Cryptography and Network Security: Fourth Edition by William Stallings Lecture Slides by Lawrie Brown/Mod. & S. Kondakci

Cryptography and Network
Security
Chapter 11
Fourth Edition
by William Stallings
Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown/Mod.

& S. Kondakci
Message Authentication
• message authentication is concerned with:
– protecting the integrity of a message
– validating identity of originator
– non-repudiation of origin (dispute resolution)
• considers a set of security requirements
• Three alternative functions used:
– message encryption
– message authentication code (MAC)
– hash function
A Set of Security Requirements
• disclosure
• traffic analysis
• masquerade
• content modification
• sequence modification
• timing modification
• source repudiation
• destination repudiation
Message Encryption
• message encryption by itself also provides a
measure of authentication
• if symmetric encryption is used then:
– receiver knows sender must have created it
– since only sender and receiver now key used
– they know that content cannot have been altered
by others than themselves
Message Encryption
• If public-key encryption is used:
– encryption provides no confidence of sender
– since anyone potentially knows public-key
– however if
• sender signs message using their private-key
• then encrypts with recipients public key
• thus, have both secrecy and authentication
Message Authentication Code (MAC)
• generated by an algorithm that creates a small fixed-
sized block
– depending on both message and some key
– like encryption though need not be reversible
• appended to message as a signature
• receiver performs same computation on message
and checks it matches the MAC
• provides assurance that message is unaltered and
comes from certain sender
Message Authentication Code
A MAC is not a digital signature

Message Authentication Codes
• as shown the MAC provides authentication
• can also use encryption for secrecy
– generally use separate keys for each
– can compute MAC either before or after encryption
– is generally regarded as better done before
• why use a MAC?
– sometimes only authentication is needed
– sometimes we need authentication to persist longer than
the encryption (eg. archival use)
MAC Properties
• A MAC is a cryptographic checksum
MAC = CK(M)
condenses a variable-length message M using a
secret key K to a fixed-sized authenticator
• is a many-to-one function
– potentially many messages have same MAC
– but finding these can be very difficult
Requirements for MACs
• Taking into account the types of attacks we
need the MAC to satisfy the following:
1. knowing a message and MAC, is infeasible to
find another message with same MAC
2. MACs should be uniformly distributed
3. MAC should depend equally on all bits of the
message
Using Symmetric Ciphers for MACs
• can use any block cipher chaining mode and
use final block as a MAC
• Data Authentication Algorithm (DAA) is a
widely used MAC based on DES-CBC
– using IV=0 and zero-pad of final block
– encrypt message using DES in CBC mode
– and send just the final block as the MAC
• or the leftmost M bits (16≤M≤64) of final block
• but final MAC is now too small for security!
Data Authentication Algorithm (FIPS PUB
113)
O1 E ( K , D1 )
O2 E ( K ,[ D2 O1 ])
O3 E ( K ,[ D3 O2 ])
.
.
.
ON E ( K ,[ DN ON 1 ])
Data Authentication Algorithm
Hash Functions
• condenses arbitrary message to fixed size
h = H(M)
• usually assume that the hash function is
public and not keyed
• hash used to detect changes to message
• can use in various ways with message
• most often to create a digital signature
Hash Functions & Digital Signatures
Requirements for Hash Functions
1. can be applied to any sized message M
2. produces fixed-length output h
3. is easy to compute h=H(M) for any message M
4. one-way property: given h is infeasible to find x
s.t. H(x)=h
5. weak collision resistance: given x is infeasible to
find y s.t. H(y)=H(x)
6. strong collision resistance: is infeasible to find any
x,y s.t. H(y)=H(x)
Simple Hash Functions
• There are several proposals for simple
functions
• based on XOR of message blocks
• not secure since can manipulate any message
and either not change hash or change hash
also
• need a stronger cryptographic function
Secure Hash Algorithm
• SHA originally designed by NIST & NSA in 1993
• was revised in 1995 as SHA-1
• US standard for use with DSA signature scheme
– standard is FIPS 180-1 1995, also Internet RFC3174
• based on design of MD4 with key differences
• produces 160-bit hash values
• recent 2005 results on security of SHA-1 have raised
concerns on its use in future applications
Secure Hash Function
CV0 IV Initial n-bit value
CVi f (CVi 1, Yi 1)
H (M ) CVL
Yi ith input block,

L= # of input blocks,
CVi = Chaining var iable
Hash Algorithm Structure
Revised Secure Hash Standard
• NIST issued revision FIPS 180-2 in 2002
• adds 3 additional versions of SHA
– SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
• designed for compatibility with increased
security provided by the AES cipher
• structure & detail is similar to SHA-1
• hence analysis should be similar
• but security levels are rather higher
SHA-512 Overview
Keyed Hash Functions as MACs
• want a MAC based on a hash function
– because hash functions are generally faster
– code for crypto hash functions widely available
• hash includes a key along with message
• original proposal:
KeyedHash = Hash(Key|Message)
– some weaknesses were found with this
• eventually led to development of HMAC
HMAC
• specified as Internet standard RFC2104
• uses hash function on the message:
HMACK = Hash[(K+ XOR opad) ||
Hash[(K+ XOR ipad)||M)]]
• where K+ is the key padded out to size
• and opad (5C Hex), ipad (36 Hex) are specified
padding constants
• overhead is just 3 more hash calculations than the
message needs alone
• any hash function can be used
– eg. MD5, SHA-1, RIPEMD-160, Whirlpool
HMAC Overview
HMAC Security
• proved security of HMAC relates to that of the
underlying hash algorithm
• attacking HMAC requires either:
– brute force attack on key used
– birthday attack (but since keyed would need to
observe a very large number of messages)
• choose hash function used based on speed
verses security constraints
X.509 Authentication Service
• Distributed set of servers that maintains a
database about users.
• Each certificate contains the public key of a
user and is signed with the private key of a CA.
• Is used in S/MIME, IP Security, SSL/TLS and
SET.
• RSA is recommended to use.
Henric Johnson 27
X.509 Formats
Henric Johnson 28
Typical Digital Signature
Approach
Henric Johnson 29
Obtaining a User’s Certificate
• Characteristics of certificates generated by CA:
– Any user with access to the public key of the CA
can recover the user public key that was certified.
– No part other than the CA can modify the
certificate without this being detected.
Henric Johnson 30
X.509 CA Hierarchy
Henric Johnson 31
Revocation of Certificates
• Reasons for revocation:
– The users secret key is assumed to be
compromised.
– The user is no longer certified by this CA.
– The CA’s certificate is assumed to be
compromised.
Henric Johnson 32

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Cryptography and Network

Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown/Mod.

A MAC is not a digital signature

Yi ith input block,

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