TORTS AND DAMAGES

WED / 5:30 – 7:30

Case Digest
October 24, 2018

ACERON, APRIL V.
2016-0068
 Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 97626
March 14, 1997

Facts:

Rommel’s Marketing Corporation (RMC) maintained two separate current accounts

with PBC in connection with its business of selling appliances. The RMC General Manager
Lipana entrusted to his secretary, Irene Yabut, RMC funds amounting to P300,000+ for the
purpose of depositing the same to RMC’s account with PBC. However, it turned out that
Yabut deposited the amounts in her husband’s account instead of RMC. Lipana never
checked his monthly statement of accounts regularly furnished by PBC so that Yabut’s
modus operandi went on for the span of more than one year.

Issue:

Whether or not Lipana’s negligence in not checking his monthly statements or the
bank’s negligence through its teller in validating the deposit slips is the proximate cause of
the loss?

Held:

There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b)
fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond;
and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant
and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Negligence is the omission to do something which
a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man
would do. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
It appears that the bank's teller was negligent in validating, officially stamping and
signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact that
the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure
of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate. The
fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in accepting deposits
should not relieve the petitioner bank of responsibility. The odd circumstance alone that such
duplicate copy lacked one vital information - that of the name of the account holder - should
have already put Ms. Mabayad on guard. Rather than readily validating the incomplete
duplicate copy, she should have proceeded more cautiously by being more probing as to the
true reason why the name of the account holder in the duplicate slip was left blank while that
in the original was filled up. She should not have been so naive in accepting hook, line and
sinker the too shallow excuse of Ms. Irene Yabut to the effect that since the duplicate copy
was only for her personal record, she would simply fill up the blank space later on. A
"reasonable man of ordinary prudence" would not have given credence to such explanation
and would have insisted that the space left blank be filled up as a condition for validation.
Unfortunately, this was not how bank teller Mabayad proceeded thus resulting in huge losses
to the private respondent. Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also
on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad.
This was exemplified in the testimony of Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig
Branch of the petitioner bank and now its Vice-President, to the effect that, while he ordered
the investigation of the incident, he never came to know that blank deposit slips were
validated in total disregard of the bank's validation procedures. It was this negligence of Ms.
Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and
supervision of its bank teller, which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the
private respondent, and not the latter's act of entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, as
insisted by the petitioners.
 Anonuevo v. Court of Appeals
G.R No. 130003
October 2004
Facts:
The accident in question occurred on 8 February 1989, at around nine in the evening,
at the intersection of Boni Avenue and Barangka Drive in. Villagracia was traveling along
Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while Añonuevo, traversing the opposite lane was driving his
Lancer car with plate number PJJ 359. The car was owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the
employer of Añonuevo's brother, Jonathan. Añonuevo was in the course of making a left turn
towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as
a result, which necessitated his hospitalization several times in 1989, and forced him to
undergo four (4) operations.
Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc.
and Añonuevo before the RTC.
Trial on the civil action ensued, and in a Decision dated 9 March 1990, the RTC
rendered judgment against Procter and Gamble and Añonuevo, ordering them to pay
Villagracia the amounts... of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150, 000.00). for actual
damages, Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for moral damages, and Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) for attorney's fees, as well as legal costs.
Issues:
Whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code, which presumes the driver of a motor
vehicle negligent if he was violating a traffic regulation at the time of the mishap, should
apply.
Ruling:
Añonuevo points out that Villagracia's bicycle had no safety gadgets such as a horn or
bell, or headlights, as invoked by a 1948 municipal ordinance. Nor was it duly registered with
the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, as required by the same ordinance. Villagracia does
not dispute these allegations, which he admitted during the... trial, but directs our attention
instead to the findings of Añonuevo's own negligence. Villagracia also contends that,
assuming there was contributory negligence on his part, such would not exonerate Añonuevo
from payment of damages. What Añonuevo seeks is for the Court to amend the explicit
command of the legislature, as embodied in Article 2185, a task beyond the pale of judicial
power. The Court interprets, and not creates, the law. However, since the Court is being
asked to consider the matter, it might... as well examine whether Article 2185 could be
interpreted to include non-motorized vehicles. If Añonuevo seriously contends that the
application of Article 2185 be expanded due to the greater interaction today of all types of
vehicles, such argument contradicts historical experience. The more pertinent basis for the
segregate classification is the difference in type of these vehicles. A motorized vehicle,
unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion is capable of greater speeds and
acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At the same time, motorized vehicles are more
capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of an accident or collision. Art.
2185 was not formulated to compel or ensure obeisance by all to traffic rules and regulations.
There is the fact which we consider as proven, that Añonuevo was speeding as he
made the left turn, and such negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident. This
reckless behavior would have imperiled anyone unlucky enough within the... path of
Añonuevo's car as it turned into the intersection, whether they are fellow motorists,
pedestrians, or cyclists.
Even assuming that Añonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not
equipped with headlights, such lapse on the cyclist's part would not have acquitted the driver
of his duty... to slow down as he proceeded to make the left turn.
The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the
logical consequences of the facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for
that matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to...
impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform up to a standard established
by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when in
fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury... sustained.
Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in
fact. After all, tort law is remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide compensation for the harm
suffered by those whose interests have been invaded owing to the conduct of... others.
 Spouses Africa v. Caltex
G.R No. L-12986
September 7, 2011

Facts:
In March 1948, in Rizal Avenue, Manila, a tank truck was hosing gasoline into the
underground storage of Caltex. Apparently, a fire broke out from the gasoline station and the
fire spread and burned several houses including the house of Spouses Bernabe and Soledad
Africa. Allegedly, someone (a passerby) threw a cigarette while gasoline was being
transferred which caused the fire. But there was no evidence presented to prove this theory
and no other explanation can be had as to the real reason for the fire. Apparently also, Caltex
and the branch owner (Mateo Boquiren) failed to install a concrete firewall to contain fire if
in case one happens.

Issue:
Whether or not Caltex and Boquiren are liable to pay for damages.

Held:
Yes. This is pursuant to the application on the principle of res ipsa loquitur (“the
transaction speaks for itself”) which states: “where the thing which caused injury, without
fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is
such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he having such control use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the injury arose
from defendant’s want of care.” The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and
employees, was under the control of Caltex and Boquiren. A fire occurred therein and spread
to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the
fire started were Boquiren, Caltex and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof
whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want
of care.
Note that ordinarily, he who charges negligence shall prove it. However, res ipsa loquitur is
the exception because the burden of proof is shifted to the party charged of negligence as the
latter is the one who had exclusive control of the thing that caused the injury complained of.
 Bernardo v. Legazpi
G.R No. 9308
December 23, 1914

Facts:
Plaintiff brought an action for damages arising from a collission of plaintiff's
automobile and that of the defendant. Defendant filed a cross-complaint against the plaintiff
claiming that the collission was due to plaintiff's negligence. Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila dismissed the complaint on the merits filed in an action to recover damages for
injuries sustained by plaintiff’s automobile by reason of defendant’s negligence in causing a
collision between his automobile and that of plaintiff. The court in its judgment also
dismissed a cross-complaint filed by the defendant, praying for damages against the plaintiff
on the ground that the injuries sustained by defendant’s automobile in the collision referred
to, as well as those to plaintiff’s machine, were caused by the negligence of the plaintiff in
handling his automobile.

Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff is negligent in handling his automobile.

Held:

The court found upon the evidence that both the plaintiff and the defendant were
negligent in handling their automobiles and that said negligence was of such a character and
extent on the part of both as to prevent either from recovering. Upon the facts, as they appear
of record, the judgment must be affirmed, as the evidence clearly supports the decision of the
trial court. The law applicable to the facts also requires an affirmance of the judgment
appealed from. Where the plaintiff in a negligence action, by his own carelessness contributes
to the principal occurrence, that is, to the accident, as one of the determining causes thereof,
he cannot recover. This is equally true of the defendant; and as both of them, by their
negligent acts, contributed to the determining cause of the accident, neither can recover.
 Josefa v. Manila Electric Company
G.R No. 182705
July 18, 2014

Facts:
At around 1:45 p.m. on April 21, 1991, a dump truck, a jeepney and a car figured in a
vehicular accident along Ortigas Avenue, Pasig City. As a result of the accident, a 45-foot
wooden electricity post, three 75 KVA transformers, and other electrical line attachments
were damaged. Upon investigation, respondent Manila Electric Company (Meralco)
discovered that it was the truck with plate number PAK-874 and registered in Josefa's name
that hit the electricity post. In a letter dated April 19, 1993, Meralco demanded from Josefa
reimbursement for the replacement cost of the electricity post and its attachments, but Josefa
refused to pay. Thus, on September 28, 1993, Meralco sued Josefa and Pablo Manoco, the
truck driver, for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. In its
complaint, Meralco alleged that Manoco's reckless driving resulted in damage to its
properties. It also imputed primary liability on Josefa for his alleged negligence in the
selection and supervision of Manoco. It thus prayed for the indemnification of the amount of
P384,846.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, P10,000.00 as litigation
expenses, and the costs of the suit. In defense, Josefa denied that Manoco was his employee
when the accident occurred. He also maintained that he exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of all his employees. As a counterclaim, he
sought the payment of attorney's fees for Meralco's filing of a baseless complaint. January 11,
1994, Meralco amended its complaint to correct the name "Pablo Manoco" to Pablo Manojo
Bautista, but soon dropped him as a party defendant in the case for failure to serve him
summons.

Issue:
Whether or not Bautista exercised due diligence in driving when the truck hit the
electricity post.

Held:

The procedural effect of res ipsa loquiturin quasi-delict cases is that the defendant’s
negligence is presumed. In other words, the burden of evidence shifts to the defendant to
prove that he did not act with negligence. This doctrine thus effectively furnishes a bridge by
which the complainant, without knowledge of the cause of the injury, reaches over to the
defendant, who knows or should know the cause, for any explanation of care exercised by
him to prevent the injury. For this doctrine to apply, the complainant must show that: (1) the
accident is of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened
except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency
or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the
negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
 The present case satisfiesall the elements of res ipsa loquitur. It is very unusual and
extraordinary for the truck to hit an electricity post, an immovable and stationary object,
unless Bautista, who had the exclusive management and control of the truck, acted with fault
or negligence. We cannot also conclude that Meralco contributed to the injury since it safely
and permanently installed the electricity post beside the street. Thus, in Republic v. Luzon
Stevedoring Corp., we imputed vicarious responsibility to Luzon Stevedoring Corp. whose
barge rammed the bridge, also an immovable and stationary object. In that case, we found it
highly unusual for the barge to hit the bridge which had adequate openings for the passage of
water craft unless Luzon Stevedoring Corp.’s employee had acted with negligence.
 Bataclan v. Medina
G.R No. L-101126
September 5, 2011

Facts:
Pass-midnight in September 1952, Juan Bataclan rode a bus owned by Mariano
Medina from Cavite to Pasay. While on its way, the driver of the bus was driving fast and
when he applied the brakes it cause the bus to be overturned. The driver, the conductor, and
some passengers were able to free themselves from the bus except Bataclan and 3 others. The
passengers called the help of the villagers and as it was dark, the villagers brought torch with
them. The driver and the conductor failed to warn the would-be helpers of the fact that
gasoline has spilled from the overturned bus so a huge fire ensued which engulfed the bus
thereby killing the 4 passengers trapped inside. It was also found later in trial that the tires of
the bus were old.

Issue:
Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al was their burning by
reason of the torches which ignited the gasoline.

Held:
No. The proximate cause was the overturning of the bus which was caused by the
negligence of the driver because he was speeding and also he was already advised by Medina
to change the tires yet he did not. Such negligence resulted to the overturning of the bus. The
torches carried by the would-be helpers are not to be blamed. It is just but natural for the
villagers to respond to the call for help from the passengers and since it is a rural area which
did not have flashlights, torches are the natural source of lighting. Further, the smell of gas
could have been all over the place yet the driver and the conductor failed to provide warning
about said fact to the villagers.
 Gaid v. People
G.R No. 171636
April 7, 2009

Facts:
Norman Gaid was driving his passenger jeepney along a two-lane road where the
Laguindingan National High School is located. During that time, several students were
coming out of the school premises so Gaid drove slowly upon reaching the vicinity of the
school. Michael Dayata (Dayata), a student, attempted to board the jeepney from behild the
left side of the road but was not noticed by Gaid and his conductor Mellalos. Dayata was
pinned to the rear wheel of Gaid’s jeepney and was seen lying and caught in between the rear
tires. Dayata was brought to the hospital but was later on pronounced dead. Consequently,
Gaid was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

Issue:
Whether petitioner should be held liable for damages resulting from the death of
Dayata.
Held:
No. The petitioner had exercised extreme precaution as he drove slowly upon
reaching the vicinity of the school and he cannot be faulted for not having seen the victim
who came from behind on the left side.Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe
for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstancesjustly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
The elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the
offender; and (2) that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is
not clearly manifest.
The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act
whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent
, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person
injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a
duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its
mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of
harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is always necessary
before negligence can be held to exist. Thus, lacking the first element of simple negligence,
petitioner should not be held liable.
 Nakpil v. Sons
G.R No. L-47851
October 3, 1996

Facts:

Philippine Bar Association (PBA) decided to construct an office building at

Intramuros, Manila. The construction was undertaken by the United Construction, Inc.
(United) on an “administration basis”, on the suggestion of Juan J. Carlos (Carlos), the
president and general manager of United. Plans and specifications for the building were
prepared by the third-party defendants Juan F. Nakpil & Sons(Nakpil) The building was
completed on June 1966.

On August 2, 1968, an unusually strong earthquake hit Manila and its environs and
the building in question sustained major damage. PBA commenced an action for the recovery
of damages arising from the partial collapse of the building against United. In turn, United
filed a third-party complaint against the architects (Nakpil) who prepared the plans and
specifications. Parties agreed to refer the technical issues involved in the case to a
Commissioner, Mr. Andres O. Hizon (Hizon). On April 30, 1979 the building was authorized
to be demolished at the expense of United and Nakpil. Hizon submitted his report with the
findings that while the damage sustained by the PBA building was caused by the earthquake,
they were also caused by the (1) defects in the plans and specifications prepared by the
architects, (2) deviations from said plans and specifications by United and (3) failure of
United to observe the requisite workmanship in construction of the building and of the
contractors and architects to exercise the requisite degree of supervision in the construction of
the said building.

The United Architects of the Philippines, the Association of Civil Engineers, and the
Philippine Institute of Architects filed with the Court a motion to intervene as amicus curiae.
The amicus curiae gave the opinion that the plans and specifications of the Nakpils were not
defective. (In contradiction to the opinion of Hizon)

Issue:

Whether or not an unusually strong earthquake caused the failure of the building,
exempts from liability, parties who are otherwise liable because of their negligence.

Ruling:

No, they are not exempted from liability. There is no dispute that the earthquake is a
fortuitous event or an act of god. But, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of
God, here concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in
any manner of the tenor of the obligation, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot
escape liability.
 The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be
one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are to be
excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect, the cause
of which is to be considered, is found to be in part the result of the participation of man,
whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence is
thereby HUMANIZED, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God.

United was found to have made substantial deviations from the plans and
specifications and to have failed to observe the requisite workmanship in the construction as
well as to exercise the requisite degree of supervision. And the Nakpins were found to have
inadequacies or defects in the plans and specifications prepared by them. The deviations
made by United caused indirectly the damage sustained and that those deviations not only
added but also aggravated the damage caused by the defects made by the Nakpins.

Thus, one who negligently creates a dangerous condition cannot escape liability for
the natural and probably consequences thereof, although the act of a third person, or an act of
God for which he is not responsible, intervenes to precipitate the loss. The destruction was
not purely an act of God. Truth to tell hundreds of ancient buildings in the vicinity were
hardly affected by the earthquake. Only one thing spells out the fatal difference; gross
negligence and evident bad faith, without which the damage would not have occurred.
 Phoenix Construction v. CA
G.R. No. L-65295
March 10, 1987

Facts:
In the early morning of 15 November 1975, at about 1:30am, private respondent
Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss,
the general manager of a marketing corporation, where he had taken "a shot or two" of liquor.
He had just crossed an intersection and while driving down the street, his headlights were
turned off. When he switched on his headlights to “bright”, he suddenly saw a Ford dump
truck some 2 ½ meters away from his Volkswagen car. It was later found out that he did not a
curfew pass that night.

The dump truck belonged to co-petitioner Phoenix, and was parked there by the
company’s driver, co-petitioner Carbonel. It was parked on the right hand side of the lane that
Dionisio was driving on, but it was parked facing the oncoming traffic. It was parked askew
so it was sticking out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were
no lights nor were there any “early warning” reflector devices set anywhere near the truck,
front or rear. Phoenix permitted Carbonel to take home the truck, which was scheduled to be
used the next morning. Dionisio, upon seeing the truck, tried to avoid a collision by swerving
to the left, but it was too late. His car smashed into the truck.

Dionisio suffered physical injuries, including permanent facial scars, “a nervous

breakdown” and loss of two gold bridge dentures. Dionisio filed an action for damages
against Carbonel and Phoenix. Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident to
respondent’s own negligence in driving at a high speed without curfew pass and headlights,
and while intoxicated. It invoked the Last Clear Chance Doctrine: Dionisio had the Last Clear
Chance of avoiding the accident and so Dionisio, having failed to take the last clear chance,
must bear his own injuries alone.

Issue:
Whether or not the collision was brought by respondent’s own negligence.

Held:
The legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the
wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the
negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a
natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.

The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a
substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff
has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original risk,
and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that
intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's
responsibility. Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a
street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the
plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is negligently driven; and one who parks
an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when
another negligently drives into it.

We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that
the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due
care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages
are subject to mitigation by the courts.

The Last Clear Chance doctrine of the Common Law was imported into our
jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is still a matter of debate whether, or to what extent, it
has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. The doctrine was applied by
Common Law because they had a rule that contributory negligence prevented any recovery at
all by a negligent plaintiff. But in the Philippines we have Article 2179 of the Civil Code
which rejects the Common Law doctrine of contributory negligence. Thus, the court in this
case stated that it does not believe so that the general concept of Last Clear Chance has been
utilizedinour jurisdiction. Article 2179 on contributory negligence is not an exercise in chron
ology or physics but what is important is thenegligent act or omission of each party and the
character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the
community. To say that Phoenix should be absolved from liability would come close to
wiping out the fundamental law that a man must. respond for the foreseeable consequences of
his own negligent act or omission. Thus, the Last Clear Chance Doctrine was not applied
because the court thinks that it is not applicable in our jurisdiction
 Raneyra v. Hiceta
G.R. No. 120027
April 21, 1999

Facts:

Petitioners herein are heirs of Reynaldo Raynera who was killed by an accident on his
way home at about 2:00 A.M. Respondents, Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla were owner
and driver, respectively, of an Isuzu truck trailer which was involved in the said accident. On
March 23, 1989, at about 2:00 in the morning, Reynaldo Raynera was on his way home. He
was riding a motorcycle traveling on the southbound lane of East Service Road, Cupang,
Muntinlupa. The Isuzu truck was travelling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. The
truck was loaded with two (2) metal sheets extended on both sides, two (2) feet on the left
and three (3) feet on the right. There were two (2) pairs of red lights, about 35 watts each, on
both sides of the metal plates. The asphalt road was not well lighted. At some point on the
road, Reynaldo Raynera crashed his motorcycle into the left rear portion of the truck trailer,
which was without tail lights. Due to the collision, Reynaldo sustained head injuries and truck
helper Geraldino D. Lucelo rushed him to the Parañaque Medical Center. Upon arrival at the
hospital, the attending physician, Dr. Marivic Aguirre, pronounced Reynaldo Raynera dead
on arrival. At time of his death, Reynaldo was manager of the Engineering Department,
Kawasaki Motors (Phils.) Corporation. The heirs of the deceased demanded from
respondents' payment of damages arising from the death of Reynaldo as a result of the
vehicular accident. The respondents refused to pay the claims. Petitioners, hence, filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Manila a complaint for damages against respondents' owner and
driver of the Isuzu truck. Petitioners sought recovery of the damages caused by the negligent
operation of the truck- trailer at nighttime on the highway, without tail the lights.

Issue:
Whether or not the truck is responsible for the accident.

Held:

No. Despite the absence of tail lights and license plate, respondents' truck was visible
in the highway. It was traveling at a moderate speed, approximately 20 to 30 kilometers per
hour. It used the service road, instead of the highway, because the cargo they were hauling
posed a danger to passing motorists. In compliance with the Land Transportation Traffic
Code (Republic Act No. 4136)" 25 respondents installed 2 pairs of lights on top of the steel
plates, as the vehicle's cargo load extended beyond the bed or body thereof.

Doctrine of last clear chance; the drivers of the vehicles "who bump the rear of
another vehicle" are presumed to be the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other
evidence; case at bar. It has been said that drivers of vehicles "who bump the rear of another
vehicle" are presumed to be "the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other
evidence." The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full
control of the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. We agree
with the Court of Appeals that the responsibility to avoid the collision with the front vehicle
lies with the driver of the rear vehicle. Consequently, no other person was to blame but the
victim himself since he was the one who bumped his motorcycle into the rear of the Isuzu
truck. He had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident. He was traversing the service
road where the prescribed speed limit was less than that in the highway.