Dushyant

M.Phil 2018, CSLG, JNU

Is the state autonomous of society? What are the challenges in

defining the boundary between state and society, and in
assessing state capacity?
(A Response)

State, which is often either understood as a distinct entity or assumed to be

enmeshed in the society, has been a curious case of intellectual inquiry throughout the
"dear delightful" centuries of Political Philosophy. As much as it has baffled age-old
theorists, it has bewitched contemporary social scientists. And to our surprise, it continues
to be an unresolved terrain across the Modern disciplines even to this date, mostly because
no theory could rose to the victory of having us convinced of its real nature and role. The
'undiscovery' of the state has also been delaying the ultimate discovery of the society's
interaction with it. Therefore, today's quest has evolved from being too much into
discovering the separation or convergence between State and Society, to becoming an
exercise in unravelling everyday practices of state and peculiarities of interactions the
society has with it. This essay attempts to weigh the difficulties that different intellectual
traditions and contemporary political science have faced in understanding the state and its
relation with the nevertheless dubious entity which is society.

In the first section, I shall briefly trace explanations, understandings, and

philosophical prescriptions around the idea of State and Society through the modern
traditions of western philosophy. In the Second, I shall broadly sketch how 20th-century
social sciences dealt with these ideas as analytical tools for professing scientific
explanations of socio-political reality. In the third, I shall outline specific debates around
these concepts that took place in the later half of the previous century and discuss
contemporary conceptualisations of State, their capacities, and relations with society.

I
Trajectories of the Modern State in Western Political Philosophy

Political Philosophy has been theorising Social-Political reality, its meaning, and
the problems associated with our existence, and in response to the discovery of those
problems and difficulties in organising the society, it has tried to offer solutions. One
such solution that resulted from the Enlightenment period was Science, which brought
optimism about science being at the core of political arguments and solutions (Shapiro,
2003). It marked the departure in methods of understanding and explaining larger
reality, and laid the foundations of modern social sciences. The dialectical journey of
solutions to moral dilemma in human existence gets infused with Scientificity, yielding
‘enlightened’ intellectual traditions looking for certainties. The period of Scientific
Revolution and Enlightenment, with their precepts articulated in the language of
Individual Freedom, challenged the existing ways of ‘seeing’. Prevailing understanding,
explanations, and solutions were found to be inadequate. Classical Greek wisdom that
was rescued by Catholic Saints of the medieval couldn’t reconcile with the Modern
assertions of Individualism. Therefore, we witness the emergence of knowledge
traditions that offered the explanations in tune with the Modern.

Science at the time of Hobbes was synonymous with certainty. Scientific

explanations ought to predict truth with certainty. Therefore, when ‘Divine origins’ of the
rule were delegitimised, and natural laws were dismissed and replaced with natural
rights, Social Contract tradition through Hobbes and Locke explained the necessity of a
‘State’ that would ensure the promises of enlightenment. In defining State, defining
society and its relation with the state was always logically essential. Although for
Hobbes, individuals existed before the existence of any society and state, it was the state
that would ensure the existence of the individual in a society. In other words, State that is
formed after the civilised society is created has the job to prevent the problems of
anarchy that existed in the preceding “State of Nature”. The sovereign Leviathan State
then exists autonomous of society even when it, as David Held interprets, “constitutes
the society”. Whereas State for Locke is a Political Society, a government that would
guard the Natural Rights of Individuals. Locke furthers Hobbes’ concern for the need of a
state which is essential for the society to establish conditions for individuals wherein
they can realise their purposes. These ideas paved the way for the English Liberal view of
State as free, autonomous Umpire facilitating the game of personal pursuits that
individuals in a civilised society play. This view of Sovereign autonomous State isn’t
taken well by Rousseau who is deeply interested in the idea of Self-government. He is
reluctant to accept a state that would demand sovereignty from the citizens. The state
according to his believes, should execute functions by the general will of the people, and
for that the legislative purposes, and therefore, the sovereignty and authority of the
Political system should reside within the people. In a way, for Rousseau, citizens are part
of the state, and the state is enmeshed in the society. Hence, the state’s executive part or
the government, in its function of executing the public interest can be autonomous, but
State as a political system can never be Sovereign or autonomous of the society.

However, these notions of state-society relations were challenged by Bentham

who dismissed Natural Law tradition altogether as “Dangerous non-sense” (Shapiro
2003). It is Bentham, the propounder of Principle of Utility and the stalwart of classical
Utilitarianism, who marks the departure from the “Creationist theories of Science”
pushed forth by Hobbes and Locke which resided in line with Biblical theology. He places
the individual at the centre stage for any analysis or proposition of state-society relation.
He believed what may be good for someone might not be good for others; therefore, a
State ought to incorporate the Utilitarian science of allocating value in society. Bentham’s
“Radically Consequentialist” doctrine demands a state which in order to balance the
average utility in society should be capable of initiating radical redistribution. Such a
State would be highly autonomous of the society, but would bulldoze individual freedom.
This impingement on individual liberty, apart from the near impossibility of scientifically
calculating utility of individuals in society, did not go well with Neo-classical utilitarians
like Pareto, J.S. Mill and ilk. Neo-classical utilitarianism doesn’t allow Bentham’s
teleological doctrine to go on with “Interpersonal comparison of Utility” in society. It
says Bentham’s state should not demand sacrifices from citizens to carry out the
pleasure maximisation in society. Neo-classical utilitarianism takes differences between
individuals seriously and imagines a state that would only regulate the functions in
society, leaving the citizens alone to make transactions in the society and pursue their
goals as citizens. The state should only prevent “Harms” in the society, guaranteeing
great individual liberty. The idea of the state in Neo-classical utilitarianism is that the
state ought to be minimally invasive in society unlike the Classical utilitarian state of
Bentham, yet remain autonomous of it.

The Marxist challenge to these propositions of State-society relation was the

centrality of the individual in the analysis of the state (Held 1989). Marx believed that
individuals exist in relation to each other, and the nature of those relations is a product of
history. Society is divided into classes, and individuals function under class algorithms.
Therefore, neither individuals nor society as a whole should be given centre stage in
analysis, explanation, prescription of state; it should be class which needs to be the focal
point. Engels argued, that state as an outcome of the class struggle is presented as the
outcome of "classless legitimate will." The state is shown as the collective of political
institutions, balancing the class power in society as if autonomously, to paint a picture of
society as a whole, unaffected by class. The state is made to give an illusion that it
constitutes the general or public interest of the society. (Abrams 1977).

The understanding that state functions autonomous of the society, marking a

clear distinction between public and private, between state, and society, is dubious.
Marx, in his early writing (The Eighteenth Brumaire), portrays the state holding a
relatively autonomous position. The state is capable of dodging the pressures from
dominant class interests and shaping the civil society. In his other position, however, he
portrays the state as depended on the dominant class’s powers. In this position, the state
isn’t the site for political action, but it’s reduced to being a “committee” for managing the
business of the bourgeoisies. Althusser and Gramsci’s contribution gives a central role to
culture in studying state. For Gramsci, the state as a site involves both coercion and
hegemony. The civil society which is an important sphere, for Gramsci, formulates
hegemony through consent and plays a vital role in consolidating and as well as
challenging the dominant classes. Althusser extends Gramsci’s formulations and gives a
key role to ‘ideology’ and ‘ideological state apparatuses’ (ISAs) in reproducing the
relations of production, thus maintaining the existing class hegemony. Therefore,
following them, the scholars studying the contours of the state have to dwell into its
relationship with society closely.

II

Difficulties In Outlining the Boundary between State and Society

Contemporary social scientific temperament urges us to see reality as an object

lying before us, even if it is hidden, it must be unmasked through finding traces and
evidence. There should not be any mysticism. All the descriptions, exegeses, and
prescriptions, starting from the Platonic Republic and Aristotelian Natural Society to
Foucauldian Governmentalized State, should have scientifically verifiable manifestation.
However, the failure of crude positivist methodology in dealing with normative aspects
of reality cautions us. To reckon truth, we must simultaneously trace out what is unreal
and illusory, and to know that, we should have normative ideal forms. Therefore, when
the idea of state is the culmination of a seemingly traceable ontological voyage through
history up to this point in time, any explanation of it, as much as it should be an
empirical depiction straight from the realms of contemporary political sociology and
international studies, it should be an ensemble of political thoughts chronologically
woven in normative philosophy, revealing the evolution of the nature of the state, both in
its institutional form and ideological prevalence. And explanations should probably move
beyond the material objectivity of the state, and keep the idea of it as the object of
analysis. (Abrams 1977)

But then what explains the absence of a consensus in accepting any theory of
state-society relation as most appropriate? What does the anxious shifts in social
sciences in the later half of the previous century tell us? Well, we have witnessed
architectonic theories that explained socio-political reality eventually falling to the
ground. Methodologies and approaches proven inadequate. Many decades of studies and
research agendas in in the twentieth century simply ignored state. Pushing forth their
society-centric ways of explanations, Pluralist and structure functionalist, for instance,
almost replaced the state with ‘government’. Political Science converged it focuses on
Government in general and Institutions in particular. “Systems” theorist sidelined Politics
from the “Political System”. Even the Neo-Marxists, as Skocpol would say, almost acted as
Neo-Pluralists in the backdrop of these trends. Society centric assumptions were so
deeply embedded in the Neo-Marxists that they almost forgot to revisit classical Marxist
assertion that state is not a system articulated by the legitimate will of society, instead it
is inherently shaped by class struggle. (Skocpol 1985). Later on, political sociology had a
suggestion from the Marxists to move on the controversial energy consuming
speculations on the state. (Abrams 1988). While Nikolas Rose (1996) concluded that it
will always be difficult for scholars of social science to decipher the exact nature of the
state because they become the instruments of the state by “experting” themselves.
Therefore, it shouldn't surprise one that explorations and understanding of State have
been a contested arena challenging not only the intellectual trends but the boundaries of
modern disciplines as well. Compartmentalised disciplines with their epistemologically
specific expert lenses, Abrams (1977) is afraid, have left the State and Society and the
relation between them, as questions unanswered and field undiscovered.

However, in this time of Globalization, when the Anglo-American vision of

statelessness is guiding the world order, the renewed fascination with civil society and
re-emergence of Neo-classical political economy provokes theorists to consider the
continuing importance of the State. (Evans 1997). Western social sciences for quite long
kept their aversion from this somewhat unresolvable and unnecessary concept of state.
“Input and Output” type analysis dealt with deciphering social reality, and situatedness
of individuals in State-Society relations. Insufficient as it were, Structural-Functionalist
approach was rendered inadequate by the 1960’s and 70’s. In the context of “Keynesian
revolution”, World War II, and Decolonization, when Anglo-American singular faith on
the centrality of ‘progressive’ economic explanations’ with a simultaneous de-emphasis
of the State’s role, was challenged, the need to “Bringing the State Back In” emerged.
(Skocpol 1985).

III
Departure from the Conventional Approaches

It has always been a challenge to sketch a distinction between State and Society.
Timothy Mitchell (1991) argues that the project of marking such a difference has
produced vague results and the state’s boundary with society mostly “appears elusive,
porous, and mobile”. He distinguishes the trends before and after the 1960’s as “Systems
Approach” and “Statist Approach” respectively and explains how both these approaches
kept the political very clearly distinct from the social. But their understanding differed in
conceptualising the Political. With a longing desire to make social sciences truly
scientific, Systems approach heavily criticised the statist approach for mythically
believing in the state as a unified political entity for explanations of reality. For them,
state was abandoned precisely because it never served as a good analytical tool in
explanations. However, even after being abandoned, State as a concept always kept
coming back from the backdoor, may be continental scholars consistently vouched for
the relevance of its existence. (Skocpol 1985). And probably that is why Netll (1968)
called its “ghostly” existence retaining a firm "skeleton." In any way though, it is not the
scholars that keep the state’s nature as mystical or its explanation rather ambiguous, it is
the way State it; very secretive. It resists discovery (Abrams 1977). Therefore, it is
necessary to keep in focus the idea of state as an ideological power. Mitchell reaffirms
Abrams' proposition when he suggests that the state as a “common ideological and
cultural construct” should be taken seriously. However, Mitchell would ask for a
departure from Statist claims of State firmly being at the centre stage of decision making
commanding the politico-economic outcomes while staying distinctly autonomous of the
socio-economic domain.

At the crossroads of this debate between the Statist and the Systems approach,
when Mitchell finds them both being two sides of the same coin unable to fix the elusive
nature of the distinction between State and Society, he calls for an alternative approach.
He suggests that research should halt the quest of finding where the boundaries of one
object ends and the other starts. Explanations should neither presume the coherence of
state as an object nor should they shy away from the complexity of the phenomenon that
is the state. The dualism of state and society with clear demarcation should be
questioned, and everyday practices of intersection between the realms of the political,
social, and economic should be examined if the patterns in their correlations are to be
unravelled. Michael Foucault has similar undertone articulating a push for examination
of everyday experiences of “Disciplining”. Evolving the earlier conceptions of power, and
tracing through history, mechanisms of prisons, asylums etc., he professes that it is this
power that regulated society’s behaviour. Therefore, the "Governmentalized State"
cannot be strictly sketched as a realm, sphere, or space, let alone an object. However,
Mitchell (1999) can see deficiencies in Foucauldian explanations when they cannot
significantly explain the institutionalisation of disciplinary power quite clearly in the
state structures. Cautioning us, he stresses that without emphasising state’s autonomy
vis-a-vis non-state agents or socio-economic domain, research should focus on the
everyday effects of the relations among these spheres. As also emphasised by Akhil
Gupta (1995), an analysis should move on “unitary descriptions” of state to a more
nuanced decentralised disaggregated studies focusing on the local sites of interaction.
Thus, the alternative approach towards studying state and society accepts the blurred
boundaries between them while simultaneously traces how the binary between them
evolved. Furthermore, it shall locate the State in its "imbricatedness" in society.

Towards Assessing State Capacity

The state has been viewed in a binary relationship with the social and the
economic domains. In assessing state capacity, the state is studied in dichotomous
relationship with the market. Statist scholars have focused on the capacity of the states
to bring economic growth, whereas, for the pro-market theorists, the market has been
the domain for development. Since the 1970’s, there has been a shift in analysing state
capacity; the importance is laid on the historical trajectory which the states have
undergone. Atul Kohli (2004), takes up a comparative study of four countries, Brazil,
India, South Korea, and Nigeria, in which he tries to draw comparisons between them on
the performance based on the capacity. The central focus is ‘why some states have been
more successful in terms of development than the others?’ He moves away from the
limited Weberian understanding of the state to analyse various aspects of state capacity
such as quality of bureaucracy, relational power, and the historical patterns on how the
states have been organised. Kohli classifies the countries on the basis of ideology,
organisation, and class alliances into neo-patrimonial states, fragmented multi-class
states, and cohesive capitalist states. The neo-patrimonial states like Nigeria, are guided
by narrow self-interest, and personal patrimony and hence, the state-led development
have been a mishap. Whereas, the cohesive capitalist states have a strong political
authority which aims at achieving higher economic targets at the cost of being
regressive. Kohli identifies South Korea in this category. Between the mishaps generated
through personal patrimony in neo-patrimonial states, and display of higher economic
growth by the strong political authority in the cohesive capitalist state lies the
fragmented multi-class states like Brazil and India which posses fragmented political
authority, thus shifting the claims for policy formulations and implementations in the
realm of ‘political.’ In sum, Kohli adopts a reasonably balanced approach in studying the
state and the market and doesn’t reduce it to zero-sum analysis.

Joel S. Migdal (1998), takes on a similar study assessing the state capacity of
various countries. In his classification of states into ‘strong-states’ and ‘weak-states,’ he
falls into the trap which has been highly criticised by Kohli of state-society dichotomy.
The discussion on “Stateness” from Netll (1968) to Evans (1997) portrays how stateness
as a phenomenon differs across countries, making every case distinct in its way. The
degree of Stateness is detrimental to the State capacity as well as autonomy. Different
degrees of Stateness produce different effects in the politico-socio-economic relations.
Thus, the studies undertaken to explain the difference of development within countries
must move beyond studying isolating spheres to include interaction between structures
and processes.

*****
 References

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