Republic of the Philippines constitutionality of Executive Order (E.O.) Nos.

364 and 379,

both issued in 2004, via the present Petition for Certiorari and
SUPREME COURT
Prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief.
Manila

E.O. No. 364, which President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued

EN BANC on September 27, 2004, reads:

G.R. No. 166052 August 29, 2007 EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 364

ANAK MINDANAO PARTY-LIST GROUP, as represented TRANSFORMING THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
by Rep. Mujiv S. Hataman, and MAMALO DESCENDANTS INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM
ORGANIZATION, INC., as represented by its Chairman
Romy Pardi, Petitioners,
WHEREAS, one of the five reform packages of the Arroyo
vs.
administration is Social Justice and Basic [N]eeds;
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE HON. EDUARDO R.
ERMITA, and THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN/LAND
REFORM, THE HON. RENE C. VILLA, Respondents. WHEREAS, one of the five anti-poverty measures for social
justice is asset reform;

DECISION
WHEREAS, asset reforms covers [sic] agrarian reform, urban
land reform, and ancestral domain reform;
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

WHEREAS, urban land reform is a concern of the Presidential

Petitioners Anak Mindanao Party-List Group (AMIN) and Commission [for] the Urban Poor (PCUP) and ancestral domain
Mamalo Descendants Organization, Inc. (MDOI) assail the
reform is a concern of the National Commission on Indigenous of the PCUP shall be ex-officio Undersecretary of the
Peoples (NCIP); Department of Land Reform for Urban Land Reform.

WHEREAS, another of the five reform packages of the Arroyo SECTION 3. The NCIP is hereby placed under the supervision
administration is Anti-Corruption and Good Government; and control of the Department of Land Reform. The Chairman
of the NCIP shall be ex-officio Undersecretary of the
Department of Land Reform for Ancestral Domain Reform.
WHEREAS, one of the Good Government reforms of the Arroyo
administration is rationalizing the bureaucracy by consolidating
related functions into one department; SECTION 4. The PCUP and the NCIP shall have access to the
services provided by the Department’s Finance, Management
and Administrative Office; Policy, Planning and Legal Affairs
WHEREAS, under law and jurisprudence, the President of the Office, Field Operations and Support Services Office, and all
Philippines has broad powers to reorganize the offices under other offices of the Department of Land Reform.
her supervision and control;

SECTION 5. All previous issuances that conflict with this

NOW[,] THEREFORE[,] I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, by the Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
powers vested in me as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, do hereby order:
SECTION 6. This Executive Order takes effect immediately.
SECTION 1. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
transformed into the Department of Land Reform. It shall be
responsible for all land reform in the country, including
agrarian reform, urban land reform, and ancestral domain
reform. E.O. No. 379, which amended E.O. No. 364 a month later or on
October 26, 2004, reads:

SECTION 2. The PCUP is hereby placed under the supervision

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 379
and control of the Department of Land Reform. The Chairman
AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 364 ENTITLED Section 2. Compensation. The Chairperson shall suffer no
TRANSFORMING THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM diminution in rank and salary.
INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM

Section 3. Repealing Clause. All executive issuances, rules and

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 8371 created the National regulations or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this
Commission on Indigenous Peoples; Executive Order are hereby revoked, amended or modified
accordingly.

WHEREAS, pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987, the

President has the continuing authority to reorganize the Section 4. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect
administrative structure of the National Government. immediately. (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President Petitioners contend that the two presidential issuances are
of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers unconstitutional for violating:
vested in me by the Constitution and existing laws, do hereby
order:
- THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF SEPARATION OF
POWERS AND OF THE RULE OF LAW[;]
Section 1. Amending Section 3 of Executive Order No. 364.
Section 3 of Executive Order No. 364, dated September 27,
2004 shall now read as follows: - THE CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME AND POLICIES FOR
AGRARIAN REFORM, URBAN LAND REFORM, INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS AND ANCESTRAL DOMAIN[; AND]
"Section 3. The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP) shall be an attached agency of the Department of Land
Reform." - THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE AND THEIR
ORGANIZATIONS TO EFFECTIVE AND REASONABLE
PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING, INCLUDING THROUGH
ADEQUATE CONSULTATION[.]1
 Petitioners find it impermissible for the Executive to
intrude into the domain of the Legislature. They posit that
By Resolution of December 6, 2005, this Court gave due course
an act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress
to the Petition and required the submission of memoranda,
causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which
with which petitioners and respondents complied on March 24,
can be questioned by a member of Congress.7 They add that to
2006 and April 11, 2006, respectively.
the extent that the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the
power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right
to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.8
The issue on the transformation of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) into the Department of Land Reform (DLR)
became moot and academic, however, the department having
Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has
reverted to its former name by virtue of E.O. No. 4562 which
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers
was issued on August 23, 2005.
and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.9

The Court is thus left with the sole issue of the legality of
The OSG questions, however, the standing of MDOI, a
placing the Presidential Commission3 for the Urban Poor (PCUP)
registered people’s organization of Teduray and
under the supervision and control of the DAR, and the National
Lambangian tribesfolk of (North) Upi and South Upi in
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) under the DAR as the province of Maguindanao.
an attached agency.

As co-petitioner, MDOI alleges that it is concerned with

Before inquiring into the validity of the reorganization,
the negative impact of NCIP’s becoming an attached
petitioners’ locus standi or legal standing, inter alia,4
agency of the DAR on the processing of ancestral domain
becomes a preliminary question.
claims. It fears that transferring the NCIP to the DAR
would affect the processing of ancestral domain claims
filed by its members.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of
respondents, concedes that AMIN5 has the requisite
legal standing to file this suit as member6 of Congress.
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged. of causation it proffers between the challenged action and
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges alleged injury is too attenuated.
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for Vague propositions that the implementation of the
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.10 assailed orders will work injustice and violate the rights
of its members cannot clothe MDOI with the requisite
standing. Neither would its status as a "people’s
It has been held that a party who assails the organization" vest it with the legal standing to assail the
constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and validity of the executive orders.14
personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any
governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in
immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos,15 which
its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some MDOI cites in support of its claim to legal standing, is
indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be inapplicable as it is not similarly situated with the therein
denied some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or petitioners who alleged personal and substantial injury
that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by resulting from the mining activities permitted by the assailed
reason of the statute or act complained of.11 statute. And so is Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources,16 for the indigenous peoples’ leaders and
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a
organizations were not the petitioners therein, who necessarily
constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has
had to satisfy the locus standi requirement, but were
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as
intervenors who sought and were allowed to be impleaded, not
a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
to assail but to defend the constitutionality of the statute.
government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.12
Moreover, MDOI raises no issue of transcendental importance
to justify a relaxation of the rule on legal standing. To be
accorded standing on the ground of transcendental
An examination of MDOI’s nebulous claims of "negative
importance, Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita17
impact" and "probable setbacks"13 shows that they are
requires that the following elements must be
too abstract to be considered judicially cognizable. And the line
established: (1) the public character of the funds or
other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a
clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory departments of the government and calls for them to be left
prohibition by the public respondent agency or alone to discharge their duties as they see fit.19
instrumentality of government, and (3) the lack of any
other party with a more direct and specific interest in
raising the questions being raised. The presence of AMIN contends that since the DAR, PCUP and NCIP were
these elements MDOI failed to establish, much less created by statutes,20 they can only be transformed,
allege. merged or attached by statutes, not by mere executive
orders.

Francisco, Jr. v. Fernando18 more specifically declares that the

transcendental importance of the issues raised must relate to While AMIN concedes that the executive power is vested in the
the merits of the petition. President21 who, as Chief Executive, holds the power of control
of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices,22 it
posits that this broad power of control including the power to
This Court, not being a venue for the ventilation of reorganize is qualified and limited, for it cannot be exercised in
generalized grievances, must thus deny adjudication of a manner contrary to law, citing the constitutional duty23 of
the matters raised by MDOI. the President to ensure that the laws, including those creating
the agencies, be faithfully executed.

Now, on AMIN’s position. AMIN charges the Executive

Department with transgression of the principle of AMIN cites the naming of the PCUP as a presidential
separation of powers. commission to be clearly an extension of the President, and the
creation of the NCIP as an "independent agency under the
Office of the President."24 It thus argues that since the
Under the principle of separation of powers, Congress, the legislature had seen fit to create these agencies at separate
President, and the Judiciary may not encroach on fields times and with distinct mandates, the President should respect
allocated to each of them. The legislature is generally limited to that legislative disposition.
the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of
laws, and the judiciary to their interpretation and application to
cases and controversies. The principle presupposes mutual In fine, AMIN contends that any reorganization of these
respect by and between the executive, legislative and judicial administrative agencies should be the subject of a statute.
 As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief
Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees
AMIN’s position fails to impress.
to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of
The Constitution confers, by express provision, the power of his department. He has control over the executive department,
control over executive departments, bureaus and offices in the bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to
President alone. And it lays down a limitation on the legislative assume directly the functions of the executive department,
power. bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials.
Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the
duty of supervising and enforcement of laws for the
maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is
The line that delineates the Legislative and Executive power is
granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under
not indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under the
his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.25
Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." The
(Italics omitted, underscoring supplied)
Constitution, as the will of the people in their original,
sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the
Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to
Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. The legislative The Constitution’s express grant of the power of control in the
body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil President justifies an executive action to carry out
government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and reorganization measures under a broad authority of law.26
tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the
Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited
by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have
power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general deliberated with full knowledge of all existing laws and
concern or common interest. jurisprudence on the subject.27 It is thus reasonable to
conclude that in passing a statute which places an agency
under the Office of the President, it was in accordance with
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the existing laws and jurisprudence on the President’s power to
President executes the laws. The executive power is vested in reorganize.
the President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce
and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws
into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. In establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the
legislature necessarily ordains an executive agency’s position
in the scheme of administrative structure. Such determination
is primary,28 but subject to the President’s continuing (2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to
authority to reorganize the administrative structure. As far as any other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions
bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are to the Office of the President from other Departments and
concerned, the power of control may justify the President to Agencies; and
deactivate the functions of a particular office. Or a law may
expressly grant the President the broad authority to carry out
reorganization measures.29 The Administrative Code of 1987 (3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to
is one such law:30 any other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to
the Office of the President from other departments or
SEC. 30. Functions of Agencies under the Office of the
agencies.31 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
President.– Agencies under the Office of the President shall
supplied)
continue to operate and function in accordance with their
respective charters or laws creating them, except as otherwise
provided in this Code or by law.
In carrying out the laws into practical operation, the President
is best equipped to assess whether an executive agency ought
to continue operating in accordance with its charter or the law
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize
creating it. This is not to say that the legislature is incapable of
his Office.– The President, subject to the policy in the Executive
making a similar assessment and appropriate action within its
Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
plenary power. The Administrative Code of 1987 merely
efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the
underscores the need to provide the President with suitable
administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this
solutions to situations on hand to meet the exigencies of the
purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
service that may call for the exercise of the power of control.

(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the

x x x The law grants the President this power in recognition of
President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the
the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office
Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the
"to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of
Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating,
the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To
or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit
remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must
to another;
be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in
the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies.
After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the
President. This is the rationale behind the President’s agencies so as not to hinder the delivery of crucial social
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure reforms.38
of the Office of the President.32

The consolidation of functions in E.O. 364 aims to attain the

The Office of the President consists of the Office of the objectives of "simplicity, economy and efficiency" as gathered
President proper and the agencies under it.33 It is not disputed from the provision granting PCUP and NCIP access to the range
that PCUP and NCIP were formed as agencies under the Office of services provided by the DAR’s technical offices and support
of the President.34 The "Agencies under the Office of the systems.39
President" refer to those offices placed under the chairmanship
of the President, those under the supervision and control of the
President, those under the administrative supervision of the The characterization of the NCIP as an independent agency
Office of the President, those attached to the Office for policy under the Office of the President does not remove said body
and program coordination, and those that are not placed by law from the President’s control and supervision with respect to its
or order creating them under any special department.35 performance of administrative functions. So it has been
opined:

As thus provided by law, the President may transfer any agency

under the Office of the President to any other department or That Congress did not intend to place the NCIP under the
agency, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in control of the President in all instances is evident in the IPRA
order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. Gauged itself, which provides that the decisions of the NCIP in the
against these guidelines,36 the challenged executive orders exercise of its quasi-judicial functions shall be appealable to the
may not be said to have been issued with grave abuse of Court of Appeals, like those of the National Labor Relations
discretion or in violation of the rule of law. Commission (NLRC) and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Nevertheless, the NCIP, although
independent to a certain degree, was placed by Congress
The references in E.O. 364 to asset reform as an anti-poverty "under the office of the President" and, as such, is still subject
measure for social justice and to rationalization of the to the President’s power of control and supervision granted
bureaucracy in furtherance of good government37 encapsulate under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution with respect to
a portion of the existing "policy in the Executive Office." As its performance of administrative functions[.]40 (Underscoring
averred by the OSG, the President saw it fit to streamline the supplied)
In transferring the NCIP to the DAR as an attached agency, the provisions in different parts of the Constitution.46 It argues
President effectively tempered the exercise of presidential that the Constitution did not intend an over-arching concept of
authority and considerably recognized that degree of agrarian reform to encompass the two other areas, and that
independence. how the law is ordered in a certain way should not be
undermined by mere executive orders in the guise of
The Administrative Code of 1987 categorizes administrative administrative efficiency.
relationships into (1) supervision and control, (2)
administrative supervision, and (3) attachment.41 With
respect to the third category, it has been held that an attached
The Court is not persuaded.
agency has a larger measure of independence from the
Department to which it is attached than one which is under
departmental supervision and control or administrative
supervision. This is borne out by the "lateral relationship" The interplay of various areas of reform in the promotion of
between the Department and the attached agency. The social justice is not something implausible or unlikely.47 Their
attachment is merely for "policy and program coordination."42 interlocking nature cuts across labels and works against a rigid
Indeed, the essential autonomous character of a board is not pigeonholing of executive tasks among the members of the
negated by its attachment to a commission.43 President’s official family. Notably, the Constitution inhibited
from identifying and compartmentalizing the composition of
the Cabinet. In vesting executive power in one person rather
than in a plural executive, the evident intention was to invest
AMIN argues, however, that there is an anachronism of sorts
the power holder with energy.48
because there can be no policy and program coordination
between conceptually different areas of reform. It claims that
the new framework subsuming agrarian reform, urban land
reform and ancestral domain reform is fundamentally AMIN takes premium on the severed treatment of these reform
incoherent in view of the widely different contexts.44 And it areas in marked provisions of the Constitution. It is a precept,
posits that it is a substantive transformation or reorientation however, that inferences drawn from title, chapter or section
that runs contrary to the constitutional scheme and policies. headings are entitled to very little weight.49 And so must
reliance on sub-headings,50 or the lack thereof, to support a
strained deduction be given the weight of helium.
AMIN goes on to proffer the concept of "ordering the law"45
which, so it alleges, can be said of the Constitution’s distinct
treatment of these three areas, as reflected in separate Secondary aids may be consulted to remove, not to create
doubt.51 AMIN’s thesis unsettles, more than settles the order
of things in construing the Constitution. Its interpretation fails citizen’s rights and privileges. It rested on the ambiguous
to clearly establish that the so-called "ordering" or conclusion that the reorganization jeopardizes economic, social
arrangement of provisions in the Constitution was consciously and cultural rights. It intimated, without expounding, that the
adopted to imply a signification in terms of government agendum behind the issuances is to weaken the indigenous
hierarchy from where a constitutional mandate can per se be peoples’ rights in favor of the mining industry. And it raised
derived or asserted. It fails to demonstrate that the "ordering" concerns about the possible retrogression in DAR’s
or layout was not simply a matter of style in constitutional performance as the added workload may impede the
drafting but one of intention in government structuring. With implementation of the comprehensive agrarian reform
its inherent ambiguity, the proposed interpretation cannot be program.lavvphil
made a basis for declaring a law or governmental act
unconstitutional.
AMIN has not shown, however, that by placing the NCIP as an
attached agency of the DAR, the President altered the nature
A law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For it and dynamics of the jurisdiction and adjudicatory functions of
to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and the NCIP concerning all claims and disputes involving rights of
unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity indigenous cultural communities and
must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.52 Any reasonable
doubt should, following the universal rule of legal hermeneutics,
be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a law.53 indigenous peoples. Nor has it been shown, nay alleged, that
the reorganization was made in bad faith.55

Ople v. Torres54 on which AMIN relies is unavailing. In that

case, an administrative order involved a system of As for the other arguments raised by AMIN which pertain to the
identification that required a "delicate adjustment of various wisdom or soundness of the executive decision, the Court finds
contending state policies" properly lodged in the legislative it unnecessary to pass upon them. The raging debate on the
arena. It was declared unconstitutional for dealing with a most fitting framework in the delivery of social services is
subject that should be covered by law and for violating the right endless in the political arena. It is not the business of this Court
to privacy. to join in the fray. Courts have no judicial power to review
cases involving political questions and, as a rule, will desist
from taking cognizance of speculative or hypothetical cases,
In the present case, AMIN glaringly failed to show how the advisory opinions and cases that have become moot.56
reorganization by executive fiat would hamper the exercise of
Finally, a word on the last ground proffered for declaring the
unconstitutionality of the assailed issuances ─ that they violate
Section 16, Article XIII of the Constitution57 on the people’s
right to participate in decision-making through adequate
consultation mechanisms.

The framers of the Constitution recognized that the

consultation mechanisms were already operating without the
State’s action by law, such that the role of the State would be
mere facilitation, not necessarily creation of these consultation
mechanisms. The State provides the support, but eventually it
is the people, properly organized in their associations, who can
assert the right and pursue the objective. Penalty for failure on
the part of the government to consult could only be reflected in
the ballot box and would not nullify government action.58

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Executive Order Nos.

364 and 379 issued on September 27, 2004 and October 26,
2004, respectively, are declared not unconstitutional.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice