URGENT FURY

Operation
Urgent
Fury and Its
Critics
Captain Daniel P. Bolger,
U.S. Army
The US incursion into the island of Grenada was not a
perfect military operation in anyone’s estimation. Some crit-
ics even contend that, although the operation was an overall
success, major flaws were uncovered in every area, including
planning, intelligence, equipment and inter-service coopera-
tion (see MR Summaries, pages 79-80). Did the operation
reflect as much incompetence as alleged? This writer refutes
some of these serious criticisms.

O n 25 October 1983, US military forces, with

several Caribbean allies, intervened on the
island of Grenada. Operation Urgent Fury
was initiated to protect the lives of US students, restore
democratic government and eradicate Cuban influ-
ence on the island. Two US Army Ranger battalions,
a brigade of the 82d Airborne Division, a Marine
amphibious unit (MAU), the Navy aircraft carrier USS
Independence and its battle group, Air Force transports
and Spectre gunships, and a few Special Operations
Forces combined to swiftly overwhelm the Cuban and
Grenadian defenders.
The US assault commenced at dawn with nearly
simultaneous assaults on the island’s two airfields.
Army Rangers parachuted into the Point Salines air-
strip, while two Marine companies secured the Pearls
Airport and nearby Grenville. The Rangers encoun-
tered heavy antiaircraft fire, but they secured the

MILITARY REVIEW  July 1986 57

Captain Daniel P. Bolger runway and a group of execution of that strategy. Each report concentrated
is a student in Russian history grateful students at near- on slightly different subjects but, in general, all three
at the University of Chicago, by True Blue Campus. provide harsh assessments of US operational plans and
Chicago, Illinois. He received
Reinforced by paratroop- execution.
a B.A. from The Citadel. His
assignments include serving as ers of the 2d Brigade, 82d The first critique was presented at a Washington,
an infantry company com- Airborne Division, the D.C., news conference on 5 April 1984 under the aegis
mander and battalion staff Army elements attacked of the congressional Military Reform Caucus. The
officer with the 24th Infantry into the thick foliage fivepage report was prepared by legislative assistant and
Division (Mechanized), Fort around Salines to isolate historian William S. Lind. Though no specific sources
Stewart, Georgia.
and destroy the remain- were given for the report, Lind remarked that he had
ing opposition. garnered much of his information from paying close
Meanwhile, Joint Task Force Commander Vice attention at various officers’ clubs.2
Admiral Joseph Metcalf III left one Marine compa- A second review of the Grenada operation ap-
ny at Pearls and sent the rest of the Marine battalion peared in a copyrighted story in The Boston Globe
landing team (BLT) to Grand Mal beach, north of the on 22 October 1984. The story stated that Operation
Grenadian capital of St. George’s. The Marines landed Urgent Fury was “a case study in military incom-
by amphibious assault vehicle and helicopter on the petence and poor execution.” The authors were
night of 25 October. By the next day, St. George’s was in Major Richard A. Gabriel, US Army Reserve, and
US hands, Army units had rescued the US students at Lieutenant Colonel Paul L. Savage, US Army, Retired.
Grand Anse Campus and the backbone of the Cuban/ These officers had written the controversial 1978 book
Grenadian opposition had been broken. Significant Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army. No
scattered resistance went on for two more days, and verifiable documentation was included in the article;
some isolated sniping continued until 2 November. the authors stated that security strictures prevented a
During the eight-day campaign, 599 US and 80 full disclosure of the sources.3
foreign students were evacuated without injury. Civil The third and most authoritative consideration
order was restored. Cuban, Soviet and various Eastern of the US military performance in Grenada was
bloc representatives were removed from the island. The copyrighted in 1984 but did not receive gener-
casualty toll was relatively light. Eighteen US troops al attention until spring 1985. This commentary
were killed in combat, one died of wounds, 115 were was included in Chapter 2, “How the Lessons of
wounded and 28 suffered nonhostile injuries. The Defeat Remain Unlearned,” in Edward N. Luttwak’s
Cubans lost 24 killed, 59 wounded and 605 captured The Pentagon and the Art of War: The Question of
who were later returned to Cuba. The Grenadian Military Reform. Luttwak, a senior fellow at the
People’s Revolutionary Army (PRA) suffered 21 killed Strategic Studies Institute, Georgetown University,
and 58 captured. There were 24 Grenadian civil- has served as a consultant to the US Department of
ians killed during the operation. Admiral Wesley L. State and the Department of Defense. He cited the
McDonald, commander, US Atlantic Command, said, US actions in Grenada, along with other examples of
“In summary, history should reflect that the operation allegedly faulty US defense planning and execution.
was a complete success.”1 Not everyone agreed. Luttwak listed the sources for his Grenada informa-
tion as two articles from the May 1984 issue of the
The Critics US Naval Institute Proceedings and news reports
The Grenada operation attracted the attention of from October and November 1983 issues of various
five prominent members of the US military reform news publications.4
community. In three separate analyses, various as- I do not question the patriotism, sincerity or convic-
pects of Operation Urgent Fury were considered, and tion of these men. Their accounts are all built around
some rather serious complaints were presented. The kernels of truth. Unfortunately, each of the treatises
accounts accepted the basic strategy set by President contains errors of fact, hasty generalizations and con-
Ronald Reagan but noted significant faults in the clusions based on shaky premises.

58 July 1986  MILITARY REVIEW

 URGENT FURY

82d Airborne soldier in terrain typical of the island’s interior.

The 1982 edition of Field Manual 100-5, Operations, tanks, artillery or air defenses. They had only a few
says: “The operational level of war uses available mili- wheeled “armored cars” and some light antiaircraft
tary resources to attain strategic goals within a theater weapons. Gabriel and Savage stated that there were few
of war.”5 This level includes the allocation of forces, the enemy units and that the original US assault units were
deployment of troops against selected enemy forces unable to cope with them.6
and terrain objectives, and the command and control The US military missions in Grenada were estab-
of engaged combat units. Each of these operational lished from the president’s strategic objectives. The
components in Grenada received criticism. It was said safety of the medical students, not the destruction of
that too many forces were employed, the forces were the Cuban/PRA forces, was the immediate objective.
deployed piecemeal against peripheral objectives and As a result, US forces were initially directed against
the operation was inefficiently directed. Lind observed: those opposition forces posing the greatest threat to the
…the United States required seven battalions of US citizens on the island. The civilian presence dis-
troops, plus elements of two other battalions, to defeat couraged the massive use of mortar, artillery or naval
fewer than 700 Cubans and a Grenadian army that hard- gunfire, and air munitions.
ly fought at all. The second objective was the restoration of a dem-
Luttwak also thought the United States used too ocratic government. This necessitated the destruction
much force. He called most of the Cubans “construc- of the PRA. There had to be an island left to restore,
tion workers” and said that only 43 were actually so collateral damage and civilian casualties had to be
soldiers. He added “those few Grenadians who were held to a minimum. Equally important, there had
actually willing to fight” to the opposition forces but to be enough US troops on the ground to physically
commented that the Cuban/PRA forces had no real sweep and control the island to prevent any Cuban/

MILITARY REVIEW  July 1986 59

 …rescue operations had priority. The US rules of en-
gagement required minimum force and minimum ca-
sualties. With these constraints, the force structure had
to include enough troop strength to handle the likely
opposition without resorting to massive firepower.
PRA guerrilla campaign. The elimination of the Cuban Cubans (who had almost 12-percent casualties) and the
presence–the third objective–implied the isolation, Grenadian PRA fought hard for the first two days. The
destruction, or capture and removal of the Cubans. PRM did not contribute much to the island’s defense.
In essence, rescue operations had priority. The US Terrain and weather also influenced US force levels.
rules of engagement required minimum force and Grenada is not a small, flat, desert island. Its area is
minimum casualties.7 With these constraints, the force 119 square miles (311 square kilometers). Grenada’s
structure had to include enough troop strength to han- volcanic, hilly terrain is heavily vegetated. Its popu-
dle the likely opposition without resorting to massive lation of about 110,000 occupies the land at a greater
firepower. density than is found in Massachusetts or Connecticut.
The determination of the enemy’s strength on the In the Caribbean, only Puerto Rico has more people
island was hampered by a lack of firm intelligence, but per square mile. Almost 30,000 Grenadians live in
open-source military periodicals indicated a potentially and around St. George’s. The rest are spread in small
sizable force. There were 701 Cuban Revolutionary towns and clusters of farm huts. About 12 percent of
Armed Forces (FAR) troops on Grenada. Of these, 43 the island is primary rain forest, with most of the rest
advised (and, in some cases, commanded) PRA units. either secondary forest or cultivated cocoa, banana and
Ten Ministry of Interior officers provided similar nutmeg groves. The central rock formations and heavy
advice to the People’s Revolutionary Militia (PRM). vegetation limit areas for helicopter landing zones. The
The Cuban construction engineer battalion was armed hot, humid air averages 82 degrees Fahrenheit which
and organized as a military unit. The engineers lived in would affect US troops. The only real coastal plain is in
barracks, carried weapons and had received defense or- the Point Salines area, and most beaches are treacher-
ders from Fidel Castro and their commander, Colonel ous, even for small boats, let alone landing craft.9
Pedro Tortoló Comas. Air reinforcement from Cuba Two factors influenced force planners. The large
was possible. population required precision in ground operations.
The Grenadian PRA was composed of two infan- Foot reconnaissance would have to be used in lieu of
try battalions, an antiaircraft battery and an artillery reconnaissance by fire. Also, the defenders had many
battery. This force had trained to deal with US air- camouflage advantages. The precipitous topography
borne and amphibious tactics. Its armament included would absorb a lot of infantry. Securing Grenada with
six BTR60PBs and some BRDM2 armored vehicles vehicles or helicopter scouts would not be very effec-
(which are still used by the Soviets), seven 130mm tive. Too much could transpire unseen under the trees.
towed artillery pieces and six twin 23mm towed air Troops available for the operation were limit-
defense guns. The PRA was supplemented by seven ed by time constraints and mission requirements.
PRM infantry battalions which had conducted major The Caribbean area comes under the US Atlantic
anti-invasion maneuvers in April 1983. Command; the USS Independence and Navy/
Soviet, Libyan, North Korean, East German and Marine amphibious group were already available.
Bulgarian contingents were on the island. The Soviets, Special Operations Forces were selected for a few
in particular, were rather well armed for “diplomats.”8 critical tasks.
The total possible opposition to the US operation US Atlantic Command planners could reinforce
was 10 battalions plus combat support and combat the MAU by sea or by air. Sea transport takes a
service support units. US staff planning officers had long time, and the dispatch of additional MAUs
to plan for the worst case. As it turned out, both the was ruled out. Air reinforcement was quicker but

60 July 1986  MILITARY REVIEW

 URGENT FURY

American students after their rescue by US Army Rangers, Point Salines, 25 October 1983.

required the seizure of one or more runways. Army superiority in numbers or excessive use of firepower .
paratroopers were the logical choice, and the Army US troop strength peaked as the Rangers were with-
Rangers had trained to rescue hostages. Thus, the drawn. The redeployment schedule was dependent
airborne Ranger battalions were added. More infan- on the MAC airflow. The 82d Airborne Division was
trymen were needed to complete the clearance of the not flown in to meet unexpectedly heavy resistance.
countryside, and the 82d Airborne Division was the The first units were already en route as the assault
closest source of nonmechanized troops. They also elements landed.10
had the ability to parachute into Grenada if neces- A second criticism of the Grenada operation
sary, and their normal readiness level is higher than concerned the disposition of the forces employed.
other available Army units. Lind thought the plan should have been one “in which
Force planners allocated the two Ranger bat- overwhelming force is used to seize all critical junctures
talions with Air Force airlift, the MAU, Air Force in an enemy’s system at the outset.” Luttwak wanted “a
Spectre gunships and the USS Independence attack sudden descent in overwhelming strength that would
aircraft to the assault echelon . Air Force Military begin and end the fighting in one stroke.”11
Airlift Command ( MAC) planes would deliver Mission considerations placed the two known
the Caribbean peacekeeping force and two brigades student concentrations at the top of the list of geo-
of the 82d Airborne Division for reinforcements. graphical objectives. Enemy unit positions guarding
The actual force ratios during the campaign proved these objectives were also designated for seizure.
adequate. However, the pace of US reinforcement There was no enemy “rear” area because the Cubans
indicates that the assault elements fought and won and Grenadians were in discontiguous locations, tied
the major engagements without any overwhelming into land features and important facilities. Most of

MILITARY REVIEW  July 1986 61

 Ground Unit Force Ratios in Grenada
25 October - 2 November 1983
US/Caribbean Cuban/Grenadian
1 USMC battalion (+) 1 Cuban engineer battallion
2 USA Ranger battalions 2 PRA infantry battalions
1 USA airborne battalion 7 PRM infantry battalions
25 1/2 battalion CPF
October 41/2 battalions 10 battalions
1 USMC battalion (+) 2/3 Cuban engineer battallion
2 USA Ranger battalions 2 PRA infantry battalions
2 USA airborne battalion PRM (snipers; fragments)
26 1/2 battalion CPF
October 51/2 battalions 22/3 battalions
1 USMC battalion (+) 1/3 Cuban engineer battallion
2 USA Ranger battalions 1 PRA infantry battalions
3 USA airborne battalion PRM (fragments)
27 1/2 battalion CPF
October 61/2 battalions 11/3 battalions
1 USMC battalion (+) 1 PRA infantry battalions
6 USA airborne battalion PRM (fragments)
28 1/2 battalion CPF
October 71/2 battalions fragments
28 October force levels maintained until 2 November, with steady erosion of Grenadian PRA units.
USA—US Army CPF—Caribbean Peacekeeping Force PRM—People’s Revolutionary Militia
USMC—US Marine Corps PRAF—People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces

the enemy force was located in the south although helicopters to lift into company-sized landing zones
aerial photographs showed a Cuban An-26 Curl air- scattered around the island. The two available air-
craft at Pearls Airport. The seizure of both airfields borne drop zones–the airfields–were extremely tight.
would cut off any possible Cuban reinforcements. Only the Point Salines airstrip could accommodate
The terrain limited the amphibious entry points to MAC C141B StarLifter and CSA Galaxy aircraft.12
three beaches-the Grand Mal, Grand Anse and Great Pearls Airport would be a possible secondary site for
River/Conference Bays. However, the MAU could use C130H Hercules transports.

62 July 1986  MILITARY REVIEW

 URGENT FURY

82d Airborne troops talk with a Cuban doctor in detention area, 26 October 1983.

The US dispositions allowed Metcalf and his ground Épines student concentrations well behind Cuban lines.
deputy, Major General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the The St. George’s facilities would also have remained in
flexibility to move most of the Marine BLT around firm PRA control.
Grenada after Pearls was taken. The BLT (-) attack on The single Marine battalion might have encoun-
26 October, combined with Army attacks at Calliste tered slow going in the thickly undergrown Calliste/
and the Grand Anse raid, broke the back of the Cuban/ Frequente area, and the Marines’ ability to contain
Grenadian resistance. It was suggested that the move- the Cuban and PRA battalions across a mile of jun-
ment of the BLT (-) to the St. George’s area was too gle foliage is questionable. Without an airstrip, the
slow, and a “platoon or two” could have been sent by Marines would have to rely on seaborne reinforcement
helicopter during the afternoon of 25 October.13 This if they ran into trouble. The Cubans and the PRA,
move might have run afoul of the St. George’s PRA secure in their barracks and located near arms caches,
antiaircraft gunners which had downed a Black Hawk could have held out for some time. This scheme might
and two Sea Cobra helicopters by 1200 on 25 October. have worked over time, but the mission was to seize
Lind preferred a scheme of maneuver involving Grenada, not beseige it.
only the Marines. The main effort of the BLT would Luttwak desired a wholly Army operation and
have been a landing at Grand Anse, followed by a opined that:
move across the southwestern peninsula to cut off …had Urgent Fury been planned by Army officers
Salines from St. George’s. “…this would have isolated competent in land warfare, their natural tendencies would
the Cubans from the rest of the island and made any have been to stage a coup de main, using as many battal-
defense on their part meaningless.”14 Unfortunately, ions of the 82d Airborne Division as could be airlifted , as
it would have also left the True Blue and Lance aux well as the Rangers.

MILITARY REVIEW  July 1986 63

 Luttwak said US troops should have come down at the very outset; the enemy troops would be stunned by
directly on each objective, using parachutes, air landing, the “sheer magnitude of the attack.” Luttwak concludes:
amphibious assault and infiltration. These forces would “Then there is no need for tactical movement on the
“suppress opposition” and capture all target areas simulta- ground or for airlifted vehicles, nor for coordination on
neously. The enemy command structure would be crushed the ground.”15 There are six problems with this plan:

64 July 1986  MILITARY REVIEW

 URGENT FURY

US Army Rangers deploying from Point Salines area, 26 October 1983.

• Grenada only has two usable airborne drop forces would have been unable to protect the 237
zones, and many objectives were not near these students who were not near the school campuses,
drop zones. Pearls or the St. George’s area. Enemy forces missed
• MAC airlift would require time to stage to the east in the initial assaults would have been free to with-
coast before executing such a plan. The air-space draw to the central mountain forests. This scheme
coordination over Grenada would have been diffi- would have lacked any operational flexibility.
cult, especially if the drops occurred at night . • Airborne, amphibious, air assault and infiltration
• If US forces did use amphibious techniques, the maneuvers all require careful coordination. It is
troops available would have been limited to the not just a simple matter of dumping clots of men
Marine Corps MAU. Assembly of more Marines all over an area.
would have taken more time than gathering and • Preparations for such a massive plan could scarce-
organizing a MAC airlift. Assembling Army units ly be missed by Soviet and Cuban intelligence
for amphibious operations would take longer still. services. Due to an established pattern of exer-
• Near-perfect intelligence would have been re- cises, it was possible to send out the Rangers and
quired concerning likely objectives. Without the first 82d Airborne Division battalion without
vehicles, ground movement or coordination, US telegraphing the punch.

MILITARY REVIEW  July 1986 65

Members of the Caribbean Multinational Force board UH60 Black Hawks to take up guard positions, 25 or 26 October 1983.

Command and control “failures” also received at- supervised five elements the first day (the Navy, the
tention from the critics. Lind stated that the operation Air Force, the 82d Airborne, the MAU and Special
was “a pie-dividing contest among all the services” Operations Forces), well within a normal span of
when it should have been a naval operation. Luttwak control. This was reduced to four subordinate units by
takes the opposite approach and says the operation 1600 that day.
was “naval through and through” even though “the There was speculation that the Army Rangers
Navy merely provided transportation and some carri- wanted “in” on Operation Urgent Fury to justify a
er-launched airstrikes that should not have been nec- third Ranger battalion.17 In fact, the Navy and Marine
essary at all.” Gabriel and Savage introduced the idea task forces offshore were not capable of fulfilling the
that “panic” over Cuban ground strength in the joint special operations requirements and facing three active
task force ( JTF) and higher headquarters diverted battalions and possibly seven militia battalions. Each
C130H s from “Fort Stewart, South Carolina” (sic) (it of the services did things essential to their nature. The
was actually Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia) to Fort Navy secured the seas, provided carrier air power and
Bragg, North Carolina, to accelerate the arrival of the landed the Marines. The Marines conducted three
82d Airborne Division.16 landings in seven days, both by LVTP7 and helicop-
The US command and control organization was ter. The Army seized an airfield by airborne assault
relatively simple. The JTF commander reported to one and fought the bulk of the Cuban/PRA ground forces.
man–the commander, US Atlantic Command. Metcalf The Air Force airlifted supplies and reinforcements

66 July 1986  MILITARY REVIEW

 URGENT FURY

and employed powerful Spectre gunships. Each service MC130Es and 18 C130Hs at Point Salines and played
freed the others to accomplish their unique missions. major roles in the fighting and rescue operations. The
The charge that the operation was too “Navy” in lead battalion of the 82d Airborne Division (already in
nature ignores basic US doctrine on amphibious oper- the air as the Rangers jumped) arrived aboard C141Bs,
ations. McDonald summarized the doctrine by noting not C130Hs.20 Rather than accelerate the deployment
that the landing force commander controls opera- airflow of follow-up battalions to meet Cuban/PRA
tions until follow-up (by doctrine, Army) forces are resistance around Salines, the JTF commander moved
established ashore. Metcalf, assisted by Army deputy the BLT (-) to Grand Mal beach, using darkness to cov-
Schwarzkopf, exercised overall command from the sea er the maneuver. It was a prudent, calculated decision
until the Army took over the entire island from the without any evidence of panic except perhaps on the
Marines for consolidation.18 Metcalf ’s position enabled part of the dismayed PRA units north of St. George’s.
him to divert readily most of the Marine BLT to the Few military operations are free of flaws and
St. George’s area on 25 October. This action tore the human errors, and the operational planning and
heart out of the PRA resistance. That the Navy direct- execution of Operation Urgent Fury were not perfect.
ed Operation Urgent Fury should come as no surprise: There is plenty of room for constructive criticism of
Grenada is an island. the Grenada operation based on impartial analysis of
The allegation that a panic in the command struc- available information. The US armed services should
ture resulted in a redirection of the airflow and that appreciate the sincere interest of men who provide
“three quarters of the Ranger force never left Fort this constructive criticism. Unfortunately, good
Stewart (actually Hunter Army Airfield)”19 was not intentions do not remedy a lack of accuracy. Nor
true. Both Ranger battalions (minus a few headquarters should the final outcome be overlooked by anyone-the
people and some brand new arrivals) jumped from five mission was accomplished.

NOTES
1. Admiral Wesley L McDonald is quoted in Lessons Learned “Blue Christmas Coming Up,” Air Force Magazine, January 1984,
as a Result of the US Military Operations in Grenada, Full Commit- pp 78-79; and Henry Zeybel, “Gunships at Grenada,” National
tee Hearing of the House Committee on Armed Services, House Defense, February 1984, pp 53-55.
Committee on Armed Services, 98th Congress, Second Session, 2. L James Binder, “Grenada Post-Mortem : A ‘Report’ That
Washington, D.C., 24 January 1984, p 17. See also “Grenada : Will Wasn’t,” Army, June 1984, p 12; “Study Faults US Military Tactics
Lessons Learned Be Taught?,” Army Times, 5 November 1984, pp in Grenada,” The Washington Post, 6 April 1984, p A-3; “Study
30·32 and 36; Benjamin F. Schemmer, “JCS Reply to Congressio- Criticizes Invasion Tactics in Grenada,” Christian Science Monitor, 6
nal Reform Caucus’ Critique of the Grenada Rescue Operation,” April 1984, p 1; and Schemmer, op. cit., p 12, features William S.
Armed Forces Journal International, July 1984, pp 13-18 and 99; Lind’s remarks on his research techniques.
Hearings on Organization, Structure and Decisionmaking Processes 3. “US Concealed Grenada Loss, Report Charges,” The New
of the Department of Defense: Part 8: Hearing Before the Senate York Times, 22 October 1984, p 10.
Armed Services Committee, US Senate, 98th Congress, First Session, 4. Edward N. Luttwak, The Pentagon and the Art of War: The
Washington, D.C., 9 November 1983, p 337; Bruce Marcus and Question of Military Reform, Simon & Schuster, N.Y., 1984, p 309.
Michael Taber, Maurice Bishop Speaks: The Grenada Revolution, In a substantive footnote, Luttwak refers to the Rangers as “1st and
1979-83, Pathfinder Press, N.Y., 1983, pp 319-21; Hugh O’Shaugh- 2nd Battalions of the 75th Infantry Brigade.”
nessy, Grenada: Revolution, Invasion and Aftermath, Hamish 5. Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, Department of the
Hamilton, London, Eng., 1984, pp 15-16; “Grenadian Arms Cache Army, Washington, D.C., 1982, p 2-3.
Diverse, Substantial,” Army Times, 28 November 1983, p 38; D-Day 6. Schemmer, op. cit.; Luttwak, op. cit., pp 51 and 53; and “US
in Grenada, edited by Kesaharu Imai, World Photo Press, Tokyo, Concealed Grenada Loss, Report Charges,” op. cit.
Japan, 1984, pp 21 and 82; “Paratroopers Get Gratitude, Aid,” 7. Lessons Learned as a Result of the US Military Operations
Army Times, 14 November 1983, p 26; “Jumping Into a Hot DZ at in Grenada, Full Committee Hearing of the House Committee on
500 Feet,” Ibid., pp 1-2, 10 and 66; Lieutenant Colonel Michael J . Armed Services, op. cit., p 27; and Hearings on Organization, Struc-
Byron, “Fury From the Sea: Marines in Grenada,” US Naval Institute ture and Decisionmaking Processes of the Department of Defense:
Proceedings, May 1984, pp 125-26; “Marines on Grenada Met Part 8: Hearing Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, op.
Light Resistance,” Army Times, 28 November 1983, p 29; Christo- cit., p 344.
pher C. Wright, “U.S. Naval Operations in 1983,” US Naval Institute 8. The Grenada Papers, edited by Paul $eabury and Walter
Proceedings, May 1984, pp 52-67 and 285-95; James W. Canan, A. McDougall, Institute for Contemporary Studies, San Francisco,

MILITARY REVIEW  July 1986 67

Calif., 1984, pp 43-44 and 184-85; Marcus and Taber, op. cit., battalion. See D-Day in Grenada, op. cit., p 82; and The U.S. War
pp 284 and 317; Timothy Ashby, “Grenada: Soviet Stepping Machine, edited by Ray L. Bonds, Crown Publishers, N.Y., 1983,
Stone,” US Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1983, pp 30 pp 186-89. The possible drop zones were evaluated by the use
and 32-33; “The Military Balance, 1983/84,” Air Force Magazine, of calculations in accordance with FM 57-38, Pathfinder Opera-
December 1983, p 125; Situation in Lebanon and Grenada, tions, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1973, Change
Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ap- 2, pp 39-40. The arithmetic assumed 64 jum pers per C130, with
propriations, House Committee on Appropriations, 98th Con- a dual-door exit at 1/2 second per paratrooper.
gress, First Session, 8 November 1983, p 39; Honorable William 13. Luttwak, op. cit., p 54.
Broomfield of Michigan Extension of Remarks, The Congressional 14. Schemmer, op. cit., p 13.
Record, House, 98th Congress, Second Session, 26 April 1984, 15. Luttwak, op. cit., pp 54 and 56-57.
pp E1804-5; and “Grenadian Army Studied US Assault Tactics,” 16. Ibid., p 56; Schemmer, op. cit.; and “US Concealed Gre-
Army Times, 28 November 1983, p 38. nada Loss, Report Charges,” op. cit.
9. National Foreign Assessment Center, World Factbook, US 17. Schemmer, op. cit.
Government Printing Office, Washington , D.C., 1981, pp 76-77; 18. Hearings on Organization, Structure and Decisionmaking
The Caribbean Year Book, 1977- 1978, edited by Colin Rickards, Processes of the Department of Defense: Part 8: Hearing Before
International Publishing Service, N.Y., 1977, pp 401 and 409; the Senate Armed Services Committee, op. cit., pp 289-90 ; Benis
Helmut Blume, The Caribbean Islands, translated by J. Maczewski M. Frank and Henry I. Shaw Jr., History of United States Marine
and A. V. Norton, Longman, N.Y., 1974, pp 350-52; and Defense Corps Operations in World War II: Victory and Occupation, US
Mapping Agency, Hydrographic Center, Sailing Directions Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1968, Volume 5,
(Enroute) for the Caribbean Sea, US Government Printing Office, pp 661; and Vice Admiral George Carroll Dyer, The Amphibians
Washington, D.C., 1976, pp 219-24. Came to Conquer: The Story of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner,
10. Schemmer, op. cit., pp 12-14; and Luttwak, op. cit., p 53. US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1972, pp 225
11. Schemmer, op. cit., p 12; and Luttwak, op. cit., p 56. an 636.
12. Marcus and Taber, op. cit., p 321, reprinted Fidel Castro’s 19. “US Concealed Grenada Loss, Report Charges,” op. cit.
23 and 24 October defense orders to his construction engineer 20. D-Day in Grenada, op. cit.

68 July 1986  MILITARY REVIEW