Small v. United States

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
SMALL v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD

CIRCUIT
No. 03—750.Argued November 3, 2004–Decided April 26, 2005
Petitioner Small was convicted in a Japanese Court of trying to smuggle firearms and
ammunition into that country. He served five years in prison and then returned to the United
States, where he bought a gun. Federal authorities subsequently charged Small under 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1), which forbids “any person … convicted in any court … of a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year … to … possess … any firearm.” (Emphasis
added.) Small pleaded guilty while reserving the right to challenge his conviction on the ground
that his earlier conviction, being foreign, fell outside §922(g)(1)’s scope. The Federal District
Court and the Third Circuit rejected this argument.
Held: Section 922(g)(1)’s phrase “convicted in any court” encompasses only domestic, not
foreign, convictions. Pp. 2—9.
(a) In considering the scope of the phrase “convicted in any court” it is appropriate to assume
that Congress had domestic concerns in mind. This assumption is similar to the legal
presumption that Congress ordinarily intends its statutes to have domestic, not extraterritorial,
application, see, e.g., Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285. The phrase “convicted in
any court” describes one necessary portion of the “gun possession” activity that is prohibited as a
matter of domestic law. Moreover, because foreign convictions may include convictions for
conduct that domestic laws would permit, e.g., for engaging in economic conduct that our society
might encourage, convictions from a legal system that are inconsistent with American
understanding of fairness, and convictions for conduct that domestic law punishes far less
severely, the key statutory phrase “convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” somewhat less reliably identifies dangerous
individuals for the purposes of U.S. law where foreign convictions, rather than domestic
convictions, are at issue. In addition, it is difficult to read the statute as asking judges or
prosecutors to refine its definitional distinctions where foreign convictions are at issue. To
somehow weed out inappropriate foreign convictions that meet the statutory definition is not
consistent with the statute’s language; it is not easy for those not versed in foreign laws to
accomplish; and it would leave those previously convicted in a foreign court (say of economic
crimes) uncertain about their legal obligations. These considerations provide a convincing basis
for applying the ordinary assumption about the reach of domestically oriented statutes here.
Thus, the Court assumes a congressional intent that the phrase “convicted in any court” applies
domestically, not extraterritorially, unless the statutory language, context, history, or purpose
shows the contrary. Pp. 2—5.
(b) There is no convincing indication to the contrary here. The statute’s language suggests no
intent to reach beyond domestic convictions. To the contrary, if read to include foreign
convictions, the statute’s language creates anomalies. For example, in creating an exception
allowing gun possession despite a conviction for an antitrust or business regulatory crime,
§921(a)(20)(A) speaks of “Federal or State” antitrust or regulatory offenses. If the phrase
“convicted in any court” generally refers only to domestic convictions, this language causes no
problem. But if the phrase includes foreign convictions, the words “Federal or State” prevent the
exception from applying where a foreign antitrust or regulatory conviction is at issue. Such
illustrative examples suggest that Congress did not consider whether the generic phrase
“convicted in any court” applies to foreign convictions. Moreover, the statute’s legislative
history indicates no intent to reach beyond domestic convictions. Although the statutory purpose
of keeping guns from those likely to become a threat to society does offer some support for
reading §922(g)(1) to include foreign convictions, the likelihood that Congress, at best, paid no
attention to the matter is reinforced by the empirical fact that, according to the Government,
since 1968, there have fewer than a dozen instances in which such a foreign conviction has
served as a predicate for a felon-in-possession prosecution. Pp. 5—8.
333 F.3d 425, reversed and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and
Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia and Kennedy, JJ.,
joined. Rehnquist, C. J., took no part in the decision of the case.

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

SMALL v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD

No. 03—750.Argued November 3, 2004–Decided April 26, 2005

333 F.3d 425, reversed and remanded.

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