CBCCs in The Asian Banking System
CBCCs in The Asian Banking System
CBCCs in The Asian Banking System
Banking System
Hardik Mittal, BFIA 2nd Year, SSCBS Ashutosh Gupta, BFIA 2nd Year,
SSCBS
hardik29hm@gmail.com ashutoshgupta1299@gmail.com
9540233101 7011185951
Background
The existing approach to cross-border payments is slow and expensive, tying up large
amounts of liquidity. Moreover, payment processes are often opaque, creating pricing
uncertainty and increasing fraud and counterparty risk.
Foreign exchange payments currently rely on so-called Nostro accounts – accounts held at
other banks in those banks’ local currencies – or on correspondent banking networks.
A major cost that arises here is the need to reconcile transactions between different centrally
maintained ledgers. Financial institutions today trust costly back-office processes to reconcile
centralised ledgers and accounting systems.
Centralised intermediaries concentrate risks and often are able to collect significant economic
rents. The 2008 financial crisis is but the latest reminder of the long history of concentrated
risk in the financial sector. As such, current methods for clearing and settling transactions,
though vastly improved from earlier generations, remain costly with many reconciliation and
counterparty risks. Furthermore, many financial products have high transaction costs and
financial inclusion is uneven in many parts of the world.
So, in an effort to address these various costs, one of the most feasible inclusions of
cryptocurrency and blockchain technology and the source code i.e. the Distributed Ledger
Technology, is integrating the interbank settlements through DLT and blockchain. In our
view, use of blockchain technology’s most radiant feature, i.e. peer to peer transactions,
without involving any central authority to perform the transactions, can significantly reduce
the cost, time and efforts involved in these interbank wholesale settlements.
This research paper ponders on the feasibility and scalability of a new single cryptocurrency,
AIBScoin ( Asian InterBank Settlement Coin), for the purpose of cross border and cross
currency payments amongst banks of Asian countries, developed, maintained(supply, to curb
volatility) by an association of the central banks. This coin, overcomes the cons of traditional
cryptocurrencies as it will be a bank only settlement currency, not to be used by the masses,
and will be backed by the strong Asian currencies like Yuan (China), Indian Rupee (India),
Yen (Japan), Dirham (United Arab Emirates), Riyal (Qatar) and many more.
Among investment banks, blockchain technology could reduce reconciliation and other
infrastructure costs by $8–12 billion a year. Incumbent firms and institutions nowadays are
constantly looking for the technology that can help them lower costs and risks, particularly
for back-office or post-trade functions.
There are social and economic benefits from encouraging sensible innovation in blockchain
technology that is consistent with established public policy goals. Properly introduced, the
technology can mitigate the ‘cost of trust’, which manifests itself in numerous ways within
the financial system and the economy. In doing so, it could lower overall costs, reduce
economic rents and create a more secure and fairer financial system.
Objective
Are the gains to be derived from moving a given process to a blockchain sufficiently
large as to compensate for the switching costs(i.e., to overcome entrenched network
effects)?
Secure, verifiable transactions can significantly reduce operational and counterparty risk – no
more waiting multiple days to ensure if counterparty actually pays or not. Hence, the
objective of this research paper is to analyse the existence of a single, wholesale CBCC, i.e.
AIBScoin , to aid international fund transfers of any nature, between any banks covered by
the Asian economy.
Research Methodologies
To determine if the said, AIBScoin, would be feasible and actually better for the banking
systems of the Asian economy, it is important to ascertain the gaps that it will fill, how, and
what will be the monetary surplus in that sense.
An integrated risk analysis of the current estimate is conducted using the resource-loaded
project schedule (for daily international fund transfers). Then, the schedule is simulated using
Monte Carlo techniques wherein:
The time-dependent costs cost more if their activities take longer because of risks
to schedule.For example, paucity of funds with the donor bank, would mean
greater cost. These include labor-type resources assigned to the activities and
supporting resources such as the Central banks of respective national economies.
Time dependent costs may be uncertain even if the schedule is fixed since the
daily exchange rate may vary for reasons of hourly rates or uncertain resource
loads i.e. funds.
Using this framework the Monte Carlo simulation of resource-loaded and cost schedules will
produce estimates of completion dates and costs that may or may not be consistent with the
ones involving the new crypto currency, which will answer our question.
Technical design elements
DLT arrangements can be designed in a number of ways and can support some or all parts of
a transaction flow. Such arrangements typically involve several key technical design
concepts that specify the information to be kept on the ledger and how the ledger is to be
updated.
Consensus
The consensus mechanism is the process by which the nodes in a network agree on a
common state of the ledger. This process typically relies on cryptographic tools, a set of
rules or procedures reflected in the protocol, and either economic incentives (applicable to
any network configuration) or governance arrangements. Consensus generally involves two
steps:
Validation: each validator identifies state changes that are consistent according to
the rules of the arrangement (that is, assets are available to the originator, and the
originator and beneficiary are entitled to exchange the assets). In order to do so,
each validator needs to rely on a record of previous states, either as a “last agreed
state” or as a “chain of previous states”.
Agreement on ledger updates: nodes agree to state changes to the ledger. This stage
of the consensus process involves mechanisms or algorithms that resolve conflicting
changes to the
At the most basic level, an arrangement needs to balance the pros and cons of having
unrestricted versus restricted access. For instance, unrestricted arrangements could open
up services to new types of participant and reduce the tiering of relationships in payment,
clearing and settlement processes. However, unrestricted access might cause scalability and
information security issues because of the inherent challenges of reaching consensus
between large numbers of participants that are unknown to each other. Anonymous
participation also calls for security measures mitigating cyber-attacks or illicit activities to be
incorporated into the design and rules of the arrangement (that is, to be resolved “on-
ledger”). These issues are significant enough that current DLT implementations for payment,
clearing and settlement activities are focused on restricted arrangements, which more
closely fit within existing legal and regulatory frameworks.
Assigning particular roles to a broad range of entities and their nodes may introduce other
important issues. For example, if only certain nodes are delegated to achieve consensus, it
may be easier (and faster) to reach consensus on the state of the ledger; however, it may
also be easier for any one of these nodes to compromise the integrity of the ledger. Thus, it
is important that such an entity is known and trusted by participants. Increasing the number
of nodes may improve the overall resilience of the network but it may also lengthen latency.
DLT arrangements characterised by a larger number of distributed roles may raise important
questions related to governance, settlement and operational risk management. As a result,
the choice of specific protocols for validation and consensus are driven primarily by access
rules and the defined roles played by entities and their nodes.
The range of approaches to DLT is an indication that a one-size-fits-all approach is not
appropriate to address the broad range of challenges in payment, clearing and settlement.
Arrangements such as the ones in the first column of Table 1 represent change that is more
incremental in nature and reflect opportunities to record information through a single
entity, much as is done today. This contrasts with the final column of Table 1, which
represents bitcoin-like arrangements. Models such as these would represent more radical
changes because of their completely decentralised nature. In the middle is a variety of other
possible arrangements. The ongoing experimentation of different design choices reflects
attempts to realise some of the benefits of DLT while recognising the specific constraints of
a particular use case.
3. Analyticalframework
This framework is designed to help central banks and other authorities understand DLT
arrangements for payment, clearing and settlement activities by providing a structured
approach to analysing their potential benefits and risks. The framework is based on four
core components: (i) scope: understanding the arrangement (see Section 3.1), which
includes its functionality and nature of service, and the factors for its effective
implementation; (ii) efficiency: analysing the arrangement’s implications for efficiency (see
Section 3.2); (iii) safety: analysing the arrangement’s implications for safety (see Section
3.3); and (iv) broader implications: analysing the arrangement’s broader financial market
implications (see Section 3.4).
The framework should be viewed as a starting point for understanding DLT arrangements to
identify a range of issues that are of interest to authorities and other stakeholders. The
framework is neither comprehensive nor exhaustive; nor does it address every possible DLT
or payment-, clearing- and settlement-related issue. For arrangements at an early stage of
development, which may not have concrete answers to some questions, the framework is
intended to identify areas where further work is required. In addition, the framework does
not prescribe or suggest particular design elements.
Conclusion