THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA (A.M. NO.

08-1-16-SC, FEBRUARY 2, 2008)

CASE NUMBER/TITLE/G.R NO/PONENTE CASE RULING

(1) DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF ULTIMATE FACTS IN A PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M. ASUNCION,
LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY SECTION 6 OF THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA requires the following MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF ULTIMATE FACTS
TAPUZ MADRIAGA, EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN IN A PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS DATA:
TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS VS DANIEL
MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ- (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M. ASUNCION,
LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY (b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the
TAPUZ MADRIAGA, EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN aggrieved party;
TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS, ET.AL, G.R.
No. 182484, June 17, 2008, BRION, J.: c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;

(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control
of the data or information, if known;

(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files kept by the respondent. In CASE OF THREATS, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act
complained of; and

(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.

We find the PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI AND ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS DATA fatally defective, both in substance and in
form. In sum, the PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is nothing more than the fishing expedition that
this COURT - IN THE COURSE OF DRAFTING THE RULE ON HABEAS DATA - had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of
habeas data is not. In these lights, the OUTRIGHT DENIAL OF THE PETITION for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in
order.

(2) MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA vs P/SSUPT. NATURE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the
PNP-Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte, and The WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP informational privacy. It seeks to PROTECT A PERSON’S RIGHT TO CONTROL INFORMATION REGARDING ONESELF, particularly
Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte, R G.R. No. in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be
193636, July 24, 2012SERENO, J.: emphasized that in order for the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT TO BE GRANTED, there must exist a nexus between the right to
 privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

***In similar fashion, the DETERMINATION OF WHETHER THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA, being an
extraordinary remedy, MAY BE GRANTED in this case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private life of
Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the STATE INTEREST OF DISMANTLING PAGS far outweighs the alleged intrusion on
the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to
a lawful mandate. Therefore, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA must be denied.

(3) IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR MERE THREATS TO FALL WITHIN THE MANTLE OF PROTECTION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA MUST BE SUPPORTED BY
THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF INDEPENDENT AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE
HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF FRANCIS SAEZ
vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, ET. AL., It cannot be overemphasized that SECTION 1 OF BOTH THE RULES ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA expressly
G.R. No. 183533, September 25, 2012 include in their coverage even threatened violations against a person’s right to life, liberty or security. Further, threat and
intimidation that vitiate the free will – although not involving invasion of bodily integrity – nevertheless constitute a violation
of the right to security in the sense of "freedom from threat"

***It must be stressed, however, that SUCH "THREAT" must find rational basis on the surrounding circumstances of the case. In
this case, the PETITION was mainly anchored on the alleged threats against his life, liberty and security by reason of his
inclusion in the military’s order of battle, the surveillance and monitoring activities made on him, and the intimidation exerted
upon him to compel him to be a military asset. While as stated earlier, MERE THREATS FALL WITHIN THE MANTLE OF
PROTECTION OF THE WRITS OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA, in the petitioner’s case, the restraints and threats allegedly made
allegations lack corroborations, are not supported by independent and credible evidence, and thus stand on nebulous grounds.

Given that the TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONER failed to support his claims, the RELIEFS PRAYED
FOR, therefore, cannot be granted. ***The LIBERALITY ACCORDED TO AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA CASES does not mean that
a claimant is dispensed with the onus of proving his case. "Indeed, even the liberal standard of substantial evidence demands
some adequate evidence."

(4) RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. WRIT WILL NOT ISSUE ON THE BASIS MERELY OF AN ALLEGED UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO INFORMATION ABOUT A PERSON (A
MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA vs. ST. NEXUS MUST EXIST BETWEEN THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY OR SECURIT)
THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T.
ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, G.R. No. The WRIT OF HABEAS DATA, however, CAN BE AVAILED of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy, MORE
202666, September 29, 2014, VELASCO, JR., SPECIFICALLY the right to informational privacy. The REMEDIES AGAINST THE VIOLATION OF SUCH RIGHT can include the
J.: updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files in possession or in control of
respondents.

***In DEVELOPING THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational privacy,
 among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined HABEAS DATA as “a procedure designed to safeguard individual
freedom from abuse in the information age.” The WRIT, HOWEVER, WILL NOT ISSUE on the basis merely of an alleged
unauthorized access to information about a person. AVAILMENT OF THE WRIT requires the existence of a nexus between the
right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Thus, the EXISTENCE OF A PERSON’S
RIGHT TO INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the
right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are INDISPENSABLE BEFORE THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT MAY BE
EXTENDED.

STC DID NOT VIOLATE PETITIONERS’ DAUGHTERS’ RIGHT TO PRIVACY. WITHOUT THESE PRIVACY SETTINGS, respondents’
contention that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebook would, in context, be correct. However, such is not the
case. It is through the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a subjective expectation that only
those to whom they grant access to their profile will view the information they post or upload thereto. Considering that the
DEFAULT SETTING FOR FACEBOOK POSTS IS “PUBLIC,” it can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to
everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. IF SUCH
WERE THE CASE, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy.

(5) DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, Petitioner, v. ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT A PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF AMPARO
P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN, G.R. No. 203254,
October 08, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: ***Thus, in order to SUPPORT A PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF SUCH WRIT, SECTION 6 OF THE HABEAS DATA RULE
essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “The manner the right to privacy is violated or
threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” In other words, the PETITION must
adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security
on the other. Corollarily, the ALLEGATIONS IN THE PETITION must be SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE showing an
actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing
out that the WRIT OF HABEAS DATA WILL NOT ISSUE to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds
invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.

In this case, the Court finds that ILAGAN was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or security was
or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While ILAGAN
PURPORTS A PRIVACY INTEREST IN THE SUPPRESSION OF THIS VIDEO – which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo
or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any
violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, COURTS cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions.
As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually PROVING THE NEXUS between one’s privacy
right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a FAILURE ON EITHER
ACCOUNT certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case. In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the
allegations, the PETITION WOULD EQUALLY BE DISMISSIBLE due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records
show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial
evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule.