Crescent Petroleum, Ltd. vs. M: VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 11, 2005 623 /V "Lok Maheshwari"

1/24/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 474
VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 11, 2005 623

Crescent Petroleum, Ltd. vs. M/V “Lok Maheshwari”
*
G.R. No. 155014. November 11, 2005.
CRESCENT PETROLEUM, LTD., petitioner, vs. M/V

“LOK MAHESHWARI,” THE SHIPPING CORPORATION
OF INDIA, and PORTSERV LIMITED and/or TRANSMAR
SHIPPING, INC., respondents.
Courts; Jurisdictions; Admiralty and Maritime Law; Two (2)

tests have been used to determine whether a case involving
contracts comes within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of
a court—the locational test and the subject matter test; The
English rule follows the locational test wherein maritime and
admiralty jurisdiction, within a few exceptions, is exercised only
on contracts made upon the sea and to be executed thereon; Under
the American rule, the criterion in determining whether a contract
is maritime depends on the nature and subject matter of the
contract, which rule has been adopted by the Philippine Supreme
Court; A contract for furnishing supplies is maritime and within
the jurisdiction of admiralty.— Under Batas Pambansa Bilang
129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, RTCs exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction “(i)n all actions in admiralty and
maritime where the demand or claim exceeds two hundred
thousand
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
624
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
pesos (P200,000) or in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim

exceeds four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000).” Two (2) tests
have been used to determine whether a case involving a contract
comes within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of a court—
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001687ea75f8ae32b51c7003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/23
the locational test and the subject matter test. The English rule
follows the locational test wherein maritime and admiralty
jurisdiction, with a few exceptions, is exercised only on contracts
made upon the sea and to be executed thereon. This is totally
rejected under the American rule where the criterion in
determining whether a contract is maritime depends on the
nature and subject matter of the contract, having reference to
maritime service and transactions. In International Harvester
Company of the Philippines v. Aragon, we adopted the American
rule and held that “(w)hether or not a contract is maritime
depends not on the place where the contract is made and is to be
executed, making the locality the test, but on the subject matter
of the contract, making the true criterion a maritime service or a
maritime transaction.” A contract for furnishing supplies like the
one involved in this case is maritime and within the jurisdiction of
admiralty. It may be invoked before our courts through an action
in rem or quasi in rem or an action in personam.
Same; Same; Same; Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 (P.D. No.
1521); Statutory Construction; Legal Research; The Ship Mortgage
Decree of 1978, which was patterned closely from the U.S. Ship
Mortgage Act of 1920 and the Liberian Maritime Law relating to
preferred mortgages, was enacted “to accelerate the growth and
development of the shipping industry” and to extend the benefits
accorded to overseas shipping under PD 214 to domestic shipping;
U.S. jurisprudence finds relevance to determining whether P.D.
No. 1521 applies in the present case.—P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship
Mortgage Decree of 1978 was enacted “to accelerate the growth
and development of the shipping industry” and “to extend the
benefits accorded to overseas shipping under Presidential Decree
No. 214 to domestic shipping.” It is patterned closely from the
U.S. Ship Mortgage Act of 1920 and the Liberian Maritime Law
relating to preferred mortgages. Notably, Sections 21, 22 and 23
of P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 are
identical to Subsections P, Q, and R, respectively, of the U.S. Ship
Mortgage Act of 1920, which is part of the Federal Maritime Lien
Act. Hence, U.S. jurisprudence finds relevance to determining
whether P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978
applies in the present case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Maritime Lien; Conflict of Laws;
Balancing basic interests—Canada is the place of the wrongful
act, of the allegiance or domicile of the injured and the place of
contract, while India is the law of the flag and the allegiance of the
defendant shipowner—it is
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VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 11, 2005 625
inconceivable that the Philippine court has any interest in the case
that outweighs the interests of Canada or India for that matter.—
Out of the seven basic factors listed in the case of Lauritzen,
Philippine law only falls under one—the law of the forum. All
other elements are foreign—Canada is the place of the wrongful
act, of the allegiance or domicile of the injured and the place of
contract; India is the law of the flag and the allegiance of the
defendant shipowner. Balancing these basic interests, it is
inconceivable that the Philippine court has any interest in the
case that outweighs the interests of Canada or India for that
matter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; PD 1521 was enacted
primarily to protect Filipino suppliers and was not intended to
create a lien from a contract for supplies between foreign entities
delivered in a foreign port.— P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage
Decree of 1978 is inapplicable following the factors under
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Like the Federal
Maritime Lien Act of the U.S., P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship
Mortgage Decree of 1978 was enacted primarily to protect Filipino
suppliers and was not intended to create a lien from a contract for
supplies between foreign entities delivered in a foreign port.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Opening up our courts to
foreign supplies by granting them a maritime lien under our laws
even if they are not entitled to a maritime lien under their laws
will encourage forum shopping.—Applying P.D. No. 1521 or the
Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 and rule that a maritime lien exists
would not promote the public policy behind the enactment of the
law to develop the domestic shipping industry. Opening up our
courts to foreign suppliers by granting them a maritime lien
under our laws even if they are not entitled to a maritime lien
under their laws will encourage forum shopping.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When the parties entered
into a contract for supplies in Canada, they could not have
intended the laws of a remote country like the Philippines to
determine the creation of a lien by a mere accident of the vessel’s
being in Philippine territory.—The submission of petitioner is not
in keeping with the reasonable expectation of the parties to the
contract. Indeed, when the parties entered into a contract for
supplies in Canada, they could not have intended the laws of a
remote country like the Philippines to determine the creation of a
lien by the mere accident of the Vessel’s being in Philippine
territory.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In light of the various
foreign interest involved, it is clear that Canada has the most
significant interest in this
626
dispute.—In light of the interests of the various foreign elements

involved, it is clear that Canada has the most significant interest
in this dispute. The injured party is a Canadian corporation, the
sub-charterer which placed the orders for the supplies is also
Canadian, the entity which physically delivered the bunker fuels
is in Canada, the place of contracting and negotiation is in
Canada, and the supplies were delivered in Canada. The
arbitration clause contained in the Bunker Fuel Agreement which
states that New York law governs the “construction, validity and
performance” of the contract is only a factor that may be
considered in the choice-of-law analysis but is not conclusive. As
in the cases of Gulf Trading and Swedish Telecom, the lien that is
the subject matter of this case arose by operation of law and not
by contract because the shipowner was not a party to the contract
under which the goods were supplied.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The supplier’s insistence on
enforcing a maritime lien before Philippine courts depends on the
existence of maritime lien under the proper law, and by
erroneously claiming a maritime lien under Philippine law instead
of proving that a maritime lien exists under Canadian law, such
supplier failed to establish a cause of action.—It is well-settled
that a party whose cause of action or defense depends upon a
foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. Such
foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded
and proved. Petitioner Crescent’s insistence on enforcing a
maritime lien before our courts depended on the existence of a
maritime lien under the proper law. By erroneously claiming a
maritime lien under Philippine law instead of proving that a
maritime lien exists under Canadian law, petitioner Crescent
failed to establish a cause of action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Processual
Presumption; Requisites for Maritime Liens on Necessaries to
Exist.—Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption,
the result will still be the same. Under P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship
Mortgage Decree of 1978, the following are the requisites for
maritime liens on necessaries to exist: (1) the “necessaries” must
have been furnished to and for the benefit of the vessel; (2) the
“necessaries” must have been necessary for the continuation of
the voyage of the vessel; (3) the credit must have been extended to
the vessel; (4) there must be necessity for the extension of the
credit; and (5) the necessaries must be ordered by persons
authorized to contract on behalf of the vessel. These do not avail
in the instant case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While it is presumed when
the master of the ship is the one who placed the order, it is not
disputed that in this
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VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 11, 2005 627
case it was the sub-charterer which placed the orders to the

supplier, hence, it is incumbent for the supplier to prove that the
benefit was extended to the vessel.—It was not established that
benefit was extended to the vessel. While this is presumed when
the master of the ship is the one who placed the order, it is not
disputed that in this case it was the sub-charterer Portserv which
placed the orders to petitioner Crescent. Hence, the presumption
does not arise and it is incumbent upon petitioner Crescent to
prove that benefit was extended to the vessel. Petitioner did not.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where it was the sub-
charterer which requested for the delivery of bunker fuels, the same
does not establish that credit was extended to the vessel.—It was
not established that credit was extended to the vessel. It is
presumed that “in the absence of fraud or collusion, where
advances are made to a captain in a foreign port, upon his
request, to pay for necessary repairs or supplies to enable his
vessel to prosecute her voyage, or to pay harbor dues, or for
pilotage, towage and like services rendered to the vessel, that
they are made upon the credit of the vessel as well as upon that of
her owners.” In this case, it was the subcharterer Portserv which
requested for the delivery of the bunker fuels. The issuance of two
checks amounting to US$300,000 in favor of petitioner Crescent
prior to the delivery of the bunkers as security for the payment of
the obligation weakens petitioner Crescent’s contention that
credit was extended to the Vessel.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A necessity of credit will be
presumed where it appears that the repairs and supplies were
necessary for the ship and that they were ordered by the master.—
There was no proof of necessity of credit. A necessity of credit will
be presumed where it appears that the repairs and supplies were
necessary for the ship and that they were ordered by the master.
This presumption does not arise in this case since the fuels were
not ordered by the master and there was no proof of necessity for
the supplies.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases;
Clearly, a sub-charterer under a time charter, is not someone to
whom the management of the vessel has been entrusted; A time
charter is a contract for the use of a vessel for a specified period of
time or for the duration of one or more specified voyages wherein
the owner of the time-chartered vessel retains possession and
control through the master and crew who remains his employees.—
The necessaries were not ordered by persons authorized to
contract in behalf of the vessel as provided under Section 22 of

P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978—the
managing owner, the ship’s husband,
628
master or any person with whom the management of the vessel at

the port of supply is entrusted. Clearly, Portserv, a sub-charterer
under a time charter, is not someone to whom the management of
the vessel has been entrusted. A time charter is a contract for the
use of a vessel for a specified period of time or for the duration of
one or more specified voyages wherein the owner of the time-
chartered vessel retains possession and control through the
master and crew who remain his employees. Not enjoying the
presumption of authority, petitioner Crescent should have proved
that Portserv was authorized by the shipowner to contract for
supplies. Petitioner failed.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Arthur D. Lim for petitioner.
Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for
respondent M/V Lok Maheshwari and the Shipping
Corporation of India.
PUNO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks

the (a) reversal of the November 28, 2001 Decision 1
of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-54920, which
dismissed for “want of jurisdiction” the instant case, and
the September
2
3, 2002 Resolution of the same appellate
court, which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,
3
and (b) reinstatement of the July 25, 1996 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Civil Case No. CEB-18679,
which held that respondents were solidarily liable to pay
petitioner the sum prayed for in the complaint.
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurred in by

Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Candido V. Rivera;
Rollo, pp. 72-81.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurred in by
Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Josefina Guevara-
Salonga; Id., pp. 83-85.

3 Penned by Judge Leonardo B. Canares, Regional Trial Court, Branch
10, Cebu City; Id., pp. 87-90.
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VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 11, 2005 629

The facts are as follows: Respondent M/V “Lok

Maheshwari” (Vessel) is an oceangoing vessel of Indian
registry that is owned by respondent Shipping Corporation
of India (SCI), a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of India and principally owned by the Government
of India. It was time-chartered by respondent SCI to Halla
Merchant Marine Co. Ltd. (Halla), a South Korean
company. Halla, in turn, sub-chartered the Vessel through
a time charter to Transmar Shipping, Inc. (Transmar).
Transmar further sub-chartered the Vessel to Portserv
Limited (Portserv). Both Transmar and Portserv are
corporations organized and existing under the laws of
Canada.
On or about November 1, 1995, Portserv requested
petitioner Crescent Petroleum, Ltd. (Crescent), a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of
Canada that is engaged in the business of selling
petroleum and oil products for the use and operation of
oceangoing vessels, to deliver marine fuel oils (bunker
fuels) to the Vessel. Petitioner Crescent granted and
confirmed the request through an advice via facsimile
dated November 2, 1995. As security for the payment of the
bunker fuels and related services, petitioner Crescent
received two (2) checks in the amounts of US$100,000.00
and US$200,000.00. Thus, petitioner Crescent contracted
with its supplier, Marine Petrobulk Limited (Marine
Petrobulk), another Canadian corporation, for the physical
delivery of the bunker fuels to the Vessel.
On or about November 4, 1995, Marine Petrobulk
delivered the bunker fuels amounting to US$103,544
inclusive of barging and demurrage charges to the Vessel
at the port of Pioneer Grain, Vancouver, Canada. The Chief
Engineer Officer of the Vessel duly acknowledged and
received the delivery receipt. Marine Petrobulk issued an
invoice to petitioner Crescent for the US$101,400.00 worth
of the bunker fuels. Petitioner Crescent issued a check for
the same amount in favor of Marine Petrobulk, which
check was duly encashed.
Having paid Marine Petrobulk, petitioner Crescent
issued a revised invoice dated November 21, 1995 to
“Portserv Limited, and/or the Master, and/or Owners,
and/or Operators, and/or Charterers of
630

M/V ‘Lok Maheshwari’ ” in the amount of US$103,544.00

with instruction to remit the amount on or before
December 1, 1995. The period lapsed and several demands
were made but no payment was received. Also, the checks
issued to petitioner Crescent as security for the payment of
the bunker fuels were dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
As a consequence, petitioner Crescent incurred additional
expenses of US$8,572.61 for interest, tracking fees, and
legal fees.
On May 2, 1996, while the Vessel was docked at the port
of Cebu City, petitioner Crescent instituted before the RTC
of Cebu City an action “for a sum of money with prayer for
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
attachment” against respondents Vessel and SCI, Portserv
and/or Transmar. The case was raffled to Branch 10 and
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-18679.
On May 3, 1996, the trial court issued a writ of
attachment against the Vessel with bond at P2,710,000.00.
Petitioner Crescent withdrew its prayer for a temporary
restraining order and posted the required bond.
On May 18, 1996, summonses were served to
respondents Vessel and SCI, and Portserv and/or Transmar
through the Master of the Vessel. On May 28, 1996,
respondents Vessel and SCI, through Pioneer Insurance
and Surety Corporation (Pioneer), filed an urgent ex-parte
motion to approve Pioneer’s letter of undertaking, to
consider it as counter-bond and to discharge the
attachment. On May 29, 1996, the trial court granted the
motion; thus, the letter of undertaking was approved as
counter-bond to discharge the attachment.
For failing to file their respective answers and upon
motion of petitioner Crescent, the trial court declared
respondents Vessel and SCI, Portserv and/or Transmar in
default. Petitioner Crescent was allowed to present its
evidence ex-parte.
On July 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in
favor of petitioner Crescent, thus:
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VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 11, 2005 631

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered in favor of plaintiff [Crescent] and against the
defendants [Vessel, SCI, Portserv and/or Transmar].

Consequently, the latter are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff
jointly and solidarily, the following:
(a) the sum of US$103,544.00, representing the outstanding

obligation;
(b) interest of US$10,978.50 as of July 3, 1996, plus
additional interest at 18% per annum for the period
thereafter, until the principal account is fully paid;
(c) attorney’s fees of P300,000.00; and
(d) P200,000.00 as litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.”
On August 19, 1996, respondents Vessel and SCI appealed

to the Court of Appeals. They attached copies of the charter
parties between respondent SCI and Halla, between Halla
and Transmar, and between Transmar and Portserv. They
pointed out that Portserv was a time charterer and that
there is a clause in the time charters between respondent
SCI and Halla, and between Halla and Transmar, which
states that “the Charterers shall provide and pay for all the
fuel except as otherwise agreed.” They submitted a copy of
Part II of the Bunker Fuel Agreement between petitioner
Crescent and Portserv containing a stipulation that New
York law governs the “construction, validity and
performance” of the contract. They likewise submitted
certified copies of the Commercial Instruments and
Maritime Lien Act of the United States (U.S.), some U.S.
cases, and some Canadian cases to support their defense.
On November 28, 2001, the Court of Appeals issued its
assailed Decision, which reversed that of the trial court,
viz.:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 25,

1996, issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 10,
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is entered
DISMISSING the instant case for want of jurisdiction.”
632

The appellate court denied petitioner Crescent’s motion for

reconsideration explaining that it “dismissed the instant
action primarily on the ground of forum non conveniens
considering that the parties are foreign corporations which
are not doing business in the Philippines.”
Hence, this petition submitting the following issues for
resolution, viz.:
1. Philippine courts have jurisdiction over a foreign

vessel found inside Philippine waters for the
enforcement of a maritime lien against said vessel
and/or its owners and operators;
2. The principle of forum non conveniens is
inapplicable to the instant case;
3. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the instant case, as well as over
the res and over the persons of the parties;
4. The enforcement of a maritime lien on the subject
vessel is expressly granted by law. The Ship
Mortgage Acts as well as the Code of Commerce
provides for relief to petitioner for its unpaid claim;
5. The arbitration clause in the contract was not rigid
or inflexible but expressly allowed petitioner to
enforce its maritime lien in Philippine courts
provided the vessel was in the Philippines;
6. The law of the state of New York is inapplicable to
the present controversy as the same has not been
properly pleaded and proved;
7. Petitioner has legal capacity to sue before
Philippine courts as it is suing upon an isolated
business transaction;
8. Respondents were duly served summons although
service of summons upon respondents is not a
jurisdictional requirement, the action being a suit
quasi in rem;
9. The trial court’s decision has factual and legal
bases; and,
10. The respondents should be held jointly and
solidarily liable.
In a nutshell, this case is for the satisfaction of unpaid

supplies furnished by a foreign supplier in a foreign port to
a vessel of foreign registry that is owned, chartered and
sub-chartered by foreign entities.
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7691, RTCs exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction “(i)n all
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VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 11, 2005 633

actions in admiralty and maritime where the demand or

claim exceeds two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000) or in
Metro Manila, where such demand or claim exceeds four
hundred thousand pesos (P400,000).” Two (2) tests have
been used to determine whether a case involving a contract

comes within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of a
court—the locational test and the subject matter test. The
English rule follows the locational test wherein maritime
and admiralty jurisdiction, with a few exceptions, is
exercised only on contracts made upon the sea and to be
executed thereon. This is totally rejected under the
American rule where the criterion in determining whether
a contract is maritime depends on the nature and subject
matter of the contract,
4
having reference to maritime service
and transactions. In International
5
Harvester Company of
the Philippines v. Aragon, we adopted the American rule
and held that “(w)hether or not a contract is maritime
depends not on the place where the contract is made and is
to be executed, making the locality the test, but on the
subject matter of the contract, making the true criterion a
maritime service or a maritime transaction.”
A contract for furnishing supplies like the one involved
in this case
6
is maritime and within the jurisdiction of
admiralty. It may be invoked before our courts through an
action7 in rem or quasi in rem or an action in personam.
Thus:
xxx
“Articles 579 and 584 [of the Code of Commerce] provide a
method of collecting or enforcing not only the liens created under
Section 580 but
_______________
4 Hernandez, Eduardo F. and Peñasales, Antero A., Philippine Admiralty and

Maritime Law (1987 ed.), pp. 9-10, citing New England Mutual Marine Insurance
Co. v. Dunkan, 8 U.S. (11 Wall) 1 (1870).
5 G.R. No. L-2372, August 26, 1949.
6 2 C.J.S. Section 39, p. 100.
7 Agbayani, Aguedo F., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Commercial
Laws of the Philippines IV (1987), p. 178; citing McMicking v. Banco Español-
Filipino, 13 Phil. 429 (1909); Ivanvich v. Odlin, 1 Phil. 284 (1902);and Heather v.
Steamer “San Nicholas,” 7 Phil. 532 (1907).
634

8
also for the collection of any kind of lien whatsoever.” In the
Philippines, we have a complete legislation, both substantive and
adjective, under which to bring an action in rem against a vessel
for the purpose of enforcing liens. The substantive law is found in
Article 580 of the Code of Commerce. The procedural law is to be
found in Article 584 of the same Code. The result is, therefore,
that in the Philippines any vessel—even though it be a foreign
vessel—found in any port of this Archipelago may be attached and

sold under the substantive law which defines the right, and the
procedural law contained9
in the Code of Commerce by which this
right is to be enforced. x x x. But where neither the law nor the
contract between the parties creates any lien or charge upon the
vessel, the only way in which it can be seized before judgment is
by pursuing the remedy relating to 10
attachment under Rule 59
[now Rule 57] of the Rules of Court.
But, is petitioner Crescent entitled to a maritime lien

under our laws? Petitioner Crescent bases its claim of a
maritime lien on Sections 21, 22 and 23 of Presidential
Decree No. 1521 (P.D. No. 1521), also known as the Ship
Mortgage Decree of 1978, viz.:
Sec. 21. Maritime Lien for Necessaries; persons entitled to such

lien.—Any person furnishing repairs, supplies, towage, use of dry
dock or maritime railway, or other necessaries, to any vessel,
whether foreign or domestic, upon the order of the owner of such
vessel, or of a person authorized by the owner, shall have a
maritime lien on the vessel, which may be enforced by suit in rem,
and it shall be necessary to allege or prove that credit was given
to the vessel.
Sec. 22. Persons Authorized to Procure Repairs, Supplies and
Necessaries.—The following persons shall be presumed to have
authority from the owner to procure repairs, supplies, towage, use
of dry dock or marine railway, and other necessaries for the
vessel: The managing owner, ship’s husband, master or any
person to whom the management of the vessel at the port of
supply is entrusted. No person tortuously or unlawfully in
possession or charge of a vessel shall have authority to bind the
vessel.
Sec. 23. Notice to Person Furnishing Repairs, Supplies and
Necessaries.—The officers and agents of a vessel specified in
Section 22 of this
_______________
8 McMicking v. Banco Español-Filipino, Id.

9 Ivanvich vs. Odlin & Pacific Lumber Co.,supra.
10 Heather vs. Steamer “San Nicholas,” supra.
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VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 11, 2005 635

Decree shall be taken to include such officers and agents when

appointed by a charterer, by an owner pro hac vice, or by an
agreed purchaser in possession of the vessel; but nothing in this
Decree shall be construed to confer a lien when the furnisher
knew, or by exercise of reasonable diligence could have
ascertained, that because of the terms of a charter party,

agreement for sale of the vessel, or for any other reason, the
person ordering the repairs, supplies, or other necessaries was
without authority to bind the vessel therefor.
Petitioner Crescent submits that these provisions apply to

both domestic and foreign vessels, as well as domestic and
foreign suppliers of necessaries. It contends that the use of
the term “any person” in Section 21 implies that the law is
not restricted to domestic suppliers but also includes all
persons who supply provisions and necessaries to a vessel,
whether foreign or domestic. It points out further that the
law does not indicate that the supplies or necessaries must
be furnished in the Philippines in order to give petitioner
the right
11
to seek enforcement of the lien with a Philippine
court.
Respondents Vessel and SCI, on the other hand,
maintain that Section 21 of the P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship
Mortgage Decree of 1978 does not apply to a foreign
supplier like petitioner Crescent as the provision refers
only to a situation where the person furnishing the
supplies is situated inside the territory of the Philippines
and not where the necessaries
12
were furnished in a foreign
jurisdiction like Canada.
We find against petitioner Crescent.
I.
P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 was

enacted “to accelerate the growth and development of the
shipping industry” and “to extend the benefits accorded to
overseas shipping 13
under Presidential Decree No. 214 to
domestic shipping.” It is pat-
_______________
11 Rollo, p. 315.
12 Id., p. 469.
13 1st and 4th Whereas Clauses, P.D. No. 1521.
636

terned closely from the U.S. Ship Mortgage Act of 1920 and
the Liberian
14
Maritime Law relating to preferred
mortgages. Notably, Sections 21, 22 and 23 of P.D. No.
1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 are identical to
Subsections P, Q, and R, respectively, of the U.S. Ship
Mortgage Act of 1920, which is part of the Federal
Maritime Lien Act. Hence, U.S. jurisprudence finds

relevance to determining whether P.D. No. 1521 or the
Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 applies in the present case.
The various tests used in the U.S. to determine whether
a maritime lien exists are the following:
One. “In a suit to establish and enforce a maritime lien
for supplies furnished to a vessel in a foreign port, whether
such lien exists, or whether the court has or will exercise
jurisdiction, depends on the law of the country where the
supplies 15 were furnished, which must be pleaded and
proved.” This16
principle was laid down in the 1888
17
case of
The Scotia, reiterated
18
in The Kaiser Wilhelm II (1916), in
19
The Woudrichem (1921) and in The City of Atlanta
(1924).
Two. The Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis trilogy of cases,
which replaced such single-factor
20
methodologies as the law
of the place of supply. 21
In Lauritzen v. Larsen, a Danish seaman, while
temporarily in New York, joined the crew of a ship of
Danish flag and registry that is owned by a Danish citizen.
He signed the ship’s articles providing that the rights of the
crew members would be governed
_______________
14 See note 4, p. 133.

15 The Woudrichem, 278 F. 568.
16 35 F. 907.
17 230 F. 717.
18 278 F. 568.
19 17 F.2d 308.
20 Dougherty, William F., “Multi-contact analysis for a multinational
industry: The United States’ approach to choice of law analysis in the
enforcement of maritime liens,” University of San Francisco Maritime
Law Journal (2000-2001), p. 89.
21 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
637
VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 11, 2005 637

by Danish law and by the employer’s contract with the

Danish Seamen’s Union, of which he was a member. While
in Havana and in the course of his employment, he was
negligently injured. He sued the shipowner in a federal
district court in New York for damages under the Jones
Act. In holding that Danish law and not the Jones Act was
applicable, the Supreme Court adopted a multiple-contact
test to determine, in the absence of a specific Congressional
directive as to the statute’s reach, which jurisdiction’s law
should be applied. The following factors were considered:

(1) place of the wrongful act; (2) law of the flag; (3)
allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4) allegiance of the
defendant shipowner; (5) place of contract; (6)
inaccessibility of foreign forum; and (7) law of the forum.
Several years after Lauritzen, the U.S. Supreme Court
in the
22
case of Romero v. International Terminal Operating
Co. again considered a foreign seaman’s personal injury
claim under both the Jones Act and the general maritime
law. The Court held that the factors first announced in the
case of Lauritzen were applicable not only to personal
injury claims arising under the Jones Act23
but to all matters
arising under maritime law in general.
24
Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis was also a suit under
the Jones Act by a Greek seaman injured aboard a ship of
Greek registry while in American waters. The ship was
operated by a Greek corporation which has its largest office
in New York and another office in New Orleans and whose
stock is more than 95% owned by a U.S. domiciliary who is
also a Greek citizen. The ship was engaged in regularly
scheduled runs between various ports of the U.S. and the
Middle East, Pakistan, and India, with its entire income
coming from either originating or terminating in the U.S.
The contract of employment provided that Greek law and a
Greek collective bargaining agreement would apply
between the employer and the seaman and that all claims
arising out of the employment contract were to be
adjudicated by a Greek court. The U.S. Supreme Court
_______________
22 358 U.S. 354, 1959 AMC 832 (1959).

23 See Dougherty, p. 82.
24 398 U.S. 306, 1970 AMC 994 (1970).
638

observed that of the seven factors listed in the Lauritzen

test, four were in favor of the shipowner and against
jurisdiction. In arriving at the conclusion that the Jones
Act applies, it ruled that the application of the Lauritzen
test is not a mechanical one. It stated thus: “[t]he
significance of one or more factors must be considered in
light of the national interest served by the assertion of
Jones Act jurisdiction. (footnote omitted) Moreover, the list
of seven factors in Lauritzen was not intended to be
exhaustive. x x x [T]he shipowner’s base of operations is
another factor of importance in determining whether the

Jones Act is applicable; and there well may be others.”
The principles enunciated in these maritime tort cases
have been extended to cases involving unpaid supplies and
necessaries such as the cases of 25Forsythe International
U.K., Ltd. v. M/V Ruth Venture, 26 and Comoco Marine
Services v. M/V El Centroamericano.
_______________
25 633 F.Supp. 74 (1985). A British corporation based in London

brought an in rem action against the vessel M/V Ruth Venture to enforce a
maritime lien. A Liberian sub-charterer contracted for the supply of
bunkers in London with Forsythe as its broker. The bunkers were
furnished to the vessel at Richards Bay, South Africa but was not paid.
The vessel was arrested in Portland, Oregon. In ruling that English law
applies, it held that the Lauritzen/Rhoditis factors should be applied in a
balancing analysis. “[T]he choice of law questions involving maritime liens
is to be resolved by weighing and evaluating the points of contract
between the transaction and the sovereign legal systems touched and
affected by it… The interests of competing sovereigns may be taken into
account without rejecting altogether the contacts the bar and the
maritime industry are accustomed to weigh in making the initial
determination of governing law.” Because English law disallows a lien for
bunkers, the court held there was no lien.
26 1983 WL 602 (D.Or.) (1983). This involves a suit by a Singaporean
corporation against a Panamanian vessel that is owned by Costa Ricans
for supplies furnished in Singapore. The court, applying the Lauritzen
factors, held that U.S. law did not apply to determine whether there exists
a maritime lien. The case was dismissed under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. (See Tetley, William, Maritime Liens, Mortgages and Conflict
639
VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 11, 2005 639

Three. The factors provided in Restatement (Second) of

Conflicts of Law have also been applied, especially in
resolving cases brought under the Federal Maritime Lien
Act. Their application suggests that in the absence of an
effective choice of law by the parties, the forum contacts to
be considered include: (a) the place of contracting; (b) the
place of negotiation of the contract; (c) the place of
performance; (d) the location of the subject matter of the
contract; and (e) the domicile, residence, nationality,
27
place
of incorporation and place of business of the parties.
In Gulf Trading
28
and Transportation Co. v. The Vessel
Hoegh Shield, an admiralty action in rem was brought by
an American supplier against a vessel of Norwegian flag
owned by a Norwegian Company and chartered by a
London time charterer for unpaid fuel oil and marine diesel
oil delivered while the vessel was in U.S. territory. The
contract was executed in London. It was held that because
the bunker fuel was delivered to a foreign flag vessel
within the jurisdiction of the U.S., and because the invoice
specified payment in the U.S., the admiralty and maritime
law of the U.S. applied. The U.S. Court of Appeals
recognized the modern approach to maritime conflict of law
problems introduced in the Lauritzen case. However, it
observed that Lauritzen involved a torts claim under the
Jones Act while the present claim involves an alleged
maritime lien arising from unpaid supplies. It made a
disclaimer that its conclusion is limited to the unique
circumstances surrounding a maritime lien as well as the
statutory directives found in the Maritime Lien Statute
and that the initial choice of law determination is
significantly affected by the statutory policies surrounding a
maritime lien. It ruled that the facts in the case call for the
application of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law.
The U.S. Court gave much significance to the congressional
intent in enacting the Maritime Lien Statute to protect the
interests of
_______________
of Laws, University of San Francisco Maritime Law Journal [Fall,

1993], p. 17.)
27 Gulf Trading and Transportation Co. v. The Vessel Hoegh Shield, 658
F.2d 363 (1981).
28 Id.
640

American supplier of goods, services or necessaries by

making maritime liens available where traditional services
are routinely rendered. It concluded that the Maritime
Lien Statute represents a relevant policy of the forum that
serves the needs of the international legal system as well
as the basic policies underlying maritime law. The court
also gave equal importance to the predictability of result
and protection of justified expectations in a particular field
of law. In the maritime realm, it is expected that when
necessaries are furnished to a vessel in an American port
by an American supplier, the American Lien Statute will
apply to protect that supplier regardless of the place where
the contract was formed or the nationality of the vessel.
The same principle was applied 29in the case of Swedish
Telecom Radio v. M/V Discovery I where the American
court refused to apply the Federal Maritime Lien Act to

create a maritime lien for goods and services supplied by
foreign companies in foreign ports. In this case, a Swedish
company supplied radio equipment in a Spanish port to
refurbish a Panamanian vessel damaged by fire. Some of
the contract negotiations occurred in Spain and the
agreement for supplies between the parties indicated
Swedish company’s willingness to submit to Swedish law.
The ship was later sold under a contract of purchase
providing for the application of New York law and was
arrested in the U.S. The U.S. Court of Appeals also held
that while the contacts-based framework set forth in
Lauritzen was useful in the analysis of all maritime choice
of law situations, the factors were geared towards a
seaman’s injury claim. As in Gulf Trading, the lien arose
by operation of law because the ship’s owner was not a
party to the contract under which the goods were supplied.
As a result, the court found it more appropriate to consider
the factors contained in Section 6 of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts of Law. The U.S. Court held that the
primary concern of the Federal Maritime Lien Act is the
protection of American suppliers of goods and services.
_______________
29 712 F.Supp. 1542 (1988).
641
VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 11, 2005 641

The same factors were applied

30
in the case of Ocean Ship
Supply, Ltd. v. M/V Leah.
II.
Finding guidance from the foregoing decisions, the Court

cannot sustain petitioner Crescent’s insistence on the
application of P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree
of 1978 and hold that a maritime lien exists.
First. Out of the seven basic factors listed in the case of
Lauritzen, Philippine law only falls under one—the law of
the forum. All other elements are foreign—Canada is the
place of the wrongful act, of the allegiance or domicile of
the injured and the place of contract; India is the law of the
flag and the allegiance of the defendant shipowner.
Balancing these basic interests, it is inconceivable that the
Philippine court has any interest in the case that
outweighs the interests of Canada or India for that matter.
Second. P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of

1978 is inapplicable following the factors under
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Like the Federal
Maritime Lien Act of the U.S., P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship
Mortgage Decree of 1978 was enacted primarily to protect
Filipino suppliers and was not intended to create a lien
from a contract for supplies between foreign entities
delivered in a foreign port.
Third. Applying P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage
Decree of 1978 and rule that a maritime lien exists would
not promote the public policy behind the enactment of the
law to develop the domestic shipping industry. Opening up
our courts to foreign suppliers by granting them a
maritime lien under our laws even if they are not entitled
to a maritime lien under their laws will encourage forum
shopping.
Finally. The submission of petitioner is not in keeping
with the reasonable expectation of the parties to the
contract. Indeed, when the parties entered into a contract
for supplies in Canada, they
_______________
30 729 F.2d 971 (1984).
642

could not have intended the laws of a remote country like

the Philippines to determine the creation of a lien by the
mere accident of the Vessel’s being in Philippine territory.
III.
But under which law should petitioner Crescent prove the

existence of its maritime lien?
In light of the interests of the various foreign elements
involved, it is clear that Canada has the most significant
interest in this dispute. The injured party is a Canadian
corporation, the subcharterer which placed the orders for
the supplies is also Canadian, the entity which physically
delivered the bunker fuels is in Canada, the place of
contracting and negotiation is in Canada, and the supplies
were delivered in Canada.
The arbitration clause contained in the Bunker Fuel
Agreement which states that New York law governs the
“construction, validity and performance” of the contract is
only a factor that may be considered in the choice-of-law
analysis but is not conclusive. As in the cases of Gulf
Trading and Swedish Telecom, the lien that is the subject

matter of this case arose by operation of law and not by
contract because the shipowner was not a party to the
contract under which the goods were supplied.
It is worthy to note that petitioner Crescent never
alleged and proved Canadian law as basis for the existence
of a maritime lien. To the end, it insisted on its theory that
Philippine law applies. Petitioner contends that even if
foreign law applies, since the same was not properly
pleaded and proved, such foreign law must be presumed to
be the same as Philippine law pursuant to the doctrine of
processual presumption.
Thus, we are left with two choices: (1) dismiss the 31
case
for petitioner’s failure to establish a cause of action or (2)
presume that
_______________
31 Coquia, J.R. and Aguiling-Pangalangan, E., Conflict of Laws (2000),

p. 129.
643
VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 11, 2005 643

Canadian law is the same as Philippine law. In either case,

the case has to be dismissed.
It is well-settled that a party whose cause of action or
defense depends upon a foreign law has the burden of
proving the foreign law. Such foreign law is treated as a 32
question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved.
Petitioner Crescent’s insistence on enforcing a maritime
lien before our courts depended on the existence of a
maritime lien under the proper law. By erroneously
claiming a maritime lien under Philippine law instead of
proving that a maritime lien exists under Canadian 33law,
petitioner Crescent failed to establish a cause of action.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption,
the result will still be the same. Under P.D. No. 1521 or
the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978, the following are the
requisites for maritime liens on necessaries to exist: (1) the
“necessaries” must have been furnished to and for the
benefit of the vessel; (2) the “necessaries” must have been
necessary for the continuation of the voyage of the vessel;
(3) the credit must have been extended to the vessel; (4)
there must be necessity for the extension of the credit; and
(5) the necessaries must be ordered34 by persons authorized
to contract on behalf of the vessel. These do not avail in
the instant case.
First. It was not established that benefit was extended

to the vessel. While this is presumed when the master of
the ship is the one who placed the order, it is not disputed
that in this case it was the sub-charterer Portserv
35
which
placed the orders to petitioner Crescent. Hence, the
presumption does not arise and it is incumbent upon
petitioner Crescent to prove that benefit was extended to
the vessel. Petitioner did not.
Second. Petitioner Crescent did not show any proof that
the marine products were necessary for the continuation of
the vessel.
_______________
32 Id., p. 121, citing Beale, The Conflict of Laws, Section 621.2 (1935).
33 See note 31.
34 Agbayani, p. 631.
35 TSN, p. 6.
644

Third. It was not established that credit was extended to

the vessel. It is presumed that “in the absence of fraud or
collusion, where advances are made to a captain in a
foreign port, upon his request, to pay for necessary repairs
or supplies to enable his vessel to prosecute her voyage, or
to pay harbor dues, or for pilotage, towage and like services
rendered to the vessel, that they are made upon the 36
credit
of the vessel as well as upon that of her owners.” In this
case, it was the sub-charterer Portserv which requested for
the delivery of the bunker fuels. The issuance of two checks
amounting to US$300,000 in favor of petitioner Crescent
prior to the delivery of the bunkers as security for the
payment of the obligation weakens petitioner Crescent’s
contention that credit was extended to the Vessel.
We also note that when copies of the charter parties
were submitted by respondents in the Court of Appeals, the
time charters between respondent SCI and Halla and
between Halla and Transmar were shown to contain a
clause which states that “the Charterers shall provide and
pay for all the fuel except as otherwise agreed.” This
militates against petitioner Crescent’s position that
Portserv is authorized by the shipowner to contract for
supplies upon the credit of the vessel.
Fourth. There was no proof of necessity of credit. A
necessity of credit will be presumed where it appears that
the repairs and supplies were necessary for the ship and
that they were ordered by the master. This presumption
does not arise in this case since the fuels were not ordered
by the master and there was no proof of necessity for the
supplies.
Finally. The necessaries were not ordered by persons
authorized to contract in behalf of the vessel as provided
under Section 22 of P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage
Decree of 1978—the managing owner, the ship’s husband,
master or any person with whom the management of the
vessel at the port of supply is entrusted. Clearly, Portserv,
a sub-charterer under a time charter, is not someone to
whom the management of the vessel has been en-
_______________
36 Agbayani, p. 631, citing 70 Am. Jur. 2d, 479.
645
VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 11, 2005 645

trusted. A time charter is a contract for the use of a vessel

for a specified period of time or for the duration of one or
more specified voyages wherein the owner of the time-
chartered vessel retains possession and control
37
through the
master and crew who remain his employees. Not enjoying
the presumption of authority, petitioner Crescent should
have proved that Portserv was authorized by the shipowner
to contract for supplies. Petitioner failed.
A discussion on the principle of forum non conveniens is
unnecessary.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV 54920, dated November 28,
2001, and its subsequent Resolution of September 3, 2002
are AFFIRMED. The instant petition for review on
certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit. Cost against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ.,

concur.
Chico-Nazario, J.,On Leave.
Judgment and resolution affirmed, petition denied.
Notes.—The party who claims the applicability of a

foreign law has the burden of proof, and where said party
has failed to discharge the burden, Philippine law applies.
(Laureano vs. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 414 [2000])
As a general rule, unlicensed foreign non-resident
corporations cannot file suits in the Philippines. (Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority vs. Universal International Group

of Taiwan, 340 SCRA 359 [2000])
——o0o——
_______________
37 Litonjua Shipping Inc. v. National Seamen Board, G.R. No. 51910,

August 10, 1989, 176 SCRA 189.
646
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1/24/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 474

VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 11, 2005 623

CRESCENT PETROLEUM, LTD., petitioner, vs. M/V

Courts; Jurisdictions; Admiralty and Maritime Law; Two (2)

624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Crescent Petroleum, Ltd. vs. M/V “Lok Maheshwari”

pesos (P200,000) or in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim

VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 11, 2005 625

Crescent Petroleum, Ltd. vs. M/V “Lok Maheshwari”

626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Crescent Petroleum, Ltd. vs. M/V “Lok Maheshwari”

dispute.—In light of the interests of the various foreign elements

VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 11, 2005 627

Crescent Petroleum, Ltd. vs. M/V “Lok Maheshwari”

case it was the sub-charterer which placed the orders to the

contract in behalf of the vessel as provided under Section 22 of

628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Crescent Petroleum, Ltd. vs. M/V “Lok Maheshwari”

master or any person with whom the management of the vessel at

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks

1 Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurred in by

Salonga; Id., pp. 83-85.

VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 11, 2005 629

The facts are as follows: Respondent M/V “Lok

630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

M/V ‘Lok Maheshwari’ ” in the amount of US$103,544.00

VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 11, 2005 631

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

defendants [Vessel, SCI, Portserv and/or Transmar].

(a) the sum of US$103,544.00, representing the outstanding

On August 19, 1996, respondents Vessel and SCI appealed

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 25,

632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The appellate court denied petitioner Crescent’s motion for

1. Philippine courts have jurisdiction over a foreign

In a nutshell, this case is for the satisfaction of unpaid

VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 11, 2005 633

actions in admiralty and maritime where the demand or

been used to determine whether a case involving a contract

4 Hernandez, Eduardo F. and Peñasales, Antero A., Philippine Admiralty and

634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

vessel—found in any port of this Archipelago may be attached and

But, is petitioner Crescent entitled to a maritime lien

Sec. 21. Maritime Lien for Necessaries; persons entitled to such

8 McMicking v. Banco Español-Filipino, Id.

VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 11, 2005 635

Decree shall be taken to include such officers and agents when

ascertained, that because of the terms of a charter party,

Petitioner Crescent submits that these provisions apply to

P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 was

636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maritime Lien Act. Hence, U.S. jurisprudence finds

14 See note 4, p. 133.

VOL. 474, NOVEMBER 11, 2005 637

by Danish law and by the employer’s contract with the

should be applied. The following factors were considered: