U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil.

128 (1909


 People v. Lacerna, G.R. No. 109250, Sept. 5, 1997

People vs. Lacerna (1997)

Subject:
Exceptions to the rule against warrantless arrest; Search of luggage inside a vehicle
requires existence of probable cause; Consented search valid if intelligently made; To be
punishable, to “give away” a prohibited drug should be with the intent to transfer ownership;
Elements of illegal sale of prohibited drugs; Criminal intent need not be proved in prosecution of
acts mala prohibita ; Intent to perpetrate the act, not intent to commit the crime necessary in
prosecution of acts prohibited by special laws
Facts:
Noriel and Marlon Lacerna were inside a taxi when the group of Police Officer Carlito
Valenzuela of the Western Police District signaled the taxi driver to park by the side of the road
in lieu of a police checkpoint. P03 Valenzuela asked permission to search the vehicle. The officers
went about searching the luggages in the vehicle. They found 18 blocks wrapped in newspaper
with a distinct smell of marijuana emanating from it. When the package was opened, P03
Valenzuela saw dried marijuana leaves. According to Noriel and Marlon, the bag was a “padala”
of their uncle. Marlon admitted that he was the one who gave the 18 bundle blocks of marijuana
to his cousin Noriel as the latter seated at rear of the taxi with it. He however denied knowledge
of the contents of the package.
Marlon was charged before the RTC for “giving away” marijuana to another. Noriel on the
other hand was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The court noticed that Noriel manifested
“probinsyano” traits and was, thus, unlikely to have dealt in prohibited drugs.
Marlon objected on the RTC’s decision, stating that the lower court erred in saying that
the act of “giving away to another” is not defined under R.A. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act.
He also said that he was not aware of the contents of the plastic bag given to him by his uncle.
Marlon also raised that his right against warrantless arrest and seizure was violated.

Held:
Exceptions to the rule against warrantless arrest
1. Five generally accepted exceptions to the rule against warrantless arrest have been judicially
formulated as follows:
(1) search incidental to a lawful arrest
(2) search of moving vehicles
(3) seizure in plain view,
(4) customs searches,
(5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and
seizure.
2. Search and seizure relevant to moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the
impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances. In such cases, however, the
search and seizure may be made only upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising
out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains
an item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction. Military or police
checkpoints have also been declared to be not illegal per se as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely
visual.
Search of luggage inside a vehicle requires existence of probable cause
3. In this case, the taxi was validly stopped at the police checkpoint. Such search however is
limited to visual inspections without occupants being subjected to a physical or body searches. A
search of a luggage inside the vehicle should require the existence of probable cause.
4. In several decisions, there was probable cause in the following instances:
(a) where the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from the plastic bag carried by the
accused
(b) where an informer positively identified the accused who was observed to have been
acting suspiciously
(c) where the accused fled when accosted by policemen
(d) where the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by
policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said accused would transport
a large quantity of marijuana
(e) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence
information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy one who participated
in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belonged that said
accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country.
5. Probable cause in this case is not evident. The mere act of slouching in the seat when the taxi
passed along P03 Valenzuela’s checkpoint does not constitute probable cause to justify search
and seizure.
Consented search valid if intelligently made
6. Aniag, Jr. vs. COMELEC outlawed a search based on an implied acquiescence, because such
acquiescence was not consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty, but was merely
passive conformity to the search given under intimidating and coercive circumstances.
7. In this case, Marlon was "urbanized in mannerism and speech" when he expressly said that he
was consenting to the search as he allegedly had nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong.
This declaration is a confirmation of his intelligent and voluntary acquiescence to the search. The
marijuana bricks were, therefore, obtained legally through a valid search and seizure, thus
admissible.
To be punishable, to “give away” a prohibited drug should be with the intent to transfer
ownership
8. As distinguished from "delivery," which is an incident of sale, "giving away" is a disposition
other than a sale. It is, therefore, an act short of a sale which involves no consideration. The
prohibited drug becomes an item or merchandise presented as a gift or premium (giveaway),
where ownership is transferred.
9. By merely handing the plastic bag to Noriel, Marlon cannot be punished for giving away
marijuana as a gift or premium to another. Intent to transfer ownership should be proven.
Elements of illegal sale of prohibited drugs
10. The elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs are as follows
 (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited
drug
(b) such possession is not authorized by law
(c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the prohibited drug.
11. Evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that Marlon was in possession of the plastic
bag containing the prohibited drugs without the requisite authority. He cannot deny knowledge
of the package as its smell is pervasive.
Criminal intent need not be proved in prosecution of acts mala prohibita
12. Criminal intent need not be proved in the prosecution of acts mala prohibita. The prohibited
act is so injurious to the public welfare that, regardless of the person's intent, it is the crime itself.
Intent to perpetrate the act, not intent to commit the crime necessary in prosecution of acts
prohibited by special laws
13. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person
may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but if he did intend to commit an act, and
that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself, then he can be held liable for the malum
prohibitum.
14. The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala prohibita
it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done. Thus in illegal possession of prohibited
drugs, the prosecution is thus not excused from proving that the act was done “freely and
consciously”, which is an essential element of the crime.
15. In this case, Marlon failed to overcome the presumption of his knowledge of the contents of
the package. He was thus held liable for illegal possession of prohibited drugs.


 People v. Manzano, G.R. No. 86555. Nov. 16, 1993

FACTS: The Drug Enforcement Section of the Western Police District received information that the
accused was engaged in the sale of marijuana. On 02 September 1983, a "trial-buy" operation was
conducted by the law enforcement operatives. At five o'clock that afternoon, a civilian poseur-buyer
was able to purchase from the accused dried flowering tops of suspected marijuana with cigarette
rolling papers contained in three (3) tea-bag sized plastic bags. Each bag sold for P5.00. No arrest
was made. At seven o'clock in the evening of the same day, however, a "buy-bust" operation, this
time conducted by police officers Sgt. Gaudencio Quebuyen, Pat. Rolando Anza, Pat. Paterno
Banawel, Pat. Bernabe Yokingco and Pat. Eriberto Alameda, with Rebecca Avila Reyes, a civilian
informer, as poseur buyer, was set into motion. The team was so positioned as to have a clear view
of the transaction that was to take place near an electric post. Not long after, the poseur-buyer gave
the accused four (4) P5.00 marked bills. The accused left; moments later, he returned and handed
over to the poseur-buyer four (4) plastic bags, tea-bag size, containing marijuana flowering tops and
pieces of white rolling paper. Forthwith, the informer gave the pre-arranged signal (by scratching her
head). The team promptly moved in and arrested the accused.

ISSUE: THE LOWER COURT (HAS) GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF
THE CRIME CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOLLOWING:

(a) Inadmissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the accused's rights under the Constitution
HELD: ccused-appellant firstly anchors his assigned error on the fact that he has been
"investigated, interrogated and made to sign an accomplished booking sheet and arrest report
without the benefit of counsel." 1 The contention is without merit. This Court has already emphasized
that "(w)hen an arrested person signs a booking sheet and arrest report at a police station, he does
not (thereby) admit the commission of an offense nor confess to any incriminating
circumstance."2 The booking sheet is no more than a record of arrest and a statement on how the
arrest is made. It is simply a police report, and it has no probative value as an extrajudicial statement
of the person being detained.3The signing by the accused of the booking sheet and arrest report is
not a part of the custodial investigation which would otherwise require the presence of counsel to
ensure the protection of the accused's constitutional rights.4

The appellant's plea of innocence on the basis of reasonable doubt, however, deserves serious
considerations.

In the prosecution of an accused for an illegal sale of prohibited drugs "what is (initially) material
is . . . the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence."5 The laboratory tests and the
chemical microscopic examination, conducted by NBI Forensic Chemist Neva Gamosa, definitely
reveal the contents of the plastic bags to be marijuana. 6 The chemistry report, attested to by the
forensic chemist, has undoubtly established the corpus delicti of the crime.7


 People v. Sy Bing Yok, [G.R. No. 121345. June 23, 1999. 


FACTS: Thaton or about the 15th day of May, 1993, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, acting in confabulation and confederating with one
another, with unity of purpose and design, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver, transport and distribute
METAMPHETAMINE (sic) HYDROCHLORIDE otherwise known as
"SHABU," a regulated drug, without lawful authority, to a posseur-buyer
(sic), approximately weighing a total of eleven (11) kilograms of said
substance packed and contained in several plastic transparent bags, and
with a street valued of (sic) of P11 million more or less.

ISSUE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-

APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE A SERIOUS DOUBT
AS TO HIS IDENTITY AS THE OWNER OF THE DRUGS ALLEGEDLY
FOUND IN HIS POSSESSION.
HELD: As a rule, denials are weak forms of defenses, particularly where they
are not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.[26] The defense of
denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts with
disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard
defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.[27] In the case at bar, appellant's bare denials cannot prevail over the
positive identification by the prosecution witnesses of appellant as the
person who was in possession of, and who delivered, five (5) kilos of
methamphetamine hydrochloride ("shabu") to Armando Pulongbarit.
the crime under consideration is mala prohibita. It is settled that lack of
criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the
crime charged is malum prohibitum.[28] Hence, appellant's contention that
he did not know that the box he was carrying contained "shabu" cannot
constitute a valid defense. Mere possession and/or delivery of a regulated
drug, without legal authority, is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs
Act.

Padilla v. Dizon, 158 SCRA 127 (1988)** 


Matalam v. People,

People v. Quijada y Circulado, G.R. Nos. 115008-09, [July 24, 1996],

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394 (2001)**

People v. Macaranas, G.R. No. 226846, June 21, 2017 R.A. 3012

FACTS: Thaton or about the 18th day of February, 2007, in the City of
Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with gun, by
means of violence and intimidation, with intent of gain and without the
consent of the owner, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal
and carry away with them one Honda Wave 125 motorcycle with Plate No.
NQ 8724 valued at P59,000.00 belonging to Jacqueline Corpuz
[Langaman], to her damage and prejudice in the aforesaid amount of
P59,000.00, and by reason or on the occasion of the commission of the said
carnapping act, the said accused in furtherance of their conspiracy and with
intent to kill did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot Frank Karim Langaman with the gun they were then
provided, hitting the latter on his neck which caused his death
ISSUE: trial court and the CA committed an error in giving full credence to
the testimony of the lone witness and in rejecting his defense of denial and
alibi.

HELD: Thus, the RTC did not commit an error in imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua considering that there was no alleged and proven
aggravating circumstance
There is no arguing that the anti-carnapping law is a special law, different
from the crime of robbery and theft included in the Revised Penal Code. It
particularly addresses the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle
belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. But a
careful comparison of this special law with the crimes of robbery and theft
readily reveals their common features and characteristics, to wit: unlawful
taking, intent to gain, and that personal property belonging to another is
taken without the latter's consent. However, the anti-carnapping law
particularly deals with the theft and robbery of motor vehicles. Hence a
motor vehicle is said to have been carnapped when it has been taken, with
intent to gain, without the owner's consent, whether the taking was done
with or without the use of force upon things. Without the anti-carnapping
law, such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would fall within the purview
of either theft or robbery which was certainly the case before the enactment
of said statute."[7]

So, essentially, carnapping is the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle and

it becomes qualified or aggravated when, in the course of the commission
or on the occasion of the carnapping, the owner, driver or occupant is killed
or raped.
In this particular case, all the elements are present as the pieces of evidence
presented by the prosecution show that there were two (2) men both
wearing jackets and bonnets, together with the appellant who approached
the victim and the witness Kathlyn and employed force and intimidation
upon them and thereafter forcibly took the victim's motorcycle and then
shot the victim on the neck causing his death.

Go v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602,

Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387. Jan. 11, 2016. J

Jacaban v. People, G.R. No. 184355. March 23, 2015

That on or about the 16th day of July 1999, at about 12:45 A.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, did then and there have in
his possession and control the of certain articles, without first securing the necessary license/permit issued
therefor from any competent authority.

ISSUE: RTC decision finding him guilty of the crime charged is premised on its erroneous conclusion that
he is the owner the house where the unlicensed firearms and ammunitions were found.
HELD: The essential elements in the prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions are: (1) the existence of subject firearm; and, (2) the fact that the accused who possessed or
owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it.11 The unvarying rule is that ownership is
not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.12 What the law requires is
merely possession, which includes not only actual physical possession, but also constructive possession or
the subjection of the thing to one’s control and management.
Here, the prosecution had proved the essential elements of the crime charged under PD 1866 as amended
by RA 8294. The existence of the seized firearm and the ammunitions was established through the
testimony of PO3 Sarte. There was an inventory of the items seized which was made in the presence of the
petitioner and the three barangay tanods who all voluntarily signed the inventory receipt. PO3 Sarte
identified all the seized items in open court.

It was convincingly proved that petitioner had constructive possession of the gun and the ammunitions,
coupled with the intent to possess the same. Petitioner's act of immediately rushing from the living room to
the room where SPO2 Abellana found a calibre .45 and grappled with the latter for the possession of the gun
proved that the gun was under his control and management. He also had the animus possidendior intent to
possess the gun when he tried to wrest it from SPO2 Abellana.

Petitioner's lack of authority to possess the firearm was established by the testimony of Police Officer IV
Dionisio V. Sultan, Chief Clerk of the Firearms and Explosive Division of the Philippine National Police-
Visayas (FED-PNP- Visayas) that petitioner is not licensed to possess any kind of firearm or ammunition
based on the FED-PNP master list.

Even assuming that petitioner is not the owner of the house where the items were recovered, the ownership
of the house is not an essential element of the crime under PD 1866 as amended. While petitioner may not
be the owner, he indeed had control of the house as shown by the following circumstances: (1) When the
PAOCTF went to the house to serve the search warrant, petitioner was very angry and restless and even
denied having committed any illegal act, but he was assured by P/SInsp. Dueñas that he has nothing to
answer if they would not find anything, thus, he consented to the search being conducted; (2) while the
search was ongoing, petitioner merely observed the conduct of the search and did not make any protest at
all; and (3) petitioner did not call for the alleged owner of the house.

Teves v. Comelec, G.R. No. 180363, April 28, 2009**

Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 179090, June 5, 2009 Circumstances modifying criminal liability:

People v. Saley, 291 SCRA 715 (1998) R.A. 7659

People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 (1994)**

Ladonga v. People, 451 SCRA 673 (2005)

People v. Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20

Facts:

Task Forcer Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report that
Mantalaba who was 17 yrs old was selling shabu. After a buy-bust operation, two informations was filed
against Mantalaba which was later on consolidated. Mantalaba pleaded not guilty.

RTC found Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was penalized of reclusion perpetua to death
and fine of 500k for selling shabu and (2) for illegally possessing shabu, Mantalaba was penalized, in
application of the ISL, 6 yrs and 1 day as minimum and 8 yrs as maximum of prision mayor and fine of 300k.
CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Thus, the present appeal.

Mantalaba: the lower court gravely erred in convicting him and that there was no evidence of actual sale
between him and the poser-buyer during the buy-bust operation. He also claims that the chain of custody
of the seized shabu was not established.

Issue: Whether Mantalaba is guilty of drug trafficking and possession.

Ruling:

The petition is without merit.

The buy-bust operation was valid, establishing the following: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore. From the
above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well established that the elements have been satisfactorily
met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly identified. The subject dangerous drug, as well as the
marked money used, were also satisfactorily presented. The testimony was also clear as to the manner in
which the buy-bust operation was conducted.

Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable
ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an accused arrest
illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.

As to his minority, Mantalaba was minor during the buy-bust operation but was of legal age during the
promulgation of the decision. It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect after the promulgation of the RTC's
decision against Mantalaba. The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with PD 603 (Child and
Youth Welfare Code) and Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law that were applicable at the time of the
promulgation of the judgment. However, as ruled in People vs Sarcia, suspension of sentence can still be
applied but NOT when the offender upon the promulgation of judgment is 21 yrs old. or older. Mantalaba is
now 21 yrs old, therefore his suspension of sentence is already moot and academic.

But as to the penalty, CA must have appreciated Mantalaba's minority as privileged mitigating circumstance
in fixing the penalty. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one degree lower
than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
having been appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum
penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum
penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating
circumstance nor aggravating circumstance.
People v. Bustinera, 431 SCRA 284 (2004)

Go-Tan v. Tan, 567 SCRA 231 (2008)

Citibank v. Tanco-Gabaldon, G.R. No. 198444, September 4, 2013 


PCGG v. Carpio-Morales

Disini v. Sandiganbayan

People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012 


People vs. Bon, 506 SCRA 168, October 30, 2006 **


People v. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009 (E.B.)

Facts:

A complaint for acts of lasciviousness was filed against accused-appellant and upon review of the evidence
by the prosecutor the charge was upgraded to rape. The prosecution alleged that accused-appellant
committed the crime of rape against AAA who was then 5 years old.AAA was playing with her cousin and
two other children in a neighbor’s house when accused invited her to the backyard of the house and raped
here. AAA’s cousin witnessed what happened.

The RTC found accused-appellant guilty and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as well as civil
indemnity of P50,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00.

The record of the case was forwarded to the SC for automatic review and then transferred to the CA for
appropriate action and disposition.

Accused-appellant denied having committed the crime and interposed the following defenses:

1. The inconsistency in the testimonies of AAA and her cousin

2. The inability of AAA to recall the exact date when the crime was committed
3. The delay in filing the case (the case was filed 4 years after the alleged rape was committed
4. Absence of proof of force or intimidation
5. Medical report on negative lacerations

The CA affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty imposed to death and increased the civil
indemnity to P75,000.00 and awarded exemplary damages of P25,000.00 aside from the P50,000.00 for moral
damages.

The case was elevated to the SC for further review.

RA 9344 took effect while the case was pending before the SC.
Issues: Whether or not accused-appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

If so, whether or not the penalty imposed was proper.

Can accused-appellant avail of the retroactive effect of RA 9344 with regard to automatic suspension of
sentence.

Ruling:

1. Guilty as charged.

Inconsistency in the testimonies of AAA and her cousin – Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, which
refer only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies
where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the accused.
Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove that their
testimonies are not rehearsed

Inability of AAA to recall the exact date when the crime was committed – Discrepancies regarding exact
dates of rapes are inconsequential and immaterial and cannot discredit the credibility of the victim as a
witness. Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the
information defective on its face. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as near
to the actual date when the offense was committed the information is sufficient.

Delay in filing the case (the case was filed 4 years after the alleged rape was committed) – The rape victim’s
delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not destroy the truth of the charge nor is it an indication of
deceit. In the absence of other circumstances that show that the charge was a mere concoction and
impelled by some ill motive, delay in the filing of the complainant is not sufficient to defeat the charge. Here,
the failure of AAA’s parents to immediately file this case was sufficiently justified by the complainant’s father
in the latter’s testimony (they had to wait until they saved enough amount of money for litigation).

Absence of proof of force or intimidation – Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary, since none
of these is an element of statutory rape. There is a conclusive presumption of absence of free consent when
the rape victim is below the age of twelve.

Medical report on negative lacerations – A medical report is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape.
What is important is that AAA’s testimony meets the test of credibility that is sufficient to convict the accused.

2. Penalty improper. The proper imposable penalty for accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.

Under Art. 335 of the RPC, the imposable penalty for statutory rape is death. However, accused-appellant is
entitled to privileged mitigating circumstance of minority because he was 18 years old at the time of the
commission of the offense. Since the prosecution was not able to prove the exact date and time when the
rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was committed on or after he reached 18 years
of age in 1996.
In assessing the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor
of the accused, it being more beneficial to the latter.

Civil indemnity maintained. Imposition of exemplary damages proper. Moral and exemplary damages
increased to P75,000 and P 30,000.00. Reason: award of moral damages is not dependent on the actual
imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of
the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. For exemplary damages, the act must be
accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.

3. No suspension of sentence. The promulgation of the sentence of conviction of accused-appellant by the

RTC cannot be suspended as he was about 25 years of age at that time.

Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law,
even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time he/she is found guilty of the offense charged.

However, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the
maximum age of 21.

Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and academic.

However, accused-appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344 which
provides for confinement of convicted children.

Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and
ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still
be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of
his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall
impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juvenile in Conflict with
the Law.
Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. – If the court finds that the objective of the
disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in
conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition of his/her disposition or rehabilitation
program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence,
the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the
maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. – A child in
conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence,
in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that
may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

Re. Penalty Imposed by Judge Teofilo Guadiz, Jr., A.M. No. 1553 CFI September 12, 1980 


Batistis v. People, G.R. No. 181571, December 16, 2009

Dimakuta v. People, G.R. No. 206513, Oct. 20, 2015

Llamado v. CA, 174 SCRA 566 (1989)


Salgado v. CA, 189 SCRA 304 (1990)


Dimacuta v. People, G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015 (EB)

Bala v. Martinez, 181 SCRA 459 (1990)

Quarto v. Marcelo, G.R. No. 169042, October 5, 2011

Quarto v. Marcelo, 


People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 185729-32, June 26, 2013 Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan 
 G.R. No. 100295
April 26, 1994

FACTS:

Petitioner herein was charged with violation of Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices.However he was granted an
immunity from suit by the PCGG related to the previous charges against him, provided that he will testify as
witness against the Marcoses in criminal proceedings in the United States Vs Ferdinand Marcos, during the
RICO, where Ferdinand Marcos and his wife, Imelda Marcos were being tried for charges of corruption. All
the expenses of Mapa were shouldered by the PCCG when they flew to New York to testify against the
Marcoses. During the trial, Ferdinand Marcos died and La Bella, the American prosecutor dispensed the
testimony of Mapa and thereby acquitted Imelda Marcos. Since Mapa, was not able to testify, it was
contended that the immunity from suit of Mapa took without force and effect. However, the record shows
that the petitioners provided information to the PCGG relating to the prosecution of the RICO cases against
the Marcoses in New York. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the immunity given by the PCGG to Mapa is still in effect and force.

HELD:

Yes. Under Sec. 5, EO 14, the PCGG has the separate power to grant immunity to any person from being
prosecuted provided they will meet the conditions provided by the PCGG.

In the case at bar, Mapa was granted immunity from the prosecution or criminal case where he is being tried,
and the PCGG even shouldered all the expenses of Mapa when they flew to New York to testify implying
that Mapa was able to meet the conditions and the PCGG accepted the information given by him (MAPA)
to testify against the Marcoses during the RICO trial. Failure of the petitioner to testify on the RICO can not
nullify the immunity given to him by the PCGG since the petitioner was able to satisfy the requirements both
of the law and the parties’ implementing agreements. Though the petitioners were not able to testify against
the Marcoses in RICO, it can be said that it not their own fault.

Wherefore, the petitioner must be acquitted on the basis of the immunity granted by the PCGG, which under
the law has the power to grant immunity.

TWO KINDS OF IMMUNITY CAN BE GRANTED:

1. Transactional Immunity - is broader aint he scope of its protection. By its grant the witness can no longer
be prosecuted for any offence whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction.

2. Used-and-derivative-use - a witnessed is only assured that his or her particular testimony and evidence
derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution.