Hon. Aguinaldo et al. v. His Excellency G.R. No.

224302
President Aquino et al. [why Topacio v. November 20, 2016
Ong does not apply] En Banc

Doctrine: A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to
the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is brought against the
person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public
office, and may be commenced by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the case
may be, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped
or unlawfully held or exercised by another.

Being included in the list of nominees had given them only the possibility, but not the certainty,
of being appointed to the position, given the discretionary power of the President in making
judicial appointments.

FACTS

Petition for Quo Warranto under Rule 66 and Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 with
Application for Issuance of Injunctive Writ by some RTC judges assailing President Aquino’s
appointment of respondents Musngi and Econg as Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan

Republic Act No. 7975 was approved into law on March 30, 1995 and it increased the
composition of the Sandiganbayan from nine to fifteen Justices who would sit in five divisions of
three members each. Republic Act No. 10660, recently enacted on April 16, 2015, created two
more divisions of the Sandiganbayan with three Justices each, thereby resulting in six vacant
positions.

JBC called for applications for 6 newly created positions. After screening and selection of
applicants, the JBC submitted to President Aquino six shortlists contained in six separate
letters.

President Aquino issued on January 20, 2015 the appointment papers for the six new
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, namely: (1) respondent Musngi; (2) Justice Reynaldo P.
Cruz (R. Cruz); (3) respondent Econg; (4) Justice Maria Theresa V. Mendoza-Arcega
(Mendoza-Arcega); (5) Justice Karl B. Miranda (Miranda); and (6) Justice Zaldy V. Trespeses
(Trespeses).

Appointment papers were transmitted and the new 6 associate justices took their oath.

Petitioners allege that Pres. Aquino violated Sec 9, Art VIII of the 1987 Constitution when the
appointments made were not in accordance with the shortlists submitted by the JBC for each
vacancy, thus affecting the order of seniority of the Associate Justices.

Petitioners insist that President Aquino could only choose one nominee from each of the six
separate shortlists submitted by the JBC for each specific vacancy, and no other; and any
appointment made in deviation of this procedure is a violation of the Constitution. Hence,
petitioners pray, among other reliefs, that the appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg
(as the 16th and 18th Associate Justices), who belonged to the same shortlist for the
position of 21st Associate Justice, be declared null and void for these were made in violation
of Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution
Respondents counter that petitioners Aguinaldo, et al. cannot institute an action for quo
warranto because usurpation of public ofce, position, or franchise is a public wrong, and not a
private injury. Hence, only the State can le such an action through the Solicitor General or public
prosecutor, under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. As an exception, an
individual may commence an action for quo warranto in accordance with Section 5, Rule 66 of
the Rules of Court if he/she claims entitlement to a public ofce or position. However, for said
individual's action for quo warranto to prosper, he/she must prove that he/she suffered a direct
injury as a
result of the usurpation of public ofce or position; and that he/she has a clear right, and not
merely a preferential right, to the contested ofce or position. Herein petitioners Aguinaldo, et al.
have failed to show that they are entitled to the positions now being held by respondents Musngi
and Econg, as the inclusion of petitioners Aguinaldo, et al. in the shortlist for the 16 th
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice had only given them the possibility, not the certainty, of
appointment to the Sandiganbayan.

Respondents further contend that petitioners disregarded the hierarchy of courts by directly
filing the instant Petition for Quo warranto and Certiorari and Prohibition before this Court. Even
in cases where the Court is vested with original concurrent jurisdiction, it remains a court of last
resort, not a court of first instance.

ISSUE
Whether or not the court may take cognizance of the quo warranto petition despite its several
procedural infirmities. - YES
RULING

1. The Court takes cognizance of the present Petition despite several procedural infirmities
given the transcendental importance of the constitutional issue raised herein.

a. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title
to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is brought
against the person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held
or exercised the public office, and may be commenced by the Solicitor General or a
public prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the
public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.
i. Petitioners Aguinaldo, et al., as nominees for the 16th Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice, did not have a clear right to said position, and therefore not
proper parties to a quo warranto proceeding. Being included in the list of
nominees had given them only the possibility, but not the certainty, of being
appointed to the position, given the discretionary power of the President in
making judicial appointments.
ii. It is for this same reason that respondents Jorge- Wagan, et al., nominees
for the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, may not be impleaded as
respondents or unwilling plaintiffs in a quo warranto proceeding.
iii. Neither can the IBP initiate a quo warranto proceeding to oust respondents
Musngi and Econg from their currents posts as Sandiganbayan Associate
Justices for the IBP does not qualify under Rule 66, Section 5 of the Revised
Rules of Court as an individual claiming to be entitled to the positions in
question.

2. Nevertheless, the Court takes in consideration the fact that the present Petition is also for
 Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, which alleges that
President Aquino violated Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution and committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in his appointment of
respondents Musngi and Econg as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
a. The Court recognized in Jardeleza v. Sereno (Jardeleza Decision that a "petition for
certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any branch or instrumentality of
the government on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the
latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions."

b. In opposing the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, the OSG cites Topacio
in which the Court declares that title to a public office may not be contested except
directly, by quo warranto proceedings; and it cannot be assailed collaterally, such as
by certiorari and prohibition.

c. Topacio is not on all fours with the instant case. In Topacio , the writs of certiorari
and prohibition were sought against Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S.
Ong on the ground that he lacked the qualification of Filipino citizenship for said
position. In contrast, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition puts under
scrutiny, not any disqualication on the part of respondents Musngi and Econg, but
the act of President Aquino, in appointing respondents Musngi and Econg as
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices without regard for the clustering of
nominees into six separate shortlists by the JBC, which allegedly violated the
Constitution and constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

3. Locus standi
a. By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this
Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded
standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or
that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question;
(4) or concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the that the official action
complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

b. While neither petitioners Aguinaldo, et al. nor petitioner IBP have legal standing to
file a petition for quo warranto, they have legal standing to institute a petition for
certiorari

i. The clustering of nominees by the JBC, which the President, for justiable
reasons, did not follow, could have caused all nominees direct injury, thus,
vesting them with personal and substantial interest, as the clustering limited
their opportunity to be considered for appointment to only one of the six
vacant positions for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice instead of all the six
vacant positions to which the JBC found them as qualied for appointment.
 This is the far-reaching adverse consequence to petitioners Aguinaldo, et al.
that they have missed. More importantly, for a complete resolution of this
Petition, the Court must inevitably address the issue of the validity of the
clustering of nominees by the JBC for simultaneous vacancies in
collegiate courts, insofar as it seriously impacts on the constitutional
power of the President to appoint members of the Judiciary.

ii. One of the fundamental purposes of the IBP is to improve the administration
of justice. As the association of all lawyers in the country, petitioner IBP has
an interest in ensuring the validity of the appointments to the Judiciary.

c. Given that the constitutional issue in the Petition at bar is of transcendental

importance and of public interest, and for the above-mentioned reasons, the Court
shall accord petitioners the legal standing to sue.
i. The Petition presents for resolution of the Court the issue of whether
President Aquino violated Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution and
gravely abused his discretionary power to appoint members of the Judiciary
when he disregarded the clustering by the JBC of the nominees for each
specific vacant position of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. The issue is of
paramount importance for it affects the validity of appointments to collegiate
courts and, ultimately, the administration of justice, for if there are questions
as to the right of the appointee to his position as judge/justice, then doubts
shall likewise shadow all his acts as such. This will indubitably undermine the
faith of the public in the judicial system. Since at hand is a constitutional issue
of rst impression, which will likely arise again when there are simultaneous
vacancies in collegiate courts, it is imperative for the Court to already resolve
the same for the guidance of the Bench and Bar, and the general public as
well.
4. Violation of the hierarchy of courts
a. Inasmuch as the Petition at bar involves a constitutional question of transcendental
importance and of first impression and demanded by the broader interest of justice,
the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, resolves to exercise primary jurisdiction
over the same

 DISMISSES the instant Petition for Quo Warranto and Certiorari and Prohibition for lack of
merit.
 Clustering of nominees by the Judicial and Bar Council UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
 Appointments of respondents Associate Justices Michael Frederick L. Musngi and
Geraldine Faith A. Econg, together with the four other newly-appointed Associate Justices of
the Sandiganbayan, as VALID

ADDITIONAL NOTES:
1. The peculiar circumstances of this case, plus the importance of the issues involved herein,
justify the relaxation of the 60-day period for the filing of this Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition. Indeed, the official act assailed by petitioners is the appointment by President
Aquino of respondents Musngi and Econg as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, which was
completed on January 25, 2016 when said respondents took their oaths of ofce. Yet,
petitioners could not have sought remedy from the Court at that point. As basis for
petitioners' opposition to the said appointments, they needed to see and secure copies of
 the shortlists for the 16th to the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. It was only after
petitioners obtained copies of all six shortlists on March 22, 2016 that petitioners would have
been able to conrm that no one from the shortlist for the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate.
2. President Aquino did not violate the Constitution or commit grave abuse of discretion in
disregarding the clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists for the six vacancies for
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
a. The power of the President to appoint members of the Judiciary is beyond question,
subject to the limitation that the President can only appoint from a list of at least three
nominees submitted by the JBC for every vacancy.
b. It should be stressed that the power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to
restrict or limit the President's power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose
someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is
still paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated by
the JBC, the appointment is valid.
c. Furthermore, the JBC, in sorting the qualied nominees into six clusters, one for every
vacancy, could inuence the appointment process beyond its constitutional mandate
of recommending qualied nominees to the President. Clustering impinges upon the
President's power of appointment, as well as restricts the chances for appointment of
the qualified nominees, because (1) the President's option for every vacancy is
limited to the five to seven nominees in the cluster; and (2) once the President has
appointed from one cluster, then he is proscribed from considering the other
nominees in the same cluster for the other vacancies. The said limitations are utterly
without legal basis and in contravention of the President's appointing power.