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GUILLERMO AUSTRIA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF

APPEALS (Second Division), PACIFICO ABAD and MARIA G.
ABAD, respondents.

Words and phrases; Requisites of fortuitous event.—It is recognized in

this jurisdiction that to constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt a person
from responsibility, it is necessary that (1) the event must be independent of
the human will (or rather, of the debtor's or obligor's); (2) the occurrence
must render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal
manner; and that (3) the obligor must be free of participation in, or
aggravation of, the injury to the creditor (Reyes & Puno, Outline of
Philippine Civil Law, Vol. IV, pages 25-26, citing Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil.
657, 661). A fortuitous event, therefore, can be produced by nature, e.g.,
earthquakes.

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Austria vs. Court of Appeals

storms, floods, etc., or by the act of man, such as war, attack by bandits,
robbery, (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, 1962 ed., page
117, citing 3 Salvat 83-84), provided that the event has all the characteristics
ennumerated above.
Agency; Receipt of thing for sale on commission basis; Robbery as
defense against civil action for loss of thing.—Where MA received from GA
a pendant with diamonds to be sold on commission basis, which MA later
on failed to return because of a robbery committed upon her, it is not
necessary that there be a conviction for robbery for MA to be relieved from
civil liability of returning the pendant under Art, 1174, New Civil Code, as
it would only be sufficient to establish that the unforseeable event, the
robbery in this case, did take place without any concurrent fault on the
debtor's part, and this can be done by preponderant evidence. To require,

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moreover. prior conviction in order to establish robbery as a fact, would

demand proof beyond reasonable doubt to prove a fact in a civil case.

PETITION for review by certiorari from a decision of the Court of

Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioner.
     Jose A. Buendia for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Guillermo Austria petitions for the review of the decision rendered

by the Court of Appeals (in CA-G.R. No. 33572-R), on the sole
issue of whether in a contract of agency (consignment of goods for
sale) it is necessary that there be prior conviction for robbery before
the loss of the article shall exempt the consignee from liability for
such loss.
In a receipt dated 30 January 1961, Maria G. Abad acknowledged
having received from Guillermo Austria one (1) pendant with
diamonds valued at P4,500.00, to be sold on commission basis or to
be returned on demand. On 1 February 1961, however, while
walking home to her residence in Mandaluyong, Rizal, Abad was
said to have been accosted by two men, one of whom hit her on the
face, while the other snatched her purse containing

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jewelry and cash, and ran away. Among the pieces of jewelry
allegedly taken by the robbers was the consigned pendant. The
incident became the subject of a criminal case filed in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal against certain persons (Criminal Case No.
10649, People vs. Rene Garcia, et al.).
As Abad failed to return the jewelry or pay for its value
notwithstanding demands, Austria brought in the Court of First
Instance of Manila an action against her and her husband f or
recovery of the pendant or of its value, and damages. Answering the
allegations of the complaint, defendants spouses set up the defense
that the alleged robbery had extinguished their obligation.
After due hearing, the trial court rendered judgment for the
plaintiff, and ordered defendants spouses, jointly and severally, to
pay to the former the sum of P4,500.00, with legal interest thereon,
plus the amount of P450.00 as reasonable attorneys' fees, and the
costs. It was held that defendants failed to prove the fact of robbery,
or, if indeed it was committed, that defendant Maria Abad was guilty
of negligence when she went home without any companion,
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although it was already getting dark and she was carrying a large
amount of cash and valuables on the day in! question, and such
negligence did not free her from liability for damages for the loss of
the jewelry.
Not satisfied with his decision, the defendants went to the Court
of Appeals, and there secured a reversal of the judgment. The
appellate court, overruling the finding of the trial court on the lack of
credibility of the two defense witnesses who testified on the
occurrence of the robbery, and holding that the facts of robbery and
defendant Maria Abad's possession of the pendant on that
unfortunate day have been duly established, declared respondents
not responsible for the loss of the jewelry on account of a fortuitous
event, and relieved them from liability for damages to the owner.
Plaintiff thereupon instituted the present proceeding.

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It is now contended by herein petitioner that the Court of Appeals

erred in finding that there was robbery in the case, although nobody
has been f ound guilty of the supposed crime. It is petitioner's theory
that for robbery to fall under the category of a fortuitous event and
relieve the obligor from his obligation under a contract, pursuant to
Article 1174 of the new Civil Code, there ought to be prior finding
on the guilt of the persons responsible therefor. In short, that the
occurrence of the robbery should be proved by a final judgment of
conviction in the criminal case. To adopt a different view, petitioner
argues, would be to encourage persons accountable for .goods or
properties received in trust or consignment to connive with others,
who would be willing to be accused in court for the robbery, in order
to be absolved from civil liability for the loss or disappearance of the
entrusted articles.
We find no merit in the contention of petitioner.
It is recognized in this jurisdiction that to constitute a caso
fortuito that would exempt a person from responsibility, it is
necessary that (1) the event must be independent of the human will
(or rather, of the debtor's or obligor's); (2) the occurrence must
render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a
normal manner; and that (3) the obligor must be1 free of participation
in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor. A fortuitous event,
therefore, can be produced by nature, e.g., earthquakes, storms,
floods, etc., or by the act of man, such as war, attack by bandits,
2
robbery, etc., provided that the event has all the characteristics
enumerated above.
It is not here disputed that if respondent Maria Abad were indeed
the victim of robbery, and if it were really true that the pendant,
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which she was obliged either to

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1 Reyes & Puno, Outline of Philippine Civil Law, Vol. IV, pages 25-26, citing
Lasam vs. Smith, 45 Phil. 657, 661.
2 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, 1962 ed., page 117, citing 3
Salvat 83-84.

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sell on commission or to return to petitioner, were taken during the

robbery, then the occurrence of that fortuitous event would have
extinguished her liability. The point at issue in this proceeding is
how the fact of robbery is to be established in order that a person
may avail of the exempting provision of Article 1174 of the new
Civil Code, which reads as follows:

"ART. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by law, or when it is

otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those
events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable."

It may be noted the reform that the emphasis of the provision is on

the events, not on the agents or factors responsible for them. To avail
of the exemption granted in the law, it is not necessary that the
persons responsible for the occurrence should be found or punished;
it would only be sufficient to establish that the unforeseeable event,
the robbery in this case, did take place without any concurrent fault
on the debtor's part, and this can be done by preponderant evidence.
To require in the present action for recovery the prior conviction of
the culprits in the criminal case, in order to establish the robbery as a
fact, would be to demand proof beyond reasonable doubt to prove a
f act in a civil case.
It is undeniable that in order to completely exonerate the debtor
for reason of a fortuitous event, such debtor must, in addition to the
casus itself,3 be free of any concurrent or contributory fault or
negligence, This is apparent from Article 1170 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, providing that:

"ART. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of
fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the
tenor thereof, are liable for damages."

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It is clear that under the circumstances prevailing at present in the

City of Manila and its suburbs, with their

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3 V. Lachica vs. Gayoso, 48 Off. Gaz. (No. 1) 205, and cases cited; Lanaso Fruit
SS Co. vs. Univ. Ins. Co., 82 L. Ed. 422.

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high Incidence of crimes against persons and property, that renders

travel after nightfall a matter to be sedulously avoided without
suitable precaution and protection, the conduct of respondent Maria
G. Abad, in returning alone to her house in the evening, carrying
jewelry of considerable value, would be negligent per se, and would
not exempt her from responsibility in the case of a robbery. We are
not persuaded, however, that the same rule should obtain ten years
previously, in 1961, when the robbery in question did take place, for
at that time criminality had not by far reached the levels attained in
the present day.
There is likewise no merit in petitioner's argument that to allow
the fact of robbery to be recognized in the civil case before
conviction is secured in the criminal action, would prejudice the
latter case, or would result in inconsistency should the accused
obtain an acquittal or should the criminal case be dismissed. It must
be realized that a court finding that a robbery has happened would
not necessarily mean that those accused in- the criminal action
should be found guilty of the crime; nor would a ruling that those
actually accused did not commit the robbery be inconsistent with a
finding that a robbery did take place. The evidence to establish these
facts would not necessarily be the same.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision of the Court of
Appeals under review, the petition in this case is hereby dismissed,
with costs against the petitioner.

       Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando,

Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
     Castro, J., did not take part.

Petition dismissed.

Notes.—Force majeure or fortuitous event; what con-stitutes.—

For caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law are identical in so
far as they exempt an obligor from liability), by definition, are
extraordinary events

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not foreseeable or avoidable, "events that could not be foreseen, or

which, though foreseen, are inevitable." It is, therefore, not enough.
that the event could not have been foreseen or anticipated, but it
must be one impossible to foresee or avoid. The mere difficulty to
foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same.
(Republic vs. Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, L-21749, Sept. 29,
1967, 21 SCRA 279).
Other examples of casus fortuitus.—See Chan Keep vs. Chan
Gioco, 14 Phil. 5; Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359;
Crame Sy Panco vs. Gonzaga, 10 Phil. 646; Novo & Co. vs.
Ainsworth, 38 Phil. 267; Lizares vs. Hernaez, 40 Phil. 981; Garcia
vs. Escudero, 43 Phil. 437; Milan vs. Rio, 45 Phil. 718.

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