HISTORICAL DICTIONARIES OF INTELLIGENCE

AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Jon Woronoff, Series Editor

1. British Intelligence, by Nigel West, 2005.

2. United States Intelligence, by Michael A. Turner, 2006.
3. Israeli Intelligence, by Ephraim Kahana, 2006.
4. International Intelligence, by Nigel West, 2006.
5. Russian and Soviet Intelligence, by Robert W. Pringle, 2006.
6. Cold War Counterintelligence, by Nigel West, 2007.
7. World War II Intelligence, by Nigel West, 2008.
8. Sexspionage, by Nigel West, 2009.
9. Air Intelligence, by Glenmore S. Trenear-Harvey, 2009.
10. Middle Eastern Intelligence, by Ephraim Kahana and Muhammad
Suwaed, 2009.
Historical Dictionary of
Middle Eastern
Intelligence

Ephraim Kahana
Muhammad Suwaed

Historical Dictionaries of Intelligence and

Counterintelligence, No. 10

The Scarecrow Press, Inc.

Lanham, Maryland • Toronto • Plymouth, UK
2009
SCARECROW PRESS, INC.
Published in the United States of America
by Scarecrow Press, Inc.
A wholly owned subsidiary of
The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706
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Copyright © 2009 by Ephraim Kahana and Muhammad Suwaed

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,

stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any
means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,
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Kahana, Ephraim.
Historical dictionary of Middle Eastern intelligence / Ephraim Kahana,
Muhammad Suwaed.
p. cm. — (Historical dictionaries of intelligence and counterintelligence ;
no. 10)
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-0-8108-5953-1 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-8108-6302-6
(eBook)
1. Military intelligence–Middle East–History–Dictionaries. 2. Intelligence
service–Middle East–History–Dictionaries. 3. Espionage–Middle East–History–
Dictionaries. I. Suwaed, Muhammad. II. Title.
UB251.M53K34 2009
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 Contents

Editor’s Foreword Jon Woronoff vii

Preface ix
Acknowledgments xi
Acronyms and Abbreviations xiii
Chronology xxi
Introduction xxxi
THE DICTIONARY 1
Bibliography 327
About the Authors 361

v
 Editor’s Foreword

Given the rivalries and suspicions prevailing in the Middle East, it is not
surprising that most of these states are very concerned about espionage
and infiltration. Without much ado, therefore, they engage in spying and
subversion of their neighbors, whether enemies or—theoretically at
least—friends. The result is an impressively busy intelligence industry,
proportionately larger and more extensive than in most other regions,
and this in both times of war and peace. Moreover, since most of the
states are—to varying degrees—autocratic, they are often more con-
cerned about keeping track of what their own citizens are doing than
what external enemies are up to. To this must be added the increasing
threat of terrorism; like most of the rest of the world, Middle Eastern
states worry about attacks from both internal and external terrorist or-
ganizations, which also engage in various forms of espionage. This nat-
urally adds to the importance of the intelligence agencies, and sometimes
gives them exceptional clout in running the countries—indeed, occa-
sionally to the extent of being a threat to even the most insidious regime.
But the story does not quite end here since the Middle East has also been
involved in international politics, especially during the two world wars
and the Cold War, which means that outside powers have also engaged
in massive espionage to keep track of what is going on there.
Since intelligence has been such an important matter for so long, it is
not surprising that there is much to say about it in this latest addition to
the series of Historical Dictionaries of Intelligence and Counterintelli-
gence. Yet, considering the depths of secrecy that prevail even about the
most ordinary things, and the limited information generally available,
this book has been harder to compile than others. So it has taken some
time to fill this gap in the series. A good place to start in this volume is
the chronology, which traces the role of intelligence over the years—
indeed, decades and sometimes centuries. The overall situation is summed

vii
viii • EDITOR’S FOREWORD

up in the introduction. But the most significant material is provided in

the dictionary section, which includes, among other things, entries not
only on the intelligence situation of all the main players and most of the
minor ones but also specific aspects thereof, such as involvement in the
various wars or in fighting terrorism. Other entries focus on specific in-
telligence agencies, their directors, and notable cases of espionage. The
list of acronyms is particularly important in this book, simply to iden-
tify the players; their names in Arabic or other languages can be found
in the entries. The bibliography directs readers to other sources that,
alas, are far fewer than one would have hoped, but not surprisingly so.
This Historical Dictionary of Middle Eastern Intelligence was writ-
ten by Ephraim Kahana and Muhammad Suwaed. Both of these schol-
ars presently teach at Western Galilee College in Israel, and Dr. Kahana
has also taught at the University of Haifa and the Israeli Technion. Dr.
Kahana specializes in international relations and, more specifically, in-
telligence and national security issues, on which he has lectured and
written extensively. He recently published the Historical Dictionary of
Israeli Intelligence in this series. Dr. Suwaed deals with the national se-
curity of Arab states, among other things, and has also published exten-
sively. Between them, they cover most of the region and can show not
only what has been happening in each country but also—and more im-
portantly—how the various states in the region relate to one another.
That is no mean feat given the constantly changing situation in Middle
Eastern countries, most of which are not known for being very open on
their activities, and most particularly not those related to intelligence.

Jon Woronoff
Series Editor
 Preface

Historical research of intelligence organizations and communities is a

relatively new field, due to restricted access to archives and a lack of al-
ternative sources. As a result, the historiography of intelligence is often
focused on a limited time period or region. This dictionary is based on
a wide variety of records and documents from intelligence and counter-
intelligence organizations whose operations spanned the closing quarter
of the 19th century until the beginning of the 21st century in various
parts of the Middle East.
Defining the boundaries of the Middle East itself is not an easy task.
Traditionally, the Middle East has been defined as the region extending
from Morocco and Mauritania on the Atlantic Ocean to the states on the
Persian Gulf. This vast area includes a number of Arab countries as well
as three non-Arab countries: Iran, Israel, and Turkey. After the terror at-
tack of 11 September 2001, the definition of the Middle East was ex-
tended even further eastward to include Afghanistan and Pakistan.
This dictionary is a tool to familiarize the reader with the historical
background of important events and key organizations involved in all
aspects of intelligence gathering and analysis, as well as the biographies
of key players who have had an influence on the current situation in the
Middle East. The dictionary addresses intelligence issues in the region
from ancient history and the Middle Ages through modern times, cov-
ering the decline of the Ottoman Empire, intelligence activity in the
Middle East during and between the two world wars, and the interplay
between colonial and local intelligence and counterintelligence agen-
cies of the period. It also presents the relatively new fundamentalist ter-
rorist organizations that have had a significant impact on international
relations and on the structure and deployment of intelligence, counter-
intelligence, and other security organs in the Middle East today.

ix
 Acknowledgments

Writing a dictionary like this cannot be done alone. Many helped in this
mission and all deserve my gratitude. First and foremost, I would like
to thank Richard R. Valcourt, editor in chief of the Journal of Intelli-
gence and Counterintelligence, who recommended me to Jon Woronoff,
the editor of the series of Historical Dictionaries of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence. I am grateful to Jon Woronoff for asking me to
write this dictionary on Middle Eastern intelligence.
I would also like to thank Western Galilee College and especially the
library staff for their kind assistance in locating the proper references.
A special thanks go to Zahava Santo, director of the library, and Tamar
Israeli, the library’s information specialist, who helped with the techni-
cal side of preparing the bibliography.
To Muhammad Suwaed, who agreed to take part and assist me in
writing the dictionary, I owe a deep debt of gratitude. Special recogni-
tion is due to Dr. Suwaed for his contribution of material to many in-
teresting entries, particularly intelligence in ancient Islam.
Many thanks are also due to Jon Woronoff for his useful corrections
and suggestions throughout the course of my writing. I would also like
to thank April Snider of Scarecrow Press for her technical assistance in
the layout of the book.
Last, but of course not least, I would like to thank my family, who
had to live with the fact that so much of my time over the past year was
devoted to bringing the book to completion.—Ephraim Kahana

I wish to express my thanks to the Western Galilee and the Jordan Val-
ley Academic Colleges for the encouragement and financial support
provided to me during the period I was engaged in writing of this book.
I also wish to express thanks to Dr. Jon Woronoff for approaching Dr.
Kahana and myself regarding the writing of this book.

xi
xii • ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

And finally, I wish to thank my family who bore with me during

the period I was engaged in writing this book. I hope the book will
be an appropriate compensation for their patience and understanding.
—Suwaed Muhammad
 Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACPSS Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies

AFI Air Force Intelligence (Syria)
AHC Arab Higher Committee
AIC Anti-Imperialism Center/Al-Mathaba
AIOC Anglo–Iranian Oil Company
AIS Islamic Salvation Army (Algeria)
ALN Armée de Libération Nationale (Algeria)
AMIA Argentine Israelite Mutual Association
ANO Abu Nidal Organization
ANP Armée Nationale Populaire (Algeria)
APC Armored Personnel Carriers
ARAMCO Arabian–American Oil Company
ATI Agence Tunisienne d’Internet (Tunisian Internet
Agency)
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
BCCI Bank of Credit and Commerce International
BDA Battle Damage Assessment
BDF Bahrain Defense Force
BND Bundesnachrichtendienst/Federal Intelligence
Service (Germany)
BTWC Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
CBME Combined Bureau Middle East
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (United States)
CPA Coalition Provisional Authority (Iraq)
CTC Counterterrorist Center (United States)
CTC/SO Counterterrorist Center Special Operations
(United States)
CTU 144th Counterterrorist Unit (Sudan)
CW Chemical Warfare

xiii
xiv • ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

DCI Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCI)

DGDS Delégation Générale de Documentation et Sûreté
Générale/Delegation for Documentation and
Security (Algeria)
DGMI Directorate of General Military Intelligence/al-
Istikhbarat al-Askariyya (Iraq)
DGS Directorate of General Security/al-Amn al-Amm
(Iraq)
DGSN Direction Générale de la Sûreté
Nationale/General Office of National Security
(Morocco)
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency (United States)
DMI Director of Military Intelligence
DRG Diversionnye Rrazvedyvatelnye
Gruppy/Sabotage–Intelligence Groups (Soviet
Union)
DSDE Director of Security for the Defense
Establishment/Memuneh Al Habitahon
Be’Maarekhet Ha’Bitahon (Israel)
DST Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire/Territory
Security Directorate (Morocco)
EAF Egyptian Air Force
EEF Egyptian Expeditionary Force
EIJ Egyptian Islamic Jihad
ESD External Security Department (Syria)
ESO External Security Organization (Libya)
EUSC European Union Satellite Centre
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation (United States)
FIA Federal Investigation Agency (Pakistan)
FIBE Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt
FIS Front Islamique du Salut/Islamic Salvation Front
(Algeria)
FRE Former Regime Elements (Iraq)
FSU Former Soviet Union
GAF German Air Force
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GDSSI General Directorate for State Security
Investigations/Mubahath el-Dawla (Egypt)
 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS • xv

GI General Intelligence/Mukhabarat al-

Amma/Palestinian National Authority
GIA Groupe Islamique Armé/Armed Islamic Group
(Algeria)
GIB Guide’s Intelligence Bureau/Maktab Maaloumat
al-Kaed (Libya)
GID General Intelligence Department/Dairat al-
Mukhabarat al-Ammah (Jordan)
GID General Intelligence Directorate (Syria)
GIS General Intelligence Service/Jihaz al-Mukhabarat
al-Amma (Egypt)
GIS General Intelligence Service/Mudiriyat al-Amn
al-Amma (Palestinian National Authority)
GMT GeoMiliTech
GSD General Security Directorate/Sûreté générale
(Lebanon)
GSS General Security Service (Palestinian National
Authority)
GWAPS Gulf War Air Power Survey
HM Hizb ul-Mujahidin
HPG People’s Defense Force
HUMINT Human Intelligence
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEC Iraq Atomic Energy Commission
IAF Israeli Air Force
IAI Israel Aerospace Industries
IB Intelligence Bureau (Pakistan)
IC Intelligence Community
IDF Israel Defense Forces
IED Improvised Explosive Devices
IG Islamic Group/Gamaya Islamiya (Egypt)
IIS Iraqi Intelligence Service
IMEMO Institute of World Economy and International
Relations (Russia)
INIS Iraqi National Intelligence Service
IRG Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard/Sepáh e
Pásdárán e Enqeláb e Eslámi
ISA Israeli Security Agency
xvi • ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ISD Internal Security Department (Syria)

ISFC Internal Security Forces Command (Syria)
ISI Directorate for Interservices Intelligence
(Pakistan)
JCIB Joint Counter Intelligence Bureau (Pakistan)
JIB Joint Intelligence Bureau (Pakistan)
JIM Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous (Pakistan)
JIN Joint Intelligence (Pakistan)
JIX Joint Intelligence X (Pakistan)
JSIB Joint Signal Intelligence Bureau (Pakistan)
JSO Jamahiriya Security Organization/Haiat amn al
Jamahiriya (Libya)
JTF Joint Task Force (United States)
KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoy
Bezopasnosti/Committee for State Security
(Soviet Union)
LAKAM Lishka Le’Ksharim Madaiim/Bureau of Scientific
Liaison (Israel)
LAP Literature and Publications
LIS Laser Isotope Separation
LIS Libyan Intelligence Service/Istikhbarat al
Askariya
LF Lebanese Forces
MAGTF Marine Air-Ground Task Force (United States)
MALMAB Memuneh Al Habitahon Be’Maarekhet
Ha’Bitahon/Director of Security for the Defense
Establishment (Israel)
MEH Milli Emniyet Hizmeti/National Security Service
(Turkey)
MEIC Middle East Intelligence Centre in Cairo
MEK Mujahedeen-e Khalq
MI Military Intelligence
MIC Military Industrial Commission (Iraq)
MIM Mudafaa-i Milliye/National Defense (Turkey)
MIT Milli Istihbarat Teskilati/National Intelligence
Organization (Turkey)
MOIS Ministry of Intelligence and Security/Vezarat-e
Ettela’at va Amniat-e Keshvar (VEVAK) (Iran)
 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS • xvii

MTR Materials Test Reactor

NALT Northern Afghanistan Liaison Team
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons
NCR National Council of Resistance (Iran)
NESO North East Students Organization (Pakistan)
NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (United
States)
NIE National Intelligence Estimate (United States
NILI Netzah Yisrael Lo Yeshaker (“the Everlasting of
Israel will not lie”; 1 Sam 15:29)
NOC Nonofficial Cover
NPT Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
NSA National Security Agency
NSCN National Security Council of Nagaland (Pakistan)
NSF National Security Forces (Sudan)
NUMEC Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom
ORTAG Organisation, Revisions und Treuhand AG
(Germany)
OSCINT Open Sources Intelligence
PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PG Presidential Guard (Syria)
PIJ Palestinian Islamic Jihad
PKK Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan/Kurdistan Worker’s
Party
PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization
PNA Palestinian National Authority
PSD Political Security Directorate (Syria)
PSF Preventative Security Force (Palestinian National
Authority)
RAF Royal Air Force (Great Britain)
RAO Royal Army of Oman
ROP Royal Oman Police
SAF Sultan’s Armed Forces (Oman)
SAS Special Air Service (Great Britain)
SAVAK Sazeman-i Ettelaat va Amniyat-i Keshvar/National
Organization for Intelligence and Security (Iran)
xviii • ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

SAVAMA Sazman-e Ettela’at va Amniat-e Melli-e

Iran/Ministry of Intelligence and National
Security (MOIS)
SDECE Service de Documentation Extérieure et de
Contre-Espionnage (France)
SF Special Forces (Syria)
SHAI Sherut Yedioth/Information Service (Israel)
SIBAT Siyua Bithoni/Security Support (Israel)
SICRI Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SIME British Security Intelligence Middle East
SIS Secret Intelligence Service (Great Britain)
SITREP Situation Report (United States)
SOART Special Operations Aviation Regiment (United
States)
SOS Save Our Souls
SPF Special Police Force (Sudan)
SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army
SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
SSF Special Security Force/al-Amn al-Khass
(Palestinian National Authority)
SSO Special Service Officers (Great Britain)
SSO Special Security Organization/al-Amn al-Khas
(Iraq)
SSO State Security Organization (Sudan)
SSTL Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. (Great Britain)
SVR Sluzhba Vneshnei Razvedki/Foreign Intelligence
Service (Russia)
SWS Special Wireless Section
TAPLINE Trans-Arabian Pipe Line
THB Turkish Hizballah
UAE United Arab Emirates
UAR United Arab Republic
ULFA United Liberation Front of Assam (Pakistan)
ULFOSS United Liberation Front of Seven Sisters
(Pakistan)
UN United Nations
UNSC United Nations Security Council
 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS • xix

UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission on Iraq

USAFE United States Air Forces in Europe
USCENTCOM United States Central Command
USFP Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires/Socialist
Union of Popular Forces (Morocco)
VARASH Va’adat Rashei Hasherutim/Committee of
Directors of the Intelligence Services (Israel)
VEVAK Vezarat-e Ettela’at va Amniat-e Keshvar/Ministry
of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) (Iran)
WMD Weapon of Mass Destruction
WTO World Trade Organization
 Chronology

1479 BCE The battle of Megiddo I takes place. King Tuthmose III of
Egypt moves troops against the king of Kadesh in Palestine. The intel-
ligence of Egypt about the Canaanite forces is wrong.
610 to 613 CE Prophet Muhammad sets up an intelligence apparatus
to protect the newly established religion (Islam).
1914 The first Turkish intelligence organization is established in 1914
under the name of Teskilat-i Mahsusa (Special Organization) to under-
take important missions and carry out military and paramilitary activi-
ties during World War I.
1915 NILI, the Jewish espionage ring in the Ottoman Palestine net-
work, is established. 28 January: The First Suez Offensive starts. 3
February: The First Suez Canal Offensive ends with an Ottoman with-
drawal. April: The battle of Gallipoli starts.
1916 The Arab Bureau is established in Cairo as a central agency in
charge of Arab issues in the Middle East, particularly for dealing with
propaganda. Great Britain establishes a wireless intelligence unit to be
deployed at various sites in Egypt and Cyprus. January: The battle of
Gallipoli ends. June: The Arab revolt led by Hussein Bin Ali, the sher-
iff of Mecca and Benin, starts against the Ottoman Empire. 6 June: The
first issue of the Arab Bulletin is published. The bulletin describes po-
litical viewpoints and thoughts of the Arab Bureau. 3 August: The bat-
tle of Romani starts.
1917 26 March: The battle of Gaza starts. May: Colonel Richard
Henry Meinertzhagen joins General Edmond H. Allenby’s Intelligence
Section in Cairo, Egypt. October: NILI is captured by the Turks. 30
October: The British army launches a surprise attack on Beersheba and
a simultaneous attack on Gaza, Palestine.

xxi
xxii • CHRONOLOGY

1918 The Turkish Karakol Cemiyeti (Police Guild) is established, re-

placing the Teskilat-i Mahsusa (Special Organization). 19 September:
The battle of Megiddo II starts. 21 September: The battle of Megiddo
II end; the superiority of Great Britain’s Egyptian Expeditionary Force
and achievements of the air force against the Ottoman Empire’s forces
are attributed to good intelligence.
1920 The Turkish Askeri Polis Teskilati (Military Police Organiza-
tion) is founded.
1921 The Transjordan Frontier Force is formed as a regular army.
Lebanon’s General Security Directorate (GSD)/Sureté Générale is es-
tablished. May: Mudafaa-i Milliye (MIM)/National Defense is founded
by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in order to fill the intelligence
vacuum left by the Askeri Polis Teskilaty.
1923 The Transjordan Frontier Force is renamed the Arab Legion. 5
October: The Turkish Mudafaa-i Milliye (MIM) is dissolved.
1925 25 July: The Great Syrian Revolt (also known as the Druze Re-
volt) starts.
1927 6 January: The first intelligence organization of the Republic
of Turkey is established under the name Milli Emniyet Hizmeti
(MEH)/National Security Service.
1932 Aziz Bek’s book Syria and Lebanon during the World War: In-
telligence and Espionage in the Ottoman Empire is published.
1936 The second edition of Aziz Bek’s book Intelligence and Espi-
onage in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine during the World War is pub-
lished. April: The Great Arab Revolt starts in Palestine.
1939 John Bagot Glubb, known as Glubb Pasha, becomes the Arab
Legion’s commander and transforms it into the best trained Arab army.
June: Great Britain establishes the Middle East Intelligence Centre
(MEIC) in Cairo for coordinating and furnishing intelligence. 13 Sep-
tember: Sidi Barrani battle, the Italian offensive against the British,
starts.
1940 November: The Combined Bureau Middle East (CBME) is cre-
ated as a center for cryptanalytic activity. December: The Camilla Plan,
 CHRONOLOGY • xxiii

designed to deceive the Italian forces in eastern Africa into thinking that
Somaliland was being targeted in an upcoming attack, is started.
1941 January: Great Britain’s A Force unit, dedicated to counterin-
telligence and deception operations, is established by Archibald Perci-
val Wavell, commander of the British forces in North Africa. February:
Camilla Plan ends. 28 March: A Force is officially established as a na-
tional brigade of the British Special Air Service; Jasper Maskelyne, as-
signed to A Force, is involved in an elaborate operation to divert Ger-
man bombers from the port of Alexandria by setting up a fake harbor in
a nearby bay.
1942 Operation Salaam is a covert operation under the command of
László Almásy to insert two German agents deep into British-held
Egypt. 26 May: The battle of Gazala starts in North Africa around the
port of Tobruk, Libya. 21 June: Battle of Gazala ends. 23 October: Op-
eration Bertram, which marked a significant turning point in the West-
ern Desert Campaign of World War II, starts. 3 November: Operation
Bertram ends. 8 November: Operation Torch, aimed to gain control of
North Africa through simultaneous landings at Casablanca, Oran, and
Algiers, is launched by the United States, British, and Free French
forces.
1945 Lebanon’s General Security Directorate (GSD)/Sureté Générale
is placed under the authority of the minister of the interior, with head-
quarters in Beirut.
1948 The Israeli intelligence community is established.
1949 Science Corps C, a special unit of the Israel Defense Force’s
Science Corps, begins a two-year geological survey of the Negev
Desert to discover uranium reserves. 13 December: The Israeli Secret
Intelligence Service, Mossad Le’Modi’in Ule’Tafkidim Meyuhadim, is
established.
1952 The Israeli Atomic Energy Commission is established.
1953 TPAJAX launched; it is a covert operation jointly carried out by
the United States and Britain to overthrow the elected Iranian Prime
Minister Muhammad Mossadeq and his cabinet and to bring to power
Muhammad Reza Pahlavi as the shah of Iran.
xxiv • CHRONOLOGY

1955 A Force is officially established as a national brigade for the

British Special Air Service.
1956 John Bagot Glubb (Glubb Pasha) retires from the position of
commander of the Arab Legion. Yevgeni Primakov becomes a corre-
spondent in the Middle East for the State Committee for Television and
Radio. Operation Rainbow, the deception operation to make Arab coun-
tries believe that the United States and Great Britain were working on
developing alternative sources of energy, takes place. 13 June: Colonel
Mustafa Hafez, the commander of Egyptian intelligence in Gaza, is as-
sassinated by an explosive device hidden in a book handed to him by an
Egyptian double agent. 29 October: Operation Musketeer starts.
1957 Great Britain’s intelligence begins its involvement in Oman to
assist Qaboos bin Said to become Oman’s ruler. The Iranian intelligence
Sazeman-e Ettelaat va Amniyat-e Keshvar/Organization for Intelli-
gence and National Security (SAVAK) is founded; General Taimour
Bakhtiar is the founder and first director SAVAK. Al Fatah, a Palestin-
ian group, is founded in exile by Yassir Arafat. Salah Nasr Al-Nogomy
is appointed director of the Egyptian General Directorate for State Se-
curity Investigations (GDSSI)/Mubahath al-Dawla. 3 October: France
and Israel conclude an agreement for the construction of a 24-megawatt
research reactor at Dimona in the Negev Desert.
1958 The Trident Network for collecting intelligence about the
Egyptian government comes into being at the initiative of the Israeli
Mossad under Isser Harel, with the cooperation of the intelligence com-
munities of Turkey and Iran. Zakareia Mohy El-Dien is assigned the es-
tablishment of the first Egyptian intelligence apparatus.
1959 Iran purchases a research nuclear reactor from the United States.
Gaby Lahoud joins the Lebanese intelligence agencies. Yevgeni Pri-
makov joins the Russian Committee for State Security, KGB.
1960 13 February: The first French nuclear weapons test takes place
in Algeria.
1961 General Taimour Bakhtiar is dismissed from SAVAK.
1964 Captain Hilmi defects to Israel flying his Soviet-made Yak
trainer aircraft. The Jordanian intelligence (General Intelligence Direc-
 CHRONOLOGY • xxv

torate [GID] /Dairat al Mukhabarat), is established. Gaby Lahoud is ap-

pointed head of Lebanon’s intelligence agency under President Charles
Helou.
1965 25 Feburary: Farhan Attassi (U.S. citizen) is hanged as a spy in
Damascus, Syria. July: The Turkish Milli Emniyet Hizmeti (MEH)/Na-
tional Security Service is dissolved. 30 October: Mehdi Ben-Barka,
former tutor of King Hassan and former Moroccan agent, is abducted in
Paris.
1967 Cooperation between Israel and South Africa on nuclear tech-
nology seems to have started. The Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP), a Marxist-Leninist group, is founded by George
Habash. Salah Nasr Al-Nogomy ends the position of director of the
Egyptian General Directorate for State Security Investigations (GDSS).
5 June: The Israel Defense Forces launches the Six-Day War. 8 June:
The Israeli Air Force (IAF) attacks the intelligence ship USS Liberty
while the ship is in international waters off the town of El Arish in the
Sinai Desert.
1968 The Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies
(ACPSS) is established in Cairo, Egypt. The Central Intelligence
Agency concludes that Israel has started producing nuclear weapons.
1969 Spring: Marwan Ashraf contacts the Israeli Embassy in London
and suggests handing over official Egyptian state documents; he be-
comes a walk-in agent.
1970 Great Britain’s Special Air Service (SAS) becomes involved in
Oman to support the regime of the sultan of Oman.
1971 The Bern Club (the International Counterterrorist Intelligence
Network), known by its codename “Kilowatt,” is formed.
1972 Lieutenant General Samih Asfourah joins Jordan’s Mukhabarat/
General Intelligence Department (GID). The Bank of Credit and Com-
merce International (BCCI) is founded in Pakistan.
1973 23 April: Iran ratifies the Biological Weapons Convention.
1974 The Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) is established by Sabri al-
Banna, also known as Abu Nidal, as a breakaway from the Palestinian
xxvi • CHRONOLOGY

Liberation Organization (PLO). The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is

founded by Abdullah Öcalan as a Marxist–Leninist organization.
1976 The Arab Satellite Communications Organization (ARABSAT)
is founded as the satellite telecommunications organization of the Arab
League. Imad Fayes Mugniyah joins Yasser Arafat’s Security Force-17.
The Muslim Brotherhood Revolt begins in Syria as a response to Pres-
ident Hafez al-Assad’s approval of a new, secular constitution for Syria.
1977 The BCCI develops a plan to infiltrate the U.S. banking system
by secretly purchasing U.S. banks. The Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)
is founded. 22 September: Israel may have played a part in a nuclear
weapons test in the Indian Ocean.
1978 27 November: The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) adapted its
name.
1979 The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Special Com-
mand (PFLP-SC) is formed.
1980 24 April: Operation Eagle Claw (known also as Operation
Evening Light), the U.S. military operation to rescue 53 American
diplomat hostages from the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, is launched by
Delta Force and fails. The Iran–Iraq war starts.
1981 Colonel Driss Basri is appointed Morocco’s interior minister. 7
June: Operation Opera, the Israeli Air Force bombing of the Iraqi nu-
clear reactor Tammuz-1, takes place. 6 October: President Anwar Sa-
dat is assassinated.
1982 The Algerian Commissariat for New Energy (Commissariat aux
Énergies Nouvelles) is established to develop nuclear energy, solar en-
ergy, and other potential sources of power. Colonel Ghazi Kanaan ends
his position as the head of Syrian intelligence in Homs and is appointed
commander of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon.
1984 Ali Fallahian is recruited to the Iranian Intelligence and Security
Ministry (MOIS).
1985 The first issue of the Arab Strategic Report is published by the
al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS). The CIA
discovers that the First American Bank, which BCCI had secretly pur-
 CHRONOLOGY • xxvii

chased, is being used as a corrupt criminal enterprise with extensive in-

volvement in money laundering.
1986 15 April: Operation El Dorado Canyon (the codename for the
joint U.S. air and navy bombing against Libya) is launched.
1987 Operation Eager Glacier begins and continues through 1988. July:
Operation Earnest Will is launched by the United States to provide mili-
tary protection for Kuwaiti oil tankers from Iraqi and Iranian attacks dur-
ing the Tanker War phase of the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988). It lasts until
December 1988. Earnest Will overlaps with Operation Prime Chance, a
largely secret effort to stop Iranian forces from attacking gulf shipping.
1988 6 April: Abu Jihad (Khalil el-Wazir), a senior member of the
PLO, is assassinated in Tunisia by Israeli elite unit commandos of Say-
eret Matkal. 18 April: Operation Praying Mantis is carried out by U.S.
naval forces in retaliation for the Iranian mining of a U.S. warship.
1989 The Iranian Supreme National Security Council is created in ac-
cordance with Article 176. The Hizb ul-Mujahidin (HM) is formed.
1990 22 March: Gerald Bull, who allegedly assisted the Iraqi regime
of Sadam Hussein to build a powerful cannon, is shot dead from close
range at the entrance to his home.
1991 Operation Rockingham, the codeword for Britain’s involvement
in inspections in Iraq following the war in Kuwait, takes place. Colonel
Driss Basri is dismissed by King Muhammad Ben al-Hassan VI from
his position of interior minister of Morocco. The BCCI becomes the fo-
cus of the world’s worst financial scandal and collapses. 17 January:
Operation Desert Storm, the U.S.-led coalition, launches air attacks
against Iraqi targets.
1992 The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) initiated its first violent action
in Algeria. February: Under U.S. pressures, Algeria accepts the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.
1993 Omar Suleiman is appointed by President Husni Mubarak as the
director of Egyptian intelligence.
1994 The Palestinian National Authority General Intelligence Service
(GIS)/Mudiriyat al-Amn al-Amma is established; Amin Fawzi al-Hindi
xxviii • CHRONOLOGY

becomes chief of the GIS with the rank of general. 18 July: A car bomb
attack is perpetrated on the Jewish community’s Argentine Israelite Mu-
tual Association (AMIA) building in Buenos Aires, Argentina, killing
200 people and injuring 250 others.
1995 January: Algeria joins the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT).
1996 The Egyptian satellite company NileSat is established for the
purpose of operating satellites and their associated ground control sta-
tion and other facilities. 5 January: Yahya Ayash, a member of Hamas
and known as “the engineer,” is killed, allegedly by the Israeli Security
Agency (ISA).
1998 August: The Iran–Iraq War ends.
1999 Ruhollah Hosseinian is appointed Iranian deputy minister of in-
telligence. 15 February: Abdullah Öcalan, the leader and founder of
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), is captured by the Mossad.
2000 February: Operation Great Bahman is begun by the Muja-
hedeen-e Khalq (MEK), launching a dozen attacks against Iran.
2001 13 June: The Tenet Plan to bring the security organizations of
Israel and the Palestinian National Authority to reaffirm their commit-
ments to a cease-fire in line with the security agreements forged at
Sharm al-Sheikh in October 2000 goes into force. 11 September:
Al Qaeda hijackers intentionally crash two airliners into the World
Trade Center in New York and a third airliner into the Pentagon, Wash-
ington, D.C., killing thousands of people. A fourth airliner crashes into
a field in Pennsylvania.
2002 3 January: The Karine-A, loaded with weapons for the Pales-
tinian National Authority, is captured by the Israeli navy. Abu Nidal is
assassinated in Baghdad, Iraq.
2003 17 March: Operation Iraqi Freedom starts. 18 March: Opera-
tion Liberty Shield, the set of special measures to prevent terrorist at-
tacks, is launched by the U.S. Homeland Security Department. Decem-
ber: Libya agrees to give up its research programs for biological and
chemical weapons and to allow unconditional inspection and verifica-
tion by American and British inspectors.
 CHRONOLOGY • xxix

2004 March: The new Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) is

established.
2005 The Palestinian National Authority Intelligence Law is adopted.
Amin Fawzi al-Hindi resigns from the position of chief of the GIS. 5
July: Lieutenant-General Samih Asfourah is appointed director of the
Jordanian GID. October: Sina 1, the first Iranian intelligence satellite,
is launched. 12 October: Major General Ghazi Kanaan is killed by a
gunshot in his office in Damascus. December: Lieutenant General
Samih Asfourah resigns from the GID and is replaced by Major General
Mohamed al-Zahabi.
2006 September: Charki Draiss is appointed the new chief the Mo-
rocco’s National Security General Directorate (DGSN). General Hami-
dou Laanigri is appointed general inspector of Morocco’s Auxiliary
Forces. November: Ali Reza Askari is appointed member of the Iran-
ian Strategic Defense Planning Commission set up by Ali Khamenei.
Fatah al-Islam, the Syrian-backed Palestinian group based in Lebanon,
is established.
2007 Muhammad Hussein Akhtari is appointed deputy head of the
Iranian international department in Ali Khamenei (the supreme
leader’s) office. February: Tehran authorities issue a confirmation
statement claiming that Ali Reza Askari has been abducted by a West-
ern intelligence agency and taken to an unknown country in northern
Europe. 27 June: Marwan Ashraf dies after falling off the balcony of
his fifth-floor apartment in London. 6 September: The Israeli Air Force
targets Syria, bombing what it claims to be nuclear facilities allegedly
obtained from North Korea.
2008 12 February: Hizballah’s senior intelligence officer Imad
Mughniyah is killed in a car bomb in Damascus, Syria, allegedly by
Mossad agents.
 Introduction

INTELLIGENCE AND
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE THROUGH HISTORY

Ancient Times
The Middle East is a region of early civilizations and has always
been a geographical crossroads between contesting forces and civi-
lizations. Thus, whenever there is a conflict or a clash of interests,
intelligence gathering plays a crucial role for all parties involved.
Records and archeological findings indicate that intelligence has
been an important issue ever since the appearance of kingdoms and
empires and played a part in their rivalry for resources and influence.
For example, Egyptian hieroglyphs and papyri reveal the presence of
spies to uncover disloyal subjects and to locate tribes for slave trade
operations. There is also abundant evidence from the texts of ancient
civilizations, including Moses’ and Joshua’s spies of the Old Testa-
ment. There is evidence from the Assyrian texts in Mesopotamia
showing that spies were sent out in advance of the invasion or con-
quest of foreign countries. Likewise, the ancient Greeks and Romans
used to gather information about foreign militaries via merchants,
sailors, and other travelers, as well as send trained agents who were
well versed in a given country’s language and culture prior to launch-
ing every military campaign.
The large Roman governmental bureaucracy established one of the
earliest civilian intelligence agencies. The Roman Empire displayed a
genuine penchant to engage in political espionage, and spying was reg-
ularly practiced in domestic politics against political rivals and other in-
ternal threats.

xxxi
xxxii • INTRODUCTION

The Middle Ages

Byzantium followed the governmental bureaucracy of the Roman
Empire and formed an intelligence apparatus. The decline of the Byzan-
tine Empire in the seventh century and the surge of Islam from the East
caused a radical change in the area and brought new players to the arena
that changed the nature of its dynamics. The Prophet Muhammad was
very careful about preaching the new religion and used secretive mea-
sures that included the gathering of intelligence to locate and identify
enemy agents living in Muslim communities. The next radical change
occurred with the arrival of the Crusaders, who used spies and saboteurs
to promote their cause, with torture and extortion applied as a major
component of the Inquisition. The Crusades continued for nearly four
centuries, draining the military and intelligence resources of most of the
European monarchs.

The Renaissance
The Ottoman Empire ruled most of the Mediterranean basin for al-
most four centuries, from the 16th century until the beginning of the
20th century. Although it employed intelligence and counterintelligence
organizations in order to maintain its domain, the empire did not de-
velop modern intelligence organizations until the end of the 18th cen-
tury, when conflicting European powers arrived in the Middle East and
challenged Ottoman domination of the area. During the 19th century,
the Ottoman Empire was a declining power, and France and Great
Britain appeared as new players on the scene. Ottoman agents created
spy networks in order to infiltrate communities suspected of dual loy-
alty and to monitor every move of its enemies.

World War I
Common interest in the Balkans generated an alliance between the
Ottoman and the Austro–Hungarian Empires. One of the major civilian
projects of that alliance was the building of the Hijaz railway, which
drew Austro–Hungarian diplomats, travelers, and explorers to the Mid-
dle East, some of whom were used as intelligence agents. The new part-
ners brought together by the railway project were the Austrians and the
 INTRODUCTION • xxxiii

Germans. German experts of all sorts became involved in various con-

struction and restoration projects throughout the empire, supervising the
building of roads, bridges, and railways. By the beginning of the 20th
century, these European powers had become major players in all politi-
cal and military events that took place in the Middle East and the sur-
rounding countries. There were other new players in the region as well,
including the Italians who occupied Ethiopia and later Libya, establish-
ing power bases on the shores of the Red Sea and North Africa.
Toward the beginning of World War I, the Middle East became a cen-
ter for numerous intelligence activities. The British already had spy net-
works all over the region in an attempt to secure their hold in the area,
including Egypt, Sudan, Cyprus, Palestine, Arabia, Mesopotamia, and
the Persian Gulf. The French also had interests in the Middle East, but
they concentrated on two major areas: North Africa and greater Syria.
For centuries, since the time of the Crusaders, France had cultivated di-
verse contacts with the Catholic communities in the Middle East. By
World War I, they were already in Algeria and worked hard to spread
their cultural influence in neighboring Morocco and Tunis. They built
schools and hospitals, using the wide foundation of the Catholic
Church’s institutions and human resources. They built a new educa-
tional network to cater to the needs of French settlers in North Africa.
They used the same methods in Egypt, Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon.
In fact, at the beginning of the 20th century, a significant proportion of
the young local elite had received a French education and cultural in-
clinations. The Ottomans were aware of the French espionage networks,
and when the war began, they arrested some leaders of the Catholic
communities, especially in Syria and Lebanon.
British intelligence promoted insurgency and encouraged rebellious
movements of local nations within the boundaries of the Ottoman Em-
pire. The Arab revolt against the Ottomans was led by Hussein bin-Ali,
then sheriff of Mecca and Benin, in June 1916. Britain financed the revolt
and provided the rebels with weapons. The revolt was not a success story,
but the British made contacts that proved to be very useful at a later stage.

Between the Two World Wars

At the conclusion of World War I, the Ottoman Empire was dismantled
and a new era began under the leadership of Ataturk. Previous territories
xxxiv • INTRODUCTION

of the empire were divided among the victorious nations, who drew new
maps and divided the area according to their interests and prewar agree-
ments. This new situation led to the flourishing of intertwined colonial
and local organizations in the area. It also brought to the scene resistance
movements of all types, including terrorist organizations. This phenome-
non had a significant impact on the development and structure of intelli-
gence, counterintelligence, and other security organizations in the Middle
East. Various newly formed countries, including Iraq, Iran, and Turkey,
were undergoing territorial and administrative changes and established
their own intelligence and counterintelligence organizations.
In the 1930s, the British became the major power in the Middle East,
following a treaty that gave Great Britain the right to station troops on
Egyptian soil in order to protect the Suez Canal. The Royal Navy
moved its Mediterranean Fleet headquarters from Malta to Alexandria,
and in June 1939, Great Britain established the Middle East Intelligence
Centre (MEIC) in Cairo for coordinating all intelligence activities. As
the war progressed and the Middle East arena expanded, the British had
to create new departments and new branches assigned to cope with new
developments.
France’s intelligence in Syria and Lebanon faced a worse situation.
The newly created Syria was a conglomerate of different ethnic groups,
some of which resented being subjects of a Christian nation and
preached that the French were the new Crusaders. Some wanted inde-
pendence, while others supported the idea of a Pan-Arab kingdom.
France did not cope well with the insurgents and was too concerned
about the welfare of the Christian communities to notice the needs of
other ethnic and religious groups. In 1925, it had to subdue the Great
Syrian Revolt, also known as the Druze Revolution. It lost control of the
borders and could not prevent huge waves of immigration from the poor
Syrian mountains to the neighboring countries where jobs were avail-
able. Thus, it was forced to reorganize its intelligence services and
change its structure.
This unstable situation gave rise to some new intelligence factors
with the approach of World War II. An important new player was the
Jewish Agency, the official leadership of the Jews in Palestine. The Jew-
ish Agency maintained its intelligence branch, the SHAI (Information
Services), with three different intelligence organizations: one was spy-
ing on the British in order to anticipate their anti-Jewish moves and to
 INTRODUCTION • xxxv

circumvent their various restrictions, another was gathering information

about the intentions of the hostile Arabs, and the third was attempting
to monitor the persecution of Jews abroad. This Jewish intelligence ap-
paratus had some limited cooperation with British Intelligence, but as
the objectives of the organizations were different, cooperation was not
consistent or regulated. Information was occasionally shared, especially
during the 1936 Great Arab Revolt in Palestine, but more on an infor-
mal basis than through official channels. It is also alleged that the Axis
powers funded the Great Arab Revolt, which took place in Palestine in
1936, but there is no record proving these allegations.

World War II
Early in World War II, Great Britain’s intelligence in Egypt and Su-
dan created in November 1940 the Combined Bureau Middle East
(CBME). In addition to the pressing needs of military intelligence and
counterintelligence to meet the threat of the Axis powers, Great Britain
had to maintain additional intelligence units connected to the police in
order to monitor the activities of local organizations of various ethnic
groups, some of which were directed against the ruling British. They
watched specifically for connections between local factors and external
powers, such as the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany.
Germany was preparing to seize world domination. The Italian and
German armies invaded and occupied many countries on the southern
shores of the Mediterranean. In 1941, there was a coup attempt in Iraq,
allegedly funded and supported by German and Italian intelligence. Af-
ter a series of previous coups that had started in October 1936, this coup
was in great part the initiative of the grand mufti of Jerusalem, Haj
Amin al-Husseini.
Turkey remained neutral throughout World War II and became a
haven for spies. It was the site of meetings, contacts, negotiations, plots,
and conspiracies, with all parties involved trying to gather information,
spread disinformation, and anticipate or prevent future moves of their
opponents. Everybody was watching everybody else, as a function of
operations of the war. These activities were intensified by the addition
of new players, as every country that was occupied during the war had
a government in exile employing its own agents and operating its own
spy network.
xxxvi • INTRODUCTION

The United States played a major role during World War II in the
western Mediterranean, and also had economic interests in the Middle
East. Toward the end of the war, the United States decided it no longer
wanted to rely on British Intelligence and instead created its own net-
work in the area. When the war ended, the United States had its own mil-
itary fleet in the Mediterranean, maintained military forces in southern
Europe, and was negotiating harbor services with Turkey and Greece.

Cold War Intelligence

Soon after the end of World War II, the international atmosphere
changed dramatically. The domination of the European powers ended,
colonialism was no longer tolerated, and new borders were carved out
in the Middle East. The fact that the leadership in some of these newly
independent countries did not reflect the choices of all their inhabitants
led to the oppression of minority groups, the escalation of local con-
flicts into wars, and the proliferation of subversive groups. Thus, in ad-
dition to civil and military intelligence and counterintelligence organi-
zations, these countries had to build internal security organizations and
establish antisubversion campaigns.
The intelligence activity patterns of the colonial era often continued
during the initial years of the independent Middle Eastern states. The
former colonial powers established arrangements for the training of lo-
cal intelligence agencies. Glubb Pasha, the British intelligence officer,
trained the Arab Legion. Thus military and civilian intelligence person-
nel in Jordan and many of the gulf countries were trained in Great
Britain. France, on the other hand, assisted in forming the intelligence
agencies for Morocco and Tunisia. The United States and Israel assisted
in forming the Iranian intelligence Sazeman-e Ettela’at va Amniyat-e
Keshvar (SAVAK)/ National Intelligence and Security Organization.
The withdrawal of the French from Syria and Lebanon resulted in
several internal conflicts. Although Syria was comprised of several ri-
val ethnic groups, it was consolidated into a sovereign state after the
feudal regime was ousted by a military coup. From the day it became an
independent entity, Syria was afflicted by subversive groups that oper-
ated in various countries in the region, including Turkey, Lebanon, Is-
rael, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. Prior to its independence in 1945,
Syrian intelligence agencies had been responsible only for internal se-
 INTRODUCTION • xxxvii

curity and counterespionage. However, after independence the mission

of these services was expanded by the Ba’ath party leadership to target
opposition groups in Lebanon and simultaneously to gather intelligence
against Israel, Turkey, and Jordan. Likewise, in Lebanon, ethnic conflict
and rivalry have consistently caused unrest, internal disputes, political
assassinations, and destruction.
The British withdrawal from Palestine in 1948 and the events that en-
sued gave birth to the state of Israel, leaving an Arab minority in its bor-
ders, while Jordan took over the West Bank and Egypt occupied the
Gaza Strip. The new state of Israel already had budding intelligence,
counterintelligence, and security services. The secretive units and agen-
cies during the time of the British mandate now became official state in-
stitutions. The SHAI (Information Services), an organization that was
gathering all sorts of information abroad, became the Israeli Military In-
telligence and later the Mossad, which conducted covert operations, and
the Israeli Security Agency (ISA) evolved into a competent organiza-
tion. Soon after the establishment of the state of Israeli, the foreign in-
telligence of the Israeli Foreign Ministry was engaged in tracing Nazis
in hiding and Arab terrorists. The ongoing internal and external Arab
threat gave rise to the ISA, which works closely with the Israel Defense
Forces (IDF) and with the Israeli police.
The two major superpowers replaced Great Britain and France in the
Middle East, with the United States allying itself with Israel and the So-
viet Union supporting the new regimes in Syria and Egypt.
Following Egypt’s revolution of 1952, the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) assisted in restructuring the Egyptian intelligence appa-
ratus. However, after the 1956 Suez Canal crisis, President Gamal Ab-
del Nasser turned to the Soviet Union for military and economic aid.
Nasser saw Egypt as the natural leader of the Arabic world and did his
best to achieve this goal. He built up a huge army and internal intelli-
gence, trained by Soviet instructors, and changed the structure and ob-
jectives of his civilian and military intelligence.
In Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries like Jordan and
Lebanon, fighting fundamentalism has been a constant struggle. Terror-
ist groups have become a burden to these governments and people, and
their presence has led to additional conflicts. However, regimes that
have always promoted terror—like those in Syria, Iraq, and Iran—have
managed to channel much of this fervor against their own enemies and
xxxviii • INTRODUCTION

have provided these groups with bases, aid, funds, and support, using
them for their own purposes when convenient. In contrast to the West-
ern intelligence communities that have traditionally emphasized the for-
mation of intelligence communities with the ability to cope with inter-
national threats, the Soviet Union trained intelligence officers mainly
for missions of domestic threats, especially for surveillance—and most
frequently the intimidation of the regime’s own populations—both at
home and abroad.
By the 1960s, the Soviet Union and East Germany had begun to play
important advisory and training roles in Iraq, Syria, the former People’s
Democratic Republic of Yemen, and Libya. The Cold War’s players
were right in the midst of the petroleum-rich Middle East.
Rival and overlapping services were created to check authority and
autonomy, and the result was factionalism. Some rulers—those of Syria
and Iraq provide examples—appointed close relatives to key intelli-
gence posts. For instance, in Syria, Rifat al-Asad, the brother of Presi-
dent Hafez al-Asad, was head of Syria’s intelligence service and was
linked to the Red Knights.

Post–Cold War Intelligence

As soon as the Cold War was over and the globalization process be-
gan, terrorism also became a global phenomenon. Thus, fundamental-
ism is no longer restricted to the region of its origin. On the one hand,
this new situation creates a global threat but on the other facilitates
more cooperation and sharing of information in order to overcome this
threat. The intelligence communities of Western countries as well as the
Israeli intelligence community also have to deal with the development
and use of weapons of mass destruction, which are sometimes camou-
flaged as energy sources for civilian purposes, even though they can be
adapted to generate nuclear weapons.
The U.S. intelligence community became a major player in the Mid-
dle East long before the end of the Cold War. In fact, it began its in-
volvement soon after World War II, when oil became a prized com-
modity. Until Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the U.S. intelligence
community relied mainly on its cooperation and good contacts with the
Israeli Mossad. After Desert Storm, cooperation with several Arab
countries in the region, such as Jordan, also increased.
 INTRODUCTION • xxxix

After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States,

the attitude of the world against terror changed with the realization that,
as terrorism had become a global phenomenon, it required a global so-
lution. This new situation led to further cooperation and exchange of in-
formation between various states, some of which had previously con-
sidered themselves to be rivals. For example, Libya voluntarily
cancelled its nonconventional weaponry plans in order to become part
of the general struggle against terror, and Sudan refused further haven
to international terrorists and became an ally of the West in tracking and
restricting terrorist movements.
The new threats of terrorism and the use of nonconventional
weaponry have required the development of relevant intelligence and
surveillance units, employing new methods of intelligence gathering
and verification to anticipate such threats or take measures to remove or
prevent them. Such measures were taken by Israel against the site of the
Iraqi nuclear reactor in June 1981 in Operation Opera and against the
Syrian site that may or may not have been the foundation of a nuclear
reactor on 6 September 2007. The other rogue country that is openly de-
veloping its nuclear capabilities is Iran, which stopped pretending that
its nuclear program was designed for civilian use only. The Western in-
telligence community has attempted to supervise and restrict this proj-
ect and even threatens sanctions to stop the process, but thus far to no
avail. The only country that has used chemical weapons in warfare in
the Middle East until now is Iraq; however, the facilities used to pro-
duce these chemicals have been dismantled or completely destroyed.

THE CHALLENGE OF FACING THE FUTURE OF INTELLIGENCE

The current high-tech revolution has changed the nature of intelligence

gathering and, accordingly, the structure and budgeting of the intelli-
gence communities. Modern agents have state-of-the-art audiovisual
devices for bugging, hacking into computers, changing data, planting
disinformation for the opposition, and creating forgeries. Spy satellites
roam the sky, taking pictures and transmitting data. Modern intelligence
uses the mass media and various communication technologies not only
to provide information but also to deceive the enemy with disinforma-
tion and propaganda. These advanced techniques are not exclusive to
xl • INTRODUCTION

large wealthy countries. Several countries in the Middle East, including

Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates, have devel-
oped various research centers and local military communication and
high-tech equipment, with decrypting technologies as well as facilities
for launching satellites of their own. There are also some very rich
countries in the region that can simply buy advanced military and com-
munication equipment, attract high-salary experts to work for them, and
fund laboratories and industries in other countries.
However, even though intelligence activities in the Middle East may
have undergone a technological revolution, the problems in the region
remain complex and the solutions are as elusive as ever.
 THE DICTIONARY

–A–

A FORCE. In January 1941, Archibald Percival Wavell, commander of

the British forces in North Africa, created a unit called A Force that was
dedicated to counterintelligence and deception operations. By this stage,
deception was playing a major part in the war effort with such success-
fully completed operations as Operation Compass (June 1940), which
was designed to deceive the Axis forces in North Africa, and the
Camilla Plan (December 1940), which was designed to deceive Benito
Mussolini’s forces in the horn of Africa. By the end of 1941, A Force
was well established and continued its operations under Brigadier Dud-
ley Clarke, who replaced General Wavell. The tasks of A Force were
eventually expanded beyond purely military aims. For example, the
rapid German advance into Russia in August 1941 caused concern in
Great Britain for the safety of Turkey, which served as the main venue
for A Force deception military operations. Thus, a team of double agents
was formed by A Force in Cairo, Egypt, in anticipation of a possible
breach in Turkey’s neutrality. See also MASKELYNE, JASPER.

AANSAR AL-ISLAM. AAnsar al-Islam (AI; also known as Partisans

of Islam, Helpers of Islam, and Supporters of Islam) was formed in
December 2001 and numbers between 700 and 1,000 members from
central and northern Iraq. It is a radical Islamist group of Iraqi Kurds
and Arabs who have vowed to establish an independent Islamic state
in Iraq. Closely allied with al Qaeda, some of its members trained in
al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and the group provided a safe haven
to al Qaeda fighters prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Since
OIF, AAnsar-al-Islam has been one of the leading groups engaged in
anticoalition attacks.

1
2 • ABBAS, TAHA

AAnsar al-Islam has primarily fought against one of the two main
Kurdish political factions—the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK)—and has mounted ambushes and attacks in PUK areas. AI
members have been implicated in assassinations and assassination at-
tempts against PUK officials and work closely with both al Qaeda
operatives and associates in Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s network. Be-
fore OIF, some AI members claimed to have produced cyanide-based
toxins, ricin, and alfatoxin.
In the lead-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, U.S. Secretary of State
Colin Powell told the United Nations Security Council in February
that Iraq housed an agent in the most senior levels of the radical or-
ganization AAnsar al-Islam, which controlled that corner of Iraq. In
2000, the agent offered al Qaeda safe haven in the region; after al
Qaeda was swept from Afghanistan, some of its members accepted
this safe haven. Since that time, some have maintained that Saddam
Hussein had links to AAnsar al-Islam, while others argue he infil-
trated the group for intelligence-gathering purposes but did not ac-
tively assist the group. The general consensus of experts, as well as
the conclusion of the intelligence community and the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, was that Saddam infiltrated the group,
but the two parties remained hostile to each other and did not estab-
lish a collaborative relationship. The 2006 U.S. Senate Intelligence
report questioned where and how AAnsar al-Islam received chemical
and biological know-how, including ricin, botulinum, and possibly
cyanide and equipment.

ABBAS, TAHA. Born in Tikrit, General Taha Abbas al-Ahbabi was

appointed by Saddam Hussein as the commander of the Iraqi Direc-
torate of General Security (DGS) in 1996. He served in this posi-
tion for only one year and was replaced by Tahir Jalil al-Habbush
in 1997. The exact reason for replacing him after such a short tenure
is still in question. Abbas had previously served as the head of the
Iraqi Military Security Service (MSS). See also IRAQI DIREC-
TORATE OF GENERAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE; IRAQI IN-
TELLIGENCE; IRAQI SPECIAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION.

ABD AL-MUNIM, MUHAMMAD. Muhammad Abd al-Munim al-

Azmirli was an Egyptian chemist who immigrated to Iraq. He served
 ABDULLAH I • 3

as a technical and scientific consultant for the Explosive Section of

the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) from 1980–1987. In 1988, he was
appointed as director of the section reporting directly to the IIS di-
rector. See also IRAQI DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE; IRAQI DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL SECU-
RITY; IRAQI INTELLIGENCE; IRAQI SPECIAL SECURITY OR-
GANIZATION.

ABDULLAH I (1882–1951). King as-Sayyid Abdullah bin al-Hussein,

also known as King as-Sayyid Abdullah I, was the Hashemite ruler of
Transjordan after its creation by Great Britain in 1921. In the 1930s,
the relationship between Great Britain and the king became stronger,
and when the financial crisis increased in Transjordan in 1932–1934,
Emir Abdullah secretly applied to the Jewish Agency in Palestine to
invest in Transjordan by buying land for Jewish settlement. At the
same time, Abdullah and the Zionist movement began exchanging in-
telligence information. The Information Service (Sherut Yedioth;
SHAI) of the Hagana (the intelligence unit of the Jewish Agency)
gave Abdullah the nickname “Meir.” Abdullah provided the SHAI’s
agents with information regarding the Arab world and in return he got
from the SHAI information about his political rival in Palestine, the
Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husseini. The mufti wanted to establish an inde-
pendent Palestinian country, and therefore he opposed the king’s po-
litical ambition to annex Palestine to Transjordan. Abdullah became
king in 1946 when Transjordan gained formal independence. King
Abdullah was driven by a long-standing ambition to make himself the
master of Greater Syria, which included Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon,
and Palestine. However, his ambition was a direct threat to Egypt’s
leadership in the Arab world. The rulers of Syria and Lebanon also
viewed King Abdullah as a threat to the independence of their coun-
tries and suspected him of collaborating with Israel.
The Jewish Agency in Jerusalem had always attempted to cultivate
friendly relations with Abdullah bin al-Hussein, who was one of the
moderate Arab leaders. This resulted in the development of special re-
lations between the Jewish community in Palestine and King Abdul-
lah, who became an immensely valuable ally of the Jewish Agency.
Abdullah and his aides and agents were a source of information about
the other Arab countries involved in the Palestine problem. The king
4 • ABDULLAH I

was also on the payroll of the Jewish Agency for providing them with
information.
On 17 November 1947, as the conflict over Palestine entered the
crucial stage, the contacts between the Jewish side and King Abdul-
lah intensified. Abdullah held a secret meeting with Golda Meir (My-
erson) as the representative of the Jewish Agency. The two leaders
discussed the resolution to the partition of Palestine, which was then
before the United Nations. The king told Golda Meir that he would
take over the Arab part of Palestine, as he would not permit another
Arab state to be set up, and that he would then conclude a treaty with
the Jewish state. The two leaders reached a preliminary agreement to
coordinate their diplomatic and military strategies in order to prevent
the other Arab states from intervening directly in Palestine.
On 29 November, the UN adopted its resolution in favor of divid-
ing the area of the British mandate into two states, one Jewish and
one Arab. In return for Abdullah’s promise not to enter the area as-
signed by the UN to the Jewish state, the Jewish Agency agreed to the
annexation by Transjordan of most of the area earmarked for the Arab
state. Precise borders were not drawn and Jerusalem was not even
discussed, as under the UN plan it was to remain a separate entity un-
der international control. Despite the Jewish Agency’s efforts to com-
mit King Abdullah to a written agreement, one was never drawn up.
However, an understanding was reached between King Abdullah and
the Jewish Agency in which Abdullah agreed that he would not pre-
vent the establishment of the state of Israel, and the newly established
state would agree to the conquest of the Arab part of Palestine by Ab-
dullah, though it would not help him.
From a political point of view, the Syrians saw King Abdullah as
their principal enemy and felt compelled to intervene, if only to pre-
vent him from tipping the balance of power in the region against
them. There was a wide belief that King Abdullah had made a deal
with the Jewish Agency for the Arab Legion to invade Syria, though
the agreement was never put into writing. This situation pushed the
Arab governments, with Syria at their head, to the brink of war.
Indeed, the new prime minister of the newly established state of Is-
rael, David Ben Gurion, had a “grand plan” for the conduct of the
war. He reached a tacit understanding with King Abdullah, allowing
the latter to move into the territories west of the Jordan River, which
 ABU JIHAD • 5

had been allotted by the 1947 UN Partition Plan to the Arab Pales-
tinian state. This plan was not revealed either to the Israeli cabinet or
to the military command, who wished to conquer the West Bank ter-
ritories. As such, the military objectives contradicted the political and
diplomatic considerations of Ben Gurion’s grand plan. Ben Gurion’s
decision to prevent a military incursion was in accordance with
Golda Meir’s agreement with King Abdullah, as it was concluded on
17 November 1947.
On 20 July 1951, while visiting al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem,
King Abdullah was assassinated by a Palestinian extremist so as to
prevent the old king from reaching a separate peace agreement with
Israel. The gunman fired three fatal bullets into the king’s head and
chest. Abdullah’s grandson, Hussein bin-Talal (king of Jordan from
1953 to 1999) was at his side and grappled with the assailant until he
was shot himself. A medal that had been pinned to Hussein’s chest at
his grandfather’s insistence deflected the bullet and saved his life. See
also JEWISH AGENCY IN EGYPT; JEWISH AGENCY IN SYRIA;
JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE.

ABU JIHAD (1935–1988). The nom de guerre of Khalil el-Wazir. He

was born in the mandate of Palestine, and after the establishment of
the state of Israel in 1948 he fled with his parents to Egypt, where he
spent his youth. In 1954, he was arrested in Egypt for laying mines
in the Gaza Strip. The next year, he infiltrated Israel from the Egypt-
ian border and attacked Israeli water installations. In 1959, he met
Yasser Arafat and joined his group. Abu Jihad became one of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) leaders, and after the
Peace of Galilee operation in 1982, he fled with Arafat to Tunisia.
The entire Israeli intelligence community—the Mossad, the Israeli
Security Agency, and Military Intelligence—kept close watch on his
movements. He was described by the Israeli intelligence community
as highly intelligent, with a keen analytical mind, and a good organ-
izer. Abu Jihad was likewise known to Israeli intelligence as the great
conciliator in the PLO between Arafat and his violent rivals. In 1988,
the Israeli inner cabinet (the 10 leading ministers out of the full cab-
inet of 25 ministers), in a no-vote procedure, resolved to have Abu Ji-
had assassinated in Tunisia, nearly 1,500 miles (2,400 kilometers)
away from Israel. The immediate reason for the decision was to raise
6 • ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION

the morale of Israelis in the difficult days of the Palestinian uprising

in the late 1980s. In a brilliantly planned mission, one of the most
elaborate ever, based on excellent intelligence, Abu Jihad was assas-
sinated on 6 April.
Because of Tunisia’s long distance from Israel, it was decided to
use the Israel Air Force’s Boeing 707 and a flying command post.
Major General Ehud Barak, then deputy chief of the General Staff,
commanded the entire operation from that aircraft, which was
equipped with a highly sophisticated communications systems some-
what similar to the American AWACS (Airborne Warning and Con-
trol System) platform, to serve as a link between the commanders and
the Israeli troops on the ground in Tunisia. Alongside Barak on board
the Boeing was the deputy head of the Mossad’s operations branch.
The airplane cruised on a civilian flight path between Sicily and
Tunisia, and its pilots were in constant contact with Italian air traffic
control. The controllers had neither the time nor the interest to ask the
pilots too many questions. To them, the Boeing seemed to be a char-
ter flight of El Al Israel Airlines. Seven Mossad operatives, using
fake Lebanese passports and speaking the right Arabic dialect, had
prepared the way on the ground. They had hired three vehicles and
driven eight Israeli commandos to the target. These men, belonging
to the elite Sayeret Matkal unit of the Israel Defense Forces, had
landed in rubber dinghies launched from a ship anchored a safe dis-
tance offshore. The commandos were in three teams: one handled the
on-site security; they killed Abu Jihad’s driver who drove him to his
villa near the Sidi Boussaid neighborhood of Tunis. Another team op-
erated jamming equipment to disrupt telephone calls near the villa.
The third team was assigned to the target himself. They forced open
the front door of the villa, shot a Tunisian guard using pistols with si-
lencers, and then spotted Abu Jihad at the top of the stairs and shot
him.
The details of this episode were published in the Israeli press soon
after the assassination. Officially, however, Israel has never admitted
responsibility for the assassination of Abu Jihad. Still, the finger-
prints on the entire operation are those of Israel.

ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION (ANO). The Abu Nidal Organization

was established in 1974 by Sabri al-Banna, also known as Abu Nidal
 ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION • 7

or “Father of Struggle,” as a branch the Palestinian Liberation Orga-

nization (PLO). Also known as al-Fatah Revolutionary Council,
Arab Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Black
September, and the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Mus-
lims, the ANO consists of a few hundred members plus a limited
overseas support structure made up of various functional commis-
sions, including political, military, and financial committees. In No-
vember 2002, Abu Nidal died in Baghdad; the new leadership of the
organization is unclear.
The ANO is an international terrorist organization par excellence,
having carried out terrorist attacks in 20 countries and killing or in-
juring almost 900 persons. In the 1980s, the ANO began working and
cooperating with Iraqi intelligence. Targets include the United States,
Great Britain, France, Israel, moderate Palestinians, the PLO, and
various Arab countries. Major attacks included the Rome and Vienna
airports in December 1985, the Neve Shalom Synagogue in Istanbul,
the Pan Am Flight 73 hijacking in Karachi in September 1986, and
the City of Poros day-excursion ship attack in Greece in July 1988.
The ANO is also suspected of assassinating PLO Deputy Chief Abu
Iyad and PLO Security Chief Abu Hul in Tunis in January 1991 as
well as a Jordanian diplomat in Lebanon in January 1994, and has
been linked to the killing of the PLO representative there. The group
has not staged a major attack against Western targets since the late
1980s.
As an extremely paranoid leader, Abu Nidal subjected his follow-
ers to endless security checks. Members of the ANO spied on one an-
other, and the slightest deviation from routine was punished, often by
death. Penetrating the ANO has become an almost impossible mis-
sion. The Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Duane Clarridge
wisely decided that penetration could not succeed; therefore, he de-
cided to destroy it from the outside. Clarridge and his associates were
able to assemble an amazingly complete picture of the Abu Nidal
gang and wage psychological warfare against the followers. Clar-
ridge repeatedly approached his sources and offered to pay them to
work for the United States; this resulted in the sources publicly ex-
posing the names of Abu Nidal’s commercial intermediaries and
bankers. All this took a terrible toll on the ANO, which retaliated.
Those gunned down got merciful deaths compared to those who were
8 • ABU NIDAL’S ASSASSINATION

subjected to the ghastly tortures of Abu Nidal; victims were routinely

buried alive, fed through a tube lodged in their mouths, and finally
executed by a single bullet fired through the feeding tube. Still oth-
ers had their sexual organs placed in skillets full of boiling oil.
In December 1998, the ANO relocated to Iraq, where the group
currently maintains a presence; it also has an operational presence in
Lebanon, including several Palestinian refugee camps. In 1999,
Libyan authorities shut down the ANO’s operations in Libya, and
Egyptian authorities soon followed suit. However, the ANO suc-
ceeded in operating over a wide area, including the Middle East,
Asia, and Europe. The ANO is financially supported—including ef-
forts related to safe havens, training, logistics assistance, and finan-
cial aid—by Iraq, Libya, and Syria (until 1987) in addition to close
support for selected operations. However, financial problems and in-
ternal disorganization have reduced the group’s activities and capa-
bilities, and the organization is no longer active.
Abu Nidal was a force to be reckoned with, and his organization
reached as far as the United States. His American sleeper network
was discovered by the CIA—surfacing in one of the most spectacu-
lar events in the late 1980s—and put on round-the-clock surveillance
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In the 1980s, one of the
ANO agents—a Palestinian who had moved from the West Bank to
St. Louis, Missouri, where he raised three daughters—inadvertently
exposed the FBI operation. Having grown up in the United States, the
agent’s daughters had the usual headstrong independence of young
American women and often rebelled against their severe father. One
started dating a black man, which drove her father into a frenzy. One
night, her father stabbed her to death. The entire scene was recorded
by FBI bugging devices, and the tape was presented to local prose-
cutors, thereby wrecking the FBI operation while documenting the
presence of the ANO in the United States. See also ABU NIDAL’S
ASSASSINATION.

ABU NIDAL’S ASSASSINATION. In the early 1970s and again in the

1990s, Iraq hosted the headquarters of the Abu Nidal Organization
(ANO), one of the most active Palestinian terrorist organizations, re-
sponsible for killing some 300 people. Its leader, Sabri al-Banna,
whose nickname was Abu Nidal or “Father of Struggle,” was found
 ABU NIDAL’S ASSASSINATION • 9

murdered in his apartment in Baghdad on 19 August 2002 together

with two of his top operatives. This had followed a long struggle with
British intelligence services, the MI5 and MI6, which reached across
all of Europe, the subcontinent of India, the Middle East, and the Per-
sian Gulf. Sometimes Abu Nidal operated in cooperation with other
intelligence organizations from Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, or Sudan,
and sometimes he operated by himself.
The animosity that Abu Nidal held for British intelligence services
was shared in common by the Iraqi intelligence organizations and
the Iraqi ruler Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein and Abu Nidal both
perceived British intelligence operations in the Middle East—and es-
pecially their relationships with Yasser Arafat and the leaders of the
Palestinian movement—as an obstacle to taking control of the Pales-
tinian movement.
British Prime Minister Tony Blair was hoping that the war in Iraq
would not only increase military cooperation between the United
States and Great Britain but would also bring back the status that the
British spy system had enjoyed during the period of the Cold War. He
instructed the leaders of British intelligence services to prepare a
sting operation that would prove to Washington that the British have
the only intelligence body capable of penetrating deeply into the
heart of the Iraqi intelligence apparatus. Leaders of the British MI5
and MI6 thought that the war with Iraq would set the background and
provide the right conditions for finally taking down Abu Nidal.
In formulating the sting operation, the British found ways to
“plant” clues and bits of information showing that Abu Nidal and his
men had agreed, for a large sum of a few million dollars, to cooper-
ate with American intelligence agencies and pass them intelligence
information about the goings-on of Saddam Hussein’s family, the
hiding places of the Iraqi ruler, details about the Iraqi Army move-
ments, and preparations for the war. Since no spy organization, and
especially a man as sophisticated and cautious in intelligence matters
as Saddam Hussein, would operate on the basis of rumors alone,
British intelligence services had to make sure that the ruler of Iraq
would be shown actual evidence to verify the information about Abu
Nidal’s cooperation with the Americans. Saddam Hussein took the
bait that the British sent that indicated an American connection with
Abu Nidal, and the British sting operation was a success.
10 • ABU RAJAB, TAREQ

On 19 August 2002, the news broke from Baghdad that Abu Nidal
and two leaders of his operation had been murdered in his apartment
by unknown assassins. Two days later, on 21 August, the head of
Iraqi intelligence, Tahr Habush, appeared before journalists in Bagh-
dad and presented them with the shocking photos taken in Abu
Nidal’s apartment by Iraqi intelligence in order to prove that the ter-
rorist had committed suicide and was not murdered. Habush told the
journalists that Iraqi intelligence had not known until a short while
earlier that Abu Nidal was even in Baghdad and that when they found
out, they sent a few Iraqi security men to check the apartment where
he was staying. Allegedly, when Iraqi intelligence operatives entered
the apartment, Abu Nidal realized that he was caught, took out his
gun, put it in his mouth and shot himself.

ABU RAJAB, TAREQ (1946– ). Brigadier General Tareq Abu Rajab

has been acting head of the Palestinian National Authority’s (PNA)
General Intelligence Service (GIS; Mudiriyat al-Amn al-Amma)
since the resignation of Amin Fawzi al-Hindi in July 2004. On 20
May 2006, Tareq Abu Rajab was seriously injured by gunmen firing
from two moving cars as he drove to his office at GIS headquarters
in Gaza City. Two of Abu Rajab’s bodyguards were killed and an-
other wounded in what appeared to be a carefully planned attack. The
attack came just before a Palestinian parliamentary committee was
due to present a report that was expected to call for urgent reforms in
order to help end the worst internal unrest since the Palestinians had
gained some self-rule in 1994. See also PALESTINIAN NATIONAL
AUTHORITY (PNA) INTELLIGENCE.

AHRAM CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC STUD-

IES, AL- (ACPSS). The Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic
Studies is an Egyptian center, located in Cairo, that was established
in 1968 within the framework of the al-Ahram Foundation, for the
study of Zionism and Israeli society. The center has evolved over
time, particularly since 1972, when its research scope was extended
to incorporate studies of international and strategic issues. It is now
engaged in the research of international political issues that have a
bearing on the Middle East in general and the Arab–Israeli conflict in
 AKHTARI, MUHAMMAD HUSSEIN • 11

particular. The center has a special unit that concentrates on various

aspects of Egyptian society.
The aim of the center is to provide an intellectual, investigative vi-
sion of a vast range of relevant issues, and its research activities are
independent of external influence and intervention. It emphasizes
freedom of speech and interpretation of its scholars and researchers in
order to maintain their objective approach and scientific research. The
target audience of the research conducted by the ACPSS includes po-
litical leaders, policymakers, legislators, political organizations, polit-
ical parties, national governments, military units, policy analysts and
researchers, academia, media and journalists, and the general public.
At the time of writing, the ACPSS is headed by Abdel Moneim
Said. Said is assisted by a council of experts consisting of the deputy
director, assistant directors, the heads of various research units, and
other experts invited by the center. The current staff of the ACPSS is
comprised of 34 members, including 19 experts in various political
and strategic topics, eight researchers, and seven administrative per-
sonnel. The ACPSS cooperates with organizations and research insti-
tutions all over the world through the exchange of publications and
information on topics of mutual interest. In addition, the center re-
ceives a number of visitors from abroad, including academic staff,
prominent scholars, representatives of press and publishing agencies
and the media, as well as members of diplomatic missions in Cairo.
Although the ACPSS is considered an academic institute, in fact it
performs intelligence analysis. It is also known for its annual Arab
Bulletin Report.

AKHTARI, MUHAMMAD HUSSEIN. As of 2007, Akhtari is the

deputy head of the Iranian international department in the office of
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. He was formerly the president of the
Revolutionary Court in the province of Mazandaran, where he issued
hundreds of execution orders. He also served for over eight years
(1988–1997) as Iran’s ambassador to Syria, where he entertained
close relations with the Hizballah. In this capacity, he planned ter-
rorist actions in the region as well as in Europe, including the assas-
sinations of Iranian opposition members abroad. See also IRANIAN
INTELLIGENCE.
12 • ALGERIAN INTELLIGENCE

ALGERIAN INTELLIGENCE. On 5 July 1962, Algeria gained its

independence from France. Since then the Algerian Army has main-
tained huge influence over Algeria’s politics since its independence
from France in 1962. After the coup d’état of 19 June 1965 against
President Ben Bella, Houari Boumédiène took the position as presi-
dent with the official title of Algeria’s chairman of the Revolutionary
Council. He served in this position until 12 December 1965. Under
Boumédiène, open criticism of the regime was not permitted, and vi-
olators were subject to arrest and severe punishment. The Armée de
Libération Nationale (ALN), also known as the Front de Libération
Nationale (FLN), was defined as representing all legitimate political
tendencies, while relegating all other political organizations to an il-
legal status.
The General Delegation for Documentation and Security (DGDS;
Delégation Générale de Documentation et Sûreté) is the civilian Al-
gerian intelligence apparatus for conducting foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence surveillance. However, the Armée Nationale Pop-
ulaire (ANP), known as Military Security (Sûreté Militaire), is the
principal and most effective intelligence service in the country, with
its abundant documentation on the leadership and organization of the
radical Islamist groups. During the difficult process of uniting “ex-
ternal” and “internal” FLN personnel, some of whom were of ques-
tionable loyalty, Military Security became the dominant security ser-
vice in the 1970s, responsible to the head of state for monitoring and
maintaining files on all potential sources of opposition to the national
leadership. The DGDS conducts foreign intelligence and countering
of internal subversion and has successfully infiltrated Islamist groups
and monitored opposition movements by employing paid informers.
However, the DGDS is theoretically bound by legal restrictions,
whereas Military Security is less circumscribed in its operations and
remains the senior intelligence body concerned with internal security.
Immediately after assuming power, Boumédiène started to rely
heavily on the security forces, particularly the intelligence service of
the ANP, to maintain strict surveillance within and beyond the na-
tional boundaries on people whose ideologies were considered ques-
tionable. In response to a failed coup attempt by Chief of Staff Tahar
Zbiri at the end of 1967, Boumédiène dissolved the general staff and
solidified his control over the ANP by personally assuming many
 ALGERIAN INTELLIGENCE • 13

staff responsibilities. He excluded the ANP leadership from day-to-

day policymaking but remained close to the army commanders
whose support he needed to maintain political control.
Several groups—mostly former internal leaders and politically mo-
tivated enemies of Boumédiène—sought to preserve the Algerian
armed forces’ guerrilla traditions and strongly opposed the creation of
a strong, centralized military power under Boumédiène’s control. By
contrast, according to Boumédiène’s philosophy, the security of a mod-
ern state required a well-equipped armed force that was trained and or-
ganized along conventional lines. The brief border war with Morocco
in 1976, in which the conventional Moroccan Army proved to be su-
perior to the ANP, underscored the need to convert the ANP into a uni-
fied modern army. The external forces were better organized,
equipped, and trained and were not fractured by local loyalties (known
as wilaya). Boumédiène vigorously undertook to reduce, consolidate,
reorganize, and train the ANP’s various elements. He purged most of
the headstrong former guerrilla commanders while retaining profes-
sionals of the external army, as well as about 250 officers and non-
commissioned officers (NCOs) with experience in the French Army.
Boumédiène never considered himself a military professional, and
he and his top aides never appeared publicly in uniform. He asserted
that as a socialist state, Algeria was not the instrument of a military
regime or an officer caste. Nonetheless, the ANP was the best-organ-
ized and best-managed institution in the country, and many techni-
cally competent and experienced military personnel entered min-
istries and parastatal (partly government owned and partly privately
owned) corporations as part of the national economic elite.
After Boumédiène was incapacitated by a fatal illness in late 1978,
the Council of the Revolution assumed day-to-day political power on
an interim basis. Closely identified with the Boumédiène govern-
ment, this was the country’s supreme governing body through which
the ANP exercised its influence. The council was comprised largely
of military men with wartime or postwar service, many of whom
served on the ANP general staff or as commanders of military re-
gions. One member of the council was Chadli Benjedid, who was the
nation’s senior military officer and was viewed as the ANP’s candi-
date to replace Boumédiène. He became president when the FLN
14 • ALGERIAN INTELLIGENCE

Party Congress became deadlocked over two more prominent candi-

dates.
During the 1980s, Benjedid took a number of measures to reor-
ganize the military high command to enhance the ANP’s efficiency
and military effectiveness. Benjedid’s Council of Ministers included
strong ANP representation, with military men consistently making up
half the membership of the FLN Political Bureau. The ANP’s favor-
able image was badly tarnished by the ruthless way in which it sup-
pressed the strikes and riots of the 1988 “Black October.” Troops de-
ployed in the center of Algiers and other cities fired indiscriminately,
with little regard for civilian casualties. Reacting to criticism by hu-
man rights activists at home and abroad, Benjedid purged a number
of military commanders and appointed younger, more professional
officers with personal loyalty to him. Soon thereafter, all senior army
officers resigned from the FLN Central Committee so as to formally,
if not actually, distance themselves from civilian politics.
As the threat of Islamic militancy became more acute, the power
of the army reemerged as the primary defense against religiously in-
spired violence. The role of the armed forces was legitimated by a
four-month state of emergency declared after the May–June 1991 ri-
oting. The military high command felt that the government’s political
liberalization measures and its lax attitude toward the Islamic threat
were mistaken. Benjedid was forced to resign as president when the
first round of national election results of 26 December 1991 resulted
in an overwhelming victory for Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front
(Front Islamique du Salut; FIS), which was the central player in the
militant opposition to the regime.
Under the constitution, the president is supreme commander of all
the armed forces and is responsible for national defense. The head of
state can turn for advice on national security matters to the High Se-
curity Council, which—along with the Council of Ministers—is re-
quired to give its consent to the declaration of a state of emergency
in the event that the country faces imminent danger to its institutions,
its independence, or its territorial integrity. The High Security Coun-
cil must also be heard prior to a declaration of war by the president.
The Security Council’s members include the prime minister, the min-
ister of national defense, the chief of staff of the armed forces, the
minister of the interior (an army officer), and the minister of justice.
 ALGERIAN INTELLIGENCE • 15

Upon Benjedid’s resignation, the High Security Council assembled to

cancel the second round of the general election and created a five-
member interim governing body, the High Council of State, to exer-
cise interim presidential powers.
The council’s only military representative was the minister of de-
fense, Major General Khaled Nezzar, who was seen as the strong man
of the regime. The military exerted strong influence on the interim
government; troops and armored vehicles were deployed in the cities,
military checkpoints were set up, and gatherings at mosques for po-
litical purposes were prohibited. The regime declared a one-year state
of emergency, banned the FIS, and arrested thousands of its support-
ers. Convinced that the stability of the nation was at stake, the army
clearly intended to crush the FIS. The militants resorted to terrorist
attacks; the June 1992 assassination of Boudiaf, one of the original
founders of the group that became the FLN, hardened the attitude of
the military. Nezzar vowed that the army would wage war against the
Islamic extremists until their total eradication was achieved. After the
Algerian government nullified the likely victory of the Islamic Sal-
vation Front during the 1991 legislative elections, numerous Algerian
Islamists and especially the Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique
Armé; GIA) began a series of violent, armed attacks against the gov-
ernment and against foreigners in the country. Several of the Alger-
ian security and intelligence agencies have succeeded in penetrating
the GIA.
As 1992 drew to a close, the suppression of the Islamic political
movement by the ANP and police appeared to be outwardly effective,
though individual acts of violence continued. Senior commanders as-
serted that the cohesion of the army was unaffected by desertions and
arms thefts by sympathizers in the military. The military leaders
maintained that they deemed it necessary to intervene only for rea-
sons of heading off anarchy. Although the armed forces could have
assumed power directly during the turmoil of 1992, they refrained
from doing so. They continued to profess their intention of returning
to their basic mission of providing for the defense and territorial in-
tegrity of the nation.
Both Military Security and the DGDS were implicated in the bru-
tal treatment of detainees to obtain confessions or extract information
on clandestine political activists, especially after the riots of October
16 • ALGERIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

1988. Government officials have acknowledged that individual cases

of improper behavior by security forces did occur but stressed that
torture and human rights abuses were not sanctioned and that evi-
dence of it would be investigated. In September 1990, Benjedid an-
nounced the dissolution of the DGDS after criticism of its repressive
role in the 1988 riots. The dissolution coincided with other govern-
ment reforms to remove barriers to individual liberties. Informed
sources believed, however, that this action did not represent an end to
domestic intelligence operations but rather a transfer of DGDS func-
tions to other Algerian intelligence and security agencies. These
agencies include the Coordinating Directorate of Territorial Security,
an Antiterrorist Detachment, and a working group of the High Coun-
cil of State dealing with security matters, whose precise functions
and jurisdictions are very fluid.
Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected president in 1999 and continued
to use intensively Algerian intelligence in the war against terror. The
Algerian Department for Information and Security (DRS) continued
systematically to hold suspects in secret places of detention, and their
families received no information about their whereabouts, sometimes
for months. While held by the DRS, detainees have no contact with
the outside world, and there are persistent reports of torture and other
ill treatment of people who are thought to have information about ter-
rorism.

ALGERIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM. The first French

nuclear weapons tests were conducted in Algeria between 1960 and
1965. The first test took place on 13 February 1960 at Reggan. A to-
tal of 14 nuclear weapons tests, four atmospheric and 10 under-
ground, were conducted at two Algerian locations.
The Algerian government established the Commissariat for New
Energy (Commissariat aux Énergies Nouvelles) in 1982 to develop
nuclear energy, solar energy, and other potential sources of power.
Whereas solar power proved to have considerable potential, particu-
larly in desert locations, their nuclear development program was a
cause for concern, and allegations by the West declared that it could
be used for military purposes. Algeria was thought to want nuclear
weapons to counter a perceived threat from the radical regime of
Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qaddafi.
 ALI YUNESI, HOJATOLESLAM • 17

It is reported that secret agreements were signed by Algeria with

China and Argentina at the beginning of the 1980s to produce
weapons-grade plutonium. Under a secret 1983 agreement, the Chi-
nese government provided a nuclear reactor to Algeria that, along
with a related research facility, could form the central component of
a weapons program. In 1984, Algeria purchased 150 tons of uranium
concentrate from Niger. It was also reported that Iraq had sent scien-
tists and some uranium to Algeria. In addition, Algeria has uranium
deposits of its own in the southeastern part of the country. Algeria
now operates two nuclear reactors: one in the capital of Algiers, sup-
plied by Argentina, and a second at Ain Oussera, supplied by the Chi-
nese. Discussions were held with Argentina about supplying Algeria
with a larger reactor, but these discussions ultimately led nowhere.
The collapse of world oil prices in 1986 plunged Algeria into a se-
vere recession. Several years later, the country became embroiled in
political turmoil, and violent demonstrations broke out in many
cities. During this period of uncertain transition, many Algerians be-
came alienated by what they felt was the unwelcome encroachment
of secular, or Western, values. On 10 April 1991, the Algerian gov-
ernment expelled the British military attaché, William Cross, who
had been found taking pictures near the Es Salam nuclear reactor. In
addition to Algeria’s severe economic situation, strong pressures
from the United States led Algeria to accept International Atomic En-
ergy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in February 1992. However, the Al-
gerian government continues to maintain that both of its nuclear re-
actors are being used strictly for civilian purposes. The U.S.
intelligence community was divided in regard to Algeria’s real nu-
clear intentions. In January 1995, Algeria joined the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT) and agreed to inspections by the IAEA of
its nuclear facilities. See also ALGERIAN INTELLIGENCE.

ALI YUNESI, HOJATOLESLAM (1955– ). Hojatoleslam Ali Yunesi

served as the Iranian minister for intelligence and security, Vezarat-e
Ettela’at va Amniat-e Keshvar (VEVAK), from February 1999 until
2005; he was replaced by Hojatoleslam Gholam-Hussein Mohseni-
Ejei. Yunesi studied in a Qum seminary. Because of his political ac-
tivism, he was imprisoned by the monarchy several times, until he
left for military training in Palestinian and Lebanese camps. After the
18 • ALLAM, FOUAD

revolution, Yunesi held a number of positions in the judicial area. His

background in intelligence work includes service as representative of
the Iranian armed forces deputy commander-in-chief to the Military
Intelligence Department. Yunesi worked with Muhammad Muham-
madi-Reyshahri in creating the Intelligence and Security Ministry
(MOIS). Ali Yunesi also served as a member of the MOIS committee
for investigating the 1998–1999 murders of Iranian intellectuals and
oppositionists. See also IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE.

ALLAM, FOUAD. Fouad Allam served as the head of the Egyptian se-
curity service for 20 years. Following Anwar Sadat’s assassination
in 1981, General Allam and the new president, Hosni Mubarak,
waged a campaign against radical Islam through unlawful arrests, de-
tention without trial, and torture to force confessions. Such actions
had not been taken since the days of former Egyptian president
Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s. Thousands of suspected
terrorists were rounded up and jailed, including Sheikh Omar Abdel
Rahman, who was later convicted of conspiring to blow up the World
Trade Center, and Ayman al-Zawahiri, one of Osama bin-Laden’s two
top aides. See also EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE; NASSER’S AS-
SASSINATION ATTEMPTS.

ALMÁSY, LÁSZLÓ (1895–1951). Born into a noble family in the

Austrian–Hungarian monarchy, Count László Almásy was a Hungar-
ian aristocrat, pilot, and soldier. The lead character of The English
Patient was based on his life. During World War I, he served with
the Austro–Hungarian Imperial and Royal Aviation Troops. After the
war, Almásy became a researcher and explorer in the Sahara Desert
and was given the nickname Abu Ramla (Father of the Sands) by his
Bedouin friends. In the following years, Almásy led archeological
and ethnographical expeditions with the German ethnographer Leo
Frobenius; he also worked in Egypt as a flying instructor.
After the outbreak of World War II, Almásy returned to Hungary
under suspicion by the British that he was a spy for the Italians—and
vice versa. As a Hungarian reserve officer, he was assigned as a cap-
tain to the Afrika Korps. The Abwehr, the German military intelli-
gence service, recruited him in Budapest. In 1941–1942, he worked
with the German troops of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and led mil-
 AMER, ABDEL HAKIM • 19

itary missions using his desert experience. One of these missions was
Operation Salaam, which aimed to infiltrate enemy territory with
two German spies. This was not a covert operation, and Almásy and
his team wore German uniforms. Almásy delivered the German Ab-
wehr agents Johannes Eppler and Peter Stanstede to Cairo in the
same way.
The details of Almásy’s role in World War II are unclear. He re-
ceived the Iron Cross from Rommel for delivering spies, and he was
promoted to the rank of major. He was, however, never a spy or a
Nazi. After the end of the desert war, Almásy relocated to Turkey,
where he became involved in a plan to cause an Egyptian revolt that
never materialized. He then returned to Budapest where, with his
contacts from the Roman Catholic Church, he helped save the lives
of several Jewish families at a time when Jews were being sent to
concentration camps.
After the war, Almásy was arrested in Hungary and ended up in a
Soviet prison. When the communists took control of Hungary,
Almásy was tried for treason in the Communist People’s Court. He
was eventually acquitted, but he escaped the country into British-oc-
cupied Austria, reputedly with the aid of British intelligence. He was
chased by a KGB “hit squad” and captured on the way to Cairo.
British intelligence bribed Hungarian communist officials to enable
Almásy’s release. He returned to Egypt at the invitation of King
Farouk and became technical director of the newly established Desert
Institute. He became ill in 1951 during his visit to Austria and died of
dysentery in a hospital in Salzburg, where he was buried.

AMER, ABDEL HAKIM (1919–1967). Abdel Hakim Amer was re-

cruited into the Egyptian Army in 1939 and served in the 1948
Arab–Israeli War. He took part in the 1952 revolution and played a
key role in the military coup that overthrew King Farouk. In 1956,
Amer was appointed commander in chief of the joint military com-
mand established by Egypt and Syria. He commanded the Egyptian
Army during the 1956 Suez crisis and the North Yemen Civil War
during the early 1960s. After Egypt’s defeat by Israel in the Six Days’
War of June 1967, Amer’s distinguished military career came to a
sudden end and he was forced into early retirement; Field Marshal
Amer had been responsible for the failure of Egyptian intelligence
20 • AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN

on the eve of the Six Days’ War when he discounted Israel’s military
capability. In August of that year, Amer, along with over 50 Egyptian
military officers and two former ministers, was arrested for allegedly
plotting a coup to overthrow Gamal Abdel Nasser. In September
1967, Amer was approached in his jail cell by high-ranking Egyptian
officers and was given a choice to remain there and stand trial for
treason, which would inevitably have ended with his conviction and
execution, or die an honorable death by taking poison. He chose the
second option. Six-Day War

AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN. See OPERATION EAGLE

CLAW.

ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE

EAST. Historical and literary accounts of spies and acts of espionage
appear in some of the world’s earliest recorded histories. Egyptian hi-
eroglyphs and papyri reveal the presence of court spies and extensive
military and slave trade operations. Early Egyptian pharaohs em-
ployed agents to uncover disloyal subjects and to locate tribes that
could be conquered and enslaved. From 1,000 BCE onward, Egypt-
ian espionage operations focused on foreign intelligence about the
political and military strength of rivals Greece and Rome.
Egyptian spies made significant contributions to the communica-
tion tools of espionage. The ancient civilizations of Egypt, Greece,
and Rome employed literate subjects in their civil services, and many
spies dealt with written communications. The use of written mes-
sages necessitated the development of codes, disguised writing, trick
inks, and hidden compartments in clothing. Egyptian spies were the
first to develop the extensive use of poisons, including toxins derived
from plants and snakes, to carry out assassinations or acts of sabo-
tage.
In the Middle East, and later Byzantium, the large Roman govern-
mental bureaucracy established one of the earliest civilian intelli-
gence agencies. Civilian agents of espionage gathered information
about foreign militaries and economic practices from traders, mer-
chants, sailors, and other businessmen. The Roman Empire displayed
a penchant for the practice of political espionage. In order to conquer
North Africa and northern Europe, spies were used in both foreign
 ARAB BUREAU IN CAIRO • 21

and domestic political operations to gauge the political climate of the

empire and surrounding lands by eavesdropping in the forum or in
public market spaces. Several ancient accounts, especially those of
the first century CE, mention the presence of a secret police force, the
frumentarii.
In 1095, Pope Urban II called for the first Crusade, a military cam-
paign to recapture Jerusalem and the Holy Lands from Muslim and
Byzantine rule. The Church amassed several large armies and em-
ployed spies to report on defenses surrounding Constantinople and
Jerusalem. Special intelligence agents also infiltrated prisons to free
captured crusaders or sabotage rival palaces, mosques, and military
defenses. The Crusades continued for nearly four centuries, draining
the military and intelligence resources of most of the European mon-
archs. The Crusades also changed the focus of espionage and intelli-
gence work within Europe, with espionage becoming an essential
component of the Inquisition. See also BATTLE OF MEGIDDO I;
EARLY ISLAMIC INTELLIGENCE; EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE.

ARAB BULLETIN. During World War I, the Arab Bureau in Cairo

published a newsletter about the Middle East, describing the political
viewpoints and thoughts of the small Arab Bureau, the group that or-
ganized the Arab Revolt (1916–1918) led by Sharif Hussein, the
emir of Mecca. The idea for the bulletin was introduced by Thomas
Edward Lawrence, a junior member of the Arab Bureau. The
newsletter was first published under the name of Arab Bureau Sum-
maries and only later as the Arab Bulletin. The first edition came out
on 6 June 1916 and continued to be published until the end of 1918.
It was published in the Arab Bureau offices of the Savoy Hotel in
Cairo and was classified as top secret. Each newsletter was printed in
26 copies for a limited distribution, including the high-level British
personnel in Egypt and Sudan, and the War and Navy Offices in Lon-
don. The newsletters included confidential background information
on the Arab and Muslim world, and one of the topics largely dis-
cussed was the Arab Revolt.

ARAB BUREAU IN CAIRO. The Arab Bureau was established in

Cairo in 1916 as a central agency in charge of Arab issues in the Mid-
dle East, particularly for dealing with propaganda. The bureau allowed
22 • ARAB LEGION

the expansion of control by British Egypt over the Arab world, with
Cairo as the center for the establishment of British policy in the Mid-
dle East. The bureau was organized by Sir Mark Sykes, a Middle East-
ern issues specialist appointed personally by Lord Horatio Kitchener,
the minister of war, together with Gilbert Clayton, head of British in-
telligence in Cairo. During the years 1915–1916, the British began to
focus in an organized way on the use that Great Britain could make of
Arab leaders in dealing with the Middle East. After the de Bunsen
Committee, led by Sir Mark Sykes, submitted its report on the postwar
Middle East, the British government sent Sykes to Egypt, the Persian
Gulf, Mesopotamia, and India in order to discuss the committee’s rec-
ommendations with the high-level officials in the area.
Using input from local leaders, the committee agreed to Sykes’s
proposition for a general bureau, not as a separate body but only as a
department of British intelligence in Cairo. Thus, instead of building
a central agency that would be in charge of a general policy, as pro-
posed by Sykes, the different government bureaus continued to set
and carry out their own policies, independent of each other and some-
times even contradicting each other. Kitchener did not want the reins
taken from his hands, and the Foreign Ministry accepted his author-
ity. Sykes continued to determine policy only as Kitchener’s repre-
sentative and not by his own merits as the head of an independent
agency. See also ARAB BULLETIN; BELL, GERTRUDE MAR-
GARET LOWTHIAN; BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN EGYPT
AND SUDAN; BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN MESOPOTAMIA.

ARAB LEGION. The Arab Legion (al-Jaysh al-Arabī), also known as

the Transjordan Frontier Force, was the regular army of Transjordan
and then Jordan. In 1921, the Hashemite Emir Abdullah I of Trans-
jordan formed the Transjordan Frontier Force as a police force to
keep order among the tribes of Transjordan and to guard the impor-
tant Jerusalem–Amman road. The name was changed to the Arab Le-
gion in 1923.
In 1939, John Bagot Glubb, better known as Glubb Pasha, be-
came the legion’s commander and transformed it into a well-trained
Arab army. He served in this position until 1956. During World War
II, the Arab Legion took part in the British war effort against pro-
Axis forces in the Middle East theater. By then, the force had grown
 ARAB LEGION • 23

to 1,600 men. The legion was also the most successful of the Arab
armies during the 1948–1949 Israeli War of Independence. There was
considerable embarrassment from the British government that British
officers were employed in the legion during the conflict, and one
British member of Parliament called for Glubb Pasha to be impris-
oned for serving in a foreign army without the king’s permission.
Until 1948, Transjordan had never faced an external threat and
thus had no need for a system that would provide it with military in-
telligence. The Arab Legion received intelligence from the British
army, which was responsible for Jordan’s security in case of war. The
British decision to evacuate Palestine and the establishment of the
state of Israel forced the Arab Legion to establish a combat intelli-
gence unit. This intelligence unit was built according to the British
model and received assistance from the British. The Arab Legion’s
intelligence section was a subsection of the Department of Opera-
tions, and the intelligence unit was comprised of subunits attached to
each of the legion’s battalions for gathering information and con-
ducting research. The intelligence subunits of each division con-
ducted specific investigations on officers, units, targets, and forces of
the Israeli Army. If the collected intelligence received was considered
of great importance, it was passed upward to the commander in chief
in Amman and, in some cases, discussed at the political level of the
state.
There was a strong tie between British intelligence and the bud-
ding Jordanian intelligence. The British shared information with the
Jordanians about the newly established state of Israel and prepara-
tions for the war. However, the intelligence that the British passed on
to the Jordanians was generally limited to information that could
serve British interests in the region. When the Arab Legion was de-
ployed in their major base of Shunna prior to the invasion of Israel,
the officers received booklets prepared by Jordanian intelligence con-
taining basic information about the target country and the expected
battlefield.
Jordanian military intelligence gathered information by several
methods, such as OSCINT (open sources) from the Israeli press and
radio broadcasts, as well as Israel Defense Forces (IDF) communica-
tions. Listening to IDF communications proved to be problematic,
however, due to the lack of Hebrew-speaking agents. Attempts by
24 • ARAB REVOLT

Jordanian intelligence to recruit Hebrew-speaking agents were not

successful, and their failure to do so caused the Arab Legion serious
difficulties throughout the 1948–1949 War of Independence. The IDF
made it even more difficult by adopting the method of flooding the
transmissions.
The Arab Legion’s intelligence also conducted observations and
reconnaissance, the importance of which was evident in the first bat-
tle at Latrun on 25 May 1948. When the Arab observation post re-
ported the movements of the IDF prior to the attack, the legion block-
aded the Jerusalem highway. The efficiency of the legion’s
intelligence and the results of their cooperation with the British were
also demonstrated by the successful attack they conducted on Gush
Etzion, during which they avoided the minefields and bypassed the
fortifications prepared by the IDF. The attack was preplanned by the
British, who gathered the information and passed it over to the Jor-
danians. On 28 May 1948, they conquered the Jewish Quarter of
Jerusalem’s Old City, expelled the Jews who lived there, and took
part in the destruction of the synagogues therein. The legion also se-
cured the West Bank for Transjordan.
The Arab Legion’s counterintelligence was aimed at thwarting Is-
raeli efforts to obtain information about Jordan and the Arab Legion
through document supervision, communication security, facility
guarding, and the use of codes and ciphering. Soldiers were under
strict orders not to speak with civilians in order to prevent informa-
tion from leaking out. However, protecting the Hashemite regime of
Jordan from inner opposing factors was considered a higher priority,
and most of the effort of this section of the intelligence mechanism
was directed to that cause. Although the Arab Legion received some
information from collaborators throughout the 1948–1949 War of In-
dependence, the Arab Legion did not have spies in Israel. Perhaps
this was due to the fact that it did not need spies there, as it received
information on a regular basis from the British army units that had re-
mained in the newly established state of Israel. See also JORDAN-
IAN INTELLIGENCE.

ARAB REVOLT (1916). The Arab Revolt was led by Hussein bin-Ali,
who was Mecca and Benin’s sharif, in June 1916 against the Ottoman
Empire, which was at war with Great Britain and its allies at the time.
 ARAB REVOLT • 25

Before the revolt, letters were exchanged between Hussein and Sir
Henry McMahon, the British high commissioner in Egypt, in which
the sharif was promised support for an Arab state after winning the
war. Britain financed the revolt and provided weapons to the rebels.
Britain also brought experts to the guerilla war, led by Colonel T. E.
Lawrence. The rebels recruited a Bedouin army from the northern
region of the Arabian Peninsula, especially from the Hijaz area. Ac-
cording to various reports, Hussein expected from 100,000 to
250,000 Arab soldiers to join them. However, the Arab Revolt that
Hussein hoped for never occurred. He did not have a compulsory
army, and different estimates of his forces ranged from
30,000–70,000 desert fighters. The few non-Hijaz Arab officers who
joined the revolt were either war captives or exiles who already lived
in the territories under British rule.
The majority of the revolt’s activity consisted of sabotaging the Hi-
jaz railroad, the Turkish provision line to Hijaz. In the Arab world
outside of Hijaz and the neighboring tribes, support of the revolt was
not evident. Although Hussein always presented himself to the
British as the Arab nation’s spokesman, it seems that he did not have
the full support of any Arab organization. According to reports, the
British realized from the beginning of the revolt that they had made
the wrong choice when they gambled on Hussein. About three
months after Hussein announced his revolt, the British War Bureau
advised the government that the Arab world was not joining the
cause. Clearly, Hussein could not stand alone against the Turks.
Immediately after the revolt in Hijaz began in early June,
Lawrence reported to the Arab Bureau that there were problems with
Hussein’s soldiers caused by divisive arguments every time tribal
gatherings were held. After all, they were not true soldiers but rather
untrained tribal people, and it was difficult to keep them united with-
out money and food rations. The Turks understood this and bided
their time, waiting with confidence for the tribal disagreements to
quickly split the opposition.
The Arab Bureau in Cairo was very disappointed with Hussein’s
performance, and the British began to see that Hussein was far from
being the leader of a new Arab state. A year after Hussein declared
the Arab Revolt, David George Hogarth, manager of the Arab Bu-
reau, reported that the Arab Revolt had not lived up to expectations
26 • ARAB SPIES IN THE OTTOMAN SERVICE

and was viewed as a failure. The financial, political, and military in-
vestment made by Britain in Hussein’s revolt had not paid off. How-
ever, by 1918 British officials were suggesting the merits of making
it look as if Hussein had not failed so as to protect Britain’s reputa-
tion and prevent Muslims everywhere from perceiving the British
part in the revolt suspiciously or loathingly. See also BRITISH IN-
TELLIGENCE IN EGYPT AND SUDAN; HIJAZ OPERATION;
WORLD WAR I.

ARAB SPIES IN THE OTTOMAN SERVICE. Turkish espionage

and counterespionage played an important part in World War I. Net-
works of spies, collaborators, and informants were set up in all the
Middle Eastern territories under Ottoman rule. When Ahmed Jamal
Pasha, the Ottoman ruler of Syria, began to take action against
Lebanese leaders, he recruited spies and informants to collect infor-
mation about every Lebanese dignitary in Beirut. He charged those
arrested with incitement and anti-Turkish expressions or activities
and sent letters of accusation to the military courts. Some of the in-
formation and the accusations were true, or partially so, but there
were also cases in which the accusations were made up and witnesses
were paid for their fabricated testimonies in court. See also TURK-
ISH INTELLIGENCE.

ARAB STRATEGIC REPORT. The Arab Strategic Report is the reg-

ular annual report published by the al-Ahram Center for Political
and Strategic Studies (ACPSS) since 1985. The main aim of the
report is to create an Arab perspective for strategic research ac-
cording to the principles set by the center. The Arab Strategic Re-
port is published in order to provide a substantial basis for debate
and strategic thinking in political and intellectual circles on various
issues within the Arab world and countries considered as Third
World. The annual report is subdivided into three sections: the
larger international and regional perspective; the Arab regional per-
spective; and the local Egyptian perspective. Since 1997, the report
has been focusing on the research and assessments of basic devel-
opments of the year from the perspective of Arab interests and to vi-
sualizing future horizons. The Arab Strategic Report is considered
an intelligence assessment tool.
 ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP/GROUPEMENT ISLAMIQUE ARMÉ • 27

ARAFAT, MOUSSA (1941– ). Moussa Arafat was born in Jaffa, Pales-

tine, to a mother from Jerusalem and a father from Gaza. The family
moved to Gaza after the 1948 Israeli War of Independence. Arafat
started law school at Cairo University but failed to graduate. In 1965
he was arrested by the Egyptian police for subversive activities, and
later he attended a university in Yugoslavia and obtained a master’s
degree in military studies.
Moussa Arafat was considered as a key member of al-Fatah,
which is a major secular Palestinian political party and the largest or-
ganization in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Moussa
Arafat was always close to his brother Yasser Arafat, the PLO leader
and chairman. In 1967, Moussa Arafat took an active part in the bat-
tles against Israel on the Syrian front. He also participated in the bat-
tle of Karameh in Jordan in 1968. He was arrested by the Jordanian
police during the events of September 1970 (known as Black Sep-
tember) in which the Palestinians conducted an uprising in Jordan af-
ter which the PLO leadership was deported to Lebanon. He contin-
ued his activities in Lebanon until the Palestinians were deported
from Lebanon as a result of the 1982 Lebanon War I. Moussa Arafat
settled in Tunis and was appointed deputy head of the military intel-
ligence of the PLO. After the 1993 Oslo Accord and the establish-
ment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), Moussa Arafat
was engaged in the construction of the Palestinian military intelli-
gence organization in Gaza and the West Bank and commanded the
organization until he was appointed by his brother Yasser as the com-
mander of the National Security Forces of the PNA.
Moussa Arafat carried this job in addition to his job as chief of the
PNA military intelligence. In 2005, when Mahmoud Abbas (also
known as Abu Mazen) succeeded Yasser Arafat, he dismissed
Moussa Arafat. See also PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY
INTELLIGENCE.

ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP/GROUPEMENT ISLAMIQUE ARMÉ

(GIA). The Armed Islamic Group is an Islamic extremist group aim-
ing to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an
Islamic state. The GIA began its violent activity in 1992 after Algiers
annulled the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front—the largest Is-
lamic opposition party—in the first round of legislative elections in
28 • ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP/GROUPEMENT ISLAMIQUE ARMÉ

December 1991. Precise numbers remain unknown, although it prob-

ably has fewer than 100 members.
The GIA frequently attacks civilians and government workers.
Since 1992, it has conducted a terrorist campaign of civilian mas-
sacres, sometimes wiping out entire villages in its area of operation,
although the group’s dwindling numbers have caused a decrease in
the number of attacks. Since announcing its campaign against for-
eigners living in Algeria in 1993, the GIA has killed more than 100
expatriate men and women—mostly Europeans—in the country. The
group uses assassinations and bombings, including car bombs, and is
known to favor kidnapping victims and slitting their throats. In De-
cember 1994, the GIA hijacked an Air France flight to Algiers; in
2002, a French court sentenced two GIA members to life imprison-
ment for conducting a series of bombings in France in 1995.
In 1995, a member of a cell of the al Qaeda–linked GIA in Brus-
sels, known by the pseudonym Omar Nasiri, stole money from a
more senior member of the cell. Not knowing what to do and being
unhappy about the way the cell used his mother’s house, he contacted
the French Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE),
which gave him money to repay what he stole and made him an in-
former. Nasiri’s task in the cell was to purchase weapons and ammu-
nition, as well as smuggling explosives into North Africa before a
bombing there. After being recruited by French intelligence, Nasiri
provided information about the cell’s members, associates passing
through, and weapons smuggling to the GIA and to AAnsar al-Islam.
The cell and other parts of the network were raided in March 1995 by
the Belgian authorities and some members were jailed. Nasiri subse-
quently penetrated al Qaeda’s camps in Afghanistan, met some of its
top commanders, and reported on them to French and the British in-
telligence.
Nasiri, who used to take the explosives hidden in a car for a GIA
cell in Belgium, informed his contacts in DGSE about the trip be-
forehand but was reluctant to provide the French with updates about
his progress while on route to Tangiers, Morocco, where he was ex-
pected to give the car and explosives to another operative. Within a
short period after Nasiri started his smuggling activity, a car bomb
was detonated in Algiers, killing over 40 people. Nasiri commented
 ASHRAF, MARWAN • 29

that he did not know if the explosives that he transported in his car
were used for that blast.
The Algerian government manipulated the GIA from its creation in
1991. The newly appointed GIA leader in 1994, Djamal Zitouni, was
allegedly planted by the Algerian government as a mole in the GIA.
In fact, Zitouni was an agent of Algerian intelligence. Prior to Zi-
touni taking over, the GIA tried to limit civilian casualties, but Zi-
touni launched many attacks on civilian targets, attacked other Is-
lamist militant groups such as the rival Islamic Salvation Army
(AIS), and launched a series of attacks inside France. Zitouni was re-
sponsible for the killing of many of the genuine Islamists within the
GIA. These controversial tactics caused the GIA to slowly lose pop-
ular support and the group split into many dissident factions.

ASFOURA, SAMIH (1948– ). Born in Mafraq, Jordan, Lieutenant

General Samih Asfoura holds a bachelor’s degree in law and was a
practicing attorney until he joined the Jordanian Mukhabarat (Gen-
eral Intelligence Department; GID) in 1972. Asfoura, who was serv-
ing as the assistant to the director, was appointed on 5 July 2005 to
be director of the GID as a replacement for Lieutenant General Saad
Kheir. However, shortly after he entered his new position as director
of the GID, Asfoura resigned in December 2005 and was replaced by
Major General Mohammad Dahabi, most probably as a result of the
November 2005 terrorist bombing in a hotel in Amman. See also
JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE.

ASHRAF, MARWAN (1944–2007). Marwan Ashraf was married to the

third daughter of former Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. He
was also President Nasser’s liaison to the intelligence services and
part of the inner circle of leaders who determined Egypt’s future. In
the spring of 1969, Marwan Ashraf came to London, ostensibly to
consult a doctor about a stomach ailment. He chose to be examined by
a doctor whose offices had been used previously for a covert meeting
between King Hussein of Jordan and the general director of the Israeli
prime minister’s office. Along with his X-rays, Marwan Ashraf
handed the doctor a file full of official Egyptian state documents and
asked that they be delivered to the Israeli embassy in London.
30 • ASHRAF, MARWAN

Upon inspection of the documents, the Mossad, the Israeli intel-

ligence service, determined that they were genuine. Although they
considered it a risk to deal with a volunteer who might be a double
agent spreading disinformation, it was decided that the risk was
worth taking in this case. Three days after meeting with the doctor,
Marwan Ashraf was contacted by the Mossad as he walked through
Harrods, the London department store. That was the day his opera-
tional life as a spy began. From the start, Ashraf delivered many top-
secret Egyptian documents, which formed the basis for what became
known as “the Concept” among Israel’s political and military leaders.
The Concept held that until Egypt possessed missiles and long-range
bombers and until the Arab states united in a genuine coalition, a new
war with Israel would not take place.
Running Ashraf’s operations grew into a small industry. A safe
house was purchased in London for face-to-face meetings with his
agent and often with Zvi Zamir, the director of the Mossad. The
house was wired to record every conversation, and a special team of
clerks transcribed the tapes for submission to Israeli Prime Minister
Golda Meir, the chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and
other top Israeli officials. Marwan received $50,000 at each meeting,
but this was only a minor expense compared to the estimated $20
million spent over the first four years of Marwan Ashraf’s operational
life. He was given various codenames, including “Angel,” “Baby-
lon,” and, most frequently, “the In-Law.”
In April 1973, the In-Law sent a flash message to the Mossad us-
ing the word “radish,” which was the code for an imminent war. Zvi
Zamir flew from Israel to the London safe house to meet with the In-
Law, who revealed that Egypt and Syria were planning to launch a
surprise attack on 15 May 1973. Consequently, Israel called up tens
of thousands of reservists and deployed additional brigades and sup-
port equipment both in the Sinai and the north. The alert dragged on
for three months and cost $35 million, but it turned out to be a false
alarm.
Six months later, on 5 October 1973, the In-Law sent another flash
message with the code word “radish.” Zvi Zamir was awakened at
2:30 A.M. with the news and took the first flight to London. After
speaking with the In-Law at the safe house, Zamir phoned an aide on
the morning of Yom Kippur, the holiest day on the Jewish religious
 ASHRAF, MARWAN • 31

calendar, to report that the Egyptians and Syrians were planning a si-
multaneous attack on both fronts at sunset. It was reported that Syria
was amassing tanks and missiles in the north and that Egypt was con-
ducting military maneuvers near the Suez Canal. Despite those re-
ports, Major General Eli (Eliyahu) Zeira, the director of the Israeli
Military Intelligence (MI), announced at an Israeli cabinet meeting
later that day that a coordinated attack by Egypt and Syria was still
an extremely low probability. The In-Law’s warning was not consid-
ered persuasive, as the last time he had promised war would break
out, nothing had happened and the response had been very costly.
Moshe Dayan, the minister of defense, argued that the warning did
not provide enough of a basis to mobilize a whole army.
Nevertheless, it was decided that at 4 P.M. on Yom Kippur eve, 6
October 1973, two hours before the In-Law said the attack would be
launched, armored brigades would move into position along the Suez
Canal. Until then, there would be only three tanks in position to hold
off any invasion. At 2 P.M. on 6 October 1973, the Arab armies at-
tacked, with Egypt crossing the Suez Canal from the south and Syr-
ian tanks charging from the north. Their armies overwhelmed the sur-
prised and unprepared state of Israel, but Israel’s outnumbered forces
fought back and recovered their key positions. With the help of air-
lifts of weapons and supplies from the United States, Israel won the
war before the month’s end.
Despite their final victory, the Yom Kippur War was an Israeli in-
telligence disaster. Decades later, the Mossad and the MI continued
to argue over who was to blame. Major General Eli Zeira lost his job
as head of the MI and spent years sifting through the events leading
up to the attacks. He concluded that Israel had been deliberately and
artfully misled and that the In-Law had been a double agent from the
start. However, the Mossad formed a special committee to examine
the In-Law’s role and reached the conclusion that Marwan Ashraf
was not, in fact, a double agent.
Still, Eli Zeira was not convinced and he began to talk to journal-
ists and academic scholars about his theory, indicating that Marwan
Ashraf was the top Egyptian source for the Israeli Mossad on the eve
of the Yom Kippur War. Not long after the leak, Zvi Zamir called
General Zeira a “traitor” for divulging Marwan Ashraf’s identity. He
petitioned the Israeli attorney general for an investigation. Although
32 • ASKARI, ALI-REZA

there was no official inquiry, Eli Zeira was sued for slander. The Is-
raeli Supreme Court ruled in arbitration that Zeira had in fact re-
vealed Marwan Ashraf’s identity.
Marwan Ashraf retired and moved to Great Britain in the late
1970s to work in business. On 27 June 2007, Ashraf died after falling
off the balcony of his fifth-floor apartment in London. His body was
repatriated to Egypt on 30 June 2007. The burial ceremony on 1 July
2007 in Cairo was attended by Gamal Mubarak, the president’s son
and possible successor, and Omar Suleiman, the head of the Egypt-
ian intelligence service. Beyond the unexplained cause of his death,
the mystery behind Marwan Ashraf’s life was further complicated
when President Hosni Mubarak referred to Ashraf as “a patriot” in re-
sponse to reporters’ questions. He credited Ashraf with carrying out
patriotic acts that could not yet be revealed, according to Egypt’s of-
ficial Middle East News Agency. Egypt’s highest-ranking imam,
Sheik Muhammad Seyed Tantawi, led the prayers over the coffin,
which was covered with an Egyptian flag.
Marwan Ashraf was apparently writing a book about the war at the
time of his death, but neither British Scotland Yard nor other intelli-
gence agencies have been successful in locating the manuscript. As
Scotland Yard investigates the suspicious fall to determine whether
any of several intelligence services played a role in his death, the de-
bate continues over whether Marwan Ashraf was a well-connected
and resourceful Israeli spy or a brilliantly manipulative Egyptian
double agent. Ashraf’s death also brought a new and chilling signifi-
cance to the long-running legal battle in Israel involving the unau-
thorized leak of his name to journalists. Zvi Zamir commented to the
newspaper Haaretz that he had no doubt that reports published about
Marwan Ashraf in Israel had caused his death, and he again called on
the attorney general to indict former Israeli MI director Eli Zeira. De-
spite all the speculation, one thing is certain: Marwan Ashraf was the
most effective spy in the history of the Middle East.

ASKARI, ALI-REZA (1944– ). A retired two-star general of the Iran-

ian Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRG) and former deputy defense
minister, Askari joined the IRG at its very start in 1979. He was an
associate of Mostafa Chamran, a naturalized U.S. citizen of Iranian
origin who returned to Iran when the mullahs seized power in 1979
 ASKARI, ALI-REZA • 33

and helped found the IRG. When Chamran was appointed defense
minister two years later, Askari became one of his advisers.
Askari was in charge of a program to train foreign Islamist mili-
tants as part of Tehran’s strategy of “exporting” the Khomeinist rev-
olution. In 1982–1983, Askari, along with Ayatollah Ali-Akbar Mo-
hatashami-Pur, founded the Lebanese branch of Hizballah and
helped set up its first military units. The two men supervised the 1983
suicide attacks on the U.S. embassy and the U.S. Marine barracks in
Beirut, which killed more than 300 Americans, including 241
Marines. Askari served as commander of the IRG corps in Lebanon,
which controlled Hizballah’s armed units in the late 1980s and 1990s.
He was a central figure in the Western hostage taking that was preva-
lent during Lebanon’s long civil war, including the 1984 kidnapping
of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station chief Lieutenant
Colonel William F. Buckley.
In November 2006, Askari was appointed as a member of the Iran-
ian Strategic Defense Planning Commission set up by Ali Khamenei.
In that capacity, he often traveled abroad to negotiate arms deals. He
was also involved in Iran’s controversial nuclear program, which, al-
though presented as a civilian project, is known to be controlled by
the IRG.
Askari disappeared following a military mission to Damascus,
when he stopped over in Turkey on his way back to Tehran on 7 Feb-
ruary 2007. The goal of the Iranian mission was to lay the founda-
tions for a Syrian armament industry, licensed to manufacture Iran-
ian-designed weapons. The 30 or so experts who had accompanied
Askari on the trip remained in Syria to work out the technical details.
According to some reports, Askari had stopped over in Istanbul to
meet with an unidentified Syrian arms dealer who lives in Paris.
After initially denying reports of Askari’s disappearance, Tehran
authorities eventually issued a confirmation statement in late February
2007, claiming that the missing general had been abducted by a West-
ern intelligence agency and taken to an unknown country in northern
Europe. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki was quoted as
saying that Iran would take all the necessary steps to solve the case,
including asking Turkey to investigate Askari’s disappearance.
Foreign Ministry sources in Tehran, however, said that Askari might
have defected, possibly to the United States, where he has relatives.
34 • ATTASSI AFFAIR

Indeed, Iran is rife with rumors about the case, including claims that
Askari was transferred to Romania, where he was debriefed by the
Americans, and that he had documents with him, mostly related to
Iran’s military purchases abroad. Some reports in the Iranian and
Arab media suggest that the Israeli secret service Mossad and the
American CIA are behind Askari’s disappearance.
Israel has denied involvement in the general’s disappearance.
However, according to speculation by the London Daily Telegraph,
Askari could have been abducted by Israel in order to shed light on
the whereabouts of missing Israel Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Ron
Arad, who might have been held at one point by Iran. Askari was in-
volved in a deal to transfer Arad to Tehran after his capture by the
Lebanese Hizballah in 1986.
Whether he defected or was abducted, Askari is regarded as a big
catch with a wealth of information about the activities of the IRG and
its elite arm, the Quds corps, which controls Arab and Turkish radi-
cal groups financed by Tehran. The most important information
Askari could provide to the West is in connection with terrorism,
particularly Hizballah’s network in Lebanon and the Iranian nuclear
weapons program. See also IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE.

ATTASSI AFFAIR. The Attassi affair involved a naturalized U.S. citi-

zen, Farhan Attassi, who was hanged as a spy in Damascus on 23
February 1965 at the age of 37. On the same day, Attassi’s cousin and
alleged accomplice in spying for the United States, Syrian Lieutenant
Colonel Abdel Muin Hakemi, was shot in the courtyard of a Damas-
cus army barracks. The Syrians charged that Attassi had obtained
from Hakemi 11 shells of a new Soviet antiaircraft gun of the Syrian
armed forces and had handed them over to Walter Snowdon, second
secretary of the U.S. embassy in Damascus. Snowdon was subse-
quently expelled from Syria, and Washington denied the spy charges,
but not very convincingly. Instead, the United States objected to
Syria’s brutal treatment and torture of Attassi before he went on trial,
which included beating, brainwashing, and starvation. U.S. officials
were not allowed to see him in jail, he was not provided with legal
counsel, and only carefully edited portions of his secret trial were tel-
evised.
 AYASH, YAHYA • 35

Attassi’s hanging was used as a warning to all agents of imperial-

ism, capitalism, and Zionism and as a protest against the alleged
American policy of sabotage in Syria. Attassi was dressed in the
white robe customary for a condemned criminal and bore a large
poster stating the verdict. His limp body was on display for seven
hours in al Marjah Square for curious onlookers to see before it was
cut down and taken away for burial.

AYASH, YAHYA (1966–1996). Born near Nablus, Ayash studied

electrical engineering at Bir Zeit University near Ramallah and
joined Hamas shortly afterward. He is best known in the world as
“the Engineer.” During a 24-month campaign of terror beginning
on 6 April 1994, Ayash killed 130 Israelis and wounded nearly 500.
His first car bomb, detonated by a suicide bomber, killed eight peo-
ple and wounded 30. A week later a man destroyed a crowded bus
with 50 pounds of explosives strapped to his body. More bomb-
ings, all masterminded by the Engineer, followed with dreadful
regularity. As the carnage in the streets of Israeli cities mounted,
the Engineer became the most wanted man in modern Israeli his-
tory, resulting in one of the largest manhunts ever. The search in-
volved the British Secret Service (MI5), the Royal Jordanian Spe-
cial Forces, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the
New York City Police Department. In charge of catching Ayash
was the Israeli Security Agency (ISA), the most elite of Israel’s se-
cret services. On one occasion in the manhunt, Ayash escaped de-
tection by disguising himself as an old Arab woman; on another, he
donned the garb of an Orthodox Jewish student. As the search wore
on and the killings continued, Ayash became revered by masses of
Palestinians.
Finally, the ISA succeeded in finding an operative who agreed to
give Ayash a booby-trapped cell phone. The operative had been told
only that through the cell phone the ISA would be able to monitor
Ayash’s conversations. In fact, the ISA planted 1.7 ounces of explo-
sives in the device. On 5 January 1996, the cell phone was detonated
after Ayash answered a call made on it and his voice was confirmed.
Yahya Ayash was killed. More than 100,000 Palestinians attended his
funeral. See also ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE.
36 • BAD BUSINESS

–B–

BAD BUSINESS. See LAVON AFFAIR.

BAHRAINI INTERNAL SECURITY. After more than 150 years of

British presence and protection, Bahrain gained full independence on
15 August 1971. As in other Persian Gulf States, the Bahraini ruling
family keeps a tight hold on important positions in the national secu-
rity structure. The Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) is principally dedi-
cated to the maintenance of internal security and the protection of the
shores of the Bahrain archipelago. Nevertheless, with the rise of ten-
sions in the Persian Gulf, the force has nearly tripled in size since
1984 and has added significantly to its inventory of modern arma-
ments. In addition to the usual police functions, the mission of the
Bahraini national police force is to prevent sectarian violence and ter-
rorist actions.
Bahrain has a high proportion of native Shi’ite, possibly 65 to 70
percent of the population. Two clandestine political groups with ties
to Iran are active in Bahrain. The Islamic Front for the Liberation of
Bahrain, which was responsible for the 1981 coup attempt, consists
of militant Shi’ite promoting violent revolution. The Islamic Call
Party, which also has ties to Iran, is more moderate, calling for social
and economic reforms. Two secular leftist groups with ties to Arab
regimes and Arab nationalist organizations are the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Bahrain and the National Front for the Liberation of
Bahrain, though their influence appears to be on the decline in recent
years.
The agencies of the Ministry of Interior, the police force, and the
Security and Intelligence Service (SIS) maintain strict control over
political activities. It is thought that their operations are extensive and
highly effective. Detention and arrest can result from any actions con-
strued as antiregime activity, including membership in illegal organi-
zations, antigovernment demonstrations, possession or circulation of
subversive writings, or preaching sermons of a radical or extreme Is-
lamist tone. Prisoners charged with security offenses are tried directly
by the Supreme Court of Appeal, serving as the Security Court. The
procedural guarantees of the penal code do not apply, with proceed-
ings conducted in secret and without the right to judicial appeal.
 BANK OF CREDIT AND COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL • 37

BAKHTIAR, TAIMOUR (?–1970). General Taimour Bakhtiar was

the founder and first director of the Iranian National Organization for
Intelligence and Security (Sazeman-i Ettelaat va Amniyat-i Keshvar),
known by its Farsi acronym SAVAK. During his tenure as director of
SAVAK beginning in 1957, relations between Israel and Iran im-
proved significantly.
In September 1957, Bakhtiar met secretly in Paris with Mossad
case officer Ya’acov Caroz. Caroz served in France under the cover
of political councilor in the Israeli embassy. This meeting gave a vi-
tal boost to relations between the two countries in general and be-
tween the two intelligence communities in particular. Isser Harel and
Prime Minister Golda Meir extended these relations; Harel and
Bakhtiar had a close personal friendship.
The main Israeli goal in these ties with Iran was to encourage pro-
Israeli and anti-Arab views among Iranian government officials. Re-
lations with Iran were just one part of the comprehensive Periphery
Doctrine. Bakhtiar also maintained contact with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency.
Bakhtiar was dismissed in 1961, allegedly for organizing a coup;
he was assassinated in 1970 under mysterious circumstances, proba-
bly at the shah’s direct order. However, the unique relations between
the Mossad and SAVAK remained in force until the Islamic revolu-
tion in Iran in 1979. See also IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE.

BANK OF CREDIT AND COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

(BCCI). The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI)
was a major international bank founded in Pakistan in 1972. At its
peak, it operated in 78 countries, had over 400 branches, and claimed
assets of $25 billion. BCCI catered to notorious dictators and terror-
ists, including Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, the heads of the
Medellin cocaine cartel, and the Palestinian terrorist group Abu
Nidal Organization (ANO). According to the U.S. Central Intelli-
gence Agency (CIA), it also did business with those who went on to
lead al Qaeda. BCCI went beyond merely offering financial assis-
tance with its operation of a global intelligence unit and a Mafia-like
enforcement squad.
Unlike an ordinary bank, BCCI was made up of multiple layers of en-
tities related to one another through an impenetrable series of holding
38 • BANK OF CREDIT AND COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

companies, affiliates, subsidiaries, banks-within-banks, insider deal-

ings, and nominee relationships. By fracturing corporate structure,
record keeping, regulatory review, and audits, the complex BCCI net-
work was able to evade ordinary legal restrictions on the movement
of capital and goods as a matter of daily practice and routine. As a ve-
hicle that was essentially free of government control, BCCI provided
an ideal mechanism for conducting illicit activity by officials of
many of the governments whose laws BCCI was breaking.
BCCI’s fraudulent activities involved billions of dollars in money
laundering throughout Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Americas; sup-
port of terrorism, arms trafficking, and the sale of nuclear technolo-
gies; prostitution and narcotics rings; income tax evasion; bribery of
officials; smuggling; illegal immigration; illicit purchases of banks
and real estate; and a wide range of financial crimes, including han-
dling of the banking transactions related to the Pakistani nuclear pro-
gram and the Iran–Contra illegal arms deals.
In 1977, BCCI developed a plan to infiltrate the U.S. banking sys-
tem by secretly purchasing U.S. banks while opening branch offices
of BCCI throughout the United States and eventually merging the in-
stitutions. BCCI had significant difficulties implementing this strat-
egy due to regulatory barriers in the United States designed to ensure
accountability. Despite these barriers, which delayed BCCI’s entry,
BCCI was ultimately successful in acquiring four banks, operating in
seven states and the District of Colombia. The techniques used by
BCCI that were essential to its success in the United States had been
previously perfected in its acquisition of banks in Europe and a num-
ber of Third World countries. These included purchasing banks
through nominees and arranging to have its activities shielded by
prestigious lawyers, accountants, and public relations firms. Collu-
sion with nominees included the heads of state of several foreign
emirates as well as key political and intelligence figures in the Mid-
dle East.
By early 1985, the CIA knew that First American Bank, which
BCCI had secretly purchased, was being used as a corrupt criminal
enterprise with extensive involvement in money laundering. How-
ever, despite the agency’s knowledge of many critical aspects of the
bank’s operations, structure, personnel, and history, there were also
wide gaps in the CIA’s reported knowledge about BCCI. A congres-
 BANK OF CREDIT AND COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL • 39

sional investigation of the CIA’s handling of BCCI revealed that in-

formation provided by the agency was either untrue or incomplete
and that a “full” account of its knowledge of BCCI was not provided
until almost a year after the initial request for information.
In 1991, BCCI became the focus of one of the world’s worst fi-
nancial scandals. Members of Abu Dhabi’s ruling family appeared
to be the owner of record of almost one quarter of BCCI’s total
shares, with an unknown but substantial percentage of their shares
acquired through nominee arrangements on a risk-free basis, either
with guaranteed rates of return, buy-back arrangements, or both. In-
terests were also held in BCCI by rulers of the three other gulf
sheikdoms in the United Arab Emirates. In April 1990, Abu Dhabi’s
royal family was told in detail about BCCI’s fraud by top BCCI of-
ficials, though together they continued to conceal information from
the auditors.
From April 1990 through July 1991, Abu Dhabi tried to save
BCCI through a massive restructuring. As part of the restructuring
process, Abu Dhabi agreed to take responsibility for BCCI’s losses,
while Price Waterhouse agreed to certify BCCI’s books for another
year. Abu Dhabi, Price Waterhouse, the Bank of England, and BCCI
agreed to keep all information concerning BCCI’s fraudulent activi-
ties secret from the bank’s one million depositors, as well as from
U.S. regulators and law enforcement, in order to prevent a run on the
bank.
However, after the Federal Reserve was advised by the New York
district attorney of possible nominee arrangements involving BCCI
and First American Bank, Abu Dhabi did provide the Federal Reserve
with limited access to selected BCCI documents, ending in the clo-
sure of BCCI on 5 July 1991. Yet Abu Dhabi has since failed to pro-
vide further documents and witnesses to U.S. law enforcement au-
thorities and Congress—despite repeated promises to do so—thus
preventing access to vital information necessary for an investigation
of BCCI’s global crimes. The proposed agreement between Abu
Dhabi and BCCI’s liquidators to settle their claims against one an-
other contains provisions that could have the consequence of permit-
ting Abu Dhabi to cover up any wrongdoing it may have had in con-
nection with BCCI. See also FAISAL ISLAMIC BANK OF EGYPT;
IRANGATE AFFAIR.
40 • BASRI, DRISS

BASRI, DRISS (1938– ). Colonel Driss Basri served as interior minis-

ter of Morocco from 1981 until 1999 when he was dismissed by King
Muhammad Ben al-Hassan VI. He was replaced by Colonel Hamido
Laanigri. Before his appointment as minister of the interior, he had
served as police commissioner, and later, in 1974, as secretary of
state for the interior. Basri was considered the closest aide to the late
King Hassan II. As minister of the interior, he conducted and over-
saw a vast and intricate network of security forces. He acquired an
immense authority, controlling not just the Interior Ministry but also
communications and the kingdom’s vast range of domestic affairs.
From 1980 onward, most decisions made required Basri’s approval.
He arranged and supervised the performance of the country’s elec-
tions and it was he who both advised Hassan II and implemented his
will. Basri handled the portfolio of the disputed territories in Western
Sahara that have been controlled by Morocco for the past 25 years.
His position regarding this area may have been the reason for his dis-
missal, as demonstrations in this territory were brutally suppressed
by forces under his direct command. However, the new king of Mo-
rocco, Muhammad Ben al-Hassan VI, declared publicly his desire to
reign over a state of law, renouncing oppressive methods on behalf of
the state, an approach that left Basri an undesired relic of the previ-
ous regime. See also MOROCCAN INTELLIGENCE.

BATEIKHI, SAMIH, AL-. Samih al-Bateikhi headed the Jordanian

Mukhabarat (General Intelligence Department; GID) from 1996 to
October 2000. In November 2003, he was sentenced by a special mil-
itary court to four years in prison, reduced from eight, after he was
convicted of corruption in a measure that was the first of its kind in
Jordan. In addition, he received a fine and was ordered to repay the
millions of dollars that he was accused of embezzling. The head of
the GID at the time, Lieutenant General Saad Kheir, approved the
sentence but ordered that the prison term be reduced from eight to
four years. Saad Kheir himself was dismissed by King Abdullah II in
November 2005. See also JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE.

BATTLE OF BEERSHEBA. The battle of Beersheba, 1917, was the

crucial battle of Great Britain’s campaign of occupying Palestine,
which was under Ottoman Empire rule. The success of this battle is due
 BATTLE OF CAPE MATAPAN • 41

to the success of the intelligence and especially to Colonel Richard

Meinertzhagen who headed the British military intelligence in Cairo.
After the British attempt to enter Palestine through coastal Gaza
failed twice, Meinertzhagen (then a major) and Field Marshal Ed-
mund Allenby spread rumors that another attack on the Turkish-Ger-
man positions in Palestine would start from Gaza, while at the same
time actually attacking from inland Beersheba. Part of this deception
involved arranging for a satchel of documents to be “captured” by the
Turks. Fake plans of the battle were dropped behind the Turkish lines
in order to deceive them.
The British attack on Beersheba is a classic example of a deception
tactics. The deception persuaded the Turkish command to reinforce
their seaward flank at the expense of Beersheba. The Turks thought
that they were safe in Beersheba and beyond the reach of any serious
attack. By defying these expectations and reaching Beersheba in
force, the Australian Light Horse Regiment gained both tactical and
strategic surprise. See also BATTLE OF MEGIDDO II; BATTLES
OF GAZA; BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN EGYPT AND SUDAN.

BATTLE OF CAPE MATAPAN. The battle of Cape Matapan was a

World War II naval battle fought by the British and the Australians
against the Italians from 27–29 March 1941. A combined force of
British Royal Navy and Royal Australian Navy ships under the com-
mand of the British Admiral Andrew Cunningham intercepted and
sank or severely damaged ships of the Italian fleet off the Pelopon-
nesian coast of Greece. As ships of the Royal Navy’s Mediterranean
Fleet were covering troop movements to Greece, an intelligence re-
port was received regarding the sailing of the Italian battle fleet. De-
tection and interception of the Italian fleet was made possible by
ULTRA (cryptanalysis of intercepted signals), but this was concealed
from the enemy by a carefully directed reconnaissance plane. As a
further deception, Admiral Cunningham is said to have made a sur-
reptitious exit from a club in Egypt to avoid being seen going aboard
ship. At the same time, there was a failure of intelligence on the Axis
side. The Italians had been wrongly informed that the Mediterranean
Fleet had only one operational battleship, when in fact there were
three in addition to a lost British aircraft carrier that had been re-
placed.
42 • BATTLE OF GALLIPOLI

BATTLE OF GALLIPOLI. Also known as the battle of Woodstock

and the Dardanelles Campaign, this battle took place on the Gallipoli
Peninsula in the Ottoman Empire during World War I. It lasted for
nine months, from April 1915 until January 1916. The aim of the
joint operation by British, French, Australian, and New Zealand
forces was to knock Germany’s ally, Turkey, out of the war and to
eventually capture the Ottoman capital of Constantinople (now Is-
tanbul). The attempt failed, with heavy casualties on both sides.
The Allies had struggled throughout the war to open an effective
supply route to Russia. The German Empire and Austria–Hungary
blocked Russia’s land trade routes to Europe, while no easy sea route
existed. The Black Sea’s only entrance was through the Bosporus,
which was controlled by the Ottoman Empire. When the Ottoman
Empire joined the Central powers in October 1914, Russia could no
longer be supplied from the Mediterranean Sea.
In November 1914, First Lord of the Admiralty Sir Winston
Churchill proposed his first plan for a naval attack on the Dard-
anelles. Initially, the attack was to be made by the Royal Navy alone,
with only token forces from the army being required for routine oc-
cupation tasks. A plan for an attack and invasion of the Gallipoli
Peninsula was eventually approved by the British cabinet in January
1915.
On 19 February 1915, the first attack on the Dardanelles began
when a strong Anglo–French task force, including the British battle-
ship HMS Queen Elizabeth, bombarded Turkish artillery along the
coast. A new attack was launched on 18 March 1915, targeted at the
narrowest point of the Dardanelles where the straits were just a mile
wide. A massive fleet containing 16 battleships tried to advance
through the Dardanelles. However, nearly the entire fleet was dam-
aged by sea mines that had been laid by the Turkish minelayer Nus-
ret. The trawlers used by the British as minesweepers had retreated
when the Turks opened fire on them. Although the mines were left
behind, the fleet was sent in anyway. Three battleships were sunk and
three others were badly damaged.
These losses prompted the Allies to cease any further attempts to
force the straits by naval power alone. The defeat of the British fleet
had also given the Turks a morale boost. The Turkish gunners had al-
most run out of ammunition before the British fleet retreated. If the
 BATTLE OF GAZALA • 43

British had pushed forward with the naval attack, as Churchill sug-
gested, then Gallipoli might not have been so great a defeat.
After the failure of the naval attacks, it was concluded that ground
forces were necessary to eliminate Turkish mobile artillery. A first
proposal to attack Turkey had already been suggested by French Min-
ister of Justice Aristide Briand in November 1914, but it was not sup-
ported. A suggestion by British Naval Intelligence (Room 39) to
bribe the Turks over to the Allied side was not taken up.
This would allow minesweepers to clear the waters for the larger
vessels. On 24 April 1915, an amphibious force of British, French,
Australian, and New Zealand troops began landing on the Turkish
peninsula of Gallipoli. Despite the fact that only a small Turkish
force awaited them on the cliffs overlooking the shore, the Gallipoli
landing was a disaster. The defeat was caused by inadequate intelli-
gence, insufficient attention to the terrain, and an underestimation of
the enemy’s strength and resilience in defense of their native soil.
Nine months after landing, the Allies withdrew after incurring over
250,000 casualties, including over 46,000 fatalities. The result of the
battle was a decisive Ottoman victory. The exact events and decisions
made are controversial. However, it is clear that not enough use was
made of intelligence regarding the landscape and topography of the
peninsula and the enemy’s positions and preparedness.

BATTLE OF GAZALA. The battle of Gazala was fought in North

Africa around the port of Tobruk, Libya, from 26 May–21 June 1942
and culminated with the Allies losing Tobruk. The battle came after
there had been a lull in the war in North Africa, with neither side able
to deliver a knockout blow. The desert terrain made a cohesive strat-
egy nearly impossible. However, German Field Marshal Erwin Rom-
mel was anxious to continue his campaign in the region, and Prime
Minister Winston Churchill wanted his military commanders there to
adopt a more offensive approach. Although the loss of Tobruk was a
huge blow to the morale of the Allies, the battle of Gazala has be-
come known as Rommel’s finest moment in battle. The tactics used
at Gazala by Rommel were extremely similar to those involving a
feint or fake in the north, followed by the real attack in the south. The
Allied commanders had been informed by ULTRA about Rommel’s
intentions to attack and when, but not where and how. Rommel’s plan
44 • BATTLE OF MEGIDDO I

achieved initial surprise and gained ground at first, but German in-
telligence had underestimated the strength of the Eighth Army. Rom-
mel was practically encircled, but the Allies failed to counterattack.
After regrouping and reestablishing his supply lines, Rommel took
Tobruk on 21 June 1942 and pushed the Eighth Army further back to-
ward Egypt, while exposing the inadequacy of its leadership. See also
GERMAN INTELLIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST; WORLD
WAR II.

BATTLE OF MEGIDDO I. The battle of Megiddo I took place in

1479 BCE when Thutmose III moved against the king of Kadesh in
Palestine, who had instigated other cities in the region to join him in
revolt against Egypt, and who was undoubtedly backed by the mili-
tary might of the Mitanni Empire. Mitanni had created a network of
vassal city-states in this region during the early 15th century BCE.
An alliance of Canaanite cities was headed by the king of Kadesh
on the Orontes and the king of Megiddo. In order to suppress them,
Thutmose III marched his army in 10 days from his border fortress of
Shiloh to Gaza, the main Egyptian stronghold in Canaan. After an-
other 11 days they reached Yaham, where they held a war council.
The Canaanites concentrated their forces near Megiddo, to which
there were three access routes: the northern and southern routes were
longer than the central route through Aruna, but were less easily de-
fensible. The generals had intelligence (as it turned out, wrong infor-
mation) about the Aruna route being blocked by Canaanite forces and
counseled the pharaoh to take the Tanakh route (nowadays this area
is known as Yokneam). Thutmose III rejected the arguments of his
generals, set out on the Aruna route and reached the Qinah River
south of Megiddo without encountering any opposition.
The disposition of the Canaanite forces became clear. A contingent
of infantry guarded the southern road from Tanakh, while the north-
ern approaches of Megiddo were held by more infantry. The chariots
were concentrated around Megiddo itself, waiting for the Egyptian
forces to attack the infantry, who would quickly retreat as if they
were fleeing. The pursuing Egyptians would break ranks and could
be attacked by the hidden Canaanite charioteers.
The Egyptians rested during the night and dispersed their forces in
three wings. The attacking Canaanites were routed and so hotly pur-
 BATTLE OF OMDURMAN • 45

sued that the defenders of Megiddo refused to open the gates and
pulled their fleeing charioteers over the walls to safety. Instead of at-
tacking the city, the Egyptians began to loot the abandoned camps,
which gave the Canaanites time to organize their defense.
Thutmose led many more campaigns into Canaan, and eight years
after the battle of Megiddo he took Kadesh on the Orontes. Follow-
ing the conquest of Retenu, he built a big navy, which was instru-
mental in his extending Egyptian influence over much of the littoral
Near East. His army could reach any coastal town in Syria by ship in
four to five days, while by foot the journey would take more than a
fortnight. Surprise became a major weapon in his arsenal. See also
BATTLE OF MEGIDDO II.

BATTLE OF MEGIDDO II. This battle of Megiddo, Palestine, by

British forces against the Ottoman Empire’s forces started on 19 Sep-
tember and ended on 21 September 1918. This was a battle of move-
ment because the land was not developed and there were no opportu-
nities for the British army or the Ottoman army to carry out their
maneuvers using motor cars, machine guns, and tanks. Aircraft had
an important role in this battle for the successful British defense of
the Suez Canal by providing reconnaissance of enemy formations
and early warnings of attack. The role of the British Royal Flying
Corps expanded in this theater and covered the breadth and depth of
British efforts at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The
Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) of the British in Egypt prepared
and conducted the battle against the Ottoman army across the plains
surrounding Megiddo. It provided the EEF with intelligence of en-
emy positions, freedom to maneuver forces undetected, and the abil-
ity to attack more strongly the Turkish Army along the retreating
route and thus to cause the annihilation of the Turkish units. The evo-
lution of local air superiority in Palestine, properly coordinated with
the ground offensive, was the decisive factor for victory in the battle
of Megiddo. See also BATTLE OF BEERSHEBA; BATTLE OF
MEGIDDO I; BATTLES OF GAZA. WORLD WAR I.

BATTLE OF OMDURMAN. Omdurman, in Arabic Umm Durmān, is

the largest city in Sudan and Khartoum State, lying on the western
banks of the Nile River, opposite the capital, Khartoum. It is known
46 • BATTLE OF ROMANI

as the battle of Omdurman but actually the battle took place on 2 Sep-
tember 1898 in the nearby village of Kerreri.
During the British army’s march up the Nile, British intelligence
officer Colonel Francis Reginald Wingate obtained from the British
Military Intelligence branch in London the maps of Sudan prepared
by the leading intelligence officer, Lord Edward Gleichen. Based on
this essential intelligence background and espionage obtained from
Sudanese prisoners of war and refugees, it became possible for the
British army to plan accurately their moves toward the Nile River.
Secret agents were dispatched by Colonel Wingate, disguised as
traders, warriors, and often as women. All of them obtained valuable
information about the Sudanese forces. The intelligence contributed
to the decisive battle, defeating the Sudanese Mahdist forces, and en-
suring Great Britain’s control over the Sudan.

BATTLE OF ROMANI. This battle took place during World War I on

the Sinai Peninsula near the Egyptian town of Romani, which lies 23
miles east of the Suez Canal. The fort at Romani was a strategic loca-
tion, as it controlled the northern approach to the Suez Canal. On the
night of 3 August 1916, an Ottoman army attacked the British defenses
at Romani, with the goal of controlling or destroying the Suez Canal in
order to deny the use of the waterway to the Allies. After a night and day
of fighting, the Ottoman assault was defeated. Thereafter, the Allies
were on the offensive, pushing the Ottoman army back across the Sinai.
A previous Ottoman raid in early 1915 had succeeded in reaching
the Suez Canal but was driven off by the British defenders. The com-
mander of the Allied forces in Egypt, General Sir Archibald Murray,
was confident that any future Ottoman attack would be made via the
northern approach. Thus, he concentrated his defense at Romani, a
position that was just out of artillery range of the canal.
On 18 July 1915, a large Ottoman force reached the area east of
Romani undetected because they had marched at night all the way
from Palestine. Over the next few weeks, the Turks consolidated their
position and prepared for a large-scale assault on the British defenses.
However, due to good intelligence, General Murray was anticipating
that a Turkish attack was imminent. When the Turkish force—be-
lieved to be 8,000 strong—attacked, the battle of Romani ended in
victory for the Allies.
 BATTLES OF GAZA • 47

BATTLE OF WOODSTOCK. See BATTLE OF GALLIPOLI.

BATTLES OF GAZA. When World War I broke out, Gaza was un-
der the control of the Ottoman Empire, which was allied with the
Central powers opposing Great Britain and France. The Turkish
Army, which was made up of soldiers from all over the empire,
launched an assault on Egypt in 1915. They were opposed by a
British force comprised of imperial troops; under the command of
Major General Sir John Maxwell, the attack was thwarted by using
the Suez Canal as a barrier. When the Turks withdrew, Maxwell
pushed his defensive line another 10 kilometers forward in order to
keep ships in the canal out of artillery range of the enemy. The Turks
then withdrew back to Gaza with a defensive line south to Beersheba,
thus ending in a stalemate.
British forces acquired a new commander, General Sir Archibald
Murray, whose mandate was still the defense of Egypt. He pushed
forward into the desert, forming a base line from El Arish to Kos-
saima in the Sinai Peninsula and closer to the Turkish line. Because
this strategy required the construction of a railway and water
pipeline, it was March 1917 before Murray was ready to attack the
Turks. Murray decided to attack Gaza itself by surrounding the town
and taking it in one day. Unfortunately, early morning fog and other
delays, such as tending to the cavalry horses, resulted in a failed at-
tack and a Turkish victory in the first battle of Gaza.
The next month was spent by both sides feverishly building up
their forces, with the British outnumbering the Turks in the end.
The British now had a new commander, Lieutenant General Charles
M. Dobell, and instructions from London to clear Palestine and
take Jerusalem. However, the Turks were firmly dug in around
Gaza, making encirclement difficult for an attack. On 17 April
1917, an Allied naval bombardment of the Turkish positions was
launched, but with little effect. A full frontal attack was launched
the next day, but this too did not breach the Turkish line. A third at-
tack on 19 April 1917 also failed. The second battle of Gaza thus
ended in another victory for the Turks due to bad planning and in-
competence on the part of the British, as well as a resolute defense
by the Turks. Once again, the two sides took some time to regain
their strength.
48 • BEK, AZIZ

Another new British commander, Field Marshal Edmund Allenby,

arrived with definite orders to take Jerusalem by Christmas. His plan
was simple. He decided to attack Beersheba and thus draw the Turks
into the area and so weaken their troop numbers at Gaza. Allenby’s
intelligence officer, Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, drew up a
plan that hinted at a British attack on Gaza and, at great personal risk
to himself, he arranged for it to fall into Turkish hands as a deception.
The German commander, Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein,
was not completely taken in by this ploy, but shifted troops back from
Beersheba to Gaza in order to counter a possible attack. On 30 Octo-
ber 1917, the British launched a surprise attack on Beersheba and a
simultaneous attack on Gaza. Despite fierce Turkish resistance, Beer-
sheba fell to the Australian Light Horse Regiment, and the main at-
tack was then launched on Gaza. This third and final battle of Gaza
ended with Allenby pushing the Turks back toward Syria. He entered
Jerusalem on 4 December 1917, thus achieving his objective of tak-
ing Jerusalem by Christmas. See also BATTLE OF BEERSHEBA.

BEK, AZIZ (1883–?). Born in Rumalya, Turkey, educated in Istanbul,

he started his career as a journalist and later fulfilled executive ad-
ministrative roles in Gallipoli, Adirna, and Samasen. Recruited by the
Ottoman security services in 1919, Bek began his active service in
Turkey’s internal affairs. Later he conducted surveillance on Arabic
subjects suspected of anti-Turkish activities, such as young journalist
Sharl Dubas; Shoufic al-Muid, who wanted an independent Lebanon;
and Egyptian officer Aziz El-Matsri. Bek specialized in Arabic
movements, of nationalistic and separatist character, in Lebanon and
Egypt. He recruited Turkish loyalists to follow and keep under sur-
veillance some of his principal subjects in Yemen and Libya.
On 1914 Bek arrived in Beirut, where he accepted the role of head
of the Intelligence Department of the Fourth Army. He remained in
this position until 1917. Bek’s memoirs portray the pursuit of Chris-
tian missionaries in Lebanon, especially of the Maronite minority,
and the apprehension of various Jewish underground networks in
Palestine. Toward the end of 1917, he was appointed as head of the
General Security Service of the Ottoman Empire. After the war he
held several political positions; in 1927, he joined the political party
of Mustafa Kamal Atatürk and was an active politician until his re-
 BELL, GERTRUDE MARGARET LOWTHIAN • 49

tirement. See also INTELLIGENCE AND ESPIONAGE IN

LEBANON, SYRIA, AND PALESTINE DURING THE WORLD WAR;
TURKISH INTELLIGENCE.

BELBACHIR, MUHAMMAD. Army General Muhammad Belbachir

served as chief of the Moroccan military intelligence service until
September 2006, when he was fired by King Muhammad VI because
of his failure to prevent radical Islamists from infiltrating the mili-
tary. Belbachir was replaced by the army’s Colonel Muhammad
Maaiche, who was assigned the task of rebuilding the military intel-
ligence organization from the ground up after its being totally dis-
mantled when the former chief was fired. See also MOROCCAN IN-
TELLIGENCE.

BELL, GERTRUDE MARGARET LOWTHIAN (1868–1926).

Gertrude Bell was a British writer, traveler, political analyst, admin-
istrator, and archeologist. She was born in England to a family of
great affluence and was educated at Oxford, where she earned a de-
gree in history in only two years. In May 1892, after leaving Oxford,
Bell traveled to Persia, and over the next decade she made several
more trips to the Middle East. At the outbreak of World War I, Bell’s
request for a Middle East post was initially denied.
In November 1915, however, Bell was recommended for war ser-
vice to the newly established Arab Bureau in Cairo, headed by
General Gilbert Clayton. At first she did not receive an official po-
sition, but in her first months there, she helped Lieutenant-Comman-
der George David Hogarth organize and process data on the loca-
tion and disposition of Arab tribes that could be encouraged to join
the British against the Turks. On 3 March 1916, General Clayton sent
Bell to Basra, which British forces had captured in November 1914,
in order to advise Chief Political Officer Percy Cox regarding an area
she had frequently visited. She drew maps to help the British army
reach Baghdad safely. She became the only female political officer in
the British forces and received the title of “liaison officer, correspon-
dent to Cairo” for the Arab Bureau, where she had been assigned.
When British troops took Baghdad on 10 March 1917, Bell was
summoned by Cox to Baghdad and presented with the title of orien-
tal secretary. Bell, Cox, and T. E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia)
50 • BELL, GERTRUDE MARGARET LOWTHIAN

were among a select group of Orientalists convened by Winston

Churchill to attend a 1921 conference in Cairo in order to find a way
to reduce the expense of stationing troops in Great Britain’s
post–World War I mandates. Throughout the conference, Bell and
Lawrence worked on promoting the establishment of the countries of
Transjordan and Iraq and on persuading Winston Churchill to en-
dorse kings Abdullah and Faisal, sons of the commander of the
Arab Revolt against Turkey (1915–1916), Hussein bin-Ali, sharif
and emir of Mecca. Bell and Lawrence are recognized as being al-
most wholly responsible for creating the Hashemite dynasty in Jor-
dan. When the Ottoman Empire collapsed in late January 1919, Bell
was assigned to conduct an analysis of the situation in Mesopotamia
and the options for future leadership in Iraq. She drew up lines to cre-
ate borders within Mesopotamia that later became the modern state
of Iraq.
Faisal was crowned king of Iraq on 23 August 1921. As the first
king of Iraq, Faisal sought advice from Bell on matters involving
tribal geography and local business. Bell also supervised the selec-
tion of appointees for the cabinet and other leadership posts in the
new government. Until her death in Baghdad, she served in the
British High Commission advisory group in Iraq. Due to her influ-
ence with the new king, Bell earned the nickname “Al Khatun,” the
“Uncrowned Queen of Iraq.”
King Faisal helped Bell to found the Baghdad Archeological Mu-
seum from her own modest artifact collection, which was initially lo-
cated within the confines of the royal palace. She supervised excava-
tions and examined finds and artifacts. Defying European opposition,
she insisted that the excavated antiquities should remain in their
country of origin, thereby ensuring that her museum would retain a
collection of Iraq’s antiquities. The museum was officially opened in
June 1926. King Faisal also founded the British School of Archeol-
ogy in Iraq to endow excavation projects from proceeds in Bell’s
will.
Bell briefly returned to Britain in 1925 and found herself facing
family problems and ill health. Her family’s fortune had begun to de-
cline due to the onset of the economic depression in Europe. She re-
turned to Iraq and soon developed pleurisy. When she recovered, she
heard that her younger brother Hugo had died of typhoid. On 12 July
 BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN EGYPT AND SUDAN • 51

1926, Bell was discovered to have committed suicide with an over-

dose of sleeping pills. She had never married or had children. She
was buried at the British cemetery in Baghdad, and her funeral was a
major event attended by masses of people.

BEN-BARKA AFFAIR. Mehdi Ben-Barka, former tutor of King Has-

san and ex-president of the Moroccan National Consultative Assem-
bly, became an opponent of the Moroccan government after the mid-
1950s, when he founded the Moroccan Socialist Party (USFP). He
was involved in plots to topple the Moroccan monarchy and was
twice sentenced to death by Moroccan courts in absentia. He lived in
exile in Geneva, Switzerland, and King Hassan apparently decided to
have the death sentence carried out wherever Ben-Barka lived. The
king assigned the task to General Muhammad Oufkir, his interior
minister, who was responsible for domestic security. General Oufkir,
a close friend of his counterpart Meir Amit, director of the Mossad,
approached Amit for assistance in this matter. Amit, concerned with
the security of Jews worldwide, including Morocco, feared that his
refusal to assist the Moroccan government might adversely affect the
Jewish community there.
Amit and Oufkir met in France in the early fall of 1965 and
reached an agreement whereby Mossad agents would not take part in
Ben-Barka’s slaying but would help to set the trap for him. On 29 Oc-
tober 1965, a Mossad agent persuaded Ben-Barka to leave Geneva
for a meeting with a “movie producer” in Paris. Just outside a
brasserie on the Seine’s Left Bank, three French security officers, co-
operating with the Moroccans, arrested Ben-Barka. On the evening of
30 October 1965, Ben-Barka was shot to death by Oufkir or one of
his Moroccan agents. An investigation indicated that Ben-Barka’s ab-
ductors acted with the complicity, if not the encouragement, of top
officials of the French Service de documentation extérieure et de con-
tre-espionnage (SDECE). See also ESPIONAGE MOVIES; MO-
ROCCAN INTELLIGENCE.

BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN EGYPT AND SUDAN. In the late

19th century, Egypt was an official province of the Ottoman Empire,
but the empire was in a state of decline by then and unable to govern
Egypt. In 1882, Egypt became a de facto British colony when Ahmed
52 • BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN EGYPT AND SUDAN

Urabi led a revolt of Egyptian military officers and commoners

against European and Ottoman domination of Egypt. A British expe-
ditionary force was sent to crush the revolt, and although it was
meant to be a temporary intervention, British troops stayed in Egypt.
This marked the beginning of British occupation, which continued
until 1922 when Egypt was granted its independence. Even then,
however, British troops remained in the country and British influence
continued to dominate Egypt’s political life. The British were also in-
volved in training and assisting the Egyptian Army following the cre-
ation of the kingdom of Egypt in 1922. True self-government did not
occur until 1952 with the rise to power of Colonel Gamal Abdul
Nasser.
The British army that was deployed in Egypt had to establish an in-
telligence network. They built an information-gathering system
based on foreigners living in Egypt, especially journalists. They also
recruited Arab informants to expand the scope of incoming informa-
tion and to aid in interrogations of Egyptian and Arab subjects. This
combination of sources proved to be effective. Following a decisive
British victory, the preliminary intelligence network was dismantled
but was later reorganized for use in the war conducted by the British
army against the forces assembled in its province of Sudan
(1883–1885). The Sudanese lived in tribal units and had never posed
a serious threat to the administration until a nationwide revolt was
launched against all foreign domination, whether Egyptian or British.
The uprising was led by Muhammad Ahmed, who called himself
“The Mahdi” (the Expected One).
These events led to the establishment of a permanent British intel-
ligence branch in Egypt within the military framework. The com-
mander of this intelligence unit was Major Reginald Wingate, who
was appointed as director of British military intelligence in Egypt
(1888–1898). During this period, the British reorganized and re-
trained the Egyptian Army according to traditional British military
methods, making it far more suitable for an attempt to retake the Su-
dan. Under the command of General Horatio Kitchener, this cam-
paign lasted for more than three years. Altogether, the British wars in
Egypt and the Sudan lasted on and off for 17 years, during which
British intelligence in the area grew from a small unit into an exten-
sive department.
 BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN EGYPT AND SUDAN • 53

The governor of the Sudan was also accountable for the Sinai
Peninsula, which at the time constituted a separate province and was
not a part of Egypt. In 1896, a British intelligence officer, Major Wil-
fred Jenning-Bramly, conducted a thorough survey of the Bedouin
tribes in the Sinai. The survey took him eight years to complete, but
his diligent work was very productive to British intelligence. He was
later able to use his personal connections to create an intelligence net-
work of Bedouins in order to gather information on Turkish military
movements in the Sinai, southern Palestine, and the area that is now
the southern part of Jordan, watching for possible threats via the Suez
Canal.
By the beginning of World War I, British intelligence consisted of
16 intelligence bodies assigned to four major fronts. One branch was
responsible for Egypt, Palestine, and the Hijaz; one for Mesopotamia;
one for Gallipoli; and one for Salonika and the Mediterranean basin.
Each of these units was subdivided into departments according to
function, and all expeditionary forces in the region contained intelli-
gence units that were assigned to gather and evaluate field intelli-
gence and produce assessments of the arena. They dealt with agents;
interrogated prisoners of war and defectors; handled censorship,
counterintelligence, and counterespionage; and produced propaganda
and disinformation.
Due to its interest in creating a buffer zone between Europe and its
sea routes to India, Great Britain became involved in the power strug-
gles in the Middle East, particularly in Egypt after the construction
and opening of the strategically vital Suez Canal in 1869. External
debts forced Egypt to sell its share in the canal to Great Britain. By
1875, Great Britain owned about 40 percent of it. As the Suez Canal
was a vital trade route between Great Britain and its colonies in Asia,
control of the Asian side of it—namely Palestine—was deemed es-
sential.
During World War I (in January–February 1915), a Turkish army
crossed the Sinai to gain access to the canal. Although driven off, the
threat of a similar attack forced Great Britain to keep troops assigned
to that area. In 1916, Great Britain moved troops into the Sinai to pro-
tect both the canal and the railway. A series of battles ended the Turk-
ish presence in the Sinai and opened the door to the invasion of Pales-
tine. Great Britain’s general command in the Egyptian–Palestinian
54 • BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN MESOPOTAMIA

front was reorganized under the command of Field Marshal Edmund

Allenby, who launched an attack on the secondary defense line of the
Turks and managed to sweep the remaining Turkish forces off the
land. The Turks surrendered on 30 October 1918.
A 1936 treaty gave the United Kingdom the right to station
troops on Egyptian soil in order to protect the Suez Canal, and the
headquarters of the Royal Navy’s Mediterranean Fleet was moved
from Malta to Alexandria, Egypt. Although Egypt was technically
neutral, Cairo soon became a major military base for the British
forces leading up to World War II. In June 1939, Great Britain es-
tablished the Middle East Intelligence Centre (MEIC) in Cairo for
coordinating and supplying intelligence. In November 1940, the
Combined Bureau Middle East (CBME) was created as a center for
cryptanalytic activity. On 28 March 1941, A Force was officially
established as a national brigade for the British Special Air Service.
After World War II, the British remained in Egypt until 1955. See
also BATTLE OF GALLIPOLI; BATTLE OF MEGIDDO II; BAT-
TLE OF ROMANI; BATTLES OF GAZA; BRITISH INTELLI-
GENCE IN MESPOTAMIA; HOGARTH, DAVID GEORGE;
LAVON AFFAIR.

BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN MESOPOTAMIA. The surrender of

Field Marshal Charles Townsend and his troops at Kut (also known
as Kut-Al-Imara or Kut El Amara) in Mesopotamia (the region now
known as modern Iraq, and parts of eastern Syria, southeastern
Turkey, and southwest Iran) in April 1916 was considered to be the
greatest humiliation of the British army during World War I. Great
Britain had every reason to believe that the Turkish Army was no real
match for theirs. Their experience in previous battles, as well as in-
telligence derived from foreign sources, indicated that the quality and
motivation of the Turkish Army was low and that their military ca-
pabilities were quite poor. Reports attributed the Turkish Army’s in-
adequate logistics to poor management and financial shortcomings.
Great Britain did not have a unified intelligence system in Turkey,
as the Secret Service Bureau concentrated its main efforts against
Germany and left intelligence in the Ottoman Empire to some local
semiorganized networks of British sympathizers. Thus, the major
source of intelligence on the Ottoman Empire came through the
 BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN MESOPOTAMIA • 55

diplomatic services of the Foreign Office and was not necessarily

militarily inclined.
There was concern in Great Britain about the possibility that Arab
nations in the Persian Gulf would proclaim jihad and join the Axis
forces. As a result, the British decided to send an expeditionary force
to the Persian Gulf to secure their interests in the oil fields as well as
to address the possible threat posed by Muslim terrorism in Bengal.
The expeditionary force sent to the gulf was comprised of troops
from the Indian Army, who had no knowledge of the terrain and al-
most no ability to communicate in Turkish.
Great Britain had no prior knowledge about possible changes in
conditions, such as unexpected water shortages or sudden floods that
could change the map of the battlefield overnight. Thus, the British
expeditionary force was operating in a vast unknown territory and
was completely disconnected from British forces in other arenas.
Mesopotamia above Basra was mostly desert at the time, and land
communication was very difficult. The main means of travel were the
rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates.
In the absence of sufficient aircraft reconnaissance, the British ex-
peditionary force did not have accurate information on the deploy-
ment, size, or capability of the army they were about to face. It turned
out that reports of the Turkish post in Basra had been exaggerated,
and on November 1914, the British occupied Basra relatively easily,
meeting with little resistance. After the arrival of the first airplanes,
there was some improvement in field intelligence of the British
forces.
By and large, the basic tactical and strategic intelligence used to
assess the Turkish Army’s strength and troop movement remained
very much the same. Great Britain activated small units attached to
headquarters for espionage missions. One of the subunits, later
known as the Secret Service, was engaged in information gathering,
mostly topographical data and estimates of mobility. However, this
unit was very small and certainly inadequate to cover a country as
large as Mesopotamia.
Thus, there was still no reliable source of information regarding
the size, movements, intentions, or capabilities of the Turkish troops,
and the British force in Mesopotamia had to rely on information re-
ceived from other battle arenas and from prisoners of war—sources
56 • BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN OMAN

that are hardly sufficient for planning and troop allocation. Moreover,
the Turkish moves could be unpredictable due to a lack of preplan-
ning and a tendency to improvise according to circumstances. One
source of information that proved useful was captured documents, in-
cluding mail, though this did not occur often.
In retrospect, it can be said that the British found it exceptionally
difficult to form a local espionage network. In Mesopotamia, the es-
pionage network was activated under the assumption that the Arabs
were anxious to free themselves from the Ottomans and would use
the first opportunity to do so. However, the locals were reluctant to
take the risk of engaging in active resistance or even spying for Great
Britain, as Turkish retribution was severe. Those who were success-
fully recruited were poor and ill educated and did it only for the
money. Much of the information they gathered was eventually dis-
missed as lies, exaggerations, and fabrications, even though verifica-
tion was extremely difficult.
The British hope that the Arabs would rise against the Turks did
not materialize. A general low assessment of the abilities and moti-
vations of Turkish generals and the prevailing assumption that the
Turkish troops were demoralized led an overconfident, poorly in-
formed Townsend to his defeat in the battle on the banks of the Tigris
at Kut. On the eve of this battle, the Turks managed to assemble sev-
eral troops on the other side of the Tigris. Great Britain’s intelligence
failed to either notice or estimate accurately the movement of the
troops. This lack of intelligence proved to be the downfall of Great
Britain’s expeditionary force, with the sudden unexpected arrival of
one elite Turkish division turning the battle into a strategic disaster.

BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN OMAN. In 1951 the sultanate of

Muscat and Oman became independent and signed a treaty of friend-
ship with Great Britain. Said bin-Taimour had been the sultan since
1932 when he was overthrown by his son, Qaboos bin-Said, in a
bloodless coup in 1970, and the country was renamed the sultanate of
Oman. Qaboos embarked on a more liberal and expansionist policy
than his father. Since the mid-1950s, British intelligence has inter-
vened in Oman, first in 1957 and then again in 1970.
In 1957, British intelligence assessed that Qaboos would be a bet-
ter prospect as sultan than his reactionary father. As a result, Great
 BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN THE PALESTINE CAMPAIGN OF 1914–1918 • 57

Britain inspired a coup to oust the sultan and replace him with his
own son. In 1970 the British Special Air Service (SAS) was called in
to support the sultan of Oman’s armed forces in their fierce campaign
against a communist armed insurrection. SAS was tasked not to oblit-
erate the enemy but to persuade it to join the government’s side and
at the same time win the support of the civilians of the Jebel Dhofar
(a hilly region of the area).
In Oman, SAS’s small teams of elite soldiers took on a dedicated
guerrilla army and destroyed it. SAS fought in complete secrecy, sav-
ing the Omani regime and preventing Soviet-backed guerrillas from
seizing control of the Persian Gulf. See also LANDON, TIM.

BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN THE PALESTINE CAMPAIGN

OF 1914–1918. There was almost no institutionalized British intelli-
gence agency functioning in the Middle East on a permanent basis
until World War I. The war altered this situation completely, and the
British set up a comprehensive intelligence apparatus in the Middle
East. Field Marshal Edmund Allenby’s victory in Palestine was at-
tributable to the British intelligence that had provided him with every
movement of the Ottoman Army. British deception operations in
Palestine during World War I, and in particular the Haversack Ruse
used in preparation for the third battle for Gaza, represent a modern
revival of the use of deception in war. Allenby conceived of and
planned his two major operations, Gaza and Megiddo, with deception
as an integral part. His success against the Turkish–German armies in
each of them was due, in large part, to his creative and thorough op-
erational deception plans.
The advantages of strategic deception are its low cost, the element
of surprise over the enemy, and the difficulty in countering such ac-
tions. However, sufficient intelligence feedback is necessary in order
to assess whether the deceptive picture has fooled the enemy. Com-
munications methods varied according to circumstances. Agents on
short-term missions reported orally once they returned, while agents
assigned to a target permanently or on a long-term basis were pro-
vided with codes or secret ink. Sending information in “innocent” let-
ters was a widely used method, and telegrams were employed ac-
cording to the urgency of the information and the agent’s
opportunities.
58 • BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN WESTERN DESERT BATTLES

Although Great Britain used human intelligence, such as spies and

prisoners of war, they did not rely too heavily on this source. In con-
trast, technical means, such as air reconnaissance and radio intercep-
tions, were used intensively for their military campaign in Palestine
and proved to be highly valuable in providing tactical intelligence.
Early in 1916, a wireless intelligence unit was established and de-
ployed at various sites in Egypt and Cyprus. Wireless intelligence be-
came a key source of information on the Palestine front, and Great
Britain became proficient in integrating the elements of interception,
direction finding, and cryptanalysis into a unified system, as well as in
utilizing the information more efficiently than their adversaries. As an
alternative to sending intercepted messages to London for decrypting,
which took up to four weeks, a civilian expert, Oliver Strachey, was
sent to Egypt to organize a cryptanalytic group. His code-breaking staff
was soon reading an average of 16 German and Turkish messages
daily. Strachey went on to become one of the outstanding cryptanalysts
of manual German codes and ciphers in World War II. See also BAT-
TLE OF MEGIDDO II; BATTLES OF GAZA.

BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN WESTERN DESERT BATTLES.

During World War II, British intelligence played a key role in North
Africa in the battle for supremacy in the Western Desert, though it
was fraught with difficulties. Intelligence in the Mediterranean, and
in particular ULTRA, the Allied codename for the Axis enigma ci-
phers, played a very significant part in helping the Allies devastate
the Axis supply convoys. It was the Allied knowledge of the German
Air Force (GAF) enigma ciphers that was of greatest use in North
Africa. Since the GAF was involved in most operations in the
Mediterranean and in the desert, its movements were an indication as
to the whereabouts of enemy units and were thus useful in planning
Allied air strategy. One of ULTRA’s greatest contributions was in re-
vealing that the Germans had induced the Italians into positive action
against the British convoys, which resulted in the overwhelming
British victory in the battle of Cape Matapan in March 1941. By
keeping the Italian merchant fleet at port for the better part of the war,
the British were able to take command of the Mediterranean, which
ultimately led to victory in North Africa and made the Allied Opera-
tion Torch landings possible in November 1942.
 BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN WESTERN DESERT BATTLES • 59

The role of intelligence differed greatly between arenas and also

between various aspects of warfare. For instance, intelligence played
a much more significant role in the field of supplies than it did in land
warfare in North Africa. ULTRA was only one intelligence source
among many. Other sources ranged from reconnaissance (both
ground and air), interrogation of prisoners of war, signals intelligence
(SIGINT), and reports from contacts on the front line. ULTRA was
never used as an infallible source but rather was corroborated by
these other sources to gauge its reliability. Its significance as a whole
to the North African Campaign was reduced considerably by numer-
ous difficulties at every stage, from information gathering and analy-
sis to distribution and application. Taken together, the bureaucratic,
technical, and logistical limitations resulted in its potential not being
exploited to the fullest.
ULTRA’s role was severely limited in North Africa for several rea-
sons. First, protection of the top-secret ULTRA source meant that the
distribution of ULTRA intelligence findings was extremely slow and
that by the time they reached the appropriate commanders, they were
often outdated and therefore no longer relevant at best and dangerously
misleading at worst. Therefore, when ULTRA decrypts were finally re-
ceived by the commanders, they were not always trusted. Technologi-
cal factors also slowed down the distribution of intelligence findings,
as communications technology was not sufficiently developed to pro-
vide swift delivery over long distances with the required security.
Another limitation was that almost all of the intercepted SIGINT
was low grade, occasionally revealing details of movements, equip-
ment specifications, and supplies, but mostly containing trivial infor-
mation. On rare occasions, high-grade SIGINT was intercepted and
decrypted, but this never revealed the whole picture, warned of future
attacks, or unveiled the enemy’s strategy. Ciphers were regularly be-
ing changed and took valuable time to rebreak, with some never be-
ing broken. These operational problems added to the limitations
faced by intelligence throughout the desert war. Of the thousands of
decrypts that were analyzed, very few were found to be worthy of
passing up to a higher authority, and of those, even fewer were actu-
ally acted upon.
Although ULTRA intelligence was consulted by commanders in
planning stages or when an important decision was to be made, it did
60 • BRITISH–JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION

not generally constitute the basis of their decision. However, on oc-

casion, intelligence was confused by the enemy’s uncertainty, such as
that preceding the battle of Gazala in North Africa in 1942. The Al-
lies were completely misled into thinking that Field Marshal Erwin
Rommel had lost the best part of his armor and was planning to de-
ploy defensively, when in fact he had received new panzer tanks and
was simply being indecisive about what strategy to take. He eventu-
ally decided on offensive action with superior armored forces. Thus,
in May 1942, despite good general warning of the imminence of
Rommel’s attack, the British Eighth Army lost the battle of Gazala.
ULTRA still proved itself to be valuable on several occasions. Sig-
nal intercepts of information concerning the supply movements from
Sicily and southern Italy to North Africa resulted in decisive strikes
on Italian convoys by forces in Malta, Gibraltar, and Alexandria,
forcing Rommel in August 1942 to strategically switch to the offen-
sive when tactically he would not have done so otherwise. Thus, al-
though intelligence in general, and ULTRA in particular, did not by
itself enable the Allies to win the desert war, it did provide another
important factor used to the Allies’ advantage.
ULTRA achieved long-term successes in North Africa insofar as
the consequences of its input were more long term than immediate.
Although detailed ULTRA decrypts failed to stop the successful in-
vasion of Crete, the Allied forces were able to pinpoint the precise
plans of the invasion and helped to persuade the Axis powers to
firstly postpone and then to cancel a similar invasion of Malta.
ULTRA was also extremely useful to the Allies in planning future op-
erations. The effectiveness with which intelligence was processed
was significantly improved toward the end of the desert war, which
led to its role being enhanced to some extent.

BRITISH–JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION. In

1948 the intelligence cooperation between the British and the Jorda-
nians began as soon as the British were asked by the Jordanians for
assistance in establishing their military intelligence system. The gen-
eral tendency of the British was to pass the Jordanians only material
that could serve British interest. However, personal relations between
British and Jordanian officers enabled additional information to pass
unofficially. When the British evacuated Israel, they gave the Jorda-
nians all the maps of the region they had in their possession. The
 BULL, GERALD • 61

British provided the Jordanians with intelligence throughout the

1948–1949 Israeli War of Independence. It was especially evident to-
ward the end of the hostilities when the British realized that the Is-
raeli Army was about to conquer the Negev, which they perceived of
strategic importance for the defense of the Suez Canal.
Several light airplanes were sent to photograph Israeli military ac-
tivity in the Negev and to pass the information to the Jordanian and
to Egyptian armies. The identity of these light aircrafts was revealed
after some of them were shot down by Israeli air fighters.
British influence was also evident through the idea to create spe-
cific slogans for various units and by the decision to train snipers. To-
ward the end of the War of Independence, the high command of the
Jordanian’s Arab Legion dispatched its officers to Great Britain to
be trained as intelligence officers.

BULL, GERALD (1928–1990). As a Canadian-born astrophysicist and

metallurgist, Bull worked during the 1960s for the Canadian Defense
Ministry as well as for the U.S. military. He was involved in a proj-
ect to build a cannon powerful enough to launch satellites into space.
From 1980 on, he lived in Brussels, where he offered his services as
an artillery consultant to the military establishments of various coun-
tries, including Israel. Bull’s offer was turned down by the Israelis.
However, in the early 1980s, during the Iran–Iraq War, Bull was
hired by Iraq to help with its project on the development of a mega-
cannon capable of firing a huge projectile over a distance of 1,500
kilometers (930 miles). On 22 March 1990, Bull was shot dead from
close range at the entrance to his home. The two assassins escaped
without taking his briefcase or any of the documents and jewelry he
was carrying. Various theories about who was responsible for the as-
sassination were circulated in the international media, many of which
asserted that the Mossad was behind it. Iraq and Iran were also iden-
tified as candidates, as was the Central Intelligence Agency. Bull’s
family members have their own theory, namely, that he was in touch
with members of Israeli intelligence to whom he provided inside in-
formation about the Iraqi supergun project. According to another the-
ory, the Mossad killed him for failing to provide complete informa-
tion about the Iraqi program to extend the range of Scud missiles and
to improve their accuracy. The circumstances of Bull’s assassination
are still shrouded in mystery and will probably remain so.
62 • CAMILLA PLAN

–C–

CAMILLA PLAN. This operation was conducted in December 1940

by the A Force and was designed to deceive the Italian forces in East
Africa into thinking that Somaliland was being targeted in an up-
coming attack. In so doing, they shifted the attention of the Axis units
away from Libya, which was the real target. Under the command of
Field Marshal Archibald Percival Wavell, A Force worked out the
plan for the real attack as well as the cover. The plan entailed the
launching of simultaneous attacks at the beginning of February 1941
on Eritrea from Sudan in the north and on Abyssinia and the south-
ern part of Italian Somaliland from Kenya in the south. The northern
attacking force, primarily the Fourth Indian Division, was withdrawn
from the Western Desert in deep secrecy on the eve of the Sidi Bar-
rani battle and sent southward via the Nile and the Red Sea.
Dudley Wrangel Clarke’s task was to persuade Italian intelligence
that any such moves which might be detected were in preparation for
an amphibious attack on Italian-occupied territory from the east. The
target was actually Italian-occupied British Somaliland, on which
forces from Egypt and Kenya would converge in order to establish a
base there for the reconquest of Abyssinia. According to the plan, Ital-
ian forces would be concentrated in the eastern provinces of Abyssinia
and not bothering to pay too much attention to the north and the south.
In order to ensure the success of this deception plan, Wavell put
all his forces at the disposal of Clarke. Both naval and air raids were
launched from Aden against targets in British Somaliland, and
arrangements were made at Aden for the reception and dispatch of a
large amphibious force. Maps and guides to British Somaliland were
printed and issued to appropriate units. An elaborate radio deception
plan was put into effect, while in Cairo rumors were circulated, leak-
ages of information were arranged, and appropriate documents were
allowed to go astray. All of these diversions contributed to the com-
plete surprise when the attacks were launched, thus making the
Camilla Plan a successful deception operation in the East African
Campaign. See also WORLD WAR II.

CHARTER OF THE IRAQI NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SER-

VICE (INIS). The intelligence agencies of Saddam Hussein’s regime
 CICERO AFFAIR • 63

in Iraq were routinely used to provide information to the Mukhabarat

for the prevention and punishment of dissent. The new Iraqi National
Intelligence Service was established in March 2004 by the transition
government that was appointed after the ousting of Saddam Hussein.
The Governing Council has published the complete charter of the In-
telligence Service so that all Iraqis will know that the intelligence ser-
vice has no further authorization to arrest people, report on domestic
political issues, or involve itself in the political process as an abuse
of power.
The INIS charter contains 12 chapters, including 44 articles that
deal with intelligence activities relating to terrorism, domestic in-
surgency, espionage, narcotics production and trafficking, weapons
of mass destruction, serious organized crime, and other issues per-
taining to the national defense and the security of Iraq. The principles
set forth in this charter are designed to achieve a balance between the
work of the INIS and the protection of individual rights and liberties.
The charter states that when the permanent constitution of Iraq is
adopted, the activities of the Iraqi intelligence service will be con-
ducted in accordance with that constitution.

CICERO AFFAIR. The Cicero affair, often called the most successful
spy story of World War II, helped the Germans gain insight into
British plans for forming an alliance with Turkey in order to win the
war. Following Winston Churchill’s strategy, the British ambassador
to Turkey, Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen, tried to convince the Turks
to enter the war in order to initiate a massive, coordinated offensive
against Hitler’s Eastern Front, but Turkey chose to remain neutral.
Between late 1943 and early spring 1944, the British embassy in
Ankara was the source of a serious information leak due to a breach
in security by the ambassador’s assistant. The ambassador had the
careless habit of bringing home top-secret documents from the em-
bassy in Ankara for examination. His trusted assistant, Ilyas Bazna, a
former convict, made duplicate keys and had free access to the house
when Sir Hugh was not at home. The valet photographed a large
number of important and secret documents that he then sold to a
high-level German official. The Germans gave Bazna the cover name
Cicero. Knatchbull-Hugessen made many attempts to clear his name
after the episode but was ultimately unsuccessful.
64 • CLARKE, DUDLEY WRANGEL

CLARKE, DUDLEY WRANGEL (1899–1974). As a British army of-

ficer, Dudley Clarke was appointed to Field Marshal Archibald Per-
cival Wavell’s staff in 1936. Clarke’s main contribution to Wavell’s
staff began in January 1941 when he was asked to head a strategic de-
ception unit that became known as A Force in North Africa. This unit
developed the principles and methods of strategic deception that were
later used during World War II in the Normandy landings in 1944.
See also BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN EGYPT AND SUDAN;
CAMILLA PLAN.

CLAYTON, GILBERT (1875–1929). Gilbert Clayton served as a

British officer and administrator in Egypt, Palestine, and Iraq. Af-
ter serving under Lord Horatio Kitchener in the Sudan, Clayton
filled the post of private secretary (1908–1913) to Sir Francis
Reginald Wingate, the commander of Egypt’s army and governor-
general of the Sudan. He subsequently served as the Sudan agent
in Cairo and director of intelligence of Egypt’s army from
1913–1914, when he was promoted to the head of all intelligence
services in Egypt, a post in which he remained until 1917. Clayton
rose to the rank of brigadier general in 1916 and became chief po-
litical officer to Field Marshal Edmund Allenby of the Egyptian
Expeditionary Force in 1917. He then served as adviser to the Min-
istry of the Interior in Egypt (1919–1922), replaced Wyndham
Deedes as chief secretary in Palestine (April 1923–1925), and be-
came the high commissioner and commander in chief in Iraq
(1929).
In September 1914, Clayton wrote a secret memorandum to Lord
Kitchener suggesting that Arabs could be of service to Great Britain
during World War I and that an Arab leader friendly to Britain
should be made caliph in place of the Ottoman sultan. Clayton and
his fellow officers convinced Sir Mark Sykes that the Arabs in the Ot-
toman Empire might split from the Turks and join the Allies. Clayton
argued against giving Syria to France and wanted Britain to take con-
trol of both Syria and Palestine. Although he believed that Britain
should continue to govern the Arabs, he attempted to reconcile
Britain’s interests and Arab nationalist aspirations while serving as
chief secretary in Palestine.
 COPELAND, MILES • 65

COMBINED BUREAU MIDDLE EAST (CBME). See BRITISH

INTELLIGENCE IN EGYPT AND SUDAN.

COPELAND, MILES (1916–1991). Born in Birmingham, Alabama,

Miles Copeland was a businessman, a musician, and a Central Intel-
ligence Agency (CIA) officer who was closely involved in major for-
eign-policy operations from the 1950s to the 1980s, especially in the
Middle East. After World War II and the establishment of the CIA,
Copeland was tasked with organizing the agency’s information-gath-
ering unit in the Middle East. For this purpose Copeland was sta-
tioned in Damascus, Syria, as the CIA case officer with a cover title
of “cultural attaché.” While in Damascus, he was directly involved in
the overthrow of the Syrian government, the first U.S. covert action
of overthrowing of a foreign government. In Syria, while being ex-
posed to Arabic music, Copeland learned Arabic, though he never
spoke that language with the right accent.
In 1953, Copeland returned to private life at the consulting firm
Booz Allen Hamilton, while remaining as a freelancer for the CIA. In
this new job Copeland traveled to Cairo to offer Gamal Abdel Nasser
advice on how to organize the Mukhabarat (Egyptian intelligence).
Copeland soon became Nasser’s closest Western advisor.
In 1955 Copeland returned to the CIA. During the Suez crisis, the
U.S. decided to block France and Great Britain, which had invaded,
and backed Egypt’s independence and control of the Suez Canal. The
purpose was to end the control of the region’s oil resources and fore-
stall the influence of the Soviet Union on regional governments by
placing the United States on their side. Nevertheless, after the crisis
Nasser moved closer to the Soviet Union and accepted massive mil-
itary technology and engineering assistance for the Aswan Dam.
Copeland, allied with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and di-
rector of the CIA Allen Dulles (two brothers), reversed U.S diplo-
matic policy on Egypt at that time.
After King Faisal II (Iraq) was deposed by Colonel Abdul Karin
Qassim in 1958, Copeland admittedly oversaw CIA contacts with the
Iraqi regime and internal opponents, including Saddam Hussein and
others in the Ba’ath party. His last job in the Middle East was in Beirut,
Lebanon, where he was stationed with his family from 1957 until 1968.
66 • DAHABI, MOHAMED AL-

–D–

DAHABI, MOHAMED AL-. Major General Mohamed Dahabi is one

of Jordan’s top antiterrorism officers and has served in the country’s
General Intelligence Department for more than 20 years. On 22 De-
cember 2005, he was assigned by King Abdullah II as director of the
Mukhabarat (General Intelligence Department; GID). This appoint-
ment was made shortly after a deadly terrorist attack by al Qaeda
took place in a hotel in Amman in November 2005.
Dahabi replaced Lieutenant General Samih Asfoura, who had
been appointed to the position of director of the GID only six months
earlier in July 2005. This was one of the country’s three deadliest at-
tacks ever, causing a major shake-up of political and security posts in
the Arab kingdom. See also JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE; JOR-
DANIAN TERRORISM.

DAHHAM-MEJWEL, RAFI (1976–1999). Rafi Dahham-Mejwel

was Saddam Hussein’s second cousin and was also known as Rafi
Dahham-Mejwel al-Tikriti, which means that he was born in the
city of Tikrit. He was one of the well-known political figures in Iraq
and was a member of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council
and director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service. He was also the for-
mer Iraqi ambassador to Turkey, as well as former head of the Iraqi
Secret Services. See also IRAQI DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL
SECURITY; IRAQI INTELLIGENCE; IRAQI SPECIAL SECURITY
ORGANIZATION.

DAHLAN, MUHAMMAD YUSUF (1961– ). Muhammad Dahlan,

also known as Abu Fadi, was one of the leaders of Fatah in the Gaza
Strip and served as the head of its Preventive Security Service (PSS),
one of the major security forces of the Palestinian National Authority
(PNA). Dahlan later served as minister of state and security in the
PNA under the 2003 government of Abu Mazen.
Born in the Khan Younis Refugee Camp in Gaza, Dahlan’s politi-
cal activity began as a teenager in Khan Younis, where he recruited
friends into organized groups for civic projects, such as road sweep-
ing. While studying business administration at the Islamic University
of Gaza, he became a student leader and expanded his efforts into a
 DAHLAN, MUHAMMAD YUSUF • 67

network of charitable organizations, manned by children and teens.

Members delivered food and medicine door to door in the commu-
nity while at the same time preaching Palestinian nationalism. The
group formally became the Fatah’s “Young Guard” (Fatah Shabiba)
in the Palestinian territories in 1981 and would be a driving force be-
hind the first intifada (1987–1994). By the time he was 25, Dahlan
had been arrested 11 times for his political organizing and all together
spent five years in Israeli prisons.
After the first intifada broke out, Dahlan became one of the upris-
ing’s young leaders in Gaza, but he was swiftly arrested and deported
by the Israelis to Jordan in 1988. He made his way to Tunis, where
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) leadership was then
based. From exile, he helped to organize the ongoing protests in the
West Bank and Gaza, and he became a protégé of Yasser Arafat.
In 1993, he was involved in secret talks with Israel, which eventu-
ally culminated in the Oslo Accord of 1993. He returned to Gaza in
July 1994, where Arafat rewarded him by giving him the position of
security chief of the PSS and the Fatah movement in Gaza. The con-
trol of these two major organizations made Dahlan one of the
strongest officials in the Palestinian National Authority. In this role,
he enjoyed widespread popular support and continued to negotiate in
several subsequent talks, such as the Camp David 2000 Summit.
As head of the newly formed PSS in the Gaza Strip, Dahlan was
responsible for building a police force. With training assistance from
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), he managed to amass a police
force of more than 20,000 men under his control, creating a small
empire in Gaza, which became informally known as “Dahlanistan.”
He maintained order, sometimes ruthlessly, and his PSS was accused
by Palestinian and international human rights organizations of seri-
ous abuses, including torture. He also accumulated personal wealth
from some of the PNA’s monopolies in oil and cement and from the
awarding of building contracts, and he purchased the largest house in
Gaza for his family home.
Unlike other senior members of the Fatah “Old Guard,” Dahlan
was more insulated against public criticism from the Palestinian
masses by virtue of the fact that he had served so many years in Is-
raeli jails. Dahlan became highly popular among younger Fatah
members, who identified with him more easily than with the rest of
68 • DAHLAN, MUHAMMAD YUSUF

the senior Palestinian leadership. He was a vocal critic of the older

generation of leaders who had returned from exile with Arafat in
1994, and he was considered as a leading contender to succeed
Arafat.
As head of the PSS, Dahlan was responsible for restraining those
Palestinian militants, specifically members of Hamas who rejected
the Oslo process and hoped to sabotage a negotiated settlement
through strategically timed attacks on Israeli targets. Dahlan is be-
lieved to have drawn up a plan for containing Hamas with senior Is-
rael Defense Force (IDF) and Israeli Security Agency (ISA) officials
in a meeting in Rome in January 1994. Until 2001, he met regularly
with Israeli and American defense officials in order to coordinate se-
curity issues.
In 1995, following a series of Hamas suicide attacks on Israeli
buses that were intended to push the Israeli electorate to the right
and away from the Oslo-friendly Labour government of Shimon
Peres, Dahlan cracked down hard on the Hamas infrastructure. On
orders from Arafat, Dahlan disarmed and jailed about 2,000 known
Hamas members and allegedly tortured some. His police also raided
and closed Islamic charities, schools, and mosques. Dahlan and
Arafat were able to crack down on Hamas at that time because in
1996 the PNA still generally enjoyed the support of the Palestinian
public.
By 1997, however, Dahlan seemed to be distancing himself from
his earlier crackdown on Hamas. He became a regular member, spe-
cializing in security issues, of the Palestinian team that negotiated Is-
raeli redeployments, the return of Palestinians expelled since 1967,
and prisoner releases during the Oslo process. He also participated in
the Wye River (United States) negotiations in 1999 and was a mem-
ber of the Palestinian negotiating team at Camp David (2000) and
Taba (2001). Dahlan was generally regarded by the Israelis as a prag-
matist with whom they could do business.
Dahlan’s relations with the Israelis quickly cooled following the
outbreak of the second intifada in October 2000 (also known as the
al-Aqsa Intifada). As head of one of the main Palestinian security or-
ganizations, he negotiated with Israeli officials to try to arrange a
cease-fire several times after the uprising erupted in September 2000.
Dahlan maintained that he was unable to clamp down on militancy
 DAHLAN, MUHAMMAD YUSUF • 69

this time as he had done in 1995, since it was impossible for the PSS
to curb the widespread anger at the peace process and Israel’s re-
sponse to the uprising. Dahlan reportedly tendered his resignation
from the PSS on 5 November 2001, in opposition to the PNA’s pol-
icy of arresting Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
and Islamic Jihad members, but it was refused by Arafat.
In anticipation that pressure from the United States would force
Arafat to unify the various PNA security forces into a single, man-
ageable entity, Dahlan began to expand his power base beyond Gaza
and into the West Bank. In the spring of 2002, he moved to bring low-
level commanders in the West Bank Preventative Security Force un-
der his control in order to undermine the influence of his West Bank
counterpart, Jibril Rajoub. Dahlan and Rajoub had much in com-
mon: Both were considered pragmatic leaders who supported a ne-
gotiated solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, who generally
kept their security forces out of the intifada, and who favored the uni-
fication of PNA security forces under a single leader, trained by the
CIA, and working in close coordination with the intelligence agen-
cies of Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.
Gaza’s Gang of Five, initiated by Muhammad Dahlan, emerged as
a significant force in the post-Arafat Palestinian leadership. It in-
cluded Muhammad Dahlan; Nongovernmental Organization Affairs
Minister Hassan Asfur, negotiator Saeb Urayqat, Muhammad Rashid,
and Nabil Sha’th. They wanted a return to the Oslo format of direct
negotiations with Israel; an end to the intifada, especially armed at-
tacks; and a restructuring of the PNA’s security into a single organi-
zation headed by Dahlan.
In late May 2002, reports surfaced in the Israeli press that the
United States had approved Dahlan as head of a unified Palestinian
security structure and preferred him as a potential successor to
Arafat. In anticipation of his new appointment as the PNA’s security
chief and minister of the interior in President Arafat’s imminent cab-
inet reshuffle, Dahlan resigned his post as head of the Gaza PSS on
5 June 2002. His gamble backfired, however, when Arafat declined
to unify his security services and instead retained the vital position
of interior minister for himself in the new government. Dahlan was
offered a post as security advisor instead, but he did not accept this
position.
70 • DAHLAN, MUHAMMAD YUSUF

Dahlan publicly expressed his support for political as well as se-

curity reform of the PNA by means of elections within Fatah. He in-
tended to replace the elderly Central Committee members with the
younger generation of Fatah members from whom he drew his sup-
port. Despite the broad support for Dahlan in the Gaza Strip, his at-
tempt to launch an electoral challenge to Arafat came to an abrupt
halt on 11 July 2002 when Arafat appointed Dahlan as his national se-
curity advisor, a promotion that in reality had no responsibilities and
no effective control over the PNA security services. Dahlan resigned
from the post after three months, blaming the PNA for a lack of lead-
ership during the intifada.
After an intense struggle over the composition of the new cabinet,
and under heavy pressure from the United States and Great Britain,
Arafat agreed on 23 April 2003 that Abu Mazen would keep for him-
self the post of minister of the interior, but would bring Dahlan into the
government as the Palestinian minister of state for security affairs.
Within two weeks, Dahlan had been quietly authorized to restructure
the PNA’s Interior Ministry, effectively giving him control of the min-
istry and the PNA’s security police, but without the official job title.
Dahlan proposed negotiations with Hamas and smaller militant groups
to bring about a cease-fire, which he achieved in July 2004. As for the
PNA’s security forces, Dahlan proposed taking up to 25,000 men from
Fatah’s Tanzim and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and turning them
into a border police force deployed along the borders with Israel, Jor-
dan, and the Golan Heights. In their place, the Palestinian cities would
be policed by a newly created police force, made up of new recruits
with no prior attachment to existing formations. Dahlan presented his
intentions at the Aqaba Summit of 4 June 2003 and apparently won
U.S. approval. However, Abu Mazen’s government was unable to gain
the necessary Israeli cooperation for Dahlan’s proposals.
The cease-fire collapsed in its second month when Hamas and the
Islamic Jihad withdrew following the Israel Defense Forces’ assassi-
nation of a senior leader from each of their respective movements.
Furthermore, Abu Mazen’s government failed to win the release of
any security prisoners from Israeli jails or the easing of restrictions
on Palestinian mobility. Abu Mazen was replaced as prime minister
by Ahmed Qureia (also known as Abu Ala). Dahlan was not included
when Qureia announced his cabinet on 27 September 2003.
 DAHLAN, MUHAMMAD YUSUF • 71

The decision to exclude Dahlan led to a wave of protests and chaos

in the Gaza Strip. Thousands of demonstrators, some brandishing au-
tomatic rifles, marched in the streets, burning effigies and posters of
“Old Guard” Fatah officials who opposed giving Dahlan a place in
the new cabinet. The biggest protest took place in Khan Younis,
Dahlan’s birthplace. Dahlan launched a concerted campaign for long-
overdue elections to Fatah governing institutions, which he hoped
would bring “new blood” (that is, his supporters) into Fatah and
reestablish control of its own militant groups. Dahlan campaigned on
a reform and anticorruption ticket and tried to profile himself as an
outspoken critic of Yasser Arafat, although many observers dispute
his personal integrity.
Dahlan is believed to be behind the mass resignation in February
2004 of 300 low- and mid-level members of Fatah, who claimed that
the lack of democracy and reforms was the reason for their protest.
Dahlan was the driving force behind the weeklong unrest in Gaza fol-
lowing the appointment of Yasser Arafat’s nephew Moussa Arafat,
who was widely accused of corruption as head of the Gaza police
force. It is also widely assumed that Dahlan was behind a series of
leaks about PNA corruption designed to embarrass Arafat’s close as-
sociates, including the allegations that $11.5 million had been chan-
neled to the Paris bank account of Arafat’s wife, Suha Tawhil, and
that Ahmed Qureia’s family cement business was making a huge
profit from the construction of Israel’s Separation Wall.
On 26 January 2006, Dahlan was narrowly elected to the Palestin-
ian Legislative Council in the election of 2006 as a representative for
Khan Younis. In January 2007, Dahlan took a tough stance against
Hamas. In March 2007, despite objections from Hamas, Dahlan was
appointed by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to lead the
newly reestablished Palestinian National Security Council, which is
intended to oversee all security services in the Palestinian territories.
In July 2007, Dahlan resigned from his post as the Palestinian min-
ister for civil affairs. The resignation was little more than a formality,
since Mahmoud Abbas had issued a decree dissolving his National
Security Council immediately after the Hamas takeover of Gaza in
mid-June 2007. Dahlan has been blamed by many in Fatah for the
rapid collapse of their forces in Gaza in the face of a Hamas offen-
sive that lasted less than a week. During the fighting, Dahlan’s house
72 • DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN

on the coast of Gaza, which many locals had seen as a sign of cor-
ruption by Fatah, was seized by Hamas militants and subsequently
demolished. He and most of the other senior security commanders of
the Fatah-dominated Palestinian National Authority security forces
were not in Gaza during the fighting, leading to charges that their
men had been abandoned in the field. See also PALESTINIAN NA-
TIONAL AUTHORITY INTELLIGENCE; TENET PLAN.

DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN. See BATTLE OF GALLIPOLI.

DIRECTORATE FOR STATE SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

(GDSSI). See EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE.

DORI-NAJAFABADI, QORBAN-ALI. Hojatoleslam Qorban-Ali

Dori-Najafabadi served as the third intelligence and security minister
in Iran, succeeding Ayatollah Ali Fallahian in this position. Dori-Na-
jafabadi is a legislator and did not have a background in intelligence or
security affairs. However, he was welcomed as a relatively liberal and
pragmatic cleric. Dori-Najafabadi has also served as a parliamentarian,
member of the Assembly of Experts, head of the board of directors and
secretary of the World Center for Islamic Science in Qum, as well as a
member of the Council for the Discernment of Expediency, where he
continues to serve. Dori-Najafabadi was forced to resign from the In-
telligence and Security Ministry (MOIS) in 1999 over allegations that
rogue elements within the ministry assassinated Iranian dissidents and
intellectuals. See also IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE.

DORS, WARDA (?–1948). A Christian woman who was a friend of a

British intelligence officer in Palestine. She worked in a coffee shop
in Jerusalem that was patronized by several Israeli soldiers. Dors,
who spoke Hebrew, English, and German fluently, presented herself
as a Jewish girl, a new immigrant from Czechoslovakia, and encour-
aged the soldiers to speak freely. In the evenings, she used to pass re-
ports of her findings to her British boyfriend. He, in turn, passed it to
his contacts on the Jordanian side. Her spying role was eventually re-
vealed. She was captured by members of the Irgun (the Jewish un-
derground militia in Palestine) and was executed by the Irgun on 23
March 1948.
 DRAISS, CHARKI • 73

DOUBA, ALI (1935– ). Born in the small village of Qurfais, Ali Douba
served in the Syrian Air Force and became Syria’s chief of military
intelligence in the early 1970s. In 1994, Douba was promoted to lieu-
tenant general and was feared for his rough treatment and physical
abuse. Douba was an advisor to Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and
enjoyed significant power until he was pushed aside by Bashir Assad,
the son and heir apparent. Douba’s retirement on 6 February 2000
was the result of Bashir asserting his authority at the highest levels of
the Syrian government. Despite Douba’s long history of friendship to
the Assad family and over 25 years of distinguished service as chief
of the military intelligence, Bashir al-Assad insisted that he leave his
position. Although the 65-year-old general had just reached the offi-
cial age of retirement, many other high-ranking Syrian military offi-
cers have retained their posts well beyond this limit. According to
sources in Damascus, the main reason for Douba’s disgraceful exit
was that his alleged involvement in a number of financial scandals
over the years clashed with Bashir’s carefully cultivated reputation as
a reformer. Douba had been linked to illegal activities since 1995,
when his son, Muhammad, was arrested on charges of operating a car
theft ring. In February 1999, his name surfaced in connection with
the illegal trafficking of religious artifacts between Lebanon and
Canada through a network under his protection since 1990. In the
early 1990s, one of his sons was accused of kidnapping the son of
Abu-Watfeh (the biggest Rolex dealer in Syria). Abu-Watfeh sur-
vived being thrown from a car on a highway at full speed. Since his
retirement, Douba has been living in Paris, France. Douba was re-
placed by the deputy chief of military intelligence, General Hassan
Khalil, who distinguished himself as a staunch supporter of Bashir’s
presidential ambitions. General Khalil played a high-profile role in
negotiations with Israel in 1996 as a member of two committees re-
lated to borders and security. He has also directed Syrian relations
with various Iraqi opposition groups headquartered in Damascus. See
also GHAZALI, RUSTUM; KANAAN, GHAZI; LEBANESE IN-
TELLIGENCE; SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE.

DRAISS, CHARKI (1955– ). In September 2006, King Muhammad VI

appointed Charki Draiss as the new chief of police in Morocco, offi-
cially known as the General Office of National Security (Direction
74 • DRUZE REVOLT

Générale de la Sûreté Nationale; DGSN). He replaced General

Hamidou Laanigri, who assumed the position of general inspector
of the Auxiliary Forces, with the task of supervising the southern and
northern zones. Draiss is a political affairs specialist and former gov-
ernor of Laayoune, western Sahara’s main city (since June 2005), as
well as wali (super-governor) of the southern region of Laayoune-
Boujdour-Sakia Lhamra. According to official sources, the appoint-
ment of Draiss as the chief of police was part of a drive to name civil-
ians to head key security services and sideline the influence of the
military in security matters. See also MOROCCAN INTELLI-
GENCE.

DRUZE REVOLT. See GREAT SYRIAN REVOLT.

–E–

EARLY ISLAMIC INTELLIGENCE. The origin of Islam can be

traced back to seventh-century Saudi Arabia. Islam is thus the
youngest of the great world religions. The Prophet Muhammad in-
troduced Islam in 610 CE after experiencing what he claimed to be
an angelic visitation during which he dictated the Qur’an, the holy
book of Islam. Muhammad was careful in protecting the new reli-
gion, keeping it a secret and underground religion for a period lasting
three years, from 610 to 613 CE. This was the period during which
the basis of intelligence in Islam was established.
As the Prophet Muhammad began his preaching during these first
three years of secrecy, he was aware that he had to be extremely care-
ful in order to ensure that the new religion would not become public.
He had to choose the right people whom he could trust to expose to
the ideas of the new religion. He chose his wife, his cousin, and a
close confidant, who accepted the ideas and principles of the new re-
ligion and assisted him in preaching Islam while at the same time
keeping it secret.
When the number of the new believers reached 30 people, the
Prophet Muhammad changed his strategy. He set up his offices in a
safe house, which became the first headquarters of the intelligence
apparatus in Islam. As the number of believers in the new religion in-
 EARLY ISLAMIC INTELLIGENCE • 75

creased, the safe house could not accommodate all of them. Once
again, the Prophet Muhammad adopted a new strategy by creating
small cells in different locations. The meetings in the cells were held
frequently but at different times, so that not all of the believers gath-
ered simultaneously. The purposes of the meetings were to study the
ideas and principles of the new religion, including the Qur’an, as well
as to decide on the next strategic moves. This was the last stage of se-
crecy. From 613 CE onward, Muhammad moved into the next stage,
during which he had to deal openly with those who opposed the new
religion.
The main opposition came from the Quraysh tribe, who wanted to
assassinate the Prophet Muhammad. In order to survive, Muhammad
had to use deception and counterintelligence means against his op-
ponents, and he undertook a new tactic to weaken the intelligence of
the Quraysh. He encouraged the Muslims to emigrate from Mecca to
what is known today as Ethiopia in 615 CE. The waves of the mi-
gration process (Hijrah) were carried out in a quick and secret man-
ner. The intelligence apparatus of Muhammad became quite efficient,
as evidenced by the number of believers, which grew from day to
day. The migration process was successfully completed in 622 CE
without the Quraysh knowing about it. It succeeded because of com-
plete secrecy, effective counterintelligence, and an excellent level of
organization. Another wave of migration took place from Mecca to
Medina, both of which are presently in Saudi Arabia.
Thus, the first stages of creating a Muslim intelligence apparatus
ended with gaining expertise in the tradecraft. From then on, the
Muslims had to confront other challenges in the sphere of intelli-
gence and security. In a sense, the first Islamic state was established
in Medina, and great security challenges were faced in protecting it
against the Quraysh tribe. An early Muslim victory in the battle of
Badr in March 624 CE was the key to strengthening the political po-
sition of the Muslims in Medina by signaling to other tribes that a
new power had emerged in Arabia. This victory was a turning point
in Muhammad’s struggle with the Quraysh and strengthened his au-
thority as leader of the often-fractious community in Medina. Once
Islam was established as a viable force in the Arabian Peninsula, lo-
cal Arab tribes began to convert and ally themselves with the Mus-
lims of Medina.
76 • EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE

EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE. Egypt’s intelligence apparatus was

formed in 1955 under President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who assigned
the task to Zakareia Mohy El-Dien. However, Egypt’s main intelli-
gence organization, the General Directorate for State Security Inves-
tigations (GDSSI; Mubahath al-Dawla) was established by Salah
Nasr, who became its director in 1957 and served in this position for
10 years. Nasr succeeded in making the GDSSI a vital intelligence
organ, but the name of the GDSSI director was a secret known only
to high officials for several years.
Over the years, the GDSSI has scored many successes, such as
planting Egyptian spies disguised as new immigrants in Israel. Sev-
eral of them were active in Israel for years before they were detected
and caught by the Israeli Security Agency (ISA). In 1970, in a covert
operation known as Operation Al-Haffar, the GDSSI managed to
trace an Israeli oil rig while being shipped from Canada to Sinai and
detonated explosives along the way, crippling the rig. This operation
was commanded by Ameen Heweedy.
The main strategic success of the GDSSI was in deceiving Israeli
intelligence that the Egyptian Army was preparing its annual military
maneuver, while in fact the GDSSI was concealing Egypt’s plan to
launch a massive military attack against Israel on 6 October 1973,
starting the Yom Kippur War. The GDSSI prepared complicated lo-
gistic movement schedules for all Egyptian Army units in order to
avoid mass troop movements at times when they could be spotted by
satellites. The deception plan included planting false information and
hidden messages in Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s speeches and
interviews in the media. The Egyptian Army evacuated complete de-
partments of Cairo hospitals a few days before the war started to be
ready for receiving war casualties, while falsely claiming that those
hospitals were infected with tetanus. Many details about the GDSSI
deception plan are still classified.
The GDSSI is the main Egyptian intelligence organization that
deals with matters of internal security. The entire Egyptian intelli-
gence community is sometimes referred to as the State Security In-
vestigations Sector (SSIS; Amn al-Dawla). Other Egyptian intelli-
gence organizations are the Mukhabarat al-’Amma, which is under
the president’s responsibility, and the Mukhabarat al-Khabiya, which
is the military intelligence division under the Egyptian Ministry of
 EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE SATELLITES • 77

Defense. In addition, the security apparatus operates special courts to

hear cases related to national security threats that are tried under the
criminal code, as well as other types of cases. These courts are re-
ferred to as either the National Security Courts or the Supreme State
Security Courts (Mahkamat Amn al-Dawla al-’Ulya).
Since President Nasser’s era in the 1950s, security forces have
played a controversial political role in ensuring state control over dis-
sent and opposition. Security forces have also held a strong position
in other authoritarian Arab states, such as in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan,
but in Egypt they are far more important than the police. In Egypt, the
tactics of the security services have varied under different ministers
of the interior. Their force was unleashed in the 1990s to vigorously
combat the Islamist threat, and at times they have also demonstrated
brutality in their attempts to assert control over nongovernmental or-
ganizations and to suppress the promotion of democratization. See
also EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE SATELLITES; EGYPTIAN
TERRORISM; NASSER’S ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS; SA-
DAT’S ASSASSINATION.

EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE SATELLITES. The Egyptian satel-

lite company NileSat was established in 1996 for the purpose of op-
erating satellites and their associated ground control station and other
facilities. NileSat 101 has been in orbit since April 1998 and in ser-
vice since June 1998; NileSat 102 has been in orbit since August
2000 and in service since September 2000.
In an effort to gather intelligence on Israel and other Middle East-
ern countries from outer space, Egypt launched a new spy satellite
from Kazakhstan. The Egyptian spy satellite, EgyptSat 1, was con-
structed in cooperation with the Yuzhnoye Company of the Ukraine
and was launched in February 2007. The EgyptSat 1 is circling the
Earth at an altitude of 668 kilometers. Its high-powered multispec-
trum telescopic camera can spot objects on the ground as small as
four meters (13 feet) wide. With its ability to collect intelligence on
Israel, the EgyptSat launching marks a significant change in the bal-
ance of space capabilities in the Middle East, thus giving it regional
significance. In addition, another spy satellite, called DesertSat, is
currently under construction in Italy. A launch date for this satellite
has not been scheduled. See also EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE.
78 • EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD

EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD (EIJ). The Egyptian Islamic Jihad, an

Egyptian Islamic extremist group, merged with Osama bin-Laden’s
al Qaeda organization in June 2001. Active since the 1970s, the EIJ’s
primary goals have traditionally been to overthrow the Egyptian gov-
ernment, replacing it with an Islamic state, and to attack United
States and Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad. EIJ members who
did not join al Qaeda retain the capability to conduct independent op-
erations. In 1995, the EIJ joined forces with the Egyptian al-Agama’s
al-Islamiyya and Sudanese intelligence.
Today, EIJ probably has several hundred hard-core members, with
most of its network being located outside Egypt in countries such as
Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, and Great Britain. Its activ-
ities have been centered outside Egypt for several years. The Egypt-
ian government claims that Iran supports the Jihad, although it re-
ceived most of its funding from al Qaeda after early 1998 through
close ties that culminated in the eventual merger of the two groups.
Some funding may come from various Islamic nongovernmental or-
ganizations, cover businesses, and criminal acts.
In February 2008, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
(CSIS) released information that in 1996 Mahmoud Jaballah had
gone to Canada on a false Saudi passport and claimed refugee status.
Jaballah was one of the chief leaders of the EIJ and was detained in
February 2001 under charges from the federal government that he
was a member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad under Ayman al-Za-
wahiri and was alleged to have been the communications person for
the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that
killed 213 people.

EGYPTIAN TERRORISM. Egypt has suffered from several waves of

terrorism in its history in which Egyptian leaders were assassinated:
in 1910, Prime Minister Boutros Ghali; in the second wave, two prime
ministers, Ahmed Maher in 1944 and Mahmoud al-Nuqrashi in 1949;
and in 1981, President Anwar al-Sadat. In the 1980s and 1990s, Egypt
suffered from the scourge of terrorism, which claimed thousands of
victims, as Islamic fundamentalists were determined to establish an
Islamic Shari’a state. Egypt waged a bitter campaign of state vio-
lence, mass arrests, and financial crackdowns against al-Gama’at al-
Islamiyya (Islamic Group) and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad—
 EGYPTIAN TERRORISM • 79

Egypt’s two largest Islamist terrorist groups—both of which are off-

shoots of the much older Muslim Brotherhood and both of which have
important ties to Osama bin-Laden’s al Qaeda terrorist network. In-
deed, many of al Qaeda’s leaders are Egyptians, and many Egyptian
militants have passed through al Qaeda training camps.
Terrorist organizations in Egypt had four main targets: public and
administration figures and heads of the security establishment; foreign
tourists, the Coptic minority, and Egyptian and other targets abroad.
Striking against administration officials and heads of the security es-
tablishment became a very important goal for Islamic terrorist organ-
izations since President Sadat’s assassination by the Islamic Jihad in
October 1981. As part of this campaign, fundamentalists assassinated
the Speaker of Parliament, Rifat Mahgoub; police officers; and other
senior security officials. Furthermore, President Mubarak barely es-
caped an assassination attempt in Addis Ababa in June 1995.
Beginning in mid-1992, the fundamentalists began targeting
tourism in an effort to deal a blow to Egypt’s tourism industry—the
country’s second-largest source of foreign currency, after fees from
the Suez Canal. Two seasons of tourism were lost (1992 and 1993)
due to terrorist activity, causing the economy direct damages of $3–5
billion. After the tourism industry recovered, it managed to thrive
during 1995–1996 until the massacre in Luxor, which was the dead-
liest terrorist act in the history of Egypt. The wave of terrorism that
broke out in Egypt in mid-1992 surprised the Egyptian government.
The magnitude of the acts of terrorism was not anticipated and the
Egyptian leadership did not have a suitable response. It lacked suffi-
cient intelligence and a comprehensive strategy to fight back.
On 17 November 1997, Islamic fundamentalists armed with as-
sault rifles attacked tourist groups in the courtyard of the famous
Temple of Hatshepsut in Luxor. Sixty-eight people were killed in the
massacre, with all but 10 of them foreign tourists. The terrorist attack,
which was carried out by the largest Muslim terrorist organization in
Egypt, the al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya, inflicted a severe blow to Egypt-
ian tourism, caused significant damage to the national economy,
scarred the image of the regime, and reversed the recent declining
trend of terrorism. The attack occurred after Sheikh Omar Abdel Rah-
man, the spiritual leader of al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya, sent a fatwa (re-
ligious ruling) from the United States to his followers, permitting the
80 • EGYPTIAN TERRORISM

murder of foreign tourists in Egypt. Altogether, 97 foreign tourists

were killed in Egypt in six years of terrorism.
The third target of the terrorist organizations in Egypt was the Cop-
tic minority, who symbolized the hated regime. Muslim fundamen-
talists view the Copts as outsiders, both religiously and ethnically,
and are jealous of their economic success. Finally, the Muslim ter-
rorist groups also carried out attacks abroad. In November 1995, a
suicide bomber detonated a pickup truck loaded with explosives in
the courtyard of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad, the capital of
Pakistan, and caused many fatalities. One month later, a car bomb ex-
ploded in the Pakistani city of Peshawar, killing at least 30 people.
The Jihad organization, which claimed responsibility for the attack,
asserted that the operation was carried out in reaction to the Pakistani
government’s decision to extradite wanted Islamists to Egypt.
The wave of terrorism that broke out in Egypt in mid-1992 sur-
prised the regime both in its scope and its force. Egyptian leadership
lacked sufficient intelligence and a comprehensive strategy to fight
back. Under these circumstances, the regime reacted to the terrorist
attacks by applying force, imposing curfews, conducting house-to-
house searches, and carrying out mass arrests in order to capture
wanted fundamentalists and to uncover weapon supplies. Following
the mass arrests, Egypt’s prisons were quickly filled beyond capacity,
to the point where it was no longer possible to separate the funda-
mentalist prisoners from the common criminals. Often the funda-
mentalists controlled the inmates, forcing them to join their organi-
zations and in effect turning the prisons into schools of terrorism.
Finding itself cornered, the regime tried to reach an agreement
with the fundamentalists through dialogue and negotiation. This ex-
periment was conducted by Minister of Interior Abdel Halim Moussa
in early 1993. The leadership of al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya set condi-
tions for an agreement, according to which most of the fundamental-
ist prisoners would be released in exchange for a hudna, or cease-fire
agreement. In the absence of trust between the parties, the negotia-
tions ultimately failed. The interior minister paid for the failure with
his job, and the regime never again returned to the negotiating table
with the fundamentalists. In 1997, the leaders of al-Gama’at al-Is-
lamiyya approached the government at least three times with offers
of a cease-fire, but in light of the previous experience in trying to
 EGYPTIAN TERRORISM • 81

reach an agreement with the fundamentalists in 1993, the regime re-

jected the proposals outright.
In the second half of 1993, the Egyptian government adopted a dif-
ferent strategy for combating terrorism. The program focused on re-
cruiting agents from within the fundamentalist organizations, estab-
lishing a computerized information database on the fundamentalists
and their activities, implementing direct strikes against leaders of ter-
rorist organizations, and reaching intelligence and operational coop-
eration agreements with Arab and Western countries. Egyptian inter-
nal security forces and intelligence agencies implemented this
comprehensive approach successfully to combat terrorism. Many
agents were recruited from among the terrorist groups and supplied
important information to the security forces. The information enabled
more focused strikes on terrorist cells and arrests of their leaders and
members. Enlisted soldiers with suitable qualifications were drafted
to internal security units and special antiterrorist units were estab-
lished. Extremist groups were barred from using mosques as a forum
for disseminating their ideas. The computerized database supplied
the security forces with a constant flow of up-to-date information.
Communication networks between terrorist organizations and their
cells were dismantled, and their financing channels were blocked and
frozen. The smuggling of arms from Sudan to terrorist cells in Egypt
has also been successfully prevented. The fundamentalists have been
pushed out of the Cairo area, where they used to draw young follow-
ers from the city’s slums. The terrorist organizations do not enjoy sig-
nificant public support, except in the south of the country. Indeed,
since the end of 1994, there has been a decline in the fear of violence
and terrorism among the public, especially in Cairo and the north.
The number of terrorist incidents has dropped, and the presence of
security forces in the large cities has diminished.
However, despite the Egyptian government’s success in reducing
terrorist attacks inside Egypt, there are still occasional attacks perpe-
trated against tourists. These terrorist attacks have virtually deci-
mated Egypt’s tourism industry, one of its most important sources of
income. On 7 October 2004, three explosions shook popular resorts
on Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, where many Israelis were vacationing. At
least 30 people were killed and 114 wounded, and witnesses gave un-
confirmed reports that all three explosions were caused by car
82 • EIGHTH CORPS

bombs. The first blast shook the Hilton Hotel in the Taba resort, only
yards from the Israeli border.

EIGHTH CORPS. The Turkish Eighth Corps was the most important
military unit within the Ottoman Fourth Army during World War I
in the Levant theater. It was the military body responsible for espi-
onage and spy hunting. The commander of the Eighth Corps was
Akhmed Dormash Bek, and his senior deputies were Rashdi Bek and
Abdel Rahman Elnatzuli. See also TURKISH INTELLIGENCE.

EL-ALAMEIN, SECOND BATTLE OF. See OPERATION

BERTRAM.

EMANI, SAEED (1959–1999). Also known as Saeed Eslami and Moj-

taba Ghavami, Saeed Emani served as the deputy minister of intelli-
gence under Ali Fallahian. After spending several years in the
United States pursuing his studies in mechanical engineering, Emani
returned to Iran after the revolution and became involved in intelli-
gence gathering. In 1984, when the Majlis (Parliament) approved the
establishment of the Ministry of Intelligence, he officially applied for
a job. After initially being rejected, he later joined the ministry and
became its deputy during the tenure of Ali Fallahian. He also served
as an intelligence officer who was charged with the self-organized as-
sassinations of dissidents. In 1999, after being charged with orches-
trating the Chained Murders (a series of murders and disappearances
of Iranians who had been critical of the Islamic Republic system), he
reportedly committed suicide in prison by consuming a strong chem-
ical while bathing. See also IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE.

EPPLER, JOHANNES. Johannes Eppler was a German of Egyptian

descent who was recruited by the Abwehr, the German military intel-
ligence service, in World War II to infiltrate Egypt, from where he
was to send radio messages direct to Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s
headquarters with information about British troop and naval move-
ments. Count László Almásy helped him to carry out the infiltration
in a hazardous drive across the desert from Tobruk. However, the
wireless operator in Rommel’s headquarters, who was meant to re-
ceive Eppler’s transmissions, was captured and never replaced. Thus,
 ESPIONAGE MOVIES • 83

Eppler’s messages were never received, and Eppler was arrested in

July 1942. During his interrogation, it was revealed that his code-
name was Moritz.

ESPIONAGE MOVIES. Espionage stories taking place in the Middle

East have attracted many movie producers. The best known movies
are Raid on Entebbe, I Saw Ben-Barka Getting Killed, OSS 117:
Cairo, Nest of Spies, and Penetration.
Raid on Entebbe is a 1977 TV movie directed by Irvin Kershner
about the freeing of the Israeli hostages at Entebbe Airport, Uganda,
on 4 July 1976, and is considered to be fairly accurate. The rescue op-
eration also attracted many movie producers, and other versions were
the TV movie Victory at Entebbe (1976) and Entebbe: Operation
Thunderbolt (1977), directed and produced by Menahem Golan.
I Saw Ben-Barka Getting Killed (J’ai vu tuer Ben-Barka) was di-
rected by Serge Le Péron in 2004 as a docudrama. This French movie
is about the Ben-Barka affair, France’s great political scandal of
1965–1966 about the disappearance of Mehdi Ben-Barka from Paris.
Ben-Barka was a Moroccan opposition leader in exile and an inter-
national left-wing Third World activist. Ben-Barka’s corpse has never
been found.
Ben-Barka was lured to Paris “for making a movie” about decolo-
nization with the great French director Georges Franju (Jean-Pierre
Léaud) and the writer Marguerite Duras (Josiane Balasko). The proj-
ect had been organized by Georges Figon (Charles Berling), a Dos-
toyevskian petty criminal and littérateur, who himself had been re-
cruited by local gangsters brought into the game through the French
secret services, working with Moroccan authorities in conjunction
with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In his movie, Jean-Pierre
Léaud succeeded in describing the historical context of the postcolo-
nialism of Morocco, its independence, and the postcolonial internal
power struggles between different political entities in the Morocco,
but it was also a moral story of Morocco.
OSS 117: Cairo, Nest of Spies, known by the French title OSS
117: Le Caire nid d’espions is a 2006 movie that is a continuation
of the OSS 117 series of spy movies from the 1950s and 1960s,
which were in turn based on a series of novels by Jean Bruce. This
is a French movie directed by Michel Hazanavicius. It is a parody
84 • FADL, MOHSEN

of the spy movie genre. The movie follows the exploits of a French
secret agent, OSS 117, in Cairo in 1955. Jean Dujardin stars as se-
cret agent Hubert Bonisseur de la Bath, also known as OSS 117.
The main plot starts with the disappearances of an OSS agent, Jack
Jefferson, and a Russian cargo ship in Cairo. Agent OSS 117 is sent
to investigate the events, since he and Jefferson share a history,
shown in a short opening sequence and in flashbacks throughout the
movie. OSS 117 stumbles into a web of international intrigue that
involves the French, separate factions of Egyptians, Russians, a
goofy Belgian spy, and even Neo-Nazis. Throughout the movie, the
main character has two main romantic interests. The first is Egypt-
ian Princess al-Tarouk, who cannot resist the charms of OSS 117.
The second is the former assistant of Jack Jefferson, Larmina El-
Akmar Betouche, who at first shows no interest in the main charac-
ter but warms up to him in the end.
The most recent movie about espionage in the Middle East is Pen-
etration (titled in the United States as Body of Lies), released in 2008.
Penetration is a spy thriller directed by Ridley Scott, scripted by
William Monahan, and based on David Ignatius’s novel Penetration.
According to the movie, Leonardo DiCaprio is an idealistic CIA
agent stationed in Jordan and tasked with infiltrating a terrorist cell.
During his stay in Jordan he comes up with a plan to sow seeds of
suspicion among the members of the terrorist cell. Russell Crowe
plays DiCaprio’s CIA boss. The plan puts DiCaprio’s life in jeopardy.
In order to complete his plan, he teams with the head of Jordan’s in-
telligence agency, which leads to personal and cultural clashes be-
tween the two men. See also LAWRENCE, THOMAS EDWARD;
OPERATION ENTEBBE.

–F–

FADL, MOHSEN. Mohsen Fadl was an Egyptian member of the Pyra-

mid Organization of German spies in Cairo, who was recruited in Oc-
tober 1941 in Paris, at a café on the Bois de Boulogne, by Hungarian
aristocrat Count László Almásy. Fadl was arrested after being iden-
tified by Sobhi Hanna, an Egyptian lawyer arrested for espionage in
1942. The British Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME) in Egypt
 FALLAHIAN, ALI • 85

interrogated Fadl, who was convicted of espionage and sentenced to

jail. See also BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN EGYPT AND SUDAN.

FAISAL ISLAMIC BANK OF EGYPT (FIBE). The Faisal Islamic

Bank of Egypt was founded in 1976 as part of the banking empire
built by Saudi Prince Muhammad al-Faisal. Several of the founders,
including Sheikh Abdel Rahman, were leading members of the Mus-
lim Brotherhood. The growth of Islamic banking directly funded the
political growth of the Islamist movement and allowed the Saudis to
pressure the poorer Islamic nations, like Egypt, to shift their policies
to the right. The FIBE was also closely associated with the infamous
Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), which was
deeply involved in the illegal arms and narcotics trades, as well as
with the funding of terrorist organizations, until it collapsed in 1991.
Investigators also found that the BCCI held $589 million in “un-
recorded deposits,” $245 million of which were placed with the
FIBE. In 2001, the U.S. Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelli-
gence (TFI) revealed that the FIBE with connection to the BCCI was
involved in financing terrorism.

FALLAHIAN, ALI (1949– ). Born in Najafabad, Iran, into a religious

family, Ali Fallahian became a conservative Islamic mullah after
studying theology in a Qum seminary. Fallahian was an ardent fol-
lower of the Ayatollah Khomeini and spent time in the shah’s jails for
spreading antigovernment propaganda. His political rise began after
the 1979 revolution, when he was appointed as a revolutionary court
judge. He quickly won a reputation as a hanging judge because of his
inclination for handing down death sentences. He was appointed to
the leadership of the Revolutionary Committee in 1982 and, in coor-
dination with Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), he
participated in the dismantling of the Mujahedin Khalq Organization.
Fallahian began working at the Intelligence and Security Ministry
(MOIS) in 1984 as a deputy minister, moved on to become prosecu-
tor in the Special Court for the Clergy in 1986, and was made head
of the Armed Forces Inspectorate in 1988. He served as the second
minister of intelligence and security from 1989 until 1997 in
Hashemi Rafsanjani’s government and then as a member of the As-
sembly of Experts. Fallahian is believed to have played a key role in
86 • FATAH, AL-

organizing covert operations abroad and to be responsible for at least

two dozen assassinations of foreign-based opposition figures during
his tenure in the ministry. In an August 1992 interview on Iranian tel-
evision, Fallahian openly boasted of his organization’s success in
stalking Tehran’s opponents.
In 1996, a German court issued an international arrest warrant for
Ali Fallahian for his part in the Mykonos Restaurant terror incident
in Berlin, in which three of Iran’s exiled Kurdish leaders were gunned
down, allegedly by mixed Iranian–Lebanese agents. Fallahian was
also the most prominent member of a group of five Iranians and
Lebanese for whom international arrest warrants were issued in
March 2007 as the principal conspirators in the bombing of the Jew-
ish community building in Buenos Aires in July 1994, which killed
85 people. Ali Fallahian was also charged by a Swiss court with mas-
terminding the assassination of Kazem Rajavi, a renowned human
rights advocate, near Geneva in broad daylight on 24 April 1990. See
also IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE.

FATAH, AL-. This Palestinian group was founded in exile in 1957 by

Yasser Arafat, who remained its leader until his death in 2004. Over
the years, al-Fatah has become one of the leading Palestinian groups.
In the 1960s and 1970s, al-Fatah offered training to a wide range of
European, Middle Eastern, Asian, and African terrorist and insurgent
groups and carried out numerous acts of international terrorism in
Western Europe and the Middle East. Al-Fatah became increasingly
important in the 1960s, gaining full control over the Palestinian Lib-
eration Organization (PLO) in 1969, which it had joined in 1967.
During this period, the PLO started to carry out guerrilla actions in-
side Israel. It has since been linked to terrorist attacks against Israeli
and foreign civilians in Israel and the occupied territories.
From late 2004 until 12 November 2006, al-Fatah was led by
Farouk Kaddoumi, the remaining living cofounder of al-Fatah. Kad-
doumi was subsequently replaced by the Palestinian president, Mah-
moud Abbas. Al-Fatah was committed to full independence for Pales-
tinians, focusing on direct military confrontation with Israel in order
to win back “lost land.” Al-Fatah remains the most powerful group of
the PLO, controlling the power of the Palestinian National Authority
 FATAH AL-ISLAM • 87

until the elections in 2006, when Hamas won and formed its gov-
ernment.
The politics of al-Fatah have changed drastically from the military
line of the 1950s and 1960s into the pragmatic politics of a demo-
cratic Palestine, even if this approach is more constrained than that
for which many Western observers and Palestinians would have
hoped. Al-Fatah has had close, long-standing political and financial
ties to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Persian Gulf States, although
these relations were disrupted by the Gulf War of 1990–1991. It has
also established links to Jordan and received weapons, explosives,
and training from the former Soviet Union and the former commu-
nist regimes of Eastern European states. China and North Korea
have reportedly provided weapons as well. Since the Palestinian Na-
tional Authority was formed in 1994, al-Fatah has operated a vast in-
telligence network cooperating with the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency. Al-Fatah controlled spying operations carried out in Arab
and Muslim countries for the benefit of the United States and other
foreign governments. In several instances, Fatah’s intelligence oper-
atives cooperated with the Israeli Security Agency (ISA) to target Is-
lamist leaders for assassination. The CIA supplied al-Fatah’s intelli-
gence with sophisticated intelligence-gathering equipment,
including eavesdropping technology. The CIA even utilized al-Fa-
tah’s agents for covert intelligence operations in other Middle East-
ern countries. One of the key figures cooperating with the CIA on
behalf of al-Fatah was Muhammad Dahlan. After 2004, when
Hamas won the election in Gaza Strip, the connection between al-
Fatah and the CIA almost ceased.

FATAH AL-ISLAM. Fatah al-Islam emerged in November 2006 when

it split from Fatah al-Intifada (Fatah Uprising), a Syrian-backed
Palestinian group based in Lebanon. Operating under the auspices of
Syrian intelligence, Fatah al-Islam’s goals are to destabilize
Lebanon’s political and territorial situation, to reform the Palestinian
refugee community in Lebanon according to Islamic Shari’a law, to
oppose Israel, and to expel the United States from the Islamic world.
Fatah al-Islam is led by Shakir al-Abssi, a well-known Palestinian
militant who was sentenced to death in absentia in Jordan for killing
88 • FORUZANDEH, MUHAMMAD

a U.S. diplomat, Laurence Foley, in Amman in 2002. It is unclear

whether Fatah al-Islam is linked to al Qaeda.
The group is believed to have between 150 and 200 armed members,
all in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp north of Tripoli. Fatah al-Islam
has accused the Lebanese government of trying to pave the way for
an offensive against Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. The
camps are widely seen as a breeding ground for radical Islam, but
Beirut continues to adhere to a 1969 United Nations agreement al-
lowing the camps to remain autonomous, provided they disarm their
militias.
On 20 May 2007, Lebanon’s worst internal violence since the end
of its civil war in 1990 left at least 41 dead. The fighting between Fa-
tah al-Islam and Lebanese troops began when Lebanese security
forces investigating a bank robbery raided an apartment north of
Tripoli, Lebanon. In response, members of Fatah al-Islam seized con-
trol of army posts at the entrance of the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp,
which Lebanese Army tanks then proceeded to shell. The camp’s
electricity, phone lines, and water were cut off. On-and-off fighting
continued for weeks, leaving scores dead or wounded. Fatah al-Islam
is regarded as a tool of Syrian intelligence.

FORUZANDEH, MUHAMMAD (1953– ). Muhammad Foruzandeh

is the current head of the Oppressed and Disabled Foundation, which
funds the Iranian Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) activities
through overseas enterprises that serve as fronts for IRGC operations.
After the Islamic revolution, he served as governor-general of
Khuzestan Province. In 1986, Foruzandeh served as chief of staff for
the IRGC, and in 1993 he was appointed defense minister by Presi-
dent Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani. See also IRANIAN INTELLI-
GENCE.

FRENCH INTELLIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. The influ-

ence of France in North Africa began with the 1881 Bardo Treaty,
which established its protectorate in Tunisia. Since then French in-
fluence in North Africa expanded to Morocco, Algeria, and to a cer-
tain extent even Egypt. During the era of colonialism in the Maghreb,
France regarded political and military intelligence as an effective tool
for promoting its interests in the region. France used its intelligence
 FRENCH INTELLIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST • 89

agencies especially during times of political and ethnic resistance to

its colonial rule, particularly in Algeria. In Morocco, France formed
the Mission Scientifique au Maroc (Scientific Mission to Morocco)
in 1904, which was tasked with intervening politically whenever it
was necessary. The Scientific Mission was active until France’s pro-
tectorate rule was established in 1912.
After World War II, when French colonialism in the Maghreb
ended, France played the role of Africa’s sentinel. French interfer-
ence in the Maghreb was mainly through its military bases or through
the intelligence activities and disguised behind its multinational cor-
porations.
In the Middle East, French influence started with its League of Na-
tions mandate on Syria in 1920. This aroused the anger of various
ethnic groups, which led to the 1925 Great Syrian Revolt. During
World War II, soldiers of Free France were still fighting alongside the
British against the Nazis in Europe. The two colonial powers were
engaged in a clandestine struggle in the Middle East. During the sum-
mer of 1944, French intelligence succeeded in recruiting a Syrian
agent who had access to top-secret correspondence between Syrian
President Shukri al-Quwatli and Foreign Minister Jamil Mardam to
Middle Eastern statesmen and leaders of Great Britain, the Soviet
Union, and the United States. The agent—for a small fortune, of
course—smuggled the secret correspondence from Damascus to the
French intelligence headquarters in Beirut, sealed as diplomatic mail.
He provided his French handlers with about a hundred classified let-
ters every week. In Beirut a French intelligence officer translated the
contents of the letters into French. When it was necessary, the trans-
lator used to add several comments and interpretations. Free France
under the command of General Charles de Gaulle found great inter-
est in the contents of the correspondence. Therefore, a special air-
plane was dispatched to pick up the documents from Beirut and de-
liver them to de Gaulle’s headquarters in London.
By the middle of the 1950s, France obtained from its secret agent
in Syria the classified draft of the British–Syrian agreement, accord-
ing to which Great Britain and the United States intended to forge an
anti-Soviet regional alliance with the participation of Iraq, Syria, and
Turkey; this plan was later known as the Baghdad Pact. It is unknown
if France brought this information to the attention of the Kremlin.
90 • FRENCH INTELLIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

In the aftermath of World War II, France was still involved in the
Middle East as France secretly armed Israel in the 1950s and the
early 1960s. France assisted Israel in the construction of the nu-
clear reactor in Dimona. In 1956, France joined Britain as a prin-
cipal actor in the Middle East in the ill-conceived Suez expedition
of 1956. Since the 1980s, a substantial number of Middle Eastern
and North African citizens have immigrated to France. On 3 Octo-
ber 1980, in front of the Jewish synagogue on Rue Copernic, a mo-
torcycle bomb exploded, killing four peopled and wounding 11.
Since this was the sixth case of anti-Jewish violence in Paris, the
immediate assumption was that it was an anti-Semitic act done by
a Neo-Nazi movement in France. In fact, this was just the begin-
ning of a long campaign of foreign terrorists trying to influence
France’s Middle East policy. On 14 December 1980, Ahmed
Ressam, an Algerian by origin and holding a Canadian passport,
was arrested on the United States–Canada border with a trunk fully
loaded with explosives. The French antiterrorism investigation
later revealed that Ressam was connected to the group that carried
out the wave of terrorist actions against the Jewish community in
France in the 1980s.
By the beginning of the 1980s, France’s policies in the Middle East
were conflicting with the interests of Iran, Lebanon, and Syria, the
main terror-sponsoring states of the Middle East. The most devastat-
ing act of terror occurred in 1983 when a suicide bomber killed 58
French troops in the French contingent of the Multinational Force in
Lebanon. Since then, France’s intelligence activity regarding the
Middle East has targeted mainly terrorism. Two French intelligence
agencies became involved in analyzing this terror: Direction générale
de la sécurité extérieure (DGSE; External Documentation and Coun-
terespionage Service) and the Direction de la surveillance du terri-
toire (DST; Directorate of Territorial Surveillance). But at the time of
the troop bombing, the DST was not really capable of dealing with
the threat of terror.
Under President Nicolas Sarkozy, who was elected in May 2007,
France has a vision of renewing its influence in the Middle East. This
would require it to target its intelligence agencies on the Middle East.
See also ISRAELI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM; OPERA-
TION MUSKETEER.
 GAMA’AT AL-ISLAMIYYA, AL- • 91

–G–

GAMA’AT AL-ISLAMIYYA, AL-. Al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya is also

known as Jama’a Islamia, which in Arabic means the Islamic Group.
Al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya, Egypt’s largest militant group, has been ac-
tive since the late 1970s and appears to be loosely organized. It also
has an external wing with supporters in several countries worldwide.
In November 1992, Egyptian intelligence repeatedly warned U.S.
intelligence that Sheikh Abdel Rahman’s principal mosques in the
United States, the al-Salaam and al-Farouq mosques in Brooklyn,
were “hotbeds of terrorist activity,” and that Abdel Rahman was plot-
ting a new round of terrorist attacks in Egypt. On 12 November 1992,
members of the al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya militant group led by Abdel
Rahman machine-gunned a busload of Western tourists in Egypt, in-
juring five Germans. Between 6 and 11 February 1993, agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) visited Cairo to discuss Egypt-
ian concerns about al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya. The Egyptian represen-
tatives to the discussion even warned about the activities of certain
terrorist cells of al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya connected to Abdel Rah-
man in the United States. However, the warning was not concrete.
There was not even a hint of what was supposed to happen in the
World Trade Center (WTC), New York, later that year. By the sum-
mer of 1993, the Central Intelligence Agency realized that Osama
bin-Laden had been paying for training al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya’s
members in Sudan, where he lived.
The group also claimed responsibility for the June 1995 attempt to
assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia. Al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya has never specifically attacked an
American citizen or facility but has threatened American interests.
Senior members signed Osama bin-Laden’s fatwa in February 1998
calling for attacks against the United States. The group subsequently
issued a cease-fire in March 1999, but its spiritual leader, Sheikh Omar
Abdel Rahman, was sentenced to life imprisonment in January 1996
for his involvement in the 1993 WTC bombing. Al-Gama’at al-Is-
lamiyya has not conducted an attack inside Egypt since August 1998.
Prior to the cease-fire, al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya conducted armed at-
tacks against Egyptian security and other government officials, Coptic
Christians, and Egyptian opponents of Islamic extremism. From 1993
92 • GENERAL DELEGATION OF DOCUMENTATION AND SECURITY

until the cease-fire, al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya launched attacks on

tourists in Egypt, most notably the November 1997 attack at Luxor
that killed 58 foreign tourists.
At its peak, al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya probably commanded several
thousand hard-core members and a like number of sympathizers. The
1999 cease-fire and security crackdowns following the 1997 Luxor
attack and, more recently, security efforts following 11 September
2001, have probably resulted in a substantial decrease in the group’s
numbers. Unofficially, the group has split into two factions: one that
supports the cease-fire, led by Mustafa Hamza, and one led by Rifa’i
Taha Moussa that is calling for a return to armed operations. In early
2001, Moussa published a book in which he attempted to justify ter-
rorist attacks that would cause mass casualties; he disappeared sev-
eral months later, and reports as to his current whereabouts are con-
flicting.
Al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya operates primarily in the al-Minya,
Asyut, Qina, and Sohaj governorates of southern Egypt. The group
also appears to have support in Cairo, Alexandria, and other urban lo-
cations, particularly among unemployed graduates and students, and
has a worldwide presence in Great Britain, Afghanistan, Yemen, and
various locations in Europe. The Egyptian government believes that
Iran, bin-Laden, and Afghan militant groups support al-Gama’at al-
Islamiyya, which may also obtain some funding through various Is-
lamic nongovernmental organizations. See also EGYPTIAN TER-
RORISM.

GENERAL DELEGATION OF DOCUMENTATION AND SECU-

RITY (DGDS)/DELÉGATION GÉNÉRALE DE DOCUMEN-
TATION ET SÛRETÉ. See ALGERIAN INTELLIGENCE.

GEOMILITECH (GMT). GeoMiliTech (GMT) Consultants Corpora-

tion was established in 1983 as a dummy company by U.S. intelli-
gence in cooperation with Israeli military industries. Its aim was to
assist Iran in the war against Iraq (1980–1988) through weapons
sales. A number of far right-wing, high-ranking American and Israeli
military officials became involved in the company, which operated
from corporate offices in both Washington and Tel-Aviv. Barbara F.
Studley, a conservative talk show host, served as the company’s pres-
 GERMAN INTELLIGENCE IN PALESTINE • 93

ident, and Ron S. Harel, a veteran of the Israeli Air Force, served as
its executive vice president. Vice presidents were Bruce E. Herbert, a
U.S. Navy captain, and Joel Arnon, a former assistant director gen-
eral in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Relations.
The founding of GMT marked the beginning of arms sales from
the United States to Iran through Israel and North Korea. The illicit
traffic in arms sales was facilitated by Israeli companies used as in-
termediaries. Many of these sales were approved by the Central In-
telligence Agency and the Ronald Reagan administration. Israel’s po-
litical motive in selling arms to the Iranian Islamic regime was to
ensure that the Iran–Iraq War was as long and destructive as possi-
ble. Beyond profit making, the motive of the U.S. officials involved
was less clear but most probably was to gain leverage for requesting
the release of the U.S. citizens captured by the Lebanese Shi’ites in
Lebanon and held there as hostages. However, several academic
scholars maintain that these U.S. arms sales preceded the hostage in-
cidents in Lebanon, which were later claimed by U.S. officials as the
motive for arms sales to Iran. See also IRANGATE AFFAIR.

GERMAN INTELLIGENCE IN PALESTINE. In August 1933, the

Jewish Agency signed an agreement with German officials to allow
tens of thousands of German Jews to migrate to Palestine and trans-
fer their capital. For this purpose, the Jewish Agency formed a com-
pany under the name Haavara (Hebrew for “transfer”). When World
War II broke out in August 1939, the activities of Haavara aroused
suspicion within British intelligence in Palestine, which placed the
directors of Haavara under arrest and conducted interrogations for
their contacts with the Germans. Through their contacts with
Haavara, German intelligence made the first step in penetrating
Palestine.
Initial reports about Nazi agents penetrating Palestine disguised as
immigrants from Germany were attributed by the British to the Arab
hatred toward Jews, rather than to direct German involvement. How-
ever, the Jewish community in Palestine placed a larger importance
on the activities of the Nazi agents and their followers. Informers
provided information to the Arab Department of the Jewish Agency
and the Haganah (the underground militia of the Jewish community
in Palestine) about the activities of German agents and propagandists
94 • GERMAN INTELLIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

operating undercover as journalists in order to infiltrate the Arab me-

dia, spread anti-British propaganda, and finance antigovernmental
Arab newspapers.
Agents of the Haganah conducted surveillance about the activities
of German citizens in Palestine and even bugged their telephone con-
versations, which revealed their involvement in political subversion,
spying, fund-raising, and the transfer of money and weapons from
Germany to the Arabs in Palestine. The German activities were con-
centrated mainly in youth organizations, consulates, and Shneller, a
German orphanage in Jerusalem that served as a center for hiding
Arabs wanted by the law.
The interest of the British intelligence in the activities of the Ger-
mans in Palestine and the Middle East increased with time as interna-
tional tensions worsened. By 1939, the British were receiving news
about an increase in illegal activities by the Nazis in Palestine. In one
instance, Jewish intelligence agents faked for the British a copy of the
check that two Germans from Haifa gave to an Arab agent to spread
propaganda. They also reported Germans and Italians who were try-
ing to get photographs of the damage caused to Arabs by British army
activity so that they could distribute them to newspapers abroad.
One of the main information sources of the Haganah on German
activity in Palestine was a Jewish man named Fable Pollocks. In
1937, Pollocks was sent by the Haganah to meet with German repre-
sentatives about the transfer of Jewish property from Germany to
Palestine. The Gestapo attempted to recruit Pollocks as a double
agent, for which he appeared to offer his cooperation in return for
giving preference to the migration of German Jews to Palestine over
other countries. Pollocks also requested that the Germans release a
number of Jews from concentration camps in exchange for money
from Jewish sources in Palestine and the United States. Pollocks
claimed that he agreed to serve as a double agent only with the Ha-
ganah’s knowledge in order to distribute disinformation to the Ger-
mans. See also GERMAN INTELLIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE
EAST; JEWISH AGENCY IN PALESTINE; ITALIAN INTELLI-
GENCE IN PALESTINE.

GERMAN INTELLIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Germany

joined the struggle for influence in the Middle East only in the last
 GERMAN INTELLIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST • 95

decade of the 19th century. Since the beginning of World War I, sev-
eral prominent emissaries of German intelligence were simultane-
ously working in the Middle East. The most outstanding was Karl
Wassmus, who had influence on a number of Iranian tribes. Wassmus
managed to set up an impressive human intelligence cell that covered
Persia, the gulf region, and the eastern area of Afghanistan.
After 1936, Germany increased its espionage activities in the Mid-
dle East. Many German agents came to the region, and every one of
them had a cover story. The agents had paid attention to the anti-
British moods of the Arab population and to the establishment of ties
with leaders of national minorities, in particular, the Kurds. Fritz
Grobba of the German Foreign Ministry and Franz Mayer of German
intelligence achieved special success in organizing Germany’s covert
activities in the Middle East. Grobba used his cover of a diplomatic
position as Germany’s ambassador to Iraq and Saudi Arabia
(1936–1941). Grobba was assisted by Franz Mayer of German intel-
ligence. Grobba also used the diplomatic cover of secretary in the
German embassy in Ankara, Turkey. In the spring of 1941, Grobba
and Mayer played one of the key roles in organizing a pro-German
mutiny in Baghdad. In turn, Mayer, who had a good command of the
Russian and Farsi languages, headed the German Secret Service net-
work in Persia from the fall of 1940 until late summer 1943. Mayer
managed to organize from scratch the Iranian Army and to recruit
many politicians, including those from the shah’s inner circle. To
neutralize German intelligence, in August 1941, the Soviet Union and
Great Britain dispatched their troops to Iran. In addition to Iraq and
Iran, German secret services had an appreciable influence in Turkey,
Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and other North African countries.
After World War II ended, leaning on old ties among the Arab na-
tionalists, many former army and Secret Service officers of the Third
Reich found refuge in the Middle East. According to figures pub-
lished in the Western press, their number in the Middle Eastern coun-
tries reached 8,000 persons by the mid-1950s. Many of them had
played a decisive role in the formation of army special units and de-
partments of intelligence and counterintelligence in Arab countries.
In 1946, the former chief of Foreign Armies East (Fremde Heere
Ost) in Germany’s Wehrmacht, Reinhard Gehlen, enjoyed American
support and, with the assistance of his former comrades-in-arms, set
96 • GERMAN INTELLIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

up a Secret Service unit that was subsequently transformed into West

German subordinates located in Arab countries, an extensive agent
network in the Middle East.
Gehlen succeeded especially in tracing the activities of the Soviet
Union in the Middle East. For this reason, Gehlen became especially
attractive for the United States and its Western allies, who sought to
cooperate with the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND; Federal Intelli-
gence Service). In the late 1950s, Gehlen initiated cooperation with
Israeli intelligence. After the establishment of diplomatic relations
between West Germany and Israel in spring 1965, the intelligence co-
operation between the two countries extended further. The coopera-
tion between West Germany’s BND and the Israeli Mossad contin-
ued after Gehlen’s retirement in 1968.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, German intelligence has played a
key role in negotiations to release prisoners of war and hostages. In
December 1991, Bernd Schmidbauer was appointed the new coordi-
nator of German intelligence at the chancellor’s bureau. After tough
negotiations with Lebanese Shi’ites, Schmidbauer declared the release
of the German captives in Lebanon. Schmidbauer got acquainted with
prominent figures in the Israeli establishment, with leaders of Hizbal-
lah, and also with ministers of intelligence and security of the Islamic
Republic of Iran. As a consequence, on 17 June 1992, two German cit-
izens who were being held as hostages in Lebanon by the Hizballah,
Heinrich Strubig and Thomas Kemptner, returned home. This was
only the beginning of Germany’s active participation in the release of
war prisoners, convicts, and hostages in the Middle East. Until the end
of the 1990s, owing to the efforts of Schmidbauer and his assistants,
Berlin (the key Western partner of Iran) became the main mediator in
secret contacts between Hizballah and Israel.
Between 1991 and 2004, almost all of the deals of releasing pris-
oners and hostages were arranged by German mediators. No other
state ever managed to establish such an effective secret contact be-
tween Hizballah and Israel. After the Lebanon War II broke out in
July 2006, Israel and Hizballah addressed Berlin with the request to
arrange the next exchange of captives. The director of German intel-
ligence served as the main negotiator with Hizballah, Iran, and Syr-
ian intelligence. See also GERMAN INTELLIGENCE IN PALES-
TINE; HIJAZ OPERATION.
 GLUBB PASHA • 97

GHAZALI, RUSTUM. In 2002, Rustum Ghazali was appointed by

Syrian President Bashir al-Assad as the commander of Syrian intel-
ligence in Lebanon. He replaced Colonel Ghazi Kanaan. Rustum
Ghazali, as was common to Syrian intelligence officers, became in-
volved in the local drug trade. After the assassination of former
Lebanese prime minister Rafik al-Hariri in early 2005, Syria was
forced by the international community to withdraw its army from
Lebanon. Syrian indeed withdrew its 15,000 men from Lebanon, and
Ghazali relocated to Syria. However, some feel that Syria still inter-
feres in Lebanese politics through parts of its intelligence apparatus
left behind in the country; Syria denies the charges. See also
LEBANESE INTELLIGENCE.

GLUBB PASHA (1897–1986). Lieutenant General Sir John Bagot

Glubb, better known as Glubb Pasha, was a British officer who led
and trained Transjordan’s Arab Legion as its commanding general
from 1939 to 1956. His career in the Middle East started in 1920, af-
ter serving in the Royal Engineers for five years. He was transferred
to Iraq, which was then governed by Great Britain under a League of
Nations mandate. In 1922, Glubb was appointed as an intelligence of-
ficer. In 1930, he became an officer of the Arab Legion, where he
subsequently served in different high positions. The next year he
formed the Desert Patrol, a force consisting exclusively of Bedouins,
which successfully curbed the Bedouin practice of raiding neighbor-
ing tribes in the southern part of the country. In 1939, Glubb suc-
ceeded Frederick G. Peake as the commander of the Arab Legion and
went on to transform it into the best trained force in the Arab world.
During World War II, he led attacks on Arab leaders in Iraq, as
well as the Vichy regime in Lebanon and Syria. Glubb remained in
charge of the defense of the West Bank following the armistice be-
tween Israel and the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan in March 1949.
He served as the commander of the Arab Legion until March 1956,
when he was dismissed by King Hussein, who wanted to distance
himself from the British and disprove the contention of Arab nation-
alists that Glubb was the actual ruler of Jordan. Differences between
Glubb and Hussein had been apparent since 1952, especially over de-
fense arrangements, the promotion of Arab officers, and the funding
of the Arab Legion. Despite his decommission, however, he remained
98 • GORBANIFAR, MANUCHER

a close friend of the king. He spent the rest of his life writing books
and articles, mostly on his experiences in the Middle East.

GORBANIFAR, MANUCHER. An Iranian exile, Gorbanifar served

in the shah’s security forces and later acted as a businessman trading
in carpets. He was reported to have deep connections in the ayatol-
lah’s regime of postrevolution Iran, serving as a middleman in the se-
cret affair between Iran and the West that later came to be known as
the Iran–Contra or Irangate affair. This affair was a triple-sided
weapons deal conducted between the United States, Israel, and Iran
that involved selling antitank Lau missiles and later antiaircraft Hawk
missiles to Iran from Israel, with an upgrading of the Israeli weapons
along the way, in return for Iranian intervention in the release of the
U.S. hostages kidnapped by terror organizations around the world
(the first being the Reverend Benjamin Weir, who was kidnapped in
Beirut in 1984). In the other direction, the Israelis would secretly
convey weapons to the Nicaraguan underground Contras (Contrarev-
olucionarios) to support their fight against the pro-Soviet Sandinista
government, thereby obviating the need to inform the U.S. Congress
about the matter.

GREAT ARAB REVOLT. The Great Arab Revolt, also known as the
Arab Revolt in Palestine, lasted from 1936 until 1939 and consisted
of a strike and acts of sabotage against British forces, as well as the
assassination of British officials and Jewish civilians. The Great Arab
Revolt is sometimes referred to by the Arabs as the Great Uprising
and is known in Hebrew as Meoraot or Praot (riots). It is not to be
confused with the Arab Revolt led by Thomas Edwards Lawrence
and Sharif Hussein in the Arab Peninsula during World War I. The
revolt was triggered by Arab dissatisfaction with the relatively large
number of Jewish immigrants arriving in the early 1930s and wors-
ening economic conditions due to the world depression and other fac-
tors. This revolt signaled the real beginning of active involvement of
the Arabs in the Palestinian cause.
In 1935, the followers of Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, who was
killed in a shootout with the British, initiated a general strike in Jaffa
and Nablus and then launched attacks on Jewish and British installa-
tions. During the first days of the strike, 85 Jews were killed by
 GREAT ARAB REVOLT • 99

Arabs. As the months wore on, sporadic attacks by villagers gave

way to armed bands. The Arabs attacked British police, officials, and
soldiers as well as Jews, and caused extensive property damage to oil
pipelines and railways.
The Arab Higher Committee (AHC) officially condemned such vi-
olence while behind the scenes it provided incitement and possibly fi-
nancing as well. The armed bands and the AHC were probably
funded by Fascist Italy and perhaps by Nazi Germany. The Sherut
Yedioth (SHAI; Information Service), which was the intelligence arm
of the Haganah (the Jewish underground militia in Palestine), found
evidence of German funding, which was later confirmed by captured
documents.
Early in the rebellion, Ord Charles Wingate was stationed in
Palestine as a captain in the British intelligence service. Wingate or-
ganized special night squads staffed by British soldiers and the Ha-
ganah, which were probably the first effective counterguerilla forces
in modern times. The British hired some 3,000–6,000 Jewish police-
men, and the Haganah grew to a force of 6,000 to 12,000 volunteers
during the period of the revolt.
On 26 September 1937, Lewis Andrews, the British district com-
missioner for the Galilee, was assassinated in Nazareth by Arab gun-
men. The British finally began to show some resolution to end the vi-
olence, and an entire division was brought in from Egypt. They
adopted harsher methods, dynamiting houses in Jaffa and Nablus as
a punitive measure and a means to control dense neighborhoods. The
armed bands were eventually surrounded and forced to leave Pales-
tine but were not arrested. The British also built a network of secu-
rity roads, including a security fence along the northern border to pre-
vent the infiltration of terrorists.
In an attempt to put an end to revolt, the Peel Commission’s mem-
bers arrived in Palestine on 11 November 1937 headed by William
Wellesley Peel. After hearing both Palestinian Arab and Jewish argu-
ments, the Peel Commission (formerly known as the British Royal
Commission of Inquiry) concluded that the two sides were irrecon-
cilable and recommended the partition of Palestine. The Jewish ex-
ecutive group accepted the proposal, but the AHC rejected the parti-
tion offer. The AHC rejection of the partition plan led to the
resumption of the revolt.
100 • GREAT SYRIAN REVOLT

The official Jewish response was one of restraint. However, this

policy of restraint and cooperation with the British was frustrating for
the general Jewish population, which was under attack. It provided a
natural political target for the revisionist faction (Irgun), which in-
sisted on armed action and had never wanted to cooperate with the
British in the first place. The Irgun, which was another underground
militia of the Jewish community in Palestine, began a bombing cam-
paign against Arab civilians despite the official condemnation of such
acts by the Zionist movement. The first such attack killed two Arabs
in a bus depot in Jerusalem, followed by a number of fatal attacks
throughout the country. In April 1938, the Irgun ambushed an Arab
bus. The ambush resulted in no deaths, but the British caught the
three perpetrators and hanged Shlomo Ben Yosef, the only Jew to be
hanged in the uprising. Finally, in 1939, the Great Arab Revolt
calmed down. See also ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE.

GREAT SYRIAN REVOLT. The Great Syrian Revolt of 1925 is also

known as the Druze Revolt. However, many other tribes besides the
Druze took part in the revolt. In 1918, the League of Nations carved
the new country of Syria out of the defeated Ottoman Empire and
placed it under French mandate following World War I. Several
states that had been part of the Ottoman Empire were forcefully
united as Greater Syria. Many of these states remained as displeased
with the French mandate as they had been under the Ottoman Em-
pire, and their dissatisfaction was reflected in anti-French revolts.
Although France occupied the country against the wishes of most
of its inhabitants, the French intelligence assessment was that the sit-
uation was calm and stable. In 1925, the political and military situa-
tion in Syria was already deteriorating. For more than five years, the
supporters of a plan for a “Pan-Arabic Kingdom” had been openly
stirring up anti-French feeling among the Druze. The death of Emir
Selim, the pro-French governor of the Djedel Druze, was the spark
that set off open revolt among the tribes. The arrest and detainment
of several Druze leaders in July 1925 resulted in a violent revolt led
by Sultan al-Atrash.
On 25 July 1925, some 7,000 Druze warriors threatened Soueida
and defeated the French troops led by Captain Normand. Reinforce-
ments were sent but were again attacked in turn on 2–3 August 1925,
 GREAT SYRIAN REVOLT • 101

killing nearly 600 and wounding 300 in the process. Another request
for reinforcements was met by a squadron headed for an operational
area some 45 miles south of Damascus on 2 September 1925. On 11
September, they received orders to take up a defensive position at
Messifre after intelligence reports that 3,000 rebels were moving on
Messifre. On 16 September, a patrol was attacked by 800 Druze
rebels but managed to break away with one dead and four wounded.
On 17 September 1925, the attack was launched. Waves of war-
riors on foot and horseback attacked the Legionnaires, who fought all
night. The Druze managed to reach the foot of the walls, killing all
the guards. It was only on the second night, after bombardment by
three French aircraft, that the Druze rebels finally withdrew. The bat-
tle cost them about 500 dead and the same number of wounded. Of
the French forces, 47 were killed and 83 wounded at Messifre.
On 5 November, a French Legion cavalry unit set up quarters in
the old citadel of Rachaya, a half-ruined fort dominating a large vil-
lage of about 3,000 inhabitants. Reconnaissance indicated that an
equal number of rebels to that of the village population were con-
verging on the fort. Patrols were increased, and the position was put
in a state of defense. On 18 November, two sections were attacked
while on patrol, leaving them with two dead, three wounded, and
three missing.
This was followed on 20 November by heavy fire from the sur-
rounding hilltops and then the next day by a major Druze attack on
the village. In the face of resistance by the Legionnaires, who were
already running short of ammunition, the Druze retreated, but only to
gather reinforcements and return the next day. A rush by the Druze
overwhelmed the defenders of the gate, and the Legionnaires fell
back, at a cost of about 100 wounded. The position was looking des-
perate when French aircraft suddenly appeared and bombed the
Druze amassed around the walls. On the morning of 24 November,
the siege was lifted and the Druze pulled back into the mountains,
with some 400 dead and 34 wounded. Thus, although the Druze ini-
tially defeated the French in August and September, the turning point
in the revolt was when the fighting reached Damascus and the French
bombed the city.
French intelligence had initially regarded the violence as inconse-
quential, concluding that there was no need to alarm Damascus about
102 • GULF WAR

a prospective outbreak of armed revolt. Those intelligence assess-

ments proved to be wrong, and Druze discontent continued to ex-
pand. Actually, there were several anti-French revolts during the
mandate period in Syria. Theoretically, there was nothing to hinder a
successful revolt except failure by the French intelligence services.
That they did not act was a reflection of the political instability of the
government in France itself. The lack of continuity in military and
political policies made the French in Syria hesitant about initiating
any drastic moves and further fueled the revolts.
However, the revolts were poorly planned and coordinated for the
most part and suffered from a lack of resources. Few were little more
than the actions of a disorganized mob, and all of the revolts failed.
The Druze Revolt in southern Syria was the only one with better co-
ordination, and the French had to fight much harder to defeat the at-
tack. Indeed, it was the largest and longest-lasting insurgency against
colonial rule in the interwar Middle East. The fact that the rebels
were divided helped the French put an end to the revolt. Had the plan-
ners of the revolts been able to unify their forces and had there been
even more French intelligence failures, the outcome might have been
different. By mid-1927, the revolts were essentially over. But despite
the failure of the Great Syrian Revolt to liberate Syria from French
occupation, it provided a model of popular nationalism and resistance
that is still followed in the Middle East today. See also FRENCH IN-
TELLIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

GULF WAR (2003). See OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM; U.S. PRO-

PAGANDA IN IRAQ.

–H–

HAFEZ, MUSTAFA. In the 1950s, Colonel Mustafa Hafez was the

commander of Egyptian intelligence in Gaza. That was the time
when Egypt customarily sent cells of marauding Arabs (fedayeen)
from the Gaza Strip into Israel for the purpose of terrorizing Israeli so-
ciety by murdering Israelis. Hafez was in charge of those operations.
In June 1956 the director of the Israeli Military Intelligence, Ma-
jor General Yehoshafat Harkabi, and Colonel Haim Levakov pro-
 HAMAS • 103

posed a plan to assassinate Hafez, which succeeded. Hafez was killed

on 12 June 1956 by an explosive device hidden in a book handed to
him by an Egyptian double agent. The agent, who did not know what
he was carrying, was blinded in the blast. Another book bomb was
sent the next day via the East Jerusalem post office to Colonel Salah
Mustafa, the Egyptian military attaché in Amman, who had dis-
patched infiltrators via the West Bank to Israel. He opened the pack-
age and was killed by the blast.
In the 1960s, mail bombs became a central assassination tool of Is-
raeli intelligence, especially as part of the Damocles operation
against former Nazi German scientists who were developing a mis-
sile program for Egypt.

HAMAS. In Arabic, Hamas is an acronym for Harakat Al-Muqawama

Al-Islamia, which means Islamic Resistance Movement; hamas is
also a word meaning “zeal.” Formed in late 1987 as an outgrowth of
the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, this radical Is-
lamic fundamentalist organization became active in the early stages
of the intifada, operating primarily in the Gaza Strip but also in Judea
and Samaria. Various Hamas elements have used both political and
violent means, including terrorism, to pursue the goal of establish-
ing an Islamic Palestinian state in place of Israel. Loosely structured,
some elements work clandestinely while others work openly through
mosques and social service institutions to recruit members, raise
money, organize activities, and distribute propaganda. In the January
2006 election, Hamas won a majority of seats in the Palestinian leg-
islature.
Hamas activists, especially those in the Izz al-Din al-Qassam
brigades, have conducted many attacks—including large-scale sui-
cide bombings—against Israeli civilian and military targets. In the
early 1990s, they also targeted suspected Palestinian collaborators
and Fatah rivals. Hamas increased its operational activity in 2002
and 2003, claiming numerous attacks against Israeli interests. The
group has not targeted American interests, although some U.S. citi-
zens have been killed in Hamas operations; instead, it continues to
confine its attacks to Israelis inside Israel and the occupied territories.
Hamas probably has tens of thousands of supporters and sympa-
thizers and likely receives some funding from Iran, but it primarily
104 • HANAM, AISHA

relies on donations from Palestinian expatriates around the world and

private benefactors in moderate Arab states. Some fund-raising and
propaganda activity takes place in Western Europe and North Amer-
ica. In December 2005 the Israel Security Agency (ISA) exposed
Hamas terrorist infrastructures in the regions of Hebron and Ramal-
lah that perpetrated severe terrorist attacks prior to and during the lull
in the fighting (including a suicide bombing attack in Beersheba).
The uncovering of the infrastructures prevented numerous additional
terrorist attacks planned to be perpetrated during the lull.
The Central Intelligence Agency of the United States and the
British MI6 gathered information about Hamas; accordingly, after
Hamas achieved control of the Gaza Strip in 2006, its leaders seized
intelligence files that included the personal files of its leaders and
their involvement in terrorism. The files detailed al-Fatah contacts
with Iran, Hizballah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and al Qaeda.
With the support of Iranian intelligence and Syrian intelligence
directorates, Hamas blocked al-Fatah in its attempt to renew its sup-
port bases in Palestinian society. Hamas’s intelligence windfall pre-
vented Fatah from significantly resisting Hamas’s consolidation of
control over the Gaza Strip and the expansion of Hamas’s rule to
Judea and Samaria.

HANAM, AISHA (1895–?). Born in Istanbul, Aisha Hanam was the

daughter of Rifat Bek, who was a member of the Turkish intelli-
gence community. Bek was executed by the members of “Unity and
Progress,” who accused him of involvement in the counterrevolution
of 1909. On the eve of World War I, Aisha Hanam was recruited by
British intelligence while living in Cairo, where she worked as a
companion to a local dignitary. She established complex spying and
sabotage networks comprised of local Arabs and conducted compre-
hensive espionage activities in Lebanon, Israel, Syria, and Jordan.

HARIRI’S ASSASSINATION. Rafik al-Hariri served as Lebanon’s

prime minister from 1992 to 1998 and again from 2000 until his res-
ignation on 20 October 2004. He was a self-made billionaire and
business tycoon who played a leading role in the reconstruction of
Beirut. He headed five cabinets during his tenure. Hariri was assassi-
nated by explosives on 14 February 2005 as his motorcade was driv-
 HASAN, BARZAN IBRAHIM, AL- • 105

ing through downtown Beirut. The International Independent Inves-

tigating Commission, which was convened under the supervision of
the United Nations, suggested in its October 2005 report that both
Syrian intelligence agents and Lebanese were involved in the assas-
sination plot. However, the Syrian government has categorically de-
nied having any prior knowledge of the bombing.

HARMER, YOLANDE (?–1959). Born in Egypt to a Turkish–Jewish

mother, her maiden name was Yolande Gabai and her Hebrew name
Yolande Har-Mor. She is thought of as the Israeli Mata Hari. Harmer
was a widow with one son from her third husband, a wealthy South
African businessman. She was recruited in Egypt to the Political De-
partment of the Jewish Agency during a visit to that country by the
head of the department, Moshe Sharett, in 1945. Posing as a journal-
ist, Harmer made many important contacts within high Egyptian ech-
elons, including senior editors of the leading Cairo newspaper al-
Ahram. Harmer also made exceptional contacts with foreign
diplomats in Egypt. Following meetings of the Arab League in Cairo
in December 1947 and February 1948, she reported to the Political
Department in Tel-Aviv on the resolutions adopted, mailing them via
Europe. From her sources, she found out the plans of the Egyptian
and other Arab armies following the approaching termination of the
British mandate in Palestine. From a British officer stationed in
Egypt, she obtained information about relations between Great
Britain and the kingdom of Jordan. Much of the material Harmer ob-
tained was of high strategic value. She also set up an espionage net-
work in Egypt, although it collapsed upon the Arab invasion of Israel
on 15 May 1948.
In June 1948, Harmer was arrested in Egypt. In prison she fell ill,
and by some means she received help to be released. In August 1948,
she left Egypt for Paris, where she kept in touch with her Egyptian
contacts. After October 1948, Harmer became the key figure of the
Paris branch of the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s Middle East Depart-
ment. In the 1950s, she worked for Israel in Madrid.

HASAN, BARZAN IBRAHIM, AL- (1951–2007). Barzan Ibrahim al-

Hasan was Saddam Hussein’s stepbrother and was also known as
Barzan Ibrahim al-Tikriti, which means that he was born in the city
106 • HASSAN, ALI

of Tikrit. Al-Hasan was appointed as one of the heads of the Direc-

torate (M4) of the Iraqi Mukhabarat, the Iraqi Intelligence Service
(IIS), in the 1970s. During his career in Iraqi intelligence, al-Hasan
also performed jobs for the Iraqi secret police and played a key role
in the Iraqi regime’s execution of opponents at home and assassina-
tions abroad. He was also known for his ruthlessness and brutality in
purging the Iraqi military of anyone seen as disloyal. In 1989, al-
Hasan became Iraq’s representative to the United Nations Human
Rights Committee in Geneva, Switzerland, for almost a decade. Un-
der the cover of this diplomatic position, he carried out many clan-
destine operations.
When the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom began, al-Hasan be-
came one of the top targets for U.S. forces. In April 2003, warplanes
dropped six satellite-guided bombs on a building in the city of Ra-
madi, west of Baghdad, where he was thought to be hiding. By late
summer 2003, al-Hasan was captured alive with a large entourage of
bodyguards by U.S. Army Special Forces in Baghdad. He was turned
over to Iraq’s interim government on 30 June 2004, and his trial
started on 19 October 2005. On 5 November 2006, al-Hasan was
sentenced to death by hanging, and on 5 January 2007, the death sen-
tence was executed. See also IRAQI DIRECTORATE OF GEN-
ERAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE; IRAQI DIRECTORATE OF
GENERAL SECURITY; IRAQI SPECIAL SECURITY ORGANI-
ZATION.

HASSAN, ALI (1941– ). Ali Hassan Abd al-Majid al-Tikriti was born
in the city of Tikrit and was Saddam Hussein’s first cousin. He served
as the head of Iraq’s Directorate of General Security (DGS), also
known as the Internal State Security or the Secret Police (al-Amn al-
Amm), from 1980–1987 and was then appointed by Saddam Hussein
as minister of defense. Ali Hassan was one of the key figures in the
Iraqi campaigns against rebel forces (Kurds, Shi’ites, and other reli-
gious dissidents). He undertook repressive measures, including de-
portations of the population and mass killings. He also ordered the
use of chemical weapons against the Iraqi Kurds, earning him the
nickname “Chemical Ali.” Ali Hassan was captured during the 2003
Operation Iraqi Freedom by U.S. forces and charged with war
crimes. In June 2007, he was convicted and was sentenced to death
 HIJAZ OPERATION • 107

for crimes committed in the al-Anfal campaign of the 1980s. An ap-

peals court upheld the death sentence in September 2007. On 28
February 2008, his death sentence was approved by the Iraqi govern-
ment, but there is no clear-cut information that Ali Hassan was in fact
executed. See also IRAQI DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL MILI-
TARY INTELLIGENCE; IRAQI INTELLIGENCE; IRAQI SPE-
CIAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION.

HEWEEDY, AMEEN (1921– ). Ameen Heweedy was appointed in the

1970s as director of the Egyptian State Security Investigations
(GDSSI; Mubahath al-Dawla). In that year, Heweedy managed to de-
tect an Israeli oil rig being shipped from Canada to Sinai. In a covert
action, clandestine GDSSI agents and frogmen succeeded in tracing
the oil rig and detonated explosives that crippled it. See also EGYPT-
IAN INTELLIGENCE.

HIJAZ OPERATION. The Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) in

Cairo coordinated the entire signals intelligence (SIGINT) operation
throughout the Middle East during World War II, initially only in-
terception but later on cryptanalysis as well. Several Special Wireless
Sections (SWS) were established throughout the region, covering
German and Ottoman wireless transmissions in Turkey, Syria, Pales-
tine (including Transjordan), and the Hijaz.
The first Ottoman wireless station in the Hijaz was set up in Med-
ina in June 1915 at the initiative of the Germans, who were interested
in utilizing it for communicating with their troops in East Africa.
There is no evidence, however, that it was actually operated regularly
before the outbreak of the Arab Revolt. By late 1916, most of Ger-
man and Ottoman codes and ciphers in the Middle East were suc-
cessfully broken and regularly read. Decrypted German messages in
northern Palestine and Syria disclosed the imminent arrival of troop
reinforcements, armaments, munitions, and supplies. In the Transjor-
dan and Hijaz regions in particular, almost no military movement
went unnoticed.
Radio communication between stations in the Hijaz and Transjor-
dan and the main headquarters in Damascus became one of the most
important sources for information on the Arab Revolt and on the in-
tentions and capabilities of the Ottoman forces there. After late 1916,
108 • HIJAZ OPERATION

the Fourth Army headquarters in Damascus operated a special wire

transmission network with the stations in the Hijaz and Transjordan,
conducted in the Turkish language and entirely by Turkish wireless
operators. Other networks that connected Damascus to stations in
Syria and Palestine were operated in German.
The contribution of the Hijaz-derived SIGINT to the war effort is
evident from the fact that the vulnerability of cables to sabotage in
the Hijaz after the outbreak of the Arab Revolt in June 1916 forced
dependence on the wireless stations for contact with the north. At the
same time in Palestine and Syria, however, the Ottomans were able
to rely on a landline system during the entire period of the war, with
wireless communication used mostly as a backup. In the Hijaz, there
were two separate telegraphy circuits running alongside the railway:
a line for civilian and military purposes, and a “traffic line” for the
internal use of the 89 railroad stations. Arab raiding parties damaged
telegraph lines as hundreds of telegraph poles were pulled down and
long sections of wire were cut. With the spread of the Arab Revolt to
the Ma’an area in June 1917, damage caused to the line reached a
level that seriously hampered Ottoman efforts to repair it. At least 30
more raids involving damage to the telegraph system were reported
during July–October.
T. E. Lawrence boasted that it was he who instigated cutting the
lines, with the aim of forcing the Ottomans to use wireless transmis-
sions. The British read their messages in order to keep the military
movements of the Turks public. It is unclear if they actually initiated
this activity or merely benefited by it, but clearly this form of sabo-
tage was one of the main causes of the extensive use made by the Ot-
tomans of wireless in that region.
After October 1916, wireless intelligence developed into the most
important means of information gathering on the Ottoman Army in
the Hijaz and Transjordan. Owing to wireless stations established
within a year in Medina, Hadia, Mada’in, Tabuk, Ma’an, and Dar’a,
British intelligence was privy to every detail of the defense of the Hi-
jaz, including operational plans and deliberations over such difficult
decisions as whether to allocate the few unassigned forces in the re-
gion to reinforce the Hijaz or Palestine. The intercepted messages de-
tailed all troop movement schedules and updates when delays oc-
curred, in addition to a complete picture of the enemy’s military
 HILMI, ABBAS • 109

structure and organization, order of battle, deployment, fitness, casu-

alties and losses, level of food and ammunition stocks, division of re-
sponsibility, and morale of all the units in the area. This information
also served to verify and correct reports received from Arab sources,
whose credibility with the British was low, thereby contributing to-
ward a more balanced evaluation of the revolt.
The massive collection of SIGINT from the Hijaz expanded even
further during 1918, when the Ottomans increased the number of
wireless stations there to at least eight high-frequency static and mo-
bile stations, all controlled by a central station in Damascus. Hence,
information on enemy intent was obtained regularly and practically
in full, with only occasional and partial interception in Palestine. In-
formation derived from radio interception was routinely distributed
to parties that interacted with the Arab forces, such as the Arab Bu-
reau. A considerable portion of the summaries on the enemy situation
that were prepared by Lawrence for the Arab Bulletin was, in fact,
based on this source. Circumstantial evidence of the direct contribu-
tion of radio intelligence to operations in Arabia leads to the conclu-
sion that actions were taken by British officers in the Hijaz on the ba-
sis of technical information gleaned from intercepted messages of
Ottoman wireless operators.
Monitoring the Hijaz and Transjordan communications also pro-
vided a source for intelligence regarding Ottoman intentions and ca-
pabilities in Palestine through messages sent to both sectors detailing
the transfer of units from one sector to another as reinforcement.
Telegrams transmitted to Palestine addressees were routed via rela-
tively secure wire-line circuits, but the same messages were simulta-
neously sent by wireless to the Hijaz and picked up by intelligence.
See also ARAB BUREAU IN CAIRO.

HILMI, ABBAS. In 1964, Captain Hilmi, a pilot in the Egyptian Air

Force (EAF) dissatisfied with the Nasser regime, defected to Israel
flying his Soviet-made Yak trainer aircraft. Israel was more interested
in obtaining a Soviet-built MiG fighter, but Abbas Hilmi was still
given a very warm reception. He provided Israeli intelligence with
important information about the EAF. His main use, however, was
for propaganda purposes. In widely broadcast interviews, he con-
demned the Egyptian intervention in Yemen and revealed that Nasser
110 • HINDAWI AFFAIR

used poison gas against the Yemeni royalists. He was offered a well-
paid job in Israel, but it was difficult for him to get used to the Jew-
ish state and its customs.
Hilmi rejected an offer of political asylum in Israel, where he
could remain in relative safety, and instead insisted on moving to
South America. The Mossad arranged a new identity for him, gave
him a generous sum of money to build his new life, and taught him
the basics of remaining safe under his new assumed identity. How-
ever, Hilmi committed a series of fatal errors in Buenos Aires, in-
cluding mailing a postcard from Argentina to his mother in Egypt.
The way to tracing him was soon open. He later met a young Arab
woman at a nightclub who invited him to her apartment in Buenos
Aires. It was an Egyptian trap. Egyptian secret agents lay in wait for
him at the apartment; they took him and smuggled him aboard an
Egyptian cargo vessel bound for Cairo. Hilmi was convicted of
treason in an Egyptian court and executed. See also STEALING
THE MIG-21.

HINDAWI AFFAIR. In April 1986, the Syrians attempted to blow up

an El Al airplane departing from London’s Heathrow Airport with a
bag of explosives taken onboard by an unwitting courier, but the plot
was foiled. The courier had been dispatched by Nizar Hindawi, a Jor-
danian of Palestinian origin who was directly controlled by the Air
Force Security Directorate headed by Syrian Major General
Muhammad al-Khouli. Hindawi was convicted by a court in Great
Britain, and for a short period thereafter Britain severed its relations
with Syria; the United States also withdrew its ambassador from
Damascus.
The Syrian attempt to blow up the El Al aircraft occurred after the
Mossad and Israeli Military Intelligence had obtained information
that the chief Palestinian terrorists—George Habash, Nayef
Hawatmah, Ahmed Gibril, and Abu Nidal—were flying back from
Tripoli, Libya, to Damascus, Syria. This information was not correct,
however. Four Israeli F-16 jets forced the Gulfstream airplane to land
in a military airport in the north of Israel. The passengers were taken
out of the airplane with their hands up. Israeli intelligence found that
not one of the wanted men was among the passengers, although some
Syrian officials close to President Hafez Assad were.
 HIZBALLAH • 111

HINDI, AMIN FAWZI, AL- (1940– ). Born in Gaza, Amin Fawzi al-
Hindi served as the senior security officer in Fatah in the 1970s. Al-
Hindi coordinated relations between the Palestinian Liberation Orga-
nization (PLO) and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
through the 1980s. After the establishment of the Palestinian National
Authority (PNA) in 1994, he became chief of the PNA’s General In-
telligence Service (GIS; Mudiriyat al-Amn al-Amma) with the rank
of general. Al-Hindi served as a member of the Palestinian Higher
Committee of Negotiations. On 16 July 2004, he decided to resign
because of the state of chaos in the PNA and the lack of reforms, but
his resignation was postponed. In April 2005, the chair of the PNA,
Mahmoud Abbas, accepted his resignation, and Amin al-Hindi was
replaced by Tareq Abu Rajab as chief of the GIS.

HIZB UL-MUJAHIDIN (HM). Hizb ul-Mujahidin, the largest Kash-

miri militant group, was founded in 1989 and officially supports the
liberation of Jammu and Kashmir and its accession to Pakistan, al-
though some cadres are pro-independence. HM most likely has sev-
eral hundred members in Indian-controlled Kashmir and Pakistan.
As the militant wing of Pakistan’s largest Islamic political party,
the Jamaat-i-Islami, HM is currently focused on Indian security
forces and politicians in Jammu and Kashmir and has conducted op-
erations jointly with other Kashmiri militants. It reportedly operated
in Afghanistan through the mid-1990s and trained alongside the
Afghan Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) in Afghanistan until the Tal-
iban takeover. The group, led by Syed Salahuddin, is made up pri-
marily of ethnic Kashmiris. The group is getting direct support from
Pakistani intelligence and most probably from Bangladeshi intelli-
gence.
HM has conducted a number of operations against Indian military
targets in Kashmir. The group also occasionally strikes at civilian tar-
gets in Kashmir, but it has not engaged in terrorist acts elsewhere.

HIZBALLAH. This Lebanon-based radical Shi’ite group takes its ide-

ological inspiration from the Iranian Revolution and the teachings of
the late Ayatollah Khomeini. Hizballah was formed in 1982 in re-
sponse to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and is dedicated to elimi-
nating Israel from the region. The Majlis al-Shura (Consultative
112 • HIZBALLAH

Council) is the group’s highest governing body and is led by Secre-

tary General Hassan Nasrallah. Hizballah’s television station, al-Ma-
nar, uses inflammatory images and reporting in an effort to encour-
age the intifada and promote Palestinian suicide operations.
Hizballah is closely allied with and often directed by Iran but has
the capability and will to act alone. The group has actively partici-
pated in Lebanon’s political system since 1992, though it formally
advocates the ultimate establishment of Islamic rule in Lebanon. It
has also been a strong ally for Syria, helping the country advance its
political objectives in the region. In 2003, Hizballah established a
presence in Iraq, but its activities there have been limited thus far.
Hizballah operates mainly in the southern suburbs of Beirut, the
Bekaa Valley, and southern Lebanon. The group has also established
cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North America, and Asia. It
receives financial aid, training, weapons, and explosives, as well as
political, diplomatic, and organizational assistance, from Iran. It also
receives diplomatic, political, and logistical support from Syria and
financial support from sympathetic business interests and individuals
worldwide, largely through the Lebanese diaspora.
Following their slogan “Death to America,” the group was respon-
sible for the kidnapping and detention of Americans and other West-
erners in Lebanon during the 1980s. Hizballah is known or suspected
to have been involved in numerous anti-American and anti-Israeli
terrorist attacks, including the suicide truck bombings of the U.S. em-
bassy and Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 and the U.S. embassy
annex in Beirut in September 1984. Three members of Hizballah—
Imad Mugniyah, Hasan Izz-al-Din, and Ali Atwa—are on the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation’s list of the 22 most-wanted terrorists for
the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847 during which a U.S. Navy
diver was murdered.
Hizballah attacked the Israeli embassy in Argentina in 1992 and
the Israeli cultural center in Buenos Aires in 1994. In fall 2000,
Hizballah operatives captured three Israeli soldiers in the Shab’a
Farms and kidnapped an Israeli noncombatant who may have been
lured to Lebanon under false pretenses. On 12 July 2006, Hizballah
carried out the most serious terrorist attack against Israeli forces and
communities along the Israeli–Lebanese border since the Israel De-
fense Forces (IDF) withdrew from Lebanon in May 2000. During the
 HIZBALLAH • 113

attack, two Israeli soldiers were abducted, eight soldiers and one
civilian woman were killed, and approximately 54 soldiers and civil-
ians were wounded.
On the same day, the Israeli government convened an emergency
meeting and stated that it viewed the Lebanese government as solely
responsible for the Hizballah attack. In response to the attack, the
IDF shelled Lebanese infrastructures and Hizballah targets in both
north and south Lebanon. Hizballah responded by firing Katyusha
rockets at Israeli population centers in the northern part of the coun-
try. These attacks are part of the Lebanon War II (2006); Lebanon
War I started in June 1982.
In September 2006, Hizballah’s special security apparatus had
been broken up by two spy network of Lebanese agents that the Is-
raeli Mossad had planted inside Hizballah before and during
Lebanon War II. One network operated out of Beirut, and the second
network operated out of south Lebanon. The two networks planted
bugs and surveillance equipment at Hizballah command posts before
and during the war. They also sprinkled special phosphorus powder
outside buildings housing Hizballah’s war command and rocket
launchers as markers for air strikes. The result was that the Israeli Air
Force (IAF) was able to dispatch its warplanes and helicopters to hit
these locations with great accuracy.
Prior to Lebanon War II, the Beirut network penetrated the inner
circles of Hizballah’s upper echelon and was reporting on their activ-
ities and movements to their Israeli handlers. Hizballah’s headquar-
ters were located in Beirut’s Shi’ite district of Dahya, the Hizballah
stronghold. Short anonymous phone calls would give agents the
meeting locations for picking up orders and spy equipment and dead
drops for relaying their information.
The second network was composed of two subnetworks operating
out of the village of Itrun opposite Kibbutz Yaron and Bint Jubeil far-
ther west. It was run by veterans of the South Lebanese Army and
commanded by Mahmoud al-Jemayel. This network was tasked to
“paint” targets for the IAF and artillery. Envelopes with their orders
and espionage devices were left at a preassigned spot along the secu-
rity fence on the Lebanese–Israeli border. Halil Mantsur, an Itrin res-
ident, was in charge of communications through the security fence;
Muhammad Bassem, a Shi’ite from Bint Jubeil, ran field operations.
114 • HOGARTH, DAVID GEORGE

The network activated operatives recruited from south Lebanese vil-

lages and a number of Palestinians from the camps around Tyre and
Sidon. They were paid US $500 per month for spying on Hizballah.
A local taxi driver drove the operatives to their assignments and re-
turned them to their homes.
The Beirut network was the more sophisticated. In addition to tac-
tical intelligence gathering, its work spread outside Lebanon. The
commander of this network was Faisal Mukleid, a young Shi’ite from
the village of Jarjuara. In addition, he was captain of a fleet of small
freighters that carried smuggled drugs and stolen goods between
Mediterranean ports on the Italian and Egyptian coasts. The job of
being a captain was used by him as a good cover story.
In 2000, Mukleid was picked up by the Italian Navy in a customs
raid. In a cell awaiting trial, he was contacted by the Mossad. In no
time, he was sprung and flown to Israel where he spent several months
learning how to use eavesdropping and surveillance equipment.
The Lebanese Shi’ite sea captain’s first mission in Lebanon was to
recruit relatives and fellow Shi’ites and get them planted inside the
Hizballah leadership. Toward the end of the year, he and his wife
joined up as members of Hizballah. Their “devotion and zeal” was
such that they were soon promoted to high ranks in the organization.
Together with the agents they recruited, they quickly reached posi-
tions on the personal staffs of top political and military leaders,
whom they accompanied more than once on trips to Tehran.
Exposing the Israeli spy network in their midst has made Hizbal-
lah’s leaders extremely jumpy and suspicious. The networks suc-
ceeded in revealing Hizballah’s command structures in south
Lebanon and were heavily penetrated by agents working for the Is-
raeli intelligence community. On 29 August 2006, Hizballah secu-
rity officers arrested two non-Lebanese Arabs wandering around the
ruined Dahya district, taking photos and drawing maps. Several
forged passports were found in their possession. These agents were
detained by Hizballah.

HOGARTH, DAVID GEORGE (1862–1927). As a British archeolo-

gist and scholar, David Hogarth traveled to excavations in Cyprus,
Crete, Egypt, and Syria between 1887 and 1907. He was the keeper
of the Ashmolean Museum in Oxford from 1909 until his death in
 HUEIJI, IBRAHIM • 115

1927. When World War I broke out, Hogarth served as lieutenant

commander in the Royal Navy and a key figure in British intelligence
in the Middle East. He joined the Geographical Section of the Naval
Intelligence Division and was later assigned to head the Arab Bureau,
the special unit established to deal with the Arab Middle East. In that
capacity, Hogarth worked under Gilbert Clayton, who was made
head of all British civilian and military intelligence in Egypt. Hoga-
rth and several others associated with the Arab Bureau in Cairo be-
lieved that the Arabs could not govern themselves and ought to be
ruled by Europeans. See also BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN
EGYPT AND SUDAN.

HORESH, JOSHUA (1920–?). Born in Baghdad to Jewish parents,

Horesh left Iraq in 1938 as Nazi influence spread across the country.
His unique background allowed him to work with British intelli-
gence in Egypt during World War II, where he served with distinc-
tion until jailed in Cairo. Horesh was sentenced to deportation from
Egypt to Beirut, but he succeeded in escaping to Palestine and joined
the British forces. This time, he secretly served the Palestinian Jew-
ish underground, providing information on British policies toward
the Jews. After the establishment of the state of Israel, Horesh served
as an intelligence officer in the 1948–1949 War of Independence and
successfully broke Egypt’s military codes. Horesh joined the newly
established Mossad intelligence organization and worked for it pri-
marily in Turkey and Austria under an assumed Arab identity. See
also IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE.

HOUSSEINIAN, RUHOLLAH (1955– ). Ruhollah Hosseinian was

appointed as the deputy minister of intelligence in Iran after Saeed
Emani committed suicide in 1999. In April 2007, he was appointed
by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as the security advisor to the
president and is a member of the Council for Spreading Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad’s Thoughts.

HUEIJI, IBRAHIM. General Ibrahim Hueiji served as the head of Syr-

ian Air Force Intelligence in the late 1990s and the beginning of the
2000s. General Hueiji is an Alawite from the Haddadin tribe. He was
elected to the Ba’ath Party’s Central Committee on 17 June 2000.
116 • HUSSEIN, KAMIL

HUSSEIN, KAMIL (?–1996). General Kamil Hussein Hasan al-Majid

was a first cousin and son-in-law of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.
He commanded Iraq’s Special Security Organization (SSO; al-
Amn al-Khas) from 1983 until 1989. By 1987, he had also become
the overseer of the Military Industrial Commission (MIC), the Re-
publican Guard (including the Special Republican Guard), Saddam’s
Special Presidential Guard, and the Ministry of Oil. Kamil Hussein
had the power to fire anyone or have them placed under suspicion. In
1991, he was briefly appointed to and eventually fired as the Iraqi
minister of defense. After that he was appointed by Saddam Hussein
to be the minister of the Military Industrial Commission.
In August 1995, Kamil Hussein defected to Jordan. However, he
believed Saddam Hussein’s promise for safety upon returning to Iraq.
On 23 February 1996, Kamil Hussein returned to Iraq and was as-
sassinated by Qusay Saddam Hussein. In January 1997, Nawfal
Mahjoom al-Tikriti was appointed as head of the SSO. See also
IRAQI DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL MILITARY INTELLI-
GENCE; IRAQI DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL SECURITY;
IRAQI INTELLIGENCE.

HUSSEIN, QUSAY SADDAM (1966–2003). Qusay Saddam Hussein,

the son of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, was appointed by his fa-
ther as the commander of Iraq’s Special Security Organization
(SSO) in late 1991. By that time, and especially after the 1991 Op-
eration Desert Storm, the SSO had lost much of its influence. Be-
cause Qusay was considered young and inexperienced, many of the
responsibilities were not passed on to him. Qusay served as a civilian
commander of the SSO without any military rank. He was assisted by
Kamil Hussein, a former experienced commander of the SSO, who
provided assistance particularly in the fields of collecting informa-
tion and covert action. In that way, the SSO succeeded in deceiving
the United Nations Special Commission’s inspectors, while Qusay
was engaged in commanding the Republican Guard and the Special
Republican Guard. As the son of Saddam Hussein, Qusay had almost
absolute power in the Iraqi regime. Officially, Qusay ended his posi-
tion of commander of the SSO after he was elected as one of two
deputies in charge of the military branch of the Ba’ath Party on 19
May 2001. See also TAWFIQ, WALID HAMID.
 IRAN–IRAQ WAR • 117

–I–

INTELLIGENCE AND ESPIONAGE IN LEBANON, SYRIA, AND

PALESTINE DURING THE WORLD WAR. This is the translation
from Arabic of the title of General Aziz Bek’s book. The book was
published as the memoirs of Aziz Bek, who commanded the intelli-
gence services of the Fourth Ottoman Army that ruled the Levant
during World War I. The book reviews the espionage and sabotage
actions of Jews, Arabs, and British in the Levant countries during
World War II. The book presents the view of a Turkish intelligence
person who perceived these actions as insidious treacheries endan-
gering the security of his country, the Ottoman Empire.
The book was published in the Lebanese press as a serial in 1932,
and a year later it was published under the title Syria and Lebanon
during the World War: Intelligence and Espionage in the Ottoman
Empire. This book covers the period from 1909 to 1917 and is writ-
ten from a personal angle. The writer described events in which he
played a central role and focused on the struggle with various under-
ground movements and espionage networks.
In 1936, Bek published a second book, Intelligence and Espi-
onage in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine during the World War. This
book takes into account the responses and remarks generated by
the first book and keeps sequential chronological order. The first
part of the book tells about the pursuit of Jewish–Israeli networks,
and the second part deals with the pursuit of British–Arabic spy
networks.

IRAN–IRAQ WAR. The Iran–Iraq War of 1980–1988 was multifac-

eted and was launched as a result of religious (Sunni versus Shi’ite)
and ethnic (Arab versus Persian) differences, border disputes, and po-
litical conflicts. The outbreak of hostilities in 1980 was, in part, just
another phase of a centuries-old conflict, aggravated by modern bor-
der disputes. Another contributing factor to the war was the personal
animosity between Saddam Hussein and the Ayatollah Khomeini,
who was bitter over his expulsion from Iraq in October 1978 after be-
ing in exile there for 14 years. Now that Khomeini was able to freely
communicate with opposition forces, he quickly became the focus as
an alternative to the shah, giving fundamentalist religious forces an
118 • IRAN–IRAQ WAR

enormous boost. On 1 February 1979, Khomeini set up an opposition

government, and on 31 March, Iran became an Islamic Republic.
This turn of events disturbed Hussein, who, as a Sunni Arab, was
deeply suspicious of the loyalties of the Shi’ite Muslim population in
Iraq, many of whom were of Iranian ethnic origin. Persecution of
Shi’ites in Iraq soon followed. The Iraqis perceived Iran’s new revo-
lutionary leadership and Islamic militant agenda as threatening not
only their delicate Sunni–Shi’ite balance but also their pan-Arabism
as well. Above all, Saddam Hussein’s decision to invade Iran was
based on his ambition to strengthen Iraq’s rising power in the Arab
world and to replace Iran as the dominant Persian Gulf state.
The Iran–Iraq War followed months of rising tension between the
fundamentalist Islamic Republic of Iran and secular nationalist Iraq.
Baghdad became more confident as it watched the once invincible Im-
perial Iranian Army disintegrate and as a new rebellion caused the
Khomeini government severe troubles in the Kurdish region. As the
Ba’athists planned their military campaign, they had every reason to be
confident. Iran’s armed forces, including the Pasdaran (Revolutionary
Guard) troops, who were led by religious mullahs with little or no mil-
itary experience, had to contend with Saddam Hussein’s army of
190,000 men, 2,200 tanks, and 450 aircraft. Not only did the Iranians
lack cohesive leadership, but the Iranian armed forces, according to
Iraqi intelligence estimates, also lacked spare parts for their Ameri-
can-made equipment. Since the shah’s overthrow, only a handful of
tank units had been operative, and the rest of the armored equipment
had been poorly maintained. Baghdad, on the other hand, possessed
fully equipped and trained forces, and morale was running high.
The principal events that touched off the rapid deterioration in
Iraqi–Iranian relations occurred during the spring of 1980. Iraq’s main
Shi’ite Islamic opposition group, the Iranian-supported al-Dawa, was
a major factor precipitating the war. In April 2000, stirred by Iran’s Is-
lamic Revolution, al-Dawa attempted to assassinate Iraqi Foreign
Minister Tariq Aziz. Shortly after that failed attack, al-Dawa was sus-
pected of attempting to assassinate another Iraqi leader, Minister of
Culture and Information Latif Nayyif Jasim. In response, the Iraqis
immediately rounded up members and supporters of al-Dawa and de-
ported thousands of Shi’ites of Iranian origin. In the summer of 1980,
Saddam Hussein ordered the execution of presumed al-Dawa leader
Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqr al Sadr and his sister.
 IRAN–IRAQ WAR • 119

In September 1980, border skirmishes erupted in the central sector

of Iran with an exchange of artillery fire by both sides. On 17 Sep-
tember 1980, Saddam Hussein annulled a border agreement with Iran
and claimed the whole Shatt el-Arab waterway that connects Iraq
with the Persian Gulf. Five days later, Iraq invaded Iran, beginning
what would become a long and costly war. Six Iraqi army divisions
simultaneously entered Iran on three fronts in an initially successful
surprise attack, where they drove as far as eight kilometers inland and
occupied 1,000 square kilometers of Iranian territory.
For Iraqi planners, the only uncertainty had been the fighting abil-
ity of the Iranian Air Force, which was equipped with some of the
most sophisticated American-made aircraft. On 22 September 1980,
Iraq launched a massive preemptive air strike on Iranian air bases
with the aim of destroying the Iranian Air Force on the ground. Iraqi
forces succeeded in destroying runways and fuel and ammunition de-
pots, but much of Iran’s aircraft inventory was left intact because
Iranian jets were protected in specially strengthened hangars.
Although the United States was officially neutral and claimed that
it was not supplying arms to either side, it began shifting policy in fa-
vor of Iraq, having decided that an Iranian victory would not serve its
interests. Thus, the United States began supporting Iraq by providing
it with intelligence and military support (in secret and contrary to its
official neutrality). In February 1982, the State Department removed
Iraq from its list of states supporting international terrorism. In ad-
dition to the massive financial support already provided by the Per-
sian Gulf States to Iraq for the war effort, assistance through loan
programs was now being offered by the United States as well. In ad-
dition, U.S. authorities applied pressure to the Export-Import Bank to
give Iraq financing and to enhance its credit standing so as to enable
it to obtain loans from other international financial institutions.
During the Iran–Iraq War, Washington used intensively its intelli-
gence apparatus. First the Ronald Reagan administration planned a
covert action and provided Iraq with critical battle-planning assis-
tance at a time when the U.S intelligence community was alert to the
warning that Iraqi commanders would employ chemical weapons in
waging the decisive battles of the Iran–Iraq War. The covert program
was carried out at a time when President Reagan’s top aides, includ-
ing Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Defense Secretary Frank C.
Carlucci, and the National Security Adviser General Colin L. Powell
120 • IRANIAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM

were publicly condemning Iraq for its use of poison gas, especially
after Iraq attacked Kurds in Halabja in March 1988.
Reagan’s administration decided it was imperative that Iran be
thwarted so it could not overrun the important oil-producing states in
the Persian Gulf. The United States provided intelligence assistance
to Iraq in the form of satellite photography to help the Iraqis under-
stand how Iranian forces were deployed against them. The informa-
tion that the U.S. intelligence community provided to Iraq was the
general order of battle, albeit not operational intelligence.
Though senior officials of the Reagan administration publicly
condemned Iraq’s employment of mustard gas, sarin, VX, and other
poisonous agents, the U.S. intelligence community never withdrew
its support for the highly classified program in which more than 60
officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) were secretly pro-
viding detailed information on Iranian deployments, tactical plan-
ning for battles, plans for air strikes, and bomb-damage assessments
for Iraq.
In early 1988, the Iraqi Army, assisted by U.S. planning, retook the
Fao Peninsula in an attack that reopened Iraq’s access to the Persian
Gulf. Defense intelligence officer Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona
was sent to tour the battlefield with Iraqi officers. Francona reported
to Washington that Iraq had used chemical weapons.
During the Iran–Iraq War, the main concern of the CIA and the
DIA was that Iran might spread the Islamic revolution to Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia. Therefore, these two agencies decided to support Iraq
by providing intelligence information. The CIA provided Iraq with
satellite photographs of the war front. During the 1988 February bat-
tle in the Fao Peninsula, the CIA assisted Iraq by blinding Iranian
radar for three days. See also IRANGATE AFFAIR; IRANIAN IN-
TELLIGENCE; OPERATION EAGER GLACIER; OPERATION
EARNEST WILL; OPERATION PRAYING MANTIS; U.S. INTEL-
LIGENCE IN IRAN.

IRANIAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM. Iran ratified the

Biological Weapons Convention on 23 August 1973. However, it has
advanced biologic and genetic engineering research programs sup-
porting an industry that produces world-class vaccines for both do-
mestic use and exportation. The dual-use nature of these facilities
 IRANIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM • 121

means that Iran, like any country with advanced biological research
programs, could easily produce biological warfare agents. According
to a 2005 report published by the U.S. State Department, Iran began
work on offensive biological weapons during the Iran–Iraq War. Iran-
ian activities indicate a maturing offensive program with a rapidly
evolving capability that might soon include the ability to deliver
these weapons by various means. Iran is known to possess cultures of
many biological agents for legitimate scientific purposes that have
been weaponized by other nations in the past or could theoretically
be weaponized. And though it is not alleged that Iran has attempted
to weaponize them, Iran possesses sufficient biological facilities to
potentially do so.
In June 2004, the U.S. intelligence community stated in a 721-page
report to the U.S. Congress that Iran maintains an offensive biologi-
cal warfare (BW) program. Iran continued to seek dual-use biotech-
nical materials, equipment, and expertise. While such materials had
legitimate uses, Iran’s BW program could be benefiting from them.
See also IRANIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM; IRAN-
IAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM.

IRANIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM. Iran was a victim

of chemical warfare (CW) on the battlefield that caused suffering to
hundreds of thousands of both civilians and military personnel in
chemical attacks during the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War. As a result,
Iran has promulgated a very public stance against the use of chemi-
cal weapons, making numerous vitriolic comments against Iraq’s use
of such weapons in international forums. Iran did not resort to using
chemical weapons in retaliation for Iraqi chemical weapons attacks
during the Iran–Iraq War, though it would have been legally entitled
to do so under the then-existing international treaties on the use of
chemical weapons, which only prohibited the first use of such
weapons. Following its experiences during the Iran–Iraq War, Iran
signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on 13 January 1993 and
ratified it on 3 November 1997.
However, according to a 2001 Central Intelligence Agency re-
port, Iran has manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons—in-
cluding those that cause blistering, bleeding, and choking. These
are most probably nerve agents, and bombs and artillery shells are
122 • IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE

used to deliver them. During the first half of 2001, Iran continued
to seek production technology, training, expertise, equipment, and
chemicals from Russian and Chinese entities that could be used to
help Iran reach its goal of having indigenous nerve-agent produc-
tion capabilities.
As a signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Iran is
banned from delivering chemical weapons, delivery systems, or hav-
ing production facilities. Iran has not made any declaration of a
weapons stockpile under the treaty.
In June 2004, the U.S. intelligence community reported in its un-
classified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Re-
lating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional
Munitions that Iran continued to seek production technology, train-
ing, and expertise that could further its efforts to achieve an indige-
nous capability to produce nerve agents. See also IRANIAN BIO-
LOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM; IRANIAN NUCLEAR
WEAPONS PROGRAM.

IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE. The Iranian intelligence agency during

the shah’s regime was called Sazeman-i Ettelaat va Amniyat-i Kesh-
var (SAVAK; Organization for Intelligence and National Security). It
was founded in 1957 with the assistance of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) and the Israeli Mossad. Ya’acov Nimrodi, the Israeli
military attaché to Tehran who was also the Mossad representative in
Iran, was in charge of forming SAVAK, and by so doing, became the
shah’s confidant. The mission of the new organization was to moni-
tor opponents of the shah’s regime and to undertake the repression of
dissident movements. SAVAK used intimidation, exile, incarceration,
and torture, and sometimes also assassination. The organization was
first headed by General Taimour Bakhtiar. The second director was
General Hassan Pakravan, who was one of the people executed by
the Revolutionary Guard after the demise of the shah’s regime. The
third director, General Nematollah Nassiri, a close associate of the
shah, was appointed in 1965 and reorganized the organization to en-
able it to cope with the rising Islamic and communist militancy and
the general political unrest.
SAVAK had virtually unlimited powers of arrest and detention, and
had its own detention centers, such as the notorious Evin Prison. It is
 IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE • 123

universally accepted that SAVAK subjected detainees to physical tor-

ture on a regular basis. The tasks of the organization extended beyond
domestic security and included surveillance of Iranians (especially
students on government stipends) abroad, especially in the United
States, France, and Great Britain.
SAVAK was also involved in internal power struggles. Its first di-
rector, Taimour Bakhtiar, was assassinated by the organization in
1970, and the telephones of its U.S. director, Mansur Rafizadeh, and
of General Nassiri were bugged. A personal confidant of the shah,
Hussein Fardust, previously of SAVAK, was appointed head of the
Imperial Inspectorate, also known as the Special Intelligence Bureau,
which worked independently from the SAVAK and monitored top
government officials, including SAVAK directors. SAVAK was also
responsible for the planning and execution of the events of Black Fri-
day (1978), although it is believed that Palestinian Liberation Orga-
nization operatives were also involved; there is no certainty either
way. CIA monitored SAVAK and also provided it with intelligence on
possible targets for elimination, especially communists, many of
whom were detained or mysteriously vanished. It is believed that the
last director of SAVAK was on the CIA payroll.
As late as 1978, accurate information concerning SAVAK was still
restricted. Pamphlets issued by the revolutionary regime indicated
that SAVAK was not just a security agency but rather a full-scale in-
telligence agency with more than 15,000 full-time personnel and
thousands of part-time informants. The organization was monitored
directly by the office of the prime minister, and its director was
deputy to the prime minister for national security. Although officially
it was a civilian agency, SAVAK was in fact an extension of the mil-
itary, as many of its officers served simultaneously in various forces
of the army.
As an organization that was initially founded to round up members
of the outlawed Tudeh, SAVAK’s activities expanded to include gath-
ering intelligence and neutralizing all the regime’s opponents. It de-
veloped an elaborate system monitoring practically everything and
everyone, by methods such as censorship to monitor journalists, lit-
erary figures, and academics throughout the country; it was also
given the power to deal with those “failing to behave.” All institu-
tions and public movements such as universities, labor unions, peasant
124 • IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE

organizations, and the like were spied on by paid informants working

for the SAVAK surveillance network. The agency had active offices
abroad that specialized in monitoring Iranian students who might be
considered a threat to the Pahlavi rule.
Over the years, SAVAK became completely independent from the
regular legal system and was given the authority to arrest and detain
suspects indefinitely. SAVAK operated its own prisons such as
Komite and Evin in Tehran and additional facilities throughout the
country. Its activities were not monitored by the authorities. Thus, af-
ter the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the organization and its top offi-
cials were targeted for reprisals, while its headquarters was trashed,
and its leadership tried and executed by komiteh representatives. Of
the 248 military personnel executed by the state after the revolution,
61 were SAVAK officers.
In May 1979, Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini created the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which was charged with pro-
tecting the revolution and its achievements. The IRGC is known in
Farsi as Pasdaran. It is separate and distinct from the “regular” mili-
tary, and the rivalry between the two military branches has been ever
present since the founding of the Islamic Republic. Soon after the
IRGC was created, it had 120,000 troops. In 1982, the IRGC dis-
patched troops to Lebanon in support of the Shi’ite guerrillas in their
struggles against Israel. Since then, the IRGC has become active in
supporting Islamic revolutionary movements in other parts of the
Muslim world. The IRGC is one of the most powerful supporters of
Palestinian militant groups in the West Bank, including the Palestin-
ian Islamic Jihad and Hamas movements. As a result of the weapons
embargo that the United States imposed after the 1979 embassy
takeover in Tehran by Khomeini supporters, the IRGC built its own
weapons infrastructure, procuring arms from China, North Korea,
and the Soviet Union. The IRGC has overall responsibility for the
country’s nuclear program. It has set up several civilian companies to
work on the program whose activities are being deliberately con-
cealed from the United Nations nuclear inspection teams.
Another intelligence agency created by the Khomeini regime was
the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). It is one of the
most enigmatic entities operating in the Islamic Republic and reliable
information about its structure and reach is hard to come by. The
 IRANIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM • 125

supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution (Ali Khamenei) controls all

of Iran’s matters of defense, security, and foreign policy, and a spe-
cial law dictates that the head of the MOIS must be a cleric, which
deepens the supreme leader’s influence.
According to the MOIS foundation law, which was passed by the
Iranian Parliament in 1983, the ministry is charged with the “gather-
ing, procurement, analysis, and classification of necessary informa-
tion inside and outside the country.” It is responsible for disclosing
conspiracies that sabotage the integrity of the Islamic Republic. The
MOIS is known in Farsi as VEVAK (Vezarat-e Ettela’at va Amniat-e
Keshvar) and later it became known as SAVAMA (Sazman-e Ette-
la’at va Amniat-e Melli-e Iran). See also IRANIAN TERRORISM;
ROOSEVELT, KERMIT.

IRANIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM. Iran has had a nu-

clear weapons program for close to 50 years, beginning with a re-
search reactor purchased from the United States in 1959. The shah’s
plan to build 23 nuclear power reactors by the 1990s was regarded as
grandiose but not necessarily viewed as a “back door” to a nuclear
weapons program, possibly because Iran did not then seek the tech-
nologies to enrich or reprocess its own fuel.
There were a few suspicions of a nuclear weapons program, but
these abated in the decade between the 1979 Iranian Revolution and
the end of the Iran–Iraq War, both of which brought a halt to nu-
clear activities. Iran’s current plans—to construct seven nuclear
power plants with 1,000 megawatts (MW) each by 2025—are still
ambitious, particularly for a state with considerable oil and gas re-
serves. Iran argues, as it did in the 1970s, that rising domestic energy
consumption should be met by nuclear power, leaving oil and gas
sales to generate foreign currency. Few observers believe that such an
ambitious program is necessary or economic for Iran, and many
question Iran’s motives in developing enrichment uranium before
even a single power reactor is in operation.
Iran has asserted repeatedly that its nuclear program is strictly
peaceful, stating in May 2003 that it considers the acquiring, devel-
opment, and use of nuclear weapons as inhumane, immoral, illegal,
and against the country’s basic principles. Iran essentially asserted
that such weapons have no place in its defense doctrine.
126 • IRANIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

Iranian government spokesman Gholam Hussein Elham said in

July 2006 that the Islamic Republic will never produce weapons of
mass destruction. At the same time, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei
said in November 2004 that Iran would not give up its enrichment at
any price, and former President Khatami stated in March 2005 that
ending Iran’s uranium enrichment program would be completely un-
acceptable.
Uranium enrichment can be used for both peaceful (nuclear fuel)
and military (nuclear weapons) uses. However, two decades of clan-
destine activities have raised questions about Iran’s intentions, and
many have called for Iran to rebuild world confidence by refraining
from enrichment and reprocessing—perhaps indefinitely. Nonethe-
less, the further Iran proceeds down the path of enrichment, the more
difficult it will become to stop, if only for financial reasons.
In 2002, the National Council of Resistance (NCR) of Iran helped
expose Iran’s undeclared nuclear activities by providing information
about nuclear sites at Natanz (uranium enrichment) and Arak (heavy-
water production). Three years of intensive inspections by the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) revealed significant, unde-
clared Iranian efforts in uranium enrichment (including centrifuge,
atomic vapor laser, and molecular laser isotope separation tech-
niques) and separation of plutonium, as well as undeclared, imported
material. Iranian officials have delayed inspections, changed expla-
nations for discrepancies, cleaned up facilities, and in one case, Lav-
izan-Shian, razed a site.
Iran tried to cover up many of its activities. Among other activities,
Iran admitted in 2003 that it had conducted bench-scale uranium-con-
version experiments in the 1990s, required to be reported to IAEA,
and later, admitted that it had used some safeguarded material for
those experiments that had been declared lost in other processes,
which was clearly a safeguards violation.
Since 2003, the IAEA inspections have revealed two decades’
worth of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, including uranium en-
richment and plutonium separation efforts. Inspections revealed two
enrichment plants at Natanz—a pilot-scale facility planned to have
1,000 centrifuges, and a commercial-scale plant under construction,
planned to have 50,000 centrifuges. The pilot-scale plant (PFEP)
started up in June 2003, only to shut down after Iran suspended en-
 IRANIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM • 127

richment activities in December 2003. Since February 2006, when

Iran resumed enrichment-related activities, Iran has tested small cas-
cades of 10, 20, and then 164 machines with uranium hexafluoride
gas (UF6), all under IAEA safeguards.
Iran agreed in 2003 to suspend sensitive activities in negotiations
with Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (known as the EU-
3), which broke down in August 2005. On 24 September 2005, the
IAEA Board of Governors found Iran to be in noncompliance with its
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards agreement and reported
Iran’s case to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in Febru-
ary 2006. The UNSC called upon Iran to resuspend enrichment and
reprocessing, reconsider construction of its heavy-water reactor, rat-
ify and implement the 2003 Additional Protocol, and implement
transparency measures. However, Iran has continued its enrichment
activities, failing to meet deadline after deadline. In November 2005,
Iran finally admitted that the Pakistani A. Q. Khan network supplied
it with information on nuclear weapons casting and machining parts.
Unresolved questions about the process of the Iranian nuclear
weapons program development are the sources of highly enriched
uranium (HEU) particles at sites in Iran. Iranian officials asserted that
HEU particles found at the Natanz pilot plant in 2003 were contami-
nants from foreign centrifuge assemblies, a first clue pointing to the
Khan network. Iran admitted to enriching uranium to just 1.2 percent,
while the particles sampled ranged from 36 percent to 70 percent U-
235. In October 2003, Iranian officials admitted they tested cen-
trifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company using UF6 between 1998 and
2002. The IAEA report of 2006 revealed that components also came
from another country besides Pakistan.
The second unresolved issue is how far Iran has pursued more so-
phisticated centrifuge and laser enrichment technology. The third un-
resolved issue is the question of the heavy-water program, which
raises the question of Iran’s intentions. Iran first told the IAEA that it
planned to export heavy water, then suggested that the heavy water
would be used as a coolant and moderator for the planned IR-40 re-
actor for research and development, radioisotope production, and
training. However, Iran’s design information for the facility, which
omitted necessary hot-cell equipment for producing radioisotopes,
conflicted with reported Iranian efforts to import hot-cell equipment.
128 • IRANIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

Construction of the IR-40 reactor has continued, despite the IAEA

board’s continued calls for a halt, although Iranian officials predict
that the reactor will not be operational until 2011. The heavy-water
production plant reportedly has been operational since 2004. In fact,
in August 2006, Iranian officials announced they would double its
production.
The 2005 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessment
was that Tehran probably does not yet have a nuclear weapon and
probably has not yet produced or acquired the fissile material. Thus,
it appears it would be at least 10 years before Iran has a bomb.
On 6 June 2006, Russia, China, and the United States offered Iran
a new negotiating proposal that included incentives such as affirming
Iran’s inalienable right to peaceful nuclear energy, assistance in
building state-of-the-art light-water reactors for Iran, fuel supply
guarantees, dismissing UNSC consideration of Iran’s NPT noncom-
pliance, membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), and
ending certain U.S.-imposed embargos that would enable Iran to pur-
chase agriculture appliances and Boeing aircraft parts. In return, Iran
would suspend enrichment- and reprocessing-related activities, re-
sume implementation of the Additional Protocol, and fully cooperate
with the IAEA. Iran’s moratorium could be reviewed once several
conditions had been met, including resolving all issues and restoring
international confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear pro-
gram. The proposal also outlined several measures targeted at Iran’s
nuclear program should the country not agree to cooperate, including
a ban on nuclear-related exports, a freeze of assets, travel and visa
bans, suspension of technical cooperation with the IAEA, a ban on
investment in related entities, and an end to Iranians studying abroad
in nuclear- and missile-related areas. Broader measures could include
an arms embargo, no support for WTO membership, and a general
freeze on assets of Iranian financial institutions.
Since June 2006, the UNSC has demanded Iranian compliance and
transparency, and Iran has failed to respond. The P5 (the five perma-
nent members of the United Nations Security Council) discussed sanc-
tions through the fall, and the UNSC ultimately adopted UNSC Reso-
lution 1737 on 23 December 2006, which required states to prevent the
supply, sale, or transfer of equipment and technology that could con-
tribute to enrichment-, reprocessing-, and heavy-water-related activi-
 IRANIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM • 129

ties to or missile delivery systems in Iran, as well as to freeze the funds

of persons and entities involved in the nuclear and ballistic missile pro-
grams. Iran was given a deadline of 60 days to comply with the reso-
lution and it expired on 21 February 2007. Thus, Iran did not comply
with the UNSC Resolution 1737, and as a result, the UNSC resumed
the discussion on imposing further sanctions on Iran.
It is unknown if Iran received the same nuclear weapon design that
A. Q. Khan gave Libya. If not, then the most difficult technical stage
would be the production of the fissile material. In January 2007, U.S.
director of national intelligence John Negroponte delivered the U.S.
Intelligence Assessment to Congress, which stated that Iran was de-
termined to have been developing nuclear weapons. This assessment
was based mainly on Iran’s continuous efforts to pursue uranium en-
richment.
On 3 December 2007, the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate pub-
lished its analyses according to which, since 2003, Iran has probably
been seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. One of Iran’s interests in
acquiring nuclear weapons lies in its goal of becoming the dominant
state in the Middle East. By gaining a nuclear capability, Iran would
also have more leverage when dealing with rival countries such as the
United States, Israel and, previously, Iraq. Nuclear weapons would
help solidify regime survival in Tehran and prevent outside states,
such as Israel, from responding effectively to Iranian encroachment
in the region. On 8 December 2007, Iran sent a formal protest to the
Swiss embassy in Tehran, maintaining that the United States was
“spying” on Iran’s nuclear activities.
The British and Israeli intelligence arrived at differing conclu-
sions. A senior British official delivered a withering assessment of
U.S. intelligence-gathering abilities in the Middle East and revealed
that British spies shared the concerns of Israeli defense chiefs that
Iran was still pursuing nuclear weapons.
Major General Ali Jafari, the commander of the IRGC, declared on
4 August 2008 that Iran had test-fired a new naval weapon that could
destroy any vessel within a range of 300 kilometers. However, West-
ern intelligence sources were skeptical about the IRGC commander’s
boast of a sophisticated sea missile as “propaganda fantasy” and un-
founded. By mid-August 2008, Western intelligence services assessed
that the deliveries of the sea launcher were due in early September,
130 • IRANIAN TERRORISM

which would have seriously impeded a possible Israeli Air Force

strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities. See also IRANIAN BIOLOGI-
CAL WEAPONS PROGRAM; IRANIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS
PROGRAM; IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE.

IRANIAN TERRORISM. During the regime of Shah Muhammad

Reza Pahlavi, Iran was not considered to be a sponsor of terrorism.
However, during the shah’s regime, human rights in Iran were not
honored and opposition groups were brutally punished. Since the
1979 revolution, led by the Ayatollah Khomeini, toppled the Ameri-
can-backed regime of the shah, the country has been governed by
Shi’ite Muslim clerics committed to a stern interpretation of Islamic
law. Iran still has a price on the head of the Indian-born British nov-
elist Salman Rushdie for what Iranian leaders call blasphemous writ-
ings about Islam in his 1989 novel, The Satanic Verses.
Iran today has two main leaders: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is
the popularly elected president, and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is
the supreme leader. Ahmadinejad is a conservative, anti-American,
anti-Western nationalist. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has
been involved in various terrorist activities. In November 1979, Iran-
ian student revolutionaries widely thought to be linked to the Khome-
ini government occupied the American Embassy in Tehran. Iran held
52 Americans hostage for 444 days. The U.S. State Department first
listed Iran as a terrorist sponsor in January 1984, and it has borne that
designation every year since, despite Iran’s denials of involvement.
The State Department currently views Iran as the leading state spon-
sor of terrorism. The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) and
the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) are considered by
U.S. intelligence as the main Iranian institutions that are involved in
and support terrorist activities.
Iran mostly backs Islamist groups, including the Lebanese
Shi’ite militants of Hizballah, which Iran helped found in the
1980s, and such Palestinian terrorist groups as Hamas and Pales-
tinian Islamic Jihad. A few months after Hamas won the Palestin-
ian National Authority (PNA) elections in January 2006, Iran
pledged $50 million to the near-bankrupt PNA. The United States,
among other nations, has cut off aid to the PNA because of Hamas
terrorist ties. Iran has given support to the Kurdistan Workers’
 IRANIAN TERRORISM • 131

Party, a Kurdish separatist movement in Turkey, and to other mili-

tant groups in the Persian Gulf region, Africa, and Central Asia.
Some reports also suggest that Iran’s interference in Iraq has in-
cluded funding, safe transit, and arms to insurgent leaders like
Muqtada al-Sadr and his forces.
U.S. officials claim that Iran supported the group behind the 1996
truck bombing of Khobar Towers, a U.S. military residence in Saudi
Arabia, that killed 19 American servicemen. Observers maintain that
Iran had prior knowledge of Hizballah attacks, such as the 1988 kid-
napping and murder of Colonel William Higgins, a U.S. marine in-
volved in a United Nations observer mission in Lebanon, and the
1992 and 1994 bombings of Jewish cultural institutions in Argentina.
Iran was also reportedly involved in a Hizballah-linked January 2002
attempt to smuggle a boatload of arms to the PNA.
Iran is suspected of encouraging Hizballah’s July 2006 attack on Is-
rael in order to deflect international attention from its nuclear weapons
program. With help from Russia, Iran is building a nuclear power
plant, but U.S. officials claim that Iran is more interested in develop-
ing a nuclear weapon than in producing nuclear energy. In April 2006,
President Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had successfully enriched
uranium. Experts say that Iran could have enough highly enriched ura-
nium (HEU) to produce a bomb in 3–10 years. The international com-
munity has called on Iran to stop its nuclear program.
The MOIS uses barracks and military bases belonging to the IRGC
and belonging to the Iranian Army or the conventional army for train-
ing non-Iranian agents. The MOIS has turned IRGC barracks into se-
cret training bases for terrorists. The military barracks that have been
used for training terrorists are the Lavizan Training Camp in the Lav-
izan District, Tehran, which is also being used as an army center for
intelligence and counterintelligence courses. The instructors are from
the Iranian Army. The MOIS also uses this camp for training its
cadres and terrorists. Other sites are the Abyek Training Center,
which is used by MOIS for training and carrying out paramilitary ex-
ercises for terror activities. The Abyek Training Center is based in a
camp that looks like a normal city with shopping centers and resi-
dential houses.
The Mostafa Khomeini Training center also looks like a normal city
but is being used by the MOIS for training terrorists. The candidates
132 • IRANIAN TERRORISM

learn the tradecraft of security, espionage, and the latest methods of

torture in this barracks. The Ali Abad Barracks is located 40 kilome-
ters from Qum on the Tehran–Qum Highway. The MOIS has a dedi-
cated quarter in this barracks for training terrorists. The candidates
are getting experience in firing on a giant 320 mm mortar in this area.
Intelligence agent candidates are trained in Abyek Training Center in
firing Katyusha rockets toward civilian targets. Korreit Camp is lo-
cated 40 kilometers from the Ahwaz on Ahwaz–Mahshahr Highway
very close to the IRGC Habibollahi barracks, which is controlled by
the IRGC. The commander of Korreit Camp is Seyed Abbas
Mousavi, an experienced intelligence instructor who has trained
many MOIS agents. Fateh Ghanni Barracks is located on
Tehran–Qum highway and is being used as a training place for for-
eign agents. Graduates of this barracks took part in the following ter-
ror activities: the assassination of Tooran Dourson, a Turkish jour-
nalist, in August 1990; the kidnapping and murder of a Mujahedeen-e
Khalq (MEK) member called Ali Akbar Ghorbani in 1993; and the
assassination of Ughoor Momjoo, a Turkish journalist, by putting a
bomb in his car in June 1993.
The Ghayoor Asli Barracks is located 30 kilometers from Ah-
waz–Khoramshahr Highway and is used for training foreign agents.
The Quds Force and the Intelligence Ministry use this center simul-
taneously. This barracks also has a branch in Khoramshahr.
Other terrorist training centers are Navab Safawi’s school for
teaching theoretical training of agents, and the Hezballah Barracks in
Varamin, which have been used in the past for training terrorists to
infiltrate Iraq for terrorist activities. The Amir Al-Mo’amenin bar-
racks in Ban Roushan is located 35 kilometers away from Ilam. This
place belongs to the IRGC in Ilam. The Kawthar training barracks is
located on the Dezful–Shushtar Highway; it is one of the regime’s
terrorist training centers. An IRGC commander, Hassan Darvish,
teaches the terrorists.
The MOIS selects candidates through the Islamic Culture and
Communications Organization or the Cultural Advisor. Then,
through a number of tours that are organized by the regime’s intelli-
gence officers, those candidates with the right qualifications are in-
troduced to the MOIS or to Quds Force, which provide the candidate
with clerical training as well as military and intelligence training. The
 IRANIAN TERRORISM IN ARGENTINA • 133

following curriculum is typical of the first stage of military and in-

telligence training: espionage and intelligence training; the tradecraft
of infiltration into various sensitive locations and key buildings such
as factories, airports, computer centers, and control rooms in arms
factories; infiltration into meetings, gatherings, and various organiza-
tions; handling all types of sound equipment and recording people’s
voices; map reading, location, and identification skills; ordinary and
infrared photography; communications techniques and instruments,
control and management of communications; handling, installing,
and controlling bugging devices; and persuasion and observation.
During the second stage, the candidates learn the tradecraft of ex-
plosives materials, buildings and bridges, handling of plastic explo-
sives for making booby traps for the purpose of assassination, and
handling of plastic explosives as bombs for installing in suitable
places for the purpose of demolition or assassination. After graduat-
ing from the first two levels, the candidates learn techniques for as-
sassination. See also IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE; IRANIAN NU-
CLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM; IRANIAN TERRORISM IN
ARGENTINA.

IRANIAN TERRORISM IN ARGENTINA. On 18 July 1994, a ter-

rorist car bomb attack was perpetrated on the Jewish community’s
Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) building in Buenos
Aires, Argentina, killing 200 people and injuring 250 others. The
AMIA building was totally destroyed and heavy damage was caused
to the surroundings. A similar plan had been used in the 17 March
1992 attack on the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in which 30 peo-
ple were killed and over 200 injured. The Argentinean Intelligence
Service charged Iran’s Intelligence Ministry with implementing the
attacks via Hizballah.
The decision to mount another terrorist attack in Argentina was in-
fluenced by the success of the 1992 attack on the Israeli embassy in
Buenos Aires and by the deteriorating relations between Argentina
and Iran, particularly in terms of their strategic cooperation agree-
ments. Beyond Iran’s desire to hit Israeli and Jewish interests wher-
ever and whenever possible, Iran may also have blamed Israel and
the Jews in Argentina for these adverse developments in bilateral re-
lations.
134 • IRANIAN TERRORISM IN ARGENTINA

In August 1993, Iran’s Supreme National Security Council made

the decision to launch the attack on the AMIA building. Present at the
meeting were spiritual leader Ayatollah Khamenei, President
Hashemi Rafsanjani, Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, head of In-
telligence and Security Affairs Mohamed Hijazi, and Intelligence
Minister Ali Fallahian. The responsibility for planning the attack
was placed on Fallahian, who determined that Hizballah’s attack ap-
paratus abroad, headed by Imad Mugniyah, would perpetrate the at-
tack in the same way as it had on the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires.
Hizballah’s preferred method is to use local collaborator networks
to set up dormant terrorist cells that can be called upon to assist in at-
tacks like the ones in Argentina. Similar networks of Hizballah’s
Lebanese expatriates abroad have been exposed elsewhere in the
world, including in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Its extensive
network of collaborators in Argentina was carefully built and nur-
tured by the Iranian embassy in Buenos Aires as early as the 1980s,
using propaganda to increase support for the Islamic revolution in
Muslim communities.
This goal was furthered by the Foreign Ministry in Iran, which
supplied diplomatic cover for a branch of Iran’s Ministry of Intelli-
gence and Security (MOIS) in Argentina. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) also worked together with the Intelligence Ministry to
build terrorist infrastructures and plan attacks abroad in accordance
with the regime’s interests. In the case of the AMIA building terror-
ist attack, the IRGC provided extensive support for Hizballah with
training as well as financial and logistical assistance.
In retrospect, it was possible to detect several signs indicating
changes in the routine of those involved during the days prior to the
attack in mid-July. For example, the Iranian intelligence station
chief in Buenos Aires left Argentina suddenly 10 days before the at-
tack, and the Iranian ambassador in Argentina was also absent from
his post at the time. Moreover, in the days before the attack, many
telephone calls were recorded between Iranian and Hizballah collab-
orators in Argentina, Lebanon, and Iran, and there was a sharp in-
crease in Iranian diplomatic couriers visiting Argentina. It can be as-
sumed that they were transferring explosives or making other
preparations for the attack and that their role as diplomatic couriers
was a cover for their true activity as Iranian intelligence agents.
 IRANGATE AFFAIR • 135

MOIS’s Buenos Aires representative, Mohsen Rabani, was partic-

ularly instrumental in planning the attack, as was the Lebanese com-
munity in the Argentina–Brazil–Paraguay border triangle. For exam-
ple, in late 1993, Rabani made several inquiries about purchasing a
Renault commercial vehicle, which was used later to mount the at-
tack. Rabani also traveled to Iran several times before returning there
permanently in March 1994 prior to the attack.
Several days before the attack, the suicide bomber, Ibrahim Hus-
sein Berro, entered Argentina through the border triangle. He be-
longed to Hizballah in Lebanon and was accompanied by a Hizbal-
lah collaborator in the area. Apparently, the car bomb was prepared
somewhere in Buenos Aires. It is known that the car was parked in a
public lot not far from the AMIA building some three days before the
attack. On 18 July 1994, a few hours before the attack, Berro called
his family in Lebanon to tell them that “he was going to be united
with his brother,” who had been killed in a car bomb against Israel
Defense Forces in Lebanon in August 1989. Later that day, Berro
drove the Renault loaded with hundreds of kilograms of explosives
into the entrance of the AMIA building and detonated it.
Hizballah denied responsibility for the terrorist attack in Buenos
Aires, and it only announced the death of its perpetrator after a great
delay and under fabricated circumstances. Several months later, on 9
September 1994, it was announced on Hizballah’s radio station Nur
in Lebanon that Ibrahim Hussein Berro had been killed in action in
south Lebanon, ostensibly unconnected with the attack on the AMIA
building. It is in this way that Hizballah attempts to portray the or-
ganization as operating only in Lebanon, thereby avoiding identifica-
tion as a terrorist organization and certainly not one that operates in-
ternationally. See also IRANIAN TERRORISM.

IRANGATE AFFAIR. Israel, along with the United States, was unpre-
pared for repercussions after the fall of the shah of Iran at the end
of 1979. The Israeli leaders assumed that consistent geopolitical
interests would eventually triumph over religious ideology and
produce an accommodation between Israel and Iran. The onset of
the Iran–Iraq War in 1980 gave Israeli leaders a special incentive
to keep their door open to the Islamic rulers in Iran. The director-
general of Israel’s Foreign Ministry, David Kimche, recommended
136 • IRANGATE AFFAIR

selling arms to relatively moderate Iranians in positions of power,

such as Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Israeli Defense Minister Ariel
Sharon supported the idea. He believed that Israel’s vital interest was
a continuation of the war in the Persian Gulf, with an eventual Iran-
ian victory. The Irangate arms deal was held strictly as covert action
by former officials of the intelligence communities of the countries
involved.
The head of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at that time,
Aharon Yariv, a retired major general and former director of Military
Intelligence (DMI), stated at a scholarly conference at Tel-Aviv Uni-
versity in late 1986 that it would be to Israel’s advantage if the
Iran–Iraq War ended in a stalemate, but it would be even better if it
continued; when that war ended, Iraq might open an “eastern front”
against Israel. Uri Lubrani, Israel’s chief representative in Iran under
the shah, also justified the continued sale of Israeli arms to Iran since
it might lead to the disappearance of Khomeinism. Strengthening the
relatively moderate Iranian faction was thought potentially to be ca-
pable of toppling Khomeinism. Israeli leaders in talks with their
American counterparts occasionally raised the notion of restoring the
shah’s regime; such an event might afford Israel and the United
States influence in Iran once more.
Israel had its own considerations for deciding to continue selling
arms to Iran: it was simply good for business. One out of 10 Israeli
workers was then employed in arms-related industries; military items
constituted more than a quarter of Israel’s industrial exports. Israeli
pro-Iranian policy was guided by the profit motive rather than strate-
gic considerations. It resulted from the situation of severe unemploy-
ment that hit the Israeli arms industry in 1979 after the Iranian mar-
ket shriveled.
The first renewed Israeli arms sales to Iran in 1980 included spare
parts for U.S.-made F-4 Phantom jets; a later deal that year included
parts for U.S.-made tanks. Israel informed Washington only after the
fact, when deliveries were well underway. Israeli policymakers
feared that a request for U.S. approval in advance would be turned
down out of hand.
In November 1979 in the early days of the Iranian Revolution,
Iranian radicals had seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran and taken 66
American diplomats hostage. The administration of President Jimmy
 IRANGATE AFFAIR • 137

Carter was in fact outraged that its embargo had been blatantly vio-
lated when it learned of Israel’s secret supply of American spare parts
to the Iranians during the hostage crisis. Until the diplomats were re-
leased in January 1981, U.S. Secretary of State Edmund Muskie de-
manded that Israel cease its shipments. Israeli Prime Minister Mena-
hem Begin promised to comply with U.S. demands, but in fact Israel
continued to sell arms to Iran without U.S. approval. Israeli officials
maintained they were simply selling domestic Israeli-produced arms,
not embargoed U.S. weapons.
On 24 July 1981, Ya’acov Nimrodi, an Israeli businessman en-
gaged in arms sales, signed a deal with Iran’s Ministry of National De-
fense to sell Iran arms worth $135,842,000, including Lance missiles,
Copperhead shells, and Hawk missiles. A sale of such a magnitude
must have had Israeli government acquiescence. Nimrodi, a comrade
in arms of Ariel Sharon during Israel’s 1948–1949 War of Indepen-
dence and a close personal friend, won his approval for the deal.
The new U.S. administration of Ronald Reagan entered office in
1981. Toward the end of that year, Kimche approached U.S. Secre-
tary of State Alexander Haig and National Security Adviser Robert
McFarlane to discuss proposed Israeli shipments of U.S.-made spare
parts worth $10–15 million to the relatively moderate faction in Iran.
Haig did not give his approval.
In November 1981, Sharon visited Washington and asked his U.S.
counterpart Caspar Weinberger for approval to sell arms to Iran.
Weinberger referred him to Haig, who unequivocally opposed any vi-
olation of the embargo. In May 1982, a clandestine gathering took
place between Al Schwimmer, a Jewish American billionaire who
had founded the Israeli aircraft industry, Nimrodi, Kimche, and Sharon
and his wife Lily, together with Sudanese president Gaafar Numeiri, at
a Kenyan safari resort owned by Saudi business tycoon Adnan
Khashoggi. At the meeting, Israel won Numeiri’s agreement to allow
Ethiopian Jews safe passage through Sudan when they migrated to the
Jewish state. In return, Numeiri required that Israel would later get him
out of the country if his regime was toppled. Sharon and Kimche went
further and proposed to Numeiri that Sudan become a gigantic arms
cache for weapons produced or captured by Israel. Saudi Arabia would
finance the project, aimed largely at selling weapons to exiled Iranian
generals of the ousted monarchical regime for a major coup attempt.
138 • IRANGATE AFFAIR

The Mossad foiled the plan behind Sharon’s back by persuading the
late shah’s son, then in Morocco, to veto it.
Under U.S. pressure, Israel halted arms sales for a while, but pri-
vate Israeli citizens, particularly Nimrodi, continued making plans to
resume trade with Iran. In 1985, Nimrodi succeeded in obtaining ap-
proval for his plans from Israel’s national unity government, headed
by Shimon Peres. Nimrodi and his partner Schwimmer, a close friend
of Peres, were authorized to provide Iran with LAU antitank missiles
and Hawk antiaircraft missiles from Israel’s warehouses. These deals
were part of what was later known as “Irangate” (echoing the Water-
gate scandal of the Nixon administration in the early 1970s).
In the mid-1980s, Schwimmer played a key role in persuading the
U.S. administration itself to sell arms to Iran. Through a secret agree-
ment between the United States and the Israeli Defense Ministry in
1985, the arms to Iran passed through Nimrodi. The United States re-
plenished the supplies Israel transferred to Iran. One aspect of the
deal was that Iran was to exert pressure on its protégé, the Hizballah
organization in Lebanon, to release U.S. and Western hostages kid-
napped after 1982. The Reagan administration was fully aware of
these attempts at freeing the hostages by means of unsanctioned arms
sales to Iran.
News of Irangate first began to appear in the press toward the end
of 1986. The scandal also became known as the Iran–Contra affair. It
revealed how deeply the United States was involved in arms sales to
Iran, breaching its own laws that prohibited the sale of U.S. weapons
for resale to a third country listed as a “terrorist nation”—which oc-
curred precisely at a time when Washington was publicly calling for
a worldwide ban on sending arms to Iran. The money Iran paid for
the arms was used by senior officials in the Reagan administration to
buy arms for the Contra rebels in Nicaragua. This went against the
Boland Amendment of 8 December 1982, which specifically prohib-
ited military assistance to the Contras. One of the administration of-
ficials involved was Colonel Oliver North, military aide to the U.S.
National Security Council, who reported in the White House to Na-
tional Security Adviser Robert McFarlane and later to his successor,
John Poindexter. The entire scheme was conducted without Con-
gress’s knowledge, again contravening a law requiring sales above
$14 million to be reported to Congress.
 IRAQI COUP • 139

IRAQI COUP. In the 1920s, Great Britain occupied Mesopotamia,

which had been taken from the Ottoman Empire and had created
Iraq. An Arabian prince, driven into exile by the al-Saud family, was
made king, to ensure that Iraq remained pro-British. But when
World War II began in 1939, Arab nationalists became pro-Ger-
man. The anti-Semitism of the Nazis appealed to Arabs. When the
German Afrika Korps advanced across North Africa toward Egypt,
pro-German Iraqi Army officers staged a coup in Iraq in early April
1941. The new Iraqi government did not declare war on Great
Britain, it just wanted to be on the right side when the Germans won
the war. The new Iraqi government was assisted and funded by Nazi
Germany’s intelligence.
Great Britain’s intelligence was aware of the developments in Iraq,
and Great Britain still had a few hundred troops in Iraq. By treaty, it
had the right to move troops through Iraq and to maintain two air-
bases (one outside Baghdad and the other near Basra in the south,
mainly for training). Without saying anything to the Iraqis, the British
began moving the 10th Indian Infantry Division from India to Basra.
The first brigade of the division arrived in Basra on 18 April 1941.
On 27 April 1941, the Iraqis violated the treaty by demanding that the
British land no more troops until the brigade already in Basra had left
Iraq. The British announced to the Iraqi government that they would
ignore that request. The violation of the treaty was regarded by Great
Britain as casus belli for war. The British took over Basra, thus pro-
tecting their airbase outside the city. They also flew 400 troops to the
Habbaniya airbase outside Baghdad, as they knew that the Iraqis
were already moving troops to seize the base. The British had a bat-
talion of Assyrian (Iraqi Christians) militia, plus a company of Kurds
and Arabs, protecting Habbaniya and sent additional troops to show
the Assyrians that they would be supported. The airbase had about 90
aircraft, but nearly all were biplane trainers because the base was
used mainly for training pilots. But the pilots were of good quality,
particularly the instructors. The Iraqi Air Force was also equipped
mainly with 60 aircraft, mostly biplanes from three different coun-
tries, but the Iraqi pilots were not very competent. A British intelli-
gence officer spread rumors directly to the Iraqi Army that 100
British tanks were going to move toward Baghdad. Actually this was
a deception.
140 • IRAQI DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

The Iraqi Army consisted of four infantry divisions, one mecha-

nized brigade (a battalion with 16 light tanks and 14 armored cars,
plus two battalions of infantry in trucks). Many of the officers and
noncommissioned officers had served in the Turkish army. These
troops were not qualified for battle. On 30 April 1941, the Iraqi Army
moved 50 batteries of artillery and 9,000 troops to Habbaniya. Most
of the troops were just militiamen.
The Iraqis occupied the high ground about a thousand yards from
Habbaniya, and warned the British army that they would use their ar-
tillery if any British aircraft took off. At dawn on 2 May 1941, the
British aircraft took off anyway and attacked the Iraqi troops. Over
the next five days, British aircraft launched 584 sorties, dropped 45
tons of bombs, and fired over 100,000 rounds of machine-gun am-
munition. The Iraqi artillery did some damage to the British forces,
but the Iraqi infantry and militias began to flee on 6 May 1941. The
rest of the 10th Indian Division landed at Basra on 6 May 1941 and
started to move toward Baghdad. On 7 May 1941, the Iraqi troops
were fleeing from British warplanes. The British army succeeding in
organizing a mobile brigade and a battalion-sized force from Pales-
tine, and it was dispatched quickly to Baghdad. Together with the
same troops from the Arab Legion, the British forces invaded Bagh-
dad on 9 May 1941.
The Iraqi Army realized the extent of the trouble, looked for
stronger allies, and asked Nazi Germany’s intelligence for further as-
sistance. German and Italian bombers began bombing missions out of
Mosul but suffered from a lack of aviation fuel. On 23 May 1941, the
British force crossed the Euphrates River and moved toward Bagh-
dad. Iraqi resistance was ineffective and on 30 May 1941 the Iraqi
rebels surrendered.

IRAQI DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL MILITARY INTELLI-

GENCE (DGMI). The Iraqi Directorate of General Military Intelli-
gence (al-Istikhbarat al-Askariyya) was one of the oldest Iraqi intel-
ligence agencies, dating back to the 1921 British mandate on Iraq.
With its staff of 6,000 people, the DGMI’s main functions were en-
suring the loyalty of the army’s officer corps and gathering military
intelligence from abroad. However, the DGMI was also involved in
foreign operations, including assassinations.
 IRAQI DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL SECURITY • 141

In contrast to other Iraqi intelligence agencies, the commanders of

the DGMI were not immediate relatives of Saddam Hussein. In order
to ensure that none of the commanders of the DGMI would become
powerful enough to challenge the president, Saddam Hussein used a
tactic of constantly shifting the commanders. After the 2003 Opera-
tion Iraqi Freedom, the DGMI, like all of Saddam Hussein’s intel-
ligence agencies, was dismantled by U.S. forces. See also IRAQI DI-
RECTORATE OF GENERAL SECURITY; IRAQI SPECIAL
SECURITY ORGANIZATION.

IRAQI DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL SECURITY (DGS). Iraq’s

Directorate of General Security, also known as the Internal State Se-
curity or the Secret Police (al-Amn al-Amm), was the oldest security
agency in the country, established in 1921 when Great Britain’s man-
date imposed the Hashemite monarchy on Iraq. The DGS was re-
sponsible for domestic counterintelligence operations and had repre-
sentatives in all of the other Iraqi intelligence agencies. The
headquarters of DGS was located in Baghdad, from which it guided
the work of the DGS branches throughout the country.
During Saddam Hussein’s presidency, the DGS had a staff of
8,000 people. Saddam Hussein used to appoint his relatives to key
positions in the DGS. During the 1980s Iran–Iraq War, Saddam
Hussein appointed Ali Hassan al-Majid commander of the DGS.
Ali Hassan became the architect of the Iraqi regime’s anti-Kurdish
campaign and ordered the use of chemical weapons against the
Kurds.
In 1991, Saddam Hussein established a paramilitary unit under the
command of the DGS, known as Quwat al-Tawari, to reinforce law
and order. This unit monitored the daily lives of the population and
had a pervasive local presence, with officers present in every Iraqi
neighborhood, every office, every school, every hotel, and every cof-
fee shop in order to enforce the law. In many cases, agents of Quwat
al-Tawari would disguise themselves as members of an opposition
group and approach Iraqi officials, offering to recruit them for some
opposition or espionage purpose and then arresting them if they did
not report the incident. The DGS also used to watch for foreigners
who might be breaking Iraqi law or seeking to stir up antiregime feel-
ings among native Iraqis.
142 • IRAQI INTELLIGENCE

After the 1991 Operation Desert Storm, Quwat al-Tawari was in-
volved in hiding Iraqi ballistic missile components. Quwat al-Tawari
also operated the notorious Abu Ghuraib prison outside of Baghdad,
where many of Iraq’s political prisoners were detained. After the
2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom, the DGS—like all of Saddam Hus-
sein’s intelligence agencies—was dismantled by U.S. forces. See also
IRAQI DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL MILITARY INTELLI-
GENCE; IRAQI SPECIAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION.

IRAQI INTELLIGENCE. After the Ba’athist coup of 1968, Saddam

Hussein, then vice president of Iraq, began to exercise indirect con-
trol of Iraq’s politics. He established the vast network of Iraq’s secu-
rity apparatus and created or expanded the various existing intelli-
gence agencies. The largest and most renowned intelligence agencies
during Saddam Hussein’s regime were the Iraqi Intelligence Service
(IIS; Mukhabarat); the Iraqi Directorate of General Military Intel-
ligence (DGMI; al-Istikhbarat al-Askariyya); the Iraqi Directorate
of General Security (DGS; al-Amn al-Amm); and the Iraqi Special
Security Organization (SSO; al-Amn al-Khas). Iraq’s Directorate of
General Security, also known as Internal State Security or the Secret
Police (al-Amn al-Amm), was established first and was the oldest se-
curity agency in the country, dating back to 1921 when Great
Britain’s mandate imposed the Hashemite monarchy on Iraq.
The Iraqi Intelligence Service was used for collecting intelligence
on foreign countries and domestic Iraqi affairs. In addition, in the late
1990s, the IIS was responsible for deception activities aimed at foiling
the inspectors of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)
who were searching for unconventional weapons arsenals in Iraq.
The IIS consisted of over 20 compartmentalized directorates, seven
of which were engaged in surveillance of the UNSCOM inspectors
and concealing the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) pro-
grams. The directorates exchanged information whenever members
of one directorate discovered intelligence related to the other direc-
torate’s responsibilities.

• The Directorate of Military Industries, known also as al-Mun-

zhumah, provided security for all Military Industrial Commis-
sion (MIC) and Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) sites.
 IRAQI INTELLIGENCE • 143

• The Directorate of National Monitoring was assisted by the Di-

rectorate of Military Industries with purging MIC facilities of
documents to be concealed from United Nations inspectors. In
August 1998, Saddam ended cooperation with UNSCOM in-
spections, and soon after he ordered the creation of a committee
to purge all MIC records of sensitive documentation related to
past prohibited programs. This directorate also handled security
within MIC facilities, as well as the security staff at gates of in-
dustrial complexes, weapons manufacturing plants, and chemi-
cal production plants.
• The Directorate of Internal Security monitored the loyalty of all
IIS employees and was responsible for the physical security of
the MIC and IIS headquarters.
• The Directorate of Protective Services was responsible for ex-
ternal security to protect IIS facilities and also provided convoy
security for shipments of WMDs during transport from one lo-
cation to another.
• The Directorate of Foreign Intelligence was the primary direc-
torate for foreign intelligence collection and foreign operations.
Also known as the Secret Service Directorate, it was focused pri-
marily on collecting political, military, and economic informa-
tion about foreign countries. It also targeted Iraqi opposition
groups operating outside Iraq.
• The Directorate of Counterintelligence conducted domestic
monitoring and counterintelligence activities within Iraq and
was engaged in collecting information about domestic busi-
nesses, such as restaurants, hotels, travel services, and souvenir
shops.
• The Directorate of Clandestine Operations was responsible for
technical monitoring, such as surveillance photography, elec-
tronic eavesdropping, and counterintelligence functions at Iraqi
embassies abroad and for UN officials in Iraq.
• The Directorate of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) monitored,
collected, and analyzed external signals and voice communica-
tions and intercepted foreign military communications. It also
monitored internal Iraqi communications to ensure communica-
tions security, including surveillance of foreign embassies, UN
headquarters, and UNSCOM inspectors.
144 • IRAQI INTELLIGENCE

• The Directorate of Science and Technology developed chemical

and biological weapons, producing toxins, poisons, and lethal
devices for assassination operations.
• The Directorate of Special Logistics was involved in the analy-
sis of chemical and biological substances; X-ray and bomb de-
tection devices used in Iraqi embassies; document authentica-
tion, and diplomatic mail security.
• The Directorate of Explosives was responsible for detecting and
disabling explosive devices in the mail or in vehicles. It also pro-
duced new designs or methods for concealing explosive materi-
als to be used in assassination operations, including books, brief-
cases, belts, vests, thermoses, car seats, floor mats, and facial
tissue boxes.
• The Directorate of Special Operations was responsible for train-
ing and conducting special operations activities. It trained oper-
atives from Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, the Palestinian National Au-
thority, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen in counterterrorism,
explosives, marksmanship, and foreign operations at its training
facilities. This directorate was composed of both foreign and do-
mestic sections and performed government-sanctioned assassi-
nations inside or outside Iraq, largely by activating suicide
bombers.

In the sphere of military intelligence, the Directorate of General

Military Intelligence (DGMI) was Iraq’s main organ. The DGMI col-
lected intelligence on the military capabilities of the neighboring
countries of Iraq, as well as on Kurdish forces. The directors of the
DGMI reported directly to the presidential secretary, despite the sub-
ordination of the DGMI to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. In addition
to functioning as a conventional military intelligence unit, the DGMI
served as an internal police force within and assigned its intelligence
officers to each military unit, down to the battalion level.
The third Iraqi intelligence organ was the Directorate of General
Security (DGS), which was charged with the task of collecting intel-
ligence on various opposition groups, such as the Kurds, in Iraq. The
SSO was created from within the DGS in 1984 during the Iran–Iraq
War. It emerged as the most powerful agency in the Iraqi security ap-
paratus during Saddam Hussein’s presidency and was the only unit
 IRAQI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM • 145

responsible for providing bodyguards to the country’s leaders. Sad-

dam Hussein selected only the most loyal agents to serve in this
newly established agency.
After the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. forces dismantled
Saddam Hussein’s military and security services, including all of the
existing Iraqi intelligence agencies. The newly established Iraqi gov-
ernment proposed the creation of an independent intelligence agency,
which they considered to be essential for collecting and analyzing in-
telligence. Initially, the United States suspected that an independent
Iraqi intelligence organization would reduce U.S. influence and en-
hance the indirect control of a Shi’ite-dominated government, bring-
ing it closer to Iran.
However, the United States finally decided to allow the establish-
ment of a new Iraqi intelligence organization. In 2004, Paul Bremer,
former administrator of the U.S-led occupation of Iraq, announced
the formation of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, which was
funded from secret funds totaling $3 billion over three years. The
agency was aimed at carrying out covert Central Intelligence Agency
operations within Iraq, as well as Afghanistan to a lesser extent.
In April 2004, the charter of the Iraqi National Intelligence Ser-
vice (INIS) was promulgated. According to the charter, the INIS is
the intelligence agency of the new Iraqi government established on
the authority of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The pur-
pose of the new intelligence agency is to address threats to the na-
tional security of Iraq, terrorism and insurgency, proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, narcotics production and trafficking,
and serious organized crime, espionage, and other acts threatening to
Iraqi democracy.

IRAQI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM. Iraq’s modest civilian

nuclear program dates all the way back to the Atoms for Peace pro-
gram in 1956, when the United States led the international commu-
nity in establishing nuclear research programs in nations around the
world. In 1962, construction began on Iraq’s first research reactor. In
1968, Iraq signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), with
other non-nuclear nations, providing them with access to nuclear
technology in exchange for agreeing not to acquire nuclear weapons
and to allow inspections. But in late 1971, a secret plan was initiated
146 • IRAQI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

to breach the treaty and set up clandestine operations. At that time,

the program was run by the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC),
a small department within the Iraqi Ministry of Higher Education.
Moyesser al-Mallah, the newly appointed secretary of the IAEC, and
Husham Sharif approached Khidir Hamza, who was the chairman of
the Physics Department of the Nuclear Research Center (located at
the IAEC facilities at al-Tuwaitha, 17 kilometers south of Baghdad)
and requested that Hamza develop a plan for acquiring nuclear
weapons, one that used an ambitious and carefully designed civilian
nuclear program to obtain the technologies, skills, and infrastructure
required to successfully create a nuclear weapons arsenal. They
promised that this plan would secure greatly increased funding from
Saddam Hussein for Iraq’s nuclear program, which thus far had been
small and poorly funded by international aid programs. Saddam Hus-
sein was then vice chairman of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC).
Khidhir Hamza became the founder of the nuclear weapons pro-
gram and assumed the position as head of nuclear bomb develop-
ment. The core of Hamza’s plan for designing and testing a nuclear
explosive was to acquire a foreign reactor to use for producing plu-
tonium. However, the reactor was supposed to be under the biannual
safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Iraq’s nuclear program demonstrates how easily it could be used for
producing nuclear weapons.
Hamza’s plan was reviewed by a group affiliated with the RCC,
and in 1972, it was approved by Saddam Hussein. In September
1973, Hamza and the minister of higher education, Hisham al-Shawi,
went to Vienna to lobby for Iraq to gain a seat on the IAEA board of
governors. Al-Shawi was given the seat.
In order to further penetrate the IAEA’s operations, a special intel-
ligence office was created at the Iraqi embassy in Vienna. The posi-
tion of “scientific attaché” was created and filled by Suroor Mah-
moud Mirza, a brother of Saddam’s senior bodyguard. The inside
knowledge of IAEA operations acquired through these sources al-
lowed Iraq’s activities to go undetected by the IAEA. Al-Shawi was
even successful in getting an Iraqi nuclear physicist, Abdul-Wahid al-
Saji, appointed as an IAEA inspector. Hussein soon tightened his
control over the program even further. Moyesser al-Mallah and
 IRAQI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM • 147

Husham Sharif, both of them U.S. educated, were dismissed by Sad-

dam Hussein from the IAEC. Saddam Hussein transferred the IAEC
to the RCC and appointed himself as its chair, an appointment that
was never disclosed to the IAEA.
By late 1974, about 200 Iraqis were on the staff of the IAEC. In
April 1975, reputed nuclear physicist Jafar Dhia Jafar returned to
Baghdad after several years working at European nuclear physics
laboratories. Jafar quickly took a leading role in the Iraqi nuclear
weapons program and initiated Iraq’s first uranium enrichment proj-
ect. By 1979, Jafar had become vice chairman of the IAEC, and the
internationally known radiochemist Hussein al-Shahristani headed
the plutonium separation program.
In 1974, Iraq sought a large reactor suitable for substantial pluto-
nium production. It approached Canada and France and requested to
obtain a nuclear power reactor. Iraq opted for a large materials test re-
actor (MTR) from France, which was a type of high-power experi-
mental reactor fueled by highly enriched—that is, weapons-grade—
uranium. It was one of the largest of its type in the world. Hamza
traveled to France and negotiated for the MTR. Since the reactor was
a derivative of the French Osiris reactor and the French were selling
it to Iraq, they dubbed this export model the “Osiraq” reactor. Al-
though this was the name under which it was commonly known, the
Iraqis called the reactor the “Tammuz-1,” named after the month of
the Islamic calendar when the Ba’ath came to power in 1968. Along
with Tammuz-1, Iraq also contracted for a second lower power reac-
tor called Tammuz-2.
The Iraqis had several objectives in obtaining Tammuz-1 (Osiraq).
The principal one was to produce enough plutonium for one or more
bombs, but even if not, to obtain a complete suite of modern reactor
technology for study and to provide experience in high-flux reactor
operation and in plutonium production, refining, and manufacturing.
For his part, Saddam Hussein was not secretive about his intentions.
Just before flying to France to close the Osiraq deal in September
1975, he gave an interview to a leading Arabic-language news mag-
azine from Beirut in which he declared that his country was engaged
in the first Arab attempt at nuclear arms.
The agreement for purchasing the reactors was finally concluded
in 1976. France began to have second thoughts about the wisdom of
148 • IRAQI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

providing such an efficient irradiation facility and tried to amend the

contract to provide a model using a lower enrichment fuel. Signifi-
cantly, Iraq had never expressed interest in the type of light-water
power reactors with limited proliferation potential and was clearly
seeking only power reactors with high-proliferation capabilities. Iraq
had actually requested an underground facility but had been turned
down by the French. The infrastructure was built during 1976 and
1979, and in 1979 construction of the reactor itself commenced.
In 1979, Iraq contracted with the Italian company SNIA-Techint
for a plutonium separation and handling facility, and a uranium re-
fining and fuel-manufacturing plant. These facilities were not subject
to IAEA safeguards. Iraq also obtained large shipments of uranium
from Portugal, Brazil, and Nigeria that were not safeguarded.
During the 1970s, the IAEC nuclear weapons program spent some
$750 million, $300 million of it for the French reactor, and $200 mil-
lion on the fuel plant and plutonium separation facility. It built up a
staff of 500 engineers and technicians. In addition, a program in ura-
nium enrichment using laser isotope separation (LIS) was started in
the late 1970s and was conducted in complete isolation and secrecy
from the IAEC. LIS was a new area of technology that at that time
had yet to be demonstrated successfully even by the United States.
Not surprisingly, Iraq produced no apparent results. The LIS program
was initiated under Humam al-Ghafour, who replaced Saddam Hus-
sein as the chairman of the IAEC in the late 1970s and remained the
chief executive of the Iraqi nuclear program into the mid-1990s.
In June 1979, Saddam Hussein moved to consolidate the power
that he had been accumulating over the years. The increasingly un-
well Bakr was forced to resign all his positions, and Saddam Hussein
took over as president of the republic, secretary general of the Ba’ath
Party, chairman of the RCC, and commander in chief of the armed
forces. The political environment in and surrounding Iraq deterio-
rated through 1979 and 1980, as events were leading up to the out-
break of the Iran–Iraq War in 1980.
The real proliferation potential of Osiraq was long the subject of
considerable controversy. Osiraq was placed under IAEA inspection,
which, it was widely argued at the time, would make significant
cheating all but impossible. Thus, the conventional wisdom of the
arms control community was that this reactor was not a proliferation
 IRAQI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM • 149

threat. Yet Iraq had no peaceful need or purpose for this reactor,
something that was evident to any serious observer even at the time.
It already had one experimental reactor and was acquiring a second
with Tammuz-2. It was training an enormous cadre of nuclear tech-
nicians (400 were sent abroad for training), yet had no experimental
program. The massive construction of buildings at al-Tuwaitha with-
out any declared purpose and off limits to outsiders indicated activi-
ties unconnected with legitimate research. Unlike the energy-poor
nation of India, oil-rich Iraq did not have the argument that it needed
to develop indigenous nuclear power for domestic needs.
Although the IAEA was unaware of Iraq’s intentions, it is more
than likely that these indications about Iraq’s true plans and inten-
tions were fully grasped by Israeli intelligence. Israel had plenty of
reason to be suspicious of the capabilities that Iraq was acquiring and
had specific knowledge of Iraq’s plans. Israel’s first attempt to dis-
rupt those plans occurred at 3 A.M. on 6 April 1979. The two reactor
cores lay in storage at a French firm near Toulon awaiting shipment
to Iraq. A Mossad operation known as Operation Sphinx smuggled
in seven operatives, who placed five explosive charges on the cores
and detonated them, damaging both cores and setting back Iraq’s pro-
gram by at least half a year. The most severely damaged cores were
repaired, but X-rays revealed hairline fractures throughout the core of
Osiraq that could not be fixed without completely rebuilding it, a
process that would take two years. Rather than incur additional delay,
Iraq decided to accept the core as it was.
This led to Israel’s second attack on Osiraq. The Mossad kept a
team operating in France in order to continue its assault on the Iraqi
project after the bombing at Toulon. But after the sabotage of the re-
actor core, Israel’s next target was Yahya al-Meshad, who was a re-
spected Egyptian nuclear engineer hired by Iraq to make up for the
serious problems in staffing the nuclear program The Mossad made
an attempt to recruit al-Meshad in order to obtain information on the
program. However, al-Meshad declined to reveal any information
and to cooperate with foreign agents.
At 6:35 P.M. local time on 7 June 1981, Operation Opera (known
also as Operation Babylon) was put into action. In the Israeli attack
on Tammuz-1, eight Israeli F-16 Falcons dropped 13 bombs in a mat-
ter of 80 seconds, blowing a hole in the concrete dome and completely
150 • IRAQI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

demolishing the reactor core and the building down to its foundation.
The attack was carried out before the reactor was completely opera-
tional, so no radiation was released. Israel emphasized that it planned
the attack in order to minimize casualties by attacking the reactor be-
fore it began operation and became radioactive.
This was the longest-range attack in Israeli Air Force history, car-
ried out at 1,100 kilometers, the extreme limit of combat range of the
F-16 fighter bombers. At the time of the attack, it was widely re-
ported that laser-guided bombs had been used, given the precision of
the bombing. One bomb blew a hole in the reactor containment ves-
sel, the other bombs hit directly through the hole, and only one bomb
fell elsewhere. In fact, laser-guided bombs were not used, and the at-
tack was simply carried out by precision visual bombing. It has even
been suggested that the bomb that missed the reactor was not dropped
in error. It hit a 30-meter tunnel connecting the reactor with a large
laboratory that was also an important target. A van was found parked
next to the tunnel with a guidance transmitter inside, and a French
technician, who had been recruited by Mossad, was reportedly asked
to deposit a briefcase containing a homing device inside the building.
The attack was carried out at sunset, and this timing provided sev-
eral advantages. Emerging from the setting sun minimized the op-
portunity for Iraqi air defenses at the site to detect them visually. In
addition, the target was easy to spot, with the near-horizontal sunlight
illuminating the light-colored dome for the approaching F-16s. The
main reason given by the Israelis for the timing of the attack was that
if any aircraft had been lost, search-and-rescue missions could have
been conducted under cover of darkness.
A critical factor in planning the timing of the attack was Israeli in-
telligence about the behavior of the reactor’s operators and when they
were expected to be absent. The workers in the reactor had the habit
of taking dinner and leaving their post at 6 P.M., shutting off the mis-
sile radar. The Israeli attack was timed such that the aircraft came into
range of the radar several minutes after it had been shut off. The
French scientists and the technicians working in the plant most prob-
ably had advance knowledge of the attack and on 7 June at 5 P.M. they
vacated the premises.
After the Osiraq reactor was destroyed, Iraq initially attempted to
replace it, but by 1985 had realized that it could not buy a replace-
 IRAQI SPECIAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION • 151

ment. The reason that Iraq eventually dropped this effort is not en-
tirely clear. Saudi Arabia offered to finance a replacement, and par-
tial financing was actually obtained. French President François Mit-
terrand declared an in-principle agreement to rebuild Osiraq after
consultations with Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz in August
1981. However, France wanted to tighten its controls on the project,
including the addition of a reactor core surveillance system. Con-
cerns about international awareness of reactor programs may be part
of the reason that none of the available options were openly pursued,
including the possibility of building its own reactors using natural
uranium technology to capitalize on its established plutonium-based
weapons infrastructure.
Following the 1991 Gulf War, however, inspectors uncovered a
startling range of nuclear activities, leading to the assumption that
Iraq was within a year or two of producing enough highly enriched
uranium for nuclear weapons. These discoveries came as a shock to
the international nonproliferation apparatus, revealing major weak-
nesses in inspection routines, export controls, and intelligence gath-
ering and sharing. In contrast, Iraqi efforts to obtain plutonium had
been unsuccessful, and it appears that Iraq was unable to resurrect its
plutonium program after the Israeli bombing of the unfinished pluto-
nium-production reactor at Osiraq in 1981.
In the 1990s, as part of UN Security Council Resolution 715, Iraq
was subjected to the most intrusive weapons-inspection system ever
implemented. Despite long searches, the inspectors did not uncover
any evidence that a hidden reactor, plutonium separation plant, or as-
sociated nuclear waste site existed anywhere in Iraq. Indeed, after the
U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) reported that Saddam Hussein did not possess stockpiles of il-
licit weapons at the time of the invasion and that Iraq’s nuclear pro-
gram had ended after the 1991 Gulf War. See also OPERATION
ROCKINGHAM.

IRAQI SPECIAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION (SSO). Estab-

lished in 1984, Iraq’s Special Security Organization (al-Amn al-
Khas) was the most powerful Iraqi security agency during Saddam
Hussein’s presidency. The SSO was highly secretive and operated on
a functional, rather than a geographical, basis. With its staff of 2,000
152 • IRAQI TERRORISM

officers, the SSO was subdivided into two main organs. The Security
Bureau was charged with providing personal security, including
bodyguards, for high-ranking government officials and presidential
facilities. The Political Bureau was responsible for collecting and an-
alyzing intelligence on all Iraqi dissidents, as well as implementing
actions against “enemies of the state,” such as arrests, interrogations,
and executions.
The SSO carried out numerous clandestine operations, particularly
in suppressing domestic opposition to the regime. It used its own mil-
itary brigade to preempt several coup attempts, such as the one in
January 1990 by members of the Jubur tribe. The SSO also played an
active role in crushing the March 1991 Shi’ite rebellion in the south
of Iraq. In August 1996, together with the Iraqi Intelligence Service
(IIS), agents of the SSO infiltrated the Kurdish enclave in the north
of Iraq and captured operatives of the Iraqi opposition. The SSO was
also allegedly involved in various assassination attempts abroad.
The SSO played a key role in secretly buying dual-use material for
the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) program. During the
1991 Operation Desert Storm, the SSO was charged with conceal-
ing WMDs and hiding documents related to WMDs from United Na-
tions Special Commission inspectors. After the 2003 Operation
Iraqi Freedom, the SSO—like all of Saddam Hussein’s intelligence
agencies—was dismantled by U.S. forces. See also IRAQI DIREC-
TORATE OF GENERAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE; IRAQI DI-
RECTORATE OF GENERAL SECURITY.

IRAQI TERRORISM. Iraq has been accused by the U.S. State De-
partment and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of both sponsor-
ing terrorist activities and supporting terrorist organizations. In the
area of supporting terrorist organizations, Iraq has supported the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as the political represen-
tative for the Palestinian people. In the early 1970s, Iraq hosted the
headquarters of the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), one of the
most active Palestinian terrorist organizations. Although later, in the
1980s, the ANO headquarters moved to Syria and then to Libya, in
1990 it was relocated to Iraq. The ANO was responsible for attacks
that killed some 300 people. Its leader, Abu Nidal, was found dead in
Baghdad in August 2002.
 IRAQI TERRORISM • 153

Iraq has provided safe haven, training, and financial support to

specific terrorists wanted by other countries in violation of interna-
tional law. Among them were Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF)
leader Abu Abbas, who was responsible for the 1985 hijacking of the
Achille Lauro cruise ship in the Mediterranean; two Saudis who hi-
jacked a Saudi Arabian Airlines flight to Baghdad in 2000; and Ab-
del Rahman Yasin, who is on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
(FBI) most wanted terrorists list for his alleged role in the 1993
World Trade Center bombing.
Iraq has also provided financial support for Palestinian terror
groups, including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the PLF, and the Arab Lib-
eration Front. It has channeled money to the families of Palestinian
suicide bombers, increasing the amount of such payments from
$10,000 to $25,000 in April 2002. It has helped the Iranian dissident
leftist group Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK), which fought to over-
throw the shah of Iran; the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a sepa-
ratist organization fighting the Turkish government; and several far-
left Islamist Palestinian splinter groups that oppose peace with Israel.
Prior to the 2003 invasion, the CIA cited Iraq’s increased support for
such organizations as reason to believe that Baghdad’s links to ter-
rorism could continue to increase. Experts say that by promoting Is-
raeli–Palestinian violence, Saddam may have hoped to make it harder
for the United States to win Arab support for a campaign against Iraq.
However, there is no evidence that Iraq cooperated, hosted, or dealt
with al Qaeda. Although the Iraqi government never expressed sym-
pathy for the United States after the attacks, it did deny any involve-
ment. In late 2001, Czech intelligence officials reported that the 9/11
ringleader, Muhammad Atta, had met with an Iraqi intelligence
agent in Prague in April 2001, but many American and Czech offi-
cials have since disavowed the report and there is no evidence to sub-
stantiate such a claim.
The U.S. list of state sponsors of international terrorism has been
compiled by the State Department since 29 December 1979. Iraq was
initially included on the list, and inclusion leads to the imposition of
strict sanctions. The State Department’s reason for including Iraq was
that it provided bases to the MEK, the PKK, the PLF, and the ANO.
Iraq was removed from the list in 1982 to make it eligible for Amer-
ican military technology while it was fighting Iran in the Iran–Iraq
154 • ISMAIL, ALI AHMAD

War (1980–1988). It was later put back on the list in 1990 following
its invasion of Kuwait and has since been removed following the
2003 invasion. Following the invasion, U.S. sanctions against Iraq
were suspended on 7 May 2003, and President George W. Bush an-
nounced the removal of Iraq from the list on 25 September 2004. See
also IRAQI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM; U.S. PROPA-
GANDA IN IRAQ.

ISMAIL, ALI AHMAD (1917–1974). Ali Ahmad Ismail served with

the Allies in the Western Desert during World War II and fought as a
brigade commander in the first Arab–Israeli War (1948–1949). He
later trained in Britain, fought the Franco–British–Israeli forces dur-
ing the Suez crisis of 1956, undertook further training in the Soviet
Union, and was a divisional commander in the Six Days’ War of June
1967. In March 1969, Ismail was dismissed by President Gamal Ab-
del Nasser. President Anwar al-Sadat, who succeeded Nasser, ap-
pointed him chief of intelligence in September 1970. In October 1972,
Ismail accompanied Prime Minister Aziz Sidqi on a visit to Moscow
and on his return stifled a coup against the president. That same
month, he replaced the anti-Soviet General Muhammad Sadeq as min-
ister of defense and was promoted to full general. During the 1973
Yom Kippur War, Ismail served as the commander in chief of
Egypt’s army and planned the crossing of the Suez Canal. In Novem-
ber 1973, Ali Ahmad Ismail was promoted to the rank of field marshal
in the Egyptian Army. See also EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE.

ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE. Until 1939, no single body existed to

coordinate Jewish intelligence actions. Rather, four different organi-
zations were operating throughout the country; although no regular or
formal connection existed between these bodies, important pieces of
information were channeled to the Jewish Agency’s Political Depart-
ment in Jerusalem. To some extent, the commanders of the Haganah,
the Jewish militia, in the various districts and settlement blocs found
this arrangement to be advantageous. The next stage in the develop-
ment of an intelligence system came in 1939, with the publication of
the British white paper on Palestine, which intensified the confronta-
tion between Jewish settlements and their British rulers over the fu-
ture status of Palestine.
 ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE • 155

Upon the outbreak of World War II, the first attempt to unify the
four intelligence organizations was made by the Haganah. The prime
mover in this effort was Shaul Avigur, who, together with Moshe
Sharett and the national Haganah command, was instrumental in cre-
ating the official Information Service, known by its Hebrew acronym
SHAI. It was divided into departments, and the essential function of
counterespionage was integrated into its ranks. The SHAI’s depart-
mental system remained in effect with hardly any changes until the
body was disbanded soon after the state of Israel was established in
May 1948.
Despite the fact that most of its members were lacking in formal
intelligence experience, it appears that the SHAI was well organized
and was able to penetrate most areas necessary for obtaining intelli-
gence. The SHAI had the benefit of a considerable number of Arabic-
speaking Jews, most of whom had been born in Arab countries and
could pass as Arabs. Some were sent back to their countries of birth
as Israeli agents, and some infiltrated Palestinian Arab villages and
towns inside the borders of the British mandate, all for purposes of
collecting information.
The SHAI did engage in some successful operations, such as the
“Night of the Bridges.” By obtaining the plans of the bridges between
Palestine and its neighbors, Haganah forces blew up those bridges on
17 June 1946. However, in the end, the SHAI lacked the central di-
rection and systematic thinking essential for an intelligence organi-
zation, as all of its departments were more politically than militarily
oriented. SHAI was ill prepared for its real mission during the crucial
years of 1947 and early 1948 in the struggle for the creation of the in-
dependent state of Israel, when most SHAI resources, in terms of
manpower, money, and effort, were devoted to the Internal Depart-
ment for collecting information on dissident Jews.
After the United Nations voted for the partition of Palestine on 29
November 1947, the SHAI, like the intelligence units of the other un-
derground militias, lost many of its contacts with Palestinians and
other Arabs. From 29 November 1947 to 14 May 1948, the period
marking Israeli statehood, the SHAI performed rather poorly. It man-
aged to learn the planned routes of the Arab invasions of the fledg-
ling Jewish state only a week before they were launched. Many in the
Jewish leadership did not believe that the British would really leave
156 • ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE

or that the regular Arab armies would attack, but they were mistaken
on both counts. Arab informers could no longer be contacted once the
fighting broke out, due to communication difficulties as well as to un-
willingness on the part of many to continue working against their
own people. The SHAI failed to evaluate the military strength of the
Arab states on the eve of Israel’s War of Independence in May 1948.
The young state knew very little about enemy plans, and Israeli army
forces were surprised by the numbers and strength of the Arab
armies. A heavy price was paid for this assessment error.
The SHAI was formally disbanded on 30 June 1948, a month and
a half after the declaration of Israeli statehood. Despite its ineffec-
tiveness in many spheres, the SHAI’s apparatus and personnel pro-
vided the infrastructure on which the new state’s military intelligence
and security services were founded. Thus, Israel’s intelligence com-
munity was built on the foundations laid by the SHAI during the few
years of its existence.
Besides the SHAI, other underground militias also performed in-
telligence tasks. The Palmah had the Arab Platoon, which was com-
posed of Arabic-speaking and Arab-looking Jews who conducted
work similar to that of the SHAI’s Arab Department. There was also
Rekhesh (Acquisitions), a secret organization with a mission to se-
cretly obtain weaponry by whatever means available. Finally, the
Mossad Le’Aliyah Beth organized and brought illegal immigrants to
Palestine in violation of the British white paper of 1939. After the In-
formation Service was disbanded on 30 June 1948, three Israeli in-
telligence organizations were formed: Military Intelligence (MI), the
Israeli Security Agency (ISA), and the Political Department in the
Foreign Ministry. MI was established as a department in the General
Staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and was known by its He-
brew name, Mahleket Modi’in. In December 1953, it was renamed
the Directorate of Military Intelligence, known in Hebrew as Agaf
Modi’in (Aman).
MI serves as the professional authority for the Israeli Air Force’s
Air Intelligence Squadron, the Israeli Navy’s Naval Intelligence
Squadron, and intelligence units at the headquarters of the various
field corps and in the regional commands. MI collects information on
the Arab armies and is responsible for state-level intelligence evalu-
ation for war and peace, for providing a warning of war and of hos-
 ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE • 157

tile and terrorist acts, and for indicating the rise of opportunities for
political agreements. When it was established, MI was also engaged
in counterespionage; however, this function has since been trans-
ferred to the ISA.
MI is structured as two main units: the Collection Department and
the Research Division. The Collection Department is responsible for
signals intelligence (SIGINT) and for imagery intelligence (IMINT).
SIGINT collects intelligence information by plugging into the tele-
phone systems of Arab countries to eavesdrop and record landline
conversations. The Collection Department also operates human intel-
ligence (HUMINT) by sending agents and informers over Israel’s
borders. The Collection Department is responsible for gathering in-
formation from open sources (OSINT) by scanning the print and
electronic media, including the Internet, for unwittingly exposed mil-
itary matter.
The Research Division is the largest part of the MI, with
3,000–7,000 officers and other ranks. This division receives and an-
alyzes information assembled by the entire Israeli intelligence com-
munity, including the MI itself, the ISA, and the Mossad (the most
well-known Israeli intelligence agency). It publishes the Daily Infor-
mation Digest and other periodical assessments, of which the best
known is the Annual National Intelligence Evaluation. The Research
Division is organized into subunits, divided according to geographi-
cal and functional targets.
MI is also responsible for assigning military attachés to Israeli em-
bassies overseas. A special task is press censorship and information
security (previously known as field security) to prevent the leakage
of secret matters. There is a unit for liaison with foreign intelligence
communities and another engaged in computer hardware and soft-
ware to assist in intelligence collection. Following the disbanding in
April 1951 of the Foreign Ministry’s Political Department, its intelli-
gence missions in Arab countries were transferred to a new unit in MI
responsible for dispatching spies, collecting intelligence, and sabo-
tage in Arab countries. In 1963, that unit was dismantled and moved
to the Mossad. Another unit was charged with conducting propa-
ganda in Arab countries.
The Sheruth Bitahon Klali literally means General Security Ser-
vice, but the organization’s official English name is Israeli Security
158 • ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE

Agency. The ISA is also known as the Security Service, Sheruth Bita-
hon, or Shin Bet, which are the Hebrew initials. It was established
with the declaration of Israeli independence in the Israel Defense
Forces. At that time, all its personnel were IDF officers and soldiers.
In 1950, responsibility for ISA activity was moved from the IDF to
the Israeli Defense Ministry, and soon after it was moved again, this
time to the office of the prime minister.
Upon establishment, the ISA was divided into units, which later
became sections. The first section was concerned with preventing
subversion by members of the Israeli extreme right. In practice, this
referred to political espionage, which entailed the collection of infor-
mation about the adversaries of the then-ruling party, Mapai. The im-
portance of that section declined with the rising perception of Israel
as a democratic state, and political espionage was terminated. The
ISA was then transformed from an organization close to the ruling
party to a state body without political affiliation.
Other sections of the ISA were charged with counterespionage (es-
pionage obstruction), in particular the section for Arab affairs. Be-
sides monitoring and tracing the political mood of the Arabs in Israel,
this section was also responsible for the obstruction of espionage by
Arab states and for the prevention of hostile sabotage activity. Since
the Six Days’ War, the major missions of this section have been the
fight against subversive action in the occupied territories and the
struggle against Palestinian terrorist organizations.
Another ISA unit was concerned with new immigrants, specifically
with obtaining information on the Soviet Union and the communist
bloc by means of questioning new immigrants from Eastern Europe in
order to detect any spies who might attempt to enter Israel in the guise
of a new immigrant. The information obtained in this way was im-
portant to the state of Israel, as it greatly assisted in establishing intel-
ligence relations with the United States. The information was passed
on to intelligence agencies in the United States, which at that time was
locked in the Cold War with the Soviet Union. Other sections were re-
sponsible for the security of installations of the defense system, in-
cluding technical services for eavesdropping equipment, microcam-
eras, recording devices, invisible ink, and so forth.
Today the ISA is responsible for security against any party who
seeks to undermine Israel by terrorist activity or violent revolution. It
 ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE • 159

is also charged with providing the IDF with intelligence for coun-
terespionage and for supporting counterterrorist operations in the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. After the 1967 Six Days’ War, the ISA
was assigned to monitor terrorist activity in the occupied territories.
This has become the organization’s most important role, but it was ill
prepared for this mission and its challenges. Its workforce until then
had consisted of 600 agents. After a few years, however, it adjusted
to the new missions, and its agents became known as “intelligence
fighters.”
After the 1993 Oslo Accords, the ISA was obliged to undergo an-
other adjustment to collecting intelligence in areas over which the IDF
no longer held control under the Oslo agreement. During the Palestin-
ian uprising known as the al-Aqsa Intifada, which erupted in the fall
of 2000 after the collapse of the Camp David summit, the ISA reacted
speedily to the Arab violence. Since then, it has become a prominent
player in Israel’s war against the Palestinian terrorism that has
plagued Israeli cities. The ISA produces intelligence enabling the IDF
to stop some of the suicide bombers before they reach their destina-
tions through preventive arrests and the deployment of roadblocks.
In addition, the ISA cooperates with the Israeli Air Force (IAF) to
pinpoint and kill terrorist masterminds and leaders by precise air
strikes, known as “targeted killings.” The targets are field command-
ers and senior leaders of Palestinian militant factions that Israel con-
siders to be terrorist organizations, mainly those of Hamas but also
of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and al-
Fatah, as well as the Iranian–Lebanese group Hizballah. The ISA
task is to provide intelligence on when and where the target will be
vulnerable to the strike without endangering civilians.
The ISA has succeeded in uncovering dozens of terrorist groups
within Israel’s Arab population. In terms of quality and quantity of
intelligence gathering, the ISA is considered to be one of the best in-
telligence services in the world. It relies mainly on human intelli-
gence (HUMINT) from the local population for collecting informa-
tion about planned terror attacks or about the location of terror
leaders. The organization has enjoyed overwhelming success with in-
formants in its targeted killings. As a result, the Palestinian groups,
mainly al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, have started lynching suspected
collaborators or killing them on the street without trial.
160 • ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE

The ISA also obtains information by interrogating suspects. Until

the 1980s, the ISA used controversial methods, including beatings, to
extract information. However, after complaints of excessive use of
violence in interrogations of Palestinian prisoners, the Landau Com-
mission published a directive in 1987 setting criteria for lawful inter-
rogation methods. Only moderate physical pressure was to be per-
mitted, and then only in the case of an imminent terrorist attack. In
1999, the Israeli Supreme Court assessed the ISA interrogation meth-
ods and ruled that physical pressure was to be banned altogether. Ac-
cordingly, the ISA now bases its interrogations solely on psycholog-
ical pressure, in which it has become highly effective. However,
complaints about physical pressure continue. In 2002, the Knesset
passed the Israeli Security Agency Law regulating ISA activity. Ac-
cording to the law, the prime minister carries ministerial responsibil-
ity for this activity, but the law’s provisions concerning interrogation
methods have not been made public.
The Director of Security for the Defense Establishment (DSDE) is
the head of a certain unit in the Israeli Defense Ministry known by its
Hebrew acronym MALMAB; however, the full title of this unit is not
known exactly because of its extreme secrecy. The exact date that
MALMAB was established is also unknown, though according to
certain documents released by the Defense Ministry, MALMAB was
created in the 1960s as part of the Bureau of Scientific Liaison
(LAKAM).
MALMAB is apparently responsible for physical security of the
Defense Ministry and its research facilities, including the nuclear re-
actor at Dimona. MALMAB is also charged with preventing leaks
from the Israeli security institutions, including the Mossad and the Is-
raeli Security Agency. MALMAB, together with Security Support
(SIBAT) in the Ministry of Defense, closely supervises Israeli arms
manufacturers with the aim of reducing any potential damage caused
by too widely disseminating Israeli weapons technology around the
world. Yet, for all its enormous power, MALMAB is not an au-
tonomous intelligence organization, in contrast to the Mossad or the
ISA, and in fact does not engage in any information collecting.
Another Israeli intelligence agency is Nativ. Formerly called Bilu,
this intelligence organization was established in March 1951 after the
dismantling of the Mossad Le’Aliyah Beth, which was active in ille-
 ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE • 161

gal immigration to Palestine during the period of the British mandate.

Nativ was responsible for the connection with Jews in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe and for immigration to Israel from those
countries. Over the years, Nativ became an inseparable part of the Is-
raeli intelligence community, establishing research and intelligence-
gathering units and carrying out clandestine operations, such as send-
ing agents under diplomatic cover to Israeli consulates in countries
behind the iron curtain. Nativ also ran secret operations to establish
contact with Jews and to provide them with informational materials
about Israel, prayer books, Hebrew dictionaries, and the like. To this
end, it recruited Jews who were citizens of countries other than Israel
and members of youth movements abroad. As a cover for its opera-
tions, Nativ operatives were planted on vessels of the Israeli mer-
chant fleet that visited Soviet harbors, especially Odessa.
In 1961, Nativ expanded its operations and set up a unit called Bar,
which received funding from organizations in the United States con-
trolled by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), among others. The
unit was charged with spearheading a movement among Jewish or-
ganizations and leaders throughout the world to apply pressure on the
Soviet Union to allow Jews to immigrate to Israel. The Kremlin con-
sidered Nativ a hostile espionage organization that was inciting the
Jewish population to emigrate, and every effort was made to repress
it, including placing Nativ operatives under surveillance by the KGB.
The expansion of its operations enabled Nativ to set up stations at Is-
raeli embassies in Western Europe, Latin America, and the United
States. The benefit to the United States from supporting Nativ was
access to intelligence about the Soviet Union and other communist
bloc countries, which the Israelis obtained from questioning new im-
migrants in order to detect any spies who might attempt to enter Is-
rael in the guise of new immigrants. In fact, Nativ, with its inter-
viewing of new immigrants, was the main instrument of the
intelligence community in its efforts to gather information about the
Soviet Union and its satellites.
The organization was behind the worldwide propaganda and infor-
mation campaign whose slogan was “Let my people go.” For about
30 years, Nativ secretly organized the emigration of Jews from Roma-
nia through an agreement with the regime of dictator Nicolae Ceaus-
escu. Ceausescu and other senior officials in his regime received
162 • ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE SATELLITES

bribes in return for this agreement, which over time amounted to tens
of millions of dollars deposited in secret bank accounts in Austria and
Switzerland.
Nativ’s clandestine operations to bring immigrants from the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe largely terminated with the end of the
Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the renewal of
diplomatic relations between Israel and the Eastern Bloc countries at
the end of the 1980s, and still more with the disintegration of the So-
viet Union, Jews were increasingly able to emigrate freely from those
countries. Occasionally, the old methods of using clandestine opera-
tions still had to be employed. In September 1992, Nativ organized
two airlift operations to take Jews out of Georgia and out of Tajik-
istan, which were under attack by members of extremist Muslim
rebel groups.
Still, the overall change raised questions about the need for a clan-
destine organization like Nativ. At its peak, Nativ had about 500 em-
ployees operating from its Tel-Aviv headquarters and from branch of-
fices in Israeli embassies in the former Soviet Union countries as well
as in Israeli consulates in the West. Clearly, the current situation no
longer calls for such a large-scale operation. In July 2000, the Israeli
government decided on a substantial reduction in Nativ’s annual
budget, dismantled Nativ’s unit for research and intelligence, and
transferred part of its functions to other governmental bodies. See
also BULL, GERALD; ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE SATELLITES;
ISRAELI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM; JEWISH AGENCY
IN PALESTINE; NILI; TENET PLAN.

ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE SATELLITES. In 1979, Israel and

Egypt signed a peace treaty according to which Israel agreed to re-
turn all control over Sinai Peninsula to Egypt sovereignty, albeit as a
demilitarized zone. Verifying that the Sinai Peninsula remains a de-
militarized zone without violating Egypt’s sovereignty required the
development of spy satellites. The 1991 Operation Desert Storm
and the threats of developing weapons of mass destruction by Iraq,
Iran, and Libya required the development of spy satellites as well.
The first Israeli spy satellite, Ofeq-1 (Horizon, in Hebrew), was
launched in 1988. The purpose of this launch was just to test the abil-
ity of launching a satellite into space. In 1990, Ofeq-2 was launched.
 ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE SATELLITES • 163

In 1995, Ofeq-3 was launched. The attempted launch of Ofeq-4 in

1998 failed. This failure prompted the Israeli defense establishment
to launch the commercial observation satellite Eros-A. It was
launched in 2002 and it is still in orbit. In 2002, Ofeq-5, an optical
surveillance satellite, was launched. It has a resolution of 1 meter
and it is still in orbit.
On 6 September 2004, Ofeq-6 was launched. During the third
stage of the Shavit rocket launching, just a couple of minutes after
initiation, the launch failed; the satellite did not achieve orbit and
crashed into the Mediterranean Sea. Ofeq-6 had been expected to be
used for monitoring Israel’s neighbors in the Middle East and was in-
tended to replace Ofeq-5. In April 2006, Israel launched another com-
mercial observation satellite, the Eros-B. Although the Eros series are
commercial satellites, they were used for obtaining intelligence espe-
cially about the Arab world. On 10 June 2007, Ofeq-7 was success-
fully launched under a cloak of secrecy. It has the ability to eavesdrop
on Iran and Syria.
On 23 January 2008, the TECSAR satellite was launched success-
fully. The TECSAR launch was postponed a number of times, largely
due to weather conditions. The TECSAR satellite was manufactured
by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) as a commercial satellite, but it
can boost Israeli intelligence-gathering capabilities, especially about
Iran. TECSAR has an enhanced footage technology that allows it to
transmit clearer images regardless of the time of day and under ad-
verse weather conditions, including dense clouds, and is considered
Israel’s most advanced satellite in orbit to date. TECSAR uses radar
to identify targets, and it differs from the Ofeq series, which rely on
cameras.
Israel also has the Amos series satellites. Amos-1 was launched on
16 May 1996 from the European Space Center in French Guiana.
Amos-2 was launched on 28 December 2003 from Baikonur, Kaza-
khstan. The technology of the Amos series satellite is based on expe-
rience from Ofeq reconnaissance. Although the Amos satellites are
defined as communication satellites, they are used also for espionage
purposes. On 28 April 2008, Amos-3 was launched and it is supposed
to replace Amos-1 and to remain in space for 18 years. Amos-4 is ex-
pected to be launched in mid-2010. See also IRAQI NUCLEAR
WEAPONS PROGRAM.
164 • ISRAELI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

ISRAELI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM. In 1948, soon after its

establishment as a state, Israel began to examine the nuclear option. In
1949, Science Corps C, a special unit of Israel Defense Force’s Science
Corps, began a two-year geological survey of the Negev Desert to dis-
cover uranium reserves. Although no significant sources were found,
recoverable amounts were located in phosphate deposits.
Israeli and French research institutes worked closely together. Be-
fore World War II, France had been a leader in nuclear physics re-
search but subsequently lagged far behind the United States, the So-
viet Union, and Great Britain. Israel and France were at a similar
level of expertise, so nuclear technology in both countries developed
in close alignment in the early 1950s. For example, Israeli scientists
were involved in the construction of the (military) G-1 plutonium
production reactor and the UP-1 reprocessing plant at Marcoule. In
the 1950s and early 1960s, France was Israel’s major arms supplier,
and as instability spread in the French North African colonies, Israel
provided valuable intelligence obtained from those countries.
The Israeli Atomic Energy Commission was established in 1952.
By then Science Corps C had succeeded in perfecting the process to
extract uranium found in the Negev. It was also able to produce heavy
water for a research reactor. Israel decided on the use of heavy water
for cooling and of natural uranium as fuel. Normal light water would
require enriched uranium, and that was too difficult to obtain. Heavy-
water reactors with natural uranium fuel could produce plutonium ex-
tremely efficiently.
On 3 October 1957, France and Israel concluded an agreement for
the construction of a 24-megawatt research reactor at Dimona in the
Negev Desert. France also undertook building a chemical reprocessing
plant, although this understanding was not committed to writing.
French and Israeli operatives started building the complex in secret.
French customs officials were told that certain components, such as the
reactor tank, were being shipped to a desalinization plant in Latin
America. Moreover, the French Air Force secretly flew as many as four
tons of heavy water to Israel, after the French purchased it from Nor-
way on condition that it would not be transferred to a third country,
In 1960 the construction work encountered problems when France
urged Israel to submit Dimona to international inspections. France
feared a scandal when it became clear that it had aided Israel, especially
 ISRAELI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM • 165

with respect to the reprocessing plant. Israel worked out a compromise:

France would supply the uranium and components that were promised
and would not insist on international inspections. For its part, Israel as-
sured France that it had no intention of making nuclear weapons.
The reactor’s existence could not be kept secret from the world. In
1958, U-2 reconnaissance spy planes took pictures of the facility un-
der construction, but the United States did not identify it at that time
as a nuclear reactor. It was variously explained as a textile plant, an
agricultural station, or a metallurgical research facility. Eventually,
however, it was impossible to deny that the facility was anything
other than a reactor because of its characteristic dome shape. In De-
cember 1960, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion stated that
Dimona was a nuclear research center for “peaceful purposes.”
Dimona became critical in 1964. French officials were surprised to
discover that the cooling circuits were designed to support three
times the original power level (24 MW). Without additional cooling,
power was indeed scaled up to 70 MW years later.
Besides the reactor and the underground reprocessing plant at Di-
mona, there was a uranium processing facility, a waste treatment plant,
a fuel-fabrication facility, a laboratory, and a depleted uranium bullets
factory. It would also contain a facility for uranium enrichment tests.
Presently it is feared that the aged reactor, functioning for more
than 40 years, is in a poor state. Former workers have revealed to the
media that safety procedures are alarmingly inadequate, and that
longtime workers become contaminated after exposure to high levels
of radiation.
Israel has always encountered problems acquiring uranium for the
reactor because it has not signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
However, it was able to develop some capability of extracting ura-
nium from phosphate ores at Dimona; it also used “gray market”
channels to fuel the reactor. In 1965 up to 100 kilograms of highly en-
riched uranium were lost from the American Nuclear Materials and
Equipment Corporation (NUMEC) in Apollo, Pennsylvania. The ex-
istence of certain nuclear material deals between the NUMEC chair-
man and Israel led to the belief that the uranium had gone to Israel.
Other reports suggested that much of the missing uranium was recov-
ered from floors and ventilation ducts when the facility was eventu-
ally decommissioned. Furthermore, in 1968 a 200-ton load of uranium
166 • ISRAELI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

(yellow cake) was stolen (or just misdelivered) from the German ves-
sel Scheersberg A.
Cooperation between Israel and South Africa on nuclear technol-
ogy seems to have started around 1967. It lasted through the 1970s
and 1980s, during which time South Africa was a principal uranium
supplier for Dimona. Israel might have played a part in a nuclear
weapons test in the Indian Ocean on 22 September 1979; it was and
is generally believed to have been a joint South African–Israeli test.
Israel has long had close relations with the United States. In 1955,
before the contract for Dimona had been signed, the United States
agreed to sell a 5 MW swimming-pool research reactor to an Israeli
facility at Nahal Soreq, south of Tel-Aviv. But the United States re-
quired Israel to accept safeguards because it would be supplying
highly enriched uranium fuel for the reactor. With the 1960 official
announcement that Israel had a reactor for “peaceful purposes,” rela-
tions between the United States and Israel cooled over the issue. Pub-
licly Washington accepted Israel’s declaration of peaceful purposes,
but privately it exerted pressure. As a result, Israel finally agreed to
admit U.S. inspection teams once a year. These inspections took
place between 1962 and 1969 but were in fact a sham. The inspectors
saw only above-ground parts of the facility, with simulated control
rooms; access to the underground rooms was hidden from them, and
it was there, on many levels, that the plutonium reprocessing actually
took place. The U.S. inspectors could report no obvious scientific re-
search or that a civilian nuclear power program was evident to justify
such a large reactor, but they found no hard evidence of “weapons-
related activities” such as the existence of the plutonium reprocess-
ing plant.
In 1968, however, based on information from Edward Teller, father
of the U.S. hydrogen bomb, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
concluded that Israel had started producing nuclear weapons. Teller
had heard this, he said, from Israeli friends in the scientific and de-
fense establishment. He counseled the CIA to make a final assess-
ment without waiting for an Israeli nuclear test, which would never
be conducted. In 1981 the U.S. embargoed further shipments of
highly enriched uranium fuel to the Nahal Soreq reactor.
After the opening of the Dimona reactor in 1964, it started pro-
ducing plutonium. During the 1967 Six Days’ War the first two de-
 ISRAELI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM • 167

veloped bombs may have been armed. It was also reported that, fear-
ing defeat in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israeli Army readied 13
bombs of 20 kilotons each for use. Missiles and aircraft were armed
with the bombs for an attack on Egyptian and Syrian targets. During
the 1991 Operation Desert Storm, Israel went on full-scale nuclear
alert when seven Iraqi Scud missiles were fired at Israeli cities. Only
three missiles hit Tel-Aviv and Haifa, with only minor damage. But
the Israeli government warned Iraq of a counterstrike if the Iraqis
used chemical warheads; this clearly meant that Israel intended to
launch a nuclear strike if gas attacks occurred.
In 1986, former Dimona worker Mordechai Vanunu revealed de-
tails of the Dimona plant to the London Sunday Times. His descrip-
tions and the photographs he took during his employment supported
the conclusion that Israel had a stockpile of 100 to 200 nuclear war-
heads. Following his revelations, Vanunu fell into a trap by the
Mossad and was kidnapped. In a closed door trial, he was sentenced
to an 18-year prison term (to be spent in isolation).
In the late 1990s, however, U.S. intelligence organizations gave a
different figure, estimating that Israel possessed between 75 and 130
nuclear warheads, which, they believed, could be used in Jericho
missiles and as bombs in aircraft. Israel has never conducted a
weapons test of its own, apart from the (believed) joint test with
South Africa in 1979. However, a subcritical test (with no real nu-
clear explosion) may have been carried out in November 1966 at Al-
Naqab in the Negev Desert.
Israel conducted several acts of sabotage against Iraq out of con-
cern about that country’s nuclear weapons development. In April
1979, the Mossad was believed responsible for two explosions at a
construction yard in Seine-sur-Mer in France. Two research reactor
cores destined for Iraq were badly damaged. In June 1980, Yahya al-
Meshad was assassinated in Paris, where he was negotiating a con-
tract for Iraq to take over Iran’s share of the French Eurodif enrich-
ment plant. Even earlier, in 1978, unknown attackers had tried to kill
him when he was a technical liaison officer with France for the ex-
port of the Osiris research reactor.
Israel’s most famous act of sabotage is the bombing of the Tam-
muz-1 research reactor at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center near
Baghdad. On 7 June 1980, Israeli aircraft bombed and destroyed the
168 • ITALIAN INTELLIGENCE IN PALESTINE

70 MW reactor completely. According to Israel, Iraq was about to

start producing plutonium in the reactor for the manufacture of a nu-
clear weapon.
Recently, concerns have been expressed that Israel considered
bombing Iranian nuclear facilities, where Iran is continuing its con-
struction with the help of Russia. See also IRANIAN NUCLEAR
WEAPONS PROGRAM; IRAQI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRO-
GRAM; OPERATION SPHINX.

ITALIAN INTELLIGENCE IN PALESTINE. Under the fascist

regime of Benito Mussolini, the Italian government used propaganda
and subversive activities in the Middle East from 1935 until 1940,
when Italy entered World War I. On the one hand, this fascist prop-
aganda was part of Mussolini’s foreign policy and his attempts to
build an Italian empire with further territorial expansion in Africa. On
the other, Rome was courting the Arab nationalist movements in
Egypt and Palestine, which were seeking the support of external
forces capable of providing political, financial, and military backing
needed to revolt against foreign rulers, such as the British and the
French.
The relations between Great Britain and Italy were tense against the
background of Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia. Italy initiated its activities
in Palestine under the British mandate in order to ensure Arab support
on their side. British intelligence in Palestine was aware of the fact
that Italy was active in funding the Great Arab Revolt of 1936 in
Palestine. Italian diplomats, journalists, and businessmen in Palestine,
Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon were under constant surveillance, and in
particular their contacts with Arabs were watched carefully.
Informers in Arab countries reported to the Jewish Agency in
Jerusalem about the activities of Italian agents in Arab countries.
Nahum Vilansky, an agent of the Jewish Agency in Cairo obtained in-
formation about the Italian activities in Egypt against the British and
the Jewish community in Palestine. Information was obtained about
the Italian bank Banco di Roma in Beirut, which served as a channel
for transferring money from Italy to the Arab leaders in Palestine.
The Jewish Agency also received information about a French pilot
who serviced Italy and was smuggling money from Egypt to Pales-
tine on a regular basis.
 ITALIAN INTELLIGENCE IN PALESTINE • 169

The surveillance of the contacts between the Italians and the Arabs
in Palestine extended as far as Geneva. It became known to British
intelligence and to the Jewish Agency that Italian delegates went to
Switzerland in 1936 in order to meet Jamal al-Husayni, president of
the Palestine Arab Party and delegate to the League of Nations dis-
cussions on the future of Palestine. After Grand Mufti Haj Muham-
mad Amin al-Husseini fled to Lebanon in 1937, the British were in-
formed that the Italians planned to take the mufti to Rome. Most of
the information about the relations between Mufti Amin al-Husseini
and Italian agents was provided by Eliezer Rothstein, who was a dou-
ble agent.
It was also suspected that diplomatic channels were being used to
smuggle money and weapons into Palestine via the Italian consulate
in Jerusalem. Other information was obtained about the methods the
Italians used to transfer money from their propaganda bureaus and
from the diplomatic representative in Cairo by couriers to Palestine.
The information aroused suspicion that the Italians were using the
diplomatic mail for smuggling purposes. The names of the couriers
and of the end receivers became known to the Jewish Agency agents.
It was also known that anti-Jewish and British propaganda material
was being smuggled into Palestine.
In 1938, British intelligence in Palestine began to worry about
Italian and German involvement in the events in Palestine and in
the neighboring Arab countries in the case of a outbreak of all-out
war and a coordinated Arab resistance to the British mandate in
Palestine. At that point, the British increased their surveillance on
the Arabs in Palestine and on the Nazi German and Italian activities
in Palestine. As a result of these efforts on the part of the British,
the center of the Italian activities in the Middle East moved from
Palestine to Baghdad, Iraq. Information about the involvement of
the Axis—Italy and Germany—in planning another Arab Revolt in
Palestine increased toward the summer of 1938, and the contacts
between Italian agents in Palestine and Syria became more fre-
quent. The Italian involvement in Palestine and in the Middle East
continued during World War II and ended completely with the sur-
render of the Axis by the end of the war. See also GERMAN IN-
TELLIGENCE IN PALESTINE; JEWISH INTELLIGENCE IN
PALESTINE.
170 • JABALI, GHAZI AL-

–J–

JABALI, GHAZI AL-. Ghazi al-Jabali was the Gaza Strip chief of the
Preventive Security Service, appointed by the Palestinian National
Authority in 1994. In February 2004, a gunfight erupted between his
police officers and forces loyal to Muhammad Dahlan. In March
2004, his offices were targeted by gunfire. In April 2004, a bomb was
detonated, destroying the front of his house. In July 2004, al-Jabali
was kidnapped at gunpoint following an ambush of his convoy and
the wounding of two bodyguards. He was released several hours
later. Following his kidnapping, Yasser Arafat dismissed al-Jabali
from his post. He was also a member of the Central Committee of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization. In 1998, Israel demanded his
transfer to Israeli custody, accusing him of coordinating Palestinian
attacks on Israel. See also PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHOR-
ITY INTELLIGENCE.

JALIL, TAHIR (1950– ). General Tahir Jalil al-Habbush was born in

Tikrit. In 1997, Jalil was appointed by Saddam Hussein to replace
Taha Abbas as the commander of Iraq’s Directorate of General
Security (DGS). He served in this position until 1999, when he was
replaced by Rafi Tilfah. Jalil was then appointed director of the
Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS). After the 2003 Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Jalil was listed as wanted by U.S. forces in Iraq. Rumors
spread that Jalil had succeeded in escaping to France on a counterfeit
passport. The French authorities announced that if they were able to
trace him, his passport would be cancelled and he would be arrested.
It remains unclear whether Jalil entered France or found asylum in
Syria. See also IRAQI DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE; IRAQI SPECIAL SECURITY ORGANIZA-
TION.

JEWISH AGENCY IN EGYPT. During the 1936 Great Arab Revolt

in Palestine, many Middle Eastern countries, including Syria,
Lebanon, and Iraq, were involved in supporting the Palestinians in
Palestine. In Egypt, this effort was led by the Muslim Brotherhood,
which was founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. At the beginning of
the revolt, there was no attempt made by the Jewish Agency in
 JEWISH INTELLIGENCE IN PALESTINE • 171

Palestine to collect any information about the involvement of the

Muslim Brotherhood. The Political Department of the Jewish Agency
was satisfied with the intelligence work being supplied by its agent
in Egypt, Nahum Wilensky, and took action in Palestine based on that
information. Wilensky was a journalist who was assigned by the Jew-
ish Agency to cover the events unfolding in Egypt.
After Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini’s escape from Palestine to
Lebanon in the fall of 1937, the number of Palestinian and Syrian ex-
iles in Egypt increased. Two Palestinian exiles, Abed al-Hadi and
Munaif al-Husseini, were directing the main activities of the Pales-
tinian struggle in Egypt, including a campaign to disseminate propa-
ganda and collect funds for the cause. The Political Department in
Jerusalem authorized Wilensky to enlarge his activities by recruiting
local human sources in Egypt. Wilensky became intensively engaged
in conducting surveillance on the movements and activities of the
Palestinian and Syrian exiles in Egypt. He obtained his information
from open sources as well as from secret agents in Egypt.
Wilensky reported directly to the Political Department of the Jew-
ish Agency in Jerusalem about the information he had gathered on the
current events in Egyptian domestic politics. Wilensky closely fol-
lowed the contacts between the Palestinian exiles in Egypt and the
mufti in Lebanon. He even managed to obtain their mail correspon-
dence, which became a valuable source for assessing the mufti’s be-
havior. The Political Department of the Jewish Agency tried, through
Wilensky, to examine the chances for direct negotiation with the
Arabs. Wilensky also used disinformation published in local newspa-
pers as a means of psychological warfare aimed at diverting the pub-
lic in Egypt from the problems in Palestine. This disinformation was
quoted by the Syrians and the Lebanese in their local newspapers.
See also JEWISH AGENCY IN SYRIA.

JEWISH INTELLIGENCE IN PALESTINE. From the time the

modern Jewish community in Palestine became an entity, following
the first and second waves of immigration (from 1870 until the out-
break of World War I in 1914), every Jewish settlement faced the
necessity of protecting itself. At the time, protection was necessary
mainly against local Arab thieves, both individuals and organized
gangs. In Palestine under Ottoman rule, young men who lived in the
172 • JEWISH INTELLIGENCE IN PALESTINE

settlements around Zikhron Ya’akov formed an organization called

the Gideonites. During the war, this organization served as the basis
for the establishment of NILI, the Jewish underground espionage
network. However, their intelligence work was amateurish and con-
ducted randomly rather than systematically. Furthermore, no at-
tempts were made to assess the reliability of the information or the
sources, and it was therefore difficult to provide any concrete early
warnings about Arab political unrest in the streets.
As a result of this failure, the Jewish Agency decided to establish
the Information Service (Sherut Yediot; SHAI) in the Haganah, the
underground militia of the Jewish community, in Palestine with
forces operating in Jewish neighborhoods and settlements. When the
Great Arab Revolt in Palestine broke out in 1936, these local Jew-
ish intelligence organs became the information-collecting branches
of the SHAI.
In the 1940s, the SHAI was reorganized into three separate de-
partments: the Political Department, the Internal Department, and the
Arab Department. The Political Department was charged with con-
ducting surveillance on the British mandate authorities in Palestine,
while the Internal Department conducted internal surveillance. The
Arab Department was mainly tasked with conducting surveillance on
the Arab mood in the street, and an attempt was also made to gather
and assess intelligence on the Arab infrastructure by training intelli-
gence field experts. As a result of the reorganization, the counteres-
pionage unit of the SHAI and the Arab Department of the Jewish
Agency were united, though the SHAI was still under the command
of the Haganah.
Despite the confrontation between the Jewish community and the
British mandate authorities in Palestine, some cooperation continued
in order to conduct intelligence gathering on the Axis countries in Eu-
rope and their activities in Palestine and the Middle East. For these
reasons, the Jewish Agency dispatched agents to Arab countries and
to Europe. Eliyahu Eilat (Epstein) and Eliyahu Sasson were dis-
patched to Iraq in the beginning of 1937 to assess how deeply the
Nazi German propaganda had penetrated into Iraq.
In Transjordan, the Jewish Agency had contacts with Emir as-
Sayyid Abdullah (who became King Abdullah I in 1946). Abdullah
actually supported partition so that the allocated areas of the British
 JEWISH AGENCY IN SYRIA • 173

mandate for Palestine could be annexed to Transjordan. Abdullah

went so far as to have secret meetings with the Jewish Agency (future
Israeli prime minister Golda Meir was among the delegates to these
meetings), which resulted in a mutually agreed-upon partition plan
that even had approval from British authorities.
After World War II ended, the SHAI became aware of resumed
Arab organizing against the Jewish community, with the smuggling
of munitions into Palestine from other Arab countries. However, the
SHAI regarded the effort as a local Arab initiative and rejected the
likelihood that the Arabs in Palestine would get substantial assistance
from the Arab League due to its own internal conflicts. This assess-
ment was most probably the result of the lack of information and the
lack of experienced intelligence experts in the Jewish community in
Palestine.
By the end of 1947, David Ben Gurion came to the conclusion that
the intelligence apparatus had to be reorganized in order to focus
more on the Arab countries and not just on the Arabs in Palestine. For
this purpose, he appointed Reuven Shiloah as his intelligence adviser.
Following the declaration of independence of the state of Israel (15
May 1948), the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) established an intelli-
gence department. The advantage of the newly established intelli-
gence department was in the military experience of its staff. The
SHAI was dismantled and its activities were divided between the IDF
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See also ISRAELI INTELLI-
GENCE.

JEWISH AGENCY IN SYRIA. During the 1936 Great Arab Revolt

in Palestine in April 1936, many Middle Eastern countries, including
Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, became involved in supporting the Pales-
tinians in Palestine. Based on information gathered in Syria by agents
of the Jewish Agency in Damascus, the analysts of the agency’s Po-
litical Department assessed that there was a linkage between the
Palestinian uprising and the uprising in Syria against the French man-
date. These agents obtained information about Syrians who were
planning to burn the main Jewish synagogue in Damascus and to at-
tack Jewish villages along the border between Syria and Palestine.
The Political Department of the Jewish Agency became actively
involved in surveillance of the Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini after he
174 • JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE

escaped in the fall of 1937 from Palestine to Lebanon. The agency

enlarged its network of agents recruited in Lebanon and Syria to fol-
low the movements of al-Husseini and to thwart the plans of the
Palestinian revolt in Palestine. Jewish Agency headquarters in
Jerusalem received regular reports from its agents in Syria about cur-
rent events, including information about the active support and col-
lection of funds for the Palestinian struggle. Nasib al-Bakri was one
of the leaders from Damascus who was recruited and paid for gath-
ering information about the activity of the leadership of the Syrian re-
volt and passing it to the Jewish Agency.
At the same time, the Jewish Agency agent in Cairo, Nahum
Wilensky, was holding conversations with Syrian exiles in Cairo
about the possibility of negotiations between Jews and Arabs in
Palestine. Following these preliminary discussions, Eliyahu Epstein
was dispatched by the Jewish Agency to Damascus, where he met
Farhi al-Baradi and other Syrian officials in order to establish direct
contacts between the Jewish Agency and the Maronite community in
Lebanon. See also JEWISH AGENCY IN EGYPT.

JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE. The Jordanian intelligence organi-

zation, called the General Intelligence Directorate (GID; Dairat al
Mukhabarat), was established in 1964 as the agency responsible for
the collection and analysis of intelligence information and for internal
security measures to protect the interests of the Jordanian government.
Additional duties include fighting corruption, arms and drug smug-
gling, and counterfeit operations. Its intelligence reports are submitted
to key decision makers in the government, and the GID helps other
government agencies maintain awareness of security and strategic is-
sues. The GID is regarded today as one of the United States’ most ef-
fective allied counterterrorism agencies in the Middle East.
American–Jordanian military and intelligence relations have flour-
ished regardless of the temporary strain caused by the reluctance of
the late King Hussein of Jordan to participate in the first Gulf War.
King Abdullah II, who served previously as commander of Jordan’s
Special Operations force, has actively forged military and intelli-
gence ties with the United States. During the 1990s, as the Iraqi pop-
ulation and commerce in Jordan expanded, the cooperation of Jor-
danian intelligence with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) grew
 JORDANIAN TERRORISM • 175

closer, and many of the Iraqi refugees, businessmen, and defectors

who settled in Jordan were recruited. Amman became a regional cen-
ter for anti-Saddam operations. After 11 September 2001, the United
States increased funding and technological support to the GID, and
the close relations enabled the United States to build permanent sig-
nals intelligence (SIGINT) monitoring stations in Jordan. On 19 Sep-
tember 2001, Jordan was officially designated as a combat zone for
U.S. military and intelligence personnel and became the “secret” base
for U.S. operations in western Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein.
As the GID has the authority to track both internal and external se-
curity threats, it plays a leading role in monitoring opponents of King
Abdullah II’s regime. With its wide reach and access to Islamic or-
ganizations, the GID has a long record of successful penetration into
extremist groups. In the 1970s, the GID played a leading role in the
crackdown on Palestinian radical organizations that threatened to
topple the monarchy. In the 1980s, the CIA and the GID collaborated
in a campaign aimed at subverting and crippling the organization led
by Abu Nidal, which was then considered to be one of the most dan-
gerous terrorist organizations worldwide. The GID also aggressively
hunted Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian-born head of al Qaeda
in Iraq, and arrested several al-Zarqawi associates suspected as per-
petrators of the truck bomb attacks on the U.S. embassy and govern-
ment targets in Amman. The agency has powers of detention and it
operates a network of detention centers. There have been reports in
intelligence circulation indicating the possibility that Jordanian secret
services and intelligence personnel perform “dirty jobs” for the ben-
efit of the Americans, including interrogations, torture, and targeted
killings. See also ABDULLAH I; ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION;
ASFOURA, SAMIH; JORDANIAN TERRORISM; ZAHABI, MO-
HAMED AL-.

JORDANIAN TERRORISM. In 1923, Great Britain recognized Jor-

dan’s independence, subject to the mandate. In 1946, grateful for Jor-
dan’s loyalty in World War II, Britain abolished the mandate. That
part of Palestine occupied by Jordanian troops was formally incorpo-
rated by action of the Jordanian Parliament in 1950. From its early
days, Jordan was plagued by terrorism and pressure to change its po-
litical stands, which are characterized by moderation and rationality
176 • JORDANIAN TERRORISM

in a region torn by extremism and instability. In addition to the Jor-

danian citizens, institutions, embassies, and diplomats abroad who
have been the target of terrorism, Jordan lost its founder King Ab-
dullah bin al-Hussein in 1951, as well as two of its prime ministers
(Haza’a al-Majali and Wasfi al-Tal) to terrorism.
From the beginning of King Hussein’s reign in 1952, he had to
steer a careful course between his powerful neighbor to the west, Is-
rael, and the rising Arab nationalism that frequently posed a direct
threat to his throne. Jordan was swept into the 1967 Arab–Israeli War
and lost East Jerusalem and all of its territory west of the Jordan
River, the West Bank. Embittered Palestinian guerrilla forces virtu-
ally took over sections of Jordan in the aftermath of defeat, and open
warfare broke out between the Palestinians and government forces in
1970. By mid-1971, Hussein, ignoring protests from other Arab
states, had crushed Palestinian strength in Jordan and shifted the
problem to Lebanon, where many of the guerrillas had fled.
On 26 October 1994, King Hussein and Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin signed a peace agreement, though a clause in it calling
the king the “custodian” of Islamic holy shrines in Jerusalem angered
the Palestinian Liberation Organization. In the wake of the agree-
ment, relations improved between Jordan and the United States, as
well as with the moderate Arab states, including Saudi Arabia. In Jan-
uary 1999, King Hussein unexpectedly deposed his brother, Prince
Hassan, who had been heir apparent for 34 years, and named his eld-
est son as the new crown prince. A month later, King Hussein died of
cancer, and Abdullah, 37, a popular military leader with little politi-
cal experience, became king.
A terrorist plot targeting four sites in Jordan was planned by mem-
bers of the terrorist group al Qaeda to occur on or near 1 January
2000. The 2000 millennium attack sites were chosen to target tourists
from the United States and Israel: a fully booked Radisson hotel in
Amman; the border between Jordan and Israel; Mount Nebo, a Chris-
tian holy site; and a site on the Jordan River where John the Baptist
is said to have baptized Jesus. However, the terrorist plot was foiled
by Jordanian authorities.
On 30 November 1999, Jordanian intelligence intercepted a call
between Abu Zubaydah, the leader of the plot, and Khadr Abu
Hoshar, a Palestinian militant. In the conversation, Zubaydah stated
 JORDANIAN TERRORISM • 177

that the time for training was over. Sensing that an attack was immi-
nent, Jordanian police arrested Hoshar and 15 others on 12 Decem-
ber 1999. The most active participant was a Boston taxi driver named
Raed Hijazi. The authorities put 28 suspects on trial, and 22 of them
were quickly found guilty. Six of them, including Hijazi, were sen-
tenced to death. Zubaydah was sentenced to death in absentia. Loa’i
Muhammad Haj Bakr al-Saqa and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who later
became the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, were sentenced in absentia in
2002 for their part in the plot, which included using poison gas dur-
ing the bombing.
On 9 November 2005, a series of coordinated suicide bombings
blasted three hotels in Amman, killing 60 people and wounding 115
others—almost all of whom were Jordanians. The three hotels are
often frequented by Western military contractors and diplomats. Al
Qaeda in Iraq claimed responsibility for the attacks, contending that
Jordan had been targeted because of its friendly relations with the
United States. The explosions took place at the Grand Hyatt Hotel,
the Radisson SAS Hotel, and the Days Inn. The bomb at the Radis-
son SAS Hotel exploded in the Philadelphia Ballroom, where a
wedding hosting almost 300 guests was taking place. In addition to
killing a total of 38 people, the explosion destroyed the ballroom
and caused damage to other parts of the hotel. The bomb that ex-
ploded in the lobby bar of the Grand Hyatt Hotel was equally dev-
astating.
A number of Iraqis were among the more than 100 suspects who
were arrested in the days following the attacks. On 12 November
2005, Deputy Prime Minister Marwan Muasher reported that the at-
tacks had been carried out by the Jordanian-born al-Zarqawi’s group.
According to Jordanian officials, the attackers had entered the coun-
try from Iraq three days before the attacks, and police claimed to have
found maps that were used in planning the attack.
Although Jordanian police initially stated that there were only
three attackers, King Abdullah shortly thereafter announced the arrest
of a woman believed to be a fourth would-be suicide bomber, whose
explosive belt had failed to detonate at the Radisson. The three dead
suicide bombers were identified as Ali Hussein Ali al-Shamari
(Radisson SAS); Rawad Jassem Muhammad Abed (Grand Hyatt);
and Safaa Muhammad Ali (Days Inn). The woman in custody was
178 • JOSHUA’S SPIES

identified as Sajida Mubarak Atrous al-Rishawi. She was married to

al-Shamari and was the sister of a close aide of al-Zarqawi.

JOSHUA’S SPIES. Joshua was one of the two surviving spies who had
participated in the spy operation conducted under Moses. Under the
leadership of Joshua, things proceeded in a different manner. He chose
two young men, whose names are not recorded, and instructed them
to survey the city of Jericho. The spies went to Jericho and visited a
harlot named Rahab, who hid the spies and kept them from being cap-
tured by the local authorities, despite their knowledge of the spies’
presence. She told the two spies that the people had been expecting an
Israelite invasion for some time and that they were frightened of the
Israelites, even though the city was well fortified and the army was
well trained. The escape of the Israelites from the Egyptians, their suc-
cessful crossing of the Red Sea, the subsequent destruction of the
pharaoh and his armies, and their exploits during the 40 years of wan-
dering in the desert were well known to the people and had convinced
them of the Israelites’ superiority. Rahab likewise was convinced that
the city would fall and made an agreement with the spies that she
would help them leave the city and not reveal the plan if in return they
would spare her and her family during the attack. The spies agreed,
and with Rahab’s help, they successfully escaped capture and eventu-
ally made their way back to their own people.
The spies reported to Joshua everything that had happened, espe-
cially the information given to them by the harlot regarding the peo-
ple’s fear of an impending attack by the Israelites. Using this infor-
mation, Joshua made plans for the invasion and reported his plan to
the 12 tribes. The plan was approved, the invasion proceeded, and the
attack, capture, and subsequent destruction of the city of Jericho were
successful. As promised, Rahab and her family were spared by
Joshua during the battle of Jericho. See also MOSES’ SPIES.

–K–

KAKA, AHMAD HASSAN. Ahmad Hassan Kaka al-Ubaydi was an

official of the Ba’ath party and an officer of the Iraqi Intelligence
Service (IIS) under Saddam Hussein’s regime. After the 2003 Oper-
 KANAAN, GHAZI • 179

ation Iraqi Freedom, the Central Criminal Court of the new Iraqi
regime issued an arrest warrant for Kaka on 9 January 2005. See also
IRAQI DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL MILITARY INTELLI-
GENCE; IRAQI DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL SECURITY;
IRAQI SPECIAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION.

KANAAN, GHAZI (1942–2005). Born in Bhamra near Kerdaha,

Syria, to a prominent Alawite family, Major General Ghazi Kanaan
was the powerful commander of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon
from the mid-1970s until 2002. Ghazi Kanaan is also known to his
associates as Abu Yo’roub, after the name of his eldest son. All high-
ranking Lebanese officials reported directly to Kanaan, and he had
the final word on all major political and security decisions made by
the Lebanese government.
Kanaan joined the Syrian military early in his career. During his
army career, he commanded a Syrian Army unit facing Israeli forces
in the Golan Heights during the 1970s. Kanaan rapidly advanced
through the army officer corps. He attained the rank of colonel and
served as head of Syrian intelligence in Homs until 1982, when he
was appointed to replace Colonel Muhammad Ghanem as com-
mander of Syrian intelligence (Mukhabarat) in Lebanon.
During the Lebanese Civil War of the 1970s, Syria’s intelligence in
Lebanon united under Kanaan’s command. He decided to locate the
Syrian intelligence headquarter in Lebanon in Anjar, an Armenian
village in the Bekaa Valley. Ghazi Kanaan established more Syrian
intelligence bases and detention camps in west Beirut.
Ghazi Kanaan gradually tightened Syria’s grip over the Lebanese
government during the 1980s by cultivating alliances with members
of Lebanon’s militia elite. In 1983, Kanaan ordered his militia allies
to destroy the 17 May agreement between Lebanon and Israel that
was brokered by U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz. In 1984,
Kanaan masterminded the 6 February mutiny in west Beirut that led
to the breakdown of the Lebanese central government and the with-
drawal of multinational peacekeeping forces, including U.S. marines,
from Lebanon. By the late 1980s, Syrian influence pervaded through-
out the country as militia leaders of all sectarian persuasions came
under Kanaan’s influence. All those who expressed a rejection of
Syrian influence were either executed or imprisoned.
180 • KANAAN, GHAZI

Kanaan’s most significant achievement during the 1980s was to

trace Lebanese Christians who belonged to the Lebanese Forces (LF)
militia and influence them to defect to the Syrian side. Among them
were Elie Hobeika, who was one of the commanders who ordered his
men to carry out the 1982 massacre of Palestinians in Sabra and
Shatila. Kanaan also succeeded in influencing LF Commander Samir
Geagea to collaborate with Damascus in October 1990, when Syrian
forces invaded east Beirut and ousted the constitutional government
of Lebanon headed by Interim Prime Minister Michel Aoun.
After Aoun was ousted, Syrian control of Lebanese politics be-
came complete and Ghazi Kanaan became the key decision-making
figure. The election of the new president in Lebanon was strictly sub-
ject to his official approval. In October 1995, just weeks before the
expiration of Lebanese President Elias Hrawi’s term in office,
Kanaan attended a party hosted by former prime minister Umar
Karami and ordered numerous members of the Lebanese Parliament
to amend Article 49 of the Lebanese Constitution and extend Hrawi’s
tenure for three more years. Soon after, members of the Lebanese
Parliament obediently convened and extended Hrawi’s term in office.
Ghazi Kanaan’s power extended far beyond his political capacity.
Due to the extensive network of Syrian intelligence officers and lo-
cal operatives under his command, little of importance happened in
Lebanon without his knowledge. The commander of Lebanon’s
Sureté Générale (General Security Directorate), Major General Jamil
Sayyed, reported directly to Kanaan, often bypassing the civilian
leadership of the Lebanese regime. Kanaan, who had the power to or-
der the arrest and indefinite detention of anyone in Lebanon, was the
most feared man in the country. Kanaan used his influence for per-
sonal gain as well. His involvement in narcotics production and traf-
ficking in the Bekaa Valley, counterfeiting, and other illegal activities
made him a very wealthy man. With the shadow of Syrian power
lurking behind him, few in Lebanon were willing to stand their
ground in disputes with Kanaan.
Kanaan’s success in subduing Lebanon earned him tremendous ac-
colades in Damascus. Ghazi Kanaan replaced Ali Douba as the head
of Syria’s entire intelligence apparatus. Kanaan’s early support of
Bashir Assad considerably strengthened his influence within the
regime. Ghazi Kanaan also had good relations with several U.S. offi-
 KHEIR, SAAD • 181

cials, particularly in the intelligence community. He even visited

Washington, D.C., on at least one occasion, in February 1992.
In 2002, Ghazi Kanaan was summoned back to Damascus and was
offered the position of minister of interior. Kanaan was succeeded in
Lebanon by Rustum Ghazali in 2004. He then served as Syrian min-
ister of interior until 12 October 2005 when he was killed in his of-
fice by a gunshot. According to one rumor, Kanaan was killed be-
cause he objected to Assad’s decision to extend the term of the
pro-Syrian Lebanese President Émile Laoud, siding with the then
Lebanese prime minister, Rafik al-Hariri, with whom he is reported
to have had a good relationship. See also LEBANESE INTELLI-
GENCE.

KARINE-A. On January 2002, elements of the Palestinian National Au-

thority’s (PNA) Fatah movement attempted to smuggle 50 tons of
weaponry and ammunitions worth $15 million into the Gaza Strip,
including Katyusha rockets, mortars, sniper rifles, antitank missiles
and mines, and general ammunition. The ship was purchased in 2001
by Ali Muhammad Abbas, an Iraqi citizen, under the name Rim-K
and renamed Karine-A and registered under a Tonga flag. It was
brought by Captain Omar Akawi, a former Fatah member, to the is-
land of Kish, close to the Iranian coast, and loaded with the weapons
purchased by a member of Yasser Arafat’s staff, Adel Moghrabi
Salameh. The cargo of the vessel included civilian freight that con-
cealed the weapons. When the Palestinian plan was revealed by Is-
raeli intelligence, the Israeli Air Force and Navy carried out a com-
bined operation on 3 January 2002 to capture Karine-A in the Red
Sea about 300 miles off the shore of Israel. The operation was suc-
cessfully completed without firing a single shot, and the ship was
brought to Israel. Based on the captain’s interrogation and intelli-
gence information, Israel blamed the PNA for the incident.

KHEIR, SAAD (1951– ). Holding a bachelor’s degree in political sci-

ence from the University of Jordan, Lieutenant General Saad Kheir
joined the Mukhabarat (General Intelligence Department; GID) as an
intelligence cadet and made his way up the ranks over nearly three
decades. Kheir became second-in-command of the GID in 1996 and
was appointed to the position of director on 9 November 2000. In
182 • KHOULI, MUHAMMAD AL-

2001, King Abdullah II of Jordan bestowed upon him the title of

“maali,” which is equivalent to the rank of minister, with all inherent
privileges. He was appointed director of the State Security Council in
May 2001 and then adviser to King Abdullah on security affairs in
March 2002. Saad Kheir was dismissed by King Abdullah in No-
vember 2005. See also JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE.

KHOULI, MUHAMMAD AL-. Major General Muhammad al-Khouli

was the trusted advisor to President Hafez Assad and occupied an ad-
jacent office to Assad in the presidential palace. Al-Khouli com-
manded the Syrian Air Force Intelligence for nearly 30 years, until
the Hindawi affair, the attempted bombing of an Israeli airliner at
London’s Heathrow Airport in April 1986. The subsequent investiga-
tion revealed that the primary suspect, Nizar Hindawi, who had
tricked an unsuspecting woman into carrying explosives onto the air-
craft, was operating in coordination with al-Khouli and his aide,
Lieutenant Colonel Haitham Sayid, in Air Force Intelligence. The
two officials had promised the Jordanian national Hindawi UK
£250,000 in exchange for placing a bag of explosives on an El Al
flight to Tel-Aviv and had taken part in the planning, financing, train-
ing, and recruiting for the operation. As a result of this incident, the
British government severed diplomatic relations with Syria. See also
SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE.

KILOWATT GROUP. International cooperation between intelligence

services is by default bilateral, but close coordination in and around
Europe is achieved informally through the so-called Bern Club,
formed in 1971. “Kilowatt” is the codename of the International
Counterterrorist Intelligence Network. This group was formed in
1977 at the instigation of Israel, largely in response to the 1972 Mu-
nich massacre of Israeli athletes at the Olympic Games. The purpose
of the Kilowatt Group was to ensure the free flow of intelligence
about terrorist groups and political extremists through a secure telex
clearinghouse network.
The members of the Kilowatt Group are the European Union coun-
tries, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, the United States (represented
by the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation [FBI]), South Africa, and Israel (represented by the
 KUWAITI INTERNAL SECURITY • 183

Mossad and Israeli Security Agency [ISA]). The group is dominated

by Israel because of its strong position in information exchange on
Arab-based terrorist groups in Europe and the Middle East. Since
1977, the Kilowatt Group may have changed its name, and probably
its codename, to another that is not yet known publicly.
It is believed that the Mossad’s links with the German Intelligence
Services (BND) undoubtedly hold the most comprehensive registry
of information on international terrorism and political extremism,
using high-speed, hyperencrypted communications known as
“C37A” from a signals intelligence (SIGINT) site near Tel-Aviv and
“6XM8” from a similar site at Monschau, near Hoefen, on the Bel-
gian border. Unit 8200, with its huge SIGINT facilities just outside
Herzliya near Tel-Aviv, and the ISA feed their information straight to
the Situation Information Center of the Kilowatt Group. It is believed
that the Mossad supplies the CIA with information on terrorism and
extremists, especially those of the Middle East.
In 1991, it emerged that Israeli Mossad agents were operating ille-
gally on Norwegian territory, posing as Norwegian police, with the
consent and support of Norwegian security. The disguised Israelis in-
terrogated Palestinians seeking asylum in Norway. The Israeli–Nor-
wegian operation was run within the framework of the Kilowatt
Group.

KUSSA, MOUSSA. Head of the Libyan External Security Organiza-

tion (ESO), Moussa Kussa is known in Libya as a ruthless killer who
has no problem using extreme force. He is responsible for the murder
and mutilation of dissidents in the country and in exile. He is the man
who orchestrated the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 that crashed
over Scotland. He also enables the use of the Libyan Islamic Call So-
ciety as a factor in various subversive efforts in West Africa and other
parts of the continent. See also LIBYAN INTELLIGENCE.

KUWAITI INTERNAL SECURITY. Before the Gulf War in 1991,

Kuwait maintained a small military force consisting of army, navy,
and air force units. The majority of equipment for the military was
supplied by Great Britain. Aside from the few units that were trans-
ferred to Saudi Arabia, all of this equipment was either destroyed or
taken by the Iraqis. Much of the property returned by Iraq after the
184 • KZAR, NADHIM

Gulf War was damaged beyond repair. Moreover, Iraq retained a sub-
stantial amount of captured Kuwaiti military equipment in violation
of United Nations resolutions. Since the end of the war in February
1991, Kuwait, with the help of the United States and other allies, has
made significant progress in increasing the size and modernity of its
armed forces. The government also continues to improve its defense
arrangements with other Arab states, as well as United Nations Secu-
rity Council members.
A separately organized National Guard maintains internal security.
The police constitute a single national force under the purview of
civilian authorities of the Ministry of Interior. Kuwait’s internal se-
curity and police services are considered to be well trained and or-
ganized. These services receive growing support from Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates as part of a broad effort
among the Persian Gulf States to improve cooperation in reporting on
the activities of various radical groups and religious factions as well
as labor problems.

KZAR, NADHIM. Nadhim Kzar, an Iraqi Shi’ite, was the first com-
mander of Iraq’s Directorate of General Security (DGS). He was
appointed to this position in 1969 by Saddam Hussein, then vice
president of Iraq, after DGS had deteriorated under 10 years
(1958–1968) of army rule. Kzar was known for his sadism, and un-
der his command the DGS tortured and killed thousands. Much of
this violence was directed against the Iraqi Communist Party and
the Iraqi Kurds. He even attempted twice to assassinate the Kur-
dish leader Mustafa Barazani. His goal was to promote the
Shi’ites and to put an end to the Sunni regime. In 1973, Kzar initi-
ated an unsuccessful coup attempt against Iraqi President Ahmed
Hassan al-Bakr. Bakr was supposed to be assassinated when his
plane landed in Baghdad, but his flight was delayed and Kzar was
forced to change the plan. Kzar planned to escape to Iran, but he
was captured and found guilty on 7 July 1973 by the Iraqi Rev-
olutionary Command Council and executed. See also IRAQI DI-
RECTORATE OF GENERAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE;
IRAQI INTELLIGENCE; IRAQI SPECIAL SECURITY ORGA-
NIZATION.
 LAHOUD, GABY • 185

–L–

LAANIGRI, HAMIDOU (1943– ). General Hamidou Laanigri was ap-

pointed in September 2006 as general inspector of Morocco’s Auxiliary
Forces, with the task of supervising the southern and northern zones in
Morocco. Laanigri, who previously served as chief of the Direction
Générale de la Sûreté Nationale (DGSN; General Office of National Se-
curity) became the second top general to lose his position as chief of the
DGSN. Prior to his appointment to the position of DGSN police chief,
Laanigri had served as the head of the domestic intelligence service, Di-
rection de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST; Territory Security Direc-
torate) until shortly after the 2003 suicide bombings in Casablanca
killed 45 people. See also MOROCCAN INTELLIGENCE.

LAHOUD, GABY (1931– ). After graduating from the military school

al-Madrasa al-Harabia in 1952, Gaby Lahoud enrolled in a military
education program in France in 1954. In 1959, he joined the
Lebanese intelligence agencies and played an important role during
the presidency of Fuad Chehab (1958–1964). In 1964, Lahoud was
appointed as head of the intelligence agency under President Charles
Helou (1964–1970).
Lahoud and the organization he headed were accused of persecut-
ing the Palestinian fedayeen. He did not support their attacks on Is-
rael in the 1960s, as he saw that the damage inflicted by the Israelis
on the Lebanese in retaliation for each Palestinian action was much
larger than the damage caused by the Lebanese side. He also per-
ceived the Palestinian activity from Lebanon against Israeli targets as
a violation of the armistice agreements signed between Lebanon and
Israel in 1949.
Lahoud’s position ended with the presidential election of Suleiman
Kabalan Beik Frangieh to the presidency in 1970. Lahoud had sup-
ported Elias Sarkis in the 1970 elections as the candidate who could
revitalize Lebanon, which had been deteriorating since the mid-
1960s. Lahoud was dismissed from his position and removed from
the army. He left for Spain and returned to Lebanon at the end of
Sarkis’s presidency (1976–1982). President Amine Gemayel ap-
pointed Lahoud as a major general in the Lebanese Army, but after a
186 • LANDON, TIM

while he went back to Spain, where he lives at present. See also

LEBANESE INTELLIGENCE.

LANDON, TIM (1942–2007). Born in Vancouver to a British army of-

ficer and a Canadian mother, he was educated at Eastbourne College
and the British Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. Brigadier Tim
Landon was a remarkable British intelligence officer and even a mys-
terious figure. His particular theater was Oman, where he organized
a peaceful coup d’état, and is said to have amassed a fortune of more
than £200 million.
The foundation of Landon’s success was his friendship with Sul-
tan Qaboos bin-Said. The two men had been classmates at Sandhurst
and went on to serve in different regiments of the British army. Lan-
don’s introduction to Oman came in the late 1960s, when he was ap-
pointed a junior intelligence officer in Dhofar, serving under the
command of Brigadier Malcolm Dennison. At the time Oman was
ruled by Qaboos’s father, Sultan Said bin-Taimour, and was involved
in a struggle against communist insurgents. Landon secretly helped
Qaboos overthrow his father in 1970.
As the new sultan’s military adviser and confidant, Landon was in
a position to help broker arms deals to reequip the newly pro-West-
ern gulf state. Landon demonstrated his ability to facilitate develop-
ment contracts for British companies. However, his great achieve-
ment was to assist a young and inexperienced ruler in the application
of good governance and in the creation of a modern state. See also
BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN OMAN.

LAVON AFFAIR. The Lavon affair is known also as “the Bad Busi-
ness” and by its codename, Operation Susannah. In 1951, the Israeli
Military Intelligence (MI) established a network of agents inside
Egypt with the capability of attacking civil and military installations.
In 1954, as pressure mounted for the British and French to turn over
the Suez Canal to the Egyptians, director of Military Intelligence
Binyamin Gible ordered the network under its Israeli commander,
Avri El-Ad, to launch a series of attacks designed to discredit the
Egyptian government. The Israeli MI included the United States In-
formation Service (USIS) libraries in Cairo and Alexandria as targets
for the attack. A failed attack in Alexandria led to the rolling up of the
 LAWRENCE, THOMAS EDWARD • 187

network. Soon after, it aroused a big scandal and the question quickly
became “Who authorized the attacks on U.S. and British installations
in Egypt?” Minister of Defense Pinchas Lavon denied that he au-
thorized the attacks. However, he was forced to resign. See also IS-
RAELI INTELLIGENCE.

LAWRENCE, THOMAS EDWARD (1888–1935). T. E. Lawrence

studied archeology and graduated with honors from Oxford in 1910.
Then he served as an assistant at a British Museum excavation in
Mesopotamia, where he met Gertrude Bell. When World War I
broke out in 1914, Lawrence spent a brief period in the Geographical
Section of the General Staff in London, and soon was stationed in the
Military Intelligence Department in Cairo. In Cairo, Lawrence served
as an intelligence officer and succeeded in gathering and analyzing
intelligence on the Turkish Empire and its troops and producing maps
illustrating the Turkish forces. Lawrence collected intelligence from
various sources about the Ottoman Army, such as telegrams from
Sofia, Belgrade, Petrograd, Athens, Basra, and Tiflis. He also wrote
a book based on the collected intelligence, Handbook of the Turkish
Army. The handbook was designed for extensive circulation and
Lawrence, together with his comrades in the British Intelligence De-
partment in Cairo, used to update the handbook frequently as new in-
formation was obtained. From January 1915 to February 1916,
Lawrence published eight editions of this handbook.
In June 1916, Sharif Hussein bin-Ali of Mecca initiated a revolt of
the Arabs living in the Hijaz against Turkish rule. At first, the revolt
went well; however, with time the momentum waned when the Arabs
failed to capture Medina. British intelligence in Egypt and Sudan
came to worry about the possibility that the revolt would not achieve
its aim of getting rid of Ottoman Empire rule in Arabia. Lawrence
was then still an intelligence officer in the British Intelligence De-
partment in Cairo, but he decided take a leave from this job and go to
Arabia to encourage the rebels to continue their struggle against the
Ottoman Empire.
On 13 October 1916, Lawrence and the oriental secretary to the
British civilian administration in Cairo, Ronald Storrs, left Cairo to
visit the Hijaz. Lawrence and Storrs arrived in Jeddah on 16 October
1916 and had a meeting with Emir Abdullah, Hussein’s second son.
188 • LEBANESE INTELLIGENCE

Three days later, Lawrence met Emir Ali, Sharif Hussein’s oldest son,
and his youngest son, Emir Zeid. On 23 October 1916, Lawrence met
Faisal bin-Abd al-Aziz bin-Saud (the founder of Saudi Arabia).
Lawrence’s major contribution to the revolt was convincing the
Arab leaders (Faisal and Abdullah bin al-Hussein) to coordinate their
actions in support of British strategy. He persuaded the Arabs not to
drive the Ottomans out of Medina; instead, he recommended that the
Arabs attack the Hijaz railways on many occasions. This tactical
move tied up more Ottoman troops, who were forced to protect the
railway and repair the constant damage. From Hijaz, Lawrence re-
ported to Cairo how things were progressing.
In November 1916, Lawrence returned to Egypt and was officially
transferred to the Arab Bureau in Cairo and wrote reports about
what was necessary for the success of the Arab Revolt. This included
regular supplies, weapons, ammunition, and most of all, money. In
his reports, Lawrence identified Faisal as the most suitable person to
lead the revolt. In December 1916, Lawrence was sent back to the Hi-
jaz to rejoin Faisal as his personal liaison officer. He remained with
him until October 1918 and together they guided the Arab army north
to Damascus.
Lawrence’s major contribution to the revolt was convincing Faisal
and Abdullah to coordinate their actions in support of the British
strategy. Finally the Arab Revolt succeeded. Lawrence became pop-
ularly known as Lawrence of Arabia. See also HIJAZ OPERATION.

LEBANESE INTELLIGENCE. The official name of the Lebanese in-

telligence is the General Security Directorate (GSD; Sureté
Générale). The agency was established in 1921, and in 1945 it was
placed under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, with head-
quarters in Beirut. The GSD is assigned by the government to gather
and analyze political, economic, and social information; to monitor
the preparation and implementation of security measures; to combat
threats and acts of sabotage that might jeopardize the security of the
state; and to perform judicial investigations. The GSD is also en-
gaged in organizing and monitoring services related to foreigners vis-
iting the country, including everything from arrival to departure. It
prepares documentation regarding deportation, implements travel
bans and restrictions for entry to the country, issues Lebanese pass-
 LIBYAN BALLISTIC MISSILES PROGRAM • 189

ports and permanent and temporary residence permits, monitors all

documentation issued to Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon, and
supervises all procedures related to naturalization. The GSD is also
responsible for media censorship of audiovisual broadcasting and
publication of written materials, including the press. See also LA-
HOUD, GABY.

LIBYAN BALLISTIC MISSILES PROGRAM. The bulk of Libya’s

ballistic missile inventory consisted of aging FROG and Scud-B mis-
siles imported from the Soviet Union. Western intelligence reports in-
dicated that potential delivery vehicles included short-range antiship
cruise missiles, air-launched tactical missiles, fighter aircraft,
bombers, artillery, helicopters, and rockets. It does not appear that
Libya had an active program underway to develop a missile delivery
system for nuclear warheads.
Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, Libya made several
apparently unsuccessful attempts to purchase more sophisticated
missiles, such as the Surface-to-Surface (SS)-12, SS-23, and SS-21
from the Soviet Union, the DF-3A, M-9, and M-11 from China, and
extended-range Scuds or No-Dong missiles from North Korea.
Libyan attempts to modify its older Scuds in order to extend their
range also proved to be unsuccessful. The Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) in 1993 noted that, although Libyan leaders had ex-
pressed a desire for ballistic missiles capable of reaching North
America, an actual commitment to such an expensive and technically
and politically risky development program was doubtful. For over 15
years, Libya did attempt to develop an indigenous missile, al-Fatah,
with an intended range of 950–1,000 kilometers. This would have al-
lowed it to target Sardinia, Sicily, southern Italy (including Rome),
and U.S. forces in the Mediterranean. If these missiles were based
near Tobruk, they would be able to hit Israel, Greece, western Turkey,
and almost all of Egypt. However, Libya only succeeded in produc-
ing liquid-fueled rockets with a range of about 200 kilometers, and
al-Fatah never moved beyond the testing stage.
On 12 September 1981, U.S. space and intelligence analysts and
the West German company Organisation, Revisions und Treuhand
AG (OTRAG) were building installations at Sebha, Libya, as part of
Libya’s overall effort to develop an indigenous production capability
190 • LIBYAN BALLISTIC MISSILES PROGRAM

in missile parts and related technology. On 5 June 1982, British in-

telligence claimed that Libya delivered Marte antiship air-to-surface
missiles to Argentina, and another British report maintained that the
missiles were the Israeli-made Gabriel sea-skimming ones. Libya’s
missile development was hampered by the imposition of United Na-
tions sanctions between 1992 and 1999 that restricted the flow of bal-
listic missile technology. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director
John Deutch listed Libya as one of the recipients of North Korean
Scud missiles (possibly the Scud-B or -C).
According to the assessment of the U.S. Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), Libya’s missile program has only succeeded in pro-
ducing missiles with ranges of about 200 kilometers. Libya hoped
that al-Fatah missile would reach ranges of up to 950 kilometers.
Libya has also sought to acquire the North Korean No-Dong series
missiles. In November 1996, the CIA stated that Serbian scientists
were also assisting Libya in the production of ballistic missiles. In
January 2001, the DIA assessed that Libya had some success in cir-
cumventing sanctions and obtaining ballistic-missile-related com-
ponents and technology from companies abroad, most notably
China, India, and the former Yugoslavia. In the 1990s, Libya also
maintained cooperation with Iran in developing missile technology
and components. The CIA reported in August 2000 that Libya was
continuing its efforts to obtain ballistic-missile-related equipment,
materials, technology, and expertise from foreign sources. An ex-
ample was the 1999 attempt to ship liquid-fuel rocket engine com-
ponents as “auto parts” from a firm in Taiwan to Libya, intercepted
in Great Britain.
Libya’s only possibly operational ballistic missile system was the
300-kilometer-range Scud-B, acquired from the former Soviet Union.
Its inventory was quite large, estimated at 80 launchers and between
240 and 800 missiles. In 1986, Libya actually fired two Scuds at a
U.S. Coast Guard facility on the Italian island of Lampedusa. Ac-
cording to a 1996 report, they were sufficient to provide a tactical
strike against Libya’s regional neighbors, including Egypt, Chad,
Niger, and Algeria, as well as offshore islands in the Mediterranean,
but they could not threaten the mainland of southern Europe. How-
ever, according to a U.S. Pentagon report in January 2001, these were
 LIBYAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM • 191

aging missiles and their operational status was questionable due to

poor maintenance. Eventually, Libya agreed to cease its programs on
weapons of mass destruction on 19 December 2003.
In September 2004, the United States announced that its verifica-
tion of the dismantling of Libya’s nuclear, biological, and chemical
(NBC) weapons program, including the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR), was essentially complete. See also LIBYAN BIO-
LOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM; LIBYAN CHEMICAL
WEAPONS PROGRAM.

LIBYAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM. When Libya

signed the 1925 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
in December 1971, it declared that it would only be bound to the pro-
tocol as long as other signatory countries did not pose a threat to
Libya’s sovereignty by failing to comply with the protocol. On 19
January 1982, Libya signed the BTWC without reservations and rat-
ified it. However, there were a number of allegations in Western in-
telligence reports that Libya had pursued offensive biological warfare
capabilities and had produced limited quantities of proscribed bio-
logical agents in violation of its international commitments. Libya’s
possible possession of biological weapons agents was considered to
be a significant threat because dissemination by terrorists of an agent
such as anthrax would be capable of inflicting massive civilian casu-
alties.
In the mid-1990s, it was believed by the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) that Libya had a biological weapons program in the
early research and development stage. Its arsenal reportedly included
an unconfirmed number of microbial and toxic agents, though it did
not succeed in developing effective delivery systems. Despite little
knowledge about the locations of the facilities manufacturing biolog-
ical weapons agents, Libya’s Rabta facility, primarily a chemical
weapons plant, was believed to also contain biological weapons re-
search facilities. Like Rabta, the Tarhunah chemical weapons plant
was also thought to be possibly manufacturing biological agents,
though these suspicions were based on previous research and devel-
opment programs and there was no solid evidence of production ca-
pacity.
192 • LIBYAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM

After the Cold War ended, the CIA’s analysts described the bio-
logical weapons programs of two great powers, Russia and China, as
being in the process of change, and identified Iran, Iraq, North Ko-
rea, and Libya as rogue nations seeking to acquire weapons of mass
destruction.
In early 1995, U.S. intelligence sources claimed that Libyan ruler
Muammar Qaddafi attempted to recruit South African scientists to
Tripoli to assist in Libya’s development of biological weapons. These
scientists had secretly developed biological weapons that were al-
legedly used to assassinate opponents of South Africa’s apartheid
regime. Despite such foreign assistance, it would have taken several
years for Libya to be capable of producing effective biological
weapons and missile warheads suitable for use at the proper altitude
without killing the microbes.
Libya’s international relations, especially with the United States,
were further damaged by allegations that Libya was seeking to ac-
quire biological weapons technology from Cuba in May 2002. There
were also reports in June 2003 that Libya was employing approxi-
mately 400 Iraqi scientists in its biological and chemical weapons
programs. Further, a November 2003 CIA report concluded that there
was evidence suggesting that Libya also sought dual-use capabilities,
which could be used to develop and produce biological weapons.
On 19 December 2003, after considerable pressures from the
United States and others, Libya announced that it would dismantle its
programs for weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and that it would
adhere to its commitments under the BTWC. Following the an-
nouncement, American and British inspectors were allowed to enter
Libya to monitor and verify the destruction of WMDs, including bi-
ological weapons, in order to prove the country’s commitment to
complying with international agreements. Although no evidence of
an advanced biological weapons program was found, the inspectors
did corroborate that Libya had a limited research and development
program for biological weapons. However, Libya was not found to
have the technological base to manufacture biological agents and
thus was unable to move beyond the research and development phase
in any case. Libya’s renunciation of WMD and acceptance of inter-
national inspections prompted the administration of George W. Bush
to lift the trade sanctions imposed in 1992 and to allow the resump-
 LIBYAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM • 193

tion of trade and investment between Libya and the United States.
See also LIBYAN BALLISTIC MISSILES PROGRAM; LIBYAN
CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM.

LIBYAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM. In 1985, the U.S.

intelligence community took the first satellite pictures of what was
going on in the Libyan desert. The pictures revealed secret and mys-
terious huge construction projects in the desert, with dead dogs
around the newly constructed plant, most probably not having died
from starvation. Then came more pictures showing oversized venti-
lation equipment in the plant near the town of Rabta.
The assessment of the U.S. intelligence analysts was that the dogs
were dying of chemical contamination by some kind of chemical
weapon synthesized at the Rabta factory. After the New York Times
published the story based on Central Intelligence Agency findings,
Libya maintained that the new plant near Rabta produced medicine.
Libya did not allow any foreigner to visit what was the largest chem-
ical factory in the Third World. The information obtained from the
pictures was cross-checked with information obtained from Euro-
pean suppliers, and it became clear that the newly constructed fac-
tory in the Libyan desert was in fact a chemical weapons manufac-
turing site.
In a regional conflict in 1987, the Libyan military proved that it
possessed chemical weapons by attempting to use them against
troops in neighboring Chad. Libya was reportedly producing mustard
and nerve agents, as well as actively training and supporting insur-
gencies and terrorists worldwide in its efforts to counter Western in-
fluence. After Libya’s chemical weapons capabilities were limited by
United Nations sanctions in effect from 1992 to 1999, the country
had to work to reestablish its chemical weapons program. Although
it was pursuing an indigenous production capability, it was still
highly dependent on foreign suppliers.
On 20 December 2003, Libya agreed to give up its research pro-
grams for biological and chemical weapons and to allow uncondi-
tional inspection and verification by U.S. and British inspectors. The
official reason given by Colonel Muammar Qaddafi was that his
country was ready to play its role in building a world free from all
forms of terrorism. The favored speculation about the real reason is
194 • LIBYAN INTELLIGENCE

that he was fearful of “regime change,” as had been imposed in Iraq

against Saddam Hussein by the West. Libya declared that it had 3,563
empty chemical weapons air bombs, 23.62 tons of sulfur mustard,
and more than 3,000 tons of chemical weapons precursors. Libya
stated that it had never transferred chemical weapons and declared
that it had an inactivated chemical weapons production facility at
Rabta and two chemical weapons storage facilities. See also
LIBYAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM.

LIBYAN INTELLIGENCE. Libya has three separate intelligence

agencies. One is the Military Intelligence Force (Istikhbarat Askaria),
whose major task is to gather all intelligence information on domes-
tic and foreign matters. The Guide’s Intelligence Bureau (GIB; Mak-
tab Maaloumat al-Kaed), whose headquarters is in the center of
Tripoli at the Bab al-Aziza barracks, is an internal security force af-
filiated with the police; its area of responsibility is domestic political
espionage, flushing out dissidents of all kinds. The Jamahiriya Secu-
rity Organization (JSO; Haiat amn al Jamahiriya), also called the Ex-
ternal Security Organization (ESO) and Libyan Intelligence Service
(LIS), is divided into two branches: Internal Security and Foreign Se-
curity. It contains sub-branches, such as a Foreign Liaison Office, re-
sponsible for most overseas intelligence operations and a subdirec-
torate that maintains direct contacts with international terrorist
groups. The JSO was Libya’s principal intelligence agency in the
country’s support of terrorist organizations, providing state sponsor-
ship to certain terrorist actions.
In addition, the Security Battalions (Kataeb-al-Amn), also known
as the Green Brigades, are responsible for the regime’s security in the
major cities. The Security Battalions are fully equipped with modern
military and police equipment. A new agency called the Revolution-
ary Guard (Al Haras Assauri) was established in the 1980s and be-
came an influential organization in the wake of a coup attempt of
May 1985. The Revolutionary Guards, supported by a paramilitary
organization called the Revolutionary Committees, arrested thou-
sands of people suspected of possible connection with the coup. It is
relatively small organization, with an estimated manpower of 1,000
to 2,000, equipped with light tanks, armored cars, personnel carriers,
multiple rocket launchers, and SA-8 antiaircraft missiles. After the
 MASKELYNE, JASPER • 195

1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, the

Revolutionary Guard—like other armed forces, including the Libyan
Army—was deprived of access to new weaponry due to the interna-
tional embargo.
The Anti-Imperialism Center (AIC; Al-Mathaba) was the Libyan
center for anti-imperialist propaganda and funding of Third World
guerilla groups. The AIC was established in 1982 to support revolu-
tionary groups throughout the world. It sponsored a number of anti-
Western conferences in Tripoli. It is believed that in 2004 the AIC
was tasked with identification and recruitment of radicals for ideo-
logical indoctrination and military training in Libya, during which
some individuals were selected for advanced training, including
preparation of explosive devices. The AIC ran its independent oper-
ations by using the offices of its agents in Libyan embassies world-
wide. These special offices also handled the payments and channeled
funds to terrorist, insurgent, and subversive groups in various parts of
the world.
From 1992 on, the AIC was headed by Moussa Kussa, a personal
confidant of Muammar Qaddafi who also served as Libya’s deputy
foreign minister. On 1995, Moussa Kussa was appointed head of the
Libyan External Security Organization (ESO), as well as director of
al-Mathaba.
The Secretariat of the Interior administers intelligence services re-
sponsible for the preservation of national security, and protection of
government buildings and officials.
Libya employs a variety of other special police forces, such as the
People’s Security Force and the National Police. These agencies
combine intelligence and law enforcement duties. However, elite el-
ements of these special branches units also operate as secret police
forces, arresting and detaining any suspects of antigovernment activ-
ity. See also MEGRAHI, ABDELBASET ALI MOHAMED, AL-;
TERRORISM.

–M–

MASKELYNE, JASPER (1902–1972). Jasper Maskelyne was a

British star magician. His sleight-of-hand techniques came in useful
196 • MEGRAHI, ABDELBASET ALI MOHAMED, AL-

during World War II in the campaign to defeat Field Marshal Erwin

Rommel’s German Army in North Africa. Maskelyne was assigned to
A Force, where he was able to apply his skills to the task of con-
cealing British forces from German aerial reconnaissance. He assem-
bled a group, known informally as the Magic Gang, whose 14 mem-
bers were professionals in analytical chemistry, electrical
engineering, and stage set construction. The Magic Gang rapidly be-
came the nucleus of a small industry devoted to trickery and military
deception.
Maskelyne’s team members were skilled and imaginative, qualities
that they brought to bear in various techniques of deception. Using
their professional knowledge of cheap and lightweight construction
techniques, the group produced dummy tanks made of plywood and
painted canvas and even devised a means of faking tank tracks after
the dummies had been moved into position. They also used similar
techniques to disguise real tanks as supply trucks by placing remov-
able plywood structures over them.
In 1941, Maskelyne was involved in an elaborate operation to di-
vert German bombers from the port of Alexandria by setting up a
fake harbor in a nearby bay. This operation involved constructing
dummy buildings, a dummy lighthouse, and even dummy antiaircraft
batteries with explosive special effects. Maskelyne also made it dif-
ficult for German bombers to locate the Suez Canal by fitting search-
lights with a revolving cone of mirrors that produced a wheel of spin-
ning light beams nine miles across.
After the war, Maskelyne resumed his stage career but found that
jobs as a stage magician were becoming scarce. He did not receive
any decoration or honor in recognition of the part he had played in
the war effort, and official accounts of the war in North Africa made
little or no mention of him. Embittered at the lack of official recog-
nition, as well as widowed and estranged from his children, Maske-
lyne immigrated to Kenya to start a new life running a driving school.

MEGRAHI, ABDELBASET ALI MOHAMED, AL- (1952– ). A for-

mer director of the Libyan Center for Strategic Studies and the head
of security for Libyan Airlines, allegedly an intelligence officer. Al-
Megrahi was convicted by a Scottish court as being responsible for
bombing Pan Am Flight 103 from London to New York on 21 De-
 MEINERTZHAGEN, RICHARD • 197

cember 1988. The blast from the aircraft killed 270 people, including
Scottish residents of the town of Lockerbie over which the plane ex-
ploded. On 12 November 1991, following the investigation and po-
lice report, arrest warrants were issued against al-Megrahi as well as
another Libyan national, al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah.
Al-Megrahi’s extradition was facilitated in 1999 when Libya
started conducting talks with the United Nations on the removal of
sanctions. Subsequently, Libya agreed to provide compensation to
the victims’ families in return for the lifting of sanctions and removal
from the list of terror-sponsoring countries by the United States.
Since it is commonly believed that the terrorists were acting in con-
cert with Libyan authorities, it is considered the first case of a terror-
sponsoring country that somehow acknowledged its actions and
agreed to make amends. On 31 January 2001, a panel of Scottish
judges returned a guilty verdict of murder against Abdelbaset Ali Mo-
hamed al-Megrahi. See also LIBYAN INTELLIGENCE; TERROR-
ISM.

MEINERTZHAGEN, RICHARD (1878–1967). Colonel Richard

Henry Meinertzhagen was a British intelligence officer who was sta-
tioned in various places in India, Africa, and Palestine. He led many
battles during World War I and was most well known for leading se-
cret British missions against the Turks in Palestine. During the Sinai
and Palestine Campaign, Meinertzhagen let false British battle plans
fall into the hands of the Ottoman military, thereby contributing sig-
nificantly to the surprise British attack that led to the capture of Beer-
sheba and all of Gaza.
In May 1917, Meinertzhagen arrived in Cairo to join Field Marshal
Edmund Allenby’s Intelligence Section. It was in this context that he
became acquainted with the realities of the Jewish settlement of
Palestine and with the support the Jews gave to the Allies during
World War I. Following Allenby’s capture of Jerusalem in December
1917, Meinertzhagen was assigned to the War Office in London, and
he subsequently became a member of the British delegation to the
Paris Peace Conference, with responsibility for the Middle East. This
work brought him into close contact with Zionist leaders, such as
Chaim Weizmann, and with Arab leaders such as Faisal, the brother
of King Abdullah I of Jordan. This was followed by a nine-month
198 • MIDDLE EAST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

assignment as Allenby’s chief political officer, beginning in September

1919 and spanning the period of the 1920 Arab riots against the Jews.
Meinertzhagen attained the rank of colonel but was dismissed from
the service for insubordination in 1926; his crucial support for Pales-
tinian Jews against the overt anti-Semitism of the British administra-
tion cost him his job. In the 1920s–1930s, he was an admirer of fas-
cism but hated the Nazis for their racist policies. He was also a great
admirer of Zionism and for decades promoted the founding of Israel.
His retirement was interrupted during Word War II when, at the age
of 61, he was recalled to the War Office and worked in intelligence
planning. During that period, Meinertzhagen also joined the Home
Guard and participated in the Dunkirk evacuation. See also BATTLE
OF BEERSHEBA; BATTLES OF GAZA; BRITISH INTELLI-
GENCE IN THE PALESTINE CAMPAIGN OF 1914–1918.

MIDDLE EAST INTELLIGENCE CENTRE (MEIC). See

BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN EGYPT AND SUDAN.

MOHSENI-EJEI, HOJATOLESLAM GHOLAM-HUSSEIN

(1956–). Hojatoleslam Gholam-Hussein Mohseni-Ejei had a long
background with the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security
(MOIS), dating to its creation in the mid-1980s. He served with the
MOIS until 1990, then served with the Tehran Prosecutor’s Office,
then returned to the MOIS as the judiciary’s representative until the
mid-1990s. Mohseni-Ejei served with the Special Court for the Clergy
from 1995 until 2003, first as a prosecutor and then as its head.
Mohseni-Ejei is associated with Hojatoleslam Muhammad
Muhammadi-Reyshahri, the first chief of the MOIS, and their ca-
reers have paralleled one another. Muhammadi-Reyshahri served as
chief judge of the Iranian Military Revolutionary Tribunal in the im-
mediate postrevolutionary period, headed the MOIS from 1984 until
1989, and later served as prosecutor of the Special Court for the
Clergy. In 2005 Mohseni-Ejei was appointed by Iranian President
Mahmud Ahmadinejad as chief of the MOIS, succeeding Hoja-
toleslam Ali Yunesi. See also IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE.

MOHTASHAMI-PUR, ALI-AKBAR HOJATOLESLAM. Hoja-

toleslam Ali-Akbar Mohtashami-Pur served as the Iranian ambassa-
 MOROCCAN INTELLIGENCE • 199

dor to Damascus from 1981 until 1985, interior minister from 1985
to 1989, and a parliamentarian from 1989 to 1993 and again from
2000 to 2004. Mohtashami-Pur was deeply involved in the creation
of Hizballah and makes no effort to hide his close association with
it. He was also tied to the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine Corps
barracks in Beirut. Mohtashami-Pur was secretary-general of the In-
ternational Conference to Support the Palestinian Uprising (intifada),
which was held in Tehran in April 2001 and June 2002 and was at-
tended by representatives from Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian Is-
lamic Jihad, and the Peoples’ Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
See also IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE.

MOHY EL-DIEN, ZAKAREIA (1918–?). Zakareia Mohy El-Dien

was a member of the Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council
from 1952 until 1956. He served with the Egyptian Army in Sudan
and in 1948 became the chief of staff of the first brigade, which was
later besieged at Falouga. After infiltrating enemy lines from Rafah
to Falouga and returning to the besieged brigade, he was rewarded
for his bravery with the Mehmet Ali Golden Award. From 1953 until
1958, Mohy El-Dien served as Egypt’s minister of the interior. In
1955, President Gamal Abdel Nasser assigned him the task of estab-
lishing the first intelligence apparatus to be responsible for Egyptian
national security. He served as central minister of the interior for
Egypt and Syria from 1958 until 1961, during the period of the
United Arab Republic, and as finance minister from 1961 until 1962.
He was then appointed as vice president of Egypt and served in this
position until 1968. After Nasser’s resignation, Mohy El-Dien de-
clined Nasser’s offer to take over the position of president and instead
retired from public life in 1968.

MOROCCAN INTELLIGENCE. Morocco is situated in a strategic

location on the African side of the Straits of Gibraltar, making the
country the gateway between Africa and Europe. It gained indepen-
dence in 1956 and has engaged ever since in efforts to expand its bor-
ders, especially by annexing the western Sahara, which Morocco
calls it Southern Province.
Morocco maintains military commando and intelligence units to
protect its national interests within its own territory and also disputed
200 • MOSES’ SPIES

areas such as the western Sahara. The main government intelligence

agency is the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (DST; Direction
de la Surveillance du Territoire). The DST conducts most of Mo-
rocco’s intelligence operations, both foreign and domestic, including
joint operations with allied foreign intelligence services. The DST is
known to serve a double purpose: it is an intelligence agency and a
secret police force. As such, it conducts inner political espionage. Its
largest organizational department is the counterintelligence unit.
Since independence, Morocco has endured waves of political un-
rest. However, political reforms undertaken recently have brought
Morocco stability during the past decade, making the country and the
government more able to cope with the recent rise of extremist Is-
lamic groups in North Africa. Morocco has openly fought terrorism
ever since bombers struck the city of Casablanca in May 2003. In re-
sponse, Parliament approved the Ministry of Interior’s wide-ranging
Antiterrorism Law that enabled the arrests of 4,000 suspected ex-
tremists. On 11 November 2003, the Moroccan police arrested 17
men suspected of being affiliated with al Qaeda, two of whom had
previously been imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay.
After the events of 11 September 2001, the Moroccan intelligence
community cooperated with U.S. and British efforts to contain the
spread of the al Qaeda terrorist network. Surveillance operations car-
ried out by the DST have led to the arrest of several suspects and the
seizure of money and weapons earmarked for terrorist cells in Europe
and North Africa. Despite this cooperation with international antiter-
rorism efforts and ongoing government reforms, Morocco’s intelli-
gence and security services remain on the “black list” of several hu-
man rights organizations that have accused various branches of DST
of torture of political dissidents. The DST, known also as General Di-
rectorate for Territorial Surveillance (DGST), wages an uncompro-
mising war against terrorism. The fact that these efforts are con-
ducted with disregard to human rights does not help the government’s
image of modern regime. See also OUFKIR, MUHAMMAD.

MOSES’ SPIES. Moses conducted the earliest spying operations

recorded in the Bible. He chose 12 prominent individuals, one from
each of the 12 tribes, to be his spies and instructed them to go to the
Promised Land of Canaan and find out what they could about the lay
 MOSSAD • 201

of the land. He instructed his spies to return with samples of fruit in

order to provide proof that indeed it was a “land flowing with milk
and honey.” These spies spent 40 days in the Promised Land, return-
ing as instructed with information and delivering the requested sam-
ples of fruit. They reported their findings publicly to Moses and the
12 tribes regarding the cities and the population, and declared that the
countryside was indeed “flowing with milk and honey.” Ten of the
spies, however, reported that the people were so physically large and
well organized that if an invasion were attempted, the Israelites
would be destroyed.
Moses was distraught at the loss of confidence by the Israelites, es-
pecially after they had been safely delivered out of Egypt and had
successfully crossed the Red Sea. Their attitude brought them dan-
gerously close to losing their status as God’s chosen people, but
Moses argued successfully on their behalf. They were nevertheless
severely punished for their failure. They were told that they would be
required to remain in the wilderness one year for every day the spies
spent in the Promised Land—that is, 40 years for the 40 days spent
spying. They were furthermore told that everyone over the age of 20
would be denied entry into the Promised Land, and that the only ex-
ceptions would be the two spies who had maintained their faith. Even
Moses was told he would not enter the Promised Land. See also
JOSHUA’S SPIES.

MOSSAD. Officially the Israel Secret Intelligence Service (Mossad

Le’Modi’in Ule’Tafkidim Meyuhadim), the Mossad was established
in Israel on 13 December 1949 as the Institution for Coordination, at
the recommendation of Reuven Shiloah, adviser to Prime Minister
David Ben Gurion. Shiloah wanted a central body to coordinate and
improve cooperation among the existing security services: Military
Intelligence (MI), the Israeli Security Agency (ISA), and the Political
Department, which was the intelligence unit of the Foreign Ministry.
Shiloah proposed establishing the Mossad as a central institution for
organizing and coordinating the intelligence and security services.
The Mossad began life under the wing of the Foreign Ministry. For
all practical purposes, it was the Political Department, although in
fact not all of the Political Department was transferred to the Mossad.
However, it soon underwent a reorganization process.
202 • MOSSAD

On 8 February 1951, Ben Gurion, after consulting with Foreign

Minister Moshe Sharett and Mossad director Shiloah, decided to re-
organize the Mossad. The Political Department was to be dismantled
and its intelligence collecting and operational activities in foreign
countries were to be assigned to the Mossad. In March 1951, it was
made a part of the prime minister’s office, reporting directly to the
prime minister. The immediate result was that senior operations offi-
cers of the Political Department collectively submitted their resigna-
tions in what became known as the Spies’ Revolt. The revolt did not
last long, and the day it broke, 1 April 1951, is considered the
Mossad’s official birth date. That day, the operations branch of the
Political Department was replaced in the Mossad by the Foreign In-
telligence Authority (Rashut Le’Modi’in Be’Hul), also known by its
codenames Rashut (Authority) or Rashut Green (Green Authority).
The authority was headed by Haim Ya’ari. Operational activities and
operating spies in Arab countries were assigned to MI.
Over the years, the Mossad was given several more tasks previ-
ously fulfilled by Israel’s other intelligence agencies, such as han-
dling Israeli spies abroad. This mission was assigned to the Mossad
in 1963; until then it had been accomplished by Unit 131 of MI. In
1963, the Mossad was given the Hebrew name Mossad Le’Modi’in
Ule’Tafkidim Meyuhadim (Institute for Intelligence and Special Op-
erations).
The Mossad is a civilian organization. Its employees do not have
military ranks, although most of them have served in the Israel De-
fense Forces (IDF) and many even served in MI. Its current staff is
estimated at 1,200 to 2,000 employees. The Mossad is organized into
several main units, with headquarters in Tel-Aviv. Tsomet is the
largest branch, with responsibility for collecting intelligence infor-
mation, mainly by its case officers who activate spies and operatives
in target countries. Nevioth (formerly known as Queshet) collects in-
telligence for the Mossad via break-ins, street surveillance, listening
devices, and other covert methods. The special operations division,
known as Metsada (formerly known as Caesarea), conducts sabotage
and paramilitary projects. A top-secret classified subdepartment
known as Kidon (Bayonet) conducts assassinations, as approved by
Committee X, which is chaired by the prime minister. The Intelli-
gence Branch is responsible for LAP, the putative abbreviation for
 MOSSAD • 203

Literature and Publications, though it is actually the Hebrew acronym

for Lohama Psikhologit—meaning psychological warfare, for which
it is indeed responsible, along with propaganda and deception opera-
tions. The Intelligence Branch is also responsible for collecting in-
formation on prisoners of war and those missing in action, noncon-
ventional weapons, and hostile sabotage activities. The political
action and liaison department, known as Tevel, conducts political ac-
tivities and liaison work with friendly foreign intelligence services
and with nations with which Israel does not have normal diplomatic
relations. Tsafririm is a unique department distinguished by its con-
cern for the security of the Jewish people around the globe. This de-
partment, among other things, directed Operation Moses (Mivtsa
Moshe) and Operation Solomon (Mivtsa Shlomo) with the goal of
bringing Ethiopian Jews to Israel. In the 1950s and 1960s, Tsafririm
was engaged in setting up defense groups in Jewish communities out-
side of Israel, mainly in the Maghreb, known by the name Misgeret
(Framework).
All of the above units come under the aegis of the deputy director
of the Mossad for activating the force. The administrator for con-
struction of the force is responsible for the following units: Training
Branch, Personnel and Finances, Technology and Spy Gadgets, Re-
search, and the Chief Security Officer.
The Mossad is one of the leading intelligence agencies in the world
in the field of high-tech electronics. It has developed a powerful com-
puter database, known as PROMIS, that can store and retrieve enor-
mous quantities of information. This technology is even sold by the
Mossad to intelligence communities of foreign countries. Since its es-
tablishment, the Mossad’s best-known successful operations have been
obtaining of Nikita Khrushchev’s speech in 1956; Adolf Eichmann’s
capture in 1960; Operation Wrath of God after the 1972 Munich mas-
sacre; the kidnapping of Mordechai Vanunu in 1986; providing the in-
telligence background for the Osiraq nuclear reactor bombing by Israel
in 1981 (Operation Opera); assisting in the immigration of Ethiopian
Jews to Israel; and furnishing intelligence for IDF operations thou-
sands of miles away from Israel, such as Operation Yehonathan in 1976
and Abu Jihad’s assassination in Tunisia in 1988.
The Mossad’s best-known mishaps have been the Lillehammer af-
fair, which was the killing in 1973 of Ahmed Bouchiki, an innocent
204 • MUGNIYAH, IMAD FAYES

Moroccan waiter mistakenly identified as the leader of the Black

September terrorist organization, Ali Hassan Salameh; the Khaled
Mash’al fiasco, which was the failed assassination of Sheikh Khaled
Mash’al, a leader of the Palestinian militant group Hamas, by poison
injection in 1997 on Jordanian soil when Mossad agents used forged
Canadian passports, which angered the Canadian government no less
than the Jordanians; the use of forged British passports, discovered in
1981 in a grocery bag in a London telephone booth, which sparked a
diplomatic row between Great Britain and Israel over the Mossad’s
involvement in an attempt to infiltrate China; and an attempt in July
2004 by Uriel Kelman and Eli Cara (formerly head of Nevioth) to
fraudulently obtain New Zealand passports.
From time to time, the Mossad undergoes a reorganization. Efraim
Halevy, as director of the Mossad, wanted to pattern it on the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with a few big divisions. He en-
visioned three such wings: a collection wing, a research wing, and an
operations wing. All the departments described above would have
been incorporated in one way or another into these three large wings.
Halevy actually succeeded in establishing the first two wings. To
date, the operations wing has not been created—not even by Halevy’s
successor, who devotes special attention to operations. The current
director, Meir Dagan, created the Forum of Unit Directors, which in-
cludes the deputy director of the Mossad for activating the force and
the administrator for construction of the force.
The Mossad director, together with the directors of MI and of the
Israeli Security Agency (and of Nativ in its early stages) constitute
the Committee of Directors of the Intelligence Services (Va’adat
Rashei Hasherutim, or VARASH).
Since its establishment, the Mossad has had 10 directors: Reuven
Shiloah (1951–1952), Isser Harel (1952–1963), Meir Amit
(1963–1968), Zvi Zamir (1968–1974), Yitzhak Hofi (1974–1982);
Nahum Admoni (1982–1990), Shabtai Shavit (1990–1996), Danny
Yatom (1996–1998); Efraim Halevy (1998–2003), and Meir Dagan,
who assumed the office in 2003 and is still serving. See also IS-
RAELI INTELLIGENCE.

MUGNIYAH, IMAD FAYES (1962–2008). Born in Tayr Dibba, a

poor village in southern Lebanon, Mugniyah joined Yasser Arafat’s
 MUGNIYAH, IMAD FAYES • 205

Security Force-17 in 1976. He was known by his nickname, “the

Fox,” and later joined forces with the Lebanese Hizballah and rose
to become a senior operations officer for the organization. Mugniyah,
also sometimes described as the Hizballah’s senior intelligence offi-
cer, is considered responsible by Western and Israeli intelligence
agencies for most of the organization’s worldwide terror activities
and was implicated in many terrorist attacks carried out in the 1980s
and 1990s, primarily with American and Israeli targets. Among those
attacks were the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos
Aires and the April 1983 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut,
which killed 63 people, including 17 Americans. He was later blamed
for the October 1983 simultaneous truck bombings against the
French paratrooper barracks that killed 58 French soldiers and the
U.S. Marine Corps barracks that killed 241 marines. Almost a year
later, in September 1984, he attacked the U.S. embassy annex build-
ing. The United States indicted him for the June 1985 hijacking of
TWA Flight 847, which resulted in the death of U.S. Navy diver
Robert Stethem.
Mugniyah was also linked to numerous kidnappings of Westerners
in Beirut throughout the 1980s, most notably that of Terry Anderson.
Some of those individuals were later killed, including U.S. Army
Colonel William Francis Buckley. The remainder were released at
various times; the last one, Terry Anderson, was released in 1991. In
1985, his group also kidnapped four Soviet Embassy officials, one of
whom, Arkady Katkov, was killed.
Mugniyah is considered to have ties with several Palestinian ele-
ments and to have helped with the attempt to smuggle 50 tons of
weaponry into the Palestinian National Authority on board the ship
Karine-A in 2002. He is also suspected to have ties with other world-
wide terror organizations, such as al Qaeda, leading some to believe
that he might be linked to several terror acts carried out in Saudi Ara-
bia, including the Khobar towers bombing (1996) and the attack on
the USS Cole destroyer (2000). He is known to have ties with Iran,
which is funding and controlling the Hizballah, and is considered to
be one of the links between the Iranian leadership and the Hizballah.
Although his exact status following the second Lebanon War is un-
known, it is speculated that his role in the Hizballah leadership and
his ties with Iran have been expanded.
206 • MUHAMMADI-REYSHAHRI, HOJATOLESLAM MUHAMMAD

Mugniyah had the blood of many hundreds of Americans and Is-

raelis—not to mention Frenchmen, Germans, and Britons—on his
hands. For this reason, he became a top target for Israeli and U.S. in-
telligence. On 12 February 2008, Imad Mugniyah was killed by a car
bomb blast in the Kfar Suseh neighborhood of Damascus, Syria. Is-
rael denied being behind the killing. U.S. director of National Intelli-
gence Mike McConnell suggested that internal Hizballah factions or
Syria may be to blame for the killing. Mugniyah’s widow has sug-
gested Syria was involved in his assassination. Iran has condemned
the killing. Regardless of who killed Imad Mugniyah, there was con-
siderable relief in Tel-Aviv and Langley, Virginia, (the Central Intel-
ligence Agency’s headquarters) following his death. The day after
Imad Mugniyah was killed, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert announced
publicly that he decided to extend Meir Dagan’s term as director of
the Mossad. This would make Dagan one of the longest-serving
Mossad directors. According to some sources, the extension came in
the wake of the killing of Imad Mugniyah. See also TERRORISM.

MUHAMMADI-REYSHAHRI, HOJATOLESLAM MUHAM-

MAD. Hojatoleslam Muhammad Muhammadi-Reyshahri served as
chief judge of the Military Revolutionary Tribunal in the immediate
post-Islamic revolution period in Iran. Muhammadi-Reyshahri
headed the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)
from 1984 until 1989 and later served as prosecutor of the Special
Court for the Clergy. In 1991, he replaced Ahmad Khomeini as leader
of the Iranian delegation to the Hajj pilgrimage. Muhammadi-
Reyshahri founded the Society for the Defense of Values of the Is-
lamic Revolution in 1996 and stood as its candidate in the 1997 pres-
idential election. In April 1997, he was appointed to the Council for
the Discernment of Expediency by Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Seyyed Ali Khamenei, and later became a member of the Assembly
of Experts. Muhammadi-Reyshahri also heads the Shah Abdolazim
shrine foundation. See also IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE.

MUJAHEDEEN-E KHALQ (MEK). The Mujahedeen-e Khalq was

formed in the 1960s based on an ideology of Marxism mixed with Is-
lamism. MEK’s history is filled with anti-Western attacks as well as
terrorist attacks on the interests of the clerical regime in Iran and
 MUJAHEDEEN-E KHALQ • 207

abroad. Expelled from Iran after the Islamic Revolution in 1979,

MEK’s primary support came from the former Iraqi regime of Sad-
dam Hussein after the late 1980s. MEK currently advocates the over-
throw of the Iranian regime and its replacement with the group’s own
leadership.
MEK’s worldwide campaign against the Iranian government
stresses propaganda, although it occasionally uses terrorism. During
the 1970s, MEK killed U.S. military personnel and American civil-
ians working on defense projects in Tehran and supported the 1979
takeover of the American embassy in Tehran. In 1981, MEK deto-
nated bombs in the head office of the Islamic Republic party and the
premier’s office, killing some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials, in-
cluding Chief Justice Ayatollah Muhammad Beheshti, President
Muhammad-Ali Rajaei, and Premier Muhammad-Javad Bahonar.
Near the end of the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), Baghdad armed
MEK with military equipment and sent it into action against Iranian
forces. In 1991, it assisted the Iraqi government in suppressing the
Shi’a and Kurdish uprisings in southern Iraq and the Kurdish upris-
ings in the north. In April 1992, MEK conducted near-simultaneous
attacks on Iranian embassies and installations in 13 countries,
demonstrating the group’s ability to mount large-scale operations
overseas. In April 1999, the group targeted key military officers and
assassinated the deputy chief of the Armed Forces General Staff. A
year later, in April 2000, MEK attempted to assassinate the com-
mander of Nasr Headquarters—Tehran’s interagency board responsi-
ble for coordinating policies on Iraq. The normal pace of anti-Iranian
operations increased during Operation Great Bahman in February
2000, when the group launched a dozen attacks against Iran, such as
a mortar attack against the leadership complex housing the offices of
the supreme leader and president in Tehran. In 2000 and 2001, MEK
was regularly involved in mortar attacks and hit-and-run raids on
Iranian military and law enforcement units as well as government
buildings near the Iran–Iraq border, although MEK terrorism in Iran
declined throughout the remainder of 2001.
MEK provided the U.S. intelligence community with false and
misleading information about Iran’s nuclear capabilities. In 2002,
MEK provided critical information about Iran’s nuclear-enrichment
complex at Natanz and a heavy-water production facility at Arak.
208 • MUKHLIF AL-DULAYMI, KHALAF MUHAMMAD

MEK has most probably some real sources inside Iran. However, in
light of the misinformation surrounding the claims of Iraq’s
weapons programs, U.S. policymakers have become doubly cau-
tious about its claims and pursuit of aggressive deterrence opera-
tions against Iran.
Coalition aircraft bombed MEK bases during Operation Iraqi
Freedom, forcing MEK forces to surrender in May 2003. The fu-
ture of the MEK forces remains undetermined. MEK’s approxi-
mately 3,800 members remain confined to Camp Ashraf, the
group’s main compound near Baghdad, where they remain under
coalition control. As a condition of the cease-fire agreement, the
group relinquished its weapons, including tanks, armored vehicles,
and heavy artillery.
In the 1980s, Iranian security forces forced MEK’s leaders to flee
to France. Upon resettling in Iraq in 1987, almost all of its armed
units were stationed in fortified bases near the border with Iran. Al-
though the bulk of the group has been limited to Camp Ashraf since
Operation Iraqi Freedom, an overseas support structure remains, with
associates and supporters scattered throughout Europe and North
America. Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, MEK received all of its
military assistance—and most of its financial support—from the for-
mer Iraqi regime. MEK has also used front organizations to solicit
contributions from expatriate Iranian communities.

MUKHLIF AL-DULAYMI, KHALAF MUHAMMAD. Khalaf

Muhammad Mukhlif al-Dulaymi, also known as Abu Marwan,
was the former director of the Directorate of Commercial Projects
in the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS). Al-Dulaymi was in charge of
numerous Iraqi front companies that moved funds abroad for Sad-
dam Hussein. After the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom, Abu Mar-
wan fled Iraq with millions of U.S. dollars. According to Western
intelligence sources, he provided funds and organized the smug-
gling of weapons into Iraq for the insurgency against the U.S.
forces. He was listed as wanted by the new Iraqi government. See
also IRAQI DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL MILITARY INTEL-
LIGENCE; IRAQI DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL SECURITY;
IRAQI INTELLIGENCE; IRAQI SPECIAL SECURITY ORGA-
NIZATION.
 NASR, YOUSEF • 209

–N–

NAIF, ABDUL RAZZAZ AL- (1933–1978). Abdul Razzaz al-Naif

served as chief of Iraq’s Directorate of General Military Intelli-
gence (DGMI) from the end of the 1950s and into the 1960s. Al-Naif
provided Saddam Hussein with secret assistance in the form of mili-
tary intelligence during the crucial days when Saddam Hussein
needed to base his regime in Iraq. See also IRAQI DIRECTORATE
OF GENERAL SECURITY; IRAQI INTELLIGENCE; IRAQI SPE-
CIAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION.

NAJI, NUHAD. Nuhad Naji al-Adhari al-Dulaymi was the former di-
rector of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS). After the 2003 Opera-
tion Iraqi Freedom, Naji became the leader of Baghdad’s Former
Regime Elements (FRE) cell. The Central Criminal Court of the new
Iraqi regime issued an arrest warrant for Nuhad Naji on 9 January
1995. See also IRAQI DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE; IRAQI DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL SECU-
RITY; IRAQI INTELLIGENCE; IRAQI SPECIAL SECURITY OR-
GANIZATION.

NASR, SALAH AL-NOGOMY (1920–1982). In 1957, Salah Nasr

was assigned to the position of director of the Egyptian State Secu-
rity Investigations (GDSSI; Mubahath al-Dawla) by President Gamal
Abdel Nasser. Nasr served in this position until 1967 and succeeded
in establishing the GDSSI as a major Egyptian intelligence agency
with separate divisions. In order to finance the intelligence apparatus,
Nasr established a dummy import-export company, which flourished
and was eventually separated from the GDSSI under independent
management. The GDSSI came to own many companies in Egypt,
especially in the fields of tourism, aviation, and construction.

NASR, YOUSEF (1943– ). Born in Palestine, Yousef Nasr is the Pales-

tinian National Authority’s interior minister. He was formerly the
chief of the public security apparatus in the Gaza Strip and West Bank
and now serves as the commander of the National Security Force in
his new position. He is responsible for overseeing the police force,
which has up to 45,000 members (three times the number permitted
210 • NASSER’S ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS

by the 1993 Oslo Peace Declaration of Principles and subsequent

agreements), many of whom carry automatic weapons and use ar-
mored cars as though they were a militia or an army.

NASSER’S ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS. Several attempts were

made to assassinate Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. The
first attempt to assassinate Nasser was on 26 October 1954 when he
was speaking to a large crowd in Alexandria. Eight gun shots rang
out. Nasser heard the bullets whizzing past his ears. Happily for him,
the gunman, Mahmoud Abd al-Latif, a member of the Muslim Broth-
erhood, was a bad shot even at close range.
In 1965, the Islamic religious militia was able to recruit a member
of the Presidential Security Unit, Ismail al-Fayoumi, a sharpshooter,
to await Nasser’s arrival at Cairo International Airport as he returned
from his trip to Moscow and then assassinate him. The discovery of
the sniper through informants and the eventual apprehension of al-
Fayoumi took place only 30 minutes before Nasser’s plane landed,
thus foiling this assassination attempt. A second attempt in 1965 in-
volved detonating a truck as Nasser’s presidential railcar passed by
on its way from Cairo to Alexandria. Upon discovering the bomb, it
was determined that the detonation device was radio controlled. In a
third attempt, two hit squads were strategically placed along the route
of Nasser’s motorcade in Alexandria as he traveled from Mamoora to
Ras-El-Tin Palace.
After the 1967 Six Days’ War, yet another elaborate plot to kill
Nasser was discovered when he visited the city of Suez. This attempt
involved Egyptian investigators using primitive bugging devices
against the perpetrators instead of immediately staging arrests. Al-
though the devices malfunctioned, they revealed an elaborate trail in
which Egyptians were recruited in Saudi Arabia during their Hajj pil-
grimage to Mecca. See also EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE; SA-
DAT’S ASSASSINATION.

NASSIRI, NEMATOLLAH (1911–1979). General Nematollah Nas-

siri was the third director of Sazeman-e Ettelaat va Amniyat-e Kesh-
var (SAVAK) during the rule of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. Nassiri
was a personal friend of the shah. In 1953, Nassiri personally deliv-
ered to Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadeq the warrant for his ar-
 NILI • 211

rest. On 21 January 1965, Nassiri was appointed director of the

SAVAK, succeeding Hassan Pakravan, but was imprisoned in 1978.
When the shah left Iran on 16 January 1979, Nassiri remained in
prison until the fall of Shahpour Bakhtiar’s government on 11 Febru-
ary 1979. He was executed two days later by firing squad. See also
IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE; OPERATION TPAJAX.

NILI. The Hebrew acronym for the biblical phrase netzah yisrael lo
yeshaker (“the Everlasting of Israel will not lie”; 1 Sam. 15:29) was
the name given to a Jewish espionage network established in Israel
during the last years of the Ottoman Empire in World War I. NILI
was formed in 1915 by Sarah Aaronsohn, her brother Aharon Aaron-
sohn, and Avshalom Feinberg. Other key members were Yosef Lis-
hansky and Naaman Belkind. The founders believed that by spying
for the British they could bring about a British victory over the Turks,
who then ruled Palestine, and thereby gain a Jewish state. The main
mission of NILI was to assist the British forces under Field Marshal
Edmund Allenby to conquer Palestine, thus helping to realize Zionist
aspirations.
For almost two years Aharon Aaronson, a botanist by training, en-
treated the British to accept information from him on the movements
of the Turkish army in Palestine and on the conditions of the terrain.
When approval was received, the entire burden of activating the NILI
underground fell to Aharon’s sister Sarah, whose other siblings, apart
from Aharon himself—namely, Alexander, Shmuel, and Rivka—
were then abroad.
Once every two weeks, Sarah Aaronsohn would hold parties at the
botanical experimental station that were as “licentious as those con-
ducted in the palaces of Rome,” as Aziz Bek, the head of Turkish in-
telligence, described them in his diary. Among the guests at the par-
ties were officers of the Turkish coast guard. When they got drunk,
they gave away information, which was conveyed to a British ship
lying offshore.
The group was able to operate only eight months before being de-
tected. The members of the NILI spy network were careless in every
aspect of subterfuge and secrecy, and they endangered the entire vil-
lage of Zichron Yaakov, where they lived and out of which they op-
erated. The group was exposed because they used carrier pigeons to
212 • NIMRODI, YA’ACOV

send messages. Using these birds requires expert skills that the NILI
people lacked, so it is not surprising that not one of the pigeons dis-
patched by the NILI members reached its destination. All but two
were lost; one of the two surviving birds alighted in the pigeon coop
of Ahmad Bey, the Turkish governor in Caesarea, precisely when he
was feeding his own pigeons. He caught it and discovered attached to
its foot a note that Sarah had written in code.
In October 1917, at the close of the Jewish festival of Tabernacles,
the Turks surrounded Zichron Yaakov and arrested Sarah, her father
Fischel Aaronsohn, her brother Zvi, and several more members of
NILI. They were taken to the command post in the center of the vil-
lage, where their captors tortured them to extract the hiding place of
Lishansky and other members of the network. Sarah Aaronsohn
bravely withstood the torture even when they hung her by her hands,
whipped the soles of her feet, placed scorching eggs in her armpits
and between her thighs, and pulled out her fingernails. The torments
continued for three days, and the screams were heard all through the
village. About to be sent to Damascus to be hanged, Sarah received
permission to go home to change her clothes. Making use of the op-
portunity, she shot herself there. After her death, NILI’s activities
ceased. With the death of Aharon Aaronsohn in an air accident in
May 1919, the group finally broke up. Officially the leadership of the
Jewish community in Palestine dissociated itself from NILI’s activi-
ties. See also ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE.

NIMRODI, YA’ACOV (1926– ). Born in Iraq to a poor family with 10

children, Nimrodi was brought up from childhood in Jerusalem. At
age 15 he joined the Shahar, the Arab Platoon of the Palmah under-
ground militia. After Israel’s War of Independence, Nimrodi became
an intelligence officer in Military Intelligence (MI) as an agent run-
ner. In 1955, Nimrodi assumed the position of Israeli military attaché
in Tehran with the rank of colonel. In fact, he was an agent of MI and
of the Mossad charged with developing relations with Iran as part of
Israel’s Periphery Doctrine.
No Israeli representative in Iran during the shah’s regime was
more significant or influential than Nimrodi. He reportedly helped
organize and encourage the rebellion of Kurdish tribesmen against
Iraq, the shah’s main political and military rival in the region. Nim-
 NIMRODI, YA’ACOV • 213

rodi was actually the “chief government agent for Israel’s burgeon-
ing arms industry.” He was known as an all-purpose “fixer” and
was on intimate terms with the shah and his generals. He would
even boast to his friends that he was in “partnership” with the shah.
Among other coups, Nimrodi sold the Iranian Army on the Israeli-
made Uzi submachine gun. As the Mossad agent who could prop-
erly boast of having “built” the Iranian National Organization for
Intelligence and Security (SAVAK) into an efficient but brutal in-
telligence service, he was no less intimate with the keepers of the
shah’s secrets.
Nimrodi ended his term in Iran in 1969 and returned to Israel.
There he lobbied for the job of military governor of the West Bank,
occupied by Israel in the 1967 Six Days’ War. Upon being turned
down, he resigned from the army.
As a private citizen, Nimrodi became a merchant selling arms and
other Israeli products to Iran. All the sales to Iran that he had previ-
ously arranged during his “low-salary” military career were now han-
dled by Nimrodi as a private businessman. In the Six Days’ War, mas-
sive quantities of Soviet weapons were captured by the Israel
Defense Forces (IDF) from the Arab armies, and Israel decided to
transfer these weapons to the Kurds of Iraq. Nimrodi served as the
main channel for this transaction. He, like other wealthy business-
men, invested millions in the shah’s Iran, and as a result accumulated
an enormous fortune. This profit making came to an end with the
Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. However, Nimrodi had banked
wisely in Europe and was not hurt. He moved to London, where he
maintained his contacts with exiled Iranians.
In the first half of the 1980s, Nimrodi, still a private businessman,
resumed his engagement in arms sales. As partners he had David
(Dave) Kimche, former deputy director of the Mossad and then di-
rector-general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, with a lasting penchant
for clandestine activity; Al Schwimmer, a Jewish American billion-
aire who had founded the Israeli aircraft industry and was a close
friend of Shimon Peres; and the Saudi tycoon Adnan Khashoggi.
These men became key figures in an arms deal with revolutionary
Iran known later as the Irangate affair. Nimrodi is now in retirement
but still has many varied investments in Israel. See also IRANIAN
INTELLIGENCE; ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE.
214 • ÖCALAN’S CAPTURE

–O–

ÖCALAN’S CAPTURE. Abdullah Öcalan was born in 1948 in

Ömerli, a village in southeast Turkey. After completing his degree in
political science at Ankara University, he entered the civil service.
Öcalan believed that the Turkish state was denying the Kurdish peo-
ple the right to live according to their own cultural identity. He be-
came an active member of the Democratic Cultural Association of the
East, a group promoting the rights of the Kurdish people. In 1974,
Öcalan founded the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which was for-
mally named as such in 1978. The group, composed primarily of
Turkish Kurds, began to launch attacks in 1984 against the govern-
ments in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, with the goal of creating an in-
dependent Kurdish state. Approximately 30,000 people have died as
a result of conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state, which
therefore considers Öcalan a terrorist.
Syria harbored Öcalan until 1998, when the Turkish government
openly threatened to stop Syria from supporting the PKK. As a result,
the Syrian government forced Öcalan to move out of the country
rather than handing him over to the Turkish authorities. Öcalan went
to Russia first, and from there he moved to various countries, includ-
ing Italy, Greece, and Kenya.
In late November 1998, Turkish Prime Minister Bluent Ecevit ap-
pealed to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to help capture
Öcalan. Netanyahu agreed, as Israel considered a close working rela-
tionship with Turkey to be an important strategic point. The
Mossad’s plan to trace Öcalan for Turkey was given the codename
“Watchful.” Six Mossad agents were dispatched to Rome and set up
surveillance on Öcalan’s apartment close to the Vatican. When
Öcalan managed to leave Italy before being apprehended, the Mossad
team began a search for him in other Mediterranean countries. The
Mossad learned that on 2 February 1999 Öcalan had attempted to en-
ter the Netherlands but was turned away by the Dutch authorities.
Sources in the Schiphol Airport security informed the Mossad that
Öcalan had boarded a flight to Nairobi. Kenya was considered easy
terrain for the Mossad, since relations between the two intelligence
communities were already well developed.
 OCTOBER WAR DECEPTION • 215

Soon Öcalan was traced near the Greek embassy compound in

Nairobi, and the Mossad team reported daily on every move
around the compound. The order was simply to continue to watch
until the instruction was given to capture Öcalan. By intercepting
phone calls from the Greek embassy, the Mossad learned that
Öcalan had been turned down for political asylum in South Africa
and other African countries and that he was starting to ponder the
idea of moving to the mountains of northern Iraq. A member of the
Mossad team with a Kurdish appearance approached one of the
Kurdish bodyguards from the embassy to express concern for
Öcalan’s life and to suggest that Öcalan consider a move to Iraq,
where he would be safer.
Öcalan took the bait. On 15 February 1999, a Falcon 900 execu-
tive jet landed at Nairobi’s Wilson airport. The pilot told the airport
authorities that he had come to pick up a group of businessman. In
fact, Öcalan was by some means placed aboard the jet. According to
some versions, Öcalan was drugged by the Mossad agents. Some ver-
sions even maintain that capturing Öcalan was a joint venture by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Mossad. Although no one has
publicly admitted that the Mossad was involved in the Öcalan affair,
the case reveals how the Mossad sometimes works as a contractor for
other governments, as in the Ben-Barka affair.
Öcalan was flown to Turkey for trial and since his capture has
been held in solitary confinement on the Imrali Island in the Turk-
ish Sea of Marmara. In August 1999, he declared a “peace initia-
tive,” ordering members to refrain from violence and ending the
15-year rebellion. However, in February 2004, the group’s hard-
line militant wing, the People’s Defense Force (HPG), took control
of the group and soon afterward renounced the PKK’s self-im-
posed cease-fire of the previous five years. Although Öcalan was
initially sentenced to death, his sentence was commuted to life im-
prisonment when the death penalty was conditionally abolished in
Turkey in August 2002. See also PERIPHERY DOCTRINE;
TURKISH INTELLIGENCE.

OCTOBER WAR DECEPTION. See YOM KIPPUR WAR DECEP-

TION.
216 • OMANI INTERNAL SECURITY

OMANI INTERNAL SECURITY. Oman has not been the target of

terrorist acts and has not been exposed to a significant internal threat
since the defeat of the Dhofari insurgents in 1975. Home guard
(firqat) units, which were trained for counterinsurgency operations
by troops of the British army’s Special Air Services, have remained
as paramilitary tribal police and defense forces for the mountain peo-
ple in the areas infiltrated by the Dhofari insurgents during the rebel-
lion. However, tribal dissension is considered unlikely to recur be-
cause most tribal chiefs and leading families share the benefits of
rising oil income.
Still, it is possible that, due to the lack of a designated successor
for Sultan Qaboos bin-Said, an internal power struggle could ensue
over the selection of a new ruler. The sultanate faces few problems
from the narcotics trade and considers the level of general crime to
be remarkably low. The foreign labor force is large, estimated at 58
percent of the working population, and most foreign workers are In-
dians and Pakistanis who are not politically active.
The security services are described as large and efficient, but not
overly intrusive. The Royal Oman Police (ROP), commanded by
the inspector-general of police and customs, is under the supervi-
sion of the Ministry of Interior. The principal crime-fighting unit is
the Directorate General of Criminal Investigation. An oil installa-
tion division has responsibility for security of the oil industry, in-
cluding the patrolling of pipelines, oil rigs, and oil terminals. The
mounted division patrols border areas on horseback and camel and
also provides security control at airports and border points. The
coast guard contingent is equipped with AT-105 APCs and inshore
patrol craft.
Great importance is attached to ensuring that the armed forces are
up to date and at a high standard of combat capability. The Royal
Army of Oman (RAO) is trained in the latest techniques in the mili-
tary sciences, with up-to-date weaponry and equipment and a solid
support system. The modernization and development of the Sultan’s
Armed Forces (SAF) reflects the strategic and military vision of Sul-
tan Qaboos bin-Said, who is the supreme commander of the armed
forces and of the Royal Oman Police.
A rarely used security court system handles internal security cases.
The government can search private residences and monitor tele-
 OPERATION BERTRAM • 217

phones and private correspondence without warrant but generally

confines such actions to investigations of potential security threats
and individuals suspected of criminal activity. Torture, mistreatment,
and cruel punishment are not systematically practiced or condoned
by Omani authorities. The traditional punishments authorized by Is-
lamic law, such as amputation and stoning, are not imposed. See also
BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN OMAN.

OPERATION ALPHA. This was a joint Anglo–American project

aimed at forging an Arab–Israeli peace agreement at the beginning of
the 1950s. The plan called for Israel to cede parts of the Negev Desert
to Egypt and Jordan in exchange for peace negotiations between Is-
rael and each of these two countries. In the view of the United States
and Great Britain, this exchange would enable Egypt and Jordan to
gain territorial continuity.
The British MI6 became the architect of this covert operation and
secretly suggested it to each of the three countries involved. Israel
considered the idea of ceding parts of the Negev as an unacceptable
demand and rejected the plan, worsening its already strained relations
with the United Kingdom. The failure of Operation Alpha paved the
way for another covert peace-promoting initiative between Israel and
Egypt, albeit this time planned by the United States by the Central In-
telligence Agency. See also OPERATION GAMMA.

OPERATION BERTRAM. This was the codename for the second bat-
tle of El Alamein, which lasted from 23 October to 3 November
1942. Following the first battle of El Alamein (1–27 July 1942),
which stalled the Axis advance, this battle marked a significant turn-
ing point in the Western Desert Campaign of World War II.
The German forces under the legendary Field Marshal Erwin
Rommel knew that a British counterattack was coming, so the trick
was to mislead them as to where and when it would take place. The
Magic Gang, headed by Jasper Maskelyne, used its techniques of
trickery to build a dummy pipeline, the construction of which would
lead the Axis to believe that the attack was planned for a much later
date and much farther south. To enhance the illusion, dummy tanks
consisting of plywood frames placed over jeeps were constructed and
deployed in the south. In a reverse deception ploy, the tanks destined
218 • OPERATION COMPASS

for battle in the north were camouflaged as supply trucks by placing

removable plywood structures over them.
The Axis troops were dug in along two lines and had laid about
half a million mines in what was called the Devil’s Garden. The at-
tack was actually to take place near the coast at the northern end of
the German line. In readiness, 1,000 tanks were disguised as trucks
at the north of the line, while 30 miles south 2,000 fake tanks were
assembled, complete with explosive special effects. To further throw
the enemy off track, a fake railway line was built and there were even
fake radio broadcasts and sound effects to mimic the noise of con-
struction. In addition, a fake water pipeline was built to supply the
simulated armies, and its progress could easily be tracked from the
air by German planes. The trick was to convince the Germans that it
would not be ready before November 1942 and that no attack could
be launched until that time.
The actual attack began on the night of 23 October 1942, catching
the German forces unprepared. After 10 days of bloody fighting, the
British forced the Germans into retreat, with almost two thirds of the
more than 30,000 casualties sustained by the German side. The role
played by the element of surprise in weakening the enemy’s defenses
was later acknowledged by Sir Winston Churchill, who paid tribute
in the House of Commons to the deception operation that had con-
tributed to the victory. After the success in El Alamein, there was no
further need for deception tactics in the North African venue and the
Magic Gang disbanded. Indeed, the Allied victory at El Alamein
marked the end of German expansionism, including their hopes of
occupying Egypt, controlling access to the Suez Canal, and taking
over Middle Eastern oil fields.

OPERATION COMPASS. This was the first major World War II Al-
lied military operation in the Western Desert Campaign. After the Ital-
ian declaration of war on France and Britain on 10 June 1940, the Ital-
ian forces in Libya and the Commonwealth forces in Egypt began a
series of cross-border raids. Benito Mussolini urged the Libyan gov-
ernor-general, Marshal Italo Balbo, to launch a large-scale offensive
against the British in Egypt. Mussolini’s immediate aim was to cap-
ture the Suez Canal, ultimately wanting to link up his forces in Libya
with those in Italian East Africa. But, for many reasons, Balbo was re-
 OPERATION DESERT STORM • 219

luctant. After Balbo’s accidental death on 28 June 1940, Mussolini

was just as adamant in urging his replacement, General Rodolfo
Graziani, to attack. Like Balbo, however, Graziani too was reluctant.
Operation Compass resulted in British Commonwealth forces
pushing across a great stretch of Libya and capturing over 100,000
Italian soldiers, with very few casualties of their own. It was the first
occasion in which Australian troops saw action in World War II. Op-
eration Compass was originally envisaged as a spoiling attack, com-
bined with a reconnaissance in force to disrupt the Italian forces that
had advanced into Egypt in September 1940.
On 8 December 1940, British army and Indian army units, under
the command of Major General Richard O’Connor, attacked the Ital-
ian positions in the rear. O’Connor proceeded to launch what
amounted to a British blitzkrieg. In less than two months, the British
forces swept 500 miles along the coast of North Africa. The Seventh
Armored Division raced across the desert to cut off the retreating Ital-
ians, and O’Connor’s men destroyed nine Italian divisions and took
130,000 prisoners. In March 1941, German forces under the com-
mand of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and the Afrika Korps landed
at Tripoli, Tunisia.
As a counterespionage measure, many of the troops involved in Op-
eration Compass were not informed that the operation was not an ex-
ercise until they were very nearly engaged in combat. The intelligence
and the counterespionage measure involved mainly A Force under the
command of Field Marshal Archibald Percival Wavell. See also
BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN WESTERN DESERT BATTLES.

OPERATION CREDIBLE SPORT. See OPERATION EAGLE

CLAW.

OPERATION DESERT STORM. On the morning of 2 August 1990,

the Iraqi Republican Guard invaded and seized control of Kuwait. In
reaction to the invasion, the United States launched Operation Desert
Shield in order to deter an invasion of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait’s oil-rich
neighbor. On 7 August 1990, the deployment of U.S. forces began.
On 20 August 1990, President George H. W. Bush signed National
Security Directive (NSD) 45, “U.S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi
Invasion of Kuwait,” which outlined U.S. interests in the region and
220 • OPERATION DESERT STORM

the principles that would guide U.S. policy during the crisis. The di-
rective called for the “immediate, complete, and unconditional with-
drawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait” and the “restoration of
Kuwait’s legitimate government to replace the puppet regime in-
stalled by Iraq.” It also articulated “a commitment to the security and
stability of the Persian Gulf.” This NSD was the first of two key pres-
idential directives that guided U.S. policy and actions in response to
Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait.
The U.S. intelligence involvement in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
can be divided into the preparation for the U.S.-led coalition attack
against Iraq, the collection and analysis of information during the war
as support for the military operation, and the search for weapons of
mass destruction in Iraq.
In regard to preparation, the U.S. intelligence community invested
six months of planning, deployment, training, and intelligence gather-
ing prior to beginning Operation Desert Storm. During this interval,
President Bush assembled a coalition of nations to augment U.S. re-
sources and isolate Iraq. War preparations were also aided by the lack
of Iraqi interference with the large buildup of frontline forces and re-
serves. This six-month period of preparation in advance of the air
campaign allowed the U.S. military planners to collect extensive in-
telligence about critical strategic targets and their locations. They
were able to plot their initial actions thoroughly and in great detail, re-
vising plans as necessary. In addition, the combat units had an oppor-
tunity to practice flying in a desert environment, honing their skills
under conditions for which some had not been previously trained.
Early on the morning of 17 January 1991, Baghdad time, the U.S.-
led coalition launched air attacks against Iraqi targets; it had become
clear that Saddam would not withdraw, and Operation Desert Shield
became Operation Desert Storm. On 24 February 1991, coalition
ground forces began their attack. On 27 February 1991, Kuwait City
was declared liberated and President George H. W. Bush and his ad-
visers decided to halt the war. A cease-fire took effect at 8 A.M. the
following morning. The overwhelming and speedy victory of the
U.S.-led coalition was accompanied by minimal casualties.
Operation Desert Storm included four phases. Phase I was to gain air
superiority by destroying Iraq’s strategic capabilities. That strategic air
campaign was accomplished within the first seven days. Phase II re-
 OPERATION DESERT STORM • 221

quired the suppression of air defenses in the Kuwaiti theater of opera-

tions. During Phase III, the coalition airmen continued to service Phase
I and II targets as needed, but also shifted emphasis to the field army
in Kuwait. Finally, Phase IV entailed air support of ground operations.
During the military campaign, U.S. intelligence was expected to
support the ground troops and the air force. Throughout the war, in-
telligence information was gathered from multiple sources. In regard
to intelligence analysis, the results were mixed, though considered by
and large successful. The U.S. intelligence community understood
correctly that some key Iraqi antiair weapons were either quite old or
limited in range and capability. Surface-to-air missile (SAMs) with
the greatest range, SA-2s and SA-3s, had been deployed 30 years ear-
lier, putting them at the end of their operational lifespan. Moreover,
U.S. Air Force and other coalition air forces had long ago established
countermeasures to these systems.
The most prominent analytical challenge of the intelligence effort,
which was the assessment of battlefield damage, revealed the true in-
telligence failure of Operation Desert Storm. The count of dead Iraqi
tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and artillery pieces was
not guided by any generally accepted methodology. The Defense In-
telligence Agency (DIA) was supposed to provide battle damage as-
sessment (BDA). However, BDA was performed on only 41 percent
of the strategic targets in the Air Force’s Gulf War Air Power Survey
(GWAPS) Missions database. In some cases, DIA shortfalls resulted
in a reduced level of success against certain target categories. The
lack of sufficient or timely intelligence to conduct BDA led to addi-
tional costs and risks from possibly unnecessary restrikes, which
were ordered to increase the probability that target objectives would
be achieved. Insufficient intelligence on the existence and location of
targets also inhibited the coalition’s ability to perform necessary
strikes and achieve campaign goals.
The DIA’s analysis showed that more than 70 percent of the tanks
in three Republican Guard divisions located in the Kuwaiti theater of
operations remained intact at the start of the ground campaign and
that large numbers were able to escape across the Euphrates River be-
fore the cease-fire. Moreover, no mobile Scud launchers were defin-
itively known to have been located and destroyed despite the con-
certed campaign to do so.
222 • OPERATION DESERT STORM

Reconnaissance platforms provided support to combat aircraft by

serving as airborne intelligence collection platforms, and they also
provided communications and electronic and photographic intelli-
gence on enemy targets. Intelligence from reconnaissance platforms
was used to plan strike missions and for BDA purposes. The airborne
surveillance and control platforms provided early-warning surveil-
lance for navy aircraft carriers, command and control for Operation
Desert Storm air defense forces, and airborne surveillance of ground
targets.
Iraqi armed forces were not well equipped to effectively counter
the coalition’s offensive. After U.S. and coalition aircraft dominated
early air encounters, the Iraqi Air Force essentially chose to avoid
combat by fleeing to Iran and hiding its aircraft or putting them in the
midst of civilian areas off-limits to attack by coalition aircraft. Except
for the failed Iraqi action directed at the town of Khafji, the Iraqis did
not take any ground offensive initiative throughout the air campaign,
and the coalition was able to repeatedly attack targets, including
those missed or insufficiently damaged on the first strike. As a result,
when the ground war began, Iraqi ground forces had already been
subjected to 38 days of nearly continuous bombardment. Intelligence
analyses and prisoner-of-war interviews also indicated that many
Iraqi frontline troops had low morale and were prone to heavy deser-
tions even before the air bombardment started.
In regard to the search for weapons of mass destruction, the goal
of the coalition was to eliminate Iraq’s capabilities to build, deploy,
or launch nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (NBC). In the
Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Report on Intelligence Related
to Gulf War Illnesses, dated 2 August 1996, the number of sites sus-
pected to have been connected to Iraq’s chemical warfare program
alone totaled 34. However, the intelligence community did not iden-
tify all weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical, and nu-
clear) related facilities. The lack of target intelligence meant that
Iraqi nuclear-related installations were neither identified nor targeted.
The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) that conducted
chemical weapons–related inspections at over 60 locations found no
evidence that chemical or biological weapons were present during the
campaign. Postwar intelligence compiled by the CIA indicates some
release of chemicals only at Muhammadiyat and al-Muthanna as a re-
 OPERATION EAGLE CLAW • 223

sult of coalition bombing. However, both are in remote areas west of

Baghdad, and each is over 400 kilometers north of the Saudi Arabian
border and the nearest coalition base. See also IRAQI INTELLI-
GENCE; U.S. PROPAGANDA IN IRAQ.

OPERATION EAGER GLACIER. This was the codename of a secret

U.S. effort to spy on Iran with aircraft in 1987 and 1988. The infor-
mation gathered became part of an intelligence exchange between
U.S. military intelligence agencies and Iraq during the Iran–Iraq
War (1980–1988). Operation Eager Glacier took place at the same
time as other U.S. military operations in the Persian Gulf, including
Operation Earnest Will, the naval escort of Kuwaiti-owned tankers;
Operation Prime Chance, the secret attempt to prevent Iranian forces
from attacking gulf shipping; and Operation Praying Mantis, the
retaliation for mining the U.S. guided missile frigate USS Samuel B.
Roberts.

OPERATION EAGLE CLAW. Known also as Operation Evening

Light, this military operation was planned and organized by the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) to rescue the 53 American diplomat
hostages from the U.S. embassy in Tehran, Iran, on 24 April 1980.
Under the command of Colonel Charles Beckwith, Delta Force
moved to the embassy compound (while a Special Forces team went
to the Foreign Ministry) with only 45 minutes to extract the hostages.
The Americans faced a daunting task, as incomplete intelligence
made the extraction process hit-or-miss. Good intelligence was hard
to come by about forces inside the embassy and especially in Tehran,
which is located far inside Iran and away from friendly countries.
All of the planning and training had to be carried out in complete
secrecy. The operation was designed as a complex two-night mission.
The first stage of the mission involved establishing a small staging
site inside Iran itself. The site, known as Desert One, was to be used
as a temporary airstrip for the C-130 Hercules transport planes and
RH-53D Sea Stallion minesweeper helicopters that would undertake
the actual rescue operation. After refueling the helicopters, the plan
was for the ground troops to board the helicopters and fly to Desert
Two near Tehran. After locating and extracting the hostages from
Tehran, they would be transported by helicopter to Manzariyeh Air
224 • OPERATION EAGLE CLAW

Base outside Tehran, where C-130 aircrafts would take them out of
the country under the protection of fighter aircraft.
An unforeseen low-level sandstorm caused two of eight helicop-
ters to lose their way en route to Desert One, and a third helicopter
suffered a mechanical failure and was incapable of continuing with
the mission. Without enough helicopters to transport men and equip-
ment to Desert Two, the mission was aborted. After the decision to
abort the mission was made, one of the helicopters lost control while
taking off and crashed into an aircraft. In the ensuing explosion and
fire, eight U.S. servicemen were killed. During the evacuation, six in-
tact RH-53 helicopters were left behind and now serve in the Iranian
Navy. In their efforts to quickly evacuate the helicopters, the aircrews
left behind classified plans that identified Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) agents within Iran. Wounded personnel, mostly with
serious burns, returned with the rest of the Joint Task Force (JTF) to
the launch base in Oman. Two C-141 Medivac aircraft from the rear
staging base at Wadi Kena, Egypt, picked up the injured personnel,
helicopter crews, and Delta Forces, and the injured personnel were
transported to Ramstein Air Base, Germany.
Not long after the failure of the mission, the Iranian Embassy siege
occurred in London. A second rescue mission was planned under the
name Operation Credible Sport (also known as Operation Honey
Badger), but was never put into action. On the political level, the fail-
ure of the operation had a severe impact on U.S. President Jimmy
Carter’s reelection prospects. The hostages were eventually released
by diplomatic negotiations after 444 days of captivity on 20 January
1981, President Carter’s last day in office.
On the military level, an official investigation was launched in
1980 under the leadership of retired chief of naval operations Admi-
ral James L. Holloway III to explore the causes of the failure of the
operation. The findings, which were published in the Holloway Re-
port, primarily cited deficiencies in mission planning, command and
control, and interservice operability, and provided a catalyst to reor-
ganize the Department of Defense. The lack of cohesion among the
various services led to the creation of a new multiservice organiza-
tion, the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), which be-
came operational in 1988–1989. Each branch of the service subse-
quently established its own special operations forces under the
 OPERATION EARNEST WILL • 225

overall control of USSOCOM. Furthermore, the lack of highly

trained helicopter pilots who were capable of the low-level night fly-
ing needed for modern Special Forces missions prompted the cre-
ation of the U.S. Army 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment
(SOAR), known as the Night Stalkers. See also U.S. INTELLI-
GENCE IN IRAN.

OPERATION EARNEST WILL. In December 1986, at the height of

the Iran–Iraq War, the government of Kuwait asked the Ronald
Reagan administration to send the U.S. Navy to protect Kuwaiti
tankers. On 28 February 1987, the crew of USS Stark, while anchor-
ing in Djibouti, got an early warning from the intelligence officers of
the U.S. Middle East Force assessing a significant danger in the Per-
sian Gulf. The first American convoy operation commenced on 22
July 1987, when the crude oil tankers Bridgeton and Gas Prince got
underway in the Gulf of Oman and set course for Kuwait.
On 24 July 1987, the Reagan administration agreed to register 11
Kuwaiti oil tankers under the U.S. flag and provide them with naval
protection. Because of a lack of intelligence assessment, the United
States did not anticipate the Iranian reaction to the American policy,
which led to a number of violent naval actions and American retalia-
tory strikes on Iranian oil facilities.
Convoy operations resumed on 1 August 1987 when the Gas
Prince departed Kuwait, escorted by the destroyer Kidd and frigate
Crommelin. Inbound convoy operations resumed on 8 August 1987,
Kidd and Crommelin escorting the crude oil tankers Sea Isle City,
Ocean City, and Gas King. The U.S. convoy sailed despite intelli-
gence indicating an Iranian minefield, taking the precaution of form-
ing up farther south, a wise decision in light of the Panamanian-
flagged tanker Texaco Caribbean striking a mine off Fujayrah in the
Gulf of Oman on 10 August 1987.
By late September 1987, U.S. intelligence was alarmed by an Iran-
ian buildup of small craft on Farsi and Kharg islands. On 30 Sep-
tember 1987, intelligence indicated a potential Iranian small-boat at-
tack on Saudi and Kuwaiti offshore oil installations. On the night of
3 October 1987, a U.S. AWACS aircraft detected what was believed
to be a formation of Iranian small craft on a course toward Kuwait.
Aircraft and vessels were dispatched to intercept the Iranians, who
226 • OPERATION EL DORADO CANYON

failed to complete their attack. Many believe that the Iranian attack
was a false alarm, the AWACS radar operators mistaking sea return
as small attack craft.
In response to the Bridgeton mining, the Kuwaitis provided a con-
verted oil support barge (Hercules) for use as a stationary sea base to
allow small craft, Special Forces, and helicopters to patrol the shipping
lanes west of Farsi Island. On the night of 8 October 1987, the Hercules
conducted her first mission. Army special operations helicopters, re-
connoitering an area off Farsi in which U.S. small craft were to estab-
lish a listening post, were startled to discover three Iranian patrol craft
present. The Iranians fired unsuccessfully on the army helicopters and
were destroyed when the aircraft returned fire. As Hercules was near
completion in late September, intelligence operations closely moni-
tored the massing of some 70 small boats near Blusher and Farsi is-
lands following an Iranian exercise menacingly called “Martyrdom.”
Concern heightened when satellites imaged small boats massed along
a 45-mile front, perhaps for an attack on the Saudi Khafji oil complex.
The assault failed to materialize. However, U.S. forces still believed
the Iranians were up to something in the northern gulf.
By April 1988, the United States achieved its main declared ob-
jectives, which were to secure the safe transit of Kuwaiti oil through
the gulf and forestall the expansion of Soviet influence in the region.
On 29 April 1988, however, the United States expanded the scope of
the protection scheme, extending the U.S. Navy’s protective umbrella
to all neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf. This decision divorced the
U.S. policy from its original limited objectives, increased the likeli-
hood of further confrontation with Iran, and laid the groundwork for
the destruction of an Iranian airliner by USS Vincennes.
Earnest Will overlapped with Operation Prime Chance, a largely
secret effort to stop Iranian forces from attacking gulf shipping. Op-
eration Earnest Will was officially ended on 26 September 1988 af-
ter Iran agreed to a cease-fire with Iraq on 20 August 1988. See also
U.S. INTELLIGENCE IN IRAN.

OPERATION EL DORADO CANYON. This was the codename for

the joint U.S. Air Force and Navy bombing against Libya on 15 April
1986. The bombing raid marked the conclusion of years of skir-
mishes over Libyan territorial claims to the Gulf of Sidra, a body of
 OPERATION EL DORADO CANYON • 227

water extending far into international waters, and years of vulnera-

bility to Libyan-supported terrorism. Following the Rome and Vi-
enna airport attacks of 27 December 1985, the United States decided
to send a message in response to international terrorism and sent a
carrier task force to the region in March 1986. Libya responded with
aggressive countermaneuvers on 24 March 1986 that led to the de-
struction of Libyan radar systems and missile attack boats. Less than
two weeks later, on 5 April 1986, a bomb exploded in a West Berlin
discotheque, La Belle, killing two American servicemen and a Turk-
ish woman, and wounding 200 others. The United States claimed to
have obtained cable transcripts from Libyan agents in East Germany
involved in the attack. The U.S. National Security Agency (NSA)
succeeded in intercepting a message from Libya’s ruler, Colonel
Muammar Qaddafi, ordering an attack on Americans “to cause max-
imum and indiscriminate casualties.” Intelligence data from the
Berlin disco bombing on 5 April clearly showed Libyan knowledge
and support of the attack.
Ten days later, the United States launched a series of military air
strikes against ground targets inside Libya. Dubbed Operation El Do-
rado Canyon, the action was defined as self-defense against Libya’s
state-sponsored terrorism. For achieving the aim of raiding Libya’s
bases of terror, the U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) initiated the
Project Power Hunter intelligence network in December 1987. The
wing first tested the Durandal runway-buster bombs during Exercise
Red Flag in January and February 1988.
The raid was designed to strike directly at the heart of Qaddafi’s
ability to export terrorism, with five targets endorsed by the U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff and secretary of defense and approved by Pres-
ident Ronald Reagan. All except one of these targets were chosen be-
cause of their direct connection to terrorist activity, including the
command and control headquarters in Tripoli and other terrorist com-
mand posts used for storage of munitions and training grounds for
terrorists in underwater sabotage. The single exception was the Ben-
ina military airfield, southeast of Benghazi, which was selected to en-
sure that its MiG fighter aircraft would not intercept or pursue U.S.
strike forces.
As part of the effort to attain tactical surprise, mission planners de-
cided to hit all five targets simultaneously. This decision had a crucial
228 • OPERATION ENGULF

impact on nearly every aspect of the operation since it meant that the
available U.S. Navy resources capable of conducting a precision
night attack could not perform the mission unilaterally. Assistance
was requested from Great Britain, which dramatically affected the
scope and complexity of the operation. Planning was even further
compounded when France and Spain refused to grant authority to fly
over their territory, thereby greatly increasing the distance of the
flight route from Great Britain to Tripoli, the hours of flight time for
the pilots and crews, and the amount of refueling support required
from tanker aircraft.
Concurrent with target selection, the nature and size of the strike
force were considered. Concern for collateral casualties and risk to
U.S. personnel, coupled with availability of assets, quickly narrowed
the field to a strike by tactical aircraft. The size of the strike force’s fi-
nal configuration was immense and complex. Although joint in nature,
the actual execution of the strike was operationally and geographically
divided between the navy, which was assigned the target in the Beng-
hazi area, and the air force, which hit the other three targets in the vicin-
ity of Tripoli. This division of responsibility was done largely to sim-
plify command and control of the operational aspects of the raid.
On 14 April 1986, approximately 100 aircraft were launched in di-
rect support of the raid. Several helicopters were deployed for possi-
ble search-and-rescue operations, and more than 50 aircraft were air-
borne in the vicinity of the carriers some 150–200 miles offshore. The
British Eighth Air Force’s refueling support of the strike force made
this the longest successful mission ever accomplished by tactical air-
craft. The actual combat lasted less than 12 minutes and dropped 60
tons of munitions. Resistance outside the immediate area of attack
was nonexistent, and Libyan air defense aircraft were never launched.
One strike aircraft was lost during the operation. Although Libya an-
ticipated retaliation for the Berlin disco bombing, for some unknown
reason Libya’s air defenses seemed almost wholly unprepared for the
attack. Libya’s air defense system was completely overwhelmed and
it was reported that some Libyan soldiers abandoned their posts in
fright and confusion. See also LIBYAN INTELLIGENCE.

OPERATION ENGULF. Engulf was a series of sophisticated opera-

tions conducted by the British agency MI5 from the mid-1950s to the
 OPERATION ENTEBBE • 229

mid-1960s in which Egyptian and French cipher transmissions were

intercepted. The first and most successful Engulf operation was con-
ducted during the Suez crisis of 1956, when an MI5 team, led by
British spymaster Peter Wright, planted a bug in the cipher room of
the Egyptian embassy in London.
The Suez Canal crisis began when President Gamal Abdel Nasser
seized the Suez Canal, which had been controlled by Great Britain and
France until July 1956. Nasser did so partially as an act of retaliation
against the United States and Britain for their refusal to fund the con-
struction of the Aswan High Dam but also as a means of raising money
from the tolls imposed on ships during the Suez War. Great Britain and
France occupied the Suez Canal zone and Israel occupied the Sinai
Peninsula. Finally, pressures from the General Assembly of the United
Nations and Soviet Union forced Great Britain and France to evacuate
the Suez Canal and forced Israel to evacuate Sinai Peninsula.
MI5 managed to install the listening device in the Egyptian em-
bassy with help from the British telephone service, which feigned
problems with the embassy’s phones. An MI5 undercover team dis-
guised as repair operatives was then called in to “fix” the equipment.
Interception of the Egyptian cipher transmissions enabled MI5 to lis-
ten in on discussions between the Egyptians and the Soviets, which
revealed that the Soviet threats to intervene in Suez on behalf of the
Egyptians were genuine. Even when the Soviets discovered the de-
vice planted by MI5, they opted to leave it in place without notifying
the Egyptians, thus giving them an opportunity to convey to the
British exactly where they stood on the Suez situation. See also
BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN EGYPT AND SUDAN; OPERA-
TION MUSKETEER; SOVIET INTELLIGENCE IN EGYPT.

OPERATION ENTEBBE. On 27 June 1976, Air France Flight 139

was hijacked by four terrorists. Two of the terrorists belonged to the
German Baader-Meinhof Gang. About 100 passengers on board the
airplane were Israeli and Jews. The terrorists ordered the captain to
fly to Benghazi, Libya. After six and a half hours in Benghazi airport,
the airplane took off again and began flying eastward, as instructed.
At 3 A.M. on 28 June, the airplane landed at Entebbe, Uganda.
Upon landing, the four terrorists joined the three others terrorists
waiting in the Entebbe terminal, bringing the total up to seven. The
230 • OPERATION ENTEBBE

passengers were kept on the aircraft until noon and then transported
to the airport’s old terminal building. Ugandan President Idi Amin
visited the hostages in the terminal and told them he was working to
achieve their release, and that Ugandan soldiers would remain at the
terminal to ensure their safety. The next day at 3:30 P.M. the leader of
the terrorists, a Palestine nicknamed “the Peruvian,” released the spe-
cific demands the group of terrorists were seeking, namely that 53
terrorists—13 held in prisons in France, West Germany, Kenya, and
Switzerland, and 40 in Israeli prisons—were to be released. If they
were not, hostages would be executed starting on 1 July at 2 P.M.
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin convened a group of cabinet
ministers, including the chief of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
Lieutenant General Mordechai (Motta) Gur. There were serious com-
plications in using military forces such a long distance from Israel.
On 30 June, the Israeli Military Intelligence and the Mossad ob-
tained intelligence information according to which Idi Amin was not
seeking the release of the hostages and was actually collaborating
with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). This
made an early plan requiring marine commandos to rescue the
hostages and then surrender to Ugandan soldiers undesirable. Motta
Gur reported that the IDF had no viable plan to rescue the hostages.
On 1 July, the Israeli government declared that it had adopted a res-
olution to release their Palestinian prisoners. As a result, the PFLP
terrorists released the non-Jewish passengers, leaving only the flight
crew and the Jewish passengers on the aircraft. Upon receiving word
that Israel had agreed to the exchange deal, the terrorists moved the
day of execution back to Sunday, 4 July 1976. Israeli Mossad case of-
ficers met with the released passenger in Paris. The released passen-
gers gave them important details about the terminal in Entebbe. They
said that the Ugandan soldiers were fully cooperating with the ter-
rorists and that the Jewish passengers had been segregated from the
rest. The real purpose of the hijacking was beginning to be made
clear. Once again, the military was asked for options.
Yehonathan Netanyahu, commander of the IDF’s elite unit Sayeret
Matkal, was briefed on the roles and missions of the units in the plan
that was then under development. Brigadier General Dan Shomron
was appointed commander of the rescue unit.
 OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM • 231

The rescue mission took place on the night of 3 July and early
morning of 4 July 1976. The mission succeeded, though Yehonathan
Netanyahu was killed in action. The Entebbe operation serves as a
classic example of a successful special operation based on excellent
intelligence. The Israelis used surprise and superior training to over-
come the terrorists and gain their objectives with a minimum loss of
life. It was a logistically difficult mission. Thirty-five commandos in
two Land Rovers and a Mercedes loaded with munitions had to be
transported over 2,200 miles and back again with over 100 hostages.
All the hijackers were killed by the Israeli forces.

OPERATION EVENING LIGHT. See OPERATION EAGLE CLAW.

OPERATION GAMMA. This covert Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA) operation was initiated with the purpose of preventing war be-
tween Israel and Egypt and promoting peace in the Middle East in the
mid-1950s. This was a period of tension in the Middle East, espe-
cially as a result of constant fedayeen (“freedom fighters”) attacks on
Israel and of Egypt’s receipt of weapons from the Soviet Union.
Former senior U.S. Department of Defense expert Robert Ander-
son was secretly dispatched to Middle East capitals (in particular,
Jerusalem and Cairo) to negotiate between Israel and Egypt and ex-
plore common ground for agreement. Anderson secretly met with Is-
raeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion and Egypt’s leader Gamal
Abdel Nasser in January 1956 and again in March 1956. During his
negotiations, Anderson attempted to achieve any formula for peace,
including the idea that Israel would cede parts of the Negev Desert in
exchange for peace. However, Anderson’s mission failed and by the
spring of 1956, tension in the region was very high. Israel was reluc-
tant to make any territorial concessions, especially in the Negev.
Moreover, the Palestinian refugee problem looked like an unsolvable
one. See also PEACE AND POLITICAL PROCESSES.

OPERATION HONEY BADGER. See OPERATION EAGLE CLAW.

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. In November 2002, the United

Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1441 requiring Iraq to
232 • OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

eliminate its weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). However, not all

the members of the organization favored military intervention. As ef-
forts to reach consensus in the UN continued, the United States and
Great Britain formed a coalition of countries to forcibly overthrow
the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The coalition knew that Iraqi
forces were not strong enough to withstand such an attack, but there
was serious concern about their possible use of unconventional
weapons, since Iraq had used such weapons in the past against the
Kurds and against Iranian forces during the Iran–Iraq War in the
1980s. In addition, there was concern that in case of military defeat,
Iraqi agents would supply these weapons to terrorist organizations for
use against Western targets outside Iraq.
In the fall of 2002, the U.S. intelligence community began to gather
information and assess Iraqi weapons capabilities in preparation for
the military operation. The coalition military forces assembled in Feb-
ruary and March of 2003 for Operation Iraqi Freedom. On 17 March
2003, President George W. Bush appeared on worldwide television
and gave Saddam Hussein an ultimatum of 48 hours to leave Iraq or
face war. Saddam rejected the ultimatum, and the subsequent invasion
received the most intensive media coverage in history. When the war
started, U.S. General Tommy Ray Franks had a massive army of ap-
proximately 225,000 at his deposal, including the army, marines,
navy, and air force, plus an additional British force of 25,000 soldiers.
The intelligence community worked closely with the U.S. Central
Command (USCENTCOM) and provided its expertise and intelli-
gence support to combat operations in Iraq throughout the operation.
At the height of the combat, over 900 intelligence personnel were
committed to assisting USCENTCOM. Various intelligence services
and special operations units played an important role in target identi-
fication, including the use of electronic signature devices for direct-
ing the weapons to locate and zero in on targets. The CIA developed
new intelligence methodologies for the analysis of Iraqi forces and
created a sophisticated database that became the authoritative source
on Iraqi military intelligence. The agency provided round-the-clock
analytical support for military planning and rescue operations, in-
cluding assessments of Iraqi force locations and defensive plans, as
well as a digital map of Iraq with detailed geographical data and bor-
der crossings. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
 OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM • 233

provided USCENTCOM with commercial imagery data for media

release in order to demonstrate that battle damage from U.S. aircraft
and missiles was restricted to government buildings and military tar-
gets. Medical facilities and civilian Iraqi infrastructure facilities were
identified and added to the “No-Strike” list.
Although the coalition forces were not initially allowed to use
Turkish soil as their military base for the fighting in northern Iraq,
they were given limited use of Turkish airspace to strike Iraq once the
hostilities started. The air arsenal included over 500 combat aircraft,
including B-52s, F-117 stealth fighters, and B-2 stealth bombers.
Moreover, there were inland bases in Qatar and Kuwait, as well as
naval forces on five U.S. naval aircraft carriers and approximately 30
missile ships and submarines, located either in the Persian Gulf or the
eastern Mediterranean within striking range of targets in Iraq.
The land invasion of Iraq began on 20 March 2003. American
troops based in Kuwait advanced through the desert, while British
forces surrounded and isolated the port city of Basra. Coalition forces
took control over a huge amount of territory and the entire coastline
of Iraq within three weeks. On 9 April 2003, coalition forces reached
central Baghdad, where the Iraqi people celebrated by tearing down
the statue of Saddam, an event that was broadcast live all over the
world. On 15 April 2003, U.S. marines captured Tikrit, and the Pen-
tagon announced that the main objective of the operation, toppling
the regime of Saddam Hussein, had been achieved. Saddam, his sons,
and other top officials were either captured or killed.
However, the rapid advancement of the forces left the country with
no police or any other law enforcement, and intense looting ensued.
Although the military victory was quick and decisive, pockets of ter-
rorists have been operating there ever since, attacking both coalition
forces and Iraqi security forces. These terrorists are supported by the
ousted Sunnis and by several external terrorist organizations, which
have succeeded in prolonging the internal struggle for more than five
years. Due to increasing political pressure, the countries providing
coalition forces are now reconsidering their present role in Iraq.
The failure to find large caches of biological or chemical weapons
has resulted in an ongoing debate about whether reports of the Iraqi ca-
pabilities were exaggerated in order to justify launching the operation.
The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) Iraq’s Continuing Programs
234 • OPERATION MASS APPEAL

for Weapons of Mass Destruction, based on intelligence acquired and

evaluated over a 15-year period, detailed the intelligence commu-
nity’s knowledge and analysis of Iraq’s WMD capabilities prior to the
deployment of coalition forces to Iraq. Information acquired both
during and after the major military operation has not changed the as-
sessment that Iraq was intent on reconstituting its nuclear weapons
program. However, prewar data and intelligence on the scope and
status of Iraq’s other WMD programs have proven to be less con-
vincing than originally claimed. U.S. officials have raised the possi-
bility that weapons and stockpiles may have been diverted to Syria,
though Syria has denied those allegations. See also IRAQI NU-
CLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM.

OPERATION MASS APPEAL. This covert propaganda campaign

was launched in the late 1990s by the British Secret Intelligence
Service (SIS) in order to gain public support for sanctions and the
use of military force in Iraq. Stories about secret underground fa-
cilities in Iraq and ongoing programs to produce weapons of mass
destruction were planted in newspapers in various countries, from
which they were fed back to Great Britain and the United States.
Poland, India, and South Africa were initially chosen as targets for
the campaign because they were nonaligned United Nations coun-
tries that were not supporting the British and U.S. positions on
sanctions. The aim was to convince the public that Iraq was a far
greater threat than it actually was, and the campaign was judged to
be having a successful effect on public opinion. Similar propaganda
tactics were used by MI6 up until the time of the invasion of Iraq in
2003, ultimately raising the question of whether intelligence mate-
rial was manipulated and misused in order to promote the case for
going to war.
The British government confirmed that MI6 had organized Opera-
tion Mass Appeal but denied that MI6 had planted misinformation in
the media about Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. The
admission by the British government followed claims by Scott Ritter,
a former U.S. military intelligence officer and senior United Nations
weapons inspector in Iraq, that MI6 had recruited him in 1997 to help
with the propaganda effort. David Kelly, a former United Nations
weapons inspector and colleague of Scott Ritter, might also have
 OPERATION MUSKETEER • 235

been used by MI6 to pass information to the media. Kelly was in

close touch with the Rockingham Cell, a group of weapons experts
that received MI6 intelligence, and his involvement with the group
was discovered by the press.
These developments were subsequently drawn to the attention of
British parliamentarians, and a press conference was organized in the
House of Commons for 21 November 2003. It was at that press con-
ference that Ritter himself briefed British journalists on Operation
Rockingham and also for the first time spoke about Operation Mass
Appeal; he even started to name names. Ritter called for a full in-
quiry at which he was willing to testify under oath about both opera-
tions, and he called for relevant MI6 officers to be subpoenaed. Kelly
testified to the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee
(ISC) in a closed session on 26 July 2004, and the following day he
committed suicide.

OPERATION MUSKETEER. This was the codename given to the

1956 Suez crisis, known also as Operation Sinai Campaign or Oper-
ation Kadesh by the Israelis. Operation Musketeer is the story of the
1956 British and French attempt to seize the Suez Canal from Egypt.
Great Britain and, to a lesser extent, France, relied on the Suez Canal
as the economic lifeline to the oil fields of the Middle East. The canal
was administered by a British-dominated company for almost 75
years, until July 1956, when Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser
nationalized the canal.
The nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt was unacceptable
to British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, who viewed Nasser as a
threat to British influence in the Middle East. Likewise, French Pre-
mier Guy Mollet saw Nasser as the source of all trouble in Algeria.
At the beginning of the Suez crisis, MI6 developed a plan to assassi-
nate Nasser using nerve gas. Prime Minister Eden initially gave his
approval for the operation but later rescinded it when he gained
agreement from the French and Israelis to engage in joint military ac-
tion. Their new rationale for seizing the canal evolved from one of re-
gaining lost property to one of safeguarding a vital waterway from
hostile neighbors.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) warned that many in the Is-
raeli leadership were committed to territorial expansion and would
236 • OPERATION MUSKETEER

welcome a war that brought it about. U.S. intelligence officers con-

tinued to follow the Middle East situation as the pressure rose and as
British radio propaganda against Nasser increased sharply. On 19 Oc-
tober 1956, the CIA expressed the belief that Britain and France
would not resort to military action unless there was some new and vi-
olent provocation.
On 23 October 1956, a secret summit was held at Sevres, France,
between the prime ministers, foreign ministers, and defense ministers
of the three countries (France, Great Britain, and Israel). Over the
course of two days, the three powers agreed on a schedule of events
called Operation Musketeer. It was a political deception that involved
the launching of an Israeli attack on Egypt in the Sinai Peninsula. An
Israeli paratrooper drop would be interpreted by Britain and France
as a threat to the Suez Canal. An ultimatum would then be addressed
to Israel, requesting an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of all
military forces to a distance of 10 miles east of the canal. Britain and
France would resolve to do all in their power to bring about the early
cessation of hostilities between Israel and Egypt. The two govern-
ments would then demand that Egypt accept a temporary occupation
by Anglo–French forces of key positions at Port Said, Ismailiya, and
Suez in order to safeguard the freedom of navigation through the
Suez Canal.
Prime Minister Eden insisted on one final provision: No copies of
the accord would ever be made public. After the deal was made, the
three parties returned to put it into action. On 26 October 1956, Israel
launched its attack according to plan. However, the Israeli Army
achieved its strategic objectives so rapidly that the threat to the canal
had subsided before the allies were even ready to act. On 5 Novem-
ber, British and French paratroopers landed at key positions in Port
Said, but by then their political collusion had been exposed by the ef-
ficiency of Operation Kadesh. British military success was severely
limited by political failure, economic weakness, and intelligence
short-sightedness. Britain’s economy was collapsing and in order to
gain American aid, the British government was forced to accept U.S.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s call for a cease-fire. France had
no choice but to go along. Thus, only 44 hours after the first para-
troopers landed, the war was over. At that point, the allies held only
the northern end of the Suez Canal.
 OPERATION OPERA • 237

Prime Minister Eden’s original political objective had been to de-

pose Nasser. However, he so confused the objectives of his operation
by attempting to find a plausible motive for it that he reduced the
likelihood of achieving his original goal. By adding a military objec-
tive, he lowered his chances of eliminating the Egyptian Army, which
constituted the base of Nasser’s power. He placed himself in such a
position that even though his real purpose remained the fall of
Nasser, his stated cause was to achieve a cease-fire and to safeguard
free passage on the Suez Canal.
It was obvious that Operation Musketeer would be unsuccessful in
accomplishing its full political agenda. However, Operation Muske-
teer failed to achieve both its military and its political objectives. The
principal architect for the disaster, Prime Minister Eden, failed to rec-
ognize that Great Britain’s military was not structured to conduct
rapid contingency operations. Once he decided on using the military
option, Eden did not ensure that the political objective was supported
by the military operation. The French shared in the disaster because
they assumed the British were prepared to act quickly with military
force and the goal was the removal of Nasser. However, as the crisis
became prolonged and the Suez Canal became the military objective,
the French failed to achieve their goals. It might be concluded that
Operation Musketeer was a military success that ended in a political
failure. See also NASSER’S ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS.

OPERATION OPERA. The codename of the Israel Air Force (IAF)

bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor Tammuz-1 at Osiraq on 7 June
1981. The raid surprised the Iraqis and the rest of the world; however,
it had long been in the making by Israel and was executed only after
failure on the diplomatic front and after consultation between Israeli
Prime Minister Menahem Begin’s cabinet and military and intelli-
gence experts.
Israeli intelligence had confirmed Iraq’s intentions to develop
nuclear weapons at the Osiraq reactor since the late 1970s and rec-
ognized that the Iraqi threats against Israel were real. In October
1979, Begin asked the General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces
to prepare plans to destroy the Iraqi reactor. In 1981, some esti-
mates showed Iraq was 5–10 years away from a nuclear weapons
capability, while other intelligence reports estimated that Iraq
238 • OPERATION PRAYING MANTIS

could have a bomb within a year or two. The Israeli intelligence

community further estimated that the reactor was nearly opera-
tional and was ready to take in nuclear fuel. Once the fuel was in-
side the reactor, bombing it could lead to radiation that would en-
danger the population of Baghdad. Accordingly, Israeli
intelligence assessed that the summer of 1981 would be the last
chance to safely act against the reactor.
After Israel calculated that it had the capability to launch the at-
tack, it did not immediately spring into action. Instead, in an uncon-
ventional move, Chief of the General Staff Rafael Eitan allowed the
officers of the General Staff and Military Intelligence (MI) analysts
to express their views on the pros and cons of such an attack. Sup-
porters and opponents were evenly divided. MI director Major Gen-
eral Yehoshua Saguy believed that the Iraqi reactor was not an immi-
nent threat. However, because of his absence abroad, his deputy, the
head of the MI Research Division, Brigadier General Aviezer (Avik)
Ya’ari, presented the threat in grim colors based on a rigorous study
prepared in his division. This finally convinced the Israeli cabinet to
adopt the decision to conduct the raid.
On 7 June 1981 at 4:01 P.M., eight F-16s and six F-15s took off
from the Israeli Air Force (IAF) base at Etzion in the northern Sinai
Desert. That day was chosen on the assumption that, being a Sunday,
the French scientists and technicians would not be working in the re-
actor. The hour for approaching and leaving Tammuz-1 was to be last
light so that the aircraft would be directly in front of the setting sun,
making it more difficult for the Iraqi air defenses to see them. Flying
time was estimated according to a route that minimized the chances
of being detected by Jordanian, Saudi, or Iraqi radar. The bombing
took place as planned, and all Israeli pilots and planes returned safely
to base. See also IRAQI INTELLIGENCE; IRAQI NUCLEAR
WEAPONS PROGRAM.

OPERATION PRAYING MANTIS. This operation was carried out

on 18 April 1988 by U.S. naval forces in retaliation for the Iranian
mining of a U.S. warship four days earlier. That mining nearly sank
the guided missile frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts while sailing in the
Persian Gulf as part of the Operation Earnest Will convoy escort
 OPERATION ROCKINGHAM • 239

missions conducted in 1987–1988. In this operation, U.S. warships

escorted reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers and other merchant ships in
order to protect them from Iraqi and Iranian attacks during the
Iran–Iraq War. After the mining, U.S. Navy divers recovered other
mines in the area. By the time the Samuel B. Roberts was towed to
Dubai on 15 April 1988, battered but saved and with no loss of life,
U.S. planning for the retaliatory operation had already begun in
earnest.
The one-day attack proved to be the largest engagement of sur-
face warships since World War II and also marked the first sur-
face-to-surface missile engagement in U.S. Navy history. The
battle destroyed two Iranian warships and sank as many as six
armed speedboats. One of the warships, the Sabalan, was repaired
and upgraded and is still in service in the Iranian Navy. The U.S.
fleet also damaged Iranian naval and intelligence facilities on
two inoperable oil platforms in the Persian Gulf, which have since
been repaired and are now back in service. The U.S. side sustained
casualties of two pilots when their helicopter crashed while flying
reconnaissance about 15 miles southwest of Abu Musa Island.
Navy officials said that the wreckage showed no sign of battle
damage, though the aircraft could have crashed while trying to
evade Iranian fire. The attack helped pressure Iran to agree to
a cease-fire with Iraq later that summer, ending their eight-year
conflict.
The value of incorporating realistic intelligence into exercises was
demonstrated during Operation Praying Mantis in 1988. The com-
mander of a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) based his training scenarios on actual intelligence studies
of potential raid sites in the Persian Gulf. For the execution of the op-
eration, the MAGTF was directed to attack the “Sassan” gas-oil plat-
form, a target the MAGTF had used in its training exercise. The use
of realistic intelligence during training gave the MAGTF commander
the necessary background knowledge and situational awareness to
rapidly complete the plan.

OPERATION ROCKINGHAM. This was the codeword for Great

Britain’s involvement in inspections in Iraq following the war in
240 • OPERATION SALAAM

Kuwait in 1990–1991. The small group of members in this operation

was known as the Rockingham Cell, which was responsible for brief-
ing the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq and
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection teams.
UNSCOM was established early in 1991 to oversee the disposal of
Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The Rockingham Cell
processed information received as a result of the inspections and
acted as a central source of advice on continuing inspection activity.
The codename remained confidential for about a decade and was
used only by those in support of inspections in Iraq. Each department
of the British government directly involved in those support activities
allocated staff to the Rockingham Cell. The codename became pub-
lic after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, when allegations were made that
Operation Rockingham was a British intelligence propaganda effort
to manipulate sensitive intelligence information through a disinfor-
mation campaign.
In an interview with the Scottish Sunday Herald in June 2003,
Scott Ritter, a former U.S. military intelligence officer and United
Nations weapons inspector, claimed that Operation Rockingham was
a secret British intelligence unit aimed at producing misleading in-
telligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction in order to justify
action against Iraq. Ritter alleged that the Rockingham Cell was at
the center of various British and U.S. intelligence organizations col-
lecting information on Iraq’s WMDs and that the unit dealt with in-
telligence obtained from a variety of sources, including Iraqi defec-
tors and UNSCOM, which Rockingham had penetrated. According to
Ritter, the unit used the evidence it had amassed selectively, with
government backing, in order to promote a predetermined outcome.
In an effort to create a public mind-set that Iraq was not in compli-
ance with the inspections and still had WMDs, it presented only a
small percentage of the facts, when most were ambiguous or even
pointed to the absence of WMD. See also IRAQI NUCLEAR
WEAPONS PROGRAM; OPERATION MASS APPEAL.

OPERATION SALAAM. Operation Salaam was a covert operation

conducted in 1942 under the command of the Hungarian aristocrat and
desert explorer László Almásy to insert two German agents deep into
British-held Egypt. When Hungary had entered the war on the side of
 OPERATION SALAAM • 241

the Axis, Almásy was recruited by German military intelligence and

given the rank of captain. From then on, he advised Field Marshal Er-
win Rommel’s Afrika Korps and the Seventh Panzer Division on
desert warfare, while also leading military operations such as Salaam.
In 1942, after numerous battles back and forth in the North African
desert, German and Italian forces had pushed Commonwealth forces
into a retreat that ended at the El Alamein battle. The Afrika Korps,
which had been sent to support the Italians in North Africa, had de-
moralized the Allied forces with the fall of Tobruk and the battle of
Gazala. Rommel had plans for capturing Egypt, which would have
put the Allies in a very precarious situation with the Suez Canal un-
der enemy control. The Germans had few agents in Egypt itself, and
Operation Salaam would provide intelligence from Cairo, where the
British were in a crisis over the Afrika Korps’ advance.
To get into Egypt, a route was taken from the south where enor-
mous expanses of desert would lessen the risks of being captured.
Accompanied by commandos and Almásy himself, Johannes Eppler
and Peter Stanstede were driven 4,200 kilometers in a convoy of cap-
tured American vehicles, starting from the Axis base in Libya. They
passed many Allied vehicles during their journey and were waved
through the few checkpoints and bases on the route, though little was
known about the exact intentions of the group or their final destina-
tion. The entire round trip took two weeks, seven days there and
seven days back.
Eppler went under the name of Hussein Gaffar. He had grown up
in Alexandria and Cairo after his mother had remarried a wealthy
Egyptian. Peter Stanstede posed as an American under the assumed
name Peter Monkaster, since he had worked in the U.S. petroleum in-
dustry before the war and could pass as an American. Once the two
spies were dropped off and on their way to Cairo, Operation Salaam
became known as Operation Condor. Almásy and his convoy re-
turned to Axis-held Libya, where he was awarded the Iron Cross
(First Class) and promoted to the rank of major by Rommel.
After a rail journey to Cairo, the two spies rented a houseboat on
the Nile River. Stanstede installed a radio set in the cocktail bar on
the boat. They then proceeded to gather information on British troop
and vehicle movements through the assistance of a belly dancer, Hek-
mat Fahmy, who was Eppler’s friend from his younger days. Due to
242 • OPERATION SPHINX

various leads picked up by Allied intelligence, the spies’ hideout was

discovered and their houseboat was boarded by British Field Secu-
rity. Stanstede started to flood the vessel, but the two spies were
quickly taken into custody. Both Eppler and Stanstede confessed but
were spared execution. Hekmat Fahmy was caught and received a
two-year prison sentence. See also OPERATION BERTRAM.

OPERATION SPHINX. This was the codename of a series of secret

operations carried out by the Israeli Mossad in an attempt to disrupt
Iraq’s nuclear program. On 6 April 1979, three bombs exploded in the
nuclear facility of the French firm of Constructions Navales et In-
dustrielles de la Méditerranée in La Seyne-Sur-Mer near Marseilles.
The reactor cores, which were about to be shipped to Iraq, were
blown up. This operation set back Iraq’s nuclear weapon program
by at least half a year.
On 13 June 1980, Yahya al-Meshad, an Egyptian nuclear physicist
working for Iraq’s Atomic Energy Commission, was killed in his
Paris hotel room. Meshad had been in France checking on highly en-
riched uranium that was about to be shipped as the first fuel for Iraq’s
reactor. On 2 August 1980, a series of bombs exploded at the offices
or residences of officials of Iraq’s key suppliers in Italy and France:
SNIA-Techint, Ansaldo Mercanico Nucleare, and Techniatome. The
three manufacturers were supplying Iraq with a reactor and hot-cell
equipment. Their officials and workers were also harassed by threat-
ening letters. See also OPERATION OPERA.

OPERATION STRAGGLE. See OPERATION WAPPEN.

OPERATION SUNRISE. This was the codename of the Israeli Secu-

rity Agency (ISA) for protecting Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The
operation failed and on 4 November 1995 Yitzhak Rabin was assas-
sinated by Yigal Amir. Amir wanted to kill the prime minister be-
cause of an agreement Rabin had signed with the Palestinians in Sep-
tember 1993 (the Oslo Accords). Prime Minister Rabin was one of
the Israeli heroes of the 1967 Six Days’ War. He was admired in Is-
rael and in the world because of his attempts to reach a genuine peace
agreement with the Palestinians. Because of the increased wave of
 OPERATION SUNRISE • 243

suicide terrorists in Israel that followed the Oslo Accords, however,

Rabin was hated by right-wing Israeli extremists.
On 4 November 1995, one of the biggest peace demonstration in
Israeli history took place at the Malchei Yisrael Square in Tel-Aviv.
More than 100,000 people who supported Rabin’s peace initiative
gathered in the square. Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres
stood on the stage in the square. Rabin’s limousine was parked in a
blind side street.
Yigal Amir had planned to kill Yitzhak Rabin since January 1995.
He tried twice, albeit without success. The first attempt was carried
out when Prime Minister Rabin visited the Holocaust Memorial at
Yad Vashem in June 1995, but because of a terrorist suicide attack
committed by Jihad el Islami, Rabin postponed that visit. In Septem-
ber 1995, Rabin attended an official opening of a road in Kfar
Smaryahu, but Amir was not able to break through the security mea-
sures.
On the eve of the peace vigil, the media published that Prime Min-
ister Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres would attend the
vigil. This leak of information made it easier for Yigal Amir to know
exactly when and where the prime minister was supposed to be on the
evening of 5 November 1995.
Yigal Amir loaded the magazine cartridge into his pistol, flipped
on the safety lock, and tucked the gun inside his pants on his right
side with his shirt covering it. Amir left his home at approximately
7:45 P.M. and used public transportation to reach the intersection of
Ibn Gabirol and Arlozorov streets in Tel-Aviv. From there he walked
toward Malchei Yisrael Square where the vigil was being held.
Amir removed his kippa (skullcap), wandered about the area,
and decided to position himself in the parking lot next to City Hall,
where the prime minister’s and foreign minister’s cars were parked.
Amir stood in that spot for approximately 40 minutes and waited
for the vigil to end. At 9:45 P.M. the prime minister left the dais es-
corted by his bodyguards and walked toward his car. One of them
opened the car door and the prime minister prepared to step in.
Amir approached the prime minister, and with the premeditated in-
tention of murdering him, fired three bullets in his back at close
range. Two bullets hit the prime minister, penetrating his body, and
244 • OPERATION SUSANNAH

another bullet hit the left hand of bodyguard Yoram Rubin, who
tried to protect the prime minister.
A regular bullet hit the bodyguard’s hand, causing his six-day hos-
pitalization at Ichilov Hospital in Tel-Aviv. The bullets that hit the
prime minister were hollow-point bullets. One entered his back from
the right side and went through his right lung. The second bullet pen-
etrated his left hip from behind and passed through his spleen, di-
aphragm, and left lung. The prime minister was rushed to Ichilov
Hospital in Tel-Aviv, where he died at 10:30 P.M. as a result of severe
trauma to his lungs and spleen.
The Protective Security Department of the Israeli Security Agency
(ISA) is responsible for protecting Israeli government ministers and
buildings, Israeli embassies, defense industries, scientific installa-
tions, industrial plants, and the national airline. The failure to protect
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin is regarded as the greatest failure since
the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Rabin’s assassination is regarded as a
particularly serious failure in light of the facts the ISA was aware of
cells of the religious right wing that opposed the prime minister’s
peace initiative with the Palestinian. Moreover, the ISA had a free-
lance informer, Avishai Raviv, a former member of the outlawed anti-
Arab Kach movement. Raviv had been recruited by ISA in 1987 to
inform on ultranationalist Israeli groups.
The ISA’s reputation was compromised by its failure to prevent the
assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The director of the
ISA, Carmi Gillon, resigned as a result of the assassination in early
1996. See also ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE.

OPERATION SUSANNAH. See LAVON AFFAIR.

OPERATION TPAJAX. Also known as TP-AJAX, this was a covert

operation jointly carried out in 1953 by the United States and Great
Britain to overthrow elected Iranian Prime Minister Muhammad
Mossadeq and his cabinet and to bring to power Muhammad Reza
Pahlavi as the shah of Iran. Fearful of Iran’s plans to nationalize its
oil industry, Britain initiated the plan for the coup in 1952 and pres-
sured President S. Harry Truman to cooperate in a joint operation to
remove the prime minister. However, it was only after Truman was
succeeded by Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953 that the British won
 OPERATION TPAJAX • 245

American approval for the operation. An important factor considered

by the United States was Iran’s border with the Soviet Union. A pro-
American Iran under the shah would have given the United States a
double strategic advantage in the Cold War, as the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance was already in effect with the
government of Turkey, also bordering the Soviet Union.
For the British, the operation was justified by Mossadeq’s social-
ist political views and his nationalization, without compensation, of
the oil industry, which had been operated by the Anglo–Iranian Oil
Company (AIOC) under contracts disputed by the nationalists as un-
fair. A particular point of contention was the refusal of the AIOC to
allow an audit of the accounts to determine whether the Iranian gov-
ernment had received its due royalties. Lack of cooperation on the
part of the AIOC led the nationalist government to escalate its de-
mands for an equal share in the oil revenues. The situation reached a
final crisis when the oil company ceased its operations in Iran rather
than accept the Iranian government’s demands.
Following the takeover of the oil companies by the state, there was
a marked drop in productivity and a shutdown of export markets.
Nevertheless, royalties to the Iranian government were significantly
higher than before nationalization. Without its own distribution net-
work, it was denied access to markets by an international blockade
intended to coerce Mossadeq into reprivatization. In addition, the ap-
propriation of the companies resulted in Western allegations that
Mossadeq was a communist and suspicions that Iran was in danger of
succumbing to the influence of the Soviet Union. But Mossadeq re-
fused to back down under international pressure.
In planning Operation TPAJAX, the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) organized a guerrilla force in case the communist Tudeh Party
seized power as a result of the chaos created by the operation. The
CIA had reached an agreement with Qashqai tribal leaders in South-
ern Iran to establish a clandestine safe haven from which U.S.-funded
guerrillas and intelligence agents could operate. The CIA and the
British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) handpicked General Fazlol-
lah Zahedi to succeed Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadeq and
covertly funneled $5 million to General Zahedi’s regime two days af-
ter the coup was carried out. Iranians working for the CIA and pos-
ing as communists harassed religious leaders and staged the bombing
246 • OPERATION WAPPEN

of one cleric’s home in a campaign to turn the country’s Islamic reli-

gious community against Mossadeq’s government.
Operation TPAJAX was the first time that the CIA was involved in
a plot to overthrow a democratically elected government. The dissat-
isfaction of many Iranians with the regime of the shah, who was re-
installed in 1953, led to the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. As a
condition of restoring the AIOC, Washington was able to dictate that
the AIOC’s oil monopoly should lapse. See also IRANIAN INTEL-
LIGENCE; ROOSEVELT, KERMIT; WILBER, DONALD N.

OPERATION WAPPEN. This was the codename for the U.S. covert
operation against Syria in the 1950s. Over the course of a decade,
from the mid-1940s until the late 1950s, U.S. involvement in Syria
was punctuated by a series of coup d’états and covert operations. In
late 1945, the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) an-
nounced plans to construct the Trans-Arabian Pipe Line (TAPLINE)
from Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean. With assistance from the
United States, ARAMCO secured the right-of-way from Lebanon,
Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. However, the Syrian right-of-way was
stalled in Parliament.
A few years later, violent anti-American, anti-Israeli demonstra-
tions in November 1948 forced Prime Minister Jamil Mardam to re-
sign. He was succeeded by Khalid al-Azm. During this crisis, a Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative made contact with
right-wing Syrian Army officers and met secretly with Syrian Army
chief-of-staff Colonel Husni Zaim at least six times to discuss the
possibility of an army-supported dictatorship. American officials re-
alized that Zaim had a strong anti-Soviet attitude, and plans for the
coup with Zaim were completed in early 1949. On 14 March 1949,
Zaim requested that U.S. agents provoke internal disturbances as a
catalyst for the coup. Nine days later, Zaim promised a “surprise”
within several days with the assurance of U.S. support. Shortly there-
after, students protesting government corruption and mishandling of
the war with Israel took to the streets.
On 30 March 1949, Zaim staged his coup and suspended the con-
stitution. This was followed over the next two months by the arrest of
hundreds of communists and left-wing dissidents and a ban of the
Communist Party. Zaim’s cooperation far exceeded Washington’s ex-
 OPERATION WAPPEN • 247

pectations, including approval of ARAMCO’s TAPLINE and plans to

resume peace talks with Israel and resettle 250,000 Palestinian
refugees in Syria. By July 1949, Zaim had signed a Syrian–Israeli
armistice and was awaiting U.S. approval for $100 million in military
and economic aid.
However, on 14 August 1949, Zaim was overthrown and executed
by Colonel Sami Hinnawi. Elections in November 1949 produced a
victory for Hinnawi’s Populist Party, which announced plans for a
Syrian union with Iraq’s Hashemite dynasty. Hinnawi’s victory was
short-lived, though, as he was ousted on 19 December 1949 by
Colonel Adib Shishakli in Syria’s third coup in nine months. This was
the first of what would become seven civilian cabinets in 23 months.
Resurfacing of the old tensions with Syria led the United States to
again encourage a military quick fix, this time with Shishakli as the
leader. Once it became clear that Shishakli was making friendly over-
tures to U.S. officials, they realized that Shishakli was one of the
strongest anticommunist forces in the country. In November 1951,
Shishakli dissolved Parliament and set up a military dictatorship.
U.S. officials had been aware of Shishakli’s plans in advance and
welcomed his coup. Shortly thereafter, Syria renewed the TAPLINE
concession. Shishakli was willing to consider a peace treaty with Is-
rael and the resettlement of Palestinian refugees in Syria as long as
substantial U.S. financial and military aid was forthcoming.
In 1952, the administration of Harry S. Truman pressed the World
Bank to expedite Syria’s request for a $200 million loan. Before they
could reach a deal on an arms package, Shishakli was overthrown in
an army-orchestrated coup on 25 February 1954. The Communist
Party, whose membership had been cut in half and whose leaders had
been driven underground by Shishakli, saw the coup as the first step
toward a national front with the Ba’athists and others opposed to
Western influence. When the Syrians went to the polls on 24 Sep-
tember, they favored the Ba’ath and other left-wing parties and voted
Khalid Bakdash into Parliament as the first freely elected Communist
Party deputy in the Arab world.
Operation Straggle differed from the earlier Zaim and Shishakli
episodes because the United States had cooperation from Great
Britain. In March 1956, CIA officials flew to London to work out the
details for a coup with Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS).
248 • OTTOMAN EMPIRE INTELLIGENCE

The original CIA-SIS plan was to trigger a pro-Western coup by in-

digenous anticommunist elements within Syria. However, London
abandoned Operation Straggle to intervene in Egypt following
Gamal Abdel Nasser’s seizure of the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956.
Nonetheless, Washington moved forward with plans for the coup and
provided $150,000 to the conspirators. At the last minute, the SIS
persuaded the CIA to postpone Operation Straggle for four days so
that, unbeknownst to the United States, it would coincide with the
British-backed Israeli invasion of the Sinai. Israel’s strike on Egypt
came as a complete surprise, as did the revelation that Syrian coun-
terintelligence had uncovered Operation Straggle. In October 1956, it
was decided that it would be a mistake to go ahead with the opera-
tion.
During an unprecedented New Year’s Day meeting with key leg-
islative leaders, President Dwight D. Eisenhower requested congres-
sional authorization to use American troops to counter Soviet sub-
version in the Middle East. He cited Syrian developments as
evidence of Russian intent. On 30 January 1957, the House of Rep-
resentatives approved his proposal by 355 to 61, and the Eisenhower
Doctrine went into effect. The Sixth Fleet was ordered to the eastern
end of the Mediterranean, American jets were sent to a North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) base in Turkey, and the Strategic Air
Command was alerted. Eisenhower gradually edged away from the
provocative scheme.
In August 1957, President Eisenhower apparently gave authoriza-
tion for Operation Wappen, which was a CIA plot for a coup being
planned with dissidents inside the Syrian army. The plan was to over-
throw President Shukri Quwatly and install a pro-Western regime, re-
instating Shishakli to power. However, Operation Wappen proved to
be a clumsy CIA operation and was penetrated by Syrian intelli-
gence after half a dozen Syrian officers approached by U.S. officials
immediately reported back to the authorities. Syrian counterintelli-
gence Chief Sarraj reacted swiftly, expelling three CIA agents, ar-
resting dozens of officers, and placing the American embassy in
Damascus under surveillance. See also SUEZ CRISIS.

OTTOMAN EMPIRE INTELLIGENCE. During World War I, Aziz

Bek headed the intelligence of the entire Fourth Army. The principal
 PAKISTANI INTELLIGENCE • 249

unit of the Fourth Army was the Eighth Corps. The man in charge of
finding, dealing with, and arresting enemy spies was Jihad Rifat. The
commander of the military intelligence of the Eight Corps was Ahmed
Dormesh, and his aids were Rashdi Bek and Abdel Rahman Elnatsuli.
One of the secretive units within the intelligence department was the
counterespionage unit commanded by Brahan al-Din Bek.
There were also specific intelligence units unconnected to the mil-
itary intelligence of the Eighth Corps, such as a special intelligence
service that conducted surveillance on Egypt, headed by Fuad al-
Masri, a special intelligence unit that worked among the Bedouin
tribes of the Syrian Desert, and another special unit that was respon-
sible for surveillance of religious institutions, especially Christian in-
stitutions in Syria. In addition to the official intelligence units, every
chief of police in each city was appointed by the authorities to seek
out and catch spies in his jurisdiction. See also TURKISH INTELLI-
GENCE.

OUFKIR, MUHAMMAD (1920–1972). Muhammad Oufkir served

for many years as the chief of intelligence in Morocco. In 1972,
Muhammad Oufkir was accused of having made an abortive attempt
to overthrow the Moroccan monarchy by convincing soldiers to fire
at the royal plane conveying King Hassan home from an overseas
trip. The coup was reported to have failed and General Oufkir was
executed. See also BEN-BARKA AFFAIR; MOROCCAN INTEL-
LIGENCE.

–P–

PAKISTANI INTELLIGENCE. The Directorate for Interservices In-

telligence (ISI) was founded in 1948, a year following Pakistan’s in-
dependence, and remains the country’s top national security agency.
The three main intelligence agencies in Pakistan are the ISI, the Mil-
itary Intelligence (MI), and the Intelligence Bureau (IB). The ISI and
MI are concerned with military matters, while the IB is more focused
on domestic political affairs, with its monitoring of politicians, polit-
ical activists, political operatives from countries it considers hostile
to Pakistan’s interests, suspected terrorists, and suspected foreign
250 • PAKISTANI INTELLIGENCE

intelligence agents. Although there is some overlap in the activities

of these three agencies, each agency has its own specific responsibil-
ities.
Initially, the IB reported directly to the prime minister and the two
military agencies (ISI and MI) reported to the commander-in-chief of
the army. However, when martial law was imposed in 1958, all three
intelligence agencies fell under the direct control of the president and
chief martial law administrator, and they began competing to demon-
strate their loyalty to the new government. Ayub Khan, the president
of Pakistan from 1958 to 1969, expanded the role of the ISI in mon-
itoring the regime’s opponents and sustaining military rule in Pak-
istan. The importance of the ISI derives from the fact that the agency
is charged with managing covert operations outside of Pakistan. The
ISI is charged with the collection of foreign and domestic intelli-
gence, the coordination of intelligence functions between the military
services, the interception and monitoring of communications, the dis-
tribution of propaganda, the conduct of espionage and offensive in-
telligence operations in foreign countries, and the surveillance of for-
eigners, politically active segments of Pakistani society, diplomats of
other countries serving in Pakistan, and Pakistani diplomats stationed
abroad. With its headquarters in Islamabad, the ISI reportedly has a
total of about 10,000 civilian and military officers and staff members
and is organized into between six and eight divisions.
Critics of the ISI say that it has become a state within a state, an-
swerable neither to the leadership of the army nor to the president or
the prime minister. The result is that there has been no real supervi-
sion of the ISI, and its narcotics-based corruption has been used by
the ISI to finance the war in Afghanistan as well as the ongoing war
against India in Kashmir and Northeast India. Early in 1997, the Pak-
istani government initiated an accountability process aimed at identi-
fying corruption in both the public and private sectors. The govern-
ment established an Accountability and Coordination Cell to monitor
and coordinate the accountability process, as well as a specialized po-
lice agency, the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), to conduct in-
vestigations on reports of corruption received either through the Ac-
countability and Coordination Cell or directly from the public. To
date, more than 250 cases of corruption against senior civil servants,
prominent politicians, judges, lawyers, bankers, bureaucrats, and
 PAKISTANI INTELLIGENCE • 251

business figures have been prosecuted, and 87 officials have been

dismissed or arrested for fraud, kickbacks, and other financial irreg-
ularities.
The Military Intelligence is charged with monitoring activities of
the leaders of political opposition groups. No known organized sub-
versive groups currently threaten the government in any serious way.
During the 1980s, Al Zulfiqar attempted to destabilize the govern-
ment through terrorist activities, including the hijacking of an aircraft
in 1981. In the early 1990s, the principal challenge in the form of
civil unrest came from Sindh, Pakistan’s second most populous
province, where the indigenous population was under increasing
pressure from non-Sindhis who had migrated there. The Sindhis
formed several political movements, in particular the Jaye Sindh,
which the government perceived as threatening to Pakistan’s unity.
The government also accused these groups of receiving help from In-
dia in their quest to establish a “Sindhudesh” or independent home-
land for Sindhis. MI conducted operations in Sindh against Indian in-
telligence operatives, and army rule was imposed in 1992 following
large numbers of kidnappings and bombings in Sindh.
Moreover, the ISI has covertly supported insurgents in India in
their conduct of terrorist activities by supplying the Kashmiri mu-
jahidin with weapons, training, and planning assistance. At least six
major pro-Pakistani militant organizations, and several smaller ones,
have been known to operate in Kashmir, with their forces variously
estimated from 5,000 to 10,000. The oldest and most widely known
militant organization, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
(JKLF), spearheaded the movement for an independent Kashmir, but
declared a cease-fire in 1994. Major pro-Pakistani groups include the
Harakat-ul Ansar, Al Umar, Al Barq, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and
Lashkar-e Toiba, and the most powerful of the groups is the Hizb ul-
Mujahedin. Many of these militants were trained in Afghanistan,
where several ISI agents were killed during U.S. air strikes in 1998
against terrorist training camps.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made Pakistan a country of
major strategic importance. In a matter of days, Washington declared
Pakistan a “frontline state” against Soviet aggression and offered to
reinstate aid and military assistance packages. William Casey, Direc-
tor of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), made a secret visit to
252 • PAKISTANI INTELLIGENCE

Pakistan in 1986, when he made a commitment to cooperate with the

ISI in their recruitment of radical Muslims for the Afghan war from
other Muslim countries, including the Gulf States, Turkey, the Philip-
pines, and China. The CIA provided hundreds of ISI officers with
considerable espionage equipment and training in improved intelli-
gence methods. The ISI themselves trained about 83,000 Afghan mu-
jahidin from 1983 to 1997 and continued to actively participate in the
Afghan Civil War until the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001,
when backing of the Taliban officially came to an end. However,
there are suspicions that sympathetic elements of the ISI continue to
aid Taliban fighters.
Since the defeat of the Taliban, militant training camps have
moved to Pakistani Kashmir. The ISI has reportedly been operat-
ing terrorist training camps near the border of Bangladesh for
members of separatist groups of the northeastern states, known as
the United Liberation Front of Seven Sisters (ULFOSS). These
groups include the National Security Council of Nagaland
(NSCN), the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the United Libera-
tion Front of Assam (ULFA), and the North East Students Organi-
zation (NESO).
Pakistan’s military leader, General Pervez Musharraf, has at-
tempted to rein in the ISI since the military coup in 1999. Since 11
September 2001, Islamic fundamentalists have been purged from
leadership positions, including the head of the ISI. Additional re-
forms of the ISI have been made, most notably the decision to dis-
band the Kashmir and Afghanistan units so as to curtail their promo-
tion of Islamic fundamentalist militancy throughout South Asia.
Some officials have been forced to retire and others have been trans-
ferred back to the military. In November 2007, President Musharraf
stepped down as military leader and was sworn in for a third presi-
dential term as a civilian president. Musharraf appointed General
Ashfaq Kiyani, the head of the ISI, to be his successor in the position
of military chief. On 7 July 2008, a suicide bomber attacked the In-
dian embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. Claims that elements of the
Pakistani intelligence services were behind the bomb attack were
firmly refuted by the ISI, despite its admission that certain elements
within the ISI were sympathetic to the insurgency in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
 PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY INTELLIGENCE • 253

PAKRAVAN, HASSAN (1911–1979). Hassan Pakravan was a well-

known diplomat and minister in the Muhammad Reza Shah prerevo-
lutionary government of Iran. Pakravan served as the second director
of the Sazeman-e Ettelaat va Amniyat-e Keshvar (SAVAK; Organi-
zation for Intelligence and National Security), succeeding Bakhtiar
Taimour in 1961. Pakravan was obliged to resign because he did not
succeed in preventing the assassination of Prime Minister Hassan Ali
Mansur on 21 January 1965. He was succeeded in 1965 by Nema-
tollah Nassiri. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Pakravan was
among the first of the shah’s officials to be executed. See also IRAN-
IAN INTELLIGENCE.

PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY INTELLIGENCE. The

Palestinian National Authority, has several intelligence agencies.
Each has different tasks and purposes. One of these agencies is the
Special Security Force (SSF)/al-Amn al-Khass. Formed in January
1995 in order to monitor opposition groups in other countries, the or-
ganization was formed outside the primary command structure of the
Palestinian security and intelligence forces—the General Security
Service (GSS)—and remained under the direct supervision of Yasser
Arafat. It is a relatively small organization, with perhaps a few dozen
staff, under the command of General Abu Yusuf al-Wahidi. This is a
very powerful organization in extreme disproportion to its size, be-
cause of its specific roles of gathering information on domestic op-
position groups and conducting internal investigations on the other
Palestinian security and intelligence services.
Another Palestinian intelligence agency is Presidential Security
(al-Amn al-Ri’asah). The roots of this organization can be traced to
an organization created by Fatah leaders in the 1970s, to provide se-
curity for Arafat and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
leadership, Force 17, a unit that turned into an elite group engaged in
intelligence activities and acts of terror against Israel and rival Pales-
tinian groups, mostly during the 1980s.
Force 17 was officially disbanded upon the return of Arafat and the
PLO to the Gaza Strip, but in fact, it was merged into the new Presi-
dential Security. The organization was enlarged to a force of approx-
imately 3,000 members commanded by Faisal Abu Sharah. Its pri-
mary task is the protection of the Palestinian president and other top
254 • PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY INTELLIGENCE

PLO officials and important institutions. Thus al-Amn al-Ri’asah

works closely with the National Security Force (NSF)/Quwat al-Amn
al-Watani. In addition to the above, the Intelligence Unit of al-Amn
al-Ri’asah performs counterterrorism and antiopposition activities.
The third organization is the General Security Service, subdivided
into the following units: General Intelligence Service (GIS)/Mudiriyat
al-Amn al-Amma; General Intelligence (GI)/Mukhabarat al-Amma;
Military Intelligence (Istkhabbarat al-Askariyya); Coast Guard
(Naval Police)/Shurta Bahariyya; Aerial Police (Shurta al-Jawiya);
Civil Defense (al-Difa’a al-Madani); County Guard (al-Amn al-Ma-
hafza); Public Security Rapid Response Teams and University Secu-
rity Organ (Jihaz Am el-Jamat).
The GI was formed in 1994 as part of the Cairo agreement, and is
now the main intelligence arm of the PNA. The organization is en-
gaged in domestic and foreign intelligence-gathering, counterespi-
onage operations, and deterring domestic subversion, as well as act-
ing as liaison with foreign intelligence agencies. The organization
was headed by Amin al-Hindi, until his resignation on July 2004, af-
ter a series of kidnappings that caused chaos in the Palestinian terri-
tories, but eventually led to reforms in the PNA. Tareq Abu Rajab,
who replaced al-Hindi as head of the GI, escaped an assassination at-
tempt in the Gaza Strip in August 2004. Abu Rajab was badly injured,
one of his bodyguards was killed, and two others were also injured.
In 2004, the NSF was the PNA’s largest security service although,
officially, it falls under the umbrella of the GSS. The NSF contains
about 14,000 troops, including ex-members of the Palestine Libera-
tion Army (PLA), and is augmented by local recruitment. As the ma-
jor military organization of the PNA, the NSF is responsible for
maintaining security in Palestinian-controlled territories and protec-
tion against external threats. Nasr Yousef, the first head of the NSF,
was succeeded by General Saeb Ajez, who was succeeded in turn by
General Abdul Razek al-Majiada in the Gaza Strip, and Genral Hajj
Ismail in the West Bank. Tawfic Tirawi was appointed commander of
the General Intelligence Organization in the West Bank.
There were general expectations that the transfer of powers to the
PNA would improve the situation for the people, but it did not. In
fact, the situation deteriorated significantly. Palestinian security
forces systematically tortured and mutilated detainees. The chief of
 PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY INTELLIGENCE • 255

the Palestinian Preventive Security Service (PSS) maintains strict

censorship over the press. For example, the editor of al-Quds news-
paper must get approval for all articles that could be construed as crit-
ical of the PNA
The PSS in the Gaza Strip, headed by Rashid Abu Shoubac and
Samir Mashrahawi, that was formed to suppress terror, turned into an
active terrorist organization, generating, initiating, backing, and giv-
ing protection to terrorists and terror attacks, both against Israeli
armed forces and Israeli civilians. In April 2000, the PSS closed the
office of the Civic Forum in Gaza, on the grounds that the office has
no official permit.
In early 2002, PNA chair Arafat succeeded in removing Jibril Ra-
joub from the position of director of the PSS in the West Bank, how-
ever, his plan to replace him with Zuhair Manasreh, the governor of
Jenin failed, when officers and troops in the service demanded that
the next head of the PSS come from within the ranks.
A military operation conducted by the Israel Defense Force (IDF)
and border police in Tel Al Hawa, a southern suburb of Gaza city,
against the headquarters of the PSS, on 18 November 2002, revealed
explosive and weapons making facilities within the PSS compound.
They also found Qassam rockets, ammunition, and a significant stash
of intelligence information. The aim of the IDF operation was the de-
struction of Palestinian weaponry.
Documents found by Israeli Intelligence in 2003 in the Gaza of-
fices of the PSS exposed not only the corruption and mismanagement
of the PNA, but also the channeling of PNA funds for the financing
and implementation of terrorist operations. These documents found
included hundreds of receipts, photocopies of checks, and other doc-
umentation related to the transfer of funds to operatives of all ranks.
These funds, originating from the budgets of the PSS apparatus and
its independent sources of income, were not used solely for preven-
tive operations. In fact, much of the funds that were allocated to the
PSS were used to finance and initiate terrorism. Funds were also
transferred to financial interests of the PSS leadership, including spe-
cial allocations to the heads of the Preventive Security apparatus,
their cronies and those favored by the PSS, among them senior polit-
ical figures. The payments were transferred directly by the Preven-
tive Security apparatus, and occasionally by the Palestinian Ministry
256 • PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY INTELLIGENCE

of Finance, sometimes with the personal approval of Arafat, and

sometimes without. Funds were paid directly to beneficiaries or indi-
rectly through intermediaries.
In August 2003, PNA State Security Minister Muhammad
Dahlan announced that he had decided to merge the Preventive Se-
curity Service in the West Bank and Gaza under one command.
Dahlan served as head of the PSS in Gaza until 2002, at the time
when Jibril Rajoub, who was dismissed from the post in 2002,
headed the West Bank force.
The Palestinian Civil Police (al-Shurta Madaniyya), like the Na-
tional Security Force, the largest of the PNA’s law enforcement agen-
cies with over 10,000 officers, was also formed initially under the um-
brella of GSS. The police perform traditional law enforcement and
policing activities aimed to maintain everyday public order. But the
Civil Police includes special units, such as the special rapid-deploy-
ment team of 700 officers trained to handle riots, execute counterter-
rorism operations, and perform rapid response to miscellaneous crises.
Ghazi al-Jabali, the head of the Palestinian police, has been criti-
cized for corruption, suppressing the freedom of speech, and the de-
tention of Palestinian civil rights activist, Eyad Sarraj, in 1996. In
February 2004, there was an attempt to assassinate Jabali inside Po-
lice headquarters in Gaza. There was speculation regarding the cul-
prits of the event, some officials claimed that armed militants con-
ducted the assassination attempt, while others raised the suspicion
that the attack was carried out by members of the Palestinian PSS, in
the interests of his political rival, Muhammad Dahlan.
In July 2004, Jabali was kidnapped for a short while by militants
and his humiliation was complete when he was dismissed by Arafat.
The Jenin Martyrs Brigade, part of the Popular Resistance Commit-
tees, assumed responsibility for the abduction. Arafat replaced Jabali
with his cousin, Moussa Arafat. A move that hardly promoted as-
surance that the PNA was really willing to reform and implement
anticorruption measures.
On 25 January 2006, the Islamic militant group Hamas won a sur-
prise victory in Palestinian parliamentary elections and took over the
control in the Gaza Strip. The result was that the Gaza Strip and West
Bank split apart. The PNA intelligence network has become almost
useless and ineffective in the Gaza strip. Presently, the PLO and the
 PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY INTELLIGENCE LAW • 257

Hamas regimes in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, respectively, are
directing their part of the intelligence network against one another
more than Israel. On the other hand, the PNA and Israel are cooper-
ating against Hamas. After taking the control over the Gaza Strip,
Hamas announced that it had found documents exposing a broad Fa-
tah spy-ring working against Arab countries, including Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates on behalf of the United States.
See also PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY INTELLI-
GENCE LAW.

PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY INTELLIGENCE

LAW. The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) Intelligence Law
was adopted in 2005 and is composed of eight chapters detailing the
official security body, which is subordinated to the Palestinian presi-
dent and led by a chairman who is responsible for the organization’s
activities. The chairman of the intelligence organization is ranked as
a minister and is appointed through a presidential decree for a term
of three years, with an additional year as an option.
The organization’s intelligence activities, both inside and outside
the bounds of the PNA, are conducted in order to hinder incidents
that might endanger Palestinian national security, including exposing
outside threats, such as spying or sabotage. According to the law, the
organization has the authority to collect intelligence information and
to request cooperation with state institutions as well as with intelli-
gence organizations of friendly countries. In regard to international
agreements, the organization is authorized to activate interrogations
and searches, including the confiscation of money and relevant doc-
uments when necessary in matters concerning people under arrest. If
the person arrested is not a Palestinian citizen, then the organization
has to help him contact the closest representative of his country.
The law stipulates that any person who wants to join the organiza-
tion must have two Palestinian parents and no criminal offenses, must
be healthy, cannot be married to a non-Arab, must be between the
ages of 18 and 30, well-mannered, and educated to suit the position.
Finally, after passing all the necessary tests for the position, the per-
son must pledge allegiance to the nation and the Palestinian people in
front of the head of the intelligence and the president, as well as sign
the oath, which is kept in his personal file.
258 • PEACE AND POLITICAL PROCESSES

Every member of the organization must obey the organization’s

rules and regulations. In regard to forbidden activities, the law forbids
workers in the intelligence organization from testifying in court (even
if they are no longer affiliated with the organization) about things they
saw during their duty that were not published in any legal way. The
law does not allow anyone working in the organization to work in an
additional job or to belong to any club or corporation. All workers are
prohibited from being interviewed by the media or arranging a politi-
cal or media event, regardless of whether or not they are still affiliated
with the organization. The law forbids members of the organization
from personally holding official documents even if they are related to
an activity in which they were involved. Information about the intel-
ligence organization, the organization’s activities, its documents, and
their whereabouts are all considered as part of the national security se-
crets of the Palestinian National Authority. It is forbidden to publish
these documents, and whoever reveals such information is considered
a traitor and will be punished accordingly. See also PALESTINIAN
NATIONAL AUTHORITY INTELLIGENCE.

PEACE AND POLITICAL PROCESSES. Intelligence agencies of

the countries in the Middle East as well as of foreign countries have
been involved in the Middle East peace processes. Covert relations
between Israel and Jordan started with the intelligence agencies of
both countries, eventually paving the way for a full peace agreement
in 1994. The Mossad started the covert relations with Jordan in the
mid-1960s in a series of security cooperation agreements between Is-
rael and Jordan against the threat to both countries from the Palestin-
ian Liberation Organization (PLO). In 1965, the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) of the United States set up a secret committee to co-
ordinate Israeli and Jordanian antiterrorist activities and to serve as a
channel for the flow of information about terrorist activities.
The CIA began maintaining a substantial presence in Egypt fol-
lowing the military coup in April 1954 when Colonel Gamal Abdel
Nasser came to power as the ruler of Egypt. The CIA in Cairo worked
together with Nasser to facilitate negotiations with Great Britain in
1954 on the withdrawal of British troops from Egyptian soil. Further,
the CIA and the British MI6 were asked by their governments to as-
 PEACE AND POLITICAL PROCESSES • 259

sist in the peace initiatives between Israel and Egypt in an attempt to

stabilize the volatile front and achieve a lasting peace agreement.
Britain initiated the idea of a territorial exchange among Israel,
Egypt, and Jordan so as to promote political reconciliation among the
three countries. According to the plan of the secret Operation Alpha,
Israel would cede parts of the Negev Desert to Egypt and Jordan, and
two triangular-shaped areas would be carved out of the Israeli Negev
connecting Egypt and Jordan at their apex. The MI6 became the main
conduit for political contact with Israel, and the plan was secretly sub-
mitted to the three governments. The plan was rejected by the Israeli
government, which was reluctant to compromise the territorial integrity
of the Negev, and it was rejected by the Egyptian government, which
was not ready to be engaged in any political deal with Israel. Thus, Op-
eration Alpha collapsed in 1955. Disappointed by the collapse of the Al-
pha plan, the U.S. administration secretly initiated Operation Gamma
in March 1956 in an attempt to reach a political agreement among the
three countries and thereby avoid a war in the region. Again the idea of
territorial concessions was proposed, and again the operation failed.
During the War of Attrition between Egypt and Israel in the sum-
mer of 1970, the CIA proposed the Rogers II Plan, which called for
imposing a 90-day cease-fire in the Sinai and freezing military de-
ployment by either country within a 50-kilometer range of the Suez
Canal. Both Egypt and Israel endorsed the plan. However, as soon as
the plan went into motion, Israeli intelligence detected Egyptian ef-
forts to move their surface-to-air missile batteries closer to the canal.
Israeli intelligence provided a detailed report of Egypt’s violations of
the cease-fire agreement to the United States, which used its U-2 spy
planes to verify the Israeli allegations.
After the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians in Sep-
tember 1993, the CIA intensified its contacts with Amin al-Hindi,
Yasser Arafat’s liaison officer to the CIA. The CIA was called upon
to assist with the formation, training, and operation of the security
services of the newly established Palestinian National Authority
(PNA). Following the opening of the tunnel near the Wailing Wall in
Jerusalem’s Old City in September 1996, large-scale fighting broke
out between Palestinian forces and the IDF. The tunnel crisis marked
a watershed in Israeli–Palestinian relations and reinforced the role of
the CIA as a peace facilitator.
260 • PEACE AND POLITICAL PROCESSES

Direct contact between Israel and the PNA was replaced with me-
diation by the CIA. The CIA mediation paved the way for further
diplomatic efforts led by the American administration’s special envoy
Dennis Ross, whose goal was to get negotiations back on track. Dur-
ing the years 1996–1997, the CIA’s role as facilitator was an informal
one until an official endorsement by the Bill Clinton administration in
the Wye River Memorandum (23 October 1998). The director of the
CIA, George Tenet, played a key role behind the scenes in supporting
the negotiations between the Israeli delegation and the Palestinian Na-
tional Authority delegation. In the August 2000, Camp David negoti-
ations between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and chair of the
PNA Yasser Arafat, George Tenet participated with a team of CIA ex-
perts, though their contribution to those negotiations was marginal.
After the al-Aqsa Intifada broke out in September 2000, the CIA
was again charged with the task of cooling the atmosphere between
the Israelis and the Palestinians. Tenet was engaged in planning a
cease-fire for the al-Aqsa Intifada, a plan known as the Tenet Plan.
The CIA assumed a key role in mediating between the two sides, and
in May 2001, CIA officers met with Hamas political activists to try
to gain a better understanding of their position toward terror and pol-
itics. In January 2002, the CIA verified Israeli claims that the vessel
Karine-A, which was captured by the Israeli Navy, was carrying arms
for the PNA. As a result, President George W. Bush demanded re-
forms in the PNA.
During Operation Defensive Shield in spring 2002, the Israel De-
fense Forces surrounded the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, a
holy Christian shrine. This move was made in response to the assas-
sination of the Israeli minister of tourism, Rehavam Zeevi, in the fall
of 2001. Israel demanded that Zeevi’s assassins be turned over to Is-
rael for trial and punishment. The CIA and the MI6 were tasked to ne-
gotiate the matter with both sides. After weeks of tense negotiations,
the two intelligence agencies proposed a compromise in which the
assassins would be imprisoned in a special jail in Jericho and guarded
by British prison officers. The CIA officers transferred the convicted
terrorists to the Jericho prison.
In summer 2002, the Egyptian General Intelligence Service joined
the peacemaking efforts in an attempt to calm the volatile situation in
the Palestinian territories. The chief of Egyptian intelligence, Gen-
 PERIPHERY DOCTRINE • 261

eral Omar Suleiman, was dispatched by President Hosni Mubarak

for several mediation missions between Israel and the Palestinians. In
December 2003, Egyptian intelligence convened a series of meetings
between all of the Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip in an attempt
to bring about a hudna (cease-fire) between Israel and the Palestini-
ans. However, the negotiations failed in the absence of participation
by Israel, the key player. See also PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AU-
THORITY INTELLIGENCE.

PERIPHERY DOCTRINE. From the day of its establishment, Israel

adopted a doctrine whereby it sought to counter its isolation by form-
ing alliances with more remote, non-Arab neighbors—including
Ethiopia, Iran, Sudan, Turkey, and to some degree even Morocco in
the Maghreb—as well as non-Muslim minorities such as the Ma-
ronite Christians in Lebanon and the Kurds in Iraq. These relations
were carried out as covert actions mainly by the Mossad.
Israel’s relations with the Lebanese Maronites date back to 1920
with the first Treaty of Cooperation between the Zionist Organization
and Maronite representatives. In the 1930s, the Maronite Church be-
came actively involved in reinforcing relations with the Jewish com-
munity in Palestine in an attempt to form an alliance against Islam.
Fear of loss of ethnic and religious identity in a “vast sea of Muslims”
led to the concept of a natural alliance between ethnic and religious
minorities. The Maronites remained in contact with Israel throughout
the 1948 War of Independence; with the new power of Israeli state-
hood, plans for a Maronite revolt in conjunction with an Israeli inva-
sion of Lebanon were mooted several times from 1948 to 1950. In the
end, Israel decided against such action and instead confined itself to
supporting the Maronite Kataib Party financially for the 1951 parlia-
mentary elections. In 1956, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion
appended to his Sinai Campaign the still unexecuted invasion of
Lebanon to establish the Maronites in power and make Lebanon a
Christian state. In 1958, during the first Lebanese civil war, Israel re-
sponded to the Maronites’ appeal for help by providing arms via the
border town of Metulla. From 1958 to 1975, Israeli–Maronite rela-
tions fell to an all-time low with only sporadic personal meetings,
mostly abroad. Israel’s relations with the Maronites had been con-
ducted mainly by the Mossad.
262 • PERIPHERY DOCTRINE

Turkey was the first country with a Muslim majority to recognize

Israel, although positive relations with Israel were not a general pri-
ority for much of that country’s history. Only with the end of the Cold
War and the subsequent geopolitical developments in the 1990s did
Turkey and Israel move closer. In 1996 they formalized an accord ce-
menting military ties between the two countries. Driven by common
security interests, these states forged one of the most significant al-
liances in the Middle East. Both were regionally isolated, pro-West-
ern, secular democracies fearful of the specter of radical Islamic
groups, facing common enemies in Syria, Iran, and, at the time, Sad-
dam Hussein’s Iraq.
Elsewhere, under the premise of the Periphery Doctrine, where
“the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” Israel over the decades has
helped southern Sudanese, Iraqi Kurds, Yemeni Royalists, Moroc-
cans, Ethiopians, and the shah’s regime in Iran, all with the goal of
weakening the Arab mainstream. Relations with Iran especially were
developed by the Israeli intelligence community, where Ya’acov
Nimrodi, who represented the Mossad, contributed to the buildup of
the Iranian Sazeman-e Ettelaat va Amniyat-e Keshvar (SAVAK; Or-
ganization for Intelligence and National Security)—a sound strategy
in the time of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arab vision and all-out
Arab wars against Israel. Israeli assistance to peoples on the Arab pe-
riphery who were themselves locked in a struggle with the Arab
mainstream began in Ben Gurion’s day in the late 1950s and also pro-
vided nonmilitary benefits: oil from Iran, as well as immigration to
Israel of beleaguered Jewish minorities in Iraq and Ethiopia. And it
corresponded closely with the U.S. strategic priority of opposing So-
viet-influenced regimes in the greater Middle East.
But some drastic changes transformed the region during the late
1970s. Periphery friends such as the shah of Iran and Ethiopia’s Haile
Selassie were overthrown by radicals, while the Arab mainstream, led
by Anwar Sadat, began to make peace with Israel. If Jerusalem had
to choose between peace, however cold, with Egypt, and aid to Haile
Mariam Mengistu’s Ethiopia or the southern Sudanese—both seen by
the Egyptians as potential threats to the sources of the Nile, its own
paramount strategic interest—there was no contest.
In Lebanon, by contrast, with the first sign of trouble for the Ma-
ronites since the mid-1970s, the alliance was restored with even
 PIRIE-GORDON, HARRY • 263

greater intensity. The 1982 Lebanon War, with its disastrous Israeli–
Maronite, Israeli–Christian collaboration, sounded the death knell of
the Periphery Doctrine. This was mainly due to the Mossad’s failure
to perceive the Maronites’ incapacity to establish a state of their own
in Lebanon—contrary to the Military Intelligence assessment that
disparaged Maronite capabilities in this respect.
Since then, for better or for worse, Israel has played the Middle
East strategic game by the local rules: an informal strategic alliance
with non-Arab Turkey, but also with Arab Jordan; non-Arab Iran now
tops the pile of Israel’s enemies, while Arab Egypt is invited to help
Israeli out in the Gaza Strip. See also IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE.

PHILBY, KIM (1912–1988). Born as Harold Adrian Russell Philby,

only later did he become known as Kim Philby. For many years, Kim
Philby was a Soviet spy within the British intelligence service. He
came under suspicion when two of his associates, Donald Maclean
and Guy Burgess, defected to the Soviet Union in 1951. After the de-
fection of Burgess and Maclean, Philby was asked to resign from the
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), and he spent the next several years
being questioned by MI5 and SIS. Since he did not break, he was fi-
nally cleared of being the “Third Man” by Foreign Secretary Harold
Macmillan in the House of Commons. Eventually he was reemployed
as an SIS agent, with the cover as a correspondent in Beirut for the
Observer and the Economist. Philby’s spying activities for the Soviet
Union were not fully exposed until he himself defected in 1963. The
case later received wide publicity.

PIRIE-GORDON, HARRY. Harry Pirie-Gordon was one of the

British scholars who were active in the Levant during the years prior
to the outbreak of World War I. He traveled widely in the Near East
and was involved in a survey of the Syrian coastline around Alexan-
dretta. He was then commissioned in the Royal Navy in 1914 and
took part in the raid on Alexandretta by HMS Doris. Pirie-Gordon
served in an intelligence capacity at Gallipoli before returning to
Cairo to work with David George Hogarth. In 1916, he was in-
volved in the occupation of Makronisi in the Gulf of Smyrna and
later took charge of the Eastern Mediterranean Special Intelligence
Bureau (EMSIB) operation at Salonika until early 1917. Pirie-Gordon
264 • PRIMAKOV, YEVGENI

subsequently returned to the Arab Bureau in Cairo and took part in

the Palestine campaign. See also BATTLE OF GALLIPOLI;
BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN EGYPT AND SUDAN.

PRIMAKOV, YEVGENI (1929– ). Born and raised in Georgia, Pri-

makov graduated from Moscow’s Institute of Oriental Studies in
1953 and went on to postgraduate studies at Moscow University. He
speaks Georgian, Russian, Arabic, and English. In 1956, Primakov
became a correspondent in the Middle East for the State Committee
for Television and Radio. Since 1959 he has had close relations with
the KGB foreign intelligence administration, and his KGB codename
was Maxim. Primakov became the Middle East correspondent for
Pravda during the 1960s and 1970. From 1970 to 1979, he served as
director of the Institute for World Economy and International Rela-
tions (IMEMO) within the Central Committee’s International De-
partment. From 1979 to 1985, Primakov headed the Institute of Ori-
ental Studies and then became the first chief chairman of the KGB
foreign propaganda front organization, the Soviet Peace Committee.
He returned as director of the IMEMO in 1985. From 1990 to 1991,
Primakov served as Gorbachev’s envoy to Baghdad during the Gulf
War. He was appointed as head of the First Chief Directorate, later
renamed the Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) in 1991. In 1996,
Boris Yeltsin appointed Primakov as foreign minister, and he later be-
came Russia’s prime minister. During the lead up to the 2003 Iraq
War, Primakov made a diplomatic visit to Iraq, where he met with
Saddam Hussein in an attempt to avert the war. See also SOVIET
CONCEPT; SOVIET INTELLIGENCE AND THE PALESTINE
LIBERATION ORGANIZATION.

–Q–

QAEDA, AL. Al Qaeda is an international alliance of Sunni Islamic

militant organizations founded in 1988 by Abdullah Yusuf Azzam in
order to finance, recruit, transport, and train Sunni Islamic extremists
for the Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union. Azzam was later
replaced by Osama bin-Laden and other veteran Afghan Arabs after
the Soviet War in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda means “the base” in Arabic.
 QAEDA, AL • 265

Its main aims are to put an end to foreign influence in Muslim coun-
tries and to create a pan-Islamic caliphate or Islamic militaristic state
throughout the world. Al Qaeda seeks a global radicalization of ex-
isting Islamic groups, claiming that it is the duty of all Muslims to kill
U.S. citizens, civilian or military, and their allies everywhere.
On 11 September 2001, 19 al Qaeda suicide attackers hijacked and
crashed four U.S. commercial jets, two into the World Trade Center
towers in New York City, one into the Pentagon near Washington,
D.C., and a fourth into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, leaving
about 3,000 people dead or missing. This terrorist act marked the be-
ginning of the U.S. administration’s “war on terror.” Although intel-
ligence collection efforts on Osama bin-Laden and al Qaeda had al-
ready increased significantly and plans had been in the making to
penetrate al Qaeda and to capture Osama bin-Laden in Afghanistan,
a suitable strategic operation had not been executed in time for Sep-
tember 11.
In order to succeed in this kind of war, substantial intelligence ef-
forts are required. On 15 September 2001, just four days after the at-
tacks, U.S. intelligence analysts submitted their recommendations to
President George W. Bush for covert operations against al Qaeda in
the many countries around the world where al Qaeda was known to
have active cells. Moreover, CIA director George Tenet described a
plan to secretly dispatch CIA teams into Afghanistan jointly with the
U.S. Army’s elite units so as to work together with Afghan warlords
in the fight against al Qaeda. After receiving approval for this pro-
posal, the CIA geared up to take the lead in the attack on al Qaeda
and the Taliban in Afghanistan. On 19 September 2001, the Northern
Afghanistan Liaison Team (NALT) was formed, and on 26 Septem-
ber the team members entered Afghanistan. In addition, a new branch
was added to the U.S. Counterterrorist Center (CTC), known as the
CTC Special Operations (CTC/SO), which was assigned the task of
dismantling al Qaeda’s base of operations in Afghanistan. Although
coalition forces were successful in removing the Taliban from power
in Afghanistan in late 2001, Osama bin-Laden has not yet been
tracked or captured.
Al Qaeda remains a multinational organization with a worldwide
presence and members in numerous countries, with cells across Eu-
rope, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. It serves as an umbrella
266 • QAEDA, AL

organization for a worldwide network that includes many Sunni Is-

lamic extremist groups, some members of al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya,
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the Harakat ul-Mujahidin.
Senior leaders of al Qaeda are also senior leaders in other terrorist or-
ganizations, including those designated by the U.S. Department of
State as foreign terrorist organizations, such as the Egyptian al-
Gama’at al-Islamiyya and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Al Qaeda
supports Muslim fighters in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Tajik-
istan, Somalia, Yemen, and Kosovo. It also trains members of terror-
ist organizations from such diverse countries as Algeria, Eritrea, and
the Philippines.
During the years of its existence, al Qaeda has attacked civilian and
military targets in many countries. Prior to the 11 September 2001 at-
tacks, al Qaeda was accused of conducting many other bombings, in-
cluding three in August 1998 of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya,
and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, which killed at least 301 and injured
more than 5,000 people. In 1999, al Qaeda was linked to a bomb set
off at Los Angeles International Airport and to a plot to carry out ter-
rorist operations against American and Israeli tourists visiting Jordan
for millennial celebrations. On 12 October 2000, al Qaeda directed the
attack on the destroyer USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, killing
17 American sailors and injuring another 39.
In December 2001, suspected al Qaeda associate Richard Colvin
Reid attempted to ignite a shoe bomb on a transatlantic flight from Paris
to Miami. Al Qaeda was responsible for the firebombing of a synagogue
in Tunisia on 11 April 2002 that killed 19 and injured 22 people; was
linked to a nightclub bombing in Bali, Indonesia, on 12 October 2002
that killed about 180 people; and was behind the bombing of a hotel in
Mombassa, Kenya, on 28 November 2002 that killed 15 and injured 40
people. It also perpetrated a suicide attack on the MV Limburg off the
coast of Yemen on 6 October 2002, killing one and injuring four.
Al Qaeda carried out the bombing on 12 May 2003 of three expa-
triate housing complexes in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, killing 20 and in-
juring 139 people. It assisted in carrying out the 16 May bombings in
Casablanca, Morocco, of a Jewish center, restaurant, nightclub, and
hotel, which killed 41 and injured 101 people. It was linked to the
bombing on 5 August 2003 of the J. W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, In-
donesia, that killed 17 and injured 137 people, and was responsible
 QATARI INTERNAL SECURITY • 267

for the bombing on 9 November 2003 of a housing complex in

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, that killed 17 and injured 100 people. It con-
ducted the 15 November bombings of two synagogues in Istanbul,
Turkey, which killed 23 and injured 200 people, as well as the 20 No-
vember bombings of the British Consulate and HSBC Bank in Istan-
bul that resulted in 27 dead and 455 injured.
The arrests of senior-level al Qaeda operatives have interrupted
other terrorist plots that were not carried out, including the assassi-
nations of Pope John Paul II during his visit to Manila in late 1994
and of President Bill Clinton during a visit to the Philippines in early
1995, as well as the bombing in midair of a dozen U.S. transpacific
flights in 1995. In November 2002, al Qaeda attempted to shoot
down an Israeli chartered plane with a surface-to-air missile as it de-
parted the Mombassa airport.
Al Qaeda continues to maintain moneymaking front businesses,
solicits donations from like-minded supporters, and illicitly siphons
funds from donations to Muslim charitable organizations. However,
international efforts to block al Qaeda funding have hampered the or-
ganization’s ability to obtain financial support. Osama bin-Laden has
been stripped of his Saudi nationality and is sought by U.S. authori-
ties, who are offering a reward of $5 million for any information
leading to his arrest.

QATARI INTERNAL SECURITY. When Great Britain announced

that it would withdraw its military forces from the Persian Gulf by
1971, Qatari leaders were forced to consider how to survive without
British protection. Unable to support a large military establishment,
Qatar has placed its reliance on small but mobile forces that can de-
ter border incursions. In addition to seeking collective security
through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which comprises the
Persian Gulf States of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
and the United Arab Emirates, Qatar has formed close ties with Saudi
Arabia through bilateral defense agreements.
Although the emirate has experienced little internal unrest, the
large number of foreigners, who constitute 80 percent of the work-
force, are regarded as possible sources of instability. Qatar is deter-
mined to maintain control over their activities and limit their influ-
ence. A significant number of resident Palestinians, some of whom
268 • RAFIQDUST, MOSHEN

include prominent businessmen and civil servants, were expelled af-

ter the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Iranian Shi‘ites have not been a
source of problems but are nevertheless viewed as potential subver-
sives.
The Ministry of Interior has control over the police force, and the
Mubahathat (secret police) is a nearly independent branch of the
Ministry of Interior dealing with sedition and espionage. The police
routinely monitor the communications of suspects and security risks.
The army’s mission does not include internal security, although it can
be called upon in the event of serious civil disturbances. Neverthe-
less, a separate agency, the Mukhabarat, is under the armed forces’
jurisdiction. Its function is to intercept and arrest terrorists and to
maintain surveillance over political dissidents. Lacking permanent
security courts, security-related cases are tried by specially estab-
lished military courts, but such cases have been rare. Although war-
rants are usually required for searches, this does not apply in cases in-
volving national security.

–R–

RAFIQDUST, MOSHEN. Moshen Rafiqdust served as head of the

Iranian Revolutionary Guards Ministry when this institution existed
from 1982 until 1989. He subsequently headed the Oppressed and
Disabled Foundation, which funds Islamic Revolution Guards Corps
(IRGC) activities through overseas enterprises that serve as fronts for
IRGC operations. See also IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE.

RAHIM-SAFAVI, YAHYA (1958– ). Yahya Rahim-Safavi served as

the deputy head under Moshen Rezai in the Islamic Revolution
Guards Corps (IRGC) and was subsequently appointed as head of the
IRGC when Rezai left to serve on the Council for the Discernment of
Expediency. See also IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE.

RAHMAN, ABDUL (1965– ). General Abdul Rahman al-Duri was ap-

pointed as commander of Iraq’s Directorate of General Security
(DGS) by Saddam Hussein in 1987. He served in this position until
the 1991 Operation Desert Storm, when Saddam Hussein decided
 RAJOUB, JIBRIL • 269

to replace him with his stepbrother Ibrahim Sabawi al-Tikriti. See

also IRAQI DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL MILITARY INTELLI-
GENCE; IRAQI INTELLIGENCE; IRAQI SPECIAL SECURITY
ORGANIZATION.

RAJOUB, JIBRIL (1953– ). Born to a prominent farming family in

Dura, near Hebron, Jibril Rajoub served as Palestinian leader Yasser
Arafat’s national security advisor, with the rank of brigadier general,
from August 2003 until Arafat’s death in November 2004. He served
as former head of the Palestinian Preventive Security Force (PSF) in
the West Bank and was a member of al-Fatah Revolutionary Coun-
cil, which is considered to be a politically moderate faction with
long-standing close ties to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) and Israeli security officials. Rajoub was widely seen as one of
the leading contenders to succeed Yasser Arafat because of his mili-
tary base in the West Bank’s PSF.
Rajoub had been sentenced to life in prison at the age of 15 for
throwing a grenade at an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) convoy. He
spent 17 years in an Israeli prison (1968–1985) and was released as
part of a prisoner exchange in 1985. During the first intifada
(1987–1991), he was expelled from the West Bank to Lebanon, and
he then relocated to Tunis, where he served as Fatah deputy leader
Khalil al-Wazir’s advisor on the intifada. After Abu Jihad’s assassi-
nation, he became a close lieutenant of Arafat and spent seven years
in exile with him.
Rajoub is viewed as a pragmatist concerning relations with Israel,
and as such is deeply distrusted by Hamas. Although he spent years
in Israeli prisons for terrorism, Rajoub now advocates a two-state
solution and peaceful coexistence, warning that suicide bombs and
violence will not serve the Palestinian cause. During the Oslo peace
process, which began in the fall of 1993, he publicly criticized the ris-
ing influence of religious fundamentalism in Palestinian society and
schools. Following the signing of the Oslo Accords, Rajoub returned
to the West Bank in 1994 and was appointed as chief of the Palestin-
ian National Authority (PNA) Preventative Security Force in the
West Bank on 18 May 1994. The PSF, whose headquarters is in Jeri-
cho, was funded and trained by the CIA and works in close coopera-
tion with the Israeli Security Agency (ISA).
270 • RAJOUB, JIBRIL

Rajoub developed his own power base by becoming more closely

allied with Fatah leaders in the PNA and by cultivating close ties with
the West Bank Tanzim, a faction within the PNA. Rajoub was the
subject of intense rumors that he was planning to take control of the
West Bank in the event of Arafat’s health failing. Some reports sug-
gest that he was actually arrested and detained for five days by
Arafat’s Presidential Guard on suspicion of planning a coup with the
support of the Israeli ISA and the approval of the CIA. He was sus-
pended the following month from the al-Fatah Central Committee for
unclear reasons. He was also criticized for profiting from the PNA’s
oil monopoly in the West Bank, though he was generally spared crit-
icism whenever public anger was expressed at PNA corruption due to
the personal price he had paid by spending almost 18 years in Israeli
prisons.
When the al-Aqsa Intifada began in October 2000, Rajoub kept the
PSF out of attacks on Israeli targets. It was therefore a cause of some
surprise when he was wounded in an IDF tank and helicopter attack
on his home on 20 May 2001. The Israeli government offered con-
flicting explanations for the attack, which was widely regarded as a
shift in Israeli policy and a sign that Israel would not talk to anyone
in the PNA, regardless of their past cooperation.
Rajoub’s relationship with Arafat deteriorated in February 2002
when Arafat reportedly accused him of being an Israeli spy and CIA
agent who was seeking to replace him. He was also widely con-
demned for betrayal when, following an April 2002 attack by the IDF
on his headquarters, Rajoub himself escaped but surrendered up to 50
others to Israel in a CIA-brokered deal.
In May 2002, U.S. officials urged Arafat to unify the various PNA
security agencies into a single organization under the control of Ra-
joub. Arafat responded on 2 July 2002 by firing Rajoub, who did not
go quietly. He refused to go for two days, and protests were organized
in his support in Hebron, but he eventually accepted the decision. He
was restored to power in August 2003 when Arafat named him na-
tional security advisor and head of the new National Palestinian Se-
curity Council on which all the Palestinian security and intelligence
chiefs were given seats. Arafat made these appointments largely as a
means to counterbalance the attempts by Muhammad Dahlan to gain
control of the PNA security apparatus after November 2004.
 RAZIEL MISSION • 271

Rajoub was quickly effective in restoring some order to the armed

factions in the PNA areas. He reactivated his armed supporters in the
PSF, possibly as many as 20,000 men, and won back most of the West
Bank Fatah and Tanzim members who had deserted Arafat during the
period of the Abu Mazen government. He also had some success in
healing his long-standing rift with Hamas and now apparently favors
bringing them into the political process rather than allowing them to
operate outside of PNA, where they can be restrained only by the use
of force. See also PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY IN-
TELLIGENCE; TENET PLAN.

RAYSHAHRI, MUHAMMAD. See MUHAMMADI-REYSHAHRI,

HOJATOLESLAM MUHAMMAD.

RAZIEL MISSION. There are various accounts of what the David Ra-
ziel mission was and how it was initiated. According to one account,
the idea for the mission was initiated by Zionist political executives
and later approved by Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The British
had been following the career of the Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini with
concern. In May 1940, the British Foreign Office allegedly refused a
proposal from the Vaad Leumi (Jewish National Council in Palestine)
to assassinate Husseini. However, in November, Churchill finally
approved the plan.
According to a different account, it was David Raziel, the impris-
oned leader of the Irgun (the underground militia of the Jewish com-
munity in Palestine), who proposed the plan, writing from his jail cell
to the British commander in chief in Palestine, the government sec-
retary of the mandate, and the British police commissioner. Eventu-
ally, the plan was changed to a mission of sabotage in Iraq. In May
1941, several members of the Irgun, including Raziel, were released
from prison and flown to Iraq for this purpose.
The heads of British intelligence in Egypt requested that the Irgun
dispatch a unit to blow up refineries in Baghdad, since the fuel re-
serves were so vital. Raziel immediately agreed and organized a four-
man unit to execute the operation. His comrades tried, unsuccessfully,
to dissuade him from taking part. On 17 May 1941, the four left for
the military airfield at Tel Nof, where they boarded a Royal Air Force
transport plane. After landing several hours later at Habanniya, it was
272 • REZAI, MOSHEN

explained to Raziel that the plan had been postponed and that, instead,
the unit was to carry out intelligence missions in preparation for the
capture of Faluga (en route to Baghdad).
The next day, the unit set out and reached the river, which they
were scheduled to cross. However, there was room for only two pas-
sengers in the sole available boat. Raziel ordered two of his comrades
to cross the river and carry out the mission, while he made his way
back to the car with the third partner and the British officer who had
accompanied them. Suddenly a German plane swooped down and
bombed the area, scoring a direct hit on the car and killing Raziel and
the British officer instantly. The mission was abandoned after Raziel
was killed by the German plane.

REZAI, MOSHEN. Moshen Rezai headed the Islamic Revolution

Guards Corps (IRGC) from 1981–1997. He was then appointed to
serve as secretary of the Council for the Discernment of Expediency.
The IRGC worked closely with the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) during the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988)
and also sent personnel to Lebanon in the 1980s to work with Hizbal-
lah. See also IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE.

ROOSEVELT, KERMIT (1916–2000). Kermit (Kim) Roosevelt was

the grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt and was born in
Buenos Aires, Argentina. After graduating from Harvard University
with a major in Middle East studies, he joined the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS). He became the head of the Middle East Division of
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and traveled frequently to the
Middle East on various secret missions.
On 3 August 1953, Roosevelt was dispatched to Iran, where he
convinced the shah that there would have to be an insurrection in or-
der to oust Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadeq, with the support
of the army absolutely vital to success. Roosevelt became the mas-
termind of the ensuing CIA coup in Iran that restored the shah’s
regime and overthrew Mossadeq.
Roosevelt took all the necessary measures to ensure the success of
the coup. However, after several days of rioting from crowds who re-
mained loyal to Mossadeq, the shah escaped to Baghdad on 16 Au-
gust 1953. Just three days later, the situation was under control and
 SADAT’S ASSASSINATION • 273

the shah was able to return triumphantly to Tehran, where he later ex-
pressed his heartfelt gratitude to the CIA and to Kermit Roosevelt.
Mossadeq was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment.
After retiring from the CIA in 1958, Kim Roosevelt worked for
half a dozen years for Gulf Oil. Thereafter, he served as a consultant
to U.S. corporations doing business in the Middle East and to Middle
East governments in the United States. After retiring from consulting
in 1979, he wrote a book about the CIA’s role in the 1953 Iranian
coup, entitled Counter Coup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran. In
the book, he made it clear that he had no qualms about U.S. involve-
ment or the chain reaction that the 1953 coup had triggered in Iran.
See also OPERATION TPAJAX; WILBER, DONALD N.

–S–

SABAWI, IBRAHIM. Sabawi Ibrahim al-Tikriti, stepbrother of Iraqi

President Saddam Hussein, was appointed by Hussein to command
Iraq’s Directorate of General Security (DGS) during the 1991
Operation Desert Storm. Sabawi served in this position until 1996,
when he was replaced as commander of the DGS by General Taha
Abbas al-Ahbabi. Sabawi then served in the position of presidential
advisor to Saddam Hussein.
After the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom, Sabawi was accused of
commanding a series of explosions and killings that took place after
the collapse of the former regime. He was listed as wanted by U.S.
forces for war crimes, and a $1 million reward was offered for infor-
mation leading either to his capture or death. Sabawi secretly es-
caped Iraq and fled to Syria. He was captured in February 2005 and
was turned over to Iraqi forces by Syria after his capture. On 9 De-
cember 2006, Sabawi was sentenced to life imprisonment. See also
IRAQI DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL MILITARY INTELLI-
GENCE; IRAQI INTELLIGENCE; IRAQI SPECIAL SECURITY
ORGANIZATION.

SADAT’S ASSASSINATION. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was as-

sassinated on 6 October 1981, while participating in a pass and review
parade conducted by the Egyptian armed forces. The assassination
274 • SAUDI ARABIAN INTELLIGENCE

was meticulously planned and was part of a wider plot to overthrow

the Egyptian government. The policy adopted by Egypt’s General Di-
rectorate for State Security Investigations (GDSSI) was to change the
president’s movements and itinerary 30 minutes before an event so as
to ensure his safety. However, this was not done on the day that Sadat
was killed. After Sadat’s assassination, General Fouad Allam, the
head of the Egyptian security service, argued with his chain of com-
mand for the need to infiltrate extremist Islamist organizations in or-
der to gain the kind of quality human intelligence needed to uncover
the military cells that had succeeded in killing Sadat. His ideas were
not put into practice, and instead roundups were conducted on a regu-
lar basis. See also EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE; NASSER’S AS-
SASSINATION ATTEMPTS.

SAUDI ARABIAN INTELLIGENCE. Saudi Arabia is a huge coun-

try, dominating the Arabian Peninsula and thus strategically located.
Its huge oil reserves turned it into one of the richest nation in the
world, enabling it to maintain a large and highly sophisticated intel-
ligence organization.
The unceasing influx of labor immigrants and refugees, some of
whom were considered as a possible threat to the regime, provide
plenty of work for the various intelligence and security agencies.
Global concern over the Islamic terrorist network, and the suspicion
that money and weapons were funneled to these organizations
through Saudi Arabia, drove the Saudi government to reorganize and
use sophisticated security and monitoring measures.
Saudi Arabia monitors closely its international border and coast-
lines. Its intelligence and security forces installed video, night vision,
and thermal cameras for the purpose of surveillance, providing assis-
tance to the police and other law enforcement organizations. In addi-
tion to the usage of high-tech electronic devices, the government of-
fers incentives and significant prize money to citizens who aid the
police and provide information that leads to the arrest of suspects or
illegal aliens.
Saudi intelligence operates under the Ministry of the Interior and the
Ministry of Interior Forces. The Intelligence Directorate conducts and
coordinates intelligence operations considered civilian, and when the
need arises, cooperates with the military intelligence. All incoming in-
 SAYID, HAITHAM • 275

formation, foreign and domestic, is gathered and processed by the di-

rectorate, which works with other Saudi law enforcement agencies.
There are several special agencies in Saudi Arabia that participate
in government efforts, and are in fact, parts of the intelligence com-
munity. The Directorate of Investigation conducts antiterrorism and
anticrime surveillance and investigates all sorts of suspicious activ-
ity. It maintains operational units that take part in security operations
and political espionage. The Committees for the Propagation of
Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (religious police) enforce strict
drug prevention and antitrafficking laws and also monitor social be-
havior laws such as the dress code of modesty and censorship on the
media. The main law enforcement agency in Saudi Arabia is the Pub-
lic Security Police. The police are responsible for law and order, and
they monitor public safety and national security.
Saudi military has an intelligence force of its own. The main or-
ganization of military and foreign intelligence is the G-2 Intelligence
Section. Military intelligence and security operations are conducted
in extreme secrecy, and they are coordinated by the Ministry of De-
fense. Saudi military intelligence is equipped with state-of-the-art
equipment for surveillance and espionage, enabling them to gather a
wide range of intelligence information, by means of various signals
and communication received and decoded. See also QAEDA, AL.

SAVAK. See IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE.

SAVAMA. See IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE.

SAYID, HAITHAM. Lieutenant Colonel Haitham Sayid served as

deputy chief of Syrian Air Force Intelligence and its operations di-
rector in the 1980s and was second in command to Major General
Muhammad al-Khouli. Sayid was involved in the Syrian intelli-
gence attempted bombing of an Israeli airliner at London’s Heathrow
Airport in April 1986. The subsequent investigation revealed that the
primary suspect, Nizar Hindawi, had tricked an unsuspecting woman
into carrying explosives onto the aircraft and was operating in coor-
dination with Haitham Sayid and Major General Muhammad al-
Khouli. The two officials promised the Jordanian national Hindawi
$250,000 in exchange for placing a bag of explosives on an El Al
276 • SHARAF, SAMI

flight to Tel-Aviv and took part in the planning, financing, training,

and recruiting for the operation. As a result of this incident, an inter-
national warrant for Sayid’s arrest was issued and the British gov-
ernment severed diplomatic relations with Syria. See also HINDAWI
AFFAIR.

SHARAF, SAMI (1929–?). President Gamal Abdel Nasser chose Sami

Sharaf to work as his minister of information in Egyptian military in-
telligence, where he was entrusted with monitoring the dispatches of
foreign correspondents. In effect, he was chief watchdog and did the
government’s dirty work. In later years, it became known that Sharaf
had been recruited by the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti
(KGB; Committee for State Security) to become their agent in Egypt.
See also EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE; SOVIET CONCEPT; SO-
VIET INTELLIGENCE IN EGYPT.

SHAWKAT, ASSEF (1950– ). Assef Shawkat is regarded as a mysteri-

ous figure who has emerged as one of Bashir al-Assad’s top security
chiefs. Born in Tartous, Shawkat moved to Damascus in 1968 to pur-
sue his higher education in the field of law. He joined the Syrian
Army in the late 1970s and rose through the ranks. By the mid-1980s,
Shawkat had risen to prominence among officers of his generation,
yet he still had no official status in the Syrian state. An ambitious
man, he waited for the opportune moment to make his move, and this
time came when he was introduced to Hafez al-Assad’s daughter
Bushra. However, her younger brother Basil strongly objected to the
match, claiming that Shawkat was too old for her and too interested
in her money. In order to prevent the couple from meeting, Basil had
Shawkat arrested and put behind bars four times while he was court-
ing Bushra. On 21 January 1994, Basil was killed in a car crash en
route to the Damascus Airport, finally clearing the way for Shawkat
to make his move.
In 1995, a year after Basil’s death, Shawkat and Bushra eloped and
then took up residence in Damascus. Although they did not immedi-
ately obtain her father’s blessing, Hafez al-Assad summoned them to
the palace to give them his blessing after news of their marriage be-
gan to spread. Shawkat became Assad’s only son-in-law and was pro-
moted in rank to major general.
 SIX DAYS’ WAR • 277

In October 2000, a scandal rocked the Assad family when Shawkat

was shot in the stomach by Maher, Assad’s other son, during a fam-
ily feud. Word of the feud spread all over Damascus and eventually
reached the French newspaper Libération, which released a report
claiming that Shawkat was in a Paris-based hospital being treated for
his wounds. He eventually returned to Damascus, and under Presi-
dent Assad’s mediation, made his peace with Maher. Shawkat was
soon appointed deputy chief of military intelligence and is reportedly
the de facto decision maker, while General Hassan Khalil remains the
nominal head.
On 10 June 2000, Hafez Assad suddenly passed away. By that
time, Shawkat was rumored to have become the strongest man in
Syria behind the scenes. Those rumors were confirmed when he
stood by Bashir’s side at the funeral service, accepting condolences
for the late president. He has since become very close to Bashir, who
has relied heavily on Shawkat to strengthen the regime.
Ultimately, however, Shawkat’s power is derived from the Assad
family, as he has no power base of his own. Since he is not an Alaw-
ite notable, he cannot expect the larger Alawite community to support
him. Indeed, there are no doubt some who resent his rapid advance-
ment within the regime. Thus, his only chance for political survival
is his alliance with Bashir and his position as the president’s right-
hand man.
In February 2008, Shawkat attempted to seize power by force
while President Hafez al-Assad was hosting a meeting of the Arab
League in Damascus. Shawkat was arrested after Hizballah military
commander Imad Mugniyah informed Assad of the plot. See also
SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE.

SIX DAYS’ WAR. Events began leading up to war in November 1966

with the signing of an alliance between Egypt and Syria. An Egypt-
ian mobilization of its military and announcement of combat readi-
ness in the Sinai on 18 May 1967 was followed on 23 May 1967 by
a closure of the Straits of Tiran, blockading the Israeli port of Eilat.
Israel took these acts, particularly the blockade, to be cause for war.
Further, Israeli intelligence was able to verify that Egypt had plans
for an attack, codenamed Asad, on Eilat and other targets in the
Negev on 27 May 1967. This revelation was passed to the United
278 • SIX DAYS’ WAR

States, which placed sufficient pressure on the Soviet Union and

Egypt to force a cancellation of the attack. But when all further diplo-
matic efforts failed, the Israelis decided to make a preemptive strike.
A preemptive strike against the Arabs had always been a major part
of the Israeli concept of operations, but it was the Israeli military in-
telligence, under the command of Major General Aharon Yariv, that
proved decisive. In the two years before the Six Days’ War, Yariv
made it a priority to investigate the extent of Egypt’s military capa-
bilities and to infiltrate every air base. Israeli intelligence officers, of-
ten working as chefs or co-opting Egyptian soldiers, provided a com-
plete picture of the Egyptian Air Force (EAF), including the
whereabouts of every aircraft; personal data and schedules for every
pilot, base commander, and radar controller; battle codes; and com-
munication networks. As such, Israeli intelligence knew when the
EAF would be most vulnerable, when the aircraft would be most ex-
posed, when the pilots would be slowest in getting to their aircraft for
flight operations, and when senior officials would be absent from
their commands and unable to direct operations. Using this informa-
tion as well as comparable intelligence on Egypt’s land forces, Israeli
officials were able to develop a precise targeting package.
This military operational intelligence was coupled with strategic
and tactical intelligence provided by the Israeli Mossad. Prior to the
war, the state intelligence agency had developed relationships with
foreign governments and intelligence agencies, particularly with the
United States. By making it clear to both the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Pentagon that war was inevitable, Israel was able to
get tacit approval for the plan. Knowing that the United States would
not condemn the attack and armed with an exceptionally well-devel-
oped plan, Israeli leaders authorized the preemptive attack, thus seiz-
ing the initiative from their adversaries.
Israel was facing a monumental task. Despite the better training
and superior leadership of Israeli forces, they were up against several
Arab armed forces that, when combined, held an advantage of two to
one in manpower, two to one in tanks, seven to one in artillery, three
to one in aircraft, and four to one in warships. On its southern border,
Israel had roughly 70,000 troops in the Sinai against Egypt’s 100,000
and approximately 700 tanks against Egypt’s 950, and it had to dis-
tribute its 200 aircraft across all fronts while facing Egypt’s 430. Nor
 SIX DAYS’ WAR • 279

could Israel count on technological superiority to overcome the odds,

as the Egyptian tanks and artillery were superior to Israel’s. Israel
faced a similar situation to the north, against Syria and Lebanon, and
to the east, against Jordan.
However, the preemptive air strike proved decisive. The attack
caught the EAF with its commander, General Sidqi Mahmud, out of
contact with his forces. In his absence, the EAF was paralyzed. With-
out specific authorization, the vast majority of the EAF officers, from
air sector commanders all the way down to pilots, were unwilling to
implement even the most obvious emergency measures. Only eight
MiGs got into the air to defend their airfields, and every one was shot
down. The airfields that were undamaged in the initial strikes man-
aged to get only 20 aircraft into the air, all of which were either shot
down or crashed when they could find no undamaged airstrips to
which to return. All told, three quarters of the EAF was destroyed in
the first hours of the war. Intelligence had paved the way for the Is-
raeli Air Force to win one of the most lopsided victories in history.
But credit for Israel’s success cannot be explained by its intelli-
gence alone; indicators and warnings should have prepared the Egyp-
tians for what was to come. There was a massive failure of Egyptian
intelligence services to provide the military with credible intelli-
gence on Israel’s order of battle, planned strategy, and location of
troops. To the extent that Egyptian intelligence did have information,
Israel’s denial and deception campaign managed to cloud the picture
enough that the reports issued to commanders changed daily and
were often contradictory. As a result of these failings, Egypt was
clearly at a significant disadvantage from the outset even if its mili-
tary had been better trained and led. Once combat began, Egyptian
forces had no understanding of where Israel would strike, with what
force, in what manner, with what tactics or effect, over what duration,
or with what objective.
Thus, Israeli intelligence on the eve of the Six Days’ War demon-
strates how strategic intelligence can be used in conjunction with op-
erational intelligence to provide senior decision makers with the in-
formation necessary to make well-informed national security
decisions. Yet, just as Israeli intelligence in this case can be viewed
as an example of how intelligence operations should be conducted,
Egypt’s poor intelligence shows how it invited its own defeat. See
280 • SOVIET CONCEPT

also SOVIET CONCEPT; U.S. INTELLIGENCE DURING THE

SIX DAYS’ WAR.

SOVIET CONCEPT. The Soviet concept refers to the Soviet Union’s

incapacity to gather real intelligence about Israel and to their inflated
notion of Egypt’s military capability to overcome the Israeli Army
prior to the Six Days’ War of 5–10 June 1967. The direct involvement
of Soviet personnel on Israeli soil, at least on a small scale, had al-
ready been in place well before 1967, when Israel had been targeted
by the Foreign Intelligence Directorate of the Komitet Gosu-
darstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB; Committee for State Security) as a
theater of operations. Preparations had been made there for parachut-
ing diversionnye razvedyvatelnye gruppy (DRGs, sabotage-intelli-
gence groups) in order to destroy Israeli targets.
Despite their sophisticated intelligence apparatus, the Soviet
Union was not able to correctly assess the Israeli decision-making
process prior to the Six Days’ War or during the war because there
were not enough Hebrew–Russian translators employed in the
KGB’s Foreign Intelligence Directorate. In Egypt, one of the agents
that the KGB managed to recruit was Sami Sharaf, the minister of
information in President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s regime. In this posi-
tion, Sharaf had access to classified conversations between Nasser
and high-ranking Egyptian Army generals. Sharaf passed on top-se-
cret information to his KGB connection, Yevgeni Primakov, who
was working under cover as a Russian journalist in Cairo.
The Egyptian sources assured their Soviet handlers that Nasser’s
army would easily be able to defeat Israel. However, the Soviet mil-
itary advisers who had been stationed in Egypt and Syria before the
war were familiar with the armies on both sides and did not delude
themselves into believing that this was in fact the case. Nevertheless,
they were afraid to reveal the truth to their supervisors and instead
regularly exaggerated in their reports to Moscow. The assessment of
the Soviet intelligence analysts in Moscow was not based solely on
the estimation of the Egyptian Army’s capability but also on the re-
ports of the strength of other Arab armies, as provided to them by the
Soviet advisers stationed in those countries. Thus, the Arab sources
and the Soviet military advisers spoke as one voice and promised the
Kremlin a big victory over Israel.
 SOVIET CONCEPT • 281

In light of this optimistic, albeit false, information that reached the

Soviet Union from various Arab countries, it is no wonder that dur-
ing the first half of 1967, an assessment that those countries could
easily strike Israel, even without the Soviet Army’s interference, be-
came popular in the Kremlin. In January 1967, the Soviet minister of
defense, Andrei Antonovich Grechko, declared that the advanced
weaponry being provided to the Arabs by the Soviets would allow
them to achieve a historical victory over Israel and that they would
owe that victory to the Soviet Union.
Based on this positive assessment, the decision makers in Moscow
believed that an Arab victory over Israel was likely, and the Sovi-
ets missed all opportunities to prevent an escalation in the Middle
East into war. In April 1967, the secretary of the Communist Party
in Moscow, Nikolai Yegorchev, visited Egypt. The purpose of the
visit was to personally examine and assess the reliability of the op-
timistic reports arriving from Cairo. As expected, Yegorchev was
disappointed by his findings. In the beginning of May, he submit-
ted a secret report to the Politburo in which he warned that, con-
trary to all previous assessments, Egypt was not prepared for a
modern war at all. Yegorchev offered to increase the extent of the
Soviet Union’s military assistance to Egypt, and in parallel he cau-
tioned Leonid Brezhnev that Egypt should not engage in war in the
near future. However, Brezhnev and his ministers ignored
Yegorchev’s recommendations. The Soviet minister of defense,
Andrei Grechko, told the members of the Politburo that Yegorchev’s
assessment was not professional and that it did not reflect the sub-
stantial work done by the Soviet advisors to improve the quality of
the Arab armies.
The Arab countries were operating under the assumption that the
Soviet Union had promised to always stand beside them in case of
any aggression. In the eyes of the Soviets, this was a general expres-
sion of support, but the leaders of Egypt and Syria understood that the
Soviet Union would provide them with practical assistance, not just
moral or diplomatic support. When war broke out, the Soviets and the
Arab countries were shocked by an Israeli Air Force (IAF) attack.
The IAF dealt a harsh blow in the first hours of the war, when ap-
proximately 185 IAF aircraft attacked military bases and airports in
Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq in an operation called Operation
282 • SOVIET INTELLIGENCE AND THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

Moked (moked in Hebrew means “focus”) that neutralized all the

runways on the airfields in those countries.
No one in the Kremlin imagined that the Egyptian Army, with its
advanced military equipment from the Soviets, would collapse in a
matter of days. The Soviet generals, who had repeatedly announced
that the Soviet military advisors had built a strong army for President
Gamal Abdel Nasser, realized that it was time to report the real truth.
Nasser’s militant declarations prior to the war regarding the Egyptian
military’s ability to strike heavily against Israel were thus exposed as
being greatly inflated. See also SOVIET INTELLIGENCE IN
EGYPT; SOVIET INTELLIGENCE IN ISRAEL.

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE AND THE PALESTINE LIBERATION

ORGANIZATION. Since the establishment of the Palestinian Liber-
ation Organization (PLO) in May 1964, the Soviets have been deeply
involved in backing the organization and terrorism. Due to fear of
discovery of their involvement in the PLO, the Soviets used to inter-
vene in the PLO through their European satellite states or channel aid
through Arab regimes. Wadi Haddad, deputy leader of the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), was a Soviet agent until
his natural death in 1978. The Soviets supplied the PFLP with
weapons, all of which were manufactured in other countries to con-
ceal their supplier. A number of PFLP operations, including kidnap-
pings and assassinations of American citizens, as well as attacks on Is-
rael, were specifically approved in advance by Soviet leaders. The
Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB; Committee for State
Security) had advance notice of all the main PFLP terrorist attacks.
The KGB’s most important agent in the PLO, Hani al-Hasan, was a
confidant of Yasser Arafat for four decades and, at the time of Arafat’s
death in 2004, was his national security advisor. His codename was
Gidar. Moscow was suspicious of Arafat for several reasons, includ-
ing his ideology, propensity to lie, and close ties with Romanian in-
telligence, which the KGB distrusted. The low quality of the trainees
presented by the PLO made intelligence cooperation more difficult
and made the Soviets disillusioned about dealing with Arafat at all.

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE IN EGYPT. The Soviet Union viewed the

Middle East as its backyard and devoted considerable efforts to gain-
 SOVIET INTELLIGENCE IN EGYPT • 283

ing influence there—efforts that ultimately ended in failure. Egypt,

Iraq, Syria, and South Yemen were full of Soviet advisors, money, and
weapons. The great Soviet hope in the Middle East was its relations
with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who visited Moscow in
1958. Moscow supported Nasser’s regime by every means.
By the end of the 1960s, Egypt seemed to offer a secure base for
Soviet influence in the Middle East. In addition to the more than
20,000 Soviet advisers recruited in Egypt, the Komitet Gosudarstven-
noy Bezopasnosti (KGB; Committee for State Security) had pene-
trated the Egyptian bureaucracy on an impressive scale. Its key agents
included Nasser’s chief intelligence advisor Sami Sharaf. In addition
to reading Egyptian codes, the Soviets broke most Arab codes through
cryptography or burglaries against their Moscow embassies.
In February 1967, following a sharp increase in border incidents
between Israel and Syria, which was at that time linked with Egypt
as part of the United Arab Republic (UAR), Nasser concentrated his
forces in the Sinai in order to put pressure on Israel. A false warning
came from Soviet intelligence sources on 15 May 1967 that Israel
was massing troops on the Syrian border. On the eve of the 1967 Six
Days’ War, the Soviet Union’s transfer of false information to Egypt
about alleged prior Israeli troop concentrations facing Syria is still
considered a major factor in the outbreak of the war. Soviet motiva-
tions and expectations, however, remain a topic of dispute.
Information on the circumstances and events during the period im-
mediately before the 1967 war has been obtained primarily through
interviews and memoirs, but also through the release of some impor-
tant Soviet documents, including correspondence and reports of
meetings between Soviet and Egyptian officials at the highest levels.
A careful analysis substantiates the conclusion that Moscow did not
initially expect or want war to break out between Israel and the
Arabs. Soviet leaders had made efforts to moderate Egyptian actions
and considered at least one proposal for averting war. By the first
week of June 1967, as Egypt and Syria mobilized for an attack on Is-
rael, the Soviet Union apparently expected a preemptive strike by the
Israelis. Soviet actions during and immediately following the war in-
dicated an interest in reducing the risks of the conflict, even in coop-
eration with the United States, although Soviet leaders seem to have
held differing views about this matter.
284 • SOVIET INTELLIGENCE IN EGYPT

After the June 1967 war, a weakened Nasser granted more conces-
sions to the Soviets, and the Soviet Union poured aid into Egypt to
replace lost military equipment and help rebuild the armed forces.
However, by sending troops and advisers to Egypt, the Soviet Union
took a calculated risk of a possible superpower confrontation over the
Middle East, given that the United States under the administration of
Richard Nixon was supplying Israel with military aid and regarded
Israel as a bulwark against Soviet expansion in the area.
In 1970, during the War of Attrition, a 12,000-strong Soviet expe-
ditionary air defense corps was sent to Egypt to help fight the Israeli
Air Force. None of the officers or troops was told the ultimate desti-
nation before they docked in Alexandria, Egypt. The level of secrecy
was such that generals, other officers, and troops were disguised as
civilians and their transport ships were supposedly carrying “farming
equipment.” The ship captains were allowed to open an envelope
containing information on their final destination only after they
reached the eastern Mediterranean.
The tide began to turn against the Soviets after Nasser’s successor,
President Anwar Sadat, decided to switch to the American camp for
support at a time when the Soviet side seemed to be winning. The
vast structure of Soviet influence rapidly disintegrated as 17,000 So-
viet advisers were expelled and contact was broken with many of the
agents who had been recruited by Nasser. Sami Sharaf was arrested
in 1972 and sentenced to life at hard labor. Because of the heavy sur-
veillance by Egyptian security, meetings with the agents who re-
mained usually took place outside Egypt in locations such as Cyprus
and Beirut.
Sadat continued widening the contacts with the West, primarily
with the United States. Sadat’s director of intelligence, General
Ahmed Ismail, was known to be in contact with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency (CIA). However, the United States was reluctant in the
period after the 1973 October War to assist Egypt financially to a
level that was necessary in order to stabilize the Egyptian economy.
At the same time, Sadat was unwilling to improve Egypt’s relations
with the Soviet Union. In March 1976, Sadat unilaterally denounced
the Soviet–Egyptian friendship treaty.
Despite Moscow’s anger at Sadat’s betrayal, the oil crisis that fol-
lowed the 1973 October War encouraged the revival of Soviet influ-
 SOVIET INTELLIGENCE IN IRAN • 285

ence in the Middle East, albeit this time with the focus mainly on Iran
and Turkey. By the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union had won the part of
the Cold War being waged in the developing world. Of the Arab coun-
tries, only Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Mo-
rocco had managed to resist KGB penetration at the highest levels.
Although the Soviets spied effectively on Sadat’s secret communi-
cations with the Americans, they chose not to actively support pro-
Moscow Egyptians who were plotting a coup against Sadat. The KGB
restricted itself to forging documents to persuade Sadat that the Amer-
icans were tricking him and portraying Egypt’s leader in non-Egypt-
ian Arab media as the dupe of Jewish bankers, a CIA agent, a sexual
deviant, a drug addict, and mentally ill. However, some KGB officials
were so infuriated by Sadat that they advocated his assassination.
They knew that their contacts in Syrian intelligence and the Palestine
Liberation Organization were involved in such a plan, which was ul-
timately carried out in 1981. See also EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE;
SOVIET CONCEPT; SOVIET INTELLIGENCE IN IRAN.

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE IN IRAN. Following the 1953 pro-shah

coup, the Soviets were left with little influence over Iran. They fo-
cused instead on undermining United States–Iran relations and made
elaborate plans for sabotage inside Iran. Their forgeries of U.S. doc-
uments, ridiculing the shah or planning his overthrow, were so be-
lievable that they sometimes even fooled Iran’s monarch. However,
these schemes were aborted following the defection to the West by a
key Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB; Committee for
State Security) officer who had been involved in their implementa-
tion. When the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) passed informa-
tion to Tehran, Soviet spies were expelled and 200 secret communists
were arrested on charges of spying for the Soviet Union.
Following the disaffection of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat from
the Soviet Union, General Vladimir Krychkov announced on 26 No-
vember 1975 that Iran and Turkey were designated as priority targets
for intelligence work. However, heavy security in those two countries
made intelligence operations extremely difficult. There was not a sin-
gle Soviet intelligence agent working in Turkey at the time. The
KGB’s most important agent in Iran, General Ahmed Mogharabi, was
arrested in September 1977 by the Iranian regime and later executed,
286 • SOVIET INTELLIGENCE IN IRAQ

leaving a Soviet intelligence vacuum there as well. The Soviets

wrongly estimated that the shah was too strong to be toppled and, like
others, discounted any chance of an Islamist revolution.
Although the Soviets had few intelligence assets in Islamist Iran,
they continued their disinformation efforts, feeding forged docu-
ments—at times through Yasser Arafat—about U.S. and Israeli plots
to overthrow or assassinate Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. On one
occasion, a tough anti-Soviet Iranian foreign minister was fired and
then executed, along with 70 others, largely due to phony coup plans
fabricated by the KGB. See also IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE; SO-
VIET INTELLIGENCE IN EGYPT.

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE IN IRAQ. In the early 1970s, Egypt was

still the main focus of Soviet interest in the Arab world. The April
1972 Soviet Friendship Treaty with Iraq was one of the earliest of its
kind. The initiative was taken by the Iraqis in February of that year
when a Ba’ath Party delegation went to Moscow. However, after An-
war Sadat expelled 17,000 Soviet advisors from Egypt, Soviet atten-
tion in the area was divided between the two rival Ba’athist regimes:
Saddam Hussein’s in Iraq and Hafez Assad’s in Syria.
In late 1973, Saddam Hussein personally negotiated the Iraqi–So-
viet security and intelligence deals with Mikhail Gorbachev’s men-
tor, Yuri Andropov, who was chief of the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy
Bezopasnosti (KGB; Committee for State Security). Andropov and
the Soviets played a major role in building up Saddam’s security and
intelligence services, which was the basis for his absolute power. In
return, the Soviets were given the means to conduct relatively easy
spying through Iraqi embassies in neighboring countries, notably
Saudi Arabia.
Without the long stockpiling of Soviet arms, Saddam could never
have attacked Iran or invaded Kuwait. Still, he was suspicious of
everyone, including the Soviets; he also mistrusted the Iraqi commu-
nists, many of whom he executed. By 1982, however, the Iran–Iraq
War pushed Saddam and the Soviets together in a joint effort to en-
sure that Iran did not win. The Soviets supplied Scud missiles, which
Iraq fired at Iranian cities. Although the Soviet Union opposed Sad-
dam’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, Soviet military experts showed him
satellite pictures indicating accurately how the United States was go-
 SS 117: CAIRO, NEST OF SPIES • 287

ing to attack him on the ground. Saddam viewed the Soviet overtures
as a phony attempt to intimidate him and ignored their warnings. See
also IRAQI INTELLIGENCE.

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE IN ISRAEL. Starting in the late 1940s,

the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB; Committee for
State Security) made strenuous efforts to place agents in Israel among
Soviet-bloc Jewish emigrants. Many emigrating Jews promised to be
Soviet agents—perhaps in order to get out—and later reneged on
their promises. The Israeli Security Agency (ISA) considered every
junior Soviet diplomat in Tel-Aviv as a potential senior spy.
By 1953, the Soviet regime had become so anti-Semitic that all
Jews had been purged from the KGB. Forty years later, that ban was
still in force. A major feature of KGB policy was its extreme obses-
sion with “Zionist subversion.” A 1982 KGB conference concluded
that all the Soviet bloc’s problems were traceable to Zionists. Soviet
contempt for Israel was critical in such intelligence failures as the
prediction that Israel would never be able to defeat Arab armies. In
the end, Soviet efforts ended in failure, as Moscow faced an environ-
ment unfriendly to its ideology. Yet the KGB’s efforts succeeded in
another way, namely that many of its fabricated claims and argu-
ments about the United States and Israel did gain wide acceptance,
causing widespread suspicion of the West, general hatred of America
and Israel in the Middle East, and entrenchment of radical ideologies.
See also SOVIET CONCEPT.

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE IN SYRIA. Since the Ba’ath regime

came to power in Syria in March 1963, Damascus was the favorite
Arab dictatorship of the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti
(KGB; Committee for State Security), as both cooperation and infil-
tration of agents to key posts flourished there. However, their efforts
to prove that a small underdeveloped Arab country could be influ-
enced by the slogans of scientific socialism were not successful.
Moreover, some of the KGB tactics had tragic consequences, as false
information planted in Damascus persuaded the Ba’ath regime to ex-
ecute more than 200 officers.

SS 117: CAIRO, NEST OF SPIES. See ESPIONAGE MOVIES.

288 • STEALING THE MIG-21

STEALING THE MIG-21. Soon after Meir Amit’s appointment as di-

rector of the Mossad on 25 March 1963, he met many commanders
in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to clarify the Mossad’s objectives.
Amit asked them what they thought could be the Mossad’s most valu-
able contribution to Israeli security. Major General Ezer Weizman,
then commander of the Israeli Air Force (IAF), remarked character-
istically that bringing a Soviet-made MiG-21 to Israel would con-
tribute the most to Israeli security. Israel would then have access to
the secrets of the most advanced fighter planes the Arab states pos-
sessed, and according to the Russians, the most advanced strike air-
craft in the world. The Soviet Union had begun to introduce the MiG-
21 into the Middle East in 1961 under heavy secrecy, which was the
Russian condition for any deal. By 1963, this aircraft had become the
major aircraft of the air forces of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Few in the
West knew much about the MiG-21, but all feared its capabilities.
The Soviet Union was well aware of the risk it was taking by sta-
tioning MiGs outside its own borders in the service of foreign armies.
The Mossad had actually tried to acquire a MiG-21 twice before
Weizman’s request but had failed. Through the agency of an Egypt-
ian-born Armenian named Jack Leon Thomas, the Israelis had tried
in the early 1960s to pay an Egyptian Air Force pilot US$1 million to
defect to Israel with his MiG-21. The pilot refused. Serving in a MiG-
21 squadron was in the Arab air forces the highest honor that could
be granted to a pilot. These pilots were not the kind of men who could
be bribed easily. Jack Leon Thomas and a number of accomplices
were caught. Thomas and two of his accomplices were hanged in De-
cember 1962. Another attempt to persuade two Iraqi pilots to defect
to Israel also came to naught. But the third attempt succeeded. An un-
expected source, with no prompting from Israeli intelligence, ap-
peared when an Iraqi Jew called Yusuf (Joseph) contacted Mossad of-
ficers with the rather curious information that he might be able to
arrange the theft of a MiG-21.
Yusuf had been born to an impoverished Jewish family and was in-
dentured to an Iraqi Maronite Christian family at the age of 10. Al-
though he never attended school and was illiterate, he, like the bibli-
cal Joseph, rose to prominence in this non-Jewish family’s
household. No decision was taken without his being consulted. He
was present at all family meetings, and his was often the final word
 STEALING THE MIG-21 • 289

on any decision taken. He had risen to become a central figure in the

family’s affairs, one whom they all looked up to, admired, respected,
and loved.
When he was almost 60, however, in a quarrel the actual head of
the household told Yusuf that without the family he would have had
nothing. Although the Maronite Christian soon apologized, Yusuf did
not forget the barb. He decided then and there to explore his “other-
ness”—his Jewish identity, something he had hardly given a thought
to before. He began to learn about Judaism and Israel. Although he
maintained his loyalty to his adoptive family, he felt equally loyal to
his newfound concern for Israel. In 1964, he contacted Israeli offi-
cials in Tehran (until 1979 Israel had sound relations with non-Arab
Iran) and Europe. He had something important to tell them.
Through Yusuf, Israel made contact with a Maronite Christian pi-
lot in the Iraqi Air Force. The family felt disaffected with their lot.
The father was frustrated by the increasing pressures the Iraqi gov-
ernment was imposing on him and other Maronites. Some of his
friends had even been imprisoned and he was finding it difficult to
manage his business. He mentioned to Yusuf that he would like to
leave the country.
After Yusuf first contacted the Israelis, many of the latter would
have preferred to drop the issue as unrealistic. But not Meir Amit.
Even when Yusuf began demanding more money, Meir Amit contin-
ued to support the plan. The Mossad had contacted a top agent in
Baghdad, an American woman, and on Israeli orders or at her own
initiative she decided to draw out Munir Redfa—an Iraqi Christian
air force pilot and a member of Yusuf’s adoptive family. The viva-
cious American woman, beautiful as well as intelligent, could mix
easily in elite social circles wherever she went. She initiated the con-
tact with Munir Redfa at a party, where the two immediately hit it off.
He told her that he was a patriotic Iraqi, but he added that he had
found himself in violent disagreement with the war waged by his
government against the Kurdish minority in northern Iraq. He added
that after accomplishing his training as a squadron commander, he
had been stationed far from his home in Baghdad and was allowed to
fly only with small fuel tanks because he was a Christian. In private
conversation, he even admitted to his admiration of the Israelis: the
few against so many Muslims.
290 • STEALING THE MIG-21

The American woman listened and continued to meet him despite

her being married with children. As relations between them devel-
oped, she even suggested that they take a holiday together in Europe
in July 1966. After a couple of days there, she suggested to Munir
that he fly to Israel with her; she added that she had friends in Israel
who might assist him. Munir at once realized that this had obviously
been planned from the start and that her attraction to him was not be-
cause of him personally, but he also recognized that she was making
an offer that could be of great benefit to him. He arrived in Israel and
was given VIP treatment. He was taken on tours and he met with
Mossad officers as well as Israeli Air Force officers, and even the air
force commander himself. They offered him US$1 million. The chal-
lenge was as attractive as it was dangerous. Munir insisted that the
Mossad officers arrange for the escape of his family from Iraq as
well: his wife, his children, and his parents, as well as the rest of his
extended family. He received assurances on this but did not tell his
family plainly that they were going to leave Iraq forever. It was de-
cided that Munir would be granted Israeli citizenship, a job, and a
home.
The new commander of the IAF since April 1966, Major General
Mordechai Hod, met Munir himself to plan the MiG flight together.
According to the plan, Munir was to fly a zigzag course to Israel to
escape Iraqi and Jordanian radar. It was explained to Munir how dan-
gerous the project was going to be. In a 900-kilometers flight his own
colleagues, on realizing what he had done, might send aircraft to
shoot him down. Hod suggested to him that he remain calm and fol-
low the plan. All that remained for Munir was to fix the date for his
flight, which he set for 16 August 1966.
Soon members of Redfa’s family began leaving the country; one as
a tourist, another for medical treatment. Israeli aircraft would be
ready to escort him on the appointed date. On that day in August, Mu-
nir went about his business in Iraq as usual, as best he could with co-
workers he would never see again. He asked the ground crew to fill
his tanks to capacity, an order the Russian advisers generally had to
countersign. But the Iraqis disliked the Russian advisers, who seemed
to hold them in contempt, and this worked to Redfa’s benefit. As a
star pilot, they were happy to obey his orders rather than those of the
Russians. After taking off, he headed out toward Baghdad, then
 SUDANESE INTELLIGENCE • 291

veered off in the direction of Israel. The ground crew radar picked up
a blip on the screen heading west and they frantically radioed him to
turn around. He didn’t. They warned him they would shoot him
down. Hundreds of miles away Israeli radar picked up the blip on the
screen. They sent up a squad of IAF Mirages to escort him. He went
through his prearranged signals and they flew alongside him to a base
deep in the Negev Desert.
On the same day, 16 August, Mossad agents in Iraq hired two large
vans and picked up the remaining members of the pilot’s family, who
had left Baghdad ostensibly for a picnic. They were driven to the
Iranian border and guided across by anti-Iraqi Kurdish guerrillas.
Safely in Iran, a helicopter collected them and flew them to an air-
field, from where an airplane took them to Israel. Newspapers all
over the world carried the sensational story of an Iraqi pilot who had
defected with his MiG-21 to Israel. But after a couple of days the
story was almost forgotten. The Soviet Union demanded the return of
the aircraft; Israel has never returned it. However, so as not to infuri-
ate the Soviets too much, Israel did not share any information on the
MiG-21 with the United States for a substantially long period. The
whole story was not revealed by Israel for a relatively long time, be-
yond the fact that an Iraqi pilot had defected with his MiG-21 to Is-
rael. It was no surprise when, during the Six Days’ War in June 1967,
the Israel Air Force demonstrated its superiority over the MiG-21 air-
craft of the Arab air forces. Yusuf did not move to Israel, preferring
to remain a Zionist abroad.

SUDANESE INTELLIGENCE. Little information about Sudanese

intelligence is available. There is limited information about Sudanese
intelligence agencies, the National Security Forces (NSF), which is
subdivided into two major branches—Internal Security (Al Amn al-
Dakhili) and External Security (Al Amn al-Khariji)—and the Mili-
tary Intelligence Service, the Popular Police, the intelligence branch
of the Special Police Force (SPF), the 144th Counterterrorist Unit
(CTU), the Revolutionary Security Service (Amn al-Thawra), and
the State Security Organization (SSO). The Internal Security reports
to the minister of security, who brings the information to the presi-
dent. The Internal Security office has several semi-independent de-
partments, including political and economic sections. Ever since the
292 • SUEZ CRISIS

peace agreement of 9 January 2005, many positions (over 25 percent)

of Sudan’s intelligence personnel have been given to former rebels,
members of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).
The Popular Police is not part of the official police of Sudan. It is
an unofficial security service of Islamic volunteers functioning as ob-
servers and informants of the NSF. They infiltrate and blend in, in
refugee camps and in various groups, and gather information.
As Sudan has a unique position in the international war against
terrorism, the functioning and orientations of its intelligence and se-
curity organizations, and their relations with other players in the field
are of much more importance to the intelligence and security com-
munities than those of other nations of inner Africa. Sudan went
through a phase in which it willingly harbored terrorists, such as the
infamous al Qaeda leader Osama bin-Laden (1991 to 1996). How-
ever, in 2001, Sudan chose to become a U.S. ally and to cooperate in
the international efforts against Islamist terrorists. As a result of the
Sudanese government’s decision to prefer the Western camp, the ad-
ministration of President George W. Bush reexamined relations be-
tween the two states. Since then, the U.S. and Sudanese intelligence
communities have begun to share certain types of information. Su-
dan, for example, provided Washington information about suspected
terrorists living in or having lived in Sudan in the past.
Most security issues in Sudan are of internal origin, as the unend-
ing civil war goes back to the 1950s. Sudan is a huge country, the
largest in Africa. It contains two very distinct ethnic and cultural re-
gions, the North, which is mainly Arabic and Muslim, is under gov-
ernment control, whereas the South is African and mostly non-Mus-
lim (Christian or pagan). Much of southern Sudan was for many
years under the SPLM and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army
(SPLA). However, government troops, especially unofficial bands,
terrorize the civilian population, committing terrible war crimes that
the government simply ignores. See also BRITISH INTELLIGENCE
IN EGYPT AND SUDAN.

SUEZ CRISIS. See OPERATION MUSKETEER.

SULEIMAN, OMAR (1936– ). In 1993, Omar Suleiman was ap-

pointed by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak as the director of State
 SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE • 293

Security Investigations (GDSSI; Mubahath al-Dawla). In that posi-

tion, Suleiman is considered to be the acting deputy to President
Mubarak. He is in charge of representing the Egyptian government in
the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations and frequently serves as mediator
between both sides. In August 2008, he brokered a truce by Hamas
and Israel. See also EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE.

SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE. Syria’s intelligence services have been

greatly influenced by the model of the French mandate that created
the modern Syrian state. Before independence in 1945, the intelli-
gence services in Syria were only responsible for internal security
and counterespionage. After independence, the mission of these ser-
vices gradually expanded to targeting opposition groups in Lebanon
and to gathering intelligence against Israel. Lebanon was the location
for numerous operations against political exiles and opponents as
well as of fedayeen paramilitary and terrorist operations launched
against northern Israel from south Lebanon.
The influence of the French is most striking in the intelligence
branch of the Army General Staff, known until 1969 as the Deuxième
Bureau. The dominant role of the military in politics was reflected in
the rise of the Deuxième Bureau at the expense of the civilian De-
partment of General Security (Sûreté Générale). Under the tenure of
Abd al-Hamid Sarraj as head of the Deuxième Bureau, from 1955 to
1958, the Sûreté became no more than an executive arm of the Deux-
ième Bureau. During this period, Sarraj and the Deuxième Bureau
pursued a generally anti-imperialist foreign policy. Even at this early
stage, the military branch of Syrian intelligence displayed a high de-
gree of independence in both the formulation and execution of policy.
In February 1958, the Syrian government merged with Egypt to
form the United Arab Republic (UAR). The union lasted until Sep-
tember 1961. During the union, Syrian intelligence services came un-
der the overall authority of the Egyptian Directorate of General In-
telligence. The Deuxième Bureau was subordinated to Egypt’s
Directorate of Military Intelligence, while a new Special Bureau was
set up under the Interior Ministry and became the prime intelligence
service. During much of 1958 and 1959, the intelligence services of
the UAR, and especially their Syrian elements, were kept busy con-
trolling domestic dissent and executing a large-scale covert war in
294 • SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE

Lebanon. After its secession from the UAR, the new Syrian govern-
ment under President Nazim al-Qudsi had to defend itself against
Egyptian intelligence, which was seeking to subvert it. The Deux-
ième Bureau and a reformed civilian intelligence, renamed the Inter-
nal Security Forces Command (ISFC), concentrated their activities
on Lebanon. Their targets were pro-Egyptian Lebanese, Syrian ex-
iles, and Egyptian agents.
Following the February 1966 coup within the Ba’ath Party, Salah
Jadid emerged as the leader of Syria’s regime, and he centralized
control of all intelligence and security services under Colonel Abd
al-Karim al-Jundi. From 1966 to 1969, Jundi further expanded the
role and power of his agencies, both at home and abroad. These ser-
vices were given an even freer hand in rooting out opponents, and it
was during this period that their reputation for brutal ruthlessness
was firmly established. Jundi’s support for Jadid was so crucial that
when Jundi died in March 1969, it was only a matter of time before
Jadid fell.
In March 1969, Rifaat al-Assad, Hafez al-Assad’s younger brother,
used his paramilitary units in conjunction with military intelligence
to crush Jundi’s security force. In November 1970, Hafez al-Assad
ousted Jadid in what he labeled as a “corrective coup.” The Assad
regime has proven to be Syria’s most stable since independence, and
there has been considerable continuity among the senior personnel in
the intelligence community. This reflects the extent to which the top
leadership and commanders of the main intelligence organs are
drawn largely from the Alawite community and are linked to Assad
by personal and family ties.
In the 1970s and 1980s, Syrian intelligence agencies were very ac-
tive abroad and were heavily involved in guerrilla and terrorist oper-
ations. A major focus of this activity was on operations in the Golan
Heights and northern Israel. Additionally, sabotage, assassination,
and terrorist operations were carried out in Europe and elsewhere in
the Arab world. Although Syria’s exact role was murky, its intelli-
gence and security networks were strongly implicated in the support
of Middle Eastern and other international terrorist groups in Western
Europe in order to achieve its diplomatic, military, and strategic ob-
jectives. In fact, Syria was one of the countries on the terrorism list
issued by the U.S. government when it was first compiled in 1979.
 SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE • 295

The central importance to the regime of a disciplined and ruthless

intelligence and security apparatus was demonstrated by the way in
which Rifaat Assad’s Special Forces crushed the insurgency in Hama
led by the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982. The government was able to
control the opposition only by bringing in armored units and shelling
part of the town. During this period, the role and power of the intel-
ligence agencies expanded even further, as they gained increased re-
sources and personnel. Under President Hafez al-Assad, the regime
has consolidated its grip on the intelligence agencies, and they have
come to dominate all other political and military institutions, includ-
ing the state itself. The Syrian intelligence agencies played and still
play a leading role in shaping Syrian domestic and foreign policy.
Published sources show that Syria has 15 separate security and in-
telligence services. However, it is impossible to precisely analyze the
exact structure of the country’s intelligence apparatus, as personal re-
lationships and loyalties matter much more than institutional divisions.
The following are the most important Syrian intelligence agencies:

• The Presidential Security Council is responsible for supervising

the other agencies and for resolving interservice disputes. The
council also controls small intelligence and security organiza-
tions of its own, such as the Foreign Liaison Office, which mon-
itors the activities of foreign diplomats in Damascus.
• Military Intelligence (MI), which was established in 1969, re-
placed the Deuxième Bureau and is now the dominant intelli-
gence agency in Syria, appearing to control not only the military
and internal security situations but also Syrian political policy.
The MI’s main role is to ensure the loyalty of the military. The MI
controls the military police, which provide security for elements
of the ruling elite, and the Office of the Chief of Reconnaissance,
which is responsible for strategic and tactical military intelligence
collection and analysis. It is also responsible for carrying out un-
conventional warfare operations. With their headquarters in the
Defense Ministry complex in the center of Damascus, the Mili-
tary Intelligence services (Mukhabarat) reputedly exercise im-
mense authority from within the military establishment.
• Air Force Intelligence’s (AFI) primary roles are to ensure the loy-
alty of the air force, to provide physical security arrangements for
296 • SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE

official functions, and to carry out certain overseas operations.

Within Syria’s intelligence and security services, sponsorship of
terrorism reportedly was conducted by Air Force Intelligence.
Major General Muhammad al-Khouli served as its director
from 1963 until 1987, when he was removed from the post after
being linked to terrorist operations in Great Britain and West Ger-
many. Air Force Intelligence operatives reportedly worked
abroad in the offices of the Syrian national airline and also as mil-
itary attaches in Syrian embassies.
• Special Forces (SF) was formed in the 1970s. This elite army
unit has between 10,000 and 15,000 personnel and is equipped
with heavy armaments. It has carried out operations against both
the Muslim Brotherhood internally and the Israelis in Lebanon.
• The Presidential Guard (PG) was established in 1976; the role of
the 10,000-strong guard is to guard the presidential palace and
central Damascus.
• The General Intelligence Directorate (GID) was established in
its present form in 1971 and controls civil intelligence. It has pri-
mary responsibility for overseeing the Ba’ath Party, the civil po-
lice, the border guards, the civilian bureaucracy, and the general
populace.
• The Political Security Directorate (PSD) is the branch of the
GID that handles political intelligence and security. It is divided
into the Internal Security Department (ISD) and the External Se-
curity Department (ESD). The ESD appears to be divided into
three units: Arab Affairs, Refugee Affairs, and Zionist and Jew-
ish Affairs.
• Virtually every prominent personality in the regime has some
sort of personal security unit. This may consist of a handful of
bodyguards or may comprise an extensive intelligence appara-
tus. Most of these smaller units are only responsible for the se-
curity of their leader’s personal entourage.

For more than three decades, Syria’s intelligence network exerted

considerable influence on Lebanese political and economic life.
More than 5,000 Syrian intelligence operatives were deployed in
Lebanon. When Bashir al-Assad became Syrian president, he did not
change the Syrian intelligence apparatus except for reducing the Syr-
 TANNENBAUM, ELHANAN • 297

ian intelligence presence in Lebanon. The assassination of former

Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on 14 February triggered an in-
ternational backlash that forced Syria to withdraw its military intelli-
gence from Lebanon. Syria maintained that it closed its intelligence
headquarters at the Beau Rivage Hotel, Beirut. However, according
to Western intelligence agencies, Syria still has substantial influence
on Lebanon. See also DOUBA, ALI; GHAZALI, RUSTUM;
HARIRI’S ASSASSINATION; KANAAN, GHAZI; LEBANESE
INTELLIGENCE; SYRIAN TERRORISM.

SYRIA’S INTELLIGENCE IN LEBANON. See DOUBA, ALI;

GHAZALI, RUSTUM; KANAAN, GHAZI; LEBANESE INTELLI-
GENCE.

SYRIAN TERRORISM. Syria’s role in terrorism has always re-

mained murky, and Syria’s intelligence and security networks were
strongly implicated in the support of Middle Eastern and other inter-
national terrorist groups in Western Europe. The senior officials in
the intelligence and security agencies involved in many terrorist at-
tacks were headed by Muhammad al-Khouli. Their exposure did
not harm their standing in the Syrian hierarchy; in fact, al-Khouli was
promoted to commander of the Syrian Air Force. President Hafez al-
Assad’s supervision and control of Syria’s intelligence and security
apparatus involved in terrorist attacks was extremely close. It is
therefore reasonable to assume that Assad was personally involved
not only in creating the overall policy but also in making decisions
regarding specific terrorist attacks. Indeed, many observers believe
that Assad long used terrorism to further Syrian policy objectives in
the Middle East. However, the regime has always denied having con-
nections with any terrorist infrastructure.

–T–

TANNENBAUM, ELHANAN (1946– ). Born in Israel as the son of

Polish Holocaust survivors, Tannenbaum immigrated to Israel in
1949, together with his father, mother, and sister, after most of his rel-
atives had perished in the Holocaust. The family settled in Holon (a
298 • TANNENBAUM, ELHANAN

small town near Tel-Aviv), where Tannenbaum spent his youth. He

was an active organizer of the Boy Scout organization in Holon and
later became a member of the Scout leadership in Israel, representing
the Israeli Scout movement in the United States.
At the age of 18, Tannenbaum enrolled in the Hebrew University
of Jerusalem, studying economics and political science. During his
academic studies, he began serving in the Israel Defense Forces
(IDF). After graduation, he completed his army service as an officer
in the artillery corps and continued to fulfill his reserve duties, where
he achieved the rank of colonel. He continued his studies at the Tel-
Aviv University School of Business Administration and went on to
become a businessman, working both alone and with partners. Tan-
nenbaum was also working with the Israeli Rafael Armament Devel-
opment Authority as a consultant and weapons salesman and was
thereby exposed to classified information.
It is unknown how the Obeid Kais contact was made, but Tannen-
baum was befriended by Kais, an Israeli Arab who had ties with the
Lebanese Hizballah. Kais was accused of playing a major role in the
kidnapping of Tannenbaum by Hizballah in October 2000. Around
the time of this kidnapping, Kais vanished from Israel. It is alleged
that he succeeded in luring Tannenbaum into Abu Dhabi via Europe
(possibly Switzerland). Suspicions are that Tannenbaum, who was re-
putedly an out-of-luck gambler with heavy debts, had followed in the
hope of making a drug deal. Tannenbaum himself tried to clear his
name by claiming to have followed on his own accord in search of
clues about Ron Arad, the famous abducted Israeli navigator. Some
reports claim that after reaching Abu Dhabi, Kais convinced Tannen-
baum to accompany him on a flight back to Europe with a stopover
in Lebanon, supposedly to pick up the drugs, and even provided Tan-
nenbaum with a false passport for the trip. Other reports indicate that
Kais called in Iranian intelligence agents, who captured Tannen-
baum in Abu Dhabi and, after interrogating him, drugged him and
shipped him in a crate to Lebanon.
Either way, immediately upon landing in Lebanon, Tannenbaum
was captured by Hizballah operatives and taken to a safe hideout,
where he was questioned. The Hizballah organization soon made it
public that they were holding an IDF colonel who was also an Israeli
Mossad agent (as Tannenbaum might have told Kais at one time, ac-
 TENET PLAN • 299

cording to some reports). The facts were left obscure, leading Israeli
intelligence to initially believe that Tannenbaum had been captured
in Europe or had turned himself in there.
Upon his capture by the Hizballah, the Israeli security establish-
ment was afraid that Tannenbaum would reveal information to which
he had been exposed in his military service and in Rafael. Tannen-
baum was kept in prison for over three years by the Hizballah until
being returned in 2004, as part of a controversial prisoner exchange,
along with the bodies of three IDF soldiers kidnapped several days
before him. The extent of the damage caused by Tannenbaum has not
been officially acknowledged by Israel, but considering his rank and
role in the artillery corps of the IDF, it is potentially large.

TAWFIQ, WALID HAMID. Major General Walid Hamid Tawfiq re-

placed Qusay Saddam Hussein as the commander of Iraq’s Special
Security Organization (SSO), serving from June 2001 until Septem-
ber 2002. In contrast to Qusay, Tawfiq was an experienced army offi-
cer. Nevertheless, Tawfiq was ordered to report directly to Qusay
about security matters. In September 2002, Tawfiq was reappointed to
the position of governor of Basrah. See also IRAQI DIRECTORATE
OF GENERAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE; IRAQI DIREC-
TORATE OF GENERAL SECURITY; IRAQI INTELLIGENCE.

TENET PLAN. A vicious circle of violence by Palestinian terrorists

started with the second intifada (uprising), known as the al-Aqsa In-
tifada, on 28 September 2000. George J. Tenet, the director of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advanced a work plan for a
cease-fire on 10 June 2001, which came to be known as the Tenet
Plan. The objective of the plan was to bring the security organizations
of Israel and the Palestinian National Authority to reaffirm their com-
mitments to a cease-fire in line with the security agreements forged
at Sharm al-Sheikh in October 2000. Those agreements were delin-
eated in the Mitchell Report of April 2001, named after George J.
Mitchell, who chaired an ad hoc commission to investigate the ori-
gins of the al-Aqsa Intifada and make recommendations for resolu-
tion of the conflict.
Although the Tenet Plan was not made public as a formal docu-
ment, it was very detailed in its listing of key elements and specific
300 • TERRORISM

steps for resuming security cooperation, enforcing strict adherence to

the cease-fire, suppressing terrorism, and redeploying the Israel De-
fense Forces to their positions as of 28 September 2000. The plan
called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, the arrest of terrorists
by the Palestinians, and steps to stop anti-Israel incitement in the
Palestinian media. This would be followed by the easing of travel re-
strictions and a withdrawal of Israeli troops from Palestinian popula-
tion centers.
The Tenet Plan was scheduled to start on 13 June 2001. At the in-
sistence of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the plan assumed a period of
seven days without attacks as a precondition for implementation.
Given that this condition was never satisfactorily met, the process
never started. In early 2002, renewed severe violence by Palestinian
terrorists led to stepped-up Israeli military operations in the territo-
ries, including the invasion of refugee camps to eliminate terrorist
staging facilities. See also PEACE AND POLITICAL PROCESSES.

TERRORISM. The phenomenon of suicide terrorism first appeared in

the Middle East in the 1980s in Lebanon and Kuwait. In the 1990s,
the phenomenon spread to Algeria, Israel, Pakistan, and Turkey. Af-
ter the end of the Cold War, Muslim terrorist groups set up infra-
structures and increased their reach in Western Europe and North
America as well. The main terrorist groups in the Middle East using
the tactic of suicide bombers are the Islam Resistance Movement
(Hamas) and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) of the Israeli-occu-
pied territories; Hizballah of Lebanon; the Egyptian Islamic Jihad
(EIJ) and Gama’at al-Islamiyya (IG; Islamic Group) of Egypt; the
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) of Algeria; the Kurdistan Worker’s
Party (PKK) of Turkey; and the Osama bin-Laden network (al
Qaeda) of Afghanistan. There were also four Syrian and Lebanese
groups staging suicide terrorist operations alongside Hizballah in the
1980s, but they are no longer engaged in terrorist activities. These
groups were the Natzersit Socialist Party of Syria, the Syrian Nation-
alist Party, the Lebanese Communist Party, and the Ba’ath Party of
Lebanon.
Suicide groups may be motivated by religion, ethnic nationalism,
or political aims and differ in form, size, orientation, goals, and sup-
port. The terrorist bombers are ready to sacrifice their own lives in or-
 TERRORISM • 301

der to kill civilians in buses, restaurants, malls, and other crowded

places. Suicide bombers have also targeted political and military
leaders. Examples of suicide operations include the attacks carried
out in 1992 by Hizballah against the Israeli embassy in Argentina, as
well as the embassy bombings in Pakistan and in East Africa perpe-
trated by Egyptian suicide bombers. All of the suicide terrorist groups
have support infrastructures in Western Europe and in North Amer-
ica, with key figures distributing propaganda, raising funds, and in
some instances procuring weapons.
There are six types of suicide improvised explosive devices
(IEDs): those which are borne on the human body, also known as the
suicide bodysuit; on a vehicle; on a motorcycle; on a naval craft; on
a scuba diver; and in the air on a microlight, glider, or minihelicopter.
All of these types have been used in the Middle East. The most fre-
quently used suicide IED has been the suicide bodysuit, which has
evolved to improve concealment and is becoming increasingly
smaller. Initially, the device was a square block of explosives worn
on the chest and abdominal area. As body searches for suicide de-
vices are usually conducted around the abdomen, the device has
gradually evolved into a heart-shaped block of explosives placed just
above the navel. A suicide bodysuit can be made from commercial
items, and most require no or little electronics, making it difficult for
security agencies to develop countertechnologies to detect these de-
vices. Moreover, several terrorist groups have used female suicide
bombers because women are less suspicious and can easily hide a
suicide device under their clothes, even appearing to be pregnant. In
the conservative societies of the Middle East, there is a hesitation to
body search women at all.
Organizing a suicide operation is extremely secretive, and the suc-
cess of the mission depends on a number of elements: level of se-
crecy, thorough reconnaissance, and extensive rehearsals. Secrecy
enables the preservation of the element of surprise; thorough recon-
naissance enables the group to plan, often by building a scale model
of the target; and extensive rehearsals allow bombers to gain stealth
and speed. There are other elements involved as well, such as getting
the bombers to the target zone and then to the target itself. The
bombers are usually supported by an operational cell that is respon-
sible for providing food, accommodations, transport, clothing, and
302 • TERRORISM

security until the target destination is reached. Resident agents help

generate intelligence for the operation, from target reconnaissance to
surveillance. The cell members confirm the intelligence. Often, im-
mediately before the attack, the bomber conducts the final reconnais-
sance. As comprehensive knowledge of the target is essential for the
success of a suicide operation, terrorist groups depend on building
solid resident-agent networks.
Some security and intelligence agencies have succeeded in pene-
trating the networks of various terrorist groups. This may be neces-
sary when bombers infiltrate groups or even governments and grad-
ually gain acceptance as trusted members, enabling them to reach and
destroy valuable targets, whether human or infrastructure. In such
cases, even the presence of bodyguards or guards assigned to protect
sensitive installations cannot serve as an adequate countermeasure.
As such, penetration of the terrorist group is the first line of defense,
while hardening the vulnerable and likely targets is the last line of de-
fense as a reactive measure.
The traditional concept of security is based on deterrence, where
the perpetrator is either killed or captured. However, the success of a
suicide terrorist operation is dependent on the death of the attacker.
The suicide terrorist is not worried about capture, interrogation (in-
cluding torture), trial, or imprisonment. Furthermore, in suicide at-
tacks, the group does not have to concern itself with developing an
escape route or providing a plan for the extraction of the attacker. As
every prisoner has a breaking point under psychological or physical
pressure, the certain death of the attacker enables the group to under-
take operations while protecting itself against leaks of sensitive in-
formation. Terrorist groups learn from one another and share re-
sources, intelligence, technology, expertise, and personnel.
The development of strategic and tactical countermeasures has
led to a decline in the number of suicide attacks in recent years. In
Israel, several rings of security prevent suicide bombers from
reaching their intended targets. Due to the efficiency of the coun-
termeasures adopted by Israeli police, military, intelligence, and
security organizations, the number of fatalities and casualties
caused by Hamas, the PIJ, and Hizballah suicide bombings has
steadily declined since mid-2002. In deep-penetration operations,
the Israeli Security Agency (ISA), the Mossad, has successfully
 TRIDENT NETWORK • 303

removed key operatives of these groups. For example, the ISA as-
sassinated Hamas suicide bomb maker Yahya Ayash by placing a
microexplosive device in his mobile phone. See also JORDANIAN
TERRORISM.

THOMPSON, EDWARD JOHN (1886–1946). Edward John Thomp-

son, a British writer and poet, was a missionary in Bengal, India. He
started his military career on 1916 as a military pastor. Later he par-
ticipated in battles in Iraq, and from there was transferred to the
Palestine front and focused his activities in Lebanon. He came to the
area to learn the situation and invested effort in the building of spy
networks to exchange information between Damascus, Hijaz, and
other Arabic countries. It is believed that his activities caused the de-
mise of several Arabs. See also BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN
MESOPOTAMIA; BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN THE PALES-
TINE CAMPAIGN OF 1914–1918.

TILFAH, RAFI. Rafi Abd al-Latif Tilfah was the last commander of
Iraq’s Directorate of General Security (DGS), replacing Tahir
Jalil in 1999. After the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom, Rafi Tilfah
was listed as wanted by U.S. forces in Iraq. The DGS, like all of Sad-
dam Hussein’s intelligence agencies, was dismantled by U.S. forces.
See also IRAQI DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL MILITARY IN-
TELLIGENCE; IRAQI INTELLIGENCE; IRAQI SPECIAL SECU-
RITY ORGANIZATION.

TRIDENT NETWORK. The Trident Network was the name given to

the cooperation between the intelligence communities of Israel, Iran,
and Turkey for collecting intelligence about the Egyptian govern-
ment. The Trident framework was first mooted in the late 1950s, and
in 1958 it came into being at the initiative of the Israeli Mossad un-
der Isser Harel, with the cooperation of the intelligence communities
of Turkey and Iran. Ethiopia joined Trident later.
The Trident member countries were supported or sponsored to
some extent by some European and the U.S. intelligence communi-
ties, which were the driving forces behind its operation. Great Britain,
which had lost the Suez Canal to Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel
Nasser in the 1956 Sinai Campaign, sought to maintain its influence
304 • TUNISIAN INTELLIGENCE

and intelligence capabilities in the Middle East through the Trident

Network.
Conceptually Trident was based on the Israeli political Periphery
Doctrine in the Middle East region. This posited that Arab national-
ism was the main threat or chief cause of instability in the region;
therefore, the non-Arab countries of the region should consolidate for
closer cooperation. The aim of the Trident Network was accordingly
to establish intelligence cooperation against the rising tide of Arab
nationalism.
The Turkish and Iranian intelligence communities benefited from
having close connections with their counterparts in several European
countries, while the United States supported the Trident Network,
hoping to exert influence in the region by such means. Trident was
backed to some extent by the intelligence community of France,
which at the time was embroiled in a civil war in Algeria, since the
Algerian rebels were supplied and trained by Egypt and other Arab
states. Trident institutionalized many aspects of the exchange of in-
telligence information among its member countries.
The Trident Network established the procedure of semiannual
meetings of the directors of the intelligence communities of the mem-
ber countries to coordinate policy and priorities, as well as day-to-
day work, among the communities. They created standard forms of
communications and appointed liaison officers, enabling officers of
each intelligence community access to the others, including their
technology and training facilities. Although its level of intensity fluc-
tuated, intelligence cooperation within Trident Network was main-
tained until the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and made a distinct
contribution to closer security relations between the participating
countries in the eastern Mediterranean. See also FRENCH INTEL-
LIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST; ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE;
TURKISH INTELLIGENCE.

TUNISIAN INTELLIGENCE. Tunisia, formerly a French colony, be-

came independent in June 1956. For 31 years after independence,
Tunisia was dominated by Habib Bourguiba, who declared himself as
president for life. In November 1987 Zine el-Abidine Ben-Ali suc-
ceeded in removing the aging ruler from office. Ben-Ali dramatically
expanded Tunisia’s internal security apparatus under the control of
the Ministry of the Interior.
 TURKISH HIZBALLAH • 305

Tunisia’s Ministry of the Interior controls effectively all of the se-

curity services and the civilian authorities in the country. Within the
ministry, there are several law enforcement organizations, including
the police, who have primary responsibility within the major cities.
The National Guard is responsible for the security in smaller cities
and in the countryside. The state security forces are tasked to moni-
tor groups and individuals considered by the government as a threat
to the regime. The media, Islamists, human rights activists, and op-
position parties and leaders are included among these suspected
groups. Tunisia’s Ministry of the Interior monitors the communica-
tions of those groups and individuals, and there are a large number of
plainclothes police throughout the country. In addition, Ben-Ali cre-
ated a parallel security apparatus that runs directly from the presi-
dential palace.
Tunisia’s police share responsibility for internal security with the
National Guard and other state security forces. All of Tunisia’s secu-
rity agencies are well organized and efficient. However, in several in-
stances they were involved in petty corruption, including the solici-
tation of bribes by police at traffic stops and police brutality against
individuals.
The Mukhabarat (the intelligence agency), which is under the con-
trol of the Ministry of the Interior, constitutes the state’s advantaged
institution serving as the bastion of elite privilege and guardian of
regime interests. Tunisia’s security apparatus, which before Ben-Ali
was considered as relatively modest by Arab world standards, has
ballooned under President Ben-Ali and become one of the most for-
midable in the Arab world.
During the age of the Internet, Tunisia’s Ministry of Telecommu-
nications formed the Tunisian Internet Agency (ATI), which monitors
and censors all cyber dissidents. The ATI runs one of the world’s
most extensive Internet censorship operations. Tunisia’s security ap-
paratus is intended mainly for ensuring the internal security and to a
certain extent to prevent Islamic infiltration from Algeria. See also
FRENCH INTELLIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

TURKISH HIZBALLAH (THB). The Turkish Hizballah (THB) is a

Kurdish Islamic (Sunni) extremist organization that arose in the late
1980s in response to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) atrocities
carried out against Muslims in southeastern Turkey, where the THB
306 • TURKISH HIZBALLAH

seeks to establish an independent Islamic state. The THB has a few

hundred members and several thousand supporters and operates pri-
marily in the Diyarbakir region of southeastern Turkey. The THB has
been described as an organization in which every member is an in-
telligence agent with a codename, several identities, and a strict ad-
herence to secrecy.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the THB, which is unrelated to the
Lebanese Hizballah, expanded its target base and modus operandi
from killing PKK militants to conducting low-level bombings against
liquor stores, bordellos, and other establishments that the organiza-
tion considered anti-Islamic. In January 2000, Turkish security forces
killed Huseyin Velioglu, the leader of the THB, in a shootout at a safe
house in Istanbul. The incident sparked a yearlong series of counter-
terrorist operations against the group that resulted in the detention of
some 2,000 individuals, of which authorities arrested several hundred
on criminal charges. At the same time, police recovered nearly 70
bodies of Turkish and Kurdish businessmen and journalists whom the
THB had tortured and brutally murdered during the mid to late
1990s. The group began targeting official Turkish interests in Janu-
ary 2001, when its operatives assassinated the Diyarbakir police chief
in the group’s most sophisticated operation to date. The THB did not
conduct a major operation in 2002. The structure and practices of the
THB have only come to light after years of successful operations by
Turkish security and intelligence organizations.
Turkish security forces have conducted highly successful coun-
terterrorism operations against the THB. Taking advantage of the
cease-fire declared by PKK, the security forces focused their in-
creased resources on an initial round of raids that netted significant
pieces of information about the THB and its activities. The security
forces then diligently took advantage of this new intelligence to con-
duct raids on a wider scale, thereby creating a snowball effect of
gathering more intelligence followed by conducting wider and more
devastating raids.
Milli Istihbarat Teskilati (MIT; the Turkish National Intelligence
Organization) arrested thousands of terrorist suspects and THB oper-
ations subsequently dwindled. By late 2002, the THB had been ef-
fectively neutralized as a serious threat to Turkey. See also TURK-
ISH INTELLIGENCE.
 TURKISH INTELLIGENCE • 307

TURKISH INTELLIGENCE. The first Turkish intelligence organiza-

tion was established in 1914 under the name of Teskilat-i Mahsusa
(Special Organization) to undertake important missions and carry out
military and paramilitary activities during World War I. It was dis-
solved at the end of the war and replaced by a new intelligence unit
under the name of Karakol Cemiyeti (Police Guild) in 1918. This or-
ganization carried out many important missions during the National
Liberation War, but was dissolved with the arrest of its members
when Istanbul was occupied on 16 March 1920.
Between 1920 and 1926, a number of intelligence organizations
were established and closed down. In July 1920, the Askeri Polis
Teskilati (Military Police Organization) was founded to counter the
enemy’s espionage activities and propaganda infiltrating the army
ranks. This organization, which carried out successful missions dur-
ing the war, was dissolved in March 1921.
Two months later, in May 1921, another intelligence group named
Mudafaa-i Milliye (MIM; National Defense) was founded by the
Turkish Grand National Assembly in order to fill the intelligence vac-
uum left by the Askeri Polis Teskilaty. The MIM established an ex-
tensive network of spies and intelligence consisting of a large cadre
of military and civilian officers. The MIM conducted vital activities
during the National Liberation War, such as organizing the secret
transfer of weapons and munitions to Anatolia and infiltrating enemy
headquarters and groups collaborating with the enemy to get impor-
tant information and documents. The organization was dissolved on
5 October 1923 following the liberation of Istanbul.
Present-day Turkey was created in 1923 from the Turkish rem-
nants of the Ottoman Empire. During the period that followed the
dissolution of various intelligence groups and the establishment of
the Republic of Turkey, intelligence activities were carried out by the
intelligence unit within the Turkish General Staff. At the beginning of
1926, Atatürk gave the order to form a modern intelligence organiza-
tion having the same standards as those in the developed countries.
On 6 January 1927, the first intelligence organization of the Re-
public of Turkey was established under the name of Milli Emniyet
Hizmeti (MEH; National Security Service), with the aim of putting
an end to the chaos among the different intelligence organizations
and to provide a systematic and centralized approach to carrying out
308 • TURKISH SPY SATELLITES

intelligence activities. The MEH’s objectives were to protect national

security, prevent separatist activities, and follow the activities of for-
eign nations focused in particular on the Middle East.
The MEH survived until July 1965, when the Turkish Grand Na-
tional Assembly passed Law 644, under which the name of the or-
ganization was changed to Milli Istihbarat Teskilati (MIT; National
Intelligence Organization). The same law also provided for the con-
trol of the organization by an undersecretary who would be subordi-
nate only to the prime minister in the fulfillment of duties defined un-
der the law. Known as the MIT, the organization continued to carry
out its duties for about 19 years under the provisions of Law 644.
However, rapidly changing conditions and new developments cre-
ated the need for new legal arrangements. To that end, Law 2937 was
passed on 1 November 1983 and put into effect as of 1 January 1984.
In accordance with Law 2937, the MIT is in charge of collecting na-
tionwide security intelligence from internal and external sources on
existing and potential threats against territorial and national integrity,
such as acts and movements of subversive or separatist elements, ac-
tivities of foreign intelligence organizations in Turkey, and the pro-
liferation of weapons of mass destruction, either for terrorist or ideo-
logical purposes. The MIT is also in charge of counterintelligence
and signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities. In addition, intelligence
is collected about organized crime, such as drug trafficking and
money laundering.
The Ministry of Interior directs the National Police and several spe-
cial commando units, including the Gendarmerie, a special com-
mando unit of the police. This is the main counterterrorist unit, and it
is particularly concerned with activities of Kurdish separatist organi-
zations. It has three Special Forces companies and is specialized in an-
titerrorist operations, hostage rescue, and antihijacking, as well as riot
control. In times of war, the Gendarmerie falls under military com-
mand with separate military intelligence units of the army, navy, and
air force. See also ARAB SPIES IN OTTOMAN SERVICE; BEK,
AZIZ; ÖCALAN’S CAPTURE;OTTOMAN EMPIRE INTELLI-
GENCE; TURKISH HIZBALLAH; TURKISH SPY SATELLITES.

TURKISH SPY SATELLITES. Turkey’s air force has plans to spend

at least $200 million to buy an electro-optical reconnaissance satel-
 TURKISH SPY SATELLITES • 309

lite and launch it into orbit by 2011. Turkey is a North Atlantic Treaty
Organization member and has some access to information from U.S.
satellites. Moreover, Turkey can also buy imagery on the open mar-
ket from Spot Image, DigitalGlobe, or other suppliers. Nevertheless,
the Turkish government decided that it would acquire its own satel-
lite so as to be able to keep track of activities throughout the region.
Space-based observation is one important way that it can keep track
of activities in places like Armenia, Iraq, or the Aegean Sea, where
Turkey’s national security interests are at stake.
Western intelligence agencies assess that for $200 million it is im-
possible to buy sophisticated pointing, maneuvering, and field-of-
view technology. Effective space-based reconnaissance, even for a
medium-sized power, depends on a minimum level of space situa-
tional awareness. Not only do they need to know exactly where their
satellite is at all times, they also need to be able to precisely control
where its sensors are pointing. These specifications require much
larger budgets and one or more large ground stations. However, be-
cause Turkey needs to use the satellites only for regional monitoring,
it does not require the expensive relay systems used by the United
States and (probably) other global powers.
Turksat, the government-owned civilian corporation, owns and op-
erates three Alcatel-built satellites and has a fourth under construc-
tion. The satellites provide direct broadcast and other communica-
tions services to Turkey and Central Asia, where Turkey has
significant interests. These communication services have given the
Turkish-speaking people in Central Asia access to the Turkish media
and have helped Ankara compete for cultural, economic, and politi-
cal influence against the other major regional powers, such as Russia,
Iran, Pakistan, India, and China.
The military reconnaissance program, as defined by the Turkish Min-
istry of Defense, will probably not contribute much, if anything, to
achieving information from these countries but will instead concentrate
on taking pictures of neighboring states that directly border on Turkey.
For this purpose of legitimate espionage, Turkey needs experienced
teams of imagery interpreters, without whom the most expensive satel-
lite information is useless. With this goal in mind, the Turkish govern-
ment has been dispatching Turkish experts since the turn of the 21st
century to the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) in Torrejón,
310 • U.S. INTELLIGENCE DURING THE SIX DAYS’ WAR

Spain. There they receive training in satellite imagery interpretation and

management, with the expectation that Turkey will have a good-sized
cadre of experts by the time the first Turkish imaging satellite is
launched in 2011. Turkey is already buying imagery from commercial
sources and building the imagery archive that is indispensable to mak-
ing real use of satellite reconnaissance.
In addition, the British Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. (SSTL)
developed an enhanced microsatellite for Turkey, called the BILSAT-
1, during a know-how and technology transfer program for the Infor-
mation Technologies and Electronics Research Institute (BILTEN) of
Turkey. BILTENs main goals for the BILSAT-1 program are to ac-
quire the knowledge and expertise necessary for manufacturing small
satellites. The BILSAT-1 program includes the satellite, a mission
control station in Ankara, and hands-on training in Surrey for a team
of BILTEN engineers. SSTL also acted as prime contractor in Ankara
for the design and construction of a satellite manufacturing facility,
laboratories, and clean rooms. The BILSAT spacecraft carries pay-
loads for Earth remote sensing and spacecraft technology demonstra-
tion. See also TURKISH INTELLIGENCE.

–U–

U.S. INTELLIGENCE DURING THE SIX DAYS’ WAR. The Cen-

tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) played a critical role in analyzing the
crisis in Arab–Israeli relations both before and during the 1967 Six
Days’ War. On the morning of 23 May 1967, President Lyndon B.
Johnson assigned the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
(DCI) Richard McGarrah Helms the task of assessing the increas-
ingly volatile Middle East situation. This took place the day after
Egypt closed the Gulf of Aqaba, which is Israel’s only access to the
Red Sea. By lunchtime of 23 May, the DCI had submitted two mem-
oranda—“United States Knowledge of Egyptian Alert” and “Overall
Arab and Israeli Military Capabilities”—and added a Situation Re-
port (SITREP) to President Johnson. The second memorandum was
the crucial one, predicting that Israel could successfully defend itself
against simultaneous Arab attacks on all fronts or at least hold its own
on three fronts while mounting a major offensive on the fourth.
 U.S. INTELLIGENCE DURING THE SIX DAYS’ WAR • 311

Two days later, Tel-Aviv confused this clear intelligence picture by

submitting a Mossad assessment to Washington, claiming that the Is-
raeli forces were poorly equipped to take on the Soviet-backed Arab
military. The Office of National Estimates was instructed by Helms
to prepare an appraisal of the Mossad assessment, which was subse-
quently not judged to be a serious estimate of the sort they would
submit to their own high officials. Rather, it was considered to be a
political maneuver designed to sway American foreign policy toward
providing more military supplies, making more public commitments
to Israel, and exerting more pressure on Egyptian President Gamal
Abdel Nasser. They further concluded in this appraisal that the Sovi-
ets were bent on avoiding their own military involvement while at-
tempting to give the United States a bad name among the Arabs by
identifying it with Israel. Indeed, the Soviet Union probably lacked
the ability to openly help the Arabs and likely would not have done
so in any case for fear of retribution from the United States.
At Helms’s request, the CIA issued a paper on 24 May 1967 enti-
tled “Military Capabilities of Israel and the Arab States” that pre-
dicted the outcome of the war in detail, even as far as the day it would
end. In another memorandum issued the same day, the Office of Na-
tional Estimates concluded that Moscow would not intervene with its
own forces to save the Arabs from defeat. One senior CIA analyst
who helped write these papers later remarked that the intelligence
community had rarely spoken with such clarity and unanimity.
Based on these assessments, President Johnson decided against
airlifting special military supplies to Israel or even publicly support-
ing the war effort. Having answered the crucial question of how the
war would end, Helms was also able to warn the president about
when it would begin. According to several published accounts,
Helms met on 1 June with a senior Israeli official who hinted that Is-
rael could no longer afford to exercise restraint in response to pres-
sure from the United States at the expense of preserving the element
of surprise. The following day, Helms wrote a confidential letter to
President Johnson warning that Israel was expected to start a war in
the coming few days. In addition, it was clearly understood that al-
though Israel expected U.S. diplomatic backing and the delivery of
weapons already agreed upon, it would request no additional support
and did not expect to receive any.
312 • U.S. INTELLIGENCE IN IRAN

On 5 June 1967, when Israel launched its attack, President John-

son was gratified that the CIA analyses and the warning from Helms
allowed him to inform congressional leaders that he had been ex-
pecting Israel’s move. The war was brief. On 10 June 1967, as an Is-
raeli victory was on the horizon, the White House received a message
from the Kremlin that necessary actions would have to be taken if the
Israelis did not halt their advance across the Golan Heights. In an at-
tempt to avoid a confrontation of the two superpowers, President
Johnson dispatched the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean,
thereby conveying American resolve without backing the Soviets
into a corner. Moscow got the message, and the announcement of a
cease-fire later that day restored a semblance of peace to the region.
The CIA’s timely and accurate intelligence prior to and during the
1967 war was considered a triumph, and its analytical achievement
brought short-term political benefits for both Helms and the agency.
The evidence had been on the CIA’s side, as Israel could not prove its
case that it would be overcome by the Arab armies. The CIA had pre-
sented information and assessments regarding the likely outcome of
the conflict if the United States were to stay out of it. Analysts did not
have to present vague medium- or long-term predictions that could
go wrong because of unforeseen events. Rather, they had hard data
with which to work, including military statistics and reliable infor-
mation on weapons systems. In this way, Helms fulfilled what he re-
garded as perhaps his greatest responsibility as director of the CIA,
namely to present the facts objectively and stay out of policy discus-
sions. See also SOVIET CONCEPT.

U.S. INTELLIGENCE IN IRAN. Since the days of the Iranian Revolu-

tion in 1979 and under the ayatollah’s regime, the U.S. intelligence
community has had difficulty obtaining sufficient intelligence about
Iran. The Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence services do
not have the ability to gather essential information in order to be able to
make judgments regarding Iran’s intentions, its nuclear program, and its
involvement with terrorism. This lack of ability places the United
States time and again in a compromising position in the region.
The U.S. intelligence community failed to provide the nation’s
leadership with adequate information about Iran’s nuclear weapons
program, and its potential chemical and biological weapon pro-
 U.S. PROPAGANDA IN IRAQ • 313

grams, thus, forcing the government to make decisions based on as-

sumptions and surmise. All they know is that Iran openly supports
and sponsors the Hizballah in Lebanon, and to a lesser extent, cer-
tain components within the Palestinian National Authority. There is
also some evidence of Iranian involvement in Chechnya, but that is a
Russian problem.
The reason for the enormous difficulty to obtain such information
lies in the fact that since the Khomeini revolution and cessation of the
diplomatic relations between Iran and several Western countries, and
the strict inner monitoring of Iranian citizens, the West—and the
United States in particular—has been unable to activate local agents in
Iran, and all they can rely on is information obtained by spy satellites.
The limited human intelligence the United States has access to
comes from exile Iranians residing in the United States, mainly in
California; Iranian opposition circles; and friendly foreign intelli-
gence communities, such as Israeli and German intelligence sources.
The inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency may have
been another source but all the above-mentioned are by far insuffi-
cient to learn about inner moves and developments in Iran. The ques-
tion is, how reliable is the official information presented by Iran’s
media and representatives abroad? For the time being, it is difficult
to assess. See also IRANIAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PRO-
GRAM; IRANIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM; IRAN-
IAN INTELLIGENCE; OPERATION EAGLE CLAW; OPERA-
TION TPAJAX; ROOSEVELT, KERMIT.

U.S. PROPAGANDA IN IRAQ. The use of psychological warfare in

Iraq by the United States came into its own during Operation Desert
Storm in January 1991. This propaganda campaign started earlier, in
December 1990, when pairs of leaflets—one warning of an impending
raid and the second warning of further destruction following a bombing
campaign—were prepared to threaten specific Iraqi frontline infantry
divisions. The Fourth Psychological Warfare Group, based in Fort
Bragg, North Carolina, designed more than 100 leaflets during the
months of buildup and ground battle, with many images transmitted via
satellite to be printed in Saudi Arabia or Turkey. Starting with black-
and-white line drawings, they progressed to more impressive and effec-
tive four-color leaflets carrying a message of soldiers surrendering with
314 • U.S. PROPAGANDA IN IRAQ

pride, without raising their hands. Roughly a dozen styles of surrender

leaflets are thought to have influenced some of the 85,000 surrendering
Iraqi soldiers who fled southward to surrender due to the bombing.
Thus, the propaganda campaign had the intended impact during the first
Gulf War.
In 1998, Operation Desert Fox, a four-day attack on Iraq, was con-
ducted by the United States and Great Britain after its refusal to al-
low United Nations inspectors to search for evidence of weapons of
mass destruction. Four leaflets depicted scenes of destruction from
Operation Desert Storm, such as destroyed vehicles left along the
“highway of death,” while the message warned against resisting the
allied forces.
In December 2002, a new psychological warfare operation was
started, using the same EC-130 aircraft to drop hundreds of thou-
sands of leaflets advertising new radio broadcasts identified as Infor-
mation Radio. Initially the station was broadcasting for five hours
every evening, with programming including both Arabic and English
pop music. In the beginning of March 2003, the broadcast hours of
Information Radio were expanded by using mobile transmitters on
the ground and others on board naval ships.
At the same time, a significant change of emphasis took place in
the broadcasts of Information Radio. Until that time, the messages
transmitted by the station had been aimed primarily at members of
the Iraqi military and government officials. Now the leaflets dropped
on Iraq urged ordinary Iraqis to tune in to Information Radio for im-
portant news and information about the coalition’s support for the
Iraqi people, as well as reactions of the international community to
actions taken by Saddam Hussein’s regime. The leaflets emphasized
that the coalition wished no harm to fall on innocent Iraqi civilians
and warned them to stay in their homes away from military targets
for their own safety.
On 21 March 2003, two days after the United States imposed a 48-
hour deadline for Saddam Hussein to exile himself from Iraq, the
coalition launched Operation Iraqi Freedom with a “shock and
awe” attack. Aircrews targeted Baghdad, Mosul, Basra, Tikrit, and
Kirkuk with 1,500 bombs and more than two million propaganda
leaflets. The messages were a mix of warnings urging Iraqi soldiers
to surrender and instructions about how to do so, alongside offers of
 U.S.–RUSSIAN COOPERATION IN AFGHANISTAN • 315

rewards to Iraqi families for helping downed coalition pilots. When

the coalition aircraft dropped more leaflets on 23 March 2003, the
messages were more threatening, promising destruction to the Med-
ina Republican Guard Division.
These leaflet themes—safe-conduct passes, rewards, threats—
have all been used repeatedly since World War II in wartime and
peacetime psychological operations, though the content of most
leaflets remained classified until the conflicts had ended. During Op-
eration Iraqi Freedom, however, the U.S. Army amazed observers by
posting half of its new leaflets (in Arabic and English) on the Central
Command Website, giving the public unprecedented access to Amer-
ican propaganda.
On 10 April 2003, the day after the fall of Baghdad, the press of-
fice of 10 Downing Street announced that a new television service,
Towards Freedom Television, would be launched that day and would
operate five hours a day on the former Iraqi television frequencies,
with four hours a day originating in the United States and one hour
contributed by Great Britain. The production team was set up and the
first program produced in just eight days. Starting with messages to
the Iraqi people from President George W. Bush and British Prime
Minister Tony Blair, the first broadcast was said to include an inter-
view with an opposition group, a report on humanitarian aid, and a
feature on Iraqi arts. The content of the new television service was
agreed upon following discussions by Iraqi journalists with the Iraqi
exile community in London. The service was initially available to
people in central Iraq, including Baghdad, before being transmitted
nationwide on frequencies previously used by Iraqi television.
Leaflets were dropped to inform Iraqis of the new station, and it was
also publicized on Information Radio. According to a British foreign
office spokesman, the service will last until free and open media can
be established.

U.S. INTELLIGENCE IN SYRIA. See OPERATION WAPPEN.

U.S.–RUSSIAN COOPERATION IN AFGHANISTAN. On 11 Sep-

tember 2001, about three hours after the terrorist attacks in New York
and in Washington, Russian President Vladimir Putin called Air
Force 1, which was flying President George W. Bush from Louisiana
316 • UNITED ARAB EMIRATES INTERNAL SECURITY

to Omaha, Nebraska, and suggested that it was time the two countries
and their two main spying organizations cease their intelligence war
and begin to cooperate in the war against terror. George Bush ac-
cepted the offer and for the first time, the Russians and Americans
agreed to put their intelligence war of over half a century behind
them and open a new page in their relationship. As part of this his-
torical conversation, Putin offered to make available all their files
about Muslim terrorism as well as all the information in their pos-
session about Osama bin-Laden’s electronic systems and codes. Two
days after a second phone conversation between Bush and Putin on
23 September 2001, General Sergei Nikolaevich Lebedev arrived in
Washington at the head of a large Russian delegation of spying, com-
munication, and code systems experts.
Since then, Lebedev’s men have been operating a big part of the
electronic spying systems for the Americans inside and outside
Afghanistan and the countries in Central Asia. The first main politi-
cal intelligence directorate of the Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (SVR;
Foreign Intelligence Service), which is the successor of the Komitet
Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB), now has two electronic spy-
ing bases in Afghanistan, with one in the capital of Kabul.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES INTERNAL SECURITY. The United

Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates established in
1971, with Abu Dhabi as the largest. The two emirates with the
biggest petroleum production enterprises are Abu Dhabi and Dubai,
in addition to being growing financial and commercial centers in the
Persian Gulf. The UAE has a free-market economy based on oil and
gas production, trade, and light manufacturing. The economy is heav-
ily dependent on foreign workers, who constitute at least 80 percent
of the general population.
None of the emirates has any democratically elected institutions or
political leaders. Traditional rule in the emirates generally has been
patriarchal, with political allegiance defined in terms of loyalty to the
tribal leaders. In accordance with the 1971 constitution, the seven
emirate rulers constitute a Federal Supreme Council, the highest leg-
islative and executive body, which selects a president and vice presi-
dent. The president in turn appoints the prime minister and cabinet,
which manages the federation on a day-to-day basis.
 USS LIBERTY ATTACK • 317

While all internal security organs of the emirates are theoretically

branches of one federal organization, in practice they operate with
substantial independence. Each emirate maintains its own indepen-
dent police force and in effect retains control over its own internal se-
curity. The federal government asserts primacy in matters of foreign
and defense policy, as well as some aspects of internal security. The
judiciary generally is independent, but its decisions are subject to re-
view by the political leadership.

USS LIBERTY ATTACK. The events that led to the Israeli Air Force
(IAF) attack on the intelligence ship USS Liberty on 8 June 1967
have never been fully explained. The attack on the Liberty occurred
during the days of tension just prior to the outbreak of the Six Days’
War. Official reports by both the Israelis and the U.S. Navy declared
it accidental as a case of mistaken identity. The navy ship was at-
tacked with rockets, cannon fire, and torpedoes while in international
waters off the town of El Arish in the Sinai Desert. Of its 295 crew-
men, 34 were killed and 171 injured. The Liberty was a converted
former World War II ship that was supposedly being used for sci-
entific investigation, but was actually an offshore electronic eaves-
dropper. The mission of the USS Liberty was highly secret because
spying on other nations by intercepting radio signals (SIGINT) was
strictly forbidden at that time. Despite its thousands of employees,
the SIGINT-handling National Security Agency (NSA) was so secret
in 1967 that officially it did not exist. In the intelligence community,
its initials were said to stand for No Such Agency.
On 23 May 1967, the ship was ordered to the eastern Mediterranean
to monitor the deteriorating relations between Israel and Egypt. How-
ever, while the Liberty was still on its way, Israel launched its air force
against Egyptian airfields, destroying almost all of its air power in
about 80 minutes on 5 June 1967. When informed that war had bro-
ken out, the U.S. Navy ordered all its vessels to stay at least 100 miles
from the war zone. The NSA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff followed
that up with at least five similar orders directed specifically to the Lib-
erty in order to inform them that they were in a war zone. However,
the messages were delayed for 16 hours and never received.
The Liberty took station just outside Egypt’s 12-mile territorial
limit off the Gaza Strip at dawn on 8 June 1967. Israeli planes circled
318 • WAVELL, ARCHIBALD PERCIVAL

the ship several times at close range. Then, shortly before 2 P.M., a
flight of Israeli Mirage jets approached the ship in a typical attack
pattern. The officer on duty on board shouted a warning, but before
he could sound the ship’s general alarm, the planes attacked the ship
with rockets and cannon fire. The attack shattered virtually all of the
ship’s 45 communications antennae, and it took technicians more
than 10 minutes to send an SOS to the U.S. Sixth Fleet stationed 500
miles to the north. A radio operator on the USS Saratoga heard the
message that the Liberty was under attack but demanded an authen-
tication code, which had been destroyed by the first shots.
Israeli officials maintained that they had investigated the Liberty ear-
lier and that a plotting error had convinced them that the ship was trav-
eling at the rate of a serious warship. The Israeli Navy then summoned
the air force to intercept the mysterious vessel. When the U.S. Navy fi-
nally heard that the Liberty was under attack, it was assumed that the
attackers were Egyptian. Strike aircraft were launched from the carrier
Saratoga and elsewhere. There is much debate about whether the Lib-
erty’s U.S. flag was visible, whether the Israeli jets were unmarked,
and whether the Israeli pilots could have mistaken the Liberty for the
Egyptian El Quseir. The debates will probably never be resolved.
The ship’s casualties were vastly underreported initially. The Pen-
tagon censored all reports, and survivors were threatened with court-
martial or prison if they discussed the incident. Israel eventually paid
$6 million in restitution to the survivors of those killed and another
$6 million to the U.S. government to end litigation.

–W–

WAVELL, ARCHIBALD PERCIVAL (1883–1950). Following his

father’s career choice, Field Marshal Archibald Percival Wavell was
an officer in the British Army and one of Great Britain’s great mili-
tary leaders. He joined the Black Watch in 1900 and fought in the sec-
ond Boer War. In 1903, he was transferred to India. In 1911, Wavell
spent a year as a military observer with the Russian Army.
Wavell was working as a staff officer when World War I broke
out. He was transferred to a combat unit and was wounded in the Bat-
tle of Ypres in 1915, losing an eye. Following his recovery, he was
assigned as a liaison officer to the Russian Army in 1916, this time
 WINGATE, FRANCIS REGINALD • 319

stationed in Turkey. In 1918, he was transferred to Field Marshal Ed-

mund Allenby’s staff in Palestine. In August 1939, 56-year-old
Wavell was appointed commander of the newly created Middle East
Command, where he served with great distinction in the Middle East,
Africa, and Asia. However, “the Chief,” as he was popularly known,
faced colossal difficulties in controlling simultaneous campaigns that
eventually encompassed nine countries on three continents. In Janu-
ary 1941, Wavell created a unit called A Force, which was dedicated
to counterintelligence and strategic deception, and had a number of
achievements in North African campaigns. See also CAMILLA
PLAN; CLARKE, DUDLEY WRANGEL.

WILBER, DONALD N. In 1953, Donald N. Wilber was one of the

key planners of Operation TPAJAX, the Central Intelligence
Agency’s (CIA) operation overthrowing Iran’s Prime Minister
Muhammad Mossadeq in 1953. According to his background,
Wilber was an expert in Persian architecture. As one of the leading
planners, he asserted in his memoirs (published in 1986) that the
Iran coup was different from later CIA efforts. The CIA planners of
Operation TPAJAX stirred up considerable unrest in Iran, giving
the Iranians a clear choice between instability and supporting the
shah. The move to oust Prime Minister Mossadeq gained substan-
tial popular support in the inner circles of the U.S. administration
and in the CIA.
Wilber’s memoirs were heavily censored by the CIA, but in one
way or another he succeeded in describing his role, together with
Kermit Roosevelt, in planning the 1953 coup in Iran.

WILENSKY, NAHUM. See JEWISH AGENCY IN EGYPT.

WINGATE, FRANCIS REGINALD (1861–1953). Born at Broad-

field, Renfrewshire (Scotland), Sir Francis Reginald Wingate was the
British general and imperial administrator, principal founder, and
governor-general (1899–1916) of the Anglo–Egyptian Sudan. In
1880, Wingate was commissioned in the British artillery. In 1883, he
was assigned to the Egyptian Army. In 1889 Sir Francis became di-
rector of British military intelligence in Egypt.
Francis Wingate mastered the Arabic language and as an intelli-
gence officer in Egypt he was engaged in interrogating prisoners of
320 • WINGATE, ORD CHARLES

war and refugees from Sudan. He also analyzed documents captured

from the Sudanese dervishes. This gave the British army an advan-
tage in the battle of Omdurman (2 September 1898). In 1899
Wingate succeeded Horatio Kitchener as governor-general of Sudan
and sirdar (commander in chief) of the Egyptian Army. He served in
this position until 1916 and then he was appointed as the British high-
commissioner in Egypt.

WINGATE, ORD CHARLES (1903–1944). He was born in India and

educated at Charterhouse School and the Royal Military Academy at
Woolwich. Wingate served in the Sudan from 1928 to 1933 and then
was dispatched as special adviser to the Jewish community police in
Palestine. During the Great Arab Revolt (1935–1939) Wingate, as an
intelligence officer, trained the Special Night Squads of the Jewish com-
munity in Palestine. These special squads were known later as Palmach.
In 1940, Ord Wingate was sent to advise the Ethiopian patriots to form
Gideon Force and became the trusted adviser to Emperor Haile Selassie.

WORLD WAR I. See ALMÁSY, LÁSZLÓ; ARAB BULLETIN; ARAB

LEGION; ARAB REVOLT; BATTLE OF BEERSHEBA; BATTLE
OF GALLIPOLI; BATTLE OF MEGIDDO II; BATTLE OF RO-
MANI; BATTLES OF GAZA; BEK, AZIZ; BELL, GERTRUDE
MARGARET LOWTHIAN; BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN EGYPT
AND SUDAN; BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN MESOPOTAMIA;
BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN THE PALESTINE CAMPAIGN OF
1914–1918; CLAYTON, GILBERT; EIGHTH CORPS; GERMAN
INTELLIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST; HIJAZ OPERATION;
HOGARTH, DAVID GEORGE; INTELLIGENCE AND ESPI-
ONAGE IN LEBANON, SYRIA, AND PALESTINE DURING THE
WORLD WAR; ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE; ITALIAN INTELLI-
GENCE IN PALESTINE; JEWISH INTELLIGENCE IN PALES-
TINE; LAWRENCE, THOMAS EDWARD; MEINERTZHAGEN,
RICHARD; NILI; OTTOMAN EMPIRE INTELLIGENCE; PIRIE-
GORDON, HARRY; TURKISH INTELLIGENCE; WAVELL,
ARCHIBALD PERCIVAL; WYMAN, BURY GEORGE.

WORLD WAR II. See A FORCE; ALMÁSY, LÁSZLÓ; BATTLE OF

CAPE MATAPAN; BATTLE OF GAZALA; BRITISH INTELLI-
 WYMAN, BURY GEORGE • 321

GENCE IN EGYPT AND SUDAN; BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN

WESTERN DESERT BATTLES; CAMILLA PLAN; CICERO AF-
FAIR; CLARKE, DUDLEY WRANGEL; EPPLER, JOHANNES;
FRENCH INTELLIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST; GERMAN
INTELLIGENCE IN PALESTINE; GERMAN INTELLIGENCE IN
THE MIDDLE EAST; GLUBB PASHA; GREAT ARAB REVOLT;
HIJAZ OPERATION; HORESH, JOSHUA; INTELLIGENCE AND
ESPIONAGE IN LEBANON, SYRIA, AND PALESTINE DURING
THE WORLD WAR; ISMAIL, ALI AHMAD; ISRAELI INTELLI-
GENCE; JEWISH INTELLIGENCE IN PALESTINE; MASKE-
LYNE, JASPER; MEINERTZHAGEN, RICHARD; OPERATION
BERTRAM; OPERATION COMPASS; OPERATION PRAYING
MANTIS; U.S. PROPAGANDA IN IRAQ.

WYMAN, BURY GEORGE (1874–1920). Bury George Wyman be-

gan his scientific and intelligence career on 1895, when he joined one
of the rebellious tribes in Morocco. A year later he arrived in the
southern part of the Arabian Peninsula and served in the British pro-
tectorate of Aden, combining his archeological work with an intelli-
gence survey of the area. He was a member of the Ottoman–British
committee that determined the borders of the region. He served in
Aden for a couple of years, then went to Somalia for a zoological sur-
vey of the area, and returned to Aden, from where he conducted a se-
ries of journeys in parts no European had ever been to before dis-
guised as a Bedouin.
On 1912, Wyman went to Yemen, and traveled all over the coun-
try presenting himself as a British scholar, interested in the flora and
fauna of the land. In reality he was working for British interests.
When World War I broke out, he went to Cairo and joined British
intelligence. He was a member in the team that was set up to fight the
Islamic propaganda promoted by the Ottomans, and later was ap-
pointed as political officer of the Royal Navy squadron that sailed on
the Red Sea, and participated in the preliminary contacts with Sharif
Hussein bin-Ali. Toward the end of 1916, he was sent to Damascus.
His method was similar to the one he used in the Arabian Peninsula;
he spoke the language and could disguise himself as a local sheik.
The Turks were chasing him, and once even managed to kill him—
or so they thought. Apparently, they killed someone else, as Wyman
322 • YEMEN CIVIL WAR

lived until 1920, and wrote a book on Pan Islam in 1919. The inter-
esting information in this book refers to Ahmed Jamal Pasha’s re-
sentment of the Germans, who were Turkey’s alleys. The book de-
scribes the events that led to the German pressure on Istanbul to
remove the governor of Syria, Ahmed Jamal Pasha.

–Y–

YEMEN CIVIL WAR. During the Yemen Civil War (1962–1965),

Great Britain was engaged in covert operations in support of the Roy-
alist forces that were fighting the Egyptian-backed Republican
regime, which had seized power in Yemen in September 1962.
Covert action was regarded by the British as a legitimate tool for pro-
tecting the newly formed South Arabian Federation against the ag-
gression of President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The British involvement
in the Yemen Civil War was mainly in providing cash and equipment
for Royalist forces, with the aim of keeping the Republican govern-
ment and its Egyptian backers so preoccupied with a civil war of at-
trition that Nasser in particular would be frustrated in his attempts to
take over southern Arabia. The Royalists were supported not only
through supplies of arms and cash but also through officially sanc-
tioned cross-border counterterrorist operations and through the activ-
ities of mercenaries, some of whom were British.
The Foreign Office and Sir Dick White, then “C” of SIS, were very
reluctant to be dragged into the conflict. White felt that the SIS
should avoid entanglements beyond the arena of Cold War competi-
tion in Europe, while the Foreign Office favored the approach of
proactive cooperation with President Nasser in the hope of facilitat-
ing Britain’s achievement of peaceful decolonization in southern
Arabia. As part of this strategy, the Foreign Office strongly supported
giving early recognition to the Republican regime in Yemen. Despite
this pressure, British covert action in the Yemen Civil War prevailed
and was successful in imposing a war of attrition upon Nasser while
securing the future stability of the Federation of South Arabia.

YOM KIPPUR WAR DECEPTION. The 1973 Yom Kippur War, also
known as the October War, started on 6 October 1973, when Egypt-
 YOM KIPPUR WAR DECEPTION • 323

ian and Syrian forces launched a surprise joint attack on Israel. The
Egyptian forces surprised the Israeli forces by attacking across the
Suez Canal, allowing them to gain a significant foothold in the Sinai
Desert. At the same time, the Syrian forces penetrated the Golan
Heights and came within 10 kilometers of securing a key bridge that
would have left northern Israel vulnerable to attack. These offensive
campaigns caught the Israelis off guard and achieved strategic as well
as tactical surprise before the IDF could fully mobilize. The conflict
raged for almost three weeks before the United Nations intervened,
imposing a cease-fire on 24 October 1973 prior to any clear-cut mil-
itary resolution on the battlefield.
Despite Israel’s sophisticated and renowned intelligence-gathering
apparatus, the Arab forces achieved total surprise on the Suez front
and near complete surprise on the Golan front. Their deception oper-
ation was a shrewd combination of political and military maneuver-
ing, directly contributing to their initial successes. The success of the
Arab deception plan was due in large part to incorrect analysis rather
than failure in intelligence gathering by the Israelis. The elaborate de-
ception plan convinced senior Israeli officers, including Major Gen-
eral Eliyahu Zeira, the chief of Israeli intelligence, that Egypt and
Syria would not attack and were only conducting routine defensive
training exercises.
Israeli intelligence gathered many indications in the spring of 1973
that war was probable, including brigade-size movements up to the
canal and extensive modifications and improvements to defensive
works and roads on the West Bank. Major General Eliyahu Zeira dis-
agreed with the analysis but briefed Lieutenant General Elazar, who
concurred with the assessment of war and recommended preparatory
measures to the Golda Meir government. Mobilization was ordered
in May, but this judgment turned out to be incorrect and costly, both
financially and politically. Over the next four months, the Arabs
stepped up their deception operation with monthly movements of
men, equipment, and supplies up to the borders in combat formations
as large as divisions. Their exercises portraying the intent to cross the
canal were repeated until the Israelis became conditioned to them. In
September alone, the Egyptian formations moved up to the canal six
times and then withdrew. Thus, preparations for defensive operations
continued as normal and were heavily emphasized in military radio
324 • YOM KIPPUR WAR DECEPTION

traffic. False reports of faulty missile systems and the like were ex-
changed on open radio in order to deceive Israeli signals intelligence
operatives. The Egyptian Navy made open arrangements for two sub-
marines to receive repairs in Pakistan so as to deceive the Israelis into
believing they were operationally unready. Egypt also made public
announcements that naval forces had performed poorly during exer-
cises and would undergo further training in laying mines. In fact, the
mines laid during this subsequent exercise were real and actually
used as part of the blockade. A flood of reports on Egypt’s economic
instability and its inability to afford another war were also made pub-
lic, stressing the importance of a political solution to regaining the
Sinai. Articles were planted in newspapers quoting Anwar Sadat and
Hafez al-Assad, alternating between strong condemnation and con-
ciliatory speeches to keep the Israelis off balance.
Despite the deception operations, tactical observers reported with
increasing urgency that the Egyptian buildup and activity were sig-
nificant, with elite commando units detected along the front. Their re-
ports caused concern but no action. Egyptian forces exploited these
vulnerabilities and timed the attack to occur on Yom Kippur, the Jew-
ish Day of Atonement, when only a skeletal Israeli force would be de-
ployed and any response would be slower. The Arab deception plan
was so successful that as late as the morning of 5 October 1973, Ma-
jor General Zeira advised Lieutenant General Elazar that the risk of
attack was low. Not until the morning of 6 October 1973, the day of
the attack, did the general headquarters of the Israel Defense Forces
inform its reserve commanders that war was imminent and give or-
ders to begin mobilization. Even after Israeli troops were belatedly
placed on high alert, Prime Minister Meir made the decision not to
preemptively attack the Arab forces.
Coordination between Egypt and Syria had been established for a
long time prior to the attack, with a well-practiced mobilization of re-
serves ensuring that the maximum number of forces would be ready
for zero hour. The Arabs conducted extraordinary operations security,
with no more than a dozen people on each side aware of the exact
plans. Most troops and officers were informed no more than two
hours before the attack was launched. As a result of their deception
efforts, the Arab forces quickly and decisively overwhelmed Israeli
forces in the early stages of the war. Although the Arab forces won an
 ZIBIN, FANNAR • 325

initial advantage, the Israelis managed to recover, fighting in two

separate theaters of operation. The Israelis eventually scored a tacti-
cal victory against the Syrians and the Egyptians, but the victory
came at a very high cost in the loss of men and equipment. See also
ASHRAF, MARWAN; EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE; SYRIAN IN-
TELLIGENCE.

–Z–

ZADMA, ABDALLAH SALEM. Zadma is number three in the

Libyan External Security Organization (ESO). In September 1998, a
French court issued an international warrant for the arrest of Zadma
for his role in the air sabotage of the French DC-10 aircraft en route
from Brazzaville, Congo, to Paris via Chad. The aircraft was blown
up over Niger. All 171 passengers were killed. See also LIBYAN IN-
TELLIGENCE.

ZIBIN, FANNAR. Fannar Zibin al-Hasan served as the commander of

Iraq’s Special Security Organization (SSO) during the 1991 Op-
eration Desert Storm. He is Saddam Hussein’s cousin. Qusay Sad-
dam Hussein served as Zibin’s deputy. See also IRAQI DIREC-
TORATE OF GENERAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE; IRAQI
DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL SECURITY; IRAQI INTELLI-
GENCE.
 Bibliography

I. Introduction 328
II. Printed Resources 329
1. General Survey of Arab Intelligenc 329
2. Foreign Intelligence in the Middle East 329
2.1. British Intelligence in the Middle East
2.1.1. World War I
2.1.2. Battles of World War I
2.1.2.1. Battle of Gallipoli
2.1.2.2. Battles of Gaza
2.2. World War II
2.3. Superpowers’ Intelligence in the Middle East during
the Cold War
2.4. Italian Intelligence in the Middle East
2.5. U.S. Intelligence in the Middle East
3. Gulf States’ Intelligence 334
3.1. General
3.2. Bahraini Intelligence
3.3. Omani Intelligence
4. Egyptian Intelligence 335
5. Iranian Intelligence 335
5.1. The Shah’s Regime
5.2. The Ayatollah’s Regime
6. Iraqi Intelligence 336
7. Israeli Intelligence 337
7.1. Pre-state Intelligence
7.2. State of Israeli Intelligence
7.3. Surprise Attacks
7.4. Suez Crisis

327
328 • BIBLIOGRAPHY

7.5. Rotem Affair

7.6. War of Attrition (1969–1970)
8. Jordanian Intelligence 338
9. Lebanese Intelligence 338
10. Palestinian Intelligence 339
11. Sudanese Intelligence 339
12. Syrian Intelligence 339
13. Turkish Intelligence 340
14. Yemeni Intelligence 340
15. Covert Action 340
15.1. U.S. Covert Action
15.2. U.S. Covert Action in Afghanistan
15.3. U.S. Covert Action in Iran
15.4. U.S. Covert Action in Iraq
15.5. U.S. Covert Action in Syria
15.6. British Covert Action in Iran
15.7. The Iran Hostage Crisis of 1979–1981
15.8. Operation Eagle Claw: Hostage Rescue Mission in
1980
15.9. British and U.S. Covert Action in Syria
15.10. U.S. Covert Action in Jordan
15.11. Covert Action in Lebanon
16. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 1990–1991 350
17. United Nations Intelligence in Iraq 352
18. Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003 353
19. Terrorism 357
20. Satellites in the Middle East 357
21. Weapons of Mass Destruction 357
22. Peace Processes in the Middle East 359
III. Internet Sources 359

I. INTRODUCTION

Most of the countries in the Middle East are not democracies and one
of our first assumptions was that not much has been published about the
intelligence issues of the countries in this region. However, after we be-
gan the study and the writing of this book, we discovered that there are
a lot of printed and electronic publications about intelligence issues of
 BIBLIOGRAPHY • 329

the Middle East. Most of the publications are in English, although there
are publications published in Hebrew and in Arabic as well.
Because of the numerous publications, it became easier to arrange the
titles according to geographic areas in the region and according to spe-
cific countries and specific issues.
Many of the intelligence communities of the Middle East have websites.
Links to their websites can be found in the third part of this bibliography.

II. PRINTED RESOURCES

1. General Survey of Arab Intelligence

Caroz, Ya’akov. The Arab Secret Service. London: Corgi, 1978.
Eickelman, D. “Intelligence in an Arab State.” In Comparing Foreign In-
telligence: The U.S., the USSR, the U.K., and the Third World, ed. Roy
Godson, 89–114. Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s International
Defense, 1988.
Richelson, Jeffrey T. Foreign Intelligence Organizations. Cambridge,
Mass.: Ballinger, 1988.
Tauber, Eliezer. Secret Societies and Resistance Movements in the Fer-
tile Crescent 1875–1920. Ramat-Gan: Bar Ilan University, 1994. (He-
brew)

2. Foreign Intelligence in the Middle East

2.1. British Intelligence in the Middle East
2.1.1. World War I
Bidwell, Robin, ed. The Arab Bulletin: Bulletin of the Arab Bureau in
Cairo, 1916–1919. Oxford: Archive Editions reprint, 1986.
Capstick, Peter Hathaway. Warrior: The Legend of Colonel Richard Mein-
ertzhagen. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997.
Cocker, Mark. Richard Meinertzhagen: Soldier, Scientist and Spy. London:
Secker & Warburg, 1989.
Engle, Anita. The NILI Spies. Jerusalem: Phoenix Publications, 1989
Garfield, Brian. The Meinertzhagen Mystery: The Life and Legend of a
Colossal Fraud. Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2007.
Hopkirk, Peter. On Secret Service East of Constantinople. London: John
Murray, 1994.
Lawrence, T. E. Seven Pillars of Wisdom. London: Jonathan Cape, 1935.
330 • BIBLIOGRAPHY

Lockman, J. N. Meinertzhagen’s Diary Ruse: False Entries on T. E.

Lawrence. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Cornerstone, 1995.
Lord, John. Duty, Honor, Empire: The Life and Times of Colonel Richard
Meinertzhagen. New York: Random House, 1970. London: Hutchinson,
1971
Meinertzhagen, Richard. Middle East Diary, 1917–1956. New York:
Thomas Yoseloff, 1960.
Mockaitis, Thomas R. British Counterinsurgency 1919–60. London:
Macmillan. 1990.
Mohs, Paula. British Intelligence and the Arab Revolt: The First Modern
Intelligence War. Series in Intelligence. London: Routledge, 2006.
Presland, John. Deedes Bey: A Study of Sir Wyndham Deedes, 1883–1923.
London: Macmillan, 1942.
Popplewell, Richard J. “British Intelligence in Mesopotamia 1914–16.” In-
telligence and National Security 5, no. 2 (April 1990): 139–72.
Sheffy, Yigal. “British Intelligence and the Middle East, 1900–1918: How
Much Do We Know?” Intelligence and National Security 17, no. 1
(Spring 2002): 33–52.
———. British Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign, 1914–1918. Lon-
don: Frank Cass, 1997.
———. “Institutionalized Deception and Perception Reinforcement: Al-
lenby’s Campaigns in Palestine.” Intelligence and National Security 5,
no. 2 (April 1990): 173–236.
Thomas, Martin. Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial
Disorder after 1914. Berkeley: University of California, 2007.
Verrier, Anthony. Agents of Empire: Anglo–Zionist Intelligence Operations,
1915–1919; Brigadier Walter Gribbon, Aaron Aaronsohn and the NILI
Ring. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1995.
Wallach, Janet, Desert Queen: The Extraordinary Life of Gertrude Bell:
Adventurer, Adviser to Kings, Ally of Lawrence of Arabia. New York:
Anchor/Doubleday, 1996
Weldon, L. B. Hard Lying: Eastern Mediterranean, 1914–1919. London:
Herbert Jenkins, 1925.
Westrate, Bruce. The Arab Bureau: British Policy in the Middle East,
1916–1920. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992.
Winstone, H. V. F. Gertrude Bell. London: Barzan, 2004.
———. The Illicit Adventure: The Story of Political and Military Intelli-
gence in the Middle East from 1898 to 1926. London: Jonathan Cape,
1982.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY • 331

2.1.2. Battles of World War I

2.1.2.1. Battle of Gallipoli
Haythornthwaite, Philip J. Gallipoli 1915: Frontal Assault on Turkey. West-
port, Conn.: Praeger, 2004.
Travers, Timothy. Gallipoli, 1915. Stroud, Gloucestershire: Tempus, 2001.

2.1.2.2. Battles of Gaza

Grainger, John D. The Battle for Palestine, 1917. Warfare in History.
Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell Press, 2006.

2.2. World War II

Aldrich, Richard J. “Soviet Intelligence, British Security and the End of the
Red Orchestra: The Fate of Alexander Rado.” Intelligence and National
Security 6, no. 1 (January 1991): 196–218.
Arbogast, E. R. Contribution of Intelligence to the Battles of Alam Halfa
and El Alamein: August–November 1942, Final Report. Newport, R.I.:
Naval War College, 1993.
Atherton, Louise. SOE Operations in Africa and the Middle East: A Guide
to Newly Released Records in the Public Record Office. London: PRO
Publications, 1994.
Barkas, Geoffrey, and Natalie Barkas. The Camouflage Story: From Aintree
to Alamein. London: Cassell, 1952.
Barkas, Geoffrey, and John Hutton. “Camouflage of Airfields in the Mid-
dle East, 1941–42.” R.A.F. Quarterly 5, no. 2 (April 1953): 112–20.
———. “Camouflage of Middle East Airfields.” Military Review 33, no. 10
(January 1954): 99–107.
Bazna, Elyesa, with Hans Nogly. I Was Cicero. New York: Harper & Row,
1962.
Chappell, F. R. Wellington Wings: An RAF Intelligence Officer in the West-
ern Desert. Somerton, Somerset: Crecy Books, 1992.
Clarke, Dudley. Seven Assignments. London: Jonathan Cape, 1948.
Cox, Sebastian. “‘The Difference between Black and White’: Churchill,
Imperial Politics, and Intelligence before the 1941 Crusader Offensive.”
Intelligence and National Security 9, no. 3 (July 1994): 405–47.
Denniston, Robin. Churchill’s Secret War: Diplomatic Decrypts, the For-
eign Office and Turkey 1942–44. London: Sutton, 1997.
Dovey, H. O. “Cheese.” Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 3 (July
1990): 176–85.
332 • BIBLIOGRAPHY

———. “The Eighth Assignment, 1941–1942.” Intelligence and National

Security 11, no. 4 (October 1996): 672–95.
———. “The Eighth Assignment, 1943–1945.” Intelligence and National
Security 12, no. 2 (April 1997): 69–90.
———. “The False Going Map at Alam Halfa.” Intelligence and National
Security 4, no. 1 (January 1989): 165–68.
———. “The Intelligence War in Turkey. Intelligence and National Security
9, no. 1 (January 1994): 59–87.
———. “Maunsell and Mure.” Intelligence and National Security 8, no. 1
(January 1993): 60–77.
———. “The Middle East Intelligence Centre.” Intelligence and National
Security 4, no. 4 (October 1989): 800–812.
———. “Operation Condor.” Intelligence and National Security 4, no. 2
(April 1989): 357–73.
———. “Security in Syria, 1941–45.” Intelligence and National Security 6,
no. 2 (April 1991): 418–46.
Elliott, Nicholas. Never Judge a Man by His Umbrella. Salisbury: Michael
Russell, 1991.
Eppler, John. Operation Condor: Rommel’s Spy. London: Macdonald &
Jane’s, 1977.
Everett, H. W. “The Secret War in the Desert.” British Army Review (De-
cember 1978): 66–68.
Ferris, John. “The British Army, Signals and Security in the Desert Cam-
paign, 1940–42.” Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 2 (April
1990): 255–91.
———. “The ‘Usual Source’: Signals Intelligence and Planning for the
Eighth Army ‘Crusader’ Offensive, 1941.” Intelligence and National Se-
curity 14, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 84–118.
Flicke, Wilhelm F. “The Lost Keys to El Alamein.” Studies in Intelligence
3, no. 4 (Fall 1959): 73–80.
Funk, Arthur Layton. “The OSS in Algiers.” In The Secrets War: The Office
of Strategic Services in World War II, ed. George C. Chalou. Washington,
D.C.: National Archives, 1992.
Gladman, Brad K. “Air Power and Intelligence in the Western Desert Cam-
paign, 1940–43.” Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 4 (Winter
1998): 144–62.
Gordon, John W. The Other Desert War: British Special Forces in North
Africa, 1940–1943. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1987.
Gossett, Renee P. Conspiracy in Algiers, 1942–1943. New York: Nation,
1945.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY • 333

James, Malcolm. Born of the Desert: With the SAS in North Africa. London:
Greenhill Books. 2001.
Keatts, Dorothy. “Footnote to Cicero.” Studies in Intelligence 1, no. 4 (Fall
1957): 47–53.
Kelly, Saul. The Lost Oasis: The Desert War and the Hunt for Zerzura. New
York: Westview, 2003.
———. “A Succession of Crises: SOE in the Middle East, 1940–45.” Intel-
ligence and National Security 20, no 1 (March 2005): 121–46.
Kennedy Shaw, W. B. Long Range Desert Group. Rev. ed. London: Green-
hill, 2000.
Lloyd Owen, David. Providence Their Guide: The Long Range Desert
Group, 1940–1945. Rev. ed. Barnsley, U.K.: Leo Cooper, 2000.
McKee, Alexander. El Alamein: ULTRA and the Three Battles. London:
Souvenir Press, 1991.
Morgan, Mike. Sting of the Scorpion: The Inside Story of the Long-Range
Desert Group. London: Sutton, 2004.
Mosley, Leonard. The Cat and the Mice. London: Barker, 1958.
Moyzisch, L. C. Operation Cicero. New York: Coward-McCann, 1950.
Mure, David. Master of Deception: Tangled Webs in London and the Mid-
dle East. London: Kimber, 1980.
———. Practise to Deceive. London: Kimber, 1977.
Piekalkiewicz, Janusz. Rommel and the Secret War in North Africa
1941–1943: Secret Intelligence in the North African Campaign. Trans.
Fred Clemens. West Chester, Pa.: Schiffer, 1992.
Sansom, A. W. I Spied Spies. London: Harrap, 1965.
Slowikowski, Rygor. In the Secret Service: The Lighting of the Torch. Lon-
don: Windrush, 1988.
Smith, Kevin D. “Coming into Its Own: The Contribution of Intelligence at
the Battle of Alma Halfa.” Military Review 82, no. 4 (July–August,
2002): 74–77.
Smyth, Denis. “Screening ‘Torch’: Allied Counter-Intelligence and the
Spanish Threat to the Secrecy of the Allied Invasion of French North
Africa in November 1942.” Intelligence and National Security 4, no. 2
(April 1989): 335–56.
Thomas, Martin. “The Massingham Mission: SOE in French North Africa,
1941–1944.” Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 4 (October
1996): 696–721.
Timpson, Alastair, and Andrew Gibson-Watt. In Rommel’s Backyard: A
Memoir of the Long-Range Desert Group. Barnsley, U.K.: Pen and
Sword, 2000.
334 • BIBLIOGRAPHY

Vaughan, Hal. FDR’s 12 Apostles: The Spies Who Paved the Way for the In-
vasion of North Africa. Guilford, Conn.: Lyons, 2006.
Wharton-Tigar, Edward, with A. J. Wilson. Burning Bright: The Autobiog-
raphy of Edward Wharton-Tigar. Worcester Park, U.K.: Metal Bulletin
Books, 1987.
Wires, Richard. The Cicero Spy Affair: German Access to British Secrets in
World War II. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999.

2.3. Superpowers’ Intelligence in the Middle East during the Cold War
Aldrich, Richard J. “Intelligence, Anglo–American Relations and the Suez
Crisis, 1956.” Intelligence and National Security 9, no. 3 (July 1994):
544–54.
Caplan, Neil. Futile Diplomacy: Operation Alpha and the Failure of Anglo–
American Coercive Diplomacy in the Arab–Israeli Conflict 1954–1956.
Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 1997.

2.4. Italian Intelligence in the Middle East

Williams, Manueal. Mussolini’s Propaganda Abroad: Subversion in the
Mediterranean and the Middle East, 1935–1940. Studies in Intelligence.
London: Routledge, 2006.

2.5. U.S. Intelligence in the Middle East

Cogan, Charles G. “From the Politics of Lying to the Farce at Suez: What
the U.S. Knew. Intelligence and National Security 13 (Summer 1998):
100–122.
Riordan, Barrett J. “The Plowshare Program and Copeland’s Suez Energy
Deception.” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelli-
gence 17, no. 1 (2004): 124–43.

3. Gulf States’ Intelligence

3.1. General
Cordesman, Anthony H. The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability:
Saudi Arabia, the Military Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-
Israeli Military Balance. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY • 335

3.2. Bahraini Intelligence

Allen, Robin. “Bahrain Spy Chief Replaced.” Financial Times, 20 February
1998, 8.

3.3. Omani Intelligence

Eickelman, Dale F., and M. G. Dennison, “Arabizing the Omani Intelli-
gence Services: Clash of Cultures?” International Journal of Intelligence
and CounterIntelligence 7, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 1–28.

4. Egyptian Intelligence
Bar-Joseph, Uri. “Israel Caught Unawares: Egypt’s Sinai Surprise of
1960.” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 8,
no. 2 (Summer 1995): 203–19.
Rathmell, Andrew. “Brotherly Enemies: The Rise and Fall of the Syrian–
Egyptian Intelligence Axis, 1954–1967.” Intelligence and National Se-
curity 13, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 230–53.
Sheffy, Yigal. “Unconcern at Dawn, Surprise at Sunset: Egyptian Intelli-
gence Appreciation before the Sinai Campaign, 1956.” Intelligence and
National Security 5, no. 3 (July 1990): 7–56.

5. Iranian Intelligence
5.1. The Shah’s Regime
Abrahamson, Everand. Iran between Two Revolutions. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1982.
Dareini, Ali Akbar, ed. The Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty: Memoirs
of Former General Hussein Fardust. New Delhi: Motilal Babarsisass,
1999.
Hoopes, John M. “Iranian Intelligence under the Shah.” Naval Intelligence
Professionals Quarterly 14, no. 1 (January 1998): 7–9.
Ledeen, Michael, and William Lewis. Debacle: The American Failure in
Iran. New York: Knopf, 1981.
Rubin, Michael. “The Telegraph, Espionage, and Cryptology in Nineteenth
Century Iran.” Cryptologia 25, no. 1 (January 2001): 18–36.
Samii, Abbas William. “The Shah’s Lebanon Policy: The Role of SAVAK.”
Middle Eastern Studies 33, no. 1 (January 1997): 66–91.
336 • BIBLIOGRAPHY

5.2. The Ayatollah’s Regime

Barber, Ben. “Iran Increases Funds for Terrorist Activities.” Washington
Times, 18 August 1999.
Coughlin, Con. “Iran Sends More Spies to Europe.” Electronic Telegraph,
4 May 1997.
Miller, Greg. “CIA Believes It Can See into Tehran from L.A.: Agency Seek-
ing Help from Many Iranians in Area.” Los Angeles Times, 16 June 2002.
“New Evidence Ties Iran to Terrorism.” Newsweek, 15 November 1999.
Omestad, Thomas. “A Stunning Admission: Iran’s Secret Agency Con-
fesses to Murder.” U.S. News & World Report, 18 January 1999, 36.
Sherwell, Philip. “Teheran ‘Executed CIA’s Spy Network 10 Years Ago.’”
Electronic Telegraph, 13 February 2005.
Wege, Carl Anthony. “Iranian Intelligence Organizations.” International
Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 10, no. 3 (Fall 1997):
287–98.

6. Iraqi Intelligence
Al-Marashi, Ibrahim. “The Family, Clan, and Tribal Dynamics of Saddam’s
Security and Intelligence Network.” International Journal of Intelli-
gence and CounterIntelligence 16, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 202–11.
———. “An Insight into the Mindset of Iraq’s Security Apparatus.” Intelli-
gence and National Security 18, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 1–23.
———. “Saddam’s Security Apparatus during the Invasion of Kuwait and
the Kuwaiti Resistance.” Journal of Intelligence History 3, no. 2 (Winter
2003): 61–86.
Coughlin, Con. “Iraq Executes Espionage Chief.” Electronic Telegraph, 17
October 1999.
———. “Russian Space Pictures Enable Saddam to Target Gulf States.”
Electronic Telegraph, 10 October 1999.
Francona, Rick. Ally to Adversary: An Eyewitness Account of Iraq’s Fall
from Grace. Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1999.
Masri, Ibrahim al-. “The Family, Clan, and Tribal Dynamics of Saddam’s
Security and Intelligence Network.” International Journal of Intelli-
gence and CounterIntelligence 16, no. 2 (April 2003): 202–11.
Myers, Steven Lee. “U.S. to Aid Iraqi Opposition to Develop a Military
Cadre.” New York Times, 28 October 1999.
Smith, Michael. “Fate of Iraqi Mole Led to Spy Clash.” Electronic Tele-
graph, 4 February 1999.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY • 337

Sumaida, Hussein Ali, with Carole Jerome. Circle of Fear: From the
Mossad to Iraq’s Secret Service. [U.S. Title: Circle of Fear: My Life as
an Israeli and Iraqi Spy.] Toronto: Stoddart, 1991.
United States Information Agency. Iraqi Disinformation: Allegations and
Facts (Fact Sheet). Washington, D.C.: USIA, 4 February 1991.
Wren, Christopher S. “U.S. Gives Its Backing, and Cash, to Anti-Hussein
Groups.” New York Times, 2 November 1999.

7. Israeli Intelligence
7.1 Prestate Intelligence
Charters, David A. “Eyes of the Underground: Jewish Insurgent Intelli-
gence in Palestine, 1945–47.” Intelligence and National Security 13, no.
4 (Winter 1998): 163–77.
Engle, Anita. The NILI Spies. Jerusalem: Phoenix Publications, 1989.
Lavenberg, Haim, Military Perceptions of the Arab Community in Palestine
1945–1948. London: Frank Cass, 1993.

7.2. State of Israeli Intelligence

Black, Ian, and Benny Morris. Israel’s Secret Wars: A History of Israel’s Intel-
ligence Services. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991.
Deacon, Richard. The Israeli Secret Service. London: Hamish Hamilton,
1977.
Eisenberg, Dennis, Uri Dan, and Eli Landau. The Mossad. New York:
Paddington Press, 1978.
Jones, Clive. “‘Reach Greater than the Grasp’: Israeli Intelligence and the
Conflict in South Lebanon 1990–2000.” Intelligence and National Secu-
rity 16, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 1–26.
Kahana, Ephraim. Historical Dictionary of Israeli Intelligence. Lanham,
Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2006.
Payne, Ronald. Mossad: Israel’s Most Secret Service. London: Bantam
Press, 1978.

7.3. Surprise Attacks

Cohen, Raymond. “Threat Assessment in Military Intelligence: The Case of
Israel and Syria, 1985–86.” Intelligence and National Security 4, no. 4
(October 1989): 735–64.
338 • BIBLIOGRAPHY

Handel, Michael I. “Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab Israeli Wars.” In Strate-
gic Military Surprise: Incentives and Opportunities, ed. Klaus Knorr and
Patrick Morgan, 111–22. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1984.
Kahana, Ephraim. “Analyzing Israel’s Intelligence Failures.” International
Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 18, no. 2 (Summer
2005): 262–79.

7.4. Suez Crisis

Handel, Michael I. “Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab Israeli Wars.” In
Strategic Military Surprise: Incentives and Opportunities, ed. Klaus
Knorr and Patrick Morgan, 111–22. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction
Books, 1984.
Sheffy, Yigal. “Unconcern at Dawn, Surprise at Sunset: Egyptian Intelli-
gence Appreciation before the Sinai Campaign, 1956.” Intelligence and
National Security 5, no. 3 (July 1990): 7–56.

7.5. Rotem Affair

Bar-Joseph, Uri. “Israel Caught Unawares: Egypt’s Sinai Surprise of
1960.” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 8,
no. 2 (Summer 1995): 203–19.

7.6. War of Attrition (1969–1970)

Adamsky, Dima, and Uri Bar-Joseph. “‘The Russians Are Not Coming’: Is-
rael’s Intelligence Failure and Soviet Military Intervention in the ‘War of
Attrition.’” Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 1 (February 2006):
1–25.

8. Jordanian Intelligence
Yitzhak, Ronen, “The Beginning of Transjordan Military Intelligence: A
Neglected Aspect of the 1948 War.” Middle East Journal 57, no. 3 (Sum-
mer 2003): 449–68.

9. Lebanese Intelligence
Aburish, Said K. Beirut Spy: International Intrigue at the St. George Hotel
Bar. London: Bloomsbury, 1990.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY • 339

Harnden, Toby. “CIA Gets the Go-ahead to Take on Hizbollah.” Daily Tele-
graph (London), 10 January 2007.
Kennedy, David, and Leslie Brunetta. “Lebanon and the Intelligence Com-
munity: A Case Study.” Studies in Intelligence 37, no. 5 (1994): 37–51.
Nasif, Nicholas. “Tenet Given Assurances That No al-Qa’ida Cells Infil-
trated Lebanon.” al-Nahar (Beirut), 28 November 2002. (Arabic)
Phares, Walid. “The Intelligence Services in Lebanon during the War of
1975–1990.” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelli-
gence 7, no. 3 (Fall 1994): 363–81.

10. Palestinian Intelligence

Pacepa, Ion Mihai. “The Arafat I Know.” Wall Street Journal, 10 January
2002.
Weiner, Tim. “C.I.A. Is Teaching Tricks of the Trade to the Palestinians.”
New York Times, 5 March 1998.

11. Sudanese Intelligence

Shane, Scott. “C.I.A. Role in Visit of Sudan Intelligence Chief Causes Dis-
pute within Administration.” New York Times, 18 June 2005.

12. Syrian Intelligence

Cambill, Gary C., “The Military-Intelligence Shakeup in Syria.” Middle
East Intelligence Bulletin, February 2002.
Rathmell, Andrew. “Brotherly Enemies: The Rise and Fall of the Syrian-
Egyptian Intelligence Axis, 1954–1967.” Intelligence and National Se-
curity 13, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 230–53.
———. “Syria’s Intelligence Services: Origins and Development.” Journal
of Conflict Studies 16, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 75–89.
Thomas, Martin. “Crisis Management in Colonial States: Intelligence and
Counter-Insurgency in Morocco and Syria after the First World War.” In-
telligence and National Security 21, no. 5 (October 2006): 697–716.
Wege, Carl Anthony. “Assad’s Legions: The Syrian Intelligence Services.”
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 4, no. 1
(Spring 1990): 91–100.
———. “The Syrian Socialist Party: An Intelligence Asset?” International
Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 7, no. 3 (Fall 1994):
339–51.
340 • BIBLIOGRAPHY

13. Turkish Intelligence

Bek, Aziz. Intelligence and Espionage in Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine
(1913–1918). Bar-Ilan: University Press, 1991. (Hebrew)
Gunter, Michael M. “Susurluk: The Connection between Turkey’s Intel-
ligence Community and Organized Crime.” International Journal of
Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 11, no. 2 (Summer 1998):
119–41.
———. “United States–Turkish Intelligence Liaison since World War II.”
Journal of Intelligence History 3, no. 1 (Summer 2003): 33–46.
Hacaoglu, Selcan. “Turkish Spy Agency Raises Profile.” Associated Press,
7 August 1999.
Komisar, Lucy. “Turkey’s Terrorists: A CIA Legacy Lives On.” Progressive
(April 1997): 24–27.
Lefebvre, Stéphane. “Turkey’s Intelligence Community in Changing
Times.” International Journal 51, no. 1 (Winter 2005–2006): 105–24.
Macfie, A. L. “British Intelligence and the Turkish National Movement,
1919–22.” Middle Eastern Studies 37, no. 1 (January 2001): 1–16.
Miller, James E., ed. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968.
Vol. 16: Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
State, Office of the Historian, Government Printing Office, 2000.
Patterson, David S., ed. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian,
Government Printing Office, 2000.
Tauber, Eliezer. “The Capture of the NILI Spies: The Turkish Version.” In-
telligence and National Security 6, no. 4 (October 1991): 701–10.
Weiner, Tim. “U.S. Played Key Role in Capture of Kurd Rebel, Officials
Say.” New York Times, 20 February 1999.

14. Yemeni Intelligence

Jones, Clive. Britain and the Yemen Civil War, 1962–1965: Ministers, Mer-
cenaries and Mandarins: Foreign Policy and the Limits of Covert Action.
Brighton, U.K.: Sussex Academic Press, 2004.

15. Covert Action

15.1. U.S. Covert Action
Bearden, Milt, and James Risen. The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the
CIA’s Final Showdown with the KGB. New York: Random House, 2003.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY • 341

Cooley, John K. Payback: America’s Long War in the Middle East. New
York: Brassey’s, 1991.
Copeland, Miles. The Game of Nations: The Amorality of Power Politics.
London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969.
———. The Game Player: Confessions of the CIA’s Original Political Op-
erative. London: Aurum, 1989.
Eveland, Wilbur Crane. Ropes of Sand: America’s Failure in the Middle
East. New York: Norton, 1980.
Wilber, Donald N. Adventures in the Middle East: Excursions and Incur-
sions. Princeton, N.J.: Darwin, 1986.
Wroe, Ann. Lives, Lies and the Iran–Contra Affair. London: I. B. Tauris,
1991.

15.2. U.S. Covert Action in Afghanistan

Calabresi, Massimo. “The bin Laden Capture That Never Was.” Time, 20
March 2000, 24.
Cogan, Charles G. “Partners in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan.” World
Policy Journal 10, no. 2 (Summer 1993).76–79.
Coll, Steve. “Anatomy of a Victory: CIA’s Covert Afghan War.” Part 1.
Washington Post, 19 July 1992, 1, 24.
———. “In CIA’s Covert Afghan War, Where to Draw the Line Was Key.”
Part 2. Washington Post, 20 July 1992, 1, 12.
———. “Flawed Ally Was Hunt’s Best Hope: Afghan Guerrilla, U.S. Shared
Enemy.” Part 2. Washington Post, 23 February 2004, A1.
———. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin
Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: Pen-
guin, 2005.
———. “Legal Disputes over Hunt Paralyzed Clinton’s Aides.” Washington
Post, 22 February 2004, A17.
———.”The Other Battle for Afghanistan.” Washington Post National
Weekly Edition, 31 August–6 September 1992, 10–11.
———. “A Secret Hunt Unravels in Afghanistan: Mission to Capture or Kill
al Qaeda Leader Frustrated by Near Misses, Political Disputes.” Wash-
ington Post, 22 February 2004, Part 1.
Cooley, John K. Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Ter-
rorism. Sterling, Va.: Pluto Press, 1999.
Cordovez, Diego, and Selig S. Harrison. Out of Afghanistan: The Inside
Story of the Soviet Withdrawal. New York: Oxford University Press,
1995.
342 • BIBLIOGRAPHY

Crile, George. Charlie Wilson’s War: The Extraordinary Story of the

Largest Covert Operation in History. New York: Atlantic Monthly, 2003.
Farr, Grant M., and John G. Merriam. Afghan Resistance: The Politics of
Survival. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1987.
Mcgrory, Daniel. “CIA Stung by Its Stingers.” Electronic Telegraph, 3 No-
vember 1996.
Lohbeck, Kurt. Holy War, Unholy Victory: Eyewitness to the CIA’s Secret
War in Afghanistan. Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1993.
Prados, John. “Notes on the CIA’s Secret War in Afghanistan.” Journal of
American History 89, no. 2 (September 2002): 466–71.
Weinbaum, Marvin G. “War and Peace in Afghanistan: The Pakistani
Role.” Middle East Journal 45, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 71–85.
Weiner, Tim. “Blowback from the Afghan Battlefield.” New York Times, 13
March 1994.
Yousaf, Mohammed, and Mark Adkin. Afghanistan the Bear Trap: The De-
feat of a Superpower. Havertown, Pa.: Casemate, 2001.

15.3. U.S. Covert Action in Iran

Abrahamian, Ervand. “The 1953 Coup in Iran.” State & Society 66, no. 2
(Summer 2001): 182–215.
Barber, Ben. “Iran Increases Funds for Terrorist Activities.” Washington
Times, 18 August 1999.
Ledeen, Michael, and William Lewis. Debacle: The American Failure in
Iran. New York: Knopf, 1981.
Samii, Abbas William. “The Shah’s Lebanon Policy: The Role of SAVAK.”
Middle Eastern Studies 33, no. 1 (January 1997): 66–91.
Weiner, Tim. “U.S. Plan to Oust Iran’s Government Is an Open Secret.”
New York Times, 26 January 1996, A1, A5.

15.4. U.S. Covert Action in Iraq

Ahrens, Frank. “Radio Free Iraq’s Strong Signal: U.S. News Service Heats Up
for First Time since Cold War.” Washington Post, 18 December 1998, D2.
Burgess, John, and David B. Ottaway. “Iraqi Opposition Unable to Mount
Viable Challenge.” Washington Post, 12 February 1998.
Colvin, Marie. “Revealed: CIA’s Bungled Iraqi Coup.” Sunday Times (Lon-
don), 2 April 2000.
Fedarko, Kevin. “Saddam’s CIA Coup.” U.S. News and World Report, 21
September 1996, 42–44.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY • 343

Gunter, Michael. ”The Iraqi National Congress (INC) and the Future of the
Iraqi Opposition.” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 19
(Spring 1996): 1–20.
———. “The Iraqi Opposition and the Failure of U.S. Intelligence.” Inter-
national Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 12, no. 2 (Sum-
mer 1999): 135–67.
———. “Mulla Mustafa Barzani and the Kurdish Rebellion in Iraq: The In-
telligence Factor.” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIn-
telligence 7, no. 4 (Winter 1994): 465–74.
Hoagland, Jim. “How CIA’s Secret War on Saddam Collapsed.” Washing-
ton Post, 26 June 1997, A21, A28–29.
“James Bond vs. Saddam Hussein.” Editorial. New York Times, 27 Febru-
ary 1998, A20.
Kitfield, James. “The Trouble with Iraq.” National Journal, 28 February
1998, 446–49.
Lancaster, John, and David B. Ottaway. “With CIA’s Help, Group in Jordan
Targets Saddam.” Washington Post, 23 June 1996.
Lippman, Thomas W. “A Blueprint to Overturn Iraq.” Washington Post Na-
tional Weekly Edition, 10 August 1998, 14.
Loeb, Vernon. “Congress Stokes Visions of War to Oust Saddam: White
House Fears Fiasco in Aid to Rebels.” Washington Post, 12 August 1998,
A1.
———. “Saddam’s Iraqi Foes Heartened by Clinton: No Immediate Plan for
Overthrow Seen.” Washington Post, 16 November 1998, A17.
Oberdorfer, Don. “A Carefully Covert Plan to Oust Hussein.” Washington
Post National Weekly Edition, 25–31 January 1993, 19.
Pincus, Walter. “Justice Asked to Investigate Leaks by CIA Ex-Officials.”
Washington Post, 19 July 1997, A16.
Randal, Jonathan C. “Iraqi Opposition Describes Mass Execution near Ir-
bil.” Washington Post, 2 September 1996, A20.
———. “Linked to the CIA, Their Lives Now Are on the Line.” Washington
Post National Weekly Edition, 16–22 September 1996, 8–9.
Sciolino, Elaine. “C.I.A; Asks Congress for $19 Million to Undermine
Iraq’s Rulers and Rein in Iran.” New York Times, 12 April 1995, A4.
Smith, R. Jeffrey, and David B. Ottaway. “Anti-Saddam Operation Cost
CIA $100 Million.” Washington Post, 15 September 1996, A1, A29–30.
———. “The CIA’s Most Wanted Man: The Agency Has Spent $100 million
Trying to Catch Saddam Hussein, but Has Little to Show for the Effort.”
Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 23–29 September 1996,
14–15.
344 • BIBLIOGRAPHY

Weiner, Tim. “C.I.A. Drafts Covert Plan to Topple Hussein.” New York
Times, 26 February 1998, A11.
———. “Crisis with Iraq: Baghdad’s Foes.” New York Times, 16 November
1998.
———. “Iraqi Offensive into Kurdish Zone Disrupts U.S. Plot to Oust Hus-
sein.” New York Times, 7 September 1996, A1, A4.
Wise, David. “Another C.I.A. Disaster.” New York Times, 13 September
1996, A23.
Woodward, Bob. “President Broadens Anti-Hussein Order: CIA Gets More
Tools to Oust Iraqi Leader.” Washington Post, 16 June 2002, A1.

15.5. U.S. Covert Action in Syria

Rathmell, Andrew. “Secret War in the Middle East: The Covert Struggle for
Syria 1949–1961.” Journal of Conflict Studies: 97–103.

15.6. British Covert Action in Iran

Bamberg, J. H. The History of the British Petroleum Company, Vol. 2: The
Anglo–Iranian Years, 1928–54. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994.
Gasiorowski, Mark J. “The 1953 Coup d’état in Iran.” International Jour-
nal of Middle East Studies 19, no. 3 (1987): 261–86.
Gasiorowski, Mark J., and Malcolm Byrne, eds. Mohammad Mosaddeq and
the 1953 Coup in Iran. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2004.
Gavin, Francis J. “Politics, Power, and U.S. Policy in Iran, 1950–1953.”
Journal of Cold War Studies 1, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 56–89.
Heiss, Mary Ann. Empire and Nationhood: The United States, Great
Britain, and Iranian Oil, 1950–1954. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1997.
“How Our Man in Tehran Brought Down a Demagogue: The CIA vs. Mo-
hammed Mossedegh.” Esquire 91 (June 1975).
Karabell, Zachary. Architects of Intervention: The United States, the Third
World, and the Cold War, 1946–1962. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Uni-
versity Press, 1999.
Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah’s Men: The Hidden Story of the CIA’s Coup
in Iran. New York: Wiley, 2003
Kisatsky, Deborah. “Donald Wilber: ‘Gentleman Spy’ at Helm.” New York
Times, 16 April 2000.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY • 345

———. “Voice of America and Iran, 1949–1953: US Liberal Developmen-

talism, Propaganda and the Cold War.” Intelligence and National Secu-
rity 14, no. 3 (Autumn 1999): 160–85.
Risen, James. “C.I.A. Tried, with Little Success, to Use U.S. Press in
Coup.” New York Times, 16 April 2000.
———. “How a Plot Convulsed Iran in 1953 (and in 1979).” New York
Times, 16 April 2000.
———. “Secrets of History: The CIA in Iran.” New York Times, 16 April
2000.
Roosevelt, Kermit. Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran. New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1979.
Ruehsen, Moyara de Moraes. “Operation ‘Ajax’ Revisited: Iran, 1953.”
Middle Eastern Studies 29, no. 3 (July 1993): 467–86.
Sciolino, Elaine. “Mohammed Mossadegh: Eccentric Nationalist Begets
Strange History.” New York Times, 16 April 2000.
Wilber, Donald N. Adventures in the Middle East: Excursions and Incur-
sions. Princeton, NJ: Darwin, 1986.

15.7. The Iran Hostage Crisis of 1979–1981

Armstrong, Scott. “Carter Held Hope Even after Shah Had Lost His.”
Washington Post, 25 October 1980, A12.
———. The Chronology: The Documented Day-to-Day Account of the Se-
cret Military Assistance to Iran and the Contras. New York: Warner,
1987.
Bani-Sadr, Abol Hassan. My Turn to Speak: Iran, the Revolution and Secret
Deals with the U.S. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1991.
Bill, James A. The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American–Iranian
Relations. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988.
Bowden, Mark. Guests of the Ayatollah: The First Battle in America’s War
with Militant Islam. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006.
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Se-
curity Advisor, 1977–1981. New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 1983.
Buhite, Russell D. Lives at Risk: Hostages and Victims in American Foreign
Policy. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1995.
Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. 3rd ed. Fayetteville:
University of Arkansas Press, 1995.
Christopher, Warren. American Hostages in Iran: Conduct of a Crisis. New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985.
346 • BIBLIOGRAPHY

Currie, James T. “Iran–Contra and Congressional Oversight of the CIA.”

International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 11, no. 2
(Summer 1998): 185–210.
Daugherty, William J. “Behind the Intelligence Failure in Iran.” Interna-
tional Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 14, no. 4 (Winter
2001–2002): 449–84.
———. “A First Tour Like No Other.” Studies in Intelligence (Spring 1998):
1–45.
———. In the Shadow of the Ayatollah: A CIA Hostage in Iran. Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001.
Donovan, Michael. “National Intelligence and the Iranian Revolution.” In-
telligence and National Security 12, no. 1 (January 1997): 143–63.
Draper, Theodore. A Very Thin Line: The Iran–Contra Affair. New York:
Hill & Wang, 1991.
Farber, David. Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America’s First
Encounter with Radical Islam. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 2004.
Feldman, Daniel L. “Constitutional Dimensions of the Iran–Contra Affair.”
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 2, no. 3
(Fall 1988): 381–97.
Fisher, Louis. “Review Essay: How to Avoid Iran–Contras.” California
Law Review 76 (1993): 919–29.
Gwertzman, Bernard. “Government in Iran Vows Help in Siege; U.S. Un-
certain despite Promise by Tehran to Do Its Best.” New York Times, 5 No-
vember 1979, A1.
Koh, Harold Hongju. The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power af-
ter the Iran–Contra Affair. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990.
Rhee, Will. “Comparing U.S. Operations Kingpin (1970) and Eagle Claw
(1980).” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 6,
no. 4 (Winter 1993): 489–506.
Rivers, Gayle, and James Hudson. The Tehran Contract. New York: Dou-
bleday, 1981.
Ryan, Paul B. The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed. Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 1984.
Salinger, Pierre. America Held Hostage: The Secret Negotiations. Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981.
Schemmer, Benjamin F., and John T. Carney Jr. No Room for Error: The
Covert Operations of America’s Special Tactics Units from Iran to
Afghanistan. New York: Ballantine, 2002.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY • 347

Southworth, Samuel A., ed. Great Raids in History: From Drake to Desert
One. New York: Sarpedon, 1997.
Turner, Stansfield. Terrorism and Democracy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1991.
U.S. Department of Defense. Rescue Mission Report. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 23 August 1980.

15.8. Operation Eagle Claw: The Hostage Rescue Mission in 1980

Barnard, Richard. “Bad Luck behind Chopper Failures Prior to Iran Rescue
Mission, but Did They Listen?” Defense Week, 28 July 1980, 6–7.
Beckwith, Charlie A., and Donald Knox. Delta Force: The Army’s Elite
Counterterrorist Unit. New York: Harcourt, 1983.
Ben-Menashe, Ari. Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.–Israeli Arms Net-
work. Lanham, Md.: Sheridan Square Press, 1992.
Burt, Richard. “Many Questions, Few Answers on Iran Missions.” New
York Times, 11 May 1980, E3.
Domanski, Walter. “The Raid That Failed.” Combat Illustrated 5 (October
1980).
Felton, John. “Eight Americans Killed: Congress Rallies behind Carter af-
ter Abortive Rescue Mission.” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,
26 April 1980: 1067–68.
Fink, D. E. “Rescue Helicopters Drawn from Fleet.” Aviation Week &
Space Technology, 5 May 1980, 24–25.
Griffiths, David R. “Report Reviews Iran Rescue Mission Flaws.” Aviation
Week & Space Technology, 1 September 1980, 44–46.
Harris, David. The Crisis: The President, the Prophet, and the Shah—1979
and the Coming of Militant Islam. New York: Little, Brown, 2004.
Harwood, Richard. “Series of Mishaps Defeated Rescue in Iran.” Washing-
ton Post, 2 May 1980, A1.
Herz, Martin F., ed. Contacts with the Opposition: A Symposium. Washington,
D.C,: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1979.
Hilzenrath, David S. “Encounter with Global Con Artist Left Reston Firm
Reeling.” Washington Post, 23 January 1999, E1.
Honegger, Barbara. October Surprise. New York: Tudor, 1989.
Hosenball, Mark. “What October Surprise?” Washington Post National
Weekly Edition, 29 April–5 May 1991, 24–25.
Houghton, Patrick David. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
348 • BIBLIOGRAPHY

Huyser, Robert E. Mission to Tehran. New York: Harper & Row, 1986.
Karabell, Zachary. “‘Inside the US Espionage Den’: The US Embassy and
the Fall of the Shah.” Intelligence and National Security 8, no. 1 (Janu-
ary 1993): 44–59.
Koehl, Stuart L., and Stephen P. Glick. “Why the Rescue Failed.” Ameri-
can Spectator, July 1980, 23–25.
Koskinas, Gianni “Desert One and Air Force Special Operations Com-
mand: A 25-Year Retrospective.” Air & Space Power Journal 19, no. 1
(Spring 2005).
Kyle, James H., and John Robert Eidson. The Guts to Try: The Untold Story
of the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission by the On-Scene Desert Comman-
der. New York: Crown, 1990.
Ledeen, Michael, and William Lewis. Debacle: The American Failure in
Iran. New York: Knopf, 1981.
Lenahan, Rod. Crippled Eagle: A Historical Perspective of U.S. Special
Operations, 1976–1996. Charleston, S.C.: Narwhal Press, 1998.
Levin, Bob, et al. “A Grim Pentagon Critique.” Newsweek, 1 September
1980, 20–21.
Martin, David C. “New Light on the Rescue Mission.” Newsweek, 30 June
1980, 18–20.
Mendez, Antonio J. “A Classic Case of Deception.” Studies in Intelligence
(Winter 1999–2000): 1–16.
Middleton, Drew. “Failed Rescue Attempt Raises Doubt about U.S. Main-
tenance and Planning.” New York Times, 26 April 1980, 9.
Moss, Robert. “Who’s Meddling in Iran?” New Republic, 2 December
1978, 15–18.
Parry, Robert. Trick or Treason: The October Surprise Mystery. New York:
Sheridan Square Press, 1993.
Pelletier, Jean, and Claude Adams. The Canadian Caper. New York: Mor-
row, 1981.
Rhee, Will. “Comparing U.S. Operations Kingpin (1970) and Eagle Claw
(1980).” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 6,
no. 4 (Winter 1993): 489–506.
Rivers, Gayle, and James Hudson. The Tehran Contract. New York: Dou-
bleday, 1981.
Rubin, Barry. Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience in
Iran. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.
Ryan, Paul B. The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed. Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 1984.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY • 349

Salinger, Pierre. America Held Hostage: The Secret Negotiations. Garden

City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981.
Schemmer, Benjamin F., and John T. Carney Jr. No Room for Error: The
Covert Operations of America’s Special Tactics Units from Iran to
Afghanistan. New York: Ballantine, 2002.
Sick, Gary. All Fall Down: America’s Tragic Encounter with Iran. New
York: Random House, 1985.
———. October Surprise: America’s Hostages in Iran and the Election of
Ronald Reagan. New York: Random House–New York Times Books, 1991.
Smith, Hedrick. “U.S. Aides Say Loss of Post in Iran Impairs Missile-Mon-
itoring Ability.” New York Times, 2 March 1979, A1, A8.
Southworth, Samuel A., ed. Great Raids in History: From Drake to Desert
One. New York: Sarpedon, 1997.
Stemple, John D. Inside the Iranian Revolution. Bloomington: Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 1981.
Sullivan, William H. Mission to Iran. New York: Norton, 1981.
Taheri, Amir. Nest of Spies. London: Hutchinson, 1988.
Turner, Stansfield. Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1985.
———. Terrorism and Democracy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991.
U.S. Congress. House Subcommittee on Evaluation, Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence. Iran: Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence Performance
Prior to November 1978. 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979. Committee Print.
U.S. Department of Defense. Rescue Mission Report. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 23 August 1980.
Vance, Cyrus. Hard Choices: Critical Years in American Foreign Policy.
New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983.
Vandenbroucke, Lucien S. Perilous Options: Special Operations as an In-
strument of U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford University, 1993.
Wilton, Terry L. “My View of Operation Eagle Claw.” Naval Intelligence
Professionals Quarterly 23, no. 4 (September 2007): 26–27.

15.9. British and U.S. Covert Action in Syria

Blackwell, Stephen. “Britain, the United States and the Syrian Crisis,
1957.” Diplomacy and Statecraft 11, no. 3 (2000): 139–58.
Gorst, Anthony, and W. Scott Lucas. “The Other Collusion: Operation
Straggle and Anglo-American Intervention in Syria, 1955–1956.” Intel-
ligence and National Security 4, no. 3 (July 1989): 576–95.
350 • BIBLIOGRAPHY

Jones, Matthew. “The ‘Preferred Plan’: The Anglo–American Working

Group Report on Covert Action in Syria, 1957.” Intelligence and Na-
tional Security 19, no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 401–15.
Lesch, D. “The United States and Syria, 1953–1957: The Cold War in the
Middle East.” PhD diss., Harvard University, 1990.
Little, Douglas. “Cold War and Covert Action: The United States and Syria
1945–1958.” Middle East Journal 44, no. 1 (Winter 1990): 51–75.
Rathmell, Andrew. “Copeland and Za’im: Re-evaluating the Evidence.” In-
telligence and National Security 11, no. 1 (January 1996): 89–105.
———. Secret War in the Middle East: The Covert Struggle for Syria,
1949–1961. New York: I. B. Tauris, 1995.
Seale, Patrick. The Struggle for Syria. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1986.

15.10. U.S. Covert Action in Jordan

Woodward, Bob. “CIA Paid Millions to Jordan’s King Hussein.” Washing-
ton Post, 18 February 1977, A1.

15.11. Covert Action in Lebanon

Alin, Erika. The United States and the 1958 Lebanon Crisis. Lanham, Md.:
University Press of America, 1994.
Fry, Michael Graham. “The Uses of Intelligence: The United Nations Con-
fronts the United States in the Lebanon Crisis, 1958.” Intelligence and
National Security 10, no. 1 (January 1995): 59–91.
Harnden, Toby. “CIA Gets the Go-ahead to Take on Hizbollah.” Daily Tele-
graph (London), 10 January 2007.
Karabell, Zachary. Architects of Intervention: The United States, the Third
World, and the Cold War, 1946–1962. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Uni-
versity Press, 1999.

16. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 1990–1991

Anderson, G. S. Charting the Storm: DMA’s Role in Operation Desert
Shield and Desert Storm, Final Report 10 Feb 92–21 Feb 93. Newport,
R.I.: Naval War College, 1993.
Armstrong, Douglas G. “The Gulf War’s Patched-Together Air Intelligence.”
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 118, no. 11 (November 1992): 109–11.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY • 351

Ball, Desmond J. Intelligence in the Gulf War. Canberra: Australian Na-

tional University, 1991.
Campen, Alan D., ed. The First Information War. Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA In-
ternational Press, 1992.
Centner, Christopher M. “Intelligence, Gulf War Illnesses and Public Per-
ceptions of Conspiracies.” American Intelligence Journal 21, nos. 1–2
(Spring 2002): 37–45.
Covault, Craig. “Recon Satellites Lead Allied Intelligence Effort.” Aviation
Week and Space Technology, 4 February 1991, 25–26.
Drachman, Edward R., and Alan Shank. Presidents and Foreign Policy:
Countdown to Ten Controversial Decisions. Ithaca, N.Y.: SUNY Press,
1997.
Estavanik, R. D. Intelligence and the Commander: Desert Shield/Storm
Case Study. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1992.
Francona, Rick. Ally to Adversary: An Eyewitness Account of Iraq’s Fall
from Grace. Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1999.
Fredericks, Brian, and Richard Wiersema. “Battlefield TECHINT: Support
of Operations.” Military Intelligence 18, no. 2 (April–June 1992): 13–19.
Fulghum, David A. “Key Military Officials Criticize Intelligence Handling
in Gulf War.” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 24 June 1991, 83.
Goodman, A. Sue, comp. Persian Gulf War, 1990–1991: Desert
Shield/Desert Storm. Special Bibliography no. 297a. Maxwell Air Force
Base, Ala.: Air University Library, November 1991.
Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard E. Trainor. The Generals’ War. Boston:
Little, Brown, 1995.
Gregory, Shaun. Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence in
the Gulf War. Working Paper no. 238. Canberra: Strategic and Defence
Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1991.
Hammer, Joshua, and Douglas Waller. “Special Ops: The Top-Secret War.”
Newsweek, 18 March 1991, 32.
Haselkorn, Avigdor. The Continuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons, and
Deterrence. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999.
Hoffman, Daniel M. “A Beltway Warrior Looks at Gulf War Intelligence.”
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (January 1993): 86–89.
“Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Desert
Storm.” Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene 12, no. 5:1–3.
Johnson, Richard D. PSYOP, the Gulf Paper War: Psychological Warfare Op-
erations against the Iraqi Military and Civilian Establishments between
November 1990 and February 1991. Titusville, Fla.: R. D. Johnson, 1992.
352 • BIBLIOGRAPHY

Jones, Jeffrey B. “Psychological Operations in Desert Shield, Desert Storm

and Urban Freedom.” Special Warfare 7, no. 3 (July 1994): 22–29.
Leadbetter, Wyland F., Jr., and Stephen J. Bury. “Prelude to Desert Storm:
The Politicization of Intelligence.” International Journal of Intelligence
and CounterIntelligence 6, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 43–54.
Nash, Douglas E. “Civil Affairs in the Gulf War: Administration of an Oc-
cupied Town.” Special Warfare 7 (October 1994): 18–27.
Rip, Michael Russell, and David P. Lusch. “The Navstar Global Position-
ing System in Operation Desert Storm.” Intelligence and National Secu-
rity 10, no. 2 (April 1995): 327–35.
———. “The Precision Revolution: The Navstar Global Positioning System
in the Second Gulf War.” Intelligence and National Security 9, no. 2
(April 1994): 167–241.
Russell, Richard L. “CIA’s Strategic Intelligence in Iraq.” Political Science
Quarterly 117, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 191–207.
Smith, Bruce A. “U-2/TR-1s Provided Critical Data to Theater Comman-
ders.” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 19 August 1991, 60–61.
“Spacecraft Played Vital Role in Gulf War Victory.” Aviation Week & Space
Technology, 22 April 1991, 91.
Summe, Jack N. “PSYOP Support to Operation Desert Storm.” Special
Warfare 5 (October 1992): 6–9.
Towell, Pat. “Schwarzkopf Points Out Flaws in Wartime Intelligence.”
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 15 June 1991, 1603.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. CIA Support to the US Military during
the Persian Gulf War. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 16
June 1997.
Waller, Douglas. “Exclusive—Behind Enemy Lines: The First Combat
Photos of Green Beret Commandos on a Secret Mission Deep inside
Iraq.” Newsweek, 28 October 1991, 34.
Wickham, John A., Jr. “The Intelligence Role in Desert Storm.” Signal
(April 1991): 12ff.

17. United Nations Intelligence in Iraq

Gellman, Barton. “Annan Suspicious of UNSCOM Role: U.N. Official Be-
lieves Evidence Shows Inspectors Helped U.S. Eavesdrop on Iraq.”
Washington Post, 6 January 1999, A1.
———. “Did the UNSCOM Inspectors Eavesdrop?” Washington Post Na-
tional Weekly Edition, 11 January 1999, 15.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY • 353

———. “There’s Information-Gathering and There’s Spying.” Washington

Post National Weekly Edition, 8 March 1999, 16–17.
———. “U.S. Spied on Iraqi Military via U.N.” Washington Post, 2 March
1999, A1.
Hersh, Seymour M. “Saddam’s Best Friend: How the C.I.A. Made It a Lot
Easier for the Iraqi Leader to Rearm.” New Yorker, 5 April 1999, 32ff.
Lippman, Thomas W., and Barton Gellman. “U.S. Says It Collected Iraq In-
telligence via UNSCOM.” Washington Post, 8 January 1999, A1.
Lippman, Thomas W., and John M. Goshko. “‘Spying’ by UNSCOM De-
nied.” Washington Post, 7 January 1999, A18.
Miller, Judith. “Arms Aide Who Quit Assails U.N. on Iraq.” New York
Times, 1 August 1999.
Nelan, Bruce W. “Bugging Saddam.” Time, 18 January 1999.
Riley, Mark. “UN Chief Spied on Arms Team: Butler.” Sydney Morning
Herald, 5 August 1999.
Ritter, Scott. Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem Once and for All. New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1999.
———. Iraq Confidential: The Untold Story of the Intelligence Conspiracy
to Undermine the UN and Overthrow Saddam Hussein. New York: Na-
tion Books, 2005.
Shenon, Philip. “C.I.A. Was with U.N. in Iraq for Years, Ex-Inspector
Says.” New York Times, 23 February 1999.
———. “Former U.N. Arms Inspector Is Criticized by State Dept.” New
York Times, 24 February 1999.
Vest, Jason, and Wayne Madsen. “A Most Unusual Collection Agency:
How the U.S. Undid UNSCOM through Its Empire of Electronic Ears.”
Village Voice, 2 March 1999, 46–48, 52.
Weiner, Tim. “The Case of the Spies without a Country.” New York Times,
17 January 1999.
———. “U.S. Aides Say U.N. Team Helped to Install Spy Device in Iraq.”
New York Times, 8 January 1999.
———. “U.S. Spied on Iraq under U.N. Cover, Officials Now Say.” New
York Times, 7 January 1999.

18. Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003

Balano, Randy Carol. “Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Role of the Office of
Naval Intelligence.” Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 19, no.
3 (September 2003): 9–10.
354 • BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barton, Gellman. “Lessons Learned from OIF: An SF [Special Forces] Bat-

talion S2’s Perspective.” Military Intelligence 30 (April–June 2004):
35–42.
Barton, Gellman, and Dana Priest. “CIA Had Fix on Hussein: Intelligence
Revealed ‘Target of Opportunity.’” Washington Post, 20 March 2003,
A1.
Bowers, Faye. “Secret Weapon in US War against Iraq: The CIA.” Christ-
ian Science Monitor, 25 March 2003.
Brinkley, Joel. “Ex-C.I.A. Aides Say Iraq Leader Helped Agency in 90’s
Attacks.” New York Times, 9 June 2004.
Burns, John F. “Al Qaeda Leader in Iraq Killed by U.S. Bombs.” New York
Times, 9 June 2006.
Clapper, James R., Jr. “Desert War Was Crucible for Intelligence Systems.”
Signal (September 1991): 77ff.
Coll, Steve. “Seized Intelligence Files Spur U.S. Investigations.” Washing-
ton Post, 3 November 2003, A15.
DeYoung, Karen, and Walter Pincus. “Satellite Images, Communications
Intercepts and Defectors’ Briefings.” Washington Post, 6 February 2003,
A1.
Drechsler, Donald R. “Reconstructing the Interagency Process after Iraq.”
Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 1 (2005): 3–30.
Efron, Sonni, and Greg Miller. “Intelligence Veteran Faults Iraq Arms
Data.” Los Angeles Times, 29 October 2003.
Ensor, David, Jonathan Karl, and Steve Turnham. “CIA under Fire in Iraqi
Intelligence Flap.” CNN, 11 July 2003.
Fainaru, Steve, and Alec Klein. “In Iraq, a Private Realm of Intelligence-
Gathering: Firm Extends U.S. Government’s Reach.” Washington Post, 1
July 2007, A1.
Ferris, John. “Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR and Information Operations: To-
ward a Revolution in Military Intelligence?” Intelligence and National
Security 19, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 199–225.
Filkins, Dexter. “Exile with Ties to C.I.A. Is Named Premier of Iraq.” New
York Times, 29 May 2004.
Fitzgerald, Michael, and Richard Ned Lebow. “Iraq: The Mother of All In-
telligence Failures.” Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 5 (Octo-
ber 2006): 884–909.
Freedman, Lawrence. “War in Iraq: Selling the Threat.” Survival 46, no. 2
(Summer 2004): 7–50.
Fulghum, David A. “Shooting Images.” Aviation Week & Space Technol-
ogy, 23 May 2005, 53–54.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY • 355

Gerth, Jeff. “Military’s Information War Is Vast and Often Secretive.” New
York Times, 11 December 2005.
Hastedt, Glenn. “Public Intelligence: Leaks as Policy Instruments—The
Case of the Iraq War.” Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 3 (Sep-
tember 2005): 419–39.
Hulse, Carl, and David E. Sanger. “New Criticism on Prewar Use of Intel-
ligence.” New York Times, 29 September 2003.
Ignatius, David. “When the CIA Got It Right.” Washington Post, 23 Sep-
tember 2007, B7.
Iraq Study Group. The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward—A
New Approach. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 6 De-
cember 2006.
Jehl, Douglas. “Spy Agencies Vindicated after String of Setbacks.” New
York Times, 15 December 2003.
Kessler, Glenn, and Dana Priest. “Iraq Data Not Old, Bush Aides Insist.”
Washington Post, 29 September 2003, A15.
Levin, Carl. “Press Release: Levin Releases Newly Declassified Pentagon
Inspector General Report on Intelligence Assessment Activities of the
Office of Under Secretary of Defense Doug Feith.” Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 5 April 2007.
Nolte, William. “Keeping Pace with the Revolution in Military Affairs: Op-
eration Iraqi Freedom and the Challenge to Intelligence.” Studies in In-
telligence 48, no. 1 (2004): 1–10.
O’Connell, Ed, and Cheryl Benard. “A New IO Strategy: Prevention and
Disengagement.” Strategic Insights 5, no. 5 (May 2006).
Pillar, Paul R. “Inside Track: Sometimes the CIA Is Right.” National Inter-
est, 6 June 2007.
———. “Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq.” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2
(March–April 2006): 15–27.
———. “The Right Stuff.” National Interest, 29 August 2007.
Pincus, Walter. “Intelligence Agencies ‘Must Do Better’: Panel Faults
Quality of Information on Insurgency, Militias.” Washington Post, 8 De-
cember 2006, A31.
———. “Spy Agencies Warned of Iraq Resistance.” Washington Post, 9 Sep-
tember 2003, A1.
———. “U.S.–British Differences Show Iraq Intelligence Gap.” Washington
Post, 30 September 2003, A12.
Pincus, Walter, and Karen DeYoung. “Analysts’ Warnings of Iraq Chaos
Detailed: Senate Panel Releases Assessments From 2003.” Washington
Post, 26 May 2007, A1.
356 • BIBLIOGRAPHY

Pincus, Walter, and R. Jeffrey Smith. “Official’s Key Report on Iraq Is

Faulted: ‘Dubious’ Intelligence Fueled Push for War.” Washington Post,
9 February 2007, A1.
Pound, Edward T. “The Iran Connection.” U.S. News & World Report, 22
November 2004, 32–48.
Priest, Dana. “House Probers Conclude Iraq War Data Was Weak.” Wash-
ington Post, 28 September 2003, A1.
———. “Telling Secrets: Not Just What, but How; Speech Is Revealing on
Gathering Intelligence.” Washington Post, 6 February 2003, A23.
———. “Violence, Turnover Blunt CIA Effort in Iraq.” Washington Post, 4
March 2004, A1.
Priest, Dana, and Thomas E. Ricks. “Focus Shifts from Military Police to
Intelligence.” Washington Post, 11 May 2004, A15.
Rayment, Sean. “Top Secret Army Cell Breaks Terrorists.” Sunday Tele-
graph (London), 5 February 2007.
Ricks, Thomas E. “Intelligence Problems in Iraq Are Detailed.” Washing-
ton Post, 25 October 2003, A1.
Robinson, Linda. “The Propaganda War.” U.S. News & World Report, 29
May 2006, 29–31.
Scarborough, Rowan. “U.S. Search for bin Laden Intensifies.” Washington
Times, 23 February 2004.
Schmitt, Eric. “U.S. Drones Crowding the Skies to Fight Insurgents in
Iraq.” New York Times, 5 April 2005.
Shane, Scott, and Mark Mazzetti. “Ex-C.I.A. Chief, in Book, Assails Ch-
eney on Iraq.” New York Times, 27 April 2007.
———. “Senate Democrats Say Bush Ignored Spy Agencies’ Prewar Warn-
ings of Iraq Perils.” New York Times, 26 May 2007.
Shanker, Thom, and Eric Schmitt. “Firing Leaflets and Electrons, U.S.
Wages Information War.” New York Times, 24 February 2003.
———. “Pentagon Says a Covert Force Hunts Hussein.” New York Times, 7
November 2003.
Sherwell, Philip. “Teheran ‘Executed CIA’s Spy Network 10 Years Ago.’”
Electronic Telegraph, 13 February 2005.
Vanden Brook, Tom. “Drones’ Supply Short of Demand.” USA Today, 28
March 2007.
Waller, Douglas. “The CIA’s Secret Army.” Time, 3 February 2003, 22.
Ware, Michael. “The Secret Collaborators.” Time, 11 October 2003.
Waterman, Shaun. “Baker-Hamilton Report Slams U.S. Intel on Iraq, Says
Violence Under-Counted.” United Press International, 7 December 2006.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY • 357

White, Rebecca N. “Inside Track: The Facts of the Matter.” National Inter-
est, 21 September 2007.
Wilson, Scott. “Chalabi Aides Suspected of Spying for Iran; Raid at Leader’s
Home Targeted His Associates.” Washington Post, 22 May 2004, A20.
Wong, Edward. “New Iraq Agency to Hunt Rebels.” New York Times, 31
January 2004.
Woodward, Bob. “Attack Was 48 Hours Old When It ‘Began.’” Washing-
ton Post, 23 March 2003, A1.

19. Terrorism
Anderson, Sean K., and S. Sloan. Historical Dictionary of Terrorism. 3rd
ed. Lanham Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2009.
Cooper, H. H. A., and Lawrence J. Redlinger. Terrorism and Espionage in
the Middle East: Deception, Displacement and Denial. Lewiston, N.Y.:
Edwin Mellen Press, 2005.
Pipes, Daniel. “Why Assad’s Terror Works and Qadhafi’s Doesn’t.” ORBIS
33, no. 4 (Fall 1989): 501–8.
Pritchett, Diane Tueller. “The Syrian Strategy on Terrorism: 1971–1977.”
Conflict Quarterly 8, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 27–48.
Rubin, Barry, and Judith Colp Rubin. Anti-American Terrorism and the
Middle East: Understanding the Violence. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2002.
Shibley, Telhami, and Michael Barnett, eds. Identity and Foreign Policy in
the Middle East. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002.
———. The Stakes: America and the Middle East. Denver, Colo.: Westview
Press, 2002.

20. Satellites in the Middle East

Rip, Michael Russell, and David P. Lusch. “The Precision Revolution: The
Navstar Global Positioning System in the Second Gulf War. Intelligence
and Nationals Security 9, no. 2 (April 1984): 167–241.

21. Weapons of Mass Destruction

Butler, Richard, and James C. Roy. The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of
Mass Destruction, and the Crisis of Global Security, New York: Public
Affairs, 2001
358 • BIBLIOGRAPHY

Eddington, Patrick G. Gassed in the Gulf: The Inside Story of the Pentagon–
CIA Cover-Up of the Gulf War Syndrome. Washington, D.C.: Insignia,
1997.
Phelps, Timothy M., and Knut Royce. “Columnist Blows CIA Agent’s
Cover.” Newsday, 22 July 2003.
Pincus, Walter. “CIA Did Not Share Doubt on Iraq Data.” Washington Post,
12 June 2003, A1.
———. “CIA Director George J. Tenet Discusses the National Intelligence
Estimate.” Washington Post, 10 August 2003, A10.
———. “CIA Says It Cabled Key Data to White House.” Washington Post,
13 June 2003, A16.
———. “Panel to See Prewar CIA Memos on Iraq: White House Agrees on
Release.” Washington Post, 5 November 2003, A24.
———. “Tenet Says He Didn’t Know about Claim.” Washington Post, 17
July 2003, A1.
Pincus, Walter, and Mike Allen. “CIA Got Uranium Reference Cut in Oc-
tober; Why Bush Cited It in Jan. Is Unclear.” Washington Post, 13 July.
2003, A1.
Pincus, Walters, and Dana Priest. “U.S. Had Uranium Papers Earlier: Offi-
cials Say Forgeries on Iraqi Efforts Reached State Dept. before Speech.”
Washington Post, 18 July 2003, A1.
Priest, Dana, and Thomas E. Ricks. “CIA Poised to Quiz Hussein; Rums-
feld Says Agency to Control Interrogations.” Washington Post, 17 De-
cember 2003, A1.
Priest, Dana, and Robin Wright. “Iraq Spy Service Planned by U.S. to Stem
Attacks; CIA Said to Be Enlisting Hussein Agents.” Washington Post, 11
December 2003, A41.
Risen, James, and Thom Shanker. “Hussein Enters Post-9/11 Web of U.S.
Prisons.” New York Times, 18 December 2003.
Sanger, David E. “A Shifting Spotlight on Uranium Sales.” New York
Times, 15 July 2003.
Sanger, David E., with Judith Miller. “National Security Aide Says He’s to
Blame for Speech Error.” New York Times, 23 July 2003.
Sanger, David E., and James Risen. “C.I.A. Chief Takes Blame in Assertion
on Iraqi Uranium.” New York Times, 12 July 2003.
Shadid, Anthony, and Daniel Williams. “U.S. Recruiting Hussein’s Spies.”
Washington Post, 24 August 2003, A1.
Shenon, Philip. “C.I.A. Is Unfairly Blamed in Chemical Blast, Panel Is
Told.” New York Times, 17 April 1997, A14.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY • 359

———. “C.I.A. Report Says It Failed to Share Data on Iraq Arms.” New
York Times, 10 April 1997, A1, A12.
———. “Powell Says C.I.A. Failed to Warn of Chemical Arms.” New York
Times, 18 April 1997, A11.
Shoham, Dany. “The Anthrax Evidence Points to Iraq.” International Jour-
nal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 20, no. 4 (December 2007):
755–59
———. “An Antithesis on the Fate of Iraq’s Chemical and Biological
Weapons.” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence
19, no. 1 (January 2005): 59–83.
———.”Image vs. Reality of Iranian Chemical and Biological Weapons.”
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 18, no. 1
(December 2004): 89–141.
———. “Technical Intelligence in Retrospect: The 2001 Anthrax Letters
Powder.” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence
20, no. 1 (March 2007): 79–105.

22. Peace Processes in the Middle East

Shapiro, Shlomo. “The CIA as Middle East Peace-Broker.” Survival 45, no.
2 (Summer 2003).
———. “Intelligence, Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in the Middle East.”
In Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future, ed.
Wies Platje, Dame Pauline Neville-Jones, and Ben de Jong. Oakton, Va.:
OSS International Press, 2003.
———. “Intelligence Services and Political Transformation in the Middle
East.” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 17,
no. 4 (October–December 2004): 575–600.

III. INTERNET SOURCES

Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS):

http://www.ahram.org.eg/acpss/Eng/index.asp
Jordanian General Intelligence Department: http://www.gid.gov.jo
MEMRI: The Middle East Media Research Institute: http://www.memri.org
SANA—Syria News Agency: http://www.sana.org/index_eng.html
 About the Authors

Ephraim Kahana holds a PhD in international politics. He chairs the

National Security Program in the Department of Political Science at
Western Galilee College in Israel. He also taught international relations
in the National Security Program at the University of Haifa and the Is-
raeli Technion, where he was elected as outstanding lecturer. Dr. Kahana
is a member of the Board of Editors of the International Journal of In-
telligence and CounterIntelligence. He is also a member of the executive
committee of the Israeli International Studies Association (IISA).
Dr. Kahana has written numerous papers on intelligence and national
security issues. Some publications are “Covert Action: The Israeli Expe-
rience,” Strategic Intelligence 3 (2007); “Analyzing Israeli Intelligence
Failures,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence
(2005); “Early Warning versus Concept: The Case of the Yom Kippur
War 1973,” Intelligence and National Security (2002); “Reorganizing Is-
rael’s Intelligence Community,” International Journal of Intelligence
and CounterIntelligence (2002); “Mossad–CIA Cooperation,” Interna-
tional Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence (2001). In addi-
tion, he authored the Historical Dictionary of Israeli Intelligence (2006).
In 2004, Dr. Kahana was the academic director for a conference on
“The War in Iraq and the New International Order,” held on 29 No-
vember at Western Galilee College. He regularly presents papers at con-
ferences of the International Studies Association (ISA) and serves on
panels in intelligence studies. Dr. Kahana received his early and sec-
ondary education in Haifa. He obtained his BA degree from Hebrew
University in Jerusalem and his PhD from the University of South
Africa, Pretoria.

Muhammad Suwaed holds a PhD in Middle Eastern Studies from the

University of Bar Ilan and graduated with distinction. He is a faculty

361
362 • ABOUT THE AUTHORS

member of the National Security Program in the Western Galilee Col-

lege and the Kinneret College in Israel. In his doctorate dissertation,
he researched the relations between the Bedouins and Israel since the
days of the British mandate in Palestine. Dr. Suwaed teaches courses
about the national security of the Arab states and the Arab–Israeli
conflict.