Jay Mark A.

Santos
2016-166335

[A.C. No. 5151. October 19, 2004]

PEDRO G. TOLENTINO, ROMEO M. LAYGO, SOLOMON M. LUMALANG, SR.,
MELITON D. EVANGELISTA, SR., and NELSON B. MELGAR, complainants,
vs. ATTY. NORBERTO M. MENDOZA, respondent.

Facts:

This case stemmed when the complainants filed an administrative case for Grossly Immoral
conduct and gross misconduct against respondent Atty. Norberto Mendoza alleging that Atty.
Mendoza abandoned his legal wife Felecitas Valderia in favor of his paramour Marilyn dela
Fuente who is also a married person. The respondent and his paramour have been cohabitating
openly and publicly as husband and wife. Further respondent had fathered two children by his
paramour and his paramour declared in the birth certificates of the two children that they were
married on May 12, 1986 in order to make it appear that the children are legitimate. However, in
the Certificate of Candidacy of the respondent in 1995 election it was declared that his wife is
Felecitas Valderia while respondent’s certificate of candidacy for the 1998 elections, he declared
his civil status as separated.

According to the complainants such declarations in the birth certificates of his children and
in his certificate of candidacy are acts constituting falsification of public documents; and
respondents acts betray his lack of good moral character and constitute grounds for his removal
as a member of the bar.
The respondent contended that the copies of the birth certificate was illegally procured and
constitute a violation of Rule 24, Administrative order no.1 series of 1993 thus it is inadmissible
as evidence. Further he contended that the complaints against him are politically motivated since
the complainants are his political opponents in Naujan Oriental Mindoro.
The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for report,
investigation and recommendation. The complainants then formally offered documentary
evidence consisting of photocopies which were admitted by respondents counsel to be faithful
reproductions of the originals or certified true copies thereof this includes the birth certificates of
the children of the respondent. Respondent, on the other hand, opted not to present any evidence
and merely submitted a memorandum expounding on his arguments that the testimonies of
complainants witnesses are mere hearsay, thus, said testimonies and their documentary evidence
have no probative weight.
Jay Mark A. Santos
2016-166335

Issue:
Whether or not the birth certificate procured by the complainants is admissible as evidence
and enough to support conviction of the respondent.
Ruling:
YES, The evidence presented by complainants are admissible and reach that quantum of
evidence required in administrative proceedings which is only substantial evidence, or that
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conviction.
The birth certificates of the two children and the Certification from the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Bulacan attesting to the existence in its records of an entry of a marriage
between respondent and one Felicitas Valderia, are public documents and are prima
facie evidence of the facts contained therein, as provided for under Article 410 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines.
Respondent mistakenly argues that the birth certificates are inadmissible in evidence for
having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993. Note
that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions against
persons violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it state that
procurement of birth records in violation of said rule would render said records inadmissible in
evidence. On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion of
evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. It should be emphasized;
however, that said rule against unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only to protect a
person from interference by the government or the state.
Further, Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. There
could be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant to the issue.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is hereby found GUILTY of
immorality, in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until he submits satisfactory proof
that he has abandoned his immoral course of conduct.
Jay Mark A. Santos
2016-166335

G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee@
,
vs.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.

FACTS:

This case started when the accused Joel Yatar was convicted for the special complex crime of
Rape with Homicide and was sentenced to Death.
Appellant Yatar and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim,
Kathylyn Uba. In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house because of their frequent quarrels.
Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in the early
morning on June 30, 1998. Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00
p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen, in and along the vicinity of the house of Isabel Dawang,
acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar. Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going
down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at
1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt. Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn
Pas-a was approaching. Later that day, the victim’s lifeless body was found with stab wounds,
her intestine protruding from her stomach, and bruises with her stained pants, bra, underwear and
shoes scattered along the periphery. The victim’s clothes were likewise found near the cadaver.
The post-mortem report of the victim’s body revealed the presence of semen in her vagina. By
DNA examination, it was found that it matches Yatar’s DNA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment regarding the conviction of Yatar is meritorious?

RULING:

Yes. The Court affords much respect and credibility to the testimonies of the witnesses absent
any showing that some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted. The trial court latter is in a better and unique
position of hearing first-hand the witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude.

Furthermore, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution proves beyond doubt that
the accused committed the crime. The requirements to determine the sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence were complied with as follows: (1) there is more than one circumstance;
(2) facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The DNA evidence
presented strengthens the conviction by circumstantial evidence.
Jay Mark A. Santos
2016-166335

Lastly, the case passed the test of moral certainty which invariably proves beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused, Yatar is guilty of Rape with Homicide.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. JOERAL GALLENO

G.R. No. 123546. July 2, 1998
PER CURIAM: EN BANC
FACTS:
The victim Evelyn Obligar Garganera a 5-year old together with her younger brother, 3-year old
Eleazar, live under the care and custody of their uncle, Emetario Obligar, and aunt, Penicola
Obligar.The accused-appellant, is 19-year old Joeral Galleno. This case started on August 16,
1994, when Emetario and Penicola left their residence to work at sugarcane plantation and the
only persons left in the house were Evelyn and Eleazar.

At around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Galleno passed by the Obligars' residence and found
the two children left to themselves. The prosecution and the defense presented conflicting
versions on what occurred at said residence. However, the result is undisputed. Evelyn sustained
a laceration in her vagina which results in profuse, life-threatening bleeding due to her tender
age.

According to Prosecution JOERAL took advantage of the situation by sexually molesting

Evelyn. The penetration caused the child's vagina to bleed, making her cry in pain Accused tried
to stop the bleeding by applying, with his finger, the sap of "madre de cacao" leaves on her
vagina. Unsuccessful in his attempt, he left Evelyn grimacing and crying in pain.

Shortly, Emeterio and Penicola came home from work. They arrived to find Evelyn crying.
Emetario noticed that there was blood in Evelyn's dress and she was pressing a rug against her
genital organ. He saw that her vagina had been lacerated and blood was oozing therefrom. He
summoned a "quack" doctor who applied herbal medicine on Evelyns's vagina but did not stop
the bleeding.

The following day, August 17, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn to the clinic of Dr. Alfonso
D. Orosco, the Rural Health Physician of Maayon, Capiz. After examining EVELYN, he
affirmed that Evelyn's vaginal laceration could have been by blunt instrument inserted into the
vigina, that it was possible that a human penis in full erection had been forcibly inserted into her
vagina and that a human penis in full errection is considered a blunt instrument.

On August 18, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn to the Roxas Memorial General Hospital
where she was examined by resident physician Dr. Ma. Lourdes Lañada. Dr. Lañada, testified
that she found that "there was a 3 cm. lacerated wound at the left anterior one-third of the
vagina" and "the presence of about 10-15cc of blood" at the vaginal vault. Dr. Lañada
Jay Mark A. Santos
2016-166335

recommended that Evelyn be admitted for confinement in the hospital because the wound in her
vagina, which was bleeding, had to be repaired. The following day, Evelyn was examined
at Roxas Memorial General Hospital again where she was attended to by Dr. Machael Toledo,
the resident physician on duty, who found blood clots and minimal bleeding in the genital area.
Dr. Toledo packed the area to prevent further bleeding and admitted the patient for possible
repair of the laceration and blood transfusion because she has anemia secondary to bleeding.

The trial deemed the following circumstances significant in finding accused-appellant

culpable for the crime of Statutory Rape.

Hence, the instant appeal and review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Trial Court erred in giving full weight and credence to the testimonies of the
medical doctors.
RULING:

NO. As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or give opinions. It
is the court's duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon the facts
proved. However, conclusions and opinions of witnesses are received in many cases, and are not
confined to expert testimony, based on the principle that either because of the special skill or
expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of the subject matter under
observation, of for other reasons, the testimony will aid the court in reaching a judgment.

In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of the expert
testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the victim's laceration,
but also the testimony the victim herself. In other words, the trial court did not rely solely on the
testimony of the expert witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided the trial court in the
exercise of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts enumerated various
possible causes of the victim's laceration does not mean the trial court's interference is wrong.

As regards the inconsistencies in Evelyn's declaration, particularly as to what really caused the
laceration, the Supreme Court is convinced that the child, due to her tender age, was just
confused.

As regards accused-appellant's argument that the victim's testimony is just a concocted story
of what really happened, the Supreme Court applies the rule that the revelation of an innocent
child whose chastity was abused deserves full credence. They likewise consider the fact that her
uncle and aunt, virtually her foster parents, themselves support her story of rape. It is unnatural
for a parent to use her offspring as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to
embarrassment and even stigma.
Jay Mark A. Santos
2016-166335

WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellant justified by the evidence on record,

the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 121099 February 17, 1999
FIDEL T. SALAMERA, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, respondent.

FACTS:

This case stemmed when the Sandiganbayan convicted Mayor Fidel Salamera of Casiguran
Aurora for the crime of Malversation of Public Property. This was about the Smith & Wesson
revolver gun that was mortgaged to him by barangay chairman Antonio Benavidez. The said gun
was owned and licensed to Ponciano Benavidez.

When Salamera went to Manila, bringing the gun with him, he was stopped at a checkpoint and
the gun was confiscated from him. After the event, Ponciano demanded that Salamera return the
gun to him. And upon failure to do so, Ponciano filed a complaint for theft against Salamera with
the office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Aurora. And upon dismissal of the case, Ponciano filed
the same with the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila.

During the investigation of the case by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Aurora, Ponciano
executed an affidavit of desistance, as Salamera had paid the value of the gun.

The Ombudsman then filed information against Salamera for Malversation of public funds.
Thinking that the gun became public property at the time that Antonio surrendered it to
Salamera.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is a grievous error for a court to take judicial notice of the market value of the
gun.

RULING:
YES. There was no evidence submitted to the court of the value of the gun to enable the court to
fix the penalty to be imposed on the accused. Assuming that petitioner malversed the gun, in
malversation, the penalty for the offense is dependent on the value of the public funds, money or
property malversed. In this case, the Sandiganbayan did not base the penalty on the minimum
value of the gun in the absence of evidence of its true worth. It took judicial notice of its market
value and estimated its "reasonable value" at P5, 000.00. This is a grievous error.
Jay Mark A. Santos
2016-166335

The Sandiganbayan could not take judicial notice of the value of the gun. It must be duly proved
in evidence as a fact. The court cannot take judicial notice of a disputed fact. The court may take
judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or which are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. Otherwise, the
court must receive evidence of disputed facts with notice to the parties. This is an innovation
introduced in the Revised Rules of Evidence the Supreme Court adopted on July 1, 1989, which
should not be unknown to the lower
courts. The new rule of evidence governs this case, since it was decided in 1995, six years after
its affectivity.
Jay Mark A. Santos
2016-166335

G.R. No. 138471 October 10, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANUEL PRUNA y RAMIREZ or ERMAN PRUNA y RAMIREZ, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
This case started on 27 January 1995, when information for rape was filed against accused-
appellant Manuel Pruna y Ramirez or Erman Pruna y Ramirez alleging that on or about January
3, 1995 at Sitio Tabing-ilog, Brgy. Panilao, Pilar, Bataan, Philippines, the said accused thru force
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and succeed to have
sexual intercourse with the offended party, Lizette Arabelle Gonzales, a 3-year-old minor girl,
against the will and consent of the latter, to her damage and prejudice.
Dr. Emelita Quiroz, an obstetrician and gynecologist at the Bataan Provincial Hospital, testified
that on 3 January 1995, she conducted a complete physical examination on LIZETTE and took
wet smear specimen from her vaginal wall through scraping. The urinalysis report includes a
positive finding for "sperm cells." Dr. Quiroz explained that the presence of sperm cells in the
vaginal canal signified that sexual intercourse and ejaculation had occurred on the person of the
patient. There was no laceration; but there was hyperemia, which means reddening of the tissue
around the vaginal opening.
On the other hand, PRUNA denied having raped LIZETTE. He claimed that in the morning of 3
January 1995, he was in his house preparing coffee for Carlito. After Carlito left, several men
arrived and boxed him for reasons not known to him. Carlito and the latter’s friend then brought
him to the barangay hall. There, LIZETTE’s father boxed him. He was thereafter brought to the
Pilar Municipal Jail.
ISSUES:

1. Whether LIZETTE was a competent and credible witness considering that she was
allegedly only 3 years old when the alleged rape occurred and 5 years old when she
testified. YES
2. Whether or not there was sufficient Evidence of LIZETTE’s Minority to substantiate the
propriety of the Imposition of the Death Penalty. NO

RULING:

1. As a general rule, when a witness takes the witness stand, the law, on ground of public policy,
presumes that he is competent. The court cannot reject the witness in the absence of proof of his
incompetency. The burden is, therefore, upon the party objecting to the competency of a witness
to establish the ground of incompetency.
Jay Mark A. Santos
2016-166335

No precise minimum age can be fixed at which children shall be excluded from testifying. The
intelligence, not the age, of a young child is the test of the competency as a witness. It is settled
that a child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive and, in perceiving,
can make known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully the facts for
which he is examined.

In determining the competency of a child witness, the court must consider his capacity (a) at the
time the fact to be testified to occur such that he could receive correct impressions thereof; (b) to
comprehend the obligation of an oath; and (c) to relate those facts truly to the court at the time he
is offered as a witness. The examination should show that the child has some understanding of
the punishment which may result from false swearing. The requisite appreciation of
consequences is disclosed where the child states that he knows that it is wrong to tell a lie, and
that he would be punished if he does so, or that he uses language which is equivalent to saying
that he would be sent to hell for false swearing. A child can be disqualified only if it can be
shown that his mental maturity renders him incapable of perceiving facts respecting which he is
being examined and of relating them truthfully.

In this case, appellant questions the competency of LIZETTE as a witness solely on the ground
of her age. He failed to discharge the burden of showing her mental immaturity. From the above-
quoted testimony, it can be gleaned that LIZETTE had the capacity of observation, recollection,
and communication and that she could discern the consequence of telling a lie. The court,
therefore, sustain the trial court in admitting her testimony and according it great weight.

The Supreme Court is not persuaded by appellant’s assertion that LIZETTE should not be
allowed to testify two years after the alleged rape "when the interplay of frail memory combines
with the imagination of earlier years." It must be noted that it is a most natural reaction for
victims of criminal violence to have a lasting impression of the manner in which the crime was
committed and the identity of the person responsible therefor.

In a string of cases, The Supreme Court had said that the testimony of a rape victim who is of
young or tender age is credible and deserves full credit, especially where no motive is attributed
to the victim that would make her testify falsely against the accused. Indeed, a girl of such age as
LIZETTE would not concoct a story of defloration; allow the examination of her private parts;
and undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, and the trauma of a public trial unless she was
in fact raped.

2.In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as a baptismal
certificate of LIZETTE, was presented to prove her age. In view of the uncertainty of
LIZETTE’s exact age, corroborative evidence such as her birth certificate, baptismal certificate
or any other authentic document should be introduced in evidence in order that the qualifying
circumstance of "below seven (7) years old" is appreciated against the appellant. The lack of
objection on the part of the defense as to her age did not excuse the prosecution from discharging
its burden. That the defense invoked LIZETTE’s tender age for purposes of questioning her
competency to testify is not necessarily an admission that she was below 7 years of age when
PRUNA raped her on 3 January 1995. Such being the case, PRUNA cannot be convicted of
qualified rape, and hence the death penalty cannot be imposed on him.
Jay Mark A. Santos
2016-166335

However, conformably with no. 3(b) of the foregoing guidelines, the testimony of LIZETTE’s
mother that she was 3 years old at the time of the commission of the crime is sufficient for
purposes of holding PRUNA liable for statutory rape, or rape of a girl below 12 years of age.
Under the second paragraph of Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in relation to no. 3 of
the first paragraph thereof, having carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age is
punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the penalty to be imposed on PRUNA should be
reclusion perpetua, and not death penalty.
Jay Mark A. Santos
2016-166335

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JAILON KULAIS, CARLOS FALCASANTOS "Commander Falcasantos," AWALON
KAMLON HASSAN "Commander Kamlon," MAJID SAMSON "Commander Bungi,"
JUMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS, NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS,
SALVADOR MAMARIL y MENDOZA, HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH, JAINUDDIN
HASSAN y AHMAD, IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH, JALINA HASSAN DE
KAMMING, FREDDIE MANUEL "Ajid" and several JOHN and JANE DOES, accused,
JAILON KULAIS, appellant
G.R. No. 100901; July 16, 1998

FACTS

This case stemmed on August 22, 1990 when five Informations for kidnapping for ransom and
three informations for kidnapping were filed before the RTC of Zamboanga City against Carlos
Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Jalina Hassan de
Kamming, Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan, Imam Taruk Alah, Freddie
Manuel and several John and Jane Does.

The informations for kidnapping for ransom set forth identical allegations save for the names of
the victims.

The three informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
likewise alleged identical facts and circumstances, except the names of the victims.

Of the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended.

The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for ransom and one
count of kidnapping a woman and public officer, for which offenses it imposed upon him six
terms of life imprisonment.
It also found him guilty of two counts of slight illegal detention for the kidnapping of Monico
Saavedra and Calixto Francisco.

May 7, 1991 Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and
Jaliha Hussin filed their Joint Notice of Appeal.

In a letter dated February 6, 1997, the same appellants, except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their
appeal because of their application for amnesty and the said motion was granted.

Hence, only the appeal of Kulais remains for the consideration of the SC.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court's erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness' testimony in another
case, also pending before it, affects the conviction of the appellant, whose guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt by other clear, convincing and overwhelming evidence, both testimonial and
documentary.
Jay Mark A. Santos
2016-166335

RULING:

NO. The appeal of Kulais is bereft of merit.

In the case at bar, appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court
took judicial notice of the testimony given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who
was the team leader of the government troops that captured him and his purported cohorts.
Because he was allegedly deprived of his right to cross-examine a material witness in the person
of Lieutenant Feliciano, he contends that the latter's testimony should not be used against
him.even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of the testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it
did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against the appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais
was not denied due process. His conviction was based mainly on the positive identification made
by some of the kidnap victims, namely, Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez.
These witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross-examinations conducted by appellant's
counsel. At best, then, the trial court's mention of Lieutenant Feliciano's testimony is a decisional
surplusage which neither affected the outcome of the case nor substantially prejudiced Appellant
Kulais.
Jay Mark A. Santos
2016-166335

PEOPLE VS. SOLAYAO

WGR 119220, SEPT. 20, 1996, SECOND DIVISION

FACTS:
This case started when Nilo Solayao was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Naval,
Biliran, Branch 16, with the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition defined and
penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1866.
SPO3 Jose Nio stated that he and other operatives went to Barangay Caulangohan, Caibiran,
Biliran. They were to conduct an intelligence patrol as required of them by their intelligence
officer to verify reports on the presence of armed persons roaming around the barangays of
Caibiran.

The team of Police Officer Nio proceeded to Barangay Onion where they met the group of
accused-appellant Nilo Solayao numbering five. The former became suspicious when they
observed that the latter were drunk and that Solayao was wearing a camouflage uniform or a
jungle suit. Solayao’s companions, upon seeing the government agents, fled.

Confiscated from Solayao is a homemade firearm called Latong. Solayao admitted that he had no
permission to possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Nio confiscated the firearm and turned him
over to the custody of the policeman of Caibiran who subsequently investigated him and charged
him with illegal possession of firearm.
Solayao was found guilty, then he appealed to the court against the admissibility of the firearm
as evidence as it was the product of an unlawful warrantless search.

ISSUE:

WON the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the homemade firearm.

RULING:
Firearm is admissible as evidence.
NO. There was no error on the part of the trial court when it admitted the homemade firearm as
evidence nor violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The case at bar constitutes an instance where a search and seizure may be effected without first
making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant when his
companions fled upon seeing the government agents. Under the circumstances, the government
agents could not possibly have procured a search warrant first. Suspicion also arouse when the
group was spotted dressed in camouflage. Also the officers were precisely in the area to conduct
an operation to verify the intelligence report and stop any potential disturbance in the area.

However, the prosecution failed to produce evidence that the accused-appellant has no license to
carry the firearm by merely relying on the lone witness SPO3 Nio’s testimony that accused-
appellant admitted to them during the time he was apprehended that he has no license to carry
such weapon.
Jay Mark A. Santos
2016-166335

The prosecution should have presented a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit of
the Philippine National Police that accused-appellant was not a licensee of a firearm of any kind
or caliber would have sufficed for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second
element of the crime of illegal possession of firearm.

Hence, Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.

Jay Mark A. Santos
2016-166335

ANTONIO M. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SECURITY BANK &
TRUST COMPANY.

G.R. No. 119845. July 5, 1996

FACTS:

This case started when SBTC obtained two loans, one, an export loan and second, a swap loan
with Antonio Garcia as surety in the SWAP loan. The controversy arose when Dynetics failed to
pay said loans, giving rise to the issue of whether or not petitioner Garcia as surety is liable
jointly and solidarily with Dynetics to SBTC for the unpaid obligations of Dynetics
under both the EXPORT loan and the SWAP loan.

SBTC foreclosed the chattel mortgage since there is a failure on the part of Dynetics to pay the
SWAP loan, SBTC was also the highest bidder. However, despite the foreclosure of the chattel
mortgage there was still a deficiency balance of P3,596,758.72. Further, Dynetics also defaulted
in the payment of the EXPORT loan which amounted to over P464 million.

Here comes the petitioner Garcia asserted that there is no prior or written demand made by
SBTC or its counsel upon any of the defendants prior to the filing of the case in court. The loans
had long been paid and extinguished and that the chattel mortgage discarded the Indemnity
Agreement and the Continuing Suretyship.

The Trial Court rendered a decision against Dynetics Incorporated and dismissed the case
against Antonio Garcia. The Court of Appeals modifies the decision of the trial court by holding
Garcia solidarily liable with Dynetics to SBTC for the unpaid balance under the EXPORT loan
and the deficiency balance on the SWAP loan

ISSUE:

Whether or not Garcia may be held liable for the deficiency.

RULING:

NO, The chattel mortgage executed between Dynetics and SBTC was merely additional security
which did not alter, affect, or modify the terms and conditions of the Indemnity Agreement
executed between Garcia and SBTC. Nonetheless, Garcia cannot be held liable for the deficiency
of 3, 596, 758.72. On the matter of petitioner's liability for the deficiency balance under the
SWAP LOAN, it is of course correct to say that the chattel mortgage executed between Dynetics
Jay Mark A. Santos
2016-166335

and SBTC was merely for additional security which did not alter, affect, or modify the terms and
conditions of the Indemnity Agreement executed between Garcia and SBTC, even if, it must be
admitted, the chattel mortgage was entered into without the knowledge of or notice to Garcia.
Hence, Garcia, contrary to his submission, was not released as surety by virtue of execution of
the aforementioned chattel mortgage. In fine, insofar as the SWAP loan was concerned, SBTC
did away with the Indemnity Agreement and the Continuing Surety, opting instead to rely solely
on the chattel mortgage. The aforequoted declarations of Atty. Bello in the course of the trial are
conclusive. Such admission is binding and no amount of contradictory evidence can offset it.

. . . Judicial admissions verbal or written made by the parties in the pleadings or in

the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive, no
evidence being required to prove the same and cannot be contradicted unless
shown to have been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made. (Philippine American General Insurance Co. Inc. vs. Sweet Lines Inc., 212
SCRA 194; 204 [1992]).

We cannot allow SBTC at this time to water down the admission it made in open court, more so
after the opposing party relied upon such judicial admission and accordingly dispensed with
further proof of the fact already admitted. An admission made by a party in the course of the
proceedings does not require proof. The record here does not show any attempt on the part of
SBTC to contradict such judicial admission on the ground of palpable mistake.

Finally, it should be noted that the chattel mortgage was entered into by Dynetics and SBTC.
Garcia was not a party to the chattel mortgage nor was he aware of the contract or its provisions.
It is a basic principle in law that contracts can only bind the parties who had entered into it, and it
cannot favor or prejudice a third person (Oreano vs. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 40 [1992]).
Only those who are parties to contracts are liable for their breach. Parties to a contract cannot
thereby impose any liability on one who, under its terms, is a stranger to the contract. And
considering that it is Dynetics which executed the chattel mortgage, the liability for the
deficiency therefor, must be adjudged against Dynetics alone.

AGUENZA VS. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO. ET AL.

Jay Mark A. Santos
2016-166335

G.R. NO. 74336, 4/7/1997

FACTS:
This case started on March 21, 1978, when private respondents Vitaliado Arrieta, VP of
Intertrade and Lilia P. Perez, a bookkeeper in the employ of Intertrade, obtained a P500,000.00
loan from private respondent Metrobank. Both executed a Promissory Note in favor of said bank
in the amount of P500,000.00. Under said note, private respondents Arrieta and Perez promised
to pay said amount, jointly and severally, in twenty five (25) equal installments of P20,000.00
each starting on April 20, 1979 with interest of 18.704% per annum, and in case of default, a
further 8% per annum.
Private respondents Arrieta and Perez defaulted in the payment of several installments, thus
resulting in the entire obligation becoming due and demandable. In 1979, private respondent
Metrobank instituted suit against Intertrade, Vitaliado Arrieta, Lilia Perez and her husband,
Patricio Perez, to collect not only the unpaid principal obligation, but also interests, fees and
penalties, exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and costs of suit.
More than a year after private respondent Metrobank filed its original complaint, it filed an
Amended Complaint dated August 30, 1980 for the sole purpose of impleading petitioner as
liable for the loan made by private respondents Arrieta and Perez on March 21, 1978,
notwithstanding the fact that such liability is being claimed on account of a Continuing
Suretyship Agreement dated March 14, 1977 executed by petitioner and private respondent
Arrieta specifically to guarantee the credit line applied for by and granted to, Intertrade, through
petitioner and private respondent Arrieta who were especially given authority by Intertrade on
February 28, 1977 to open credit lines with private respondent Metrobank. The obligations
incurred by Intertrade under such credit lines were completely paid as evidenced by private
respondent Metrobank's debit memo in the full amount of P562,443.46.
RTC ruled that petitioner and Intertrade are not liable for the promissory note executed by
Arrieta and Lilia Perez in

the amount of ₱ 500,000 as the same was the personal liability of the latter.
CA reversed the trial court and ordered Intertrade and Marketing Co., Inc. and J. Antonio
Aguenza to pay, jointly and severally, the promissory note contracted by Arrieta and Lilia Perez.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN REVERSING AND

[SETTING] ASIDE THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE LOAN OF
P500,000.00 PROCURED 21 MARCH 1978 BY RESPONDENTS VITALIADO ARRIETA
AND LILIA PEREZ IS NOT A CORPORATE LIABILITY OF RESPONDENT INTERTRADE
AND THAT PETITIONER IS NOT LIABLE THEREON UNDER THE "CONTINUING
SURETYSHIP AGREEMENT" DATED 4 MARCH 1977.
Jay Mark A. Santos
2016-166335

RULING:

The petition has merit.The principal reason for respondent appellate court's reversal of the trial
court's absolution of petitioner is its finding that the loan made by private respondent Arrieta and
Lilia Perez were admitted by Intertrade to be its own obligation.

After a careful scrutiny of the records, however, we find and we so rule that there is neither
factual nor legal basis for such a finding by respondent Appellate Court.

First, the general rule that "the allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a pleading are
conclusive as against the pleader"6 is not an absolute and inflexible rule7 and is subject to
exceptions. Rule 129, Section 4, of the Rules of Evidence

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by a party

in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (Emphasis supplied).

In other words, an admission in a pleading on which a party goes to trial may be

contradicted by showing that it was made by improvidence or mistake or that no such
admission was made, i.e., "not in the sense in which the admission was made to appear or
the admission was taken out of context."8

In the case at bench, we find that the respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in
appreciating the "Answer" filed by the lawyer of Intertrade as an admission of corporate liability
for the subject loan. A careful study of the responsive pleading filed by Atty. Francisco
Pangilinan, counsel for Intertrade, would reveal that there was neither express nor implied
admission of corporate liability warranting the application of the general rule. Thus, the alleged
judicial admission may be contradicted and controverted because it was taken out of context and
no admission was made at all.
Jay Mark A. Santos
2016-166335

ALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 226679 August 15, 2017

FACTS:

Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165.

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for
violation of Section 12 (NOTE: should have been Section 15?) of the same law, with a penalty of
rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the
dangerous drug seized in his possession.

Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all violations of
said law violates:

1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;

2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution; and

3. The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon the

power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure.

2. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for being violative of the

Constitutional right to equal protection of the law.

RULING:

FIRST ISSUE: YES

The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
is now their exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative
departments.

The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our
government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches
Jay Mark A. Santos
2016-166335

trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or
modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.

Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its
discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the
legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court’s authority to
promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of
Our institutional independence.

SECOND ISSUE: UNRESOLVED

The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary
to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any
future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165.

Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a qualified
version thereof, the Court deemed it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea
bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through an
administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.
Jay Mark A. Santos
2016-166335

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO CARIDO y TONIDO

G. R. No. L-32242. November 18, 1988

Facts:

This case started when Solomon Young, the employer of the victim and his wife are the person
found the lifeless body of Nora in their clinic. Dr. Young also noticed that he lost a wall clock
hanging on the wall of the receiving room and a transistor radio on the table of the victim.

Ildefonso Laboa, a detective in the Manila Police Department who interrogated the accused after
the death of Nora. He testified in court that Carido told him that he is the one who stabbed the
victim and told him the whole story. At that precise moment, he paid the bill and Detective
Javier arrived. Accused also told him that he took also a lady's bag and a wall clock and he threw
the knife and the bag in the estero and the wall clock was wrapped in a newspaper and placed
underneath a TV set in his aunt's house in Benavidez.

While in Luneta Park police station, the statements given by Carido were taken (Exhibit I),
exhibit 1-1 was prepared by the accused. However, it was not signed because accordingly he will
only sign the said annotation with the assistance of his lawyer. Upon the arrival of his lawyer,
Carido was advised not to sign the waiver.

Carido was later brought to the fiscal office, the in-house fiscal Baltazar Dizon asked him if he
voluntarily give the statement exhibited in Exhibit I. Carido answered yes. Carido latterly
disowned the said exhibits.

Issue: the Trial Court gravely erred in giving credence to the statement of the appellant, exhibit
I, which is unsigned, repudiated, disowned by the appellant.

Held:

1. Yes, the Trial Court gravely erred in giving credence to the statement of the appellant,
exhibit I, which is unsigned, repudiated, disowned by the appellant.

The alleged extrajudicial confession of Carido that he did commit the crime is not alone credible
to support his conviction. Evidence, to be believed must not only come from the mouth of
a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself. Here, there is no credible evidence
that can support that it was indeed Carido who commit the crime. The Trial Court merely
Jay Mark A. Santos
2016-166335

rely on the allege confession made by Carido. Hence, the Trial Court gravely erred in
giving weight the unsigned extrajudicial confession of Carido.

Furthermore, according to the Supreme Court: the presumption of voluntariness of confessions

cannot attach to the alleged confession of accused even if it was executed prior to the
1973 Constitution because the same was not signed by accused and it remained unsigned
even when presented as evidence.