Selected Docket Entries For Case 18 2868: Filed Document Description Docket Text
Selected Docket Entries For Case 18 2868: Filed Document Description Docket Text
Selected Docket Entries For Case 18 2868: Filed Document Description Docket Text
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VIRGINIA L. GIUFFRE,
Plaintiff,
v.
15-cv-07433-RWS
GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
Defendant.
--------------------------------------------------X
Laura A. Menninger
Jeffrey S. Pagliuca
Ty Gee
HADDON, MORGAN AND FOREMAN, P.C.
150 East 10th Avenue
Denver, CO 80203
303.831.7364
Case 18-2868, Document 279, 08/09/2019, 2628231, Page2 of 37
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ARGUMENT....................................................................................................................... 2
I. Ms. Maxwell is not liable for republications of the January 2015 statement. .............. 2
B. New York state and federal courts have rejected liability for republication
based on “foreseeability.” ................................................................................ 5
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 30
i
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). .............................................. 9
Blair v. Inside Ed. Prods., 7 F. Supp. 3d 348, 358 & n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ...................... 25
Chambers v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CV 15-6976 (JBS/JS), 2016 WL 3533998, at
*8 (D.N.J. June 28, 2016) .......................................................................................... 2, 20
China Med. Techs., Inc., 539 B.R. 643, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) .......................................... 12
Cowan v. City of Mount Vernon, 95 F. Supp. 3d 624, 645-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ......... 13,25
Croy v. A.O. Fox Mem’l Hosp., 68 F. Supp. 2d 136, 144 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) ....................... 3
Dalbec v. Gentleman’s Companion, Inc., 828 F.2d 921, 927 (2d Cir. 1987) ................... 25
Davis v. Costa-Gavras (“Davis I”), 580 F. Supp. 1082, 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ....... 2,3,4,6
Davis v. Costa-Gavras (“Davis II”), 595 F. Supp. 982, 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ................... 3
Dibella v. Hopkins, No. 01 CIV. 11779 (DC), 2002 WL 31427362, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
30, 2002) ........................................................................................................................ 20
Egiazaryan v. Zalmayev (“Egiazaryan I”), No. 11 CIV. 2670 PKC, 2011 WL 6097136, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011) ............................................................................................. 3
Egiazaryan v. Zalmayev (“Egiazaryan II”), 880 F. Supp. 2d 494, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
................................................................................................................................... 3,4,5
Folwell v. Miller, 145 F. 495, 497 (2d Cir. 1906) ............................................................ 2,4
Geraci v. Probst, 938 N.E.2d 917, 921 (N.Y. 2010) ..................................... 2,3,5,6,8,10,13
ii
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Hoffman v. Landers, 537 N.Y.S.2d 228, 231 (2d Dep’t 1989) ........................................... 5
Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc., 416 N.E.2d 557, 560 (N.Y. 1980) ....................................... 3
Karedes v. Ackerley Grp., Inc., 423 F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 2005) ................................... 26
Law Firm of Daniel P. Foster, P.C. v. Turner Broad. Sys., 844 F.2d 955, 959 (2d Cir.
1988). ................................................................................................................. 15, 28, 29
National Puerto Rican Day Parade, Inc. v. Casa Pubs. (“NPR”), 914 N.Y.S.2d 120, 122-
23 (1st Dep’t 2010) ........................................................................................................... 5
Porky Prods. v. Nippon Exp. U.S.A., 1 F.Supp.2d 227, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) .................... 2
Rand v. New York Times Co., 430 N.Y.S.2d 271, 275 (1st Dep’t 1980) ....................... 9, 10
Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 420 N.E.2d 377, 382 (N.Y. 1981) .............................. 2,3,7
Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 425 N.Y.S.2d 101, 104 (1st Dep’t 1980) .......................... 3
Rizzuto v. Nexxus Prod. Co., 641 F. Supp. 473, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d, 810 F.2d
1161 (2d Cir. 1986) ....................................................................................................... 16
iii
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Sweeney v. Prisoners’ Legal Servs. of N.Y., 538 N.Y.S.2d 370, 371-72 (3d Dep’t 1989).
....................................................................................................................................... 19
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Northrop Grumman Corp., No. 12 CIV. 3040 KBF, 2013 WL
3055437, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2013) ..................................................................... 12
United States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1985). ..................................... 25
Rules
Treatises
iv
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Before the Court reaches the question whether plaintiff can prove falsity and actual
malice, it should decide three questions of law, one that narrows considerably the legal issues
control over any of the media that decided to republish excerpts from the statement. On these
facts, under black letter New York law, she is not responsible for these republications. Plaintiff’s
contrary argument relies on a “foreseeability” doctrine the New York Court of Appeals has
specifically rejected. Summary judgment should enter in favor of Ms. Maxwell as to any
republication.
nonactionable opinion depends upon, among other things, an examination of the full context of
the communication and consideration of the setting surrounding it. The January 2015 statement,
making no reference to specific allegations, explains why the author believes plaintiff’s
allegations are “obvious lies”: “Each time the story is re told [sic] it changes with new salacious
previously, others are free to opine she is telling falsehoods now. This is nonactionable opinion.
3. Under New York law, a statement made pertinent to good faith anticipated litigation is
nonactionable. The statement was sent exclusively to the media representatives, and contained a
clear message: the media should not republish plaintiff’s “obvious lies,” else Ms. Maxwell would
If the Court reaches the question of falsity and actual malice, the Rule 56 record
establishes plaintiff cannot prove falsity and actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.
1
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ARGUMENT
I. Ms. Maxwell is not liable for republications of the January 2015 statement.
Under black letter New York law, liability for republication of an allegedly defamatory
statement “must be based on real authority to influence the final product.” Davis v. Costa-
Gavras, 580 F. Supp. 1082, 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). “[W]here a defendant ‘had no actual part in
composing or publishing,’ he cannot be held liable.” Id. (citing Folwell v. Miller, 145 F. 495, 497
(2d Cir. 1906)); accord Geraci v. Probst, 938 N.E.2d 917, 921 (N.Y. 2010). “[C]onclusive
evidence of lack of actual authority [is] sufficiently dispositive that the [trial court] ‘ha[s] no
option but to dismiss the case . . . .’” Id. (emphasis supplied; quoting Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin,
It is undisputed Ms. Maxwell and her agents had no ability to control and did not control
whether or how the media-recipients would use the statement. DOC. 542-7, Ex.J ¶¶ 2-3; id., Ex.K
¶ 24. Unsurprisingly, plaintiff has offered no evidence of such control. A fortiori this Court
“ha[s] no option but to dismiss the case,” id. (internal quotations omitted), to the extent it is
the “fundamental principles”1 of the underlying substantive law. Plaintiff Giuffre’s argument
The New York Court of Appeals in Geraci followed a long line of New York cases
holding that a defamation defendant is not liable for republication of his allegedly defamatory
statement unless he had “actual authority” to control the decision to republish: “Our
1
Porky Prods. v. Nippon Exp. U.S.A., 1 F.Supp.2d 227, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 152
F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998).
2
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republication liability standard has been consistent for more than one hundred years.” See
Geraci, 938 N.E.2d at 921 (footnote omitted). Indeed, the Geraci court observed, the New York
“It is too well settled to be now questioned that one who . . . prints and publishes a
libel[] is not responsible for its voluntary and unjustifiable repetition, without his
authority or request, by others over whom he has no control and who thereby
make themselves liable to the person injured, and that such repetition cannot be
considered in law a necessary, natural and probable consequence of the original
slander or libel.”
938 N.E.2d at 921 (emphasis supplied; quoting Schoepflin, 56 N.E. at 504).
The cases in which this Court and its sister courts in this Circuit assiduously have
followed this line of New York cases are legion.3 The Second Circuit was in the vanguard.4
2
56 N.E. 502 (N.Y. 1900).
3
See Egiazaryan v. Zalmayev, 880 F. Supp. 2d 494, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[t]he original
publisher is not liable for republication where he had ‘nothing to do with the decision to
[republish] and [he] had no control over it.’”) (quoting Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 425
N.Y.S.2d 101, 104 (1st Dep’t 1980), aff’d, 420 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1981)); Egiazaryan v.
Zalmayev, No. 11 CIV. 2670 PKC, 2011 WL 6097136, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011) (same);
Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 595 F. Supp. 982, 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“Under New York law, liability
for a subsequent republication must be based on real authority to influence the final product, not
upon evidence of acquiescence or peripheral involvement in the republication process.”); Davis,
580 F. Supp. at 1094 (original publisher not liable for injuries caused by the republication
“‘absent a showing that they approved or participated in some other manner in the activities of
the third party republisher’”) (quoting Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc., 416 N.E.2d 557, 560 (N.Y.
1980)); Croy v. A.O. Fox Mem’l Hosp., 68 F. Supp. 2d 136, 144 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (“The original
author of a document may not be held personally liable for injuries arising from its subsequent
republication absent a showing that the original author approved or participated in some other
manner in the activities of the third-party republisher.”) (citations omitted); Cerasani v. Sony
Corp., 991 F. Supp. 343, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“a libel plaintiff must allege that the party had
authority or control over, or somehow ratified or approved, the republication”).
4
See Folwell v. Miller, 145 F. 495, 497 (2d Cir. 1906) (affirming directed verdict in favor
of managing editor: “when it appears affirmatively that he was not on duty [upon receipt of
libelous matter and its republication], and could not have had any actual part in composing or
publishing, we think he cannot be held liable without disregarding the settled rule of law by
which no man is bound for the tortious act of another over whom he has not a master’s power of
control”) (emphasis supplied), quoted with approval in Davis I, 580 F. Supp. at 1096; Cerasani,
991 F. Supp. at 351.
3
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In the face of this uninterrupted line of New York state (and federal) cases dating back to
the nineteenth century powerfully establishing a bright line rule regarding republication liability,
there are “[t]wo standards” in New York law: one “older,” and one “more modern.” Resp. 28.
The “older” standard, plaintiff says, is represented by the legion of cases we have cited. The
defamation. Id. (citing Sack on Defamation § 2.7.2, at 2-113 to -114 (4th ed. 2016)). It surely is
frivolous to argue that a treatise creates a republication-liability standard that is separate from,
“more modern” than, and supersedes the New York Court of Appeals’ 2010 decision in Geraci
Trying to build on this start, plaintiff argues, “New York appellate courts have repeatedly
held than an individual is liable for the media publishing that individual’s defamatory press
January 2015 statement as a “press release,”5 her argument still would be meritless. To begin
with, when plaintiff says the New York appellate courts have “repeatedly” supported her claimed
rule of law, she means . . . twice. And an examination of those two cases reveals she is quite
wrong and, worse, has advanced a seriously misleading argument. Neither case involved, as here,
a motion for summary judgment. In both cases, the New York appellate division affirmed the
denial of a motion to dismiss under the state’s equivalent of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). See Levy v. Smith, 18 N.Y.S.3d 438, 439 (2d Dep’t 2015); National Puerto Rican Day
Parade, Inc. v. Casa Pubs. (“NPR”), 914 N.Y.S.2d 120, 122-23 (1st Dep’t 2010).
5
As discussed in This Reply, at 16-19, the January 2015 statement would be a strange
“press release,” as it threatened to sue the very press to which it was “releasing” information.
4
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This argument, too, is frivolous. Despite plaintiff’s baseless claim there is an “old”
formulation and a “more modern” formulation of republication-liability law in New York, both
cases she cites applied the same “old” standard used by the New York Court of Appeals in
Geraci, by this Court in the two Egiazaryan cases, and by us in our Memorandum of Law in
support of Ms. Maxwell’s motion for summary judgment. See Levy, 18 N.Y.S.3d at 439 (citing
Geraci and Schoepflin); NPR, 914 N.Y.S.2d at 594-95 (citing Hoffman v. Landers, 537 N.Y.S.2d
Both the courts in Levy and NPR applied the Geraci standard and the 12(b)(6) standards,
e.g., assuming the pleaded facts were true. They concluded it was possible to infer from the
complaints’ allegations that the defendant caused the republications. Accordingly, they denied
the motions to dismiss. See Levy, 18 N.Y.S.2d at 439; NPR, 914 N.Y.S.2d at 123. It was
improper for plaintiff to cite these cases without disclosing they are 12(b)(6) cases in which the
courts applied the Geraci republication rule and inferred facts from the pleaded allegations.
B. New York state and federal courts have rejected liability for republication
based on “foreseeability.”
Plaintiff cites section 576 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts for the proposition that if
republication was foreseeable, then the defendant is the cause of any special damages from the
republication. This argument is frivolous. As an initial matter, plaintiff has pleaded no special
Regardless, the New York Court of Appeals in Geraci rejected the Restatement’s
foreseeability doctrine. See 938 N.E.2d at 921-22 (noting that section 576’s foreseeability
standard “is not nearly as broad as plaintiff . . . suggest[s]” and “[t]hat we did not endorse such a
broad [Restatement] standard of foreseeability in Karaduman is evident from our decision the
5
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While trying to distinguish this Court’s decision in Davis, plaintiff fails to disclose that
The Davis plaintiffs, like plaintiff Giuffre here, also asserted republication liability, despite
defendant’s lack of participation, on the ground “he could reasonably have foreseen that
republication would occur.” 580 F.Supp. at 1096. This Court, relying on Karaduman, was
unpersuaded: The New York Court of Appeals “has not applied the foreseeability standard
suggested by plaintiffs in prior libel cases in which such a standard would have been relevant, if
not controlling.” Id. This Court noted: The jurisdictions that have adopted a foreseeability
standard “have refused to hold responsible a defendant with no control or influence over the
entity that actually republished the statement.” Id. Plaintiff’s failure to disclose this Court’s
Plaintiff eventually purports to apply the “old” standard, that is to say, the controlling law
in the state of New York. She argues Ms. Maxwell “authorized” the January 2015 statement,
“paid money to her publicist to convince media outlets to publish it,” “request[ed]” its
publication, “made a deliberate decision to publish her press release,” “actively participated” in
“the decision to publish her press release,” was “active” in “influencing the media to publish” the
statement, and “approved of” and “pushed for” the publication of the statement. Resp. 30-31.
In applying the controlling law, plaintiff wittingly makes a mess of it. She disingenuously
suggests any help Ms. Maxwell gave to help her lawyer prepare the January 2015 statement and
her signing-off on it are the equivalent of requesting, authorizing and controlling its
republication. That isn’t the law. The “authority” required for republication liability is the
“actual authority . . . to decide upon or implement” the republication. 580 F.Supp. at 1095
6
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(emphasis supplied; citing Rinaldi, 420 N.E.2d at 382). Judge Sofaer studied Rinaldi’s holding,
and noted republication liability must be based on a “decision” by the defendant to republish and
must focus on “real authority to influence the final product, not upon evidence of acquiescence
Accordingly, Judge Sofaer held, when there is “conclusive evidence of lack of actual authority”
this is “dispositive” of republication liability and the trial court “‘ha[s] no option but to dismiss
the case against the [defendant].” Id. (emphasis supplied; quoting Rinaldi, 420 N.E.2d at 382).
There is no evidence Ms. Maxwell “paid money to her publicist to convince” the media
to publish her statement; this is why plaintiff cites no evidence to support that assertion. See
Resp. 30. Mr. Gow’s email containing the statement says nothing to “convince” the media to
publish the statement. See Doc.542-6, Ex.F. There is no evidence Ms. Maxwell was “active” in
“influencing the media to publish” it; nor is there any evidence she “pushed for” or “requested”
its publication; this is why plaintiff cites no evidence to support these assertions. See id. 31.
Indeed, plaintiff has zero evidence Ms. Maxwell or her agents ever did anything to urge
or request any media to publish the statement. Mr. Gow presented the January 2015 statement
via email to six to thirty media representatives; it was not sent to anyone else; in the email he
told the journalists he was presenting a “quotable statement” “on behalf of” Ms. Maxwell and
“[n]o further communication will be provided.” Doc.542-6, Ex.F. It is undisputed Ms. Maxwell
and her agents had no control over the media that republished portions of the statement.
Plaintiff argues “a jury” should decide whether Ms. Maxwell “authorized or intended”
the statement to be republished, or “approved of, and even participated, in” its republication.
Resp. 30-31. All plaintiffs want to get to “a jury.” The summary-judgment question is whether
they deserve to. Plaintiff has offered no evidence to put before a jury on the dispositive Geraci
7
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question: whether Ms. Maxwell affirmatively authorized or requested a person or entity “over
whom [s]he has . . . control,” 938 N.E.2d at 921. The only new argument plaintiff makes in her
entreaty to see “a jury” is that she should be permitted to prove Ms. Maxwell’s “complicity.” As
with her other factually bereft arguments, the complicity argument awaits plaintiff’s introduction
of facts to support it. Having failed to do so, plaintiff cannot avoid summary judgment.
Plaintiff labors in vain to turn the Barden Declaration into “disputed issues of fact.” For
there to be a disputed factual issue, plaintiff would need to introduce evidence disputing his
sworn statements. She has not done so. In any event, the Barden Declaration is all but irrelevant
to the central, dispositive republication question: whether Ms. Maxwell is liable for the media’s
republication of her statement, where they did so without her authority or request and where she
and her agents had “no control”6 over the media. On this question we cited to the Barden
Declaration for one evidentiary fact: Messrs. Barden and Gow had no control over the media.7
See Doc.542-7, Ex.K ¶ 24, cited in Memo. of Law 14.8 Plaintiff has offered no admissible
“[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving
party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
249 (1986). It is one thing to argue in conclusory fashion, as plaintiff does, that “a jury” should
decide a factual question. It is quite another to identify evidence in the Rule 56 record that raises
a genuine question of material fact, which plaintiff does not do. Summary judgment is warranted.
6
Geraci, 938 N.E.2d at 921.
7
As discussed in Argument I.D., below, we cited more plenarily to the Barden
Declaration in connection with a different point—the particular unfairness of subjecting
Ms. Maxwell to liability when the media selectively quoted portions of the January 15 statement.
8
In the Memorandum, we erroneously cited to ¶ 24 of Exhibit J; we intended to cite to
¶ 24 of Exhibit K (Doc.542-1, Ex.K), which is Mr. Barden’s declaration.
8
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It is undisputed that no one ever republished in toto the January 2015 statement and that
various media unilaterally selected portions of the statement to republish. We said on page 14 of
our Memorandum that the media’s “selective, partial republication of the statement is more
statement liable for republications over which she had no control, worse is it to make her liable
for selective, partial republications of her statement. We relied on the holding in Rand v. New
York Times Co., 430 N.Y.S.2d 271, 275 (1st Dep’t 1980), that a publisher cannot be charged with
Plaintiff argues that our position is “absurd on its face” because “[i]t would mean . . . a
defamer could send to the media a long attack on a victim with one irrelevant sentence and, when
the media quite predictably cut that sentence, escape liability.” Resp. 32. This argument has two
erroneous assumptions. One is that the “defamer” can “escape liability.” Not true. An original
publisher remains liable for her defamation. We are concerned here with republication. The
second wrong assumption is that the original publisher must always remain liable for any
republication. Geraci rejects that view: Under New York law “each person who repeats the
defamatory statement is responsible for the resulting damages.” 938 N.E.2d at 921.
The effort by plaintiff to distinguish Rand is meritless. She argues the media’s
republication of the January 2015 statement actually was not a republication at all, just an
original publication. Resp. 32. That argument is “absurd on its face,” id., since there is no dispute
Ms. Maxwell did not control the media’s decision to republish (excerpts from) the statement.
Plaintiff next argues the media did not “edit[]” or “tak[e] . . . quote[s] out of context.” Id.
Plaintiff could not be more wrong. As she concedes, all republications of the statement by the
9
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media were selective, partial republications of the statement. Any such selective, partial
republication by definition took those excerpts “out of context.” This is so because Mr. Gow
informed the media in his email that he was providing “a quotable statement,” Doc.542-6, Ex.F,
not a statement “from which you, the media, are free to excerpt as you please.”
substantially altered his message. See id., Ex.K ¶ 20. For example, when he said in the third
paragraph that plaintiff’s claims are “obvious lies,” it followed two paragraphs in which he
explained why it was obvious the new claims are lies. See id., Ex.K ¶¶ 19-22. Excerpting and
republishing only the “obvious lies” phrase—as plaintiff did in her complaint—certainly gives
the reader a different understanding than if the media had republished the entire statement. As
Rand held: A defendant cannot be liable for the republication of derogatory but constitutionally
protected opinion “when the foundation upon which that opinion is based is omitted. The
defamatory remark should be read against the background of its issuance.” 430 N.Y.S.2d at 275
Plaintiff argues: “A jury could reasonably conclude that [Ms. Maxwell’s] statement that
Ms. Giuffre’s claims of child sexual abuse are ‘obvious lies’ is not a rhetorical device, nor
hyperbole, but a literal and particular affirmation that [plaintiff] lied.” Resp. 33 (emphasis
supplied). We italicize plaintiff’s rhetorical sleight of hand. As plaintiff knows, nowhere did the
January 2015 statement specify which of plaintiff’s countless allegations are “obvious lies.”
Indeed, this is the problem with plaintiff’s case: since the statement specified no particular
allegations as obvious lies, plaintiff believes she is entitled to “prove” the truth of every
allegation she ever has made about her alleged experience as a “sex slave.” What Mr. Barden’s
plaintiff. He had a bigger target: plaintiff’s credibility. He used the statement to show plaintiff’s
10
Case 18-2868, Document 279, 08/09/2019, 2628231, Page16 of 37
behavior is that of a liar, i.e., one who increasingly embellishes her story, and her allegations
become more and more outlandish, so that by January 2015 she was claiming to have had sex
with a well respected Harvard law professor, Alan Dershowitz. See Doc.542-7, Ex.K ¶¶ 19-22.
Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, “even apparent statements of fact may assume the
character of statements of opinion, and thus be privileged, when made in public debate . . . or
other circumstances in which an audience may anticipate the use of epithets, fiery rhetoric or
hyperbole.” Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 501 N.E.2d 550, 556 (N.Y. 1986) (internal quotations and
brackets omitted). That was the case here. Plaintiff falsely—and, as Judge Marra held,
“unnecessar[ily]”9—alleged in lurid detail that Ms. Maxwell had sexually abused her. The six to
thirty journalists would have anticipated a “fiery” denial of the allegations. Regardless, the
statement overall was constitutionally protected opinion grounded on facts disclosed to the
journalists: plaintiff’s increasingly outlandish and inconsistent stories, her newly embellished
allegations, and her increasingly lurid and salacious enhancements of her earlier allegations.
Plaintiff makes a plethora of complaints about Mr. Barden’s declarations. None has any
merit. She objects to Mr. Barden’s declaration of his intent and purposes for preparing the
January 2015 statement because, she says, this implicates the attorney-client privilege. That is
untrue. His intent and purposes are by definition not attorney-client communications and do not
implicate such communications; they are attorney work product,10 which he is free to disclose.11
9
Doc.542-5, Ex.E, at 5.
10
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Northrop Grumman Corp., No. 12 CIV. 3040 KBF, 2013 WL
3055437, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2013) (identifying work product as including defense
counsel’s “mental impressions, thought processes and strategies connected with [the] defense”) .
11
See In re China Med. Techs., Inc., 539 B.R. 643, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
11
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She objects he is “non-deposed.” But Mr. Barden was the third-listed potential witness in
our Rule 26(a)(1)(A) disclosure, served on plaintiff a year ago; the disclosure said he “has
Plaintiff was free to depose him; that she chose not to was her own tactical decision. Finally,
plaintiff argues “there are factual disputes” regarding the declaration. But plaintiff identified no
such factual disputes relating to the declaration. A party opposing summary judgment cannot
create a dispute by arguing, which is all plaintiff does. See Resp. 35-38.
F. Plaintiff effectively has confessed Arguments I.B. and I.C. of the Memorandum.
Argument I.B. of the Memorandum contends the First Amendment bars liability for
republication by media organizations of the January 2015 statement. See Memo. of Law 16-17.
Argument I.C. contends that under Geraci plaintiff is barred from introducing into evidence any
of the media organizations’ republication of the January 2015 statement. See id. at 17-18.
Plaintiff offers no resistance to these arguments. We respectfully request that the Court consider
these arguments confessed. See, e.g., Cowan v. City of Mount Vernon, 95 F. Supp. 3d 624, 645-
567 N.E.2d 1270, 1274 (N.Y. 1991). See id. at 1274, 1277-78, 1280-82 (noting Steinhilber’s
adoption of formula). We addressed each of the four Ollman factors. The plaintiff avoids this
analysis, choosing merely to block-quote large portions of this Court’s Rule 12(b)(6) order. That
12
Menninger Decl. EXHIBIT NN, at 2.
13
Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
12
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is a mistake. Immuno AG is the seminal case prescribing the analysis to be used in a summary-
judgment proceeding for assessing whether under the New York Constitution a statement is
Instead of addressing the four factors, plaintiff simply relies on this Court’s 12(b)(6)
order. The Court’s order does not control. In deciding the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court
assumed the complaint’s allegations were true and drew all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s
favor. In this proceeding, plaintiff is not entitled either to the assumption or the inferences. The
Relying on the Court’s order, plaintiff argues that the question whether the three
allegedly defamatory sentences are opinion or fact is controlled by Davis v. Boeheim, 22 N.E.3d
999 (N.Y. 2014), and Green v. Cosby, 138 F. Supp. 3d 114 (D. Mass. 2015). See Resp. 38. Davis
was an appeal from a 12(b)(6) dismissal. This procedural posture was critical to its decision:
[D]efendants argue that because a reader could interpret the statement as pure
opinion, the statement is as a consequence, nonactionable and was properly
dismissed [pursuant to a pre-answer motion]. However, on a motion to dismiss we
consider whether any reading of the complaint supports the defamation claim.
Thus, although it may well be that the challenged statements are subject to
defendants’ interpretation, the motion to dismiss must be denied if the
communication at issue, taking the words in their ordinary meaning and in
context, is also susceptible to a defamatory connotation. We find this complaint to
meet this minimum pleading requirement.
Davis, 22 N.E.3d at 1006-07 (internal quotations, brackets, ellipsis and citations omitted).
Green was a decision on the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The case was decided under
California and Florida defamation law. See 138 F. Supp. 3d at 124, 130, 136-37. The court made
it clear the 12(b)(6) procedural posture was critical to its decision: “At this stage of the litigation,
the court’s concern is whether any fact contained in or implied by an allegedly defamatory
statement is susceptible to being proved true or false; if so capable, Defendant cannot avoid
application of defamation law by claiming the statement expresses only opinion.” Id. at 130.
13
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In the case at bar, application of the four Steinhilber factors on the Rule 56 record
compels a different conclusion. The complaint alleges three sentences in the January 2015
statement are defamatory: in the first paragraph of the statement, plaintiff Giuffre’s allegations
are “untrue”; in the same paragraph, the “original allegations” have been “shown to be untrue”;
and in the third paragraph, plaintiff’s “claims are obvious lies.”14 Doc.1 ¶ 30.
proceeding, the words “untrue” and “obvious lies” might be susceptible of “a specific and readily
understood factual meaning,” Doc.37 at 9. This is especially true if it is taken out of context, e.g.,
extracted from the statement. But this approach is forbidden. See, e.g., Law Firm of Daniel P.
Foster, P.C. v. Turner Broad. Sys., 844 F.2d 955, 959 (2d Cir. 1988).
The first sentence—“[t]he allegations made by [plaintiff] against [Ms. Maxwell] are
untrue”—is indefinite and ambiguous because it is wholly unclear which “allegations” are being
referenced. The second sentence—“[t]he original allegations . . . have been fully responded to
and shown to be untrue”—also is indefinite and ambiguous for the same reason. Additionally, it
is unclear what are the “original” allegations. It is unclear what is meant by “shown to be
untrue.” What one person may believe is a fact shown to be untrue, another person may believe
is a fact not (sufficiently) shown to be untrue. The existence of God, climate change and
existence of widespread voter fraud in the election are examples of this. The third sentence—
14
Ms. Maxwell testified in her deposition that she “know[s]” plaintiff is a “liar.” This
testimony, plaintiff argues, “contradict[s]” our contention that the three allegedly defamatory
sentences in the July 2015 statement are opinion. Resp. 39-40. Plaintiff’s argument is a non-
sequitur. Ms. Maxwell’s 2016 deposition testimony in which she disclosed all the reasons she
believes plaintiff has uttered a plethora of false allegations is irrelevant to whether the three
sentences in the July 2015 statement, prepared by Mr. Barden to respond to the joint-motion
allegations, are opinions.
14
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“[plaintiff’s] claims are obvious lies”—also is indefinite and ambiguous. An “obvious lie” to one
Factor 2: Capable of being characterized as true or false. On the 12(b)(6) record, the
Court held the three statements “are capable of being proven true or false.” Doc.37 at 9. As a
general question of law, one person’s statement that another person’s allegations are “untrue” or
are “obvious lies” is not necessarily capable of being proved true or false—regardless of the
subject matter of the opined “untruths” or “lies.” See Rizzuto v. Nexxus Prod. Co., 641 F. Supp.
473, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d, 810 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1986); Telephone Sys. Int’l v. Cecil, No.
(citing cases). As Steinhilber observed, “even apparent statements of fact may assume the
At least two of plaintiff’s CVRA allegations cannot be proven true or false (only two
such allegations are needed in order to render the January 15 statement an opinion). We have
identified two such allegations in the joinder motion: that Ms. Maxwell “appreciated the
immunity granted” to Epstein, and that she “act[ed] as a ‘madame’ for Epstein.” Memo. of Law
22. Plaintiff does not dispute this. The result is that the January 15 statement’s assertion that
plaintiff’s “allegations” and “claims” in the joint motion are “untrue” or “obvious lies” is by
definition an opinion. It cannot be proven true or false whether Ms. Maxwell “appreciated”
Epstein’s immunity or whether she “acted as a madame.” Indeed, it seems quite obvious that the
In the statement, Mr. Barden on behalf of Ms. Maxwell also says plaintiff’s “original
allegations . . . have been fully responded to and shown to be untrue.” Doc.542-6, Ex.F. This
cannot be proven true or false. The “full response” to the original allegations is a reference to the
allegations contained in media stories, including the Churcher articles. See Doc.542-3, Ex.C.
Whether the 2011 statement “fully” responded to the original allegations and whether it
“showed” the original allegations to be untrue are pure (argumentative) opinion. “[O]bvious lies”
on its face is an opinion. The “obviousness” of a lie simply cannot be proven true or false.
Factor 3: The full context of the statement. Three contextual facts are revealed by the
Rule 56 record. One, the email transmitting the statement to the media-representatives—along
with the third-person references to Ms. Maxwell—told them Ms. Maxwell did not prepare the
statement: “Please find attached a quotable statement on behalf of Ms. Maxwell.” Doc.542-6,
Ex.F (emphasis supplied). It is undisputed that in fact Mr. Barden prepared the bulk of it and
ultimately approved and adopted as his work all of it. Doc.542-7, Ex.K ¶ 10.
Two, Mr. Barden’s statement issued on behalf of his client would not be a traditional
press release solely to disseminate information to the media; this is why he did not request
Mr. Gow or any other public relations specialist to prepare or participate in preparing the
statement. Id., Ex.K ¶ 15. The statement was a broad-brush communique to the media about
plaintiff and her new allegations; it was not to be a “point by point” rebuttal of each new
allegation. Id., Ex.K ¶ 13. The logic and approach to preparing the statement were simple:
compare plaintiff’s prior allegations and conduct in telling her story with her current allegations
and conduct. See generally id., Ex.K ¶ 13. When he wrote the statement, he knew of plaintiff’s
2011 allegation that she had not had sex with Prince Andrew and he knew of her CVRA
allegation that she did have sex with him. Id., Ex.K ¶ 14. Also within his knowledge was the
story she had told Churcher before March 2011—a story that was far less provocative and
salacious than the one she included in the joinder motion. See id., Ex.K ¶ 5; compare Docs.542-1
& 542-2, Exs.A & B (Churcher articles published March 2011) with Doc.542-4, Ex.D (plaintiff’s
joinder motion containing dramatically different and more lurid and salacious allegations).
16
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Mr. Barden’s approach provides critical context to explaining how the statement builds a
logical argument that the new allegations are false. It first notes plaintiff’s “original allegations”;
then it points out how the story changed and was embellished over time, “now” with allegations
that plaintiff had sex with a prominent and highly respected Harvard law professor (“Each time
the story is re told [sic] it changes with new salacious details about public figures and world
leaders . . . .”). The argument builds up to the opinion in the third paragraph: “[Plaintiff’s] claims
are obvious lies and should be treated as such . . . .” Doc.542-6, Ex.F. See generally id., Ex.K
¶¶ 13-22. This third paragraph—and the threat in the fourth paragraph to sue the media for
republication of plaintiff’s falsehoods—confirms what is plain from the statement itself: it was
Three, the statement was intended to respond (via denial) to the media-recipients’
requests for a reply to the new CVRA joinder-motion allegations. Id. ¶¶ 8, 10, 16. But more than
that, it was intended to be “a shot across the bow” of the media. Id. ¶ 17. The logical argument
was created to (a) persuade the media-recipients that they needed to “subject plaintiff’s
allegations to inquiry and scrutiny”; (b) explain to the media-recipients how it was “obvious”
that plaintiff “had no credibility” because of her shifting story and increasingly lurid and
salacious allegations as time went on, many of which (e.g., the allegations of sex with Prince
Andrew and Professor Dershowitz) on their face appear far-fetched,15 and (c) warn the media-
15
Since the CVRA joinder motion, there has emerged a substantial amount of evidence—
some from plaintiff’s own pen—that plaintiff’s allegations about having been “forced” to have
sex with prominent individuals are falsehoods. A telling example is a series of emails between
plaintiff and reporter Churcher when plaintiff was working on negotiating a book deal about her
alleged experiences and Churcher was trying to help her. On May 10, 2011, plaintiff tells
Churcher she cannot remember whom she had told Churcher she had had sex with. Churcher
responds responds, “Don’t forget Alan Dershowitz,” which Churcher says is a “good name for
[plaintiff’s] pitch” to her literary agent. It is clear neither Churcher nor plaintiff believed plaintiff
(footnote cont’d on next page)
17
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recipients that they republished plaintiff’s obvious falsehoods against Ms. Maxwell at their legal
As the New York Court of Appeals observed, the context of a statement often is the “key
consideration” in fact vs. opinion cases. Davis, 22 N.E.3d at 1006. So it is here. As Davis
suggested, the three challenged statements are “subject to [Ms. Maxwell’s] interpretation,” id. at
1007; accord Sweeney v. Prisoners’ Legal Servs. of N.Y., 538 N.Y.S.2d 370, 371-72 (3d Dep’t
1989). The context of the January 2015 statement makes clear that the characterization of
plaintiff’s allegations and claims as “untrue” or “obvious lies” are ultimate opinions—
Factor 4: The broader setting surrounding the statement, including conventions that
might signal to readers that the statement likely is opinion and not fact. It is undisputed that
the January 2015 statement was sent exclusively to more than six and fewer than thirty media
representatives, each of whom expressly had requested from Mr. Gow that he provide them with
Ms. Maxwell’s reply to the new joint-motion allegations. Doc.542-7, Ex.K ¶¶ 8, 10. As was
obvious from the statement, it was not a traditional press release, as such a release does not
credibility. Nor does a traditional release threaten to sue the media to whom the release is sent.
The media representatives upon receiving the January 2015 statement would have understood it
was presenting an (opinionated) argument that plaintiff was not credible because of her
had had sex with Professor Dershowitz, since (a) Churcher suggests that he would be a “good
name” to “pitch” because of his prominence (“he [represented] Claus von Bulow and a movie
was made about that case…title was Reversal of Fortune”), and (b) Churcher states, “We all
suspect [Professor Dershowitz] is a pedo[phile] and tho no proof of that, you probably met him
when he was hanging put w [Epstein].” Menninger Decl., EXHIBIT.OO, at Giuffre004096-97
(emphasis supplied).
18
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inconsistent and shifting sex abuse story and her increasingly lurid allegations against more and
more prominent individuals. And they would have understood that these characteristics of a
storyteller undermine her credibility and ergo the credibility of her new allegations.
In its 12(b)(6) order the Court said the three sentences have the effect of denying
plaintiff’s story but “they also clearly constitute fact to the reader.” The ruling is affected in two
ways by the Rule 56 record. Based on the foregoing discussion of the evidence, the three
sentences clearly constitute (argumentative) opinions of Mr. Barden on behalf of Ms. Maxwell.
Though the Court did not discuss who is “the reader,” this is important in Steinhilber
viewed “from the perspective of the audience to whom it is addressed.” Dibella v. Hopkins, No.
01 CIV. 11779 (DC), 2002 WL 31427362, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2002). Here, “the reader” is
six to thirty journalists. They could not have read the July 2015 statement—or the three allegedly
defamatory sentences—the same way it was read by these journalists’ audience, i.e., the general
public. This is because, as plaintiff implicitly concedes, these journalists only republished
excerpts—and not the entirety of the statement, which would have given context to the three
rest of the statement—would deprive the reader of the logic and reasoning behind the
opinionated conclusion that plaintiff was making “untrue” allegations and telling “obvious lies.”
19
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Statements pertinent to a good faith anticipated litigation made by attorneys (or their
agents under their direction16) before the commencement of litigation are privileged and “no
cause of action for defamation can be based on those statements,” Front, Inc. v. Khalil, 28
N.E.3d 15, 16 (N.Y. 2015). The facts that must be established, therefore, are (a) a statement,
(b) that is pertinent to a good faith anticipated litigation, and (c) by attorneys or their agents
under their direction. We did this. See Memo. of Law 6-8, 33-38; Doc.542-7, Ex.K ¶¶ 8-30. For
example, Mr. Barden (a) drafted the vast majority of the January 2015 statement and approved
and adopted all of it, (b) directed Mr. Gow to send it to the media representatives who had
requested Ms. Maxwell’s reply to plaintiff’s joint-motion allegations, (c) in the statement
threatened legal action again these media representatives, and (d) at the time of the statement
“was contemplating litigation against the press-recipients.” Id., Ex.K ¶¶ 10, 16-17, 28, 30.
Plaintiff argues without citation to authority: Ms. Maxwell herself did not testify she
intended to sue; she hasn’t offered any witnesses to testify she intended to bring a lawsuit; she
didn’t in fact sue; and—this one is a non-sequitur—the statement was an “attempt[] to continue
to conceal her criminal acts.” Resp. 41-42. These arguments fail. The privilege exists without
regard to whether Ms. Maxwell testifies she “intended” to sue, whether she has “witnesses” to
say she intended to sue, or whether she “in fact” sued. It refers to “anticipated” litigation, not
16
See Chambers v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CV 15-6976 (JBS/JS), 2016 WL
3533998, at *8 (D.N.J. June 28, 2016); see generally Hawkins v. Harris, 661 A.2d 284, 289-91
(N.J. 1995).
20
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anticipated, attorneys and parties should be free to communicate in order to reduce or avoid the
need to actually commence litigation.”). It applies when there is a good faith basis to anticipate
litigation. Mr. Barden, Ms. Maxwell’s lawyer who drafted and caused the statement to be sent
out, actually was anticipating litigation. Doc.542-7, Ex.K ¶ 28. The argument that the statement
was an attempt to “conceal” Ms. Maxwell’s “criminal acts” is fatuous. It would be hard to post
facto “conceal” alleged criminal acts that plaintiff luridly and salaciously described in an earlier
public filing, i.e., in the CVRA case, in which the United States government was the defendant.
Citing no record evidence, plaintiff argues, “The record evidence shows [Mr. Barden] did
not make the [January 2015] statement.” Resp. 42. That argument is easily disposed of by
Mr. Barden’s uncontested testimony. See Doc.542-7, Ex.K ¶¶ 10-13, 15-17, 20, 26-28, 30.
Citing the New York Court of Appeals’ decision in Khalil, we pointed out that malice is
not relevant to the pre-litigation privilege. Memo. of Law 34-35. To prevail on the pre-litigation
privilege the defendant need only establish one element: the allegedly defamatory statement at
issue was “‘pertinent to a good faith anticipated litigation.’” Id. (quoting Khalil, 28 N.E.3d at
16). Plaintiff disputes this and, without discussing Khalil or citing authorities, simply argues the
pre-litigation privilege is “foreclosed . . . because [Ms. Maxwell] acted with malice.” Resp. 43.
As suggested by her inability to find any law to support her, plaintiff is wrong.
Under general New York defamation law, “[t]he shield provided by a qualified privilege
may be dissolved” if plaintiff in rebuttal can show that the defendant “spoke with ‘malice.’”
Liberman v. Gelstein, 605 N.E.2d 344, 349 (N.Y. 1992); accord Khalil, 28 N.E.3d at 19.
“Malice” means two things: spite or ill will, and knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of
falsity. Liberman, 605 N.E.2d at 349. Plaintiff relies on this general qualified-privilege law.
21
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The problem for plaintiff is that in Khalil the New York Court of Appeals held this
general rule does not apply to the pre-litigation privilege. Khalil worked for a company named
Front. After eight years, he resigned and began working for “EOC,” one of Front’s competitors.
Front’s lawyer Kimmel sent a demand letter to Khalil alleging he had committed criminal,
tortious and ethical misconduct. Kimmel sent another demand letter to EOC and others stating
Khalil had conspired with EOC to breach his fiduciary duty to Front. Six months later, Front
sued Khalil. Khalil brought a third-party claim against Kimmel for libel per se. The trial court
dismissed the lawsuit, ruling that the letters were “absolutely privileged” under the litigation
privilege “and that it therefore did not need to reach the question of malice.” 28 N.E.3d at 17
(internal quotations omitted). The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the litigation
privilege absolutely protected the letter “because they were issued in the context of prospective
The Court of Appeals affirmed, but altered the law on the litigation privilege. It observed,
“Although it is well-settled that statements made in the course of litigation are entitled to
absolute privilege, this Court has not directly addressed whether statements made by an attorney
on behalf of his or her client in connection with prospective litigation are privileged.” Id.
(emphasis supplied). Some Appellate Division departments had held the absolute privilege
applies to statements made in connection with prospective litigation, but other departments had
The answer to whether pre-litigation statements should be absolute or qualified, the Court
Id. at 19. However, the court recognized that “extending privileged status to communication
made prior to anticipated litigation has the potential to be abused”; extending an absolute
privilege to this context, the court said, “would be problematic and unnecessary.” Id.
The court held it would recognize only a qualified privilege for pre-litigation
communications. Id. Crucially to the case at bar, the court held that the traditional privilege-
Rather than applying the general malice standard to this pre-litigation stage, the
privilege should only be applied to statements pertinent to a good faith anticipated
litigation. This requirement ensures that privilege does not protect attorneys who
are seeking to bully, harass, or intimidate their client’s adversaries by threatening
baseless litigation or by asserting wholly unmeritorious claims, unsupported in
law and fact, in violation of counsel’s ethical obligations. Therefore, we hold that
statements made prior to the commencement of an anticipated litigation are
privileged, and that the privilege is lost where a defendant proves that the
statements were not pertinent to a good faith anticipated litigation.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
Accordingly, the only question is whether the January 2015 statement Mr. Barden caused
to be issued to the six to thirty journalists was “pertinent to a good faith anticipated litigation.”
The undisputed evidence establishes that the answer is yes. Mr. Barden anticipated litigation.17
He “fully complied with [his] ethical obligation as a lawyer.”18 He was hardly “bully[ing],
harass[ing], or intimidat[ing]” the six to thirty journalists, since he caused a press agent, Mr.
17
See Doc.542-7, Ex.K ¶ 28 (“At the time I directed the issuance of the statement, I was
contemplating litigation against the press-recipients . . . .”); id. ¶ 17 (statement was intended as
“‘a shot across the bow’”; “the statement was very much intended as a cease and desist letter to
the media-recipients, letting [them] understand the seriousness with which Ms. Maxwell
considered the publication of plaintiff’s obviously false allegations and the legal indefensibility
of their own conduct”); Doc.542-6, Ex.F (“Maxwell . . . reserves her right to seek redress”).
18
Doc.542-7, Ex.K ¶ 26.
23
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Gow, to issue the statement,19 and he believed he had an affirmative duty in representing
Ms. Maxwell to prepare the statement and cause it to be delivered to the journalists.20
Plaintiff argues that when Mr. Barden issued the January 2015 statement on
Ms. Maxwell’s behalf, he had only “‘wholly unmeritorious claims, unsupported in law and fact,
in violation of counsel’s ethical obligations’” and did not have “‘good faith anticipated
litigation.’” Resp. 46 (quoting Khalil, 28 N.E.3d at 19; italics omitted). Plaintiff’s rationale?
Because she was telling the truth and so the media would only be reporting the truth. Id. That is a
Whether Mr. Barden, who represents Ms. Maxwell, had a meritorious or good faith basis
for anticipating defamation litigation has nothing to do with whether the media believed plaintiff
was telling the truth, and surely not whether the plaintiff believed or said she was telling the
truth. Based on his knowledge of plaintiff’s history, Mr. Barden in good faith believed that
plaintiff had been making false allegations for years and that the falsity of the allegations “should
have been obvious to the media.” Doc.542-7, Ex.K ¶ 13; see id. ¶¶ 14, 16-17, 20-23, 26-28, 30.
Accordingly, at the time he caused the statement to issue, Mr. Barden had a good-faith basis to
anticipate litigation against any of the media that republished plaintiff’s false allegations.
It hardly matters for purposes of the pre-litigation privilege whether the media
republished or did not republish plaintiff’s allegations or whether Mr. Barden ultimately did or
did not sue any of the media for any republication. As the Khalil court recognized, “[a]ttorneys
often send cease and desist letters to avoid litigation,” 28 N.E.3d at 19, and such letters have a
19
The Khalil court admonished attorneys to “exercise caution when corresponding with
unrepresented potential parties who may be particularly susceptible to harassment and
unequipped to respond properly even to appropriate communications from an attorney.” Khalil,
28 N.E.3d at 19 n.2.
20
See Doc.542-7, Ex.K ¶ 26.
24
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valid purpose protected by the pre-litigation privilege. Mr. Barden testified that the January 2015
statement in fact served as a cease and desist letter. See Doc.542-7, Ex.K ¶ 17.
Plaintiff did not respond to our argument that Ms. Maxwell’s January 4, 2015, statement
to a reporter is nonactionable. See Memo. of Law 38-39. We respectfully submit plaintiff has
Plaintiff is a public figure. See Memo. of Law 16-17, 49-54. Therefore, she must prove
falsity and actual malice. Under New York law, a public-figure defamation plaintiff must go
beyond the federal constitutional minimum and prove falsity by clear and convincing evidence.
Blair v. Inside Ed. Prods., 7 F. Supp. 3d 348, 358 & n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing DiBella v.
Hopkins, 403 F.3d 102, 111 (2d Cir.2005)). She must also prove actual malice by clear and
convincing evidence. Karedes v. Ackerley Grp., Inc., 423 F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting
Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that “produces in the mind of the trier of fact a
firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, evidence so
clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable the factfinder to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Blair, 7 F. Supp. 3d. at 358 (internal
Plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence (a) the material falsity of three
sentences in the context of the January 2015 statement, and (b) Ms. Maxwell’s actual malice, i.e.,
knowledge of the falsity of the three sentences or reckless disregard of whether they were false.
The three sentences are: in the first paragraph of the statement, plaintiff’s allegations are
25
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“untrue”; in the same paragraph, the “original allegations” have been “shown to be untrue”; and
in the third paragraph, plaintiff’s “claims are obvious lies.”21 Doc.1 ¶ 30.
Plaintiff cannot prove the falsity of the three sentences, let alone actual malice. If the
Rule 56 record establishes that two of plaintiff’s CVRA joinder-motion allegations are false and
two of her “original” allegations are false, this defamation action collapses on itself. This is
because the statement does not specify how many of plaintiff’s allegations are false; it certainly
does not say “all” plaintiff’s allegations are false. It uses the plural of “allegation.” The plural of
allegation literally means “more than one.” See Memo. of Law 21.
Sentence No. 1. Since the sentence does not specify any particular allegation and since
plaintiff made a plethora of allegations against Ms. Maxwell, plaintiff would be required to prove
the truth of every one of the plethora of allegations and that Ms. Maxwell knew each one of the
allegations was true. Conversely, if there are at least two allegations that plaintiff cannot prove to
be true or if there was good reason for Ms. Maxwell to believe at least two of the allegations to
There are at least two allegations by plaintiff against Ms. Maxwell that are untrue. In the
CVRA joinder motion, plaintiff alleged that in plaintiff’s first encounter with Mr. Epstein,
Ms. Maxwell took her to Mr. Epstein’s bedroom for a massage that Mr. Epstein and
Ms. Maxwell “turned . . . into a sexual encounter,” Doc.542-4, Ex.D, at 3. This allegation
contradicted her allegation in the Sharon Churcher article that a woman other than Ms. Maxwell
21
Ms. Maxwell said in her deposition she “know[s]” plaintiff is a “liar.” This testimony,
plaintiff argues, “contradict[s]” our contention that the three sentences in the January 2015
statement are opinion. Resp. 39-40. Plaintiff’s argument is a non-sequitur. Ms. Maxwell’s 2016
deposition testimony in which she disclosed all the reasons she believes plaintiff has uttered a
plethora of false allegations is wholly irrelevant to whether the three sentences in the January
2015 statement, prepared by Mr. Barden to respond to the joint-motion allegations, are opinions.
26
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took her to Mr. Epstein’s bedroom; during the massage that woman gave instructions to plaintiff,
and the massage “quickly developed into a sexual encounter.” Doc.542-1, Ex.A, at 4.
introduction of plaintiff to Prince Andrew is untrue. In the joinder motion, plaintiff alleged
Ms. Maxwell served an “important . . . role” in “Epstein’s sexual abuse ring,” namely,
connecting Mr. Epstein to “powerful individuals” who would sexually abuse plaintiff. Id., Ex.D,
at 5. Plaintiff alleged that in this role Ms. Maxwell introduced plaintiff to Prince Andrew, and
she was “forced to have sexual relations with this Prince in three separate geographical
locations,” including Ms. Maxwell’s London apartment. Id., Ex.D, at 5. These allegations
directly contradicted her earlier allegations in the 2011 Churcher article that (a) there never was
“any sexual contact between [plaintiff] and [Prince] Andrew,” and (b) Prince Andrew did not
know “Epstein paid her to have sex with [Epstein’s] friends.” Id., Ex.A, at 6.
Mr. Barden on behalf of Ms. Maxwell said in the first sentence that plaintiff’s
plaintiff’s own contradictory words that it would be fair to characterize at least two of her
allegations to be untrue. Having spent significant time with Ms. Churcher in 2011 and having
substantial incentive to disclose all important details of her “sex abuse” story, see Menninger
Decl. EXHIBIT OO, plaintiff in 2011 presented a story that exculpated Ms. Maxwell and Prince
Andrew of the very misconduct that in 2015—after securing a lawyer and seeing her story as a
profit vehicle—she inculpated them for. In the face of her contradictory allegations, plaintiff
cannot possibly prove by clear and convincing evidence that all her joinder-motion allegations
are true, or that when Ms. Maxwell said they were untrue, she knew each one of the allegations
was true or that she recklessly disregarded whether each one was true.
27
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Under New York law, a defendant’s allegedly defamatory statement is held “to a standard
of substantial, not literal, accuracy.” Law Firm of Daniel P. Foster, 844 F.2d at 959. Here,
Ms. Maxwell’s first sentence literally is true: more than one of plaintiff’s allegations are
Sentence No. 2. The second sentence at issue in this action states, “The original
allegations are not new and have been fully responded to and shown to be untrue.” Plaintiff
alleges the sentence is defamatory to the extent it asserts the original allegations were “shown to
It is a matter of pure opinion whether any given allegation was “shown” to be untrue.
Some people require more proof than others to conclude that a fact has been “shown to be
untrue.” We discussed above various examples of this, e.g., climate change. Here, Ms. Maxwell
via Mr. Barden in March 2011 issued a statement denying plaintiff’s Churcher-story allegations
as “all entirely false.” Doc.542-3, Ex.C. Plaintiff did not respond to this statement, let alone
claim it was defamatory. Her non-response reasonably could be seen as a concession that
Ms. Maxwell’s denial was righteous. See Doc.542-7, Ex.K (Mr. Barden: “I would have been
remiss if I had sat back and not issued a denial, and the press had published that Ms. Maxwell
had not responded to enquiries and had not denied the new allegations; the public might have
taken the silence as an admission there was some truth in the in allegations.”).
Regardless, we easily can show two of plaintiff’s original allegations are untrue. Many of
plaintiff’s original allegations are contained in the two Churcher articles, Docs.542-1 & 542-2,
Exs.A & B. The articles contained numerous allegations by plaintiff relating to her alleged
sexual abuse. In her deposition, plaintiff was shown Deposition Exhibit 7, a collection of some of
her allegations in the articles. Plaintiff placed checkmarks by those allegations she admitted—
over the course of 20 pages of testimony—were not true. See Menninger Decl. EXHIBIT PP, at
28
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435:7-455:6 & Depo. Ex.7. These include her claims that: (1) she was 17 when she flew to the
Caribbean with Mr. Epstein and Ms. Maxwell “went to pick up Bill in a huge black helicopter,”
referring to former President Bill Clinton; (2) her conversation with Mr. Clinton about
Ms. Maxwell’s pilot skills; and (3) Donald Trump was a “good friend” of Mr. Epstein’s and
Plaintiff’s admissions on the falsity of her original allegations are fatal to her defamation
claim as to the second sentence. The eleven admittedly false “original allegations” axiomatically
would warrant the second sentence. Plaintiff has no possible way to prove the second sentence is
false. Indeed, like Ms. Maxwell’s first sentence, the second sentence literally is true: more than
one of plaintiff’s original allegations are untrue. A statement that literally is true cannot be
defamatory as a matter of law. See Law Firm of Daniel P. Foster, 844 F.2d at 959.
discussed above, whether plaintiff has uttered “obvious lies” is a matter of opinion: in the face of
plaintiff’s gratuitous and lurid allegations of Ms. Maxwell’s years-long participation at the center
of a child sex-trafficking ring, for the journalists-recipients of the July 2015 statement the phrase
was an anticipated “epithet[], fiery rhetoric or hyperbole,” Steinhilber, 501 N.E.2d at 556
(internal quotations omitted); see Tel. Sys. Int’l, 2003 WL 22232908, at *2 (observing Court’s
previous holding in Rizzuto that defendants’ use of phrases “conned,” “rip off” and “lying” in
advertisements were not actionable as libel and were “rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet
used by those who considered themselves unfairly treated and sought to bring what they alleged
considered opinion, the Rule 56 record forecloses a defamation claim. The sentence does not
specify which of plaintiff’s “claims,” i.e., allegations, are obvious lies. It could refer to the
29
Case 18-2868, Document 279, 08/09/2019, 2628231, Page35 of 37
“original” claims; the “new,” CVRA claims; the claims against Ms. Maxwell; the claims against
anyone, including Professor Dershowitz, who was mentioned in the preceding sentence; or any
two or more of all the claims plaintiff ever had made about her alleged experiences as the alleged
discussion above of the first and second sentences, the Rule 56 record establishes that at least
two of plaintiff’s “original” allegations are untrue, at least two of her CVRA allegations are
untrue, at least two of her allegations against Ms. Maxwell are untrue, at least two of her
allegations against anyone (e.g., Ms. Maxwell, Prince Andrew or Professor Dershowitz) are
untrue, and at least two of her allegations about her alleged sex-trafficking experiences are
After all, plaintiff herself admitted under oath that a multitude of her original allegations are
untrue, and she implicitly admitted some of her CVRA allegations are untrue because they were
CONCLUSION
30
Case 18-2868, Document 279, 08/09/2019, 2628231, Page36 of 37
Respectfully submitted,
s/ Laura A. Menninger
Laura A. Menninger (LM-1374)
Jeffrey S. Pagliuca (pro hac vice)
Ty Gee (pro hac vice pending)
HADDON, MORGAN AND FOREMAN, P.C.
150 East 10th Avenue
Denver, CO 80203
Phone: 303.831.7364
Fax: 303.832.2628
lmenninger@hmflaw.com
31
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on February 10, 2017, I electronically served this Reply Brief in Support of
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment via ECF on the following:
32
Case 18-2868, Document 280, 08/09/2019, 2628232, Page1 of 74
Virginia L. Giuffre,
v.
Ghislaine Maxwell,
Defendant.
________________________________/
Sigrid McCawley
BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP
401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
(954) 356-0011
Case 18-2868, Document 280, 08/09/2019, 2628232, Page2 of 74
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
i
Case 18-2868, Document 280, 08/09/2019, 2628232, Page3 of 74
B. Documentary Evidence also Shows that Defendant Trafficked Ms. Giuffre and
Procured her for Sex with Convicted Pedophile Jeffrey Epstein while She Was
Underage................................................................................................................12
6. Message Pads.............................................................................................17
10. It is undisputed fact that the FBI report and the Churcher emails
reference Ms. Giuffre’s accounts of sexual activity with Prince
Andrew that she made in 2011, contrary to Defendant’s argument that
Ms. Giuffre never made such claims until 2014........................................25
1. Under New York Law, Defendant is liable for the media’s publication
of her press release. ...................................................................................28
ii
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D. The Pre-Litigation Privilege Does Not Apply to Defendant’s Press Release .......40
VII. THE COURT NEED NOT REACH THE ISSUE, AT THIS TIME, OF WHETHER
MS. GIUFFRE IS A LIMITED PURPOSE PUBLIC FIGURE........................................51
A. When Ms. Giuffre Initially Described Her Encounters With Defendant and
Epstein, She Mistakenly Believed the First Encounter Occurred During the
Year 1999. .............................................................................................................57
iii
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F. Defendant Did Act as a “Madame” For Epstein to Traffic Ms. Giuffre to The
Rich and Famous. ..................................................................................................63
iv
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Baiul v. Disson,
607 F. App'x 18 (2d Cir. 2015)..................................................................................................50
Davis v. Costa-Gavras,
580 F. Supp. 1082 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ..........................................................................................31
Flomenhaft v. Finkelstein,
127 A.D.3d 634, 8 N.Y.S.3d 161 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) .........................................................42
Frechtman v. Gutterman,
115 A.D.3d 102, 979 N.Y.S.2d 58 (2014).................................................................................42
Friedman v. Meyers,
482 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1973) ......................................................................................................36
Front v. Khalil,
24 N.Y.3d 713 (2015).........................................................................................................passim
v
Case 18-2868, Document 280, 08/09/2019, 2628232, Page7 of 74
Giuffre v. Maxwell,
165 F. Supp. 3d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) ................................................................................passim
Herbert v. Lando,
596 F. Supp. 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ..........................................................................................51
Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
443 U.S. 111, 99 S. Ct. 2675, 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979) ..............................................................53
Kirk v. Heppt,
532 F. Supp. 2d 586 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) .......................................................................................42
Levy v. Smith,
18 N.Y.S 3d 438 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 2015) ...............................................................................28
vi
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Patrick v. Le Fevre,
745 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1984) ......................................................................................................36
Petrus v Smith,
91 A.D.2d 1190 (N.Y.A.D.,1983) .............................................................................................42
Rubens v. Mason,
387 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2004) ......................................................................................................35
Stern v. Cosby,
645 F. Supp. 2d 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) .................................................................................27, 47
Rules
Other Authorities
vii
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I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
There can be no question that disputed issues of material facts preclude granting
summary judgment when, in a one-count defamation case, Defendant presents the Court with a
68-page memorandum of law, a 16-page statement of purported facts, and approximately 700
demonstrates that volumes of disputed facts surround the core question of whether Defendant
abused Ms. Giuffre. Indeed, Defendant acknowledges a dispute between the parties as to whether
she abused Ms. Giuffre. See, e.g., Motion for Summary Judgment at 1; Motion to Dismiss at 1.
This Court already said that this disputed factual question is central to this case:
Either Plaintiff is telling the truth about her story and Defendant’s involvement, or
defendant is telling the truth and she was not involved in the trafficking and
ultimate abuse of Plaintiff. The answer depends on facts. Defendant’s statements
are therefore actionable as defamation. Whether they ultimately prove to meet the
standards of defamation (including but not limited to falsity) is a matter for the
fact-finder.
Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 10. While this fact remains in dispute,
But even turning to Defendant’s claims, the avalanche of aspersions she casts upon Ms.
Giuffre and her counsel should not distract the Court from the fact that the instant motion cannot
come within sight of meeting the standard for an award of summary judgment. The most glaring
and emblematic example of the Defendant’s far-fetched claims appears in her attempt to move
away from her defamatory statement by arguing that it was her attorney and not her, who issued
the defamatory statement for the press to publish, though she is forced to admit the statement
was made on her behalf. This is an untenable position to take at trial, and an impossible
argument to advance at the summary judgment stage, as both the testamentary and documentary
evidence positively refute that argument. Defendant incorrectly asks this Court to make a factual
1
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finding that her defamatory press release was actually a legal opinion, issued not by her, but by
Defendant also argues that she has proven the truth of her statement calling Ms. Giuffre a
liar with respect to the statements Ms. Giuffre made about Defendant. To the contrary,
voluminous evidence, both documentary and testimonial from numerous witnesses, corroborate
Ms. Giuffre’s account of Defendant’s involvement in the sexual abuse and trafficking of Ms.
Giuffre. Just to briefly highlight a few, Johanna Sjoberg, testified that Defendant recruited her
under the guise of a legitimate assistant position, but asked her to perform sexual massages for
Epstein, and punished her when she didn’t cause Epstein to orgasm.1 Tony Figueroa testified that
Defendant contacted him to recruit high school-aged girls for Epstein, and also testified that
Maxwell and Epstein participated in multiple threesomes with Virginia Giuffre. Even more
shockingly, the butler for Defendant’s close friend witnessed, first-hand, a fifteen-year-old
Swedish girl crying and shaking because Defendant was attempting to force her to have sex with
Epstein and she refused. This is a fraction of the testimony that will be elicited at trial about
Defendant’s primary argument in support of her contention that she did not abuse and
traffic Ms. Giuffre as a minor child is that employment records show that Ms. Giuffre was either
sixteen or seventeen when Defendant recruited her from her job at Mar-a-Lago for sex with
Epstein, not fifteen-years-old as Plaintiff originally thought. Call this the “yes-I’m-a-sex-
abuse of a fifteen year old differs in any material way from sexual abuse of a sixteen or
seventeen year old. All instances involve a minor child, who cannot consent, and who is
1
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 16, Sjoberg Dep. Tr. at 8:5-10; 13:1-3; 12:17-14:3; 15:1-5; 32:9-16; 34:5-35:1;
36:2-1.
2
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protected by federal and state laws. The fact remains that Defendant recruited Ms. Giuffre while
she was a minor child for sexual purposes and then proceeded to take her all over the world on
convicted pedophile Jeffrey Epstein’s private jet, the “Lolita Express,”2 as well as to his various
residences, and even to her own London house. Flight logs even reveal twenty-three flights that
Defendant shared with Ms. Giuffre – although Defendant claims she is unable to remember even
a single one of those flights. Inconsequential details that Ms. Giuffre may have originally
remembered incorrectly do not render her substantive claims of abuse by Defendant false, much
less deliberate “lies.” At most, these minor inaccuracies, in the context of a child suffering from
a troubled childhood and sexual abuse, create nothing more than a fact question on whether
Defendant’s statement that Ms. Giuffre lied when she accused Defendant of abuse is
“substantially true,” thereby precluding summary judgment. See Mitre Sports Int’l Ltd. v. Home
Box Office, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 3d 240, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Because determining whether COI
is substantially true would require this court to decide disputed facts ... summary judgment is not
appropriate”).
Defendant has tried to spin these inconsequential mistakes of memory into talismanic
significance and evidence of some form of bad-faith litigation, but this claim fails under the
weight of the evidence. As the Court knows, the clear weight of the evidence establishes
Defendant’s heavy and extensive involvement in both Jeffrey Epstein’s sex trafficking ring and
in recruiting Ms. Giuffre, living with her and Jeffrey Epstein in the same homes while Ms.
Giuffre was a minor, and traveling with Ms. Giuffre and Jeffrey Epstein – including 23
documented flights. Even the house staff testified that Defendant and Ms. Giuffre were regularly
2
See, e.g.: “All aboard the ‘Lolita Express’: Flight logs reveal the many trips Bill Clinton and Alan Dershowitz took
on pedophile Jeffrey Epstein’s private jet with anonymous women” at The Daily Mail,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2922773/Newly-released-flight-logs-reveal-time-trips-Bill-Clinton-
Harvard-law-professor-Alan-Dershowitz-took-pedophile-Jeffrey-Epstein-s-Lolita-Express-private-jet-anonymous-
women.html.
3
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together. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 1, Alessi Dep. Tr. at 103:4-9 (“Q. After that day, do you
recall that she started coming to the house more frequently. A. Yes, she did. Q. In fact, did she
start coming to the house approximately three times a week? A. Yes, probably.”). It is also
undisputed that witnesses deposed in this case have testified about Defendant’s role as a procurer
of underage girls and young women for Jeffrey Epstein. At the very least, a trier of fact should
determine whether the evidence establishes whether or not Ms. Giuffre’s claims of Defendant
being involved in her trafficking and abuse are true. Defendant’s summary judgment motion
The record evidence in this case shows that Defendant shared a household with convicted
pedophile Jeffrey Epstein for many years. While there, she actively took part in recruiting
underage girls and young women for sex with Epstein, as well as scheduling the girls to come
over, and maintaining a list of the girls and their phone numbers. Ms. Giuffre was indisputably a
minor when Defendant recruited her to have sex with convicted pedophile Jeffrey Epstein.
Thereafter, Ms. Giuffre flew on Epstein’s private jets – the – Lolita Express” – with Defendant at
least 23 times.
Ms. Sjoberg’s account of her experiences with Defendant are chillingly similar. As with
Ms. Giuffre, Defendant, a perfect stranger, approached Ms. Sjoberg while trolling Ms. Sjoberg’s
school grounds. She lured Ms. Sjoberg into her and Epstein’s home under the guise of a
legitimate job of answering phones, a pretext that lasted only a day. A young college student,
4
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nearly 2,000 miles from home, Defendant soon instructed Ms. Sjoberg to massage Epstein, and
made it clear that Sjoberg’s purpose was to bring Epstein to orgasm during these massages so
5
Case 18-2868, Document 280, 08/09/2019, 2628232, Page14 of 74
THE WITNESS: Well, beyond companionship, her job, as it related to me, was to find
other girls that would perform massages for him and herself.3
Ms. Sjoberg also testified about sexual acts that occurred with her, Prince Andrew, and
Ms. Giuffre, when she and Defendant were staying at Epstein’s Manhattan mansion:
Ms. Sjoberg’s testimony corroborates Ms. Giuffre’s account of how Defendant recruited
her (and others) under a ruse of a legitimate job in order to bring them into the household to have
sex with Epstein. Ms. Sjoberg’s testimony also corroborates Ms. Giuffre’s account of being lent
out to Prince Andrew by Defendant, as even the interaction Ms. Sjoberg witnessed included a
sexual act: Prince Andrew using a puppet to touch Ms. Giuffre’s breast while using a hand to
Tony Figueroa testified that Plaintiff told him about threesomes Ms. Giuffre had with
Q. Okay. And tell me everything that you remember about what Ms. Roberts said about
being intimate with Ms. Maxwell and Mr. Epstein at the same time.
A. I remember her talking about, like, strap-ons and stuff like that. But, I mean, like I said,
all the details are not really that clear. But I remember her talking about, like, how they
would always be using and stuff like that.
Q. She and Ms. Maxwell and Mr. Epstein would use strap-ons?
A. Uh-huh (affirmative).
***
3
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 16, Sjoberg Dep. Tr. at 8:5-10; 13:1-3; 12:17-14:3; 15:1-5; 32:9-16; 34:5-35:1;
36:2-15.
4
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 16, Sjoberg Dep. Tr. at 82:23-83:9.
5
Defendant attempts to discredit Figueroa’s damaging testimony by repeatedly mentioning that he has been
convicted for a drug-related offense. Unsurprisingly, in this attack, Defendant does not mention that she has a DUI
conviction. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 11, Maxwell Dep. Tr. at 390:13-15. (April 22, 2016).
6
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Q. Other than sex with the Prince, is there anyone else that Jeffrey wanted Ms. Roberts to
have sex with that she relayed to you?
A. Mainly, like I said, just Ms. Maxwell and all the other girls.
Q. Ms. Maxwell wanted -- Jeffrey wanted Virginia to have sex with Ms. Maxwell?
A. And him, yeah.
Q. And did she tell you whether she had ever done that?
A. Yeah. She said that she did.
***
Q. And what did she describe having happened?
A. I believe I already told you that. With the strap-ons and dildos and everything.6
.7
Figueroa also testified that Defendant called him to ask if he had found any other girls for
Q. [W]hen Ghislaine Maxwell would call you during the time that you were living with
Virginia, she would ask you what, specifically?
A. Just if I had found any other girls just to bring to Jeffrey.
Q. Okay.
A. Pretty much every time there was a conversation with any of them, it was either asking
Virginia where she was at, or asking her to get girls, or asking me to get girls.
***
Q. Okay. Well, tell me. When did Ms. Maxwell ask you to bring a girl?
A. Never in person. It was, like, literally, like, on the phone maybe, like, once or twice.
Q All right. Did Ms. Maxwell call you frequently?
A. No.
Q. All right. How many times do you think Ms. Maxwell called you, at all?
A. I’d just say that probably a just a few, a couple of times. Maybe once or twice.
Q. One or two --
A. The majority of the time it was pretty much his assistant.
Q. How do you know Ms. Maxwell’s voice?
A. Because she sounds British.
Q. So someone with a British accent called you once or twice and asked for --
A. Well, she told me who she was.
Q. Okay. And what did she say when she called you and asked you to bring girls?
A. She just said, “Hi. This is Ghislaine. Jeffrey was wondering if you had anybody that could
come over.”8
6
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 4, Figueroa June 24, 2016 Dep. Tr. Vol. 1 at 96-97 and 103.
7
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 11, Maxwell Dep. Tr. at 55:19-58:23 (July 22, 2016).
8
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 4, Figueroa Dep. Tr. at 200:6-18; 228:23-229:21.
7
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Rinaldo Rizzo was the house manager for one of Defendant’s close friends, Eva Dubin.
Mr. Rizzo testified - through tears – how, while working at Dubin’s house, he observed
Defendant bring a 15 year old Swedish girl to Dubin’s house. In distress, the 15 year old girl
tearfully explained to him that Defendant tried to force her to have sex with Epstein through
A. Yes.
Q. Was she in fear?
A. Yes.
Q. You could tell?
A. Yes.
A. She was shaking uncontrollably.9
Lyn Miller is Ms. Giuffre’s mother. She testified that when Ms. Giuffre started living
with Defendant, Defendant became Ms. Giuffre’s “new momma.”10 Incredulously, Defendant
Detective Recarey led the Palm Beach Police’s investigation of Epstein. He testified that
Defendant procured girls for Epstein, and that he sought to question her in relation to his
investigation, but could not contact her due to the interference of Epstein’s lawyer:
9
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 14, Rinaldo Rizzo’s June 10, 2016 Dep. Tr. at 52:6-7; 52:25-53:17; 55:23-58:5
10
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 12, Lynn Miller’s May 24, 2016 Dep. Tr. at 115.
11
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 11, Maxwell Dep. Tr. at 77:25-78:15 (April 22, 2016).
9
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THE WITNESS: Ms. Maxwell, during her research, was found to be Epstein’s long-time
friend. During the interviews, Ms. Maxwell was involved in seeking girls to perform
massages and work at Epstein’s home.12
Notably, at Defendant’s deposition, Defendant refused to admit that she flew with Ms.
Giuffre, and denied that she appeared on Epstein’s pilot’s flight logs.13 However, David Rodgers,
Epstein pilot, testified that the passenger listed on his flight logs bearing the initials – GM – was,
in fact, Ghislaine Maxwell, and that he was the pilot on at least 23 flights in which Defendant
flew with Plaintiff.14 The dates of those flights show that Ms. Giuffre was an underage child on
Both Sarah Kellen and Nadia Marcinkova lived with Jeffrey Epstein for many years.
They both invoked the Fifth Amendment when asked about Defendant’s participation in
recruiting underage girls for sex with Epstein. Marcinkova testified as follows:
Q. Did Ghislaine Maxwell work as a recruiter of young girls for Jeffrey Epstein when
you met her?
A. Same answer. [Invocation of Fifth Amendment]
***
Q. Have you observed Ghislaine Maxwell and Jeffrey Epstein convert what started as
a massage with these young girls into something sexual?
A. Same answer.16
12
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 13, Recarey Dep. Tr. at 27:10-17; 28:21-29:20.
13
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 11, Maxwell’s April 22, 2016 Dep. Tr. at 78-79, 144.
14
See McCawley Decl. at Exhibit 41, Rodgers Dep. Ex. 1, GIUFFRE 007055-007161 (flight records evidencing
Defendant (GM) flying with Ms. Giuffre).
15
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 15, David Rodgers’ June 3, 2016 Dep. Tr. at 18, 34-36; see also Exhibit 41,
Rodgers Dep. Ex. 1 at flight #s 1433-1434, 1444-1446, 1464-1470, 1478-1480, 1490-1491, 1506, 1525-1526, 1528,
1570 and 1589.
16
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 10, Marcinkova Dep. Tr. at 10:18-21; 12:11-15.
10
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Q. Did Ghislaine Maxwell work as a recruiter for young girls for Jeffrey Epstein when you
met her?
A. On advice of my counsel I must invoke my Fifth and Sixth Amendment privilege . . .
***
Q. Isn’t it true that Ghislaine Maxwell would recruit underage girls for sex and sex acts with
Jeffrey Epstein?
A. On advice of my counsel I must invoke my Fifth and Sixth Amendment privilege . . .17
Similarly, Jeffrey Epstein invoked the Fifth Amendment when asked about Defendant’s
Q. Maxwell was one of the main women whom you used to procure underage girls for sexual
activities, true?
THE WITNESS: Fifth.
***
Q. Maxwell was a primary co-conspirator in your sexual abuse scheme, true?
THE WITNESS: Fifth.
Q. Maxwell was a primary co-conspirator in your sex trafficking scheme, true?
THE WITNESS: Fifth.
Q. Maxwell herself regularly participated in your sexual exploitation of minors, true?
THE WITNESS: Fifth.18
Q. And over the course of that 10-year period of time while Ms. Maxwell was at the house,
do you have an approximation as to the number of different females – females that you were
told were massage therapists that came to house?
A. I cannot give you a number, but I would say probably over 100 in my stay there.
***
Q. I don’t think I asked the right – the question that I was looking to ask, so let me go back.
Did you go out looking for the girls –
A. No.
Q. – to bring –
A. Never
Q. – as the massage therapists?
A. Never.
Q. Who did?
17
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 8, Kellen Dep. Tr. at 15:13-18; 20:12-16.
18
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 3, Epstein Dep. Tr. at 116:10-15; 117:18-118:10.
11
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A. Ms. Maxwell, Mr. Epstein and their friends, because their friend relay to other friends
they knew a massage therapist and they would send to the house. So it was referrals.
***
Q. Did you have occasion to clean up after the massages?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And that is after both a massage for Jeffrey Epstein, as well as clean up after a
massage that Ghislaine Maxwell may have received?
A. Yes.
Q. And on occasion, after -- in cleaning up after a massage of Jeffrey Epstein or Ghislaine
Maxwell, did you have occasion to find vibrators or sex toys that would be left out?
A. yes, I did.19
Defendant has not been able to procure a single witness - not one – to testify that
Defendant did not procure girls for sex with Epstein or participate in the sex. Even one of her
own witnesses, Tony Figueroa, testified that she both procured girls and participated in the sex.
Another one of Defendant’s witnesses, Ms. Giuffre’s mother, named Defendant as Ms. Giuffre’s
“new mamma.” Indeed, those who knew her well, who spent considerable time with her in
Epstein’s shared household, like Juan Alessi, Alfredo Rodriguez and Joanna Sjoberg, have
testified that she was Epstein’s procuress. Others who lived with her – Jeffrey Epstein, Nadia
Marcinkova, and Sarah Kellen – invoked the Fifth Amendment so as not to answer questions on
Defendant has never offered a legal explanation for what she was doing with, and why
she was traveling with, a minor child on 21 flights while she was a child, including 6
international flights, aboard a convicted pedophile’s private jet all over the world. Her motion for
19
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 1, Alessi Dep. Tr. at 28:6-15; 30:51-25; 52:9-22.
12
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summary judgment – as well as all previous briefing papers – are absolutely silent on those
damning documents.
2. The Photographs
Throughout a mountain of briefing and, and even in her own deposition testimony,
Defendant never offered an explanation regarding Ms. Giuffre’s photographs of her, Defendant,
and Epstein. She never offered a legal explanation for why Prince Andrew was photographed
with his hand around Ms. Giuffre’s bare waist while she was a minor child, while posing with
Defendant, inside Defendant’s house in London. This particular photograph corroborates Ms.
Giuffre’s claims, and there is no other reasonable explanation why an American child should be
in the company of adults not her kin, in the London house owned by the girlfriend of a now-
Ms. Giuffre also produced pictures of herself taken when she was in New York with
Defendant and Epstein, and from a trip to Europe with Defendant and Epstein:21
20
See McCawley Dec at Exhibit 42, GIUFFRE007167, Prince Andrew and Defendant Photo.
21
See McCawley Dec at Exhibit 42, GIUFFRE007182 - 007166.
13
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And, Ms. Giuffre has produced a number of pictures of herself taken at the Zorro Ranch,
Finally, among other nude photos, which included full nudes of Defendant, Ms. Giuffre
produced images of females that the Palm Beach Police confiscated during the execution of the
22
See McCawley Dec at Exhibit 42, GIUFFRE007175; 007173.
14
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warrant, including one photograph revealing the bare bottom of a girl who appears to be pre-
In 2008, the United States Attorney’s office for the Southern District of Florida identified
Ms. Giuffre as a protected “victim” of Jeffrey Epstein’s sex abuse. The U.S. Attorney mailed Ms.
Ms. Giuffre has provided extensive medical records in this case, including medical
records from the time when Defendant was sexually abusing and trafficking her. Ms. Giuffre
produced records supporting her claim of being sexually abused in New York resulting in both
23
See McCawley Dec at Exhibit 44, GIUFFRE007584.
24
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 30, GIUFFRE 002216-002218, Victim Notification Letter.
15
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Defendant and Epstein taking Plaintiff to New York Presbyterian Hospital in New York while
she was a minor.25 The dates on the hospital records show she was seventeen years old.
As the Court is aware, Defendant propounded wildly overbroad requests for production
concerning the past eighteen years of Ms. Giuffre’s medical history. Defendant repeatedly and
vehemently argued to the Court that it was essential to procure every page of these records in a
fanfare of unnecessary motion practice. See, e.g., Defendant’s Motion to Compel (DE 75);
Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions at 10 (“Ms. Maxwell has been severely prejudiced by
Plaintiff’s failure to provide the required identifying information and documents from her health
care providers.”). Ms. Giuffre and her counsel took on the considerable burden and significant
expense of retrieving and producing over 250 pages of medical records from over 20 providers,
Now that those records have been collected, Defendant’s 68 page motion makes no
reference to a single medical record produced by Ms. Giuffre, nor a single provider, nor a single
treatment, nor or a single medication prescribed. After Defendant’s repeated motion practice
stressing the essentiality of these records, this may surprise the Court. But not Ms. Giuffre.
Defendant’s requests unearthed documents that are highly unfavorable to Defendant that
Years before this cause of action arose, Ms. Giuffre sought counseling from a
psychologist for the trauma she continued to experience after being abused by Defendant and
25
See McCawley Dec at Exhibit 33, GIUFFRE003259-003290.
16
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. . . [Ms. Giuffre] was approached by Ghislaine Maxwell who said she could help
her get a job as a massage therapist . . . seemed respectable . . . was shown how to
massage, etc., Geoff [sic] Epstein. Told to undress and perform sexual acts on
person. Miss Maxwell promised her $200 a job.26
Therefore, years before Defendant defamed her, Ms. Giuffre confided in her treating
6. Message Pads
Detective Recarey, the lead investigator of the criminal investigation into Epstein and his
associates’ sex crimes, recovered carbon copies of hand-written messages taken by various staff,
including Defendant, at Epstein’s Palm Beach residence.27 These were collected both from trash
pulls from the residence and during the execution of the search warrant where the pads were
found laying out in the open in the residence.28 The search warrant was executed in 2005 and the
message pads collected include messages recorded in 2004 and 2005. Numerous witnesses have
described that these copies of collected messages accurately reflect those taken by various staff
The messages raise a question of fact as to Maxwell’s involvement in the sexual abuse of
minors and are relevant to refute Maxwell’s denial of any involvement with Epstein during
relevant time periods, and, accordingly her denial of knowledge of certain events.
While there were hundreds of these messages recovered during the investigation, this
small sample demonstrates the undeniable reality that there exists a genuine issue of material fact
with respect to Defendant’s involvement in and knowledge of the activities described by Giuffre
26
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 38, Lightfoot Records, GIUFFRE005437.
27
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 13, Recarey Dep. Tr. at 45:13-25; 97:9-98:8.
28
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 13, Recarey Dep. Tr. at 25:12-21; 40:5-15; 41:16-23; 42:14-43:10; 45:13-25; see
also search warrant video showing the pads openly displayed on the desk.
29
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 21, 1, 16, 11, Rodriguez Dep. Tr. at 73:19-74:12; Alessi Dep. Tr. at 141:18-21;
Sjoberg Dep. Tr. at 64:1-6; Maxwell Dep. Tr. at 147:23-148:3; 148:19-149:14.
17
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This sampling reveals that Maxwell, “GM,” took messages at the residence, including
from underage girls who were calling to schedule a time to come over to see Epstein. This
demonstrates that Maxwell was at Epstein’s Palm Beach mansion in 2004 and 2005, incidentally
a time period she has denied being around the house in her deposition. See supra
GIUFFRE001412; 001435; 001449. The messages also reveal that multiple “girls” were leaving
messages that were being taken and memorialized and left out in the open for anyone to see.
Certain messages also make clear that a number of these “girls” were in school. In addition to
taking messages herself (and the staff working under her direction taking these relevant
messages), staff employees were taking and leaving messages for Defendant. This is evidence
that Maxwell was in the house at relevant times, including times that she has now testified under
oath that she was not there. Other messages demonstrate Epstein and Maxwell’s friends,
including Jean Luc Brunel, leaving messages relating to underage females. The following is a
18
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19
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The following are descriptions of a sampling of messages pads30 that create a genuine dispute
of material fact:
One message pad reflects , who is identified in the Palm Beach Police
Report as a minor, contacting Jeffrey Epstein for “work” explaining that she does not
have any money. The term “work” was often used by members of Jeffrey Epstein’s
sexual trafficking ring to refer to sexual massages. (See GIUFFRE05660 (“She stated she
was called by Sara for her to return to work for Epstein. stated ‘work’ is the term
used by Sarah to provide the massage in underwear.”). Giuffre 001462: July 5th no year
to JE from ”I need work. I mean I don’t have money. Do you have some
work for me?”
Other message pads reflect who was a minor, calling and leaving a message at
the Palm Beach mansion that she has recruited another girl for Jeffrey Epstein. The
second message demonstrates that Jeffrey Epstein required different girls to be scheduled
every day of the week. The third shows an offer to have two minor girls come to the
home at the same time to provide sexual massages. These type of messages indicate the
lack of secrecy of the fact that multiple young females were visiting every day and at
least raises a question of fact whether Maxwell was knowledgeable and involved as
Giuffre has said, or whether Giuffre was lying and Maxwell was not at all involved or
aware of this activity, as Defendant would attempt to have the world believe.
Giuffre 001428 – undated Jeffrey From – “Has girl for tonight” ;Giuffre
001432 (pictured above)– 7/9/04 – Mr. Epstein From –“ is available
on Tuesday no one for tomorrow”; GIUFFRE 001433 /1/17/04 – Mr. Epstein from
– “Me and _____ can come tomorrow any time or alone” ; Giuffre –
001452 – undated Jeffrey from “Has girl for tonight.”
Other message pads demonstrate that there was a pattern and practice of using young
females to recruit additional young females to provide sexual massages on a daily basis.
Giuffre 001413 (pictured above)– JE from “N” – “ hasn’t confirmed
for 11:00 yet, so she is keeping on hold in case doesn’t call back;
Giuffre 001448 -8/20/05 JE from - confirmed ___ at 4 pm. Who is
scheduled for morning? I believe wants to work.”
This message pad reflects that a friend of Jeffrey Epstein is sending him a sixteen year
old Russian girl for purposes of sex. Giuffre 001563 (pictured above)- 6/1/05 For
Jeffrey From Jean Luc “He has a teacher for you to teach you how to speak
Russian. She is 2X8 years old not blonde. Lessons are free and you can have your
1st today if you call.”
This message pad directly refutes Maxwell’s sworn testimony that she was not present
during the year 2005 at Jeffrey Epstein’s Palm Beach mansion because this shows
leaving a message for Jeffrey at the Palm Beach home that she was going to work out
30
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 28.
20
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with the Defendant on September 10, 2005. The police were only able to retrieve a
fraction of these message pads during their trash pull but even in the few they recovered,
it shows Maxwell was regularly at the Palm Beach home during the time period she
claimed she was not. To the contrary, she was both sending and receiving messages and
messages, like this one, reflect her presence at the mansion. Giuffre 001412 – 9/10/05
(during the year Maxwell says she was never around) JE from – “I went to
Sarah and made her water bottle and I went to work out with GM.”
These message pads further corroborate that Defendant lied in her testimony and she was
in fact in regular contact with Jeffrey Epstein during the years 2004 and 2005. For
example, the message from “Larry” demonstrates that Defendant is at the Palm Beach
mansion so frequently that people, including Epstein’s main pilot Larry Visoski, are
leaving messages for Maxwell at the Palm Beach house. Giuffre 001435 7/25/04 – Mr.
Epstein from Ms. Maxwell – “tell him to call me”; Giuffre – 001449 – 8/22/05 – JE
from GM; Giuffre – 001453 – 4/25/04 for Ms. Maxwell From Larry “returning your
call”;
This message pad shows that Defendant was clearly actively involved in Jeffrey Epstein’s
life and the activities at his Palm Beach mansion. Giuffre – 001454 – undated Jeffrey
From Ghislaine – “Would be helpful to have ___________ come to Palm Beach
today to stay here and help train new staff with Ghislaine.”
This message pad clearly reflects an underage female (noted by the police redaction of
the name) leaving a message asking if she can come to the house at a later time because
she needs to “stay in school.” Giuffre 001417 (pictured above)– Jeffrey 2/28/05
Redacted name “She is wondering if 2:30 is o.k. She needs to stay in school.”
This message pad reflects a message from who was under the age of eighteen at
the time she was going over to Jeffrey Epstein’s home to provide sexual massages
according to the Palm Beach Investigative Report. Giuffre 001421 3/4/05 to Jeffrey
from “It is o.k. for to stop by and drop something?”
These message pads reflect the pattern of underage girls (noted by the police redaction of
the name on the message pad) calling the Palm Beach mansion to leave a message about
sending a “female” over to provide a sexual massage. Giuffre 001423 11/08/04 To Mr.
JE – redacted from – “I have a female for him” Giuffre 001426 (pictured above) –
1/09/05 JE To JE from Redacted – “I have a female for him.”
This message pad reflects the pattern and practice of having young girls bring other
young girls to the house to perform sexual massages. Indeed the “ ” reflected in this
message pad corresponds in name to the ” that Tony Figueroa testified he initially
brought to Jeffrey Epstein during the time period that the Defendant was requesting that
Tony find some young females to bring to Jeffrey Epstein’s home. See Figueroa at 184-
185. The Palm Beach Police Report reflects that “ ” and “ ” also brought
seventeen year old to the home to perform sexual massages. See GIUFFRE
05641. thereafter recruited a number of other young girls to perform sexual
21
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massages as reflected in the Palm Beach Police Report. Giuffre 001427 (pictured
above) – 1/2/03 – JE from “Wants to know if she should bring her friend
with tonight.”
This message pad reflects multiple sexual massages being scheduled for the same day
which corroborates Virginia GIUFFRE, and Johanna Sjorberg’s
testimony that Jeffrey Epstein required that he have multiple orgasms in a day which
occurred during these sexual massages. Giuffre 001449 (pictured above) – 9/03/05 JE
from – “I left message for to confirm for 11:00 a.m. and for
4:30 p.m.”
This message pad shows a friend of Jeffrey Epstein’s discussing with him how he had sex
with an 18 year old who had also been with Jeffrey Epstein. Giuffre – 001456 (pictured
above)– undated JE from Jean Luc – “He just did a good one – 18 years – she spoke
to me and said “I love Jeffrey.”
Law enforcement was able to confirm identities of underage victims through the use of
Q. The next line down is what I wanted to focus on, April 5th, 2005. This trash pull, what
evidence is yielded from this particular trash pull?
THE WITNESS: The trash pull indicated that there were several messages with written items
on it. There was a message from HR indicating that there would be an 11:00 appointment.
There were other individuals that had called during that day.
Q. And when you would -- when you would see females’ names and telephone numbers,
would you take those telephone numbers and match it to -- to a person?
THE WITNESS: We would do our best to identify who that person was.
Q. And is that one way in which you discovered the identities of some of the other what soon
came to be known as victims?
THE WITNESS: Correct.
***
Q. Did you find names of other witnesses and people that you knew to have been associated
with the house in those message pads?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Q. And so what was the evidentiary value to you of the message pads collected from Jeffrey
Epstein’s home in the search warrant?
THE WITNESS: It was very important to corroborate what the victims had already told me
as to calling in and for work.31
Palm Beach Police confiscated an extensive lists of contacts with their phone numbers
form Defendant and Epstein’s residence.32 Ghislaine Maxwell maintained a contact list in an
31
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 13, Recarey Dep. Tr. at 42:14-43:17; 78:25:-79:15.
22
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approximately 100-page-long hard copy, which was openly available to other house employees.
It consisted primarily of telephone numbers, addresses, or email addresses for various personal
Prior to being terminated by Defendant, the Palm Beach house butler Alfredo Rodriguez printed
a copy of this document and ultimately provided it to the FBI. This document reflects the
numerous phone numbers of Defendant, Epstein as well as staff phone numbers. Additionally,
and importantly, there are several sections entitled “Massage” alongside a geographical
designation with names of females and corresponding telephone numbers. These numbers
Epstein. This document is an authentic reflection of the people who were associated with
Epstein, Defendant, and the management of their properties, and the knowledge each had of the
Detective Recarey authenticated an Amazon.com receipt that the Palm Beach Police
collected from Jeffrey Epstein’s trash. The books he ordered are titled:
(2) SlaveCraft: Roadmaps for Erotic Servitude – Principles, Skills and Tools by Guy
Baldwin; and
(3) Training with Miss Abernathy: A Workbook for Erotic Slaves and Their Owners, by
Christina Abernathy, as shown below:
32
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 45, Phone List, Public Records Request No.: 16-268 at 2282 – 2288.
23
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This disturbing 2005 purchase corroborate Ms. Giuffre’s account of being sexually
exploited by Defendant and Epstein – not to mention the dozens of underage girls in the Palm
Beach Police Report. Additionally, Defendant testified that she was not with Jeffrey Epstein in
2005 and 2006 when he was ordering books on how to use sex slaves; however, record evidence
Defendant also was integral in arranging to have Virginia go to Thailand. While Epstein
had paid for a massage therapy session in Thailand, there was a catch. Defendant told Virginia
she had to meet young girls in Thailand and bring her back to the U.S. for Epstein and
Defendant. Indeed, on the travel records and tickets Defendant gave to Virginia, Defendant wrote
on the back the name of the girl Virginia was supposed to meet, and she was also instructed to
check in frequently with Defendant as it was further signified by the words “Call Ms. Maxwell
(917) !” on Virginia’s travel documents. In this case, Virginia also produced the hard
copy records from her hotel stay in Thailand paid for by Epstein. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit
24
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10. It is undisputed fact that the FBI report and the Churcher emails
reference Ms. Giuffre’s accounts of sexual activity with Prince
Andrew that she made in 2011, contrary to Defendant’s argument
that Ms. Giuffre never made such claims until 2014.
Based on the FBI’s Interview of Ms. Giuffre in 2011, they wrote a report reflecting Ms.
33
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 31, GIUFFRE001235-1246, FBI Redacted 302.
25
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Additionally, 2011 correspondence with Sharon Churcher shows that Ms. Giuffre
disclosed her sexual encounters with Prince Andrew, but Churcher had to check with the
evidence that refutes Defendant’s meritless argument that Ms. Giuffre did not allege she had sex
with Prince Andrew until 2014. To the contrary, two sources, including the FBI, show Ms.
Defendant has produced no documents that even tend to show that she did not procure
underage girls for sex with Epstein, and no documents that tend to show that she did not
participate in the abuse. Indeed, Defendant refused to produce any documents dated prior to
2009, which includes the 2000-2002 period during which she abused Ms. Giuffre.
trafficked Ms. Giuffre, summary judgment on any of the issues advanced by Defen dant is
inappropriate. While we discuss the particulars of the individual claims below, the larger picture
is important too. Ms. Giuffre will prove at trial that Epstein and Defendant sexually trafficked
her. And yet, when Ms. Giuffre had the courage to come forward and expose what Defendant
had done to world – in a Court pleading trying to hold Epstein accountable – Defendant
26
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responded by calling her a liar in a press release intended for worldwide publication. Such
heinous conduct is not a mere “opinion,” but rather is defamation executed deliberately and with
actual malice. The jury should hear all of the evidence and then render its verdict on Ms.
Giuffre’s complaint.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a motion for summary
judgment may be granted only when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” The Second Circuit has repeatedly
held that “all ambiguities and inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts should be
resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine
issue for trial should be resolved against the moving party.” Swan Brewery Co. Ltd. v. U.S. Trust
Co. of New York, 832 F. Supp. 714, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Sweet, J.), citing Brady v. Town of
Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 210 (2d Cir. 1988) (internal quotations omitted). In other words, in
deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party’s
favor. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 517 F.3d 76, 87 (2d Cir. 2008). Stern v. Cosby,
645 F. Supp. 2d 258, 269 (S.D.N.Y.2009). Summary judgment should be denied “if the evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict” in favor of the non-moving party. See Net
Jets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Commc’ns, LLC, 537 F.3d 168, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2008).
Defendant’s lead argument is that, when she issued a press release attacking Ms. Giuffre
to members of the media, she somehow is not responsible when the media quickly published her
27
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attacks. If accepted, this remarkable claim would eviscerate defamation law, as it would permit a
defamer to send defamatory statements to the media and then stand back and watch – immune
from liability – when (as in this case) the defamatory statements are published around the world.
This absurd position is not the law, particularly given that the Defendant released a statement to
media asking them to “[p]lease find attached a quotable statement on behalf of Ms. Maxwell.”
To make her claim seem plausible, Defendant cites older cases, some dating back as far
as 1906. This presents a distorted picture of the case law on these issues. As a leading authority
defendant: “Two standards have evolved. The older one is that the person making the defamatory
statement is liable for republication only if it occurs with his or her express or implied
authorization of consent. The more modern formulation adds responsibility for all republication
that can reasonably be anticipated or that is the ‘natural and probable consequence’ of the
publication.” SACK ON DEFAMATION § 2.7.2 at 2-113 to 2-114 (4th ed. 2016). In this case,
however, the nuances of the applicable legal standards make little difference because Defendant
so clearly authorized – indeed, desired and did everything possible to obtain – publication of her
1. Under New York Law, Defendant is liable for the media’s publication
of her press release.
Given the obvious purposes of defamation law, New York law unsurprisingly assigns
liability to individuals for the media’s publication of press releases. Indeed, New York appellate
courts have repeatedly held that an individual is liable for the media publishing that individual’s
defamatory press release. See Levy v. Smith, 18 N.Y.S.3d 438, 439, 132 A.D.3sd 961, 962–63
(N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 2015) (“Generally, [o]ne who makes a defamatory statement is not
responsible for its recommunication without his authority or request by another over whom he
28
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has no control . . . Here, however . . . the appellant intended and authorized the republication of
the allegedly defamatory content of the press releases in the news articles”); National Puerto
Rican Day Parade, Inc. v. Casa Publications, Inc., 914 N.Y.S.2d 120, 123, 79 A.D.3d 592, 595
(N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept. 2010) (affirming the refusal to dismiss defamation counts against a defendant
who “submitted an open letter that was published in [a] newspaper, and that [the defendant] paid
to have the open letter published,” and finding that the defendant “authorized [the newspaper] to
recommunicate his statements.”) See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 576 (1977) (“The
publication of a libel or slander is a legal cause of any special harm resulting from its repetition
by a third person if . . . the repetition was authorized or intended by the original defamer, or . . .
Defendant deliberately sent her defamatory statement to major news media publishers for
worldwide circulation because Defendant wanted the public at large to believe that Ms. Giuffre
was lying about her abuse. Defendant even hired a public relations media specialist to ensure the
media would publish her statement. Her efforts succeeded: her public relations agent instructed
dozens of media outlets to publish her “quotable” defamatory statement and they did.
Defendant now disclaims any responsibility for the media publishing her press release. If we
understand Defendant’s position correctly, because she somehow lacked “control” over what
major newspapers and other media finally put in their stories, she escapes liability for
defamation. This nonsensical position would let a defamer send a false and defamatory letter to
major media, and then, when they published the accusation, escape any liability. Such an
34
Cf., Eliah v. Ucatan Corp., 433 F. Supp. 309, 312–13 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (“The alleged multistate publication of
plaintiff’s photograph without her consent thus gives rise to a single cause of action. … However, evidence of the
multistate publication of the magazine and the number of copies sold would be competent and pertinent to a
showing of damages, if any, suffered by plaintiff.”)
29
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argument is not only an affront to logic, but it is contrary to prevailing New York case law, cited
above. Perhaps even more important, in the context of the pending summary judgment motion, it
would require Defendant to convince the jury that she did not “authorize or intend” for the major
media to publish her press release. Obviously the disputed facts on this point are legion, and
Even the cases Defendant cites contradict her argument. She first cites Geraci v. Probst,
in which a defendant sent a letter to the Board of Fire Commissioners, and, years later, a
newspaper published the letter. The court held that the defendant was not liable for that belated
publication, “made years later without his knowledge or participation.” Id., at 340. By contrast,
Defendant not only authorized the defamatory statement, but paid money to her publicist to
convince media outlets to publish it promptly – actions taken with both her knowledge and
consent. Defendant’s statement was thus not published “without [her] authority or request,” as in
Geraci, but by her express authority and by her express request. Defendant’s publicist’s
testimony and the documents produced by Defendant’s publicist unambiguously establish that
the media published her press release with Defendant’s authority and by her request:
Q. When you sent that email were you acting pursuant to Ms. Maxwell’s retention of your
services?
A. Yes, I was
***
Q. The subject line does have “FW” which to me indicates it’s a forward. Do you know
where the rest of this email chain is?
A. My understanding of this is: It was a holiday in the UK, but Mr. Barden was not
necessarily accessible at some point in time, so this had been sent to him originally by Ms.
Maxwell, and because he was unavailable, she forwarded it to me for immediate action. I
therefore respond, “Okay, Ghislaine, I’ll go with this.”
It is my understanding that this is the agreed statement because the subject of the second
one is “Urgent, this is the statement” so I take that as an instruction to send it out, as a
positive command: “This is the statement.”35
35
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 6, Ross Gow Dep. Tr. at 14:15-17; 44:6-45:13 (emphasis added).
30
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Similarly, another case cited by Defendant, Davis v. Costa-Gavras, involved a libel claim
against a book author who wrote an account of the 1972 military coup in Chile. Years later, the
republish the book in paperback form and a third-party filmmaker who released a movie based
on the book. The Court held that a “party who is ‘innocent of all complicity’ in the publication of
a libel cannot be held accountable . . . [but that] a deliberate decision to republish or active
participation in implementing the republication resurrects the liability.” 580 F. Supp. 1082, 1094
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). Here, Defendant made a deliberate decision to publish her press release, and
actively participated in that process. At the very least, the jury must make a determination of
whether Defendant was “innocent of all complicity” for a libelous statement contained in her
press release.
Finally, Defendant cites Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc., 416 N.E.2d 557 (1980), which
held that reporters of a series of articles on narcotics trade “cannot be held personally liable for
injuries arising from its subsequent republication in book form absent a showing that they
approved or participated in some other manner in the activities of the third-party republisher.”
Id., 416 N.E.2d at 559-560. Again, the jury could reasonably find that Defendant both approved
of, and even participated in, the media’s publication of her press release. Indeed, it is hard to
understand how any jury could find anything else. Defendant was obviously “active” in
influencing the media to publish her defamatory press release, she both “approved” of and
pushed for the publication of the press release. Accordingly, she is liable for its publication.36
36
On page 14 of her motion, Defendant makes wholly contradictory statements. In back-to-back sentences, she tells
the Court that (1) she has no control over whether the media published the statement she sent to the media (with
instructions to publish it by an influential publicist); (2) her public relations representative gave instructions to the
media on how to publish it (in full); and (3) her public relations representative “made no effort to control” how the
media would publish it. Indeed, the best evidence of Defendant’s control over the press is the fact dozens of media
outlets obeyed her directive to publish her defamatory statement.
31
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Therefore, disclaiming responsibility for the media’s publication of a statement (for which she
hired a publicist for the purpose of influencing the media to publish that statement) is contrary to
After arguing, contrary to New York law, that she is not liable for the media’s publication
of her own press release, Defendant next argues that she is not liable for the media’s publications
of the defamatory statement contained within her press release if the media chose to make even
the tiniest of editorial changes. If we understand Defendant’s argument correctly, any omission
of any language from a press release is somehow a “selective, partial” publication for which she
escapes liability. Mot. at 14. Once again, this claim is absurd on its face. It would mean that a
defamer could send to the media a long attack on a victim with one irrelevant sentence and, when
the media quite predictably cut that sentence, escape liability for the attack. Moreover, even on
its face, the claim presents a jury question of what changes would be, in context, viewed as
“selective” or “partial” publications – something that only a jury could determine after hearing
In support of this meritless argument, Defendant cites Rand v. New York Times Co., for
the proposition that a defendant cannot be liable for a publisher’s “editing and excerpting of her
statement.” 430 N.Y.S.2d 271, 274, 75 A.D.2d 417, 422 (N.Y.A.D. 1980). This argument fails
for several reasons. First, there is no “republication” by the media as a matter of law. Defendant
issued a defamatory statement to the press, and its publication (as Defendant intended) is not a
“republication” under the law, as discussed above. Second, there was no “editing” or
paraphrasing or taking the quote out of context of the core defamatory statement in the press
release: that Ms. Giuffre is a liar. The “obvious lies” passage is the heart of the message
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Defendant sent to the press: that Ms. Giuffre was lying about her past sexual abuse. Even in
isolation, Defendant’s quote stating that Ms. Giuffre’s claims are “obvious lies” does not distort
or misrepresent the message Defendant intended to convey to the public that Ms. Giuffre was
lying about her claims. As this Court explained in denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, this
case “involves statements that explicitly claim the sexual assault allegations are false.” Giuffre v.
Furthermore, the facts at issue here make the Rand holding inapposite. In Rand, a
paraphrasing occurred in the instant case: the media quoted Defendant’s statement accurately.
Further, the phrase at issue in Rand was that certain people “screwed” another person. The
speaker/newspaper used the term “screwed” in reference to a record label’s dealings with a
performing artist, and not did not mean “screwed” in the literal sense, but as “rhetorical
hyperbole, and as such, is not to be taken literally.” Id. By contrast, there is no hyperbole in
Defendant’s defamatory statement, and it was never distorted or paraphrased by any publication
known to Ms. Giuffre. A jury could reasonable conclude that Defendant’s statement that Ms.
Giuffre’s claims of child sexual abuse are “obvious lies” is not a rhetorical device, nor
hyperbole, but a literal and particular affirmation that Ms. Giuffre lied.
Accordingly, there is no support in the factual record that the media reporting that
Defendant stated that Ms. Giuffre’s claims of childhood sexual abuse are “obvious lies” is a
distortion of Defendant’s message or hyperbole. Even a cursory review of the press release
would lead to that conclusion. Moreover, to the extent that there is any dispute that Defendant’s
statement had a different meaning outside of the context of the remainder of the press release,
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such a determination of meaning and interpretation is a question of fact for the jury to decide,
The primary basis of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is her attorney’s self-
serving, post hoc affidavit wherein he sets forth his alleged “intent” with regard Defendant’s
defamatory statement.37 Ms. Giuffre disputes Defendant’s attorney’s alleged and unproven
“intent” (not to mention Defendant’s “intent”), not only because Defendant refuses to turn over
her attorney’s communications, but also because questions of intent are questions of fact to be
determined by a trier of fact. Furthermore, ample record evidence contradicts the claimed
“intent.”
In her brief, Defendant discloses her attorney’s alleged legal strategy and alleged legal
advice; however, she deliberately states that her attorney “intended,” instead of her attorney
“advised,” when discussing her attorney’s legal strategy and advice, using that phrase at least 37
times,38 and using phrases such as Barden’s “beliefs,”39 “purposes,”40 “goals,”41 and
37
The Barden declaration is problematic for other reasons as well. In addition to Defendant’s over-length, 68-page
motion and among Defendant’s 654 pages of exhibits lies an eight-page attorney affidavit that proffers legal
conclusions and arguments. This exhibit is yet another improper attempt to circumvent this Court’s rules on page
limits. See Pacenza v. IBM Corp., 363 F. App'x 128, 130 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming lower court decision to strike
“documents submitted . . . in support of his summary judgment motion [that] included legal conclusions and
arguments” because those “extraneous arguments constituted an attempt . . . to circumvent page-limit requirements
submitted to the court.”); cf. HB v. Monroe Woodbury Cent. School Dist., 2012 WL 4477552, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
27, 2012) (“The device of incorporating an affirmation into a brief by reference, as Plaintiffs have done here, in
order to evade the twenty-five page limit, rather obviously defeats the purpose of the rule”). The court should
disregard the Barden Declaration for that reason alone
38
MSJ at 7 (three times), 8 (three), 15 (four), 16, 25 (five), 26, 33, 35 (two), 36 (three); Statement of Facts at 6
(two), 7 (five); Decl. of Philip Barden at 4 (four), 5 (three).
39
MSJ at 25, 35; Statement of Facts at 7 (two); Decl. of Philip Barden at 3, 4 (three), 5 (two).
40
MSJ at 8, 25, 35; Statement of Facts at 7 (three); Decl. of Philip Barden at 4 (two), 5 (three).
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“contemplations” 25 other times. All the while Defendant has claimed a privilege as to her
communications with Barden. Defendant attempts to convince the Court that she only granted
Gow permission to publish the defamatory statement as part of “Mr. Barden’s deliberated and
carefully crafted” (MSJ at 16) legal strategy and advice. Yet, she still refused to turn over her
If the Court were to consider the Barden Declaration (which it shouldn’t), it would be
ruling on a less than complete record because, based on this Declaration, it is necessary that
Defendant disclose all communications with him and possibly others. Ms. Giuffre doesn’t have
those communications, the court doesn’t have those communications; therefore, Defendant is
The Court should also not consider the Barden Declaration because it will be
made without turning over the documents that are relevant to the declaration. See, e.g., Rubens v.
Mason, 387 F.3d 183, 185 (2d Cir. 2004) (“We find that the District Court predicated its grant of
summary judgment as to liability on an affidavit from the arbitrator who presided over the
underlying arbitration, the probative value of which was substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice. The affidavit, therefore should not have been admitted. We therefore vacate
the grant of summary judgment to the defendants on liability and remand to the District Court.”).
Even were the Court to consider this Declaration and representations therein – which it
should not – the declaration itself demonstrates that the Court would have to make factual
41
MSJ at 27.
42
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 22, Defendant’s Privilege Log.
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finding as to what Mr. Barden’s intent really was. Finding about intent are inappropriate at the
summary judgment stage, as this Court and the Second Circuit have recognized. This Court has
explained, “if it is necessary to resolve inferences regarding intent, summary judgment is not
appropriate.” Id. (Sweet, J.) (emphasis added), citing Patrick v. Le Fevre, 745 F.2d 153, 159 (2d
Cir. 1984); Friedman v. Meyers, 482 F.2d 435, 439 (2d Cir. 1973) (other citations omitted).
Finally, there are material disputes over the statements in the Barden Declaration because
they are directly refuted by record evidence. For example, the instant motion and the Barden
Declaration describe the press release merely as a document expressing “his [Mr. Bardent’s]
opinion – in the form of a legal argument –as a lawyer would be,” as opposed to a press release
for dissemination by the media to the public. Record evidence refutes this claim, as (1) the press
release was sent to journalists, not media publishers or in-house counsel; (2) the press release
instructed the journalists to publish the defamatory statement (“Please find attached a quotable
statement on behalf of Ms. Maxwell”); (3) it was issued by a publicist on Defendant’s behalf and
not by an attorney, without any reference to attorneys or laws – indeed, Gow testified that
Barden was unavailable to approve the statement; and (4) Gow testified that he issued the
statement only after he understood Defendant to have “signed off” it, an understanding he
formed based on Defendant’s “positive command” to him: “This is the agreed statement.”
Q. When you sent that email were you acting pursuant to Ms. Maxwell’s retention of your
services?
A. Yes, I was.
***
Q. When you say “agreed statement” can you tell me more about what you mean? Who
agreed to the statement?
A. I need to give you some context, if I may, about that statement. So, this is on New Year’s
Day. I was in France so the email time here of 21:46, in French time was 22:46, and I was
getting up early the next morning to drive my family back from the south of France to
England, which is a 14-hour journey, door to door. So on the morning of the 2nd of January,
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bearing in mind that Ms. Maxwell, I think was in New York then, she was five hours behind,
so there was quite a lot of, sort of time difference between the various countries here, I sent
her an email, I believe, saying - parsing this-- forwarding this email to her saying “How do
you wish to proceed?” And then I was on the telephone-- I had two telephones in the car, I
received in excess of 30 phone calls from various media outlets on the 2nd of January, all
asking for information about how Ms. Maxwell was looking to respond to the latest court
filings, which were filed on the 30th of December as I understand.
And by close-- towards close of play on the 2nd, I received an email forwarded by
Ms. Maxwell, containing a draft statement which my understanding was the majority of
which had been drafted by Mr. Barden with a header along the lines of “This is the agreed
statement.”· At close of play on the 2nd. So–I was–I had gone under the Channel Tunnel and
I was sitting on the other side and that email, which my understanding was that it had been
signed off by the client, effectively, was then sent out to a number of media, including Mr.
Ball and various other UK newspapers.
Q. Mr. Gow, when you say “end of play” and “close of play,” are you referring to sending
the email that is Exhibit 2?
A. Yes, I am
***
Q. The subject line does have “FW” which to me indicates it’s a forward. Do you know
where the rest of this email chain is?
A. My understanding of this is: It was a holiday in the UK, but Mr. Barden was not
necessarily accessible at some point in time, so this had been sent to him originally by Ms.
Maxwell, and because he was unavailable, she forwarded it to me for immediate action.
I therefore respond, “Okay, Ghislaine, I’ll go with this.”
It is my understanding that this is the agreed statement because the subject of the
second one is “Urgent, this is the statement” so I take that as an instruction to send it
out, as a positive command: “This is the statement.”43
Accordingly, record evidence shows that the press release was intended as press release,
and not as a “legal argument.” Record evidence also establishes that Defendant circulated the
press release to Barden and Gow, and then gave a “positive command” to Gow to publish it.
Additionally, there is no indicia that the press release is a legal opinion. To the contrary, it was
issued by, and specifically attributed to, a woman who has personal knowledge of whether Ms.
Giuffre’s claims of sexual abuse are true, and she states that Ms. Giuffre is a liar.44 At the very
43
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 6, Ross Gow Dep. Tr. at 14:15-17; 31:19-33:7; 44:6-45:13 (emphasis added).
44
Unsurprisingly, Defendant cites no case law to support her argument that her attorney’s alleged influence in
preparing the statement Defendant issued to the media somehow shields her from liability.
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Another example is that Defendant states that “Gow served only as Mr. Barden’s conduit
to the media” (MTD at 25), and “Mr. Barden was directing the January 2-15 statement to a
discrete number of media representatives.” Barden wasn’t directing anything – he wasn’t even in
the loop when Defendant decided to publish the statement - and the documents prove it. Indeed,
the press release itself states that it is “on behalf of Ms. Maxwell,” not Barden, and it was
Defendant who gave the “positive command” to Gow to publish it. These are just a couple of
examples, among many, of the purported facts asserted in Defendant’s motion and Barden’s
Finally, neither the media nor the general public could have known that the statement
should be attributed to Barden. His name was nowhere in it, nor is there any reference to counsel.
Defendant’s argument that the “context” is the media knowing Barden’s intent or involvement is
unsupported by the record. The significant factual disputes about Barden, alone, prevent
summary judgment.
As this Court previously held, correctly, Defendant stating that Ms. Giuffre’s claims of
“First, statements that Giuffre’s claims ‘against [Defendant] are untrue,’ have
been ‘shown to be untrue,’ and are ‘obvious lies’ have a specific and readily
understood factual meaning: that Giuffre is not telling the truth about her history
of sexual abuse and Defendant’s role, and that some verifiable investigation has
occurred and come to a definitive conclusion proving that fact. Second, these
statements (as they themselves allege), are capable of being proven true or false,
and therefore constitute actionable fact and not opinion. Third, in their full
context, while Defendant’s statements have the effect of generally denying
Plaintiff’s story, they also clearly constitute fact to the reader.”
Giuffre v. Maxwell, 165 F. Supp. 3d 147, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). This Court further explained:
“Plaintiff cannot be making claims shown to be untrue that are obvious lies
without being a liar. Furthermore, to suggest an individual is not telling the truth
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about her history of having been sexually assaulted as a minor constitutes more
than a general denial, it alleges something deeply disturbing about the character of
an individual willing to be publicly dishonest about such a reprehensible crime.
Defendant’s statements clearly imply that the denials are based on facts separate
and contradictory to those that Plaintiff has alleged.” Id.
Defendant argues that somehow the “context” of the entire statement “tested against the
understanding of the average reader” should be the press release as a whole being read only by
journalists. This is an unreasonable construct because the ultimate audience for a press release is
the public. Indeed, the purpose of a press release is to reach readers. Unsurprisingly, Defendant
cites no case that holds that journalists might somehow believe statements of fact are opinion
This Court has previously covered this ground when it clearly stated:
Giuffre v. Maxwell, 165 F. Supp.at 152 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). The same conclusion applies now. At
the motion to dismiss stage, Defendant had not yet produced the statement she issued to the
press. That statement is now in evidence, so there is no ambiguity as to what defendant released
to the press.
The absurdity of Defendant characterizing his statements calling Ms. Giuffre a liar as
mere “opinion” is revealed by the fact that Defendant was the one who was sexually trafficking
and otherwise abusing Ms. Giuffre. No reasonable person in any context would construe that as
Defendant’s mere “opinion” on the subject, since Defendant knew she was abusing Ms. Giuffre.
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A. I can only testify to what I know. I know that Virginia is a liar and I know what
she testified is a lie. So I can only testify to what I know to be a falsehood and half
those falsehoods are enormous and so I can only categorically deny everything she
has said and that is the only thing I can talk about because I have no knowledge of
anything else.
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 11, Maxwell Dep. Tr. (April 17, 2016) at 174:6-19.
Defendant slyly contends in her motion that “Mr. Barden’s “arguments” in the press release
constitute ‘pure opinion,’” attempting to disclaim any involvement in making the defamatory
statement. However, it is not Mr. Barden’s statement, nor his opinion, that it at issue here. At
issue here is Defendant’s statement – a statement attributable to her, that she approved, whose
publication she “command[ed],” and for which she hired a public relations representative to
disseminate to at least 30 journalists for publication. While Mr. Barden could possibly have had
his own opinion as to whether or not his client abused Ms. Giuffre, Defendant cannot express an
opinion on a binary, yes/no subject where she knows the truth. As this Court previously
articulated, “statements that Giuffre’s claims ‘against [defendant] are untrue,’ have been ‘shown
to be untrue,’ and are ‘obvious lies’ have a specific and readily understood factual meaning.”
Giuffre v. Maxwell, 165 F. Supp. 3d at 152. Again, at the very least, the jury must pass on such
issues.
Defendant’s next argument seeks refuge in the pre-litigation privilege. If we understand the
argument correctly, Defendant seems to be saying that because she was contemplating an
(unspecified and never-filed) lawsuit involving the British Press, she somehow had a “green
light” to make whatever defamatory statements she wanted about Ms. Giuffre. To prove such a
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remarkably claim, Defendant relies on caselaw involving such mundane topics as “cease and
desist” letters sent to opposing parties and the like. Obviously such arguments have no
application to the press release that Defendant sent out, worldwide, attacking Ms. Giuffre’s
veracity.
The problems with the Defendant’s argument are legion. For starters, there is no record
evidence – not even Defendant’s own testimony – suggesting that she was contemplating
litigation against Ms. Giuffre, or that her press release was related to contemplated litigation
against Ms. Giuffre. Tellingly, the only “evidence” Defendant cites of any alleged contemplated
litigation is the self-serving, post hoc, partial waiver of attorney-client privilege found in the
Barden Declaration. As discussed above, that Declaration fails to establish that there was good
faith anticipated litigation between her and Ms. Giuffre, particularly when evidence in the record
contradicts such assertions. At the very least, it is a matter of fact for the jury to decide.
statements made to the press, this Court denied summary judgment, and held, “[t]o prevail on a
qualified privilege defense [defendant] must show that his claim of privilege does not raise
triable issues of fact that would defeat it.” Block v. First Blood Associates, 691 F. Supp. 685,
699-700 (Sweet, J.) (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (denying summary judgment on the pre-litigation qualified
privilege affirmative defense because there was “a genuine issue as to malice and appropriate
First, Defendant’s testimony makes no mention of any contemplated lawsuit – much less,
any contemplated lawsuit against Ms. Giuffre. Second, Defendant has offered no witnesses who
will testify that she intended to bring any law suit. Third, she did not, in fact, bring any such
lawsuit. The only “evidence” is a post hoc Declaration written by her attorney. Finally, it must be
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remembered, as explained at length above, the Defendant had sexually trafficking Defendant and
was attempting to continue to conceal her criminal acts. Whether her statements had an
“appropriate purpose,” Block 691 F. Supp. at 699-700 (Sweet, J.) – or were, rather, efforts by a
criminal organization to silence its victims – is obviously contested. Accordingly, obvious issues
anticipated litigation made by attorneys (or their agents under their direction) before the
commencement of litigation are privileged.” (MSJ at 33). The record evidence shows that
Defendant’s attorney did not make the defamatory statement. Further, Defendant’s attorney’s
agents did not make the defamatory statement. Defendant did. And, there was no statement made
Accordingly, the cases Defendant cites where attorneys are making statements (or where clients
are making statements to their attorneys regarding judicial proceedings including malpractice)
45
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Similarly, in Black v. Green Harbour Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc., 19 A.D.3d 962, 963, 798
N.Y.S.2d 753, 754 (2005), cited by Defendant, the Court held a privilege applied to a letter sent
by a home owner’s association board of directors to the association’s members informing them
of the status of litigation to which the association was a party, and to the association’s letter to
the state attorney general sent to discharge it’s duties to the association. In this case, litigation
was actually pending, the communication was sent by a party to that litigation as part of its
duties, and the communication itself concerned the litigation. Defendant’s press release fits none
of those descriptions.
Unsurprisingly, Defendant cites to no case in which a Court has held that this or any
the purported “anticipated” litigation. Regardless of whether or not Barden had a hand in drafting
the statement (another disputed issue of fact for the jury), Defendant issued the statement,
instructed that it be published, and the statement she issued was attributed to her, and not to her
attorney (or his agents). Accordingly, all the case law Defendant cites about an attorney making
a statement (or a client making a statement to their attorney or malpractice carrier) is inapposite.
In any event, because Defendant acted with malice, she cannot avail herself of the pre-
litigation privilege. As this Court has explained denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss, “‘There
is no qualified privilege under New York law when such statements are spoken with malice,
knowledge of their falsity, or reckless disregard for their truth.’” Giuffre v. Maxwell, 165 F.
Supp. 3d at 155 (citing Block, 691 F. Supp. at 699 (Sweet, J.) (S.D.N.Y. 1988). There is ample
record evidence that Defendant acted with malice in issuing the press release, thereby making the
litigation privilege inapplicable. See Block, 691 F. Supp. at 700 (Sweet, J.) (“Here, sufficient
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evidence has been adduced to support the inference that [defendant] acted with malice, and may
not, therefore, claim a qualified privilege under New York law . . . a genuine issue as to malice
and appropriate purpose has properly been raised and is sufficient to preclude summary
judgment.”). For example, Ms. Sjoberg testified that Defendant recruited her for sex with
Epstein, thus corroborating Ms. Giuffre’s own account of Defendant’s involvement in abusing
her with Epstein. For another example, Jeffrey Epstein’s pilot testified that Defendant flew with
Ms. Giuffre on at least 23 flights, thus corroborating Ms. Giuffre’s claims against Defendant. See
McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 15, Rodgers Dep. Tr., at 34:3-10. For another example, Tony
Figueroa testified that Defendant asked him for assistance in recruiting girls for Epstein – more
Defendant’s statements that Ms. Giuffre was lying and her claims of sexual abuse were
“obvious lies” were not pertinent to a good faith anticipated litigation but, instead, they were
made for an inappropriate purpose – i.e., to bully, harass, intimidate, and ultimately silence Ms.
Giuffre. As the record evidence shows, Defendant knew the statements were false because
Defendant engaged in and facilitated the sexual abuse of this minor child, therefore, they were
made for the inappropriate purpose of “bullying,” “harassment,” and “intimidation.” See Front v.
Khalil, 24 N.Y.3d 713, 720 (2015). Simply put, Defendant sexually trafficked Ms. Giuffre – and
then tried to silence Ms. Giuffre to keep her crimes secret – circumstances that prevent her from
using privileges designed to shield legitimate legal disputes from court interference.
New York case law fully confirms that pre-litigation qualified privilege does not apply to
this case. Historically, statements made in the course of litigation were entitled to privilege from
defamations claims “so that those discharging a public function may speak freely to zealously
represent their clients without fear of reprisal or financial hazard.” Id. at 718. A 2015 New York
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Court of Appeals case somewhat extended this privilege by holding that statements made by
attorneys prior to the commencement of the litigation are protected by a qualified privilege if
those statements are pertinent to a good faith anticipated litigation. Id. at 718. (“Although it is
well settled that statements made in the course of litigation are entitled to absolute privilege, the
Court has not directly addressed whether statements made by an attorney on behalf of his or her
client in connection with prospective litigation are privileged” . . . “to advance the goals of
statements made prior to the commencement of an anticipated litigation are privileged, and that
the privilege is lost where a defendant proves that the statements were not pertinent to a good
The Court of Appeals’ reason for allowing this qualified privilege could not be more
clear: “When litigation is anticipated, attorneys and parties should be free to communicate in
order to reduce or avoid the need to actually commence litigation. Attorneys often send cease
and desist letters to avoid litigation. Applying privilege to such preliminary communication
encourages potential defendants to negotiate with potential plaintiffs in order to prevent costly
and time consuming judicial intervention.” Id. at 719-20. Under this rationale, the Khalil court
found that an attorney’s letters to the potential defendant were privileged because they were sent
“in an attempt to avoid litigation by requesting, among other things, that Khalil return the alleged
stolen proprietary information and cease and desist his use of that information.” Id. at 720.
Here, quite unlike Khalil, the Defendant’s statements were (1) made by a non-attorney
(Defendant through Gow); (2) concerning a non-party to any alleged anticipated litigation; (3)
knowingly false statements; and (4) contained in a press release directed at, and disseminated to,
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the public at large. Defendant’s statements cannot be considered “pertinent to a good faith
Finally, though it strains credulity to even entertain the prospect, if Defendant could
make even colorable showings on these basic issues, it would remain an issue of fact for the jury
to determine whether or not Defendant’s press release, calling Ms. Giuffre’s sex abuse claims
“obvious lies,” was any type of “cease-and-desist” statement or a statement that acted to “reduce
here as well.
Finally, Defendant cannot prevail in asserting this qualified privilege because, in order to
invoke this privilege, she must have “meritorious claims” for “good faith anticipated litigation.”
Khalil specifically states that for the qualified privilege to apply, the statements must be made
“pertinent to a good faith anticipated litigation,” and it does not protect attorneys . . . asserting
wholly unmeritorious claims, unsupported in law and fact, in violation of counsel’s ethical
obligations.” Khalil, 24 N.Y.3d at 718, 720 (emphasis added). Defendant has neither
“meritorious claims” nor “good faith anticipated litigation.” Defendant cannot have a
“meritorious claim” for “good faith anticipated litigation” against the press (or Ms. Giuffre)
because Ms. Giuffre’s reports of her sexual abuse are true, Defendant knows that they are true,
and Defendant made a knowingly false statement when she called Ms. Giuffre a liar. Under these
circumstances, Defendant has no “meritorious” claim to make in “good faith” relating to either
Ms. Giuffre’s statements or their coverage in the press, thereby making her defamatory
statements wholly outside the protection of this qualified privilege. At the very least, the issue of
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whether Defendant has meritorious claims against the press on the grounds that she did not abuse
Defendant next claims that her press release calling Ms. Giuffre a liar about her past sex
abuse was somehow “substantially true.” Here again, this is a highly disputed claim. On its face,
to determine what is “substantially” true or not requires extensive fact finding, such as whether
Defendant recruited Ms. Giuffre as a minor child for sex with Defendant’s live-in boyfriend and
convicted pedophile, Jeffrey Epstein. Accordingly, summary judgment is not appropriate. See
Mitre Sports Intern. Ltd. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 3d 240, 255 (S.D.N.Y.2014)
(denying summary judgment because it would require the Court to decide disputed facts to
determine whether the statement at issue was substantially true); Da Silva v. Time Inc., 908 F.
Supp. 184, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying motion for summary judgment because there was a
genuine issue of material act as to whether defamatory photo and caption were not true, stating
“[i]n the instant case Da Silva’s contention that she was a reformed prostitute at the time of
photography and publication provides a rational basis upon which a fact-finder could conclude
Additionally, Defendant has remarkably not submitted any evidence that she did not
recruit Ms. Giuffre for sex with Epstein. Nor has Defendant offered any evidence that her role in
Epstein’s household was not to recruit girls and young women for Jeffrey Epstein. Accordingly,
summary judgment is inappropriate. See Stern v. Cosby, 645 F. Supp. 2d 258, 277 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (because defendant had “not submitted any evidence to show that Statement 11 is
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Further, much of the purported evidence upon which Defendant relies to allege the truth
of her defamatory statement is merely hearsay, including inadmissible hearsay statements made
by Alan Dershowitz, who Defendant did not depose in this case (and whom Ms. Giuffre has not
had an opportunity to cross examine). Hearsay cannot establish the truth of a defamatory
F. Supp.2d 348, 359 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (denying summary judgment and holding “defendants’
evidence as to what they were told by representatives of NYU and Kean College, to the extent
offered for the truth of the matters asserted, is inadmissible hearsay and an insufficient basis
upon which to grant summary judgment of dismissal on the ground that the statements were
substantially true.”).
Finally, many of the facts upon which Defendant bases her argument that her defamatory
statement was true are wholly tangential to the claims against her by Ms. Giuffre and the
defamatory statement. For example, Defendant supports her contention that she did not recruit
Ms. Giuffre for sex with Epstein based on the fact that Ms. Giuffre lived independently of her
parents before meeting Epstein and Ms. Maxwell. (Of course, a child outside the supervision of
her parents makes it much more likely she would be recruited by Defendant into sex trafficking,
but that is for the jury to decide.) That fact does not go to whether or not Defendant’s statement
calling Ms. Giuffre a liar is true, because Ms. Giuffre never made any claims relating to where
she lived prior to meeting Defendant. Moreover, it is immaterial with whom she was living: the
fundamental and overarching fact remains that Defendant recruited Ms. Giuffre for sex with
Defendant next proffers Ms. Giuffre’s limited high school enrollment and short-term jobs
that she held as evidence that she and Epstein did not abuse her. The logic of this position is
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unclear. The fact that Ms. Giuffre worked at Taco Bell for a few days hardly establishes she was
not abused by Defendant and Epstein. Indeed, if anything its shows the vulnerability of Ms.
Giuffre to enticements that a billionaire and his wealthy and powerful girlfriend could offer. In
any event, what to make of such fact is something for the jury to consider. They are irrelevant for
the same reason as above: Ms. Giuffre never made any claims about her studies or her prior
employment. Indeed, neither Ms. Giuffre’s statement about being recruited by Defendant as a
child, nor Defendant’s refutation even mentions Ms. Giuffre’s lack of schooling or lack of a
stable home as a child. Purported facts that have nothing to do with Ms. Giuffre’s claims of
sexual abuse against Defendant, and nothing to do with Defendant calling Ms. Giuffre a liar for
such claims, do not establish the “substantial truth” of Defendant’s statement. Tellingly,
Defendant cites to no analogous case in any jurisdiction that even suggests otherwise.
Defendant’s next (and, again, quite remarkable) argument is that Ms. Giuffre somehow
will be unable to establish actual malice in this case. One would think that a sex trafficker calling
one of her victims a liar would be a quintessential example of actual malice. Defendant’s
spurious case citations and misplaced argument do not detract from this core fact.
Though Defendant does not mention the legal standard for actual malice until she is 48
pages into her 68-page brief,46 the legal definition of actual malice, as defined by the United
46
Though perhaps a scrivener’s error, Defendant errantly cites to two Supreme Court cases – Gerts v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) and Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) – that arose out of the
laws of Illinois and Pennsylvania, respectively, to support a proposition concerning New York law. Defendant also
cites to Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 105 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1989),
wherein the ruling was not at summary judgment, and the plaintiff in the defamation case was a judicial candidate in
a public election.
49
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States Supreme Court, and reiterated by the Second Circuit, should be the light by which all of
Defendant’s purported “facts” and argument should be viewed. “Actual malice” means that the
statement was published with “knowledge that the statement was ‘false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.’” Baiul v. Disson, 607 F. App'x 18, 20 (2d Cir. 2015),
quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686
(1964).
Defendant argues that Ms. Giuffre is a limited purpose public figure. While Ms. Giuffre
disputes that claim, the issue is entirely irrelevant here because Ms. Giuffre will prove at trial,
with overwhelming evidence, that Defendant made her statement calling Ms. Giuffre a liar with
malice, fully knowing – as a sex trafficker – that it was false. Put another way, Defendant knew
that Ms. Giuffre was telling the truth when she described how Defendant recruited her for sex as
an underage girl and then sexually trafficked her with her boyfriend Jeffrey Epstein.
The Second Circuit instructs that, “[o]n a motion for summary judgment, a court cannot
try issues of fact; it can only determine whether there are issues to be tried. If, as to the issue on
which summary judgment is sought, there is any evidence in the record from any source from
which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, summary
judgment is improper.” Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994)
(internal citations and quotations omitted). “As the moving party, Defendants have the burden of
Sole v. Knoedler Gallery, LLC, 139 F. Supp. 3d 618, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Chambers).
Defendant fails to meet her burden of demonstrating an absence of clear and convincing
evidence substantiating Ms. Giuffre’s claims that Defendant acted with actual malice. Ms.
Giuffre will easily be able to meet any trial burden of clear and convincing evidence of actual
50
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malice. Tellingly, Defendant does not even attempt to address the documentary evidence, nor the
As shown above, far beyond showing that a reasonable inference could be drawn in her
favor, which is all that is required at this point to defeat Defendant’s motion, Ms. Giuffre will
easily be able to meet her trial burden of clear and convincing evidence of actual malice.
Of course, a plaintiff need only show “actual malice” on the part of a defendant if that
plaintiff is a public figure or a limited public figure, which Ms. Giuffre is not, as explained infra.
VII. THE COURT NEED NOT REACH THE ISSUE, AT THIS TIME, OF WHETHER
MS. GIUFFRE IS A LIMITED PURPOSE PUBLIC FIGURE
For the reasons just explained, Ms. Giuffre will easily be able to prove actual malice at
the trial in this case. Defendant argues that Ms. Giuffre “is a public figure who must prove actual
malice.” MSJ at 49. Given the overwhelming proof of the second part of that statement, the
If the Court wishes to nonetheless consider the issue at this time, it is not appropriate for
disposition at the summary judgment stage of this case. The defendant bears the burden of
demonstrating that the plaintiff is a limited purpose public figure. See Lerman v. Flynt Distrib.
Co., 745 F.2d 123, 136–37 (2d Cir. 1984). Defendant correctly articulates the legal test for a
finding that a plaintiff is a limited purpose public figure, but glosses over the fact that all prongs
of the test must be met in order for a court to make that finding. See, e.g., Contemporary
Mission, Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co., 842 F.2d 612, 617 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[T]his court set forth a four
part test for determining whether someone is a limited purpose public figure” (emphasis added));
Herbert v. Lando, 596 F. Supp. 1178, 1186 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“The Second Circuit recently
summarized the criteria” (emphasis added)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.
1986); cf. Nehls v. Hillsdale Coll., 178 F. Supp. 2d 771, 778 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (finding plaintiff
51
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was not a limited public figure for failing one element of the Lerman test and thus denying
defendant’s motion for summary judgment) (“The defendant has proven all of the elements but
the third …”), aff’d, 65 F. App’x 984 (6th Cir. 2003). Of course, proof that Ms. Giuffre (or
anyone else) is a limited purpose public figure requires proof of a set of facts from which Ms.
Giuffre believes Defendant has not shown in satisfaction of the four-part test.
Significantly –this Court should pause here to note that the details of Jane Doe 3’s sexual
exploitation and abuse, as anonymously set forth in her CVRA joinder motion, caused the
Defendant to identify, with certainty, Jane Doe 3 as Ms. Giuffre. Yet, at her deposition,
Defendant claimed to “barely remember her at all.”47 Defendant’s ability to immediately and
positively identify the anonymous individual making claims of sexual abuse, if anything, shows
Defendant or convicted pedophile Jeffrey Epstein when she was a child – legally, she did not
even have the capacity to consent. Defendant cannot recruit a minor child for sexual exploitation
and then, afterwards, argue that her victim injected herself into the public controversy when
Moreover, Defendant has not made a sufficient showing that Ms. Giuffre has “regular”
and “continuing” access to the news media. The policy rationale behind this prong is that public
figures generally enjoy significant access to the media. One reporter wrote some articles on Ms.
Giuffre in 2011. Thereafter, it was not until 2015, that Ms. Giuffre spoke to someone in the news
media about these issues, and that interview was granted after Defendant’s defamatory remarks.
Such limited contacts precludes a finding that Ms. Giuffre is a limited public figure. See
47
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 11, Maxwell Dep. Tr. at 44:23-45:4 (July 22, 2016) (“Q. You do remember
Virginia, about that time back in the 2000s, giving Mr. Epstein massages? A. I barely remember her at all.”).
52
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Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 99 S. Ct. 2675, 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979) (finding plaintiff
maintained no regular and continuing access to the media and thus was not a public figure).
It is also unclear how Defendant plans to show that Ms. Giuffre “successfully invited
public attention to her views.” To be sure, Ms. Giuffre decided to start “Victims Refuse Silence,”
a not-for-profit organization whose mission is “to change the landscape of the war on sexual
abuse and human trafficking. Our goal is to undertake an instrumental role in helping survivors
break the silence associated with sexual abuse. To fulfill this mission, we aim to enhance the
lives of women who have been victimized.”48 The website lists the National Trafficking Hotline,
and provides a state-by-state resources for local organizations where victims can seek help.
Unsurprisingly, Defendant cites no cases that hold that maintaining a website makes one a public
figure. See Mitre Sports Int’l Ltd. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 3d 240, 252 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (finding plaintiff was not a limited public figure and denying defendant’s motion for
summary judgment) (“corporate policy denouncing child labor on its website … do[es] not show
that Mitre … aimed to influence the public’s views on the controversy”). More important,
Defendant does not explain how Ms. Giuffre was using the website to influence public views on
whether she had been abused by Defendant – the subject at issue in this lawsuit.
Interestingly, Defendant has spent $ 17,87549 on an expert witness to tell the Court and
the jury that hardly anyone searches on the internet using search terms such as “victims refuse
silence sex slave.” One of Defendant’s six briefs raising Daubert issues specifically argues that
Dr. Anderson’s estimates on the cost of remediating Ms. Giuffre’s online reputation are improper
because Dr. Anderson included nearly unused search phrases when evaluating internet content.
Kent’s rebuttal report states: “. . . there seems no reason to believe that such a person would use
48
http://www.victimsrefusesilence.org/our-mission.
49
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 9, Kent Dep. Tr. at 25:16-26:6.
53
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this term . . . Indeed, these are terms unlikely to be used by anyone unfamiliar with this litigation.
. . . Why, for instance, would it be necessary to push down offending Web pages in the results
that the search engines provide for the term victim’s refuse silence sex slave, when this term is
likely never used . . .” See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 25, Kent Report at 10, 33.
Defendant cannot argue to the Court that Ms. Giuffre has “successfully” invited public
attention to her views through her VRS website while simultaneously filing a Daubert motion
that argues that search terms such as “victims refuse silence sex slave” are “likely never used,”
thus making the website unsuccessful in inviting public attention. In any event, Defendant has
failed to set forth with precision the allegedly undisputed fact – and supporting evidence – she
Moreover, “[i]t is preferable to reduce the public figure question to a more meaningful
context by looking to the nature and extent of an individual’s participation in the particular
controversy giving rise to the defamation.” Greenberg v. CBS Inc., 69 A.D.2d 693, 704, 419
N.Y.S.2d 988, 995 (1979) (emphasis added), citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
345, 352, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789. The context here is highly significant. Ms. Giuffre
never chose to participate in Defendant and Epstein’s underage sex ring, a “controversy” that
gave rise to Defendant’s defamation. In arguing that Ms. Giuffre thrust herself into the public
spotlight, Defendant conveniently leaves out the fact that it is by her doing that Ms. Giuffre is in
this controversy in the first place. No minor child willingly becomes a participant in sexual
abuse, and it is perverse for the abuser to argue that her victim deliberately became a subject of
public attention when speaking out about that abuse for the purpose of advancing justice and
54
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For all these reasons, the Court should simply decline to decide the public figure issue at
this juncture. But if it chooses to reach the issue, it should reject Defendant’s unsupported
argument.
As a final argument, Defendant argues that her January 2015 statement was “substantially
true.” Given that the statement argues that Ms. Giuffre lied when she said she was sexually
trafficked by Defendant, the reader of Defendant’s motion might reasonably expect to see some
evidence presented showing that Defendant was not a sex trafficker. Instead, the reader is treated
to technical quibbles. For example, the lead argument to show the “substantial” truth of
Defendant’s statement is the argument that Ms. Giuffre was not fifteen years old, but all of
sixteen or seventeen years old when she was trafficked. As the Court knows (and can take
judicial notice of), Florida law makes age eighteen the age of consent. Accordingly, it is no
moment that Ms. Giuffre may have been mistaken about the exact year the sex trafficking
More broadly, at issue are the statements Ms. Giuffre made regarding Defendant’s
involvement in, and knowledge of, the sexual abuse and sex trafficking of Ms. Giuffre (and other
minor girls) through a recruitment scheme executed by Defendant and Jeffrey Epstein. In
response to those various statements, Defendant publicly claimed that, “the allegations made by
(Ms. Giuffre) against Ghislaine Maxwell are untrue.” Defendant continued that Ms. Giuffre’s
“claims are obvious lies and should be treated as such....” Defendant, through her statement
55
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intended to convey that Ms. Giuffre was lying about everything she had said against Defendant –
“the allegations.”
In sum and essence, those statements made by Ms. Giuffre about which Defendant
released a public statement to exclaim were “untrue” and “obvious lies” were:
(1) That Defendant approached Ms. Giuffre while Ms. Giuffre was an underage
minor working at the Mar-a-Lago Country Club, and recruited the then-minor
Ms. Giuffre to go to the house of Jeffrey Epstein under the pretense of providing
a massage to Jeffrey Epstein for money;
(2) That Ms. Giuffre followed Defendant’s instructions, and was driven to Jeffrey
Epstein’s house, where she was greeted by Defendant and later introduced to
Jeffrey Epstein;
(3) That Ms. Giuffre was lead upstairs to be introduced to Jeffrey Epstein in his
bedroom, and that while there Defendant demonstrated how Ms. Giuffre should
provide a massage to Jeffrey Epstein;
(4) That Defendant and Epstein converted the massage into a sexual experience,
requesting that Ms. Giuffre remove her clothing, after which time a sexual
encounter was had;
(5) That Defendant and Epstein expressed approval for Ms. Giuffre, and offered her
money in exchange for this erotic massage turned full sexual encounter;
(6) That Defendant and Epstein offered Ms. Giuffre the promise of money and a
better life in exchange for Ms. Giuffre acting sexually compliant and
subservient to their demands;
(7) That Ms. Giuffre, after that first encounter, was repeatedly requested to service
Epstein and/or Defendant sexually and/or others;
(8) That Ms. Giuffre was taken on Epstein’s private planes on numerous occasions
and trafficked nationally and internationally for the purpose of servicing Epstein
and others, including Defendant, sexually;
(9) That Defendant was Epstein’s primary manager of the recruitment and training
of females who Epstein paid for sexual purposes;
(10) That Defendant participated in sexual encounters with females, including Ms.
Giuffre; and
(11) That Ms. Giuffre and other recruited females were encouraged by Defendant
and Epstein to bring other young females to Epstein for the purpose of servicing
him sexually.
56
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Defendant, by way of her January 2015 statement, declared that Ms. Giuffre lied about
each and every one of these allegations regarding Defendant. In fact, Defendant clarified further
this position in her deposition when she said repeatedly that everything Ms. Giuffre said about
Defendant was totally false.50 The clarification in her deposition is identical in intention to the
reasonable interpretation of her statement that Defendant made publicly, which has formed the
basis of this defamation action—that Ms. Giuffre was lying about everything she said about
Defendant, and that Defendant was not at all involved in the activity she was accused of
engaging in.
While her public statement could not have been more clear, as her deposition testimony
further underscored, Defendant intended the world to believe that nothing Ms. Giuffre said about
Defendant was true, and that Defendant was not at all involved with any of the things she was
accused of, Defendant has decided in this motion to minutely dissect the nuance of Ms. Giuffre’s
various statements to cause the Court to reach a far-fetched conclusion that Defendant’s
repositioning amounts to nothing more than an admission by Defendant of the defamatory nature
of her statement.
A. When Ms. Giuffre Initially Described Her Encounters With Defendant and
Epstein, She Mistakenly Believed the First Encounter Occurred During the
Year 1999.
Discovery has resulted in the production of records, including Ms. Giuffre’s employment
records from Mar-a-Lago, which she did not possess at the time she was recounting her
interactions with Defendant. Those records establish that the initial encounter wherein Defendant
recruited Ms. Giuffre occurred during the year 2000 and not during 1999. Ms. Giuffre was
50
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 11, Maxwell 4-22-2016 Dep. Tr. at 135:3-4; 178:15-178:24; 179:20-180:7; 228:7-
229:10.
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sixteen years old before August 9, 2000, and turned seventeen on that date. It is unclear from the
limited records available whether Defendant approached and recruited Ms. Giuffre before or just
after Ms. Giuffre’s 17th birthday. However, what has now been established through numerous
witnesses is that Defendant approached and recruited a minor child for the purposes of enticing
that minor over to the house of Jeffrey Epstein, a currently-registered sex offender.51 The exact
lure of Ms. Giuffre by Defendant - enticement of being paid money to give a billionaire a
massage at his mansion - was used by Epstein and his many associates and employees to recruit
dozens and dozens of other underage girls. There is no doubt that the crux of Ms. Giuffre’s
statement on this point is that Defendant recruited her when she was only a minor child unable to
consent to sex, not precisely how far under the age of consent she was. Defendant’s public claim
that Ms. Giuffre’s account of this approach, and recruiting element, was “untrue” and “obvious
lies” is not “substantially true,” but is itself an obvious lie – as Ms. Giuffre will prove to the jury
at trial.
Defendant next argues that she “accurately denied that [she] ‘regularly participate[d] in
Epstein’s sexual exploitation on minors’ and that ‘the Government knows such fact.’” MSJ at 58.
It is not clear whether Defendant is nitpicking this statement by contesting whether she
“regularly” participated in Epstein’s sexual exploitation or whether she did participate, but the
Government was unaware of the extent of her involvement. Call this the “yes-I’m-a-sex-
51
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 1, 5, Alessi Dep. Tr. at 94:24-95:2; Giuffre Dep. Tr. at 111:12-111:21; 116:19-
117:12.
58
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chosen to use to support her point, there is an abundance of evidence clearly linking Defendant
to Epstein’s sexual exploitation of minors. As the Court is aware, numerous message pads were
Epstein’s illegal exploitation. 52 Additionally, numerous employees and others have testified
about Defendant’s high-ranking position in the hierarchal structure of the sexual exploitation
scheme. 53 In fact, multiple individuals, in addition to the Ms. Giuffre, have testified about
Defendant also argues that one government investigator, Palm Beach, Florida, Detective
Recarey, may not have been aware of her involvement in the sex trafficking. Defendant fails to
cite another passage in Detective Recarey’s deposition, where he noted that he was aware of
Defendant’s involvement with Epstein and the sexual exploitation of children.55 But even
assuming Recarey was unaware (which Ms. Giuffre strongly disputes), Defendant would have, at
More broadly, Ms. Giuffre’s statement about what the “Government” knew about sex
trafficking was made in pleadings filed in a federal Court case attacking the decision of the U.S.
Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida to offer Jeffrey Epstein immunity from
prosecution for federal sex trafficking crimes. Accordingly, to present an even arguable claim for
summary judgment, Defendant would have to show that the U.S. Attorney’s Office (and its
52
See, e.g., McCawley Dec at Exhibit 28 (message pad excerpts), GIUFFRE 001412, 001418, 001435, 001446,
001449, 001453, 001454.
53
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 21, 1, Rodriguez Dep. Tr. at 169:1-169:4; Alessi Dep. Tr. at 23:11-23:20; 34:19-
35:3; 98:5-98:12; 104:15-104:23.
54
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 16, 4, Sjoberg Dep. Tr. at 13; Figueroa Dep. Tr. at 96-97; 103; 200:6-18; 228:23-
229:21.
55
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 13, Recarey Dep. Tr. at 29:16-29:20; 45:13-25; 83:3-83:15.
59
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investigators from the FBI) did not know about Defendant’s sex trafficking. This proof would
need to include, for example, evidence that the FBI did not learn about Defendant’s sex
trafficking when (among other things) Ms. Giuffre told FBI agents about it when she met with
them in Australia in 2011. Here again, Defendant has no evidence to even begin making such a
showing.
Defendant next argues that she accurately disputed Ms. Giuffre’s statement that
Defendant held her as a “sex slave.” Relying on dictionary definitions of “slave” that define the
term to refer to a “confined” person who is the “legal property” of another (MSJ at 59, citing
Merriam-Webster, etc.), Defendant claims Ms. Giuffre was not confined or the property of
Defendant does not explain why the jury would be required to use the held-in-chains
definition of “slave” in evaluating her statement. Merriam-Webster (11th ed. 2006) also defines
“slave” as “one that is completely subservient to a dominating influence” – a definition that fits
Ms. Giuffre’s circumstances to a tee. As Ms. Giuffre has explained in detail, she was recruited as
a minor child by Defendant, who then dominated her and used for sexual purposes. That
From the context of all of Ms. Giuffre’s statements about Defendant, Ms. Giuffre has
never said or implied that she was physically placed in a cage. Instead, she has described the vast
disparity of power and the influence of Defendant and Epstein, the fear of disobedience, the
typical locations of the abuse being in a private plane, in huge mansion manned with Epstein
employed servants, a private island, or some inescapable place abroad in the presence of
60
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Defendant, in addition to the continued – and fraudulent – promise of a better future, as those
things that kept her retained in a situation of sexual servitude. While not physical chained, Ms.
Giuffre was groomed as minor and trained, and these factors became her invisible chains.
Indeed, as Ms. Giuffre’s expert on sex trafficking, Professor Coonan, has explained:
Popular understandings of the term “sex slave” might still connote images of
violent pimps, white slavery, or of victims chained to a bed in a brothel in the
minds of some people. To call Ms. Giuffre a victim of sex trafficking would
however very accurately convey the reality that she along with a great many other
victims of contemporary forms of slavery are often exploited by the “invisible
chains” of fraud and psychological coercion.
If the Court takes as true, which it must for the purpose of this motion, that Ms. Giuffre
was trafficked and used exclusively for sexual purposes by Defendant and Epstein, then the
Court must also reach the conclusion at this stage that Maxwell’s assertion – that Ms. Giuffre’s
description of being a sex slave is “untrue” or “obvious lies” – is not substantially true. There
undoubtedly remains a genuine issue of material fact on this point, and in fact, Defendant’s
position taken in this motion is tantamount to an admission of the truth of Plaintiff’s statement
Defendant next contends that she accurately recounted that Alan Dershowitz had denied
having sex with Ms. Giuffre. MSJ at 60. Call this the “yes-I’m-a-sex-trafficker-but-she-was-not-
against Professor Dershowitz, those allegations are not at issue in this case. Defendant, in her
defamatory statement, claimed that “the allegations made by [Ms. Giuffre] against Ghislaine
Maxwell are untrue.” See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 26, GM_00068. In her deposition,
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Defendant maintained the position that she “cannot speculate on what anybody else did or didn’t
do.” See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 11, Maxwell 4-22-2016 Dep. Tr. at 180:3-180:4. In fact,
regarding Ms. Giuffre’s claims about others, Defendant unequivocally stated, “I can only testify
to what she said about me, which was 1000 percent false.” See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 11,
defamation action filed against him in her desperate attempt to have Dershowitz to jump aboard
and help bail out her sinking canoe. While Ms. Giuffre can – and, if necessary, will – refute
Dershowitz’s claim he was not a beneficiary of Epstein and Defendant’s sex trafficking, that is
not relevant at this stage. Whatever may or may not have happened with Dershowitz (and Ms.
Giuffre’s sworn statements that he sexually abused her is alone enough to create disputed facts
on the issue of whether Defendant’s statements about him were “substantially true”) has no
bearing whatsoever on the truth or falsity of the statements Ms. Giuffre made about Defendant.
This case is not about whether Ms. Giuffre has ever made untruthful allegations against
anyone, which she contends she has not, but about whether her allegations about Defendant
were true, or whether those specific allegations were “untrue,” “obvious lies” as Defendant
publicly proclaimed. These issues are disputed and must go to the jury.
Defendant next argues that she did not create child pornography and that the Government
earlier, Defendant’s claim requires that she show that “the Government” – in context, the FBI
and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida – “knew” that she had no
62
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child pornography. Yet Defendant has offered no such evidence – much less evidence so
This point is disputed from the simple fact that Ms. Giuffre herself testified that
Defendant took many photograph of her naked. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 5, Giuffre Dep.
Tr. at 232:3-9; 233:7-9. This is consistent with the Palm Beach butler’s, Alfredo Rodriguez’s,
testimony that he personally saw photos of naked children on Defendant’s computer. See
McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 21, Rodriguez Dep. Tr. at 150:10-17; 306:1-306:24. Another
housekeeper, Juan Alessi also saw photos of young nude females on Defendant’s computer,
although he wasn’t sure whether to consider it pornography. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 1,
Alessi Dep. Tr. at 175:5-175:24. Finally, Detective Recarey found a collage of nude photos of
young females in Epstein’s closet, and turned the photos over to the FBI and U.S. Attorney’s
office.56 While the U.S. Attorney’s office will not share the photos obtained from Recarey’s
investigation, it is thus undisputed that the government possesses photos of nude, young females
confiscated from Epstein’s Palm Beach mansion. Indeed, the police video disclosed through a
FOIA request shows naked images of women throughout the house, including a full nude of the
Defendant.57 At a minimum, there is a clear genuine issue of material fact in this regard.
F. Defendant Did Act as a “Madame” For Epstein to Traffic Ms. Giuffre to The
Rich and Famous.
Defendant next argues that she did not act as a “Madame” for Epstein. MSJ at 63. The
gist of the argument seems to be that Defendant believes trafficking one girl to Epstein does not
argument fails linguistically on the very dictionary definitions that Defendant cites elsewhere –
56
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 13, Recarey Dep. Tr. at 73:19-73:24; 74:2-74:7.
57
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 44, FOIA CD GIUFFRE 007584.
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but not here. See Merriam-Webster (11th ed. 2006) (defining “madam” as “the female head of a
house of prostitution”).
Once again, Defendant conceals the relevant facts on this issue. First, multiple witnesses
have testified to Defendant’s recruiting, maintaining, harboring, and trafficking girls for
Epstein.58 In fact, Defendant herself was unable to deny procuring Ms. Giuffre for Epstein.59
While Defendant has attempted to fumble her way through explaining some plausible reason for
bringing a sixteen or seventeen year old to Epstein, her explanations are, to put it blandly,
unpersuasive. As with other issues, the jury will have to decide who to believe.
One of the individuals Ms. Giuffre was trafficked to was Prince Andrew – trafficking that
took place in Defendant’s own townhouse in London. There exist flight logs evidencing Ms.
Giuffre flying to London alongside Defendant and Epstein on Epstein’s private plane, and a
photo of Ms. Giuffre, Defendant, and the Prince, without Defendant ever offering a legal
reasonable explanation for that photo being taken, or for traveling with a year old girl overseas.
burden to substantiate Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant was Epstein’s Madame, which is a point
at issue, into whether or not Plaintiff has conclusively proven the identities and accurate job titles
of the other men to whom Plaintiff was lent for sex by Epstein. No matter how hard Defendant
tries to reframe this case, drag other people in, or split hairs, she is unable to contest the facts –
facts showing she was more than a Madame but a full-fledged sex trafficker. Ms. Giuffre told the
truth when she said that Defendant recruited her as a minor, under the pretense of giving a
58
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 16, 1, 18, 2, Sjoberg Dep. Tr. at 13; Alessi Dep. Tr. at 34; GIUFFRE000105 at 57-
58; GIUFFRE000241-242 at p. 212-213; Austrich Dep. Tr. at 34-35, 100-101, 127-128; Alessi Dep. Tr. at 34:19-
35:3; 98:5-98:12; 104:15-104:23.
59
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 11, Maxwell Dep. Tr. at 214:14-215:3.
64
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massage, and converted her into a traveling sex slave, consistent with Defendant and Epstein’s
As the Court astutely acknowledged early on, “at the center of this case is the veracity of
a contextual world of facts more broad than the allegedly defamatory statements . . . either
transgression occurred or it did not. Either Maxwell was involved or she was not.” If Defendant
was involved, then her January 2015 statement was defamatory. Ms. Giuffre will prove to the
jury, through overwhelming evidence, her prior allegations about Defendant’s involvement. The
Court should give Ms. Giuffre that opportunity, and deny Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment.
IX. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny Defendant’s motion for summary
Respectfully Submitted,
David Boies
Boies Schiller & Flexner LLP
333 Main Street
Armonk, NY 10504
65
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on January 31, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing
document with the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system. I also certify that the foregoing
document is being served this day on the individuals identified below via transmission of Notices
60
This daytime business address is provided for identification and correspondence purposes only and is not intended
to imply institutional endorsement by the University of Utah for this private representation.
66
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Virginia L. Giuffre,
v.
Ghislaine Maxwell,
Defendant.
________________________________/
1. Ms. Maxwell’s response to publications of Ms. Giuffre’s false allegations: the March
2011 statement. In early 2011 Ms. Giuffre in two British tabloid interviews made
numerous false and defamatory allegations against Ms. Maxwell. In the articles, Ms.
Giuffre made no direct allegations that Ms. Maxwell was involved in any improper
conduct with Jeffrey Epstein, who had pleaded guilty in 2007 to procuring a minor for
prostitution. Nonetheless, Ms. Giuffre suggested that Ms. Maxwell worked with Epstein
and may have known about the crime for which he was convicted.
Ms. Giuffre denies that the allegations she made against Ms. Maxwell are false.
Furthermore, Ms. Giuffre did give an interview to journalist, Sharon Churcher, in which Ms.
Giuffre accurately and truthfully described Defendant Maxwell's role as someone who recruited
or facilitated the recruitment of young females for Jeffrey Epstein. See McCawley Dec. at
Exhibit 34, GIUFFRE003678. Ms. Giuffre was also interviewed by the FBI in 2011 and she
discussed Defendant’s involvement in the sexual abuse. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 31, FBI
Redacted 302, FIUFFRE001235-1246. Those statements were not "false and defamatory," but
1
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2. In the articles, Ms. Giuffre alleged she had sex with Prince Andrew, “a well-known
businessman,” a “world-renowned scientist,” a “respected liberal politician,” and a
“foreign head of state.”
Ms. Giuffre does not contest this fact, but believes that it is irrelevant.
3. In response to the allegations Ms. Maxwell’s British attorney, working with Mr. Gow,
issued a statement on March 9, 2011, denying “the various allegations about [Ms.
Maxwell] that have appeared recently in the media. These allegations are all entirely
false.”
Ms. Giuffre denies that Mr. Barden, “issued a statement.” Instead it appears to have the
2
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Media contact:
Ross Gow
Acuity Reputation
Tel: +44-203-008-7790
Mob: +44-7778-755-251
Email: ross@acuityreputation.com
Media contact: Ross Gow, Acuity Reputation, Tel: +44-203-008-7790,
Mob: +44-7778-755-251, Email: ross at acuityreputation.com
The document speaks for itself although it is unclear if the original included the italics
5. Ms. Giuffre’s gratuitous and “lurid” accusations in an unrelated action. In 2008 two
alleged victims of Epstein brought an action under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act against
the United States government purporting to challenge Epstein’s plea agreement. They
alleged the government violated their CVRA rights by entering into the agreement.
While we would stipulate to the statement in this paragraph starting with the words “In
2008” , we do not stipulate to the opening sentence fragment Maxwell places in bold.
6. Seven years later, on December 30, 2014, Ms. Giuffre moved to join the CVRA action,
claiming she, too, had her CVRA rights violated by the government. On January 1, 2015,
Ms. Giuffre filed a “corrected” joinder motion.
Agreed.
7. The issue presented in her joinder motion was narrow: whether she should be permitted
to join the CVRA action as a party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21,
specifically, whether she was a “known victim[] of Mr. Epstein and the Government
owed them CVRA duties.” Yet, “the bulk of the [motion] consists of copious factual
details that [Ms. Giuffre] and [her co-movant] ‘would prove . . . if allowed to join.’” Ms.
3
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Giuffre gratuitously included provocative and “lurid details” of her alleged sexual
activities as an alleged victim of sexual trafficking.
Ms. Giuffre denies that the issues presented in here joinder motion were narrow. The
issues presented by the joinder motion and related pleadings were multiple and complex,
requiring numerous details about Ms. Giuffre’s sexual abuse and the perpetrators of her abuse.
In a pleading explaining why the motion was filed, Ms. Giuffre’s lawyers sp ecifically listed nine
separate reasons why Jane Doe 3’s allegations that Dershowitz had sexually abused her were
1. To establish that Jane Doe 3 had been sexually abused by Jeffrey Epstein
and his co-conspirators (including co-conspirator Alan Dershowitz), which would make
her a “victim” of a broad sex trafficking conspiracy covered by the federal Crime
Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771, and therefore entitled to participate in the case;
3. To support the victims’ allegation that the Government had a motive for
failing to afford victims with their rights in the criminal process – specifically,
pressure from Dershowitz and other members of Epstein’s legal defense team to
keep the parameters of the non-prosecution agreement (NPA) secret to prevent
Jane Doe 3 and other victims from objecting to and blocking judicial approval of
the agreement;
5. To provide part of the factual context for the scope of the “interface”
between the victims, the Government, and Epstein’s defense team – an interface
that was relevant under Judge Marra’s previous ruling that the Government was
entitled to raise “a fact-sensitive equitable defense which must be considered in
the factual context of the entire interface between Epstein, the relevant
prosecutorial authorities and the federal offense victims . . .”;
4
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7. To bolster the victims’ argument that their right “to be treated with
fairness,” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8), had been violated through the Government’s
secret negotiations with one of their abusers;
9. To support Jane Doe 3’s argument for equitable estoppel to toll the six-
year statute of limitations being raised by the Government in opposition to her
motion to join – i.e., that the statute was tolled while she was in hiding in
Australia due to the danger posed by Epstein and his powerful friends, including
prominent lawyer Alan Dershowitz.
Jane Does #1 and #2 v. United States, No. 9:08-cv-80736, DE 291 at 18-26 & n.17 (S.D. Fla.
2015). Ms. Giuffre’s lawyers had attempted to obtain a stipulation from the Government on
point #1 above (“victim” status), but the Government had declined. Judge Marra’s ruling
concluded that certain allegations were not necessary “at this juncture in the proceedings.” DE
324 at 5. Judge Marra specifically added, however, that “Jane Doe 3 is free to reassert these
factual details through proper evidentiary proof, should Petitioners demonstrate a good faith
basis for believing that such details are pertinent to a matter presented for the Court’s
consideration.” DE 324 at 6. The CVRA litigation continues and no trial has been held as of the
filing of this brief. As such, the extent to which these factual details will be used at trial has not
yet been determined. See Docket Sheet, Jane Does #1 and #2 v. U.S., No. 9:08-cv-80736.
8. At the time they filed the motion, Ms. Giuffre and her lawyers knew that the media had
been following the Epstein criminal case and the CVRA action. While they deliberately
filed the motion without disclosing Ms. Giuffre’s name, claiming the need for privacy
and secrecy, they made no attempt to file the motion under seal. Quite the contrary, they
filed the motion publicly.
5
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10. The district court found not only that the “lurid details” were unnecessary but also that
the entire joinder motion was “entirely unnecessary.” Ms. Giuffre and her lawyers knew
the motion with all its “lurid details” was unnecessary because the motion itself
recognized that she would be able to participate as a fact witness to achieve the same
result she sought as a party. The court denied Ms. Giuffre’s joinder motion.
11. One of the non-parties Ms. Giuffre “named” repeatedly in the joinder motion was Ms.
Maxwell. According to the “lurid details” of Ms. Giuffre included in the motion, Ms.
Maxwell personally was involved in a “sexual abuse and sex trafficking scheme” created
by Epstein:
Ms. Maxwell “approached” Ms. Giuffre in 1999 when Ms. Giuffre was “fifteen
years old” to recruit her into the scheme.
Ms. Maxwell was “one of the main women” Epstein used to “procure under-aged
girls for sexual activities.”
Ms. Maxwell was a “primary co-conspirator” with Epstein in his scheme.
6
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She “persuaded” Ms. Giuffre to go to Epstein’s mansion “in a fashion very similar to
the manner in which Epstein and his other co-conspirators coerced dozens of other
children.”
At the mansion, when Ms. Giuffre began giving Epstein a massage, he and Ms.
Maxwell “turned it into a sexual encounter.”
Epstein “with the assistance of” Ms. Maxwell “converted [Ms. Giuffre] into . . . a
‘sex slave.’” Id. Ms. Giuffre was a “sex slave” from “about 1999 through 2002.”
Ms. Maxwell also was a “co-conspirator in Epstein’s sexual abuse.”
Ms. Maxwell “appreciated the immunity” she acquired under Epstein’s plea
agreement, because the immunity protected her from prosecution “for the crimes she
committed in Florida.”
Ms. Maxwell “participat[ed] in the sexual abuse of [Ms. Giuffre] and others.”
Ms. Maxwell “took numerous sexually explicit pictures of underage girls involved in
sexual activities, including [Ms. Giuffre].” Id. She shared the photos with Epstein.
As part of her “role in Epstein’s sexual abuse ring,” Ms. Maxwell “connect[ed]”
Epstein with “powerful individuals” so that Epstein could traffic Ms. Giuffre to these
persons.
Ms. Giuffre was “forced to have sexual relations” with Prince Andrew in
“[Ms. Maxwell’s] apartment” in London. Ms. Maxwell “facilitated” Ms. Giuffre’s
sex with Prince Andrew “by acting as a ‘madame’ for Epstein.”
Ms. Maxwell “assist[ed] in internationally trafficking” Ms. Giuffre and “numerous
other young girls for sexual purposes.”
Ms. Giuffre was “forced” to watch Epstein, Ms. Maxwell and others “engage in
illegal sexual acts with dozens of underage girls.”
See Ms. Giuffre’s Response to Point #7, above. Ms. Giuffre contests the reference to
“lurid details”. Moreover, the testimony from numerous witnesses corroborates the statements
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 16, Sjoberg’s May 18, 2016 Dep. Tr. at 8-9, 13, 33-35,
142-143
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 4, Figueroa June 24, 2016 Dep. Tr. Vol. 1 at 96-97 and
103
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 14, Rinaldo Rizzo’s June 10, 2016 Dep. Tr. at 52-60
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 12, Lynn Miller’s May 24, 2016 Dep. Tr. at 115
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 13, Joseph Recarey’s June 21, 2016 Dep. Tr. at 29-30
7
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See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 15, David Rodgers’ June 3, 2016 Dep. Tr. at 18, 34-36
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 10, Marcinkova Dep. Tr. at 10:18-21; 12:11-15; etc.
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 8, Kellen Dep. Tr. at 15:13-18; 20:12-16; etc. Epstein
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 30, U.S. Attorney Victim Notification Letter
GIUFFRE002216-002218
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 33, July 2001 New York Presbyterian Hospital Records
GIUFFRE003258-003290
GIUFFRE005431-005438
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 28, Message Pad evidencing Defendant arranging to have
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 29, Black Book in which Defendant and other household
, who were minors at the time the Palm Beach Police’s Investigation of
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 40, Sex Slave books Epstein ordered from Amazon.com at
GIUFFRE006581
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 32, the folder Defendant sent to Thailand with Ms.
8
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See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 39, the Palm Beach Police Report showing that Epstein
used women and girls to collect underage girls for his abuse GIUFFRE005614-005700
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 41, Epstein’s Flight Logs showing that Defendant flew
12. In the joinder motion, Ms. Giuffre also alleged she was “forced” to have sex with
Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz, “model scout” Jean Luc Brunel, and “many
other powerful men, including numerous prominent American politicians, powerful
business executives, foreign presidents, a well-known Prime Minister, and other world
leaders.”
13. Ms. Giuffre said after serving for four years as a “sex slave,” she “managed to escape to a
foreign country and hide out from Epstein and his co-conspirators for years.”
Agreed that Ms. Giuffre made this statement and has since discovered evidence that
indicates she was mistaken on the exact timeframe of her abuse and was with Defendant and
Jeffrey Epstein from the years 2000 – 2002.
14. Ms. Giuffre suggested the government was part of Epstein’s “conspiracy” when it
“secretly” negotiated a non-prosecution agreement with Epstein precluding federal
prosecution of Epstein and his “co-conspirators.” The government’s secrecy, Ms. Giuffre
alleged, was motivated by its fear that Ms. Giuffre would raise “powerful objections” to
the agreement that would have “shed tremendous public light on Epstein and other
powerful individuals.
Ms. Giuffre did not suggest that the Government was part of Epstein's conspiracy to
commit sex offenses. The CVRA case deals with whether the Government failed in their
responsibilities to the victims to inform the victims that the Government was working out a NPA,
9
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and it is Ms. Giuffre's belief that the Government did fail to so inform the victims, and
intentionally did not inform the victims because the expected serious objection from many of the
victims might prevent the Government from finalizing a NPA with Epstein. See McCawley Dec.
15. Notably, the other “Jane Doe” who joined Ms. Giuffre’s motion who alleged she was
sexually abused “many occasions” by Epstein was unable to corroborate any of Ms.
Giuffre’s allegations.
This is untrue. The other Jane Doe could corroborate many of Ms. Giuffre's allegations
based on a similar pattern of abuse that she suffered by Epstein. She did not know Ms. Giuffre
though. , who was deposed in this case, and who was a minor, corroborates the
same pattern of abuse. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 7, Dep. Tr. at 54:25-57:5.
16. Also notably, in her multiple and lengthy consensual interviews with Ms. Churcher three
years earlier, Ms. Giuffre told Ms. Churcher of virtually none of the details she described
in the joinder motion.
This is untrue. Furthermore, Defendant does not offer any citation or evidence on this
point. Defendant's statement here is knowingly false. Having read the articles and taken Ms.
Giuffre's deposition, Defendant knows that Ms. Giuffre did reveal details in 2011 consistent with
those in the joinder motion. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 31, GIUFFRE003678, FBI Redacted
302, GIUFFRE001235-1246.
17. Ms. Maxwell’s response to Ms. Giuffre’s “lurid” accusations: the January 2015
statement. As Ms. Giuffre and her lawyers expected, before District Judge Marra in the
10
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CVRA action could strike the “lurid details” of Ms. Giuffre’s allegations in the joinder
motion, members of the media obtained copies of the motion.
18. At Mr. Barden’s direction, on January 3, 2015, Mr. Gow sent to numerous representatives
of British media organizations an email containing “a quotable statement on behalf of
Ms. Maxwell.” The email was sent to more than 6 and probably less than 30 media
representatives. It was not sent to non-media representatives.
Defendant falsely claims that “[a]t Mr. Barden’s direction, on January 3, 2015, Mr. Gow
statement on behalf of Ms. Maxwell.’” This is a blatant falsehood about the document that is at
the heart of this litigation. Record evidence shows that Gow sent that email at Defendant’s
direction, not at Mr. Barden’s direction. Indeed, on the evening before his deposition, Mr. Gow
produced an email exchange he had with Defendant in which Defendant directs Mr. Gow to send
11
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Chronologically, this email comes at the end of various other email exchanges between
Defendant and Gow that discuss issuing a press release. The subject line of this email that
Defendant wrote to Gow states “URGENT – this is the statement,” thereby instructing Gow to
release this statement to the press. Shortly after Defendant sent this email to Gow directing him
to release the statement, Gow distributed the statement to multiple media outlets. Neither
Defendant nor Gow have produced any email in which Barden directed Gow to issue this press
Despite sending it herself, and despite it being responsive to six court-ordered search
terms, Defendant failed to produce this email. Her press agent, Gow, produced this the evening
before his deposition on November 17, 2016. At the deposition, Mr. Gow authenticated this
Q. When you sent that email were you acting pursuant to Ms. Maxwell's retention of your
services?
A. Yes, I was.
***
(Exhibit 9 was marked for identification.)
Q. This also appears to be an email chain with you and Ms. Maxwell; is that correct?
A. It does appear to be so.
Q. Did you send the top email of the chain that says "Okay, G, going with this"?
A. I did.
Q. And did you receive from Ms. Maxwell, the bottom email of that chain?
A. I believe so. Well, I believe -- yes, yeah, it was forwarded from Ms. Maxwell, yes.
MR. DYER: Sorry, I don't quite understand that answer.
THE WITNESS: I misspoke that. I did receive it from Ms. Maxwell.
MR. DYER: Okay.
Q. The subject line does have “FW” which to me indicates it’s a forward. Do you know
where the rest of this email chain is?
A. My understanding of this is: It was a holiday in the UK, but Mr. Barden was not
necessarily accessible at some point in time, so this had been sent to him originally by
Ms. Maxwell, and because he was unavailable, she forwarded it to me for immediate
action. I therefore respond, “Okay, Ghislaine, I’ll go with this.”
It is my understanding that this is the agreed statement because the subject of the
second one is “Urgent, this is the statement” so I take that as an instruction to send it out,
as a positive command: “This is the statement.”
12
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See McCawley Decl. at Exhibit 6, November 18, 2016, Ross Gow Dep. Tr. at 14:15-17; 44:6-
45:13.
Together, the email and Gow’s testimony unequivocally establish that Defendant – not
Barden – directed and “command[ed]” Gow to publish the defamatory statement. Accordingly,
The second sentence – “This email was sent to more than 6 and probably less than 30
media representatives” – omits the fact that not only did Gow admit to emailing the statement to
the press, but he also read it to over 30 media representatives over the phone:
Q. Do you recall ever reading the statement to the press or the media over the phone?
A. It's very possible that I would have done so, yes.
See McCawley Decl. at Exhibit 6, Gow Dep. Tr. at 64:8-14 (emphasis added). Thus, the second
19. Among the media representatives were Martin Robinson of the Daily Mail; P. Peachey of
The Independent; Nick Sommerlad of The Mirror; David Brown of The Times; and Nick
Always and Jo-Anne Pugh of the BBC; and David Mercer of the Press Association.
These representatives were selected based on their request—after the joinder motion was
filed—for a response from Ms. Maxwell to Ms. Giuffre’s allegations in the motion.
Ms. Giuffre agrees to the first sentence. The second sentence is a false. Accordingly,
there is no record evidence that Gow (or anyone else) “selected” journalists “for a response,” or
that there was any selection process whatsoever. To the contrary, Gow testified that anyone who
13
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Q. To the extent you can recall or could estimate, how many other emails do you believe
you sent bearing that statement that's in Exhibit 2?
A. I really can't remember but certainly more than six and probably less than 30,
somewhere in between. Any time there was an incoming query it was either dealt with on
the telephone by referring them back to the two statements of March 2011 and January
2015 or someone would email them the statement. So no one was left unanswered,
broadly, is the -- is where we were. But I can't remember every single person we reached
out to.
See McCawley Dec at Exhibit 6 Gow Dep. Tr. at 67:15-68:1 (emphasis added).
Ross Gow
ACUITY Reputation
Jane Doe 3 is Virginia Roberts—so not a new individual. The allegations made by
Victoria Roberts against Ghislaine Maxwell are untrue. The original allegations are not
new and have been fully responded to and shown to be untrue.
Each time the story is re told [sic] it changes with new salacious details about public
figures and world leaders and now it is alleged by Ms. Roberts [sic] that Alan
Derschowitz [sic] is involved in having sexual relations with her, which he denies.
Ms. Roberts claims are obvious lies and should be treated as such and not publicized as
news, as they are defamatory.
Ghislaine Maxwell’s original response to the lies and defamatory claims remains the
same. Maxwell strongly denies allegations of an unsavoury nature, which have appeared
in the British press and elsewhere and reserves her right to seek redress at the repetition
of such old defamatory claims.
14
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While Defendant cropped the body text of the email that was sent to news media
representatives, she completely omitted the headings and metadata. Ms. Giuffre has put an image
15
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21. Mr. Barden, who prepared the January 2015 statement, did not intend it as a traditional
press release solely to disseminate information to the media. So he intentionally did not
pass it through a public relations firm, such as Mr. Gow’s firm, Acuity Reputation.
Defendant states: “Mr. Barden, who prepared the statement, did not intend it as a
traditional press release solely to dissemination information to the media.” Ms. Giuffre contests
this statement, and all statements regarding Mr. Barden’s beliefs and purposes, and the like.
Further, as stated in detail in Ms. Giuffre’s Opposition Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, this Court should not even consider the Barden Declaration. Additionally, there is
absolutely no record evidence of Barden’s intent and the Court should not consider it.
The next sentence states, “So he intentionally did not pass it [the press release] through a
public relations firm, such as Mr. Gow’s firm, Acuity Reputation.” Again, there is zero record
evidence to support any assertion of Barden’s intent. To the extent that this sentence claims that
Barden did not give the statement to Gow, Ms. Giuffre does not dispute it; as described above,
Defendant gave the statement to Gow with instructions to publish it. See McCawley Dec. at
Exhibit 48, RG(UK)_000009, imaged in full at paragraph 81, supra. To the extent that this
sentence claims that the statement did not pass “through a public relations firm, such as Mr.
Gow’s firm, Acuity Reputation,” Ms. Giuffre disputes that statement. Record documentary
evidence and testimony establish that this statement was disseminated through a public relations
firm, namely, Ross Gow’s firm, Acuity Reputation. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 6, Gow Dep.
Tr. at 109:4-6 (“Q. Approximately how long have you been providing such services? A. Acuity
16
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22. The January 2015 statement served two purposes. First, Mr. Barden intended that it
mitigate the harm to Ms. Maxwell’s reputation from the press’s republication of Ms.
Giuffre’s false allegations. He believed these ends could be accomplished by suggesting
to the media that, among other things, they should subject Ms. Giuffre’s allegations to
inquiry and scrutiny. For example, he noted in the statement that Ms. Giuffre’s
allegations changed dramatically over time, suggesting that they are “obvious lies” and
therefore should not be “publicized as news.”
Ms. Giuffre objects to this paragraph in its entirety. She disputes that the January 2015
statement “served two purposes,” as this statement is wholly unsupported by the record, which
Defendant again neglects to cite. Ms. Giuffre also contests the second sentence in which
Defendant claims that “Mr. Barden intended that it mitigate the harm to Ms. Maxwell’s
reputation from the press’s republication of Ms. Giuffre’s false allegations.” First, Ms. Giuffre
disputes any statement of Barden’s intent as explained above. Second, Ms. Giuffre disputes that
there was any “republication” by the press as a matter of law, as explained in her memorandum
of law opposing summary judgment, as the press did not “republish” the press statement under
New York law. Third, Ms. Giuffre disputes that her allegations are “false,” and cites to the
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 16, Sjoberg’s May 18, 2016 Dep. Tr. at 8-9, 13, 33-35,
142-143
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 4, Figueroa June 24, 2016 Dep. Tr. Vol. 1 at 96-97 and
103
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 14, Rinaldo Rizzo’s June 10, 2016 Dep. Tr. at 52-60
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 12, Lynn Miller’s May 24, 2016 Dep. Tr. at 115
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 13, Joseph Recarey’s June 21, 2016 Dep. Tr. at 29-30
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 15, David Rodgers’ June 3, 2016 Dep. Tr. at 18, 34-36
17
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See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 10, Marcinkova Dep. Tr. at 10:18-21; 12:11-15; etc.
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 8, Kellen Dep. Tr. at 15:13-18; 20:12-16; etc. Epstein
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 30, U.S. Attorney Victim Notification Letter
GIUFFRE002216-002218
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 33, July 2001 New York Presbyterian Hospital Records
GIUFFRE003258-003290
GIUFFRE005431-005438
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 28, Message Pad evidencing Defendant arranging to have
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 29, Black Book in which Defendant and other household
, who were minors at the time the Palm Beach Police’s Investigation of
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 40, Sex Slave books Epstein ordered from Amazon.com at
GIUFFRE006581
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 32, the folder Defendant sent to Thailand with Ms.
18
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See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 39, the Palm Beach Police Report showing that Epstein
used women and girls to collect underage girls for his abuse GIUFFRE005614-005700
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 41, Epstein’s Flight Logs showing that Defendant flew
Next, Defendant states, “He [Barden] believed these ends could be accomplished by
suggesting to the media that, among other things, they should subject Ms. Giuffre’s allegations to
inquiry and scrutiny.” Ms. Giuffre disputes any statement as to Barden’s “belief” (supra). Ms.
Giuffre disputes that the harm to Defendant’s reputation could be mitigated by the media’s
inquiry into and scrutiny of Ms. Giuffre’s allegations, because a deeper inquiry would only
reveal additional evidence corroborating Ms. Giuffre’s allegations, such as the evidence put forth
in Ms. Giuffre’s opposition memorandum of law and detailed in the bulleted citations, supra.
Defendant then states, “For example, he [Barden] noted in the statement that Ms.
Giuffre’s allegations changed dramatically over time, suggesting that they are ‘obvious lies’ and
therefore should not be ‘publicized as news.’” First, Ms. Giuffre disputes that Barden noted
Defendant’s work for her, but the closest evidence Defendant has for such a statement is
testimony from the Gow deposition wherein Gow speculates that Barden “had a hand in”
drafting the press statement, an opinion which may or may not be based on first-hand
knowledge. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 6, Gow Dep. Tr. at 45:14-17 (Q. Okay. A. And I say,
“Thanks, Philip” because I’m aware of the fact that he had a hand, a considerable hand in the
drafting.”) This is wholly insufficient to show who drafted the passages quoted by Defendant
above. Regardless of those passages’ original author, it is ultimately Defendant who “noted”
anything because it is her statement and she directed that it be sent to the media and public.
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Second, Ms. Giuffre disputes that her allegations have changed over time, “dramatically”
or otherwise. Third, Ms. Giuffre disputes that the press release “suggest[ed]” that her allegations
are “obvious lies,” because Defendant’s press release affirmatively, unambiguously stated that
her allegations are “obvious lies” – there is no subtlety, suggestion, or statement of opinion here.
See Giuffre v. Maxwell, 165 F. Supp.3d 147, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“. . . these statements (as they
themselves allege), are capable of being proven true or false, and therefore constitute actionable
23. Second, Mr. Barden intended the January 2015 statement to be “a shot across the bow” of
the media, which he believed had been unduly eager to publish Ms. Giuffre’s allegations
without conducting any inquiry of their own. Accordingly, in the statement he repeatedly
noted that Ms. Giuffre’s allegations were “defamatory.” In this sense, the statement was
intended as a cease and desist letter to the media-recipients, letting the media-recipients
understand the seriousness with which Ms. Maxwell considered the publication of Ms.
Giuffre’s obviously false allegations and the legal indefensibility of their own conduct.
Defendant states: “Second, Mr. Barden intended the January 2015 statement to be a ‘shot across
the bow’ of the media, which he believed had been unduly eager to publish Ms. Giuffre’s’
allegations without conducting any inquiry of their own.” Not only does Defendant once again
refer to Mr. Barden’s intent, but she also mischaracterizes the statement as a “shot across the
bow” of the media. The press release did not threaten or give warning to the media in any way
whatsoever. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 26, GM_00068, full image copied in Ms. Giuffre’s
Next, Ms. Giuffre disputes the sentence, “Accordingly, in the statement he repeatedly
noted that Ms. Giuffre’s allegations were ‘defamatory.’” Barden did not “note” anything in the
statement, nor does Defendant cite to any record evidence that he does. Furthermore, Ms. Giuffre
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denies that any of her allegations are defamatory in the slightest, as they are all true and
Ms. Giuffre also disputes the sentence, “In this sense, the statement was intended as a
cease and desist letter to the media-recipients, letting the media-recipients understand the
seriousness with which Ms. Maxwell considered the publication of Ms. Giuffre’s obviously false
allegations and the legal indefensibility of their own conduct.” First, Ms. Giuffre objects to any
release was in no way any type of “cease and desist letter.” There is no record evidence in
support of this claim, and Defendant unsurprisingly cites to none. Third, Ms. Giuffre disputes
that any media-recipients would be given to understand “the seriousness with which Ms.
Maxwell considered the publication of Ms. Giuffre’s obviously false allegations and the legal
unsupported by the record. Finally, Ms. Giuffre rejects that her allegations are "obviously false,”
24. Consistent with those two purposes, Mr. Gow’s emails prefaced the statement with the
following language: “Please find attached a quotable statement on behalf of Ms.
Maxwell” (emphasis supplied). The statement was intended to be a single, one-time-
only, comprehensive response—quoted in full—to Ms. Giuffre’s December 30, 2014,
allegations that would give the media Ms. Maxwell’s response. The purpose of the
prefatory statement was to inform the media-recipients of this intent.
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Ms. Giuffre disputes that any part of Defendant’s press release is “consistent with those
two [of Barden’s] purposes.” Indeed, Ms. Giuffre disputes this and any statement relating to
Next, Ms. Giuffre disputes that, “The statement was intended to be a single, one-time-
only, comprehensive response – quoted in full – to Ms. Giuffre’s December 30, 2014, allegations
that would give the media Ms. Maxwell’s response.” First, Ms. Giuffre disputes this and any
statement relating to Barden’s “intent” as explained above. Second, Ms. Giuffre disputes that
anyone intended the press release to be a one-time-only, comprehensive response. The record
evidence says otherwise: Gow repeatedly issued this statement via email and over the phone for
months on end.
Next, Defendant states, “The purpose of the prefatory statement was to inform the media-
recipients of this intent.” First, Ms. Giuffre disputes this and any statement relating to Barden’s
purpose as explained above. Second, Ms. Giuffre disputes that the press release was to inform
the media of anything. Defendant issued a press release, instructed them to publish it (by telling
them it was “quotable”), see McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 48, RG(UK)_000009 (supra), and hired
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See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 6 Gow Dep. Tr. at 12:19-21; 13:9-16. The record evidence shows
that Defendant’s intent was for the press to publish her press release: any other interpretation is
25. Ms. Giuffre’s activities to bring light to the rights of victims of sexual abuse. Ms.
Giuffre has engaged in numerous activities to bring attention to herself, to the prosecution
and punishment of wealthy individuals such as Epstein, and to her claimed interest of
bringing light to the rights of victims of sexual abuse.
Agreed to the portion of Defendant’s assertion in bold font. Ms. Giuffre has not engaged
in activities to bring attention to herself, rather she has taken action to aid in the prosecution of
her abusers, and she seeks to bring light to the rights of victims of sexual abuse.
26. Ms. Giuffre created an organization, Victims Refuse Silence, Inc., a Florida corporation,
directly related to her alleged experience as a victim of sexual abuse.
Ms. Giuffre created Victims Refuse Silence, Inc., in order to help other sexually
trafficked victims find the resources they need to recover and heal. See
www.victimsrefusesilence.org.
27. The “goal” of Victims Refuse Silence “was, and continues to be, to help survivors
surmount the shame, silence, and intimidation typically experienced by victims of sexual
abuse.” Toward this end, Ms. Giuffre has “dedicated her professional life to helping
victims of sex trafficking.”
Agreed.
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28. Ms. Giuffre repeatedly has sought out media organizations to discuss her alleged
experience as a victim of sexual abuse.
Denied. Ms. Giuffre was approached by numerous media outlets and refused to speak to
most of them. Media organizations sought her out; she did not seek them out. See McCawley
Dec. at Exhibit 35, GIUFFRE003690, email from Sharon Churcher seeking to interview Ms.
Giuffre.
29. On December 30, 2014, Ms. Giuffre publicly filed an “entirely unnecessary” joinder
motion laden with “unnecessary,” “lurid details” about being “sexually abused” as a
“minor victim[]” by wealthy and famous men and being “trafficked” all around the world
as a “sex slave.”
See Ms. Giuffre’s Paragraph 7, supra, listing multiple reasons why details were, in fact,
necessary.
30. The Ms. Giuffre’s alleged purpose in filing the joinder motion was to “vindicate” her
rights under the CVRA, expose the government’s “secretly negotiated” “non-prosecution
agreement” with Epstein, “shed tremendous public light” on Epstein and “other powerful
individuals” that would undermine the agreement, and support the CVRA Ms. Giuffre’s’
request for documents that would show how Epstein “used his powerful political and
social connections to secure a favorable plea deal” and the government’s “motive” to aid
Epstein and his “co-conspirators.”
See Ms. Giuffre’s Paragraph 7, supra, listing multiple purposes of Ms. Giuffre’s lawyers’
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31. Ms. Giuffre has written the manuscript of a book she has been trying to publish detailing
her alleged experience as a victim of sexual abuse and of sex trafficking in Epstein’s
alleged “sex scheme.”
See Ms. Giuffre’s Paragraph 52, infra, explaining that the context of this statement is
misleading.
32. Republication alleged by Ms. Giuffre. Ms. Giuffre was required by Interrogatory No. 6
to identify any false statements attributed to Ms. Maxwell that were “‘published globally,
including within the Southern District of New York,’” as Ms. Giuffre alleged in
Paragraph 9 of Count I of her complaint. In response, Ms. Giuffre identified the January
2015 statement and nine instances in which various news media published portions of the
January 2015 statement in news articles or broadcast stories.
Ms. Giuffre objects to this paragraph in its entirety, starting with the bolded heading
case, as explained in Ms. Giuffre’s memorandum of law. Accordingly, Ms. Giuffre is not and has
not alleged republication. As noted in her objection that, it is Defendant who possesses the
responsive list would be unduly burdensome.” This, of course, is because Defendant caused her
statement to be published in an enormous number of media outlets. Ms. Giuffre’s full response to
Interrogatory No. 6 is below. As the Court can see, these nine instances were a good-faith effort
to provide some samples (as it would be virtually impossible to provide all of them), below. Ms.
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Giuffre has also put forth an exhaustive expert report and expert testimony from Jim Jansen
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While there may be certain publications who did not print every word of Defendant’s
lengthy press release, most publications quoted the most salient, to-the-point parts of
Defendant’s statement that call Ms. Giuffre a liar. In each of the nine articles listed above, the
actionable, is published. See Giuffre v. Maxwell, 165 F. Supp.3d 147, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
(“statements that Giuffre’s claims ‘against [Defendant] are untrue,’ have been ‘shown to be
untrue,’ and are ‘obvious lies’ have a specific and readily understood factual meaning: that
Giuffre is not telling the truth about her history of sexual abuse and Defendant’s role, and that
some verifiable investigation has occurred and come to a definitive conclusion proving that fact.
Second, these statements (as they themselves allege), are capable of being proven true or false,
and therefore constitute actionable fact and not opinion”). Ms. Giuffre also put forth extensive
viewers through her expert witness Jim Jansen. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 24, Expert Report
of Jim Jansen.
34. Ms. Maxwell and her agents exercised no control or authority over any media
organization, including the media identified in Ms. Giuffre’s response to Interrogatory
No. 6, in connection with the media’s publication of portions of the January 2015
statement.
Ms. Giuffre disputes this statement in its entirety, as it is completely devoid of record
evidence. In fact, the record establishes the contrary. First, Defendant hired Gow because his
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position allowed him to influence the press to publish her defamatory statement. A sampling of
***
Q. Is it your belief that that agreement was in effect on January 2nd, 2015?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall the terms of that agreement?
A. Well, it was a re-establishment of an existing agreement so if we go back to the
original agreement, it was to provide public relations services to Ms. Maxwell in
the matter of Giuffre and her activities.
***
Q. You can answer -- to the extent that anything you testify to is not protected by a
privilege.
A. Ms. Roberts first came to my attention on or around March 2011 when I was
called into a meeting with Philip Barden and Ms. Maxwell at Devonshires law office,
that she had made -- Ms. Giuffre had made extremely unpleasant allegations about
Ms. Maxwell's private life. We were -- Acuity Reputation, my firm was called in to
protect Ms. Maxwell's reputation, and to set the record straight. That was -- and
that work commenced on or around March of 2011.
***
Q. Does this document fairly depict pages from your -- from Acuity Reputation's
website?
A. It does.
Q. Do you see where it says "We manage reputation and forge opinion through
public relations, strategic communications and high level networking"?
A. I do.
Q. Is that a true statement?
A. Say it again. Sorry.
Q. Is that a true statement?
A. It is, yes. I wrote that statement.
***
Q. · · Okay.· Do you see where your website claims that your company has "excellent
relationships with the media"?
A.· · I do.
Q.· · Is that a true statement?
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111:3-7. In addition to testimonial evidence, the proof is also in the result. By using Gow to issue
her press release, Defendant caused her statement to be published by numerous major news
organizations with wide readership all over the globe. Accordingly, the record evidence shows
that Ms. Maxwell, through her agent, had immense control and authority over the media,
convincing major news outlets to publish her words based on nothing more than a single email
from Gow.
35. Ms. Giuffre’s defamation action against Ms. Maxwell. Eight years after Epstein’s guilty
plea, Ms. Giuffre brought this action, repeating many of the allegations she made in her
CVRA joinder motion.
Agreed, but noting that the defamation cause of action against Defendant did not accrue
until Defendant defamed her in January of 2015, the same year Ms. Giuffre filed suit against
36. The complaint alleged that the January 2015 statement “contained the following
deliberate falsehoods”:
(a) That Giuffre’s sworn allegations “against Ghislaine Maxwell are untrue.”
(b) That the allegations have been “shown to be untrue.”
(c) That Giuffre’s “claims are obvious lies.”
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Agreed. However, in discovery, Defendant was finally forced to produce the complete
press release she issued. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 26, GIUFFRE00068.
37. Ms. Giuffre lived independently from her parents with her fiancé long before meeting Epstein
or Ms. Maxwell. After leaving the Growing Together drug rehabilitation facility in 1999,
Ms. Giuffre moved in with the family of a fellow patient. There she met, and became
engaged to, her friend’s brother, James Michael Austrich. She and Austrich thereafter rented
an apartment in the Ft. Lauderdale area with another friend and both worked at various jobs
in that area. Later, they stayed briefly with Ms. Giuffre’s parents in the Palm Beach/
Loxahatchee, Florida area before Austrich rented an apartment for the couple on Bent Oak
Drive in Royal Palm Beach. Although Ms. Giuffre agreed to marry Austrich, she never had
any intention of doing so.
Ms. Giuffre did not voluntarily live independently from her parents with her fiancé, rather
Ms. Giuffre was a troubled minor child who was not truly engaged prior to meeting Defendant and
Epstein. Where Ms. Giuffre lived, and who she lived with, are not relevant to the issues being
decided in this action. Again, this is merely a transparent distraction from the case that is
actually at issue, and is being used for the sole purpose of inserting conjecture in an effort to
Although Austrich testified that he proposed to Ms. Giuffre on Valentine’s Day, see
Austrich at p. 19, Ms. Giuffre was a troubled teen who could not realistically be considered a
fiancé in the true sense of the word, nor was she of legal age to marry. In fact, as accurately
described by Defendant, Ms. Giuffre never had any intention of marrying Austrich. Giuffre Dep. Tr.
at 127:22-128:21. Given that Ms. Giuffre was a child with limited legal capacity at this point, and
that she did not have any intention of marrying Austrich, a reasonable person could not assert that
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38. Ms. Giuffre re-enrolled in high school from June 21, 2000 until March 7, 2002. After
finishing the 9th grade school year at Forest Hills High School on June 9, 1999, Ms.
Giuffre re-enrolled at Wellington Adult High School on June 21, 2000, again on August
16, 2000 and on August 14, 2001. On September 20, 2001, Ms. Giuffre then enrolled at
Royal Palm Beach High School. A few weeks later, on October 12, 2001, she
matriculated at Survivors Charter School. Id. Survivor’s Charter School was an
alternative school designed to assist students who had been unsuccessful at more
traditional schools. Ms. Giuffre remained enrolled at Survivor’s Charter School until
March 7, 2002. She was present 56 days and absent 13 days during her time there. Id.
Ms. Giuffre never received her high school diploma or GED. Ms. Giuffre and Figueroa
went “back to school” together at Survivor’s Charter School. The school day there lasted
from morning until early afternoon.
Ms. Giuffre denies this statement. Either Defendant is blatantly misleading this Court or
Defendant simply does not understand how to interpret Ms. Giuffre’s school records. The record
reflects semester start and end dates per each 180 day school year, not dates that Ms. Giuffre
physically enrolled or withdrew from school. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 27, GM0888.
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While “Grade 30” indicates adult education, Ms. Giuffre’s attendance records indicate that she
was not present in school between 6/21/00-09/20/01 (see withdrawal codes W32 and W47).
More importantly, Ms. Giuffre’s school transcripts clearly indicate “NO COURSES
TAKEN” for the 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 school years. (See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 27,
GM_00893.) Ms. Giuffre’s attempt to work and resume school at Survivor’s Charter School as a
10th grader in the 2001-2002 school year was limited to a portion of the school year (10/20/01-
03/07/02), and further substantiates Ms. Giuffre’s testimony that she attempted to get away from
Q: Was there a period of time between 2001 and when she left in 2002 here she was
not working for Jeffrey?
A: Yes.
Q: What period of time was that?
A: It was pretty much, like, when she was actually working as a server. Like,
basically because we were trying to not have her go back there. Like, she did not
want to go back there. And we were trying to just work without needing his
money, you know.”
Q: So the thing that Virginia was tired of …What was it that Virginia was trying to
get away from and stop with respect to working at Jeffrey Epstein's house?
A: To stop being used and abused.
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Even still, if the records are correct, which Ms. Giuffre does not concede, the records
indicate that Ms. Giuffre’s attendance was poor, with 69 days present and 32 days absent out of a
required 180 day school year and that she was not enrolled at the end of the school year
(emphasis added).
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pilot on flight logs, and an abundence of witness testimony all corroborate her story that she was
that Ms. Giuffre was flying domestic and internationally with Epstein at least 32 times between
flights). See McCawley Dec. at Exhibits 15 and 41, Pilot, David Rodgers’ Dep. Tr. 96:12-166;
Rodger’s Dep. Ex. 1 (Ms. Giuffre flight dates: 12/11/00; 12/14/00 (GIUFFRE007095); 01/26/01;
McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 1, Alessi Dep. Tr. at 104: 9-14 (Q: Do you know how long Virginia
had been coming over to the house before she started traveling on an airplane with Ghislaine and
Jeffrey? THE WITNESS: Not too long. I don't think it was too long after that); See McCawley
39. During the year 2000, Ms. Giuffre worked at numerous jobs. In 2000, while living with
her fiancé, Ms. Giuffre held five different jobs: at Aviculture Breeding and Research
Center, Southeast Employee Management Company, The Club at Mar-a-Lago, Oasis
Outsourcing, and Neiman Marcus. Her taxable earnings that year totaled nearly $9,000.
Ms. Giuffre cannot now recall either the Southeast Employee Management Company or
the Oasis Outsourcing jobs.
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Ms. Giuffre disputes this statement. During 2000, Ms. Giuffre shared an apartment with
her then boyfriend, James Michael Austrich and his friend, Mario. See McCawley Dec. at
Exhibit 2, Austrich Dep. Tr. at p. 92. Although Austrich testified that he proposed to Ms. Giuffre
on Valentine’s Day, see Austrich at p. 19, Ms. Giuffre was a troubled teen who could not
realistically be considered a fiancé in the true sense of the word nor was she of legal age to
marry. While Ms. Giuffre held various jobs in 2000, “[SSA] records do not show the exact date
of employment (month and day) because [they] do not need this information to figure Social
The reason that Ms. Giuffre cannot recall two companies listed on her SSA records
(Southeast Employee Management Company or Oasis Outsourcing) is simply because they were
not her employers. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 5, Giuffre Dep. Tr. at 470-472. Had Defendant
bothered to run a simple google search, she could have ruled them out as being payroll and
http://www.progressiveemployer.com/;
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20060501006151/en/Progressive-Employer-Services-
Purchases-Southeast-Employee-Management.
Ms. Giuffre has testified that she believes she worked at Taco Bell, at an aviary, then
Mar-a-Lago (See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 5, Giuffre Dep. Tr. at p. 53, 470). Austrich also
testified that Ms. Giuffre worked with him at Taco Bell, as well as a pet store for “over a month”
before working at Mar-a-Lago (See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 5, Austrich Dep. Tr. at p. 16, 30,
98). Neither Taco Bell nor the pet store are listed on Ms. Giuffre’s SSA records because they
were most likely paid through payroll companies. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 46,
GIUFFRE009178. Ms. Giuffre also testified that she volunteered at an aviary where they
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eventually put her on their payroll, but paid her very little. Giuffre Dep. Tr. at p. 52; Aviculture
Breeding and Research Center taxable earnings for 2000 is $99.48, See McCawley Dec. at
40. Ms. Giuffre’s employment at the Mar-a-Lago spa began in fall 2000. Ms. Giuffre’s
father, Sky Roberts, was hired as a maintenance worker at the The Mar-a-Lago Club in
Palm Beach, Florida, beginning on April 11, 2000. Mr. Roberts worked there year-round
for approximately 3 years. After working there for a period of time, Mr. Roberts became
acquainted with the head of the spa area and recommended Ms. Giuffre for a job there.
Mar-a-Lago closes every Mother’s Day and reopens on November 1. Most of employees
Mar-a-Lago, including all employees of the spa area such as “spa attendants,” are
“seasonal” and work only when the club is open, i.e., between November 1 and Mother’s
Day. Ms. Giuffre was hired as a “seasonal” spa attendant to work at the Mar-a-Lago Club
in the fall of 2000 after she had turned 17.
Ms. Giuffre disputes this statement. Defendant cannot simply infer Ms. Giuffre’s
employment history and claim it to be undisputed. The Mar-a-Lago Club produced 177 pages of
records in response to Defendant’s subpoena. However, not one page indicated Ms. Giuffre’s
actual dates of employment, nor whether she was a full-time or seasonal employee. In fact, the
only significant record produced was a single, vague chart entry indicating that Ms. Giuffre was
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Job postings and job descriptions produced by Mar-a-Lago from 2002 and later are
irrelevant to Ms. Giuffre’s employment because they are from after she worked there. Ms.
Giuffre testified that Mar-a-Lago was a summer job. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 5, Giuffre
Dep. Tr. 56, 550. In fact, her father, Sky Roberts, testified that he referred his daughter for
employment, and she did not get the job through a posting (See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 17,
Sky Roberts Dep. Tr. at 72); he drove his daughter to and from work consistent with his full time
schedule (See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 17, Sky Roberts Dep. Tr. at 74); he believes the spa –
like the kitchen/dining room - was open to local guests in the summer (See McCawley Dec. at
Exhibit 17, Sky Roberts Dep. Tr. 138-139); and that his daughter was not attending school when
she worked at Mar-a-Lago (See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 17, Sky Roberts Dep. Tr. 134). In
addition, Juan Alessi testified that it was “Summer” when Defendant approached Ms. Giuffre at
Mar-a-Lago because he specifically remembered “that day I was sweating like hell in the -- in
the car, waiting for Ms. Maxwell to come out of the massage.” See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 1,
41. Ms. Giuffre represented herself as a masseuse for Jeffrey Epstein. While working at
the Mar-a-Lago spa and reading a library book about massage, Ms. Giuffre met Ms.
Maxwell. Ms. Giuffre thereafter told her father that she got a job working for Jeffrey
Epstein as a masseuse. Ms. Giuffre’s father took her to Epstein’s house on one occasion
around that time, and Epstein came outside and introduced himself to Mr. Roberts. Ms.
Giuffre commenced employment as a traveling masseuse for Mr. Epstein. Ms. Giuffre
was excited about her job as a masseuse, about traveling with him and about meeting
famous people. Ms. Giuffre represented that she was employed as a masseuse beginning
in January 2001. Ms. Giuffre never mentioned Ms. Maxwell to her then-fiancé, Austrich.
Ms. Giuffre’s father never met Ms. Maxwell.
Ms. Giuffre denies Defendant’s false and factually unsupported narrative. In Florida, a
person cannot work as a masseuse unless she is “at least 18 years of age or has received a high
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school diploma or high school equivalency diploma.” Fla. Stat. § 480.041. Ms. Giuffre was a
minor child, under the age of 18, when she was working at Mar-a-Lago as a spa
attendant. Giuffre Dep. Tr. at 61:9-61:24. She was approached by Defendant, who told her she
could make money as a masseuse, a profession in which Ms. Giuffre had no experience. See
McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 5, Giuffre Dep. Tr. at 111:12-111:21; 116:19-117:12. (Sky Roberts,
Ms. Giuffre father, verified Ms. Giuffre’s account that Defendant recruited his daughter to “learn
massage therapy.” See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 17, Sky Roberts Dep. Tr. at 80:7-19; 84:18 -
85:1).
Ms. Giuffre’s father drove her to Jeffrey Epstein’s house, the address of which was given
to her by Defendant. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 5, Giuffre Dep. Tr. at 117:20-118:1. Ms.
Giuffre was lead into the house, and was instructed by Defendant on how to give a massage,
during which Epstein and Defendant turned the massage into a sexual encounter, and offered Ms.
Giuffre money and a better life to be compliant in the sexual demands of Defendant and
Epstein. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 5, Giuffre Dep. Tr. at 198:20-199:3; 199:15-199:18.
The minor Ms. Giuffre then began travelling with Defendant and Epstein on private planes and
servicing people sexually for money—working not as a legitimate masseuse, but in a position of
sexual servitude. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibits 5, 1, Giuffre Dep. Tr. at 193:22-194:16;
Epstein’s house manager, Juan Alessi, described Defendant’s methodical routine of how
she prepared a list of places ahead of time, then drove to each place for the purpose of recruiting
girls to massage Epstein. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 18, Alessi Dep. Tr. at 34;
multiple occasions he drove Defendant to pre-planned places while she recruited girls for
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massage. Id. He furthered testified that he witnessed Ms. Giuffre at Epstein’s house on the very
same day that he witnessed Defendant recruit Ms. Giuffre from Mar-a-Lago. See McCawley
Johanna Sjoberg, through her sworn testimony, demonstrated that Defendant recruited
her in a similar fashion by driving to the college campus where she attended school and
approached her to work at Epstein’s home answering phones. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 16,
Sjoberg Dep. Tr. at 8-9. Sjoberg testified that she answered phones for one day before
Defendant propositioned her to rub feet for $100.00 an hour. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 16,
Sjoberg Dep. Tr. at 13. The following day, Sjoberg was paired with Defendant’s assistant,
Emmy Taylor, who provided her with massage training on Epstein. Sjoberg at 13-15. Ms.
Giuffre’s then-boyfriend, Austrich, testified that he could not recall the name of the person who
recruited Ms. Giuffre. However, he did say that she was recruited by someone to work for
Epstein as a massage therapist, but that Ms. Giuffre did not have any experience. See McCawley
Dec. at Exhibit 2, Austrich Dep. Tr. at 34-35, 100-101, 127-128. Neither Ms. Giuffre nor Sjoberg
were licensed or trained in massage, but were invited soon after being recruited to travel with
Epstein on his private plane to massage him. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 16, Giuffre Dep. Tr.
at 16-17; Sjoberg Dep. Tr. at 13-15; Austrich Dep. Tr. at 109-110; Alessi Dep. Tr. at 104.
42. Ms. Giuffre resumed her relationship with convicted felon Anthony Figueroa. In
spring 2001, while living with Austrich, Ms. Giuffre lied to and cheated on him with her
high school boyfriend, Anthony Figueroa. Ms. Giuffre and Austrich thereafter broke up,
and Figueroa moved into the Bent Oak apartment with Ms. Giuffre. When Austrich
returned to the Bent Oak apartment to check on his pets and retrieve his belongings,
Figueroa in Ms. Giuffre’s presence punched Austrich in the face. Figueroa and Ms.
Giuffre fled the scene before police arrived. Figueroa was then a convicted felon and a
drug abuser on probation for possession of a controlled substance.
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This entire statement is wholly irrelevant to the case being tried, and is improperly being
inserted to tarnish the record. Ms. Giuffre’s dating history as a young teen bears no relation to
the allegations made within Ms. Giuffre’s complaint against Defendant. As previously stated,
Defendant is attempting to muddy the record with nonsensical teen drama in an effort to detract
from her salacious sexual abuse of a minor child. Such statements bear no relation to the issues
presented through her motion for summary judgment, and should be given weight reflecting the
same. As specifically set forth in Ms. Giuffre’s objections to designated testimony, the alleged
information would be excluded by multiple rules of evidence, and contested by Ms. Giuffre. See
McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 5, Virginia Dep. Tr., passim. Moreover, it was the Defendant who
solicited Anthony Figueroa to recruit high school aged girls for Epstein. See McCawley Dec. at
43. Ms. Giuffre freely and voluntarily contacted the police to come to her aid in 2001
and 2002 but never reported to them that she was Epstein’s “sex slave.” In August
2001 at age 17, while living in the same apartment, Ms. Giuffre and Figueroa hosted a
party with a number of guests. During the party, according to Ms. Giuffre, someone
entered Ms. Giuffre’s room and stole $500 from her shirt pocket. Ms. Giuffre contacted
the police. She met and spoke with police officers regarding the incident and filed a
report. She did not disclose to the officer that she was a “sex slave.” A second time, in
June 2002, Ms. Giuffre contacted the police to report that her former landlord had left her
belongings by the roadside and had lit her mattress on fire. Again, Ms. Giuffre met and
spoke with the law enforcement officers but did not complain that she was the victim of
any sexual trafficking or abuse or that she was then being held as a “sex slave.”
This statement is misleading in several respects and irrelevant. The fact that Ms. Giuffre
did contact police on two occasions for two specific purposes and did not take that opportunity to
also inform the police of everything else that was going on in her life at the time is immaterial.
Defendant implies that anytime someone calls the police for one thing they should tell the police
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about every other crime regardless of the relevance to the crime to which the police responded
and regardless to the threat to herself should she report on these powerful people. Moreover, as
Popular understandings of the term “sex slave” might still connote images of violent
pimps, white slavery, or of victims chained to a bed in a brothel in the minds of some
people. To call Ms. Giuffre a victim of sex trafficking would however very accurately
convey the reality that she along with a great many other victims of contemporary forms
of slavery are often exploited by the “invisible chains” of fraud and psychological
coercion.
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 23, Coonan Expert Report at 20. Ms. Giuffre specifically testified
that she was fearful of Defendant and Epstein, and, accordingly, she would not have reporter her
abusers. She also knew that Epstein had control over the Palm Beach Police. See McCawley Dec.
44. From August 2001 until September 2002, Epstein and Maxwell were almost entirely
absent from Florida on documented travel unaccompanied by Ms. Giuffre. Flight
logs maintained by Epstein’s private pilot Dave Rodgers evidence the substantial number
of trips away from Florida that Epstein and Maxwell took, unaccompanied by Ms.
Giuffre, between August 2001 and September 2002. Rodgers maintained a log of all
flights on which Epstein and Maxwell traveled with him. Epstein additionally traveled
with another pilot who did not keep such logs and he also occasionally traveled via
commercial flights. For substantially all of thirteen months of the twenty-two months
(from November 2000 until September 2002) that Ms. Giuffre lived in Palm Beach and
knew Epstein, Epstein was traveling outside of Florida unaccompanied by Ms. Giuffre.
During this same period of time, Ms. Giuffre was employed at various jobs, enrolled in
school, and living with her boyfriend.
The flight logs produced in this matter provide substantive evidence of Ms. Giuffre’s
travel while in the control of Defendant and Epstein, but are clearly incomplete. Moreover, Ms.
Giuffre also was flown by Defendant on commercial flights. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 5,
Giuffre Dep. Tr. at 155:5-11. Ms. Giuffre disputes Defendant’s statement to the contrary, as
reliance upon incomplete records to prove that Ms. Giuffre was not in fact in the presence of
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Defendant and Epstein is insufficient. Ms. Giuffre incorporates additional details contained in
Ms. Giuffre’s obvious gap in her school records, her presence verified by Epstein’s pilot
on flight logs, and witness testimony, corroborate her story that she was traveling with Defendant
and Epstein. In fact, flight logs and pilot testimony clearly prove that Ms. Giuffre was flying
domestic and internationally with Epstein at least 32 times between 12/11/00-07/28/01 and
As Defendant acknowledges in her own statement #44, flight records are incomplete.
There were several pilots and co-pilots that flew Epstein and Maxwell (Lawrence “Larry”
Visoski, David (Dave) Rodgers, Bill Hammond, Pete Rathgeb, Gary Roxburgh, and Bill
Murphy) in multiple aircrafts (JEGE, Inc. Aircraft # N908JE – Type B-727-31, and Hyperion
Air, Inc. Aircraft # N909JE – Type G-1159B). Yet, only one pilot, David Rodger’s produced
flight records. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 41, David Rodger’s Flight Log,
routinely traveled on commercial flights for the purposes of providing massages to Epstein or
guests at Epstein’s New York, New Mexico, or U.S. Virgin Island homes. See McCawley Dec.
As thoroughly depicted below, Ms. Giuffre’s passport application, travel records and
witness testimony clearly demonstrate flight logs are incomplete because only one pilot kept a
log, and Ms. Giuffre also flew commercially while she worked for Defendant and Epstein. For
example, on December 11, 2000, while underage, Ms. Giuffre appears on Rodger’s flight log
(flight #1433) traveling with Epstein, Maxwell and Emmy Taylor from PBI (Palm Beach, FL) to
TEB (Teterboro, NJ) then on December 14, 2001 (#1434) continues traveling with Epstein and
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Maxwell to TIST (U.S. Virgin Islands); however, there is no flight records of Ms. Giuffre’s
return to Palm Beach. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 15, see McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 41,
Rodger’s Dep. Ex. 1 at GIUFFRE007095; see also Rodger’s Dep. Tr. 96-98 (“Q: And do you
know how Jeffrey Epstein, Ghislaine Maxwell, Adam Perry Lang, and Virginia get off of St.
Thomas or leave the island? A: No. I do not. Probably a charter, I'm guessing.”).
On January 12, 2001, at Defendant’s directive, Ms. Giuffre applied for a Passport to
travel with them internationally. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 37, GIUFFRE004721, passport
application listing travel plans to London; flight logs subsequently lists Ms. Giuffre traveling to
On January 26, 2001, while underage, Ms. Giuffre appears on Rodger’s flight log (flight
#1444) traveling with Epstein, Maxwell and Emmy Taylor from TEB (Teterboro, NJ) to PBI
(Palm Beach, FL); however, there is no flight record indicating how Ms. Giuffre got to New
York. On January 27, 2001 (#1445) continues traveling with Epstein, Maxwell and Emmy
Taylor from PBI (Palm Beach) to TIST (U.S. Virgin Islands) returning from TIST (U.S. Virgin
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Islands) four days later on January 30, 2001. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 15, Rodger’s Dep.
On March 5, 2001 Ms. Giuffre, Maxwell, Epstein, Emmy Taylor traveled together
internationally (flight #1464) leaving PBI (West Palm Beach) to CYJT (Stephenville, Canada);
then on March 6, 2001 (#1465) they continued on to LFPB (Paris, France) with a layover for
three days. On March 8, 2001, other passengers, including one unidentified female, joined them
on flights # 1466-1467 (from LFPB (Paris, France) - LGGR (Granada, Spain) eventually landing
in EGGW (London, England) on March 11, 2001, where she was then introduced to and lent out
to Prince Andrew. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 15, Rodger’s Dep. Ex. 1 at GIUFFRE007097;
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See also photo of Ms. Giuffre, Maxwell and Prince Andrew in London.
Ms. Giuffre, Epstein, Maxwell, and Taylor remained in London for three days until
departing on March 11, 2001 (#1469), stopping in BGR (Bangor, Maine) before departing
(#1470) back to TEB (Teterboro, NJ); however, there is no flight record of Ms. Giuffre’s return
to Palm Beach. See Rodger’s Dep. Ex. 1 at GIUFFRE007097; Rodger’s Dep. Tr. at 104-114.
On March 27, 2001, while underage, Ms. Giuffre, Maxwell, Epstein, Emmy Taylor, two
unidentified females and others traveled together (#1478) from PBI (Palm Beach) to TEB
(Teterboro, NJ); then three days later, on March 29, 2001, continued on (#1479) to SAF (Santa
Fe, NM), returning to PBI (Palm Beach, FL) with Nadia Bjorlin (#1480) on March 31, 2001. See
McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 15, Rodger’s Dep. Ex. 1 at GIUFFRE007098; Rodger’s Dep. Tr. at
119-125.
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A few glaring examples of how Ms. Giuffre’s travel records are incomplete is that Ms.
Giuffre traveled from ADS (Addison, Texas) on May 3, 2001 (#1501) to SAT (San Antonio,
Texas); then departs SAT (San Antonio, Texas) on May 5, 2001 (#1502) to PBF (Pine Bluff,
AR) but there is no record produced that explains how Ms. Giuffre arrived in Addison, Texas or
how she returned to Palm Beach from Pine Bluff, AR. Although Epstein’s plane appears to have
to originated from Palm Beach on April 23, 2001, Ms. Giuffre’s name doesn’t not appear on the
log. See Rodger’s Dep. Ex. 1 at GIUFFRE007099; Rodger’s Dep. Tr. at 130-132 (“Q: Do you
know how Virginia Roberts got to Addison, Texas? A: No. … Q: Went to Addison and picked
Another prime example of how incomplete Ms. Giuffre’s travel records are is on on May
14, 2001. While Ms. Giuffre appears on flight #1506 with Epstein, Maxwell, Emmy Taylor and
others (including one unidentified female) from TIST (U.S. Virgin Islands) to TEB (Teterboro,
NJ), there is no record produced explaining how Ms. Giuffre arrived to the U.S. Virgin Islands or
where she stayed when she landed in New York. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 15, Rodger’s
Dep. Ex. 1 at GIUFFRE007100; Rodger’s Dep. Tr. at 132-133 (“Q: What were the other possible
avenues back in those days for Jeffrey Epstein, Ghislaine Maxwell to travel to the Virgin
Islands? A: They could have done a charter, possibly.”) (Id. at 134-135 “Q: All right. So at some
point in time, between May 7th and May 14th – A: Uh-huh. Q: -- somebody flies the Gulfstream
to the Virgin Islands. A: Correct. Q: And who would that be? A: Larry Visoski and I don't know
who the other person would have been.”); Id. at 136 (“Q. Do you know where Virginia Roberts
went during that time after she landed in Teterboro on the 14th? A. I do not.”)
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On June 3, 2001, Ms. Giuffre travels from PBI (Palm Beach) to TIST (U.S. Virgin
Islands) on flight #1510 for three days; then, on June 5, 2001, continues on flight #1511 to TEB
(Teterboro, NJ); however, there is no record of Ms. Giuffre returning to Palm Beach. See
Then, on July 4, 2001, Ms. Giuffre reappears on flight #1524 with Epstein and an
unidentified female leaving TIST (U.S. Virgin Islands) to return to PBI (Palm Beach); however,
there is no flight record that reflects how Ms. Giuffre got to the U.S. Virgin Islands. See
McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 15, Rodger’s Dep. Ex. 1 at GIUFFRE007101; Rodger’s Dep. Tr. at
138-139 (“Q. And do you know how Virginia Roberts got to the Virgin Islands? A: No. Q. Is
there any -- is it possible that the Cessna took her or the Boeing took her? Or any other aircraft
that is owned by Jeffrey? A: No, I would -- if I had to guess, I would guess the airlines.”)
Again, on July 8, 2001, Ms. Giuffre appears on flight #1525 with Epstein, Maxwell,
Emmy Taylor and others including an unidentified female departing PBI (Palm Beach) to TEB
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(Teteboro, NJ). Four days later, on July 11, 2001, Ms. Giuffre, Epstein and Maxwell continue on
(#1526) to CPS (Cahokia-St. Louis, Illinois) which was a stop due to a mechanical delay on the
way to Sante Fe, NM; however, there is no flight record that reflects how Ms. Giuffre returned
home to Palm Beach. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 15, Rodger’s Dep. Ex. 1 at
GIUFFRE007101; Rodger’s Dep. Tr. 139-141 (“Q: And then three days later, you leave out of
Teterboro to CPS? A: Yes. Q: Where is that? A: That is St. Louis, actually it is Cahokia, Illinois,
across the river from St. Louis. Q. Who are your passengers? A. Jeffrey Epstein, Ghislaine
Maxwell, Emmy Tayler, Virginia Roberts. We were actually en route to Santa Fe. We had a
On July 16, 2001, Ms. Giuffre appears on flight #1528 with Epstein, Maxwell and Emmy
Taylor from SAF (Santa Fe, NM) to TEB (Teteboro, NJ); however, Ms. Giuffre’s flight to Santa
Fe, NM is missing from the records. In addition, on July 28, 2001, Ms. Giuffre reappears on the
flight log (#1531) returning with Epstein from TIST (U.S. Virgin Islands) to PBI (Palm Beach);
however, there is no record of Ms. Giuffre’s flight to the U.S. Virgin Islands. See McCawley
Dec. at Exhibit 15, Rodger’s Dep. Ex. 1 at GIUFFRE007102; Rodger’s Dep. Tr.142.
On June 21, 2002, Ms. Giuffre appears on flight #1570 with Epstein, Maxwell, Sarah
Kellen, Cindy Lopez and Jean Luc Brunel from PBI (Palm Beach, FL) to MYEF (George Town,
Bahamas); however, there is no record of Ms. Giuffre returning to Palm Beach. See McCawley
Dec. at Exhibit 15, Rodger’s Dep. Ex. 1 at GIUFFRE007111; Rodger’s Dep. Tr. 161-162 (“Q:
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Virginia Roberts was taken to the Bahamas. Do you know where she went from there? A. I do
not.”)
On August 17, 2002, Ms. Giuffre appears on flight #1589 with Epstein, Maxwell, Sarah
Kellen, Cindy Lopez and others from SAF (Santa Fe, NM) to TEB (Teterboro, NJ); Ms. Giuffre
returns to PBI (Palm Beach, FL) on August 18, 2002 with Epstein and one unidentified female
(#1590). See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 15, Rodger’s Dep. Ex. 1 at GIUFFRE007112; Rodger’s
Dep. Tr. 165 (“Q: Do you know how Virginia Roberts got to Santa Fe? A: No.”)
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From September 29, 2002 through October 19, 2002, Defendant and Epstein sent Ms.
Giuffre on a commercial flight to Thailand for massage training and provided her with all
45. Ms. Giuffre and Figueroa shared a vehicle during 2001 and 2002. Ms. Giuffre and
Figueroa shared a ’93 white Pontiac in 2001 and 2002. Ms. Giuffre freely traveled around
the Palm Beach area in that vehicle. In August 2002, Ms. Giuffre acquired a Dodge
Dakota pickup truck from her father. Figueroa used that vehicle in a series of crimes
before and after Ms. Giuffre left for Thailand.
Ms. Giuffre and Tony Figueroa did not share a vehicle during 2001 and 2002. Instead,
Figueroa borrowed Ms. Giuffre’s car while she was traveling with Defendant and Epstein.
Figueroa testified that he “got to take the car, because she was going somewhere else in the
world and did not need it, so…” Figueroa Dep. Tr. At 89-90.
In fact, Ms. Giuffre was frequently traveling with Defendant and Epstein. See McCawley
Dec. at Exhibit 1, Alessi Dep. Tr. at 9-14 (stating that Virginia started traveling on an airplane
with Ghislaine and Jeffrey “not too long” after she started going over to the house). Figueroa
further testified that Virginia “would normally go about two weeks out of every month” with
Epstein. Figueroa Dep. Tr. at 90. He further stated, “Pretty much every time I took her there, it
was always to his mansion. I picked her up one time -- maybe it was a couple of times --from
the jet stream place. But pretty much every single time it was at the hou- -- at the mansion.” Id.
Moreover, Ms. Giuffre testified she purchased a car from the $10,000 payment she received from
Epstein after she was forced to have sex with Prince Andres in London at Defendant’s home
when Ms. Giuffre was a minor. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 5, Giuffre Dep. Tr. at 120:1-20.
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46. Ms. Giuffre held a number of jobs in 2001 and 2002. During 2001 and 2002, Ms.
Giuffre was gainfully employed at several jobs. She worked as a waitress at Mannino’s
Restaurant, at TGIFriday’s restaurant (aka CCI of Royal Palm Inc.), and at Roadhouse
Grill. She also was employed at Courtyard Animal Hospital (aka Marc Pinkwasser
DVM).
This statement is laughable. Ms. Giuffre was hardly gainfully employed during a time
period in which she was trying to escape from the grip Epstein and Maxwell had on Ms. Giuffre.
While Social Security provides that she earned nominal amounts of earning statements for 2001
and 2002, the records do not indicate the month or quarter of the year’s work. See McCawley
Dec. at Exhibit 46, GIUFFRE009176. For a brief period, Ms. Giuffre attempted to go back to
school to earn her GED, and tried unsuccessfully to hold down waitressing jobs. See McCawley
For example, in 2001, Ms. Giuffre earned $212.00 as a waitress working “briefly” at
Mannino’s Restaurant. (See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 5, Giuffre Dep. Tr. at 472). In 2002, Ms.
Giuffre earned $403.64 at CCI of Royal Palm Beach working there (TGI Fridays) for a “short
time period.” (See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 5, Giuffre Dep. Tr. at 473). Then, Ms. Giuffre
worked at Roadhouse grill until about March 2002 earning $1,247.90 (See McCawley Dec. at
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According to Dr. Pinkwasser’s records, Ms. Giuffre’s also received payroll checks for
weeks ending 04/22/02-06/04/02 earning a total of $1,561.75. (See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit
47, GIUFFRE009203).
Not long after Ms. Giuffre losing her job at Courtyard Animal Hospital,
GIUFFRE00009211, flight records show that Ms. Giuffre was soon back under Epstein’s control
traveling with Maxwell to the Bahamas, Santa Fe, New Mexico then New York, see McCawley
47. In September 2002, Ms. Giuffre traveled to Thailand to receive massage training
and while there, met her future husband and eloped with him. Ms. Giuffre traveled
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Ms. Giuffre did travel to Thailand to receive massage training in September 2002.
However, Defendant has inaccurately told only part of the story. Defendant has conveniently left
out certain key facts, which includes the fact that Ms. Giuffre was given an assignment from
Defendant and Epstein that she had to recruit another underage girl from Thailand, and bring that
young girl back to Epstein. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 43, GIUFFRE 003191. The
document Ms. Giuffre was give directs her to “call Ms. Maxwell.” See McCawley Dec. at
Exhibit 32, GIUFFRE003191. It is not disputed by Defendant or Epstein, that Ms. Giuffre was
expected to return to Epstein and Maxwell upon completion of her massage training and
assignment. It is undisputed by Ms. Giuffre that she did not return to Defendant and Epstein, but
instead escaped clear across the world to Australia where she remained in hiding from Defendant
48. Detective Recarey’s investigation of Epstein failed to uncover any evidence that Ms.
Maxwell was involved in sexual abuse of minors, sexual trafficking or production or
possession of child pornography. Joseph Recarey served as the lead detective from the
Palm Beach Police Department charged with investigating Jeffrey Epstein. That
investigation commenced in 2005. Recarey worked only on the Epstein case for an entire
year. He reviewed previous officers’ reports and interviews, conducted numerous
interviews of witnesses and alleged victims himself, reviewed surveillance footage of the
Epstein home, participated in and had knowledge of the search warrant executed on the
Epstein home, and testified regarding the case before the Florida state grand jury against
Epstein. Detective Recarey’s investigation revealed that not one of the alleged Epstein
victims ever mentioned Ms. Maxwell’s name and she was never considered a suspect by
the government. None of Epstein’s alleged victims said they had seen Ms. Maxwell at
Epstein’s house, nor said they had been “recruited by her,” nor paid any money by her,
nor told what to wear or how to act by her. Indeed, none of Epstein’s alleged victims ever
reported to the government they had met or spoken to Ms. Maxwell. Maxwell was not
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seen coming or going from the house during the law enforcement surveillance of
Epstein’s home. The arrest warrant did not mention Ms. Maxwell and her name was
never mentioned before the grand jury. No property belonging to Maxwell, including
“sex toys” or “child pornography,” was seized from Epstein’s home during execution of
the search warrant. Detective Recarey, when asked to describe “everything that you
believe you know about Ghislaine Maxwell’s sexual trafficking conduct,” replied, “I
don’t.” He confirmed he has no knowledge about Ms. Maxwell sexually trafficking
anybody. Detective Recarey also has no knowledge of Ms. Giuffre’s conduct that is
subject of this lawsuit.
This statement is false. Detective Recarey knew that Maxwell was involved in the illegal
sexual activities at Epstein's house. He wanted to speak to her, but Maxwell did not return his
calls. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 13, Recarey Dep. Tr. at 28:23-29:10. Detective Recarey
concluded that Defendant’s role was to procure girls for Epstein. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit
13, Recarey Dep. Tr. at 29:16-29:20. In the execution of the search warrant, stationary was
found in the home bearing Maxwell's name, and notes were written by house staff to Maxwell.
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 13, Recarey Dep. Tr. at 45:13-25; Id. at 83:3-83:15; see also
Message Pads, GIUFFRE 001412, 001418, 001435, 001446, 001449, 001453, 001454. A key
piece of evidence in the investigation were message pads uncovered in trash pulls, and from
inside the residence during the search warrant. Those message pads revealed numerous calls left
at the house for Maxwell, indicating she was staying in the house during the days when Epstein
Additionally, a walk through video taken during the execution of the search warrant
revealed photos of topless females at the home, and there was even a photograph of Maxwell
naked hanging in the home. The house staff who were deposed in the civil cases each testified to
Maxwell being the boss in charge of everyone in the house. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibits 1,
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19, 21, Banasiak Dep. Tr. at 8:21-9:16; 14:20-15:6; Alessi Dep. Tr. at 23:11-23:20; Rodriguez
Rodriguez, the house butler from 2004 through 2005, a time period that revealed daily
sexual abuse of underage females, testified that Maxwell kept a list of the local girls who were
giving massages at her desk, and that Maxwell kept nude photos of girls on her computer. See
McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 21, Rodriguez Dep. Tr. at 238:4-238:22; 302:19-303:10; 306:1-
306:24. Recarey testified that when the search warrant was executed, the house had been
sanitized and the computers removed from the home. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 13,
Recarey Dep. Tr. at 72:25-73:15. Banaziak testified that the computers were removed by
Adriana Ross, another employee who answered to Maxwell. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 19,
The record is replete with testimony demonstrating that Maxwell recruited Virginia, and
recruited other females, who in turn recruited other females, all who were sexually abuse by
Epstein; meaning, it is undisputed that Maxwell started the top of the pyramid of local Palm
Beach girls who were all eventually identified as victims. See, e.g., McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 1,
Alessi Dep. Tr. at 34:19-35:3; 98:5-98:12; 104:15-104:23. The co-conspirator who maintained
direct contact with the many underage victims was Sarah Kellen, whose sole responsibility was
to schedule underage girls to visit Epstein for sex. Sarah reported directly to Maxwell. See
McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 21, Rodriguez Dep. Tr. at 26:10-26:20. On the day when the search
warrant was executed, the house maid, Ruboyo was scheduled to report to the house that day at 8
am; however, she received a call from Maxwell telling her not to go. See McCawley Dec. at
Exhibit 20, Rabuyo Dep. Tr. at 81:20-82:25. Maxwell orchestrated and ran the entire sex
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trafficking scheme from a high level, and insulated herself from most of the underage girls who
Tony Figueroa, Ms. Giuffre's ex-boyfriend, did testify that Maxwell personally requested
that he find and bring girls to Epstein for sex once Ms. Giuffre had escaped, and that when he
brought the girls Maxwell interacted with them. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 4, Figueroa Dep.
Tr. at 200:6-18; 228:23-229:21. Rodriguez testified unequivocally that Maxwell was "the boss"
and that she knew everything that was going on. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 21, Rodriguez
49. No nude photograph of Ms. Giuffre was displayed in Epstein’s home. Epstein’s
housekeeper, Juan Alessi, “never saw any photographs of Virginia Roberts in Mr.
Epstein’s house.” Detective Recarey entered Epstein’s home in 2002 to install security
cameras to catch a thief and did not observe any “child pornography” within the home,
including on Epstein’s desk in his office.
Rodriguez Dep. Tr. 150:10-17; 306:1-306:24. He also testified to there being a collage of nude
photos in Epstein's closet. Id. 253:14-254:18. That collage was eventually taken into evidence
by Detective Recarey, who testified to that fact in his deposition. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit
13, Recarey Dep. Tr. at 73:19-73:24. And those photos are still in the possession of the FBI or
US Attorney's Office. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 13, Recarey Dep. Tr. at 74:2-74:7.
Numerous other people have testified about nude photographs being on display in the
home including Ronaldo Rizzo, who visited the home on numerous occasions and who was
reprimanded by Maxwell herself for looking at the nude photos. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit
14, Rizzo Dep. Tr. at 25:19-26:20. Additionally, the search warrant video, taken at a time when
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the house had already been sanitized, revealed photographs of nudity displayed, including a
photograph of Maxwell herself in the nude. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 44, Search Warrant
Johanna Sjorberg testified that the Defendant bought her a camera for the specific
purpose of her taking nude photos of herself. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 16 Sjoberg Tr. at
150. Finally, Virginia Giuffre testified that there was a nude photograph of her at the house. See
50. Ms. Giuffre intentionally destroyed her “journal” and “dream journal” regarding
her “memories” of this case in 2013 while represented by counsel. Ms. Giuffre
drafted a “journal” describing individuals to whom she claims she was sexually trafficked
as well as her memories and thoughts about her experiences with Epstein. In 2013, she
and her husband created a bonfire in her backyard in Florida and burned the journal
together with other documents in her possession. Id. Ms. Giuffre also kept a “dream
journal” regarding her thoughts and memories that she possessed in January 2016. To
date, Ms. Giuffre cannot locate the “dream journal.”
The dream journal contained memories of Ms. Giuffre’s dreams. While Ms. Giuffre has
looked for this journal, which is wholly irrelevant to this case, she has been unable to locate it.
Ms. Giuffre also wrote in a personal journal some of her experiences with Maxwell and Epstein,
which were harmful and painful. In an effort to relieve herself of those past painful experiences,
Ms. Giuffre followed the advice of a therapist, and burned the journal as a form of cathartic
release at a time when she was under no obligation to maintain the personal memorialization of
personal and painful experiences. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 5, Giuffre Dep. Tr. at 205:13-
206:10.
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51. Ms. Giuffre publicly peddled her story beginning in 2011. Ms. Giuffre granted
journalist Sharon Churcher extensive interviews that resulted in seven (7) widely
distributed articles from March 2011 through January 2015. Churcher regularly
communicated with Ms. Giuffre and her “attorneys or other agents” from “early 2011” to
“the present day.” Ms. Giuffre received approximately $160,000 for her stories and
pictures that were published by many news organizations.
Defendant's statement misrepresents history. In 2011, Ms. Giuffre was still in hiding
from Epstein and Maxwell in Australia. Ms. Giuffre was not looking to sell anything or even
speak with anyone about what had happened to her in her previous life from which she
dramatically escaped. Journalist, Sharon Churcher, located Ms. Giuffre and impressed the
importance of Ms. Giuffre standing up to those who had harmed her and speak with Federal
authorities, which Ms. Giuffre did in 2011. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 31, Redacted 302
GIUFFRE001235-01246.
In addition, Churcher impressed the importance of bringing the abuse of Defendant and
Epstein to public light to prevent their continued abuse of others. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit
35, Giuffre003690. After much deliberation, Ms. Giuffre agreed to be interviewed by Churcher,
and was compensated for sharing her story, which came at a heavy price of being publicly
scrutinized.
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Defendant’s characterization of these activities are out of context and thus misleading. In
2008, Ms. Giuffre received a Victim Notification Letter from the United States Attorney’s office
for the Southern District of Florida, see McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 30, GIUFFRE0010202,
regarding her sexual victimization by Epstein. Thereafter, in 2011, she sought psychological
counseling from a psychologist for the trauma she endured. Also that year, journalist Sharon
Churcher sought her out, and traveled half way around the globe to interview her on painful
subjects. Ms. Giuffre was interviewed by the FBI in 2011. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 31,
FBI Redacted 302 GIUFFRE01235-1246. She was also getting psychological help. See
Ms. Giuffre began to draft a fictionalized account of what happened to her. It was against this
backdrop of her trauma being unearthed, her steps to seek psychological counseling for it, that
she drafted this manuscript. Doing so was an act of empowerment and a way of reframing and
taking control over the narrative of her past abuse that haunts her.
“Writing ‘I’ has been an emancipatory project for women.” Perreault, Jeanne,
edited by Sidonie Smith & Julia Watson. Indeed, scholars have written that the act of engaging in
one’s own narrative and one’s own self: “Thus a specific recitation of identity involves the
inclusion of certain identity contents and the exclusion of others; the incorporation of certain
narrative itineraries and internationalities, the silencing of others; the adoption of certain
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Indeed, even a cursory look at the manuscript penned by Ms. Giuffre informs the reader
that she is trying to put forth a more palatable and more empowering narrative to over-write that
powerlessness she felt when being abused by Defendant and Epstein. While Ms. Giuffre
explored trying to publish her story to empower other individuals who were subject to abuse, she
ultimately decided not to publish it. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 5, Giuffre Dep. Tr. 249:16-
18; 250:19-251:3.
53. Ms. Giuffre’s publicly filed “lurid” CVRA pleadings initiated a media frenzy and
generated highly publicized litigation between her lawyers and Alan Dershowitz. On
December 30, 2014, Ms. Giuffre, through counsel, publicly filed a joinder motion that
contained her “lurid allegations” about Ms. Maxwell and many others, including Alan
Dershowitz, Prince Andrew, Jean-Luc Brunel. The joinder motion was followed by a
“corrected” motion and two further declarations in January and February 2015, which
repeated many of Ms. Giuffre’s claims. These CVRA pleadings generated a media
maelstrom and spawned highly publicized litigation between Ms. Giuffre’s lawyers,
Edwards and Cassell, and Alan Dershowitz. After Ms. Giuffre publicly alleged Mr.
Dershowitz of sexual misconduct, Mr. Dershowitz vigorously defended himself in the
media. He called Ms. Giuffre a liar and accused her lawyers of unethical conduct. In
response, attorneys Edwards and Cassell sued Dershowitz who counterclaimed. This
litigation, in turn, caused additional media attention by national and international media
organizations.
See Ms. Giuffre’s Paragraph 7, supra, explaining why the allegations were necessary and
appropriate for multiple reasons. Ms. Giuffre disputes Defendant’s false characterization of these
events, and, indeed, the media attention was caused by Defendant’s is suing her defamatory press
release.
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54. Ms. Giuffre formed non-profit Victims Refuse Silence to attract publicity and speak
out on a public controversy. In 2014, Ms. Giuffre, with the assistance of the same
counsel, formed a non-profit organization, Victims Refuse Silence. According to Ms.
Giuffre, the purpose of the organization is to promote Ms. Giuffre’s professed cause
against sex slavery. The stated goal of her organization is to help survivors surmount the
shame, silence, and intimidation typically experienced by victims of sexual abuse. Ms.
Giuffre attempts to promote Victims Refuse Silence at every opportunity. For example,
Ms. Giuffre participated in an interview in New York with ABC to promote the charity
and to get her mission out to the public.
Ms. Giuffre did not form the non-profit Victims Refuse Silence to "speak out on a public
controversy," but instead to simply help survivors of sexual abuse and sexual trafficking. In
order to provide assistance to victims, Ms. Giuffre attempted to talk about the non-profit’s
55. Virginia Roberts was born August 9, 1983. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 51,
57. In 2000, Virginia's father Sky Roberts worked at the Mar-a-Lago. See McCawley
58. Sky Roberts got Virginia a job at Mar-a-Lago in 2000, either months before or
just after Virginia's 17th birthday. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 17, Sky Roberts Dep. Tr. at
59. The only year in which Virginia was employed at Mar-a-Lago was 2000. See
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60. Virginia worked at Mar-a-Lago as a spa bathroom attendant. See McCawley Dec.
61. Virginia was not a masseuse at Mar-a-Lago as she had no massage experience.
See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 5, Giuffre Dep. Tr. at 111:12-111:21; 116:19-117:12; Austrich
Dep. Tr. at 34-35, 100-101, 127-128; Figueroa Dep. Tr. at 82:10-15; 168:24-169:1; Sky Roberts
62. Maxwell approached Virginia at Mar-a-Lago, and recruited her to come to Jeffrey
Epstein's house. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibits 1, 5, and 17, Giuffre Dep. Tr. at 111:12-111:21;
116:19-117:12; Alessi Dep. Tr. at 94:24-95:2; Sky Roberts Dep. Tr. at 80:7-19; 84:18 -85:1.
63. At the time Maxwell recruited Virginia to Jeffrey Epstein's house, Virginia was
either 16 or 17 years old, depending on whether this occurred just before or just after Virginia's
64. Virginia followed Maxwell's instructions and reported to Jeffrey Epstein's house
on the night of the day when Maxwell approached Virginia at Mar-a-Lago. See McCawley Dec.
at Exhibits 5 and 18, Giuffre Dep. Tr. at 117:20-118:1; Alessi Dep. Tr. at 96-98;
GIUFFRE000102-103 at p. 48-49.
65. Maxwell told Virginia at Mar-a-Lago that Virginia could get paid for giving a
massage to Jeffrey Epstein. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 5, Giuffre Dep. Tr. at 111:12-111:21;
116:19-117:12.
66. When Virginia arrived at Epstein's house, she was taken upstairs to Epstein's
bedroom, and instructed by Maxwell and Epstein how to give Epstein a massage. See McCawley
Dec. at Exhibit 5, Giuffre Dep. Tr. at 198:20-199:3; 199:15-199:18; Epstein Dep. Tr. at 74:3-14.
63
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67. Epstein and Maxwell turned the massage into a sexual encounter. See McCawley
68. Virginia was not a professional masseuse, and was not old enough to be a
masseuse in Florida even though Maxwell testified she only hired professional masseuses. See
McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 5, Giuffre Dep. Tr. at 61:9-61:24, 111:12-111:21, 116:19-117:12; Fla.
Stat. § 480.041; Maxwell Dep. Tr. at 23:21-24:9; 31:6-18; 41:7-13; 220:13-221:2; 225:23-
69. Maxwell and Epstein promised Virginia money and a better life in exchange for
complying with their sexual demands. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 5, Giuffre Dep. Tr. at
198:20-199:3; 199:15-199:18.
70. Maxwell had sex with Virginia and other females. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit
5, Giuffre Dep. Tr. at 138:17-139:16; Maxwell 07-22-2016 Dep. Tr. at 86:25-87:9; 91:15-91:21.
71. Virginia was trafficked nationally and internationally for sexual purposes. See
McCawley Dec. at Exhibits 5, 1, 41? GIUFFRE007055-007161 (Flight Logs); Giuffre Dep. Tr.
72. Maxwell recruited other non-professionals under the guise of being a masseuse,
but in reality only recruited girls for sexual purposes. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibits 5, 16, 4, 1,
18 Giuffre Dep. Tr. at 198:20-199:3; Sjoberg Dep. Tr. at 13-15; Figueroa Dep. Tr. at 88:12-22;
73. Maxwell was the boss of others whose job it was to recruit minor females for
Epstein for sex, such as Sarah Kellen. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 21, Rodriguez Dep. Tr. at
26:10-26:20.
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74. Maxwell was a recruiter of underage girls and other young females for Epstein for
sex, and was the boss in charge of those females. See McCawley Dec. at Exhibits 16, 4, 21, and
1, Sjoberg Dep. Tr. 8-9, 13-15, 27; Figueroa Dep. Figueroa Dep. Tr. at 200:6-18; 228:23-229:21;
Rodriguez Dep. Tr. 169:1-169:4; Alessi Dep. Tr. at 23:11-23:20; 34:19-35:3; 98:5-98:12;
104:15-104:23.
1
This daytime business address is provided for identification and correspondence purposes only
and is not intended to imply institutional endorsement by the University of Utah for this private
representation.
65
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on January 31, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing
document with the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system. I also certify that the foregoing
document is being served this day on the individuals identified below via transmission of Notices
66
Case 18-2868, Document 282, 08/09/2019, 2628236, Page1 of 8
v.
Ghislaine Maxwell,
Defendant.
____________________________/
I, Sigrid McCawley, declare that the below is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge as follows:
1. I am a Partner with the law firm of Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP and duly
licensed to practice in Florida and before this Court pursuant to this Court’s Order granting my
3. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 1 are true and correct copies of Excerpts from
4. Attached here to as Sealed Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of Excerpts from
5. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of Excerpts from
6. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of Excerpts from
7. Attached hereto as Sealed Composite Exhibit 5 are true and correct copies of
Excerpts from May 3, 2016 and November 14, 2016, Deposition of Virginia Giuffre.
8. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 6 is a true and correct copy of Excerpts from
9. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 7 is a true and correct copy of Excerpts from
10. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 8 is a true and correct copy of Excerpts from
11. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 9 is a true and correct copy of Excerpts from
12. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 10 is a true and correct copy of Excerpts from
13. Attached hereto as Sealed Composite Exhibit 11 are true and correct copies of
Excerpts from April 22, 2016 and July 22, 2016, Depositions of Ghislaine Maxwell.
14. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 12 is a true and correct copy of Excerpts from
15. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 13 is a true and correct copy of Excerpts from
16. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 14 is a true and correct copy of Excerpts from
17. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 15 is a true and correct copy of Excerpts from
18. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 16 is a true and correct copy of Excerpts from
2
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19. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 17 is a true and correct copy of Excerpts from
20. Attached hereto as Sealed Composite Exhibit 18 are true and correct copies of
GIUFFRE000105; GIUFFRE000241-000242).
21. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 19 is a true and correct copy of Excerpts from
GIUFFRE004437-004438; GIUFFRE004477).
22. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 20 is a true and correct copy of Excerpts from
23. Attached hereto as Sealed Composite Exhibit 21 is a true and correct copy of
Excerpts from July 29, 2009 and August 7, 2009, Deposition of Alfredo Rodriguez
24. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 22 is a true and correct copy of August 1,
25. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 23 is a true and correct copy of September 15,
26. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 24 is a true and correct copy of September 15,
27. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 25 is a true and correct copy of November 28,
2016, Expert Report of Peter Kent
28. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 26 is a true and correct copy of January 2,
3
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29. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 27 is a true and correct copy of Excerpts of
30. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 28 is a true and correct copy of Excerpts of
Message Pads (GIUFFRE001388; GIUFFRE001409; GIUFFRE001412-4213;
GIUFFRE001417-18, GIUFFRE001421; GIUFFRE001423; GIUFFRE001426-1428;
GIUFFRE001432-1433; GIUFFRE001435; GIUFFRE001446; GIUFFRE001448-1449;
GIUFFRE001452-1454; GIUFFRE001456; GIUFFRE001462; GIUFFRE001474;
GIUFFRE001563).
31. Attached here to as Sealed Exhibit 29 is a true and correct copy of Epstein’s
32. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 30 is a true and correct copy of September 3,
33. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 31 is a true and correct copy of July 5, 2013,
34. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 32 is a true and correct copy of Handwritten
35. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 33 is a true and correct copy of July 2001 New
36. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 34 is a true and correct copy of a February 17,
37. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 35 is a true and correct copy of February 13,
38. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 36 is a true and correct copy of February 25,
39. Attached hereto as Exhibit 37 is a true and correct copy of a Passport Application
4
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(GIUFFRE004721).
40. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 38 is a true and correct copy of Judith
41. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 39 is a true and correct copy of July 25, 2006,
42. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 40 is a true and correct copy of an Amazon
Receipt (GIUFFRE006581).
43. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 41 is a true and correct copy of David
44. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 42 are true and correct copies of Photographs
(GIUFFRE007162-7182).
45. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 43 is a true and correct copy of Travel
46. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 44 is a true and correct copy of Walkthrough
Video CD (GIUFFRE007584).
47. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 45 is a true and correct copy of West Palm
48. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 46 is a true and correct copy of October 23,
49. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 47 is a true and correct copy of November 7,
50. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 48 is a true and correct copy of January 2,
51. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 49 are true and correct copies of Termination
5
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52. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 50 is a true and correct copy of January 2,
53. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 51 is a true and correect copy of Virginia
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
6
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Respectfully Submitted,
David Boies
Boies Schiller & Flexner LLP
333 Main Street
Armonk, NY 10504
1
This daytime business address is provided for identification and correspondence purposes only and is
not intended to imply institutional endorsement by the University of Utah for this private representation.
7
Case 18-2868, Document 282, 08/09/2019, 2628236, Page8 of 8
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31st day of January, 2017, I electronically filed the
foregoing document with the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system. I also certify that the
foregoing document is being served to all parties of record via transmission of the Electronic
Note: This service is not intended for secure transactions such as banking, social media, email, or purchasing. Use at your own risk. We assume no liability whatsoever for broken pages.
Alternative Proxies: