord Baltimore forced Claiborne to abandon his Kent and Palmer’s islands
trading posts.
In both instances, these power struggles rather than any cultural differ-
ences between Indians and European allies were the reason intercultural alli-
ances failed. Yet, to a significant degree, they were unintended consequences
of Europeans’ preoccupations with their own rivalries and interests. When
Europeans focused their attention on mapping other European rivals without
paying adequate notice to the webs of Native American connections, the effects
could be extremely disruptive for Indians and European colonists alike. . . .
70
Additional Resources
Gary Nash, Red, White, and Black: The Peoples of Early America (2nd ed.;
Prentice-Hall, 1982) is an excellent survey for the colonial period. Robert
Berkhofer, The White Man’s Indian: Images of the American Indian From Colum-
bus to the Present (Random House, 1978) provides a panoramic consideration of
the stereotypes of Indians developed by Europeans and white Americans. Two
works by James Axtell—The European and the Indian: Essays in the Ethnohistory
of British America, 1607–1789 (Oxford University Press, 1981) and The Invasion
Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonial North America (Oxford University
Press, 1985)—are indispensable. Karen Ordahl Kupperman, Settling with the
Indians: The Meeting of English and Indian Cultures in America, 1580–1640 (Row-
man and Littlefield, 1980) and Bernard Sheehan, Savagism and Civility: Indians
and Englishmen in Colonial Virginia (Cambridge University Press, 1980) offer
conflicting explanations for the nature of Indian–white relations in the colo-
nies. The themes of coexistence and coercion in relation to contacts between
Native Americans and Englishmen in New England are assessed in Alden T.
Vaughan, New England Frontier: Puritans and Indians, 1620–1675 (Little, Brown,
1965), Francis Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the
Cant of Conquest (University of North Carolina Press, 1975), Neal E. Salisbury,
Manitou and Providence: Indians, Europeans, and the Beginnings of New England
(Oxford University Press, 1982), and William Cronon, Changes in the Land:
Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England (rev. ed.; Hill & Wang, 2003).
A valuable introduction to the history of the Powhatan Confederacy can
be found in Helen C. Rountree, Pocahontas’s People: The Powhatan Indians of
Virginia Through Four Centuries (University of Oklahoma Press, 1990). Douglas
E. Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk: New England in King Philip’s War (rev. ed.;
Norton, 1966) and Jill Lepore, The Name of War: King Philip’s War and the
Origins of American Identity (Alfred A. Knopf, 1998) are excellent studies of that
momentous clash.
71
YES: Lyle Koehler, from A Search for Power: The “Weaker Sex” in
Seventeenth-Century New England (University of Illinois, 1980)
NO: Laurie Winn Carlson, from A Fever in Salem: A New Interpreta-
tion of the New England Witch Trials (Ivan R. Dee, 1999)
Learning Outcomes
After reading this issue, you should be able to:
• Discuss the importance of gender, class, and race in evaluat-
ing historical events.
• Recognize the role of gender relations in early America.
• Understand multicausal explanations of historical events.
• Appreciate the influence of power relationships and power-
lessness in human society.
• Discuss the possible impact of biological and/or ecological
forces in history.
ISSUE SUMMARY
YES: Lyle Koehler argues that the Salem witchcraft hysteria is best
understood from the perspective of differential relationships in a
patriarchal Puritan society whereby the female accusers of “witches”
exercised an unconscious search for power to overcome their own
subordination in a rapidly changing world.
NO: Laurie Winn Carlson believes that the witchcraft hysteria in Salem
was the product of people’s responses to physical and neurological
behaviors resulting from an unrecognized epidemic of encephalitis.
72
73
74
An Epidemic of Witchcraft
The Salem Village witch mania began easily enough, when several young girls
experimented with fortune-telling and read occult works. In late January 1692,
these girls began creeping under chairs and into holes, uttering “foolish, ridicu-
lous speeches,” assuming odd postures, and, on occasion, writhing in agony.
Their antics soon became full-fledged hysterical fits. Their tongues extended out
to “a fearful length,” like those of hanged persons; their necks cracked; blood
“gushed plentifully out of their Mouths.” A local physician named William
Griggs, unable to explain the girls’ behavior in medical terms, warned that it
must be due to an “Evil hand.” The fits quickly spread to other youngsters rang-
ing in age from twelve to nineteen, as well as to married women like Ann Pope,
Sarah Bibber, Ann Putnam, and “an Ancient Woman, named Goodall.”
The afflicted girls initially charged Sarah Good, Sarah Osborne, and the
minister’s Indian slave Tituba with practicing maleficium upon them. Local
magistrates served warrants on these designated witches, who faced a court-
room examination on March 1. Twenty days later, Deodat Lawson, an ex-Salem
Village pastor visiting from Boston, delivered a rousing anti-witchcraft sermon
after observing the convulsive fits of Mary Walcott and Abigail Williams. A
week later, Samuel Parris called his congregation to search out the many dev-
ils in the church. Parris was an old-line Puritan—a man anxious about his
declining ministerial power, intensely suspicious of his neighbors, obsessed
with thoughts of his own filthiness, and fearing the subversion of the Biblical
Commonwealth.
The half-dozen afflicted girls had accused only three witches in February
and four in March, but after the ministers’ warnings, no fewer than fifteen girls
and women of Salem Village accused witches—at least twenty-five additional
From A Search for Power: The “Weaker Sex” in Seventeenth-Century New England by Lyle Koehler,
pp. 108–129. Copyright © 1980 by Lyle Koehler.
75
during April, and fifty-one in May. “Witch” Martha Corey warned the authori-
ties in March, “We must not believe all these distracted children say,” but pros-
ecutions continued. More persons from areas outside Salem Village were added
to the list of accused witches—thirteen from Topsfield, most of whom had
previously quarrelled with the Putnam family over land boundaries, twelve
others from Gloucester; thirteen from the port of Salem; and fifty-five from
Andover, a locale torn by land stress. Twenty-eight different persons, including
four Andover women, fell subject to hysterical attacks in five outlying towns.
Altogether, these ostensibly betwitched persons denounced almost all of the
56 men and 148 women accused of practicing witchcraft in 1692–93. Not only
were three-quarters of the accused persons females, but of the 56 men half
were singled out only after a close female relative or a wife had been accused—
a sort of guilt by association. The reverse pattern holds true for only one, or
possibly three, of the remaining male witches. Thus, the traditional notion of
the witch as a specifically female type held true for most Essex County accusa-
tions—even during times of severe stress, when virtually anyone might suffice
as a scapegoat. . . .
The Accusers
For many people who were already struggling against spiritual, political,
and economic deprivation, and against the force of late seventeenth cen-
tury changes, making a witchcraft accusation expressed their anxiety while
it reasserted a sense of their own potency. Sociologist Dodd Bogart’s con-
clusion that demon or witch charges are attempts to restore “self worth,
social recognition, social acceptance, social status, and other related social
rewards” is pertinent to the Salem Village situation. Accusations allowed
the angry, the helpless, and sometimes the sensitive to fight the imagined
malign powers that frustrated them by scapegoating suitable incarnations
of evil. By testifying against a witch, they not only exposed but also con-
quered their own feelings of powerlessness in a changing world. By blaming
witches, men and women attempted to reestablish some feeling of order,
of control, when confronted by the discomforting effects of threats both
external (e.g., Indians, political anarchy, urban materialism) and internal
(e.g., the inability to achieve assurance of justification before God, or to
understand, if assured, why God had chosen to “providentially” destroy a
given animal or person).
The sixty-three men and twenty-one women who testified as corroborating
witnesses against accused witches had much in common with the six males and
thirty-seven females whose hysterical fits initiated proceedings. In specifically
sex-role-defined ways, members of each sex responded to an apparent condition
of helplessness. Men primarily appeared before the magistrates and, in typically
straightforward fashion, gave accounts of the witches’ maleficium; women usually
made their accusations more circuitously, behind the cover of a fit. Men revealed
their feelings of fear and impotence by describing how witches had pressed them
into rigid immobility; bewitched women demonstrated dramatically, before the
very eyes of the justices, how that—and far worse—could happen.
“Now stand up, and Name your Text.” In the beginning of his sermon Good-
wife Ann Pope told him, “Now there is enough of that,” and after it was fin-
ished, Williams asserted, “It is a long Text.” Twelve-year-old Anne Putnam
shouted out that an invisible yellow bird, a witch’s familiar, sat on Lawson’s
hat as it hung on a pin. In the afternoon sermon Williams again spoke up: “I
know no Doctrine you had,” she informed the minister, “If you did name one,
I have forgot it.” Such outspokenness dumbfounded the congregation. Here
three females had violated the biblical injunction against women speaking in
church; furthermore, a little girl had criticized the minister. Obviously witches
were to blame!
Not only had such females assumed the power to speak in church, and
to designate men and women as witches; they also claimed the ability to van-
quish supernatural creatures. They asserted that they could see and talk to
the Devil, yet emerge unscathed from those encounters. Tituba, powerless
both as servant and as woman, told imaginative tales of her own fearless con-
tact with frightening spectral creatures—hairy upright men and great black
dogs. Another “very sober and pious woman,” uncowed by a malign specter’s
appearance, disputed with it about a scriptural text. . . .
The choice of victims, many of them eccentrics, suggests that the
bewitched females were most discomforted by those women who had acted
upon their own inner needs to ignore or defy the ideal feminine sex role; i.e.,
those women who best illustrated the projected desires of the afflicted. Unable
to be similarly assertive, the accusers turned instead to equally unfeminine, but
disguised and purely destructive, aggression in punishing those nontraditional
women. The psychoanalyst Merell Middlemore appears correct when he writes
that the Salem Village girls could not “consolidate a female identification”—
but only if his remark is qualified to read Puritan, or perhaps seventeenth-
century, female identification.
Scapegoating witches did not always work for the individual accuser, as
the shocking inhumanity of sending people to the gallows sometimes became
too much for the afflicted girls to handle. Some initial accusers ceased to have
fits or to denounce witches long before the frenzy abated. Mary Warren, after
actively accusing a number of witches, suddenly began to charge that the
“afflicted children did but dissemble.” Immediately she was cried out upon
as a witch, but in prison she continued to speak out against the proceedings,
asserting several times that the magistrates “might as well examine Keysar’s
daughter that had been distracted many years.” She explained, “when I was
afflicted, I thought I saw the apparitions of a hundred persons,” but then added
that her head had been “distempered.” In court, however, the other girls, Ann
Pope, and John Indian attributed their violent fits to her, and under strin-
gent cross-examination Mary Warren fell once again into fits. Imprisoned for
a month, she finally retracted her criticism, admitted her own witchcraft, and
once more began accusing others. Similarly, when Deliverance Hobbs wavered
from her accusatory afflictions, the bewitched girls denounced her. She, like
Mary Warren, denied signing the Devil’s book, but then, under the magis-
trates’ relentless questioning, also admitted her witchcraft. Another of the
girls, Sarah Churchill, fell under suspicion of practicing witchcraft, probably
for the same reason. After her examination she cried and appeared “much
troubled in spirit.” She explained to Sarah Ingersoll that she had confessed her
maleficium only “because they threatened her, and told her they would put her
into the dungeon.”
The line between witch and bewitched was dangerously thin, both
on the psychological level and in terms of the social distribution of power
which an accuser manipulated. Once a woman began having fits in which
she declared herself afflicted by agents of Satan, she could afford no second
thoughts, however sane and humane. Once she had “sold her soul”—that is,
disavowed responsibility for her own deepest impulses—she could not recover
it without sharing the fate of her accused victims, without becoming as power-
less as they in the grip of the larger Puritan community. . . .
Those women who walked bravely to the gallows may have summoned
strength from their religious faith, or from recognition of the integrity of their
own personhood. Other women signed petitions supporting accused witches,
even though such petitioners should have been aware that the afflicted girls
quickly accused their critics. Two Putnam opponents, Israel and Elizabeth
Porter, headed a petition signed by sixteen other women and twenty-one men
on behalf of Rebecca Nurse. Another thirteen men and seven of their wives
requested leniency for the Proctors. . . .
During the trials, from time to time an occasional unaccused woman
went so far as to attack the character of one or more of the afflicted. For exam-
ple, Lydia Porter charged Goody Bibber with mischief-making and lying. Mary
Phips, the wife of the governor, expressed her own disagreement by pardon-
ing one convicted witch in the governor’s absence, although she had no legal
power to do so. Lady Phips, Lydia Porter, and the almost one hundred female
petitioners, as well as many of the “witches,” were acting assertively in varying
degrees, reflecting and contributing to the style of the nontraditional woman.
An End to Witchcraft
As witchcraft accusations increased in number, protests also mounted, from
men as well as from women. Husbands spoke up in defense of their wives.
Ex-deputy Robert Pike told Justice Corwin that “diabolical visions, apparitions
or representations” were “more commonly false and delusive then real,” also
pointing out that the afflicted women raised the dead, like the Witch of Endor
in biblical times. A Salem Quaker named Thomas Maule anonymously blasted
the Puritans for murdering one another under the Devil’s influence, and as
early as June the Anabaptist William Milbourne protested to the General Court
against the use of “bare specter testimonie” to convict “persons of good fame
and of unspotted reputations.” A Boston merchant by the name of Thomas
Brattle, in an October letter, penned a scathing criticism of the Salem proceed-
ings. At about the same time Samuel Willard published a disapproving analysis
of the arguments used against witches, in Some Miscellany Observations on our
Present Debates Respecting Witchcraft, In a Dialogue between S[alem] and B[oston].
Cotton Mather had begun to doubt the reality of specter evidence, while other
ministers, including Joshua Moody, John Hale, John Wise, Francis Dane, James
Allen, and John Baily, raised objections to the proceedings. Willard and Moody
took occasion to preach the text, “they that are persecuted in one city, let them
flee to another,” and then counselled four “witches” to escape from prison.
The afflicted girls ultimately insured that the witchcraft proceedings
would halt—by accusing the most prestigious members of Puritan society.
The girls had first charged contentious, penniless Sarah Good, disreputable
Sarah Osborne, and the exotic Barbadian Indian slave Tituba. Sensing their
own power in the court’s response, they subsequently broadened their attack
by clamoring not only against low-status eccentrics, but also against virtu-
ous women like Rebecca Nurse, and even against men. On May 31 attorney
Thomas Newton would assert that they “spare no person of what quality so
ever.” By November the bewitched had charged the wives of critics Moody,
Hale, and Dane, as well as several members of Boston’s ruling elite. However,
the authorities were reluctant to prosecute. Margaret Thatcher, the widow of
Boston’s wealthiest merchant and mother-in-law of Judge Jonathan Corwin,
who presided at witchcraft trials, escaped apprehension, even though she was
much complained about by the afflicted. So did Mary Phips, Samuel Willard,
and Mistress Moody. The magistrates did issue a warrant for the arrest of a
prominent merchant named Hezekiah Usher, but he received lodging in a pri-
vate house and then was permitted to leave the colony.
Bostonians had less respect for the orders of the Salem Court than did the
citizenry of any other area; their constables ignored warrants. Accused witches
broke out of prison altogether too easily, suggesting complicity on the part of
the jailor. In fact, the keeper had no apparent hesitancy about releasing one
“witch” upon receipt of Lady Phips’s pardon. Other Bostonians hid “witches”
who had escaped from prison or fled apprehension.
The Salem Village girls who accused proper Bostonians quite possibly
exploited the resentment of many rural Salem Villagers for those alien yet very
powerful urbanites who often valued capital over land, commerce over hus-
bandry, ornamentation over simplicity, and new ideas over old. The Putnams,
in particular, facing diminishing land resources and declining status, had a
good deal to resent; they listened with open ears while the girls accused nine
prominent Bostonians and denounced Nathaniel Saltonstall, the Haverhill
Councillor who had resigned his seat on the witch court. Those with Boston
connections also faced prosecution. In Andover, for example, three prominent
Bradstreets—a family with close marital and political ties to Boston’s ruling
elite—fled prosecution. Before the witchcraft frenzy had abated, even the sec-
retary of Connecticut had been denounced.
Perhaps nothing better illustrates many people’s dislike for the merchant
class than the destruction wrought against the property of the wealthy French
Huguenot, Philip English. (There was undoubtedly some anti-French feeling
involved in English’s case as well.) After English and his “aristocratic” wife,
Mary, escaped from Salem prison, an irate group of citizens sacked their “great
house” at Salem, destroying or carrying away various old family portraits and
furniture and robbing storehouses of goods valued at £2,683. When English
later returned, he found a single servant’s bed the only furniture remaining in
the house.
The colony’s economic and political leaders objected to the accusations
levied against so many of their friends and wives. Quite probably their objec-
tions were crucial in bringing the frenzy to a halt. Robert Calef credited one
prominent Bostonian with stopping proceedings at Andover by threatening
to sue his accusers there in a £1,000 defamation action. Governor William
Phips initially left all witchcraft affairs to the Court of Oyer and Terminer, but
after returning to Boston from an expedition against the Maine Indians he
found “many persons in a strange ferment of disatisfaction.” Soon the royal
governor forbade the issuance of any new literature on the subject, asked the
Crown for counsel, and dissolved the Court of Oyer and Terminer. In the win-
ter of 1692–93 Phips pardoned some convicted witches, caused some to be
let out on bail, and “put the Judges upon considering a way to relieve others
and prevent them from perishing in prison.” The General Court on December
16, 1692, directed the newly created Superior Court to try the “witches” still
in custody within Essex County. The Superior Court, meeting on January 3,
1692/3, acquitted forty-nine “witches” and convicted three. Deputy Governor
Stoughton, the chief justice, ordered the execution of those three, as he had of
other “witches,” but Phips pardoned these and five other convicted persons.
Stoughton, enraged, refused to sit on the bench of the next court at Charles-
town. That body released all the accused persons tried before it.
Before the Superior Court met at Salem, the bewitched girls had ceased
their afflictions. Perhaps by then they had realized that their reach exceeded
their grasp. Perhaps they felt guilty over precipitating the deaths of twenty-five
persons. Perhaps their power impulses had been satiated. (After all, for some
time people as far away as Boston, Andover, and Gloucester had sought their
advice in pointing out witches.) Perhaps they were drained by the physical and
emotional strain which attended fits. Perhaps they felt purged, for a time, of
their own unfeminine longings. For whatever reasons, they had had their day;
now it seemed only appropriate that they return to their status as unobtrusive
members of the Puritan community. . . .
Only in eastern Massachusetts, with its intense and numerous frustra-
tions, could a sustained witch hunt be mounted. There the reality of the
nontraditional woman loomed larger, helping to precipitate fits in powerless
adolescents and religious Puritan wives, as well as aggravating the already
established tendency to view unfeminine behavior as witchlike. Those
independent-spirited women who faced prosecution as witches were the vic-
tims of other, more conservative women’s unconscious search for power.
From A Fever in Salem: A New Interpretation of the New England Witch Trials by Laurie Winn
Carlson (Ivan R. Dee, 1999), pp. xiii–xvi, 114–125, 142–146. Copyright © 1999 by Laurie
Winn Carlson. Reprinted by permission of Ivan R. Dee/Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
84
outbreak of illness, for ten months the community wrestled with sickness, sin,
and the criminal act of witchcraft. By September 1692, nineteen convicted
witches had been hanged and more than a hundred people sat in prison await-
ing sentencing when the trials at last faded. The next year all were released and
the court closed. The craze ended as abruptly as it began.
Or did it? There had been similar sporadic physical complaints blamed
on witchcraft going back several decades in New England, to the 1640s when
the first executions for the crime of witchcraft were ordered in the colonies.
Evidence indicates that people (and domestic animals) had suffered similar
physical symptoms and ailments in Europe in still earlier years. After the
witch trials ended in Salem, there continued to be complaints of the “Salem
symptoms” in Connecticut and New Hampshire, as well as in Boston, into the
early eighteenth century. But there were no more hangings. The epidemic and
witchcraft had parted ways.
By examining the primary records left by those who suffered from the
unexplainable and supposedly diabolical ailments in 1692, we get a clear
picture of exactly what they were experiencing. The Salem Witchcraft Papers,
a three-volume set compiled from the original documents and preserved as
typescripts by the Works Progress Administration in the 1930s, has been edited
for today’s reader by Paul Boyer and Stephen Nissenbaum. It is invaluable for
reading the complete and detailed problems people were dealing with. Like sit-
ting in the physician’s office with them, we read where the pain started, how
it disappeared or progressed, how long they endured it.
A similar epidemic with nearly exact symptoms swept the world from
1916 to 1930. This world-wide pandemic, sleeping sickness, or encephalitis
lethargica, eventually claimed more than five million victims. Its cause has
never been fully identified. There is no cure. Victims of the twentieth-century
epidemic continue under hospitalization to the present day. An excellent
source for better understanding encephalitis lethargica is Oliver Sacks’s book
Awakenings, which is now in its sixth edition and has become a cult classic.
A movie of the same title, based on the book, presents a very credible look
at the physical behaviors patients exhibited during the epidemic. While
encephalitis lethargica, in the epidemic form in which it appeared in the early
twentieth century, is not active today, outbreaks of insect-borne encephalitis
do appear infrequently throughout the country; recent outbreaks of mosquito-
borne encephalitis have nearly brought Walt Disney World in Florida to a halt,
have caused entire towns to abandon evening football games, and have made
horse owners anxious throughout the San Joaquin Valley in California.
Using the legal documents from the Salem witch trials of 1692, as well
as contemporary accounts of earlier incidents in the surrounding area, we
can identify the “afflictions” that the colonists experienced and that led
to the accusations of witchcraft. By comparing the symptoms reported by
seventeenth-century colonists with those of patients affected by the encepha-
litis lethargica epidemic of the early twentieth century, a pattern of symptoms
emerges. This pattern supports the hypothesis that the witch-hunts of New
England were a response to unexplained physical and neurological behaviors
resulting from an epidemic of encephalitis. This was some form of the same
He accused his patients of being deceitful, clever actresses who delighted in fool-
ing the male physician. Charcot’s medical students claimed to be able to trans-
fer diseases from hysterics with the use of magnets, something they called the
“metal cure.” Eventually his professional standing as a neurologist diminished
and faded, and he turned to faith healing, Sigmund Freud, one of his students,
began his work under Charcot’s direction.
A more modern version of the hysteria complex is called Mass Psycho-
genic Illness, or MPI, which is defined as the contagious spread of behav-
ior within a group of individuals where one person serves as the catalyst or
“starter” and the others imitate the behavior. Used to describe situations where
mass illness breaks out in the school or workplace, it is usually connected to a
toxic agent—real or imagined—in a less than satisfactory institutional or fac-
tory setting. MPI is the sufferer’s response to overwhelming life and work stress.
It relies on the individual’s identification with the index case (the first one to
get sick, in effect the “leader”) and willingness to succumb to the same illness.
A classical outbreak of MPI involves a group of segregated young females in a
noisy, crowded, high-intensity setting. It is most common in Southeast Asian
factories crowded with young female workers; adults are not usually affected.
Symptoms appear, spread, and subside rapidly (usually over one day). Physi-
cal manifestations usually include fainting, malaise, convulsions with hyper-
ventilation, and excitement. Transmission is by sight or sound brought about
by a triggering factor which affects members of the group, who share some
degree of unconscious fantasies. A phenomenon more related to the industrial
world of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries than to pastoral village life
in colonial New England, MPI does not address the question of why men and
young children, who would not have identified emotionally and psychologi-
cally with a group of young girls, suffered. The New England colonists scarcely
fit the pattern for this illness theory that demands large groups of people of
similar age, sex, and personality assembled in one confined location.
Salem’s witches cannot, of course, escape Freudian critique. Beyond the
hysteria hypothesis, John Demos, in Entertaining Satan, looked at the evidence
from the perspective of modern psychoanalysis. He pointed out that witch-
craft explained and excused people’s mistakes or incompetence—a failure or
mistake blamed on witches allowed a cathartic cleansing of personal respon-
sibility. Witches served a purpose; deviant people served as models to the rest
of society to exemplify socially unacceptable behavior. But Demos’s explana-
tion that witch-hunts were an integral part of social experience, something
that bound the community together—sort of a public works project—does not
address the physical symptoms of the sufferers.
For the most part, examinations of the afflicted individuals at Salem have
focused on the young women, essentially placing the blame on them instead
of exploring an organic cause for their behaviors. Freudian explanations for
the goings-on have attributed the activities of the possessed girls to a quest
for attention. Their physical manifestations of illness have been explained as
being conversion symptoms due to intrapsychic conflict. Their physical expres-
sion of psychological conflict is a compromise between unacceptable impulses
and the mind’s attempt to ignore them. Demos uses the example of Elizabeth
Knapp, whose fits became increasingly severe while strangers gathered to view
her behavior. Instead of considering that she was beset by an uncontrollable
series of convulsions which were likely worsened by the excited witnesses who
refused to leave her alone, he attributes her worsening condition to her exhibi-
tionist tendencies, motivated by strong dependency needs. Elizabeth’s writh-
ing on the floor in a fetal position is seen as an oral dependency left over from
childhood, causing her regression to infancy.
But “inner conflict” simply does not explain the events at Salem. Neither
does the idea that the young afflicted girls were motivated by an erotic attrac-
tion to church ministers who were called in to determine whether Satan was
involved. The girls’ repressed adolescent sexual wishes (one girl was only
eleven years old) and their seeking a replacement for absent father figures
scarcely explains the toll the disease was taking on victims of both sexes and all
ages. No Freudian stone has been left unturned by scholars; even the “genetic
reconstruction” of Elizabeth Knapp’s past points out that her childhood was
filled with unmet needs, her mother’s frustration because of an inability to
bear additional children, and her father’s reputation as a suspected adulterer.
“Narcissistic depletion,” “psychological transference,” “a tendency to fragment
which was temporarily neutralized”—the psycho-lingo just about stumbles
over itself in attempts to explain the afflicted girls at Salem. But unanswered
questions remain: Why the sharp pains in extremities? The hallucinations?
The hyperactivity? The periods of calm between sessions of convulsions? Why
did other residents swear in court that they had seen marks appear on the arms
of the afflicted?
The opinion that the victims were creating their own fits as challenges
to authority and quests for fame has shaped most interpretations of what hap-
pened in 1692. But would the colonists have strived for public notice and
attention? If the afflicted individuals were behaving unusually to garner public
notice, why? Did women and men of that era really crave public attention, or
would it have put them in awkward, critical, and socially unacceptable situ-
ations? How socially redeeming would writhing on the ground “like a hog”
and emitting strange noises, “barking like a dog,” or “bleating like a calf ” be
for a destitute young servant girl who hoped to marry above her station? It
is difficult to accept that these spectacles, which horrified viewers as well as
the participants themselves, were actually a positive experience for the young
women. That sort of suspicious activity usually met with social stigma, shun-
ning, or, at the least, brutal whipping from father or master.
Puberty, a time of inner turmoil, is thought to have contributed to the
victims acting out through fits, convulsions, and erratic behavior. The vic-
tims’ inability to eat is explained away as a disorder related to the youth-
ful struggle for individuality: anorexia nervosa. What about the young men
who reported symptoms? Freudian interpretation attributes their behavior to
rebellion against controlling fathers. How have psycho-social interpretations
explained the reason witch trials ended after 1692 in Salem? As communities
grew into larger urban units, people no longer knew their neighbors, grudges
receded in importance as a factor in social control, and witches were no longer
valuable to society. John Demos observes that witchcraft never appeared in
cities, and that it lasted longest in villages far removed from urban influence.
That linkage between witchcraft outbreaks and agricultural villages is impor-
tant when establishing a connection with outbreaks of encephalitis lethargica,
which appeared largely in small towns and rural areas in the early twentieth
century. Rather than accepting the idea that witchcraft receded because it was
no longer useful in a community context, one must examine why epidemics
occurred in waves and how particular diseases affected isolated population
groups.
The situation in seventeenth-century New England fails psycho-social
explanation because too many questions remain unanswered. Not only can we
not make a strong case that infantilism, sexual repression, and a struggle for
individuality caused the turmoil in Salem, but a psycho-social explanation does
not answer why the symptoms, which were so obviously physical, appeared with
such force and then, in the autumn of 1692, largely disappeared from Salem.
Because the complexity of psychological and social factors connected
with interpreting witchcraft is so absorbing, the existence of a physical pathol-
ogy behind the events at Salem has long been overlooked. Linnda Caporeal, a
graduate student in psychology, proposed that ergot, a fungus that appears on
rye crops, caused the hallucinogenic poisoning in Salem. Her article appeared
in 1976 in Science while Americans were trying to understand the LSD drug
phenomenon. Hers is one of the few attempts made to link the puzzling occur-
rences at Salem with biological evidence.
Ergot was identified by a French scientist in 1676, in an explanation of
the relation between ergotized rye and bread poisoning. It is a fungus that
contains several potent pharmacologic agents, the ergot alkaloids. One of
these alkaloids is lysergic acid amide, which has ten percent of the activity
of LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide). This sort of substance causes convulsions
or gangrenous deterioration of the extremities. Caporeal proposed that an
ergot infestation in the Salem area might explain the convulsions attributed to
witchcraft. If grain crops had been infected with ergot fungus during the 1692
rainy season and later stored away, the fungus might have grown in the storage
area and spread to the entire crop. When it was distributed randomly among
friends and villagers, they would have become affected by the poisoned grain.
Caporeal’s innovative thinking was challenged by psychologists Nicholas
Spanos and Jack Gottlieb, who were quick to point out that her theory did not
explain why, if food poisoning were to blame, families who ate from the same
source of grain were not affected. And infants were afflicted who may not have
been eating bread grains. Historically, epidemics of ergotism have appeared in
areas where there was a severe vitamin A deficiency in the diet. Salem residents
had plenty of milk and seafood available; they certainly did not suffer from
vitamin A deficiency. Ergotism also involves extensive vomiting and diarrhea,
symptoms not found in the Salem cases. A hearty appetite, almost ravenous,
follows ergotism; in New England the afflicted wasted away from either an
inability to eat or a lack of interest in it. The sudden onset of the Salem symp-
toms in late winter and early spring would be hard to trace to months of eat-
ing contaminated grain. Ergot was never seriously considered as the cause of
problems at Salem, even by the colonists themselves who knew what ergotism
was (it had been identified sixteen years earlier) and were trying desperately to
discover the source of their problems.
An explanation that satisfies many of the unanswered questions about
the events at Salem is that the symptoms reported by the afflicted New
Englanders and their families in the seventeenth century were the result of an
unrecognized epidemic of encephalitis. Comparisons may be made between
the afflictions reported at Salem (as well as the rest of seventeenth-century
New England) and the encephalitis lethargica pandemic of the early twentieth
century. This partial list, created from the literature, reveals how similar the
two epidemics were, in spite of the variation in medical terms of the day:
1692 1916–1930s
SALEM ENCEPHALITIS EPIDEMIC
fits convulsions
spectral visions hallucinations
mental “distraction” psychoses
pinching, pricking myoclonus of small muscle
bundles on skin surface
“bites” erythmata on skin surface,
capillary hemorrhaging
eyes twisted oculogyric crises: gaze fixed
upward, downward, or to
the side
inability to walk paresis: partial paralysis
neck twisted torticollis: spasm of neck
muscles forces head to one
side, spasms affect trunk
and neck
repeating nonsense words palilalia: repetition of one’s
own words
In both times, most of the afflicted were young women or children; the
children were hit hardest, several dying in their cradles from violent fits. The
afflictions appeared in late winter and early spring and receded with the heat of
summer. . . . Von Economo noted that most encephalitis lethargica epidemics
had historically shown the greatest number of acute cases occurring in the first
quarter of the year, from midwinter to the beginning of spring. The “pricking
and pinching” repeated so often in the court records at Salem can be explained
by the way patients’ skin surfaces exhibited twitches—quick, short, fluttering
sequences of contractions of muscle bundles. Cold temperatures cause them
to increase in number and spread over the body. Twitches were seldom absent
in cases of hyperkinetic encephalitis lethargica during the 1920s epidemic. The
skin surface also exhibited a peculiar disturbance in which red areas appeared
due to dilation and congestion of the capillaries. Red marks that bleed through
the skin’s surface would explain the many references in court documents to
suspected bites made by witches.
include itching, hives, swollen eyelids, and flulike symptoms such as fever,
headache, stiff neck, sore muscles, fatigue, sore throat, and swollen glands.
The symptoms go away after a few weeks, but without medical treatment
nearly half the infected people will experience the rash again in other places
on their bodies. In the later stages, three major areas—the joints, the nervous
system, and the heart—may be affected even months after the tick bite. People
with Lyme disease can develop late-stage symptoms even if they have never
had the rash. About 10 to 20 percent of the people who do not get treatment
develop nervous system problems: severe headache, stiff neck, facial paralysis,
or cranial nerve palsies, and weakness and/or pain in their hands, arms, feet,
or legs. Symptoms may last for weeks, often shifting from mild to severe and
back again.
These symptoms are found in the present form of Lyme disease; the dis-
ease could likely have mutated over the centuries, because hallucinations and
paranoia, along with lethargy, are not found in today’s tick-borne version of
Lyme disease. Questions and problems arise when connecting Lyme disease
to the situations in 1692 or 1920, but it is another factor to consider. Could
ticks have been common in Salem? The colonists did not bathe regularly, and
they lived close by their domestic animals. Ticks could have wintered inside
the home, carried in on firewood. They would have found ample hiding places
in the seams of the heavy woolen clothing commonly worn by the colonists.
What about 1920? A common nuisance of that era was the “bedbug,”
chinch bug, or Cimex lectularius. Jar lids filled with arsenic were placed under
bedsteads to keep the critters from climbing into bed and feeding on people’s
blood. Head lice have been common throughout the ages; today’s rampant
epidemics in schools are nothing to ignore, though scientists reassure us
that neither bedbugs nor head lice carry any type of disease. Perhaps they did
at one time. Many avenues must be explored, much research must be done.
Perhaps we will never know what caused encephalitis lethargica. . . .
94
Additional Resources
For an older and broader comparative study, see George L. Kittridge, Witchcraft
in Old and New England (Harvard University Press, 1929). Documentary evi-
dence of seventeenth-century witchcraft can be examined in George L. Burr,
ed., Narratives of the Witchcraft Cases, 1648–1706 (Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1914), Paul Boyer and Stephen Nissenbaum, eds., Salem-Village Witchcraft: A
Documentary Record of Local Conflict in Colonial New England (Northeastern Uni-
versity Press, 1993), David D. Hall, ed., Witch-Hunting in Seventeenth Century
New England: A Documentary History, 1638–1693 (2nd ed.; Northeastern Uni-
versity Press, 1999), and Frances Hall, ed., The Salem Witch Trials Reader (Da
Capo Press, 2000). More recent studies include Larry Gragg, The Salem Witch
Crisis (Praeger, 1992), and Bernard Rosenthal, Salem Story: Reading the Witch
Trials of 1692 (Cambridge University Press, 1993). For additional discussion of
the relationship between women and witchcraft, see Elizabeth Reis, Damned
Women: Sinners and Witches in Puritan New England (Cornell University Press,
1997), and Elaine G. Breslaw, Tituba, Reluctant Witch of Salem: Devilish Indians
and Puritan Fantasies (New York University Press, 1995).
Carol Karlsen’s work reflects a growing interest in the status of colonial
American women. Students in American history classes have, for generations
read of the founding of the colonies in British North America, their politi-
cal and economic development, and the colonists’ struggle for independ-
ence without ever being confronted by a female protagonist. Are there other
equally valid explanations that place little or no weight on the gender of the
accused? Only in the last three or four decades have discussions of the role
of women in the development of American society made their appearance in
standard textbooks. Consequently, it is useful to explore the status of women
in colonial America. Surveys of American women’s history that address the
colonial period include June Sochen, Herstory: A Woman’s View of American
History (Alfred Publishing Company, 1974) and Nancy Woloch, Women and
the American Experience (Alfred A. Knopf, 1984). The idea that colonial Ameri-
can women enjoyed a higher status than their European counterparts is sup-
ported in Richard B. Morris, Studies in the History of American Law (2nd ed.;
Octagon books, 1964), Roger Thompson, Women in Stuart England and America:
A Comparative Study (Routledge & Kegan, 1974), and Page Smith, Daughters
of the Promised Land: Women in American History (Little, Brown, 1977). Laurel
Thatcher Ulrich’s Good Wives: Image and Reality in the Lives of Women in North-
ern New England, 1650–1750 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1980) describes a variety of roles
performed by married women.
Women in the age of the American Revolution are the focus of Linda
Grant DePauw and Conover Hunt, “Remember the Ladies”: Women in America,
95
96
YES: Thomas S. Kidd, from The Great Awakening: The Roots of Evan-
gelical Christianity in Colonial America (Yale University Press, 2007)
NO: Jon Butler, from “Enthusiasm Described and Decried: The
Great Awakening as Interpretative Fiction,” Journal of American His-
tory (September 1982)
Learning Outcomes
After reading this issue, you should be able to:
• Discuss the role played by religion in the British North Ameri-
can colonies.
• Identify George Whitefield and explain his contributions to
the Great Awakening.
• Understand the origins, goals, leaders, and consequences of
the First Great Awakening.
• Evaluate the relationship between evangelical Protestantism
and democracy in early America.
• Analyze these essays within the context of a discussion of his-
torical truth.
ISSUE SUMMARY
97
98
99
100
... U ntil 1982, historians took the Great Awakening as a given, but then
historian Jon Butler argued that it was only an “interpretative fiction” invented
by nineteenth-century Christian historians. Although Butler’s argument was
overextended, it helpfully provoked a revaluation of what we actually mean by
“the Great Awakening.” He contended that the event really amounted to just
“a short-lived Calvinist revival in New England during the early 1740s.” No
doubt the eighteenth-century awakenings were centered in New England, but
over time they came to influence parts of all the colonies, and more important,
they helped birth an enormously important religious movement, evangelical-
ism, which shows no sign of disappearing today.
Butler also asserted that the “revivals had modest effects on colonial reli-
gion” and that they were “never radical.” But if the revivals helped create
evangelicalism, then not only did the awakenings make a profound change in
colonial religion, but they began a major alteration of global Christian history.
Moreover, . . . the revivals featured all manner of radical spiritual manifesta-
tions, unnerving antirevivalists and moderate evangelicals alike. Butler’s critique
does show, however, that it is not enough to evaluate evangelicalism as a
homogenous whole. It had radical implications, but those implications were
hotly contested by moderates, and its social potential often came to naught
for women, African Americans, and Native Americans. Some evangelicals also
began a great assault on the churchly establishments of colonial America, and
the revolutionary move for disestablishment on the federal and state levels
can largely be attributed to evangelical and deist cooperation in favor of the
separation of church and state.
Butler finally claimed that, contrary to the suggestions of previous schol-
ars, “the link between the revivals and the American Revolution is virtually
nonexistent.” . . . I am in substantial agreement with Butler on this point.
Moreover, evangelicals’ responses to the Revolution covered the whole range of
opinions from enthusiastic Patriotism to staunch Loyalism. But we should also
note that evangelical rhetoric and ideology helped to inspire and justify the
Patriot cause for both evangelical and nonevangelical leaders. Evangelicalism
From The Great Awakening: The Roots of Evangelical Christianity in Colonial America by Thomas
S. Kidd (Yale University Press, 2007), pp. xviii–xix, 83–90, 91, 92–93 (excerpts). Copyright
© 2007 by Yale University. Reprinted by permission of Yale University Press.
101
did not start the Revolution, but the Patriot side certainly benefited from the
support of many evangelicals.
. . . I contend that there was, indeed, a powerful, unprecedented series
of revivals from about 1740 to 1743 that touched many of the colonies and
that contemporaries remembered for decades as a special visitation of the
Holy Spirit. Calling this event “the” Great Awakening does present historical
problems. Chief among them is that the standard framework of the “First”
and “Second” Great Awakenings may obscure the fact that the evangelical
movement continued to develop after 1743 and before 1800. There were
important, widespread revivals that happened before the First, and between
the First and Second, Great Awakenings. . . . I examine, instead, what we
might call the long First Great Awakening and the contest to define its bound-
aries. Although many revivals, including the major season from 1740 to 1743,
happened during this period, revivals alone did not delineate the early evan-
gelical movement. Instead, persistent desires for revival, widespread indi-
vidual conversions, and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit distinguished the
new evangelicals. The long First Great Awakening started before Jonathan
Edwards’s 1734–35 Northampton revival and lasted roughly through the end
of the American Revolution, when disestablishment, theological change, and
a new round of growth started the (even more imprecise) “Second” Great
Awakening. The controversial emergence of the religion of the new birth
demarcated the long First Great Awakening and the first generation of
American evangelical Christianity.
. . . New Englanders began to hear about George Whitefield in 1739,
and many hoped that he would soon visit them. Benjamin Colman of
Boston’s Brattle Street Church wrote to Whitefield in December 1739 after
having received a letter from him. Whitefield estimated that he might
come to New England by summer 1740. Colman was deeply impressed by
what he had learned about Whitefield. He had read Whitefield’s Journals,
as well as some of his sermons. Colman wrote that he had never encoun-
tered anything comparable to Whitefield’s ministry, although he had wit-
nessed “uncommon Operations of the holy Spirit . . . ; as in our Country of
Hampshire of late; the Narrative of which by Mr. Edwards, I suppose you may
have seen.” If Whitefield would come to New England, he would find the
churches’ Calvinist doctrine to his liking, “how short soever we may come
of your Fervours.” Colman told him that the churches had been praying for
him publicly, and that when he arrived he could use the commodious Brattle
Street Church for meetings. In a letter to Gilbert Tennent, Whitefield wrote
that he found Colman’s published sermons “acute and pointed, but I think not
searching enough by many degrees.” If anything, Colman was too polite for
Whitefield. Nevertheless, Whitefield wrote back to Colman and promised that
when he came to New England “I shall endeavour to recommend an universal
charity amongst all the true members of CHRIST’s mystical body.” Because of
this universal spirit, he suggested that he might stay in the fields to preach,
and out of the meetinghouses. He appreciated Colman’s latitudinarianism,
and they both hoped that the old division of Anglican versus dissenter would
become irrelevant in light of the ministry of the new birth.
way of worship,” he told Cutler. Whitefield was able to leave Cutler on friendly
terms, but he would receive a much warmer welcome among the Congrega-
tionalists, especially from Benjamin Colman. After visiting Cutler he preached
at the Brattle Street Church to about four thousand.
Whitefield spoke from supporters’ Boston pulpits as well as on Boston
Common. On September 20, he preached at Joseph Sewall’s Old South
Church to about six thousand, and in the afternoon he addressed a crowd
at the common that he estimated at eight thousand, although the papers
guessed five thousand. The next day he attended Sunday morning services at
the Brattle Street Church and spoke at Thomas Foxcroft’s Old Brick Church
in the afternoon. The crowd pressing to see him was so large that he went
out to the common again and preached to an enormous assembly he totaled
at fifteen thousand, close to the whole population of Boston (the newspa-
pers guessed eight thousand). On Monday morning he sermonized at John
Webb’s New North Church to about six thousand. Then, in the afternoon,
tragedy struck the tour. At Samuel Checklcy’s New South Church, the sound
of a breaking board in the gallery triggered a stampede among the overflow
crowd. A number of people were severely trampled, and some jumped from
the balcony. Five people died. Whitefield decided to go on with the message
he planned to deliver, only moving out to the common. No doubt this sug-
gested insensitivity in Whitefield’s character, but the crowd wanted him to go
on, and one could hardly imagine a better moment for people to contemplate
their mortality.
Whitefield visited Harvard and was not impressed with the size of the
school or its spirit. He noted that “bad books,” such as those by John Tillotson
and Samuel Clarke, defenders of natural religion, were popular there, not the
Puritan classics. Whitefield would later regret his harsh assessment of Harvard
and Yale and would become a great supporter of the colleges. Whitefield also
toured neighboring towns, including Roxbury and Charlestown, in his cir-
cuit. On September 27, Whitefield preached to one of his greatest crowds yet,
fifteen thousand, on the common. Many were deeply affected, and Whitefield
himself wrote that he felt like shouting, “This is no other than the House
of God and the Gate of Heaven.” Boston Common had become a portal to
divine glory.
Whitefield began taking collections for the Bethesda Orphanage, and the
number of pounds given was truly remarkable: perhaps £3,000 in local currency.
Boston outpaced collections even in London. On September 28 alone, he col-
lected more than £1,000 in services at the Old South and Brattle Street churches.
After speaking at Brattle Street in the afternoon, Whitefield held two private
meetings that showed the breadth of his appeal. The first was with the governor,
Jonathan Belcher, who was an evangelical supporter of Whitefield. The second
was with “a great number of negroes,” who requested a private session with him.
He preached to them on the conversion of the Ethiopian in Acts 8.
Whitefield visited towns up the coast from Boston from September 29 to
October 6, finding some successes but also a great deal of passivity. Maine and
New Hampshire had a substantial revival tradition, having seen large numbers
of conversions and admissions to full communion in the 1727–28 earthquake
I saw before me a Cloud or fogg rising; I first thought it came from the
great River, but as I came nearer the Road, I heard a noise something like a
low rumbling thunder and presently found it was the noise of Horses feet
coming down the Road and this Cloud was a Cloud of dust. . . . I could
see men and horses Sliping along in the Cloud like shadows . . . every
horse seemed to go with all his might to carry his rider to hear news from
heaven for the saving of Souls, it made me tremble to see the Sight, how
the world was in a Struggle.
When they arrived at the Middletown meeting house, Cole guessed that per-
haps three or four thousand had assembled there, the countryside having
emptied of its residents. Then Whitefield came to the scaffold:
Cole’s “quarrelling” with God lasted almost two years. Like Jonathan
Edwards, he wrestled with the doctrine of predestination, thinking it abhor-
rent, while at the same time wondering if he himself was damned. “Hell fire
was most always in my mind; and I have hundreds of times put my fingers into
my pipe when I have been smoaking to feel how fire felt.” In the midst of his
fears of hell’s torments, however, God gave him a vision:
God appeared unto me and made me Skringe: before whose face the
heavens and the earth fled away; and I was Shrinked into nothing; I
knew not whether I was in the body or out, I seemed to hang in open Air
before God, and he seemed to Speak to me in an angry and Sovereign
way what won’t you trust your Soul with God; My heart answered O yes,
yes, yes. . . . Now while my Soul was viewing God, my fleshly part was
working imaginations and saw many things which I will omitt to tell
at this time. . . . When God appeared to me every thing vanished and
was gone in the twinkling of an Eye, as quick as A flash of lightning; But
when God disappeared or in some measure withdrew, every thing was
in its place again and I was on my Bed. My heart was broken; my burden
was fallen of[f] my mind; I was set free, my distress was gone.
Cole’s long conversion culminated, as it did for many early evangelicals, with
a vision of God.
In New Haven, Whitefield visited with Rector Thomas Clap, who would
later become one of his most bitter opponents. For now, Whitefield received a
universally polite, if not entirely zealous, reception at Yale, despite his speak-
ing to the students about “the dreadful ill consequences of an unconverted
ministry.” Whitefield then continued toward New York, and when he reached
the border, he evaluated New England as impressive because of its godly herit-
age, but he feared that “Many, nay most that preach . . . do not experimen-
tally know Christ.” He loved the excitement his visit generated, though, and
he thought New England was pliable enough for true revival. Pastor William
Gaylord of Wilton, Connecticut, brother-in-law of James Davenport, wrote
that many thought Whitefield “has a Touch of Enthusiasm” but that over-
heatedness could be forgiven more easily than lukewarmness. He believed
Whitefield’s most profound effect might have been “stirring up” the ministers
themselves, though he did have reservations about Whitefield’s comments on
unconverted ministers. Much of the power of Whitefield’s tours lay in his abil-
ity to excite the local ministers to more fervent gospel preaching.
As Whitefield’s band crossed into New York, the Harvard tutor Daniel
Rogers came to the spiritual awakening he had sought during weeks of travel.
After a meeting at King’s Bridge (now a part of the Bronx), Rogers wrote,
“It pleased God of his free Sovreign Grace to come into my poor Soul with
Power and so to fill me with Peace: yea with Such Joy in the Holy Ghost as
I never Experienced before—I cd not forbear Smiling nay Laughing for Joy
and Gladness of Heart.” Rogers shared the news with an elated Whitefield, but
soon after Satan was tormenting Rogers with “Abominable Horrible Shocking
Tho’ts.” Assurance was not always easily gained by the new evangelicals. . . .
Whitefield continued to preach with considerable success in New York
City, then moved on to Staten Island where he rendezvoused with Gilbert
Tennent and John Cross. Tennent told him of his recent itineration through
south Jersey, Delaware, and northern Maryland, while Cross reported that he
had recently “seen great and wonderful things in his congregations.” They
arrived at Cross’s Basking Ridge congregation on November 5, where James
Davenport had been preaching in the morning. At an affecting afternoon serv-
ice, Daniel Rogers recalled that a nine- or ten-year-old boy began speaking
loudly, at which time Whitefield called on the crowd “to hear this Lad preach-
ing to them.” This led to a “General motion” during which many cried out,
some fainted, and some fell into fits. A young man near Rogers was so moved
that he had to lean on Rogers during much of the sermon until he finally fell
to his knees.
The large crowd then retired to Cross’s barn for the evening lecture. Ten-
nent preached first, followed by Whitefield. Whitefield estimated that he had
spoken for six minutes when one man began to shout, “He is come, He is
come!” (Rogers recalled the man as crying “I have found him!”) Many oth-
ers began crying out “for the like favour,” and Whitefield stopped to pray
over them, which only heightened their fervent emotions. Rogers struggled to
adequately describe the meeting, but noted that many were “weeping, Sigh-
ing, Groaning, Sobbing, screaching, crying out.” The ministers finally retired,
but Rogers and Davenport returned at one o’clock in the morning to resume
preaching. Many in the congregation stayed up all night in the barn, praying
and worshipping. “Tis a night to be remembered,” Rogers wrote.
The next morning many penitents approached the departing Whitefield,
including a “poor negro woman,” a slave, who asked to join his entourage.
Her master actually agreed to this idea (it is unlikely that he had permanent
emancipation in mind), but Whitefield told her to go home and “serve her
present master.” Whitefield and most white evangelicals were unprepared to
let the social implications of his gospel run a course to abolitionism. . . .
. . . Whitefield’s tour moved on to New Brunswick, where Whitefield
began telling Gilbert Tennent and Daniel Rogers to go to New England to
follow up on the work there. Tennent initially refused, but after encourage-
ment from Whitefield and an apparent vote by the entourage, Tennent agreed.
Whitefield headed south with Davenport while Rogers and Tennent began
planning their new tours. In Philadelphia, Whitefield began preaching in the
so-called New Building, a structure erected by supporters specifically for his
visits. The one-hundred-by-seventy-foot building became Whitefield’s usual
pulpit in Philadelphia, and though the fervor of his earlier visit had abated,
wondrous visitations continued. At one meeting, many reported experiencing
the sensation of being pierced by “pointed arrows” as he preached, and a
young woman fell down senseless during the meeting and had to be carried
home. On another occasion Whitefield reported that he spontaneously spoke
against “reasoning unbelievers,” and he later found out that “a number of
them were present” at his sermon. He attributed his well-timed admonition to
the leading of the Holy Ghost.
Through November, Whitefield continued his tour of southern New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, making stops at friendly
congregations in Whiteclay Creek, Fagg’s Manor, Nottingham, and Bohemia
Manor. Whitefield, as was often the case, fell terribly ill at Fagg’s Manor, writ-
ing that “straining caused me to vomit much.” But he continued preaching
and praying, and “soon every person in the room seemed to be under great
impressions, sighing and weeping.” On December 1, Whitefield departed for
South Carolina and Georgia, noting with satisfaction that he had preached
perhaps one hundred seventy-five times since he arrived in Rhode Island two-
and-a-half months earlier. The presence of God that attended his meetings
convinced him that the British American provinces would remain his “chief
scene for action.” The fall 1740 tour had been a gigantic success for Whitefield.
His method of theatrical field preaching rejuvenated New England’s substan-
tial revival tradition and captivated tens of thousands of listeners. His incau-
tious remarks about unconverted ministers, however, and his friendship with
such figures as Tennent, Davenport, and Cross laid the groundwork for great
controversies concerning the awakenings in the years ahead.
I n the last half century, the Great Awakening has assumed a major role in
explaining the political and social evolution of prerevolutionary American
society. Historians have argued, variously, that the Awakening severed intellec-
tual and philosophical connections between America and Europe (Perry
Miller), that it was a major vehicle of early lower-class protest ( John C. Miller,
Rhys Isaac, and Gary B. Nash), that it was a means by which New England
Puritans became Yankees (Richard L. Bushman), that it was the first “intercolo-
nial movement” to stir “the people of several colonies on a matter of common
emotional concern” (Richard Hofstadter following William Warren Sweet), or
that it involved “a rebirth of the localistic impulse” (Kenneth Lockridge).
American historians also have increasingly linked the Awakening directly
to the Revolution. Alan Heimert has tagged it as the source of a Calvinist polit-
ical ideology that irretrievably shaped eighteenth-century American society
and the Revolution it produced. Harry S. Stout has argued that the Awakening
stimulated a new system of mass communications that increased the colonists’
political awareness and reduced their deference to elite groups prior to the
Revolution. Isaac and Nash have described the Awakening as the source of a
simpler, non-Calvinist protest rhetoric that reinforced revolutionary ideology
in disparate places, among them Virginia and the northern port cities. William
G. McLoughlin has even claimed that the Great Awakening was nothing less
than “the Key to the American Revolution.”
These claims for the significance of the Great Awakening come from more
than specialists in the colonial period. They are a ubiquitous feature of American
history survey texts, where the increased emphasis on social history has made
these claims especially useful in interpreting early American society to twentieth
-century students. Virtually all texts treat the Great Awakening as a major
watershed in the maturation of prerevolutionary American society. The Great
Republic terms the Awakening “the greatest event in the history of religion in
eighteenth-century America.” The National Experience argues that the Awakening
brought “religious experiences to thousands of people in every rank of society”
and in every region. The Essentials of American History stresses how the Awakening
“aroused a spirit of humanitarianism,” “encouraged the notion of equal rights,”
From Journal of American History by Jon Butler, vol. 69, no. 2, September 1982, pp. 305–314,
316–317, 322–325. Copyright © 1982 by Organization of American Historians. Reprinted by
permission.
110
movement, whose early leaders opposed revivals. Thus, not until the last half of
the nineteenth century did “the Great Awakening” become a familiar feature of
the American historical landscape.
Second, this particular label ought to be viewed with suspicion, not
because a historian created it—historians legitimately make sense of the minu-
tiae of the past by utilizing such devices—but because the label itself does
serious injustice to the minutiae it orders. The label “the Great Awakening”
distorts the extent, nature, and cohesion of the revivals that did exist in the
eighteenth-century colonies, encourages unwarranted claims for their effects
on colonial society, and exaggerates their influence on the coming and char-
acter of the American Revolution. If “the Great Awakening” is not quite an
American Donation of Constantine, its appeal to historians seeking to explain
the shaping and character of prerevolutionary American society gives it a
political and intellectual power whose very subtlety requires a close inspection
of its claims to truth.
How do historians describe “the Great Awakening”? Three points seem
especially common. First, all but a few describe it as a Calvinist religious revival
in which converts acknowledged their sinfulness without expecting salvation.
These colonial converts thereby distinguished themselves from Englishmen
caught up in contemporary Methodist revivals and from Americans involved
in the so-called Second Great Awakening of the early national period, both
of which imbibed Arminian principles that allowed humans to believe they
might effect their own salvation in ways that John Calvin discounted. Sec-
ond, historians emphasize the breadth and suddenness of the Awakening
and frequently employ hurricane metaphors to reinforce the point. Thus,
many of them describe how in the 1740s the Awakening “swept” across the
mainland colonies, leaving only England’s Caribbean colonies untouched.
Third, most historians argue that this spiritual hurricane affected all facets of
prerevolutionary society. Here they adopt Edwards’s description of the 1736
Northampton revival as one that touched “all sorts, sober and vicious, high
and low, rich and poor, wise and unwise,” but apply it to all the colonies.
Indeed, some historians go farther and view the Great Awakening as a verita-
ble social and political revolution itself. Writing in the late 1960s, Bushman
could only wonder at its power: “We inevitably will underestimate the effect
of the Awakening on eighteenth-century society if we compare it to reviv-
als today. The Awakening was more like the civil rights demonstrations, the
campus disturbances, and the urban riots of the 1960s combined. All together
these may approach, though certainly not surpass, the Awakening in their
impact on national life.”
No one would seriously question the existence of “the Great Awaken-
ing” if historians only described it as a short-lived Calvinist revival in New
England during the early 1740s. Whether stimulated by Edwards, James Dav-
enport, or the British itinerant George Whitefield, the New England revivals
between 1740 and 1745 obviously were Calvinist ones. Their sponsors vig-
orously criticized the soft-core Arminianism that had reputedly overtaken
New England Congregationalism, and they stimulated the ritual renewal of a
century-old society by reintroducing colonists to the theology of distinguished
preaching styles as a result of the 1740 revivals. Heimert quotes Isaac Backus on
the willingness of evangelicals to use sermons to “’insinuate themselves into
the affections’ of the people” and notes how opponents of the revivals like
Chauncy nonetheless struggled to incorporate emotion and “sentiment” into
their sermons after 1740. Yet revivalists and evangelicals continued to draw sharp
distinctions between the rights of ministers and the duties of the laity. Edwards
did so in a careful, sophisticated way in Some Thoughts concerning the Present
Revival of Religion in New England. Although he noted that “disputing, jangling,
and contention” surrounded “lay exhorting,” he agreed that “some exhorting is
a Christian duty.” But he quickly moved to a strong defense of ministerial pre-
rogatives, which he introduced with the proposition that “the Common people
in exhorting one another ought not to clothe themselves with the like authority,
with that which is proper for ministers.” Gilbert Tennent was less cautious. In his
1740 sermon The Danger of an Unconverted Ministry, he bitterly attacked “Pharisee-
shepherds” and “Pharisee-teachers” whose preaching was frequently as “unedify-
ing” as their personal lives. But Gilbert Tennent never attacked the ministry itself.
Rather, he argued for the necessity of a converted ministry precisely because he
believed that only preaching brought men and women to Christ and that only
ordained ministers could preach. Thus, in both 1742 and 1757, he thundered
against lay preachers. They were “of dreadful consequence to the Church’s peace
and soundness in principle. . . . [F]or Ignorant Young Converts to take upon them
authoritatively to Instruct and Exhort publickly tends to introduce the greatest
Errors and the greatest anarchy and confusion.”
The 1740 revival among Presbyterians in New Londonderry, Pennsylvania,
demonstrates well how ministers shepherded the laity into a revival and how the
laity followed rather than led. It was Blair, the congregation’s minister, who first
criticized “dead Formality in Religion” and brought the congregation’s members
under “deep convictions” of their “natural unregenerate state.” Blair stimulated
“soul exercises” in the laity that included crying and shaking, but he also set
limits for these exercises. He exhorted them to “moderate and bound their pas-
sions” so that the revival would not be destroyed by its own methods. Above
this din, Blair remained a commanding, judgmental figure who stimulated the
laity’s hopes for salvation but remained “very cautious of expressing to People
my Judgment of the Goodness of their States, excepting where I had pretty clear
Evidences from them, of their being savingly changed.” . . .
Nor did the revivals change the structure of authority within the denom-
inations. New England Congregationalists retained the right of individual con-
gregations to fire ministers, as when Northampton dismissed Edwards in 1750.
But in both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, these congregations
seldom acted alone. Instead, they nearly always consulted extensively with
committees of ordained ministers when firing as well as when hiring minis-
ters. In the middle colonies, however, neither the prorevival Synod of New
York nor the antirevival Synod of Philadelphia tolerated such independence
in congregations whether in theory or in practice. In both synods, unhappy
congregations had to convince special committees appointed by the synods
and composed exclusively of ministers that the performance of a fellow cleric
was sufficiently dismal to warrant his dismissal. Congregations that acted
Fourth, the link between the revivals and the American Revolution is
virtually nonexistent. The relationship between prerevolutionary political
change and the revivals is weak everywhere except in Virginia, where the
Baptist revivals indeed shattered the exclusive, century-old Anglican hold on
organized religious activity and politics in the colony. But, their importance
to the Revolution is weakened by the fact that so many members of Virginia’s
Anglican aristocracy also led the Revolution. In other colonies the revivals fur-
nished little revolutionary rhetoric, including even millennialist thought, that
was not available from other sources and provided no unique organizational
mechanisms for anti-British protest activity. They may have been of some
importance in helping colonists make moral judgments about eighteenth-
century English politics, though colonists unconnected to the revivals made
these judgments as well.
In the main, then, the revivals of religion in eighteenth-century America
emerge as nearly perfect mirrors of a regionalized, provincial society. They
arose erratically in different times and places across a century from the 1690s
down to the time of the Revolution. Calvinism underlay some of them, Pietism
and Arminianism others. Their leadership was local and, at best, regional, and
they helped reinforce—but were not the key to—the proliferation and expan-
sion of still-regional Protestant denominations in the colonies. As such, they
created no intercolonial religious institutions and fostered no significant expe-
riential unity in the colonies. Their social and political effects were minimal
and usually local, although they could traumatize communities in which they
upset, if only temporarily, familiar patterns of worship and social behavior.
But the congregations they occasionally produced usually blended into the
traditional social system, and the revivals abated without shattering its struc-
ture. Thus, the revivals of religion in prerevolutionary America seldom became
proto-revolutionary, and they failed to change the timing, causes, or effects of
the Revolution in any significant way.
Of course, it is awkward to write about the eighteenth-century revivals of
religion in America as erratic, heterogeneous, and politically benign. All of us
have walked too long in the company of Tracy’s “Great Awakening” to make
our journey into the colonial past without it anything but frightening. But as
Chauncy wrote of the Whitefield revivals, perhaps now it is time for historians
“to see that Things have been carried too far, and that the Hazard is great . . .
lest we should be over-run with Enthusiasm.”
Additional Resources
Students interested in further analyses of the Great Awakening should con-
sult Edwin Scott Gaustad, The Great Awakening in New England (Harper &
Brothers, 1957); David S. Lovejoy, Religious Enthusiasm and the Great Awaken-
ing (Prentice-Hall, 1969); and Frank Lambert, Inventing the “Great Awakening”
120
121
122
123
Learning Outcomes
After reading this issue you should be able to:
• Critically analyze whether the American Revolution was a
radical or conservative revolution or just a political rebellion.
• Critically evaluate whether the American Revolution was an
economic revolution, largely a product of market-driven con-
sumer boycotts that gave the colonists a sense of nationhood.
ISSUE SUMMARY
124
125
126
127
From The Marketplace of Revolution: How Consumer Politics Shaped American Independence
(Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. xiv–xvii, 298–303, 316–317 (excerpts). Copyright © 2004
by T. H. Breen. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press.
128
sacrificing every other consideration to the Love of our Country. And can he
be a true lover of his country . . . who would be seen strutting about the streets,
clad in foreign [British] fripperies, than to be nobly independent in the russet
grey?”
Commercial rituals of shared sacrifice provided a means to educate and
energize a dispersed populace. These events helped participants discover the
radical political implications of their own actions, even as those same rituals
demonized people who inevitably held back, uncertain and afraid, victims of
new solidarities they never quite understood. Indeed, the boycott movement
invited colonists traditionally excluded from formal political processes—the
election of representatives to colonial assemblies, for example—to voice their
opinions in a raucous, open public forum, one that defined itself around sub-
scription lists, voluntary associations, organized protests, destruction of goods,
and incendiary newspaper exchanges. What we encounter in colony after col-
ony is a radically new form of politics, a politics practiced out-of-doors, in
which women and the poor experienced an exhilarating surge of empower-
ment. Although during the two decades following the winning of national
independence—the so-called constitutional period—well-to-do leaders had
second thoughts about encouraging such groups to speak out, we should
appreciate the powerfully egalitarian potential of that earlier moment. The
non-importers of the 1760s and 1770s were doing more than simply obstruct-
ing the flow of British-made goods. They were inviting the American people to
reinvent an entire political culture. . . .
. . . How does one explain the timing of revolution? Why did the break
with Great Britain not occur at an earlier moment when passions ran high and
mobs roamed the streets of the major colonial ports? A glib answer would be
that the colonists were not ready to mount such a united effort in 1765 or 1770.
The translation of local grievance into organized rebellion required the devel-
opment of ways for Americans to reach out effectively to other Americans. That
process of discovery took time. The colonists drew upon their participation in
a vast new consumer marketplace, an experience that persuaded them that
their dependence upon British manufactures might be turned by a colonial
people into a powerful political weapon. During the Stamp Act agitation they
took tentative steps toward non-importation. At first, it seemed reasonable
to place responsibility for the success of this strategy on the merchants. Only
slowly did ordinary colonists begin to appreciate that such a plan had little
chance of success. The merchants marched to different drummers. More radi-
cal Americans such as Samuel Adams concluded that the protest against the
Townshend duties had been a failure; after 1770 colonial consumers raced
once again to the shops, buying British imports at record levels. In their dis-
appointment, Adams and others undervalued changes in the political culture
that were of profound significance for the character of later events. Between
1767 and 1770 Americans invented a “public” which monitored behavior in a
consumer public sphere, experimented with new forms of extra-legal political
participation, constituted themselves as a group with interests separate from
those of the British, and forged channels of communication that promoted a
sense of trust among distant strangers.
When Parliament passed the Tea Act in May I773, the colonists were not
the same people they had been in 1768. They drew upon a history of protest
within the consumer marketplace, a history without precedent and entirely
of their own making. Almost without fully comprehending the magnitude
of their own achievement, Americans now almost instinctively moved from
demands for non-importation to appeals for non-consumption, a shift of immense
importance in the history of popular political protest. On this occasion they
insisted that the people must take personal responsibility for their own politi-
cal destiny. As one Connecticut writer observed in 1774, the former effort
to make non-importation work had collapsed because “it stood on a rotten
and unsolid basis. It was erected wholly on the virtue of the merchants, and
rested its whole weight solely on this prop.” Just as the authors of the formal
political pamphlets—documents that so often structure modern accounts of
the American Revolution—were struggling to comprehend a republican polity
founded on the will of the people, ordinary men and women were being asked
in a parallel discourse to sacrifice personal comforts lor the common good.
Samuel Adams understood the challenge. In a letter written in June 1774 to
Richard Henry Lee about the prospects for a total American boycott, Adams
observed, “It is the virtue of the yeomanry we are chiefly to depend on.” In this
atmosphere, the people no longer defined British imports such as tea as luxuries
or as sources of debt but as poisons they had to purge in the name of liberty.
The argument is not that consumer goods caused the American Revo-
lution. In Aristotelian terms, the claim is rather that British imports pro-
vided a necessary but not sufficient cause for the final break with Parliament.
Other developments within late colonial society—the spread of evangeli-
cal Christianity, for example—helped ordinary men and women make sense
of political events. And without an inspiring language of universal rights,
non-importation would have been little more than a strategy in search of
a proper goal. Still, imported goods invited colonists to think radical new
thoughts about empire. British manufactures came to symbolize dependence
and oppression. The mental link was so strong that when a small, very poor
community in Massachusetts addressed the problem of the tea, it also raised
questions about its place within a larger world. In response to news of the
arrival of the tea ships in Boston Harbor, the inhabitants of the town of
Harvard discussed the situation and found “it to be a matter of as interest-
ing and important a nature when viewed in all its Consequences not only
to this Town and Province, but to America in general, and that for ages and
generations to come, as ever came under the deliberation of this Town.” The
intensity of the reaction of these obscure farmers helps explain why colo-
nists from South Carolina to New Hampshire stood with Boston during the
terrible days following the destruction of the tea.
During 1773 the pace of events accelerated. Following the collapse of
organized resistance three years earlier, many people on both sides of the
Atlantic persuaded themselves that the time of troubles had ended and
Humpty Dumpty had not in fact taken a great fall. But the House of Com-
mons, now led by Frederick Lord North, second earl of Guilford, managed
once again to roil imperial waters. The new crisis resulted not from tougher
American policy but rather from a much overdue attempt to bring order to the
chaotic affairs of the East India Company. This grossly mismanaged enterprise
possessed a monopoly to import tea from South Asia into Great Britain, but
for many reasons—internal corruption being a prime candidate—the directors
had run up huge operating debts, and to avoid bankruptcy they turned to the
government for an emergency loan. Lord North offered to support such an
arrangement, but only on condition that the Company reform its business
practices. The directors argued that if they could sell their tea directly to the
Americans without paying normal duties or going through wholesalers who
ran up the price, they might be able to turn a profit. A concession from the
government on duties would enable the Company to undersell the smugglers,
who obtained their tea from the Dutch. Anxious that he not signal a retreat
on the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, North refused to drop the last
remaining Townshend Duty, a decision that still allowed the Company to
cut prices substantially but also compelled the Americans to pay a tax which
they labeled unconstitutional. When asked why he did not show greater flex-
ibility on this point, North growled that “the temper of the people there is
little deserving favour from hence.” If the minister really thought the colo-
nists would accept the Tea Act, he was in for a shock. Although some modern
Americans seem to accept the notion that the federal government should bail
out failing corporations, the colonists branded the legislation venal, and they
vowed to teach North that their love of liberty exceeded their love of tea.
During the fall of 1773 Americans scrambled to nullify the Tea Act.
Learning that Company ships would arrive in the major colonial ports some-
time in November, local protest groups pressured civil authorities to prohibit
the unloading of the vessels. The Sons of Liberty did their best to intimidate
newly appointed tea agents, many of them prominent merchants whose per-
sonal loyalties lay with the crown. In the newspapers and in cheap broadsides,
patriotic voices sounded the alarm once again, urging the colonists to resist
political oppression by refusing to buy imported goods. By now the mental
link between consumer sacrifice and political ideology was well established.
Still, at that moment, no one could confidently predict the popular response
to the Tea Act. After all, between 1770 and 1773, in addition to the smuggled
Dutch tea, Americans bought some 300,000 pounds of tea annually from Brit-
ish merchants, knowing full well that the purchase price included the Town-
shend duty. Of the many entreaties broadcast during this period, few were as
strongly worded as a letter in the Pennsylvania Packet addressed to “the Free-
holders and Freemen” of Pennsylvania. “Taking for granted . . .,” the writer
reasoned, “that the revenue acts are opposite to the very idea and spirit of
liberty, it will naturally follow, that a ship, loaded with goods which come
under one of those acts is the true and literal Pandora’s box, filled with pov-
erty, oppression, slavery, and every other hated disease.” Colonial consumers
should be forewarned that this legislation was only the start. “Whenever the
Tea is swallowed, and pretty well digested, we shall have new duties imposed
on other articles of commerce.” The Association of the Sons of Liberty in New
York City prepared a stirring history of American non-importation from the
“detestable Stamp Act” to the current campaign against tea.
opposed the Tea Act to stake out ever more radical ground. One announce-
ment signed by “The People” reminded “The Public, That it was solemnly
voted by the Body of the People of this and the neighboring Towns . . . that the
said Tea never should be landed in this Province, or pay one Farthing of Duty.”
Anyone who dared to assist such an attempt, declared “The People,” “must
betray an inhuman Thirst for Blood, and will also in great Measure accelerate
Confusion and Civil War. This is to assure such public Enemies of this Country,
they will be considered and treated as Wretches unworthy to live, and be made
the first Victims of our just Resentment.”
If crown officials and their supporters thought that such inflated rheto-
ric amounted to no more than bluster, they were mistaken. On December 16
Boston “Mohawks” spent much of the day throwing tea chests into the harbor,
one of which, of course, found its way to Ebenezer Withington. Accounts of the
Indian disguise have given this famous incident a slightly ludicrous character
in American history, transforming the Tea Party into a kind of carnival event
in which feathered citizens lightheartedly sparked the final confrontation with
Parliament. It was nothing of the sort. As every participant understood, the
destruction of the tea invited immediate and severe retaliation. They had vio-
lated private property, a provocation no British ruler could ignore. More to
the point, the Tea Party represented not a break with the previous history of
colonial resistance but rather an escalation of a tradition of consumer protest
that had begun a decade earlier.
Boston’s punishment staggered even those who expected the worst. Lord
North could endure no more insolence from what seemed to him America’s hot-
bed of radicalism. A well-placed London diarist, Matthew Brickdale, recorded
the ministry’s case against the community that had drowned the tea. Boston,
scribbled Brickdale, “has been the ringleader of all violence and opposition
to the execution of the laws of this country. New York and Philadelphia grew
unruly on receiving the news of the triumph of the people of Boston. Boston
had not only therefore to answer for its own violence but for having incited
other places to tumults.” Thinking of this sort led in the spring of 1774 to a
series of statutes known collectively in the colonies as the Intolerable Acts. These
bills closed Boston Harbor to all commerce until the city reimbursed the East
India Company for its loss. Other acts fundamentally altered the constitu-
tion of Massachusetts Bay. Perhaps the most intrusive measure was legislation
limiting town meetings throughout the colony to a single session each year,
a serious blow to a people who prized the rough-and-tumble debate of local
government.
One Connecticut writer who styled himself the “Conciliator” explained
the larger meaning of North’s punitive policy. “At length,” he declared, “the
Harbor of Boston is blocked up, and the Business of Importation in that Town
at an End. . . . Foreign Manufactures, it seems, are considered as pernicious to
the Constitution of America, and we must either disuse them, or encounter the
Horrors of Slavery.” The Conciliator insisted that no colonist should be sur-
prised to discover that common consumer goods now defined the battle lines
of empire. “The Language of Great-Britain in Years past, in Accents loud as
Thunder, has rung this solemn Peal in our Ears—Americans! Stop your Trade.”
But even in these dark hours, hope beckoned. The British “know that Economy,
Frugality and Virtue will raise us above the Reach of the envenomed Arrows of
Oppression. . . . Our foolish Fondness for the Toys of that Country, provokes
her Resentment.” The message was clear. Americans might assist Boston with
food and money. If they meant to be free, however, they had to rededicate
themselves to consumer sacrifice. Sounding like an Old Testament prophet
who believed that virtuous consumers must atone for past market sin, the Con-
ciliator exclaimed, “It is our Treachery to ourselves, my Countrymen, that has
brought these Burdens upon us.”
It did not require a miracle to persuade other Americans to pledge their
support to Boston. They might, of course, have taken an easier path. After all,
they might have reasoned, the Intolerable Acts did not directly affect them.
Why not wait? Since Parliament had not closed their ports, they might con-
tinue to do business as usual. And yet, by and large, they stood firm when
it counted most. The explanation for solidarity—a challenge informing this
study from the start—was that by the summer of 1774 Americans had learned
how to reach out to each other. They had begun to think continentally. The
experience of mounting ever more effective consumer protests against a com-
mercial empire had encouraged them to imagine a new, geographically inclu-
sive identity. A decade of protest in the marketplace had forced them to define
themselves as not fully British. Indeed, in defiance of parliamentary taxation
they increasingly saw themselves as Americans. The North government failed
to appreciate that it was no longer dealing with a loose collection of colonies
which might turn on each other to gain some transient advantage.
Parliament tried to make an example of Boston and, by so doing, aroused a
nation. The reaction of the planters of Queen Anne’s County, Maryland, to the
Boston crisis was unusual only in its eloquence. In June 1774, they declared,
“Duly considering, and deeply affected with the prospect of the unhappy situ-
ation of Great Britain and British America, under any kind of disunion, this
Meeting think themselves obliged, by all the ties which ever ought to preserve
a firm union amongst Americans, as speedily as possible, to make known their
sentiments to their distressed brethren of Boston, and therefore publish [them]
to the world.” The planters’ first decision reflected long years of experimen-
tation with non-importation: “[T]hey look upon the cause of Boston, in its
consequences, to be the common cause of America.” Resolutions of this sort
poured forth from small, scattered communities. Their residents wanted to reg-
ister a public commitment to a larger responsibility. . . .
In each community tea sparked a slightly different political conversation.
A meeting of the inhabitants of Brookline, Massachusetts, for example, agreed
with other towns that anyone who imported tea while it was still subject to
a parliamentary tax should be “considered and treated by this Town as an
Enemy to this Country.” What struck these people as most offensive was the
blatant inequity of the legislation. They were tired of being treated like second-
class subjects of the crown. They had no doubt that a few well-placed individu-
als in England were getting richer at the expense of American rights, a kind
of corporate profiteering that once had the capacity to inspire indignation.
“Thus,” the Brookline meeting observed, “have the Parliament discovered the
most glaring Partiality in making one and the same Act to operate for the Ease
and Convenience of a few of the most opulent Subjects in Britain on the one
Hand, and for the Oppression of MILLIONS of Freeborn and most loyal Inhab-
itants of America on the other.” Only a few months later, the “votable inhabit-
ants” of Bolton staged a seminar on tea and taxation, and after considering the
issue of parliamentary sovereignty from various perspectives—they termed it a
“free debate”—the assembly passed without a single negative voice a number
of strongly worded resolutions, the most demagogic of which declared that “in
order to counteract and render abortive (according to the utmost of our power)
the British act, respecting the duty on Tea to be paid here, we will not take of
this politically forbidden fruit, if even solicited thereto by the Eves of our own
bosoms, nor any other consideration whatever, whilst it remains under the
circumstance of taxation.” . . .
At the distance of over two centuries, public opinion can be measured
only crudely through anecdotes. As colonial leaders were busy attempting to
make sense of an official British policy of punishment, ordinary Americans
sought as best they could to provide proof of consumer virtue. In a letter sent
to Abigail during the summer of 1774, John Adams recounted a scene that
warmed the heart of a weary patriotic traveler. After a hard ride of over thirty-
five miles through the interior of Massachusetts, Adams finally arrived at the
house where he intended to take a rest. “‘Madam’ said I to Mrs. Huston, ‘is it
lawful for a weary Traveller to refresh himself with a Dish of Tea provided it has
been honestly smuggled, or paid no Duties?’” Mrs. Huston was shocked by the
request. “‘No sir,’ said she, ‘we have renounced all Tea in this Place. I cant make
Tea, but I’le make you Coffee.’ Accordingly I have drank Coffee every After-
noon since, and have borne it very well. Tea must be universally renounced. I
must be weaned, and the sooner, the better.” About Adams’s contribution to the
revolutionary cause, there is not the slightest doubt. It is people such as Mrs.
Huston who have been undervalued. . . .
From Out of Our Past: The Forces That Shaped Modern America, 2nd. ed. Copyright © 1959,
1970 by Carl N. Degler. Reprinted by permission of HarperCollins Publishers.
137
nation. . . .” What actual effect the removal of the French produced upon the
thinking of the colonists is hard to weigh, but there can be little doubt that
the Great War for the Empire opened a new era in the relations between the
colonies and the mother country.
Great Britain emerged from the war as the supreme power in European
affairs: her armies had swept the once-vaunted French authority from two con-
tinents; her navy now indisputably commanded the seven seas. A symbol of
this new power was that Britain’s ambassadors now outranked those of France
and Spain in the protocol of Europe’s courts. But the cost and continuing
responsibilities of that victory were staggering for the little island kingdom.
Before the war the annual expenditures for troops in America and the British
West Indies amounted to £110,000; now three times that sum was needed
to protect the western frontier, suppress Indian revolts and maintain order.
Furthermore, the signing of the peace found Britain saddled with a debt of
£130 million, the annual charges of which ran to another £4 million. Faced
with such obligations, the British government was compelled to reassess its
old ways of running an empire, particularly in regard to the raising of new
revenues.
Before the war, the administration and cost of the Empire were primarily,
if not completely, a British affair. Imperial defense on the high seas was in the
hands of the Royal Navy, and though the colonies were called upon from time
to time to assist in the war with France, the bulk of the fighting was sustained
by British troops. In return, the colonies had acquiesced in the regulation of
their trade through a series of so-called Navigation Acts, which were enacted
and enforced by the British authority; no revenues, however, except those col-
lected as import or export duties, were taken from the colonies by Britain.
Under the pressure of the new responsibilities, the British authorities
began to cast about for a new theory and practice of imperial administration
into which the colonies might be fitted as actively contributing members.
Prior to the war the government had been willing to protect the West Indian
sugar interests at the expense of the rest of the Empire. But now, in the inter-
est of increased revenue, the old protective duty, which was much too high to
bring any return, was cut in half, thus permitting French molasses to compete
with British West Indian in the English and colonial markets. In 1766, this
molasses duty, in a further effort to increase revenue, was cut to two thirds of
what it had been before the war. In short, the need for imperial revenues, not
private interests, was now dictating legislation. The Stamp Act of 1765 and the
Townshend duties of two years later were similar efforts to spread the financial
burdens of the Empire among the beneficiaries of the British triumph over the
French.
It seemed only simple justice to London officialdom that the colonies
should share in the costs as well as the benefits to be derived from the defeat of
the ancient enemy. At no time, it should be noticed, were the colonies asked to
contribute more than a portion of the price of their own frontier defense. The
stamp duty, for instance, was envisioned as returning no more than a third
of the total military expenditures in America; the remainder would be borne
by the home government. And because the colonists had difficulty scraping
together the specie with which to pay such duties, the British government
agreed to spend all the revenue obtained from the stamp tax in the colonies in
order to avoid depleting the scanty colonial money supply. Nor were Ameri-
cans heavily taxed; it was well known that their fiscal burden was unique in its
lightness. In 1775 Lord North told the House of Commons that the per capita
tax payments of Britons were fifty times those of the Americans. It was not
injustice or the economic incidence of the taxes which prompted the colonial
protests; it was rather the novelty of the British demands.
The new imperial policies of the British government caught the Ameri-
cans off guard. Reveling in the victory over the French, the colonists confi-
dently expected a return to the lax, uninterested administration of the prewar
years and especially to their old freedom from any obligation to support the
imperial defenses. Therefore, when the first of the new measures, the Sugar Act
of 1764, became law, the Americans protested, but on a variety of grounds and
without sufficient unity to command respect. By the time of the Stamp Act in
the following year, however, the colonists were ready.
The essential colonial defense, from which the colonies never deviated,
was a denial that the British Parliament had any right in law or custom to
lay taxes upon the colonies for revenue purposes. Such taxes, the colonials
insisted, could only be levied by the colonial legislatures. Actually, this expres-
sion of the colonial constitutional position was as novel as the imperial policy.
Never before had there been an occasion for such an assertion simply because
England had heretofore confined her colonial legislation to the regulation of
trade. It is true that the Pennsylvania Charter of 1681 specifically reserved
to the British Parliament the right to tax the colony; but since Parliament
had never used this power, the colonists had a case when they said the new
British taxes were historically unknown and therefore unconstitutional. The
details of this controversy, in which merit is by no means the exclusive posses-
sion of either side, do not concern us here. The important fact is not whether
the Americans or the British were right in their respective readings of impe-
rial constitutional history, but that the colonials believed they were right and
acted accordingly. Regardless of the constitutional niceties involved, it is pat-
ent that the English had waited too long to assert their authority. Too many
Americans had grown accustomed to their untrammeled political life to sub-
mit now to new English controls. In brief, the colonists suddenly realized that
they were no longer wards of Britain, but a separate people, capable of forging
their own destiny.
This conviction runs all through the polemics of the Revolutionary crisis.
For underlying the constitutional verbiage which Englishmen and Americans
exchanged were two quite different assumptions about the nature of the
British Empire and the character of the American people. Whereas English-
men saw America as a part of an Empire in which all elements were subordi-
nate to Britain, the Americans, drawing upon their actual history, saw only a
loose confederation of peoples in which there were Britons and Americans,
neither one of whom could presume to dictate to the other. The colonials, in
effect, now felt themselves Americans, not displaced, subordinate Englishmen.
Jefferson suggested this to the King himself when he wrote in his Summary
View of the Rights of British America: “You are surrounded by British counsel-
lors. . . . You have no minister for American affairs, because you have none
taken from us.” Furthermore, even after 1776 many a Loyalist exiled in Britain
found the English annoying and strange—evidence of the fact that residence
in America had worked its influence even upon those loyal to the Crown. “It
piques my pride, I must confess,” wrote one expatriated Loyalist, “to hear us
called ‘our colonies, our plantations,’ in such terms and with such airs as if our
property and persons were absolutely theirs, like the ‘villains’ in their cottages
in the old feudal system.”
The imperial view so confidently advanced by Grenville and others of
the British administration came too late; the Americans were not interested in
making a more efficient Empire to be manipulated from Whitehall. Because
of this basic conflict in assumptions, American demands continued to leap-
frog ahead of British concessions right up to the Carlisle Peace Mission in the
midst of the Revolutionary War. Even ministerial assurances in 1769 that there
would be no further imperially imposed taxes failed to divert the colonial drive
toward equality with Britain. The child was truly asserting himself, and, as so
often happens, the parent was reluctant to strike him down.
Measured against the age of Hitler and Stalin, the British overlords of
the eighteenth century appear remarkably benign in their dealings with the
colonies in the years after 1763. For it is a fact that the colonies were in revolt
against a potential tyrant, not an actual one. Much more fearsome in the eyes
of the politically sensitive colonials was the direction in which the British
measures tended rather than the explicit content of the acts. As Bernard Bailyn
has pointed out after a survey of some 400 tracts of the Revolutionary era,
Americans were convinced that a conspiracy was afoot in Britain to deprive
them of their liberties, though historians can find little basis for such political
paranoia. But that such fear was a source of revolutionary fervor, Bailyn has no
doubt. Furthermore, Englishmen could never bring themselves to enforce, with
all the power at their command, what they believed was the true nature of the
Empire, that is, the subordinate position of the colonies. More than once Gen-
eral Thomas Gage, commanding the British troops in America, reported that his
forces were too scattered to preserve proper order and government in the colo-
nies. “I am concerned to find in your Lordship’s letters,” he wrote from New
York in 1768, “that irresolution still prevails in our Councils; it is time to come
to some determination about the disposition of the troops in this Country.”
Part of this irresolution was born of British confusion as to what should
be the government’s purpose, as the hasty repeals of the stamp and Townshend
duties testify on the one hand, and the remarkably inept Tea Act reveals on
the other. Part of it stemmed from the fact that within their own house, so to
speak, were Americans: at times Lord Chatham himself, at all times Edmund
Burke, Colonel Isaac Barré, John Wilkes, and Dr. Price, who insisted that
Americans possessed the rights of Englishmen. “The seditious spirit of the col-
onies,” George Grenville wryly complained on the floor of Commons in 1776,
“owes its birth to the factions in this House.”
Divided as to aims and devoid of strong leadership, the British permitted
the much more united colonists, who were blessed with superb and daring
leadership, to seize and hold the initiative. Not until the very end—after
the destruction of the tea at Boston Harbor in 1773—did the patience of the
British ministry run dry. By then, however, the years of acrimony, suspicion,
and growing awareness of the differences between the two peoples had done
their work, and the harsh coercive measures taken against Massachusetts only
provoked counterviolence from all the colonies. Lexington and Concord,
Bunker Hill and Independence Hall, were then not far behind.
By implication, the interpretation of the coming of the Revolution given
here greatly subordinates the role of economic factors. Since the economic
restrictions imposed upon the colonies have traditionally played a large role
in most discussions of the causes of the Revolution, they deserve some com-
ment here. Those who advance an economic explanation for the Revolution
argue that the series of economic measures enacted by Britain in the century
before 1750 actually operated to confine, if not stifle, the colonial economy.
Therefore, it is said, the colonies revolted against Britain in an effort to break
through these artificial and externally imposed limits. On the surface and
from the assumptions of twentieth-century economic life, the mercantilistic
system appears severe and crippling and worthy of strong colonial opposi-
tion. But before such speculative conclusions can be accepted, they deserve
to be checked against the facts.
Several historians have sought to measure quantitatively the restrictive
effects of English mercantilism upon the colonial economy. Their conclusions,
it can be said at the outset, are generally in the negative. For example, take
the three major British limitations on colonial manufactures. On the statute
books the Iron Act of 1750 appears to halt the erection of additional slitting
mills in the colonies, but the fact is that many were set up after that date,
regardless of the act’s prohibitions, and to such an extent that by 1776 there
were probably more such mills in America than in England. Nor, Lawrence
Harper tells us, did the Woolens Act of 1699, designed to prevent colonial com-
petition with a major English industry, actually inhibit American endeavors in
the field, since few Americans cared to engage in the industry. True, Harper
concluded that the colonial beaver-hat industry suffered from the restrictions
of the Hat Act of 1732, but, as he adds, that branch of economic activity could
hardly be considered an important segment of the economy. And those are the
three major British efforts to “stifle” American manufacturing.
Nor can the restrictions on the settlement of the West be viewed, as some
historians have asserted, as a significant motive for the Revolution. For one
thing, movement into the West was never absolutely halted, and as early as
1764 the Proclamation Line of the previous year was being moved westward to
permit settlement beyond the mountains. Furthermore, as Thomas Abernathy
has shown, the Virginia gentry—often cited as heavily involved in western
land speculation and therefore concerned with restrictions on the West—were
not vitally interested in the matter economically, though the religious and
political implications of the later Quebec Act, for example, did arouse them.
All in all, it would appear that the western land question may have been an
irritating factor, but, in view of the changing and indecisive English policy,
hardly a revolution-making force.
Perhaps the most that can be said quantitatively about the burden of
the whole navigation or mercantilist system in which England encased the
colonies is that the regulations concerning the routing of trade added between
$2.6 million and $7 million to the cost of doing business in the colonies.
Over against this, however, must be placed the fact that the system did not
seem a burden to the colonies. Very few objections to the navigation system
appear in the voluminous literature of the crisis. In fact, so acceptable did it
appear to that jealous American, Benjamin Franklin, that in 1774 he suggested
to Lord Chatham that all the basic Navigation Laws be re-enacted by the colo-
nial legislatures as an earnest of colonial loyalty. Furthermore, in October of
that year, the first Continental Congress publicly declared the colonies willing
to “cheerfully consent to the operation of such acts of the British Parliament,
as are bona fide, restrained to the regulation of our external commerce, for the
purpose of securing the commercial advantages of the whole empire to the
mother country, and the commercial benefits of its respective members. . . .”
In short, the navigation system was acceptable. Certainly laws the repressive
nature of which no one was disturbed about can hardly be accepted as the
grounds for a revolution.
No better economic argument can be made for taxation as a cause for the
Revolution. Despite the tradition of oppressive taxation which the myth of the
Revolution has spawned, the actual tax burden of the colonies was much heavier
in the seventeenth century than in the years immediately before the conflict. On
a per capita basis, taxes were five times greater in 1698 than they were in 1773.
The lightness of the British taxes in the pre-Revolutionary period is also shown
by the fact that the duty on molasses in 1766 was only a penny a gallon, or less
than the duty the federal government imposed in 1791. As Lord North pointed
out in 1775, taxation of the Americans was neither excessive nor oppressive.
From the unconvincing character of the economic explanations for the
coming of the Revolution, it would appear, therefore, that the underlying
force impelling the break was the growing national self-consciousness of the
Americans. “The Revolution was effected before the war commenced,” John
Adams remarked years afterward. “The Revolution was in the minds and hearts
of the people. . . .” The origins of the “principles and feelings” which made
the Revolution, Adams thought, “ought to be traced back . . . and sought in
the history of the country from the first plantations in America.” For a century
and a half the Americans had been growing up and now they had finally come
of age. Precisely because the Revolution was the breaking away of a young
people from a parent, the substance of the Revolution was political. The argu-
ment concerned the question of parental authority, because that is the precise
point at which tension appears as the child approaches maturity and seeks to
assert his independence. Unfortunately for Britain, but like so many modern
parents, the mother country had long before conveniently provided the best
arguments in favor of freedom. And the colonists had learned the arguments
well. For this reason, the rhetoric of the Revolutionary argument was in the
language of the British political and constitutional tradition.
As children enjoying a long history of freedom from interference
from their parent, the Americans might well have continued in their loose
144
Additional Resources
There are numerous anthologies that offer a diverse range of interpretations
about the American Revolution. Two of the best-edited collections are George
Athan Billias, The American Revolution: How Revolutionary Was It? (Holt, Rinehart
& Winston, 1980) and Richard M. Fulton, The Revolution That Wasn’t: A Con-
temporary Assessment of 1776 (Kennikat Press, 1981), which discusses numerous
theories of revolution. Among the most recent edited collections is Kirk D.
Werner, ed., The American Revolution (Greenhaven Press, 2000). William Dudley
has edited some of the most useful primary sources to a reasonable length in
The American Revolution: Opposing Viewpoints (Greenhaven Pres, 1992).
The two major interpretative articles on the subject are Jack P. Greene,
“The Reappraisal of the American Revolution in Recent Historical Litera-
ture,” in Greene, ed., The Reinterpretation of the American Revolution (Harper &
Row, 1968), an anthology of essays that highlights Greene’s historiographi-
cal appraisal from Bancroft to Bailyn. A second immensely detailed appraisal
sympathetic to a radial interpretation of the Revolution is Alfred E. Young,
“American Historians Confront the Transforming Hand of Revolution,”
in Ronald Hoffman and Peter Albert, eds., The Transforming Hand of Revolu-
tion: Reconsidering the American Revolution as a Social Movement (University of
Virginia Press, 1996).
145
YES: Howard Zinn, from A People’s History of the United States (Harper
Collins, 1999)
NO: Gordon S. Wood, from “Democracy and the Constitution,” in
Robert A. Goldwin and William A. Schambra, eds., How Democratic
is the Constitution? (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1980)
Learning Outcomes
After reading this issue you should be able to:
• Gain an understanding of the political, philosophical, and
social differences between the Federalists (Cosmopolitans)
and the Anti-Federalists (Localists).
• Gain an understanding of economics as a force in history and
whether or not economics was the primary motivating force
in writing the Constitution.
ISSUE SUMMARY
146
147
148
149
T o many Americans over the years, the Constitution drawn up in 1787 has
seemed a work of genius put together by wise, humane men who created a legal
framework for democracy and equality. This view is stated, a bit extravagantly,
by the historian George Bancroft, writing in the early nineteenth century:
Another view of the Constitution was put forward early in the twenti-
eth century by the historian Charles Beard (arousing anger and indignation,
including a denunciatory editorial in the New York Times). He wrote in his
book An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution:
In short, Beard said, the rich must, in their own interest, either control
the government directly or control the laws by which government operates.
Beard applied this general idea to the Constitution, by studying the eco-
nomic backgrounds and political ideas of the fifty-five men who gathered in
Philadelphia in 1787 to draw up the Constitution. He found that a majority
of them were lawyers by profession, that most of them were men of wealth, in
land, slaves, manufacturing, or shipping, that half of them had money loaned
From A People’s History of the United States by Howard Zinn (HarperCollins, 1999). Copyright
© 1980 by Howard Zinn. Reprinted by permission of HarperCollins Publishers.
150
out at interest, and that forty of the fifty-five held government bonds, accord-
ing to the records of the Treasury Department.
Thus, Beard found that most of the makers of the Constitution had some
direct economic interest in establishing a strong federal government: the man-
ufacturers needed protective tariffs; the moneylenders wanted to stop the use
of paper money to pay off debts; the land speculators wanted protection as
they invaded Indian lands; slaveowners needed federal security against slave
revolts and runaways; bondholders wanted a government able to raise money
by nationwide taxation, to pay off those bonds.
Four groups, Beard noted, were not represented in the Constitutional
Convention: slaves, indentured servants, women, men without property. And
so the Constitution did not reflect the interests of those groups.
He wanted to make it clear that he did not think the Constitution was
written merely to benefit the Founding Fathers personally, although one
could not ignore the $150,000 fortune of Benjamin Franklin, the connections
of Alexander Hamilton to wealthy interests through his father-in-law and
brother-in-law, the great slave plantations of James Madison, the enormous
landholdings of George Washington. Rather, it was to benefit the groups the
Founders represented, the “economic interests they understood and felt in
concrete, definite form through their own personal experience.”
Not everyone at the Philadelphia Convention fitted Beard’s scheme.
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts was a holder of landed property, and yet
he opposed the ratification of the Constitution. Similarly, Luther Martin of
Maryland, whose ancestors had obtained large tracts of land in New Jersey,
opposed ratification. But, with a few exceptions, Beard found a strong connec-
tion between wealth and support of the Constitution.
By 1787 there was not only a positive need for strong central government
to protect the large economic interests, but also immediate fear of rebellion by
discontented farmers. The chief event causing this fear was an uprising in the
summer of 1786 in western Massachusetts, known as Shays’ Rebellion.
In the western towns of Massachusetts there was resentment against the
legislature in Boston. The new Constitution of 1780 had raised the property
qualifications for voting. No one could hold state office without being quite
wealthy. Furthermore, the legislature was refusing to issue paper money, as
had been done in some other states, like Rhode Island, to make it easier for
debt-ridden farmers to pay off their creditors.
Illegal conventions began to assemble in some of the western counties to
organize opposition to the legislature. At one of these, a man named Plough
Jogger spoke his mind:
I have been greatly abused, have been obliged to do more than my part
in the war; been loaded with class rates, town rates, province rates,
Continental rates and all rates . . . been pulled and hauled by sheriffs,
constables and collectors, and had my cattle sold for less than they
were worth. . . .
. . . The great men are going to get all we have and I think it is
time for us to rise and put a stop to it, and have no more courts, nor
sheriffs, nor collectors nor lawyers. . . .
The chairman of that meeting used his gavel to cut short the applause. He and
others wanted to redress their grievances, but peacefully, by petition to the
General Court (the legislature) in Boston.
However, before the scheduled meeting of the General Court, there
were going to be court proceedings in Hampshire County, in the towns of
Northampton and Springfield, to seize the cattle of farmers who hadn’t paid
their debts, to take away their land, now full of grain and ready for harvest.
And so, veterans of the Continental army, also aggrieved because they had
been treated poorly on discharge—given certificates for future redemption
instead of immediate cash—began to organize the farmers into squads and
companies. One of these veterans was Luke Day, who arrived the morning of
court with a fife-and-drum corps, still angry with the memory of being locked
up in debtors’ prison in the heat of the previous summer.
The sheriff looked to the local militia to defend the court against these
armed farmers. But most of the militia was with Luke Day. The sheriff did
manage to gather five hundred men, and the judges put on their black silk
robes, waiting for the sheriff to protect their trip to the courthouse. But there
at the courthouse steps, Luke Day stood with a petition, asserting the people’s
constitutional right to protest the unconstitutional acts of the General Court,
asking the judges to adjourn until the General Court could act on behalf of
the farmers. Standing with Luke Day were fifteen hundred armed farmers. The
judges adjourned.
Shortly after, at courthouses in Worcester and Athol, farmers with guns
prevented the courts from meeting to take away their property, and the militia
were too sympathetic to the farmers, or too outnumbered, to act. In Concord,
a fifty-year-old veteran of two wars, Job Shattuck, led a caravan of carts, wag-
ons, horses, and oxen onto the town green, while a message was sent to the
judges:
The voice of the People of this county is such that the court shall not
enter this courthouse until such time as the People shall have redress of
the grievances they labor under at the present.
A county convention then suggested the judges adjourn, which they did.
At Great Barrington, a militia of a thousand faced a square crowded with
armed men and boys. But the militia was split in its opinion. When the chief jus-
tice suggested the militia divide, those in favor of the court’s sitting to go on the
right side of the road, and those against on the left, two hundred of the militia
went to the right, eight hundred to the left, and the judges adjourned. Then the
crowd went to the home of the chief justice, who agreed to sign a pledge that the
court would not sit until the Massachusetts General Court met. The crowd went
back to the square, broke open the county jail, and set free the debtors. The chief
justice, a country doctor, said: “I have never heard anybody point out a better
way to have their grievances redressed than the people have taken.”
The governor and the political leaders of Massachusetts became alarmed.
Samuel Adams, once looked on as a radical leader in Boston, now insisted
people act within the law. He said “British emissaries” were stirring up the
farmers. People in the town of Greenwich responded: You in Boston have the
money, and we don’t. And didn’t you act illegally yourselves in the Revolu-
tion? The insurgents were now being called Regulators. Their emblem was a
sprig of hemlock.
The problem went beyond Massachusetts. In Rhode Island, the debtors had
taken over the legislature and were issuing paper money. In New Hampshire,
several hundred men, in September of 1786, surrounded the legislature in Exeter,
asking that taxes be returned and paper money issued; they dispersed only when
military action was threatened.
Daniel Shays entered the scene in western Massachusetts. A poor farm
hand when the revolution broke out, he joined the Continental army, fought
at Lexington, Bunker Hill, and Saratoga, and was wounded in action. In 1780,
not being paid, he resigned from the army, went home, and soon found him-
self in court for nonpayment of debts. He also saw what was happening to
others: a sick woman, unable to pay, had her bed taken from under her.
What brought Shays fully into the situation was that on September 19,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts met in Worcester and indicted
eleven leaders of the rebellion, including three of his friends, as “disorderly,
riotous and seditious persons” who “unlawfully and by force of arms” pre-
vented “the execution of justice and the laws of the commonwealth.” The
Supreme Judicial Court planned to meet again in Springfield a week later, and
there was talk of Luke Day’s being indicted.
Shays organized seven hundred armed farmers, most of them veterans of
the war, and led them to Springfield. There they found a general with nine hun-
dred soldiers and a cannon. Shays asked the general for permission to parade,
which the general granted, so Shays and his men moved through the square,
drums banging and fifes blowing. As they marched, their ranks grew. Some of
the militia joined, and reinforcements began coming in from the countryside.
The judges postponed hearings for a day, then adjourned the court.
Now the General Court, meeting in Boston, was told by Governor James
Bowdoin to “vindicate the insulted dignity of government.” The recent rebels
against England, secure in office, were calling for law and order. Sam Adams
helped draw up a Riot Act, and a resolution suspending habeas corpus, to
allow the authorities to keep people in jail without trial. At the same time,
the legislature moved to make some concessions to the angry farmers, saying
certain old taxes could now be paid in goods instead of money.
This didn’t help. In Worcester, 160 insurgents appeared at the court-
house. The sheriff read the Riot Act. The insurgents said they would disperse
only if the judges did. The sheriff shouted something about hanging. Someone
came up behind him and put a sprig of hemlock in his hat. The judges left.
Confrontations between farmers and militia now multiplied. The winter
snows began to interfere with the trips of farmers to the courthouses. When
Shays began marching a thousand men into Boston, a blizzard forced them
back, and one of his men froze to death.
An army came into the field, led by General Benjamin Lincoln, on
money raised by Boston merchants. In an artillery duel, three rebels were
killed. One soldier stepped in front of his own artillery piece and lost both
arms. The winter grew worse. The rebels were outnumbered and on the run.
Shays took refuge in Vermont, and his followers began to surrender. There
were a few more deaths in battle, and then sporadic, disorganized, desperate
acts of violence against authority: the burning of barns, the slaughter of a
general’s horses. One government soldier was killed in an eerie night-time
collision of two sleighs.
Captured rebels were put on trial in Northampton and six were sentenced
to death. A note was left at the door of the high sheriff of Pittsfidd:
Thirty-three more rebels were put on trial and six more condemned to
death. Arguments took place over whether the hangings should go forward.
General Lincoln urged mercy and a Commission of Clemency, but Samuel
Adams said: “In monarchy the crime of treason may admit of being pardoned
or lightly punished, but the man who dares rebel against the laws of a republic
ought to suffer death.” Several hangings followed; some of the condemned
were pardoned. Shays, in Vermont, was pardoned in 1788 and returned to
Massachusetts, where he died, poor and obscure, in 1825.
It was Thomas Jefferson, in France as ambassador at the time of Shays’
Rebellion, who spoke of such uprisings as healthy for society. In a letter to
a friend he wrote: “I hold it that a little rebellion now and then is a good
thing. . . . It is a medicine necessary for the sound health of government. . . .
God forbid that we should ever be twenty years without such a rebellion. . . .
The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patri-
ots and tyrants. It is its natural manure.”
But Jefferson was far from the scene. The political and economic elite
of the country were not so tolerant. They worried that the example might
spread. A veteran of Washington’s army, General Henry Knox, founded an
organization of army veterans, “The Order of the Cincinnati,” presumably (as
one historian put it) “for the purpose of cherishing the heroic memories of
the struggle in which they had taken part,” but also, it seemed, to watch out
for radicalism in the new country. Knox wrote to Washington in late 1786
about Shays’ Rebellion, and in doing so expressed the thoughts of many of the
wealthy and powerful leaders of the country:
The people who are the insurgents have never paid any, or but very
little taxes. But they see the weakness of government; they feel at once
their own poverty, compared with the opulent, and their own force,
and they are determined to make use of the latter, in order to remedy
the former. Their creed is “That the property of the United States has
been protected from the confiscations of Britain by the joint exertions
of all, and therefore ought to he the common property of all. And he
Alexander Hamilton, aide to Washington during the war, was one of the
most forceful and astute leaders of the new aristocracy. He voiced his political
philosophy:
All communities divide themselves into the few and the many. The
first are the rich and well-born, the other the mass of the people. The
voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God; and however
generally this maxim has been quoted and believed, it is not true in
fact. The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or
determine right. Give therefore to the first class a distinct permanent
share in the government. . . . Can a democratic assembly who annu-
ally revolve in the mass of the people be supposed steadily to pursue
the public good? Nothing but a permanent body can check the impru-
dence of democracy. . . .
interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards
be the most ready to lament and condemn.” And: “In these critical moments,
how salutary will be the interference of some temperate and respectable body
of citizens in order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow
meditated by the people against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth
can regain their authority over the public mind?”
The Constitution was a compromise between slaveholding interests of
the South and moneyed interests of the North. For the purpose of uniting the
thirteen states into one great market for commerce, the northern delegates
wanted laws regulating interstate commerce, and urged that such laws require
only a majority of Congress to pass. The South agreed to this, in return for
allowing the trade in slaves to continue for twenty years before being outlawed.
Charles Beard warned us that governments—including the government
of the United States—are not neutral, that they represent the dominant eco-
nomic interests, and that their constitutions are intended to serve these inter-
ests. One of his critics (Robert E. Brown, Charles Beard and the Constitution)
raises an interesting point. Granted that the Constitution omitted the phrase
“life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,” which appeared in the Declara-
tion of Independence, and substituted “life, liberty, or property”—well, why
shouldn’t the Constitution protect property? As Brown says about Revolution-
ary America, “practically everybody was interested in the protection of prop-
erty” because so many Americans owned property.
However, this is misleading. True, there were many property owners. But
some people had much more than others. A few people had great amounts of
property; many people had small amounts; others had none. Jackson Main
found that one-third of the population in the Revolutionary period were small
farmers, while only 3 percent of the population had truly large holdings and
could be considered wealthy.
Still, one-third was a considerable number of people who felt they had
something at stake in the stability of a new government. This was a larger
base of support for government than anywhere in the world at the end of the
eighteenth century. In addition, the city mechanics had an important inter-
est in a government which would protect their work from foreign competi-
tion. As Staughton Lynd puts it: “How is it that the city workingmen all over
America overwhelmingly and enthusiastically supported the United States
Constitution?”
This was especially true in New York. When the ninth and tenth states had
ratified the Constitution, four thousand New York City mechanics marched
with floats and banners to celebrate. Bakers, blacksmiths, brewers, ship join-
ers and shipwrights, coopers, cartmen and tailors, all marched. What Lynd
found was that these mechanics, while opposing elite rule in the colonies,
were nationalist. Mechanics comprised perhaps half the New York population.
Some were wealthy, some were poor, but all were better off than the ordinary
laborer, the apprentice, the journeyman, and their prosperity required a gov-
ernment that would protect them against the British hats and shoes and other
goods that were pouring into the colonies after the Revolution. As a result, the
mechanics often supported wealthy conservatives at the ballot box.
that he or she was protected in the exercise of free speech. That basis has
been explained by historian Leonard Levy. Levy points out that it was gener-
ally understood (not in the population, but in higher circles) that, despite
the First Amendment, the British common law of “seditious libel” still ruled
in America. This meant that while the government could not exercise “prior
restraint”—that is, prevent an utterance or publication in advance—it could
legally punish the speaker or writer afterward. Thus, Congress has a conven-
ient legal basis for the laws it has enacted since that time, making certain kinds
of speech a crime. And, since punishment after the fact is an excellent deter-
rent to the exercise of free expression, the claim of “no prior restraint” itself is
destroyed. This leaves the First Amendment much less than the stone wall of
protection it seems at first glance.
Are the economic provisions in the Constitution enforced just as weakly?
We have an instructive example almost immediately in Washington’s first admin-
istration, when Congress’s power to tax and appropriate money was immediately
put to use by the Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton.
Hamilton, believing that government must ally itself with the richest
elements of society to make itself strong, proposed to Congress a series of laws,
which it enacted, expressing this philosophy. A Bank of the United States was
set up as a partnership between the government and certain banking inter-
ests. A tariff was passed to help the manufacturers. It was agreed to pay bond-
holders—most of the war bonds were now concentrated in a small group of
wealthy people—the full value of their bonds. Tax laws were passed to raise
money for this bond redemption.
One of these tax laws was the Whiskey Tax, which especially hurt small
farmers who raised grain that they converted into whiskey and then sold. In
1794 the farmers of western Pennsylvania took up arms and rebelled against
the collection of this tax. Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton led the troops
to put them down. We see then, in the first years of the Constitution, that
some of its provisions—even those paraded most flamboyantly (like the First
Amendment)—might be treated lightly. Others (like the power to tax) would
be powerfully enforced.
Still, the mythology around the Founding Fathers persists. To say, as one
historian (Bernard Bailyn) has done recently, that “the destruction of privilege
and the creation of a political system that demanded of its leaders the respon-
sible and humane use of power were their highest aspirations” is to ignore
what really happened in the America of these Founding Fathers.
Bailyn says:
Everyone knew the basic prescription for a wise and just government. It
was so to balance the contending powers in society that no one power
could overwhelm the others and, unchecked, destroy the liberties that
belonged to all. The problem was how to arrange the institutions of
government so that this balance could be achieved.
Were the Founding Fathers wise and just men trying to achieve a good
balance? In fact, they did not want a balance, except one which kept things as
they were, a balance among the dominant forces at that time. They certainly
did not want an equal balance between slaves and masters, propertyless and
property holders, Indians and white.
As many as half the people were not even considered by the Founding
Fathers as among Bailyn’s “contending powers” in society. They were not men-
tioned in the Declaration of Independence, they were absent in the Constitu-
tion, they were invisible in the new political democracy. They were the women
of early America.
...
From How Democratic is the Constitution by Gordon S. Wood (American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1980). Copyright © 1980 by American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research. Reprinted by permission.
161
over all America such a strong, overarching national government as the Con-
stitution provided. Such a powerful central government operating directly on
individuals was diametrically opposed to all the principles of the Revolution.
More than anything else, the Revolution intended to reduce the overween-
ing power of the government, particularly far-removed central government
associated with the British imperial system. Any revolutionary in 1776 sug-
gesting a national government resembling the one eventually created by the
Constitution of 1787 would have been branded a lunatic or, worse, a British
monarchist.
instantly thinks how it will affect his constituents.” In short, the representa-
tives of the people—the democratic parts of the mixed constitutions—were
responding too readily to the wishes of the people they represented. When the
Federalists in 1787 came to complain of “the turbulence and follies of democ-
racy,” this is what they meant.
American leaders tried several approaches to these democratic abuses in
the states. Some attempted to reform the revolutionary state constitutions by
reducing the power of the popular assemblies and enhancing that of the gov-
ernors and senates. The Massachusetts constitution of 1780 embodied many
of these second thoughts, and during the 1780s other states sought to remake
their constitutions in Massachusetts’ image. Others tried to use the judiciary
against what were thought to be unconstitutional acts of the legislatures; there
were scattered and rudimentary expressions of what would become judicial
review. Many leaders, however, thought such judicial overturnings of law
enacted by popularly elected legislatures smacked of despotism and were con-
trary to republican government.
By the mid-1780s, men were increasingly disillusioned with these reforms
and devices at the state level. Finally, when even Massachusetts with its sup-
posedly model constitution experienced popular excesses, including Shays’
Rebellion and the subsequent legislative “tyranny” of Shaysite sympathizers,
many leaders were ready to shift the arena of constitutional change from the
states to the nation. It seemed to many that only by modifying the structure
of the central government could America find an answer to its democratically
caused problems within the states.
What happened in 1786–1787, in brief, was the coalescing of two dif-
ferent and hitherto separate reform movements. The previously frustrated
attempts of various groups—public creditors, merchants, and others—to
amend the Articles of Confederation were reinforced by the efforts of those
alarmed by majoritarian tyranny within the states. Heightened concern with
the implications of state politics overwhelmed the state particularism and the
fear of far-removed central power that had prevented earlier reform of the
Articles of Confederation and forced a recasting of the terms of the problem
facing Americans. Since the legislative abuses of the states flowed from the
revolutionary aim of increasing the participation of the people in government,
the very success of the revolutionary experiment in popular government was
at stake. Thus, changing the central government was no longer a matter of
standing firm in foreign affairs or of satisfying particular creditor or mercantile
interests. It was now a matter, as Madison said, that would “decide forever the
fate of republican government.”
Madison wanted from the new central government and how disappointed he
was with the final Constitution. Madison’s proposals were truly radical; they
were designed not to solve particular problems of the confederation but to
remedy the deficiencies of republicanism itself. The evidence is strong that
Madison and other nationalists who thought like him wanted greater consoli-
dation and a correspondingly greater weakening of the states than they got.
Madison wanted a national government that not only would have “a positive
and compleat authority in all cases where uniform measures are necessary,”
as in commerce and foreign policy, but would have “a negative in all cases
whatsoever on the Legislative Acts of the States as the King of Great Britain
heretofore had.” This veto power over all state legislation seemed to Madison
“to be absolutely necessary, and to be the least possible encroachment on the
State jurisdictions.” Without it, he believed, none of the great objects which
led to the convention—neither the need for more central authority nor the
desire to prevent instability and injustice in state legislation—would be met.
When the convention eventually set aside this national veto power, Madison
initially thought that the Constitution was doomed to failure.
Although deeply disappointed with the Constitution Madison and other
nationalists aimed to make the best of what they had, a greatly enlarged and
elevated republic. All scholars now know how ingeniously Madison made the-
oretical sense of the new national system. Seizing on David Hume’s radical
suggestion that a republican government might operate better in a large terri-
tory than in a small one, Madison reversed the traditional assumptions about
the appropriate size of a republic. Since experience in America from 1776 had
demonstrated that no republic could be made small enough to avoid the clash-
ing of rival parties and interests (tiny Rhode Island was the most faction-ridden
of all), the republican state, said Madison in a series of notable letters, essays,
and speeches climaxing with his Federalist No. 10, must be enlarged “without
a departure from the elective basis of it.” In this way “the propensity in small
republics to rash measures and the facility of forming and executing them”
by overbearing factional majorities would be stifled. “In a large Society,” said
Madison, “the people are broken into so many interests and parties, that a
common sentiment is less likely to be felt, and the requisite concert less likely
to be formed, by a majority of the whole.”
All this may be common knowledge to scholars, but it has led to great
misunderstanding of Madison’s meaning. Some have pictured Madison “as the
originator of what has come to be called an “interest-group” theory of politics.
But Madison was not a forerunner of Arther Bentley, David Truman, or Robert
Dahl. Despite his keen appreciation of the multiplicity of interests in a com-
mercial society, Madison was not presenting a pluralist conception of politics.
He did not envision public policy or the common good emerging naturally
from the give-and-take of hosts of competing interests. Instead he hoped that
these competing parties and interests in an enlarged republic would neutralize
themselves, which in turn would allow rational men to promote the public
good. It had worked that way in America’s religious situation, which was a
common analogy for Madison. The multiplicity of religious sects in America
prevented any from dominating the state and permitted the enlightened
reason of philosophes like Jefferson and himself to shape public policy and
church-state relations. Madison did not want the new national government to
be an integrator and harmonizer of different interests in the society; instead he
wanted it to be a “disinterested and dispassionate umpire in disputes” between
these different interests. In other words, Madison was not as modern as we
often make him out to be. He hoped the national government might play the
same role the British king had been supposed to play in the empire.
This expanded electorate and elevated government would then act as a kind
of filter, refining the kind of men who would become national leaders. In a
larger arena with a smaller number of representatives, only the most notable
and most socially established were likely to gain political office. If the people
of a state, New York, for example, had to select only ten men to the federal
Congress in contrast to the sixty-six they elected to their state assembly, they
were more apt in the case of the few representatives in the national govern-
ment to ignore obscure ordinary men with local reputations and elect those
who were well bred, well educated, and well known. Election by the people in
large districts would inhibit demagoguery and crass electioneering and would
therefore, as Madison’s closest ally in the convention, James Wilson, said, “be
most likely to obtain men of intelligence and uprightness.”
What was the meaning of all this Federalist talk of keeping out of govern-
ment “men of factious tempers, of localist prejudices, or of sinister designs”?
Who were the men possessing “the most attractive merit and most diffusive
and established characters”? If anyone today used those terms to describe
political leaders, we would be understandably suspicious. We might even say
that these are “code words” for distinct social types. The Federalist diagnosis
of the problems of state politics in the 1780s was at bottom social. Prior to
the Revolution, the colonists, like all eighteenth-century Englishmen, had less
need for such circumlocutions; they then talked more candidly about the dis-
tinction between gentlemen and ordinary people and were much more blunt
in designating some as aristocrats and most as not. Since the Revolution, how-
ever, the distinction between gentlemen and common people was becoming
blurred; aristocracy, even a republican “natural aristocracy,” had become a
pejorative term in many parts of the country. It is perhaps anachronistic and
crude to refer to this gentry sense of difference from obscure ordinary people
as a “class” distinction, for it was a distinction that belonged to the older hier-
archically and vertically organized society of ranks and degrees and not to the
economically based class and horizontally organized society of the future. Yet,
it is surely more accurate to describe the controversy over the Constitution
in these anachronistic and crude “class” terms than to suggest that it had no
social implications whatsoever. The Federalists knew well the social signifi-
cance of their enlarged republic. They had a shrewd sociological insight into
American politics, and they aimed to use it in transforming the social charac-
ter of American government.
It is a sociological insight that was exploited time and again in later
American history. The Progressive period, for example, was marked by the
reforming efforts of cosmopolitan types, often liberal, upper-income profes-
sionals and businessmen, to wrest the reins of government out of the hands of
“corrupt” and “undesirable” localist elements. The Progressive reformers often
did this by shifting the level of governmental decision making from wards,
towns, and counties to the states and the nation. Commissions of “experts”
at the state and federal level supplanted parochial politicians who could not
see beyond their own neighborhoods. Changing the level of decision making
continues to have social implications; much of our national politics still swirls
around this cosmopolitan-localist dichotomy. What do we mean socially when
The changes in language and thought that made this new, more modern
definition of democracy possible were not as easily reached as suggested here.
Nor was the Federalist use of populism to defend the Constitution as self-
conscious or calculating as here implied. Ideas and words are not manipulated
or transformed quite that crudely. But, in sum, the Federalists did seek to cover
their aristocratic document with a democratic mantle. The state problems of
the 1780s they hoped to solve were those of excessive democracy; yet, the solu-
tion, they said, or felt compelled to say, was likewise democratic. As Madison,
who was somewhat less willing than other Federalists to distort language and
indulge the people, put it, the Constitution was “a republican remedy for the
diseases most incident to republican government.” Whatever the terms used,
the Federalists in their public statements were not able to say candidly what
at least some had said within the secrecy of the Philadelphia Convention: that
the source of their difficulties came from too much local democracy, and that
the solution was to limit this local democracy by erecting a more aristocratic
structure over it.
In the end, the Federalists had little choice in their rhetoric. If they were
to get the Constitution ratified, they had to work within the egalitarian and
populist currents flowing from the Revolution. Despite the suggestion of disin-
genuousness, there is no denying their achievement. They thought and acted
more creatively than any other generation in American history. They not only
convinced the country to accept a national government inconceivable a dec-
ade earlier but they did so without repudiating the republicanism and the
popular basis of government that nearly all devoutly believed in. The Feder-
alists of 1787–1788 were not the Federalists of the 1790s; they were alarmed
by the abuses of popular power, but they were not, like the later Federalist
party, actually fearful of the people. They remained confident that, if only
the people’s choice could be undisturbed by ambitious local demagogues and
crass electioneering, the people would “choose men of the first character for
wisdom and integrity,” men very much like themselves. It was an achieve-
ment that transcended their intentions and one that has rightly earned them
the admiration of subsequent generations. Somehow for a moment they rec-
onciled aristocracy with democracy and gave us, as John P. Roche has said
“a classic example of the potentialities of a democratic elite.”
Nevertheless, great as the Federalists’ achievement was, the cost to the
future of American politics was high. By using the most popular and demo-
cratic rhetoric available to explain and justify their aristocratic system, the
Federalists helped to foreclose the development of an American intellectual
tradition in which differing ideas of politics would be intimately and gen-
uinely related to differing social interests. In other words, the Federalists of
1787 furthered the American disavowal of any sort of aristocratic conception
of politics and encouraged the American belief that the ills of democracy can
be cured by more democracy. From the creation of the Constitution, as the
Federalist party of the 1790s eventually discovered to its dismay, democracy in
America was no longer something to be discussed skeptically and challenged
but a faith to which all Americans and all American institutions must unques-
tioningly adhere.
171
Additional Resources
Many books and articles proliferated in the 1980s celebrating the two hun-
dredth anniversary of the Constitution. See the following review essays of the
literature: Edmund Morgan’s review essay of 19 books on the Constitution in
The New Republic (June 29, 1987); and Forrest McDonald, “A New Introduction”
to Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United
States (Free Press, 1986), a brilliant and critical analysis of the literature criti-
quing Beard. Additional bibliography includes discussions of the “originalist”
interpretations of the Constitution and its effects on the modern-day Tea Party
movement. Garret Epps, “Stealing the Constitution: Inside the Right’s Campaign
to Hijack Our Country’s Founding Text—and How to Fight Back,” The Nation
(February 7, 2011); Jill Lepore, “The Commandment: The Constitution and its
Worshippers,” The New Yorker (January 17, 2011); and Gordon S. Wood, “No
Thanks for the Memories: A Review of Jill Lepore, The Whites of Their Eyes: The
Tea Party’s Revolution and the Battle Over American History,” The New York Review
of Books (January 13, 2011), which is more critical of Lepore than expected and
views the Tea Party movement as a legitimate grassroots protest movement.
172
YES: John Steele Gordon, from An Empire of Wealth: The Epic History
of American Economic Powers (Harper Collins, 2004)
NO: Joyce Appleby, from Inheriting the Revolution: The First Generation
of Americans (The Belknap Press, 2000)
Learning Outcomes
After reading this issue, you should be able to:
• Critically analyze the arguments supporting and opposing
Hamilton’s economic policies.
• Critically analyze the long-range effects of Hamilton’s eco-
nomic program on United States economic development in
the nineteenth century.
• Critically analyze Joyce Appleby’s argument that it was Jeffer-
son’s economic policies that liberated the American economy
in the years from the 1790s through the 1840s.
ISSUE SUMMARY
173
174
175
176
From An Empire of Wealth: The Epic History of American Economic Power by John Steele Gordon
(HarperCollins, 2004). Copyright © 2004 by John Steele Gordon. Reprinted by permission of
HarperCollins Publishers.
177
The Holy Roman Emperor, the Hapsburg Charles V, also adopted the thaler
as the standard for his own coinage in both his Austrian and Spanish lands and
his new-won, silver-rich empire in the New World. The staggering amounts of
gold and silver mined in Spanish America in the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies (just between 1580 and 1626, more than eleven thousand tons of gold and
silver were exported to Spain from the New World) made the thaler the standard
unit of international trade for centuries. Thaler became dollar in the English lan-
guage, much as Thal, centuries earlier, had become dale and dell. It also became
the most common major coin in the British North American colonies.
Jefferson, in his “Notes on the Establishment of a Money Unit, and of a
Coinage for the United States,” advocated not only using the dollar but making
smaller units decimal fractions of the dollar. Today this seems obvious. After all,
every country in the world now has a decimal monetary system, and as Jefferson
himself explained, “in all cases where we are free to choose between easy and
difficult modes of operation, it is most rational to choose the easy.” But Thomas
Jefferson was the first to advocate such a system, and the United States, in 1786,
was the first country in the world to adopt one.
Spanish dollars had often been clipped into halves, quarters, and eighths,
called bits, to make small change (which is why they were often called “pieces
of eight”). But Jefferson advocated coinage of a half dollar, a fifth, a tenth (for
which he coined the word dime), a twentieth, and a hundredth of a dollar (for
which he borrowed the word cent from Robert Morris’s scheme). In 1785 Con-
gress declared that the “monetary unit of the United States of America be one
dollar.” But the next year Congress, while adopting the cent, five-cent, dime,
and fifty-cent coins advocated by Jefferson, decided to authorize a quarter-
dollar coin rather than a twenty-cent piece.
The quarter is with us yet, now the last, distant echo of the old octal
monetary system of colonial days. But other echoes held on for decades. The
New York Stock Exchange still gave prices in eighths of a dollar as late as 1999.
And the term shilling long remained in common use to mean twelve and a half
cents, an eighth of a dollar, although there has never been a United States coin
in that denomination. The east side of Broadway, in New York, where the less
fashionable stores were located, was still called the “shilling side” as late as the
1850s, while the west side of the street was called the “dollar side.”
One reason the term shilling held on so long, of course, was that American
coinage was not adequate to the ever-growing demand for it and the old
hodgepodge of foreign coins thus held on as well. The first United States coin,
a copper cent bearing the brisk motto “Mind Your Business,” was privately
minted. The Philadelphia mint was established in 1792 but minted few coins
in the early years for lack of metal with which to do so.
be the tariff, but there was lengthy debate over what imports should be taxed
and at what rate. Pennsylvania had had a high tariff under the old Articles
to protect its nascent iron industry and wanted it maintained. The southern
states, importers of iron products such as nails and hinges, wanted a low tariff
on iron goods or none at all. New England rum distillers wanted a low tariff
on its imports of molasses. Whiskey manufacturers in Pennsylvania and else-
where wanted a high tariff on molasses, to stifle their main competition.
Congress finally passed the Tariff and Tonnage Acts (the latter imposed
a duty of 6 cents a ton on American ships entering U.S. ports and 50 cents a
ton on foreign vessels) in the summer of 1789. But, second only to slavery, the
tariff would be the most contentious issue in Congress for the next hundred
years. Pierce Butler of South Carolina even issued the first secession threat
before the Tariff Act of 1789 made it through Congress.
With funding in place, Hamilton’s most pressing problem was to deal
with the federal debt. The Constitution commanded that the new federal gov-
ernment should assume the debts of the old one, but how that should be done
was a fiercely debated question. Much of the debt had fallen into the hands of
speculators who had bought it for as little as 10 percent of its face value.
On January 14, 1790, Hamilton submitted to Congress his first “Report
on the Public Credit.” It called for redeeming the old debt on generous terms
and issuing new bonds to pay for it, backed by the revenue from the tariff.
The report became public knowledge in New York City, the temporary capital,
immediately, but news of it spread only slowly to other parts of the country,
and New York speculators were able to snap up large quantities of the old debt
at prices far below what Hamilton proposed redeeming it for.
Many were outraged that speculators should profit while those who had
taken the debt at far higher prices during the Revolution should not see their
money again. James Madison argued that only the original holders should
have their paper redeemed at the full price and the speculators get only what
they had paid for it. But this was hopelessly impractical. For one thing, deter-
mining who was the original holder would have often been impossible.
Even more important, such a move would have greatly impaired the credit
of the government in the future. If the government could decide to whom
along the chain of holders it owed past debts, people would be more reluctant
to take future debt, and the price in terms of the interest rate demanded, there-
fore, would be higher. And Hamilton was anxious to establish a secure and
well-funded national debt, modeled on that of Great Britain and for precisely
the purposes that Great Britain had used its debt.
Many of those in the new government, unversed in public finance, did
not grasp the power of a national debt, properly funded and serviced, to add
to a nation’s prosperity. But Hamilton grasped it fully. One of the greatest
problems facing the American economy at the start of the 1790s was the lack
of liquid capital, capital available for investment. Hamilton wanted to use the
national debt to create a larger and more flexible money supply. Banks hold-
ing government bonds could issue banknotes backed by them. And govern-
ment bonds could serve as collateral for bank loans, multiplying the available
capital. He also knew they would attract still more capital from Europe.
The other major part of Hamilton’s fiscal policy was the establishment of a
central bank, to be called the Bank of the United States and modeled on the
Bank of England.
Hamilton expected a central bank to carry out three functions. First, it
would act as a depository for government funds and facilitate the transfer of
them from one part of the country to another. This was a major consideration
in the primitive conditions of the young United States. Second, it would be
a source of loans to the federal government and to other banks. And third, it
would regulate the money supply by disciplining state-chartered banks.
The money supply was a critical problem at the time. Specie—gold and
silver coins—was in very short supply. In 1790 there were only three state-
chartered banks empowered to issue paper money, including Hamilton’s Bank
of New York, but these notes had only local circulation. Hamilton reasoned
that if the Bank of the United States accepted these local notes at par, other
banks would too, greatly increasing the area in which they would circulate.
And if the BUS refused the notes of a particular bank, because of irregularities
or excess money creation, other banks would refuse them as well, helping to
keep the state banks on the straight and narrow.
Hamilton had learned not to like the idea of the government itself issu-
ing paper money, knowing that in times of need the government would be
unable to resist the temptation to solve its money problems by simply print-
ing it. Certainly the Continental Congress had shown no restraint during
the Revolution, but at least it had had the excuse of no alternative. And the
history of paper money since Hamilton’s day has shown him to be correct.
Without exception, wherever politicians have possessed the power to print
money, they have abused it, at great cost to the economic health of the coun-
try in question.
Hamilton proposed a bank with a capitalization of $10 million. That was
a very large sum when one considers that the three state banks in existence
had a combined capitalization of only $2 million. The government would hold
20 percent of the stock of the bank and have 20 percent of the seats on the
board. The secretary of the treasury would have the right to inspect its books
at any time. But the rest of the bank’s stock would be privately held.
“To attach full confidence to an institution of this nature,” Hamilton wrote
in his “Report on a National Bank,” delivered to Congress on December 14, 1790,
“it appears to be an essential ingredient in its structure, that it shall be under
a private not a public direction—under the guidance of individual interest, not of
public policy; which would be supposed to be, and, in certain emergencies, under
a feeble or too sanguine administration, would really be, liable to being too
much influenced by public necessity.”
The bill passed Congress with little trouble, both houses splitting along
sectional lines. Only one congressman from states north of Maryland voted
against it and only three congressmen from states south of Maryland voted for
it. Hamilton thought the deal was done.
But he had not counted on Thomas Jefferson, by now secretary of state,
and James Madison, who then sat in the House of Representatives. Although
Jefferson had personally enjoyed to the hilt the manifold pleasures of Paris
while he had served as minister to Louis XVI under the old Articles of Con-
federation, nonetheless he had a deep political aversion to cities and to the
commerce that thrives in them.
Nothing symbolized the vulgar, urban moneygrubbing he so despised as
banks. “I have ever been the enemy of banks . . .” he wrote to John Adams in
old age. “My zeal against those institutions was so warm and open at the estab-
lishment of the Bank of the U.S. that I was derided as a Maniac by the tribe of
bank-mongers, who were seeking to filch from the public their swindling, and
barren gains.”
Jefferson, born one of the richest men in the American colonies—on his
father’s death he inherited more than five thousand acres of land and three
hundred slaves—spent money all his life with a lordly disdain for whether he
actually had any to spend. He died, as a result, deeply in debt, bankrupt in
all but name. And regardless of his own aristocratic lifestyle, his vision of the
future of America was a land of self-sufficient yeoman farmers, a rural utopia
that had never really existed and would be utterly at odds with the American
economy as it actually developed in the industrial age then just coming into
being.
Jefferson and his allies Madison and Edmund Randolph, the attorney
general, fought Hamilton’s bank tooth and nail. They wrote opinions for Presi-
dent Washington saying that the bank was unconstitutional. Their arguments
revolved around the so-called necessary and proper clause of the Constitution,
giving Congress the power to pass laws “necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers.”
As the Constitution nowhere explicitly grants Congress the power to
establish a bank, they argued, only if one were absolutely necessary could Con-
gress do so. This “strict construction” of the Constitution has been part of the
warp and woof of American politics ever since, although even Jefferson admit-
ted that it appealed mostly to those out of power. The fact that the Constitu-
tion nowhere mentions the acquisition of land from a foreign state did not
stop Jefferson, as president, from snatching the Louisiana Purchase when the
opportunity presented itself.
Hamilton countered with a doctrine of “implied powers.” He argued
that if the federal government were to deal successfully with its enumerated
duties, it must be supreme in deciding how to do so. “Little less than a prohibi-
tory clause,” he wrote to Washington, “can destroy the strong presumptions
which result from the general aspect of the government. Nothing but demon-
stration should exclude the idea that the power exists.” Further, he asserted
that Congress had the right to decide what means were necessary and proper.
“The national government like every other,” he wrote, “must judge in the first
instance of the proper exercise of its powers.” Washington, his doubts quieted,
signed the bill.
The sale of stock was a resounding success, as investors expected that the
bank would prove very profitable, which it was. It also functioned exactly as
Hamilton thought it would. The three state banks in existence in 1790 became
twenty-nine by the turn of the century, and the United States enjoyed a more
reliable money supply than most nations in Europe.
With the success of the Bank of the United States stock offering, the
nascent securities markets in New York and Philadelphia had their first bull
markets, in bank stocks. Philadelphia, the leading financial market in the
country at that time, thanks to the location there of the headquarters of
the Bank of the United States, established a real stock exchange in 1792. In
New York a group of twenty-one individual brokers and three firms signed
an agreement—called the Buttonwood Agreement because it was, at least
according to tradition, signed beneath a buttonwood tree (today more com-
monly called a sycamore) outside 68 Wall Street. In it they pledged “our-
selves to each other, that we will not buy or sell from this day for any person
whatsoever any kind of Public Stock, at a less rate than one quarter per cent
Commission on the specie value, and that we will give preference to each
other in our negotiations.”
The new group formed by the brokers was far more a combination
in restraint of trade and price-fixing scheme than a formal organization,
but it proved to be a precursor of what today is called the New York Stock
Exchange.
A speculative bubble arose in New York, centered on the stock of the
Bank of New York. Rumors abounded that it would be bought by the new Bank
of the United States and converted to its New York branch. Numerous other
banks were announced and their stock, or, often, rights to buy the stock when
offered, was snapped up. The Tammany Bank announced a stock offering of
4,000 shares and received subscriptions for no fewer than 21,740 shares.
An unscrupulous speculator named William Duer was at the center
of this frenzy in bank stocks. He had worked, briefly, for the Treasury, but
had resigned rather than obey the rule Hamilton had put in place forbidd-
ing Treasury officials from speculating in Treasury securities. Hamilton was
appalled by what was happening on Wall street. “‘Tis time,” he wrote on
March 2, 1792, “there should be a line of separation between honest Men &
knaves, between respectable Stockholders and dealers in the funds, and mere
unprincipled Gamblers.”
It didn’t take long for Duer’s complex schemes to fall apart, and he was
clapped into debtors prison, from which he would not emerge alive. Panic
swept Wall street for the first time, and the next day twenty-five failures were
reported in New York’s still tiny financial community, including one of the
mighty Livingston clan.
Jefferson was delighted with this turn of events. “At length,” he wrote
a friend, “our paper bubble is burst. The failure of Duer in New York soon
brought on others, and these still more, like nine pins knocking down one
another.” Jefferson, who loved to calculate things, estimated the total losses
at $5 million, which he thought was about the total value of all New York real
estate at the time. Thus, Jefferson gleefully wrote, the panic was the same as
though some natural calamity had destroyed the city.
In fact, the situation was not nearly that dire, especially as Hamilton
moved swiftly to stabilize the market and ensure that the panic did not bring
down basically sound institutions. He ordered the Treasury to buy its own
securities to support the market, and he added further liquidity by allowing
customs duties—ordinarily payable only in specie or Bank of the United States
banknotes—to be paid with notes maturing in forty-five days.
The system Hamilton had envisioned and put in place over increasing
opposition from Thomas Jefferson and his political allies worked exactly as
Hamilton had intended. Several speculators were wiped out, but they had been
playing the game with their eyes open and had no one to blame but them-
selves. The nascent financial institutions, however, survived. “No calamity
truly public can happen,” Hamilton wrote, “while these institutions remain
sound.” The panic soon passed and most brokers were able to get back on their
feet quickly, thanks to Hamilton’s swift action.
Unfortunately, Thomas Jefferson was a better politician than Hamilton,
and a far better hater. The success of the Bank of the United States and its
obvious institutional utility for both the economy and the smooth running of
the government did not cause him to change his mind at all about banks. He
loathed them all. The party forming around Thomas Jefferson would seize the
reins of power in the election of 1800 and would not lose them for more than
a generation. In that time, they would destroy Hamilton’s financial regulatory
system and would replace it with nothing.
As a result, the American economy, while it would grow at an aston-
ishing rate, would be the most volatile in the Western world, subject to an
unending cycle of boom and bust whose amplitude far exceeded the normal
ups and downs of the business cycle. American monetary authorities would
not—indeed could not—intervene decisively to abort a market panic before it
spiraled out of control for another 195 years.
Thomas Jefferson, one of the most brilliant men who has ever lived, was
psychologically unable to incorporate the need for a mechanism to regulate
the emerging banking system or, indeed, banks at all, into his political phi-
losophy. His legion of admirers, most of them far less intelligent than he, fol-
lowed his philosophy for generations as the country and the world changed
beyond recognition. As a direct result, economic disaster would be visited on
the United States roughly every twenty years for more than a century.
From Inheriting the Revolution: The First Generation of Americans by Joyce Appleby, (Belknap
Press, 2000). Copyright © 2000 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Reprinted
by permission.
186
eighteenth century had taken a turn for the worse in the 1790s, and continued
high for the next hundred years as the new killers—tuberculosis, yellow fever,
and cholera—took their terrible toll. White women in 1800 bore an average
of seven children; enslaved black women nine, with each delivery a threat
to their health. Such high fertility made for a youthful nation; 58 percent of
America’s population was under twenty in 1820 as compared to 44 percent in
1899 and 18 percent in 1940!
How long people worked also made life hard by today’s standards. Ten
hours a day, six days a week was the norm. Wages, good by European stand-
ards, were far from generous when the cost of living was factored in—food,
clothing and shelter took 80 percent or more of a worker’s wages. Average
unskilled laborers got seventy-five cents a day in the early part of the century,
and frontier farmers paid workers even less for the back-breaking work of clear-
ing the land. Slaves hired out got comparable wages. Laborers in Pittsburgh
could earn two dollars a day, although in New York City not even 1 percent
of the population earned the equivalent of $7,000 in 1980 dollars.
But people take their bearings from what has gone before them, not
future, unimaginable attainments. And what Americans in the early repub-
lic experienced was the steady reworking of the material environment—acres
brought under the plow, steam engines applied in unfamiliar ways, rivers and
streams dammed and sluiced to power mills, canals, and roads cut through
the wilderness. The market’s opportunities came in new guises to new partici-
pants. The digest of patents that the first commissioner put together reveals
the full sweep of commercial imagination. Scores of inventors patented devices
in metallurgy, chemical processes, hydraulic implements, machine tools, and
household conveniences. And every idea that found material expression in
novel artifacts proved just how wrong were the old-timers who invoked the
past to predict the future. Reflecting on this, Chauncey Jerome said he could
not “now believe that there will ever be in the same space of future time so
many improvements and inventions as those of the past half century—one of
the most important in the history of the world.” Novelty, always experienced
as a break with the expectation of how things were going to be, became the
most constant feature in the lives of Jerome’s generation.
Not everyone favored these changes. The manufacturers’ use of water
power in rural areas provoked contention over fishing rights along the rivers.
Manufacturing and farming families disputed the justice of paying taxes for
schools. Religious groups like the Hicksite Quakers viewed banks, agricultural
societies, missions, chemistry, and the Erie Canal as signs of an unwholesome
desertion of true piety. Pockets of opposition to commercial intrusion into
traditional ways of work and life like these remained throughout the country,
but most conflicts broke out among economic competitors when new develop-
ment made salient how diverse interests would be affected by specific changes.
After Jefferson’s election, the westward movement of families away from
eastern centers of authority and refinement, a development that Federalists
had dreaded, accelerated. When land offices opened on the frontier, land sales
soared. In 1800 some 67,000 acres passed into private hands; 497,939 acres did
so in 1801. By 1815 annual sales hit one and half million dollars, more than
began to sell their livestock and dairy products to the cities, which were dou-
bling in size with every passing decade. Those established on the best lands or
those near cities could get by, but others who had pushed onto marginal lands
in the preceding generation were hard-pressed to compete. Raising merino
sheep and Morgan horses gave northern New Englanders a brief respite, but
soon Ohio graziers were wintering over sheep for a dollar when it cost two in
Vermont. In the end New England’s best export was its farming families, the
intrepid Yankees who pushed into the West on sleighs, on foot, and in wagons,
carrying with them their farming lore, their work habits, and their religious
preferences. . . .
Southern Planters would have grown wealthy in the early national period
whether the North had expanded or contracted, remained rural or become
urban, developed a worldwide commerce or continued to ply the waters of
the Atlantic. Events elsewhere shaped their economic destiny. Great Britain’s
revolutionary technology for manufacturing fabric triggered an unprece-
dented demand for raw cotton. Rarely in history has one spot on the globe
become favored above all others, but such was the case of the American South
in the first half of the nineteenth century, as it had been earlier for the sugar
cane-growing islands of the Caribbean and would become later for countries
rich in oil deposits. Subject to booms and bust, particularly during the rapa-
cious scramble for land when each territory opened up, the cotton economy
brought great wealth to the nation as a whole, its marketing and shipping
adding measurably to the prosperity of the North Atlantic states. Against the
measurable wealth that slave labor created must be placed the immeasurable
loss to the South of cultural capital in skills not learned and lessons in adapt-
ability postponed. Even less tangible was the enormous drain of the region’s
moral resources spent defending a social system that others found increasingly
indefensible.
William Grayson painted a graphic picture of the impact of the cotton boom
in his hometown of Beaufort, South Carolina. Recalling the beautiful orchards of
a neighbor, he detailed their bounty “in all good things.” “Oranges were plentiful,
figs without number, peaches and pomegranates in profusion,” he chronicled with
evident nostalgia, warming to the climax of his story:
Boston, Charleston, Baltimore, and New Orleans among the top six. The paral-
lel growth of America’s rural areas meant that not until 1840 did the propor-
tion of those living in towns over 2,500 exceed the level in 1690!
While much of the wealth of the seaport merchants went into urban
real estate, by the 1820s even America’s most conservative investors recog-
nized the attractiveness of western lands and internal improvements. Many
other holders of urban wealth needed the help of an expert to make their
choices. The time was ripe for the development of investment trusts to sweep
up the savings of the wealthy, not to mention the urban middle class of
clerks and professional men. Nathaniel Bowditch, Boston’s polymath scien-
tist, merchant, and mathematician, initiated the first extensive trust business
at the Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance Co. By 1830 there were a variety
of companies dealing in fire insurance and annuities as well as simple sav-
ings in Philadelphia and New York as well as Boston. In this, as in so much
else, a new age was dawning, for earlier neither the statistical nor the moral
underpinnings for such enterprises existed. Where calculating the likelihood
of accidents once abraded the sensibilities of those who stoically accepted
the hand of God in human affairs, insuring against possible loss increasingly
appeared to make good common business sense, insinuating market rational-
ity into popular thinking.
The wealthy of the old colonial seaports tended to be unimaginative
investors, but Moses Brown of Providence and the Lowells and Lawrences of
Boston proved to be stellar exceptions. One of four brothers of a prominent
colonial merchant family, Brown brought the secrets of the famous English
cotton manufacturing system to America in the person of Samuel Slater who
reproduced Arkwright’s cotton-spinning machinery for him. After visiting an
English factory, enthusiasm for textiles also spurred on Francis Cabot Lowell,
a member of the new generation. Returning to Boston he got some fifty fami-
lies to join him in forming the Boston Manufacturing Company. Capitalized
at $400,000, Lowell’s group built the world’s first integrated textile factory at
Waltham, Massachusetts in 1814.
The Boston Associates went on to establish entirely new towns at
Lawrence and Lowell and another factory at Manchester, New Hampshire.
While most American textile mills as late as the 1830s hired fewer than twenty
hands, the Associates’ employee rolls ballooned to four hundred, six hundred,
and eight hundred, the lion’s share of jobs going to women and children.
Advertising throughout the agricultural communities of Northern New Eng-
land, Boston’s pioneering industrialists drew young, unmarried women from
their family farms in Vermont and New Hampshire to planned communities
of dormitory living, strict discipline, and female conviviality. Their employ-
ment policies form a major chapter in the history of women in the United
States, for they were the first manufacturers to turn to female labor in the early
years of industrialization, taking advantage of women’s dexterity in operating
the new machinery and the cheapness of their labor. In the traditional rural
economy of this region, the wages of children and women had been low—
about a quarter of what men were paid, rising to half for factory jobs. Along
with textiles, Northerners began manufacturing boots, shoes, hats, paper, and
woolens, all industries using female labor. Like cheap water power, low wages
underwrote hundreds of new ventures, many of them failures.
The success of the Lowell Associates helped turn Massachusetts into the
most thoroughly industrialized section of the United States, second only to
Great Britain in the world. Manufacturers in Springfield, Philadelphia, and
Providence proved to be equally assiduous in exploiting the domestic market
for textiles. Within the first twelve years, the Bostonians’ dividends began to
exceed the amount of their original pooled investment. Flush with profits, the
partners put money into mining, canal companies, and railroads. The first rail-
road in Massachusetts, built in 1825, ran between Lowell and Boston. Despite
the boldness of their production system and their social engineering, these
Boston entrepreneurs followed the conservative financial strategies of an elite.
They did not maximize profits so much as they secured the growth of their
wealth. Achieving their goal of establishing fortunes, individual family mem-
bers were free to pursue careers in philanthropy, education, and reform.
The truly unexpected development of the early nineteenth century came
from the boot-strap manufacturing ventures that proliferated in the rural
North, independent of the investment plans of the nation’s wealthy. Textile
factories and railroads—even cargoes for Atlantic voyages—took a consider-
able amount of capital to finance, but artisans-turned-manufacturers scraped
by with very little start-up capital. Merchants of the seaport cities, many of
them members of prominent colonial families, sought safe investments in real
estate, but mechanics, tradesmen, and farmers with little or no capital turned
their brains and hands to making something new.
In Newark, Moses Combs, a master shoemaker and tanner, got local farm-
ers to make shoes during their winter fallow seasons. A natural merchandiser,
Combs introduced Newark shoes to both the New York City and Southern
markets in the 1790s. Thirty years later, one-seventh of the Newark labor force
devoted itself to shoemaking at a time when applications of stream-driven
machinery were still two decades away. The substantial productivity growth
of the early nineteenth century came largely, experts say, from changes “in
organizations, methods, and designs which did not require much in the way
of capital deepening or dramatically new capital equipment.”
Shoemaking was an interesting example of an ancient craft transformed
under the expansion of national marketing. . . .
Two factors democratized opportunity in manufacturing in the first dec-
ades of the nineteenth century. The men with the most money in America—
those who might have been able to monopolize winning projects—moved
slowly into industrial ventures. Second, the energy for much manufacturing
came from creeks and streams, tying production to rural millsites that were
readily accessible to farmers and their sons. Zachariah Allen, a well-connected
Providence inventor, fashioned a little homily from the location of American
mills: steam aggregates workers and promotes vice while water power disperses
them with benefit to their morals. The sudden appearance of factories even
found expression in jest. Olive Cleaveland Clarke remembered that a tour of
a new theological seminary prompted her brother to remark that here they
“would manufacture ministers.”
rather than conserve it. Control of banks enabled them to tap into the savings
of the community. When Thomas, the New England bookseller in Charleston,
was denied full credit from a local bank, he succeeded in getting a charter for
the Planters and Mechanics Bank, gloating many years later about his capacity
to get even. A group of Philadelphia merchants who felt that they had been
treated unfairly by existing banks started a new institution specifically directed
to men of smaller means, pricing their shares at one hundred dollars, consid-
erably below the norm of four hundred dollars. Sometimes only half of the
cost of shares was demanded. In New Hampshire, opening up the Federalists’
banking preserve became the Jeffersonians’ principal campaign issue. With
the uniting of small pools of capital in new banks, the Jeffersonians argued,
“the industrious citizens might share with the more wealthy in the benefits”
of banking.
Far from being the rich man’s preserve, banking offered hundreds of
local savers an investment possibility. Stalwarts of the old order like Boston’s
Nathan Appleton and New York’s Isaac Bronson decried the leveling tendency
in easy money policies, but ordinary people resoundingly approved. Soon leg-
islators were yielding to popular pressure for corporations for surfacing roads,
building canals, and starting insurance companies. Some states passed general
incorporation acts. Even in those states that did not, entry into the banking
business got easier and easier in the years before 1819. Bitterly opposed ini-
tially, the already-established discovered, to their chagrin, that no amount of
banking wisdom could stay the hand of the legislators, who had the power to
grant new charters. New Hampshire, a small state undistinguished for wealth
in any category, had ten banks in six different towns by 1813, four of them
in Portsmouth, a town or less than six thousand. Competition, although only
grudgingly accepted by bankers themselves, greatly facilitated the expansion
of business in the first decades of the nineteenth century. New banks also
had the means of compelling cooperation. If a bank refused to receive their
notes, they could call for specie payment for the other bank’s notes that passed
through normal business transactions into their possession.
During buoyant periods when bank notes gave market participants the
wherewithal to put in effect their plans, the extra notes were a kind of bor-
rowing against the future, the deployment of faith in lieu of savings. As long
as people had high hopes, they accepted bank notes gladly, but any contrac-
tion of credit exposed the fragility of the system. Cautious creditors could call
in their debts or demand specie payment for the notes they held. American
banking practices encouraged inflation, and inflation primed the pump of
economic activity, arousing conservatives’ fears on both counts. In personal
reminiscences banks figure as the principal source for currency—welcome,
unregulated, and amazingly good at flooding the nation with notes.
Since bank notes were often presented for payment far from the point
of issuance, shopkeepers had no way to determine their value. Eager to make
a sale, they usually erred on the side of liberality. The slightest hint of value
sufficed for circulation. Ichabod Washburn described the trepidation he felt
passing his master’s “uncurrent five dollar Ohio Bank Bill” during a trip home
through central Massachusetts. Washburn was astonished when a tavern
keeper accepted the bill and gave him $4.50 change. He carefully avoided the
man on the return trip. John Neal, reminiscing from the safe shores of old
age about his work in a haberdashery shop, described learning how to “lie-
cheat-swear-and pass counterfeit money-if occasionally required.” Indeed,
he recalled that he and his fellow merchants would never turn down a sale
because payment was offered in counterfeit bills. Estimating that 10 percent of
the bills circulating during his business career in the first decade of the nine-
teenth century were worthless, Neal conveyed to a more law-abiding age the
merchant’s settled maxim: “if you buy the devil, the sooner you sell him, the
better.” . . .
Most businessmen operated with small savings sweated from their own
labor and larger borrowings, usually from friends or relatives. A punishing
process of adaptation lay behind the dynamic economic development of this
period. Commercial growth was rapid, unregulated, and marked by sudden
reversals of good times and bad. Neither farmers, clerks, professional men, nor
manufacturers escaped these unexpected downturns. Debt acted as a mighty
leveler in this ebullient society, and it figured in almost every autobiography.
Anson Jones had to declare bankruptcy when he was sued for his board as a
medical student. Samuel Foot went to prison for his brother’s gambling debts.
Workers lost back wages when their employers went broke. James Finley lost
his frontier farm “by going security, or appearance-bail” for one of his neigh-
bors. Because the court was forty miles away in Chillicothe, he did not go to
lift his bonds, so when his neighbor decamped after a judgment went against
him, Finley had to pay the debt. . . .
The capacity of industrial capitalism to concentrate economic power and
forge a new elite could not be foreseen. Americans, especially in the North,
viewed commercial expansion as the moral and material handmaiden to their
liberal society. For many years after the Revolution, whatever class antago-
nisms existed pointed back to the residual traces of conflicts about privilege.
Conservatives then were not proto-industrialists, but defenders of obsolete cul-
tural traditions. Competition, far from being associated with grinding the face
of the poor, stirred up hopes of advancement in ordinary men and women,
who vigorously rejected the aristocratic notion of natural inequality. Such
a conviction was reinforced by men like John Jacob Astor, who introduced
profit-sharing to his men, relying in his struggle with the French for control
of Hudson’s Bay trade upon the entrepreneurial initiatives of his employees.
With economic pursuits that had previously been regulated now
open to all comers, the economy could be construed as voluntary, free,
even natural. The facts seemed to confirm the most potent ideological legacy
of this era: the idea of a natural harmony of interests mediated by natural
economic laws. Of course the national market required a legal framework,
but memories of the contribution of the Constitution and John Marshall’s
decisions receded quickly from public consciousness in ensuing decades,
making it easy to think of economic activities as operating without govern-
ment help. The less heard from conservatives about public order and pre-
serving continuity, the less conspicuous became society’s role in facilitating
economic development, even though the federal government continued to
199
Additional Resources
The most up-to-date summaries and bibliographies on this issue can be found
in Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism (Oxford, 1993) which
is pro-Hamilton; Gordon Wood, Empire and Liberty (Oxford, 2009) which is
pro-Jefferson; and Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to
Lincoln (Norton, 2005) which is massive in its coverage of political parties.
There are numerous biographies of Hamilton. The most comprehensive
is Ron Chernow’s prize winning Alexander Hamilton (Penguin Press, 2004). But
see also Forrest McDonald’s Alexander Hamilton: A Biography (Norton, 1979), a
concise discussion in support of Hamilton’s economic policies; Clinton Ros-
siter’s older but neglected Alexander Hamilton and the Constitution (Harcourt,
Brace & World, Inc., 1964) which discusses the many Hamiltons; and, finally,
30 pages from Thomas K. McGraw, “The Strategic Vision of Alexander Hamil-
ton,” The American Scholar 63/1 (Winter, 1994), 31–57 which says more than
most biographies of the man.
There are numerous biographies of Jefferson. The two best scholarly
and readable are Merrill D. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation
(Oxford, 1970) and Joseph Ellis, American Sphinx (Random House, Vintage,
1996, 1998).
Joyce Appleby has written a short biography of Thomas Jefferson for
the American Presidents series (Times Books, 2003). Besides Inheriting the
Revolution (Belknap, 2000) see Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Repub-
lican Vision of the 1790s (New York University, 1984); her important collec-
tion of articles in Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination
(Belknap, 1992), and her comprehensive and comparative study of The
200
201
YES: Robert V. Remini, from Andrew Jackson and His Indian Wars
(Viking Penguin, 2001)
NO: Alfred A. Cave, from “Abuse of Power: Andrew Jackson and
the Indian Removal Act of 1830,” The Historian (Winter 2003)
Learning Outcomes
After reading this issue, you should be able to:
• Evaluate the status of Native Americans in Jacksonian America.
• Discuss the concept of citizenship rights as applied to Native
Americans in the 1820s and 1830s.
• Identify and explain the significance of the Indian Removal
Act of 1830.
• Analyze the concept of nationhood as applied to both Anglo-
Americans and Native Americans.
• Understand the nature and limitations of humanitarian
reform when confronted with minority rights.
• Offer an appraisal of the consequences of land ownership in
the age of Jackson.
• Determine whether President Jackson’s actions amount to an
abuse of his presidential powers.
ISSUE SUMMARY
202
203
204
205
From Andrew Jackson and His Indian Wars (Viking Penguin, 2001), pp. 226–232, 237–238,
279–281. Copyright © 2001 by Robert V. Remini. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission
of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
206
Indian annihilation. As “hard and cruel,” as the policy was, wrote one con-
temporary a short while later, it “is now universally felt to have been as kind
as it was necessary.” Indeed many historians today agree with that conclusion.
Which is not to exonerate Sharp Knife of the horrors that followed. Still,
to properly understand him and why he behaved as he did, it is necessary to
reemphasize that he never intended or imagined the horror that accompa-
nied removal and that he acted out of a fierce nationalism and an overwhelm-
ing concern for the nation’s security and unity. Quite frankly, Jackson was
obsessed over national security, which is quite understandable considering his
experiences over the years with the British and Spanish and their involvement
with hostile southern tribes.
It is true that he could be a fire-breathing and ruthless opponent if crossed
or contradicted. Like most Americans at the time, he was a racist (not that he
had the faintest idea what that meant), and he held an assortment of wrong-
headed prejudices about Native Americans. But he was not a madman intent
on genocide. Nor was he intent on the wholesale punishment of Indian tribes
for their alleged past “misconduct.” Removal was meant to prevent annihila-
tion, not cause it.
Carroll and Coffee followed Jackson’s instructions to the letter. But they
did not have his skill in a face-to-face encounter and the chiefs of both tribes
absolutely refused to grant the President’s request. This was their land; their
fathers were buried in it; it was their home. They had no connection with the
Arkansas Territory and had no desire to visit it. Not only would they refuse to
emigrate, they told the commissioners, but they would counsel other tribes
against emigration.
The resistance of the Indians and what had become mounting opposi-
tion by many church groups to any attempt by the government to relocate the
southern tribes convinced Jackson that a major political problem was develop-
ing that could easily spin out of control. He had to take immediate executive
action. So, as a first step, he ordered the army to run off all white intrud-
ers in Indian lands and if necessary destroy their cabins and fields. Next he
assigned Thomas L. McKenney to undertake the task of molding public opin-
ion in favor of removal. McKenney had served as superintendent of Indian
trade and had become the head of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, beginning
in 1824. He was hailed as a humanitarian who cared personally and deeply
about Native Americans. And although he had supported Adams’s reelection,
more important, he favored removal. He also recognized that whites, from the
beginning of their arrival in North America, had pushed the Indians westward
and degraded their cultures until many eastern tribes had vanished. Further-
more, he appreciated the fact that Indians readily acquired the worst vices
of the white race. If they were ever to make real progress toward civilization
and legal equality with other Americans, they must be removed. Such was his
thinking. He therefore proved to be a most effective advocate among church
groups in getting them to understand that removal was best for the red people.
Jackson also cautioned key southern leaders against any action that
might jeopardize the administration’s new policy and generate northern
opposition. Then he replaced a number of Indian agents with reliable loyalists
whose commitment to removal was above question. When he took office there
were twenty such agents and thirty-six subagents. Over the next two years he
removed ten agents and nineteen subagents.
The urgency to bring about removal as quickly as possible increased with
the discovery of gold in northeastern Georgia in the summer of 1829, bringing
with it an avalanche of white squatters into Cherokee territory. And although
the invasion brought boisterous demands from church groups to expel the
intruders, led by Jeremiah Evarts, the administration saw it as additional proof
that the whites were about to overwhelm the Indians in their eastern territory.
“Overwhelm” is hardly the word. The Cherokees were being inundated.
And they cried out to their Great Father to protect them. “There are hundreds
of whitemen searching and digging for gold within the limits of the nation,”
they wrote. “. . . The number of these intruders has been variously stated from
one to two thousand . . . which we cannot but consider as depriving us of
property for which the faith of the Gov’t is pledged for our protection. . . . We
humbly request that you will consider the subject, as soon as the pressure of
business will admit, and if possible grant the wishes of our people.”
Not only were Americans invading Indian territory, but the annuities
owed to the tribes were frequently handed over by agents to white creditors to
pay for outstanding debts. When Jackson heard that the agent for the Creeks
had “paid out large sums in discharge of judgements recovered by the white
citizens of Alabama,” he immediately instructed the secretary of war to inves-
tigate the “impropriety” of this action and submit a report. Control of money
owed the tribes, he protested, was being taken away from them without their
knowledge or consent.
All of the more cordial—that is, nonviolent—relations between the two
races that had been developing since the end of the Indian wars over ten years
earlier now seemed close to collapsing. “Our white brothers on each side of us
appear to have lost all the good feelings which formerly existed,” complained
several Creek chiefs. “All appear to have turned their hands to crush us.” They
have no regard for us or our rights as guaranteed by your treaties.
By this time, whites were more brazen and determined to take what-
ever Indian land was still available within settled states, and they became
extremely adept at justifying their actions. A short time later, several white
settlers insisted that they had moved into tribal lands with the consent of
the agent and the permission of the Indians themselves. They said they had
settled in the Cherokee Nation “and pitched their crops for the year.” They
further declared that they “will not now permit, at this season of the year,
their families to be turned out of doors, and their wives and children deprived
of the means of subsistence.” Not “without making the manly resistance of
husbands and fathers in defence of every thing sacred and dear.” They had
a right to settle in the Nation, they protested, and they expected the state to
enforce their right.
One “old and feeble” chief wrote to his Great Father and advised him of
the “dreadful consequences” if these conditions persisted. “Your white sons
and daughters are moving into my country in abundance and they are spoil-
ing my lands and taking possession of the Red peoples improvements. . . . And
your soldiers have refused to prevent it.” Your white children “are bringing
whiskey and opening drinking houses . . . they steal our property and make
false accounts against us [and then] they sue us in your state courts for what
we know nothing of.” And what has been the result? “My Red children . . .
have been compelled to resort to there guns.” When that happens “the whites
have collected themselves in bodies and hunted up . . . and shot them as if . . .
they had been so many wild dogs.” “All I want is peace,” the old chief begged.
Only you my Great Father can help. “With every Respect I have the honor to
be your unfortunate old brother.”
This was the situation Jackson faced when he became President, and it
kept getting worse over the next several years. The collision of the two peoples
in the southeast had become increasingly dangerous. The worst in white cul-
ture seemed to be destroying what was left of Indian life and civilization. He
had to do something. So, as his final action in inaugurating the new Indian
policy, he prepared to go to Congress and request appropriate legislation to
end the collision, the intrusion, the killing, and the debasement of Indian cul-
ture and “save the remaining tribes from extinction.” In December 1829, when
the two houses reconvened, he formally presented his proposal and provided
specific details. Without doubt he fully intended to make Indian removal his
administration’s first piece of major legislation.
Among the Jackson papers there is a draft of his first annual message
in the President’s hand. In it he set down his thinking about foreign affairs,
rotation, the tariff, internal improvements, the public debt, the national bank,
and the Indians. The Native Americans constituted the final topic he dealt
with, but the document breaks off just before he reached a conclusion. What
he wrote out was a recapitulation of present conditions, particularly how the
government had tried to civilize the tribes and encourage them to abandon
“their wandering ways.” All to no avail, he said. “It will not answer to encour-
age them to the idea of exclusive self government. It is impracticable.” No
people can form a government or social compact “until education and intel-
ligence was first introduced.” True, each tribe has a few educated and well-
informed men, but the great body of southern Indians “are erratic in their
habits, and wanting in those endowments, which are suited to a people who
would direct themselves and under it be happy and prosperous.” And while
we have tried to be solicitous and caring in our treatment of them, we have
told them that “it cannot be conceded to them to continue their efforts at
independence within the limits of any of the states.”
With these harsh words the document ends. But the draft message was
subsequently turned over to advisers, including Martin Van Buren, Andrew
Jackson Donelson, William B. Lewis, Amos Kendall, and James A. Hamilton,
the son of Alexander Hamilton. Together they produced a final version that
was delivered to Congress after it reconvened on December 7,1829, and read
aloud by a clerk. It was written in a flat, somber and prosaic style, quite unlike
Jackson’s unique and forceful form of utterance.
It starts off by describing the current situation and what the President had
recently done to correct it. These southern tribes, he said, are surrounded by
whites who are destroying the resources the Indians depend on for livelihood
and which will therefore doom them to “weakness and decay.” Look at what
happened to the Mohegans, the Narragansetts, and the Delawares, he contin-
ued. They are gone, extinct. And the same fate “is fast overtaking the Choctaw,
the Cherokee, and the Creek. . . . Humanity and national honor demand that
every effort should be made to avert so great a calamity.” It is too late to wonder
whether it was just to have included them within the territorial bounds of the
United States. That step cannot be retraced. A state cannot be dismembered by
Congress without its consent nor restricted in the exercise of its constitutional
powers. You are now asked whether it is indeed possible to do something for
the Indians that is consistent with the rights of the states and “actuated by
feelings of justice and a regard for our national honor . . . to preserve their
much-injured race.”
As a matter of fact, something can be done. “I suggest for your consid-
eration” the propriety of setting apart an ample area west of the Mississippi,
outside the limits of any state or territory now formed, to be guaranteed to
the Indian tribes, each tribe having distinct control over the portion of land
assigned to it. There they can be Indians, not cultural white men; there they
can enjoy their own governments subject to no interference from the United
States except when necessary to preserve peace on the frontier and between
the several tribes; there they can learn the “arts of civilization” so that the race
will be perpetuated and serve as a reminder of the “humanity and justice of
this Government.”
The emigration should be voluntary, the President declared, for it would
be “as cruel as unjust to compel the aborigines to abandon the graves of
their fathers and seek a home in a distant land.” They should be “distinctly
informed” that if they choose to remain where they are within the limits of
the states, then “they must be subject to their laws.” But if they stay it is surely
visionary to expect protection of their claims to land on which they have
never dwelt nor made improvements “merely because they have seen them
from the mountains or passed them in the chase.” By submitting to state law if
they stay and receiving protection in their persons and property like other citi-
zens, “they will ere long become merged in the mass of our population.” . . .
Actually the Indian Removal Act did not remove the Indians at all. What
it did was empower the President to exchange unorganized public land in the
trans-Mississippi west for land held by the Indians in the east. In addition it
gave to the Indians who moved perpetual title to the new land and compensa-
tion for improvements they had made on the old. The federal government
would assume all the costs involved in the removal and provide Indians with
“such aid and assistance as may be necessary for their support and subsistence
for the first year after their removal.” Finally the act authorized an appropria-
tion of $500,000 to carry out these provisions.
This monumental event in American history brought the entire govern-
ment into the process of expelling the southern Indians from their home-
land. Heretofore the early Presidents—many of whom were founding fathers
of the Republic—removed Indians by executive initiative. What Jackson did
was force the Congress to face up to the Indian issue and address it in the only
way possible. And what it did at his direction was harsh, arrogant, racist—and
inevitable. There was no way the American people would continue to allow
the presence of the tribes in the fertile hills and valleys that they coveted.
Sooner or later, white culture and life would engulf them.
The Indian Removal Act did not order the removal of the Indians, even
though that was a foregone conclusion once the talks actually began about
exchanging land. And, as far as Jackson was concerned, the Indians could
refuse to remove and stay where they were; but if they stayed, they had to
recognize that they were subject to state law and jurisdiction. No longer could
they live under their own laws and practices. Henceforth the laws and prac-
tices would be white laws and white practices. But knowing Indians as he did,
he understood that few could live under state jurisdiction. It was a hateful
alternative. It therefore made sense for them to resettle in the west. That way
they could preserve their Indian heritage and way of life.
Unfortunately the President’s noble desire to give the Indians a free
choice between staying and removing, one devoid of coercion, was disregarded
by land-greedy state and federal officials, who practiced fraud and deception
to enrich themselves and their friends at the expense of the native tribes. The
removal process sullied virtually everyone involved in it.
Where Jackson is particularly culpable is in his insistence on speed and
economy in reaching a decision with the several tribes. He wanted action
immediately. He lacked patience, and by his pressure to move things along
quickly he caused unspeakable cruelties to innocent people who deserved bet-
ter from a nation that prided itself on its commitment to justice and equality.
Removal could not be speeded up; it could not happen overnight. It would
take months and years to properly transport and settle people from the coun-
try of their birth to a place they knew nothing about.
And $500,000 would not begin to cover the cost of removal. It actually
took tens of millions of dollars to complete the process. Jackson wanted a
quick ending to the Indian problem, and he achieved it. In his eight years in
office some seventy-odd treaties were signed and ratified, adding to the public
domain approximately 100 million acres of Indian land in the east at a cost of
$68 million and 32 million acres of land west of the Mississippi River. But the
cost in human lives and suffering was incalculable.
Eventually most Americans accepted what had happened. And even
when the opposition party came to power it pursued the same savage practices
against Native Americans as had the Democrats. Within a few years many
thought the policy humane and enlightened. They understood the rationale
behind removal and approved it. What they and Andrew Jackson failed to
realize was that they had betrayed some of their most cherished ideas about
American justice and decency. . . .
What Jackson did to the Indians as President was . . . end the drift and
indecision of previous administrations by instituting a policy of removal that
included an exchange of land. With the lessening of hostilities the tribes begged
to be left alone, pleaded for protection and to be spared the necessity of con-
tending with the power of the surrounding states whose citizens continually
crowded in on them. But what they asked was impossible to provide in 1830.
Perhaps it was never possible. As it turned out, the American people as a whole
sided with the government and approved Jackson’s policy. They did so because
of their racism, their decades-old fear and mistrust of Native Americans, and
their insatiable desire for the land they occupied. What resulted constitutes
one of the great tragedies in the history of the United States, a tragedy for
which the American people and their President must be held accountable. Like
Jackson, they agreed that removal (which would make Indian land theirs) was
also the only way to preserve Indian life and culture. Thus by shunting them
off to the wilderness where they would no longer threaten the safety of the
United States or hinder its westward and southern expansion, Americans felt
they could resolve the problem of the Indian presence in a humanitarian man-
ner that would not conflict with their Christian conscience or moral sensibility.
The distinguished scholar of Native American history Francis Paul Prucha
has argued that four courses of action were available to the government in
ending the everlasting white/red crisis. And four courses only. First, genocide.
Exterminate the race. But no one in his right mind seriously proposed such a
solution, certainly not Jackson or any other responsible official in government.
Second, integrate the two societies. But Native Americans had no desire to
become cultural white men. They had their own customs, laws, language, reli-
gion, government, and leaders and wanted to keep them. White man’s culture
was an abomination, except for those skills that could improve their standard
of living. Nor did whites favor integration. As racists they feared that integra-
tion with red people would ultimately lead to integration with blacks. And
that possibility horrified them. Third, protect the natives where they lived by
enforcing existing treaties. Jackson knew such a policy was doomed from the
start and had fifteen years of personal experience to attest to its impossibility.
There was not army enough to keep squatters from invading Indian coun-
try. And future confrontations with southern states, similar to the one with
Georgia, would undoubtedly follow, particularly in Alabama and Mississippi.
Fourth, removal. That was the course Jackson knew would work and therefore
adopted. No other alternative existed if Indians were to survive.
It needs to be remembered that removal was never just a land grab. That
is too simplistic an explanation. Jackson fully expected the Indians to thrive
in their new surroundings, educate their children, acquire the skills of white
civilization so as to improve their living conditions, and become citizens of
the United States. Removal, in his mind, would provide all these blessings.
At one point in this sad story a delegation of Chippewa, Potawatomi, and
Ottawa chiefs came to Jackson in the White House and movingly described
to him their suffering. “Your agent,” they said, “told us at the Treaty made at
Chicago in 1833 that the country assigned to us west of the Mississippi was
equally good as the lands in Illinois. . . . Father—we have been deceived and we
feel disappointed & dissatisfied. . . . There is scarce timber enough to build our
Wigwams, and that some of our land is too poor for snakes to live upon. Our
men are not accustomed to the Prairie. They have always lived in the woods.”
Jackson listened to this recitation but did not hear. A long time before,
he had made up his mind about what should be done with Native Americans,
and nothing would change his mind, even though the eastern tribes no longer
posed a danger to the country, nor was national security the issue. He believed
the good of the nation and the tribes required their removal, and so thousands
of men, women, and children suffered not only the loss of their property, but
physical agony and even death.
To his dying day on June 8, 1845, Andrew Jackson genuinely believed
that what he had accomplished rescused these people from inevitable annihi-
lation. And although that statement sounds monstrous, and although no one
in the modern world wishes to accept or believe it, that is exactly what he did.
He saved the Five Civilized Nations from probable extinction.
From The Historian, 65:6, Winter 2003, pp. 1333–1335, 1337–1342, 1353 (excerpts, refs.
omitted). Copyright © 2003 by Phi Alpha Theta History Honor Society, University of South
Florida. Reprinted by permission of Wiley-Blackwell.
215
treaties with the United States that they claimed protected their rights against
encroachment by Georgia in fact were nothing more than temporary grants of
privilege awarded by a conquering power—the United States—to a vanquished
people, the Cherokee. There were, Eaton declared, no guarantees in any treaty
that could be considered permanent, nor could any clause be construed as
“adverse to the sovereignty of Georgia.” Indeed, in the early stages of Con-
gress’s deliberations on Indian removal, the report of the House Committee
on Indian Affairs, written by close associates of the president, dismissed Indian
treaty-making as nothing more than an “empty gesture” to placate Indian
“vanity.” Such treaties were not really treaties, the committee declared, but
were only a “stately form of intercourse” useful in gaining Indian acquiescence
in peacemaking and land cession. Although that view was rejected in the bill
finally presented to Congress, it was reflected still in the words of some pro-
removal congressmen and thereby served to arouse suspicion of the adminis-
tration’s real intent with regard to Indian removal.
Although privately in favor of coerced removal (and as a former treaty
commissioner, skilled and experienced in the coercing of Indians), President
Jackson recognized that he could not obtain from Congress the aggressive
removal law that many writers imagine was actually passed. Hence, Jackson did
not ask that Congress authorize forced deportation, but instead sought author-
ization and funding to continue his predecessors’ policy of granting land west
of the Mississippi to tribes willing to relinquish their eastern holdings. The
Indian Removal Act of 1830 made provision for the president to negotiate
for land exchanges and make payments for “improvements” (i.e., houses,
barns, orchards, etc.) that Indians had made on their lands. The president was
also authorized to pay transportation costs to the West. An appropriation of
$500,000 was provided for those purposes. Significantly, there was no provi-
sion in the bill authorizing the seizure of land that Indians declined to cede
by treaty.
Members of Jackson’s administration underscored the presumed volun-
tary nature of the president’s removal program. Secretary of War John Henry
Eaton assured skeptical congressmen that “nothing of a compulsory nature to
effect the removal of this unfortunate race of people has ever been thought
of by the President, despite assertions to the contrary.” Worried by the exten-
sive anti-removal campaign recently mounted by the Boston-based American
Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions and by some of Jackson’s political
opponents, Eaton in confidential correspondence twice warned the Governor
of Georgia that the state must be careful to avoid “the appearance of harshness
towards the Indians.” Should Georgia be suspected of “injustice,” it might well
prove impossible to secure broad based support for Jackson’s removal program.
To reassure the general public, Michigan Governor and Jackson loyalist Lewis
Cass, in an unsigned article in the influential North American Review in January
1830, declared that the administration not only understood that “no force
should be used,” but was determined that Indians “shall be liberally remuner-
ated for all they may cede.”
Jackson’s supporters in Congress also assured doubters that the adminis-
tration did not intend to force a single Indian to move against his or her will.
the states in which they resided. In so doing, he far exceeded his legal mandate
under the Indian Removal Act of 1830. That law, as we have seen, explicitly
upheld existing treaty rights and obligations. Rather than enforcing the laws
that forbade white settlement on treaty lands, Jackson informed Indian lead-
ers that he lacked the power to protect them from even the most extreme and
oppressive actions of the state governments and of lawless whites. One chief,
self-described as “old and feeble,” wrote to his “Great Father” Andrew Jackson
to complain that treaty provisions were no longer honored and that whites
invaded Indian country to “steal our property.” Making matters worse, the fed-
eral soldiers in the area refused to help the Indians, but when Indians tried to
resist the squatters, they were hunted down and shot “as if . . . they had been
so many wild dogs.” Only the Great Father, the chief pleaded, could protect
his Indian children and restore peace. We have no record of Jackson’s reply.
But a typical example of Jackson’s response to Indian petitioners is found in
his message to the Cherokee, dated 16 March 1835, wherein he declared, “you
cannot remain where you now are. Circumstances that cannot be controlled,
and which are beyond the reach of human laws, render it impossible that
you can flourish in the midst of a civilized community. . . . Deceive yourselves
no longer. . . . Shut your ears to bad counsels.” While it is true that Jackson
on occasion sought to curb the excesses of some of the more corrupt Indian
removal contractors, and ordered some reforms in the process, a close exami-
nation of the record suggests that he was primarily concerned with dealing
with those who defrauded the government or who cheated other whites, and
was relatively indulgent with those who defrauded Indians.
While some writers have explained Jackson’s refusal to protect the sov-
ereignty of Indian nations against the claims of the states as an act consist-
ent with his deep respect for states’ rights, one must remember that Andrew
Jackson not only refused to honor the obligations contained in treaties nego-
tiated by his predecessors, but also ignored treaty promises made by his own
administration. His newly negotiated removal treaties generally guaranteed
Indians federal protection from the depredations of white squatters prior to
the completion of land surveys. While the federal government clearly pos-
sessed both the right and the obligation to enforce those guarantees, Sec-
retary of War Cass, although required by the removal treaties to direct his
agents to eject intruders on Indian land, made it clear that Andrew Jackson
did not want federal officers to be particularly diligent in doing so. In a letter
to United States Marshal Robert L. Crawford, he wrote: “it is the President’s
desire” that the order “be executed with as much regard for the feelings and
situations of the persons (white squatter), whose cases are embraced by it, as
possible.” Force, the marshal was told, should be used “only when absolutely
necessary,” and then only after explaining the situation at length to those
who were asked to move. Soon thereafter, Jackson’s administration abandoned
even the pretext of removing illegal occupants of Indian land. Southern poli-
ticians had made it clear that their constituents would not tolerate any real
enforcement of the protective clauses in the removal treaties. In Mississippi,
Congressman Franklin Plummer declared that the settlers who had occupied
Choctaw lands came from “numerous families of the first respectability” and
had been encouraged by the federal agent to plant their crops on Indian land.
He further warned that Mississippi would resent their eviction. Similarly, in
Alabama, federal efforts to deal with an unusually violent group of squatters
provoked an armed confrontation, and a period of tension between the state
and the administration that ended with an agreement that the treaty provision
calling for the removal of all intruders on Creek land would not be enforced.
Plummer’s claim of federal collusion was well founded. Jackson’s agents
from the outset understood that the president expected them to be consider-
ate of white squatters, not of the Indians the squatters had so often dispos-
sessed. Thus they not only did not challenge state officials who encouraged
whites to occupy Indian lands prior to removal, but also on occasion actively
encouraged the violation of removal treaty guarantees. The removal treaties
envisioned an orderly process whereby whites purchasing Indian land would
take possession only after the original owners had departed. But when Con-
gressman Plummer in the spring of 1832 expressed concern that a provision in
the recent Choctaw treaty which forbade white occupation of land in Choctaw
territory occupied before September 1833 might be used to disallow the rights
of some Mississippians who had already bought Indian titles, Secretary of War
Cass replied: “The President is happy . . . that he is not called upon to execute
[those] . . . provisions of the treaty.” As to the political reasons for Jackson’s
happiness, General Winfield Scott, in correspondence with Secretary of War
Cass, noted that use of federal troops to eject white occupants of Indian land
“would inflame the passions of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, and Mississippi, and thus give wider spread to the heresies of nul-
lification and secession.”
Jackson was well aware of the misdeeds of his Indian agents. After leav-
ing office, he told Francis P. Blair that dealing with the Indian office was “the
most arduous part of my duty, and I watched over it with great vigilance, and
could hardly keep it under proper restraint, and free from abuse and injury to
the administration.” His claim that he had displayed “great vigilance” must be
placed in proper context. Jackson was speaking of those who cheated the gov-
ernment or other whites, not those who abused Indians. One combs the record
in vain for evidence that Jackson took any particular pains to protect Indians
from speculators and swindlers. . . .
Antiremoval protestors frequently charged that Andrew Jackson’s refusal
to execute the Indian treaties and laws of the United States “constituted a
gross abuse of presidential power.” The charge was well-founded. Nothing in
the Indian Removal Act of 1830 authorized his denial of Indian treaty rights in
the removal process. While the law’s affirmation that prior treaties remained
in force was not as strong as Jackson’s critics wished, it was nonetheless part
of the law. By disregarding the obligations placed upon him by legislation
providing for protection of Indian property, by denying the legitimacy of prior
federal treaty commitments to Indian nations, by ignoring the promises writ-
ten into his own removal treaties, and by tacitly encouraging the intimida-
tion and dispossession of Indians, Jackson transformed the voluntary removal
program authorized by Congress into a coerced removal sanctioned by the
White House. The failure of subsequent Congresses dominated by Jacksonian
loyalists to deal with those abuses does not alter the fact that the president
was operating outside the law. It is doubtful that Jackson could have achieved
his objectives in Indian removal had he either accepted the constraints con-
tained in the enabling legislation, or honored the promises made to Congress
to secure passage of that law. It is a mark of Jackson’s political success that so
many historians over the years have conveyed to their readers the impression
that neither the constraints nor the promises existed.
223
224
Learning Outcomes
After reading this issue you should be able to:
• Critically analyze whether merchant capitalism opened new
economic opportunities for women.
• Critically analyze whether “the cult of motherhood”
restricted or opened up more opportunities for women inside
the home.
• Critically analyze whether Jacksonian democracy disenfran-
chised and limited economic opportunities for the “lady” and
the “mill girl.”
ISSUE SUMMARY
225
226
227
228
From The Bonds of Womanhood: “Women’s Sphere” in New England, 1780–1835 by Nancy F.
Cott (Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 1, 3, 5–9, 19, 23–27, 36–42, 43–44, 45–46, 57–59, 61–62
(excerpts, notes omitted). Copyright © 1997 by Yale University. Reprinted by permission of
Yale University Press.
229
seventieth year, she delivered more than a thousand babies. The very pro-
cesses of her work engaged her in community social life. In her medical work
she became acquainted with her neighbors as she provided services for them,
and domestic crafts, such as quilting and spinning, also involved her in both
cooperative and remunerative social relationships. The pattern of her life was
not atypical for the matron of a farm household, particularly in a frontier com-
munity, in the late eighteenth century. . . .
The basic developments hastening economic productivity and ration-
alizing economic organization in New England between 1780 and 1835
were extension of the size of the market, increases in agricultural efficiency,
reduction in transportation costs, and consequent specialization of economic
function, division of labor, and concentration of industry. In late eighteenth-
century towns, subsistence farming and household production for family use
prevailed, supplemented by individual craftsmen (cobblers, coopers, black-
smiths, tailors, weavers, etc.) who were established or itinerant depending on
density of population in their locale, and by small industrial establishments
such as sawmills, gristmills, fulling mills, ironworks, and brickyards. The
Revolutionary war stimulated some forms of household production (such as
“homespun”), and so did the disruption of the international market during
the Napoleonic wars, but more continuous lines of change moved the New
England economy from its agricultural and household-production base and
gave it a commercial and then industrial emphasis by 1835.
Merchant capitalism was a primary force in this transformation. Merchant
capitalists took risks, supplied capital, searched out markets, and attempted to
maximize profits by producing standardized goods at the least cost, thus organ-
izing production on a larger scale than had previously been typical. Their actions
commanded a shift away from home production for family use, and from local
craftsmen’s production of custom or “bespoke” work for known individuals,
toward more standardized production for a wider market. Mercantile capitalism
flourished during the enormous expansion of New England’s carrying trade and
re-export business that occurred from 1793 to 1807 because of the confusion of
European shipping during the Napoleonic wars. This burst of shipping energy also
caused subsidiary economic activities, such as shipbuilding, and complementary
businesses, such as brokerage, marine insurance, warehousing, and banking, to
grow. Under the brunt of the national embargo in 1807 and the subsequent war
with England this blooming of the American carrying and re-export trade faded,
but since much of the capital involved was transferred to manufacturing activity
overall economic productivity did not diminish greatly.
The shift to market-oriented production under merchant capitalists pre-
pared the way for the development of manufacturing and the factory system.
Under the demand of the merchant capitalist for widely distributable goods,
the craftsman’s shop became a larger and more specialized unit, for production
only rather than (as formerly) for production and retail sale. The master crafts-
man became the “boss” of a larger number of journeymen and apprentices.
In New England another production system, limited mainly to shoes and tex-
tiles, also preceded and overlapped with industrial manufacture. This was the
“putting-out” or “given-out” system, in which a merchant or master craftsman
Barrett to be made into cloth. The power loom did not appear in New England
until 1814. That year the Boston Manufacturing Company introduced it at
Waltham, Massachusetts, uniting under one factory roof all the operations neces-
sary to turn raw fiber into finished cloth. Factories mass-producing cotton cloth
multiplied during the 1820s.
By 1830, industrial manufacture had largely superseded home spinning
and weaving in New England by producing cloth more cheaply. This changed
women’s work more than any other single factor, and likely had more emphatic
impact on unmarried women than on mothers of families. Industrialization of
textiles disrupted daughters’ predictable role in the household first. Mothers’
lives continued to be defined by household management and child rearing.
Daughters, however, often had to earn wages to replace their contribution to
family sustenance. Textile mill operatives, who were almost all between the
ages of fifteen and thirty, were young women who followed their traditional
occupation to a new location, the factory. New England textile factories from
the start employed a vastly greater proportion of women than men.
The economic and social change of the period injected uncertainty, vari-
ety, and mobility into young women’s lives—into none more dramatically
than the early mill operatives’. Mary Hall began industrial employment after
her academy schooling and experience in schoolteaching. In November 1830
she started folding books at a shop in Exeter, New Hampshire, not happy to
be removed from her family. “Yes, I shall probably be obliged to call this, to me
a land of strangers, home for the present,” she wrote in her diary. “But home
sweet home can never be transfer’d in the affections of Me. . . . How often this
day amidst its cares and business have I been in imagination under the pater-
nal roof seeing, hearing and conversing with its lov’d inhabitants.” She was
twenty-four years old. After seven months she returned home, because several
family members were ill. In September 1831, she went to Lowell, Massachusetts,
for employment as a cotton-mill operative. She worked in Lowell for the next
five years, except for returns home to Concord for more than a year between
1832 and 1833, for the summer in 1834, for weeks in November and December
1834 (because of deaths in her family), and in November 1835 and June 1836.
During her years in Lowell she worked for at least three different corporations.
Emily Chubbuck, whose family was probably poorer than Mary Hall’s,
had a more disjointed employment history. The fifth child in a New Hampshire
family transplanted to upstate New York, she went to work in 1828, at the age
of eleven, splicing rolls in a woolen factory. Her parents allowed her to keep
her weekly wage of $1.25. When the factory closed in January 1829 she began
attending a district school, to supplement the education she had received
from an older sister. Two months later the factory reopened and she resumed
work there. During the next three years, as her family moved several times
in attempts to make a living, she intermittently worked for a Scottish weaver
twisting thread, attended an academy, washed and ironed for her family’s
boarders, sewed for a mantua-maker, and attended a district school. At four-
teen, despite her mother’s advice to apprentice herself to a milliner, she lied
about her age to obtain a schoolteaching job. Her wages were only 75 cents
a week plus board. She knew that she “could earn as much with the milliner,
and far more at twisting thread,” but she hoped for a future in literary pursuits
rather than manual employment.
There was a large class of young women who would have spun at home
in early decades but whose families’ incomes or priorities made factory work
unlikely for them. Their work too became variable and sporadic, shifting
among the options of schoolteaching, needlework, domestic work, and given-
out industry. None of these was really a full-time, year-round occupation.
Women tended to combine them. Rachel Stearns, under pressure of necessity,
became willing to intersperse sewing in another household with her school-
teaching, although earlier she had “thought it quite too degrading to go to
Uncle F’s and sew.” Nancy Flynt, a single woman of Connecticut, wrote to her
married sister around 1810, “[I am] a tugging and a toiling day and night to get
a maintenance, denying myself the pleasure of calling on my nearest neigh-
bors. . . . I would tell you how much work I have dispatched since I saw you,
I have a great deal of sewing on hand now.” The twenty-five-year-old daughter
of the minister in Hawley, Massachusetts, decided she should learn to support
herself “by the needle” and therefore began to learn the milliner’s trade, but
her health failed, preventing her from continuing. “Perhaps [I] flattered myself
too much with the idea of being able to bear my own expenses,” she reflected
somewhat bitterly.
Given-out industry, which constituted a significant stage in the indus-
trial development of New England, enabled women to earn money while stay-
ing at home. Two kinds of production organized this way drew heavily on
women’s labor: the stitching and binding of boots and shoes (concentrated
in eastern Massachusetts) and the braiding, or plaiting, of straw bonnets. The
latter was a handicraft designed before 1800 by New England women who
used native rye straw for the material. By 1830 thousands carried it on in the
employ of entrepreneurs who imported palm leaves from Cuba and distrib-
uted them to farmhouses to be made up into hats. Eliza Chaplin and her sister
Caroline of Salem, Massachusetts, made and sold bonnets during the 1820s,
the same years that they taught school. Julia Pierce taught school in the sum-
mer and had “plenty of work” to do in the winter, she said: “I have braided
more than 100 hats and the other girls as many more.” The working life of
Amanda Elliott of Guilford, Connecticut, exemplifies the variety of this transi-
tional period. Within six months in 1816–17 she devoted considerable time to
splitting straw and braiding hats; noted five new boarders; taught school; and
mentioned binding shoes, in addition to usual domestic needlework, knitting,
washing, and ironing. For some fortunate young women, of course, the dimi-
nution of household manufacture for the family meant greater leisure and
opportunity for education. Hannah Hickok Smith’s letters after 1800 revealed
that spinning gradually dwindled in importance in her daughters’ occupa-
tions. “As we have had much leisure time this winter,” she wrote in 1816,
“the girls have employed themselves chiefly in reading writing and studying
French Latin and Greek.”
While economic modernization changed young unmarried women’s
work more conspicuously than their mothers’ at first, the disruption of the
integral relation between the household and the business of society was bound
cloth”), four kinds of yarn and thread, leather, and buttons; bought silk shawls,
bonnets, dresses, stockings, and kid gloves, and also paid for people’s services
in making clothing. The farm produced the marketable commodities of grain
(oats, rye, corn) and timber, animals (calves, turkeys, fowl) and animal prod-
ucts (eggs, hens’ feathers, quills, wool, pork), and other farm produce which
required more human labor, such as butter, cider, lard, and tallow. . . .
The growing availability of goods and services for purchase might spare a
married woman from considerable drudgery, if her husband’s income sufficed
for a comfortable living. It also heightened her role in “shoping,” as Abigail
Brackett Lyman spelled it (her consumer role), although that was subject to her
husband’s authority over financial resources. In colonial America husbands, as
“providers,” typically were responsible for purchasing goods—including house-
hold goods, furniture, and food staples, if they were to be bought—but in com-
mercial towns of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century wives more
frequently became shoppers, especially for articles of dress and food. The increas-
ing importance of monetary exchange bore hard on those who needed to replace
their former economic contribution of household manufacture with income-
producing employment, while meeting their domestic obligations. Taking in
boarders was one alternative. Betsey Graves Johnson did that while she brought
up the five children born to her between 1819 and 1830. Otherwise, married
women had the same options for wage earning as single women who wished to
stay at home: to take in sewing, or work in given-out industry. Schoolteaching,
a slight possibility for wives, was a likelier one for widows whose children had
reached school age. One widow’s “cares,” as described by her sister in 1841, were
“enough to occupy all her time and thoughts almost. . . . [She] is teaching from
16 to 20 sholars [sic] boarding a young lady, and doing the housework, taking
care of her children, &c.”
These constants—“doing the housework, taking care of her children”—
persisted in married women’s lives. Child care required their presence at home.
This responsibility revealed itself as the heart of women’s domestic duties
when household production declined. After four years of marriage Sarah Ripley
Stearns regretfully attributed her neglect of church attendance and devotional
reading not to household duties but to “the Care of my Babes, which takes
up so large a portion of my time of my time [sic] attention.” More than ever
before in New England history, the care of children appeared to be mothers’
sole work and the work of mothers alone. The expansion of nonagricultural
occupations drew men and grown children away from the household, abbre-
viating their presence in the family and their roles in child rearing. Mothers
and young children were left in the household together just when educational
and religious dicta both newly emphasized the malleability of young minds.
Enlightenment psychology drew tighter the connection between early influ-
ence on the child, and his or her eventual character, just as mothers’ influence
on young children appeared more salient. . . .
While changes in economy and society made young women’s work
more social, more various and mobile, the same developments reduced the
social engagement, variety, and mobility in the work of wives and mothers.
Housekeeping and child care continued to require married women’s presence
production for direct use with wage earning, the institution of time-discipline
and machine regularity in place of natural rhythms, the separation of work-
places from the home, and the division of “work” from “life” were overlapping
layers of the same phenomenon. . . .
Despite the changes in its social context adult women’s work, for the
most part, kept the traditional mode and location which both sexes had ear-
lier shared. Men who had to accept time-discipline and specialized occupa-
tions may have begun to observe differences between their own work and that
of their wives. Perhaps they focused on the remaining “premodern” aspects
of women’s household work: it was reassuringly comprehensible, because it
responded to immediate needs; it represented not strictly “work” but “life,”
a way of being; and it also looked unsystematized, inefficient, nonurgent.
Increasingly men did distinguish women’s work from their own, in the early
nineteenth century, by calling it women’s “sphere,” a “separate” sphere.
Women’s sphere was “separate” not only because it was at home but also
because it seemed to elude rationalization and the cash nexus, and to integrate
labor with life. The home and occupations in it represented an alternative to
the emerging pace and division of labor. Symbol and remnant of preindustrial
work, perhaps the home commanded men’s deepest loyalties, but these were
loyalties that conflicted with “modern” forms of employment. To be idealized,
yet rejected by men—the object of yearning, and yet of scorn—was the fate
of the home-as-workplace. Women’s work (indeed women’s very character,
viewed as essentially conditioned by the home) shared in that simultaneous
glorification and devaluation.
From The Majority Finds Its Past by Gerda Lerner (Oxford University Press, 1979). Copyright
© 1979 by Gerda Lerner. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press.
240
The vast majority of women worked within their homes, where their
labor produced most articles needed for the family. The entire colonial pro-
duction of cloth and clothing and in part that of shoes was in the hands of
women. In addition to these occupations, women were found in many dif-
ferent kinds of employment. They were butchers, silversmiths, gunsmiths,
upholsterers. They ran mills, plantations, tan yards, shipyards, and every kind
of shop, tavern and boarding house. They were gate keepers, jail keepers, sex-
tons, journalists, printers, “doctoresses,” apothecaries, midwives, nurses, and
teachers. Women acquired their skills the same way as did the men, through
apprenticeship training, frequently within their own families.
Absence of a dowry, ease of marriage and remarriage, and a more lenient
attitude of the law with regard to women’s property rights were manifestations
of the improved position of wives in the colonies. Under British common law,
marriage destroyed a woman’s contractual capacity; she could not sign a con-
tract even with the consent of her husband. But colonial authorities were more
lenient toward the wife’s property rights by protecting her dower rights in
her husband’s property, granting her personal clothing, and upholding pre-
nuptial contracts between husband and wife. In the absence of the husband,
colonial courts granted women “femme sole” rights, which enabled them to
conduct their husband’s business, sign contracts, and sue. The relative social
freedom of women and the esteem in which they were held was commented
upon by most early foreign travelers in America.
But economic, legal, and social status tells only part of the story. Colonial
society as a whole was hierarchical, and rank and standing in society depended
on the position of the men. Women did not play a determining role in the
ranking pattern; they took their position in society through the men of their
own family or the men they married. In other words, they participated in
the hierarchy only as daughters and wives, not as individuals. Similarly, their
occupations were, by and large, merely auxiliary, designed to contribute to
family income, enhance their husbands’ business or continue it in case of
widowhood. The self-supporting spinsters were certainly the exception. The
underlying assumption of colonial society was that women ought to occupy
an inferior and subordinate position. The settlers had brought this assumption
with them from Europe; it was reflected in their legal concepts, their willing-
ness to exclude women from political life, their discriminatory educational
practices. What is remarkable is the extent to which this felt inferiority of
women was constantly challenged and modified under the impact of environ-
ment, frontier conditions, and a favorable sex ratio.
By 1840 all of American society had changed. The Revolution had sub-
stituted an egalitarian ideology for the hierarchical concepts of colonial life.
Privilege based on ability rather than inherited status, upward mobility for all
groups of society, and unlimited opportunities for individual self-fulfillment
had become ideological goals, if not always realities. For men, that is; women
were, by tacit concensus, excluded from the new democracy. Indeed their actual
situation had in many respects deteriorated. While, as wives, they had benefit-
ted from increasing wealth, urbanization, and industrialization, their role as
economic producers and as political members of society differed sharply from
that of men. Women’s work outside of the home no longer met with social
approval; on the contrary, with two notable exceptions, it was condemned.
Many business and professional occupations formerly open to women were
now closed, many others restricted as to training and advancement. The entry
of large numbers of women into low status, low pay, and low skill industrial
work had fixed such work by definition as “woman’s work.” Women’s politi-
cal status, while legally unchanged, had deteriorated relative to the advances
made by men. At the same time the genteel lady of fashion had become a
model of American femininity, and the definition of “woman’s proper sphere”
seemed narrower and more confined than ever.
Within the scope of this essay only a few of these changes can be more
fully explained. The professionalization of medicine and its impact on women
may serve as a typical example of what occurred in all the professions.
In colonial America there were no medical schools, no medical jour-
nals, few hospitals, and few laws pertaining to the practice of the healing arts.
Clergymen and governors, barbers, quacks, apprentices, and women practiced
medicine. Most practitioners acquired their credentials by reading Paracelsus
and Galen and serving an apprenticeship with an established practitioner.
Among the semi-trained “physics,” surgeons, and healers the occasional
“doctoress” was fully accepted and frequently well rewarded. County records
of all the colonies contain references to the work of the female physicians.
There was even a female Army surgeon, a Mrs Allyn, who served during King
Philip’s war. Plantation records mention by name several slave women who
were granted special privileges because of their useful service as midwives and
“doctoresses.”
The period of the professionalization of American medicine dates from
1765, when Dr. William Shippen began his lectures on midwifery in
Philadelphia. The founding of medical faculties in several colleges, the stand-
ardization of training requirements, and the proliferation of medical societies
intensified during the last quarter of the 18th century. The American Revolu-
tion dramatized the need for trained medical personnel, afforded first-hand
battlefield experience to a number of surgeons and brought increasing numbers
of semi-trained practitioners in contact with the handful of European-trained
surgeons working in the military hospitals. This was an experience from which
women were excluded. The resulting interest in improved medical training,
the gradual appearance of graduates of medical colleges, and the efforts of
medical societies led to licensing legislation. In 1801 Maryland required all
medical practitioners to be licensed; in 1806 New York enacted a similar law,
followed by all but three states. This trend was reversed in the 1830s and 40s
when most states repealed their licensure requirements. This was due to pres-
sure from eclectic, homeopathic practitioners, the public’s dissatisfaction with
the “heroic medicine” then practiced by licensed physicians, and to the dis-
trust of state regulation, which was widespread during the Age of Jackson.
Licensure as prime proof of qualification for the practice of medicine was rein-
stituted in the 1870s.
In the middle of the 19th century it was not so much a license or an
M.D. which marked the professional physician as it was graduation from an
midwife. There are many records of well-trained midwives with diplomas from
European institutions working in the colonies. In most of the colonies mid-
wives were licensed, registered, and required to pass an examination before a
board. When Dr. Shippen announced his pioneering lectures on midwifery, he
did it to “combat the widespread popular prejudice against the man-midwife”
and because he considered most midwives ignorant and improperly trained.
Yet he invited “those women who love virtue enough, to own their Igno-
rance, and apply for instruction” to attend his lectures, offering as an induce-
ment the assurance that female pupils would be taught privately. It is not
known if any midwives availed themselves of the opportunity.
Technological advances, as well as scientific, worked against the inter-
ests of female midwives. In 16th-century Europe the invention and use of
obstetrical forceps had for three generations been the well-kept secret of the
Chamberlen family and had greatly enhanced their medical practice. Hugh
Chamberlen was forced by circumstances to sell the secret to the Medical
College in Amsterdam, which in turn transmitted the precious knowledge to
licensed physicians only. By the time the use of the instrument became wide-
spread it had become associated with male physicians and male midwives.
Similarly in America, introduction of the obstetrical forceps was associated
with the practice of male midwives and served to their advantage. By the end
of the 18th century a number of male physicians advertised their practice of
midwifery. Shortly thereafter female midwives also resorted to advertising,
probably in an effort to meet the competition. By the early 19th century male
physicians had virtually monopolized the practice of midwifery on the Eastern
seaboard. True to the generally delayed economic development in the Western
frontier regions, female midwives continued to work on the frontier until a
much later period. It is interesting to note that the concepts of “propriety”
shifted with the prevalent practice. In 17th-century Maine the attempt of a
man to act as a midwife was considered outrageous and illegal; in mid-19th-
century America the suggestion that women should train as midwives and
physicians was considered equally outrageous and improper.
Professionalization, similar to that in medicine with the elimination
of women from the upgraded profession, occurred in the field of law. Before
1750, when law suits were commonly brought to the courts by the plaintiffs
themselves or by deputies without specialized legal training, women as well
as men could and did act as “attorneys-in-fact.” When the law became a paid
profession and trained lawyers took over litigation, women disappeared from
the court scene for over a century.
A similar process of shrinking opportunities for women developed in
business and in the retail trades. There were fewer female storekeepers and
business women in the 1830s than there had been in colonial days. There was
also a noticeable shift in the kind of merchandise handled by them. Where
previously women could be found running almost every kind of retail shop,
after 1830 they were mostly found in businesses which served women only.
The only fields in which professionalization did not result in the elimi-
nation of women from the upgraded profession were nursing and teaching.
Both were characterized by a severe shortage of labor. Nursing lies outside the
field of this inquiry since it did not become an organized profession until after
the Civil War. Before then it was regarded peculiarly as a woman’s occupation,
although some of the hospitals and the Army during wars employed male nurses.
These bore the stigma of low skill, low status, and low pay. Generally, nursing
was regarded as simply an extension of the unpaid services performed by the
housewife—a characteristic attitude that haunts the profession to this day.
Education seems, at first glance, to offer an entirely opposite pattern
from that of the other professions. In colonial days women had taught “Dame
schools” and grade schools during summer sessions. Gradually, as educational
opportunities for girls expanded, they advanced just a step ahead of their
students. Professionalization of teaching occurred between 1820 and 1860,
a period marked by a sharp increase in the number of women teachers. The
spread of female seminaries, academies, and normal schools provided new
opportunities for the training and employment of female teachers.
This trend, which runs counter to that found in the other professions,
can be accounted for by the fact that women filled a desperate need created
by the challenge of the common schools, the ever-increasing size of the stu-
dent body, and the westward growth of the nation. America was committed
to educating its children in public schools, but it was insistent on doing so as
cheaply as possible. Women were available in great numbers, and they were
willing to work cheaply. The result was another ideological adaptation: in the
very period when the gospel of the home as woman’s only proper sphere was
preached most loudly, it was discovered that women were the natural teachers
of youth, could do the job better than men, and were to be preferred for such
employment. This was always provided, of course, that they would work at
the proper wage differential—30 to 50 per cent of the wages paid male teach-
ers was considered appropriate. The result was that in 1888 in the country as
a whole 63 per cent of all teachers were women, while the figure for the cities
only was 90.04 per cent.
It appeared in the teaching field, as it would in industry, that role expec-
tations were adaptable provided the inferior status group filled a social need.
The inconsistent and peculiar patterns of employment of black labor in the
present-day market bear out the validity of this generalization.
There was another field in which the labor of women was appreciated
and which they were urged to enter—industry. From Alexander Hamilton to
Matthew Carey and Tench Coxe, advocates of industrialization sang the praises
of the working girl and advanced arguments in favor of her employment. The
social benefits of female labor particularly stressed were those bestowed upon
her family, who now no longer had to support her. Working girls were “thus
happily preserved from idleness and its attendant vices and crimes,” and the
whole community benefitted from their increased purchasing power.
American industrialization, which occurred in an underdeveloped econ-
omy with a shortage of labor, depended on the labor of women and chil-
dren. Men were occupied with agricultural work and were not available or
were unwilling to enter the factories. This accounts for the special features
of the early development of the New England textile industry: the relatively
high wages, the respectability of the job and relatively high status of the mill
girls, the patriarchal character of the model factory towns, and the temporary
mobility of women workers from farm to factory and back again to farm. All
this was characteristic only of a limited area and of a period of about two
decades. By the late 1830s the romance had worn off: immigration had sup-
plied a strongly competitive, permanent work force willing to work for subsist-
ence wages; early efforts at trade union organization had been shattered, and
mechanization had turned semi-skilled factory labor into unskilled labor. The
process led to the replacement of the New England-born farm girls by immi-
grants in the mills and was accompanied by a loss of status and respectability
for female workers.
The lack of organized social services during periods of depression drove
ever greater numbers of women into the labor market. At first, inside the fac-
tories distinctions between men’s and women’s jobs were blurred. Men and
women were assigned to machinery on the basis of local need. But as more
women entered industry the limited number of occupations open to them
tended to increase competition among them, thus lowering pay standards.
Generally, women regarded their work as temporary and hesitated to invest
in apprenticeship training, because they expected to marry and raise families.
Thus they remained untrained, casual labor and were soon, by custom, rel-
egated to the lowest paid, least skilled jobs. Long hours, overwork, and poor
working conditions would characterize women’s work in industry for almost
a century.
Another result of industrialization was in increasing differences in life
styles between women of different classes. When female occupations, such as
carding, spinning, and weaving, were transferred from home to factory, the
poorer women followed their traditional work and became industrial work-
ers. The women of the middle and upper classes could use their newly gained
time for leisure pursuits: they became ladies. And a small but significant group
among them chose to prepare themselves for professional careers by advanced
education. This group would prove to be the most vocal and troublesome in
the near future.
As class distinctions sharpened, social attitudes toward women became
polarized. The image of “the lady” was elevated to the accepted ideal of femi-
ninity toward which all women would strive. In this formulation of values
lower-class women were simply ignored. The actual lady was, of course, noth-
ing new on the American scene; she had been present ever since colonial days.
What was new in the 1830s was the cult of the lady, her elevation to a status
symbol. The advancing prosperity of the early 19th century made it possible
for middle-class women to aspire to the status formerly reserved for upper-
class women. The “cult of true womanhood” of the 1830s became a vehicle
for such aspirations. Mass circulation newspapers and magazines made it pos-
sible to teach every woman how to elevate the status of her family by setting
“proper” standards of behavior, dress, and literary tastes. Godey’s Lady’s Book
and innumerable gift books and tracts of the period all preach the same gospel
of “true womanhood”—piety, purity, domesticity. Those unable to reach the
goal of becoming ladies were to be satisfied with the lesser goal—acceptance of
their “proper place” in the home.
Notes
1. To the date of the first printing of this article (1969).
2. In 1979, I would not agree with this optimistic generalization.
250
Additional Resources
The bibliography on women’s history is enormous. A critical analysis of “the
cult of motherhood” as a framework of analysis can be found in Linda K.
Kerber’s “Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Woman’s Place: The Rhetoric of
Women’s History,” Journal of American History, 75/1 (June 1988), 9–39 reprinted
in Toward An Intellectual History of Women (University of North Carolina
Press, 1997).
Two excellent textbooks on women’s history with extensive bibli-
ographies are Sara M. Evans, Born for Liberty: a History of Women in America
(The Free Press, 1989), and Nancy Woloch, Woman and the American Experience,
2nd ed. (McGraw Hill, 1994).
The essays in this issue deal with white middle-class women. Linda K.
Kerber and Jane Sherron De Hart, have pulled together an excellent collec-
tion of essays and primary sources that focus on working-class women, as well
as immigrants and non-white minority groups—African Americans, Asians,
Hispanics and Native Americans—in Women’s America: Refocusing the Past,
6th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2004). See also Vicki L. Ruiz and Ellen Carol
Du Bois, eds., Unequal Sisters: A Multicultural Reader in U. S. Women’s History,
3rd ed. (Routledge, 1990). For an example of the immigrants who succeeded
the “Daughters of Freemen” at the Lowell mills, see Hasia Diner, Erin’s Daughters
251
252
254
255
Learning Outcomes
After reading this issue, you should be able to:
• Understand the forces that produced an “age of reform” in the
first half of the nineteenth century.
• Discuss the connection between religion and social reform in
the first half of the nineteenth century.
• Evaluate the economic arguments that promoted attacks on
American drinking habits.
• Analyze ways in which temperance reform represented a mech-
anism of social control over undesirable individual behavior.
• Differentiate between the goals of “temperance,” “abstinence,”
and “prohibition.”
ISSUE SUMMARY
YES: W. J. Rorabaugh points out that in the first half of the nine-
teenth century evangelical Christian ministers portrayed liquor as
the tool of the Devil and developed temperance societies as social-
izing institutions to ease social tensions and anxieties that contrib-
uted to alcohol consumption.
NO: John J. Rumbarger concludes that nineteenth-century temper-
ance reform was the product of a pro-capitalist market economy
whose entrepreneurial elite led the way toward abstinence and
prohibition campaigns in order to guarantee the availability of a
more productive work force.
256
257
258
Demon Rum
During the 1820s per capita consumption of spirituous liquor climbed, then
quite suddenly leveled off, and in the early 1830s began to plummet toward
an unprecedented low. This decline marked a significant change in American
culture, as a zestful, hearty drinking people became the world’s most zealous
abstainers. Just why this dramatic change took place is not entirely clear, due
at least in part to the fact that historians who have studied the temperance
movement have not analyzed it adequately. . . .
The antiliquor campaign was launched about 1810 by a number of
reform-minded ministers, who were evangelical Calvinists associated with
the newly founded Andover Seminary. Indeed, it appears that the movement
began at one of a series of Monday night gatherings where Justin Edwards,
Moses Stuart, Leonard Woods, and Ebenezer Porter met in the latter’s study to
discuss social questions. Early fruits of this Andover meeting were a number
of militant antiliquor articles in Jeremiah Evarts’ Panoplist, a Boston religious
periodical with strong Andover ties. These articles were followed in 1814 by a
seminal temperance pamphlet issued by Andover’s New England Tract Society.
This pamphlet was widely used by ministers to prepare sermons opposing the
use of alcohol. The founders of the movement soon discovered that their cause
had broad appeal, and when the Massachusetts Society for the Suppression of
Intemperance was organized in 1812, its leaders included not only the Ando-
ver crowd but such prominent figures as Abiel Abbot, Jedidiah Morse, and
Samuel Worcester. Within the next two decades these clergymen and others
who subsequently joined them spread their message across the country.
Militant moral reformers succeeded in attracting public attention. A
populace that had not responded to Benjamin Rush’s rational warnings that
spirits brought disease and death was captivated by emotional, moral exhor-
tations warning that the drinker would be damned. The success of this emo-
tional appeal shows clearly that Americans were more receptive to a moral
argument against liquor than to a scientific argument. To persuade people to
quit drinking, temperance leaders used two techniques. On the one hand, they
advocated religious faith as a way for people to ease the anxieties that led to
drink; on the other hand, they made drinking itself the source of anxieties
259
by portraying liquor as the agent of the devil. Those Americans who were
persuaded that Satan assumed “the shape of a bottle of spirits” found that liq-
uor did more to increase anxieties than to lessen them. Such people preferred
abstinence to alcohol.
The leaders of the temperance crusade created a significant socializing
institution, the temperance society. These “moral machines” were established
in many villages and towns following a visit from an agent of a state or national
temperance organization. An agent commonly wrote ahead to the ministers of
a town to seek support for the cause. He then visited the town, gave a public
address in one of the churches, and urged the clergymen and leading citizens
to form a temperance society. The agent furnished a model constitution for
such an organization, blessed the project; and proceeded to the next town.
If successful, he left behind a concern about drinking and a group of promi-
nent local people who would organize a society, adopt a constitution, write
a pledge against drinking intoxicants, and undertake to get members of the
community to sign it. Copies of the pledge were circulated among friends and
neighbors, and new signers were initiated at monthly meetings where mem-
bers congratulated themselves on the strength and vigor of their organization.
When a temperance society had gathered sufficient popular support, it might
plan to celebrate a holiday, such as the 4th of July, with a dry parade, picnic,
or public speech designed to counter traditional wet festivities. These celebra-
tions did not always succeed. Sometimes rival wet and dry programs sparked
controversy, and at least one temperance group fought a pitched battle with its
opponents. What is more surprising is how often temperance societies came to
dominate the life of a town. Perhaps the best indication of their strength and
influence is the fact that in some localities drinkers felt sufficiently threatened
to form antitemperance societies. . . .
While the campaign against alcohol was of benefit to expansionary
industrialism, it also met the needs of a growing religious movement. In the
last quarter of the eighteenth century the influence of religion on American
life had declined, the victim of Revolutionary chaos, a loss of English subsidies
to the Episcopal church, popular distrust of authority, and the prevailing ideol-
ogy of Reason. After 1800 the situation changed, and Americans, particularly
those on the frontier, began to take a new interest in religion. The preachers
soon saw that the Lord intended them to lead a great revival, to cleanse the
nation of sin and to prepare for judgment, which might well be at hand. Some,
especially the Methodist preachers, organized camp meeting revivals, where
hordes of people pitched their tents, gathered for days on end, listened to
numerous exhortations from a host of ministers, and were converted by the
dozens amid frenzy and emotion. At one such meeting in Tennessee, “hun-
dreds, of all ages and colors, were stretched on the ground in the agonies of
conviction. . . .”
Camp meetings became one of the focal points of frontier life, attracting
not only those who sought salvation but also curiousity seekers, scoundrels,
and scoffers. Troublemakers often crept along the edges of the camp, threaten-
ing to steal provisions, shouting obscenities, and drinking. These intoxicated
scoffers presented the leaders of a revival with a dilemma. If they posted sentinels
to protect the camp and bar entry, the rowdies would taunt them from the
darkness of the forest. Moreover, such a policy precluded what could be the
highlight of the meeting, the dramatic and inspiring conversion of a drunkard.
On the other hand, if half-drunk rowdies were admitted, they might heckle or
even try to force whiskey down the throat of an abstaining minister. In either
case a preacher must be ever vigilant, like the incomparable Peter Cartwright.
Once that pious Methodist swung a club to knock a mischief-maker off his
horse; another time he stole the rowdies’ whiskey. On a third occasion he
drove off troublemakers by hurling chunks of a camp fire at them. As he threw
the burning wood, he shouted that fire and brimstone would descend upon
the wicked. Sometimes, however, the antagonists had their joke. The Reverend
Joseph Thomas was horrified when several intoxicated men, having joined
the celebration of the Lord’s Supper, produced a loaf of bread and a bottle of
spirits.
These conditions led frontier revivalists to preach sermons contrasting
the defiant, unrepentant drinker with the pietistic, humble churchgoer. The
consumer of alcohol was portrayed as a man of depravity and wickedness, and
this idea was supported both by the presence of rowdies at camp meetings and
by the emergence of a religious doctrine that demanded abstinence. Although
most denominations had long condemned public drunkenness as sinful, it
was revivalistic Methodists who most vigorously opposed alcohol. After 1790
the Methodist Church adopted rules that imposed strict limitations on the use
of distilled spirits. In 1816 the quadrennial general conference barred minis-
ters from distilling or selling liquor; in 1828 it praised the temperance move-
ment; and in 1832 it urged total abstinence from all intoxicants. A similar
rise in opposition occurred among Presbyterians. In 1812 their official body
ordered ministers to preach against intoxication; in 1827 it pledged the church
to support the temperance movement, in 1829 expressed regret that church
members continued to distill, retail, or consume distilled spirits, and in 1835
recommended teetotalism.
This increased hostility to drink showed the impact of the camp meet-
ings and revivals upon all sects. Even conservative Congregationalists and
Presbyterians were, in the words of one evangelical, moving “from the laby-
rinth of Calvinism . . . into the rich pastures of gospelliberty.” Ministers of
these denominations were relieved, after a long period of religious quiescence,
to find people thirsting for salvation. Although theological conservatives tried
to bend the enthusiasm for revivals to their own interest, they were less suc-
cessful than the Methodists, whose feverish, anti-intellectual, nondoctrinal
spirit was most in harmony with the national mood. To compete in winning
converts, conservative ministers were compelled to adopt an evangelical style
that the public demanded and to subordinate doctrine to the task of winning
hearts.
Ministers of many denominations followed the lead of the Methodists,
who preached that a man was saved when he opened his heart unto the Lord.
This simple doctrine appealed to millions of Americans, but it also endan-
gered religious authority, for the concept of personal salvation meant that it
was impossible for an outsider, even a preacher, to know whether a man had
actually received saving grace. A man might either claim salvation falsely or
believe it mistakenly. The possibility of deceit or delusion so haunted evangeli-
cal clergymen that most came to believe that salvation was only likely when
inner feelings were matched by outer deeds. When a man claimed grace, the
preacher looked for a visible proof of conversion, an indication of true faith
and allegiance, a token of the renunciation of sin and acceptance of the Lord.
One visible outward sign of inner light was abstinence from alcoholic
beverages. A man reborn of God had no need to drink spirits, since his radiant
love for the Lord would fully satisfy him. Conversely, concluded one minis-
ter, “we may set it down as a probable sign of a false conversion, if he allows
himself to taste a single drop.” In the same vein it was held that a drinking man
could not give himself to God; his drinking confirmed his hardness of heart;
he was damned of God, because he would not save himself. Warned one cler-
gyman, “Few intemperate men ever repent.” This view led evangelicals to see
alcohol as the devil’s agent, the insidious means by which men were lured into
Satan’s works, such as gaming, theft, and debauchery and, worse still, trapped
and cut off from their own eternal salvation. Said one preacher, “From the
United States, then, what an army of drunkards reel into Hell each year!”
Not all Americans adopted the view that abstinence signified holiness
and that drinking was damnable. Among the most prominent opponents of
the temperance cause were the primitive Baptists, sometimes called Hard Shells
or Forty Gallon Baptists. They were antinomians who believed that faith alone
insured salvation and that the demand for proof of faith, such as requiring
abstinence, was blasphemous. Indeed, some held that abstinence was sinful,
because “God gave the spirit in the fruit of grain, and the ability to extract and
decoct it, and then he gave them the inclination to drink.” Furthermore, they
believed that temperance organizations, like home missions, Sunday schools,
and moral tract societies, threatened the purity of religion by involving the
church in social problems that were best left to secular authority. Doctrine,
however, may not have been the most important reason for this sect’s oppo-
sition to temperance, for it was claimed that their illiterate preachers were
“engaged largely in making and selling whisky.” In any event, many primitive
Baptist congregations expelled a member either for public intoxication or for
joining a temperance society. This bifurcated policy led one exasperated man
to bring a flask before his church board and ask, “How much of this ‘ere critter
does a man have to drink to stay in full fellership in this church?”
Most Americans, however, did accept abstinence as a sign of grace. Dur-
ing the late 1820s religious fervor peaked in a wave of revivals that swept
across the country, that brought large numbers of new members into old con-
gregations, and that led to the establishment of many new churches. This
period of rising interest in religion coincided with the first popular success of
the campaign against alcohol. The two were inexorably linked. In many locali-
ties revivals were held, church rosters bulged, and then six months or a year
later temperance societies were organized. If this pattern had been universal,
we could conclude that antiliquor sentiment was an outgrowth of religious
enthusiasm, that the signing of a pledge was nothing more than proof of con-
version, a symbolic act with no significance of its own. In some places, however
one sense they were right; only escalation of their efforts could keep attention
focused on their goal of a dry America and obscure the contradictions inher-
ent in their position. During the 1830s, when new pledges began to fall off,
reformers turned to attacking beer and wine and proving that the wine used
in the biblical accounts of the Christian sacrament was the unfermented pure
wine of the grape—i.e., grape juice. Not everyone was convinced. The failure
of exhortation to procure universal teetotalism led to a campaign for legal
prohibition, which brought about local option licensing in the 1840s, state
prohibition in the 1850s, and, ultimately, in 1919, the national constitutional
prohibition of all intoxicating liquor. Each effort failed to achieve the universal
abstinence that reformers sought. Again and again it was demonstrated that
those who believed in abstinence could not succeed in imposing their own
view of morality upon that portion of the population that did not share their
vision. In 1838, when Massachusetts outlawed the retail sale of distilled spirits,
Yankee ingenuity triumphed. An enterprising liquor dealer painted stripes on
his pig and advertized that for 6¢ a person could see this decorated beast. The
viewer also got a free glass of whiskey. Such ploys spurred a hurried repeal of
the nation’s first prohibition law.
The moral of the striped pig was that a belief in temperance was only one
component of the American ethos. This moral was lost on antiliquor zealots,
who attempted to transcend the contradictions within American society with
a combination of religious fervor, postponed gratification, and promises of
heavenly rewards. While the faithful found these ideas appealing, others chose
to forego religious commitment for the pursuit of economic gain. They were
led to a kind of pragmatism that stressed industrialization, materialism, and
progress. As worldly success became the counterweight to reform, the chance
for Americans to develop a consensual, holistic ethos that would serve them
during the period of industrialization was lost. Some, such as abolitionist John
Brown, would lapse into self-deluding fanaticism; others, such as Wall Street
stock manipulator Daniel Drew, into self-destructive cynicism. Most Ameri-
cans would be content with a contradictory mixture of morality and material-
ism that would be mindlessly played out in the years ahead. The heroes of the
next generation would be entrepreneurs like Cornelius Vanderbilt, who had so
few scruples that he could ignore his avaricious and rapacious pursuit of mil-
lions and without embarrassment deliver public lectures on virtue. Somehow,
despite his utter baseness, Vanderbilt was more admirable than a hypocritical
Henry Ward Beecher, who preached against sin while facing charges of adul-
tery. In the years after the Civil War the hope for financial gain overshadowed
the search for righteousness, although neither quest could express all the con-
trary desires of Americans. The times favored men such as Vanderbilt, who
ignored principles, followed instincts, and subordinated both his head and his
heart to his gut.
In my view the kind of society that Americans built in the nineteenth
century resulted both from the way that ideology and institutions interacted
with changing contemporary conditions and from the way in which society
itself evolved as a consequence of those interactions. Just as historical circum-
stances and economic developments had led to the opportunity for increased
drinking in the 1820S, the binge itself created another opportunity; the
impulses toward materialism and evangelicalism dictated the shape and con-
tour of the response to that opportunity. The campaign for abstinence and the
transformation of alcohol from the Good Creature into the Demon Rum were
a logical outgrowth of prevailing attitudes, values, and institutions. As drink-
ing declined, as society was reshaped, as the framework for modern capitalism
developed, and as the churches organized their moral campaign, the chance
for a holistic ethos disappeared.
America was left as a culture dominated by an ambivalence that could be
transcended only through an anti-intellectual faith. The potential for power-
ful intellects to influence American life had diminished; a unified moral code
was no longer possible. By 1840 the pattern that would dominate the country
for a century was set. Entrepreneurial capitalism, the corporate structure, the
cult of private enterprise, and the glorification of profit were to dominate the
rational, hard, masculine, and efficient side of the culture; evangelical religion,
the voluntary reform society, the cult of Christian charity, and the glorifica-
tion of God were to dominate the emotional, soft, feminine, and inspirational
side. Institutions representing the two sides were to work in tandem to build
the country. Important among those institutions were temperance societies.
They were, in many ways, the crucial link between the two contrasting sides
of American culture. A majority of the participants in the early temperance
movement were women, but, in contrast to a later era, the leaders were men,
mostly evangelical clergymen. These ministers were to be the bridge between
the two sides of American culture, the men who connected the masculine and
feminine, hard and soft, rational and emotional aspects. Or as one American
said in the 1830s, clergymen were “a sort of people between men and women.”
This remark- has a second, deeper meaning. Being neither men nor women,
the clergy were clearly impotent, and, ultimately, incapable of sustaining a
coherent, holistic, living culture.
From Profits, Power, and Prohibition: Alcohol Reform and the Industrializing of America, 1800–1930
by John J. Rumbarger (State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 3, 4, 5–10, 11–15, 19–20
(excerpts, notes omitted). Copyright © 1989 by State University of New York. Reprinted by
permission of State University of New York Press, Albany NY.
266
Billy Clark had studied medicine; Esek Cowan had read law; Lebbius
Armstrong was trained for the ministry. All three invested their surplus pro-
fessional income in land and agricultural production. Clark, for example,
owned several farms and had a large investment in a local paper mill. Cowan
was a prosperous farm owner with a reputation for innovative husbandry.
More important, however, for the purposes of temperance reform, was the
common world view—quite like Rush’s—the three shared. In one degree
or another Moreau’s temperance reformers believed society could improve
with individual discipline and practical innovation, and that the criterion of
improvement was business profits. William Hay, who subsequently headed
the society, recalled that Clark was “convinced of the necessity of self-
culture, and consequently acquired what are pertinently termed business hab-
its.” Hay admiringly described Clark as “pecuniarily successful as a physician
and a businessman,” and also wrote approvingly of Esek Cowan’s various
employments as a jurist, farmer, and classical scholar. For this kind of man
“recreation was only change of employment,” and employment was directed
towards profit. . . .
These ideological conceptions nurtured temperance reform. But the
reformers’ stance towards other social classes was flexible: traditional rank or
position was not an obstacle for association with like-minded men, provided
the requisite social virtues of practical knowledge and disciplined effort could
be demonstrated. Despite this apparent democratic appeal, the political ideol-
ogy of a temperance “middle” class did not look to a reordering of society.
Forged as it was in the crucible of business enterprise, it sought ultimately to
redirect the energies and activities of capital and labor, but not to alter their
social relationship. In the social context of Jeffersonian America, however,
temperance ideology was radical in both theory and practice since it claimed
to seek another reallocation of wealth and property according to utilitarian
norms even as it sought an increase in social productivity. The assumption
of the permanency of social stratification, to be dominated by a rationally
selected elite, was but poorly masked by notions of individual worth taken to
be demonstrated by the social virtues of innovation and discovery wedded to
a discipline, including temperance, congenial to business. Because of this criti-
cal defect, temperance reformation, insofar as it envisioned a distinct “middle”
class, was necessarily procapitalist.
The idea of a middle class proved especially valuable to the socialization
process required by young America, which in the period 1820–50 could not
compel people to alter their customary behavior sufficiently to modify the
social order’s value system. Indeed, the idea that personal characteristics and
behavior were a form of capital may be seen as the sine qua non of American
economic development in these years. Thus, all manner of ideologies, both
secular and religious, that encouraged the development of internal modes of
self-discipline as forms of “moral capital” were encouraged by the early advo-
cates of liquor reform.
During the decades of the 1820s and 1830s temperance reform wherever
it appeared became a political effort to create a social order universally congen-
ial to entrepreneurial capitalism. It was during these years that the perceptions
of men like Benjamin Rush and Billy Clark took root in business activity out-
side of agriculture, and attracted attention from such established institutions
as the Protestant churches. But while local societies of employers who mutu-
ally agreed “that hereafter we will carry on our business without the use of
distilled spirits as an article of refreshment, either for ourselves or those whom
we may employ” remained on the reform scene, they proved insufficient to
the task of extending temperance sentiment. To meet this need and to deal
with the realities facing various enterprises, their politicization was required.
In Jeffersonian and Jacksonian America, maritime commerce ranked with
agriculture in its importance to the economy. Here, too, liquor was customar-
ily provided for laborers. . . .
In shipbuilding, workers enjoyed ceremonial provisions of strong drink
in addition to their daily rations. At the completion of each major stage of
construction they joined with shipowners and masters to toast their work’s
progress. Thus when the keel was put down, the ribs erected, the decking laid,
and the masts raised and stepped there would be general celebrations fueled
by large amounts of whiskey.
The earliest efforts at reform in these employment areas followed the
boycott tactics that were being developed by agricultural temperance societies.
In Medford, Massachusetts, for example, a local shipbuilder, Thacher Magoun,
refused to permit rum or distilled spirits to be used in his shipyard. Magoun’s
1817 no-rum edict was immediately interpreted by his laborers as “practically
an increase in the working time, the employer thus saving the cost of time as
well as the cost of the rum.” Other Medford shipbuilders followed Magoun’s
lead, even to the point of raising wages. These boycotts could only be partially
effective, however, because of the apprentice system and the grog shop, which
furnished money and the means to smuggle the contraband refreshment into
the yards.
By 1819, temperance advocates outside of agricultural societies had devel-
oped an analysis of the liquor problem that would eventually permit them to
go beyond the limits of the boycott, and thus politicize the temperance move-
ment. Thomas Hertell’s An Expose of the Causes of Intemperate Drinking and the
Means by which It May Be Obviated considered the entire social order to be the
obstacle to temperance reform. Hertell implied that reform could only succeed
if society in general were reformed with respect to drinking.
Hertell, who served for more than a dozen years on the bench of New York
City’s maritime court, asserted that his antiliquor convictions proceeded from
the fact that “intemperate drinking is inimical to agricultural and mechani-
cal, as well as moral improvement.” He maintained that neither distillers nor
the grog shop lay at the root of the problem; both were symptoms and con-
sequences. The real cause of society’s intemperate drinking was to be found
in the “intemperate use of ardent liquor [which] originates in the fashions,
habits, customs, and examples of what are called the upper or wealthy classes
of the community.” Because of the universal employment of such drinks by
society’s elites in both public and private, Hertell concluded that “inebriating
drinks” had gained sanction as the “median universally adopted by society for
manifesting friendship and good will, one to another.”
Such pressures divided the established churches even though they pro-
duced condemnations of varying strength from national and state ecclesiasti-
cal organizations. The larger ones usually confined their expressions of opinion
to vague generalities and left it to specific congregations to act. The Protestant
clergy was also encouraged to advance the utilitarian purposes of the reform-
ers. Thus, a Connecticut clergyman maintained that the cause would be well
served “if farmers and mechanics would agree not to drink spirits themselves,
and not provide them for their workmen.”
By 1834 it was clear that the established churches had not made any deep
inroads against either moderate drinking or the liquor traffic. In addition, their
involvement in reform entailed a necessary hindrance to it since wine was of
central importance to the Christian ritual as well as the ordinary drink of the
wealthy. When, in the mid-1830s, ATS pushed for total abstinence from all alco-
holic beverages and demanded state action against the liquor traffic, the diffi-
culties posed by the churches appeared to outweigh their assets. As one clerical
reformer acknowledged to the 1834 New York State Temperance Convention: “I
have therefore been pained to see so many inclined to connect their religion with
temperance. . . . And I know many individuals, who keep themselves aloof from
the temperance society on this account, who would undoubtedly join the ranks,
if the cause of temperance could be kept separate from everything else.”
While the American Temperance Society concentrated its efforts on arous-
ing the consciousness of property holders through the churches, state societies
continued to recruit such people to the cause of temperance by stressing the utili-
tarian benefits of reform. In July 1833, the Temperance Recorder, the official organ
of the New York State Temperance Society, reported that the consolidation of the
Erie Canal’s several towing firms into the Albany and Buffalo Towing Company
had enabled the teamsters’ employers to gain “control and government” over
them, with the result that their intemperate drinking habits had been effectively
checked. The same issue praised the society’s forwarding of a circular letter to
American consuls in Europe, warning émigrés that those who drank would find
it difficult to obtain employment, and urging them to affiliate with a temperance
society as an aid to finding work. The New York Society, which was dominated by
mercantile and landed capitalists like Edward C. Delavan of Albany and Stephen
Van Rensselaer of Saratoga, urged “the proprietors of our large, as well as our
small manufacturing establishments . . . to take their subject into immediate
consideration,” since it was clear that intemperance was more dangerous to busi-
ness prosperity than even foreign competition. The New Yorkers advised that
temperance societies be organized within the factories themselves, and that pro-
prietors and owners become the officers: “Unless proprietors or agents take the
lead, nothing need be expected; but by their taking the course recommended . . .
all under their control will be brought speedily into this ‘ark of safety.’ ”
But the efforts of the New York Society and ATS to use the churches to
arouse a class-conscious temperance sentiment in favor of overseas economic
expansion ran afoul of the churches’ difficulties and weakened the desired
condemnation and divided the reformers. Many reformers recognized that the
association of temperance with specific political and economic issues detracted
from its class appeal. If the temperance movement were to gain the class support
that its adherents believed was crucial, temperance morality would have to be
divorced from specific secular and religious issues, and its moral appeal would
have to come from an agency not associated with the churches.
In May 1833 ATS directors convened a national convention in Philadel-
phia to consider these questions and to chart the future course of reform. The
four hundred delegates from twenty-four states represented the country’s mer-
cantile, manufacturing, and landed capital. Indicative of the range and scope
of this class of men are Gerrit Smith and Stephen Van Rensselaer. Together
with John Jacob Astor, Smith’s father had acquired over one million acres of
land in upstate New York, some 700,000 acres of which he passed on to his son
in 1819. Van Rensselaer’s holdings were equally vast. Both men were outstand-
ing proponents of internal improvements and expanded trade with the West.
Smith violently opposed a governmental role in expanding these markets, but
Van Rensselaer was a strong advocate of such aid.
Other representatives of mercantile wealth included Edward C. Delavan,
Roberts Vaux and his son, Richard, of Philadelphia, Samuel Ward of New York
whose family’s wealth had been invested in the banking firm of Prime, Ward,
and King, Samuel Mifflin of Philadelphia, and John Tappan of Boston. Typi-
cal of emerging manufacturing representatives were Amasa Walker of Boston,
Jonas Chickering, whose piano manufacturing concern of Stewart and Chicker-
ing developed the single casting iron frame for making grand pianos, and Mat-
thew Newkirk, whose cotton goods business provided the funds for his railroad
investments. Many of them, Delavan, Newkirk, and Smith, for example, had
multiple investments in land, transportation, and manufacturing.
Also attending the first national temperance convention were luminaries
from the first ranks of law, politics, religion, and science, many bearing some of
the oldest family names in America. Reuben Hyde Walworth, chancellor of New
York State, was named the convention’s president. Joseph H. Lumpkin (whose
brother Wilson was a Georgia planter and governor of the state), who would
himself become a member of Georgia’s Supreme Court, was named convention
vice president. Timothy Pitkin, the author of the first major statistical account of
American commerce, was a delegate from Connecticut. John McLean, who was to
become president of the College of New Jersey, was a delegate. So also was Samuel
L. Southard, Democractic senator from New Jersey. Amos Twitchell, a pioneer
heart surgeon, represented New Hampshire. Jonas K. Converse of Burlington,
Vermont, was a delegate, as were Philadelphia philanthropists John Sargent
and Joseph B. Ingersoll; businessmen-publicists such as Mathew Carey, William
Goodell, Thomas Bradford, Jr., and Sylvester Graham were typical delegates.
Other men of similar stature, like chemist Benjamin Silliman of Yale,
or perhaps less well known, such as George Chambers, largest landowner in
Franklin County, Pennsylvania and a reformer in education and agriculture,
filled out the complement of delegates to the Philadelphia meeting. Their
differences in economic interest, political affiliation, and religious persuasion
were transcended by a fundamental class problem: the liquor question. . . .
In the end, this effort to rely solely upon the resources of property would
fail because, as Gerrit Smith had already pointed out, America was a society
where the demand for labor could not be met. Would-be employers would find
the pledge inadequate and the law insufficient. But from the vantage point of
1834, the antiliquor movement had achieved astounding success. It had aroused
the consciousness of virtually the entire propertied class, regardless of particu-
lar economic or political interest, to the importance of extirpating the use of
distilled alcohol as a precondition of capitalist development. It had created a
secular temperance morality that avoided the rigidities of various theologies
while, at the same time, it had been able to enlist the churches in raising the
consciousness of the “employing class.” And it had developed its archetypal
propaganda institution, the American Temperance Society, which was control-
led by entrepreneurs of all sorts, and state and local temperance societies, which
were to organize local property interests for the cause. Finally, the reform was
being urged in the direction of a political attack on the liquor traffic itself.
When the United States Temperance Union and its affiliates met at
Saratoga Springs in 1836, there appeared to remain but two mutually compat-
ible tasks for the reform: first, spread the new gospel that “it has been proved
a thousand times, that more labor can be accomplished in a month, or a year,
under the influence of simple nourishing food and unstimulating drink than
through the aid of alcohol”; second, organize and launch a political assault on
the liquor traffic itself. To further these ends, the USTU named Reverend John
Marsh and Edward C. Delavan to its principal offices. Both were fitting choices
for the work. Marsh was related by marriage to the Tappan mercantile family
of Boston and New York; his cousin Samuel would head the New York and Erie
railroad. Delavan, on the other hand, was an active entrepreneur whose fortune
had been made, ironically, as an importer of wine, and who came to the temper-
ance reform after Nathaniel Prime, Lynde Catlin, and he had lost three hundred
thousand dollars invested in the manufacture of steam engines and other heavy
iron work because, they claimed, of “the unfortunate drinking habits [of the
workers], which for best of motives, we ourselves encouraged.”
275
Additional Resources
The scholarly literature on the “age of reform” is extensive. Interested stu-
dents should consult Timothy L. Smith, Revivalism and Social Reform: Ameri-
can Protestantism on the Eve of the Civil War (Harper & Row, 1957); Whitney R.
Cross, The Burned-Over District: The Social and Intellectual History of Enthu-
siastic Religion in Western New York, 1800–1850 (Cornell University Press,
1950); and Clifford S. Griffin, Their Brothers’ Keepers: Moral Stewardship in
the United States, 1800–1865 (Rutgers University Press, 1960). David Brion
Davis, ed., Ante-Bellum Reform (Harper and Row, 1967) is an excellent collec-
tion of readings. The social-control thesis can be traced for various reform
endeavors in Joseph R. Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the
American Temperance Movement (University of Illinois Press, 1966); Michael B.
Katz, The Irony of Early School Reform: Education and Innovation in Mid-
Nineteenth Century Massachusetts (Beacon Press, 1968); Joseph M. Harris,
Children in Urban Society: Juvenile Delinquency in Nineteenth-Century America
(Oxford University Press, 1971); David J. Rothman, The Discovery of the Asy-
lum: Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic (Little, Brown, 1971); and
Gerald Grob, Mental Institutions in America: Social Policy to 1875 (Free Press,
1973). For some of the aspects of American reform generally dismissed by
Tyler as “fads,” see John D. Davies, Phrenology, Fad and Science: A Nineteenth-
Century American Crusade (Yale University Press, 1955); and Ronald L. Num-
bers, Prophetess of Health: A Study of Ellen G. White (Harper & Row, 1976).
For important studies on the abolitionist movement, see citations listed in
the postscript for Issue 13.
The status of women was another major concern for reformers in the
antebellum period. Students interested in this topic should see Barbara Welter,
“The Cult of True Womanhood, 1820–1860,” American Quarterly (Summer
1966); Barbara J. Berg, The Remembered Gate: Origins of American Feminism-
The Woman and the City, 1800–1860 (Oxford University Press, 1978); Ellen C.
Du Bois, Feminism and Suffrage: The Emergence of an Independent Woman’s Move-
ment in America, 1848–1869 (Cornell University Press, 1978); Barbara Leslie
Epstein, The Politics of Domesticity: Women, Evangelism, and Temperance in
Nineteenth-Century America (Wesleyan University Press, 1981); Lori D. Ginzberg,
Women and the Work of Benevolence: Morality, Politics, and Class in the
Nineteenth-Century United States (Yale University Press, 1990); and Carolyn J. Lawes,
276
277
Learning Outcomes
After reading the essays you should be able to:
• Critically evaluate the causes of the Mexican War from the
United States and Mexican points of view.
• Critically analyze the concepts of “manifest destiny” and
“imperialism.”
• Critically analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the “American
Empire.”
ISSUE SUMMARY
T he origins of the Mexican War began with the controversy over Texas, a
Spanish possession for three centuries. In 1821, Texas became the northern-
most province of the newly established country of Mexico. Sparsely populated
with a mixture of Hispanics and Indians, the Mexican government encour-
aged immigration from the United States. By 1835, the Anglo population had
278
279
280
281
Generally the officers of the army were indifferent whether the annexation [of
Texas] was consummated or not. . . . For myself, I was bitterly opposed to the
measure, and to this day regard the war, which resulted, as one of the most
unjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation.
From Habits of Empire: A History of American Expansion (Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), pp. 187–189,
192–202, 206–210 (excerpts, notes omitted). Copyright 2008 © by Walter Nugent. Reprinted
by permission of Random House Inc. For on-line information about other Random house,
Inc. books and authors: www.randomhouse.com
282
most importantly the harbor of San Francisco, but also, maybe, the rest of Alta
(Upper) California and the province of New Mexico, which happened to be
en route. He would do this by diplomacy and cash, not to mention bribery, if
possible; or by military force, if necessary.
Polk was a man whose interests and intellect were blinkered and narrow.
Yet his vision, though tunneled, looked far. He was almost willfully ignorant,
but hardly stupid, and he never shrank from using the power of the presidency
as he saw fit. Like Jackson, he was a Tennessean. He was a Jacksonian loyalist
as Speaker of the U.S. House during Jackson’s last two presidential years and
Van Buren’s first two (1835–1839). He lost a couple of elections in the early
1840s and was considered finished politically. But he captured the Democratic
nomination for president in 1844 as the first true “dark horse.” After favorites
Van Buren and Clay both came out publicly against expansion in May 1844,
Polk embraced it—both the “re-occupation” of Oregon to 54°409, and the
“re-annexation” of Texas to the Rio Grande. In response, the Democratic Party
and the voters rewarded him with the presidency.
In these two claims the “re” was a distortion and exaggeration. But he
slipped past Clay, his more illustrious Whig opponent, by 38,367 votes out of
2.7 million, receiving 49.6 percent of the total popular vote and 50.7 percent
of the Clay-Polk major-party vote. (James G. Birney of the antislavery Liberty
Party got 62,000.) Polk’s margin in the electoral college was 170–105. He carried
neither his own Tennessee nor Clay’s Kentucky. But he did win every other then-
western state from Alabama to Michigan except Ohio, and he nearly won there
as well. His spread-eagle platform resounded in those parts. He had to back off
from the 54°409 claim, as we saw earlier; and he did not have to “re-annex” Texas
because President John Tyler and Congress had already done that just before he
was inaugurated. But California (and New Mexico with it) were still out there,
and Texas’s full statehood brought with it the threat of war with an aggrieved
Mexico. That war, he could see, was both threat and opportunity.
Polk, like Jackson and Jefferson before him, maintained that Texas had
been part of the Louisiana Purchase. The claim was transparently flimsy to begin
with, and had been specifically repudiated in the 1819 Adams-Onís treaty. To
the Polkites, however, that treaty had “faded away” under the strong light of the
American overrunning of Texas. Realistically, Texas had become American, and
a few voices within Mexico and among European diplomats urged Mexico to
recognize the fact, even though it was political suicide. Piling insensitivity upon
intransigence, the Polk policy toward Mexico could only end violently. Before
and during the outbreak of war, Polk (like Madison in 1812) employed secret
agents, asserted the baseness of the other side’s motives and tactics, manipulated
the popular mood of manifest destiny, promised more army volunteers than he
could deliver, and used other unpretty devices that were not new to presidential
behavior then and have become routine since. . . .
Polk’s aggressiveness, California’s volatility, and Texas’s Rio Grande
claims might have gone nowhere if conditions in Mexico had been stable. But
Mexico was chaotic and had been so since Texas broke away in 1836. There
was an occasional bright spot, such as New Mexico’s demolition of an inva-
sion force of Texans who attempted to annex everything east and north of the
Rio Grande in 1841. But Mexico’s problems were both fundamental and super-
ficial. It had no effective tax-collecting system. It had too many ambitious
and feuding generals, preeminently the pop-up dictator, Santa Anna. Political
animosities ran deep, more in the nature of competing worldviews than the
relatively consensual American partisanship, which was divisive enough.
Deep divisions separated clericalists, anticlericals, liberals, conservatives, mon-
archists, republicans, federalists, centralists—each representing not just poli-
cies but ideologies. Compromise and concerted action, even in the face of
invasion, loss of territory, or loss of national existence, eluded the troubled
country. Mexico was as badly positioned to defend itself and as divided as
Spain was in 1808 when Napoleon invaded it. The result by 1848 was national
dismemberment. It could have been national extinction.
In this context, Polk the hedgehog held the advantage. On Oregon he
had “looked John Bull in the eye,” at least until Aberdeen’s thirty ships of the
line loomed, and he still acquired everything up to the forty-ninth parallel.
He could look Mexico in the eye—Santa Anna or anyone—without worry-
ing about any ships of the line. As a result, he did as he pleased, like a true
Jacksonian.
Polk’s Brinkmanship
Polk’s 1844 platform and March 1845 inaugural speech were thunderously
clear about Oregon and Texas. But they never mentioned California. Once in
office, however, Polk moved toward his cherished if not yet public project. He
had told Navy Secretary George Bancroft in early 1845 that acquiring California
was the most important goal of his administration. In October 1845, he told
Senator Benton that by “reasserting” Monroe’s “doctrine” against allowing
European incursions into the hemisphere, “I had California and the fine bay
of San Francisco as much in view as Oregon.” California was Polk’s hidden
agenda. Transpacific commercial possibilities, particularly the market poten-
tial of China, likely motivated him more than visions of settlement did, but
both objectives might be achieved.
President Tyler had done Polk the favor of bringing Texas all but into the
Union, after the February 28 joint resolution offering annexation. The only
remaining steps were ratification by the Texas Congress and, formally, by the
U.S. Congress. The first came on July 4, and the second on December 29, 1845.
Texan statehood meant, of course, a casus belli with Mexico. The Mexican
foreign minister had said so bluntly as early as mid-1843. The Mexican
minister in Washington, Juan Nepomuceno Almonte, also made that clear.
When Congress passed its joint resolution, Almonte told Secretary of State
Calhoun that annexation was aggression. He demanded his passports, left
Washington, and thereby broke diplomatic relations between the two coun-
tries. Any Mexican leader would have agreed that an independent Texas might
be barely acceptable but the loss of it to the United States was not. Beyond
that, as an issue, were the claims (some well founded, some trumped up) of
U.S. citizens against Mexican taxes, customs duties, port regulations, and the
like. Even in more normal times the claims issue festered. Polk’s position, to
the contrary, was that Mexico owed money to Americans; it had no money; it
did have sparsely settled land; therefore the claims could be paid off in terri-
tory, with some cash going to Mexico as a sweetener.
Texas, from the American standpoint, was no longer on the table, but
California would do very well. Polk preferred purchase via diplomatic negotia-
tion to war, though he would go to war “if necessary.” Accordingly he sent
a Louisiana congressman, John Slidell, to Mexico City in the fall of 1845 to
negotiate. Already, however, he prepared to “look Mexico in the eye,” and
in June 1845 he ordered General Zachary Taylor to proceed from Louisiana
to south Texas, and Commodore David Conner to patrol the Gulf coast of
Mexico, both to be ready to act if war broke out. Taylor arrived at Corpus
Christi (just south of the Nueces River) by early August with eight companies
of soldiers and awaited orders.
being thrown back by one of Santa Anna’s armies at San Antonio in 1842,
Texans maintained the claim as they traveled their bumpy road toward annex-
ation. The United States’ terms of annexation in 1845 did not explicitly accept
that claim, which included not only the Gulf coast but all the land north and
east of the Rio Grande to its source and then north to the forty-second parallel.
In Congress’s annexation resolution the border was left to be worked out over
time. The time came very soon.
Clearly, the Nueces strip had never been part of Texas under either Spain
or Mexico. So thinly populated was south Texas before 1821 that provincial
boundaries were almost pointless, as there were virtually no people or gov-
ernments there. When the San Antonio missions were founded around 1718,
the Medina and San Antonio Rivers separated Texas from the province of
Coahuila. By 1767 the Nueces was recognized as the boundary between Texas
and Coahuila. As of 1805, Texas’s southern boundary ran from the Gulf up
the Nueces for over one hundred miles, then north to the Medina (near San
Antonio), and then northwest another two hundred miles—none of it any-
where near the Rio Grande. The boundary stayed that way until Texas and
Coahuila were made a joint state under the Mexican federal constitution of
1824. They remained a joint state, with the Texas segment consisting of the
land north of the Nueces. Stephen F. Austin’s empresario maps of 1829, 1833,
and 1836 also showed the Nueces River, not the Rio Grande, demarcating
Texas from Coahuila.
When Texans defeated Santa Anna at San Jacinto in May 1836, the cap-
tured general agreed, with his life hanging in the balance, to sign the “Treaty
of Velasco.” It withdrew Mexican forces to south of the Rio Grande, implying
that the Nueces strip was Texan. But the Mexican Congress repudiated it. Polk,
to the contrary, acted as if it were fact. In August 1845, when news came that a
Mexican army was about to cross the Rio Grande, Polk asserted that the Nueces
strip was “virtually” American and any Mexican crossing “must be regarded as
an invasion of the United States.” Thus, in his war message in May 1846, he
proclaimed that “Mexico has invaded our territory and shed American blood
upon the American soil.” With that, the war began.
For Mexico, any American troop movement south of the Nueces was an
invasion of its territory. The coastal strip was part of the state of Tamaulipas,
and the inland area belonged to Nuevo León and Coahuila. In an 1847 book,
Carlos María de Bustamante affirmed that “sending troops into Mexican
territory”—Corpus Christi or anywhere else south of the Nueces—“doomed all
moderation, and Mexico was left with no other recourse but to engage in bat-
tle. The territory between the Nueces and Rio Grande rivers neither by fact nor
by law could have belonged to Texas. Not by fact because it was not populated
by [Anglo] Texans . . . nor . . . by law because all this coast, through a territorial
division recognized by all the nation and by the Texas colonists themselves,
has belonged to the state of Tamaulipas.” He was right. No Anglos lived there;
the empresario grants did not extend south of the Nueces; and even in 1845
no Texas counties had been organized there. To the contrary, the people liv-
ing on the north side of the Rio Grande were Mexican, and Mexican authori-
ties had a duty to protect them. Quite unlike east Texas and the region of the
Run-up to War
Diplomacy ensued, or started to. Word reached Polk in early November 1845
that the Mexican commander on the Rio Grande and leaders in Mexico City
were ready to talk, surely a sign that strong words (Polk’s preferred tactic)
would push the Mexicans in his direction. With cabinet agreement, and at
Buchanan’s suggestion, Polk sent John Slidell to Mexico City. He was to offer
to take over all outstanding claims and buy California and New Mexico. The
amount was negotiable up to $25 million, depending on whether Mexico
would sell both provinces. As for the claims, Mexico had agreed in 1839 to
pay them, made a few payments, then had to stop. Polk was ready to have the
U.S. government assume the claims and pay Mexico some cash for its northern
states. Did not Mexico need money more than the land? To Polk the answer
was obvious. Unfortunately for peace, no one in Mexico saw it that way.
Slidell’s credentials from Polk named him “envoy extraordinary and min-
ister plenipotentiary.” But the president never asked or received the Senate’s
confirmation, leaving Slidell in the status of a special presidential emissary.
The Mexican government accordingly refused to accept him as fully creden-
tialed. When he arrived in Mexico City on November 29, 1845, the situa-
tion was more than usually turbulent. General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga,
commander of field forces, ousted the then unpopular Santa Anna and by
early December replaced him as president with another general, José Joaquin
Herrera. The foreign minister, Manuel Peña y Peña, a distinguished lawyer and
jurist, was a moderate. Peña made clear to Slidell that he would be happy to
receive him to discuss his purchase proposal as well as outstanding problems
like the claims and borders. But if he recognized him as a new U.S. minister, he
would be acquiescing in the Texas annexation, the main reason why Almonte
had broken relations the previous spring. This was no quibble—John Quincy
Adams would have scoffed if another country had sent someone with Slidell’s
faulty credentials—but Polk and Buchanan chose to be incensed at the rebuff
of Slidell. The president decided that the time had come to move from “diplo-
macy if possible” to “force if necessary.”
Herrera had taken a great risk in allowing Slidell into Mexico at all, and
it cost him his job. In late December 1845, General Paredes removed Herrera
(in office less than four weeks) and installed himself as president on January 2,
1846. A semicovert monarchist, Paredes followed a harder line: no truck with
the United States, no recognition of Texas, certainly no boundary south of the
Nueces, and no Slidell. As Polk’s biographer states, “the Polk-Slidell policy of
combined bullying and bribery was precisely what no Mexican regime could
submit to and survive”—Paredes’s least of all. Slidell dallied in Mexico City in
vain hope. Meanwhile, on January 13, the Polk administration ordered Gen-
eral Taylor to move his forces to the Rio Grande opposite the Mexican coastal
is at war. . . . If the bill contained any recitation upon that point in truth
and justice, it should be that this war was begun by the President. The
river Nueces is the true western boundary of Texas. The country between
that stream and the Del Norte [the Rio Grande] is part of Mexico.
Davis nonetheless voted for the bill, as did all but fourteen diehards—all
Whigs and abolitionists who abhorred slavery’s extension. Forty-eight Whigs
voted “yea” to avoid being branded unpatriotic.
Debate in the Senate took another day, much of it centered on who
owned the Nueces strip. But the bill passed there too, 40 yea (26 Democrats
and 14 Whigs) to 2 nay (both Whigs), with John C. Calhoun and two others
not voting. Polk signed the bill on May 13. War was declared.
The now familiar tactic of the chief executive maneuvering Congress
into a fait accompli with regard to declaring war was certainly employed by
Polk in 1846. . . . Polk put Taylor’s army on the Rio Grande and Conner’s navy
off the Mexican coast. When the inevitable skirmish happened, congressmen
had no option. Either go along, declare war, or be criticized for undercutting
the troops. Once American troops were “in harm’s way,” although Polk placed
them there and thereby contrived to have Mexico fire the first shot, it was too
late to object. Public opinion soon split on the Mexican War, but at the outset
Congress could not buck the belligerent spirit.
As soon as the Senate passed the war bill, and before it even reached Polk
for signature, he reaffirmed to Navy Secretary Bancroft that Commodore Sloat
and the Pacific squadron should occupy Monterey and San Francisco. The next
day Polk sent orders to Colonel (soon General) Stephen Watts Kearny at Fort
Leavenworth, on the Missouri River, to head for Santa Fe and secure it. The
grand strategy, set at least eleven months earlier in mid-1845, was reaching
fruition: try diplomacy (Slidell and money) but position forces (Taylor and
Conner). If and when diplomacy failed, send Taylor to the Rio Grande, claim
the Nueces strip, provoke Mexico into armed defense of it, and then insist that
American blood had been shed on American soil. Congress could not resist
that strategy. Meanwhile, make a deal with Britain over Oregon, and forget
about the unattainable (and baseless) claim of 54°409. With war declared, send
the army to New Mexico and the navy to the California coast. How it would
all end—how much it would cost, how many would be killed, how much of
Mexico would be occupied or kept—was not clear at all. But Polk’s primary
objective, making California American, was nearly in his grasp.
Mexico was prepared for war with the United States only in the strength
of its sense of nacionalidad, and that existed primarily among its small elites.
At the opening of the war, its land area was close to that of the United States,
but its population was considerably smaller—about 7.5 or 8 million compared
to the States’ 17 million. As had been true since Aztec times, most lived in
central Mexico. The northern states had always been underpopulated and only
distantly connected to the center. The majority of the people were Indians or
mestizos, divided in languages, often innocent of Spanish, practicing some-
thing close to subsistence farming and contributing little to national prod-
uct or tax base. Many were Catholics, after more than three centuries of the
Spanish presence. Some, however, the indios bárbaros of the California interior
and the Great Plains, were not only unassimilated but hostile. Comanches
and Apaches raided at will many miles south of the Rio Grande, as they had
ever since the Spanish pushed north of it. Mexico’s preoccupation with the
American invasion in 1846 provided the Comanches with further opportuni-
ties. As a result, Mexico found itself fighting on two fronts, against both the
Americans and the Plains Indians.
Mexico’s class structure made a unified war effort difficult. Above the
Indian majority were a smaller number of largely mestizo artisans, shop-
keepers, peasants, parish clergy, and others, comprising, to stretch a somewhat
anachronistic term, a lower middle class. On top were people of European
(usually Spanish) stock, the well landed, the upper clergy, military officers,
the educated professionals. These Europeans split further into criollos, if they
were Mexican-born, or gachupines, if they were the envied and often disliked
Spanish-born. Ideological fissures separated the elites—clericals versus liberals,
federalists versus centralists, monarchists versus republicans. Leadership, up to
and including the presidency, oscillated among these groups.
Add to all that the epidemic of politically involved generals, including
above all the charismatic Santa Anna, with his remarkable ability to raise armies
and his ineptitude in leading them; the lack of any effective tax system and, for
that matter, anything much to tax; the exemptions of the clergy and the military
from the ordinary system of laws and courts; and in 1846, an army poorly paid,
fed, clothed, equipped, and armed. The outcome was almost foreordained.
As nationalistic and full of their sense of destiny as the Americans of that
day were, the Mexicans were equally so. No one monopolized nationalism
in the nineteenth century. Though lacking the illusion that their “destiny”
was “manifest,” they were just as sensitive to insults to national honor and to
threats to the integrity of their national territory. Americans were aggressive
expansionists; Mexicans were determined to defend what they had.
The decade prior to 1846 brought Mexico’s internal problems and divi-
sions to a boil. Since the defeat at San Jacinto and de facto Texan independence
in 1836, politics had never been calm. Santa Anna rode in and out of power,
donning whatever cloak—centralist, federalist, liberal, conservative—would
bring him back or keep him there. Only one thing was a given: no president or
general could alienate any territory, even the lost territory of Texas. If he gave
even a hint of that, as Herrera did by admitting Slidell in late 1845, he was
ousted by someone more “patriotic.” Thus war would surely come, however
unready Mexico was. Defeat (and despite all of Mexico’s handicaps it was not
a certainty until it actually happened) was preferable to dishonor. In the two
years beginning in late 1845, during wartime, five presidents succeeded one
another; finance ministers and war ministers and commanders tumbled after
one another; armies coalesced and crumbled. Mexico lost every significant bat-
tle of the war. But some were close, and most were valiantly defended. That
was a wonder, in view of the country’s lack of resources. . . .
Negotiations had already started. Polk had sent a negotiator, Nicholas P.
Trist, with Scott, and after some initial friction Trist and Scott worked very
well together. Following the capture of Mexico City, the obvious question was
how to wind up the war. It could have ended in March 1847, in theory, since
Polk’s territorial objectives were satisfied by then. But neither side was ready to
stop fighting, and the Scott campaign followed. By the fall of 1847, with the
American victory seemingly complete, the question to many Americans was
how much of Mexico to absorb. The United States was positioned to take more
than New Mexico and California, but should it? . . .
movement, and Polk himself, whose “mind,” Lincoln told the House, “taxed
beyond its power, is running hither and thither, like some tortured creature
on a burning surface.” On December 22, 1847, Lincoln introduced eight
“spot resolutions” calling on Polk to answer whether “the spot on which the
blood of [American] citizens was shed as in his messages declared was not
within the territory of Spain [and then] . . . Mexico,” and related questions.
Lincoln expanded the resolutions into his first major speech, which he gave
on January 12, 1848. Polk never responded.
The all-Mexico debate raged in the Senate from December 15, 1847, into
February 1848. Southern Democrats, John C. Calhoun most prominently,
opposed “all Mexico” because absorbing it would mean expanding nonslave
areas—he assumed that Mexico would never reintroduce slavery—and taking
on a huge nonwhite population. In a private conversation with Polk, Calhoun
“said he did not desire to extend slavery,” though he would vote against a
Wilmot-like antislavery provision in any peace treaty as a matter of “principle.”
Many southerners, however, supported the all-Mexico movement. Among
them was the powerful Treasury secretary, Robert J. Walker of Mississippi.
Some military men (though not Lieutenant Ulysses S. Grant) favored large,
possibly total, acquisition. The always aggressive Commodore Stockton roared
in December 1847 that “if the war were to be prolonged for fifty years, and cost
money enough to demand from us each half of all that we possess,” he would
nevertheless be confident that “the inestimable blessings of civil and religious
liberty should be guaranteed to Mexico.” Walt Whitman, then editor of the
Brooklyn Eagle, called for “fifty thousand fresh troops” to “make our authority
respectable,” as “this talk about a peace party is all moonshine.” Various gener-
als urged permanent occupation of Mexico north of the Sierra Madre Oriental
(it actually runs more north and south, but what they wanted was Tamaulipas
and the coast south beyond Tampico). Others coveted the whole country.
Senator Lewis Cass of Michigan, who became the Democratic presi-
dential nominee in 1848, agreed. When John Crittenden, a Kentucky Whig,
demanded in the Senate to know why the army needed ten more regiments
unless they were to occupy and perhaps annex the whole country, Cass argued
that the troops had to be there to produce a “moral effect”—that is, intimidate
guerrillas.
The most cogent speech against the all-Mexico idea came from Andrew
Pickens Butler, a Democrat and Calhoun’s South Carolina colleague. If we per-
sist in “conquering and subjugating the Republic of Mexico,” either making it
part of “this Confederacy” or keeping it as a dependency, then “it would not
be an extravagant proposition for the President to ask for two hundred thou-
sand men to do it with security and safety.” In other words, it would be a quag-
mire. American troops would not be in Mexico to fight, but “to overrun the
Mexican states, to disarm the population, to confiscate the public property, to
sequester the revenues, and to become . . . armed jailers.” Every part of Europe,
and many at home, are “a formidable opposition . . . against us.”
Heated discussion continued into February, with many nuances worth
noting because they reveal the twists of territorial ambition at that time. John
Bell of Tennessee opposed strengthening the army and occupying Mexico,
because four of the eight million Mexicans are “degraded, vile, addicted to
every vice,” including “the Romish religion.” Annexation would eventu-
ally mean “fifty new Representatives [and] forty new Senators, men of this
mixed race.” Most speakers steered clear of slavery. Southerners were not of
one mind, but Calhoun’s belief that large-scale annexation would weaken, not
strengthen, slavery found support from Senator Jefferson Davis, among others.
As for Polk himself, his initial targets of California and New Mexico
expanded after Scott’s successes. In late 1847, privately and in the cabinet, he
toyed with annexing everything north of the twenty-sixth parallel. His annual
message to Congress of December 1847 left the door open for substantial
acquisitions south of the Rio Grande. Partly as a result, the all-Mexico senti-
ment strengthened that winter. On January 2, 1848, he told Secretary of State
Buchanan that he would be happy with Upper and Lower California, New
Mexico, the Tehuantepec Isthmus, and Tampico.
But the Whig-majority House of Representatives elected in 1846 took
office in December 1847 (Lincoln among them). It debated for weeks how
much of Mexico to annex. Whigs were not likely to embrace the all-Mexico
idea, strong though it was in the press and among the military. New England
Whig papers insinuated that the real motive for large annexation was to cap-
ture the silver mines of Zacatecas and San Luis Potosí and extend slavery to all
of Mexico. It was a way to provide an “outlet for our slaves,” who were rapidly
multiplying and threatening to overrun the South. Nor were the Whigs eager
to finance the army or call for more volunteers.
The all-Mexico debate stopped abruptly when a draft peace treaty from
Mexico City arrived and became known in late February 1848, because it lim-
ited the gains to New Mexico and Upper California. . . .
O n May 11, 1846, President James K. Polk presented his war message to Con-
gress. After reviewing the skirmish between General Zachary Taylor’s dragoons
and a body of Mexican soldiers along the Rio Grande, the president asserted that
Mexico “has passed the boundary of the United States, has invaded our territory
and shed American blood upon the American soil. . . . War exists, and, notwith-
standing all our efforts to avoid it, exists by act of Mexico.” No country could
have had a superior case for war. Democrats in large numbers (for it was largely
a partisan matter) responded with the patriotic fervor which Polk expected
of them. “Our government has permitted itself to be insulted long enough,”
wrote one Georgian. “The blood of her citizens has been spilt on her own soil.
It appeals to us for vengeance.” Still, some members of Congress, recalling more
accurately than the president the circumstances of the conflict, soon rendered
the Mexican War the most reviled in American history—at least until the Viet-
nam War of the 1960s. One outraged Whig termed the war “illegal, unrighteous,
and damnable,” and Whigs questioned both Polk’s honesty and his sense of
geography. Congressman Joshua R. Giddings of Ohio accused the president of
“planting the standard of the United States on foreign soil, and using the mili-
tary forces of the United States to violate every principle of international law
and moral justice.” To vote for the war, admitted Senator John C. Calhoun, was
“to plunge a dagger into his own heart, and more so.” Indeed, some critics in
Congress openly wished the Mexicans well.
For over a century such profound differences in perception have per-
vaded American writings on the Mexican War. Even in the past decade, histo-
rians have reached conclusions on the question of war guilt as disparate as
those which separated Polk from his wartime conservative and abolitionist
critics. . . .
In some measure the diversity of judgment on the Mexican War, as on
other wars, is understandable. By basing their analyses on official rationaliza-
tions, historians often ignore the more universal causes of war which transcend
individual conflicts and which can establish the bases for greater consensus.
Neither the officials in Washington nor those in Mexico City ever acknowledged
any alternatives to the actions which they took. But governments gener-
ally have more choices in any controversy than they are prepared to admit.
Circumstances determine their extent. The more powerful a nation, the more
From Pacific Historical Review by Norman A. Graebner, vol. 49, no. 3, August 1980,
pp. 405–426. Copyright © 1980 by University of California Press, Journals Division. Reprinted
by permission.
295
remote its dangers, the greater its options between action and inaction. Often
for the weak, unfortunately, the alternative is capitulation or war. . . . Polk and
his advisers developed their Mexican policies on the dual assumption that
Mexico was weak and that the acquisition of certain Mexican territories would
satisfy admirably the long-range interests of the United States. Within that
context, Polk’s policies were direct, timely, and successful. But the president
had choices. Mexico, whatever its internal condition, was no direct threat to
the United States. Polk, had he so desired, could have avoided war; indeed, he
could have ignored Mexico in 1845 with absolute impunity.
In explaining the Mexican War historians have dwelled on the causes of fric-
tion in American-Mexican relations. In part these lay in the disparate quali-
ties of the two populations, in part in the vast discrepancies between the two
countries in energy, efficiency, power, and national wealth. Through two dec-
ades of independence Mexico had experienced a continuous rise and fall of
governments; by the 1840s survival had become the primary concern of every
regime. Conscious of their weakness, the successive governments in Mexico
City resented the superior power and effectiveness of the United States and
feared American notions of destiny that anticipated the annexation of Mexi-
co’s northern provinces. Having failed to prevent the formation of the Texas
Republic, Mexico reacted to Andrew Jackson’s recognition of Texan independ-
ence in March 1837 with deep indignation. Thereafter the Mexican raids into
Texas, such as the one on San Antonio in 1842, aggravated the bitterness of
Texans toward Mexico, for such forays had no purpose beyond terrorizing the
frontier settlements.
Such mutual animosities, extensive as they were, do not account for the
Mexican War. Governments as divided and chaotic as the Mexican regimes
of the 1840s usually have difficulty in maintaining positive and profitable rela-
tions with their neighbors; their behavior often produces annoyance, but seldom
armed conflict. Belligerence toward other countries had flowed through U.S. his-
tory like a torrent without, in itself, setting off a war. Nations do not fight over
cultural differences or verbal recriminations; they fight over perceived threats to
their interests created by the ambitions or demands of others.
What increased the animosity between Mexico City and Washington was
a series of specific issues over which the two countries perennially quarreled—
claims, boundaries, and the future of Texas. Nations have made claims a pretext
for intervention, but never a pretext for war. Every nineteenth-century effort to
collect debts through force assumed the absence of effective resistance, for no
debt was worth the price of war. To collect its debt from Mexico in 1838, for
example, France blockaded Mexico’s gulf ports and bombarded Vera Cruz. The
U.S. claims against Mexico created special problems which discounted their seri-
ousness as a rationale for war. True, the Mexican government failed to protect
the possessions and the safety of Americans in Mexico from robbery, theft, and
other illegal actions, but U.S. citizens were under no obligation to do business in
Mexico and should have understood the risk of transporting goods and money
in that country. Minister Waddy Thompson wrote from Mexico City in 1842 that
it would be “with somewhat of bad grace that we should war upon a country
because it could not pay its debts when so many of our own states are in the same
situation.” Even as the United States after 1842 attempted futilely to collect the
$2 million awarded its citizens by a claims commission, it was far more deeply
in debt to Britain over speculative losses. Minister Wilson Shannon reported in
the summer of 1844 that the claims issue defied settlement in Mexico City and
recommended that Washington take the needed action to compel Mexico to pay.
If Polk would take up the challenge and sacrifice American human and material
resources in a war against Mexico, he would do so for reasons other than the
enforcement of claims. The president knew well that Mexico could not pay, yet
as late as May 9, 1846, he was ready to ask Congress for a declaration of war on
the question of unpaid claims alone.
Congress’s joint resolution for Texas annexation in February 1845 raised
the specter of war among editors and politicians alike. As early as 1843 the
Mexican government had warned the American minister in Mexico City that
annexation would render war inevitable; Mexican officials in Washington
repeated that warning. To Mexico, therefore, the move to annex Texas was an
unbearable affront. Within one month after Polk’s inauguration on March 4,
General Juan Almonte, the Mexican minister in Washington, boarded a packet
in New York and sailed for Vera Cruz to sever his country’s diplomatic rela-
tions with the United States. Even before the Texas Convention could meet
on July 4 to vote annexation, rumors of a possible Mexican invasion of Texas
prompted Polk to advance Taylor’s forces from Fort Jesup in Louisiana down
the Texas coast. Polk instructed Taylor to extend his protection to the Rio
Grande but to avoid any areas to the north of that river occupied by Mexican
troops. Simultaneously the president reinforced the American squadron in the
Gulf of Mexico. “The threatened invasion of Texas by a large Mexican army,”
Polk informed Andrew J. Donelson, the American charge in Texas, on June 15,
“is well calculated to excite great interest here and increases our solicitude con-
cerning the final action by the Congress and the Convention of Texas.” Polk
assured Donelson that he intended to defend Texas to the limit of his consti-
tutional power. Donelson resisted the pressure of those Texans who wanted
Taylor to advance to the Rio Grande; instead, he placed the general at Corpus
Christi on the Nueces River. Taylor agreed that the line from the mouth of the
Nueces to San Antonio covered the Texas settlements and afforded a favorable
base from which to defend the frontier.
Those who took the rumors of Mexican aggressiveness seriously lauded the
president’s action. With Texas virtually a part of the United States, argued the
Washington Union, “We owe it to ourselves, to the proud and elevated character
which America maintains among the nations of the earth, to guard our own ter-
ritory from the invasion of the ruthless Mexicans.” The New York Morning News
observed that Polk’s policy would, on the whole, “command a general concur-
rence of the public opinion of his country.” Some Democratic leaders, fearful
of a Mexican attack, urged the president to strengthen Taylor’s forces and order
them to take the offensive should Mexican soldiers cross the Rio Grande. Others
believed the reports from Mexico exaggerated, for there was no apparent rela-
tionship between the country’s expressions of belligerence and its capacity to
act. Secretary of War William L. Marcy admitted that his information was no bet-
ter than that of other commentators. “I have at no time,” he wrote in July, “felt
that war with Mexico was probable—and do not now believe it is, yet it is in the
range of possible occurrences. I have officially acted on the hypothesis that our
peace may be temporarily disturbed without however believing it will be.” Still
convinced that the administration had no grounds for alarm, Marcy wrote on
August 12: “The presence of a considerable force in Texas will do no hurt and pos-
sibly may be of great use.” In September William S. Parrott, Polk’s special agent in
Mexico, assured the president that there would be neither a Mexican declaration
of war nor an invasion of Texas.
Polk insisted that the administration’s show of force in Texas would pre-
vent rather than provoke war. “I do not anticipate that Mexico will be mad
enough to declare war,” he wrote in July, but “I think she would have done so
but for the appearance of a strong naval force in the Gulf and our army mov-
ing in the direction of her frontier on land.” Polk restated this judgment on
July 28 in a letter to General Robert Armstrong, the U.S. consul at Liverpool:
“I think there need be but little apprehension of war with Mexico. If however
she shall be mad enough to make war we are prepared to meet her.” The presi-
dent assured Senator William H. Haywood of North Carolina that the American
forces in Texas would never aggress against Mexico; however, they would pre-
vent any Mexican forces from crossing the Rio Grande. In conversation with
Senator William S. Archer of Virginia on September 1, the president added
confidently that “the appearance of our land and naval forces on the borders
of Mexico & in the Gulf would probably deter and prevent Mexico from either
declaring war or invading Texas.” Polk’s continuing conviction that Mexico
would not attack suggests that his deployment of U.S. land and naval forces
along Mexico’s periphery was designed less to protect Texas than to support
an aggressive diplomacy which might extract a satisfactory treaty from Mexico
without war. For Anson Jones, the last president of the Texas Republic, Polk’s
deployments had precisely that purpose:
Texas never actually needed the protection of the United States after I
came into office. . . . There was no necessity for it after the ‘preliminary
Treaty,’ as we were at peace with Mexico, and knew perfectly well that
that Government, though she might bluster a little, had not the slight-
est idea of invading Texas either by land or water; and that nothing
would provoke her to (active) hostilities, but the presence of troops in
the immediate neighborhood of the Rio Grande, threatening her towns
and settlements on the southwest side of that river. . . . But Donelson
appeared so intent upon ‘encumbering us with help,’ that finally, to
get rid of his annoyance, he was told he might give us as much protec-
tion as he pleased. . . . The protection asked for was only prospective and
contingent; the protection he had in view was immediate and aggressive.
war; this alone compelled the administration to avoid a conflict over Texas. In
his memoirs Jones recalled that in 1845 Commodore Robert F. Stockton, with
either the approval or the connivance of Polk, attempted to convince him that
he should place Texas “in an attitude of active hostility toward Mexico, so that,
when Texas was finally brought into the Union, she might bring war with her.” If
Stockton engaged in such an intrigue, he apparently did so on his own initia-
tive, for no evidence exists to implicate the administration. Polk not only pre-
ferred to achieve his purposes by means other than war but also assumed that
his military measures in Texas, limited as they were, would convince the Mexi-
can government that it could not escape the necessity of coming to terms with
the United States. Washington’s policy toward Mexico during 1845 achieved the
broad national purpose of Texas annexation. Beyond that it brought U.S. power
to bear on Mexico in a manner calculated to further the processes of negotiation.
Whether the burgeoning tension would lead to a negotiated boundary settle-
ment or to war hinged on two factors: the nature of Polk’s demands and Mexico’s
response to them. The president announced his objectives to Mexico’s troubled
officialdom through his instructions to John Slidell, his special emissary who
departed for Mexico in November 1845 with the assurance that the government
there was prepared to reestablish formal diplomatic relations with the United
States and negotiate a territorial settlement. . . .
were limited. In June 1845, Polk’s mouthpiece, the Washington Union, had
observed characteristically that, if Mexico resisted Washington’s demands, “a
corps of properly organized volunteers . . . would invade, overrun, and occupy
Mexico. They would enable us not only to take California, but to keep it.”
American officials, in their contempt for Mexico, spoke privately of the need
to chastize that country for its annoyances and insults. Parrott wrote to Secre-
tary of State James Buchanan in October that he wished “to see this people well
flogged by Uncle Sam’s boys, ere we enter upon negotiations. . . . I know [the
Mexicans] better, perhaps, than any other American citizen and I am fully per-
suaded, they can never love or respect us, as we should be loved and respected
by them, until we shall have given them a positive proof of our superiority.”
Mexico’s pretensions would continue, wrote Slidell in late December, “until
the Mexican people shall be convinced by hostile demonstrations, that our
differences must be settled promptly, either by negotiation or the sword.” In
January 1846 the Union publicly threatened Mexico with war if it rejected the
just demands of the United States: “The result of such a course on her part may
compel us to resort to more decisive measures. . . . to obtain the settlement of
our legitimate claims.” As Slidell prepared to leave Mexico in March 1846, he
again reminded the administration: “Depend upon it, we can never get along
well with them, until we have given them a good drubbing.” In Washington
on May 8, Slidell advised the president “to take the redress of the wrongs and
injuries which we had so long borne from Mexico into our own hands, and to
act with promptness and energy.”
Mexico responded to Polk’s challenge with an outward display of bellig-
erence and an inward dread of war. Mexicans feared above all that the United
States intended to overrun their country and seize much of their territory.
Polk and his advisers assumed that Mexico, to avoid an American invasion,
would give up its provinces peacefully. Obviously Mexico faced growing diplo-
matic and military pressures to negotiate away its territories; it faced no moral
obligation to do so. Herrera and Paredes had the sovereign right to protect
their regimes by avoiding any formal recognition of Slidell and by rejecting
any of the boundary proposals embodied in his instructions, provided that
in the process they did not endanger any legitimate interests of the American
people. At least to some Mexicans, Slidell’s terms demanded nothing less than
Mexico’s capitulation. By what standard was $2 million a proper payment for
the Rio Grande boundary, or $25 million a fair price for California? No gov-
ernment would have accepted such terms. Having rejected negotiation in the
face of superior force, Mexico would meet the challenge with a final gesture
of defiance. In either case it was destined to lose, but historically nations have
preferred to fight than to give away territory under diplomatic pressure alone.
Gene M. Brack, in his long study of Mexico’s deep-seated fear and resentment
of the United States, explained Mexico’s ultimate behavior in such terms:
President Polk knew that Mexico could offer but feeble resistance mil-
itarily, and he knew that Mexico needed money. No proper American
would exchange territory and the national honor for cash, but President
Polk mistakenly believed that the application of military pressure would
convince Mexicans to do so. They did not respond logically, but patri-
otically. Left with the choice of war or territorial concessions, the former
course, however dim the prospects of success, could be the only one.
Mexico, in its resistance, gave Polk the three choices which every nation gives
another in an uncompromisable confrontation: to withdraw his demands and
permit the issues to drift, unresolved; to reduce his goals in the interest of an
immediate settlement; or to escalate the pressures in the hope of securing an
eventual settlement on his own terms. Normally when the internal conditions
of a country undermine its relations with others, a diplomatic corps simply
removes itself from the hostile environment and awaits a better day. Mexico,
despite its animosity, did not endanger the security interests of the United
States; it had not invaded Texas and did not contemplate doing so. Mexico
had refused to pay the claims, but those claims were not equal to the price of a
one-week war. Whether Mexico negotiated a boundary for Texas in 1846 mat-
tered little; the United States had lived with unsettled boundaries for decades
without considering war. Settlers, in time, would have forced a decision, but
in 1846 the region between the Nueces and the Rio Grande was a vast, generally
unoccupied wilderness. Thus there was nothing, other than Polk’s ambitions,
to prevent the United States from withdrawing its diplomats from Mexico City
and permitting its relations to drift. But Polk, whatever the language of his
instructions, did not send Slidell to Mexico to normalize relations with that
government. He expected Slidell to negotiate an immediate boundary settle-
ment favorable to the United States, and nothing less.
Recognizing no need to reduce his demands on Mexico, Polk, without
hesitation, took the third course which Mexico offered. Congress bound the
president to the annexation of Texas; thereafter the Polk administration was
free to formulate its own policies toward Mexico. With the Slidell mission Polk
embarked upon a program of gradual coercion to achieve a settlement, prefer-
ably without war. That program led logically from his dispatching an army
to Texas and his denunciation of Mexico in his annual message of December
1845 to his new instructions of January 1846, which ordered General Taylor to
the Rio Grande. Colonel Atocha, spokesman for the deposed Mexican leader,
Antonio López de Santa Anna, encouraged Polk to pursue his policy of escala-
tion. The president recorded Atocha’s advice:
Anna were all willing for such an arrangement, but that they dare not
make it until it was made apparent to the Archbishop of Mexico & the
people generally that it was necessary to save their country from a war
with the U. States.
other than money. On April 23, Paredes issued a proclamation declaring a defen-
sive war against the United States. Predictably, one day later the Mexicans fired
on a detachment of U.S. dragoons. Taylor’s report of the attack reached Polk on
Saturday evening, May 9. On Sunday the president drafted his war message
and delivered it to Congress on the following day. Had Polk avoided the crisis,
he might have gained the time required to permit the emigrants of 1845 and
1846 to settle the California issue without war.
What clouds the issue of the Mexican War’s justification was the acquisi-
tion of New Mexico and California, for contemporaries and historians could
not logically condemn the war and laud the Polk administration for its territo-
rial achievements. Perhaps it is true that time would have permitted American
pioneers to transform California into another Texas. But even then California’s
acquisition by the United States would have emanated from the use of force,
for the elimination of Mexican sovereignty, whether through revolution or war,
demanded the successful use of power. If the power employed in revolution
would have been less obtrusive than that exerted in war, its role would have
been no less essential. There simply was no way that the United States could
acquire California peacefully. If the distraught Mexico of 1845 would not sell
the distant province, no regime thereafter would have done so. Without force-
ful destruction of Mexico’s sovereign power, California would have entered the
twentieth century as an increasingly important region of another country.
Thus the Mexican War poses the dilemma of all international relations.
Nations whose geographic and political status fails to coincide with their
ambition and power can balance the two sets of factors in only one manner:
through the employment of force. They succeed or fail according to circum-
stances; and for the United States, the conditions for achieving its empire in
the Southwest and its desired frontage on the Pacific were so ideal that later
generations could refer to the process as the mere fulfillment of destiny. “The
Mexican Republic,” lamented a Mexican writer in 1848, “. . . had among other
misfortunes of less account, the great one of being in the vicinity of a strong
and energetic people.” What the Mexican War revealed in equal measure is
the simple fact that only those countries which have achieved their destiny,
whatever that may be, can afford to extol the virtues of peaceful change.
304
305
306
Additional Resources
Two major works on the Mexican side of the war are Rodolfo Acuna, Occupied
America: A History of Chicanos, 3rd ed. (Harper and Row, 1988) and Ramón Ruiz,
Triumphs and Tragedy: A History of the Mexican People (W. W. Norton, 1992). Polk’s
most recent biographer, Robert W. Merry, A Country of Vast Designs: James K.
Polk, the Mexican War and the Conquest of America (Simon & Schuster, 2009),
provides a favorable view of the president shared by Graebner, but older writ-
ers are more critical of Polk’s actions in pushing the Mexican government to
assert its authority in the disputed territory. See both David M. Pletcher’s The
Diplomacy of Annexation (University of Missouri Press, 1973) and Charles Sell-
ers’s biography James K. Polk, 2 vols. (Princeton University Press, 1957–1966).
307
Learning Outcomes
After reading this issue, you should be able to:
• Define “terrorism” and place this concept in a broad historical
context that does not simply include the present.
• Determine whether John Brown’s actions amount to terrorist
tactics.
• Compare the abolitionists’ goals for freedom for African American
slaves with the political freedom sought by the founders of the
American republic.
• Assess the legitimacy of employing violence to end the insti-
tution of slavery.
ISSUE SUMMARY
308
309
310
From Terrible Swift Sword: The Legacy of John Brown by Peggy A. Russo and Paul Finkelman
(Ohio University Press, 2005), pp. 107–113, 114–116 (notes omitted). Copyright © 2005 by
Ohio University Press. www.ohioswallow.com. Reprinted by permission.
311
and murdered five Kansans, including a constable and his two sons. The killings
were particularly brutal: the victims were hacked to death by repeated sword
blows. In December 1858 the state of Missouri and the federal government
offered a reward for Brown’s capture because he was the chief suspect in yet
another criminal homicide. Finally, Brown’s criminal activities culminated in the
seizure of the federal armory at Harpers Ferry on October 16, 1859. A company of
U.S. Marines captured him the following day, and history records his execution
less than fifty days after his attack against the armory.
The question of whether John Brown was indeed a terrorist must be
based on a definitional standard that defies emotional or mythical distortion.
The linkage of Brown’s cause to the horrors of slavery circumvents the true
nature of the man and of his crimes. According to Albert Parry, author of a
best-selling work on the history of terror and revolutionary violence, terrorists
and those who study them offer innumerable explanations of their violence;
yet their motivations can be compacted into three main concepts:
perfected, will make the gallows glorious like the Cross.” Other towering figures
of the arts echo the purity of Brown while conveniently ignoring his murderous
past. Henry David Thoreau wrote, “No man in America has ever stood up so per-
sistently and effectively for the dignity of human nature, knowing himself for
a man, and the equal of any and all governments. . . . He could not have been
tried by a jury of his peers, because his peers did not exist.” Other, more con-
temporary sources, including scores of textbooks, continue to echo such lauda-
tory sentiments, informing generation after generation of young Americans
that John Brown was a genuine hero. Typical of many such high school and
middle school American history texts, one leading book praises Brown through
Emerson’s words as “a new saint,” while another considers him “a martyr and
hero, as he walked resolutely to the scaffold.”
In a pragmatic sense, it is doubtful that the heroic legend of John Brown
will ever include the terrorist truth of his crimes. As observed by guerrilla war-
fare essayist Walter Laqueur, “terrorism has long exercised a great fascination,
especially at a safe distance . . . the fascination it exerts and the difficulty of
interpreting it have the same roots: its unexpected, shocking and outrageous
character.” While many American terrorists exert a continuing fascination,
none have occupied the unique position of John Brown. By contemporary
definition, he was undoubtedly a terrorist to his core, demonstrating repeat-
edly the various axioms from which we shape this unique crime. Brown quite
purposely waged war for political and social change while simultaneously
committing the most heinous crimes. As political scientist Charles Hazelip
would say when defining a terrorist, he had “crossed over the blurred line of
demarcation between crime and war where political terrorism begins.”
Yet John Brown’s obsessive target, the focus of all his energy and murder-
ous deeds, has by its nature absolved him from the cold label of terrorist.
History and popular opinion have quite naturally found the greater criminal-
ity of slavery to far outweigh his illegal acts. The bold tactics at Harpers Ferry,
coupled with his humanistic motives to free the Virginia slaves, compels us
to forgive his disturbed personality and deadly past. The attack on a key gov-
ernment arsenal and armory, which in a contemporary context would horrify
the nation, has been judged through the passage of time to be an inevitable,
gallant first strike against the soon to be formed Southern Confederacy. When
taken as a whole, and to the natural dismay of our justice system, Brown’s
actions quite convincingly demonstrate that if the weight of moral sentiment
is on one’s side, terroristic violence can be absorbed into a nation’s historiog-
raphy in a positive sense. [Christopher] Dobson and [Ronald] Payne conclude,
“the main aim of terror is to make murderers into heroes.” While many will
continue to debate the magnitude of John Brown’s terrorism, his heroic stature
has been secured by the often paradoxical judgment of history.
From Terrible Swift Sword: The Legacy of John Brown by Peggy A. Russo and Paul Finkelman
(Ohio University Press, 2005), pp. 61–69, 70–71, 72–75 (excerpts; notes omitted). Copyright
© 2005 by Ohio University Press. www.ohioswallow.com. Reprinted by permission.
317
more defenseless slaves. Still, the manner in which Brown summarily executed
these five resembles that of the vicious terrorist more than that of the righteous
warrior, and the Pottawatomie Massacre chills the blood of even the most ardent
foe of oppression.
These aspects of Brown’s psyche reflect something about our own political
soul—our “political psyche” writ large. If Brown embodies the essence of us all,
then it might be conceded that Brown’s more pathological qualities replicate a
profound dissonance within our general political and social culture. We must
consider the inevitable consequences inherent within a sociopolitical condi-
tion fractured by the collision between the ideals of democratic liberty and the
appalling realities of slavery and racism. No American will impugn the princi-
ples of liberty and equality, for however they are construed or comprehended,
the structuring principles of the American polity are derived from a noble vision
and an aspiration for a free and dignified humanity. The presence of slavery in
a country committed, at least in principle, to freedom is the worst possible
incidence of ideational failure. Brown’s fractured self is an embodiment of the
tangled forces of light and darkness that grappled for the republic’s soul; his
character and actions demonstrate this, and in so doing, make him no different
from the ruptured essence of our collective political self-consciousness. The
Pottawatomie slaughter represents a symptom of the deeper malady, just as
the abuse of any slave by an overseer represents the same type of symptomatic
manifestation. In contrast to Brown’s avenging violence in Kansas, the incident
at Harpers Ferry was driven by a spirit imbued with the transfiguring fire of the
idea of universal freedom, in the same manner as the Underground Railroad
or the individual dissent of the most famous resident of Walden Pond. Both
America and Brown reveal this self-negating duality.
That Brown could be so moved to action by the tragedy of his times
further amplifies his character and conviction. Most citizens, absorbed in the
daily process and considerations of private interest and obligation, ignore or
suppress the maladies of the deeper social structure. The affairs of the state
frequently demand too much concentration and emotional investment for
the average citizen. Nevertheless, there will always be those among us who,
like Brown, seriously regard the structuring principles of a political culture
with unabashed sincerity and are thus impelled to hold our institutions and
practices accountable to our own higher ideas and political ideals.
Brown judged society according to the laws of God, and he saw with a
piercing clarity that neither the ruling political doctrine nor, more important,
the commandments of Providence were being properly revered. Nothing could
absolve us from the sin of slavery, and the distinctions between righteousness
and evil were easily and sharply drawn. No ambiguity, no “gray in gray,” no
compromise or allowance would be tolerated; either one was with the warriors
for freedom and divine righteousness or among the profane legions who served
on behalf of sinful oppression. For Brown, unlike most of his fellow Americans,
the only solution was an obvious one—brook no sympathy for or concession
to the minions of evil, and unconditionally submit without hesitation or dif-
fidence to the Higher Authority, never relenting until total emancipation was
achieved or sublime retribution judiciously dispensed. This is what drove John
Brown to act with such intensity of conviction, which magnified every hidden
idiosyncrasy. Hence, Brown is at once liberator and fanatic, messiah and mon-
ster, the very incarnation of the conflicted American political soul.
This leads us to a more direct consideration of the notion of foundations
and founding. The act of founding involves at least an abstract comprehen-
sion of those first principles that constitute a political soul and the resolve to
forward those principles in an undiluted form. . . .
Upon examining those individuals who are noted for participating in an
act of founding, we notice something unique that separates them from the
ordinary politician, activist, or statesman. This is explained with considerable
clarity by Machiavelli, who typically adds the ingredient of realpolitik to his
observations of founding and reformative leadership. Given the fact that all
founders and reformers will inevitably encounter resistance from those ene-
mies who “profit from the old order,” and assuming that a purely good leader
will “bring about his own ruin among so many who are not good,” Machiavelli
notes that a lawgiver or prophet must go forth armed and prepared for strug-
gle. Machiavelli’s idea of a founder is consonant with the idea of virtue, or
grandeur of soul—a character of extraordinary proportions, defined in terms
of “ingenuity, skill, and excellence.” Machiavelli seeks a type of transcending
leadership, attaching a significant martial quality to his model founders. Even
Moses, a religious founder, employs the might of God against Pharaoh in order
to liberate the enslaved Israelites, something that those who follow the New
Testament model of the suffering Christ would unequivocally reject.
Brown’s actions are like those of a prophet-warrior. However, Machiavelli’s
armed prophet is also a conqueror; failure is associated with those who attempt
to establish founding law without the enforcing power of arms. Brown does
not seem to conform easily to the prophet-warrior model, for his arms were
poor, his numbers few, and his plan thwarted by overextension and local
hostility. Moses was at least able to extricate the Israelite slaves from their
Egyptian oppressors. Moses conquered by overcoming the power of Egypt and
then founded both a religion and a nation through the transmission of the Law
of God. It is an understatement to say that Brown’s achievement falls far short
of this mark.
But if one considers the substance of Brown’s commitment (the emanci-
pation of the enslaved) and the method of Brown’s action (confrontation with
the sinful oppressor on behalf of the oppressed), Brown’s character and actions
do approximate the Machiavellian hero-founder. Furthermore, although he
does not conquer in the physical or political sense, he does emerge trium-
phant. Brown was defeated but martyred, and in the end emancipation came
for his people through the violence that he had prophesied. In a sobering
moment of synchronicity, Lincoln’s retrospective utterance in his second inau-
gural address, that “until every drop of blood drawn with the lash, shall be
paid by another drawn with the sword,” echoes Brown’s last testimony. Two
years earlier, Lincoln, at Gettysburg, had referred to a “new birth of freedom,”
and thus implicitly defined a new act of founding in the context and terms
of the emancipation. From the blood and ashes of the war against slavery,
the nation would be re-formed; Brown, who did not survive to witness the
nation’s second birth, nonetheless prophesied the act in his words. The nation
was literally made anew but in a way that reaffirmed more completely the first
principles of the republic. This represents an act of founding, and Brown’s
strike at Harpers Ferry was the prophetic prelude. Even though John Brown is
distinct from Machiavelli’s legendary types in a number of ways, he certainly
shares in the role of founding/reforming visionary. Indeed, Lincoln, generally
regarded as the heroic and tragic, even Christlike figure of the Civil War, resem-
bles Brown in the end, only on a larger scale and from the comparatively more
acceptable authority of his office. For Lincoln used violence to preserve the
Union and purge the new nation of slavery. In his second inaugural address,
he finally admits what he most likely knew from the beginning, that slavery
was “somehow the cause of the war,” and in so doing, for a brief moment
toward the end of that war, the Great Emancipator shows himself akin to the
Prophet of Osawatomie.
An alternative discussion of the founder-legislator is found in Rousseau’s
Social Contract. The Rousseauian founder is less applicable to the case of John
Brown than the Machiavellian model. Rousseau’s founder-legislator possesses a
“superior intelligence” and is capable of “beholding all the passions of human
beings without experiencing them.” It is unlikely that Brown possessed a
superior intelligence, and Brown’s personality was far from the dispassionate
character that Rousseau requires of his legislator. Furthermore, Rousseau’s con-
cept of the founder is identical to the concept of the first lawgiver and by no
means resembles a prophet-warrior. Martial skill is not a requisite quality of
Rousseau’s founder, for Rousseau is always careful to mark an acute distinction
between government based on consent and authority imposed by force. . . .
At another level, however, there is a similarity between Brown and
Rousseau’s founder. Rousseau’s founder is an individual of superhuman quali-
ties; indeed, Rousseau’s description compares the creation of human first laws
to the actions of gods. Rousseau’s ideal founder is not afraid to act in a way
that would challenge “human nature” itself. Brown seems to act against the
natural order, but he does not intend to “change” human nature so much as
to salvage it and even to save us from it. As a Calvinist, Brown undoubtedly
believed that our nature is fixed by original sin; hence, he departed from
Rousseau in yet another way. Brown fought against our sinful nature on behalf
of redemption. Again, this seems to depart from Rousseau, but one must note
that Rousseau’s overall view of human nature was not much different from
that of Calvin. Rousseau and Calvin both argued that humanity exists in a
fallen condition, and although we cannot return to our original innocence, we
can recover something of it through the affirmation of freedom and morality.
For Calvin and John Brown, that higher state could be achieved through the
Redeemer; for Rousseau, redemption is possible through the Social Contract.
Both Rousseau and Brown sought a kind of recovery and affirmation of a better
state of existence, and both insisted that in order to achieve such a goal, we
must struggle mightily against our corrupted natures in order to reform and
ennoble our humanity.
It should also be emphasized that the element of consent is vital to
Rousseau. Brown’s actions cannot admit of either direct or indirect consent
of the governed for a number of reasons; most obvious of these is that Brown
governed no one and possessed no legal or political authority, and that Brown
was wholly dissociated from normal political channels. Even so, Brown acted
in a way that relates indirectly to the notion of consensual governance. Brown
sought neither the approval nor the consent of the populace, for the majority
of the populace ignored, permitted, supported, or participated in the pos-
session of human beings. More importantly, the law of God is not based on
consent, but like Rousseau’s general will, it is always right. Additionally, a
minority of the population, both the enslaved victims and the various types
of free dissenters and abolitionists, had been effectively deprived of their fun-
damental right to consent. The only rule that the slave knew was the rule
of force, and the only rule that the abolitionist experienced was ultimately
deemed immoral. The case of John Brown and his small group of followers
and sympathizers exemplifies the latter, and it is compatible with Rousseau’s
theory of consent and resistance.
Even if Brown is not a founder-legislator in the strict Rousseauian sense,
there are at least two arguments in the Social Contract that provide theoretical
and moral support for Brown’s extreme actions. First, Rousseau follows Locke
in affirming that the notion of consent unequivocally requires unanimity. A
political culture that either legitimizes or permits slavery violates this fun-
damental principle of universal consent. No one consents to be a slave; the
enslaved population constitutes an excluded group that indicates a govern-
ment based (partially) on force that is thus (wholly) illegitimate. Lincoln saw
this as well and employed a similar argument in one of his many criticisms
directed at the continued allowance of slavery. Even if one counters this argu-
ment by incorrectly objecting that Rousseau would not have included a slave
population when considering the origins of the social contract, one would
still have to take into account the abolitionists who, in acting against slavery
from first principles, withdrew their consent to be governed by the current
instrument. The unanimity that Rousseau demanded in theory never existed
in practice under a regime that allowed slavery; thus, according to these stand-
ards, the Constitution, if it did indeed support or permit slavery (an issue that
is in itself open to further analysis and argument within a different context)
was therefore not legitimate. The founding act had occurred under an initial
condition that was shaped by a great error.
This directs us back to our second point. Rousseau states without ambi-
guity that slavery is in every instance illegitimate and immoral. Freedom can-
not be surrendered or usurped, for to “renounce liberty is to renounce being
a man, to surrender the rights of humanity and even its duties.” Thus, slavery
can never be rendered legitimate or permitted by a government or any portion
of its population. Rousseau makes this clear in the cases of both voluntary and
involuntary submission. Slavery can be based neither on a voluntary arrange-
ment nor on coercion or conquest. In the case of the former, one who agrees
to be a slave is “out of one’s mind,” for it is madness to “renounce one’s very
humanity.” Of course, American slavery was anything but voluntary, and for
Rousseau, this form of slavery is equally inhumane. . . . As Rousseau power-
fully states, “So, from whatever aspect we regard the question, the right of
slavery is null and void, not only as being illegitimate, but also because it is
absurd and meaningless. The words slave and right contradict each other, and
are mutually exclusive. It will always be equally foolish for a man to say to a
man or people: ‘I make with you a convention wholly at your expense, and
wholly to my advantage; I shall keep it as long as I like, and you will keep it
as long as I like.’ ” Thus, not only is a social contract left unformed if it does
not include the affirmation of every voice that is present within the polity, it is
also morally incompatible given the presence of an enslaved group regardless
of how the enslavement came about. In refusing to seek the consent of the
majority, Brown chose to act on behalf of those who had been excluded from
the founding act of consent and against a government that under Rousseau’s
definition can only be interpreted as illegitimate. Surely an analysis of Brown’s
actions from this perspective can better illuminate the questions that revolve
around the accusation of his “lawlessness.”
The notion of founding entails far more than establishment of institu-
tions or governmental charters; it also, and above all, includes critical political
and social reform in the pursuit of the higher principles of a given political cul-
ture. If we are to accept, along with such martyred luminaries as Lincoln and
King, the proposition that the first principles of the American founding are to
be understood as the guarantee of both individual liberty and the advance of
political and legal equality, and if we add to this Rousseau’s theoretical demoli-
tion of any claim to the alleged right to own human beings as property, then
we can see in Brown’s holy war against slavery an act that does indeed resonate
with the spirit of the founding movement. . . .
Significantly, Brown made one major attempt to assume the mantle of
legislator. The provisional constitution that was drafted and signed at the anti-
slavery convention in Chatham, Ontario, was intended to provide the founda-
tions for the new society that Brown envisioned establishing in the South after
his successful liberation of the slaves and, as such, emulates the type of effort
associated with a founder-legislator. In the Chatham document, Brown once
again shares something in common with Lincoln in the latter’s reaffirmation
of the first principles established within the Declaration of Independence.
Brown included in the Chatham document a statement that his provisional
constitution was not meant to dissolve the federal constitution, but only to
reaffirm the principles of the American Revolution through amendment and
modification. The banner of the Spirit of ’76 was to serve as the flag of the
provisional government, thus echoing Lincoln’s belief that the true founding
of the nation began in the struggle for liberty and equality during the Revolu-
tion. In addition to the expression of higher political ideals, Brown also pro-
vided plans for framing a new government for the freed slaves and their allies,
a proposed political system that, to many, was original and revolutionary.
The Brown document departed dramatically from all previous constitutional
examples because of such features as a supreme court that was to be elected
by the widest possible popular vote; government officials who were “to serve
without pay” and be removed and punished upon misconduct; extensive pub-
lic reclamation of all property that was formerly acquired at the expense of the
slaves; protection of female prisoners from violation; and plans for the “moral
instruction” of the new citizens. Here again, Brown comes close to Rousseau’s
concept of the founder: a lawgiver who attempts to make human nature anew,
one who is committed through law more than through force to the moral
elevation of the human spirit. This is an example of Brown designing a more
democratic government aimed toward human advancement and intended to
restore the principles of the original American founding. . . . Brown’s actions
at Chatham are also similar to the steps taken at the convention of 1776, and
once his supporters had signed the document, Brown felt prepared to enter
the field of battle, knowing that his deeds were formally supported by writ-
ten principles and political ideals as well as by his steadfast religious faith.
At Chatham, Brown exchanged arms for pen and ink and, like Jefferson and
Madison, attempted to establish a new order for humanity through law. . . .
In turning back to Harpers Ferry, we must also raise the following ques-
tion: Why weren’t more people of conscience moved to arms, as was John
Brown? This can be partially explained by the close connection between abo-
lition and nonviolent moral suasion, as in the case of William Lloyd Garrison
and the Transcendentalists, but that connection notwithstanding, it is still
remarkable that, after conceding the pacifism of most free opponents of slav-
ery, we cannot remember another case that resembles or emulates the Harpers
Ferry raid. This might be the best evidence on behalf of the case for Brown as
founder, for his was an act consistent both with the tenets of scripture and
with the political principles of the polity within which he lived. It was com-
mitted out of the purest motivations, it was directed to the achievement of the
goal of purging the pathology responsible for the republic’s social and cultural
ills, and it anticipated the violent methods in which slavery was finally abol-
ished. John Brown acted from high principles against evil, and while his meth-
ods were decidedly flawed, the moral necessity of his act of resistance remains
evident. Although Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry was ultimately unsuccessful,
he exemplifies the true spirit of just liberty; and while he contributed nei-
ther new law to support democracy nor any new concept to develop the idea
of freedom, his deeds accelerated its progress. Thomas Jefferson proclaimed
the egalitarian creed when he drafted the Declaration, but he was unable to
renounce his own status as master or overcome his idiosyncratic ideas about
racial difference. Abraham Lincoln sincerely and eloquently reaffirmed this
creed on a higher and more authentically universal level at Gettysburg, but
he was unable to act immediately and abolish the pernicious institution. John
Brown, however, perhaps more than any founder since Thomas Paine, fully
incorporated the creed into his actions and lived the idea of equality and racial
friendship with unparalleled purity and ardor. John Brown compels us to think
of him as a founder—one who, unlike Jefferson and Lincoln, appears to live
and act on the fringes of society, but one who, on closer examination, springs
from its very center.
Measuring the character and relevance of any historical figure is a task
that lends itself to a certain degree of ambiguity. Figures such as Jefferson,
Lincoln, and King have all been assessed differently by their champions and
critics, and interpretations of their character and descriptions of their heroism
as well as their lesser acts have all undergone continual redefinition. Yet they
remain, for us, heroes all the same, for in spite of any inadequacies, they
reflect the perpetual quest for the affirmation of higher political principle and
remain among the great movers who helped shape the conscience and the
development of the republic.
John Brown differs from these men because he shaped nothing tangi-
ble, at least nothing that we can point to today as the direct creation of his
actions or product of his influence. However, he is similar to them because he
represents the pursuit of high ideas consistent with action. In some aspects,
John Brown is more relevant than they, for in his perpetually frustrated zeal
for freedom and justice, he embodies the core of the American story; we see in
the growth of the nation writ large the same constant buffeting between the
idea of freedom and the reality of its interminable frustration that created a
similar tension in the turbulent psyche of the Osawatomie Prophet. That ten-
sion was felt by the Sage of Monticello and was manifested in the visage of the
Melancholy President, but it was incarnate in John Brown, and through that
incarnation, the hope and dread of the American soul became flesh.
If some can embrace as a great hero the figure of Robert E. Lee, the
defender of a commonwealth that included slavery as an accepted institution,
then is it implausible to recognize heroism in the more astonishing figure of
Brown? Lee never supported secession until the deed was committed, yet he
chose to renounce his commission and past loyalties after years of distinction
under arms only in order to side with his state. Other distinguished Southern
warriors, such as David Farragut of Tennessee and Winfield Scott, Lee’s fel-
low Virginian, went with the North, but Lee reluctantly followed the Old
Dominion into the Confederacy. Is it fair to say that whereas Lee chose his
homeland, Brown chose humanity? To his credit, Lee worried over the pos-
sibility of siding against his family and friends, thus exhibiting a tenderness
for his communal roots and native land that is not as evident in Brown, so
is it fair to argue that Lee chose to defend the hearth while Brown chose to
fight for an abstraction? Whose abstraction is more meaningful: Lee’s insist-
ence on abiding with Virginia right or wrong or Brown’s devotion to a people
sealed in bondage? We must bear in mind that, in spite of his protestations,
Lee owned slaves, and his wife owned even more than he did. Regardless of
the answer to these questions, popular history has made its judgments, and
Lee is known (by most) today as a gentleman warrior, acting from duty and
on principle, while Brown is considered (by many) as the guerrilla fanatic,
blinded by undignified zeal and without honor. But we must ask which of the
two acted on the higher principle, which violated the greater law, which one
carries more blood on his hands, and who between them is a more genuinely
American hero? If it is madness to conduct a private, unruly, and suicidal war
against an enemy that one perceives as the very cause of sinful oppression,
then what state of mind could cause a man of principle to lead thousands
into death out of questionable loyalty to a political system that acknowledges
oppression as a venerable institution? Who acted on the real spirit of liberty
as expressed in the motto Sic semper tyrannis? Without intending to detract
from the achievement of either man, it is still instructive to compare the
actions and motivations of these past contemporaries, one widely deemed a
hero, the other, quite often, a villain. At Harpers Ferry, these two men of dif-
ferent principles fatally met, and it is primarily on principle that their legacies
stand before us today.
If we are to judge heroes on the principles that they attempt to advance,
then we must develop a more comprehensive sense of the value and purity of
those ideals that stir one to action. By any measure, John Brown represents the
more startling manifestation of the murky dynamics that course within the
continual process of the unfolding and founding of America’s first principles;
thus, he represents an individual of heroic, if still frightening, proportions
who speaks powerfully to us today as we continue to confront our higher
purposes as a political culture and democratic nation. Perhaps for this reason
he is the most typical founder of all: the most consistently idealistic, the most
existentially frustrated, the most American.
Additional Resources
Conflicting views of the abolitionists are presented in Richard O. Curry, ed., The
Abolitionists: Reformers or Fanatics? (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965). For gen-
eral discussions of the abolitionist movement, see Gerald Sorin, Abolitionism: A
326
327
Images of Battle
Drawing from the manuscript collections at the University of North Carolina, this
site contains an excellent collection of Civil War letters.
http://www.lib.unc.edu/mss/exhibits/civilwar/index.html
328
• Was Slavery the Key Issue in the Sectional Conflict Leading to the Civil
War?
• Are Historians Wrong to Consider the War Between the States a “Total
War”?
• Was Abraham Lincoln America’s Greatest President?
• Did Reconstruction Fail as a Result of Racism?
329
Learning Outcomes
After reading this issue, you should be able to:
• Describe the process used in the South to gain support for
secession.
• Evaluate the validity of the states’ rights argument in pressing
for secession.
• Understand that white southerners were not of one mind
when it came to the decision to leave the Union.
• Some of the economic explanations employed both for and
against secession.
• Analyze the extent to which race and slavery were the keys to
the sectional conflict leading to the American Civil War.
ISSUE SUMMARY
YES: Charles B. Dew uses the speeches and public letters of 41 white
southerners who, as commissioners in 1860 and 1861, attempted to
secure support for secession by appealing to their audiences’ com-
mitment to the preservation of slavery and the doctrine of white
supremacy.
NO: Marc Egnal argues that the decision of Lower South states
to secede from the Union was determined by an economically-
based struggle between residents with strong ties to the North and
330
I n April 1861, less than a month after his inauguration, President Abraham
Lincoln attempted to send provisions to Fort Sumter in South Carolina, part
of the newly formed Confederate States of America. Southern troops under the
command of General P. G. T. Beauregard opened fire on the fort, forcing its
surrender on April 14. The American Civil War had begun.
Numerous explanations have been offered for the cause of this “war
between the states.” Many contemporaries and some historians saw the conflict
as the product of a conspiracy housed either in the North or South, depend-
ing upon one’s regional perspective. For many in the northern states, the chief
culprits were the planters and their political allies who were willing to defend
southern institutions at all costs. South of the Mason–Dixon line, blame was
laid at the feet of the fanatical abolitionists, like John Brown (see Issue 13), and
the free-soil architects of the Republican party. Some viewed secession and war
as the consequence of a constitutional struggle between states’ rights advocates
and defenders of the U.S. federal government, whereas others focused upon
the economic rivalries or the cultural differences between North and South.
Embedded in each of these interpretations, however, is the powerful influence
of the institution of slavery.
In the 85 years between the start of the American Revolution and the
coming of the Civil War, Americans made the necessary political compromises
on the slavery issue in order not to split the nation apart. The Northwest Ordi-
nance of 1787 forbade slavery from spreading into those designated territories
under its control, and the new Constitution written in the same year held out
the possibility that the Atlantic slave trade would be prohibited after 1808.
There was some hope in the early nineteenth century that slavery might
die from natural causes. The Revolutionary generation was well aware of the
contradiction between the values of an egalitarian society and the practices of
a slaveholding aristocracy. Philosophically, slavery was viewed as a necessary
evil, not a positive good. The northern states were well on their way to abol-
ishing slavery by 1800, and the erosion of the tobacco lands in Virginia and
Maryland contributed to the lessening importance of a slave labor system.
Unfortunately, two factors—territorial expansion and the market econ-
omy—made slavery the key to the South’s wealth in the 35 years before the
Civil War. First, new slave states were created out of a population expanding
into lands ceded to the United States as a result of the Treaty of Paris of 1783
and the Louisiana Purchase of 1803. Second, slaves were sold from the upper
to the lower regions of the South because the invention of the cotton gin made
it possible to harvest large quantities of cotton, ship it to the textile mills in
New England and the British Isles, and turn it into cloth and finished clothing
as part of the new, specialized market economy.
331
332
333
From Apostles of Disunion: Southern Secession Commissioners and the Causes of the Civil War by
Charles B. Dew (University of Virginia Press, 2001), pp. 4, 18–21, 74–81. Copyright © 2001 by
the Rectors and Visitors of the University of Virginia. Reprinted by permission of University
of Virginia Press.
334
Constitution of the United States. Through their efforts “your fathers achieved
that liberty which comes of a free government, founded on justice, order and
peace,” Preston said. In order to preserve the principles and the constitutional
forms established by the Revolutionary generation, “you, the immediate off-
spring of the founders, went forth to that death grapple which has prevailed
against you,” he continued. It was the North, “the victors,” who rejected
“the principles,” destroyed “the forms,” and defeated “the promised destiny of
America,” Preston charged. “The Constitution you fought for”—the Confederate
Constitution—“embodied every principle of the Constitution of the United
States, and guaranteed the free Constitution of Virginia. It did not omit one
essential for liberty and the public welfare,” he claimed. The Confederacy was
in ashes, however, and so was true constitutional liberty. “That liberty was lost,
and now the loud hosanna is shouted over land and sea—‘Liberty may be dead,
but the Union is preserved. Glory, glory, glory to Massachusetts and her Hessian
and Milesian mercenaries,’” Preston declaimed. Yet all was not lost. Even though
“cruel, bloody, remorseless tyrants may rule at Fort Sumter and at Richmond . . .
they cannot crush that immortal hope, which rises from the blood soaked earth
of Virginia,” Preston believed. “I see the sacred image of regenerate Virginia, and
cry aloud, in the hearing of a God of Right, and in the hearing of all the nations
of the earth—ALL HAIL OUR MOTHER.”
Passionate, unregenerate, unapologetic, unreconstructed—all these and
more apply to Preston’s remarks on this occasion. But so do words like “conven-
iently forgetful,” “strongly revisionist,” and “purposely misleading.” Nowhere
to be found are references to many of the arguments and descriptions he had
used over and over again before the Virginia Convention in February 1861—
things like “the subject race . . . rising and murdering their masters” or “the
conflict between slavery and non-slavery is a conflict for life and death,” or his
insistence that “the South cannot exist without African slavery,” or his portrait
of the “fermenting millions” of the North as “canting, fanatics, festering in
the licentiousness of abolition and amalgamation.” All this was swept aside as
Preston sought to paint the Civil War as a mighty struggle over differing con-
cepts of constitutional liberty. Like Jefferson Davis and Alexander H. Stephens in
their postwar writings, Preston was trying to reframe the causes of the conflict in
terms that would be much more favorable to the South.
Preston was not the only former secession commissioner to launch such
an effort after the war. Jabez L. M. Curry, who had served as Alabama’s com-
missioner to Maryland in December 1860, became a leading figure in the
drive to improve primary and secondary education in the postwar South. As
agent for both the Peabody and Slater Funds and as supervising director of the
Southern Education Board, Curry worked tirelessly to establish public schools
and teacher training for both races in the states of the former Confederacy.
Curry also worked diligently to justify the Lost Cause of the Confederacy. In
his Civil History of the Government of the Confederate States, with Some Personal
Reminiscences, published in Richmond in 1901, Curry offered an analysis of
the coming of the war that closely paralleled the argument used by John S.
Preston in 1868. “The object in quitting the Union was not to destroy, but to
save the principles of the Constitution,” Curry wrote. “The Southern States
from the beginning of the government had striven to keep it within the orbit
prescribed by the Constitution and failed.” The Curry of 1901 would hardly
have recognized the Curry of 1860, who told the governor of Maryland that
secession meant “deliverance from Abolition domination,” and who predicted
that under Republican rule the South’s slave-based social system would “be
assaulted, humbled, dwarfed, degraded, and finally crushed out.”
In 1860 and 1861 Preston, Curry, and the other commissioners had seen
a horrific future facing their region within the confines of Abraham Lincoln’s
Union. When they used words like “submission” and “degradation,” when
they referred to “final subjugation” and “annihilation,” they were not talking
about constitutional differences or political arguments. They were talking about
the dawning of an abominable new world in the South, a world created by the
Republican destruction of the institution of slavery.
The secession commissioners knew what this new and hateful world
would look like. Over and over again they called up three stark images that,
taken together, constituted the white South’s worst nightmare.
The first threat was the looming specter of racial equality. The commis-
sioners insisted almost to a man that Republican ascendancy in Washington
placed white supremacy in the South in mortal peril. Mississippi commissioner
William L. Harris made this point clearly and unambiguously in his speech to
the Georgia legislature in December 1860. “Our fathers made this a government
for the white man,” Harris told the Georgians, “rejecting the negro, as an igno-
rant, inferior, barbarian race, incapable of self-government, and not, therefore,
entitled to be associated with the white man upon terms of civil, political, or
social equality.” But the Republicans intended “to overturn and strike down this
great feature of our Union . . . and to substitute in its stead their new theory of
the universal equality of the black and white races.” Alabama’s commissioners
to North Carolina, Isham W. Garrott and Robert H. Smith, predicted that the
white children of their state would “be compelled to flee from the land of their
birth, and from the slaves their parents have toiled to acquire as an inheritance
for them, or to submit to the degradation of being reduced to an equality with
them, and all its attendant horrors.” South Carolina’s John McQueen warned
the Texas Convention that Lincoln and the Republicans were bent upon “the
abolition of slavery upon this continent and the elevation of our own slaves
to an equality with ourselves and our children.” And so it went, as commis-
sioner after commissioner—Leonidas Spratt of South Carolina, David Clopton
and Arthur F. Hopkins of Alabama, Henry L. Benning of Georgia—hammered
home this same point.
The impending imposition of racial equality informed the speeches of
other commissioners as well. Thomas J. Wharton, Mississippi’s attorney general
and that state’s commissioner to Tennessee, said in Nashville on January 8,
1861, that the Republican Party would, “at no distant day, inaugurate the
reign of equality of all races and colors, and the universality of the elective
franchise.” Commissioner Samuel L. Hall of Georgia told the North Carolina
legislature on February 13, 1861, that only a people “dead to all sense of virtue
and dignity” would embrace the Republican doctrine of “the social and politi-
cal equality of the black and white races.” Another Georgia commissioner,
Luther J. Glenn of Atlanta, made the same point to the Missouri legislature
on March 2, 1861. The Republican platform, press, and principal spokesmen
had made their “purposes, objects, and motives” crystal clear, Glenn insisted:
“hostility to the South, the extinction of slavery, and the ultimate elevation
of the negro to civil, political and social equality with the white man.” These
reasons and these reasons alone had prompted his state “to dissolve her con-
nexion with the General Government,” Glenn insisted.
The second element in the commissioners’ prophecy was the prospect of a
race war. Mississippi commissioner Alexander H. Handy raised this threat in his
Baltimore speech in December 1860—Republican agents infiltrating the South
“to excite the slave to cut the throat of his master.” Alabamians Garrott and
Smith told their Raleigh audience that Republican policies would force the South
either to abandon slavery “or be doomed to a servile war.” William Cooper,
Alabama’s commissioner to Missouri, delivered a similar message in Jefferson
City. “Under the policy of the Republican party, the time would arrive when the
scenes of San Domingo and Hayti, with all their attendant horrors, would be
enacted in the slaveholding States,” he told the Missourians. David Clopton of
Alabama wrote the governor of Delaware that Republican ascendancy “endangers
instead of insuring domestic tranquility by the possession of channels through
which to circulate insurrectionary documents and disseminate insurrection-
ary sentiments among a hitherto contented servile population.” Wharton of
Mississippi told the Tennessee legislature that Southerners “will not, cannot
surrender our institutions,” and that Republican attempts to subvert slavery “will
drench the country in blood, and extirpate one or other of the races.” In their
speeches to the Virginia Convention, Fulton Anderson, Henry L. Benning, and
John S. Preston all forecast a Republican-inspired race war that would, as Benning
put it, “break out everywhere like hidden fire from the earth.”
The third prospect in the commissioners’ doomsday vision was, in many
ways, the most dire: racial amalgamation. Judge Harris of Mississippi sounded
this note in Georgia in December 1860 when he spoke of Republican insist-
ence on “equality in the rights of matrimony.” Other commissioners repeated
this warning in the weeks that followed. In Virginia, Henry Benning insisted
that under Republican-led abolition “our women” would suffer “horrors . . .
we cannot contemplate in imagination.” There was not an adult present who
could not imagine exactly what Benning was talking about. Leroy Pope Walker,
Alabama’s commissioner to Tennessee and subsequently the first Confederate
secretary of war, predicted that in the absence of secession all would be lost—
first, “our property,” and “then our liberties,” and finally the South’s greatest
treasure, “the sacred purity of our daughters.”
No commissioner articulated the racial fears of the secessionists better, or
more graphically, than Alabama’s Stephen F. Hale. When he wrote of a South
facing “amalgamation or extermination,” when he referred to “all the horrors
of a San Domingo servile insurrection,” when he described every white South-
erner “degraded to a position of equality with free negroes,” when he foresaw the
“sons and daughters” of the South “associating with free negroes upon terms of
political and social equality,” when he spoke of the Lincoln administration con-
signing the citizens of the South “to assassinations and her wives and daughters
with the coming of the Civil War. To put it quite simply, slavery and race were
absolutely critical elements in the coming of the war. Neo-Confederate groups
may have “a problem” with this interpretation, as the leader of the Virginia
Heritage Preservation Association put it. But these defenders of the Lost Cause
need only read the speeches and letters of the secession commissioners to learn
what was really driving the Deep South to the brink of war in 1860–61.
From Civil War History by Marc Egnal vol. 50, no. 3, September 2004, pp. 261–290 (notes
omitted). Copyright © 2004 by Kent State University Press. Reprinted by permission.
342
The nature of this division has proven elusive. Several scholars have sug-
gested a split between unionist small farmers and secessionist slaveholders, but
any generalization that seeks to link the split over secession in the Deep South
to wealth or slaveholding will not stand. The ranks of ardent secessionists
included many small farmers in the southern districts of South Carolina,
Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi; in peninsular Florida; and in southwestern
Louisiana. To be sure, some nonslaveholding farmers in the Lower South were
consistent, outspoken unionists; but their role should not lead us to generalize
about a whole class.
Two studies that closely analyze the opposing sides in the secession debate
highlight the weak connection between slaveholding and disunion in the
Lower South. An analysis of the votes for the secession conventions in Alabama,
Mississippi, and Louisiana concludes that “the variance in the cooperationist
vote is explained by factors other than the percentage of slaveholders.” The
correlation computed was extremely low, with slaveholding explaining only
17 percent of the vote for secession. Another scholar reaches the same conclu-
sion through a different method. Ralph Wooster’s study of the members of the
secession conventions demonstrates that comparable groups of small farmers
and slaveholders stood on both sides of the issue. Wooster observes: “In the
conventions of the lower South the percentage of those who held 20 slaves or
more was almost the same for the secessionists and their opponents, 41.8 per-
cent of secessionists and 41.0 percent of the cooperationists.”
This essay suggests a new approach to secession and the events leading
up to that crisis by contending that the battle over secession in the Lower
South was the culmination of a long-standing struggle between two groups—
one with strong ties to the Union and one that flourished in relative isolation
from the states to the north. . . .
Two factors in particular shaped the clashing societies of the cotton
states—the origins of the settlers and the patterns of the regional economy.
These elements also gave rise to conflicting worldviews that guided the behav-
ior of the two groups. The two camps, it should be emphasized, were loose
coalitions. No firm geographical features defined their boundaries. Their ideo-
logical borders were permeable and shifted from issue to issue. Furthermore,
the opposing sides shared many fundamental values, including a dedication to
slavery and a deep-rooted racism. References to two “societies” must be taken
figuratively, not literally.
Still these qualifications should not obscure the importance of these
groupings. The opposing sides are not ahistorical conceptions. Contemporaries
were well aware of the lines that split several states of the Deep South into
northern and southern reaches and divided others along similar, geographical
lines. During the crisis of 1849–52 and the secession winter of 1860–61,
these warring camps shattered the Democratic party and disrupted the Whig-
Opposition party. A close analysis of this division helps us understand the
ardent secessionists as well as their more moderate opponents.
The first of the two forces shaping these groups was the origins of the
settlers. The white people who populated the Lower South came from dis-
tinct sending areas and set the imprint of contrasting cultures on states from
South Carolina to Texas. One set of migrants came from the Upper South,
although many could trace their family ties back to Northern Ireland and the
continent of Europe. Typically, the ancestors of these migrants had landed in
Philadelphia and resided for a time in southeastern Pennsylvania. Over the
course of generations, these families had migrated south through the Appala-
chian highlands before spreading through large areas of the Upper and Lower
South. These migrants from the Upper South arrived in South Carolina and
Georgia before the Revolution and moved into the other Gulf states during
the period of initial settlement. A second group of migrants came from a dif-
ferent “hearth”: the tidewater region of South Carolina and Georgia. Many of
these Lower South residents had ancestors who hailed from southern England.
These two large-scale migrations divided the Deep South into distinct regions.
The most important line of division separated several states into northern and
southern regions. Settlers from the Upper South predominated in the north-
ern reaches of South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama, as well as northeastern
Mississippi; Lower South residents dominated the southern districts in these
states. The two groups of migrants had different outlooks, distinct family histo-
ries, and different ways of building their homes and talking to their neighbors.
John C. Calhoun described the two societies within his own state of
South Carolina. “Our State was first settled on the coast by emigrants princi-
pally from England, but with no inconsiderable intermixture of Huguenots
from France . . . ,” he noted in 1846. “The portion of the State along the
falls of the rivers and back to the mountains had a very different origin and
settlement. Its settlement commenced long after, at a period, but little ante-
rior to the war of the Revolution, and consisted principally of emigrants
who followed the course of the mountains, from Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Virginia & North Carolina. They had very little connection, or intercourse
for a long time with the old settlement on the coast.”
Migrants from the two hearths influenced politics and society in Texas
and Florida, although these groups did not follow the pattern of settling along
a north-south axis. In Texas, Upper South migrants dominated the northern
and west central counties. Similarly, a study of Florida shows that Upper South
settlers arrived in the 1830s, became wealthy cotton planters, and controlled
the politics of “Middle Florida,” the term for the Panhandle counties between
the Suwannee and Apalachicola Rivers. These districts supported the Whigs
and were moderate in sectional politics. The most striking difference between
the Democratic and Whig leaders was their origins. Fully 64 percent of promi-
nent Florida Democrats were from the Deep South, while only 37 percent of
the Whigs originated from that area.
Conflicts over Southern rights often featured politicians with different
origins. For example, the clash in Texas pitted John Reagan and Sam Houston,
both with strong Tennessee roots, against Louis Wigfall of South Carolina.
The division in Mississippi found on one side cooperationist James Alcorn,
who was raised in Kentucky, and on the other side secessionist Albert Gallatin
Brown of South Carolina. In Alabama moderates William King and George
Smith Houston from the Upper South clashed with Georgians Dixon Hall
Lewis and William Lowndes Yancey. There were exceptions to the rule. Some
planters residing upon the confines [i.e., outskirts] of the Confederacy.” William
McBurney also fretted about the growth of inland trade. He remarked, “What is
to hinder Wilmington and Charlotte, N.C., from becoming depots from which
the upcountry of S.C. may be supplied. And so of Knoxville, Chattanooga, &
Memphis, Tennessee, for the other states?” McBurney favored a light duty on
goods entering the Confederacy: “A small percentage would have the advantage
of giving to the Seaboard Cities the importing business and the supply of the
interior merchants, whereas an entire exemption would enable to the interior
merchant to do as many of them have always done—buy in northern cities—at
least there would be no impediment in their way of so doing.”
The separation of the Deep South into northern and southern regions was
the most important division produced by economic activities, but others may be
noted. The Louisiana sugar planters, who enjoyed the protection of federal tariffs,
looked favorably on the Union. In the Bayou State crop preferences often became
political preferences. Finally, commercial activities tied many city and townsfolk
to the North and made them less willing to entertain extreme states’ rights views
during the secession crisis. Northern capital financed the sale of Southern staples
and the import of finished goods into the South. A few traders advocated seces-
sion, but most were unionists. These city dwellers were more likely to join the
Whig party, which became the party of moderation.
The division that emerged from differences in birthplaces and economic
activities reflected opposing outlooks. These distinct mind-sets can best be
understood in the context of the debate between historians James Oakes and
Eugene Genovese. For Oakes the South was characterized by an “entrepreneur-
ial ethos” and an “intense devotion to the capitalistic spirit of accumulation.”
Genovese, by contrast, emphasizes the “premodern quality of the Southern
world.” The slave lords, he asserted, were “precapitalist, quasi-aristocratic
landowners” who “grew into the closest thing to feudal lords imaginable in
a nineteenth-century bourgeois republic.” Other historians and economists
have chosen sides in this debate. Both sides suggest the universality of their
conclusions. All planters, indeed, all white Southerners, these works contend,
conformed to a single mold.
A closer look at the divisions within the Lower South suggests that we
must credit the insights of both Oakes and Genovese—but in each case for only
one of the two groups. The cohort with roots in the Upper South and North
embodied the buoyant, entrepreneurial spirit that Oakes delineates. The bustling
economic activities of the small farmers in northern counties of their states dis-
turbed outspoken advocates of Southern rights. Daniel Hamilton of Charleston
shared his concerns with radical congressman William Porcher Miles. “How long
would it be after disunion,” Hamilton asked in January 1860, “before we should
have the same hungry manufacturing population infesting the upper part of
So. Ca., Cherokee [i.e., northern] Georgia, Tennessee, North Carolina (French
Broad [River] with its exhaustless water power) and even the upper portion of
Alabama?” He continued: “Why not five years would elapse before they would be
setting their looms to work on every stream in these locations under the impulse
of occupation and the introduction of numbers, they would soon make their
presence felt. . . . A few years more and you would have a strong party of our
own people in favour of a protective Tariff, and advocating all those extrava-
gant expenditures for Internal Improvements.”
Wealthy planters as well as small farmers in this region shared this entre-
preneurial outlook and a desire to build a more diversified economy. James
Orr, the upcountry leader of the South Carolina National Democrats, pointed
out the path to growth. “The first step to be taken . . . ,” he explained in
an 1855 speech, “to reinvigorate our decaying prosperity, and to develop our
exhaustless resources, is for our planters and farmers to invest the whole of the
net profits on agricultural capital in some species of manufacturing; the field
is broad and inviting, and but little has yet been occupied. With prudence
and energy there can be no failure in any branch.” Fellow upcountry poli-
tician Benjamin Perry, who often boosted manufacturing in his newspaper,
applauded these remarks: “One such speech as this of Col. Orr’s will do more
good in the State than all the patriotic fustian and bombast which have been
delivered in South Carolina for the last twenty years.” Other planters shared
these views. James Alcorn, the prominent north Mississippi politician (and
opponent of secession), hoped the state would support new enterprises. He
observed, “The wealth of a State consists in the property and intelligence of
her people; every intelligent proposition which has for its object the increase
of knowledge, or the enhancement of aggregate wealth, should receive the
calm judgment of the Legislature.”
Merchants, traders, and other townsfolk also applauded diversification,
and their views were reflected in the Whig press. The Milledgeville, Georgia,
Southern Recorder noted in 1843 that “our climate, the face of our country, our
copious and unfailing water power, the abundant supply of raw materials, and
the cheap labor which we command, invite us to apply a portion of our labor
and capital to manufactures.” The Mobile Advertiser concurred, remarking in
1848 that cotton planters, “instead of investing their surplus capital in negroes
and lands, [should] invest it in manufactures.”
Spokesmen for the settlers who came from the South Carolina—Georgia
“hearth” enunciated a different outlook, one that was more in keeping with
Genovese’s depiction of the Southern economy. These individuals were proud
that Southerners were not like the hard-trading, entrepreneurial Yankees. In
1855 Alabama fire-eater William Lowndes Yancey expounded on the differ-
ences between the North and South: “The climate, the soil and productions
of these two grand divisions of the land, have made the character of their
inhabitants. Those who occupy the one are cool, calculating, enterprising, sel-
fish and grasping; the inhabitants of the other, are ardent, brave and mag-
nanimous, more disposed to give than to accumulate, to enjoy ease rather
than to labor.” Mississippi radical John F. H. Claiborne agreed. He remarked
in 1860, “Sedentary and agricultural, we cherish the homesteads and laws of
our ancestors, and live among the reminiscences of the past.” Jefferson Davis
echoed these views. During the Panic of 1857 he rejoiced in the strengths of
the Southern way. “Ours was an agricultural people, and in that consisted their
strength,” he told an audience in Jackson, Mississippi. “Their prosperity was
not at the mercy of such a commercial crisis as the one with which the country
had just been visited. Our great staple was our safety.”
Additional Resources
The literature on the causes of the Civil War is extensive. Kenneth M. Stampp, ed.,
The Causes of the Civil War (Prentice-Hall, 1965) provides a collection of primary
documents and historical interpretations by leading scholars. Other edited
volumes of scholarly interpretations can be found in William R. Brock, ed.,
The Civil War (Harper & Row, 1969); Hans L. Trefousse, ed., The Causes of the
Civil War: Institutional Failure or Human Blunder? (Holt, Rinehart and Watson,
1971); and Michael Perman, ed., The Coming of the American Civil War (3rd ed.;
350
351
YES: Mark E. Neely, Jr., from “Was the Civil War a Total War?” Civil
War History 50 (2004)
NO: James M. McPherson, from “From Limited to Total War:
Missouri and the Nation, 1861–1865,” Gateway Heritage Magazine
(vol. 12, no. 4, Spring, 1992)
Learning Outcomes
After reading the essays, you should be able to:
• Define “total war.”
• Distinguish “total war,” “unconditional surrender,” and
“modern war” from earlier types of warfare.
• List arguments for and against the Civil War as a total war and
critically analyze the validity of these arguments.
ISSUE SUMMARY
YES: Professor Mark E. Neely, Jr., argues that the Civil War was not
a total war because President Lincoln and the Union military lead-
ers, such as General William T. Sherman, respected the distinction
between soldiers and civilians, combatants and noncombatants. In
addition, the North did not fully mobilize its resources nor engage
in centralized planning and state intervention as was typical of
twentieth-century wartime economies.
NO: Professor James M. McPherson argues that the Civil War was a
total war. While conceding the distinction between combatants and
noncombatants, he insists that the war accomplished the abolition of
slavery and the extinction of a national state system—the Confederacy.
T he confusion around the issue of whether the Civil War was a total war
centers around the terms which historians use to describe the conflict. Are the
352
353
354
... T he idea of total war was first applied to the Civil War in an article about
William T. Sherman published in the Journal of Southern History in 1948: John B.
Walters’s “General William T. Sherman and Total War.”1 After this initial use
of the term, it was quickly adopted by T. Harry Williams, whose influential
book Lincoln and His Generals, published in 1952, began with this memora-
ble sentence: “The Civil War was the first of the modern total wars, and the
American democracy was almost totally unready to fight it.” Among the more
popular Civil War writers, the idea also fared well. Bruce Catton, for exam-
ple, wrote in a 1964 essay on “The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant” that “He
was fighting . . . a total war, and in a total war the enemy’s economy is to be
undermined in any way possible.” Scholarly writers continued to use the term
as well. In his masterful Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, Princeton Uni-
versity’s James M. McPherson writes, “By 1863, Lincoln’s remarkable abilities
gave him a wide edge over Davis as a war leader, while in Grant and Sherman
the North acquired commanders with a concept of total war and the necessary
determination to make it succeed.” Professor McPherson’s book forms part
of the prestigious Oxford History of the United States. In another landmark
volume, “A People’s Contest”: The Union and the Civil War (Harper & Row’s New
American Nation series), historian Phillip Shaw Paludan writes, “Grant’s war
making has come to stand for the American way of war. For one thing, that
image is one of total war demanding unconditional surrender.”2
Surely any idea about the military conduct of the Civil War that has been
championed by Williams, Catton, McPherson, and Paludan, that is embodied
in the Oxford History of the United States and in the New American Nation
series, can fairly be called accepted wisdom on the subject. Most writers on the
military history of the war, if forced to articulate a brief general description of
the nature of that conflict, would now say, as McPherson has, that the Civil
War began in 1861 with a purpose in the North “to suppress this insurrection
and restore loyal Unionists to control of the southern states. The conflict was
therefore a limited war . . . with the limited goal of restoring the status quo
ante bellum, not an unlimited war to destroy an enemy nation and reshape
its society.” Gradually, or as McPherson puts it, “willy-nilly,” the war became
“a total war rather than a limited one.” Eventually, “Union generals William
Tecumseh Sherman and Philip Sheridan saw more clearly than anyone else the
nature of modern, total war, a war between peoples rather than simply between
armies, a war in which the fighting left nothing untouched or unchanged.”
From Civil War History by Mark E. Neely, Jr., December 2004. Copyright © 2004 by Kent State
University Press. Reprinted by permission.
355
President Lincoln came to realize the nature of the military contest and “sanc-
tioned this policy of ‘being terrible’ on the enemy.” Finally, “when the Civil
War became a total war, the invading army intentionally destroyed the eco-
nomic capacity of the South to wage war.” Northern victory resulted from this
gradual realization and the subsequent application of new and harsh doctrines
in the war’s later phase. . . .
Northerner and Southerner alike have come to agree on the use of this
term, total war, but what does it mean exactly? It was never used in the Civil
War itself. Where does it come from?. . . .
Unfortunately, like many parts of everyday vocabulary, total war is a
loose term with several meanings. Since World War II, it has come to mean,
in part, a war requiring the full economic mobilization of a society. From the
start, it meant the obverse of the idea as well: making war on the economic
resources of the enemy rather than directly on its armed forces alone. Yet
there was nothing really new about attacking an enemy’s economic resources;
that was the very essence of naval blockades and they long predated the
Civil War. The crucial and terrible new aspect of the notion of total war was
embodied in the following idea, part of a definition of the term cited in the
Oxford English Dictionary: “Every citizen is in a sense a combatant and also
the object of attack.” Every systematic definition of the term embodies the
concept of destroying the ages-old distinction between civilians and soldiers,
whatever other ideas may be present. Another citation in the OED, for exam-
ple, terms it “a war to which all resources and the whole population are com-
mitted; loosely, a war conducted without any scruple or limitations.” Webster’s
. . . Unabridged dictionary describes total war as “warfare that uses all possible
means of attack, military, scientific, and psychological, against both enemy
troops and civilians.” And James Turner Johnson, in his study of Just War Tra-
dition and the Restraint of War, asserts that in total war “there must be disregard
of restraints imposed by custom, law, and morality on the prosecution of the
war. Especially, . . . total war bears hardest on noncombatants, whose tradi-
tional protection from harm according to the traditions of just and limited
warfare appears to evaporate here.”
Close application of this twentieth-century term (the product of the age
of strategic bombing and blitzkrieg and powerful totalitarian governments
capable of mobilizing science and psychology) to the Civil War seems fraught
with difficulty. Surely no one believes, for example, that the Civil War was
fought “without any scruple or limitations.” From the ten thousand plus pages
of documents in the eight full volumes of the Official Records dealing with pris-
oners of war, to the many copies of General Orders No. 100, a brief code of the
laws of war distributed throughout the Union army in 1863, evidence abounds
that this war knew careful limitation and conscientious scruple. Even World
War II followed the rules bearing on prisoners of war. Any assessment of the
Civil War’s nearness to being a total war can be no more than that: an assertion
that it approached total war in some ways. By no definition of the term can it
be said to be a total war.
Occasionally, the term total war approximates the meaning of moder-
nity. T. Harry Williams used the terms interchangeably, as in this passage from
a later work in which he hedged a bit on calling the Civil War a total war:
“Trite it may be to say that the Civil War was the first of the modern wars, but
this is a truth that needs to be repeated. If the Civil War was not quite total, it
missed totality by only a narrow margin.”
Modernity is not a very useful concept in military history. Surely every
war is thought to be modern by its participants—save possibly those fought
by Japan in the strange era when firearms were consciously rejected. As a his-
torian’s term, modern when applied to warfare has a widely accepted meaning
different from total. Modern warfare generally connotes wars fought after the
French Revolution by large citizen armies equipped with the products of the
Industrial Revolution and motivated more by ideology than the lash or strictly
mercenary considerations. The Civil War certainly was a modern war in that
sense, but it was not a total war in the sense that civilians were commonly
thought of as legitimate military targets.
Perhaps no one who maintains the Civil War was a total war means it so
literally. Historian Brian Bond provides a useful idea when he writes, “strictly
speaking, total war is just as much a myth as total victory or total peace. What
is true, however, is that the fragile barriers separating war from peace and sol-
diers from civilians—already eroded in the First World War—virtually disap-
peared between 1939 and 1945.” Seeing how often that fragile barrier broke
in the Civil War will tell how nearly it approached being a total war. All such
matters of degree contain dangers for the historian trying to answer the ques-
tion; the risk of sinking under a mass of piecemeal objections raised after-
ward by critics is very high. Even the most conservative of Civil War generals
occasionally stepped over the boundaries of customarily accepted behavior in
nineteenth-century warfare. General George B. McClellan, for example, did
so in the Peninsula campaign, after only about a year’s fighting. On May 4,
1862, he informed Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton: “The rebels have been
guilty of the most murderous & barbarous conduct in placing torpedoes [land
mines] within the abandoned works, near wells & springs, near flag staffs, mag-
azines, telegraph offices, in carpet bags, barrels of flour etc. Fortunately we
have not lost many men in this manner—some 4 or 5 killed & perhaps a dozen
wounded. I shall make the prisoners remove them at their own peril.” . . .
John B. Walters cited General Sherman’s use of prisoners to clear mines as
an example of his total war practices, but Sherman’s reaction was in fact exactly
like McClellan’s. When Sherman saw a “handsome young officer” with all the
flesh blown off one of his legs by a Confederate mine in Georgia in December
1864, he grew “very angry,” because “this was not war, but murder.” Sherman
then retaliated by using Confederate prisoners to clear the mines. What at first
may seem an incident suggesting the degeneration of warfare, in fact proves
the belief of the protagonists in rules and codes of civilized behavior that have
in the twentieth century long since vanished from the world’s battlefields. The
real point is that Union and Confederate authorities were in substantial agree-
ment about the laws of war, and they usually tried to stay within them.
Leaving aside similar isolated instances caused by temporary rage, can a
historian seeking to describe the war’s direction toward or away from total war
examine larger aspects of the war where the “fragile barriers” between soldiers
and civilians may have broken down? Since the conscious application of a
new doctrine in warfare forms part of the total war interpretation, can a his-
torian focus on certain figures in high command who held such doctrines and
applied them to the enemy in the Civil War? Throughout, can the historian
keep an eye on the dictionary definition of total war to measure the proximity
of the Civil War to it? Surely this can be done, and short of a study of the Civil
War day by day, there can hardly be any other test. . . .
Sherman is the Civil War soldier most often quoted on the subject of
total war. An article about him gave rise to this interpretation of the Civil
War, and indeed it is now widely held that, as historian John E. Marszalek has
expressed it, William T. Sherman was the “Inventor of Total Warfare.” “We
are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and must make old
and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as their organized
armies,” Sherman told Gen. Hency W. Halleck on Christmas Eve 1864. As early
as October 1862 he said, “We cannot change the hearts of these people of the
South, but we can make war so terrible . . . [and] make them so sick of war that
generations would pass away before they would again appeal to it.”3
The gift of sounding like a twentieth-century man was peculiarly Sherman’s.
Nearly every other Civil War general sounds ancient by comparison, but many
historians may have allowed themselves to be fooled by his style while ignor-
ing the substance of his campaigns.
Historians, moreover, quote Sherman selectively. In fact, he said many
things and when gathered together they do not add up to any coherent “total-
war philosophy,” as one historian describes it. Sherman was not a philosopher;
he was a general and a garrulous one at that. “He talked incessantly and more
rapidly than any man I ever saw,” Maj. John Chipman Gray reported. “It would
be easier to say what he did not talk about than what he did.” Chauncey Depew
said Sherman was “the readiest and most original talker in the United States.”
And what Sherman said during the war was often provoked by exasperating,
momentary circumstance. Therefore, he occasionally uttered frightening state-
ments. “To secure the safety of the navigation of the Mississippi River I would
slay millions,” Sherman told Gen. John A. Logan on December 21,1863. “On
that point I am not only insane, but mad . . . For every bullet shot at a steam-
boat, I would shoot a thousand 30-pounder Parrotts into even helpless towns
on Red, Oachita, Yazoo, or wherever a boat can float or soldier march.” This
statement was all the more striking, coming from a man widely reputed by
newspaper critics to be insane. On another occasion, Sherman said, “To the
petulant and persistent secessionists, why, death is mercy, and the quicker he
or she is disposed of the better” (italics added).4
In other moods and in different circumstances, Sherman could sound
as mild as Robert E. Lee. “War,” the alleged inventor of total war wrote on
April 19, 1863, “at best is barbarism, but to involve all—children, women,
old and helpless—is more than can be justified.” And he went on to cau-
tion against seizing so many stores that family necessities were endangered.
Later, in the summer of 1863 when General Sherman sent a cavalry expe-
dition toward Memphis from Mississippi, General Grant instructed him to
“impress upon the men the importance of going through the State in an
orderly manner, abstaining from taking anything not absolutely necessary for
their subsistence while travelling. They should try to create as favorable an
impression as possible upon the people.” These may seem hopeless orders
to give General Sherman, but his enthusiastic reply was this: “It will give me
excessive pleasure to instruct the Cavalry as you direct, for the Policy you
point out meets every wish of my heart.”5
Scholars who pay less heed to the seductively modern sound of
Sherman’s harsher statements and look closely instead at what he actually did
on his celebrated campaigns in Georgia and the Carolinas, find a nineteenth-
century soldier at work—certainly not a man who made war on noncombatants.
Joseph T. Glatthaar’s study of Sherman’s campaigns confirmed that, for the most
part, Sherman’s men did not physically abuse civilians who kept to themselves:
atrocities were suffered mostly by soldiers on both sides; in Georgia and the
Carolinas, Sherman’s army recovered the bodies of at least 172 Union soldiers
hanged, shot in the head at close range, with their throats slit, or “actually
butchered.” And only in South Carolina, the state blamed for starting the war,
did Sherman fail to restrain his men in their destruction of private property.
Before the idea of total war came to Civil War studies, shrewd students of
the conflict had noted the essentially nineteenth-century nature of Sherman’s
campaigns. Gamaliel Bradford’s Union Portraits, for example, written during
World War I, observed: “Events . . . have made the vandalism of Sherman seem
like discipline and order. The injury done by him seldom directly affected
anything but property. There was no systematic cruelty in the treatment of
noncombatants, and to the eternal glory of American soldiers be it recorded
that insult and abuse toward women were practically unknown during the
Civil War.”6
Though not a systematic military thinker, General Sherman did com-
pose a letter addressing the problem of noncombatants in the Civil War, and
it described his actual policies better than his frequently quoted statements
of a more sensational nature. He sent the letter to Maj. R. M. Sawyer, whom
Sherman left behind to manage Huntsville, Alabama, when he departed for
Meridian, Mississippi, early in 1864. Sherman also sent a copy to his brother,
Republican Senator John Sherman, with an eye to possible publication:
In my former letters I have answered all your questions save one, and
that relates to the treatment of inhabitants known or suspected to be
hostile or “Secesh.” This is in truth the most difficult business of our
army as it advances and occupies the Southern country. It is almost
impossible to lay down rules, and I invariably leave the whole subject
to the local commanders, but am willing to give them the benefit of
my acquired knowledge and experience. In Europe, whence we derive
our principles of war, wars are between kings or rulers through hired
armies, and not between peoples. These remain, as it were, neutral, and
sell their produce to whatever army is in possession.
Napoleon when at war with Prussia, Austria, and Russia bought
forage and provisions of the inhabitants and consequently had an
interest to protect the farms and factories which ministered to his
wants. In like manner the allied Armies in France could buy of the
Joseph E. Brown that the march would sever the state from the Confederacy.
“They may stand the fall of Richmond,” Sherman told Grant on September 20,
“but not of all Georgia.” At the same time he belittled the effects of mere
destruction: “the more I study the game the more I am convinced that it
would be wrong for me to penetrate much farther into Georgia without an
objective beyond. It would not be productive of much good. I can start east
and make a circuit south and back, doing vast damage to the State, but result-
ing in no permanent good” (italics added).9
Less than three weeks later, Sherman gave a rather different explanation
to Grant: “Until we can repopulate Georgia, it is useless to occupy it, but the
utter destruction of its roads, houses, and people will cripple their military
resources. By attempting to hold the roads we will lose 1,000 men monthly,
and will gain no result. I can make the march, and make Georgia howl.”
Ten days after that, he more or less combined his different arguments in
a letter to General Halleck. “This movement is not purely military or strate-
gic,” he now said, “but it will illustrate the vulnerability of the South.” Only
when Sherman’s armies arrived and “fences and corn and hogs and sheep”
vanished would “the rich planters of the Oconee and Savannah” know “what
war means.” He spoke more tersely to his subordinates. “I want to prepare for
my big raid,” he explained on October 19 to a colonel in charge of supply, and
with that Sherman arranged to send his impedimenta to the rear.
With plans more or less set, Sherman explained to Gen. George Thomas,
who would be left to deal with Confederate Gen. John Bell Hood’s army, “I pro-
pose to demonstrate the vulnerability of the South, and make its inhabitants
feel that war and individual ruin are synonymous terms.” Delays ensued and
Sherman decided to remain in place until after election day. On the twelfth he
cut his telegraph lines, and the confusing explanations of the campaign ceased
pouring out of Georgia.
Sherman did not attempt the “utter destruction” of Georgia’s “people.”
He did not really attack noncombatants directly or make any serious attempt to
destroy “the economic capacity of the south to wage war,” as one historian has
described his purpose. After capturing Atlanta, for example, Sherman moved
to capture Savannah and then attacked the symbolic capital of secession,
South Carolina. He did not attack Augusta, Georgia, which he knew to contain
“the only powder mills and factories remaining in the South.” Though he did
systematically destroy railroad lines, Sherman otherwise had little conception
of eliminating essential industries. Indeed, there were few to eliminate, for
the South, in comparison with the North, was a premodern, underdeveloped,
agrarian region where determined men with rifles were the real problem—not
the ability of the area’s industries to manufacture high-technology weapons.
Despite scorching a sixty-mile-wide swath through the Confederacy, Sherman
was never going to starve this agrarian economy into submission, either. He
had remarked in the past on how well fed and even shod the Confederate
armies were despite their backward economy.
What Sherman was doing embodied traditional geopolitical objectives in
a civil war: convincing the enemy’s people and the world that the Confederate
government and upper classes were too weak to maintain nationhood. He did
this with a “big raid.” “If we can march a well-appointed army right through
his [ Jefferson Davis’s] territory,” Sherman told Grant on November 6, 1864,
“it is a demonstration to the world, foreign and domestic, that we have a
power which Davis cannot resist.” In Battle Cry of Freedom this statement is fol-
lowed by ellipsis marks and the statement, “I can make the march, and make
Georgia howl!” But that appears to be a misquotation. In fact, Sherman went
on to say something much less vivid and scorching:
And Mr. Lincoln himself endorsed the view. In his letter congratulating
Sherman on his Christmas capture of Savannah, the president counted the
campaign “a great success” not only in affording “the obvious and immediate
military advantages” but also “in showing to the world that your army could
be divided, putting the stronger part to an important new service, and yet leav-
ing enough to vanquish the old opposing force of the whole—Hood’s army.”
This, Lincoln said, “brings those who sat in darkness, to see a great light.”
Neither Sherman nor Lincoln put the emphasis on the role of sheer destruc-
tiveness or economic deprivation. . . .
In fact, no Northerner at any time in the nineteenth century embraced
as his own the cold-blooded ideas now associated with total war. If one seeks
the earliest application of the idea (rather than the actual term) to the Civil
War, it lies perhaps in the following document, written in the midst of the
Civil War itself:
[T]hey [the U.S.] have repudiated the foolish conceit that the inhabit-
ants of this confederacy are still citizens of the United States, for they
are waging an indiscriminate war upon them all, with a savage ferocity
unknown to modern civilization. In this war, rapine is the rule: private
residences, in peaceful rural retreats, are bombarded and burnt: Grain
crops in the field are consumed by the torch and when the torch is not
convenient, careful labor is bestowed to render complete the destruc-
tion of every article of use or ornament remaining in private dwellings,
after their inhabitants have fled from the outrages of a brutal soldiery.
Mankind will shudder to hear of the tales of outrages committed
on defenceless females by soldiers of the United States now invading
our homes: yet these outrages are prompted by inflamed passions and
madness of intoxication.
The source of the idea was, of course, Confederate, and it was a high
Confederate source indeed: Jefferson Davis.
Republican president stated in his annual message to the United States Con-
gress in December 1864:
Notes
1. John B. Walters, “General William T. Sherman and Total War,” Journal of
Southern History 14 (November 1948): 447–80. See also John B. Walters,
Merchant of Terror: General Sherman and Total War (Indianapolis, Ind.:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1973). Phillip Paludan mistakes the origins of Walters’s
ideas as being a product of the Vietnam War era, ignoring the anti-Yankee
roots of the idea apparent in the earlier article. See Philip Paludan, “A
People’s Contest”: The Union and the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row,
1988), 456. Other books on Sherman embracing the total war thesis in-
clude: John G. Barrett, Sherman’s March through the Carolinas (Chapel Hill:
Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1956); Burke Davis, Sherman’s March (New
York: Random House, 1980); and James M. Reston Jr., Sherman’s March and
Viet Nam (New York: Macmillan, 1984).
2. T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1952), 3; Bruce Catton, “The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant,” in Grant,
Lee, Lincoln and the Radicals: Essays on Civil War Leadership, ed. Grady
McWhiney (New York: Harper Colophon, 1966), 8; James M. McPherson,
Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Oxford Univ. Press,
1988), 857; Paludan, “A People’s Contest,” 296.
3. OR 44:798; OR 17, 2:261.
4. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 809; John Chipman Gray and John
Codman Ropes, War Letters 1862–1865 (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin,
1927), 425, 427; Edmund Wilson, Patriotic Gore: Studies in the Literature of
the American Civil War (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1962), 205; OR 31,
3:459; OR 32, 2:281.
5. OR 24, 2:209; John Y. Simon, ed., The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, 16 vols. to
date (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1967–), 9:155, 156n.
6. Joseph T. Glatthaar, The March to the Sea and Beyond: Sherman’s Troops in the
Savannah and Carolinas Campaigns (New York: New York Univ. Press, 1985),
72–73, 127–28; Gamaliel Bradford, Union Portraits (Boston: Houghton,
Mifflin, 1916), 154n–155n, Paludan, though he says Sherman “helped
announce the coming of total war,” also states that “Sherman’s idea of
war was more description than doctrine.” Paludan, “A People’s Contest.”
291, 302.
7. Rachel Sherman Thorndike, ed., The Sherman Letters: Correspondence be-
tween General and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891 (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1894), 228–30.
8. Ibid. 175–76,181–82,185; M. A. DeWolfe Howe, ed., Home Letters of General
Sherman (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1909), 209.
9. OR 39, 2:412.
A few years after the Civil War, Mark Twain described that great conflict
as having “uprooted institutions that were centuries old, changed the politics
of a people, transformed the social life of half the country, and wrought so
profoundly upon the entire national character that the influence cannot be
measured short of two or three generations.” This profound transformation
was achieved at enormous cost in lives and property. Fully one-quarter of the
white men of military age in the Confederacy lost their lives. And that terrible
toll does not include an unknown number of civilian deaths in the South.
Altogether nearly 4 percent of the Southern people, black and white, civilians
and soldiers, died as a consequence of the war. This percentage exceeded the
human cost of any country in World War I and was outstripped only by the
region between the Rhine and the Volga in World War II. The amount of prop-
erty and resources destroyed in the Confederate States is almost incalculable.
It has been estimated at two-thirds of all assessed wealth, including the market
value of slaves.
This is the negative side of that radical transformation described by Mark
Twain. The positive side included preservation of the United States as a unified
nation, the liberation of four million slaves, and the abolition by constitu-
tional amendment of the institution of bondage that had plagued the nation
since the beginning, inhibited its progress, and made a mockery of the libertar-
ian values on which it was founded. No other society in history freed so many
slaves in so short a time—but also at such a cost in violence.
The Civil War mobilized human resources on a scale unmatched by any
other event in American history except, perhaps, World War II. For actual com-
bat duty the Civil War mustered a considerably larger proportion of American
manpower than did World War II. And, in another comparison with that glo-
bal conflict, the victorious power in the Civil War did all it could to devas-
tate the enemy’s economic resources as well as the morale of its home-front
population, which was considered almost as important as enemy armies in the
war effort. In World War II this was done by strategic bombing; in the Civil
War it was done by cavalry and infantry penetrating deep into the Confeder-
ate heartland.
Reprinted with permission from Gateway Heritage Magazine, vol. 12, no. 4, Spring, 1992.
Courtesy of the Missouri History Museum, St. Louis, MO.
366
truce between Union and Confederate factions that had followed the riots and
fighting in May 1861 broke down a month later when the Union commander
Nathaniel Lyon rejected a compromise with pro-Confederate elements, which
included the governor, with these words: “Rather than concede to the State of
Missouri for one single instant the right to dictate to my Government in any
matter . . . I would see you . . . and every man, woman, and child in the State,
dead and buried.”
These statements certainly sound like total war, war without limits or
restraints. But of course none of the scenarios sketched out in these quotations
literally came true—not even in Missouri, where reality came closer to rhetoric
than anywhere else. Therefore, those who insist that the Civil War was not
a total war appear to have won their case, at least semantically. Recognizing
this, a few historians have sought different adjectives to describe the kind of
conflict the Civil War became: One uses the phrase “destructive war”; another
prefers “hard war.”
But these phrases, though accurate, do not convey the true dimensions
of devastation in the Civil War. All wars are hard and destructive in some
degree; what made the Civil War distinctive in the American experience? It
was that overwhelming involvement of the whole population, the shocking
loss of life, the wholesale devastation and radical social and political transfor-
mations that it wrought. In the experience of Americans, especially Southern-
ers, this approached totality; it seemed total. Thus the concept, and label, of
total war remains a useful one. It is what the sociologist Max Weber called an
“ideal type”—a theoretical model used to measure a reality that never fully
conforms to the model, but that nevertheless remains a useful tool for analyz-
ing the reality.
That is the sense in which this essay will analyze the evolution of the
Civil War from a limited to a total war. Despite that fierce rhetoric of destruc-
tion quoted earlier, the official war aims of both sides in 1861 were quite
limited. In his first message to the Confederate Congress after the firing
on Fort Sumter by his troops had provoked war, Jefferson Davis declared
that “we seek no conquest, no aggrandizement, no concession of any kind
from the States with which we were lately confederated; all we ask is to be
let alone.” As for the Union government, its initial conception of the war
was one of a domestic insurrection, an uprising against national authority
by certain lawless hotheads who had gained temporary sway over the oth-
erwise law-abiding citizens of a few Southern states—or as Lincoln put it
in his proclamation calling out seventy-five thousand state militia to put
down the uprising, “combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the
ordinary course of judicial proceedings.” This was a strategy of limited war—
indeed, so limited that it was scarcely seen as a war at all, but rather as a
police action to quell a large riot. It was a strategy founded on an assump-
tion of residual loyalty among the silent majority of Southerners. Once the
national government demonstrated its firmness by regaining control of its
forts and by blockading Southern ports, those presumed legions of Unionists
would come to the fore and bring their states back into the Union. To cul-
tivate this loyalty, and to temper firmness with restraint, Lincoln promised
that the federalized ninety-day militia would avoid “any devastation, any
destruction of, or interference with, property, or any disturbance of peaceful
citizens.”
None other than William Tecumseh Sherman echoed these sentiments
in the summer of 1861. Commander of a brigade that fought at Bull Run,
Sherman deplored the marauding tendencies of his poorly disciplined soldiers.
“No curse could be greater than invasion by a volunteer army,” he wrote. “No
Goths or Vandals ever had less respect for the lives and properties of friends
and foes, and henceforth we should never hope for any friends in Virginia. . . .
My only hope now is that a common sense of decency may be infused into this
soldiery to respect life and property.”
The most important and vulnerable form of Southern property was
slaves. The Lincoln administration went out of its way to reassure Southerners
in 1861 that it had no designs on slavery. Congress followed suit, passing by
an overwhelming majority in July 1861 a resolution affirming that Union war
aims included no intention “of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or
established institutions of the States”—in plain words, slavery—but intended
only “to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and to pre-
serve the Union with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States
unimpaired.”
There were, to be sure, murmurings in the North against this soft-war
approach, this “kid-glove policy.” Abolitionists and radical Republicans insisted
that a rebellion sustained by slavery in defense of slavery could be crushed only
by striking against slavery. As Frederick Douglass put it: “To fight against Sla-
veholders, without fighting against slavery, is but a half-hearted business, and
paralyzes the hands engaged in it. . . . Fire must be met with water. War for
the destruction of liberty must be met with war for the destruction of slavery.”
Several Union soldiers and their officers, some with no previous antislavery
convictions, also began to grumble about protecting the property of traitors in
arms against the United States.
The first practical manifestation of such sentiments came in Missouri.
Thus began a pattern whereby events in that state set the pace for the transfor-
mation from a limited to a total war, radiating eastward and southward from
Missouri. The commander of the Western Department of the Union army in
the summer of 1861, with headquarters at St. Louis, was John C. Frémont,
famed explorer of the West, first Republican presidential candidate (in 1856),
and now ambitious for military glory. Handicapped by his own administra-
tive incompetence, bedeviled by a Confederate invasion of southwest Missouri
that defeated and killed Nathaniel Lyon at Wilson’s Creek on August 10 and
then marched northward to the Missouri River, and driven to distraction by
Confederate guerrilla bands that sprang up almost everywhere, Frémont on
August 30 took a bold step toward total war. He placed the whole state of
Missouri under martial law, announced the death penalty for guerrillas cap-
tured behind Union lines, and confiscated the property and emancipated the
slaves of Confederate activists.
Northern radicals applauded, but conservatives shuddered and border-
state Unionists expressed outrage. Still pursuing a strategy of trying to cultivate
Southern Unionists as the best way to restore the Union, Lincoln feared that
the emancipation provision of Frémont’s edict would
alarm our Southern Union friends, and turn them against us—perhaps
ruin our rather fair prospect for Kentucky. . . . To lose Kentucky is nearly
the same as to lose the whole game. Kentucky gone, we can not hold
Missouri, nor, as I think, Maryland. These all against us, and the job on
our hands is too large for us. We would as well consent to separation at
once, including the surrender of this capitol.
soldiers as Nathan Bedford Forrest’s troops did at almost the same time in the
more famous Fort Pillow massacre in Tennessee.
Confederate guerrillas had no monopoly on atrocities and scorched-earth
practices in Missouri. The Seventh Kansas Cavalry—“Jennison’s Jayhawkers”—
containing many abolitionists including a son of John Brown, seemed deter-
mined to exterminate rebellion and slaveholders in the most literal manner.
The Union commander in western Missouri where guerrilla activity was most
rife, Thomas Ewing, issued his notorious Order No. 11 after Quantrill’s raid
to Lawrence. Order No. 11 forcibly removed thousands of families from four
Missouri counties along the Kansas border and burned their farms to deny the
guerrillas the sanctuary they had enjoyed in this region. Interestingly, Ewing
was William T. Sherman’s brother-in-law. In fact, most of the Union command-
ers who subsequently became famous as practitioners of total war spent part
of their early Civil War careers in Missouri—including Grant, Sherman, and
Sheridan. This was more than coincidence. What they saw and experienced in
that state helped to predispose them toward a conviction that, in Sherman’s
words, “we are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people” and must
make them “feel the hard hand of war.”
That conviction took root and began to grow among the Northern peo-
ple and their leaders in the summer of 1862. Before then, for several months
in the winter and spring, Union forces had seemed on the verge of winning
the war without resorting to such measures. The capture of Forts Henry and
Donelson, the victories at Mill Springs in Kentucky, Pea Ridge in Arkansas, Shiloh
in Tennessee, Roanoke Island and New Bern in North Carolina, the capture of
Nashville, New Orleans, and Memphis, the expulsion of organized Confederate
armies from Missouri, Kentucky, and West Virginia, the Union occupation of
much of the lower Mississippi Valley and a large part of the state of Tennessee,
and the advance of the splendidly equipped Army of the Potomac to within five
miles of Richmond in May 1862 seemed to herald the Confederacy’s doom. But
then came counteroffensives by Stonewall Jackson and Robert E. Lee in Virginia
and by Braxton Bragg and Kirby Smith in Tennessee, which took Confederate
armies almost to the Ohio River and across the Potomac River by September 1862.
Those deceptively easy Union advances and victories in early 1862 had
apparently confirmed the validity of a limited-war strategy. Grant’s capture
of Forts Henry and Donelson, for example, had convinced him that the Con-
federacy was a hollow shell about to collapse. But when the rebels regrouped
and counterpunched so hard at Shiloh that they nearly whipped him, Grant
changed his mind. He now “gave up all idea,” he later wrote, “of saving the
Union except by complete conquest.” Conmplete conquest meant not merely
the occupation of territory, but also the crippling or destruction of Confeder-
ate armies. For if these armies remained intact they could reconquer territory,
as they did in the summer of 1862. Grant’s new conception of the war also
included the seizure or destruction of any property or other resources used to
sustain the Confederate war effort. Before those Southern counteroffensives,
Grant said that he had been careful “to protect the property of the citizens
whose territory was invaded”; afterwards his policy became to “consume
everything that could be used to support or supply armies.”
longer play a game in which it stakes all, and its enemies stake nothing.
Those enemies must understand that they cannot experiment for ten
years trying to destroy the government, and if they fail still come back
into the Union unhurt.
Using one of his favorite metaphors, Lincoln warned Southern whites that
“broken eggs cannot be mended.” The rebels had already cracked the egg of
slavery by their own rash behavior; the sooner they gave up and ceased the
insurrection, “the smaller will be the amount of [eggs] which will be past
mending.”
William Tecumseh Sherman eventually became the foremost military
spokesman for remorseless war and the most effective general in carrying
it out. Sherman too had spent part of the winter of 1861–1862 in Missouri
where he stored up impressions of guerrilla ferocity. Nonetheless, even as late
as July 1862, as commander of Union occupation forces around Memphis,
he complained of some Northern troops who took several mules and horses
from farmers. Such “petty thieving and pillaging,” he wrote, “does us infinite
harm.” This scarcely sounds like the Sherman that Southerners love to hate.
But his command problems in western Tennessee soon taught him what his
brother-in-law Thomas Ewing was also learning about guerrillas and the civil-
ian population that sheltered them across the river in Arkansas and Missouri.
Nearly every white man, woman, and child in Sherman’s district seemed to
hate the Yankees and to abet the bushwhackers who fired into Union supply
boats on the river, burned railroad bridges and ripped up the tracks, attacked
Union picket outposts, ambushed Northern soldiers unless they moved in
large groups, and generally raised hell behind Union lines. Some of the cavalry
troopers who rode with Nathan Bedford Forrest and John Hunt Morgan on
devastating raids behind Union lines also functioned in the manner of guerril-
las, fading away to their homes and melting into the civilian population after
a raid.
These operations convinced Sherman to take off the gloves. The distinc-
tion between enemy civilians and soldiers grew blurred. After fair warning,
Sherman burned houses and sometimes whole villages in western Tennessee
that he suspected of harboring snipers and guerrillas. The Union army, he now
said, must act “on the proper rule that all in the South are enemies of all in the
North. . . . The whole country is full of guerrilla bands. . . . The entire South,
man, woman, and child, is against us, armed and determined.” This convic-
tion governed Sherman’s subsequent operations which left smoldering ruins
in his track from Vicksburg to Meridian, from Atlanta to the sea, and from the
sea to Goldsboro, North Carolina.
When Mississippians protested, Sherman told them that they were lucky
to get off so lightly: A commander
may take your house, your fields, your everything, and turn you all
out, helpless, to starve. It may be wrong, but that don’t alter the case.
In war you can’t help yourselves, and the only possible remedy is to
stop the war. . . . Our duty is not to build up; it is rather to destroy both
the rebel army and whatever of wealth or property it has founded its
boasted strength upon.
When Confederate General John Bell Hood charged him with barba-
rism for expelling the civilian population from Atlanta, Sherman gave Hood
a tongue-lashing. Accusations of barbarity, he said, came with a fine irony
from “you who, in the midst of peace and prosperity, have plunged a nation
into war . . . who dared and badgered us to battle, insulted our flag . . . turned
loose your privateers to plunder unarmed ships, expelled Union families by
the thousands [and] burned their houses. . . . Talk thus to the marines, but not
to me, who have seen these things.” Sherman vowed to “make Georgia howl”
in his march from Atlanta to Savannah, and afterwards expressed satisfaction
with having done so. He estimated the damage to Confederate resources “at
$100,000,000; at least $20,000,000 of which has inured to our advantage, and
the remainder is simple waste and destruction.” And this turned out to be
mere child’s play compared with what awaited South Carolina.
Sherman was convinced that not only the economic resources but also
the will of Southern civilians sustained the Confederate war effort. His cam-
paigns of devastation were intended to break that will as much as to destroy
the resources. This is certainly a feature of modern total war; Sherman was a
pioneer in the concept of psychological warfare as part of a total war against
the whole enemy population. Sherman was well aware of the fear that his
soldiers inspired among Southern whites. This terror “was a power,” he wrote,
“and I intended to utilize it . . . to humble their pride, to follow them to their
inmost recesses, and to make them fear and dread us. . . . We cannot change
the hearts and minds of those people of the South, but we can make war so
terrible . . . [and] make them so sick of war that generations would pass away
before they would again appeal to it.”
This strategy seemed to work; Sherman’s destruction not only deprived
Confederate armies of desperately needed supplies; it also crippled morale
both on the home front and in the army. Numerous soldiers deserted from
Confederate armies in response to letters of despair from home in the wake
of Sherman’s juggernaut. One Southern soldier wrote after the march through
Georgia: “I hev conckludud that the dam fulishness uv tryin to lick shurmin
Had better be stoped, we have gettin nuthin but hell & lots uv it ever since we
saw the dam yankys & I am tirde uv it . . . thair thicker than lise on a hen and
a dam site ornraier.” After the march through South Carolina, a civilian in that
state wrote: “All is gloom, despondency, and inactivity. Our army is demoral-
ized and the people panic stricken. To fight longer seems to be madness.”
Philip Sheridan carried out a similar policy of scorched earth in the
Shenandoah Valley. Interestingly, Sheridan too had spent most of the war’s
first year in Missouri. There as well as subsequently in Tennessee and Virginia
he saw the ravages of Confederate guerrillas, and responded as Sherman did. If
guerrilla operations and Union counterinsurgency activities in Virginia during
1864 were slightly less vicious than in Missouri, it was perhaps only because
the proximity of Washington and Richmond and of large field armies imposed
some restraint. Nevertheless, plenty of atrocities piled up in John Singleton
Mosby’s Confederacy just east of the Blue Ridge and in the Shenandoah Valley
to the west. In retaliation, and with a purpose similar to Sherman’s to destroy
the Valley’s resources which helped supply Lee’s army, Sheridan carried out a
campaign of devastation that left nothing to sustain Confederate armies or
even to enable the Valley’s inhabitants to get through the winter. In little more
than a week, wrote Sheridan in one of his reports, his army had “destroyed
over 2,000 barns filled with wheat, hay, and farming implements; over seventy
mills filled with flour and wheat; have driven in front of the army over 4,000
head of stock, and have killed and issued to the troops not less than 3,000
sheep.” That was just the beginning, Sheridan promised. By the time he was
through, “the Valley, from Winchester up to Staunton, ninety-two miles, will
have little in it for man or beast.”
Several years later, while serving as an American observer at German
headquarters during the Franco-Prussian War, Sheridan lectured his hosts on
the correct way to wage war. The “proper strategy,” said Sheridan, consisted
first of “inflicting as telling blows as possible on the enemy’s army, and then in
causing the inhabitants so much suffering that they must long for peace, and
force the government to demand it. The people must be left nothing but their
eyes to weep with over the war.”
Abraham Lincoln is famed for his compassion; he issued many pardons
and commuted many sentences of execution; the concluding passage of his
second inaugural address, beginning “With malice toward none; with charity
for all,” is one of his most familiar utterances. Lincoln regretted the devasta-
tion and suffering caused by the army’s scorched-earth policy in the South.
Yet he had warned Southerners in 1862 that the longer they fought, the more
eggs would be broken. He would have agreed with Sherman’s words to a South-
erner: “You brought all this on yourselves.” In 1864, after the march to the
sea, Lincoln officially conveyed to Sherman’s army the “grateful acknowledg-
ments” of the nation; to Sheridan he offered the “thanks of the nation, and
my own personal admiration, for [your] operations in the Shenandoah Val-
ley.” And while the words in the second inaugural about malice toward none
and charity for all promised a generous peace, the victory that must precede
that peace could be achieved only by hard war—indeed, by total war. Consider
these words from the second inaugural:
The kind of conflict the Civil War had become merits the label of
total war. To be sure, Union soldiers did not set out to kill Southern civil-
ians. Sherman’s bummers destroyed property; Allied bombers in World War II
destroyed hundreds of thousands of lives as well. But the strategic purpose of
both was the same: to eliminate the resources and break the will of the people
to sustain war. White people in large parts of the Confederacy were indeed left
with “nothing but their eyes to weep with.” This was not pretty; it was not glo-
rious; it did not conform to the image of war held by most Americans in 1861
of flags waving, bands playing, and people cheering on a spring afternoon.
But as Sherman himself put it, in a speech to young men of a new generation
fifteen years after the Civil War, the notion that war is glorious was nothing
but moonshine. “When . . . you come down to the practical realities, boys,”
said Sherman, “war is all hell.”
378
Additional Resources
The literature on the Civil War is enormous. Just about all the essays in the sym-
posium On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars
of Unification, 1861–1871, edited by Stig Forster and Jorg Nagler (Cambridge
University Press, 1997), are worth reading for both an American and compara-
tive perspective. Two older essays provide a detailed look and ask the right
questions about military tactics and strategy as well as bottom-up social his-
tory questions about the role of the average Civil War soldier. See Marvin R.
Cain, “A ‘Face of Battle’ Needed: An Assessment of Motives and Men in Civil
War Historiography,” Civil War History 28 (1982); and Joseph T. Glatthaar, “The
‘New’ Civil War History,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography
65 (July, 1991). Other essays on an important related question can be found
in “Why the South Lost the Civil War: Ten Experts Explain the Fall of Dixie,”
American History (October, 1995).
James M. McPherson is the dean of Civil War history. In addition to his
Battle Cry of Freedom (Oxford, 1998), the Princeton professor has published
numerous critical review essays for The New York Review of Books which are
conveniently collected in Drawn with the Sword (Oxford, 1996) and This Mighty
Scourge (Oxford, 2007).
379
380
381
Learning Outcomes
After reading this issue, you should be able to:
• Evaluate the criteria historians use to assess presidential
performance.
• Analyze Lincoln’s leadership from the perspective of the con-
cept of the “imperial presidency.”
• Identify and assess Lincoln’s policies as a wartime president.
• Summarize the major points of criticism of Lincoln’s
presidency.
ISSUE SUMMARY
382
383
384
T he oath is a simple one, made all the more austere because there is no
coronation, no anointing by priest or predecessor. The office has passed from
one person to another months before, first by popular election and then by a
ritualistic casting of votes by presidential electors, whose names are forgotten
if anyone knew them in the first place. The only requirement on the day the
president takes office is an oath or affirmation: “I do solemnly swear that I will
faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the
best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States.”
Each president in the history of the nation has tried to protect and defend
the Constitution—some with more dedication than others. Each responded to
the challenges and the opportunity that his time gave him. No president had
larger challenges than Abraham Lincoln, and the testimony to his greatness
rests in his keeping of that oath, which led him to be responsible for two enor-
mous accomplishments that are part of folk legend as well as fact. He saved the
Union and he freed the slaves.
He preserved the unity of the nation both in size and in structure. There
were still thirty-six states at the end of his presidency; there might have been
twenty-five. The population of the nation when he died was 30 million; it
might have been 20 million. The constitutional instrument for changing gov-
ernments was still in 1865 what it had been in 1861—win a free election and
gain the majority of the electoral votes. Another option might have existed—
secede from the country and make war if necessary after losing the election.
A divided nation might have been more easily divided again—perhaps when
angry westerners felt exploited by eastern capitalists, perhaps when urban
minorities felt oppressed by powerful majorities. And there were lasting inter-
national consequences from Lincoln’s achievement: Foreign oppressors of the
twentieth century were not allowed to run free, disregarding the two or per-
haps three or four countries that might have existed between Canada and
Mexico.
Because of Lincoln, 4 million black Americans gained options beyond a
life of slavery for themselves and their children. Men, women, and children
were no longer bought and sold, denied their humanity—because of Lincoln,
From The Presidency of Abraham Lincoln by Philip Shaw Paludan (University Press of Kansas,
1994), pp. xiii–xvii, 315–319. Copyright © 1994 by University Press of Kansas. Reprinted by
permission.
385
but certainly not because of Lincoln alone. Perhaps 2 million Union soldiers
fought to achieve these goals. Women behind the lines and near the battle-
fields did jobs that men would not or could not do. Workers on farms and in
factories supplied the huge army and the society that sustained it. Managers
and entrepreneurs organized the resources that helped gain the victory. But
Lincoln’s was the voice that inspired and explained and guided soldiers and
civilians to continue the fight.
Black soldiers, too, preserved the Union and freed slaves. And these black
soldiers were in the army because Lincoln wanted them there, accepted the
demands of black and white abolitionists and growing numbers of soldiers
and sailors that they be there. Hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of
slaves, given the chance, walked away from slavery and thus “stole” from their
masters the labor needed to sustain the Confederacy and the ability of those
masters to enslave them. No one would ever again sell their children, their
husbands, their wives; no one would rape and murder and mutilate them,
control their work and much of their leisure.
Lincoln kept his oath by leading the nation, guiding it, insisting that it
keep on with the task of saving the Union and freeing the slaves.
Too often historians and the general populace (which cares very much,
and may define itself in vital ways by what Lincoln did and means) have
divided his two great achievements. They have made saving the Union, at least
for the first half of his presidency, a different task from freeing the slaves. They
have noted that Lincoln explained to Horace Greeley that he could not answer
Greeley’s “Prayer of Twenty Million” and simply free the slaves. His prime
goal, he told Greeley, was to save the Union, and he would free none, some,
or all the slaves to save that Union. But before Lincoln wrote those words he
had already decided that to save the Union he would have to free the slaves.
. . . Freeing the slaves and saving the Union were linked as one goal, not
two optional goals. The Union that Lincoln wanted to save was not a union
where slavery was safe. He wanted to outlaw slavery in the territories and thus
begin a process that would end it in the states. Slave states understood this;
that is why they seceded and why the Union needed saving.
Freeing the slaves, more precisely ending slavery, was the indispensable
means to saving the Union. In an immediate practical sense, those 180,000
black soldiers were an essential part of the Union army in the last two years
of the war. They made up almost 12 percent of the total Union land forces by
1865, adding not only to Union numbers but subtracting from the Confeder-
ate labor force. Moreover, those black soldiers liberated even where they did
not march. Their example was noted throughout the South so that slaves far
from Union occupation knew that blacks could be soldiers, not just property,
and they began to march toward freedom.
Ending slavery also meant saving the Union in a larger sense. Slavery had
endangered the Union, hurting black people but also hurting white people,
and not only by allowing them to be brutes, as Jefferson had lamented. Slavery
had divided the nation, threatening the processes of government by making
debate over the most crucial issue of the age intolerable in the South and, for
decades, dangerous in the Congress of the United States. To protect slavery the
Put the case that the same multitude were addressed by two orators,
and on the same question and occasion; that the first of these orators
considered in his mind that the people he addressed were to be con-
trolled by several passions . . . the orator may be fairly said to have no
faith in the people; he rather believes that they are creatures of passion,
and subject to none but base and selfish impulses. But now a second
orator arises, a Chatham, a Webster, a Pericles, a Clay; his generous
spirit expands itself through the vast auditory, and he believes that he
is addressing a company of high spirited men, citizens. . . . When he
says “fellow citizens,” they believe him, and at once, from a tumultu-
ous herd they are converted into men . . . their thoughts and feeling
At their best American presidents recognize that their duty as the chief
opinion maker is to shape a public understanding that opens options and tells
the truth about what the people can be and what their problems are. Appeal-
ing to the fears we have, manipulating them to win office or pass a law or
achieve another goal, does not so much reflect who we are as it in fact creates
who we are. It affirms us as legitimately fearful—afraid of something that our
leaders confirm to be frightening—and as being citizens whose fears properly
define us.
Appealing to better angels is more complicated—it requires calling on
history for original aspirations—reminding Americans for example that the
basic ideal of the nation is that “all men are created equal.” Equally vital,
such an appeal also requires reminding Americans that they have in fact estab-
lished institutions that work to that end—not only reminding them of their
aspirations but also reassuring them that their history, their lived experience,
reveals legitimate paths to achieving those goals. History thus acts to recall
the nation’s best dreams, but it also restores faith that the means to approach
the dream live, abide in the institutions as well as in the values that shape the
nation.
I believe that a history of the presidency of Abraham Lincoln can show
how Lincoln managed to shape a public understanding, how at times he failed,
but how he usually succeeded. Thus he set a standard that makes it legiti-
mate that we, when the better angels of our nature prevail, define ourselves
in important ways by who Lincoln was, by what he did, and by what he said.
The Lincoln presidency did not end through the operation of the political-
constitutional system. There was no joyous ritual, no abiding process that had
gone on for generations. It was the first assassination of a president in history.
A single bullet erased the decision by the people of the Union that Abraham
Lincoln should be their president. It was stunning, an awful repudiation of the
system that helped define them as a people, that they had been fighting for
over the last four years, that had cost them such blood and treasure.
Yet the process endured. Reacting to the murder of the president news-
papers throughout the country spoke of the need to “let law and order resume
their sway,” as the San Francisco Chronicle noted. “The law must reign supreme,”
the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin declared, “or in this great crisis chaos will over-
whelm us, and our own maddening feeling bring upon us national wreck and
ruin which traitor arms have failed to accomplish.” More specifically there was
admiration and recognition for a system that could overcome even assassina-
tion. “When Andrew Johnson was sworn in as President,” the Reverend Joseph
Thompson told a New York audience, “the Statue of Liberty that surmounts
the dome of the Capitol and was put there by Lincoln, looked down on the
city and on the nation and said ‘Our Government is unchanged—it has merely
passed from the hands of one man into those of another.’”
The words reflected part of a larger legacy. The Union was saved, and
thus the political-constitutional process endured—the nation would change
governments, settle controversies, and debate alternatives at the polls, in legis-
lative halls, and in courtrooms, not on bloody battlefields. It would be a nation
whose size and diversity gave it wealth and opportunities for its citizens and
huge potential influence in the world. Future autocrats would have reason to
fear that influence, just as future immigrants would be drawn to it. Its power
would not always be used well. Native Americans who “obstructed” national
mission, foreign governments deemed “un-American” had reason to fear and
to protest against invasions of their rights and the destruction of their people.
But within the nation itself, because of what it stood for and fought for and
preserved, there remained a conscience that could be appealed to in the name
of the ideals it symbolized and had demonstrated in its greatest war. Saving the
Union had meant killing slavery.
Slavery was dead. Its power to divide the Union, to erode and destroy con-
stitutional and political debate was over. No longer was the highest court in the
land able to rule that under the Constitution black people had no rights that
white people had to respect and that no political party legally could say other-
wise. No longer could men, women, and children be bought and sold: treated
as things without ties to each other, without the capacity to fulfill their own
dreams. The Thirteenth Amendment, ending slavery throughout the nation
and moving through the states toward ratification, ensured that. And in the
van of that amendment came protection for civil rights and suffrage. Blacks
were promised that they would enter the political arena and the constitutional
system—this time as participants, not as objects.
This more perfect Union was achieved chiefly through an extraordinary
outreach of national authority. Certainly Lincoln extended presidential power
beyond any limits seen before his time—the war demanded that; Congress
agreed, the Supreme Court acquiesced, and the people sustained his power.
If one compares Lincoln’s use of power with executive actions before 1861,
popular and even scholarly use of a word such as “dictatorship” makes lim-
ited sense. Lincoln had produced, as Edwin S. Corwin observes, “a complete
transformation in the President’s role as Commander in Chief.” Yet war was
about the expansion of power, and Congress also stepped forward, expand-
ing national power, extending its authority. Even state governments reached
further than precedent admitted, increasing expenditures, strengthening their
police powers over health, morals, and safety, and establishing new regulatory
agencies to shape the economy.
After the war public pressures demanded a return to peacetime bounda-
ries. Executive authority in most areas, once the fight between Johnson and
Congress was settled, rapidly contracted. A few outbursts of presidential influ-
ence showed that the White House was still occupied. Grant fought senators
bitterly over the Santo Domingo Treaty and presided over an effective Treaty
of Washington, which resolved claims against the British for building rebel
raiders. Hayes sent federal troops to settle labor protests and worked for civil
service reforms. Garfield, Arthur, and Harrison also kept busy; Cleveland’s
vetoes showed signs of vigor. Generally, however, the presidency declined in
power. With the exception of Grant a series of one-term presidents did little to
inspire demands that they stay in office. For the rest of the century no presi-
dent came within miles of Lincoln’s power or even close to Polk or Jackson, for
that matter. By 1886 Woodrow Wilson was able to write that national govern-
ment in the United States was “congressional government.” M. Ostrogorsky,
telling foreign audiences about America, described a lawmaking environment
in which “after the [civil] war the eclipse of the executive was complete and
definitive”; Lord Bryce told British and American audiences in 1894 that “the
domestic authority of the President is in time of peace small.” These late-
nineteenth-century images may have inspired Theodore Lowi to assert in 1992
that “by 1875 you would not know there had been a war or a Lincoln.”
But Lord Bryce had added a caveat about the president’s domestic author-
ity: In time of war, “especially in a civil war, it expands with portentous speed.”
Clearly it had been thus with Lincoln. Despite calls to retreat from the vast
domains of Civil War there is a sense in which Lincoln’s legacy of power in
the presidency survived the retreat. Certainly presidential authority, like the
national authority with which it was connected, diminished when the war was
over. But national power was still available after Appomattox and for the fun-
damental purpose that had called it forth originally: to destroy slavery and its
vestiges. The fight between Congress and Lincoln’s successor has obscured the
fact that congressional Republicans were acting in the same cause for which
Lincoln had acted. They were not recapturing power lost to the president; they
were claiming power that they had shared increasingly with Lincoln.
Before Lincoln died many of the more radical Republicans had been
attacking him for moving too slowly toward emancipation and then for
yielding too much to military necessity and Southern loyalists. After early
statements of satisfaction with Johnson they quickly came to their senses as
Johnson proved not only to be slower than Lincoln to march to their goals but
also to be a bitter racist obstructionist. Thus they fought against Johnson and
for goals that Lincoln had espoused and had used his power to try to achieve:
civil rights, education, suffrage for the freedmen. The army, which had been
the major instrument of Lincoln’s expanding egalitarianism and which looked
to its commander in chief for direction, shifted its allegiance to Congress. Sol-
diers such as Grant, whom Lincoln had charged with leading the army to save
the Union, did not think it incongruous to support Congress in its battle to
preserve the gains of war. And when legislators moved to weaken executive
power over the army with the Tenure of Office and the Command of the Army
acts, they were trying to save Lincoln’s legacy by weakening Johnson.
Although President Grant retreated on other issues, he tried to protect
former slaves from white Southerners’ efforts to restore as much of the pre-
war South as they could. Grant sent troops into Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, and South Carolina to effect the Force Acts and to destroy the Ku
Klux Klan. A vocal element in the Republican party continued to push for
federal intervention in the South in the form of national civil rights and
suffrage-enforcement laws well into the 1890s. Despite retreating from the
broadest definitions of federal power when it interpreted the Civil War amend-
ments, the Supreme Court struck down laws that kept blacks off juries, and that
denied Chinese Americans equal chances to work, and it upheld federal power
to protect blacks from political violence. The Justice Department prosecuted
thousands of election officers under this power. Local juries usually acquitted
their white neighbors, but the national prohibition remained. Because of the
Lincoln presidency the constitutional system carried promises of equality, and
the processes to bring those promises to life endured. One hundred years after
Lincoln had been awakened by the Kansas Nebraska Act to the dangers of
slavery to the constitutional system, blacks and whites would see the United
States Supreme Court strike down inequality in that system (that case would,
interestingly enough, also involve Kansas).
Not every element, even in that reformed constitutional system, prom-
ised equal justice. The Union that Lincoln and his forces had saved remained
a Union of states. Lincoln’s respect for those states, demonstrated in his com-
mitment to reconstruct them rather than to allow Congress to govern terri-
tories and in his insistence that only a constitutional amendment, ratified by
states, would secure slavery’s death, strengthened later arguments that states
should control the fate of their citizens, old and new. Lincoln’s abiding insist-
ence that the Constitution guided his actions meant that black equality could
be hindered or denied by constitutional claims of states’ rights and local self-
government. Brutal racism could find shelter in such legal arguments.
Yet the triumph and the irony of his administration resided in Lincoln’s
commitment to the Constitution; without that there would have been no
promises to keep to 4 million black Americans. Because so many Americans
cherished the Union that the Constitution forged, they made war on slave
masters and their friends, on a government that Alexander Stephens claimed
rested “on the great truth that the negro is not the equal of the white man;
that slavery . . . is his natural and normal condition.”
Without the president’s devotion to and mastery of the political-
constitutional institutions of his time, in all probability the Union would
have lacked the capacity to focus its will and its resources on defeating that
Confederacy. Without Lincoln’s unmatched ability to integrate egalitarian
ends and constitutional means he could not have enlisted the range of sup-
porters and soldiers necessary for victory. His great accomplishment was to
energize and mobilize the nation by affirming its better angels, by showing
the nation at its best: engaged in the imperative, life-preserving conversation
between structure and purpose, ideal and institution, means and ends.
392
future obligations to the Negro, slave and free. It was of course an essential
ingredient of Lincoln’s position that he make a success at being anti-Southern
or antislavery without at the same time appearing to be significantly impious
about the beginnings of the Republic (which was neither anti-Southern nor
antislavery)—or significantly pro-Negro. He was the first Northern politician
of any rank to combine these attitudes into a viable platform persona, the first
to make his moral position on slavery in the South into a part of his national
politics. It was a posture that enabled him to unite elements of the Northern
electorate not ordinarily willing to cooperate in any political undertaking. And
thus enabled him to destroy the old Democratic majority—a coalition neces-
sary to preserving the union of the states. Then came the explosion. But this
calculated posturing has had more durable consequences than secession and
the Federal confiscation of property in slaves. . . .
In the nation as a whole what moves toward fruition is a train of events
set in motion by the duplicitous rhetoric concerning the Negro that helped
make Abraham Lincoln into our first “sectional” president. Central to this
appeal is a claim to a kind of moral superiority that costs absolutely nothing
in the way of conduct. Lincoln, in insisting that the Negro was included in the
promise of the Declaration of Independence and that the Declaration bound
his countrymen to fulfill a pledge hidden in that document, seemed clearly
to point toward a radical transformation of American society. Carried within
his rejection of Negro slavery as a continuing feature of the American regime,
his assertion that the equality clause of the Declaration of Independence was
“the father of all moral principle among us,” were certain muted corollaries.
By promising that the peculiar institution would be made to disappear if can-
didates for national office adopted the proper “moral attitude” on that subject,
Lincoln recited as a litany the general terms of his regard for universal human
rights. But at the same time he added certain modifications to this high doc-
trine: modifications required by those of his countrymen to whom he hoped
to appeal, by the rigid racism of the Northern electorate, and by “what his
own feelings would admit.” The most important of these reservations was that
none of his doctrine should apply significantly to the Negro in the North. Or,
after freedom, to what he could expect in the South. It was a very broad, very
general, and very abstract principle to which he made reference. By it he could
divide the sheep from the goats, the wheat from the chaff, the patriot from
the conspirator. But for the Negro it provided nothing more than a technical
freedom, best to be enjoyed far away. Or the valuable opportunity to “root,
hog, or die.” For the sake of such vapid distinctions he urged his countrymen
to wade through seas of blood.
To be sure, this position does not push the “feelings” of that moralist
who was our sixteenth president too far from what was comfortable for him.
And it goes without saying that a commitment to “natural rights” which will
not challenge the Black Codes of Illinois, which promises something like them
for the freedman in the South, or else offers him as alternative the proverbial
“one-way-ticket to nowhere” is a commitment of empty words. It is only an
accident of political history that the final Reconstruction settlement provided
a bit more for the former slave—principally, the chance to vote Republican;
and even that “right” didn’t last, once a better deal was made available to his
erstwhile protectors. But the point is that Lincoln’s commitment was precisely
of the sort that the North was ready to make—while passing legislation to
restrict the flow of Negroes into its own territories, elaborating its own system
of segregation by race, and exploiting black labor through its representatives
in a conquered South. Lincoln’s double talk left his part of the country with a
durable heritage of pious self-congratulation. . . .
The second heading in this “case against Lincoln” involves no com-
plicated pleading. Neither will it confuse any reader who examines his record
with care. For it has to do with Lincoln’s political economy, his management
of the commercial and business life of the part of the Republic under his
authority. This material is obvious, even though it is not always connected
with the presidency of Abraham Lincoln. Nevertheless, it must be developed
at this point. For it leads directly into the more serious charges upon which
this argument depends. It is customary to deplore the Gilded Age, the era of
the Great Barbecue. It is true that many of the corruptions of the Republican
Era came to a head after Lincoln lay at rest in Springfield. But it is a matter of
fact that they began either under his direction or with his sponsorship. Mili-
tary necessity, the “War for the Union,” provided an excuse, an umbrella of
sanction, under which the essential nature of the changes being made in the
relation of government to commerce could be concealed. Of his total policy
the Northern historian Robert Sharkey has written, “Human ingenuity would
have had difficulty in contriving a more perfect engine for class and sectional
exploration, creditors finally obtaining the upper hand as opposed to debtors,
and the developed East holding the whip over the underdeveloped West and
South.” Until the South left the Union, until a High Whig sat in the White
House, none of this return to the “energetic government” of Hamilton’s design
was possible. Indeed, even in the heyday of the Federalists it had never been so
simple a matter to translate power into wealth. Now Lincoln could try again
the internal improvements of the early days in Illinois. The difference was that
this time the funding would not be restrained by political reversal or a failure
of credit. For if anything fell short, Mr. Salmon P. Chase, “the foreman” of his
“green printing office,” could be instructed “to give his paper mill another
turn.” And the inflationary policy of rewarding the friends of the government
sustained. The euphemism of our time calls this “income redistribution.” But
it was theft in 1864, and is theft today.
A great increase in the tariff and the formation of a national banking
network were, of course, the cornerstones of this great alteration in the pos-
ture of the Federal government toward the sponsorship of business. From the
beginning of the Republican Party Lincoln warned his associates not to talk
about their views on these subjects. Their alliance, he knew, was a negative
thing: a league against the Slave Power and its Northern friends. But in private
he made it clear that the hidden agenda of the Republicans would have its
turn, once the stick was in their hand. In this he promised well. Between 1861
and 1865, the tariff rose from 18.84 percent to 47.56 percent. And it stayed
above 40 percent in all but two years of the period concluded with the elec-
tion of Woodrow Wilson. Writes the Virginia historian Ludwell H. Johnson, it
the name of preserving the Union. As Clinton Rossiter has stated, Lincoln
believed there were “no limits” to his powers if he exercised them in that “holy
cause.” Gottfried Dietze compares Lincoln in this role to the Committee of
Public Safety as it operated in the French Revolution. Except for the absence
of mass executions, the results were similar. War is of course the occasion for
concentration of power and the limitation of liberties within any nation. But
an internal war, a war between states in a union of states, is not like a war to
repel invasion or to acquire territory. For it is an extension into violence of a
domestic political difference. And it is thus subject to extraordinary abuses of
authority—confusions or conflations of purpose which convert the effort to
win the war into an effort to effect even larger, essentially political changes
in the structure of government. War, in these terms, is not only an engine for
preserving the Union; it is also an instrument for transforming its nature. But
without overdeveloping this structure of theory, let us shore it up with spe-
cific instances of presidential misconduct by Lincoln: abuses that mark him
as our first imperial president. Lincoln began his tenure as a dictator when
between April 12 and July 4 of 1861, without interference from Congress,
he summoned militia, spent millions, suspended law, authorized recruiting,
decreed a blockade, defied the Supreme Court, and pledged the nation’s credit.
In the following months and years he created units of government not known
to the Constitution and officers to rule over them in “conquered” sections
of the South, seized property throughout both sections, arrested upwards of
twenty thousand of his political enemies and confined them without trial in a
Northern “Gulag,” closed over three hundred newspapers critical of his policy,
imported an army of foreign mercenaries (of perhaps five hundred thousand
men), interrupted the assembly of duly elected legislatures and employed the
Federal hosts to secure his own reelection—in a contest where about thirty-
eight thousand votes, if shifted, might have produced an armistice and a nego-
tiated peace under a President McClellan. To the same end he created a state in
West Virginia, arguing of this blatant violation of the explicit provisions of the
Constitution that it was “expedient.” But the worst of this bold and ruthless
dealing (and I have given but a very selective list of Lincoln’s “high crimes”)
has to do with his role as military leader per se: as the commander and selec-
tor of Northern generals, chief commissary of the Federal forces, and head of
government in dealing with the leaders of an opposing power. In this role the
image of Lincoln grows to be very dark—indeed, almost sinister.
The worst that we may say of Lincoln is that he led the North in war
so as to put the domestic political priorities of his political machine ahead
of the lives and the well-being of his soldiers in the field. The appointment
of the venal Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania as his secretary of war, and of
lesser hacks and rascals to direct the victualing of Federal armies, was part of
this malfeasance. By breaking up their bodies, the locust hoard of contractors
even found a profit in the Union dead. And better money still in the living.
They made of Lincoln (who winked at their activities) an accessory to lost
horses, rotten meat, and worthless guns. But all such mendacity was noth-
ing in comparison to the price in blood paid for Lincoln’s attempts to give
the nation a genuine Republican hero. He had a problem with this project
throughout the entire course of the war. That is, until Grant and Sherman
“converted” to radicalism. Prior to their emergence all of Lincoln’s “loyal”
generals disapproved of either his politics or of his character. These, as with
McClellan, he could use and discharge at will. Or demote to minor tasks. One
thinks immediately of George G. Meade—who defeated Lee at Gettysburg, and
yet made the mistake of defining himself as the defender of a separate North-
ern nation from whose soil he would drive a foreign Southern “invader.” Or
of Fitz John Porter, William B. Franklin, and Don Carlos Buell—all scapegoats
thrown by Lincoln to the radical wolves. In place of these heterodox profes-
sionals, Lincoln assigned such champions of the “new freedom” as Nathaniel
P. (“Commissary”) Banks, Benjamin F. (“Beast”) Butler, John C. Fremont, and
John A. McClernand. Speaking in summary despair of these appointments
(and adding to my list, Franz Sigel and Lew Wallace), General Henry Halleck,
Lincoln’s chief-of-staff, declared that they were “little better than murder.” Yet
in the East, with the Army of the Potomac, Lincoln made promotions even
more difficult to defend, placing not special projects, divisions, and brigades
but entire commands under the authority of such “right thinking” incompe-
tents as John Pope (son of an old crony in Illinois) and “Fighting Joe” Hooker.
Or with that “tame” Democrat and late favorite of the radicals, Ambrose E.
Burnside. Thousands of Northern boys lost their lives in order that the Repub-
lican Party might experience rejuvenation, to serve its partisan goals. And
those were “party supremacy within a Northern dominated Union.” A Demo-
cratic “man-on-horseback” could not serve those ends, however faithful to
“the Constitution as it is, and the Union as it was” (the motto of the Demo-
crats) they might be. For neither of these commitments promised a Republican
hegemony. To provide for his faction both security and continuity in office,
Lincoln sounded out his commanders in correspondence (much of which still
survives), suborned their military integrity, and employed their focus in purely
political operation. Writes Johnson:
All Lincoln asked of the ordinary Billy Yank was that he be prepared
to give himself up to no real purpose—at least until Father Abraham found
a general with the proper moral and political credentials to lead him on to
Richmond. How this part of Lincoln’s career can be reconciled to the myth of
the “suffering savior” I cannot imagine.
We might dwell for some time on what injury Lincoln did to the dignity
of his office through the methods he employed in prosecuting the war. It was
no small thing to disavow the ancient Christian code of “limited war,” as did
his minions, acting in his name. However, it is enough in this connection to
remember his policy of denying medicines to the South, even for the sake
of Northern prisoners held behind the lines. We can imagine what a mod-
ern “war crimes” tribunal would do with that decision. There may have been
practicality in such inhumane decisions. Practicality indeed! As Charles Francis
Adams, Lincoln’s ambassador to the Court of St. James and the scion of the
most notable family in the North, wrote in his diary of his leader, the “Presi-
dent and his chief advisers are not without the spirit of the serpent mixed in
with their wisdom.” And he knew whereof he spoke. For practical politics, the
necessities of the campaign of 1864, had led Lincoln and Seward to a decision
far more serious than unethical practices against prisoners and civilians in the
South. I speak of the rejection by the Lincoln administration of peace feel-
ers authorized by the Confederate government in Richmond: feelers that met
Lincoln’s announced terms for an end to the Federal invasion of the South.
The emissary in this negotiation was sponsored by Charles Francis Adams. He
was a Tennessean living in France, one Thomas Yeatman. After arriving in
the United States, he was swiftly deported by direct order of the government
before he could properly explore the possibility of an armistice on the condi-
tions of reunion and an end to slavery. Lincoln sought these goals, but only
on his terms. And in his own time. He wanted total victory. And he needed a
still-resisting, impenitent Confederacy to justify his re-election. We can only
speculate as to why President Davis allowed the Yeatman mission. We know
that he expected little of such peace feelers. (There were many in the last stages
of the conflict.) He knew his enemy too well to expect anything but subjec-
tion, however benign the rhetoric used to disguise its rigor. Adams’s peace
plan was perhaps impossible, even if his superiors in Washington had behaved
in good faith. The point is that none of the peace moves of 1864 was given
any chance of success. Over one hundred thousand Americans may have died
because of the Rail-Splitter’s rejection of an inexpedient peace. Yet we have still
not touched upon the most serious of Lincoln’s violations of the Presidential
responsibility. I speak, finally, of his role in bringing on the War Between the
States.
There is, we should recall, a great body of scholarly argument concerning
Lincoln’s intentions in 1860 and early 1861. A respectable portion of this
work comes to the conclusion that the first Republican president expected
a “tug,” a “crisis,” to follow his election. And then, once secession had
occurred, also expected to put it down swiftly with a combination of persua-
sion, force, and Southern loyalty to the Union. The last of these, it is agreed,
he completely overestimated. In a similar fashion he exaggerated the force of
Southern “realism,” the region’s capacity to act in its own pecuniary interest.
The authority on Lincoln’s political economy has remarked that the Illinois
lawyer-politician and old line Whig always made the mistake of explaining in
Additional Resources
The shelves of any library will attest to the fact that Abraham Lincoln is the
most written-about President. Carl Sandburg’s classic Abraham Lincoln (6 vols.;
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1926–1939), is a poetic panorama that focuses
401
402
YES: LeeAnna Keith, from The Colfax Massacre: The Untold Story
of Black Power, White Terror, and the Death of Reconstruction (Oxford
University Press, 2008)
NO: Heather Cox Richardson, from The Death of Reconstruction:
Race, Labor, and Politics in the Post-Civil War North, 1865–1901
(Harvard University Press, 2001)
Learning Outcomes
After reading this issue, you should be able to:
• Explain several factors that prevented the Reconstruction
process from being more successful.
• Analyze the political, economic, and social implications of
the era of Reconstruction.
• Evaluate the role played by race in the reaction to the Recon-
struction governments in the South following the Civil War.
• Define free labor ideology and explain its influence on
Reconstruction.
ISSUE SUMMARY
G iven the complex issues of the post-Civil War years, it is not surprising
that the era of Reconstruction (1865–1877) is shrouded in controversy. For
403
404
405
406
From The Colfax Massacre: The Untold Story of Black Power, White Terror, and the Death of Recon-
struction by LeeAnna Keith, (Oxford University Press, 2008). Copyright © 2008 by Oxford
University Press. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press (USA).
407
safe place to sleep. All of her neighbors had fled. The body remained unburied,
attracting so many turkey vultures by the end of the week that the roof of the
house was covered with birds.
The raiding party at McKinney’s farm brought together an unlikely hand-
ful of area whites. Among participants later identified by the widow and
other eyewitnesses, representatives from distant parishes made up the party
that pulled the trigger. Denis Lemoine, a rollicking Creole from 60 miles away
in Avoyelles Parish, joined his cousins from the extensive Natchitoches clan
of Lemoines. On April 5, Lemoine was riding with Bill Irwin, a poor farmer
from the Rapides section of Grant Parish. Their unlikely company suggested
the reach and strategy of the white supremacist organizations that planned
the attack on the Colfax courthouse. In fact, the Knights of the White Camel-
lia and a group calling itself the “Old Time Ku Klux Klan” played a major
organizational role. Acting as scouts, Lemoine, Irwin, and their associates
secured a site to feed and water the horses of a growing contingent of armed
men. They would visit the abandoned McKinney house on patrol and make
liaisons there until supplies ran out.
Like many who would join their ranks in the area around Colfax, Irwin
and Lemoine were Confederate veterans. Apart from the killing of civilians
and other excesses, white preparations betrayed a jaunty military spirit. Where
former officers such as George Stafford and David Paul took the lead, volunteers
formed “companies” and even designated ranks. Rapides Parishes offered three
such units, under Captains Stafford, Paul, and Joseph W. Texada, all promi-
nent planters and former slaveholders. Contingents from Catahoula, Con-
cordia, and Winn Parishes traveled long distances under similar leadership.
Others, such as Denis Lemoine, arrived as individuals or in small groups. Local
residents offered directions and hospitality, putting up out-of-towners and
providing meals as possible. Veterans figured prominently in the mix, but a
significant number of young men joined in, including many, such as Stafford,
who had lost older brothers and other relatives in the Civil War.
The talk around their campfires was of genocide. Many expressed the
strong conviction that the seizure of the Colfax courthouse was the first step
in a war of conquest to eradicate the white race.
The Negroes at Colfax shouted daily across the river to our people that
they intended killing every white man and boy, keeping only the young
women to raise from them a new breed [explained the organizer of an
elite Rapides Parish contingent]. On their part if ever successful, you may
safely expect that neither age, nor sex, nor helpless infancy will be spared.
“[T]he open threats of the negroes were to kill the white men and violate
the white women,” remembered one participant. Another account suggested
the participation of militant organizations in fanning the rumor.
We were all startled and terrified at the news by a Courier who had just
gotten in from our Parish Site, that the Negroes under the leadership of
a few unprincipled white men had captured the Court House & driven
all white inhabitants out of the Town, and were raiding stealing & driv-
ing the cattle out of the surrounding country. The Negro men making
their brags that they would clean out the white men & then take their
women folks for wifes.
Bearing a white flag, Nash approached the Smithfield Quarters and asked
for John Miles, a man later celebrated as a favorite of the white community.
Miles would make the journey to the courthouse on Nash’s behalf, walking
out along the open road between the main positions of the armed rivals. Nash
withdrew with his seconds to a point forward of the white line and observed
as a black man exited the courthouse and mounted a dappled gray horse.
Benjamin L. Allen—known locally as Levy, Levin, or Lev—identified
himself as the commander of the courthouse defense. Allen was one of two
Buffalo Soldiers to remain in the radical camp. . . . Like the storekeeper, Peter
Borland, who also chose to stay, Allen had long years of military experience,
including the defense of stationary targets, such as garrisons and telegraph and
railroad installations, against mounted Apaches on the Texas frontier. Though
he never stood for office or played a visible role in Republican Party affairs, his
commitment to preserving the possibility for black advancement in the parish
was second to none. Allen had traveled the countryside during the buildup to
the conflict, recruiting new men by appealing to the pride of their race. Even
if he had no arms, he insisted, all black men should lend their hands to the
defense. As for weapons, he said, “they could have his when he was killed.”
The interview between Allen and Nash was dignified and brief, despite
the breach of protocol that placed the black military commander, not the sher-
iff, as the counterpart of the would-be white officeholder. In fact, Sheriff Dan
Shaw, the last of the white men in the courthouse defense, had headed for
Mirabeau Plantation just as Nash and the others rode into view. Lev Allen
himself had given Sheriff Shaw the go-ahead. “Old man,” said Allen, “go away
and save yourself, if you can.” . . .
Having stated their cases, the two sides agreed to proceed with hostilities.
Allen rode back to the courthouse redoubt, where he “received the approba-
tion of the whole posse, the men all believing that the proposal of their assail-
ants was a ruse to entrap them into disarming, that they might be incapable of
resisting in case of a massacre.”
Nash had agreed to give Allen 30 minutes to remove the women and
children from the line of fire. Most headed for Mirabeau Plantation on the
open road. Stragglers, a group that included the elderly and mothers of small
children, became reluctant to enter the line of fire as the deadline approached.
Scaling the riverbank, six to eight feet to a narrow shore, a contingent waited
out the battle from just below the action.
A flanking maneuver brought one of the three white squadrons face to
face with the noncombatants at the Red River shoreline, as a picked group
of 30 men sought a new angle on the courthouse, some 75 yards from the
riverbank. The encounter must have marked the interlude before the fight-
ing with considerable tension down below, as the white men warned the
gathering not to betray their location. No injuries or killings were reported,
however, and the white squadron retained the element of surprise until the
critical moment.
Up in the town, a kind of comic indolence set in as the warning period
extended to about two hours. The improbability of the coming confronta-
tion taxed the comprehension of men on both sides, the majority of whom
gunshots (and the sound of shots fired in pursuit nearby) marked the standoff
phase of the fight.
In their cleanup operations around town, the Fusionists and Klansmen
had taken prisoner a handful of men in the warehouse and one hiding under a
building nearby. From these, the captains chose a man named Pinkney Cham-
bers and handed him a pole they had affixed to a saddle blanket doused in
coal oil. “[Here’s] a chance to save your life,” they said; “we are going to light
this and you must take it and put it on the roof.” With “ten [double barrel]
shotguns trained on him from his back, and I suppose 50 guns in front of him
[in the courthouse],” as a white man remembered it, Chambers put the torch
on the cypress shingles to start a lively fire.
The men inside the courthouse observed as Pinkney Chambers set the
roof on fire, but did not shoot him. Instead, they tried to knock the burn-
ing cypress shingles from the roof from the building’s rough upper story. The
cause was hopeless, and many of the men inside began to despair.
Among those fighting the fire on the second storey, a local man named Shack
(or Jack or Jacques) White strayed too close to an open window. With the invad-
ers deliberately shooting at the fire, providing cover as it grew, White took a
bullet to the neck.
By this time, the white line had mostly dismounted and drawn close to
the burning building. They were close enough for Shack White to recognize a
friend among the men nearby. “Save me, Bill Irwin,” he called from the win-
dow. Irwin replied that he owed him one, perhaps assuring him of the services
of the surgeon and doctor in the company of whites. White tore the sleeve
from his white shirt (some accounts say a large sheet of paper), put it out the
window, and shouted, “We surrender!” Too late to save his life, he brought the
courthouse siege to an unexpected halt.
Was he heard downstairs above the crackling of the fire on the roof?
Could they know below about the improvised flag of truce? What they saw,
within the incalculable space of time between two incidents, was the approach
of armed white men to the door. The first, Sidney Harris, carrying a gun,
opened the door. At his rear walked a man dressed in a sword and wearing the
red rosette of his secret order, James West Hadnot.
Fast as thought, Harris was dead and Hadnot lay mortally wounded in
the gut. . . .
The horror that gripped the body of whites at the courthouse—a group
that included “Old Man” Hadnot’s three young adult sons—turned the
momentum of the fighting as if on a switch. By this time, a handful of black
men had emerged from the courthouse and begun to stack their arms. They
were overwhelmed by a blast of gunfire from the white side. With men press-
ing out of the burning building amid continuing fire, bodies fell in a stack
by the door, including several who were slightly injured or not hurt. Using
pistols and Bowie knives, the whites killed several in close combat. The door
slammed. Those afraid to surrender hid under the floorboards. The cinders
crackled overhead, as white men sorted out the living from the dead at the
doorway and just beyond.
“Get up, old man, you’re not dead,” said a man. Benjamin Brimm was
56 years old, the father of four girls, a former slave. He was directed to the
base of a pecan tree some distance from the courthouse and made to wait with
other prisoners. Fifteen minutes later, he was told to go inside the burning
courthouse to retrieve the last of the holdouts before it collapsed.
“They was under the floor in the little back room,” he later testified.
“[YJ’all had better come,” he called. They agreed, all but one. “I might just as
well to be burned up as to be shot,” said the man, who burned to death some
time in the next hour. The others, including Alabama Mitchell, emerged safely
and were taken prisoner. A few dozen—28 or 48, in typical accounts—waited
under the pecan tree to learn the final resolution of the fight.
After sunset it began to rain. The wounded blacks were moved to the
porch of the nearby boardinghouse, while the remainder of the prisoners
made do under the shelter of the tree. Black women, emboldened by the lack
of gunfire, left their hiding places and moved within sight of the battlefield,
staying well away from both the prisoners and the dead.
The armed force of whites was breaking up, with hungry men eager to
make camp and others preparing for a long journey home. . . . The semblance
of military discipline abated, as the remaining white chiefs discussed the fate
of the last living black men in the town.
Nash wanted to set them free. “[N]ow boys,” he asked Benjamin Brimm
and the others, “if I take you all and send you home to your cotton, will you
go to work?”
“I answered quick,” remembered Brimm, “[as] I knowed Mr. Nash and he
knowed me.” Brimm promised he would.
A white man objected: “[B]y God, Nash . . . if you send these God Dam
Negroes home you won’t live to see two weeks.” Having killed 50 or more in
the courthouse fight and cleanup operations, many in the crowd may have
feared reprisals, legal and personal, after the prisoners returned home. . . .
Liquor whetted the appetite for violence in the group. One man said that he
had ridden 60 miles to kill niggers, and was not yet prepared to stop. Over-
riding Nash’s objections, the remainder of the white force decided to execute
the prisoners. “Unless these niggers are killed,” a Grant Parish man, Thomas
Hickman, told Nash, “we will kill you.” . . .
The white men told the remaining prisoners to line up and prepare to be
marched to the sugarhouse, where they would spend the night and be set free
in the morning. Luke Hadnot, whose dying father had recently departed on a
boat to Alexandria, called out the names of five men. The five stepped forward;
Hadnot lined them up in close ranks, and killed all five with two gunshots.
Others likewise identified their victims of choice. Clement Penn, for example,
selected and killed Etienne Elzie while Elzie’s wife, Annie, stood by only a few
feet away. “I was looking directly at Penn when he shot my husband,” Annie
Elzie later testified. “I heard him beg for his life.” . . .
Chaos reigned in Colfax on Monday, when the excesses of the previous
hours saw light of day. Scores of white men, including many who had not
participated in the fight, came to town to witness the outcome of the struggle.
The distribution of the bodies told much of the story. In the shallow breast-
works around the courthouse, the bodies of the earliest victims could be seen.
A significant number of corpses fanned out from the courthouse door, with
piles on either side of the door in mute witness to the gunfire that greeted
those trying to escape the fire. The ruins of the courthouse contained the smol-
dering remains of the man who feared to exit, and a few others were found
killed beneath the warehouse and other buildings in the town.
Something special—still secret—could be found in the vicinity of the
old pecan tree, which later became the object of special pride among area
whites. According to some accounts, thirteen prisoners were hanged from its
branches, and may have remained visible to visitors on April 14. By the time
authorities arrived on Tuesday, however, the only bodies near the tree were
the victims of gun violence. Most revealed gunshots to the head. One man’s
skull had been crushed. He had died with his hands still clasped in the act of
begging for his life.
Whites in Colfax Monday attempted to count the number of dead, a
task complicated by the pursuit of some black participants by men on horse-
back. At least three of the identifiable victims on April 13 had been killed out-
side the town, one more than ten miles downriver in Cotile, Louisiana. The
removal and burial of some of the bodies on Monday further disrupted the
count. Among those who attended to the numbers, the final tally varied on
a wide range, with the most conservative reckoning the number of victims at
71. Whites may have indulged in exaggeration, but the most morbidly diligent
white veteran historian of the massacre accepted the high number presented
in Oscar Watson’s reminiscences, “An Incident of My Boyhood Days”:
Next morning myself & 8 or 10 others went back to look and count the
dead[. A]fter making the rounds of the town 165 dead was reported within
the entrenchment [and] no one will ever know how many met their fate
further out[,] as some 25 or 30 men scoured the Country for 4 or 5 miles
[and] no report ever reached us of how many they killed in this raid.
[I]t was a sorry blunder the negroes made in [firing] on our men after sur-
render, for only their leaders would have been dealt with[. B]ut after their
treachery the order went let none escape. The order was carried out.
Whether 70 or 165 or many more, the accepted number of victims was larger
than any other incident of racial violence in American history (the only com-
parable number of casualties, the victims of the New York City Draft Riot of
When I went to Colfax the day after the fight I found my dead son’s
body; dogs were eating him; I took the remains home and buried them;
I felt so bad that I didn’t know what I did.
Whites permitted the removal of Lank Pittman’s body because of the extreme
circumstances, and may have allowed other burials as well. On the whole,
however, they were satisfied to leave the bodies where they fell.
Their pride in display revealed the symbolic significance of the white raid
on the town. Conceived as a lesson to those who advanced the black cause in
politics, the rout of the courthouse defense served notice of white determina-
tion. The white men of Louisiana would unite to defeat their enemies within,
killing and dying for white supremacy and home rule.
“Civil rights,” in the immediate aftermath of the war, meant something dif-
ferent than it gradually came to mean over the next several years. Harper’s
Weekly distinguished between “natural rights” to life, liberty, and “the fruits
of . . . honest labor,” and “civil rights,” which were critical to a freedperson’s
ability to function as a free worker. Civil rights, it explained, were “such rights
as to sue, to give evidence, to inherit, buy, lease, sell, convey, and hold prop-
erty, and others. Few intelligent persons in this country would now deny or
forbid equality of natural and civil rights,” it asserted in 1867. The 1866 Civil
Rights Act, written by the man who had drafted the Thirteenth Amendment,
Illinois senator Lyman Trumbull, was intended to secure to African-Americans
“full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person
and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.” It guaranteed only that the legal
playing field would be level for all citizens; state legislatures could not enact
legislation endangering a black person’s right to his life or his land. By 1867,
hoping to woo conservative Republican voters into the Democratic camp and
From The Death of Reconstruction: Race, Labor, and Politics in the Post-Civil War North, 1865–1901
by Heather Cox Richardson (Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 122–125, 140–145, 150–154.
Copyright © 2001 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Reprinted by permission of
Harvard University Press.
416
Republican insistence that social equality would work itself out as freedpeo-
ple worked their way up to prosperity could not provide an answer for the
overwhelming discrimination African-Americans faced. While many black
and white Southerners accepted the established patterns of segregation, those
practices meant that African-Americans’ public life was inferior to that of their
white counterparts. Black people could not sit on juries in most of the South,
they could not be certain of transportation on railroads or accommodation
at inns, their schools were poor copies of white schools. In addition to creat-
ing a climate of constant harassment for African-Americans, discrimination,
especially discrimination in schooling, seemed to hamper their ability to rise
economically. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments had made all Amer-
icans equal before the law, but they could not guarantee equal access to trans-
portation, accommodations, or schools, and while many ex-slaves accepted
conditions as an improvement on the past and dismissed civil rights bills as
impractical, those African-Americans who had worked hard to become mem-
bers of the “better classes” deeply resented their exclusion from public facili-
ties. “Education amounts to nothing, good behavior counts for nothing, even
money cannot buy for a colored man or woman decent treatment and the
comforts that white people claim and can obtain,” complained Mississippi
Sheriff John M. Brown. Prominent African-Americans called for legislation to
counter the constant discrimination they faced.
African-American proponents of a new civil rights law to enforce non-
discrimination in public services had a champion in the former abolitionist
Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts. An exceedingly prominent man,
the tall, aloof Sumner was the nation’s leading champion of African-American
rights after the war and had advocated a civil rights measure supplementary to
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 since May 1870, when he introduced to the Senate
a bill (S. 916) making the federal government responsible for the enforcement
of equal rights in public transportation, hotels, theaters, schools, churches,
public cemeteries, and juries.
But Sumner’s sponsorship of a civil rights bill immediately made more
moderate congressmen wary of it; his enthusiasm for black rights frequently
made him advocate measures that seemed to remove African-Americans from
the free labor system and make them favored wards of a government that
was expanding to serve them. Only two months after the ratification of the
fifteenth Amendment had reassured moderate Republicans and Democrats
alike that they had done everything possible to make all men equal in America,
Sumner told the Senate that black men were not actually equal enough, but
that his new bill would do the trick. When it passes, he said, “I [will] know
nothing further to be done in the way of legislation for the security of equal
rights in this Republic.” . . .
By 1874, most Republicans were ready to cut the freedpeople’s ties to the gov-
ernment in order to force African-Americans to fall back on their own resources
and to protect the government from the machinations of demagogues push-
ing special-interest legislation. When Mississippi Republicans asked President
Grant in January 1874 to use the administration to shore up their state organi-
zation, the Philadelphia Inquirer enthusiastically reported his refusal. Grant
“remove[d] his segar from his mouth and enunciate[d] a great truth with star-
tling emphasis,” according to a writer for the newspaper. The president said it
was “time for the Republican party to unload.” The party could not continue
to carry the “dead weight” of intrastate quarrels. Grant was sick and tired of it,
he told listeners. “This nursing of monstrosities has nearly exhausted the life of
the party. I am done with them, and they will have to take care of themselves.”
The Philadelphia Inquirer agreed that the federal government had to cease to
support the Southern Republican organizations of freedpeople and their dema-
gogic leaders. The New York Daily Tribune approved Grant’s similar hands-off
policy in Texas, thrilled that “there [was] no longer any cause to apprehend
that another State Government will be overturned by Federal bayonets.”
Benjamin Butler’s role as the House manager of the civil rights bill only
hurt its chances, for he embodied the connection between freedpeople and
a government in thrall to special interests. The symbol of the “corruption”
of American government, Butler was popularly credited with strong-arming
the House into recognizing the Louisiana representatives backed by the
Kellogg government, which was generally believed to be an illegal creation
of Louisiana’s largely black Republican party, supported not by the people of
the state but by federal officers. Honest men wanted to destroy “the principle
which Mr. Butler and his followers represent,” wrote the New York Daily Tribune
and others. “The force in our politics of which he is the recognized exponent,
and of which thousands of our politicians of less prominence are the crea-
tures.” “Butlerism” meant gaining power by promising an uneducated public
patronage or legislation in their favor, and all but the stalwart Republicans and
Democratic machine politicians hoped for the downfall of both Butler and
what he represented.
Despite the fact that it was prosperous African-Americans who advocated
the bill, it appeared to opponents that the civil rights bill was an extraordinary
piece of unconstitutional legislation by which demagogues hoped to hold
on to power in the South, and thus in the nation, by catering to the whims
of disaffected African-Americans who were unwilling to work. The proposed
law seemed to offer nothing to the nation but a trampled constitution, lazy
the Speaker’s table. Finally Republicans agreed to let Butler take it to the floor
in late January.
The galleries were full as the House discussed the bill in early February.
After omitting provisions for integrated schools, churches, and cemeteries, the
House passed the bill on February 5 by a vote of 162 to 100. While African-
Americans in favor of a civil rights bill were horrified at the sacrifice of the
school clause, all but the most radical Republicans approved the omission.
“The bill . . . is worthy [of] the support of every congressman who wishes to
deal equitably with the citizens of the United States, white and black,” wrote
even the Boston Evening Transcript. “This measure simply provides for the edu-
cation of the blacks, and does not force their children into association with
white scholars,” at the same time demanding that the schools be equal. “The
Republicans can stand upon such a platform as that,” the Transcript chided
unwilling party members. “The great desire and solicitude of the people are to
support ‘civil rights’ and so execute in good faith the constitutional pledges of
the nation.” After initial reluctance, the Senate passed the school amendment
by a vote of 38 to 62, and despite Democratic plans to talk the bill to death, the
Senate repassed the civil rights bill without further amendment on February 27,
1875, with Democrats in the opposition. Grant signed the civil rights bill into
law on March 1, 1875.
While some radical papers like the Boston Evening Transcript defended the
bill—wondering “[i]f the blacks and whites cannot shave and drink together . . .
how can they remain tolerably peaceful in the same community?”—its passage
drew fire from conservative and moderate Northern Republicans who still
read into the measure a larger political story of the corruption of a growing
government by those determined to advance through government support
rather than through productive labor. The New York Times noted that Nothern
African-Americans were “quiet, inoffensive people who live for and to them-
selves, and have no desire to intrude where they are not welcome.” In the
South, however, it continued, “there are many colored men and women who
delight in ‘scenes’ and cheap notoriety.” It was these people, the “negro politi-
cian, . . . the ignorant field hand, who, by his very brutality has forced his way
into, and disgraces, public positions of honor and trust—men . . . who have
no feeling and no sensibility,” who would “take every opportunity of inflicting
petty annoyances upon their former masters.” The author concluded that the
law would not be enforceable, and that “it is a great mistake to seek to impose
new social customs on a people by act of Congress.” Noticing the immediate
efforts of Southerners to circumvent the law by giving up public licenses and
legislating against public disturbances, the San Francisco Daily Alta California
agreed that the act was likely to produce more trouble than equality, and reit-
erated that social equality must be earned rather than enforced by law.
The true way for African-Americans to achieve equality, Republicans
argued, was to work. The New York Times approvingly quoted an African-
American minister in the South who reiterated the idea that laborers must rise
socially only as they acquired wealth and standing. The Times recorded his
warning that “character, education, and wealth will determine their position,
and all the laws in the world cannot give them a high position if they are not
In 1883, the U.S. Supreme Court considered five civil rights cases, one each
from Tennessee, New York, Kansas, Missouri, and California. On October 15,
1883, the court decided that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was unconstitutional
because federal authority could overrule only state institutional discrimina-
tion, not private actions; Justice John Marshall Harlan of Kentucky cast the
only dissenting vote. With the decision, Northern Republicans stated that
they had never liked the law, because it removed African-Americans from the
tenets of a free labor society, using the government to give them benefits for
which others had to work. The New York Times declared that African-Americans
“should be treated on their merits as individuals precisely as other citizens
are treated in like circumstances” and admitted that there was, indeed, “a
good deal of unjust prejudice against” them. But the Times remained skeptical
that legislation could resolve the problem. Even newspapers like the Hartford
Courant, which supported the law, said it did so only because it proved that
Americans were sincere in their quest for equal rights. Three days later that
newspaper mused that the law had been necessary only for “the reorganiza-
tion of a disordered society,” and that freedpeople no longer needed its protec-
tion. The Philadelphia Daily Evening Bulletin agreed that public sentiment had
changed so dramatically that the law was now unnecessary. Even the radi-
cal African-American Cleveland Gazette, which mourned the court’s decision,
agreed that the law was a dead letter anyway. The New York Times welcomed
the decision, going so far as to charge the law with keeping “alive a prejudice
against the negroes . . . which without it would have gradually died out.”
Instead of supporting the Civil Rights Act, Republicans reiterated the
idea that right-thinking African-Americans wanted to succeed on their own.
The New York Times applauded the public address of the Louisville, Kentucky,
National Convention of Colored Men that concentrated largely on the needs of
Southern agricultural labor and referred not at all to civil rights. That the con-
vention had pointedly rejected chairman Frederick Douglass’s draft address,
which had included support for civil rights legislation, made the Times con-
clude that most attendees were “opposed to the extreme views uttered by Mr.
Douglass,” and that the great African-American leader should retire, since his
“role as a leader of his race is about played out.”
Despite the Times’s conclusion, African-Americans across the country pro-
tested the decision both as individuals and in mass meetings, reflecting, “It is a
mercy that Charles Sumner is not alive to mourn for his cherished Civil Rights
bill.” At a mass meeting in Washington, D.C., Frederick Douglass admonished
that the decision “had inflicted a heavy calamity on the 7,000,000 of colored
people of this country, and had left them naked and defenceless against the
action of a malignant, vulgar and pitiless prejudice.” When the African Meth-
odist Episcopal (AME) Church Conference of Western States, in session in
Denver, discussed the decision, delegates made “incendiary” speeches and “[a]
Bishop declared that if the negroes’ rights were thus trampled upon a revolu-
tion would be the result.” . . .
Republicans and Democrats agreed that the only way for African-
Americans to garner more rights was to work to deserve them, as all others did
in America’s free labor system. The Philadelphia Daily Evening Bulletin repeated
this view:
The Democratic Hartford Weekly Times agreed, and asserted that true black
leaders, “not men like Fred. Douglass, who are ‘professional’ colored men, and
who have been agitating something and been paid for it all of their lives,”
approved of the decision. “They say there is no such thing as social equality
among white men, and that the colored man cannot get it by law, but by the
way he conducts himself.”
Republican and Democratic newspapers highlighted those African-
Americans who cheerfully told their neighbors “to acquire knowledge and
wealth as the surest way of obtaining our rights.” From Baltimore came the
news that “Mr. John F. Cook, a colored man of character, who deservedly
enjoys the respect of this entire community, who has held and administered
with marked ability for years the responsible office of Collector of Taxes for
the District of Columbia,” told a reporter that he had no fears of white repris-
als after the decision, expecting whites to accord to African-Americans “what
legislation could never accomplish.” “These are golden words, and if all men
of his race were like Mr. Cook there would never be any trouble on this sub-
ject,” concluded the Republican Philadelphia Daily Evening Bulletin.
Even many Northern Democrats painted their own picture of an egalitarian
free labor society that had no need of a civil rights law. First they restated the idea
that Republican efforts for African-Americans had simply been a ploy to con-
trol the government by marshalling the black vote. Trying to make new ties to
African-American voters, the Democratic San Francisco Examiner emphasized that
Republicans had only wanted to use the black vote to create a Republican empire
and that the reversal showed that Republicanism no longer offered advantages to
black citizens. A reporter noted that members of the black community had said
that “it was about time to shake off the Republican yoke and act in politics as
American citizens, not as chattels of a party who cared but for their votes.”
425
426
427
AUTHORS
JOYCE APPLEBY is Professor emerita of History at UCLA where she taught for
20 years. Her book Ideology and Economic Thought in Seventeenth-Century
England (Princeton, 1978) won the Berkshire Prize. Other works include
Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s (NYU,
1984), Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination (Harvard,
1992), and The Relentless Revolution: A History of Capitalism (W. W. Norton,
2010). She is also the past president of the American Historical Association
and the Organization of American Historians, and, in 2009, she won the
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Award for distinguished writing in American
History.
MELVIN E. BRADFORD (1934–1993) was a professor of literature at the Uni-
versity of Dallas from 1967 until his death. His publications include Against
the Barbarians and Other Reflections on Familiar Themes (University of Mis-
souri Press, 1992) and Original Intentions: On the Making and Ratification of
the United States Constitution (University of Georgia Press, 1993).
T. H. BREEN is the William Smith Mason Professor of American History at
Northwestern University, where he specializes in early American history.
Among his many honors and awards, Breen has been a Guggenheim fellow
and held distinguished professorships at both Cambridge and Oxford.
Among his several award-winning monographs are Tobacco Culture: The
Mentality of the Great Tidewater Planters on the Eve of Revolution (Princeton
University Press, 1985) and Imagining the Past: East Hampton Histories
(Addison-Wesley, 1989).
JON BUTLER is the Howard R. Lamar Professor of American History and Dean
of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at Yale University. He is the
author of The Huguenots in America: A Refugee People in New World Society
(Harvard University Press, Harvard University Press, 1983); Awash in a Sea
of Faith: Christianizing the American People (Harvard University Press, 1990);
and coauthor of Religion in American Life: A Short History (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2002). He coedited Religion in American History: A Reader (Oxford
University Press, 1997) and is currently writing a book on religion in mod-
ern New York City.
LAURIE WINN CARLSON is assistant professor of history at Western Oregon
University. She is the author of several scholarly historical studies, includ-
ing Cattle: An Informal Social History (Ivan R. Dee, 2002); Seduced by the
West: Jefferson’s America and the Lure of the Land Beyond the Mississippi (Ivan R.
Dee, 2003); and William J. Spillman and the Birth Of Agricultural Economics
(University Press, 2005).
ALFRED A. CAVE is professor emeritus of history at the University of Toledo,
where he served as Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences from 1973–
1990. The recipient of grants from the Danforth Foundation and National
Endowment for the Humanities, his books include Jacksonian Democracy and
the Historians (University of Florida Press, 1964); An American Conservative in
the Age of Jackson: The Political and Social Thought of Calvin Colton (Texas
Christian University Press, 1969); The Pequot War (University of Massachu-
setts Press, 1996); and Prophets of the Great Spirit: Native American Revitaliza-
tion Movements in Eastern North America (University of Nebraska Press, 2006).
NANCY F. COTT is the Jonathan Trumbull Professor of American History at
Harvard University and Pforzheimer Foundation Director of the Schlesinger
Library on the History of Women in America. A specialist in nineteenth-
and twentieth-century social and cultural history, her other books include
The Grounding of Modern Feminism (Yale University Press, 1987); A Woman
Making History: Mary Ritter Beard through Her Letters (Yale University Press,
1991); and Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation (Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2000).
CARL N. DEGLER is the Margaret Byrne Professor emeritus of American His-
tory at Stanford University and during his distinguished academic career
served as president of the American Historical Association, the Organiza-
tion of American Historians, and the Southern Historical Association. His
book Neither Black Nor White: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and the
United States (University of Wisconsin, 1971) won the Pulitzer Prize for his-
tory. He also is the author of In Search of Human Nature: The Decline and
Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought (Oxford University Press,
1992) and At Odds: Women and Family in America from the Revolution to the
Present (Oxford University Press, 1997).
CHARLES B. DEW is the Ephraim Williams Professor of American History at
Williams College. Two of his books, Apostles of Disunion (University of
Virginia Press, 2002) and Ironmaker to the Confederacy: Joseph R. Anderson
and the Tredegar Iron Works (Yale University Press, 1966), received the
Fletcher Pratt Award presented by the Civil War Round Table of New York
for the best nonfiction book on the American Civil War. He is also the
author of Bond of Iron: Master and Slave at Buffalo Forge (W. W. Norton,
1994), which received the Elliott Rudwick Prize from the Organization of
American Historians.
MARC EGNAL is a professor of history at York University, Toronto, Canada. A
specialist on the American Revolution and Civil War, he is the author of A
Mighty Empire: The Origins of the American Revolution (Cornell University
Press, 1988); Divergent Paths: How Culture and Institutions Have Shaped North
American Growth (Oxford University Press, 1996); New World Economies:
The Growth of the Thirteen Colonies and Early Canada (Oxford University
Press, 1998); and, most recently, Clash of Extremes: The Economic Origins of
the Civil War (Hill & Wang, 2009).
ROBERT FINLAY is a professor of history at the University of Arkansas, where
he has taught since 1987. A specialist in Renaissance and world history, he
is the author of Politics in Renaissance Venice (Rutgers University Press,
1980), which won the Howard R. Marraro Prize for the best book on Italian
or Italian-American history from the American Historical Association; The
Pilgrim Art: The Culture of Porcelain in World History (University of California
Republic, 1776–1787 (North Carolina, 1969) won the Bancroft Prize, and
he received the Pulitzer Prize for History for The Radicalism of the American
Revolution (Knopf, 1992). Most recently, he has published Empire of Liberty:
A History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815 (Oxford, 2009) in the Oxford His-
tory of the United States series. In 2010, he was awarded the National
Humanities Medal.
HOWARD ZINN (1922–2010) was professor emeritus of political science at
Boston University where he taught for 24 years. Well known as a political
and social activist in the civil rights and antiwar movements of the 1960s,
he is also the author of The Southern Mystique (1962; South End Press Edi-
tion, 2002), SNCC: The New Abolitionists (Beacon Press, 1964), The Politics
of History (Beacon Press, 1970; 1990)), and his memoir You Can’t Be Neutral
on a Moving Train: A Personal History of Our Times (Beacon Press, 1994).