Pakistan and the Quadrilateral Security

Dialogue: Current and Future Perceptions

Benjamin Clarke

Benjamin Clarke*

Abstract
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad or QSD), a
proposed multilateral platform consisting of the United
States (US), India, Japan and Australia intended to
underpin a future Asia-Pacific order, has the potential to
significantly impact Pakistan‟s international standing. As
an important regional actor, Pakistan‟s responses to such
a platform will be influential. This article discusses
possible ways Pakistan is likely to perceive the Quad and
its consequences. It analyses the nature of the Quad,
Pakistan‟s foreign policy and current geopolitical trends
to provide a framework for discussion. It then outlines
two potential forms the Quad may take, aggressive and
cooperative, and explores Pakistan‟s likely perceptions
and responses. It finds that in case of an aggressive Quad,
Pakistan will resist pressure and seek external support
which may trigger greater strategic competition, whereas
it may be willing to adopt a balanced foreign policy in the
case of a cooperative Quad. These findings demonstrate
the importance of considering such long-term
implications at a time when other concerns are driving
international engagement with Pakistan.

Keywords: Multilateralism, Foreign Policy, International Security, Asia-

Pacific, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Pakistan-US relations.

* The author is a research student at the Australian National University with a focus on
conflict resolution and international security in the Asia-Pacific. He can be reached at:
bclarke1@gmail.com.
______________________________

@2019 by the Islamabad Policy Research Institute.

IPRI Journal  XIX (1): 30-55.
https://doi.org/10.31945/iprij.190102.

30 IPRI JOURNAL  WINTER 2019

 Pakistan and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue:
Current and Future Perceptions

Introduction

he Western Pacific has been regarded as a site of strategic

T competition for some time, but the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has
recently begun to emerge as another pivotal area in major power
rivalry. Driven by China‟s Two-Ocean Strategy, India‟s regional
ambitions, economic competition and United States‟ (US) efforts to
maintain ascendancy, the IOR has transformed from a geopolitical
sideshow to a critical region with an uncertain future.1 In an effort to
maintain order and protect their interests, the US, India, Japan and
Australia are considering forming a partnership to exert influence across
the Asia-Pacific. Known as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad or
QSD), this proposed multilateral platform is yet to solidify into a tangible
force. However, it has the potential to substantially influence the region‟s
future by becoming a mechanism for coordinated strategies and incident
responses. As a country with strong interests in the IOR, Pakistan is
keenly watching such developments. With a strategically important
location, nuclear weapons, ongoing territorial disputes with India and
significant relations with both China and the US, Pakistan is playing an
important role in the region‟s shifting politics and will likely have a major
impact on its future. It is, therefore, vital to consider the impact the Quad
may have on Pakistan‟s interests.
This study will analyse how Pakistan perceives the Quad at present,
and how it will likely perceive different forms it may take in the future. It
will also explore what this means for regional stability. It will begin by
analysing the Quad, its objectives and prospects in order to provide
context for the following sections. It will, then, look at which domestic
interest groups influence Pakistan‟s foreign policy and what their
concerns are in the IOR in order to provide a background for analysing the
country‟s security and strategic concerns about the Quad. The final

1
Anit Mukherjee, “Indian Ocean Region Strategic Outlook,” in ASEAN and the Indian
Ocean: The Key Maritime Links, eds. Sam Bateman, Rajni Gamage and Jane Chan
(Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2017), 21-22,
https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Monograph33.pdf.

IPRI JOURNAL  WINTER 2019 31

 Benjamin Clarke

section will outline different forms the platform may adopt in the future,
ranging from an aggressive entity to one based on international
cooperation, and discuss how Pakistan will perceive and respond to them.
This will demonstrate markedly different potential outcomes for Pakistan
and the wider region, highlighting the importance of the country‟s
perceptions and the ramifications of different policy options currently
under consideration by governments in the US, India, Japan and Australia.

The Quad
The Quad is a proposed grouping of the Asia-Pacific‟s most prominent
democracies, the US, India, Japan and Australia. The four countries first
worked together in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, but it took
subsequent geopolitical pressures to raise the prospect of permanent
cooperation. Warm relations between former US President George Bush
and former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who shared concerns
about China‟s rise, drove talks. As a result, government representatives
from each country met alongside the 2007 Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum to discuss solidifying their ties.
Despite a positive start, with a large multilateral naval exercise being held
that year, this first attempt at building the Quad quickly evaporated after
China protested, and new leadership in Japan and Australia moved in
other directions.2 Discussions were eventually revived a decade later, and
senior officials from the four countries met alongside the ASEAN Summit
in November 2017. A second meeting followed in Singapore in June 2018
and the members agreed to consider holding regular meetings.3
This second push for the Quad was spurred by a growing wariness
of China‟s intentions in the Asia-Pacific. Many things had changed after
the first round of Quad talks fell apart post-2007, which happened when
there was greater optimism that China would be content with a peaceful

2
Dhruva Jaishankar, “It‟s Time to Resuscitate the Asia-Pacific Quad,” The Order from
Chaos Blog, January 9, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/
01/09/its-time-to-resuscitate-the-asia-pacific-Quad.
3
Ankit Panda, “US, Japan, India, and Australia hold Senior Official-Level Quadrilateral
Meeting in Singapore,” Diplomat, June 8, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/us-
japan-india-and-australia-hold-senior-official-level-quadrilateral-meeting-in-singapore.

32 IPRI JOURNAL  WINTER 2019

 Pakistan and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue:
Current and Future Perceptions

economic rise and not flex its muscles internationally. The current
geopolitical climate is much more adversarial. China‟s assertiveness in the
South China Sea, its Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) declaration
in the East China Sea, and an expanded naval doctrine have raised the
prospect of conflict. The inroads it has made into the IOR through military
bases, economic influence, debt-trap diplomacy and port leasing has
exacerbated concerns.4 The US 2017 National Security Strategy
characterised this as „a geopolitical competition between free and
repressive visions of world order‟ and pledged to increase Quadrilateral
cooperation with Japan, Australia and India in response.5 Shinzo Abe‟s
return to power in Japan gave the talks additional momentum as he made
restricting China‟s regional influence a priority due to disputes in the East
China Sea.6 Troubled relations with China, including a 2017 border
standoff, also helped spark India‟s renewed interest in the Quad. Prime
Minister Modi‟s „Act East‟ policy, which makes relations in East Asia a
foreign policy priority, has also played a role. Meanwhile, Australia
comprehensively committed itself to a US-led regional order by declaring
it essential for the country‟s security and prosperity.7
While details of the Quad‟s purpose are scant at this point, all
members frame it as a commitment to a „free and open Indo-Pacific.‟8
According to post-consultation statements of member countries this

4
Jesse Barker Gale and Andrew Shearer, “The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the
Maritime Silk Road Initiative” (brief, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington, D. C., 2018), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/
180717_GaleShearer_QuadSecurityDialogue.pdf?csNA9Z0fB6r4L9KKdBnc.a0LzXdN
Tr7b.
5
White House, GoUS, National Security Strategy of the United States of America
(Government of the United States, 2017), 45-46, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
6
Emma Chanlett-Avery, “Japan, the Indo-Pacific, and the „Quad‟” (brief, Chicago
Council on Global Affairs, Chicago, 2018),
https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/brief-japan-and-the-
quad_chanlettavery_20180214.pdf.
7
Department of Defence, GoA, “2016 Defence White Paper” (paper, Department of
Defence, Government of Australia, Canberra, 2016), 41-46,
http://www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/Docs/2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdf.
8
Gale and Shearer, “The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the Maritime Silk Road
Initiative.”

IPRI JOURNAL  WINTER 2019 33

 Benjamin Clarke

includes a rules-based order, freedom of navigation and overflight, respect

for international law, enhanced connectivity (referring to alternatives to
China‟s Belt and Road Initiative [BRI]), maritime security, nuclear non-
proliferation, and counterterrorism. However, the statements of different
countries vary – India, for example, omits mention of freedom of
navigation, respect for international law and maritime security (all were
included by the other three members), while Japan omitted
„connectivity‟.9 This reflects different threat perceptions and approaches
to managing relations with China, as well as concerns about how
upholding such principles may impact other matters. Despite this, all
members agree that previously disparate regions in the Indian Ocean and
Western Pacific are being bound more tightly by economic and security
linkages, and this necessitates a new approach. They also recognise that
each of the Quad members has similar values and interests, and that by
cooperating they will have a stronger effect than various bilateral and
trilateral arrangements.10
With goals of the Quad still fluid, how they will be achieved is even
more unclear. There appears to be no interest in a military alliance at
present, despite predictions that even the traditionally non-aligned India
could be receptive to the idea if its fear of China deepens.11 Lower level
military cooperation is frequently mentioned as an important aspect of the
arrangement. The re-inclusion of Australia to the trilateral Malabar naval
exercises between Japan, India and the US is often used as an indicator of
the Quad‟s progress, with India‟s decision to again exclude Australia in

9
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “India-Australia-Japan-U.S.
Consultations on Indo-Pacific,” press release, November 12, 2017,
http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29110/IndiaAustraliaJapanUS_Consultations_
on_IndoPacific_November_12_2017; and Ankit Panda, “US, Japan, India, and Australia
hold Working-Level Quadrilateral Meeting on Regional Cooperation,” Diplomat,
November 13, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/us-japan-india-and-australia-hold-
working-level-quadrilateral-meeting-on-regional-cooperation.
10
Richard Rossow and Sarah Watson, “China Creates a Second Chance for the „Quad‟”
(Washington, D.C.: Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2016),
https://amti.csis.org/4379-2/.
11
Jeff M. Smith, Yuki Tatsumi, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Rory Medcalf and David
Brewster “Return of the Quad”, Diplomat, issue 42, May 2018,
https://magazine.thediplomat.com/#/issues/-LAWCg2zSGAbYVn-2Qr2/preview/-
LAWCnijekQqONjhfT7t.

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 Pakistan and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue:
Current and Future Perceptions

2018 interpreted as a setback.12 India‟s lack of trust in Australia is a

significant obstacle to military cooperation. Tensions following the
former‟s nuclear tests and Australia‟s former opposition to export uranium
to India generated lingering hostilities in New Delhi‟s security
establishment that also doubts Canberra‟s international influence.
However, Shinzo Abe believes the Quad may pursue its goals even
without military activities, citing coordinated diplomatic pressure,
advocacy for international law and targetted economic investment as
potential aspects of a comprehensive effort to solidify a regional order.13
A US economic strategy aimed at „advancing a free and open Indo-
Pacific‟ reveals likely approaches, even though the amount committed is
much less than the sum of China‟s regional investments.14 Australia and
Japan have joined the US in pursuing the multifaceted strategy that aims
to drive growth and develop infrastructure.15
One thing is certain: for the Quad to achieve its purpose, India must
increase its influence and take on a more active role in the IOR for the
platform to be effective. Its importance is emphasised by each country
despite its relatively minor capacity for power projection and regional
influence at present.16

12
Emanuele Scimia, “Malabar 2018: India Deals a Blow to Australia and „the Quad‟,”
Southasian Monitor, May 2, 2018, http://southasianmonitor.com/2018/05/02/malabar-
2018-india-deals-a-blow-to-australia-and-the-quad/.
13
Shinzo Abe, interview, Financial Review, January 20, 2018, https://www.afr.com/afr-
special/shinzo-abe-interview-with-the-australian-financial-review-20180118-h0kpj5.
14
US Department of State, Government of the United States, “Advancing a Free and Open
Indo-Pacific,” press release, July 30, 2018,
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/07/284829.htm.
15
Overseas Private Investment Corporation, “US-Japan-Australia Announce Trilateral
Partnership for Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Investment,” press release, July 30, 2018,
https://www.opic.gov/press-releases/2018/us-japan-australia-announce-trilateral-
partnership-indo-pacific-infrastructure-investment.
16
Robert Stewart-Ingersoll and Derrick Frazier, “India as a Regional Power: Identifying
the Impact of Roles and Foreign Policy Orientation on the South Asian Security Order,”
Asian Security 6, no. 1 (2010): 51-73 (70), DOI: 10.1080/14799850903472003.

IPRI JOURNAL  WINTER 2019 35

 Benjamin Clarke

The US acknowledges India‟s „leadership role in Indian Ocean

security,‟ while Australia is aware of New Delhi‟s importance to the
future balance of power.17 The country is also „extremely important‟ to
Japan which labels it a latent economic power with common security
interests.18 As for India itself, it also envisions a much more expansive
role. Many in the country see the Indian Ocean as naturally falling under
their area of influence and key to India‟s „manifest destiny‟ to become a
great power.19 The latter‟s maritime strategy is beginning to reflect such
ambitions. In 2015, it was expanded to include provision of security to a
vast area of the Indian Ocean, including its major choke points, and
playing a supporting role well into the Pacific (Figure 1) which is a
significant escalation since 2007.20

17
White House, GoUS, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 50; and
Department of Defence, GoA, “2017 Foreign Policy White Paper” (paper, Department
of Defence, Government of Australia, Canberra, 2017), 25,
https://www.fpwhitepaper.gov.au/foreign-policy-white-paper.
18
Ministry of Defense, GoJ, Defense of Japan 2017 (Government of Japan, 2017), 367.
19
David Brewster, You Ji, Zhu Li, Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, Abhijit Singh, Rajan Menon,
Darshana M. Baruah, John W. Garver, and Rory Medcalf, “India and China at Sea: A
Contest of Status and Legitimacy in the Indian Ocean,” Roundtable in Asia Policy 22
(2016): 5-6.
20
Gurpreet S. Khurana, “India‟s Maritime Strategy: Context and Subtext,” Maritime
Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India 13, no. 1 (2017): 14-26
(15-16), https://doi.org/10.1080/09733159.2017.1309747.

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 Pakistan and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue:
Current and Future Perceptions

Figure-1
Indian Navy’s Areas of Interest

Source: Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), GoI, Ensuring

Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy (Government of India,
2015), 36.
Note: Dark Blue-primary areas of interest; Light Blue-secondary areas of
interest.

Given how far the Quad is from becoming a meaningful force, it is

understandable that some may disregard it. There are many obstacles to
overcome. Not the least of which is India‟s policy of neutrality ever since
independence. There are also doubts in member countries about the
reliability of others, and leadership changes could easily derail the
process. Moreover, there is considerable work to be done in narrowing
down the Quad‟s objectives from broad statements. A rules-based order is
easy to agree on, but much more difficult to define in detail – particularly
when India is dissatisfied with many aspects of the status quo that the

IPRI JOURNAL  WINTER 2019 37

 Benjamin Clarke

other members seek to uphold.21 However, the underlying trends that have
pulled the four countries together are continuing and their interests are
converging. It is possible that a gradual building of concerns, or a strategic
shock (such as China establishing a military base in Pakistan),22 will
provide the necessary impetus to overcome the obstacles and make it a
reality.

Pakistan’s Interests in IOR

It is often difficult to define Pakistan‟s national interests in detail. While
most countries regularly publish white papers or similar documents to
articulate their concerns and objectives, the last time Pakistan did so was
in 1976.23 Its foreign policy is characterised by a lack of consensus on key
issues and a disorganised process which often produces ad hoc policies.24
This is due to poor governance and weak institutions which means formal
processes of policy formulation are often disregarded. Instead, interest
groups can exert undue influence over government policy, producing a
perpetual power struggle over government policy.25 This lack of a unified
vision must be considered when analysing the country‟s interests and
approaches to the region. Rather than solely relying on government
statements, it is also necessary to examine the interests of Pakistan‟s
military, which often has contrasting views and considerable power over

21
Alexander Davis, “Australia and India: Different Worlds,” Interpreter, July 17, 2018,
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/australia-and-india-different-worlds.
22
Department of Defense, GoUS, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, report (Government of
United States, 2018), 112, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-
1/1/2018-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF.
23
Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, GoP, Abbottabad Commission
Report on the Killing of Osama Bin Laden, report (Government of Pakistan, 2013), 322.
24
Ayaz Ahmed, “Foreign Policy Implications for Pakistan,” Defence Journal 21, no. 3
(2017): 69; and Arshad Zaman, “Sovereign Development: Toward a Grand Strategy for
Pakistan,” Pakistan Development Review 56, no. 4 (2017): 14.
25
Javid Hussain, “Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in Pakistan,” in Short Course on
the Foreign Policy Process in Pakistan (Lahore: Pakistan Institute of Legislative
Development and Transparency, 2004), 56-57, http://www.millat.com/wp-content/
uploads/ pdf/democracy/1/fp_proceedings_04_2004.pdf.

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 Pakistan and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue:
Current and Future Perceptions

foreign policy.26 Public opinion is also a particularly powerful force in

Pakistan, where deeply entrenched beliefs are capable of fuelling unrest
which can reverse policy and threaten governments.27
One constant among politicians, the military and the general
population is that reservations about India loom large in their regional
calculations.28 Their common concerns have created a consensus which
produces a firm set of national interests. A turbulent recent history has
created an institutional and cultural mistrust of New Delhi which is
unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Pakistan‟s economic and
military power relative to India is, thus, a major concern given its smaller
size, as is diplomatic prestige. A more powerful India is interpreted as an
existential threat, so attempting to achieve a balance has been a driver of
key decisions in the past including international alignments and the
production of nuclear weapons.29 To prevent this gap from widening,
Pakistan opposes any elevation of India‟s regional and international
standing – the legitimisation of the latter as a nuclear country by the US is
cause for concern, as is any momentum for greater Indian influence in the
United Nations (UN).30 There are widespread fears that India seeks
regional hegemony, and an internationally accepted role as the
predominant power in South Asia (that has some basis31), which may have

26
Vali Nasr, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat (New York:
Anchor Books, 2013), 69; and Shaheen A. Gillani, “Process of Foreign Policy
Formulation in Pakistan,” in Short Course on the Foreign Policy Process in Pakistan
(Lahore: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, 2004), 58-59,
http://www.millat.com/wp-content/uploads/pdf/democracy/1/
fp_proceedings_04_2004.pdf.
27
Paul Staniland, “America and Pakistan after 2014: Toward Strategic Breathing Space,”
in Pakistan’s Enduring Challenges, eds. C. Christine Fair and Sarah J. Watson
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 220-221.
28
Karamatullah K. Ghori. “Sixty Years of Pakistan‟s Foreign Policy,” Pakistan Horizon
60 no. 2 (2007): 9-24.
29
Ibid.
30
Cyril Almeida, “Analysis: A Nuclear Deal – Need or Prestige?” Dawn, October 21,
2015, https://www.dawn.com/news/1214525.
31
Sunil Khilnani, Rajiv Kumar, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Prakash Menon, Nandan Nilekani,
Srinath Raghavan, Shyam Saran and Siddharth Varadarajan, Nonalignment 2.0: A
Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century, report (New Delhi:

IPRI JOURNAL  WINTER 2019 39

 Benjamin Clarke

severe consequences for Pakistan‟s security and autonomy.32

Pakistan‟s strategic concerns extend to the Indian Ocean,
particularly as India‟s Blue Water Navy grows with a more expansive
doctrine. With 95 per cent of Pakistan‟s trade being seaborne, its economy
depends on secure Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs).33 Pakistan has
limited capacity to ensure their security or to keep chokepoints free from
interference, meaning the predominant naval power in the region can
achieve considerable influence over it. The security of its ports is another
important consideration in case of naval conflict. Until recently, Karachi
was its only naval base, and that was easily blockaded during the 1971
war due to its proximity to India. The development of Gwadar Port near
the Iranian border gives Pakistan strategic depth as well as an important
position on the SLOCs leading out of the Persian Gulf.34 However, this
advantage could be negated by a navy capable of long-distance
operations. Yet another concern is the likely nuclearisation of the ocean as
India prepares submarines capable of nuclear strikes. Pakistan‟s strategists
fear this will undermine the country‟s nuclear deterrence and cause
strategic imbalance.35
Despite the consensus that India poses a threat to Pakistan, opinions
on how to deal with that vary. The predominant voice in such matters
traditionally comes from the military, which has generally favoured a
confrontational approach and transactional international partnerships
(such as providing the US with logistical support in return for financial

National Defence College, 2012), 15-17,

https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/kii/documents/NonAlignment20.pdf.
32
“Pakistan Not to Tolerate India‟s „Hegemony‟ in Region: Sartaj Aziz,” Nation, January
16, 2017, https://nation.com.pk/16-Jan-2017/pakistan-not-to-tolerate-india-s-hegemony-
in-region-sartaj-aziz.
33
Hasan Yaser Malik, “Strategic Importance of Gwadar Port,” Journal of Political Studies
19, no. 2 (2012): 57-69 (57), http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pols/pdf-files/gwadar
%20article -winter2012.pdf.
34
Inayat Kalim, “Gwadar Port: Serving Strategic Interests of Pakistan,” South Asian
Studies: A Research Journal of South Asian Studies 31, no. 1 (2016): 207-221,
http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/csas/PDF/14%20Inayat%20Kaleem_v31_no1_jan-
jun2016.pdf.
35
Ghazala Yasmin Jalil, “India‟s Development of Sea-Based Nuclear Capabilities:
Implications for Pakistan,” Strategic Studies 38, no. 1 (2018): 34-47 (41-45),
http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/3-SS_Ghazala_Yasmeen_Jalil_No-
1_2018.pdf.

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 Pakistan and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue:
Current and Future Perceptions

assistance) to bolster its strength. The military‟s strategic culture is

influenced by a need to resist India and a perception that politicians
cannot be trusted with national security.36 However, there is also evidence
of a growing perception that a different approach should be taken. In a
purposive sampling survey of 50 military officers, defence experts and
civil bureaucrats, 16 of which were senior officers ranked at or above the
level of Colonel, 54 per cent of respondents indicated that the national
security policy should prioritise internal security and regional trade and
cooperation. Only 15 per cent favoured external security and domestic
economic performance. The study found a growing perception that
poverty is Pakistan‟s most serious problem.37
The potential for economic cooperation with India to improve
Pakistan‟s situation is also gaining traction, aided by the possibility that
control of India‟s economic activity may give Pakistan additional
leverage.38 Opinions among politicians vary, but it is more common to
find those who believe that improving relations and resolving disputes
amicably is the best approach to minimising the threat from India.
However, as well as contending with the military establishment they must
also consider the public, large portions of which are staunchly anti-Indian
and readily mobilised against leaders perceived as serving foreign

36
C. Christine Fair, Pakistan’s Strategic Culture: Implications for How Pakistan Perceives
and Counters Threats, report no. 61 (Washington, D.C.: National Bureau of Asian
Research, 2016), 3-4, https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/
special_report_61_pakistans_strategic_culture_december2016.pdf.
37
Muhammad Azfar Anwar and Zain Rafique, “Defense Spending and National Security
of Pakistan: A Policy Perspective,” Democracy and Security 8, no. 4 (2012): 374-399
(394-396), https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2012.739551.
38
Muhammad Afzal, “Indian Quest for Reconnecting to Central Asia via Land Route and
its Implications for Pakistan,” Opinion: A Journal of the Armed Forces War College 4
(2016): 55-74 (71-73), https://ndu.edu.pk/afwc/pub/Opinion-Vol-No.4.pdf; and Javed
Ashraf Qazi, “How Security Considerations Influence Foreign Policy in Pakistan: The
Role of Security Agencies and How This Practice Compares with Other Countries of the
World,” in Short Course on the Foreign Policy Process in Pakistan (Lahore: Pakistan
Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, 2004), 27-28,
http://www.millat.com/wp-content/uploads/pdf/democracy/1/
fp_proceedings_04_2004.pdf.

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 Benjamin Clarke

interests.39 Despite the prevalence of anti-Indian attitudes, 62 per cent of

Pakistanis believe it is important to improve bilateral relations –
suggesting large support bases for both confrontational and conciliatory
approaches.40
The position of China in the IOR is also vital to Pakistan‟s interests.
While most see Beijing as an important partner, just how deep this
relationship should be is debateable. Underpinning China-Pakistan
relations is the shared belief that India must not be permitted to dominate
South Asia and the Indian Ocean. This gives China an enduring interest in
a strong Pakistan to balance against India – a convenient situation for the
former as this can provide economic and military assistance as well as a
sympathetic permanent member of the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC).41 From a military perspective, the prospect of a friendly China
projecting its forces into the IOR is an attractive one as India‟s navy is
rapidly outpacing Pakistan‟s. China‟s economic commitment through the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) gives Beijing a further
interest in Pakistan‟s security. CPEC is an ambitious project to
economically link western China to Pakistan‟s Gwadar Port, and includes
many associated development and infrastructure projects. It has drawn the
support of most political parties which desperately seek development and
foreign investment. As a result, the public image of China is the most
favourable out of any country in the world.42

39
Najmuddin A. Shaikh, “How Security Considerations Influence the Formulation of
Foreign Policy,” in Short Course on the Foreign Policy Process in Pakistan (Lahore:
Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, 2004),
http://www.millat.com/wp-content/uploads/pdf/democracy/1/
fp_proceedings_04_2004.pdf.
40
PRC, Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More Critical of U.S., report (Washington, D.C.:
Pew Research Center, 2012), 20, http://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites
/2/2012/06/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Project-Pakistan-Report-FINAL-Wednesday-June-27-
2012.pdf.
41
Andrew Scobell, Ely Ratner and Michael Beckley, China’s Strategy toward South and
Central Asia: An Empty Fortress, report (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2014), 62-
63, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/RR525/
RAND_RR525.pdf.
42
PRC, “Opinion of China,” Global Indicators Database (Washington, D.C.: Pew
Research Center, 2015), http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/24/survey/17/.

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 Pakistan and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue:
Current and Future Perceptions

The role of the US is more controversial. The military is the

strongest supporter of partnership with Washington. The predominant
view among officers is that the US cannot be completely trusted, but
partnership with it brings important advantages. This results in the
military hedging by offering only limited cooperation.43 This arrangement
appears satisfactory, as a common theme in recent publications from
military officers is that Pakistan can and should adopt a stance that
balances good ties with both China and the US.44 Political parties have
generally cooperated with the US on foreign and security policy yet
maintain very critical attitudes for domestic audiences. They regularly
condemn the US over drone strikes, the war in Afghanistan, criticism of
Pakistan and events such as the bin Laden raid.45 This has contributed to
widespread anti-American sentiment among the populace, where 62 per
cent of people hold an unfavourable view of the US.46 Anti-Americanism
is a major obstacle to improved bilateral relations and fuels opposition to a
regional US role. However, neither country has made significant efforts to
change such perceptions.

43
Hussain Nadim, “Neither Friend nor Foe: Pakistan, the United States and the War in
Afghanistan” (paper, Lowy Institute, Sydney, 2017), 4,
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/documents/Nadim%20-%20Pakistan
%2C%20the%20United%20States%20and%20the%20war%20in%20Afghanistan_WE
B.pdf.
44
Qaisar Suleman, “US-India Strategic Alliance and Pakistan‟s Security Concerns,”
Opinion: A Journal of the Armed Forces War College 2, no. 2 (2014): 26-38 (35-36),
http://www.academia.edu/37745887/Armed_Forces_War_College_Journal_2014;
Imran, Kashif, Tauqeer, Moin and Zahani, “The New Silk Road and Maritime Silk Road
– Impact on Economic and Security Environment,” Opinion: A Journal of the Armed
Forces War College 4 (2016): 1-12 (10-11), https://ndu.edu.pk/afwc/pub/Opinion-Vol-
No.4.pdf; and Irfan Shakeel, Yasir Nawaz, Majid, Tanvir Butt and Alhaji, “Indian
Power Potential and Rising Asymmetry vis-à-vis Pakistan,” Opinion: A Journal of the
Armed Forces War College 4 (2016): 37-54 (53), https://ndu.edu.pk/afwc/pub/Opinion-
Vol-No.4.pdf.
45
Karl Kaltenthaler and William J. Miller, “Partner or Enemy? The Source of Attitudes
toward the United States in Pakistan,” in Pakistan’s Enduring Challenges, eds. C.
Christine Fair and Sarah J. Watson (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2015), 233.
46
PRC, “Opinion of the United States,” Global Indicators Database (Washington, D.C.:
Pew Research Center, 2015),
http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/1/survey/17/response/Unfavorable/.

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 Benjamin Clarke

Current Perceptions about Quad in Pakistan

There is relatively little discussion directly concerning the Quad as it
remains a potential entity. However, there is much more discourse
surrounding the geopolitical trends that led to the platform. This allows
one to build a reasonably clear picture of how the Quad is perceived.
The Quad is a product of renewed emphasis on great power
relations among its members, which includes a reduced focus on Pakistan
as the „War on Terror‟ loses centrality in geopolitics. It also involves India
taking on a much greater regional role along with closer ties to the other
member states, a fundamental change in IOR dynamics. These processes
have now been underway for some time and attract considerable attention
from influential decision makers and commentators in Pakistan. Their
effects on the country‟s foreign policy are already discernible.
At present, the Quad is interpreted as a direct threat to Pakistan‟s
interests. The widely held assumption that Pakistan should pursue parity
with India in hard power and international influence is the basis of such
concerns. Deepening US-India ties are often interpreted as an „Indo-US
nexus‟ intended to exert dominance over the IOR that will inevitably
marginalise Pakistan.47 The government expressed such concerns through
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), which claimed that the US is
undermining strategic stability through policies of discrimination and
exceptionalism.48 Military publications also conclude that closer US-India
strategic cooperation is inevitable and will have negative implications for
Pakistan‟s security by exacerbating the power differential and affording
New Delhi a stronger say on international issues.49 This is a reasonable
argument – as long as adversarial relations between India and Pakistan

47
Ashfaq Ahmad Malik and Nazir Hussain, “Indo-US Nexus to Isolate Pakistan: Options
and Responses,” Journal of Political Studies 25, no. 1 (2018): 113-124 (113-116),
http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pols/pdf-files/7_25_1_18.pdf; and Syed Shahid Hussain
Bukhari, “Indo-US Strategic Partnership and Pakistan‟s Security: A Theoretical
Evaluation,” Strategic Studies 35, no. 3 (2015): 71-86 (74), http://issi.org.pk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/Dr._Syed_Shahid_Vol.35_No.3_2015.pdf.
48
“Waiver to India by US to Further Erode Non-Proliferation Norms: Pakistan,” Pakistan
Today, August 2, 2018, https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/08/02/waiver-to-india-
by-us-to-further-erode-non-proliferation-norms-pakistan/.
49
Suleman, “US-India Strategic Alliance and Pakistan‟s Security Concerns,” 34-35.

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 Pakistan and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue:
Current and Future Perceptions

persist, the US‟ position will affect the balance of power. Public opinion
reflects these concerns, with 50 per cent of Pakistanis believing US policy
favours India, while only 9 per cent think Pakistan is advantaged.50
Despite the belief that Islamabad can maintain constructive relations
with Washington even as it becomes closer with New Delhi, current US
policies are eroding that viewpoint, and stoking fears that Pakistan may be
framed as a threat in the future.51 Frustrated at Pakistan‟s perceived lack
of action against terrorism, the US has become increasingly assertive in
attempting to coerce its leaders.52 This is due to the dominance of the US
military and intelligence agencies in influencing Washington‟s approach
to Pakistan – which view the latter as an immediate security problem and
undermine simultaneous attempts to build the broader-focused, positive
relationship that policymakers in Islamabad crave.53 What was once the
pillar of US-Pakistan relations, military cooperation, is severely strained.
A recent suspension of security assistance has even cut much-vaunted
educational programmes for Pakistani officers which may have a long-
term impact on bilateral relations.54 Pakistan‟s official military publication
describes current US policy as haphazard and confused; while the Army
and MoFA both point out Pakistan feels betrayed.55
While considerable hope remains that the relationship can be
repaired, there has been a noticeable shift in Pakistan‟s foreign relations as
it seeks economic and security assurances. It has primarily turned to China
as their mutual concerns about US-India ties drive closer cooperation,

50
PRC, Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More Critical of U.S., 21.
51
Nasr, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat, 62-63.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid.
54
Idrees Ali and Phil Stewart, “Exclusive: As Trump Cracks Down on Pakistan, U.S. Cuts
Military Training Programs,” Reuters, August 10, 2018,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-usa-military-exclusive/exclusive-as-trump-
cracks-down-on-pakistan-u-s-cuts-military-training-programs-idUSKBN1KV166.
55
Asna H. Rizvi, “The Changing U.S.-Pakistan Security Cooperation Scenario,” Hilal
English, June 2018, https://www.hilal.gov.pk/eng-article/the-changing-u.s.---pakistan-
security-cooperation-scenario/MjE0.html; and Kay Johnson, “Pakistan Army Chief Says
Nation Felt „Betrayed‟ by US Criticism,” Reuters, January 12, 2018,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-usa/pakistan-army-chief-says-nation-felt-
betrayed-by-u-s-criticism-idUSKBN1F11AI.

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 Benjamin Clarke

although engagement with Russia is also growing with calls for more
political, strategic and economic cooperation to diversify options.56
Military reliance on China has grown as the US is no longer considered a
reliable source of military equipment – the value of Chinese arms exports
to Pakistan is now over 20 times that of the US and includes high-end
systems like fighter jets and submarines.57 The Minister of Defence in
2011 requested that China build a naval base at Gwadar and military
officers have recommended that a formal alliance be sought,
demonstrating the utility they see in this.58 The election of Imran Khan as
Prime Minister, who recently claimed Pakistan must delink from the US,
may also prove significant.59 However, it is unlikely he will have the
power to follow through on much of his anti-American rhetoric.
Pakistan‟s shift towards China has included enormous financial
commitments which effectively put it within Beijing‟s sphere of influence.
Limited export industries have given it little option other than reliance on
CPEC to propel the future economy. The decision to participate in CPEC
was motivated by the need to restore Pakistan‟s security and geopolitical
standing, and resist economic pressure from Western institutions.60 The
project is enormously popular in Pakistan where many hope it will bring
socioeconomic prosperity. However, concerns also exist about

56
Shabir Ahmed Khan, “Russia‟s Changing Policy towards South Asia: Options for
Pakistan,” in Regional Dynamics and Strategic Concerns in South Asia, ed. Sarah
Siddiq Aneel (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2018) 163-164,
http://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/rdib1362018.pdf.
57
Anwar Iqbal, “Pakistan Reducing Dependence on US Arms: FT Report,” Dawn, April
19, 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1402479/pakistan-reducing-dependence-on-us-
arms-ft-report.
58
Farhan Bokhari and Kathrin Hille, “Pakistan Turns to China for Naval Base,” Financial
Times, May 22, 2011, https://www.ft.com/content/3914bd36-8467-11e0-afcb-
00144feabdc0; and Imran Raza Naqvi and Wasim Hussain, “India‟s Balancing Act:
Relations with the US, Russia and China,” Opinion: A Journal of the Armed Forces War
College 1, no. 2 (2013): 41-53, https://ndu.edu.pk/afwc/pub/OPINION-Vol.1-No.2-
Dec.pdf.
59
Phil Stewart, “US Weighs Pakistani Blowback as it Piles Pressure on Islamabad,”
Reuters, January 6, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-pakistan/u-s-weighs-
pakistani-blowback-as-it-piles-pressure-on-islamabad-idUSKBN1EV02G.
60
Zulfqar Khan, “Synergizing Foreign and Security Policy of Pakistan,” Margalla Papers
21 (2017): 49-60 (55), https://www.ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/margalla-
paper/Margalla-Paper-2017/4-Synergizing-Foreing-Dr-Zulfqar-Khan.pdf.

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 Pakistan and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue:
Current and Future Perceptions

consequences for the country‟s autonomy.61 Opaque conditions

surrounding massive loans with high interest rates may be unsustainable
for Pakistan‟s developing economy and represent a debt trap, giving
China substantial leverage in the future. This may include control over
vital infrastructure – Gwadar port being the primary concern.62

Looking to the Future

Having established Pakistan‟s interests as interpreted by the main parties
influencing foreign policy and their current approach to the Quad, it is
possible to discuss how they will perceive it after possible future
developments. At this early stage, the Quad‟s objectives and methods are
not clearly defined. There are many options available, but this section will
outline two potential forms the Quad may take. To provide contrast, this
will involve options on either end of the spectrum – aggressive and
cooperative – but the future Quad may fall anywhere between these two
options or employ different strategies at different times.

A ‘Hard’ Quad
In this scenario, the Quad takes on an aggressive pursuit of its interests in
the IOR. While a formal military alliance seems unlikely, there is still
scope for much more military and political cooperation that would make it
the most powerful entity in the IOR, and enable it to engage in economic,
diplomatic and military coercion. This may involve direct pressure on
Pakistan to change its behaviour or attempts to contain it by nullifying its
ability to have an impact on the IOR. Current US policies towards
Pakistan, along with India‟s approach where there is little momentum for
improving relations, does suggest some potential for this to become a
reality. There are, of course, significant obstacles, such as Japan‟s

61
Syed Fazl-e-Haider, “Pakistan and its Foreign Debt Obligation,” Pakistan & Gulf
Economist, August 14, 2017, http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/2017/08/14/pakistan-
foreign-debt-obligation/; and Yigal Chazan, “Pakistan‟s Risky Reliance on China Set to
Grow,” Diplomat, March 26, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/pakistans-risky-
reliance-on-china-set-to-grow.
62
Ibid.

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 Benjamin Clarke

constitutional constraints on using military force and Australia‟s aversion

to risking its economic ties with China, but it is possible that these may be
overcome with time and new developments.Pakistan‟s future perceptions
of a „hard‟ Quad are relatively straightforward. The current fears that it
represents a threat to the country will become a concrete reality. In a
scenario where the platform is committed to becoming the ascendant
power in the IOR and pursuing that goal aggressively, Pakistan‟s pursuit
of strategic balance with India will be opposed. This undermines the
former‟s security and will be viewed with great concern by the military,
politicians, civil society and the general populace alike. Current
perceptions that India is an aggressive power determined to isolate
Pakistan will be applied to the Quad as a whole, but with even more
concern considering the greater hard power and international influence
available to it.63 The arguments of those who seek peace with India and
are open to negotiations on Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) would be
greatly discredited, as a „hard‟ Quad would convey the message that the
only option for calm is to accept India as the regional leader – something
very few in Pakistan would be open to.
A „hard‟ Quad would face a major challenge in asserting its will
over Pakistan. Recent history shows that Islamabad is unlikely to bend in
the face of external pressure.64 The major exception to this was President
Musharraf abandoning the Taliban and agreeing to aid US forces in the
aftermath of 9/11. However, it was only a unique set of circumstances that
produced this. There was significant international and domestic US
support for action in Afghanistan, and a refusal to assist from Pakistan
would have had major consequences. The US also had significant
leverage at the time, offering to end Pakistan‟s international isolation
which Musharraf‟s coup had triggered and replace it with billions of
dollars in assistance.65 The situation is now very different. The US has
less credibility for military action in the region, and it now has very little
leverage over Pakistan after again cutting aid and degrading prospects for
a long-term strategic relationship. Pakistan is aware of this, and several
63
Malik and Hussain, “Indo-US Nexus to Isolate Pakistan: Options and Responses,” 114-
115.
64
Nasr, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat, 4.
65
Ibid., 53-54.

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Current and Future Perceptions

years of threats and bluffs from the US have not only failed to increase
cooperation, but reduced it.66
There are multiple structural factors that will shield Pakistan from
external coercion in the future. It is becoming less vulnerable to isolation
as its strategic and economic links with China deepen. The country is now
more reliant on China than the US - the threat of unilateral US sanctions
carry less weight.67 Pakistan is also well placed to withstand any threat of
military coercion. Pakistan‟s leadership has faith that the nuclear deterrent
will prevent any direct attack, a belief which has been strengthened by
recent incidents such as the 1999 Kargil War, 2001-02 standoff and 2016
Uri attacks. On each of these occasions, India was unwilling to
significantly escalate the conflict despite having conventional superiority
and domestic support to do so.68 Pakistan‟s strategic culture will also drive
resistance to any coercion involving India.69
If the Quad is interpreted as a direct threat, it is likely that Pakistan
will try to deepen its relations with China even further and exact stronger
commitments. Islamabad has a long history of aligning with stronger
powers to balance against threats, pragmatically switching allegiances
depending on the political climate at the time.70 Such behaviour would be
consistent with current trends of a shift towards reliance on China. At
present, while China sees the importance of its relations with India in
order to project an image of a peacefully rising power,71 Beijing is likely
to see a „hard‟ Quad as a threat, which would change its strategic calculus

66
Ibid., 71.
67
Shubhangi Pandey, “US Sanctions on Pakistan and Their Failure as a Strategic
Deterrent” (brief no. 251, Observer Researcher Foundation, New Delhi, 2018),
https://www.orfonline.org/research/42912-u-s-sanctions-on-pakistan-and-their-failure-
as-strategic-deterrent/.
68
Sumit Ganguly and Michael R. Kraig, “The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing
the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,” Security Studies 14, no. 2 (2005): 290-324 (297-
306), https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410500232958.
69
Fair, Pakistan’s Strategic Culture: Implications for How Pakistan Perceives and
Counters Threats, 3-4.
70
Jabin T. Jacob, “China-Pakistan Relations: Reinterpreting the Nexus,” China Report 46,
no. 3 (2010): 217-299 (220), https://doi.org/10.1177/000944551104600304.
71
Scobell, Ratner and Beckley, China’s Strategy toward South and Central Asia: An
Empty Fortress, 62.

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 Benjamin Clarke

and make it much more receptive to Pakistan‟s overtures regarding

strategic commitments. CPEC‟s importance as an alternate supply route to
Southeast Asia‟s choke points would become much more significant, and
China has previously demonstrated a willingness to use its position on
IOK as a bargaining chip in relations with India.72
Pakistan‟s likely perceptions and reactions to a „hard‟ Quad may
pose a danger to stability in the IOR. There is a real risk of two blocs with
opposing interests forming, locked in a zero-sum game as they jostle for
influence. This would be a major departure from the prevailing methods
of maintaining peace in the IOR by balancing interests. For example,
China generally avoids antagonising India and chastises Pakistan as
required to maintain stability, and cooperates with the US on crisis
management and peacebuilding.73 As alignments harden and willingness
to compromise reduces, it will become more difficult to manage a
complex region which is already a dangerous flashpoint.74 Such blocs
would also be an obstacle to the IOR‟s economic integration, hindering
development and reducing incentives for cooperation. Even on current
trends, economic investment is fuelling strategic competition rather than
hindering it, and is a key consideration for Quad members as they seek
ways to counter China‟s growing influence.75

A ‘Soft’ Quad
It is possible for the Quad to adopt a much more careful approach by
reducing its emphasis on direct competition and military activities. By
pursuing their shared interests, while also being sensitive to the concerns
of others and leaving scope for cooperation with them, the platform may
be able to construct a more inclusive regional order within which it is a
preeminent power. This would involve a less aggressive security

72
Jacob, “China-Pakistan Relations: Reinterpreting the Nexus,” 225-226.
73
Andrew Small, “Accelerating Competition: The Risk of Regional Blocs in South Asia,”
in Regional Dynamics and Strategic Concerns in South Asia, ed. Sarah Siddiq Aneel
(Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2018), 122-123.
74
Zulfiquar Ahmed Qureshi, “Global Strategic Threats to International Peace and Security
Post Cold War Era,” Opinion: A Journal of the Armed Forces War College 2, no. 2
(2014): 85-103 (93), https://ndu.edu.pk/afwc/pub/OPINION-Vol.2-No.2.pdf.
75
Ibid., 124.

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framework with an emphasis on upholding norms every country can

benefit from by ensuring freedom of movement, rule of law and security
assistance to other states requiring it. India‟s vision for a polycentric
political order in which the legitimate interests of numerous countries are
accommodated may provide some inspiration for such an arrangement.76
Its emphasis on cooperation with ASEAN is a good basis for this. 77
Singapore‟s Prime Minister sees merit in the Quad underpinning an
inclusive regional architecture, which may also draw support from
countries like Sri Lanka and Vietnam which are concerned about their
future.78 Shinzo Abe‟s belief that military activities are not essential for
the Quad to have influence supports experts in India and Australia who
argue strategic deterrence should not be its goal, and military cooperation
should only complement extensive diplomatic and foreign policy efforts.79
Australia‟s recent Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting
announcement on joint economic and infrastructure projects to strengthen
Pacific nations indicates the type of work a „soft‟ Quad could undertake.80
Given China‟s economic, political and strategic importance to the Quad
members, there are substantial incentives to avoid excessively aggravating
it by constructing an aggressive platform – particularly when a „soft‟
76
Davis, “Australia and India: Different Worlds.”
77
“PM Modi Participates in ASEAN-India Breakfast Summit in Singapore,” Economic
Times, November 15, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-
nation/pm-modi-participates-in-asean-india-breakfast-summit-in-singapore/articleshow/
66629736.cms.
78
Kenneth Cheng, “PM Lee Warns against Formation of Rival Regional Blocs, as Fresh
Alignments Take Shape,” Today Online, March 15, 2018,
https://www.todayonline.com/world/pm-lee-warns-against-formation-rival-regional-
blocs-fresh-alignments-take-shape; and Barana Waidyatilake, “Sri Lanka‟s Strategy for
Regional Security,” Diplomat, July 19, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/sri-
lankas-strategy-for-regional-security.
79
Abe, interview; Gurmeet Kanwal, “Pakistan‟s Gwadar Port: A New Naval Base in
China‟s String of Pearls in the Indo-Pacific” (brief, Center for Strategic & International
Studies, Washington, D.C., 2018), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/180717_Kanwal_PakistansGwadarPort.pdf; and Ramesh Thakur,
“Australia and the QUAD,” Strategist, July 5, 2018,
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-and-the-QUAD/.
80
“Australia Focuses on Pacific after APEC Meeting Ends in Disagreement,” SBS News,
November 19, 2018, https://www.sbs.com.au/news/australia-focuses-on-pacific-after-
apec-meeting-ends-in-disagreement.

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framework may be even more effective in reducing China‟s influence by

lowering regional threat perceptions.
In the case of a „soft‟ Quad, Pakistan‟s perception is likely to be
much less uniform. If Pakistan is constructively engaged by the Quad and
there is less of an obvious threat, the fractured nature of its governing
system will become more apparent as different interest groups and
narratives compete for influence over foreign policy. Such a Quad will
still be received poorly due to the enhanced international standing it will
bring India. However, the tendency of military and bureaucratic elites to
desire good relations with the US will likely prevent a strong reaction if
they believe the possibility for such relations persist, even in the face of
long-term strategic differences.81
Recent history demonstrates that maintaining good relations with
Pakistan is possible even while building ties with India.82 China has been
balancing its relations with India and Pakistan since 1979. Cooperation
has steadily improved and China even adopted a neutral stance during the
1999 Kargil War. Despite this, good diplomacy and a continued
commitment to Pakistan‟s development and security means that relations
are stronger than ever.83 Pakistan‟s policymakers have also come to accept
that the US desires good relations with India, and understand that this
does not inherently mean US-Pakistan ties must suffer as a result.84 While
India itself being part of the Quad will complicate matters, this does
suggest that there is scope for the country‟s leadership to understand that a
„soft‟ Quad is not intended to target it, and develop foreign policy
accordingly. This may include positive bilateral relations with other Quad
members despite disapproving of their drift towards India.

81
Michael Kugelman and Raoof Hasan, “What a Year of Track II Discussions Says about
the Future of U.S.-Pakistan Relations,” War on the Rocks, November 30, 2017,
https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/year-track-ii-discussions-says-future-u-s-pakistan-
relations/.
82
Jingdong Yuan, “Beijing‟s Balancing Act: Courting New Delhi, Reassuring Islamabad,”
Journal of International Affairs 64, no. 2 (2011): 37-54 (42-46).
83
Ibid.
84
Syed Farooq Hasnat, “Pakistan-US Relations on Slippery Grounds: An Account of Trust
and its Deficit,” Pakistan Vision 12, no. 1 (2011): 23-69 (52),
http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/studies/PDF-FILES/Artical-2-Vol-12-1-2011.pdf.

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A „soft‟ Quad would also leave space for activities that could
actively improve Pakistan‟s perceptions of its regional standing. While it
may be difficult for the Quad itself to engage with it due to troubled India-
Pakistan relations, without coordinated confrontational policies member
states would be able to cultivate their bilateral ties with Islamabad. A
resumption of US cooperation with Pakistan would restore a vital
component of their relationship, while expanded cooperation from
Australia and Japan as they become more active in the IOR would build
Islamabad‟s confidence. An eventual drawdown of international
involvement in Afghanistan would facilitate this by reducing political
spats over smaller-scale issues, and allowing broad strategic concerns to
drive relations.85 This would also allow Quad members to improve their
image among Pakistan‟s population, where drone strikes and other
conflict-related incidents are major drivers of anti-Americanism and
nationalistic sentiment. Efforts could be made to increase the visible
impact of aid and investment, which has been less successful than Chinese
projects in capturing the public‟s imagination. This may soften opinions
and reduce the impetus for political parties to oppose the US (and the
Quad‟s) interests.86
A „soft‟ Quad which is not broadly perceived as a threat within
Pakistan would likely produce a less volatile IOR. Even though it will still
be viewed with suspicion by strategists who oppose a greater regional role
and international influence for India, this is unlikely to override their
enthusiasm for positive relations with the US and its partners. If the Quad
manages to engage with Pakistan, and provide opportunities for it to
benefit from the political order, or at least leave enough breathing space
for its members to do so individually, it is unlikely that the country‟s
leadership will be supportive of a confrontational approach. China will
remain an influential partner, but the danger of opposing blocs forming
would be reduced, and it is more likely that the historical pattern of
maintaining regional stability by balancing interests would continue. The

85
Staniland, “America and Pakistan after 2014: Toward Strategic Breathing Space,” 222-
224.
86
Nasr, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat, 61.

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potential for a „soft‟ Quad to reduce hostility among the populace and
soften politicians‟ stances would contribute to preventing an escalation of
tensions. This could potentially serve as a catalyst for greater stability to
develop over time, supported by the already significant popular support
base for improved bilateral relations with India.

Conclusion
The Quad is a potentially transformative platform that may forge new
international partnerships and permanently alter the dynamics of the Asia-
Pacific. As it is still in its formative stages, the Quad is undecided on how
it will pursue its goal of a „free and open‟ region which will safeguard its
members‟ interests in a contested environment, with options including
military, economic and diplomatic endeavours. In the IOR, this would
represent a significant change as India coordinates its efforts with outside
actors that support its role as a more influential regional power. This
would be a major challenge for Pakistan, which has long sought strategic
and international parity with India to defend itself from what it sees as a
threatening power. Pakistan is already taking action in response to the
geopolitical changes which the Quad is a part of, shifting its political
orientation away from the US and becoming more reliant on China, which
is seen as a more reliable partner due to mutual interests in limiting
India‟s influence. This trend will continue if the Quad coalesces into an
assertive regional force. Pakistan would likely resist pressure to accept
India‟s regional supremacy, and instead, closely align itself with China in
opposition to the Quad, raising the spectre of competing power blocs.
Alternatively, if the platform models itself as a moderating force for an
inclusive regional order which Pakistan can benefit from, it is more likely
that the country will balance its interests, and maintain positive relations
with both China and the Quad, creating greater potential for regional
stability.
This holds clear implications for policymakers in Quad member
countries, particularly in the US and India, where confrontational policies
towards Pakistan are in favour to serve short- and medium-term interests
relating to domestic politics and the war in Afghanistan. It is imperative
that they weigh up the long-term consequences of such policies. Such

54 IPRI JOURNAL  WINTER 2019

 Pakistan and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue:
Current and Future Perceptions

considerations are also relevant to those in Australia and Japan who will
decide the trajectory of the Quad, and must be fully aware of its
implications. The future order of the IOR is as important to Pakistan as
any other country – it is equally important that policymakers there
understand the potential dangers facing the region, and consider how their
own actions may influence the attitudes and policies of others.

IPRI JOURNAL  WINTER 2019 55