Golden Gate University School of Law

Digital Commons: The Legal Scholarship Repository @ Golden

Gate University School of Law
Theses and Dissertations Student Scholarship

10-1-2007

The Use of Offender Profiling Evidence in Criminal

Cases
Norbert Ebisike
Golden Gate University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/theses

Part of the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ebisike, Norbert, "The Use of Offender Profiling Evidence in Criminal Cases" (2007). Theses and Dissertations. Paper 23.

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at Digital Commons: The Legal Scholarship Repository @
Golden Gate University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons: The Legal Scholarship Repository @ Golden Gate University School of Law. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu.
 11/02-/0 7

THE USE OF OFFENDER PROFILING EVIDENCE IN L-cw~ CoJ2-f,

CRIMINAL CASES . I
/-M,.
. ,.

~7;
BY

NORBERT EBISIKE

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF JURIDICAL SCIENCE AT GOLDEN GATE
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, SAN FRANCISCO,
CALIFORNIA

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
Dean Emeritus and Professor Peter Keane
Professor Dr. Christian Okeke
Distinguished Professor Emeritus Dr. Sompong Sucharitkul

2007
 Table of Contents

Acknow iedgements .................................................................. 3

Research Methodology ............................................................. 5

Abstract ................................................................................6

Introduction ........................................................................... 8

CHAPTER ONE: What is Offender Profiling? ....................................... 13

1.1 Definition of Offender Profiling ... ........................... '" ................... 13

1.2 Rationale for Offender Profiling ... ................................................. 16
1.3 Purpose/Goals of Offender Profiling ... ............................................ 17
1.4 Crime Scene Staging ............................................................ ....... 21
1.5 Modus Operandi ......................................................................... 22
1.6 Offender's Signature ................................................................... 23
1.7 Motives of a Crime ...................................................................... 25
1.8 Linkage Analysis ... ...................................................................... 26
1.9 Types of Crime Suitable for Profiling ....................................... .... 27
1.10 History and Development of Offender Profiling ... ............................ 29

CHAPTER TWO: Approaches to Offender Profiling ..................... 56

2.1 Diagnostic Evaluation Approach ... ................................................ 56

2.2 Criminal Investigative Analysis/FBI Approach ......... .................. ...... 60
2.3 Investigative Psychology Approach ... ............................................. 77
2.4 Geographic Profiling ................................................................... 90
2.5 Behavioral Evidence Analysis Approach ........................................ 93
2.6 Crime Action Profiling ................................................................. 97

CHAPTER THREE: Expert Testimony: The Conflicting Rules and

Standards ........................................................................... 100

3.1 The general rules and principles governing the admissibility of scientific
evidence in general ... ................. , ....................... , ..................... ...... 100

1
 3.2 The Frye Test Standard ... ..................................................... .... 102
3.3 Federal Rules ofEvidence ... ..................................................... 124
3.4 The Daubert Decision .............................................................. 138
3.5 General Electric Co ................................................................. 151
3.6 Kumho Tire Co ....................................................................... 156

CHAPTER FOUR: Offender Profiling in the Courtroom ............... 163

4.1 Is Offender Profiling Impermissible Character Evidence? ................ 164

4.2 Who is Qualified to give Expert Offender Profiling Testimony? ....... 185
4.3 Is Offender Profiling too Prejudicial than Probative? ....................... 194
4.4 Is Offender Profiling an Opinion on the Ultimate Issue? ................... 213
4.5 Is Offender Profiling Sufficiently Reliable as to be Admissible? ....... 221

CHAPTER FIVE: Offender Profiling in Comparative Perspective ... 268

5.1 Offender Profiling in England ... ................................................. 268
5.2 Offender Profiling in Canada ... ................................................... 283
5.3 Offender Profiling in Other Countries ... ....................................... 298

CONCLUSION ................................................................... 303

TABLE OF CASES ............................................................... 312

BIBLIOGRAPHy ............................................................... 315

l 2
 Acknowledgements

The members of my dissertation committee have been a source of inspiration and it is a

great honor and pleasure of having them as my advisers. I would like to thank them for

believing in me. I am greatly indebted to my dissertation supervisor, Dean Emeritus and

Professor Peter Keane, for the first class level of supervision that I have received. His

prompt responses to my work and detailed suggestions and advice made it possible for

me to produce this comprehensive, and interesting work, as well as being able to finish

the program on schedule. Distinguished Professor Emeritus Sompong Sucharitkul

provided me with a wide range of international and comparative perspectives to this

dissertation. I will forever be grateful to him for his excellent suggestions, advice and

encouragement. Professor Christian Okeke's insights, suggestions, advice and

encouragement also ensured that I never gave up my constant curiosity to learn.

Furthermore, I would like to thank the committee members for their open door policy, for

sharing their knowledge and for showing me the 'light'. They always made out the time

to advise me even without prior notice.

I would also like to thank my parents for their continued belief that education is a good

investment that opens many doors. May I also use this opportunity to express my

appreciation to my brothers and sisters for their encouragement and understanding

throughout this program.

3
 My sincere gratitude goes to all the staff of Golden Gate University Center for Advanced

International Legal Studies for their excellent support and encouragement. I would like to

thank Jonathan Chu, Administrative Director and John Pluebell, the Assistant Director of

the graduate programs, for their encouragement and for helping me with the

administrative side of things. My special thanks also go to Melissa Beuoy, at the Golden

Gate University Law Library, for her excellent and speedy assistance. She made sure that

I received all materials without any delay.

Finally, I would like to thank many people who assisted me in one way or the other

throughout this research. Many thanks to the offender profiling experts who assisted me

by sharing their knowledge and information with me.

I
 Research Methodology

This dissertation is a qualitative research with two methods of study. It involved

interviews with Crime Scene Analysts and Offender Profilers. This method provided first

hand and up to date information on the different approaches to offender profiling.

The standard legal research method of case analysis has also been used. This involved

extensive case analysis. Cases that involved offender profiling have been analyzed. This

method provided adequate background information on the admissibility problems of

offender profiling evidence.

The limitation to this dissertation is the unwillingness of some profilers to grant

interviews and share their knowledge.

5
~ ......................---------
Abstract

This dissertation examined the use of offender profiling evidence in criminal cases. The

meaning, history, approaches and legal admissibility of offender profiling have been

discussed. The introduction of offender profiling into the courtroom has been

controversial, problematic and full of inconsistencies. This dissertation therefore,

examined the central problems with offender profiling evidence, and answered such

questions as - Is offender profiling impermissible character evidence? Who is qualified to

give expert profiling evidence? Is offender profiling too prejudicial than probative? Is

offender profiling an opinion on the ultimate issue? Is offender profiling sufficiently

reliable as to be admissible? This dissertation has noted that in United States, there are

inconsistencies in the court decisions on offender profiling evidence as a result of the

three conflicting rules governing the admissibility of expert evidence. After a critical

examination of the three rules, the adoption of one rule has been suggested. The Frye test

standard combined with the Federal Rules of Evidence 702 provides the best

admissibility standard.

Many people are confused as to the appropriate discipline of offender profiling. This

dissertation has therefore, presented a step by step analysis of the history and

development of offender profiling. Offender profiling is a multi-disciplinary practice that

cuts across many disciplines. At the moment, it is best described as an art with the

potential of becoming a science. This dissertation concludes that offender profiling is not

1
~ .................. --------~

sufficiently reliable as to be admissible. It is too prejudicial than probative. This

dissertation also concludes that there is an uneasy relationship, lack of unity and absence

of sharing information amongst the different segments involved with offender profiling,

and that this problem has limited the potential of offender profiling. Hence, some courts

are not convinced as to the reliability and validity of this technique. Several

recommendations have been made.

7
 Introduction

In spite of the ever-increasing media interest in the use of offender profiling in criminal

trials, this technique is still not well understood by a lot of people, including judges,

lawyers and jurors. Some people see offender profiling as some sort of mystic and others

simply see it as a fiction. It is the aim of this dissertation to demystify offender profiling

and try to raise the general level of knowledge and understanding of this crime

investigation technique. This dissertation has two hypotheses. The first is that offender

profiling is not widely accepted in courts because its reliability and the scientific basis

has not been established and second, that there are inconsistencies surrounding the

admission of offender profiling as a result of the conflicting rules and standards

governing its admissibility in various jurisdictions. The central thesis of this dissertation

is that offender profiling is not sufficiently reliable as to be admissible (in proving the

guilt or innocence of an accused), its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its

probative value and that there is an uneasy relationship, lack of unity, cooperation and

absence of sharing of information among the different segments/profilers which has

limited the potential of offender profiling. There is the problem with the existence of

three rules governing the admissibility of expert evidence in United States. This has led

to inconsistencies in the decisions to admit or exclude offender profiling and its

derivatives. There has been a lot of conflicting court decisions on this technique.

8
This dissertation examined the central problems of offender profiling evidence. Two

questions provided the guideline to this dissertation. First, is offender profiling

sufficiently reliable as to be admissible? Offender Profiling involves gathering

information from the crime scene, witnesses, victim statements, autopsy reports,

offender's physical descriptions, race, age, criminal records and so on. The question then

is - how accurate is information gathered in this manner? Should it be tendered in court

as proof of guilt or innocence? Offender Profiling does not point to specific offenders. It

does not determine whether a given defendant committed a specific act. This question

arises because in several cases the reliability and accuracy of offender profiling has been

at issue. Second, is offender profiling more prejudicial than probative? Offender profiling

is too prejudicial to the accused. Offender profiling only provides an indication of the

type of person likely to have committed a type of crime. It does not point to a specific

individual. This question arises because in several cases examined, courts have been

inconsistent in their decisions on this issue.

In chapter one, we have discussed the meaning and nature of offender profiling. The

goals of offender profiling have also been discussed. Offender profiling is an innovative

but worrying technique of crime investigation. In order to have a better understanding of

this technique, the history and development have been discussed in this chapter.

Offender Profiling is mainly used by the police to narrow down suspects list in cases

where no physical evidence were left at the crime scene. In recent times however, this

technique has been introduced into the courtroom as evidence and there has been a lot of

9
 controversy surrounding it. Hence, there had been conflicting court decisions on its status

as admissible evidence. In several cases, the reliability, validity and scientific basis of this

technique had been at issue. Chapter two therefore, introduced us to the principles and

practice of offender profiling. The different approaches to profiling have been discussed,

bringing out their various strengths and weaknesses.

In chapter three, the general rules and principles governing the admissibility of scientific

evidence are discussed. The Frye Test Standard, The Federal Rules of Evidence, The

Daubert Decision and the Kumho Tire Co. decision have been critically examined. As we

mentioned earlier on, there are a lot inconsistencies surrounding the admission of

offender profiling in criminal cases. One reason has been identified and it relates to the

fact that there are three main rules governing the admissibility of scientific evidence. The

three rules are as follows. The Frye Test Standard, The Federal Rules of Evidence and

The Daubert Decision. Each state in United States has adopted one of these

rules/standards. Some states are using Frye, some have adopted the Daubert criteria

while others have adopted Frye plus their own Rules of Evidence. It should be noted that

the Daubert criteria is the main rule at the federal courts. This leads us to the question - Is

it possible to adopt one particular rule? This is a question that has also been examined.

This dissertation is also aimed at providing a critical analysis of the use of offender

profiling in criminal cases. Hence, in chapter four, we discussed the central problems of

offender profiling evidence. Cases that involved offender profiling have been critically

10

1
examined. The different areas of challenging offender profiling have also been discussed.

We have answered such questions as:

(1) Is offender profiling impermissible character evidence?

(2) Who is qualified to give expert offender profiling testimony?

(2) Is offender profiling too prejudicial than probative?

(3) Is offender profiling an opinion on the ultimate issue?

(4) Is offender profiling sufficiently reliable as to be admissible?

One of the aims of this research is to provide a comparative analysis of the use of

offender profiling in various jurisdictions. In chapter five therefore, we have discussed

the admissibility of offender profiling in England and Canada. We have also examined

the state of offender profiling in other countries.

In this dissertation we have made some recommendations, looked at the future of

offender profiling and have suggested areas where further research is needed. This

dissertation argues that offender profiling is a specialized area of knowledge, but at the

moment it has not reached a sufficient level of reliability as to be admissible. This

dissertation is very critical of the continued admission of offender profiling in criminal

trials and concludes that offender profiling is a technique based on assumptions,

suspicion, stereotypes and probabilities.

This dissertation differs from other previous published studies in many ways. First, this

work has presented an interdisciplinary and non-segmental approach to the understanding

11
of offender profiling. The nature, theory, practice and the legal aspects of offender

profiling have been presented in one study. This dissertation goes further with the theory

that offender profiling can be used in developing crime prevention measures. There has

also been an examination of offender profiling in a comparative perspective. Above all,

none of the previous published studies examined the uneasy relationship among the

different segments/approaches to offender profiling which has limited the potential of this

technique. This work has demystified offender profiling.

12
 CHAPTER ONE

What is Offender Profiling?

'Offender profiling' has become part of public consciousness

even though many people are not really sure what it is and
the great majority of people have no idea at all of how it is
done. This ignorance is just as prevalent in professional
circles as amongst the lay public. Psychologists,
psychiatrists, probation officers and social workers all have
an interest in how their disciplines can contribute to police
investigations, but few practitioners are aware of exactly
what the possibilities for such contributions are. Others, such
as police officers and lawyers, who seek advice from
'profilers' often also have only the vaguest ideas as to what
'profiling' consists of or what scientific principles it may be
based on. The army of students who aspire to emulate the
fictional activities of psychologists who solve crimes is yet
another group who desperately need a systematic account of
what 'offender profiling' is and what the real prospects for its
development are. I

Offender profiling has been defined in many ways by various scholars based on their

backgrounds. Similarly, offender profiling is known by various names such as

psychological profiling, criminal profiling, criminal investigative analysis, crime scene

analysis, behavioral profiling, criminal personality profiling, sociopsychological profiling

and criminological profiling. In this dissertation however, the term 'offender profiling'

will be used.

1 David Canter, Series Preface, in D. Canter, and L. Alison, (eds) Profiling in Policy and Practice, VII
(1999),

13
As Canter has noted, 'offender profiling' is a tenn coined by the FBI in the 1970's to

describe their criminal investigative analysis work. 2 He maintained that "when FBI

agents first began this work they invented a new tenn to grace their actions: offender

profiling. By doing so they created the impression of a package, a system that was sitting

waiting to be employed, rather than the mixture of craft, experience and intellectual

energy that they themselves admit is at the core of their activities,,3.

Canter sees offender profiling as 'criminal shadows'. He maintained that a criminal

"leaves psychological traces, tell-tale patterns of behaviour that indicate the sort of

person he is. Gleaned from the crime scene and reports from witnesses, these traces are

more ambigious and subtle than those examined by the biologist or physicist. They

cannot be taken into a laboratory and dissected under the microscope. They are more like

shadows, which undoubtedly are connected to the criminal who cast them, but they

flicker and change, and it may not always be obvious where they come from. Yet, if they

can be fixed and interpreted, criminal shadows can indicate where investigators should

look and what sort of person they should be looking for,,4

Canter and Heritage also maintained that "a criminal leaves evidence of his personality

through his actions in relation to a crime. Any person's behaviour exhibits characteristics

2D .
aVId Canter, Criminal Shadows: Inside the mind a/the serial killer, 12 (1994).
3 Id.

4 Id.

14
unique to that person, as well as patterns and consistencies which are typical of the sub-

group to which he or she belongs".5

Ainsworth defined offender profiling as "the process of using all the available

information about a crime, a crime scene, and a victim, in order to compose a profile of

the (as yet) unknown perpetrator,,6. For Davies, "offender profiling (more technically

known as Criminal Investigative Analysis) is the name given to a variety of techniques

whereby information gathered at a crime scene, including reports of an offender's

behaviour is used both to infer motivation for an offence and to produce a description of

the type of person likely to be responsible.,,7

Geberth sees a criminal personality profile as "an educated attempt to provide

investigative agencies with specific information as to the type of individual who may

have committed a certain crime,,8. Turvey, writing from a behavioral evidence analysis

point of view, defined offender profiling as "the process of inferring the personality

characteristics of individuals responsible for committing criminal acts,,9. For Grubin,

offender profiling refers to "information gathered at a crime scene, including reports of

5 David Canter and Rupert Heritage, "A Muiltivariate Model of Sexual Offence Behaviour: Developments
in Offender Profiling", Journal of Forensic Psychiatry, (1990).

6 Peter .B. Ainsworth, Offender Profiling and Crime Analysis, 7 (2001).

7
Anne Davies, Rapists Behaviour: A three Aspect Model as a Basis for Analysis and Identification of a
Serial Crime, Forensic Science International, 173 (1992).

8Vernon J. Geberth, Practical Homicide Investigations: Tactics, Procedures, and Forensic Techniques, 4th
edition, 46 (1996).
9
Brent Turvey, Criminal Profiling: Introduction to Behavioral Evidence Analysis, 1 (2002).

15
an offender's behaviour, used both to infer motivation for an offence and to produce a

description of the type of person likely to be responsible"lO.

Put simply, offender profiling is a crime investigation technique whereby information

gathered from the crime scene, witnesses, victims, autopsy reports and information about

an offender's behavior is used to draw up a profile of the sort of person likely to commit

such crime. It is a complementary technique and is usually taken up when no physical

traces were left at the crime scene. Offender profiling does not point to a specific

offender. It is based on the probability that someone with certain characteristics is likely

to have committed a certain type of crime.

Rationale for Profiling

There are two operating words in offender profiling: modus operandi (method of

operation) and behavior. The modus operandi could lead to clues about the offender.

There is the idea that an offender is likely to commit a particular type of crime in a

particular or similar pattern. Thus offender profiling is based on the premise that the

modus operandi may lead to clues about the perpetrator and that the crime scene

characteristics may point to the personality of the perpetrator. Behavior helps to predict

the personality type or the motives for the crime. Therefore, the single most important

thing that a pro filer looks for at a scene of crime is anything that may point to the

personality of the offender.

10 Don Grubin, Offender Profiling, Journal of Forensic Psychology 259 (1995).

16
The rationale behind this approach is that behavior reflects personality, and by examining

behavior the investigator may be able to determine what type of person is responsible for

the offense. II When profiling, the profiler notes the physical description, individual traits,

any odd behaviour and remarks or records of anything that the offender said or did during

the attack. Also to be noted are information about the steps the offender used to avoid

being detected, method of killing, or the way he approaches his victims, as well as notes

about the offender's gender, age group, race, occupation and criminal records. 12

The Purpose/Goals of Profiling

Offender Profiling is mainly used when the offender did not leave any physical trace at

the crime scene. It is used to narrow down the suspects list. As Douglas and Olshaker

have pointed out, "criminal profiling is used mostly by behavioral scientists and the

police to narrow down an investigation to those who posses certain behavioral and

personality features that are revealed by the way a crime was committed,,13. Continuing,

Douglas and Olshaker also maintained that "the primary goal is to aid local police in

limiting and refining their suspect list so that they can direct their resources where they

might do the most good".

11
John. E. Douglas., Ressler, R.K., Burgess, AW., and Hartman, c.R., Criminal Profilingfrom Crime
Scene Analysis .Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 403 (1986).
12
Norbert Ebisike, An Appraisal ofForensic Science Evidence in Criminal Proceedings, 44 (2001).
13
John. Douglas, J., and Olshaker, M., Mindhunte: Inside the FBI's Elite Serial Crime Unit, (1999).

17
"Another key use of a profile, is when necessary, to go proactive, which means letting the

public become a partner in crime solving. The unknown suspect may have displayed

some sort of odd behaviour to those close to him that will indicate his involvement with

the crime. Getting the public, and hopefully those people to be aware of what they have

seen, telling them to corne forward may solve the case". 14

Egger maintained that "the purpose of profiling is to develop a behavioral composite,

combining sociological and psychological assessments of the offender. Profiling is

generally based on the premise that an accurate analysis and interpretation of the crime

scene and other locations related to the crime can indicate the type of person who

committed the crime".IS Hence, "because certain personality types exhibit similar

behavioral patterns (in other words, behavior that becomes routine), knowledge and an

understanding of the patterns can lead investigators to potential suspects".16 Similarly,

Jackson and Bekerian maintained that "a profile is based on the premise that the proper

interpretation of crime scene evidence can indicate the personality type of the

individual(s) who committed the offence. It is assumed that certain personality types

exhibit similar behavioral patterns and that knowledge of these patterns can assist in the

investigation of the crime and the assessment of potential suspects". 17

14
Id.

15 Steven A. Egger, Psychological Profiling: Past, Present, and Future, Journal of Contemporary Criminal
Justice, vol. 15, No.3, August 1999,243 (1999).
16
Id.

17 Janet L. Jackson, and Bekerian D. A. (eds), Offender Profiling: Theory, Research and Practice, 3 (1997).

18
Holmes and Holmes have outlined three major goals of profiling as follows. 18

(1) Social and psychological assessments of offenders.

This involves an evaluation of the social and psychological characteristics of the

offender. In fact, "a profile should contain basic and sound information concerning the

social and psychological core variables of the offender's personality, including the

offender's race, age, employment status and type, religion, marital status, and level of

education. This psychological information will help to focus the investigation by

allowing police to narrow its range, which in tum will have a direct effect upon the

number of days and weeks police must spend on the case".19

(2) Psychological evaluations of belongings found III the possession of suspected

offenders.

This involves the evaluation of any items found at the suspect's home, such as souvenirs

taken from the crime scenes, pictures, videos, books, magazines or other items that might

point to the background and motives for the crimes, as well as link the suspect to the

crime. Holmes and Holmes noted the case of Jerry Brudos a sadistic serial killer in the

United States who had such a fetish about his victims' high heeled shoes. He took their

shoes, wore and stored them at his home. 2o

18 Ronald. M. Holmes., and Stephen T. Holmes., Profiling Violent Crimes: An Investigative Tool, 3 (1996).
19
Id
20
Id, at 4.

19
(3) Suggestions and strategies for interviewing suspected offenders when they are

apprehended.

Another primary goal of profiling is to suggest the most effective interviewing strategy to

be used once the offender has been arrested. As there are different types of offenders, one

interviewing/interrogation strategy may not be suitable for all the different types,

especially when dealing with rapists. As Holmes and Homes have pointed out, "not all

people react to questions in the same fashion. For one type of offender, one strategy may

be effective, but it is a mistake to assume that all those who commit similar crimes will

respond to the same interviewing strategy. For example, not all serial murderers kill for

the same reasons, and not all respond to the same type of interviewing strategy. Violent

personal offenders also vary in their motives as well as their responses to interrogation,,21.

It has been observed that offender profiling is usually taken up late in an investigation.

Offender profiling tends to be normally taken up as an alternative where DNA profiling is

impossible because there were no samples left at the scene of crime?2 There are

obviously certain dangers with this approach. It is therefore suggested that in

serious/major crimes, offender profiling should be used at the onset, along with the other

techniques. It should not be left till later in the investigation when we have come to

realize that no physical trace has been left at the crime scene, bearing in mind the issue of

'staged crime scenes'. Important details might be lost later in the investigation and as we

know, crime scenes can be tampered with, by both weather conditions and human

tampering.

21 Id, at 5,

22 Eb'lSI'ke, supra note 12, at 48,

20
~ ........................ ----~

Crime Scene Staging

'Crime scene staging' occurs when the offender alters the crime scene in order to conceal

the original intent. For instance, the offender may stage signs of burglary in order to

conceal a homicide. Arguably, staging is mainly done by an organized offender as

opposed to a disorganized offender. Hence, any evidence of staging at the crime scene

may point to an organized offender. In fact, an offender stages a crime scene in order to

"mislead the authorities and/or redirect the investigation. Staging is a conscious criminal

action on the part of an offender to thwart an investigation,,23. Geberth has clearly

outlined three types of staging:

1. The most common type of staging occurs when the perpetrator changes elements

of the scene to make the death appear to be a suicide or accident in order to cover

up a murder.

2. The second most common type of staging is when the perpetrator attempts to

redirect the investigation by making the crime appear to be a sex-related

homicide.

3. Arson represents another type of staging. The offender purposely torches the

crime scene to destroy evidence or make the death appear to be the result of an
24
accidental fire.

23Vernon J. Geberth, Practical Homicide Investigation: Tactics, Procedures, and Forensic Techniques, 4th
edition, 22 (2006).

24 Id, at 23.

21
Modus Operandi or Method of Operation (MO)

An offender's method of operation includes such things as the type of victim chosen,

location of attack, time of attack, type of weapon used, as well as the method of gaining

entry. The method of operation is very important in linking cases, but needs to be

examined with caution.

It should be noted that the method of operation can change. In fact, as an offender

commits more crime, he/she learns new ways that will help avoid detection. Hence, the

method of operation can change. For instance, an offender who normally strangles the

victims with bare hands may change and start strangling the victims with stockings or

start suffocating the victims with pillows. Similarly, an offender may change from

attacking at night to attacking during the day time, or the offender may change from

choosing females to males, young victims to older victims, blacks to whites, or blondes to

brunettes.

Douglas and Munn maintained that "the offender's actions during the perpetration of a

crime form the MO. The offender develops and uses an MO over time because it works,

but it also continually evolves. The modus operandi is very dynamic and malleable.

During his criminal career, an offender usually modifies the MO as he gains experience.

The burglar refines his breaking and entering techniques to lower his risk of apprehension

and to increase his profit. Experience and confidence will reshape an offender's MO.

22
Incarceration usually impacts on the future MO of an offender, especially the career

criminal. He refines the MO as he learns from the mistakes that led to his arrest,,25.

Furthermore, "the victim's response can also significantly influence the evolution of an

MO. If the rapist has problems controlling a victim, he will modify his MO to

accommodate resistance. He may bring duct tape or other ligatures, he may use a

weapon, or he may blitz-attack the victim and immediately incapacitate her. If such

measures are ineffective, he may resort to greater violence or kill the victim. Thus, MO

will evolve to meet the demands of the crime,,26. In fact, Turvey maintained that an

offender's MO "most often serves (or fails to serve) one or more of three purposes:

protects the offender's identity, ensures the successful completion of the crime and

facilitates the offender's escape',27.

Offender's Signature or Calling Card

It should be noted that modus operandi is different from the 'signature aspects', or the

'motives' of a crime. Holmes and Holmes maintained that "the signature of a perpetrator

is the unique manner in which he or she commits crimes. A signature may be the manner

in which the person kills, certain words a rapist uses with victims, a particular manner in

25 John. E. Douglas, Munn, C. M., "Modus Operandi and Signature Aspects of Violent Crime, in Douglas,
et ai, Crime Classification Manual, 260 (2006).

26 Id.
27
Brent Turvey, Criminal Profiling: An Introduction to Behavioral Evidence Analysis, 151 (1999).

23
which a perpetrator leaves something at crime scenes, or some other indicator,,28. Geberth

also maintained that "the signature aspect of a violent crime is a unique and integral part

of the offender's behavior. This signature component refers to the psychodynamics,

which are the mental and emotional processes underlying human behavior and its

motivations,,29. In fact, "when an offender displays behavior within the crime scene and

engages in activities which go beyond those necessary to accomplish the act, he is

revealing his signature. These significant personality identifiers occur when an offender

repeatedly engages in a specific order of sexual activity, uses a specific type of binding,

injures and/or inflicts similar types of injuries, displays the body for shock value, tortures

and mutilates his victim, and engages in some form of ritualistic behavior".3o Geberth

also noted that "one of the common signatures is that of the psychopathic sexual sadist,

who involves himself in complete domination of the victim".3)

The signature aspects of a crime, which can also be called the 'mark' of the perpetrator, is

an element in an offender's behavior which in most cases may always be present, and

recognizable at the scene of crime, but it can change. It is the overriding psychological

need of an offender. It is what drives a killer to engage in an attack and the particular

method of carrying out that attack. Signature aspects of a crime reveal the deep emotional

needs that have to happen in order for the offender to fulfill his or her fantasy. Put

simply, the signature aspect of a crime refers to the specific thing(s) that an offender tend

28
Holmes and Holmes, supra note 18, at 42.

29 Vernon J. Geberth, "The Signature Aspect in Criminal Investigations", Law and Order Magazine, 43 (11)
November 1995.
30
Geberth, supra note 23, at 824.

31 Id.

24
to do at the crime scene. It could be cutting off a specific part of the victim's body and

taking it as a souvenir, cutting the victims throats, or putting the victims inside the bathe

tub after killing them, and so on. Hence, signature can be described as the 'mark' of a

killer, which may distinguish one killer from another. It should be noted however that

there are various things that can affect signature. Therefore, signatures are not a

conclusive or a reliable indicator that a particular offender carried out a particular attack.

Offenders learn from other offenders, from television crime series, from their experience,

develop new fantasies and they also read/learn from books on crime investigations and

forensic science, and so their signature may change. Geberth will probably support this

view, and he wrote: "the 'signature' component may also change to some degree.

However, the change usually involves a progression of violence and sexual mutilation,

which is consistent with the paraphilia sexual sadism seen in lust murders,,32. The point

however, remains that signatures may change.

Motives of a Crime

The motive of a crime refers to the reason why the offender committed the crime. Motive

deals with the primary reason why a particular crime was committed. It is one of the

identifying elements at a crime scene. An offender can have different motives for

32
Id, at 822.

25
different crimes. Turvey observed that "an offender's motives are evidenced by signature

behaviors that suggest overall signature aspects, or motivational aspects of a crime". 33

Linkage Analysis

Linkage analysis refers to the method whereby behavioral patterns, wound patterns,

crime scene characteristics, victimology and other aspects of two or more crimes

committed at different crime scenes are examined in an attempt to ascertain whether the

crimes were committed by one offender. Linkage analysis has faced a lot of criticism.

Professor Risinger and Loop, for instance, argued that linkage analysis "appears to have

been developed, not as an investigatory aid, but primarily as a means of obtaining either

the admission of other crimes evidence which might not otherwise be admitted, or a

means to convince the jury that the other crimes evidence was more meaningful than they

otherwise might believe, or both. In sum, it was not a way to identify unknown

perpetrators, but a tool to help build a case against defendants already believed to be

guilty". 34

33
Turvey, supra note 27, at 153.
34M' h
IC ael D, Risinger and Jeffrey L. Loop, "Three Card Monte, Monty Hall, Modus Operandi and
"Offender Profiling": Some Lessons of Modem Cognitive Science for the Law of Evidence", 24 Cardozo
Law Review, 193,254, (November 2002).

26
Types of Crime Suitable for Profiling

It has been recognized that not all types of crime are suitable for profiling. In fact, there is

general agreement that crimes most suitable for profiling are:

1. crimes where the perpetrator showed elements of psychopathology.

2. crimes believed to be part of a series.

3. violent crimes.

4. attacks on strangers.

5. contact crimes - crimes where the offender engaged in long conversations and

communications with the victim.

Serial murders, serial rapes, sexual homicides, ritual crimes, arson, and hostage taking

have been seen to be very suitable for profiling. Research by Holmes and Holmes have

shown that the types of crimes most suitable for profiling include sadistic torture in

sexual assaults, evisceration, postmortem slashing and cutting, motiveless fire setting,

lust and mutilation murder, rape, satanic and ritualistic crime and pedophilia.,,35 It has

also been noted that "cases involving mere destruction of property, assault, or murder

during the commission of a robbery are generally unsuitable for profiling, since the

personality of the criminal is not generally revealed in such crime scenes. Likewise drug

induced crimes lend themselves poorly to profiling because the true personality of the

perpetrator is often altered,,36.

35
Holmes and Holmes, supra note 18, at 2.
36
McCann, J. T., Criminal Personality Profiling in the Investigation o/Violent Crime: Recent Advances
and Future Directions, Behavioral Sciences and the Law, vol. 10,476 (1992).

27
'Contact crimes' are suitable for profiling. In fact, "these 'contact crimes' are believed to

be the ones in which aspects of an offender's underlying personality and motivations are

most likely to be revealed by the way in which an offence or series of offences has been

carried out".37 Schurman-Kauflin noted that "serial killers are the most frustrating and

disturbing of all violent predators, but they are the most profilable. Why? When they kill,

they are filling complex psychological needs. Sometimes, they may steal when they kill,

but from my experience of studying serial predators for twenty years and interviewing

over twenty five of them, their motivations are in their heads, not their wallets. Because

they kill for psychological reasons, many times, they leave a lot of clues for profilers".38

Geberth also maintained that "practically speaking, in any crime in which available

evidence indicates a mental, emotional, or personality aberration by an unknown

perpetrator, the criminal personality profile can be instrumental in providing the

investigator with information that narrows down the leads. The behavioral characteristics

of the perpetrator as evidenced in the crime scene - not the offense per se - determine the

degree of suitability of the case for profiling,,39.

37 A'
msworth, supra note 6, at 9.
38
Deborah Schurman-Kauflin, Vulture: Profiling Sadistic Serial Killers, 10 (2005).
39
Geberth, supra note 23, at 774.

28
History and Development of Offender Profiling

Offender Profiling goes as far back as 1876 when the Italian Criminologist, Physician and

psychiatrist, Cesaro Lombroso (Nov. 6, 1835 - Oct. 19, 1909), published his work

"L'Uomo Delinquente" (The Criminal Man), in which he argued that there are certain

physical characteristics that are indicative of a born criminal. He maintained that by

comparing information about similar offenders like race, age, sex, physical

characteristics, education and geographic location, that. the origins and motivations of

criminal behavior could be better understood and subsequently predicted. Lombroso,

basing his ideas on Darwin's theory of evolution, maintained that there are six types of

criminals, the born criminal, the insane criminal, the criminal by passion, the habitual

criminal, the occasional criminal and the criminaloid.

Lombroso had the idea that there is a born criminal and argued that criminality is

inherited and could be identified by physical defects. For him, criminals have certain

physiognomic deformities. He saw criminals as savage and atavistic. In his theory of

atavism, he measured the heads of living and executed criminals against the skulls of

apes and prehistoric humans and came up with the idea that criminals were victims of

atavism. He maintained that 'born criminals' have the following physical

characteristics/deformities:

• Deviation in head size and shape from type common to race and region from

which the criminal came.

• Asymmetry of the face.

29
 • Eye defects and peculiarities.

• Excessive dimensions of the jaws and cheek bones.

• Ears of unusual size, or occasionally very small, or standing out from the head as

do those of the chimpanzee.

• Nose twisted, upturned, or flattened in thieves, or aquiline or beak-like in

murderers, or with a tip rising like a peak from swollen nostrils.

• Lips fleshy, swollen, and protruding.

• Pouches in the cheek like those of some animals.

• Peculiarities of the palate, such as are found in some reptiles, and cleft palate.

• Chin receding, or excessively long, or short and flat, as in apes.

• Abnormal dentition.

• Abundance, variety, and precocity of wrinkles.

• Anomalies of the hair, marked by characteristics of the hair of the opposite sex.

• Defects of the thorax, such as too many or too few ribs, or supernumerary nipples.

• Inversion of sex characters in the pelvic organs.

• Excessive length of arms.

• Supernumerary fingers and toes.

• Imbalance of the hemispheres of the brain (asymmetry of cranium).

Lombroso maintained that the insane criminals were the type of criminals who suffered

from mental illnesses and also had some physical deformities. The habitual criminals

according to Lombroso are those who commit crimes as a result of poor socialization.

The occasional criminals commit crimes to protect family honor and as self-defence. The

30
criminaloids are those who commit crimes when the opportunities anse In their

environment. Lombroso maintained that criminaloids are usually left-handed, which he

said was common among swindlers, are also characterized by early baldness and

grayness, insensitivity to pain and that a large number of them abuse alcohol.

Lombroso believed that the study of individuals should involve the utilization of

measurements and statistical methods in compiling anthropological, social and economic

data. He was against capital punishment and argued in favor of rehabilitation. He also

contended that there should be humane treatment for criminals because their criminality

is inherited.

Lombroso's views were undoubtedly criticized. The greatest criticism came from Charles

Goring an Englishman, who carried out a study of 3,000 English convicts and compared

them with groups of university students, hospital patients and British solders. Using

statistical methodology, Goring compared measurements of thirty seven specific physical

characteristics of the groups and observed that "in fact, both with regard to measurements

and the presence of physical anomalies in criminals, our statistics present a startling

conformity with similar statistics of the law-abiding classes. Our inevitable conclusion

must be that there is no such thing as a physical criminal type,,40.

Goring also noted that "all English criminals, with the exception of those technically

convicted of fraud, are markedly differentiated from the general population in stature and

body-weight; in addition, offenders convicted of violence to the person are characterized

40 Charles Goring, The English Convict: A Statistical Study, 174 (1913).

31
by an average degree of strength and of constitutional soundness considerably above the

average of other criminals and of the law-abiding community: finally, thieves and

burglars (who constitute, it must be borne in mind, 90 percent of all criminals) and also

incendiaries, as well as being inferior in stature and weight, are also, relatively to other

criminals and the populations at large, puny in their general bodily habit". Goring also

observed some differences between criminals and non criminals in terms of sexual

profligacy, alcoholism, and epilepsy, and he concluded that "the one vital mental

constitutional factor in the etiology of crime is defective intelligence".

Goring's views also met severe criticisms. Hagan argued that "while Goring refuted

Lombroso's notion of physical differences, his own methodology was critically flawed.

Eschewing the then-available Simon-Binet tests of mental ability, he used his own

impressions in order to operationalize the mental ability of his subjects. The nail in the

coffin of Goring's theory was the advent of wide-scale mental testing of US military

conscriptees during World War 1. Using Goring's definitions of feeblemindedness,

nearly one-third of the draftees would have been so classified; the standards for such tests

were modified as a result. Other studies comparing mental age found no difference in

performance by prisoners and the draft army, and one even found that the former

performed better. As a result, the notion of feeblemindedness as a cause of criminal

behavior was interred in the graveyard of outmoded criminological concepts,,41.

Similarly, Sutherland and Cressey argued that Goring's study did not include women.

That Goring saw crime as a male disposition. They also argued that Goring "considered
41
Frank E. Hagan, Introduction to Criminology, 3rd edition, 143 (1994).

32
only few environmental factors, as opposed to many that exist", and finally that Goring

did not consider a wide range of offenses in his study.

It should be noted at this point that two of Lombroso's students - Enrico Ferri (1856 -

1929) and Raffaelo Garofalo (1852 - 1934), later took a different approach to the

explanations of criminal behavior. For instance, Garofalo in this theory of moral

degeneration, maintained that degeneration resulted from retrogressive selection and

caused the individual "to lose the better qualities which he had acquired by secular

evolution, and has led him back to the same degree of inferiority whence he had slowly

risen. This retrogressive selection is due to the mating of weakest and most unfit, of those

who have become brutalized by alcohol or abased by extreme misery against which

apathy has prevented them from struggling. Thus are formed demoralized and outcast

families whose interbreeding in time produces a true face of inferior quality".42

Following the criticisms of his work and after further research, Lombroso later revised

his work and admitted that social, economic and environmental factors also played

significant roles in criminal behavior. He however, still maintained that at least 40

percent of criminality is a result of biological heredity. Nevertheless, Lombroso's early

explanation of criminality, using measurements is undoubtedly the beginning of the

attempts to find a scientific basis to the idea of predicting crimes and criminals.

42 Baron R. Garofalo, Criminology, trans. 110 (1914).

33
Following the work of Goring, Earnest Hooton, an American anthropologist, in 1939,

carried out a study of 13,873 male criminals in 10 states and compared it with a civilian

group of 3,023 and found out that "criminals are organically inferior. Crime is the

resultant of the impact of environment upon low grade human organisms. To eliminate

crime, the physically, mentally, and morally unfit must be exterminated or segregated

completely in a "socially aseptic environment".43

Hooton claimed that certain morphological characteristics were more common in

criminals than among civilians. These characteristics include thin lips, straight hair, thin

beards and body hair, thick head hair, long thin necks, sloping shoulders, low and sloping

foreheads, compressed jaw angles, blue-gray and mixed eyes, protruding and small ears,

tattooing, and nasal bridges and tips varying to both extremes of breath and narrowness. 44

Hooton also believed that criminals were inferior to non criminals, and that inferiority

could be explained by heredity, arguing that physical inferiority indicates mental

inferiority. Furthermore, Hooton claimed that murderers and robbers tend to be tall and

thin; burglars and thieves tend to be undersized and that short and heavily built men tend

to be involved in sexual offenses and assaults.

Hooton's arguments were seen as fundamentally flawed. VoId, for instance, argued that

Hooton "ignored the fact that more than half of his prisoners had served previous terms

and a very large proportion of these previous sentences had been for crimes different

43
Earnest A. Hooton, The American Criminal: An Anthropological Study, vo1.l, 309 (1939).
44
Earnest A. Hooton, Crime and Man, 301 (1939).

34
from the offense of the current tenn.,,45 Johnson also contended that "in using prisoners

to represent criminals, Hooton ignored the effects of the differential selection of prisoners

from the total body of offenders that the system of criminal justice makes according to

factors extraneous to criminal behavior. Hooton's control group was too small and

included firemen and militiamen who had been accepted for these occupations after

passing a physical examination, thus exaggerating physical differences between offenders

and nonoffenders,,46.

Dr. Hans Gross, an Austrian judge and criminologist also made very important

contributions towards the attempts to explain criminality and the prediction of criminals.

In fact, he is widely regarded as the first person to write about offender profiling per se.

In 1893 he published his work "Criminal Investigation: A Practical Textbook for

Magistrates, Police Officers, and Lawyers", in which he maintained that criminals can be

better understood by studying their crimes. Gross argued that "in nearly every case the

thief has left the most important trace of his passage, namely the manner in which he has

committed the theft. Every thief has in fact a characteristic style or modus operandi

which he rarely departs from, and which he is incapable of completely getting rid of; at

times this distinctive feature is so visible and so striking that even the novice can spot it

without difficulty; but on the one hand the novice does not know how to group,

45
George B. Void, Theoretical Criminology, 62 (1958).
46
Elmer H. Johnson, Crime, Correction, and Society, 211 (1974).

35
differentiate or utilize what he has observed, and on the other hand the particular

character of the procedure is not always so easy to recognize".47

Gross also maintained that by examining the character and beliefs of an offender that we

can know more about the offender's criminal actions, and he wrote:

Is it not known that every deed is an outcome of the total

character of the doer? Is it not considered that the deed and
the character are correlative concepts, and that the character
by means of which the deed is to be established cannot be
inferred from the deed alone? Each particular deed is
thinkable only when a determinate character of the doer is
brought in relation with it - a certain character predisposes to
determinate deeds, another character makes them unthinkable
48
and unrelatable with this or that person.

In 1888 there were several murder cases in the Whitechapel area of East London,

England. In fact, between August 31 st and November 9th 1888, five female prostitutes

were murdered, and the police had no clues as to the identity of the killer. On August 31,

1888 Mary Ann Nichols was found brutally murdered. This was followed by the

discovery of the viciously mutilated body of Annie Chapman on September 8, 1888. On

September 30, 1888 was the discovery of the double murder of Elizabeth Stride and

Catherine Eddowes. On November 9, 1888 another murder occurred and this time Mary

Jane Kelly was brutally murdered. At this point Dr. Thomas Bond, a police surgeon was

asked to perform an autopsy on Mary Jane Kelly. The killer after strangling the women,

will cut their throat and then remove some of their internal organs. This prompted the

47
Hans Gross, Criminal Investigation, 478 (1924).
48
Hans Gross, Criminal Psychology, 55 (1934).

36
police to think that the killer may be somebody with anatomical or surgical knowledge

like a surgeon or a butcher.

Hence, Dr Bond was also instructed to give an opinion on this issue. After the autopsy on

Mary Jane Kelly, Dr. Bond also studied the medical reports of the other victims as well as

the police reports, and he decided to do a crime scene reconstruction to see if he could

find any behavioral patterns that could lead investigators to the possible killer. He

believed that the mutilations of the five victims suggested that one person was

responsible for the five murders. Above all, all the five murders shared similar

characteristics. All the victims were left in open places, where their bodies were found

soon after they were killed, all the victims were women and prostitutes, all the victims

were viciously mutilated and internal organs removed from their body.

Dr. Bond produced a report/profile which he sent to the head of the Criminal

Investigation Division, London. In his report/profile, Dr. Bond wrote that:

The murderer must have been a man of great physical strength and
of great coolness and daring. There is no evidence that he had an
accomplice. He must in my opinion be a man subject to periodical
attacks of Homicidal and Erotic mania. The character of the
mutilations indicate that the man may be in a condition sexually, that
may be called Satyriasis. It is of course possible that the Homicidal
impulse may have developed from a revengeful or brooding
condition of the mind, or that religious mania may have been the
original disease but I do not think either hypothesis is likely. The
murderer in external appearance is quite likely to be quiet
inoffensive looking man probably middle-aged and neatly and
respectably dressed. I think he must be in the habit of wearing a
cloak or overcoat or he could hardly have escaped notice in the
streets if the blood on his hands and clothes were visible.

37
 Assuming the murderer to be such a person as I have just described,
he would be solitary and eccentric in his habits, also he is most likely
to be a man without regular occupation, but with some small income
or pension. He is possibly living among respectable persons who
have some knowledge of his character and habits and who may have
grounds for suspicion that he isn't quite right in his mind at times.
Such persons would probably be unwilling to communicate
suspicions to the police for fear of trouble or notoriety, whereas if
49
there were prospects of reward it might overcome their scruples.

It should be noted that the unknown killer was referred to as the "Leather Apron" killer,

but in a letter he sent to the police he called himself "Jack the Ripper". As at today, the

identity of this killer is still a mystery. Hence, the five murders still remain unsolved.

Therefore, the accuracy or usefulness of Dr. Bond's profile/report cannot be evaluated.

However, his efforts constitute another major contribution towards the history and

development of offender profiling.

In 1943 the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS) asked Dr. Walter C. Langer, a

psychiatrist based in New York to produce a psychological profile of Adolf Hitler. This

was for military intelligence purpose, and not for criminal investigation. The OSS was

the ann of the US Anny responsible for gathering intelligence. 50 The OSS wanted a

personality profile of Hitler so that they will know the best interrogative

strategy/technique to be used if he was captured. Dr. Langer studied and analyzed the

speeches made by Hitler, studied Hitler's book - Mein Kampf, and interviewed those

Who knew Hitler and he came up with a psychodynamic personality profile. Dr. Langer

stated that he was asked by the OSS to provide "a realistic appraisal of the Gennan

49
Donald Rumbelow, The Complete Jack the Ripper, 138 (1975).
50
The CIA took over this intelligence in 1945 when the ass was disbanded.

38
situation. If Hitler is runnmg the show, what kind of person is he? What are his

ambitions? We want to know about his psychological makeup - the things that make him

tick. In addition, we ought to know what he might do if things begin to go against him."Sl

Dr. Langer predicted that:

• Hitler may die of natural causes - deemed to be a remote possibility, as he was in

good health aside from a stomach ailment, probably linked to a psychosomatic

disturbance.

• Hitler might seek refuge in a neutral country - unlikely, as it would cast doubt on

his myth of immortality ifhe fled at the critical moment.

• Hitler might get killed in battle - a possibility, as he might desire to cast himself

as a fearless leader, and his death might have the adverse effect of binding the

German people to his legend.

• Hitler might be assassinated - another plausible outcome, which he himself

speculated over.

• Hitler might go insane - he was believed to exhibit many characteristics of a

borderline schizophrenic, and if faced with defeat, it was likely his psychological

constitution would collapse.

• German military might revolt and seize him - an unlikely event because of the

unique position he enjoyed in the eyes of the German people, but he might be

confined in secret should he become unstable.

51
Walter C. Langer, The Mind of Adolf Hitler: The Secret Wartime Report, 19 (1972).

39
 • Hitler might fall into Allied hands - the most unlikely eventuality as this would be

the scenario he personally would do his utmost to avoid.

• Hitler might commit suicide - the most conceivable conclusion due to his

inordinate fear of death, which he had already envisaged, stating "Yes, in the hour

of supreme peril I must sacrifice myself for the people,,52.

Dr. Langer's profile was seen to be correct, as Hitler committed suicide in a bunker when

he found out that the Allies were winning. Langer's work and contribution has been well

received by many scholars. Holmes and Holmes maintained that:

Despite its Freudian psychoanalytic orientation, Langer's profile

proved to be amazingly accurate as far as the scenarios for the
war's end were concerned. Hitler did commit suicide in a bunker
with Eva Braun. He never married, perhaps because he never
found anyone he felt was enough like his mother. Hitler's writings
from the time near the end of the war indicate that he appeared to
be on the fringe of mental illness. He also left many documents
that pointed toward some unusual sexual leanings: coprolagnia and
urolagnia (sexual excitement gained from eating feces and drinking
urine) and others. Langer's work was not in vain. It proved to be a
worthy attempt at the use of profiling as a tool to understand an
aberrant personality. 53

Commenting also on the work of Dr. Langer, Norris maintained that "although Langer

details each circumstance and its likelihood of occurrence, perusal of the document

indicates the tenuos nature of the profile in general. Although there is some level of

psychiatric assessment - for example, describing Hitler as a borderline schizophrenic or a

hysteric - significant interpretation of his actual behavior relies on Hitler's own

52
Id, at 10.
53
Holmes and Holmes, supra note 18, at 19.

40
assertions, gleaned primarily from his writings and speeches. Nevertheless, Langer was to

pave the way for others to analyze unknown individuals based on their observable
. ,,54
behaVlOr .

In 1949 William H. Sheldon, a psychologist came up with his "Somatotype" theory in

which he argued that physique or body type is related to certain temperaments. During an

eight year period, Sheldon tested his theory on delinquent boys and normal college

students and found out that there is a link between the mesomorphic body type and crime,

which explained why some juveniles are delinquent. His three body types are as follows.

(1) Endomorphs: These are individuals who he said are soft, round/fat physiques, and

plump.

(2) Mesomorphs: This people are muscular, hard, with heavy chest and heavy bones.

(3) Ectomorphs: These are people who are thin/lean, fragile, with droopy shoulders

and small faces.

Sheldon's three temperaments are as follows:

(1) Viscerotonia - the individuals with this type of temperament tend to be relaxed,

comfort-loving, greedy for affection and approval, slow in reaction, even in

emotions, and tolerant.

(2) Somatotonia - this type of temperament is associated with individuals who are

assertive, adventure-loving, psychologically callous, energetic, compulsive, and

ruthless.

54 Gareth Norris, "Criminal Profiling: A Continuing History" in Wayne Petherick (ed) Serial Crime:
Theoretical and Practical Issues in Behavioral Profiling, 3 (2006).

41
 (3) Cerebrotonia - individuals with this type of temperament are tight in posture,

physiologically overresponsive, emotionally restrained, unpredictable in attitude

and mentally overintense.

For Sheldon, endomorphs tend to have viscerotonia temperaments, mesomorphs tend to

be somatotonic and ectomorphs have cerebrotonia type of temperament. In his study of

200 delinquent boys (aged 15 - 21) in a rehabilitation center, he found out that delinquent

youths tend to be mesomorphs. Sheldon used statistical correlations and ranked

individuals on a subject scale of 1 to 7 to indicate the predominant temperament in each

individual. Using what he called an "Index of Delinquency" or "Index of

Disappointingness", Sheldon tried to provide a quantitative account of an individual's

psychiatric problems, residual delinquency, as well as shortcomings in IQ insufficiency.

He concluded that delinquents are mainly mesomorphs.

As we have seen, Sheldon made a great contribution towards the attempts to predict

criminals and criminal behavior. In fact, his study was later supported by Sheldon and

Eleanor Gluecks. In 1956, the Gluecks, using Sheldon's somatotype system, studied 500

boys considered to be persistently delinquent and compared them to 500 non-delinquent

boys in Boston public schools, Massachusetts, and they also found out that mesomorphic

boys have higher delinquency level/potential than the other body types.

The studies by Sheldon and the Gluecks were undoubtedly criticized. Indeed, "the studies

have been criticized for inadequate sampling and their misuse of control groups. Ideally,

42
the offenders studied should represent all criminals, and the subjects in the control groups

should represent all noncriminals. Thereby, differences found between the two samples

would be applicable to the respective populations they were supposed to represent".55

In 1955, Ernst Kretschmer (1888 - 1964), a German Criminologist, came up with a body

types theory in which he argued that there is a high degree of correlation between body

types, personality types and criminal potential. Kretschmer studied 260 insane people in

Swabia (a southwestern German town), and in his work "Physique and Character", he

contended that there are four body types and that each is linked to a person's personality,

character and criminal potential. His four body types are as follows.

(1) Leptosome or Asthenic: Tall and thin, and mainly involved in fraud and thievery. He

said that schizophrenics fall into this group.

(2) Athletic: Very muscular, flat stomachs, and usually involved in violent crimes.

(3) Pyknic: Short, fat, broad faces, and usually involved in fraud, deception and

sometimes violent crimes, and that manic depressives fall into this category.

(4) Dysplastic or Mixed: These are individuals who fit into more than one body type and

they are generally involved in some violent crimes and indecency. Generally, these

individuals are very emotional, lack self control and mostly involved in sexual offenses

and crimes of passion.

Kretschmer's work attracted a lot of criticisms. "Kretschmer's theories, however, were

Viewed as extremely dubious because he never disclosed his research, his inferences and
ss
Johnson, supra note 45 at 211.

43
descriptions were always incredibly vague, and no specific comparisons were performed

with non-criminals populations. In short, he would not submit his findings for any form

of peer review, and his approach was clearly non-scientific. As a result, many argued

that his theories regarding his findings were nothing more than unfounded inference and

correction masquerading as science"s6.

Dr. James Brussel, an American Psychiatrist, is arguably the father of modem offender

profiling. In 1956, Dr. Brussel who was in private practice and was also the Assistant

Commissioner of Mental Hygiene for the state of New York was approached by police

investigators to help them with the investigation of series of bomb explosions in New

York City. It should also be noted that Dr. Brussel was the Chief of Neuropsychiatry in

the US Millitary (at Fort Dix) prior to going into private practice. Later he was the head

of US army neuropsychiatry during the Korean war.

In 1956, Brussel compiled a psychological profile which led to the identification and

arrest of George Metesky (known as the New York Mad Bomber) who caused thirty-two

explosions in New York City between 1940 and 1956. Using crime scene information,

Brussel was able to make psychodynamic inferences. He studied the crime scene photos

and the letters that the bomber wrote and he produced a profile of the likely offender.

56
Turvey, supra note 27, at 4.

44
 .......

In his psychological profile, Dr. Brussel urged the investigators to "look for a heavy man.

Middle-aged. Foreign born. Roman Catholic. Single. Lives with a brother or sister".57 He

also stated that "when you find him, chances are he'll be wearing a double-breasted suit.

Buttoned".58 In general, Brussel's profile also asked the police to look for:

Single man, between 40 and 50 years, introvert. Unsocial

but not antisocial. Skilled mechanic. Cunning. Neat with
tools. Egostical of mechanical skill. Contemptuous of
other people. Resentful of criticism of his work but
probably conceals resentment. Moral. Honest. Not
interested in women. High school graduate. Expert in
civil or military ordinance. Religious. Might flare up
violently at work when criticized. Possible motive:
discharge or reprimand. Feels superior to critics.
Resentment, keeps growing. Present or former
Consolidated Edison worker. Probably case of
. . 59
progreSSIve paranOIa.

Dr. Brussel's profile proved to be accurate. Metesky was a former employee of

Consolidated Edison, and most interesting of all, when the police went to arrest him at his

house, they asked him to get changed and he came out dressed in a double-breasted suit,

just like Brussel predicted. Metesky confessed to having committed the crimes.

Dr. Brussel was also asked by the police to help them in the case of the "Boston

Strangler". In Boston, Massachusetts, between June 1962 and January 1964, thirteen

sexually motivated murders occurred and the police had no suspects. In what became

known as the 'Boston Strangler' case, Dr. Brussel was asked to produce a psychological

profile of the likely offender. Initially, the investigators believed that the murders were

57
James A. Brussel, Casebook of a Crime Psychiatrist, IX (1968).
58
Id.
59
Id, at 47.

45
committed by two killers. This was based on the fact that the victims were of two age

groupS - young women and older women. Dr Brussel believed that only one person was

responsible for the thirteen murders, and he produced a profile. Albert DeSalvo was

arrested in November 1964 in connection with another rape and murder known as the

"Green Man Sex Crimes". He fitted the profile drawn up by Brussel. He was detained

and he later confessed to his psychiatrist that he was the 'Boston Strangler'. While in

person, awaiting trial for the other murders, DeSalvo was stabbed to death by a fellow

inmate. Hence, he was not tried for the 'Boston Strangler's murders. Therefore, the

accuracy or otherwise of Dr. Brussel's profile cannot be evaluated on this case.

Suffice it to say however, that Brussel used his practical psychiatric

knowledge/experience, personal intuition and police and medical records to come up with

the profiles. Such approach is therefore subjective and should be used with caution. In

fact, Brussel admitted that he made mistakes in some of his cases, and he wrote: "The

only thing that I have done to get my name in the papers has been to apply some common

psychiatric principles in reverse, using my own private blend of science, intuition, and

hope. With this approach, I've been able to help the police solve some bizarre criminal

cases and I've been summoned as an expert witness in some famous criminal trials".6o

Furthermore, Brussel maintained that, "I haven't chosen the cases to show what a clever

fellow I am. I made mistakes in some of them, as I will admit. I analyzed facts incorrectly

or incompletely, I made deductions I had no right to make. Some of the cases earned me

60
Id, at 3.

46
accolades, but others did not. In one of them, the police and courts didn't even listen to

me. In another, the major questions were not answered and the persons will never be
,,61
caught

Following the work of Dr. Brussel, the FBI in the 1970's started to expand on offender

profiling and they established the Behavioral Science Unit at the FBI training academy in

Quantico, Virginia in 1974, with the aim of studying serial rape and homicide cases.

Howard Teten and Pat Mullany were the first instructors at this unit. However, in 1975,

Robert Ressler, Dick Ault and John Douglas joined and expanded the unit. It should be

noted that in 1983 Pierce Brooks founded the FBI's VICAP (computer reporting system)

and the unit was made up of Anna Boudea, Ken Handtland, David Icove and Jim

Howlett. In 1984, the NCA VC (National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crimes) was

created. This unit was charged with the responsibility of identifying and tracking serial

killers.

During the 1970's there were several murder cases that the FBI were unable to solve.

They became increasingly frustrated with the fact that physical evidence even when

present at the scene of crime could not provide clues as to the sort of person they should

be looking for. The FBI needed a technique that would help them focus on the most

likely offenders rather than focusing on a large number of suspects. The FBI conducted

indepth interviews with thirty six convicted serial killers and found that their crimes were

all almost sexually motivated. Their main aim of carrying out the interviews was to

identify the personality and behavioral characteristics of these offenders.

61
Id, at 4.

47
Following the interviews, the FBI then came up with the idea of organized and

disorganized offenders. 62 As Ainsworth has pointed out:

The FBI believed that this classification into organized and

disorganized murders was helpful as they claimed that the two
different types of offenders typically had very different
personality and demographic characteristics. In the case of
organized murderers, a typical offender would be intelligent (but
possibly an underachiever), socially skilled, sexually competent,
and be living with a partner. This mask of 'normality' however
often hid an antisocial or psychopathic personality. Such an
individual may have been experiencing a great deal of anger
around the time of the attack and have been suffering from
depression. He would also be likely to follow news reports about
6
his offence and to leave the area following the attack.

Ainsworth further argued that "such characteristics are in sharp contrast to the

disorganized murderer who is more likely to live alone and quite near the scene of the

attack. He would be socially and sexually inept, of low intelligence and to have had some

quite severe form of mental illness. He was also likely to have suffered physical and

sexual abuse as a child. In the case of these disorganized offenders, the offence would

tend to be committed when in a frightened or confused state,,64.

The first case in which the FBI used offender profiling occurred in June 1973 when a

seven year old girl, Susan Jaegar went missing while on a camping holiday with her

parents. She was abducted from her tent while her parents were sleeping. For a year, the

Montana Police could not find the missing girl. Then in January 1974, police discovered

62 Th'IS has been discussed in more details in chapter 2 under the CSAlFBI approach to offender profiling,

63 A'
lllsworth, supra note 6, at 101.
64 Id,

48
the charred body of an eighteen year old girl in the woodland near the camp where Susan

Jaegar was abducted. Police suspected that one killer was responsible for both murders

and they decided to call in the FBI to assist them with the investigation. The FBI drew up

a profile of the likely killer, which among other things stated that :-

(1) the offender was a young white male.

(2) A loner.

(3) Lived near the camp.

(4) Likely to have been arrested before.

(5) Likely to have kept souvenir from the victims.

Their profile fitted David Meirhofer who was already on the FBI suspects list. He was

named by an informant. He was arrested, questioned but released as there was no

physical evidence linking him to the murders. As part of their investigation, the FBI kept

a telephone recorder at Susan Jaeger's mother's house .... as predicted, an anonymous

caller telephoned and said that he has abducted Susan, her mother was able to record his

voice. It was identified as that of Meirhofer. A search of his home revealed the gruesome

body parts, kept as 'souvenirs'. He later admitted to both murders as well as two others of

local boys, before hanging himself in his cell. 65

It should be noted that the FBI in the 1970's carried out another interview with 41

convicted serial rapists and they came up with four types of rapists - power reassurance,

power assertive, anger-retaliatory and anger excitation. These initial groupings of

;:--------------------
Canter, supra note 2, at 14.

49
murderers and rapists eventually led to the development of the Crime Classification

Manual (Ressler, Douglas, Burgess and Burgess). This is a classification system for the
66
types of crimes in which the behaviour of the perpetrator plays an important role.

In Britain, on the other hand, Paul Britton, a British criminal psychologist was

approached by the police in 1984 to assist them with the case of a 33 year old woman -

Caroline Osborne, from Leicesterhire, England. Caroline's body was found with seven

stab wounds and her hands and feet were bound with string. There were no signs of

robbery or sexual assault. It should be noted that a piece of paper containing a drawing of

a pentagram in a circle was found at the crime scene. This image is usually linked to

black magic or satanism. In order to draw up a profile of the likely killer, Britton studied

the crime scene photographs and autopsy reports and he predicted that the killer was :-

(1) Male in his mid-teens to early twenties.

(2) Sexually immature.

(3) Lacked social skills to maintain relationships.

(4) Lived at home with both parents or one parent.

(5) Likes to keep to himself.

(6) Probably lives near the area where the body was found.

(7) Was a manual worker.

(8) Strong and athletic build.

(9) Had forensic awareness or kept souvenirs.

66
Jackson and Bekerian, supra note 17, at 5.

50
Another murder occurred fourteen months later in the area, with similar patterns and

Britton was called in again to assist with the investigation. Britton said that even though

there were a few differences in the two murders that they were committed by the same

person. Following Britton's profile, Paul Kenneth Bostock was arrested. Britton

suggested to the police the interviewing strategies to be used and Bostock later confessed

to the two murders. In June 1986 he was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Leicester

Crown Court. Britton believed that there were sexual motives for the murders and he

wrote: "Caroline Osborne's murder was an expression of a corrupt lust. The bindings,

control and choice of victim suggested a killer whose sexual desire had become mixed

with anger and the need to dominate. He would have rehearsed the scene in his mind

beforehand - fantasizing about a woman being taken, restrained, bound, dominated,

mutilated and killed with a knife".67

Paul Britton was also involved in the controversial case of Rachel Nickell, a twenty year

old model who was murdered on July 15, 1992 on Wimbledon Common, London, while

walking her dog with her two year old son. Following the initial investigation, police had

a suspect Colin Stagg, but he was released because there was no physical evidence to

charge him. The police, on the advice of Paul Britton decided to organize a sting

operation whereby an undercover policewoman codenamed Lizzie James would begin a

relationship with the suspect. The aim of the operation was to link their suspect to the

crime. Lizzie James started to exchange letters with Colin Stagg and swapped sexual

fantasies. Britton's idea was to see if the suspect would implicate himself. Hence, through

letters, meetings and telephone calls over seven month undercover operation, Lizzie
;---------------------
Paul Britton, The Jigsaw Man, 49 (1997).

51
James encouraged Colin Stagg to develop his fantasies that matched the profile

characteristics drawn up by Paul Britton. It should be noted that Colin's replies to the

letters written to him by Lizzie James led to him being charged with the murder of Rachel

Nickell. In one of their meetings, Lizzie told Colin that she enjoyed hurting people and

always "wants blood, buckets of it". She also described to Colin how in her teenage years

she was involved in satanism and had murdered a mother and her baby. She told Colin

that she was looking for a meaningful and long lasting relationship with a man with

similar experience and desires. In order to impress Lizzie and carryon with their

relationship, Colin told her that he murdered a woman in New Forest. Police records and

investigations showed that there was no such murder and that Colin lied to impress

Lizzie. Britton at this point advised Lizzie to go back to Colin and tell him that she does

not believe the New Forest story and that "if only you had done the Wimbledon Common

murder; if only you had killed her, it would be all right". Colin told her that he was not

involved in that murder, yet because he fitted some of the characteristics in the profile

drawn up by Britton, he was charged with the murder.

During the trial the defense argued that the undercover police operation was unfair and

constitutes a breach of a defendant's right not to incriminate himself. Gisli Gudjonsson, a

psychologist representing the accused, argued that Britton's profile was mere speculation

and based only on his own personal intuition. It was also argued that the offender

profiling used is an unreliable technique that had not achieved general acceptance as a

science.

52
On September 14, 1994, Mr. Justice OgnaU acquitted Colin Stagg of the murder. The

judge was very critical of the seven month undercover police operation and the role of

Paul Britton in the case. The judge ruled that the whole operation was unfair, a breach of

a defendant's right not to incriminate himself and was "misconceived", and he said: "I

am afraid this behaviour betrays not merely an excess of zeal, but a blatant attempt to

incriminate a suspect by positive and deceptive conduct of the grossest kind. Any

legitimate steps taken by the police and the prosecuting authorities to bring perpetrators

to justice are to be applauded, but the emphasis must be on the word legitimate. A careful

appraisal of the material demonstrates a skilful and sustained enterprise to manipulate the

accused, sometimes subtly, sometimes blatantly".

It should be noted that because of his role in this case, Paul Britton faced charges of

professional misconduct by the British Psychological Society. However, the Disciplinary

Committee of the society met on October 29 and 30, 2002 and dismissed the charges. The

committee maintained that due to the delays which occurred during the process of the

case, that it believed that Mr. Britton would not receive a fair hearing. The committee

stated that "the disciplinary process was originally subject to four years delay, due to the

likelihood of private civil proceedings, then latterly it was delayed by the need to gather

extensive evidence and agree a date when all parties would be available. All of this has

had a bearing on whether Mr. Britton could receive a fair hearing after so long".

Canter and Alison were also very critical of the work of Britton. They described Britton's

Work as mere intuitive personal opinion, and they wrote:

53
 Britton uses an additional device to help convince the
audience of his profiling expertise - he presents points as
separate though they are clearly related. For example in
stating that an individual is sexually immature also implies
he has few if any previous girlfriends. However, Britton is
able to give the impression that these are two separate points
merely by separating them by another point in a list of
characteristics. It is perhaps more surprising, that nowhere in
Britton's account are there any references to psychological
principles or any indication of a process by which he has
come to his conclusions. Thus despite an advert for Britton's
book that boasts, 'if you did it he'll get you' we are no
clearer by the end ofthe book of how 'he will get you. 68

Paul Britton as we have seen has assisted the police in several cases in Britain, but David

Canter is undoubtedly the father of offender profiling in Britain. Between 1982 and 1986

series of rapes and murders occurred in London and the Home Counties and the police

were not making any progress in apprehending the offenders. Hence, the police sought

the help of David Canter, a Professor of Psychology, presently at the University of

Liverpool. In July 1985, three violent rape attacks occurred and the police launched

'Operation Hart'. In August 1985 John Duffy was arrested and charged with violent

offences but was released on bail. Immediately after Duffy was released, a nineteen year

old girl, Alison Day, was dragged from an East London train and taken to a garage where

she was raped and killed. Another girl, fifteen year old Maartje Tamboezer was also

raped and killed on her way to the shops in West Horley, three months later. Her body

was set on fire. However, semen traces were found. Another attack occurred on May 18,

1986 when Mrs. Anne Lock was abducted on her way to work.

;----------------------
David Canter., and Lawrence Alison, "Profiling in Policy and Practice", in D. Canter., and A. Lawrence,
(eds) Profiling in Policy and Practice, 8 (1999).

54
Having found semen traces on one of the bodies, the investigations intensified. John

Duffy was re-arrested, interviewed, but he refused to give blood sample. Duffy was again

released on bail and he later bribed one of his friends to "mug" him. He reported to the

police that he has been mugged and voluntarily checked himself into a psychiatric

hospital claiming that he is suffering from trauma and amnesia as a result of the mugging.

John Duffy attacked and raped another girl, a fourteen year old girl. The girl survived the

attack. She was blindfolded during the attack but a caught a glimpse of Duffy when his

mask fell off. She later identified Duffy as her attacker at the identification parade.

The profile compiled by Professor Canter matched Duffy'S characteristics and he was

placed under surveillance. 69 A few weeks later, he was arrested at his mother's house

where physical evidence was gathered. It should be noted that his blood sample matched

the semen traces found on Maartje Tamboezer's body. Some fibres found on Duffy's

clothing also matched those found on one of the victims. Strings found at Duffy's house

also matched the strings used to bind the victims. Thus, there was enough evidence to

charge Duffy with the murders and rapes. Mr. Justice Farquarson on February 26, 1988

sentenced Duffy to seven life sentences.

In this chapter, we have defined offender profiling. A historical account of offender

profiling has also been discussed. In the next chapter, we discuss the different approaches

to offender profiling, examining their various strengths and weaknesses.

69
Canter, supra note 2, at 52 - 57.

55
 CHAPTER TWO

Approaches to Offender Profiling

There are three main approaches to offender profiling - Diagnostic Evaluation or Clinical

approach, Criminal Investigative Analysis or the FBI approach, and the Investigative

Psychology or Environmental Psychology approach. In recent times however, some

scholars have developed other 'approaches' such as Geographic Profiling, Behavioral

Evidence Analysis, and Crime Action Profiling.

Diagnostic Evaluation (DE) or Clinical Approach

Behavioral details from crime scenes, reconstructed crime

activity and witness accounts can offer an additional
perspective to forensic information gathered by traditional
investigative methods. This behavioral information can often
provide insights into the thinking patterns and personal habits
of offenders that extend beyond the limits of the offence
itself. The offender's focus of interest, the type of
relationship that he makes with the victim, the criteria by
which he chooses the circumstances of the offence, the
amount of planning he engages in and the risks he is willing
to run, all help to build up a picture of the offender's mental
world. This, in tum, can provide useful insights into his likely
motivations, his personal needs, his lifestyle and his past
history. The professional who considers these issues is more
likely to understand the contexts within which the offender
commits the offence. This broad, contextual information can
help generate, or support, particular lines of enquiry during
investigations. This type of information can be particularly
useful, for instance, where linked series of offences are being
investigated, where the victim may be a stranger to the
offender, or where an offence seems bizarre and
inexplicable. 7o

7°R'lchard J, Badcock, "Developmental and clinical Issues in Relation to Offending in the Individual", in
Janet L. Jackson, and Debra A. Bekerian, Offender Profiling: Theory, Research and Practice, 40 (1997),

56
Diagnostic Evaluation or Clinical Approach is the oldest approach to offender profiling.

It is an approach mainly adopted by psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. Diagnostic

evaluation approach looks at offenders from a mental illness point of view and tries to

examine crimes and crime scenes from that perspective. Based on their clinical practice

experience, their knowledge of mental health processes and their knowledge of

psychological disorders, these practitioners try to predict the type of offenders who are

likely to be responsible for certain types of criminal behavior. Hence, the diagnostic

evaluation approach "relies on the clinical judgment of a profiler to ascertain the

underlying motives behind an offender's actions".7!

The Diagnostic Evaluation approach is based on the premise that "psychiatrists may be

able to offer insights into some of the more bizarre forms of clinical activity, or at least

those which do not fit into the more normal pattern of criminal behavior. In some cases

the police may be baffled by a particularly unusual crime and might be struggling to

interpret the significance of some aspects of the incident. In such cases a psychiatrist or

clinical psychologist may, from their knowledge of many forms of mental illness, be able

to offer an explanation for behaviour which appears, on first encounter, to make little

sense. Whilst the media may talk of a 'senseless' killing, the clinician may at least be able

to offer an explanation of the killing from the offender's perspective"n. Under the

diagnostic evaluation approach, "the construction of profiles is achieved by diagnosing

71 A'
Insworth, supra note 6, at 123.
72
rd, at 141.

57
the probable psychopathology and/or personality type likely to have committed the crime.

However, such a diagnosis can vary widely among different practitioners,,73.

There is general agreement that some forms of mental illness may predispose certain

individuals to commit certain crimes. This is why psychiatrists and clinical psychologists

playa very important role in offender profiling. Their knowledge of mental disorder, for

instance, helps them to be in a better position to produce a profile of the individuals likely

to commit certain types of crime, especially crimes showing elements of

psychopathology, paraphilias and sadomasochistic behavior. Indeed, Badcock noted that

"the mental disorders most commonly associated with offending are the psychoses,

sociopathic personality disorder and drug/alcohol additions,,74.

Diagnostic evaluation approach was very useful and in fact seen to be accurate in the

"New York Mad Bomber" case in 1956, when Dr. James Brussel produced a

psychological profile of the bomber using this approach. 75 This approach was also used

by Dr. Thomas Bond in profiling Jack the Ripper. Similarly, this was also the approach

used to produce a psychological profile of US President Woodrow Wilson (this was not

for criminal investigation).

73
.Paul Wilson, Robyn Lincoln, and Richard Kocsis, "Validity, Utility and Ethics of Profiling for Serial
VIOlent and Sexual Offenders", Psychiatry, Psychology, and Law, Vol.4, No. 1,3 (April 1997).
74
Badcock, supra note 70, at 26.
75
SUpra at 44.

58
In spite of the above noted successes of diagnostic evaluation, it is not without criticism.

The scientific basis of this approach is still in question. This is an approach that relies

heavily on the personal clinical experience and knowledge of an individual practitioner.

As such it is subjective and cannot be empirically tested.

Another criticism leveled against this approach is that it is an approach done by

psychiatrists and psychologists who do not have any law enforcement background. Egger

argued that diagnostic evaluations are done by psychiatrists and psychologists who "have

very little experience or knowledge of law enforcement or investigation,,76. Wilson et al

sees the main problem with this approach as being its individualistic nature, arguing that

"this individualistic approach also prevents adequate comparative assessments of validity,

utility and process, and the category of profiling now in the ascendancy is that of crime

scene analysis,,77. Ainsworth also argued that "rather than studying a large number of

cases and drawing inferences from those, this approach is more likely to involve multiple

observations of single cases,,78. Ainsworth further contended that "such an approach has

some advantages but may also suffer from some disadvantages when compared to

approaches which involve the study of large numbers of cases. For example, the single

case study allows for a very detailed consideration of all the aspects of one incident and

may thus produce information which a less considered examination might reveal.

76
Egger, supra note 15, at 250.
77 W'I1 son, Lincoln, and Kocsis, supra note 73, at 4.

78 Ai
nsworth, supra note 6, at 141.

59
However, information derived from such a single case may be so specific to that incident

that it is all but impossible to extrapolate the findings to other investigations,,79.

In the final analysis, it should be noted that all other approaches to offender profiling

originated from diagnostic evaluation, and as we have seen it has proved very useful in

several cases. The most important thing about this approach is that it offers a better and

more authoritative insight into the motivations underlying an offender's criminal action.

Criminal Investigative Analysis (CIA)/FBI Approach or Crime Scene Analysis

(CSA)

Although obviously an oversimplification, the basic

blueprint for the FBI approach involves considering the
available aspects of the crime scenes; the nature of attacks;
forensic evidence; and information related to the victim:
then classifying the offender and, finally, referring to the
appropriate predictive characteristics. Results from such
investigations are incorporated in a framework which
basically classifies murderers according to whether they are
'organized' (which implies that murderers plan their
crimes, display control at scene of crime, leave few or no
clues, and that the victim is a targeted stranger) or
'disorganized' (which implies that murders are not planned
and crime scenes show evidence of haphazard behaviour)
.
or a mIxture 0 f the two. 80

79
Id .
80
Jackson and Bekerian, supra note 17, at 4.

60
The FBI defined Criminal Investigative Analysis as "a process of reviewing crimes from

both a behavioral and investigative perspective. It involves reviewing and assessing the

facts of a criminal act, interpreting offender behavior, and interaction with the victim, as

exhibited during the commission of the crime, or as displayed in the crime scene".81 This

approach is based on crime scene analysis and involves an examination of the method of

operation and other behavioral patterns that can be deduced from the crime scene

characteristics. Having found that the diagnostic evaluation approach proved very helpful

in apprehending unknown serial killers, and having been influenced by the work of Dr.

James Brussel, the FBI introduced criminal investigative analysis. It should be noted that

criminal investigative analysis is done by the Behavioral Analysis Unit (Behavioral

Sciences Unit) of the FBI based in Quantico, Virginia. This approach is undoubtedly the

most popular approach. In fact, this approach is fast becoming synonymous with the term

'offender profiling' itself. This does not mean that this is the most reliable approach. This

situation exists because those in law enforcement field see offender profiling as their own

exclusive club, and have virtually succeeded in showcasing themselves as the one and

only group of people who are better placed to produce the best and most accurate

profiles. Are they correct? You will found out for yourself after reading this study.

However, there is no gainsaying the fact that the FBI has given immense popularity to

this crime investigation technique. In line with Kocsis, "this popularization in itself is a

significant accomplishment that should not be underestimated or devalued as without

these efforts it is debatable to what extent, if at all, the practice of profiling would have

81
!llip;llwww.fbi.gov/hglisd/cirg/ncavc.htm (assessed January 16,2007).

61
evolved beyond the classical circumstance of DE,,82. This technique is undoubtedly the

offshoot of diagnostic evaluation and it was after the work and contributions of Dr. James

Brussel that the FBI began to embrace and develop this technique.

In the 1970's the FBI were frustrated with the fact that physical evidence even when it

was present at a crime scene did not provide clues to the sort of individuals that they

should be looking for. With this in mind, they used data from serious sexual assault and

murder cases and tried to see if they could identify the behavioral characteristics of these

sort of offenders. They also carried out in-depth interviews with 36 convicted serial

killers. As Ainsworth has pointed out, "a careful recording and analysis of the crimes

which these offenders had committed built up a database. Based on this information, the

FBI advocated that important information could be gleaned by: (1) a careful examination

of the various aspects of the crime scene, (2) a study of the nature of the attacks

themselves, (3) careful consideration of the medical examiners report, (4) the

identification of the characteristics of the type of victim selected".83

Under this approach, an offender is classified according to whether the crime scene

appeared to be organized or disorganized. This classification of offenders into organized

or disorganized offenders helps investigators to draw conclusions as to the characteristics

of the likely offenders. The FBI maintained that the organized and disorganized offenders

have different demographic and behavioral characteristics. According to the FBI, the

crime scene of an organized offender shows the following features:

82 R'
lchard N, Kocsis, Criminal Profiling: Principles and Practice, XIII (2006),
83 A'
IUsworth, supra note 6, at 16,

62
 • Shows signs of some sort of planning.

• Shows that the offender was in control at the scene.

• Shows evidence of forensic awareness by the offender (revealed by the lack of

physical traces at the scene).

84
Ressler et al maintained that organized offenders tend to:

* Have a high birth order (often being the firstborn son in a family).
* Their father's work history is generally stable.
* Parental discipline is perceived as inconsistent.
* Have mobility (his car is in good condition).
* Likely to choose a stranger as the victim.
* This type of offender is intelligent and possibly an underachiever.
* Socially skilled.
* Sexually competent.
* Likely to be living with a partner.
* Likely to be depressed and experiencing a great deal of anger around the time of

attack.

* Likely to follow news report about the attack and likely to leave the area after the

attack.

On the other hand, the FBI maintained that the crime scene of a disorganized offender

tend to show the following features.

84
Robert K. Ressler., Ann W. Burgess., and John E. Douglas, Sexual Homicide: Patterns and Motives, 121
(1992).

63
 • Shows evidence of little or no planning.

• Shows that the attack was random.

• Shows that the offender carried out the attack when in a frightened or confused

state of mind.

• Shows evidence of disorganized behavior.

• The offender chooses any weapon that he or she can find at the scene and is likely

to leave the weapons at the scene.

• There is little or no attempt made by this type of offender to conceal any clues at

the scene.

85
It has also been noted that the disorganized offender is:

• Likely to live alone.

• Lives near the scene of crime.

• Socially and sexually inept.

• Likely to be of below average intelligence.

• Suffers from some form of mental illness.

• Likely to have suffered physical or sexual abuse as a child.

• Likely to be oflow birth status in the family.

• Father's work is unstable.

• This type of offender has poor work history.

• Likely to have suffered harsh parental discipline.

85
Id, at 130.

64
This classification into organized and disorganized offenders helps to determine at the

outset whether a series of attacks are likely to be the work of one person or more

individuals.

The FBI also classified crime scenes into the organized crime scene, disorganized crime

scene, mixed crime scene and the atypical crime scene. The organized crime scene as we

have seen shows elements of planning and premeditation, as well as attempts to conceal

any physical traces. The disorganized crime scene shows a high level of disorganized and

disoriented behavior; appears to be unplanned and random, and no attempts are made to

conceal any physical traces. The mixed crime scene refers to a crime scene that shows the

characteristics of both the organized and the disorganized. Davies noted that "this could

indicate the presence of two offenders in the crime, or it could indicate that one offender

had planned the crime and then abandoned the plan due to unforeseen circumstances, or it

could indicate that an offender had staged the outcome (made it look like something

else),,86. The atypical crime scene is one where no classification can be made because of

lack of available information. This is usually the case where they crime scene was located

several years later.

The FBI has done considerable specific analysis of offenders who rape. They classified

rapists into two - selfish and unselfish rapists. 87 As Ainsworth has pointed out "the

86
Joseph A. Davies, "Criminal Personality Profiling and Crime Scene Assessment": A Contemporary
Investigative Tool to Assist Law Enforcement Public Safety", Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice,
Vol. 15, No.3, 296 (August 1999).
87
RObert R. Hazelwood, "Analyzing the Rape and Profiling the Offender", in Robert R. Hazelwood., and
A Multidisciplinary Approach, 3rd edition,
Ann W. Burgess, (eds), Practical Aspects of Rape Investigation:
134 (2001).

65
distinction refers to the extent to which the rapist showed any consideration towards the

victim during the act,,88. According to the FBI, the selfish rapist tends to be:

• Violent, shows a high level of aggression.

• Shows total sexual dominance.

• Shows self-confidence.

• Makes no attempt to establish any form of intimacy with the victim.

• Engages in anal sex, followed by fellatio.

• Tends to use very offensive, threatening, abusive, profane, demeaning,

humiliating, impersonal and sexually oriented language.

The unselfish rapist on the other hand is seen to show:

• Lack of self-confidence.

• Does not appear to be violent in the attack. Tends to use minimal level of force.

• Not likely to cause any physical harm.

• Likes to involve the victim in the sexual act, tries to establish some sort of

intimacy.

• Likely to tell the victim to perform certain sexual acts on him. For instance he

may ask the victim to kiss him, fondle him and so on.

• Tends to use language that is personal, reassuring, complimentary, non-profane,

concerned and apologetic.

88 A'lUsworth, supra note 6, at 103.

66
This classification is useful because it is believed that verbal utterances by the offender

during the attack will reveal a lot of infonnation about him or her. Above all, this

classification helps in choosing an appropriate interviewing/interrogation strategy.

Following the usefulness of the above classification, the FBI made further classification

of rapists. Hazelwood maintained that there are four types of rapists: 89

(1) Power Reassurance Rapist or Compensatory Rapist:

This type of rapist sees rape as a way of showing his masculinity and sexual adequacy,

and shows the signs of an unselfish rapist. This type of rapist sees rape as a way of

removing any doubts about their sexual inadequacy. In fact, "the sexual act goes some

way to reassuring the perpetrator about his insecurity. However, the effect may be short

lived, and the offender might strike again within a few days or weeks, and probably in the

same district. It is not uncommon for such a perpetrator to take an item of clothing or

other possession from his victims as a bizarre 'trophy'. He may also keep careful records

of his conquests. As the primary motivation is the removal of feelings of inadequacy, this

type of perpetrator is unlikely to stop offending until he is caught and incarcerated.,,9o

It has also been noted that this type of rapist usually attacks in late evenings or early

mornings when the victim is likely to be alone or with small children, and that this type

89
Hazelwood, supra note 87, at 14l.
90 A.
tnsworth, supra note 6, at 105.

67
of rapist also chooses a victim about his own age and his own race. 91 It is also believed

that this type of rapist likes to think that the victim is 'enjoying' the rape and is most

likely to ask the victim to undress on hislher own. They appear to be concerned about the

welfare of the victim and tend to feel some sort of remorse, and likely to apologize to the

victim. Holmes and Holmes maintained that this type of rapist is likely to be single, lives

with one or both parents, non-athletic, quiet, passive, social loner, with limited education,

often employed in a menial job, likes to visit adult bookstores, likely to be a transvestite,

a fetishist, involved in voyeurism, excessive masturbation and exhibitionism, tends to

attack in his own neighborhood, and most likely to have been raised by an aggressive,

seductive and dominating mother. 92

Furthermore, "for this rapist, the sex act validates his position of importance. He

perceives himself as a loser, and by controlling another human being he hopes to make

himself believe that he is important, if only temporarily. For this reason, he uses only

enough force to control his victim,,93. Holmes and Holmes have suggested that when

interviewing this type of rapist that the interviewer should adopt the strategy of appealing

to the rapist's "sense of masculinity", arguing that "the interviewer might indicate to him

that the woman who was raped in the case under investigation has not suffered "undue"

trauma, and that the police realize the rapist had no desire to harm his victim; such a

statement could set the stage for a "sympathetic" relationship that might result in the

91
Id.
92
Holmes and Holmes, supra note 18, at 20.
93
Id, at 121.

68
rapiSt's sharing information, not only about the rape currently under investigation, but

about other suspected connected rapes".94

(2) Power-Assertive Rapist or Exploitative Rapist:

The power assertive rapist sees rape as an expression of his masculinity and superiority.

This rapist has no doubts or fears about his sexual adequacy and falls under the selfish

category. Therefore, they tend to use force during the attack. "This type of rapist may

well tear his victim's clothing and discard it. He may also carry out repeated sexual

assaults rather than just one, thus adding to his assailant's feelings of virility and

dominance. If the man has driven the victim to the location of the rape, he may well leave

her there without her clothing, and as a result the victim will be unable to report the

assault swiftly,,95.

This type of rapist is normally athletic and does not see anything wrong with rape. For

them, raping of women is 'normal'. Date rapes fall into this category and they are

normally problematic in prosecuting. It has been observed that this type of rapist is likely

to have been raised in a single parent family, lived in foster homes, suffered physical

abuse as a child, a high school dropout, has domestic problems, unhappy marriages, likes

to visit bars, likely to be employed in macho occupations - construction or police work,

96
and likely to choose a victim of his own race.

94
Id, at 122.
95 A'
lllsworth, supra note 6, at 106.
96
Holmes and Holmes, supra note 18, at 126.

69
Holmes and Holmes have suggested that:

It is best for the interviewer to approach the interview

session with all the facts in hand: the placement of the
suspect at the scene, physical evidence that directly
implicates him in the rape (or rapes), and other
pertinent information that shows the interviewer is a
professional. What the police should communicate is,
We know you did it, and this is how we are going to
prove it. If the interviewer is in error about the facts, or
if there is some other reason for the rapist to discount
the interviewer's competence as a professional, it is
unlikely that any cooperation will be gained from the
rapist through any means, including intimidation, ~leas
9
for aid, and appeals based on the victim's welfare.

(3) Anger-Retaliatory Rapist:

As the name suggests, this type of rapist tend to rape as a result of his anger and distaste

of women. This rapist is extremely angry, violent and basically hates women. They

derive sexual excitement by hurting women and see women as the source of their

troubles, and so seeks revenge. As such "this type of rapist appears to commit his assaults

as a way of expressing his own rage and hostility. He appears to possess a great deal of

anger and animosity towards women in general and uses the act of rape as a way of

expressing or releasing this anger. He also appears to derive pleasure from degrading his

victims. The style of the rape will be particularly selfish and the perpetrator will use

extreme amounts of violence,,98.

97
Id, at 128.
98 A'
IUsworth, supra note 6, at 106.

70
Generally speaking, this type of rapist likes to perform degrading sexual acts on the

victims, the attack tends to be unplanned, the victim is likely to be someone who closely

matches the woman the rapist sees as the source of his troubles. The rapist is likely to be

married, have many affairs, and is likely to choose a victim of his own age. This type of

rapist tends to come from a broken home, and is likely to have been physically abused as

a child. Holmes and Holmes maintained that "some 80% have been reared by a single

female parent or other single female caregiver,,99. They suggested that the interviewer

should be male as this type of rapist hates women.

(4) Anger-Excitement Rapist or Sadistic Rapist:

This type of rapist sees rape as a source of pleasure. The idea of torturing the victims

provides this rapist with sexual excitement, and he likes to inflict pain on the victims.

There is general agreement that this is the most dangerous of all rapists. The attack tends

to be planned, violent and could result in murder. This rapist is likely to have a 'rape kit',

which he takes to the location of the attacks. Furthermore, this type of rapist falls under

the selfish category and likes to see the victims suffer; likes to instill fear in the victims

and most likely to choose the type of victim that will fulfill his inner fantasies/desires.

This rapist will continue to rape until he is caught. This rapist is likely to come from a

single - parent family, with divorced parents, lived in foster homes, age range 30 - 39,

physically abused as a child, raised in a sexually deviant home, married, with some

college education, employed in white collar jobs, likely to be a middle class family man,

99
Holmes and Holmes, supra note 18, at 123.

71
 loo
has compulsive personality, ritualistic, likely to stalk and eventually kill victims.

Holmes and Holmes noted that there is no interviewing strategy that is effective with this

. 101
type 0 f rapIst.

Having discussed these examples of various classifications of offenders by the FBI, we

noW move on to discussing how a typical criminal profile is produced. Douglas et al have

clearly outlined the various stages involved in the criminal profile generating process thus

_ profiling inputs, decision process models stage, crime scene assessment, criminal

pro fil ' .' d h'

1 e, mvestlgatlOn an appre enslOn.
102

(1) Profiling Inputs: This involves collecting all available information about the

crime, including physical evidence, crime scene photographs, autopsy reports,

witness and victim statements, as well as police reports. Detailed background

information about the victim is noted. It should also be noted at this stage whether

the crime scene is indoors or outdoors. "In homicide cases, the required

information includes a complete synopsis of the crime and a description of the

crime scene, encompassing factors indigenous to that area to the time of the

incident such as weather conditions and the political and social environment,,103.

100
Id, at 129.
101
Id, at 131.

102Th'IS discussion draws from the work of Douglas, Ressler, Burgess and Hartman, "Criminal Profiling
from Crime Scene Analysis", Behavioral Sciences and the Law, Vol. 4, No.4, 401 - 421 (1986).
103
Id, at 406.

72
 (2) Decision Process Models: At this stage, the profiler organizes "the input into

meaningful questions and patterns"IO\ (for example, what type of murder - serial,

mass or spree murder?). What is the primary intent? The location, pattern and acts

that took place before and after the offense will also be noted at this stage. At this

stage, attempt will also be made to ascertain the length of time taken to carry out

the attack.

(3) Crime Scene Assessment: This is arguably the most crucial stage and care should

be taken to note whether the crime scene is staged or not. The profiler at this stage

tries to reconstruct the behavior of the offender and the victim. The aim here is to

try to ascertain what kind of weapon was used and the type of injuries. Here the

profiler also tries to classify the crime scene and the likely offender. Does the

crime scene appear to be the work of organized or disorganized offender? Also to

be determined at this stage are the likely motives of the crime.

(4) Criminal Profile: At this stage, the profiler formulates an initial description of

the most likely suspects. The actual criminal profile is now created and the best

methods of apprehending the unknown offender will be suggested. A criminal

profile usually contains such information as the likely age, race, height, gender,

marital status, job type, education, location, criminal record, military background,

social skills, sexual life as well as use of drugs or alcohol.

104
Id.

73
 (5) Investigation: At this stage a written report will be presented to the investigators

and they will concentrate on the suspects matching the profile. Any new

information about the crime or other connected crimes will also be put together.

(6) Apprehension: If any suspect is arrested, an interviewing technique will be

chosen. The criminal profile is then evaluated to see how it matches the suspect.

The FBI approach has proved to be very useful in many cases. As Ainsworth has pointed

out this approach constitutes "the first systematic attempt to classify serial and serious

criminals on the basis of behavioral characteristics,,105. Furthermore, "the classification

made it somewhat easier to assess whether a series of crimes which appeared similar in

many respects was likely to have been committed by the same person. If the police were

investigating the abduction and murder of two young girls in the same area, the fact that

one appeared to be the work of a disorganized murderer, and the other the work of an

organized murderer may prove to be helpful. But, more importantly, the ability to assess

whether a series of crimes was likely to be the result of a single perpetrator would be

helpful in allowing the police to pool all the evidence accumulated on each single case in
1
order to build up a better picture of the offender" 06.

The FBI approach has however, been criticized. It has been argued that their approach is

not scientific, that the data sample was insufficient, that their approach is subjective and

the fact that the FBI declines to share information about their methods, so that other

105 A'
lllsworth, supra note 6, at 101.
106 rd,

74
scholars can test their hypothesis. In the words of Ainsworth, "one immediate problem

with this approach was the fact that the classification arose mainly from interviews with

just 36 American, convicted, serial murderers. It was not clear whether the findings

applied only to serial murderers, who are after all a type of offender which is still

statistically extremely rare, even in the USA. The fact that all the interviewees were

convicted murderers also raises the question as to whether more successful murderers

(i.e. those who have not been caught) might have provided different information. It is

also not clear whether any information obtained from this American sample is directly

applicable to offenders in different countries,,107. Ainsworth also maintained that "to base

a major classification on such a small number of specialist offenders is somewhat

questionable" 108. He further argued that the FBI approach lacks clarity, and that "the lack

of clarity is not helped by the fact that the FBI is reluctant to allow social scientists to test

their hypotheses in a systematic and objective way. The situation is confused further

when former FBI employees who have written memoirs of their exploits appear to

contradict each other. (see for example Douglas and Olshaker, 1995 and Ressler and

Shachtman, 1992),,109.

Canter and Alison were also very critical of the FBI approach and they maintained that "a

careful examination of the content of their profiles shows a severe lack in accounts of any

systematic procedures or any substantive theoretical models of behaviour. There is no

107
Id, at 102.
108
Id, at 110.
109
Id,atl14.

75
reference to any commonly accepted psychological principles - pathological or

. 1,,110
SOCIa .

Wilson et a1 also argued that "first it is believed that this approach has no real theoretical

basis. It simply reduces human behavior to a few observable parameters which lead to

characteristics of the unknown offender. Second, the various descriptors used in the

classification manual are not weighted or given any order of priority. The typologies

include an extensive range of crime scene indicators and their associated heuristic

inferences, but the formulation of profiles is sti111eft to the subjective interpretation of the

individual compiling them".111

On a similar vein, Muller contended that this approach "relies heavily on the experience

and intuition of the profi1er, both of which are difficult to empirically test. One of the

main problems with a scientific analysis of CSA is that its proponents have never felt the

need to have it scientifically verified" I 12. Muller further argued that:

Many of the claims of CSA sound much like those of

psychoanalysis, with talk of fantasies and sexual motivations,
and like psychoanalysis, these claims do not seem to be
falsifiable in most cases. Take, for example, the following
statement: "Although some of the murderers in our study did
not report fantasies in conscious way, their descriptions of the
murders they committed reveal hidden fantasies of violence"
(Ressler et al., 1988, p.52). We may be left wondering when
FBI agents became experts in interpreting the unconscious
fantasies of others. If one claims that a violent murder is a sign
110
Canter and Alison, supra note 1, at 6.
III W.
llson, Lincoln and Kocsis, supra note 73, at 5.
112
Damon A. Muller, "Criminal Profiling: Real Science or Just Wishful Thinking?", Homicide Studies,
Vol. 4, No.3, 248 (August 2000).

76
 of violent fantasies - even if the murderer does not report any
violent fantasies - then how is one to falsify the hypothesis that
murderers have violent fantasies?

As it stands, the CSA approach is not a good candidate for

falsifiability, primarily due to the nature of the ideas that it is
based on. A further problem is that those involved have had
little interest in their work being empirically substantiated. One
of the problems is that of operationalizing the variables. I 13

The major problem with the FBI approach relates to the fact that there is no method of

testing the reliability, validity/consistency of their methods. This approach is subjective

and needs to be used with caution. It should be noted however, that their classification of

crime scenes and offenders has been very useful in crime investigations.

The Investigative Psychology (IP) or Environmental Psychology Approach

I quickly realized that 'profiling' lacked any clearly

articulated or scientifically based set of procedures,
findings or theories and that many of the people
following in my footsteps were doing little more than
attempting to live up to a media created fiction. I
therefore set about creating a new discipline that I
named Investigative Psychology that would offer a real
scientific base for the development of our
understanding of criminal behaviour in ways that are
relevant to police investigations. The Centre for
Investigative Psychology that I have set up at The
University of Liverpool now provides a framework for
.. 114
that actIVIty.

113
Id, at 249.

David Canter, Biography, http://www.liv.ac.uklpsychology/staff/dcanter.html(last accessed February

114
11,2007).

77
 Investigative Psychology approach was developed by Professor David Canter, currently a

professor of psychology at the University of Liverpool. This approach started in 1985 when

Professor Canter said that he was invited by Detective Chief Superintendent Thelma Wagstaff

and Detective Chief Inspector John Grieve to Scotland Yard office to discuss the possibility of

using psychology to assist in police investigations. Canter admitted that at the beginning he had

no experience of police procedurelinvestigations and had just little knowledge of criminal

behavior. However, after more contact with the police detectives, and police investigations,

Canter said that he "felt a start had to be made somewhere to see whether even elementary

psychological principles could be used to help a major police investigation". 1 IS In 1986, Canter

wrote a letter to Detective Chief Superintendent Thelma Wagstaff regarding a series of rapes he

had read about in the local newspaper. In response to the letter, he was invited to Hendon Police

College where an incident room was set up in connection with the rapes (named the Hart

inquiry). Canter stated that it was at this meeting that he was formally asked by Detective Chief

Superintendent Vince McFadden, the head of Surrey CID, to "use whatever skills I might have

as a psychologist to contribute directly to a major inquiry into rape and murder" 116. Canter noted

that this was in effect the beginning of his "personal journey to see if a criminal's actions in a

crime really could reveal systematically his key identifying characteristics" 1 I?

Canter maintained that a criminal leaves not only physical traces at a scene of crime, but also

Psychological traces, and that by examining these psychological traces, investigators can have an

lIS
Canter, supra note 2, at 29.
116
Id, at 33.
117
Id.

78
idea as to the sort of person likely to commit a particular crime. I IS Following the footsteps of the

FBI and drawing from their work, Canter maintained that "the only way open to me to discover

what profiling could be, and how it might relate to the psychological theories and methods that I

knew, was by working alongside an ongoing investigation, trying out ideas as they occurred to

me. This is not the best way to become involved in any area of research, coming up with possible

results without the time or resources to test them thoroughly, but it was the only way forward". I 19

Professor Canter came up with what he called a five-factor model of offender behavior. He based

his work on the five aspects of the interaction between the victim and the offender. According to

Canter, the five aspects of interaction are interpersonal coherence, significance of time and place,

criminal characteristics, criminal career and forensic awareness.

Interpersonal Coherence:

Canter argued that an offender's criminal activity makes sense to them within their own personal

psychology. This involves analyzing an offender's criminal actions to see if it is related to the

way he/she deals with other people in non-criminal situations. It is believed that an offender's

actions at a crime scene mirror his or her actions in non-criminal day to day activities. As such,

"the psychologist should be able to determine something about the offender from the victim and

the way the offender interacted with the victim (where this can be determined, such as with

118 Id.

119
Id, at 35.

79
rape)".120 "For instance, the offender will select victims that are consistent with the important

characteristics of people who are important to the offender". 121

Significance of Place and Time:

Canter believed that an offender will likely choose to attack at a location that has some sort of

significance to him or her. There is the idea that offenders tend to commit murder and rape in

familiar locations, where they feel in control and comfortable. "Therefore, if all of the crimes are

committed in a certain geographic location, there is a high chance that the offender lives or

works around the area".122 Furthermore, an examination of the place and time of an attack "may

provide valuable information on the constraints of offender's mobility. Addressing the

characteristics of the criminal allows researchers to determine whether the nature of the crime

and the way it is committed can lead to a classification of criminal characteristics. This may lead

to common characteristics of a subgroup of offender and provide some guidance for the direction

of the investigation. The development of a person's criminal behavior may allow the police to

backtrack the probable career of the unidentified offender and narrow the possibilities".123 "A

rudimentary example of this would be the perpetrator who offends while traveling along a major

road or highway - this may indicate that travel is a part of the offender's job, such as a courier or

120
Muller, supra note 112, at 241.
121 Id.

122
Id, at 242.
123
Egger, supra note 15, at 247.

80
trUck driver. Conversely, crime scenes that are proximal may indicate a lack of access to

" 124
tranSport .

Criminal Characteristics:

Here attempt is made to classify offenders, the crimes, and the crime scenes. There are various

ways of classifying offenders and crimes scenes. For instance, the FBI's classification into

organized and disorganized offenders, power reassurance rapists, power assertive rapists, anger
. d . . 125
retaliatory rapIsts an anger excItement rapIsts.

Criminal Career:

It is believed that many offenders do not change their crime patterns. Therefore, attempts should

be made to determine if the likely offender is a career criminal. This involves looking at the

possible skills and occupations of the likely offender.

Forensic Awareness:

Canter also maintained that if a crime scene reveals that the offender took conscious steps to

conceal physical evidence, that such offender is likely to have had previous contact with the

police and knows about crime scene investigation techniques. Therefore, this sort of offender is

likely to have a criminal record, and so investigators are able to narrow their search to suspects

with criminal records.

124
Wayne Petherick, "What's in a Name? Comparing Applied Profiling Methodologies", 5 Journal of Law
and Social Challenges, 181 (Summer 2003).
125
Supra at 47.

81
Drawing ideas from environmental psychology, Professor David Canter also came up with what

be called the "Circle Theory of Environmental Range" 126. He maintained that there is some sort

of relationship between criminal activity range and the home base of serial offenders. Canter

argued that serial offenders tend to attack and operate in locations where they feel in control and

comfortable. The circle theory emphasizes the study of offenses to find out the offender's home

base. It involves the prediction of an offender's residential area by examining the spatial

distribution of serial offenses.

In his circle theory, Professor Canter came up with two models - The Marauder and the

Commuter. The marauder is the serial offender who commits crime within his home base, while

the commuter travels a distance from his home to commit crime. For Canter, there is a causal

relationship between the marauder and his home base as opposed to the commuter model where

there is no causal relationship.

In order to test the circle theory, Godwin and Canter in 1997 carried out a study in the United

States involving 54 male US serial killers. 127 These 54 serial killers were only those who were

convicted of at least 10 murders on different dates and at different locations. Godwin and Canter

gathered data from various police departments in the US and also studied 540 victims. Their

study was based on the following hypothesis:

126 .
David Canter, and Larkin P, "The Environmental Range of Serial Rapists", Journal of Environmental
Psychology, 13,63 - 69, (1993).
127
Maurice Godwin., and David Canter, "Encounter and Death: The Spatial Behavior of US Serial Killers",
Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategy and Management', Vol. 20, No. 1,24 - 38 (1997).

82
(1) The home operates as a focus for the activities of serial killers in apprehending their victims

and leaving their bodies. The focus is hypothesized as being the most likely center of gravity

of their actions.

(2) There will be differences in the distances traveled to apprehend victims and to leave their

bodies. It is proposed that the dumping of the body carries most evidential implications and

therefore is likely to be a further distance as well as being more likely to be shaped by

buffering processes.

(3) The distances serial killers travel to dump the victims' bodies are likely to change

systematically over time while the victims' points of fatal encounter locations are not. The

counter-intuitive possibility that this change relates to an increasing incorporation of all his

killing activities into his domestic area will also be tested. 128

Their study showed the home as a focus of serial murder, which implies that serial killers

are most likely to apprehend nearly all their victims near their home (serial killer's

home).129 Their study also "indicates that the offenders, on average, tended to make

initial contact with their victims closer to home than the locations in which they

eventually place the bodies"13o. This study further showed that "as the number of murders

increases, killers generally cover a narrower area in which to leave the bodies of their

victims, until the ninth and tenth offenses where the offender may be disposing of bodies

quite close to his home. This pattern contrasts markedly with the locations at which the

128
Id, at 27.
129
Id,at29.
130
Id, at 3l.

83
initial contact is made with the victim. All ten of the murders in the sequences studied

here tended to be close to the home base of the offender, typically less than a couple of

miles from his residence" 131. In a nutshell, Godwin and Canter concluded that as the

series of offenses progresses, the sites where the serial offender dumps the bodies of

victims get closer to the offender's home, and that this could be as a result of the serial

offender trying to reduce the risks associated with transporting the body, and could also

be that the offender has gained more confidence.

Obviously, this study by Godwin and Canter is very useful for investigators in making

decisions as to the first areas to search for suspects. This however, has to be approached

with extreme caution. In fact, Godwin and Canter even drew attention to this issue and

they called for more research to explore this process, arguing that "the systematic

changing of locations and distances relative to the home base may be a deliberate ploy to

distract police attention from the killer's home base" \32. Above all, no investigator can

really be sure of the number of victims and the locations in any serial killing case.

Godwin and Canter suggested that "investigative efforts should go into interviewing

people within the neighborhood from which victims go missing in order to pinpoint

precisely the address or location where the victim may have been last seen.,,133

131
Id, at 35.
132
Id, at 36.
13 3
Id.

84
It should be noted at this point that Investigative Psychology approach uses a statistical

analysis method called Multi-dimensional Scaling (MDS). There are different types of

MDS and IP uses the type called Smallest Space Analysis. "In very simplistic terms

multi-dimensional scaling is a method of statistically analyzing the relationships between

multiple variables simultaneously" 134. For a more detailed discussion of the MDS, please
135
see the work of Palermo and Kocsis.

Data analyzed using MDS enable the creation of a diagram

within which the variables under consideration can be
individually plotted. Where these variables appear within a
diagram (i.e. plotted) denotes the relationship they hold with
each other. Consequently, variables that are plotted in a
region of space close together hold a relationship with each
other. The closer any variables are plotted together, the
stronger their relationship or association. The opposite
applies with variables appearing far apart in a MDS diagram
indicating that the variables hold few similarities in that case.
Furthermore, variables that appear in a location between
other variables can be interpreted as holding some central or
common relationship. In addition to the relationship plotted
variables may have with each other in MDS diagram, their
respective positions also convey some impression of their
distinctiveness. Thus, variables that appear closer to the
center of a MDS diagram are typically found to be commonly
occurring variables, where as those that are plotted in the
outlying rejions of a MDS diagram, are said to be more
distinctive. 1 6

Investigative psychology approach seems to have advantage over the other approaches

and has been well received by many scholars. Muller, for instance, maintained that

134
G. B. Palenno and R. N. Kocsis, Offender Profiling: An Introduction to the Sociopsychological Analysis
of Violent Crime, 158 (2005).
135
Id, at 157 - 177.
136
rd, at 158.

85
"unlike CSA, IP was designed from the beginning with science in mind but this does not

mean that it is a science in itself. Canter and his colleagues have attempted to use

established psychological principles and research methodology to create a discipline that

is empirically sound and open to peer review. IP has a great deal of potential to become a

science, but it still has a long way to go before it will be recognized as a discipline in

itself' 137. Muller further noted that IP has the advantage that it falls under the established

science of psychology or criminology, arguing that "as such, most of the theories that

have been formulated as part of IP are constructed in such a way that can be easily

falsified,,]38. This is in fact where IP appears to be of more value and stronger than the

other approaches. One can safely say therefore, that if any approach is capable of

becoming genuinely scientific on its own, then it is IP.

On a similar vem, Ainsworth maintained that "while Canter's work shares some

commonalities with that developed by the FBI's Behavioral Science Unit, he has tried to

place his approach within an accepted psychological framework. Canter believes that as a

branch of applied psychology, his work goes beyond what is traditionally thought of as

offender profiling. Canter's early work tried to understand the type of crime in which any

one individual might be likely to become involved, and he also considered the way in

which such a crime might be carried out. Most importantly, Canter tried to establish

whether the way in which an offender's behaviour while committing a crime mirrored

their behaviour in everyday life. Canter suggested for example, that in their choice of

137
Muller, supra note 112, at 251.
138 Id.

86
victims, offenders will only select people who, even within non-offending behaviour, are

important to them. Canter supports this viewpoint by reference to the fact that the vast

majority of serial killers target victims within their own ethnic groUp.,,139

The Investigative Psychology approach has undoubtedly been criticized. Egger argued

that IP practitioners lack police/law enforcement experience and also that IP does not

make use of interview data of a wide range of offenders. Egger further argued that this

approach psychology relies heavily upon victim information. 140

Petherick was also critical of IP's model of offender behavior. He noted that "there is

little available to tell the practitioner how to apply this model to an actual investigation.

The original study that was done to develop the model was retrospective, that is, used

solved cases where both the location of the offender's home and crimes were known.

This must bring the practical application of this model into question, as it it would be

practically impossible to know whether you were dealing with a marauder or a commuter

with an unknown offender. The distances defined by the criminal range and home range

are also problematic, as there is no clear relationship between the size or location of the

criminal range and the distance it is from the offender's home,,141.

139 ·
A msworth, supra note 6, at 118.
140
Egger, supra note 15, at 252.

141 Wayne Petherick, "Criminal Profiling: How it got started and How it is used",
~.crimelibrary.com!criminal-mind/profiling/profiling2/4.html. (last accessed February 10, 2007).

87
Similarly, Ainsworth contended that "if one takes Canter's Circle Theory we can see

some of the difficulties which can be encountered. His theory relies on one being able to

draw a circle around all of an offender's crimes. Given some of the arguments presented

... , we must question how feasible this is. Not all crimes will be reported or recorded, and

even those may be recorded inaccurately. Furthermore, in the real world of police

investigation it will not be particularly easy to establish whether a series of crimes has

been committed by the same individual" 142. The statistical analysis adopted by IP can

only be useful if it is based on accurate data.

Wilson et al were also highly critical of investigative psychology. They argued that:

A weakness of Canter's work is that to date it does not

necessarily offer anything new, although contributions from
the field of environmental psychology do provide new
avenues to explore. What it does do is encouch known
criminological or psychological principles in ways that can
be useful to the crime investigator. It utilizes the same factors
as the FBI but places them firmly within psychological
theory and methodology. It is not yet clear how well Canter's
theories (especially circle theory) will be adapted for use in
the United States with its higher rate of serial crime, its
greater penchant for mobility, and its more vast urban
. . . 143
enVIronment In many regIOns.

Muller did not agree with this criticism by Wilson et al. For Muller "this is probably a

somewhat extreme view, as applying the application of psychological knowledge to

criminal investigation potentially has great value. Canter has shown that the application

of psychological principles and methodologies can, for example, help identify where the

142 A'
lllsworth, supra note 6, at 132.
143 W'II son, Lincoln and Kocsis, supra note 73, at 6.

88
offender might live and what his job might be (e.g., Godwin and Canter, 1997). It is very

easy for those in academia to remain aloof and remote from the real world, yet this is an

attempt to make some practical use of psychology by applying it to genuine social

problems".144 Indeed, the statement by Wilson et al is an overreaction. As we mentioned

earlier on, if any approach to offender profiling has the potential of being generally

accepted as scientific, then it is the IP approach. As we can see from the above

discussion, IP is based on psychological theories. Research in the field of psychology is

peer reviewed and accepted.

The mam difference between the FBI approach and the investigative psychology

approach is that the FBI approach is mainly drawn from crime scene analysis while

investigative psychology approach goes further with the application of psychological

theories/principles .

... whilst sharing some characteristics with the FBI's approach it

does differ in a number of ways. For example, Canter and
Heritage used statistical analysis in order to establish connections
between various elements in rape behaviour. Publication of their
methods and techniques also allowed other researchers to
examine their work. Based on this, those who wished to do so
could replicate the study but perhaps varying the method slightly.
They may, for example, use different type of statistical analysis
in order to test whether the conclusions remained the same under
such conditions. The point is that by disclosing their methods
and findings in an appropriate journal, researchers such as Canter
and Heritage allowed the academic community to scutinize their
work and to comment upon it. One of the reasons why the FBI's
work has come in for so much criticism is that such an
opportunity has never been afforded those who might wish to test
the reliability or validity of their claims. 145

144
Muller, supra note 112, at 252.
145 A'
lllsworth, supra note 6, at 123.

89
In the final analysis, one can safely say that even though Canter's investigative

psychology approach offers a more scientific basis to offender profiling (based on

psychological principles, and the use of statistical analysis), it still does not provide a

way of using the profiles to point to specific offenders. Nevertheless, Canter has made

and is still continuing to make very important contributions to the understanding of the

theory and practice of offender profiling. The main strength of investigative psychology

approach lies in the attempts to predict the location of serial offenders, by analyzing the

spatial distribution of offenses.

Geographic Profiling

Geographic profiling was developed in 1995 by D. Kim Rossmo, a former police officer

with the Vancouver City Police Department. Rossmo sees geographic profiling as "a

strategic information management system used in the investigation of serial violent

crime,,146. He maintained that "this methodology was designed to help alleviate the

problem of information overload that usually accompanies such cases", arguing that "by

knowing the most probable area of offender residence, police agencies can more

effectively utilize their limited resources, and a variety of investigative strategies have

now been developed to maximize the utility of this process for unsolved cases".147

146
D. Kim Rossmo, "Geographic Profiling",in Janet L. Jackson, and Debra A. Bekerian, (eds) Offender
Profiling: Theory, Research and Practice, 174 (1997).
147
Id.

90
Drawing ideas from environmental psychology and investigative psychology, geographic

profiling "focuses on the probable spatial behaviour of the offender within the context of

the locations of, and the spatial relationships between the various crime sites.,,)48

Geographic profiling uses a computer program to analyze crime scene locations in an

attempt to predict the likely residence of the offender. This computerized program is

known as Criminal Geographic Targeting (CGT). Rossmo believed that "by examining

the spatial information associated with a series of crime sites, the CGT model produces a

three-dimensional probability distribution termed a 'jeopardy surface', the 'height' of

which at any point represents the likelihood of offender residence or workplace. The

jeopardy surface is then superimposed on a street of the area of the crimes; such maps are

termed 'geoprofiles' and use a range of colours to represent varying probabilities. A

geoprofile can be thought of as a fingerprint of the offender's cognitive map,,)49.

Geographic profiling is made up of two components - quantitative or objective and

qualitative or subjective. "The subjective component of geographic profiling is based

primarily on a reconstruction and interpretation of the offender's mental map") 50.

Geographic profiling approach has been criticized on many grounds. Many scholars have

argued that Geographic profiling is not an approach on its own. Palermo and Kocsis, for

instance, argued that "one pertinent issue to consider is the likely efficacy of geographic

148
Id, at 161.
149
Id at 162.
150
Id, at 161.

91
profiling in contributing beyond what can be ascertained by common knowledge,,15l.

Indeed geographic profiling seems to be more of an aid to the investigative psychology

approach than an approach on its own. Palermo and Kocsis further maintained that

"although geographic profiling as a technique appears potentially useful, it is perhaps

best when supplemented by other investigatory measures that attempt to predict

information that may assist in the detection and apprehension of an offender". 152

Petherick contended that Rossmo "claimed that his profiling method requires a

psychological profile before a geographic profile can be produced, yet he has been noted

to have produced a geographic profile without a psychological profile,,153. As such "the

result of ignoring important behavioral and case context and not utilizing fully drawn

profiles is that geographic profiling does not, and cannot, differentiate between two or

more offenders operating in the same geographic area,,154.

Similarly, McGrath argued that "difficulties would include cases with a small number of

known linked crimes and cases where linked crime scenes have not been identified or

even discovered,,155. "Also, the underlying theories are mostly drawn from databases

related to burglaries and other crimes that may not translate well to the serial murderer or

151 .
Palenno and KOCSIS, supra note 134, at 240.
152
Id, at 242.
153 .
Pethenck, supra note 124, at 183.
154
Id .

155 Michael G. McGrath, "Criminal Profiling: Is there a Role for the Forensic Psychiatrist?", Journal of
American Academy of Psychiatry and Law, Vol. 28, No.3, 319 (2000).

92
rapist, and these theories relate to overall crime patterns, not individual crimes or crime

series. Research on the connection between spatial coordinates and offender and victim

variables continues, but at present, geographic profiling is probably best viewed as an

adjunct to criminal profiling and not as a profiling process in and of itself ,1 56.

Geographic profiling is clearly a useful aid to crime investigation, but whether it qualifies

as an approach on its own is a different matter. It does appear however, that geographic

profiling is best construed as an aspect of the investigative psychology approach.

Behavioral Evidence Analysis (BEA)

Behavioral Evidence Analysis also known as the deductive method of criminal profiling

was developed by Brent E. Turvey, an American forensic scientist. In 1999, and

following his interview with Jerome Brudos, an American serial killer, Turvey noted that

police case files differed from Brudo's own accounts, and therefore concluded that it is

totally wrong to accept the premises on which the earlier profiling approaches based their

profiles, and he came up with his new approach. Behavioral evidence analysis is

primarily based on the availability of physical evidence. Turvey was very critical of the

assumptions and inferences made by the other approaches (i.e. diagnostic evaluation, FBI

approach and investigative psychology), and therefore argued that "a full forensic

IS6
Id.

93
analysis must be perfonned on all available physical evidence before this type of

' can b
pro fil1 mg ' ,,157 .
egm

Fundamentally, Turvey maintained that BEA produces a deductive criminal profile as

opposed to an inductive one. For him, "a deductive criminal profile is a set of offender

characteristics that are reasoned from the convergence of physical and behavioral-

evidence patterns within a crime or a series of related crimes. Pertinent physical evidence

suggestive of behavior, victimology, and crime scene characteristics are included in the

structure of a written profile to support any arguments regarding offender ,

I~

characteristics" 158. On the other hand, Turvey sees an inductive criminal profile as "any 'I

'I
method that describes, or bases its inferences on the characteristics of a typical offender I'"

type. This includes the employment of broad generalizations, statistical analysis, or

intuition and experience" I 59.

Turvey maintained that the infonnation used to argue a deductive criminal profile

includes the following. 160

157
Turvey, supra note 27, at 29.
158
Id, at 28.
159
Turvey, supra note 9, at 686.
160
Turvey, supra note 27, at 28.

94
 (1) Forensic and Behavioral Evidence (Equivocal Forensic Analysis)

This involves the examination of any physical evidence that was gathered. It also

includes an examination of victim and witness statements, crime scene photographs as

well as crime scene reports.

(2) Victimology

This involves a detailed examination of background information about the victim. Here,

the profiler should look at the victim's occupation, drug and alcohol use, hobbies, family,

friends, and criminal records. It is believed that by studying the victim characteristics,

that investigators and pro filers may have an idea as to the motives of the crime. Similarly,

the risk assessment level of the victim should also be carried out. It is generally accepted

that prostitutes, for instance, carry a very high risk assessment level.

(3) Crime-scene characteristics

Here the profiler examines the crime scene to try and establish such things as the time of

attack, type of weapons used, method of gaining entry, type of location, and other crime

scene features. Anything that the offender said or did during the attack should also be

noted. The profiler should also try to ascertain whether the crime scene is staged. 161 Then

the criminal profile is produced.

Turvey further argued that deductive criminal profiling has two phases - investigative

phase and the trial phase. "The investigative phase of criminal profiling generally

161
Id, at 29.

95
involves behavioral analysis of the patterns of unknown offenders for known crimes,,162,

while the trial phase "involves behavioral evidence analysis of known crimes for which

there is a suspect or a defendant (sometimes a convicted defendant); this takes place in

the preparation for both hearings and trials (criminal, penalty, and/or appeal phases of the

trial are all appropriate times to use profiling technique" 163.

This approach has undoubtedly been criticized. Kocsis maintained that "there are

however, some significant limitations in describing BEA as a distinct approach to

profiling as it does not appear to be informed by a discreet substantive body of original

empirical research. Instead, what BEA offers in some respects is a fusion of previous

criminological literature on various forms of violent crime, the forensic sciences and

philosophical concepts related to modes of reasoning, most notably, inductive vs

deductive reasoning. BEA seems to hypothesize that a method of analysis is possible,

whereby crimes may be interpreted for the purpose of profiling by adopting deductive

reasoning processes as opposed to inductive ones. Given our current understanding of

how the human mind functions and cognitively processes information in a heterogeneous

fashion, some inherent difficulties exist with such a hypothesis. 164

There is still debate as to whether BEA can be properly seen as an approach on its own.

The point however, remains that BEA still cannot point to a special offender being

162
Id, at 35.
163
Id, at 36.
164
Kocsis, supra note 82, at xiv.

96
responsible for a certain crime, and also has not established any scientific basis. Turvey

even admitted this and he wrote: "any discipline that involves interpreting the multi-

dimensional nature of human behavior cannot be referred to as a hard science with a

straight face. However, it does demonstrate that the deductive method of profiling can be

informed by the same thinking strategies,,165. Finally, there is an over-reliance on the

availability of physical evidence by BEA.

Crime Action Profiling (CAP)

In an analogous manner the research strands of CAP have

studied both the behavioral patterns inherent to violent
crimes (akin to psychology's study of mental disease) as
well as the structure, processes, accuracy and skills
related to constructing profiles (akin to the clinical
practice of psychology). This is a distinguishing feature
of CAP as other approaches to profiling have
predominately focused solely on the study of offender
typologies and have for the most part, largely ignored
such issues related to the practical concept of
constructing a profile. 166

Crime Action Profiling was developed by Richard N. Kocsis, an Australian forensic

psychologist. Based on his clinical knowledge and research literature, Kocsis maintained

that profiling has its foundation in forensic psychology. "As a consequence, this

conception of profiling assumes knowledge of human behavior and psychology such as

165
Turvey, supra note 27, at 32.
166
Kocsis, supra note 82, at xvi.

97
personality dynamics and human psychopathologies,,167. Kocsis claimed that he became

fully involved in offender profiling when he was approached by the Australian Police to

assist them in a high profile serial murder case.

Crime action profiling, in the words of Kocsis "is used to describe and signify this

process relating to the consideration of crime actions and the prediction, or profiling, of

offender characteristics from those actions" 168 . Basically, crime action profiling tries to

"examine offense behaviors independent of any inferred motivations,,169.

In analyzing patterns of crime behaviors, CAP uses the multi-dimensional scaling (MDS)

method of statistical analysis. MDS is made up of various types and CAP uses the type

called SYSTAT. This approach also uses cluster analysis, conical correlation and

mathematical formulae to "plot the orientation of the offender characteristic vector

Crime action profiling is the newest 'approach' to offender profiling and as such not a lot

of reviews and research has been carried out. Nevertheless, CAP has contributed to the

efforts to find a scientific basis to offender profiling.

167
Id, at xv.
168
Id, at xvi.
169
Palermo and Kocsis, supra 134, at 183.
170
Id, at 220.

98
All the different approaches to offender profiling have their strengths and weaknesses,

and it is only when they come together as a team that offender profiling will muster a

scientific basis, gain general recognition in the various disciplines, and easily pass the

Daubert legal admissibility test/standard. The greatest strength of the diagnostic

evaluation approach lies in its ability to provide better explanations on the motivations

underlying certain criminal actions. The FBI approach shows much strength in its various

classification methods. The FBI's classification of offenders into organized and

disorganized offenders and their classification of crime scenes and rapists have proved to

be very useful. Investigative psychology's greatest strength is in its ability to apply

psychological theories, and using statistical analysis, in trying to predict the residential

location of serial offenders.

99
 Chapter Three

Expert Testimony: The Conflicting Rules and Standards

Under virtually all evidence codes, trial courts must

evaluate the admissibility of proffered expert testimony.
The manner in which they accomplish this task,
however, varies greatly among jurisdictions. This
variability revolves around two basic aspects of the
admissibility determination. The first concerns the
nature and rigor of the legal test to be applied. Courts
differ substantially in the ways they define the judge's
role concerning scientific evidence, with some adopting
an active role in screening the evidence and others
taking little or no responsibility to check the evidence.
The second concerns the criteria used to assess the
expertise under whatever legal test is adopted. Some
courts use criteria that call for deference to the
professional opinion of experts from the respective
field, where as others assume the responsibility
themselves to evaluate the scientific basis of the
proffered opinion.l?l

The admissibility of any form of scientific evidence has always been problematic, full of

controversy and inconsistencies. The introduction of scientific evidence into the

courtroom can sway a case one way or the other. In fact, Peterson et al noted that "about

one quarter of the citizens who had served on juries which were presented with scientific

evidence believed that had such evidence been absent, they would have changed their

verdicts - from guilty to not guilty.,,172 The courts are fully aware of this and therefore,

special rules have been adopted by many courts when deciding whether to admit or

exclude any scientific evidence. New scientific techniques and fields of knowledge
171
David L. Faigman., David H. Kaye., Michael 1. Saks., and Joseph Sanders, Science in the Law:
Standards, Statistics and Research Issues, 2 (2002).
172
Joseph L. Peterson., John P. Ryan., Pauline 1. Houlden, and Steven Mihajlovic, "The Use and Effects of
Forensic Science in the Adjudication of Felony Cases", 32 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1730, 1748 (1987).

100
emerge and the court must be satisfied, not only that the witness is qualified, but whether

such evidence should be given. 173 In fact, "admitting unreliable, unproven data can be as

prejudicial as excluding sound evidence that is merely unfamiliar to the courts and

society in general. Distinguishing between sound and unreliable evidence is especially

problematic given the rapid developments in scientific knowledge and the possible

appearance to those not educated in the area that scientific results are infallible. To keep

pace with such a progressive area, the courts must be dynamic in their approach and

accept new developments in these specialized areas.,,174

Many scholars have put forward the justifications for these special rules and admissibility

hurdles that have to be overcome before presenting any scientific evidence. Friedland et

aI, for instance, have given four justifications for these special hurdles as follows: (1) an

"aura of infallibility" surrounded the evidence so that a jury was unlikely independently

to evaluate, or to be skeptical of, its worth; (2) scientific evidence relies on such arcane

information that it will be very difficult for jurors to evaluate its worth, even if they are

not "overawed" by any view of science as infallible; therefore, jurors just won't try, it

being easier simply to take the expert's word; (3) the evidence is so unfamiliar to the

courts that judges will have difficulty guiding juries on how fairly to evaluate it; and (4)

the evidence "invades the province of the jury in a particularly powerful way, such as lie-

detector test results determining for the jury who speaks "truth" and who does not".175

173 Steve Uglow, Evidence: Text and Materials, 619 (1997).

174 Lisa Gonzalez, "The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: The History and Demise of Frye v. United
States", 48 U. Miami L. Rev. 371 (November 1992).

175 Steven I. Friedland., Paul Bergman., and Andrew E. Taslitz, Evidence Law and Practice, 274 (2000).

101
Frye v. United States

In United States, the decision in Frye v. United States 176 (also known as the General

Acceptance Rule) was the main rule that governed the admissibility of scientific evidence

for seventy years (1923 - 1993). Frye is a 1923 decision by the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia, in a case that involved the admissibility of opinion

evidence derived from a systolic blood pressure deception test.

In this case, the defendant, James Alphonzo Frye was convicted of the murder of Dr.

Robert W. Brown, in the second degree. During the trial, the defendant sought to

introduce testimony based on systolic blood pressure deception test. This is the early

form of the polygraph lie-detector test. The systolic blood pressure deception test is based

on the theory that "truth is spontaneous, and comes without conscious effort, while the

utterance of a falsehood requires a conscious effort, which is reflected in the blood

pressure. The rise thus produced is easily detected and distinguished from the rise

produced by mere fear of the examination itself. In the former instance, the pressure rises

higher than in the latter, and is more pronounced as the examination proceeds, while in

the latter case, if the subject is telling the truth, the pressure registers highest at the

beginning of the examination, and gradually diminishes as the examination proceeds.,,177

It should be noted that before the trial, the defendant was subjected to this test and it

showed that he was telling the truth when he denied that he committed the murder. He
176
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
177
Id.

102
therefore, prayed the court to accept the testimony of Dr. William Moulton Martson (the

inventor of the test), which supported his plea of innocence. The government counsel

raised an objection which was sustained. The defense counsel further offered to have Dr.

Martson conduct a new test in the presence of the jury, the government counsel again

raised an objection, which was also sustained. The trial court excluded the testimony. The

defendant was convicted and he appealed.

In their brief, counsel for the defendant, Richard V. Mattingly and Foster Wood, stated

that:

The rule is that the opinions of experts or skilled

witnesses are admissible in evidence in those
cases in which the matter of inquiry is such that
inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove
capable of forming a correct judgment upon it, for
the reason that the subject-matter so far partakes
of a science, art, or trade as to require a previous
habit or experience or study of it, in order to
acquire a knowledge of it. When the question
involved does not lie within the range of common
experience or common knowledge, but requires
special experience or common knowledge, then
the opinions of witnesses skilled in that particular
science, art, or trade to which the question relates
' 'bl'
are admISSI e III eVI'd ence. 178

In its ruling, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to exclude the

testimony and held that "the systolic blood pressure deception has not yet gained such

standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as

would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery,

178 Id,

103
development, and experiments thus far made.,,179 Fundamentally, the court stated that

scientific evidence is admissible if is generally accepted that the methods and principles

underlying it had achieved widespread acceptance in the relevant discipline. Justice Van

Orsdel, delivering the opinion of the Court, stated that:

Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses

the line between the experimental and demonstrable
stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery,
the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs. 180

The Court in Frye did not cite any authority in formulating the new rule. This decision

raised several questions. What exactly was the "thing" that must be sufficiently

established? What is the "relevant scientific community"? Who defines it? How do

judges determine "general acceptance"? Does Frye require that general acceptance within

the scientific community be established by disinterested scientists? 181

The Frye test became the main rule governing the admissibility of scientific evidence but

courts and scholars battled with answers to the above questions. Starrs maintained that

"the Frye court does not inform us in what way the expert testimony proffered in the trial

court was defective. Surely it was unacceptable for lack of general acceptance. But what

179
Id .

180
Id.

181 Melissa M. Home, "Novel Scientific Evidence: Does Frye require that General Acceptance within the
Scientific Community be Established by Disinterested Scientists?", 65 U. Det. L. Rev. 147 (Fall 1987).

104
precisely was not generally accepted? Was it the validity of the principle that deception is

reflected in discernible changes in the blood pressure of the prevaricator? Or was it,

rather, the validity of the systolic blood pressure test (the sphygmomanometer) to detect

such alterations in blood pressure?,,182.

Identifying what relevant community a technique falls also proved very problematic, and

courts battled to arrive at an acceptable way. The identification of the discipline to which

the "thing" falls is a very determinative factor in any trial involving scientific evidence.

Thus, "if the relevant scientific field requirement is construed broadly, the Frye test acts

as a formidable barrier to admissibility. In Cornet v. State,183 for example, the relevant

scientific community for purposes of spectrograph (voiceprint) analysis was held to

include engineers, linguists, and psychologists, as well as those who use voice

spectrography for identification purposes. Because different disciplines do not share a

common view of a particular scientific method, the burden of establishing general

acceptance is undoubtedly onerous. Consequently, the broader the construction of the

relevant scientific field, the less likely the party will be able to utilize the novel scientific

evidence,,184.

On a similar vein, Moenssens noted that "some courts have determined the proper field

without difficulty, but other courts have had difficulty with this step of the analysis.

182 James E. Starrs, "A Still-Life Watercolor: Frye v. United States", Journal of Forensic Sciences, Vol. 27,
No.3, 686 (July 1982).
183
Cornet v. State, 450 NE. 2d 498 (Ind. 1983).

184 Thaddeus Murphy, "The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence in Illinois", 21 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 935, 943
(Spring 1990).

105
Occasionally, new techniques compound the problem by combining elements of several

disciplines, with no discipline claiming the novel process as its own. An imaginative

expert who develops a new technique may be considered radical by his conservative

peers, who may reject the technique regardless of its validity. Alternatively, a discipline

may accept a new technique simply because the technique promotes the overall

objectives of the discipline. The discipline might accept the new technique, therefore,

without requiring objective scientific validation of the underlying postulates.,,185

Moenssens gave the example of sound spectrographic voice identification technique

where there were arguments as to which field the technique should be generally accepted.

Is it the field of radio communications, speech and audiology, fingerprint identification,

or voice examination? 186

As we mentioned earlier, the Court of Appeals in Frye did not cite any authority or give

any explanations/justifications for formulating the general acceptance rule. Other courts

however, have defended the decision and offered some justifications. In fact, three major

court rulings have justified Frye and stated the advantages of the rule.

First, in United States v. Addison,187 the Court stated that the Frye test ensures that there

exist a minimal reserve of experts who can examine the validity of any scientific

evidence. The case involved two defendants - Roland Addison and Henry Raymond, who

185 Andre A. Moenssens, "Admissibility of Scientific Evidence - An Alternative to the Frye Rule", 25 Wm.
& Mary L. Rev. 545, 548 (Summer 1984).
186
Id, at 549.
187
United States v. Addison, 498 F. 2d 741 (D.C eir. 1974).

106
were both convicted by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

They were both convicted of assault with intent to kill while armed, and assault on a

member of the police force with a dangerous weapon. Henry Raymond was additionally

charged and convicted of carrying a dangerous weapon.

During the trial, the government counsel proffered evidence of voice print analysis

(spectrographic identification) that proved that the defendant, Raymond made the

telephone call to which a police officer, Sergeant Wilkins was responding when he was

shot. Lieutenant Ernest Nash, a voice technician at the Michigan State Police

Department, gave expert testimony that the voice print analysis showed that Raymond

made the call that led the police officer to the scene where he was shot. It should be noted

that Raymond raised an objection to the order requiring him to submit his voice sample

for analysis. He argued that the order violated his Fourth Amendment right to privacy. He

also contended that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel because his

counsel was denied adequate time to consider the new scientific technique and the

associated novel issues.

In its ruling, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in admitting the voice

print analysis evidence. The Court also ruled, however, that the jury's judgment was not

substantially swayed by the error and therefore affirmed the conviction. The Court held

that "spectrographic identification of defendant as maker of telephone call to which

police officer was responding when shot was not sufficiently accepted by scientific

community as a whole to form a basis for jury's determination of guilt or innocence, and

107
was inadmissible, but erroneous admission of testimony based on spectrogram did not

fatally infect jury's verdict and did not require reversal, in light of overwhelming

evidence of guilt.,,188

Circuit Judge, McGowan, stated that the decision in Frye v. United States was "the

standard by which questions of admissibility of expert testimony based on new methods

of scientific measurements are to be resolved.,,189 The Court defended Frye and stated

that:

The requirement of general acceptance in the scientific

community assures that those most qualified to assess the
general validity of a scientific method will have the
determinative voice. Additionally, the Frye test protects
prosecution and defense alike by assuring that a minimal
reserve of experts exists who can critically examine the
validity of a scientific determination in a particular case.
Since scientific proof may in some instances assume a
posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of
laymen, the ability to produce rebuttal experts, equally
conversant with the mechanics and methods of a
. I ar techmque,
partlcu . may prove to b ' I .190
e essentla

In People v. Kelly, 191 another case that involved voice print analysis, the Supreme Court

of California also justified the decision in Frye, stating that the Frye test ensures

uniformity of judicial decisions. The case involved Robert Emmett Kelly who was

convicted of extortion by the Superior Court, Orange County, California. The extortion

arose from several anonymous and threatening telephone calls that the defendant made to

188 Id.

189
Id, at 743.
190
Id, at 744.
191
People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P. 2d 1240 (1976).

108
-r--
I
Terry Waskin. The police, with Waskin's consent, tape-recorded two of the telephone

calls. A police informant later identified the defendant as the person whose voice was on

the tapes. The defendant's voice examplar and the two tape recorded calls were sent to

Lieutenant Ernest Nash, the voice print analysis technician at Michigan State Police

Department for analysis. Lt. Nash concluded that the voices on the tapes were that of the

defendant, and he was allowed to testify. The trial court ruled that voice print analysis has

achieved sufficient scientific acceptance and therefore the expert's testimony was

admissible. Kelly was convicted and he appealed.

The defendant argued that (1) Lieutenant Nash, the VOIce print expert, failed to

sufficiently establish that the technique has achieved general acceptance in the scientific

community; (2) that Lt. Nash was not qualified as an expert, and, (3) that the procedure

was not carried out in a fair and impartial manner. In its ruling, the Supreme Court of

California stated that voice print analysis had not achieved general scientific acceptance

as a reliable technique and that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony. The Court

therefore, reversed the judgment of conviction. The Court held that the "testimony by

police officer who was head of voice identification unit for a state police force and who

had extensive experience with voice print analysis was insufficient to establish that the

voice print was generally regarded as reliable in the scientific community; and that error

.
In . . 0 f th
admISSIOn '
e testImony was not h arm Iess. ,,192

192 Id.

109
The Supreme Court of California, in reversing the judgment also stated that, "we have

expressly adopted the foregoing Frye test and California courts, when faced with a novel

method of proof, have required a preliminary showing of general acceptance of the new

technique in the relevant scientific community. . .. we are satisfied that there is ample

justification for the exercise of considerable judicial caution in the acceptance of

evidence developed by new scientific techniques.,,193

The Court re-stated the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia's
194
decision in United States v. Addison and added that:

Moreover, a beneficial consequence of the Frye test is

that it may well promote a degree of uniformity of
decision. Individual judges whose particular
conclusions may differ regarding the reliability of a
particular scientific evidence, may discover
substantial agreement and consensus in the scientific
community." 195

Hence, "for all the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded by the wisdom of, and reaffirm

our allegiance to, the Frye decision and the "general acceptance" rule which that case

mandates." 196

The third major case where a court justified the decision in Frye was in Reed v. State, 197

where the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated that Frye ensures judicial economy, by

193
rd, at 1244.

194 United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
195
People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P. 2d 1244, 1245 (J 976).
196
Id, at 1245.
197
Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 393 A. 2d 364 (1978).

110
avoiding the time-consuming examination and cross-examination of witnesses. In this

case, the defendant James Reed was convicted of rape, unnatural and perverted sex acts,

robbery, verbal threats, and unlawful use of telephone, by the Circuit Court, Montgomery

County in Maryland. The facts of the case are that in September 1974, a woman was

raped outside her home in Montgomery County, Maryland. She reported the rape to the

police. The following day, she received a telephone call from a man saying that he was

the person who raped her. She immediately called the police, and it was decided that her

telephone calls should be tape-recorded in case the assailant called again. As the police

predicted, the assailant called several times within three days. During one of the

telephone calls, the assailant told the woman that he would like to have sexual intercourse

with her again, but the woman said no, and offered to pay the assailant $1,000 dollars so

that he can leave her alone. The assailant called again to accept the offer and instructed

her to go and leave the money inside one of the lockers in the locker room of the

Greyhound Bus Station in the District of Columbia. By this time, the police put the locker

room under surveillance and when the assailant came to collect the money, he was

arrested.

DUring the trial, the defendant was ordered to submit a voice examplar, which was then

sent to the voice identification unit at Michigan State Police Department for analysis. The

defendant's voice examplar was compared to those recorded on the tapes, but the results

were deemed inconclusive. The defendant was ordered to submit another voice examplar

and the second voice print analysis showed that there is a match. The voice print expert

Was allowed to testify in court identifying Reed as the person who made the calls. The

III
jury could not reach a decision after two and half days of deliberation, and a mistrial was

declared. However, there was a retrial in March 1976 and Reed was convicted. The

defendant appealed, arguing that the voice print analysis should not have been admitted

because the technique is not generally accepted by the scientific community as being

sufficiently reliable; and also that the second request for his voice examplar is a violation

of the Best Evidence Rule.

The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded

with directions. It was held that "testimony based on "voiceprints" or spectrograph is

inadmissible in Maryland courts as evidence of voice identification because, at the

present time, such technique has not reached the required standard of acceptance in the

scientific community.,,198 The Court went on to justify the Frye test and stated that:

Without the Frye test or something similar, the reliability of

an experimental scientific technique is likely to become a
central issue in each trial in which it is introduced, as long
as there remains serious disagreement in the scientific
community over its reliability. Again and again, the
examination and cross-examination of expert witnesses will
be as protracted and time-consuming as it was at the trial in
the instant case, and proceedings may well degenerate into
trials of the technique itself. The Frye test is designed to
forestall this difficulty as well. 199

The Frye test standard has been adopted by many states. It should be noted however, that

Frye has faced a lot of criticisms. First, Frye has been criticized because it did not "cite

198 Id.

199
Id .

112
any policy justification for the general acceptance standard: the court merely mandated

the standard as ipse dixit.,,200

"Another asserted weakness of the Frye approach concerns the difficulty of ascertaining

when a scientific proposition has been generally accepted. The test does not specify what

proportion of experts constitute general acceptance. Courts have never required

unanimity, and anything less than full consensus in science can quickly resemble

substantial disagreement. In fact, the most rigorous fields with the healthiest scientific

discourse might fail the Frye test with the greatest frequency. In light of the skeptical

perspective of good scientific investigation, judges should be cautious when they

approach a field in which there is too much agreement.,,201

Moreover, the Frye test requires general acceptance in the

particular field. But there are no standards defining which
field to consult. Courts have had considerable difficulty
assessing scientific information under this standard because
it often extends into more than one academic or
professional discipline. Furthermore, each field may
contain subspecialities. This difficulty leads to paradoxical
results. General acceptance, often criticized for being the
most conservative test of admissibility, in practice can
produce the most liberal standards of admission. The more
narrowly a court defines the pertinent field, the more
agreement it is likely to find. The general acceptance test
thus degenerates into a process of deciding whose noses to
count. The definition of the pertinent field can be over-
inclusive or under-inclusive. Because the pertinent field can

Edward 1. Imwinkelried, "The Importance of Daubert in Frye Jurisdictions", 42 Crim. Law Bulletin 5
200
(March - April 2006).
201 F .
algman, Kaye., Saks. and Sanders, supra note 171, at 8.

113
 be so readily manipulated, the test by itself grovides courts
with little protection against shoddy science. 02

Faigman et al further argued that "under the Frye variant, because the courts have to rely

on the standards set within each field, they find themselves accepting more readily the

offerings of less rigorous fields and less readily the offerings of more rigorous fields.

Fields that set higher thresholds will place a smaller proportion of their knowledge over

the threshold. ,,203

Frye has also been criticized as being conservative. Frye appeared to exclude relevant

and reliable expert evidence until it has been generally accepted by the relevant scientific

community. Maletskos and Spielman argued that "a literal reading of Frye v. United

States would require that the courts always await the passing of a 'cultural lag' during

which period the new method will have had sufficient time to diffuse through scientific

discipline and create a requisite body of scientific opinion needed for acceptability. ,,204

Faigman et al also argued that Frye "imposes a protracted waiting period that valid

scientific evidence and techniques must endure before gaining legal acceptance.,,205 They

argued that "this criticism highlights the fact that all significant scientific findings gestate

before they are accepted by the general scientific community: During this time period

202 Id , at 9 .

203
Id, at lO.

204 Constantine J. Maletskos., and Stephen J. Spielman, Introduction of New Scientific Methods in Court,
Law Enforcement Science and Technology, 957, 958 (S.A. Yefsky. Ed. 1967).
205 F .
algman, Kaye, Saks and Sanders, supra note 171, at 8.

114
 courts and the parties before them are deprived of this work. Moreover, many critics also

note the "nature" of the scientific enterprise which sometimes responds negatively to

revolutionary findings, because they might threaten entrenched "paradigms" and thus

entrenched scientists. Proponents of this view observe that the opinions of a scientist

heralded today as brilliant, but dismissed in his day as misguided or worse, would be

excluded under a general acceptance test. Galileo, for example, or Einstein early in his

career, would not have been allowed to testify because of the radical nature of his
views. ,,206

In a similar vein, Giannelli maintained that:

Frye envisions an evolutionary process leading to the

admissibility of scientific evidence. A novel
technique must pass through an "experimental" stage
in which it is scrutinized by the scientific community.
Only after the technique has been tested successfully
in this stage and has passed into the "demonstrable"
stage will it receive judicial recognition. What is
unique about the Frye opinion is the standard it
establishes for distinguishing between the
experimental and demonstrable stages. In contrast to
the relevancy approach, it is not enough that a
qualified expert, or even several experts, believes that
a particular technique has entered the demonstrable
stage; Frye imposes a special burden - the technique
must be generally accepted by the relevant scientific
community. 207

206
Id.

207 Paul C. Giannelli, "The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-
Century Later", 80 Colum. L. Rev.1197, 1205 (1980).

115
A case in point is Coppolino v. State,208 where the Court of Appeals of Florida rejected

the Frye test and was critical of the general acceptance rule. The defendant, Dr Carl

Coppolino, an anesthesiologist, was charged with the murder of his wife Carmela

Coppolino by poisoning. From the beginning, there was evidence showing that

Coppolino had bought some quantity of a substance called succinylcholine chloride,

about three months before the murder of his wife. During the trial, both the defense and

prosecution offered medical and scientific witnesses regarding the cause of death. The

expert witnesses for the State included Dr. Helpem (a pathologist), Dr. Umberger (a

toxicologist), Dr. La Du, and Dr. Cleveland. In his testimony, Dr. Helpem said that his

autopsy on the victim showed that she was in good health at the time of death. He also

said that even though the autopsy was inconclusive as to the cause of death, that he found

a needle injection tract in the left buttock of the deceased. He therefore, called Dr.

Umberger to perform chemical analysis and tests on the body tissues.

At the time of the trial, there were no known medical or scientific methods for detecting

the substance (succinic acid) in body tissues, but Dr. Umberger used various procedures

and was able for the first time in medical history to detect succinic acid in the body

tissue.

Dr. Umberger testified that he first performed a "general

unknown" test which was designed to disclose the
presence of certain drugs and poisons in the body tissue.
The results of this "general unknown" test were negative.
Dr Umberger then attempted to establish a method
whereby he could determine if unusual amounts of the
component parts of succinylcholine chloride were present
in the body issue. Dr. Umberger testified that some of his
tests and procedures were standard ones and that some
208
Coppolino v. State, 223 So.2d 68 (Fla. App. 1968).

116
 were new. As a result of his tests Dr. Umberger reached
the conclusion, so testified, that Carmela Co~polino
received a toxic dose of succinylcholine chloride. 2 9

It should be noted that when Dr. Helpem was recalled, he testified that based on the

autopsy and on Dr. Umberger's findings that he concluded that the victim died from an

overdose of succinylcholine chloride. Dr. La Du also testified that he found a minute

quantity of succinylcholine chloride at the needle injection tract on the victim's left

buttocks, and therefore, was of the opinion that the victim died as a result of the

succinylcholine chloride. Dr. Cleveland also testified that based on the negative findings

in Dr. Helpem's autopsy report and the positive findings of Dr. Umberger, he was of the

opinion that the victim died as a result of an overdose of succinylcholine chloride.

It should also be noted that the State called Marjorie Farber to testify. She was Dr. Carl

Coppolino's lover between 1962 and 1964 during which time the defendant was married

to the victim. She testified that the defendant made certain incriminating statements

regarding the death of his wife during the time they had an affair. The defense raised an

objection but it was denied, and the testimony was admitted. The defendant called several

expert witnesses who testified that it was "impossible by medical scientists to

demonstrate the presence of succinylcholine chloride or its component parts in the body".

The defendant was however, convicted and he appealed. The defendant argued among

other things that:

(1) The scientific tests performed by Dr. Umberger were unreliable and scientifically

unacceptable, that their admission into evidence was error.

209
rd, at 69.

117
 (2) The trial court committed reversible error by instructing the jury on second and

third degree murder and manslaughter.

(3) The trial judge erred by admitting into evidence the testimony given by Marjorie

Farber.

In its ruling, the Court of Appeals of Florida, Second District, affirmed the trial court's

judgment and held that the defendant had failed to show that the trial judge abused his

discretion. It was also held that the trial court's instruction of the jury on the second and

third degree murder and manslaughter was not an error because under the authority of

Fla. Stat. Ch. 919.14, the jury was permitted to find defendant guilty of the degree

charged or lesser degree. The Court however, held that the trial court erred by admitting

the testimony given by Marjorie Farber. The Court stated that "we believe that the

testimony in question was irrelevant to the proper issues of the case, that its sole effect

was to attack the character of the accused and that the trial court erred by admitting it into

evidence. However, the fact that an error was committed in admitting testimony does not

automatically result in reversal, there must be a showing that such error was harmfully

prejudiced. ,,21 0

The Court of Appeal further stated that:

The tests by which the medical examiner sought to

determine whether death was caused by
succinylcholine chloride were novel and devised
specifically for this case. This does not render the
210
Id, at 72.

118
 evidence inadmissible. Society need not tolerate
homicide until there develops a body of medical
literature about some particular lethal agent. The
expert witnesses were examined and cross-examined
at great length and the jury could either believe or
doubt the prosecution's testimony as it chose. 211

The Frye test has also been criticized for leading to inconsistencies. Moenssens argued

that "the Frye rule has different meanings for forensic scientists, prosecutors, defense

attorneys, and judges. To forensic scientists and prosecutors, the Frye rule is an obstacle

that often excludes evidence based on novel scientific techniques. Although the Frye rule

also prevents the defendants' novel scientific evidence from reaching the jury, defense

attorneys and the few forensic scientists who work with the defense bar see the rule as an

ineffective barrier to unreliable prosecution evidence. The meaning of the Frye rule to

judges is less clear. Many judges do not perceive the rule as a significant issue.,,212

Another criticism leveled against the Frye test is its inflexibility, confusion of issues, and

superfluity.213 McCormick argued that "procedures that operate within the framework of

general relevancy and expert testimony rules offer a more meaningful and effective

alternative. The values sought to be protected by Frye can be preserved without the cost

of its disadvantages. Factors that directly address the merit of new scientific

developments can be identified and delineated. They incorporate concepts that judges

understand and routinely use. At the same time, the rules allow necessary flexibility by

211
Id, at 75.
212
Moenssens, supra note 185, at 545.
213
Mark McCormick, "Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility", 67 Iowa L. Rev.
879,915 (1981-1982).

119
turning the decision on the characteristics of the evidence as well as the characteristics of

the particular case. The relevant factors sharpen and define precise issues that should

affect the admissibility decision.,,214

It has also been argued that by focusing particularly on general acceptance, Frye obscures

other critical problems in the use of a particular technique. 215 Giannelli gave the

admissibility of neutron activation analysis (NAA) as an example, arguing that "under the

Frye courts have concentrated primarily on the general acceptance of NAA" and that

"this approach tends to conceal the most critical aspects of NAA - whether, as

interpreted, the results of the test are relevant to the issues in dispute.,,216

Following the criticisms of the Frye test, some scholars have suggested alternative rules

for admitting scientific evidence. Professor McCormick for instance, argued that the

"relevancy test" is an appropriate standard. He maintained that:

General scientific acceptance is a proper condition upon

the court's taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but
not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence.
Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a
qualified expert witness should be received unless there
are other reasons for exclusion. Particularly, its probative
value may be overborne by the familiar dangers of
prejudicing or misleading the jury, unfair surprise and
undue consumption of time. On this footing the novelty
and want of acceptance at that time of the lie-detector
lessened the probative value of the test and probably
heightened the danger of misleading the jury. If the courts
had used this approach, instead of repeating a supposed

214
Id,at916.
215 G'
Iannelli, supra note 207, at 1226.
216 Id.

120
 requirement of "general acceptance" not elsewhere
imposed, they might have arrived at some practical way
of utilizing a technique of investigation which has proved
so fertile as a means of ascertaining truth. 217

Fundamentally, McCormick argued that any scientific evidence should be admitted if it is

relevant to the facts of the case and if an expert testifies to its validity. Many scholars and

courts were very critical of this suggestion. In fact, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in
218
Reed v. State addressed this suggestion from Professor McCormick. The Court stated

that judges and jurors are not equipped to assess the reliability of scientific techniques

when scientists disagree on the issue. The Court stated that:

This view seems to us unacceptable. It fails to recognize

that laymen should not on a case by case basis resolve a
dispute in the scientific community concerning the validity
of a new scientific technique. When the positions of the
contending factions are fixed in the scientific community, it
is evident that controversies will be resolved only by
further scientific analysis, studies and experiments. Juries
and judges, however, cannot experiment. If a judge or
jurors have no foundation, either in their experience or in
the accepted principles of scientists, on which they might
base an informed judgment, they will be left to follow their
fancy. Thus, courts should be properly reluctant to resolve
the disputes of science. "It is not for the law to experiment
but for science to do so," State v. Cary, supra, 99 N. J.
Super. at 332, 239 A. 2d at 684?19

Professor Richardson also called for the substitution of "general acceptance" by

"substantial acceptance." "Is the basis of admissibility to be universal acceptance by

217 Charles T. McConnick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence, 363 (1954).

218
Reedv. State, 283 Md. 371. A.2d 364 (1978).
219
Id.

121
scientific thought? Is it to be general acceptance by science? Or is it to be substantial

acceptance which gives a reliable degree of credibility?,,22o Many scholars are not in

support of substituting "general acceptance with "substantial acceptance'. Murphy argued

that substantial acceptance is not any less amorphous or difficult to define as general
221
acceptance.

The establishment of a "Science Court" has also been suggested by Dr. Arthur

Kantrowitz, an American Scientist. He called for the establishment of a "Science Court"

to screen any new scientific technique before it is introduced into the courtroom?22 The

reasons for creating a science court are the "need for accurate information to serve as a

basis for deciding basic policy questions,,223 and the need for an institution that will "limit

to the power exercised by scientists.,,224 The science court will also "eliminate the

opportunity for policymakers to hide policy decisions behind scientific conclusions,,,225

as well as helping to ensure that "discredited claims should be identified, especially when

they arise in the course of public debate. ,,226

220 James R. Richardson, Modem Scientific Evidence: Civil and Criminal, 2nd ed, 24 (1974).
221
Murphy, supra note 184, at 967.

222 Arthur Kantrowitz, "Controlling Technology Democratically", 63 AM. SCI. 505 (1975).

223 James A. Martin, "The Proposed "Science Court", 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1058,1059 (1977).
224
Id.

225 Id, at 1060.

226 Id.

122
Professor Giannelli maintained that the advantages of such a panel of experts and

tribunals are that the screening will be done by a group of scientists, that their evaluations

would be carried out by a group of scientists who have no financial or professional

interests in the technique, thereby solving the problem ofpartiality.227

However, the creation of a science court has been described as time consuming and
228
inconclusive. Justice Bazelon supports the goals of a science court but finds some of

the court's features worrying. He maintained that a science court will be time consuming,

arguing that "a lengthy adversary proceeding, limited solely to factual issues, might well

exaggerate the importance of those issues, and might tend to diminish the importance of

the underlying value choices. A factual decision by a Science Court, surrounded by all

the mystique of both science and the law, might well have enormous, and unwarranted,

political impact.,,229 "Moreover, it is not entirely clear to me that all disputes among

either could or should be "resolved." Experts usually disagree not so much about the

objectively verifiable facts, but about the inferences that can be drawn from those facts.

And they disagree precisely because it is impossible to say with certainty which of those
. c 230
mlerences are "correct."

227 Giannelli, supra note 207, at 1232.

Justice David L. Bazelon, "Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process", 62 Cornell Law
228
Review, 817, 827 (June 1977).

229 Id.

230
Id.

123
In the final analysis, it should be noted that none of these suggested alternatives to Frye

was adopted. It seems that the Frye test has come to stay. In fact, Frye remained the main

rule governing the admissibility of scientific evidence even after the enactment of the

Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. As at today Frye is still the main admissibility rule in

many states. It is also noteworthy to point out that Frye has been adopted by arguably all

the highly litigious states like California, New York and Florida. 231

The Federal Rules of Evidence

The Federal Rules of Evidence goes as far back as 1961 when Chief Justice Earl Warren

appointed a Special Committee on Evidence, charged with the responsibility of finding

out how feasible and desirable a uniform code of evidence will be for federal courts. In

1962, the Special Committee recommended the adoption of federal rules of evidence.

Chief Justice Earl Warren therefore, appointed an Advisory Committee in 1965 to draft

the rules of evidence. In 1969, the first draft was published. A revised draft was also

published in 1971. In 1972, the United States Supreme Court promulgated the Federal

Rules of Evidence. It should be noted that:

Unlike prior procedural Rules, however, when the Supreme

Court promulgated the Federal Rules of Evidence on
November 20, 1972, questions were raised concerning the
Court's authority to prescribe certain Rules. The Rules
were promulgated pursuant to congressional enabling

231 For full details of all the states and the rules they have adopted, please see; David E. Berstein., and
Jeffrey D. Jackson, "The Daubert Trilogy in the States", 44 Jurimetrics 351 (2004).351 - 366., Joseph R.
Meaney, "From Frye to Daubert: Is a Pattern Unfolding?", 35 Jurimetrics J. 191 (1995) 191- 199., Heather
G. Hamilton, "The Movement from Frye to Daubert: Where do the States Stand?", 38 Jurimetrics 201
(1998) 201 - 213.

124
 authority granting the Supreme Court the power to
prescribe rules governing the practice and procedure of
federal courts, provided that such Rules did not "abridge,
enlarge, or modify any substantive right". Critics closely
scrutinized several of the Rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court in an effort to determine whether the Court
had exceeded its authority under the Enabling Act by
prescribing rules that were outside the scope of "practice
and procedure". The debate over whether the Supreme
Court had exceeded its power became moot, however,
when Congress intervened in the process with legislation
stipulating that the Federal Rules of Evidence would not
take effect until they were expressly approved by Congress.
While Congress thereafter revised the Supreme Court's
version of the Rules in specific, isolated provisions, it did
not reconstruct the design of the Rules. Its modifications
were limited to the revision of the specific text of discreet
provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the vast
majority of the Supreme Court's version of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, as well as the integrity of the structure
of the Rules, were left intact by Congress when the rules
became effective on January 1975 ?32

Congressional hearings took place between 1973 and 1974. The House of

Representatives completed their hearings in February 1974 and the Senate in November

1974. It was then sent to President Gerald Ford who signed the Rules into law on January

2,1975. The Federal Rules of Evidence took effect on July 1,1975.

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of expert testimony.

Rule 702 states that:-

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will

assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert

Glen Weissenberger, "The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence", 53
232
Ohio St. L. J. 1307,1319 (1992).

125
 by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise?33

Rules 401, 402, 403, 703, 704 and 705 also affect the admissibility of expert scientific
234
testimony. It is therefore, very important to cite them at length.

Rule 401. Definition of "Relevant Evidence". "Relevant evidence" means evidence

having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the

determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the

evidence. ,,235

Rule 402. Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible.

"All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of

the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the

Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not

admissible.,,236

Rule 403. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste

of Time. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the Issues,

233 Fed. R. Evid. 702

234 These Rules are also very important to our subsequent discussions.
235 .
Fed. R. EVld. 401
236
Fed. R. Evid. 402

126
misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of time, needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.

(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or trait of

character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity

therewith on a particular occasion, except:

(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by

an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a

trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by an

accused and admitted under Rule 404 (a)(2), evidence of the same trait of

character of the accused offered by the prosecution;

(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of

the alleged of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to

rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the

alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut

evidence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor;

(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided

in rules 607, 608, and 609.

(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not

admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in

conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as

proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or

absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the

127
 prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial,

or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the

general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.,,237

Rule 703. Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts. "The facts or data in the particular

case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or

made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by

experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences, upon the subject, the

facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be

admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury

by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their

probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially

outweighs their prejudicial effect.,,238

Rule 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue. (a) "Except as provided in subdivision (b),

testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not

objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.

(c) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a

defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the

defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element

237 Fed. R. Evid. 403

238 Fe.
d R. Evi d. 703.

128
 of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for

the trier of fact alone. ,,239

Rule 705. Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion. "The expert may

testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without first testifying to

the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any

event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.,,24o

The adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 raised one key question - did the

Federal Rules supersede the Frye test? This question was not addressed either in the

Advisory Committee Notes, the Congressional Hearing Committee Reports or during the

Congressional hearings. Trial courts were left to decide for themselves. Many courts

continued with Frye, some adopted the new Federal Rules, and some combined the two

rules.

In United States v. Smith,241 for instance, the court continued with the Frye test while at

the same time recognized the authority of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Delivering the

opinion of the Court of Appeals, Circuit Judge, Kanne said: "although the validity of the

judge-made rule in Frye has been criticized by some courts and commentators for

239 Fed. R. EVld.

. 704.

240 .
Fed. R. EVld. 705

241 United States v. Smith, 869 F. 2d 348 (th Cir. 1989).

129
numerous reasons, this circuit has continued to affirm (and to apply) the Frye

,,242
standar d .

In United States v. Downing,243 the court rejected Frye and adopted the new Federal

Rules of Evidence. The Third Circuit Court stated that Frye was inconsistent with the

Federal Rules of Evidence based upon the Rules' broad scope of relevance. In this case,

the Court of Appeals, through Circuit Judge Becker, held that, "the balance of this section

is devoted to a discussion of the perceived evidentiary problems posed by novel forms of

scientific expertise, generally, and to an analysis of the test announced in Frye v. United

States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), as a way of dealing with those test problems. We

conclude that the status of the Frye test under Rule 702 is somewhat uncertain, but reject

that test for reasons of policy. In section 1Y, we set forth an alternative standard for

evaluating novel scientific evidence that we believe comports with the language and

policy of Rule 702.,,244 "We reject the Frye test.,,245

The Court of Appeals further stated that:

In sum, the Frye test suffers from serious flaws. The test has
proved to be too malleable to provide the method for orderly
and uniform decision-making envisioned by some of its
proponents. Moreover, in its pristine form the general
acceptance standard reflects a conservative approach to the
admissibility of scientific evidence that is at odds with the
spirit, if not the precise language, of the Federal Rules of

242 rd, at 351.

243 United States v, Downing, 753 F. 2d 1224, 1224 (3d Cir, 1985),

244 rd, at 1232,

245 rd, at 1233,

130
 Evidence. For these reasons, we conclude that "general
acceptance in the particular field to which [a scientific
technique] belong," should be rejected as an independent
controlling standard of admissibility. Accordingly, we hold
that a particular degree of acceptance of a scientific
technique within the scientific community is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for admissibility; it is,
however, one factor that a district court normally should
consider in deciding whether to admit evidence based upon
246
the technique.

In State v. Kersting,247 it was held that "scientific evidence which is not generally

accepted may nevertheless be admitted if there is credible evidence on which the trial

judge can rely in making the initial determination that the technique is reasonably

reliable." The case involved Dennis Dean Kersting who was convicted of murder by the

Circuit Court, Multnomah County, Oregon, and he appealed. At the trial, the State

presented an expert who testified that certain hairs obtained from the defendant were

indistinguishable from or similar to hairs found on the victim. The defendant argued that

that this was irrelevant to the case.

At the Court of Appeals, the defendant argued that the scientific techniques used by the

State's expert were not generally accepted in the scientific community as being

reasonably reliable, therefore, the trial court erred by admitting the expert's testimony.

In its ruling, the Court of Appeals of Oregon stated that "where judicial notice may not be

taken properly because relatively new scientific techniques are involved, some

foundation is required as a prerequisite to admission of such evidence; however, only

246
Id, at 1237.
247
State v. Kersting, 50 Or. App. 461, 623 P. 2d 1095 (1981).

131
foundation required is that there be credible evidence on which the trial judge may make

the initial determination that the technique is reasonably reliable and, if so, the evidence

may be admitted and the weight to be given it is for the jury, who may consider evidence

as to its reliability.,,248 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision and

granted review.

The case reached the Supreme Court of Oregon, En Banc, which affirmed the Court of

Appeals' decision. Delivering the judgment, Chief Justice Denecke, stated that "we

granted review solely to consider one contention made by the defendant. That contention

was that the Court of Appeals erred in adopting the "reliability" test for the admission of

scientific testimony rather than the standard that scientific testimony must be based upon

methods generally accepted in the scientific community. Upon review of the record we

find that we cannot reach this issue. ,,249

The above case is quite in contrast to Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp.,250 where

both the Frye test and Federal Rules of Evidence were combined. The case involved

Rosemarie Christophersen (the surviving spouse of Albert Roy Christophersen,

deceased), and Steven Roy Christophersen, who sued Allied-Signal Corporation, alleging

that Albert Christophersen's death was as a result of exposure to fumes that contained

particles of nickel and cadmium, which caused the small-cell cancer that led to his death

in 1986. Albert Christophersen worked for fourteen consecutive years prior to his death,

248 Id.

249
Id, at 1145.

250 Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F. 2d 1106 (5 th Cir. 1991).

132
for the corporation at their plant based in Waco, Texas, where nickel and cadmium

batteries were produced.

During the trial, the plaintiffs proffered expert testimony that exposure to cadmium and

nickel fumes caused Albert's death. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs' expert

testimony did not meet the Frye test, because the expert did not follow the generally

accepted methods in reaching his conclusion, and that the basis for the expert's opinion

was insufficiently reliable. The United States District Court for the Western District of

Texas excluded the expert testimony. The Court stated that the plaintiffs' expert

testimony did not meet the Frye criteria and granted summary judgment in favor of the

defendants. There was an appeal. The issue centered on the appropriate criteria for

admitting expert testimony.

The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's summary

judgment. The Court of Appeals in its ruling combined the Frye test and the Federal

Rules of Evidence. The Court stated that:

"The Federal Rules of Evidence, combined with Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C

Cir. 1993), provide a framework for trial judges struggling with proffered expert

testimony. The signals are not neatly cabined categories, and we disentangle them only to

accent the independent significance of each.

(1) whether the witness is qualified to express an expert opinion, Fed. R. Evid. 702.

(2) whether the facts upon which the expert relies are the same type as are relied upon

by other experts in the field, Fed. R. Evid. 703.

133
 (3) whether in reaching his conclusion the expert used a well-founded methodology,

Frye; and

(4) assuming the expert's testimony has passed Rules 702 and 703, and the Frye test,

whether under Fed. R. Evid. 403 the testimony's potential for unfair prejudice

substantially outweighs its probative value.

These four signals or inquiries introduce no new concepts to our jurisprudence. They are

only guideposts drawn from the Federal Rules of Evidence and our cases. We list these

inquiries, but in doing so we do not intend that they be applied mechanically. At the same

time, they often will naturally lend themselves to sequential application. The reality is

that trials are too varied for fixed mold; we construct none today.,,251

The Federal Rules of Evidence was criticized. As we stated earlier on, the Rule did not

mention the Frye general acceptance criteria. It did not state whether expert evidence

must be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.

The Federal Rules of Evidence is also too loose, too liberal and less stringent than Frye.

Rule 702, for instance states that an expert can be qualified by knowledge, skill,

experience, training or education. This in effect means that almost anybody can qualify as

an expert witness.

Many scholars were also concerned about the appropriate interpretation of the Federal

Rules of Evidence. Should the Rules be interpreted as a statute? Professor Weissenberger,

251
Id, at 1110.

134
for instance, argued that The Federal Rules of Evidence is not a statute. He maintained

that:

In actuality, the Federal Rules of Evidence have very little in

common with a typical statute. Most fundamentally, the
Federal Rules of Evidence originated in, and were designed by,
the judicial branch and not the legislative branch. In addition,
the role of Congress in the process that generated the Federal
Rules of Evidence was largely passive. Congress's primary
function was to enact into law the will and intent of the
Supreme Court and its Advisory Committee. Moreover, the
judicial branch designed the Federal Rules of Evidence to
operate as guidance for the exercise of discretion within the
federal judiciary, and consequently, the Rules' intended
function is very much unlike that of most statutes. Based on all
of these considerations, the primary thesis of this ... is that
application of the doctrine of "legislative intent" is functionally
and substantially misplaced in the interpretation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 252

Professor Weissenberger further argued that "contrary to the typical statutory enactment,

however, the Federal Rules of Evidence were developed by a multibranch process in

which the subjective intent of the drafters is predominately traceable to the judicial

branch. In the case of most of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress's role was

primarily to review and ratify the intent of a coordinate branch of government in its

design of rules intended to operate internally within that branch. Only in isolated

instances, did Congress actually modify the version of the Rules submitted to it by the

Supreme Court.,,253 He contended that the "principle of legislative supremacy does not

comport with the unique and extraordinary process which produced the Federal Rules of

252 W .
elssenberger, supra note 232, at 1307.
253
Id, at 1309.

135
Evidence",254 arguing that the Rules "were never intended to operate as a statute which

would have plain meaning. Rather than being designed as specific mandates, the Federal

Rules of Evidence were consciously drawn with a recognition that the federal judiciary

possess substantial inherent discretion in interpreting, expanding upon, and applying the

Rules.,,255

Fundamentally, Professor Weissenberger maintained that the Federal Rules of Evidence

"should not be interpreted as a typical statute, but should rather be subject to a unique set

of hermeneutics that reflects the Rules' identity as a codification of the common law.,,256

"Ultimately, however, treating the Federal Rules of Evidence as a stature will result in

courts abdicating their time-honored role in crafting the law of evidence. If courts treat

the Federal Rules of Evidence as a stature, they will defer to the legislative branch as the

arbiter of evidentiary policy when confronted with the inevitable indeterminacy of the

text of the Rules. ,,257

254 Id.

255 Id, at 13 10.

256Glen Weissenberger, "The Elusive Identity of the Federal Rules of Evidence", 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
1613 (May 1999).

257 Glen Weissenberger, "Evidence Myopia: The Failure to see the Federal Rules of Evidence as a
Codification of the Common Law", 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1539,1554 (May 1999).

136
On the other hand, Professor Imwinkelried argued that the Federal Rules of Evidence is a

statute and should be interpreted according to moderate textual principles of statutory

.
constructIOn. 258 ImWl'nk eIne
. d mamtame
. . d that:

In most of the cases construing the Federal Rules of Evidence,

a majority of the justices have adopted a moderate textual
approach. On the one hand, the justices have rejected a strict
textual approach that would allow a judge to consider extrinsic
legislative history material only if the judge cannot discern a
"plain meaning" on the face of the statute. Instead, the justices
routinely consider extrinsic material such as the Advisory
Committee Notes and relevant congressional committee
reports. On the other hand, a majority of the justices also have
abandoned the traditional "legal process" approach to statutory
construction. Under that approach, a judge should not only
consider the extrinsic material; more importantly, he or she
should attach great weight to the material. The legal process
approach often yields the conclusion that an intent expressed
only in the extrinsic material trumps any apparent plain
meaning of the statutory text. In contrast, textualists assign
great primacy to the specific language of the statute. They
argue that the text is "all that Congress enacts into law" and
that the extrinsic material is subject to manipulation by special
interest groups. Moderate textualists thus recognize a strong,
albeit rebuttable, presumption that the text prevails over any
contrary meaning suggested by the extrinsic material. I have
written in defense of this brand of moderate textualism?59

This argument amongst scholars as to the proper interpretation of the Federal Rules of

Evidence and whether the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the Frye test continued

until the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue in Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 26o In Daubert,261 the Supreme Court stated that the Federal Rules

258Edward J. Imwinkelried, "Whether the Federal Rules of Evidence should be Conceived as a Perpetual
Index Code: Blindness is Worse than Myopia.", 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1595, 1596 (1999).
259
Id.
260
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 u.s. 579 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
261 . ,F.
1l1;ra at 138.

137
of Evidence is a statute. Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Blackmun said: "we

interpret the legislatively enacted Federal Rules of Evidence as we would any statute.,,262

The Supreme Court also stated that the Frye test was superseded by the Federal Rules of

EVI'd ence. 263

It should be noted that on April 17, 2000, United States Chief Justice, William H.

Rehnquist, wrote to the speaker of the United States House of Representatives proposing

an amendment of Rule 702. Thus, on December 1, 2000, Rule 702 was amended and

three crucial requirements were added:-

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will

assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if
(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data,
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case. 264

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

Following the criticisms of Frye and the confusion on whether the Federal Rules of

Evidence replaced Frye, The United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow

262
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 Us. 579 S. Ct. 2794 (J 993).
263
Id, at 2793.

264 The three additional requirements are noted in italics. Fed. R. Evid. 702.

138
Pharmaceuticals,265 overturned the Frye test and stated that it had been superseded by the

Federal Rules of Evidence. The facts of the case are that the petitioners, two minor

children (Jason Daubert, Eric Schuller were born with severe birth defects) and their

parents sued Merrell Dow Pharmaceutials Company, alleging that the birth defects were

caused by the mothers' use of Bendictin, an anti-nausea drug marketed by the company.

At the trial, the respondents offered expert testimony to prove that the use of Bendictin

during pregnancy does not cause birth defects in humans. They called Dr. Steven H.

Lamm, a physician and epidemiologist who testified that "he had reviewed all literature

on Bendictin and human birth defects, more than thirty published studies involving over

130,000 patients, and that none of them found any link between Bendictin and

malformations in fetuses.,,266 Dr Lamm therefore, concluded that based on these, that the

mothers's use of Bendictin during the first trimester of the pregnancy did not cause the

birth defects.

The petitioners on the other hand, called eight experts who testified and concluded that

Bendictin can cause birth defects. Their experts included Dr. Shanna Helen Swan and Dr.

Stuart A. Newman. The experts drew their conclusions from (1) "in vitro" (test tube),

and "in vivo" (live) animal studies that found a link between Bendictin and

malformations, (2) pharmacological studies of the chemical structure of Bendictin which

found similarities between the chemical structure of Bendictin and that of other

SUbstances that cause birth defects, (3) they carried out a "reanalysis" of previously

265
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 u.s. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
266
Id, at 279l.

139
published epidemiological (human statistical) studies, which also found a link between

Bendictin and birth defects.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of California, in their ruling,

granted company's motion for summary judgment. The District Court stated that

scientific evidence is admissible only if the principle upon which it is based is

"sufficiently established to have general acceptance in the field to which it belongs.,,267

The Court held that the testimony given by the petitioners' expert witnesses did not meet

the applicable "general acceptance" standard for the admission of expert testimony. It

was also held that expert opinion not based on epidemiological (human statistical) studies

is not admissible to establish causation. 268 "Thus, the animal-cell studies, live animal

studies, and chemical-structure analyses on which petitioners had relied could not raise

by themselves a reasonably disputable jury issue regarding causation. Petitioners'

epidemiological analyses, based as they were on recalculations of data in previously

published studies that had found no causal link between the drug and birth defects, were

ruled to be inadmissible because they had not been published or subjected to peer

review.,,269 The District Court therefore, granted company's motion for summary

judgment and the petitioners appealed.

267 .
Daubert v. Merrell Dow PharmaceutIcals, 727 F. Supp. 570, 572, (S.D. Cal. 1989).

268
Id, at 575.
269
Id.

140
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's

decision and stated that "expert opinion based on a scientific technique is inadmissible

unless the technique is "generally accepted" as reliable in the relevant scientific

community. ,,270 The Court of Appeals also stated that expert opinion based on a

methodology that diverges "significantly from the procedures accepted by recognized

authorities in the field cannot be shown to be 'generally accepted as a reliable

technique' .,,271

The Court of Appeals rejected the "reanalysis" of the epidemiological studies presented

by the petitioners' experts and stated that "reanalysis is generally accepted by the

scientific community only when it is subjected to verification and scrutiny by others in

the field.,,272 In affirming the District Court's decision, the Court of Appeals further

stated that the reanalyses was "unpublished, not subjected to the normal peer review

process and generated solely for use in litigation,,,273 and that the petitioners' experts

provided insufficient foundation to prove that Bendictin caused the birth defects.

The case reached the United States Supreme Court. Michael H. Gottesman, counsel for

the petitioners, argued that Frye's "general acceptance" criteria has been superseded by

the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Supreme Court in its ruling, agreed with the

petitioners and stated that the Federal Rules of Evidence, not Frye provide the standard

270 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 951 F. 2d 1128, 1129 (9 th Cir. 1991)

271 rd, at 1130.

272 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 951 F. 2d 1128, 1131 (9 th Or. 1991)
273
rd, at 1131.

141
 274
for admitting expert scientific testimony in a federal tria1. The Supreme Court stated

that Frye's "general acceptance" test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal

Rules of Evidence. 275 It was held that "nothing in the Rules as a whole or in the text and

drafting history of Rule 702, which specifically governs expert testimony, gives any

indication that "general acceptance" is a necessary precondition to the admissibility of

scientific evidence. Moreover, such a rigid standard would be at odds with the Rules'

liberal thrust and their general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to "opinion

testimony. ,,276

The Supreme Court further stated that:

Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony under

Rule 702, the trial judge, pursuant to Rule 104(a), must make
a preliminary assessment of whether the testimony's
underlying reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid
and properly can be applied to the facts at issue. Many
considerations will bear on the inquiry, including whether the
theory or technique in question can be (and has been) tested,
whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication,
its known or potential error rate and the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling its operation, and
whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a
relevant scientific community. The inquiry is a flexible one,
and its focus must be solely on principles and methodology,
not on conclusions that they generate. Throughout, the judge
should also be mindful of other applicable Rules. 277

274 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 Us. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2792 (1993).

275 Id, at 2793.

276 Id, at 2792-94.

277
Id, at 2796-9.

142
Justice Blackmun stated that trial judges have the function to act as "gatekeepers" and

determine whether the testimony being presented is reliable and scientifically valid. On

the issue of whether the Federal Rules of Evidence is a statute, the Supreme Court stated

that, "we interpret the legislatively enacted Federal Rules of Evidence as we would any

statute. Rule 402 provides the baseline: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as

otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these

rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.

Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.,,278

The Supreme Court went on to say that "given the Rules' permissive backdrop and their

inclusion of a specific rule on expert testimony that does not mention "general

acceptance", the assertion that the Rules somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing.

Frye made "general acceptance" the exclusive test for admitting expert scientific

testimony. That austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal Rules

of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials. ,,279

The United States Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals decision and remanded
28o
the case for further proceedings.

278 Id, at 2794.

279
Id.
280
Id, at 2799.

143
The Supreme Court's decision in Daubert has been criticized extensively. The opinion in

Daubert created difficult burdens for trial judges, the opinion is still ambiguous, it did not

address crucial questions, and did not provide specific guidelines to trial courts. Above

all, it did not state whether the Daubert criteria also applied to nonscientific evidence.

Under Daubert, trial judges became "gatekeepers" who have to decide what is a reliable

or an unreliable scientific technique. As Justice Feldman has pointed out "judges are

trained lawyers and only rarely trained scientists, which explains their failure to provide

coherent guidelines on how to accomplish this task. ,,281 In fact, "the dilemma for the trial

judge is how to separate the accurate, reliable testimony that aids the fact-finding process

from the so-called "junk science" that contorts the fact-finding process. But whether

Daubert does much to help is another challenge for the trial bench and bar.,,282 Justice

Feldman further argued that "the impact of the Court's newly elaborated standard is

unclear. Daubert could be viewed as something of a disappointment. The Court declared

that the Frye test was superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence, and thereby

outwardly relaxed the standard for admission of scientific evidence. However, the fact

that the four Daubert criteria are substantially similar to the factors commonly employed

by those courts that applied Frye suggests that the practical impact of Daubert could be

minimal and confusing. Indeed, one critic has predicted that the Daubert standard will

suffer the same problems that critics directed at Frye.,,283 Justice Feldman therefore

concluded that:

Justice Martin L. C. Feldman, "May I Have the Next Dance, Mrs. Frye?", 69 Tul. L. Rev. 793 (February
281
1995).

282 Id.

283 Id, at 802.

144
 At best, Daubert offers an awkward analytical model.
The Court failed to provide trial judges with a well-
defined standard for separating unreliable scientific
evidence from reliable scientific evidence. Perhaps none
exists. Daubert specifically ruled out the general
acceptance standard as a precondition of admissibility,
but offered only "general observations" in return. The
Court failed to clarify whether Daubert expands or
contrasts the role of the trial judge in considering the
admissibility of scientific evidence. After all, we all
already knew that we are the "gatekeepers". Moreover,
the Court sent conflicting signals to trial courts by
abandoning Frye's general acceptance test, only to
resurrect it as one consideration under the new
standard. 284

On a similar vein, Professor Milich maintained that Daubert "requires nonscientist trial

judges to evaluate science in a way that may exceed their scientific abilities" and also that

"it is too vague on the degree of reliability that the trial judges are supposed to be looking

for. ,,285

Professor Jonakait was also highly critical of the Daubert decision which he also

described as being unclear. He contended that Daubert is based on unarticulated

assumptions. 286 "The opinion commands trial courts to determine whether something is

"scientific", not whether it is physics, chemistry, biology, epidemiology, psychology,

accidentology, clinical ecology, or forensic science. This can be done only if there are

general standards and methods applicable to all fields of science that distinguish genuine

284
Id, at 806.

285 Paul S. Milich, "Controversial Science in the Courtroom: Daubert and the Law's Hubris", 43 Emory L.
J. 913,917 (1994).

Randolph N. Jonakait, "The Meaning of Daubert and What that Means for Forensic Science", 15
286
Cardozo L. Rev. 2103 (April 1994).

145
science from pseudoscience. Furthennore, the court's command can only be followed if

trial courts can understand those standards and use them to identify real science. These

premises, however, were not stated. It would have been better if they had been to help

insure that trial courts would begin their analyses at the proper starting point.,,287

Professor Jonakait further argued that Daubert failed to address crucial questions; "for

example, what if the error rate is unknown? Does it matter if it is ascertainable, but no

one has bothered to ascertain it? What does it mean for the reliability of a scientific

technique if its error rate is not knowable? If the error rate is known, does it matter? If the

error rate is less than fifty percent does it satisfy a preponderance of the evidence notion

of reliability? Or does the error rate have to be small enough to confonn to "scientific"

notions of confidence? Is there a connection between error rates and the statistical tests

that nonnally require scientists to reach a ninety-five percent confidence level?,,288 These

questions and many more were left unanswered by the Supreme Court in Daubert.

Professor Jonakait cautioned that courts should not reach a conclusion on a scientific

method or technique simply because it has been peer reviewed or published, arguing that

"peer review is hardly a perfect system - it is often less than demanding because

scientists are busy or because of conflicts of interest.,,289 "Furthennore, strict scrutiny

287
Id.

288 Id, at 2106.

289 Id, at 2111.

146
does not necessarily follow from the fact of publication. Too much scientific literature is

published for scientists to scrutinize most of it.,,29o

Polentz also maintained that Daubert is ambiguous and full of confusing contradictions.

He argued that the "Daubert decision did not resolve how to correlate the Federal Rules

of Evidence with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Nor did Daubert ameliorate the

conflict between the Frye test and the Federal Rules of Evidence. In addition, Daubert's

ambiguity created new splits among the lower courts because of the potential for multiple

interpretations of the decision. In short, the decision in Daubert is flawed, as it breeds

confusion rather than clarity.,,291

It has also been argued that "the Supreme Court provided only abstract, general guidance

about how the lower courts should handle admissibility of scientific evidence under the

Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court did not apply the general guidelines it outlined to

the facts of the case. Instead, it chose to remand the case to the Ninth Circuit for a

determination of whether the testimony was grounded on a reliable foundation and was

relevant. ,,292

Moenssens was also very critical of the Daubert decision. He argued that Daubert

"rather than protecting the fact finding process from contamination by unreliable expert

290 Id.

Michael C. Polentz, "Post-Daubert Confusion with Expert Testimony", 36 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1187,
291
1202 (1996).

292 Nancy S. Farrell, "Congressional Action to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 702: A Mischievous
Attempt to Codify Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.", 13 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 523,
534 (Spring 1997).

147
opinion, may have actually increased the likelihood of such contamination, especially in

criminal cases.,,293 Moenssens contended that "the Supreme Court in Daubert did not see

fit to create distinctions between proof in criminal versus civil cases, as far as reliability

is concerned, even though literature and case law frequently cautioned that in criminal

cases, where a person's freedom is at stake, courts ought to be more reluctant to admit

evidence based on new, as yet unproven, techniques when such evidence is being offered

by the prosecution. ,,294 He suggested extra judicial caution, and the reasons for extra

judicial caution include the following - most witnesses are not truly scientists but are

technicians, pro-prosecution bias may impair scientific impartiality, experts tend to testify

beyond their expertise, experts prevaricate on their credentials, there are doubts as to the

proficiency of crime laboratories, human errors which can result in reaching wrong

.
conc IUSIOns, among oth er reasons. 295

Some states rejected Daubert and continued with Frye. In People v. Leahy,296 for instance
97
the Supreme Court of California rejected Daubert stating that Kell/ /Frye remained the

standard for the admissibility of new scientific evidence. The case involved William

Michael Leahy who was convicted by the Municipal Court, West Orange County Judicial

District, of driving under the influence of alcohol and driving with blood alcohol level in

excess of 0.08 percent. On the day he was arrested, the police officer gave the defendant

293 Andre A. Moenssens, "Novel Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: Some Words of Caution", 84 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 1, 4 (Spring 1993).
294
Id.
295
Id, at 5-20.

296 P
eople v. Leahy, 8 Ca1.4' h 587, 882 P.2d 321 (1994).
297
supra at 108.

148
some field sobriety tests, including the HGN (horizontal gaze nystagmus) test. "An

inability of the eyes to maintain visual fixation as they turned from side to side (in other

words, jerking or bouncing) is known as horizontal gaze nystagmus, or HGN".298 At the

trial, the court admitted the HGN test without a Kelly/Frye hearing. The defendant was

convicted and he appealed, arguing that the HGN test should not have been admitted

without a Kelly/Frye hearing.

At the Court of Appeals, the issue centered on whether HGN tests are admissible without

a Kelly/Frye hearing. In their ruling, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's

judgment of conviction because the court failed to apply the Kelly/Frye standard. The

Supreme Court of California granted review to decide whether the Kelly/Frye standard

should be modified in view of the United States Supreme Court decision in Daubert.

Delivering the opmIOn of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Lucas stated that "the

Kelly/Frye formulation (or now more accurately, the Kelly formulation) should remain a

prerequisite to the admission of expert testimony regarding new scientific methodology

in this state. We further conclude, consistent with the Court of Appeal's conclusion

herein, that the HGN test is a "new scientific technique" within the scope of Kelly, and

that the trial court improperly admitted police testimony regarding that technique without

first requiring compliance with Kelly".299 Chief Justice Lucas also stated that "Daubert

298 h
People v. Leahy, 8 Cal.4 1 587, 592, 882 P.2d 321 (J 994).
299
rd, at 591.

149
affords no compelling reason for abandoning Kelly in favor of the more "flexible"

approach outlined in Daubert".30o

The Supreme Court of California held that:

In sum, Kelly sets forth the various reasons why the more
"conservative" Frye approach to determining the reliability
of expert testimony regarding scientific techniques represents
an appropriate one. Daubert, which avoided the issue of
Frye's "merits", presents no justification for reconsidering
that aspect of our holding in Kelly. Thus, we conclude that
the Kelly formulation survived Daubert in this state, and that
none of the above described authorities critical of that
formulation persuades us to reconsider or modify it at this
time. 30 )

Therefore, "our Kelly doctrine survived Daubert and continues to represent the standard

by which new scientific techniques should be measured before evidence derived

therefrom may be admitted in court.,,302 Chief Justice Lucas also stated that "general

acceptance" under Kelly means a consensus drawn from a typical cross-section of the

relevant, qualified scientific community".303

300
Id, at 594.
301
Id, at 604.
302
Id,at612.

303 Id.

150
General Electric Co. v. Joiner

It should be noted that in General Electric v. JOiner,304 the United States Supreme Court

restated the function of the trial judge to determine when to admit or exclude scientific

evidence. It was held that the abuse-of-discretion is the proper standard for appellate

review regarding trial court decisions on the admissibility of evidence. Robert Joiner, an

electrician and his wife, sued General Electric and Westinghouse Electric, where Joiner

worked, alleging that his lung cancer was "promoted" by his exposure to polychlorinated

biphenyls (PCBs) and their derivatives - "furans" and "dioxins". PCBs are hazardous

substances that were banned by Congress in 1978, with limited exceptions.

Joiner called expert witnesses (Dr. Arnold Schecter and Dr. Daniel Teitelbaum), who

testified that PCBs, furans and dioxins can "promote" lung cancer and therefore,

concluded that Joiner's lung cancer was likely to have been caused by his exposure to

PCBs at his workplace. The experts based their conclusions on the following.

(1) studies that showed that an infant mice developed cancer after being injected with

massive doses of PCBs.

(2) an epidemiological study that involved workers who were exposed to PCBs at an

Italian electrical plant. The study by Bertazzi, Riboldi, Pesatori, Radice and

Zocchetti (1987), found that lung cancer deaths among the ex-workers at the

Italian plant were higher than expected. It should be noted however, that these

304 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 u.s. 136, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).

151
 authors were unwilling to state that PCBs had caused the lung cancer in the ex-

workers.

(3) an epidemiological study that involved ex-employees at Monsanto's PCB

production plant in Sauget, Illinios. The authors of the study (J. Zack and D.

Musch, 1979), also found that lung cancer deaths among the ex-employees were

higher than expected. The authors noted however, that their finding was not

statistically significant and so could not suggest a link between the increase in

lung cancer deaths and exposure to PCBs.

(4) an epidemiological study involving workers at a Norwegian Cable manufacturing

company, who were exposed to mineral oil. The authors of the study -

(Ronneberg, Andersen and Skyberg (1988)), found a statistically significant

increase in lung cancer in the workers, but the study did not mention PCBs.

(5) an epidemiological study involving workers exposed to PCBs in Japan. The

authors - (Kuratsune, Nakamura, Ikeda and Hirohata 1987), found a statistically

significant increase in lung cancer among the workers, but the workers were

exposed to numerous potential carcinogens. The workers were also exposed to

toxic rice oil.

Based on the above studies, Joiner's expert witness, Dr Schecter testified that it is "more

likely than not that Mr. Joiner's lung cancer was causally linked to cigarette smoking and

PCB exposure.,,30S Dr. Teitelbaum also testified that Joiner's lung cancer was caused by

305
Id, at 518.

152
or contributed to a significant degree by his exposure to the substances at the plant where

he worked.

The petitioners on the other hand argued that the experts' conclusions were mere

speculation, not supported by appropriate epidemiological studies, and was based on

studies with laboratory animals.

In its ruling, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

excluded the experts' testimony and stated that the animal studies that the experts relied

on, did not support his contention that the PCBs promoted his small cell cancer. 306 The

District Court stated that the study involving infant mice that was injected with highly

concentrated and massive doses of PCBs was different from the case of Robert Joiner,

who is an adult human, and who was only exposed to PCBs on a small scale. The Court

also rejected the four epidemiological studies presented by Joiner's experts. It was held

that the studies did not provide a sufficient basis for an expert's opinion, since the authors

of the studies were unwilling to suggest a link between increases in lung cancer and

exposure to PCBs. The Court stated that the third epidemiological study that involved

workers who were exposed to mineral oil was not relevant to the case. Similarly, the

District Court also rejected the fourth study that involved workers exposed to many

carcinogens, plus PCBs. The study was not specific to PCBs. The Court therefore,

granted summary judgment to the petitioners and stated that "there was no genuine issue

as to whether he had been exposed to furans and dioxins, and his experts' testimony had

306
General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 864 F. Supp. 1310 (N.D. Ga. 1994).

153
failed to show that there was a link between exposure to PCBs and small-cell lung cancer

and was therefore inadmissible because it did not rise above "subjective belief or

unsupported speculation. ,,307

There was an appeal. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 308 reversed the judgment

and ruled that the District Court erred in excluding the testimony of the respondent's

expert witnesses. The Court of Appeals held that "because the Federal Rules of Evidence

governing expert testimony display a preference for admissibility, we apply a particularly

stringent standard of review to the trial judge's exclusion of expert testimony.,,309

The case reached the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari

to determine "what standard an appellate court should apply in reviewing a trial court's

decision to admit or exclude expert testimony under Daubert.,,3l0 The Supreme Court

reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Delivering the judgment, Chief Justice

Rehnquist, said: "we hold that abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard. We apply

this standard and conclude that the District Court in this case did not abuse its discretion

when it excluded certain proffered expert testimony.,,3ll Chief Justice Rehnquist further

said that "we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in its review of the exclusion of

Joiner's experts' testimony. In applying an overly "stringent" review to that ruling, it

307
Id, at 1326.

308 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 78 F. 3d 524 (1996).

309
Id, at 529.
310 . .
General Electrzc Co. v. Jomer, 522 u.s. 136, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
311
Id, at 139.

154
failed to give the trial court the deference that is the hallmark of abuse-of-discretion
. ,,312
reVIew.

Chief Justice Rehnquist also stated that:

Respondent points to Daubert's language that the "focus,

of course, must be solely on principles and methodology,
not on the conclusions that they generate." ... He claims
that because the District Court's disagreement was with the
conclusion that the experts drew from the studies, the
District Court committed legal error and was properly
reversed by the Court of Appeals. But conclusions and
methodology are not entirely distinct from one another.
Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data.
But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of
Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence
that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of
the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too
great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion
proffered .... That is what the District Court did here, and
we hold that it did not abuse its discretion in so doing. 313

In reversing the judgment, the Supreme Court said:

We hold, therefore, that abuse of discretion is the proper

standard by which to review a district court's decision to
admit or exclude scientific evidence. We further hold
that, because it was within the District Court discretion to
conclude that the studies upon which the experts relied
were not sufficient, whether individually or in
combination, to support their conclusions that Joiner's
exposure to PCBs contributed to his cancer, the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding their
testimony. These conclusions, however, do not dispose of
this entire case. 314

312
Id,at143.
313
Id, at 146.

314 Id.

155
The Supreme Court therefore, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and

remanded the case for "proceedings consistent with this opinion.,,315 The Supreme

Court's decision in this case has been criticized. Professor Giannelli, for instance, argued

that the decision "seems to support the theme of liberal admissibility.,,316 "The Court

ruled that the proper standard for reviewing a trial court's admissibility decision under

Daubert was an abuse-of-discretion, a standard adopted without even considering the

principal alternative standard: de novo review. This standard suggests that admissibility

decisions would not be second guessed on appeal - i.e., giving the trial court more

leeway in admitting evidence. In contrast, a de novo review standard would have given

appellate courts more authority to control junk science. ,,317

Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael

As we mentioned earlier on in this chapter, the Daubert decision was criticized on several

issues. There was the unresolved issue of whether the Daubert criteria also applied to non

scientific testimony. Thus, on March 23, 1999, the United States Supreme Court in the

case of Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,318 stated that the function of trial judges to act as

315 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 u.s. 136, 147 (1997
316 Paul C. Giannelli, "Daubert Revisited", 41 No.3 Crim. Law Bulletin 5, (June 2005).
317
Id .

318 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 u.s. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999).

156
"gatekeepers", reqUITIng an inquiry into both the relevance and reliability of expert

testimony, "applies not only to "scientific" testimony, but to all expert testimony.,,319

On July 6, 1993, Patrick Carmichael was driving his minivan when the right rear tire on

the van blew out and the van overturned. One passenger died while others sustained

serious injuries. Carmichael and the others sued the tire manufacturer and distributor

(collectively called Kumho Tire Co.), for the death and the injuries. They claimed that the

tire failed because it was defective. They called a tire failure analyst, Dennis Carlson, Jr.,

who testified that he had examined the failed tire, and was of the opinion that a defect in

the tire's manufacture or the design caused the tire to blowout. He said that his analysis

of the failed tire showed that the tread of the tire separated from the steel-belted carcass,

which means that the separation was caused by either a defect or from overdeflection,

which is a type of tire abuse. Carlson based his conclusions on (1) a visual and tactile

inspection of the failed tire, and (2) on his own theory that "in the absence of at least two

of four specific, physical symptoms indicating tire abuse, the tire failure of the sort that

occurred here was caused by a defect. ,,320 According to Carlson, "these symptoms include

(a) tread wear on the tire's shoulder that is greater than the tread wear along the tire's

center, (b) signs of a "bead groove", where the beads have been pushed too hard against

the bead seat on the inside of the tire's rim, (c) sidewalls of the tire with physical signs of

deterioration, such as discoloration, and/or (d) marks on the tire's rim flange.,,321

319 Id , at 138 .

320 Id, at 137.

321 rd, at 144.

157
 During his testimony, Carlson noted that (1) the failed tire was made in 1988 and was

installed before Carmichael bought the van in March 1993, (2) the Carmichaels had

driven the van approximately 7,000 additional miles in the two months that he owned the

van, and (3) that the tire tread had at least two punctures that had been repaired

inadequatel y. 322

Counsel for Kumho Tire Co., argued that the expert's testimony should be excluded

because the methodology used by the expert in reaching his conclusion was unreliable.

Kumho Tire Co. also argued that the methodology did not satisfy the Federal Rule of

Evidence 702 which requires expert testimony to be both relevant and reliable. They also

argued that the methodology did not satisfy the Daubert criteria.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama,323 excluded the

expert's testimony and granted summary judgment for defendants. In excluding the

testimony, the District Court stated that the Federal Rule of Evidence 702 "imposes a

special obligation upon a trial judge to ensure that scientific testimony is not only

relevant but reliable. The District Court also recognized the fact that Daubert required

trial judges to act as "gatekeepers" and should consider four factors when deciding

whether to admit or exclude expert testimony. In the Court's view, Carlson's testimony

did not satisfy Daubert's four factors - testability, peer review and publication, error rate

and general acceptance.

322
Id, at 143.
323
Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 144 (SDAla. 1997).

158
The plaintiffs then filed a motion for reconsideration, stating that the Daubert factors

should be applied flexibly. The District Court granted their motion for reconsideration

and agreed that "Daubert should be applied flexibly, that its four factors were simply

illustrative, and that other factors could argue in favor of admissibility.,,324 The District

Court however, affirmed its earlier decision, stating that it "found insufficient indications

of the reliability of Carlson's methodology. ,,325 The plaintiffs appealed.

The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded. The

Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred as a matter of law in applying the

Daubert standard. Following a de novo review of the District Court's decision to apply

the Daubert criteria, the Court of Appeals stated that Daubert only applied to "scientific"

testimony, and that Carlson's testimony was not scientific and therefore falls outside the

scope of Daubert. 326

The case reached the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari and reversed

the Court of Appeals decision. The issue centered on whether the Daubert factors also

applied to nonscientific expert testimony. The Supreme Court held that the District

Court's decision to exclude Carlson's testimony was within its discretion and was lawful.

The Supreme Court also noted that there was no reference to any articles or papers that

validates Carlson's methodology. The Supreme Court stated that:

324 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 u.s. 137 (1999).

325 Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 144 (SDAla. 1997).

326 131 F. 3d 1433, 1435 (11 th Cir. 1997).

159
 The Daubert "gatekeeping" obligation applies not only to
"scientific" testimony, but to all expert testimony. Rule 702
does not distinguish between "scientific" knowledge and
"technical" or "other specialized" knowledge, but makes
clear that any such knowledge might become the subject of
expert testimony. It is the Rule's word "knowledge", not
the words (like "scientific") that modify that word, that
establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability. Daubert
referred only to "scientific" knowledge because that was
the nature of the expertise there at issue. Neither is the
evidentiary rationale underlying Daubert's "gatekeeping"
determination limited to "scientific" knowledge. Rules 702
and 703 grant all expert witnesses, not just "scientific"
ones, testimonial latitude unavailable to other witnesses on
the assumption that the expert's opinion will have a reliable
basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.
Finally, it would prove difficult, if not impossible, for
judges to administer evidentiary rules under which a
"gatekeeping" obligation depended upon a distinction
between "scientific" knowledge and "technical" or "other
specialized" knowledge, since there is no clear line
dividing the one from the others and no convincing need to
make such distinctions. 327

The Supreme Court further stated that a trial judge may consider one or more of the

Daubert factors when deciding whether to admit or exclude expert testimony. The

Supreme Court therefore, held that "the Court of Appeals erred insofar as it ruled those

factors out in such cases. In determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable,

the trial court should consider the specific Daubert factors where they are reasonable

measures of reliability.,,328

327 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 Us. 137,138 (1999).

328 rd.

160
Justice Breyer, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, also stated that "a court of

appeals must apply an abuse-of-discretion standard when it reviews a trial court's

decision to admit or exclude expert testimony.,,329 Justice Breyer further stated that:

We must therefore disagree with the Eleventh Circuit's

holding that a trial judge may ask questions of the sort
Daubert mentioned only where an expert "relies on the
application of scientific principles", but not where an
expert relies "on skill - or experience-based observation".
We do not believe that Rule 702 creates a schematism that
segregates expertise by type while mapping certain kinds of
questions to certain kinds of experts. Life and the legal
cases that it generates are too complex to warrant so
33o
definitive a match.

In a nutshell, the Supreme Court recognized the fact that not all the Daubert factors

applied to all fonns of expert testimony; and that the Daubert factors did not constitute

mandates but are flexible guidelines, and that trial judges must look at other factors

bearing in mind the circumstances of each case.

The Supreme Court's decision in this case has faced some criticisms. Professor

Weissenberger, for instance, argued that "a closer examination of the reasoning m

Kumho, however, reveals limits to the applicability of the more specific holdings m

Daubert to non-scientific expert testimony. The court declined to limit the trial court's

detennination of the reliability of expert testimony to the celebrated (or notorious,

depending upon one's adversarial posture), list of factors set forth in Daubert, and the

329 Id.

330
Id, at 151.

161
court also stated that an application of those factors was not necessary in every case.

After Kumho, it is clear that factors other than those listed in Daubert may be considered

by trial courts in determining the reliability of proffered testimony, and certain Daubert

factors may simply be inapplicable to certain kinds of expert testimony.,,33!

In summary, this chapter has revealed the confusion, controversy and inconsistencies

surrounding the admissibility of expert testimony. We have discussed the three main

rules guiding the admissibility of expert testimony, bringing out their various strengths

and weaknesses. The Frye test emphasizes general acceptance of a technique in the

relevant discipline. The Federal Rule of Evidence 702 emphasizes relevance and

reliability of a technique. The Rule also stresses that a method or technique can be

scientific, technical or other specialized field of knowledge. Rule 702 further stresses that

if a method or technique can assist judges and jurors, then an expert qualified by

knowledge, skill, experience or training should be allowed to give expert testimony.

Daubert emphasizes relevance, reliability, and validity. Daubert stresses that trial judges

have the function to act as "gatekeepers." Above all, Daubert also emphasizes that there

are four factors that trial judges should be looking at when deciding to admit or exclude

expert testimony (testability, peer review, error rate and general acceptance). In essence,

this chapter has revealed the problems resulting from the adoption of the three rules. In

the next chapter, we discuss the admissibility of offender profiling and the impact these

three rules have on the trial outcome of cases involving offender profiling.

331 Glen Weissenberger, Weissenberger's Federal Evidence: 2006 Courtroom Manual, 227 (2005).

162
 Chapter Four

Offender Profiling in the Courtroom

Though courts have generally rejected testimony concerning

profiling frankly so offered, they have often bent over
backwards to admit profiling-based testimony, or testimony
by profilers, when it could be labeled differently. 332

Offender profiling is a crime investigation technique based on probabilities, stereotypes,

suspicion and assumptions. It does not point to a specific offender as being responsible

for a specific offense. Offender profiling only generalizes. As such it is not a method

sufficiently reliable to prove the guilt or innocence of an accused. There are no questions

as to the usefulness of offender profiling in crime investigations. Where there are

question marks and problems are when it is being introduced into the courtroom as

evidence. The reliability and validity of offender profiling cannot be ascertained at the

moment by any objective method.

The nature of offender profiling does not lend this technique to any form of reliable

testing. There is the problem of replicating a crime scene. No one can state with certainty

that one offender will commit all crimes in the same manner or exhibit the same

characteristics at subsequent crimes. Offenders, especially serial offenders, will learn

from experiences, media, from victim responses, and then may change their method of

operation. They may also develop new fantasies; hence the signature aspects of their

crime may change.

332 R'ISlnger
'd an Loop, supra note 34 , at 25 3 ,

163
The current position in United States courts is that offender profiling and its derivatives

have been admitted in many cases and also have been excluded in many others. There has

been a lot of inconsistencies. Hence, in this chapter, the central problems of offender

profiling evidence are discussed. In some of the cases where offender profiling or its

derivatives were admitted, it is surprising that the reliability of this technique was never

questioned. Some of the courts appeared to have been taken in by the credentials of the

profilers at the expense of assessing the reliability and validity of this technique. The fact

that a technique is useful in crime investigation does not render it a reliable tool for

courtroom use. Utility does not equal/amount to reliability.

Is Offender Profiling Impermissible Character Evidence?

There are many problems with the introduction of offender profiling in the courtroom.

The first relates to whether offender profiling constitutes impermissible character

evidence. There is general disagreement amongst scholars and courts as to whether

offender profiling is impermissible character evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence,

Rule 404 deals with character evidence and provides the guideline. Rule 405 and 406 also

affects character evidence. It is therefore, important to cite the Rules at length.

164
Rule 404. Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other

Crimes.

(a) Character evidence generally. - Evidence of a person's character or trait of character

is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular

occasion, except:

(1) Character of accused. - In a criminal case, evidence of a pertinent trait of

character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if

evidence of a trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by an

accused and admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of

the accused offered by the prosecution;

(2) Character of alleged victim. - In a criminal case, and subject to the limitations

imposed by Rule 412, evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim

of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or

evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the

prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first

aggressor;

(3) Character of witness. - Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in

Rules 607, 608, and 609. 333

Rule 405. Methods of Proving Character

(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of

character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to

333 Fed. Evid. R. 404.

165
 reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination,

inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.

(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or trait of character of a

person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be

made of specific instances of that person's conduct. 334

Rule 406. Habit; Routine Practice

Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether

corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove

that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity

with the habit or routine practice. 335

In general terms, offender profiling deals with the character traits of individuals. As such

it is character evidence. However, whether it will be seen as permissible or impermissible

character evidence largely depends on two things. First, for it to be admissible the

defendant must first put his character at issue. If the prosecution offers character evidence

before the defendant, it will be ruled inadmissible. Second, whether it will be ruled

admissible or inadmissible also depends on the purpose of its introduction. By purpose,

we mean - is it being introduced to show criminal intent, criminal propensity or is it

simply to assist the fact-finders? It is generally permissible where it is being used to show

criminal intent as opposed to where it is being offered to show criminal propensity.

334 Fed. Evid. R. 405

335 Fed. Evid. R. 406

166
Cleary et al maintained that "when the plaintiff or the government offers evidence that

the defendant fits an incriminating profile, it may be excluded under the rule that

prohibits evidence of character to show conduct on a particular occasion. Yet, arguably

the rule should not bar admission in all such cases. After all, the rule rests on the premise

that the marginal probative value of character evidence generally is low while the

potential for distribution, time-consumption and prejudice is high. If it were shown that

the profile was both valid and revealing - that it distinguishes between offenders and

non-offenders with great accuracy - then the balance might favor admissibility. It is far

from clear, however, that any existing profile is this powerful. ,,336

Thus, "when the profile evidence is used defensively (to show good character, to restore

credibility, or to prove apprehension in connection with a claim of self-defense), it falls

under an exception to the rule against character evidence. Admissibility then should tum

on the extent to which the expert testimony would assist the jury viewed in the light of

the usual counterweights. The qualifications of the expert, the reliability and validity of

using the profile, and the need for the evidence thus affect the admissibility and of course

the weight of the profile evidence.,,337

In State v. Haynes,338 the expert testimony of a criminal profiler was seen as

impermissible character evidence, and therefore inadmissible. Richard Haynes was

Edward W. Cleary., Kenneth S. Brown., George E. Dix., Ernest Gellhom., D.H. Kaye., Robert
336
Meisenholder, E.F. Roberts., and John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence, 3rd Edition, 635 (1984).
337
Id, at 636.

338 State v. Haynes, 1988 WL 99189 (Ohio App. 9 Dist).

167
charged with murder and grand theft of a motor vehicle, and was convicted by the

Common Pleas Court, County of Lorain, Ohio. Richard Haynes claimed that on October

20, 1986, he went to Douglas Fauver's horne to fill out a job application form and was

offered some drinks and some pills (speed). He claimed that at 11.30 pm he woke up

from sleep and found out that he was still at Fauver's horne and that Fauver was sitting

across from him, stark naked. 339 Fauver then told him that he had sexual intercourse with

him and wanted to know if he enjoyed it. 340 Haynes said that he then went to the

bathroom to clean up. Then Fauver carne at him with a small knife and they engaged in a

fight. Haynes also stated that he stabbed Fauver twice in the chest and once in the back,

after Fauver had cut his (Haynes) wrist. Haynes claimed that he then waited for two hours

for the police to arrive, but they did not. He said that he thought the neighbors had called

the police when they heard the noise during the fight. Haynes later used a stolen car to get

away and was arrested in Arizona for another crime. It should be noted that Fauver died

in his horne and his body was discovered the next day.

At the trial, the State called Robert Walter, a psychologist and criminal pro filer, to testify

in support of the State's argument that the murder was anger-retaliatory and "not a

homophobic murder done out of panic after an unsolicited homosexual encounter.,,341

The State believed and argued that the timing of the events, along with other factors,

implied that Fauver's murder was anger-retaliatory.342 Walter testified that there is what

339 Id.

340 Id, at 1.

341 Id, at 2.

342
Id.

168
he called homophobic murder and anger-retaliatory murder and that each type has

distinctive patterns. He stated that his analysis of the crime scene characteristics and

reports revealed patterns consistent with anger-retaliatory murders. Therefore, he was of

the opinion that the murder was not committed as a result of panic. Haynes claimed that

he acted in self-defense and that the State "set up the theory of homophobic murder as a

strawman argument and then set out to attack it.,,343 The expert's testimony was however,

admitted.

Haynes was convicted and sentenced to a term of fifteen years to life for the murder and a

consecutive term of two years for the theft. He appealed his conviction. The defendant

argued that Walter's theory was not generally accepted and was not scientifically reliable

and should not have been admitted. The defense also argued that the prejudicial effect of

the expert testimony far outweighed its probative value. Furthermore, the defendant

argued that "the State has overlooked the principle that unless scientific evidence and/or

theory can be considered reliable, it cannot be of assistance to the trier of fact. ,,344

The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Ninth District., Lorain County, ruled that the "admission

of Walter's testimony conflicts with several evidentiary rules,,345 and therefore its

admission was error. The Court did not see offender profiling as being reliable and stated

that "although this testimony may indicate that profiles may be a reliable investigative

343 rd.

344
rd, at 3.
345
rd, at 2.

169
tool, there is little indication in the record that they can be said to be reliable for the

purposes for which they were used by the state in the instant case.,,346

On the issue of whether the criminal profiling testimony assisted the trier of fact, the

Court of Appeals stated that "the relevancy/admissibility analysis of novel scientific

evidence also requires that the expert's testimony assist the trier of fact to understand the

evidence or determine a fact in issue. If the subject of the testimony is within the

understanding of the jury, it is inadmissible. It appears that the main point made by expert

testimony in the instant case was well within the understanding of the average juror, as

demonstrated by the following colloquy on direct examination.,,347

Delivering the judgment, Justice Cacioppo, stated that the expert testimony was more

prejudicial than probative, and stated that:

The issues of timing and sudden panic are directly related

to the distinction between voluntary manslaughter and
murder. From the defendant's confession, a jury could
decide for themselves that he did not kill Fauver
immediately after discovering that he had been assaulted,
but that a period of time had elapsed in which he could
have "cooled off'. The use of expert testimony for this
purpose was improper; the prejudicial impact outweighed
probative value, as it tended to "sensationalize" the facts
348
and issues.

346
Id, at 3.
347
Id, at 4.

348 Id.

170
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that the testimony relating to "timing and panic

embraced the ultimate issue of intent to be decided by the jury. ,,349 It was also held that

the expert's testimony confused the issues and/or misled the jury, by setting up the

strawman argument. 350

Interestingly, the Court of Appeals also held that the admission of the expert testimony

violated Evid. R. 404(A)(l), regarding character evidence. Justice Cacioppo stated that

"in the instant case, Walter testified that the appellant's version of the killing and his

subsequent actions were classically typical of an anger-retaliatory murder. In fact, Walter

testified at great length and in great detail as to the traits and characteristics of such a type

of murderer, and found that the appellant's actions and motivations matched that

profile.,,351 Hence, "the possibility of stereotyping also brings up the possibility that

admission of the expert testimony violated Evid.R. 404(A)(1).,,352

The Court of Appeals further stated that since the defendant did not testify, he did not

put his character in issue. 353 The Court also stated that "Walter's testimony on anger-

retaliatory profile was laden with references to personality and character traits of the

349
Id.

350 Id.

351
Id, at 5.

352 Id.

353 Id.

171
accused that matched the profile of a deliberate killer. The testimony therefore, can be

considered inadmissible solely on the basis ofEvid.R. 404(A)(1).,,354

The Court also held that the expert testimony was inadmissible based on the hearsay rule.

Walter testified on cross-examination that he based his

opinion on police reports, the autopsy report, and
conversations with the prosecutor and the police. Only
the autopsy report was admitted into evidence. "Pursuant
to Evid.R. 703, an expert may not base his opinion on
hearsay but must rely upon his own personal knowledge
of facts and data submitted as evidence in the case." ...
The conversations Walter had with the police and the
prosecutor are clearly hearsay.355

The Court of Appeals therefore concluded that "there exists a reasonable possibility that

the admission of Walter's expert testimony contributed to the appellant's conviction, and

therefore the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable.,,356 Haynes's conviction was

therefore reversed and remanded for a new trial.

In State v. Roquemore,357 the opinion testimony of an offender profiler was ruled

inadmissible. It was seen to be impermissible character evidence. The court stated that

such testimony which stereotypes the defendant violates the Federal Rule of Evidence

404(A)(1).358 The defendant, Dennis Roquemore was convicted of two counts of rape

354 Id.

355 Id ,at 6 .

356
Id, at 7.
3~ .
State v. Roquemore, 85 OhIO App.3d 448, 620 NE.2d 110 (1993)
358
Id, at 115.

172
and one count of involuntary manslaughter by the Franklin County Court of Common

Pleas, Ohio. The defendant knew the victim (Yvonne Mathis) for ten years and they lived

together for one year in 1990. Roquemore claimed that on September 1, 1990, they both

went to a friend's house where they drank and socialized with other people and that on

their way back to their home, Mathis was angry because of certain jokes at the friend's

house. Roquemore claimed that later on he 'wrestled' with Mathis and they had 'rough'

sexual intercourse, and that afterwards he noticed that Mathis was unconscious. He also

claimed that "he attempted to revive her and then carried her into the bathroom and

placed her in the bathtub to run water over her. He began to panic and left the house.,,359

Roquemore further claimed that he then went to an ex-girlfriend's house but there was no

answer. He therefore, telephoned her and told her what happened and she called the

police. Roquemore said that the police went to the wrong house and he went to Alum

Creek Reservoir to kill himself but he could not, and then he went back to the house and

called the police.

At the trial, the State argued that Roquemore raped Mathis and that Mathis died as a

result of rape trauma. The State therefore, called a criminal profiler, Richard Walter, who

testified that his review of the crime scene, the crime scene photographs, police reports

and pathological reports showed that rape occurred. The main reason that the State called

the profiler was to give testimony on the crime scene assessment which will bolster their

argument that the defendant raped the victim and that the victim died as a result of heart

stoppage from the rape trauma. Walter testified that the crime scene showed patterns of

359
Id, at 112.

173
violent rape behavior. In his testimony, Walter stated that the crime scene fell into

patterns of known violent behavior that he had studied in the past. 360 It should be noted

that during cross-examination, Walter was asked if he was going to give an opinion on

whether rape occurred and he answered in the affirmative. 361

The defense argued that the expert's testimony should be excluded. The defendant

acknowledged that they had rough sex that night and that they have had rough sex in the

past, and that he did not rape Mathis. The State argued that Walter'$ testimony should be

admitted because he was testifying about the patterns of violent behavior that occurred,

and not to the conduct of the defendant. The State further presented the medical

examiner, who testified that Mathis's death was "related to the rectal and vaginal trauma

that she had suffered and subsequent, due to pain, emotional disability from this

abnormality, that she had sudden cardiac stoppage on the basis of a neurogenic response

to the trauma that she suffered and this caused her heart to stop beating and she

subsequently expired because it did not start beating again.,,362 The medical examiner

further stated that "if the nerve response had not occurred, the injuries received by the

victim would not have caused death.,,363

The expert's testimony was admitted. The defendant was convicted and he appealed.

Among other issues, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by admitting the

360 Id.

361
Id, at 113.
362
Id, at 112.

363 Id.

174
profile testimony. He argued that the testimony was inadmissible because it violated

Evid. R. 402, 403, and 703. Hence, he was denied due process of law. The defendant

also argued that the profile testimony was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial.

In its ruling, the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, held that even though the

expert's testimony was relevant, it ought to have been excluded because it violated other

evidence rules. Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Whiteside said: "the witness's

testimony appears to be relevant, since it indicates a pattern of violence and makes the

determination that a rape occurred more probable than without the evidence. However,

even though the evidence may be relevant, it must be excluded, since it conflicts with

other evidence rules which provide that it must be excluded. For example, excludable

hearsay is inadmissible because it is relevant but unreliable.,,364

Justice Whiteside went on to say that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 "establishes the

requirement that expert testimony is admissible only if it will assist the trier of fact. This

means that the expert testimony must have both a sufficient basis and a sufficient factual

foundation in the record that can reasonably be relied upon.,,365 Justice Whiteside

therefore, ruled that "although the witness stated that the assessment is probability based,

he does not keep files on all the cases he reviews (only approximately twenty-five percent

of them), nor does he keep statistics about them. He stated that he used statistics from

364
Id, at 1l3.

365 Id.

175
other sources, including the FBI, but there is no indication as to how he reaches his
·
conc1uSlOns. ,,366

Hence, the Court of Appeals held that "in this case, there is a distinct possibility of

stereotyping the defendant. The witness testified only concerning the "typical" crime

scene pattern and the "typical" violence associated with such a crime scene. The witness

did not interview or evaluate the defendant or "profile" a specific person. He profiles for

a type of person who would do a particular crime that has been assessed as a member of

that group. This stereotyping of the defendant has several problems. First, the

stereotyping can prejudice the jury.,,367 The Court therefore, ruled that assuming aguendo

that the testimony satisfied the relevancy requirement it must still be excluded if its

prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its probative value. 368 The Court concluded

that "these generalities and typical facts rather than specific facts tend to place the

defendant into a stereotype. ,,369

The Court of Appeals held that the profile testimony, which stereotypes the defendant

violated Evid. R. 404 (a)(l) on character evidence. The Court of Appeals restated the fact

that, "this rule does not allow the prosecution to procure testimony about character traits

of the defendant unless the defendant first put his character in issue in the case. In this

case, the witness discussed anger, revenge, hostility and difficulty in relationships with

366
Id, at 114.
367
Id,atl15.

368 Id.

369
Id.

176
women, all in relation to the motivational structure on which he classified this case. This

type of character evidence is inadmissible at least unless the defendant has first put his

character at issue and probably not even then.,,37o

Justice Whiteside further stated that the profile testimony has to be excluded as it is in

conflict with Evid. R. 703, which provides that "the facts or data in the particular case

upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by him or

admitted in evidence at the hearing.,,371 Justice Whiteside said:

In this case, the witness based his opinions on the crime

scene photos, the police reports and the pathological
report. When a direct opinion based solely on the police
report was about to be given, the court instructed the jury
not to accept or consider the opinion of this witness
based on the police report in this case. This instruction is
a curative one and we assume the jury followed the
instruction. However, to the extent any other opinions of
this witness, such as how he determined in which
classification these events belonged, were based on the
police report, these opinions are inadmissible based upon
Evid. R. 703, since the police reports were not admissible
.
mto eVl'd ence. 372

It was also held that "since the witness purported to base his opinion on his own "studies"

rather than upon an accepted scientific basis, the opinion testimony is not admissible.,,373

In the Court's view: "without the witness's testimony, the evidence admitted is far short

of being overwhelming of defendant's guilt. It may be reasonable to find either that a

370
Id, at 116.

371 Id.

372 Id.

373 rd.

177
rape did or did not occur that evening, but it is for the jury to decide which version of the

events to believe. The weight given to and the credibility of the witness are questions for

the trier of fact to determine .... There exists a reasonable possibility, actual probability,

that the witness's testimony contributed to the defendant's conviction, thereby

prejudicing him. This prejudice affected a substantial right and the error is not harmless.

Since admission of the opinion evidence was prejudicial error, defendant's first

assignment of error is well taken.,,374

The Court of Appeals therefore, reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the

case for further proceedings.

Offender profile evidence was also ruled to be impermissible character evidence in State

v. Parkinson,375 where sex offender profile testimony by a psychologist, and by a former

FBI agent, was ruled inadmissible. The experts offered expert opinion that the defendant

did not fit the profile of a sex offender. Kelly Parkinson was charged and convicted of

sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen. On March 28, 1992, Parkinson's niece,

E.F. (13 years) and her brother, B.F. (12 years), visited Parkinson and spent the night at

his house. The two children and their cousin slept in one of the bedrooms; E.F. slept in

the bed, while her brother and her cousin slept on the floor. It was reported that Parkinson

went into the bedroom where the three children were sleeping three times that night and

each time he sexually abused E.F. E.F. said that first, she woke up and found Parkinson

374 rd, at 117.

375 .
State v. Parkznson, 128 Idaho 29, 909 P2d 647(1996).

178
 376
rubbing her buttocks. About two hours later, Parkinson came back and was "rubbing

her breast and pulling at her nightgown.,,377 That Parkinson came back around 6.30 am

and again came to the bed and began rubbing her buttocks. E.F said that her brother B.F.

was awaken and was stirring at what was happening and Parkinson then left the bedroom.

E.F. then started crying and told her brother what happened that night. On March 31,

1992, they told their mother what happened and she called the police.

At the trial, Parkinson called two expert witnesses, Dr. Marcel Chappuis (a psychologist)

and Mr. Peter M. Welch (a former FBI agent). The defendant sought to introduce the

experts to testify that he did not fit the psychological profile of a sex offender, and

therefore, would not have committed the crime.

The trial judge denied the motion to introduce the testimony by the two experts. The trial

court stated that; (1) the profile evidence was offered to bolster Parkinson's credibility

and was thus impermissible because veracity is not a "fact in issue" subject to expert

opinion; (2) the evidence at issue would not assist the trier of fact to understand the

evidence; and (3) the expert opinion evidence would constitute a direct comment on the

guilt or innocence of Parkinson and replace, rather than aid, the jury's function.,,378 The

trial court also stated that an adequate foundation had not been made for the admission of

the testimony.379

376
Id, at 32.

317 Id.

378 Id.
379
Id, at 33.

179
Parkinson was convicted by the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Madison

County, Idaho. He appealed. Among many issues, the defendant argued that the trial

court erred by excluding the testimony by Dr. Chappuis and Mr. Welch. In its ruling, the

Court of Appeals of Idaho stated that there was no error in the exclusion of the testimony

by the two expert witnesses. Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Lansing stated

that "it was not error for a trial court to exclude from evidence testimony dealing with a

scientific theory for which an adequate foundation has not been laid.,,38o The Court of

Appeals held that there was no showing of the reliability of Dr. Chappuis' assessment

technique sufficient to meet standards for admission of the testimony under Rule 702. 381

"Dr Chappuis did not: describe the personality or psychological characteristics that made

up the profile; describe the methodology by which the profile was derived; state whether

or how the technique had been tested; describe the profile's level of accuracy in

distinguishing between offenders and non-offenders; or state whether the profile and the

assessment technique utilized by Dr. Chappuis had attracted widespread acceptance

within the psychological community.,,382 On Agent Welch's testimony, Justice Lansing

also stated that:

Mr. Welch's proffered testimony suffers from similar defects

in foundation. Mr. Welch acknowledged that the F.B.I. sex
offender profile which he utilized was developed for use by
law enforcement officials and that its application was more
of an art than science. He did not identify the components of
the profile or explain how it was developed, other than
noting that its development involved interviews with
convicted sex offenders. Mr. Welch did not state whether or

380 Id.

381
Id, at 35.

382 Id.

180
 how the resulting profile had been tested for accuracy or
identify the technique's error rate. Although Mr. Welch
testified that the profile is widely used in the law
enforcement community, it is not apparent whether that use
is primarily for devising profiles of perpetrators of unsolved
crimes or for the purpose for which it was offered in the
present case - to determine whether an accused identified by
the alleged victim did in fact commit the crime. In short, Mr.
Welch's testimony did not provide information from which it
could reasonably be ascertained that the profile technique
was trustworthy, that it was based upon valid scientific
principles, or that it could properly be applied in the manner
advocated by Parkinson. Therefore, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by excluding Mr. Welch's testimony.383

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

In Penson v. State,384 offender profiling testimony was also ruled to be impermissible

character evidence. Allen Wayne Penson was charged with burglary and two counts of

arson, for entering and setting fire to the Walker County Rescue Building and a vehicle.

The prosecution stated that a person carrying a sandy-colored bag and fitting the

description of the defendant was seen loitering near the building before the fire outbreak.

When the police went to search Penson's house, which was about 500 feet from the scene

of the arson, they found a sheet of notebook paper (which belonged to one of the

members of the rescue building). This member identified the sheet and stated that it must

have been taken by Penson at the time of the arson. A sandy-colored bag was also found

at Penson's house. Penson also had cuts and scratches on his arm.

383 Id.

384
Penson v. State, 222 Ga. App.253, 474 s.E.2d. 104 (Ga. 1996).

181
At the trial, the State introduced a State fire investigator, Ken Palmer, who testified as an

expert on arson. Palmer based his testimony on an FBI serial arsonist profile, titled

"Record on Essential Findings of the Study of Serial Arsonists.,,385 "Palmer testified that

serial arsonists share certain common characteristics including the following: white males

between 18-27, loners, educational failures, homosexuals, or bisexuals, history of

criminal activity, medical or mental problems, poor employment records, alcohol and

drug abuse, and dysfunctional family backgrounds. According to the profile, serial

arsonists are mainly walkers who set fires within two miles of their home and act on the

spur of the moment, usually for revenge.,,386

The defense raised an objection to this testimony. The defendant argued that the

prejudicial effect of the testimony far outweighed its probative value. The defendant also

contended that the testimony should be excluded because he was not charged as a serial

arsonist and that the profile was not used during the investigation. The motion to exclude

Palmer's testimony was denied. The trial judge however, instructed the State not to apply

the profile to the defendant, and that the expert should not give an opinion that the

defendant was a serial arsonist.

Penson called two witnesses. Daphne Young, who testified that Penson was at her

birthday party on the night of the arson. Jeffrey Cameron also testified that Penson was at

his house after the party and was there when they heard the fire alarm.

385
Id, at 106.
386
Id.

182
At the Walker Superior Court, Georgia, Penson was convicted of burglary and two counts

of arson and he appealed. The defendant argued that the trial judge erred by admitting the

FBI serial arsonist profile. The Court of Appeals of Georgia ruled that the trial court erred

by admitting the serial arsonist profile. In the opinion delivered by Justice Harold R.

Banke, it was held that the profile evidence was impermissible character evidence. Citing

Sanders v. State, 387 Justice Banke stated that:

Unless a defendant has placed his character in issue or

has raised some defense which the profile is relevant to
rebut, the state may not introduce character evidence
showing a defendant's personality traits and personal
history as its foundation for demonstrating the defendant
has the characteristics of a typical arsonist." ... In this
case, the profile did not rebut Penson's alibi defense that
he was attending a birthday party at the time the fire
originated or aid the jury in determining whether Penson
was at the birthday on the night of the fire. Nor had
Penson placed his character in issue. 388

Justice Banke further stated that "the trial court's directive to the State that it not apply

the serial arsonist profile to Penson was meaningless given the State's extensive

exploration of Penson's personal history and personality traits and the State's transparent

efforts to subtly correlate this information to the serial arsonist profile. Even before the

State's expert testified, the prosecutor acknowledged that certain seemingly irrelevant

exhibits would later become relevant in light of the profile. The admission of the serial

arsonist profile was plainly error, and Penson's conviction must be reversed unless it was

highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.,,389

387
Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 76 (3),303 SE.2d 13 (1983)
388
Penson v. State, 222 Ga. App.253, 474 SE.2d 104, 106 (Ga. 1996).

389 Id.

183
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. Justice Banke

stated that they were "unable to conclude that it is highly probable that the profile

evidence did not contribute to the verdict.,,39o

One thing about this case is that the prosecution did not have overwhelming evidence to

prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the decision to reverse the trial court's

judgment was warranted.

Finally, it should be noted that many states have statutes that provides additional

guidelines on the use of character evidence in cases involving sexual offenses. For

instance, the California Evidence Code provides that:

(a) Except as provided in this section and in sections 1102 and 1103, evidence of a

person's character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an

opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his of her

conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified

occasIOn.

(b) Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that a person

committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact

(such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,

absence of mistake or accident, or whether a defendant in a prosecution for an

unlawful sexual act or attempted unlawful sexual act did not reasonably and in

390
Id, at 107.

184
 good faith believe that the victim consented) other than his or her disposition to

commit such an act.

(c) Nothing in this section affects the admissibility of evidence offered to support or

attack the credibility of a witness. 391

Who is Qualified to give Expert Offender Profiling Testimony?

As we mentioned in chapter two, offender profiling is a multi-disciplinary practice.

Profilers come from different backgrounds, different academic areas, with varying

degrees of experience and knowledge. Hence, there is general disagreement amongst

scholars as to who is qualified to give offender profiling testimony. Ultimately, it is the

judge who decides who is qualified to give evidence. In United States, the Federal Rule

of Evidence 702 provides the guideline for the trial judges. Rule 702 states that:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will

assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods,
and (3) the witness has applied the principles and method
reliably to the facts of the case. 392

The problems with this Rule have been discussed in the previous chapter. The main

problem being the fact that the rule is too loose that almost everybody can qualify as an

391
CAL. EVID. CODE s 1101 (West. Supp. 1992).

392 Fed. Evid. R. 702.

185
expert, either by knowledge, skill, expenence, training, or education. There is no

acceptable professional body for profilers. This is as a result of the uneasy relationship

amongst profilers. Each segment thinks that offender profiling is their exclusive club.

Hence, it has been difficult for the different segments to come together as one and move

the field forward. Hence, the difficulty with establishing a professional body that will be

acceptable by all the different segments.

There are two issues to be borne in mind when discussing the question of who is qualified

to give expert profiling testimony. The first is the fact that offender profiling is a multi-

disciplinary practice that cuts across many disciplines. The second is the fact that the

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 has created a huge dilemma for trial judges. As trial

judges have been given the ultimate responsibility to decide who is qualified as an expert

testimony, we need to assist them in making that difficult decision. Allowing an

unqualified expert to give testimony will/may result in a reversal, plus other dangers

associated with that. Therefore, it is important to get it right from the onset.

Brunson v. State 393 is one of the cases that highlight the problem with admitting expert

testimony by an unqualified expert. This case also highlights the need to assist trial

judges in this regard. Furthennore, this case clearly reveals and supports my argument

that the Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is too loose, too liberal. In this case, the defendant,

Larry Darnell Brunson was charged with two counts of first-degree murder of his wife

(Gloria Brunson) and her lover (Frankie Shaw) in 1999. The State presented several

393
Brunson v. State, 349 Ark. 300, 79 S W3d 304 (2002)

186
witnesses - Gloria's children, law enforcement officers, Gloria's friends and co-workers.

The State also presented Barbara Ann Neiss, who was qualified by the trial court as an

expert on predictability that a batterer would become a murderer. 394 During her

testimony, Neiss stated that she is an expert on profiling batterers and can determine

when they are likely to tum into murderers. She testified that there are ten risk

factors/characteristics of these sorts of individuals. "She stated that she had taken the ten

risk factors from the work of a police officer, Anne O'Dell, who surveyed 70,000 cases

and assembled what she thought were ten warning signs that a domestic-violence

offender would commit murder.,,395 The article by Ms. O'Dell was entitled "Assessing

Whether Batterers Will Kill." Ms. Neiss used a three page summary of this article

prepared by an attorney, Barbara Hart, and obtained from an internet, in used it in her

testimony.396 Ms. Neiss testified that if more than three of the factors are met, then there

is an "incredible duty" to warn a woman of the threat to her safety.397 According to Neiss,

the ten risk factors are as follows:

(1) Threats of homicide against his spouse or children or threats of suicide.

(2) Fantasies of homicide or suicide.

(3) Depression.

(4) Access to weapons.

(5) Obsessive behavior about his wife or family.

(6) Centrality of the battered woman to the batterer's life.

394
Id.

395 Brunson v. State, 349 Ark. 300, 307, 79 S. W3d 304 (2002).

396
Id .

397 Id.

187
 (7) Rage against the battered woman.

(8) Drug or alcohol consumption

(9) Abuse of the battered woman's pet animal.

(10) Access to the battered woman. 398

Neiss gave her qualifications as:

(1) A bachelor's degree in political science and journalism.

(2) A master's degree in public administration.

(3) Studying for a second master's degree in social work.

(4) Have attended several seminars on domestic violence.

(5) Worked for one year with the Arkansas Commission on Child Abuse, Rape and

Domestic Violence.

(6) Almost three years employment as an Executive Director for Advocates for

Battered Women.

(7) Ten years voluntary work with the Battered Women's Shelter.

(8) Worked at a Mediation Center for battered women and their husbands.

(9) Other work experiences in the domestic violence center.

(10) That she had testified once in a circuit court, several times in a chancery court in

. orders, but not as an expert. 399

support 0 f protectIve

398 Id, at 307.

399
Id, at 306.

188
 Neiss testified that her analysis showed that the defendant met eight of these ten risk

factors. The defendant raised an objection to the admission of this testimony, arguing

that (1) Ms. Neiss was not qualified to render an opinion that he has the

characteristics of batterers who may eventually kill, (2) that the testimony embraced

the ultimate issue, and (3) that the testimony was unduly prejudicial.

In his ruling, Justice Berlin C. Jones, for the Circuit Court, Jefferson County,

Arkansas, qualified Ms. Neiss as an expert, and stated that "she was qualified under

Ark.R.Evid. 702, because she possessed specialized knowledge that would assist the

jury in understanding the evidence in this case.,,400 Neiss's testimony was admitted.

The defendant was convicted for the murders and sentenced to two terms of life

imprisonment.

The case reached the Supreme Court of Arkansas, where the defendant argued that

the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Neiss's testimony as an expert. That

the testimony placed him within the characteristics ofbatterers who kill, and therefore

it was unduly prejudicial. The defendant also argued that the testimony fell into the

ultimate issue.

Delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, Justice Robert L. Brown,

agreed with the defendant that Neiss was not qualified to render an expert opinion on

the predictability that a batterer will become a murderer. Justice Brown said:

400 Id.

189
 The State responds that Ms. Neiss's testimony was
helpful to the jury and thus, it qualifies as expert
testimony. Yet, in doing so the State only addresses one
facet of Rule 702 and never squarely addresses the other
facet of whether Ms. Neiss was qualified by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education to give an
opinion that was helpful to the jury. The problem we see
with the State's argument is that testimony may be
helpful to a jury but still may be properly excluded if that
testimony is offered by a person who is not qualified to
render the opinion. The trial court, in its ruling, appears
to have similarly conflated the issue of a person's
qualifications and the "helpfulness of the testimony".401

The Supreme Court, citing its prior decision in Dillion v. State,402 reiterated the fact

that "while a proffered expert's experience might have been beyond that of persons

who had no experience at all in the general area to which he would testify, it was not

error to refuse to qualify him as an expert when his knowledge was below the

standards of most recognized experts in the subject field.,,403

The Supreme Court also stated that:

We have no doubt that predicting human behavior, and

specifically whether a person has a proclivity to murder
based on certain risk factors, requires a highly
specialized psychological expertise. Ms. Neiss, while a
bona fide expert on domestic abuse, exceeded her
expertise by profiling batterers who kill and by
conveying to the jury that Brunson fell within that
profile. A case in point of Ms. Neiss testifying far
beyond her range of expertise was her conclusion that
Brunson suffered from depression - one of the ten risk
factors. Ms. Neiss did not possess the necessary

401 Id, at 310.

402 Dillion v. State, 317 Ark. 384, 394, 877 S. W 2d. 915, 920 (1994).
403
Brunson v. State, 349 Ark. 300, 310, 79 S. W 3d 304 (2002).

190
 psychiatric background to render such a diagnosis. The
trial court abused its discretion in qualifying her to so
testify.404

The Supreme Court further ruled that Neiss's testimony violated Rule 403 of the

Arkansas Rules of Evidence because its prejudicial effect far outweighed its probative

value, and also fell on the ultimate issue. 405

Justice Brown stated that "we believe that her testimony both mandated a conclusion

and was unduly prejudicial. After a description of each one of the ten risk factors

Mrs. Neiss borrowed from the article by Ms. O'Dell, the prosecutor elicited an

opinion from her regarding whether she thought that Brunson met the factors in this

case. For eight of the ten factors, Ms. Neiss answered affirmatively.,,406 "It is true that

the prosecutor did not ask Ms. Neiss specifically whether Brunson killed the victims.

Nevertheless, her profile about abusers-turned-murderers and Brunson in particular

placed Brunson squarely in the murderer category. This is particularly concerning,

since the State's only proof in this case was circumstantial and its theory centered

around Brunson's history of domestic abuse and his motive to kill an unfaithful wife

and her lover. Ms. Neiss's testimony, in effect, was clear indication to the jury that

Brunson was the culprit.,,407

404 Id.

405
Id, at 312.
406
Id.

407
Id .

191
 In reversing the judgment and conviction, the Supreme Court of Arkansas concluded

that "the profiling of batterers likely to become killers and then placing Brunson

within that category was unduly prejudicial to his case and, thus violated Rule

403.,,408

The above case has highlighted the problem that arises when profilers testify beyond

their expertise. This is because offender profiling is not well understood by many

people including judges. This is compounded by the fact that many criminal profilers

have what Professor Risinger and Loop described as "intimidating credentials from

the F.B.I.,,409 Judges and Jurors seem to be seduced by impressive qualifications. The

reliability of such testimony is thereby overlooked. Judges therefore, need

assistance/further guidelines when deciding to qualify a criminal profiler as an expert.

Professor Risinger and Loop have suggested that a pro filer with intimidating

credentials should "not be allowed to reveal his "pro filer credentials" to the jury

beyond saying that he had worked for many years for the FBI (or other organization)

as a specialist in the investigation of sexually driven crimes like rape and sexual

homicide, and that in the course of his career, both through research and through

involvement in actual cases, he or she had seen the details of many cases.,,410 Risinger

and Loop also maintained that "such a witness would only testify in regard to

408
Id, at 315.

409 Risinger and Loop, supra note 34, at 257.

410
Id, at 284.

192
 characteristics which In his expenence were truly rare In the type of crime

involved.,,411

In deciding whether an expert is qualified to give offender profiling testimony, it is

submitted that trial judges should first examine closely the purpose why the expert is

being called. From there the judge will have better idea as to whether such expert is

qualified in the area, assuming the testimony is relevant, and will assist the trier of

fact. For example, if an expert is needed on crime scene characteristics, or on modus

operandi, then a profiler with law enforcement background will be the best qualified

person in this area. If expert testimony is needed to show elements of motives and

fantasies, especially in sexual offenses, a forensic psychologist or a clinical

psychiatrist will be better placedlbest qualified to give testimony in this area. A

forensic psychiatrist, forensic psychologist or a criminologist is also better qualified

to give expert testimony on victimology. Similarly, a profiler with forensic science

background will be better placed to testify in cases where there were physical traces

and inferences can be drawn from them. However, as we suggested in chapter two, a

profiling team made up of the different segments provides the best alternative. In fact

this was the case in the early days when DNA profiling was being introduced into the

courtroom. Many experts, including geneticists, microbiologists, statisticians,

biologists, all came together, and courts began to accept DNA.

It is submitted that in all cases where offender profiling testimony is involved, the

trial judge should give a jury directive. The trial judge should inform the jury about

411 Id.

193
 the level of reliability and validity of offender profiling. This will assist them in

determining the weight (if any) to be accorded to the testimony.

Is Offender Profiling too Prejudicial than Probative?

As we mentioned earlier on, offender profiling is a technique based on probability,

suspicion, assumption and stereotypes. Stereotyping in particular creates prejudice.

Offender profiling involves creating a list of characteristics or character traits and

then an individual is placed within that category. This invariably leads judges and

jurors into reaching a certain conclusion. Hence, the prejudicial effect usually

outweighs its probative value.

Indeed as Professor Ormerod has pointed out, "profile evidence generates great

prejudice for the accused who possesses the stated characteristics, yet it is

insufficiently probative to point to the accused as being the guilty man rather than

someone who has the characteristics of the perpetrator.,,412 Professor Ormerod further

argued that:

This clear potential to generate great prejudice triggers

some familiar alarm bells. Jurors could choose to convict
a defendant who is a paedophile for that reason alone.
They may assign a disproportionate weight to the
evidence of the paedophilia, or deny the accused the
benefit of the doubt and convict on less than the full
standard of proof. There is also a very real and even

412 David C. Ormerod, "The Evidential Implications of Psychological Profiling", Crim. L. Rev. 873 (1996).

194
 more sinister danger: that the evidence of such traits
leads the police to "round up the usual suspects". If the
profiler relies on a statistic that, say, paedophiles who
murder are usually Caucasian and aged between 45 and
55, there is a risk that the police will only direct their
enquiries towards such people, therefore leading to
proportionally higher conviction rates of people who fit
the bill. This in tum feeds back into and distorts the
statistical data from which we began. 413

It has also been argued that "evidence of discreditable traits of the offender will be

transposed in the minds of the jury to the accused. We know that previous

convictions, or other discreditable conduct not amounting to a crime, also create in

the minds of the jury sinister prejudices.,,414 In fact "the most important of these

prejudices have recently been described as 'moral prejudice' and 'reasoning

prejudice' .,,415 Professor Ormerod concluded that the prejudicial effect of profile

evidence will in almost all cases substantially outweigh its limited probative value. 416

Courts are divided on this issue. While many courts have ruled that offender profiling

is too prejudicial and therefore inadmissible, many others believe that even if it is

prejudicial, that the prejudicial effect does not far outweigh its probative value. It is

submitted that the prejudicial effect of offender profiling far outweighs its probative

value and therefore, should be ruled inadmissible.

413 Id, at 874.

414David C. Ormerod., and Jim Sturman, "Working with the Courts: Advice for Expert Witnesses," in
Alison, L, (eds), The Forensic Psychologist's Casebook: Psychological Profiling and Criminal
Investigation, 185 (2005).
415
Id.
416
Ormerod, supra note 412, at 877.

195
 In State v. Roquemore,417 offender profiling testimony was ruled to be too prejudicial

to the accused. The Court of Appeals of Ohio stated that profile evidence is based on

generalities and typical facts, and that these generalities and typical facts tend to place

the defendant into a stereotype. 418 It was held that this stereotyping causes the jury to

be prejudiced. 419 Hence, jurors "could decide the facts based on typical, and not the

actual, facts.,,42o

Similarly, in Brunson v. State,421 the Supreme Court of Arkansas, ruled that "allowing

expert to give profiling testimony both improperly mandated a legal conclusion

before jury, and constituted prejudicial error.,,422 The Supreme Court of Arkansas

further stated that "even assuming that profile testimony is in some degree relevant to

the issues at trial, the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused has generally been

found to outweigh the probative value.,,423

In People v. Robbie,424 the Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California, also

held that rapist profile testimony resulted in unfair prejudice. Walter Vincent Robbie

417 State v. Roquemore, 85 Ohio App.3d 448, 620 NE.2d 110(1993).

418
supra at 172.

419 State v. Roquemore, 85 Ohio App. 3d 448, 620 N.E.2d Jl 0, Jl5 (1993).

420 Id.

421
supra at 186.
422
Brunson v. State, 349 Ark. 300, 79 S. W3d 304 (2002).
423
Id, at 314.
424 P eople v. RobbIe,
. 92 Cal.App.4 th 1075 (2002).

196
 was charged with and convicted by the Superior Court, Contra Costa County,

California, of kidnapping Jane Doe, for sexual purposes, oral copulation and

penetration with a foreign object. 425

At the trial, the defendant called witnesses who testified that he is an honest and non-

violent man. The defendant also called Jane's ex-boyfriend and Jane's three

classmates who testified that Jane was untruthful. Two other witnesses also testified

that Jane used drugs. On the other hand, the prosecution called Sharon Pagaling, a

special agent with the violent crime profiling unit, in the California Department of

Justice, to testify that the defendant's conduct was consistent with a certain type of

rapist (the type alleged in this case). The defense raised an objection to the admission

of this testimony. The defense argued that the testimony must be "limited to general

misconceptions about sex offenders, and that an expert cannot render an opinion as to

whether a defendant committed the charged crimes.,,426 Pagaling informed the court

that her testimony was "to disabuse the jury of common misconceptions about

conduct of a rapist. ,,427

The trial judge ruled that the testimony was admissible. It is noteworthy to point out

that during her testimony, Pagaling acknowledged the fact that the behaviors and

conduct that she stated were typical of rape cases, may also be found in non-rape

425 Id.

426 Id, at 1081.

427 Id.

197
 cases. Robbie was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate term of fifteen years

to life and he appealed.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Pagaling's testimony was profile evidence and that

profile evidence is generally inadmissible to prove guilt. Justice Corrigan, in the

opinion, stated that:

... profile evidence is inherently prejudicial because it

requires the jury to accept an erroneous starting point in
its consideration of the evidence. We illustrate the
problem by examining the syllogism underlying profile
evidence: criminals act in a certain way; the defendant
acted that way; therefore, the defendant is a criminal.
Guilt flows ineluctably from the major premise through
the minor one to the conclusion. The problem is the
major premise is faulty. It implies that criminals, and
only criminals act in a given way. In fact, certain
behavior may be consistent with both innocent and
illegal behavior, as the People's expert conceded here.

This flawed syllogism lay at the heart of Pagaling's

testimony. She was asked hypothetical questions
assuming certain behavior that had been attributed to the
defendant and was allowed to opine that it was the most
prevalent kind of sex offender conduct. The jury was
invited to conclude that if defendant engaged in the
conduct described, he was indeed a sex offender. 428

The Court of Appeals further stated that "profile evidence is unfairly relied upon to

affirmatively prove a defendant's guilt based on his match with the profile. The jury

is improperly invited to conclude that, because the defendant manifested some

characteristics, he committed a crime. ,,429 The Court ruled that the trial court erred by

428
rd, at 1085.

429 rd, at 1086.

198
 admitting the expert testimony. That profile evidence was inadmissible. It was held

that the erroneous admission of this testimony was not harmless. Therefore, the Court

of Appeals reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded for a new trial. In

reversing the judgment, the Court of Appeals stated that "given the highly prejudicial

nature of the expert's testimony and the prosecutor's argument, we must conclude

there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a result more

favorable to defendant had the court excluded Pagaling's testimony.,,43o

In the above cases, profile evidence was inadmissible because of its unfair prejudice.

However, in several cases, some courts have admitted such evidence even though it

was clear that the prejudicial effect far outweighed the probative value. For instance,

in United States v. Webb,431 expert testimony on modus operandi was admitted and

ruled not prejudicial. The United States District Court for the Central District of

California convicted Marty Webb of possession of ammunition by a felon. Following

an informant's tip off, the Los Angeles Law enforcement officers, on October 17,

1995 arrested the defendant. When the officers searched the defendant's car, they

found a loaded gun wrapped in a shirt and concealed in the car's engine

compartment. 432 Webb claimed that he did not know that the gun was there.

The State presented a police expert at the trial, who testified on modus operandi,

"regarding the reasons people typically hide guns in the engine compartment of

430 Id, at 1088.

431 United States v. Webb, 115 F.3d 711 (J 997).

432
Id, at 713.

199
 cars.,,433 The expert testified that people typically conceal guns in the engme

compartment of a car so that they have ready access to them, but police would not

easily find them and also to disclaim knowledge of the gun when the police find it.

The defendant objected to this testimony, arguing that it was improper and unduly

prejudicial and was also inadmissible based on the Evid.R. 704(b), which prohibits an

expert's opinion on the ultimate issue. The trial judge permitted the testimony and

stated that the police expert witness used the word "people" instead of the word

"criminals", hence it was not prejudicial. Furthermore, the trial judge ruled that the

expert did not give an opinion on whether the defendant knew that a gun was in his

car. Therefore, he ruled that the testimony was admissible. Webb was convicted and

he appealed.

At the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Webb contended that the trial

court erred by admitting the expert testimony. The defendant also argued that the

testimony ought to have been excluded because it was similar to a drug courier profile

evidence and also was an opinion on the ultimate issue. 434 The defendant also argued

that the trial court ought to have applied the Daubert criteria, which would have ruled

that the testimony was inadmissible because it was unreliable.

The Court of Appeals, through Justice Trott, ruled that the testimony on modus

operandi "was relevant to and probative of Webb's knowledge of the gun's presence.

433 Id.

434 Id.

200
 Moreover, the testimony explained evidence about the gun's whereabouts that easily

could have been beyond the knowledge of an average jurOr.,,435 Justice Trott further

stated that:

In addition, the trial court and the Government took

steps to mitigate the testimony's potential prejudicial
effect. The Government focused its questions on the
practices of "persons" rather than criminals or gang
members. Moreover, even if the jury drew the adverse
inference that Webb was a criminal, that inference
would not prejudice him because the jury already knew
that Webb was a criminal: Webb had stipulated that he
had been convicted of three prior felonies.

In light of the above, the district court properly

determined that the testimony'S prejudicial effect did
. 11 y outwelg
not substantla . h'ItS prob'
atlve va1ue. 436

On the defendant's contention that the testimony was similar to a drug courier profile

evidence, the Court of Appeals ruled that "none of the expert testimony in this case

was admitted to demonstrate that Webb was guilty because he fit the characteristics

of a certain drug-courier profile. Instead, the expert testimony was properly admitted

to assist the jury in understanding the reasons why a person would conceal a weapon

in the engine compartment of a car.,,437 Justice Trott also stated that the testimony did

not violate Evid.R. 704(b) which prohibits expert opinion on the ultimate issue.

The Court of Appeals further ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion

by not applying the Daubert criteria in this case. It was held that "because the expert

435 Id.

436
Id,at715.

437 Id.

201
 testimony in this case constitutes specialized knowledge of law enforcement, not

scientific knowledge, the Daubert standards for admission simply do not apply.,,438

The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

admitting the testimony on modus operandi and therefore, affirmed the judgment of

conviction. It should be noted that this case took place before the United States

Supreme Court decision in Kumho Tire Co. in 1999, where it was held that the

Daubert criteria applied to all forms of expert testimony.

In Simmons v. State,439 offender profile testimony by a crime scene analyst was also

ruled not prejudicial. In this case, Clarence Leland Simmons was convicted of

intentional murder and capital murder by the Circuit Court, Jefferson County,

Alabama. On January 3, 1996 the nude body of a sixty-five year old woman (M.A.)

was discovered by a security guard at Highland Manor Apartments in Alabama. The

security guard, Alma Underwood, was instructed by the victim's daughter to check on

her because she had not heard from her and was worried. When the police arrived,
44o
they discovered that M.A. had been stabbed to death and disemboweled. Police

investigation revealed that the last person seen with the victim was the defendant and

he was arrested for the murder.

438
Id,at716.

439 Simmons v. State, 797 So.2d 1134 (Ala. 2000).

440
Id, at 1147.

202
 A piece of human tissue found on Simmon's pants was analyzed and the DNA from

the tissue matched M.A. 's blood sample.,,441 Several items were also collected from

the defendant's home. The autopsy was carried out by Dr. Robert Brissie.

According to Dr. Brissie, M.A's body had been cut by the

offender from the upper part of the abdomen, down the
front of the abdomen, down across the pubic bone, with
several extensive slicing wounds between the legs, then
upward on the back of M.A's buttocks, to the back.
Additionally, M.A. had been stabbed 73 times; these stab
wounds were approximately an inch and half in depth and
had marks indicating that the knife used to stab M.A. had a
hilt. He testified that six of these incised wounds extended
across the front ofM.A's neck. Many of these wounds had
been inflicted before M.A. died and, according to Dr.
Brissie, were probably intimidation wounds and not fatal.
Twenty-three of these wounds were concentrated in the
chest area, at least five of these wounds did not penetrate
the chest cavity and Dr. Brissie opined that some of these
wounds were inflicted while M.A. was alive. 442

Dr. Brissie also testified that "most of M.A's internal organs had been removed from

her body. Her left lung was separated into two pieces; her spleen and liver had been

cut; most of her large and small intestines were missing.,,443

At the trial, the State called several witnesses. First, Jack Neely testified that he met

the defendant and the victim the day before her murder at the South Place Pool Hall,

where he had an argument with the defendant and that the defendant threatened to cut

him into pieces. Loretta Chambers, a bartender at the Pool Hall, also testified that she

witnessed the confrontation and that Simmons was with the victim on that day

441 Id, at 1148.

442
Id.

443 Id.

203
 (January 2, 1996). Betty Harper also testified that she saw Simmons and M.A. getting

into the elevator at M.A's apartment on January 2, 1996. Jerry Trousdale and Alma

Underwood who were the maintenance person and security guard at the apartment

building respectively, also testified that they saw Simmons enter the apartment with

M.A. the day before her murder and that Simmons was the last person seen with M.A.

In order to bolster their claim that the defendant should be convicted of capital

offense of murder committed during sexual assault, the prosecution decided to call

FBI agent Thomas Neer, who testified that the crime scene analysis showed that the

murder was sexually motivated. Neer was qualified by the trial court as an expert on

crime scene analysis and victimology. Neer testified that his analysis of the crime

scene and the autopsy report showed that the "offense was sexually motivated and

that the person who committed the offense did so for sexual gratification.,,444 The

defendant raised an objection to the admission of this testimony but it was denied.

Simmons was convicted of intentional murder and capital murder and sentenced to

death by electrocution. He appealed. Among other claims, the defendant argued that

the admission of Neer's testimony by the trial court was error. The defendant argued

that Neer's testimony was a novel scientific evidence and therefore, failed to meet

Frye criteria, which required such testimony to have gained general acceptance in the

444
rd, at 1150.

204
 relevant scientific community.445 The defendant also contended that the testimony

was unduly prejudicial and violated the ultimate issue rule.

In its ruling, the Court of Appeals of Alabama disagreed with the appellant.

Delivering the opinion, Justice Fry said:

We reject Simmon's argument that Neer's testimony

was based on novel scientific evidence. Crime scene
analysis and victimology do not rest on scientific
principles like those contemplated in Frye; these fields
constitute specialized knowledge. Specialized
knowledge offers subjective observations and
comparisons based on the expert's training, skill, or
experience that may be helpful to the jury in
understanding or determining the facts. Crime scene
analysis which involves the gathering and analysis of
physical evidence, is generally recognized as a body of
specialized knowledge. ... Therefore, because crime
scene analysis is not scientific evidence, we conclude
that we are not bound by the test enunciated by Frye. 446

Justice Fry further stated that Rule 702, Ala.R.Evid., was the proper standard for

admitting Neer's testimony. Justice Fry went on to say that:

Alabama Rule of Evidence 702 is identical to the

Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Fairness to a party
seems to dictate that before evidence based on
specialized knowledge can be admitted against a party
at trial, the party is entitled to a determination that the
specialized knowledge is reliable and that it is relevant
to a material issue. Once the trial court determines that
the testimony involves a legitimate specialized
knowledge, that the witness is an expert in that field,
and that the expert testimony would assist the jury, a
party's rights are adequately protected by the ability to

445
Id.

446 Id, at 1151.

205
 subject witnesses to cross-examination and to attack
the basis and methods used in developing the opinion.

Therefore, with the principles enunciated in Daubert

and Kumho in mind, we must determine whether the
fields of victimology and crime-scene analysis
constitute reliable specialized knowledge; whether
Neer is an expert within these fields; and whether the
subject matter of his testimony is relevant and assists
the trier of fact in this case. 447

"During defense counsel's cross-examination of Neer, Neer testified that crime-scene

analysis of homicides that appear to be sexually motivated began developing as a

specialized field in the late 1970s and that the research has been published within the

field and subjected to peer review. Neer established the general acceptance of

victimology when he testified that numerous law enforcement agencies relied upon

crime-scene analysis and victimology when conducting their investigations. Neer

detailed the theories supporting crime scene analysis and victimology, the way the

theories are applied by others with the same "specialized knowledge," and the way

the specialized knowledge was applied in this particular case. He further explained

the method in which he conducted his investigation and the factors considered in

reaching his determination. We recognize that through interviews, case studies, and

research a person may acquire superior knowledge concerning characteristics of an

offense. Thus, based on the record before us, adequate evidence was presented to

establish the reliability of crime-scene analysis and victimology as fields of

specialized knowledge. 448

447
rd, at 1154.
448
rd, at 1155.

206
 The Court of Appeals further held that "the jury in this case was presented with a

homicide trial at which no eyewitnesses testified. M.A.'s body was discovered in a

horrifying, mutilated condition. The method and motivation for killing an elderly

female presented serious questions for the jury to resolve. Whether the offender

received sexual gratification while committing the offense was a critical issue of the

case, and Neer's testimony was probative on that issue. Inferences had to be drawn

from the physical evidence presented at the crime scene. Neer offered observations of

the crime scene and the elderly female victim that would assist the jury in evaluating

the circumstances surrounding the murder and the reasons for the method employed

by the offender. "A homicide and its crime scene, after all, are not matters likely to be

within the knowledge of an average trier of fact" (United States v. deSoto, 885 F.2d

354,359 (i h Cir.1989). ,,449

In a nutshell, the Court of Appeals ruled that the expert testimony assisted the jury

and so its admission by the trial court was not error. The Court also ruled that the

testimony was more probative than prejudicial, and did not violate the ultimate rule

issue. The Court of Appeals stated that "in this case, Neer frankly conceded the

limitations of his testimony. He unequivocally testified that he was not saying that

Simmons committed the murder, only that in his opinion the physical evidence from

the crime scene and from M.A.' s body indicated that the offense itself was sexually

motivated. Neer did not reach a "diagnosis" of sexual abuse and certainly did not

449 Id, at 1156.

207
 identify the offender; thus, we do not perceive Neer's testimony as testimony on the

ultimate issue. ,,450

Justice Fry concluded that even if the admission of the expert testimony was error, it

would still be ruled as harmless error. 451 The Court of Appeals affirmed the death

sentence on the capital murder charge, but "remanded with directions as to sentencing

for count 111; and reversed as to conviction and sentence imposed pursuant to count

11. ,,452

This case clearly demonstrates my argument that the outcome of any trial involving

offender profiling testimony to a great extent is determined by the admissibility

standard applied by the trial court. In this case, the Court of Appeals stated that Rule

702 Ala. R.Evid., was the appropriate standard and applied it in this case. On the

other hand, the defendant/appellant contended that the Frye test standard, which

presumably would have excluded the testimony, was the proper standard that ought to

have been applied. In this case, the reliability of the testimony seems to have been

loosely interpreted by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The Courts

placed more emphasis on relevance and assistance to the trier of fact, without much

enquiry into whether the basis of such testimony was generally accepted by the

relevant community. The trial court particularly believed that crime scene analysis

450 Id, at 1158.

451 Id.

452 Id.

208
 and victimology were reliable because "numerous law enforcement agencies relied

upon crime-scene analysis and victimology when conducting their investigations.,,453

This is a dangerous basis to guage the reliability of any technique. The trial court

simply took the expert's words ipse dixit and seemed to have been seduced by Neer's

impressive qualifications. The usefulness of a technique in assisting in crime

investigation should not be taken as an indication that the technique will be

sufficiently reliable as to be admissible in the courtroom.

State v. Sorabella 454 contrasts with the above case. In Sorabella, the court recognized

the fact that profile evidence is prejudicial, but believed that the prejudicial effect can

be minimized by limiting the scope of the testimony. In January 2000, the New

Britain Police Department, in Connecticut, decided to launch an undercover operation

in an attempt to stop the increased violations of the state's child pornography laws via

the internet. Detective James Wardwell was one of the detectives assigned to the

operation, and on January 4, 2000, he logged onto the America Online (AOL) chat

room and posed as a thirteen year old girl, under the screen name "Danutta333. 455 He

received an instant message from a man with a screen name - "JoSkotr.,,456 They

started to exchange instant messages during which "JoeSkotr" asked the thirteen year

old girl to meet up with him for sexual relations, telling the girl how she should dress

and what he wanted her to do to him and vice versa. He told the girl that he lived in

453 Id, at 1155.

454
State v. Sorabella, 277 Conn. 155, 891 A.2d 897 (2006).
455
Id, at 163.
456
Id.

209
 Massachusetts but will come to Connecticut to meet her at a donut shop. "JoeSkotr"

sent pornographic materials to the girl within this time. On March 8, 2000, they

agreed to meet up at a donut shop, but "JoeSkotr" went to the wrong shop. He

arranged another meeting on March 14, 2000 at a shopping mall. On arrival at the

shopping mall, he was arrested by the police.

"JoeSkotr" was identified as John Sorabella, and he was charged with (1) two counts

of attempt to commit sexual assault in the second degree, (2) two counts of attempt to

commit risk of injury to a child by sexual contact, (3) three counts of attempt to

commit risk of injury to a child, (4) one count of attempt to entice a minor to engage

in sexual activity, (5) one count of importing child pornography, and (6) one count of

. 457
ob scemty.

At the trial, the State called Kenneth Lanning, a former FBI agent, who testified that

the defendant possessed the psychological and behavioral characteristics of child sex

offenders. In his testimony, Lanning stated that Sorabella falls under the category of

sex offenders called "preferential offenders". Lanning testified that there are what he

referred to, as the "customs and habits" of preferential sex offenders and situational

458
sex offenders.

According to Lanning, situational sex offenders take

advantage of opportunistic situations to engage in sex
offenses and are typically thought-driven, undertaking
action without consideration of getting caught. Lanning

457 rd, at 160.

458
rd, at 212.

210
 testified further that preferential sex offenders are
individuals who have specific sexual preferences for
certain activities or victims and whose behavior is
normally need-driven or fantasy-driven. Preferential
sex offenders typically collect pornography, erotica and
mementos relating to their sexual interest or preference
and spend a great deal of time and money in fulfilling
their sexual needs or fantasies. With respect to
preferential sex offenders with an interest in children,
they may use child pornography to rationalize
abhorrent behavior, fuel and reinforce their sexual
arousal or lower a potential victim's inhibitions by
conveying the message that other children are doing it.
Preferential sex offenders typically will engage in a
prolonged and elaborate grooming or seduction process
that is designed to exploit and manipulate vulnerable
children. Preferential sex offenders may lessen the
grooming time by targeting a child who is sexually
experienced. 459

The defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony, but it was denied.

The defense counsel argued that the State failed to demonstrate the admissibility of

the testimony as required in the decision in State v. Porter,460 when a scientific

evidence is being presented. The defense also argued that the testimony should not be

admitted because of its prejudicial effect. Denying the motion, the trial court stated

that Lanning's testimony was not scientific, and so Porter does not apply. However,

the court instructed the expert to limit his testimony only to 'customs and habits' of

preferential sex offenders. That the expert should not state his opinion on the

459 Id, at 213.

460 State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57,698 A.2d 739 (1997). Cert.denied, 523 US1058, 118 SCt. 1384, 140
L.Ed. 2d 645 (1998).

211
 defendant's state of mind or whether he fits the characteristics of the preferential sex

offenders. 461

The trial court admitted the testimony and stated that its probative value outweighed

its prejudicial effect. The trial court also stated that the testimony was relevant to "the

defendant's intent in engaging in the behavior, his belief as to the age of Danuta333

and whether his conduct was corroborative of his purpose as at least the start of a line

of conduct leading naturally to the crime.,,462

The defendant was convicted by the jury on all counts and was sentenced to ten years

imprisonment, execution suspended after five years, and fifteen years probation. 463

The defendant appealed and the case reached the Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Among other issues, the defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by

not subjecting Agent Lanning's testimony to a Porter hearing. The defendant also

argued that the prejudicial effect of the testimony far outweighed its probative value.

The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the lower court's judgment and stated

that the expert testimony was not scientific. Therefore, a Porter hearing was not

required. The Supreme Court stated that:

The trial court reasonably concluded that Lanning's

testimony was relevant and likely to assist the jury in

461
State v. Sorabella, 277 Conn. 155,212,891 A.2d 897 (2006).

462 Id.

463 Id, at 162.

212
 light of the nature of the charges and Lanning's
experience and expertise in matters relating to the
victimization of children. The court also carefully
evaluated the potential prejudicial effect of the testimony
and reasonably concluded that its probative value
outweighed any such effect. Moreover, the court guarded
against the possibility of undue prejudice by limiting the
scope of Lanning's testimony to 'customs and habits' of
preferential sex offenders in general and by prohibiting
Lanning from expressing any opinion either about the
defendant's mental state or about whether the defendant
fit the profile of a preferential sex offender. We
conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that the probative value of
Lannin~s' testimony outweighed any prejudicial
44
effect.

The Supreme Court of Connecticut therefore, affinned the judgment of conviction.

Is Offender Profiling an Opinion on the Ultimate Issue?

First, what is ultimate issue rule? The Ultimate Issue Rule is a rule which prohibits an

expert, lay or expert, from giving an opinion on an issue of law or fact which is for

the court to decide. Hence, "ultimate issues in criminal trials may be defined as the

ultimate, sometimes called material facts which must be proved by the prosecution

beyond reasonable doubt before a defendant can be found guilty of a particular

offence and those facts, if any, which must be proved by the defendant in order to

avoid guilt for that offence. ,,465 All witnesses are barred from testifying on the

464 Id, at 217.

465 Colin Tapper, Cross and Tapper on Evidence, 551 (1995).

213
 ultimate issue to be decided by the court, which is the issue of guilt or innocence.

Testifying on the ultimate issue is seen as usurping the function of the trier of fact, an

invasion of the province/ken of the jury.

The ultimate issue rule has faced a lot of criticism. McCormick was very critical of

the ultimate issue rule. He maintained that "this general rule is unduly restrictive, is

pregnant with close questions of application, and often unfairly obstructs the party's

presentation of his case.,,466 McCormick further argued that "even the courts which

profess adherence to the rule fail to apply it with consistency. All such courts, for

example, disregard the supposed rule, usually without explanation as to why it should

not be applied, when value, sanity, handwriting and identity are in issue.,,467

Wigmore also maintained that the phrase "usurping the function of the jury" is "a

mere bit of empty rhetoric." He contended that:

There is no such reason for the rule, because the witness,

in expressing his opinion, is not attempting to "usurp"
the jury's functions; nor could if he desired. He is not
attempting it, because his error (if it were one) consists
merely in offering to the jury a piece of testimony which
ought not to go there; and he could not usurp it if he
would, because the jury may still reject his opinion and
accept some other view, and no legal power, not even the
judge's order, can compel them to accept the witness'
. . agamst
opmIOn . th' elf own. ,,468

466 McCormick, supra note 217, at 26.

467
Id .

John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, volume 7, revised by James H. Chadbourn, s
468
1920,18 (1978).

214
 "Furthermore, the rule if carried out strictly and invariably would exclude the most

necessary testimony. When all is said, it remains simply one of those impracticable

and misconceived utterances which lack any justification in principle.,,469

Friedland et al argued that the ultimate issue rule "often made it unreasonably

difficult for advocates to present their cases, forcing the witnesses into verbal

contortions to avoid the disfavored magic phrasing.,,47o Similarly, Jackson maintained

that the "the rule is superfluous and that cases which have recently excluded evidence

on the grounds of the rule can be supported on other grounds.,,471 Keane also argued

that "the objection of undue influence makes no allowance for cases in which the

tribunal of facts is a professional judge rather than a jury, overlooks the frequency of

conflicts in expert testimony and is largely incompatible with the very justification for

admitting expert evidence, that the drawing of inferences from the facts in question

calls for an expertise which the tribunal of facts does not possess. ,,472

Following the criticisms, the ultimate Issue rule has been abolished in many

jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions added certain exceptions to the rule. In United

States, the Federal Rule of Evidence 704 provides the guideline on the ultimate issue.

The Rule states that:

469 Id.

470 Friedland, Bergman and Taslitz, supra note 175, at 262.

471 J. D. Jackson, "The Ultimate Issue Rule: One Rule Too Many," Crim. L.R. 75 (1984).

472 Adrian Keane, The Modern Law of Evidence, 407 (1985).

215
 Rule 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue

(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or

inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate

issue to be decided by the trier of fact.

(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a

defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the

defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of

the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier

of fact alone. 473

Courts have been inconsistent with their decisions on the ultimate issue when it

comes to offender profiling evidence. In some cases, offender profile evidence has

been ruled inadmissible based on the ultimate issue, while in many others, it has been

seen as not an opinion on the ultimate issue.

In State v. Armstrong,474 the Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit, ruled that

expert testimony regarding the "psychological dynamics" of the defendant was

"inadmissible expression of opinion as to defendant's innocence." Craigory A.

Armstrong was charged with aggravated rape of his eight year old cousin. On the day

of the rape, the girl was sleeping in her mother's house, when the defendant (who

also lived there), raped her. The victim told her twelve year old sister about the rape

473 Fed.Evid.R. 704.

474
State v. Armstrong, 587 So.2d 168 (La. 1991).

216
 but they did not tell their mother. It was reported that two days later, the girl

complained of stomach cramps and was taken to Dr. Gregory Molden's clinic. The

medical tests showed that the girl had gonorrhea. Dr. Molden therefore, contacted the

child protection bureau of New Orleans Police Department. Interviews with the

victim and her sister revealed the rape and Armstrong was arrested.

During police interrogation, Armstrong admitted having sexual intercourse with the
475
eight year old girl, but claimed that the girl initiated it. He also claimed that he

once had gonorrhea, but thought that it had been cured. At trial, he called three

witnesses who attested to his credibility. He also called a clinical psychologist who

testified that his "psychological dynamics would not support the view of him being a

child sexual perpetrator.,,476

The prosecution objected to the admission of this testimony. In its ruling, the

Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans, excluded the testimony. Justice George v.

Perez stated that "the testimony of Armstrong's expert would have been an

expression of opinion as to Armstrong's innocence.,,477 The petit jury convicted

Armstrong of forcible rape and he was sentenced to twenty-five years, at hard

labor. 478 He appealed his conviction and contended that (1) the trial court erred by

excluding the testimony by the clinical psychologist which showed that he did not

475 Id, at 169.

476 Id, at 170.

477 Id.

478 Id, at 169.

217
 have the 'psychological dynamics' of child sex offenders; (2) that the trial court also

erred by making his confession known to the jury.

The Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit, ruled that the exclusion of expert

testimony by the clinical psychologist was not error. The Court of Appeals stated that

under the Louisiana Code of Evidence Art.704, regarding opinion on ultimate issue,

that "an expert shall not express an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the

accused.,,479 Delivering the judgment, Justice Ward said: "In this case, where the

expert would give an opinion as to the innocence of Armstrong, the trial court did not

abuse that discretion. As a matter of fact, that testimony was not admissible.,,48o The

Court of Appeals therefore, affirmed the trial court's judgment and sentence.

Other cases where profile testimony was ruled inadmissible based on the ultimate

issue include State v. Haynes,481 where it was held that:

The testimony as to timing and panic embraced the

ultimate issue of intent to be decided by the jury. Under
Evid.R. 704, "opinion testimony on an ultimate issue is
admissible if it assists the trier of the fact, otherwise it
is not admissible. The competency of the trier of the
fact to resolve the factual issue determines whether or
not the opinion testimony is of assistance." For this
reason, an ultimate issue opinion by an expert should
be excluded in extreme cases where that opinion IS
482
inherently misleading or unduly prejudicia1.

479 Id, at 170.

480
Id.
481
supra at 167.

482 State v. Haynes, 1988 WL 99189, 3, 4 (Ohio App. 9 Dist.).

218
 Similarly, in State v. Parkinson,483 the Court of Appeals of Idaho ruled that the

admission of expert testimony on sex offender profiles was an opinion on the ultimate

issue. The Court of Appeals upheld a trial court's ruling that "the expert opinion

evidence would constitute a direct comment on the guilt or innocence of Parkinson

and replace, rather than aid, the jury's function.,,484

The Supreme Court of Arkansas in Brunson v. State 485 also ruled that expert

testimony on the predictability of batterers who would become murderers was an

opinion on the ultimate issue. In this case, The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that

the "profile testimony both mandated a conclusion and was unduly prejudicial.,,486

It should be noted however, that in United States v. Webb,487 the United States Court

of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, ruled that expert testimony on modus operandi, regarding

the reasons why people conceal weapons in the engine compartment of cars was not

impermissible opinion on the ultimate issue. In this case, the United States Court of

Appeals said:

Webb next argues that the expert testimony was

inadmissible because it constitutes testimony on his state
of mind, in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b).
Rule 704(b) prohibits an expert from stating his opinion

483
supra at 178.

484 State v. Parkinson, 1281daho 29, 32, 909 P.2d 647, 650 (1996).
485
supra at 186.

486 Brunson v. State, 349 Ark. 300, 312, 79 S. W 3d 304 (2002).

487
supra at 199.

219
 on the ultimate issue of whether a defendant had the
particular mental state at issue.

The expert in this case described a typical situation, and

never offered any opinion about whether Webb knew the
weapon was hidden in his car. The expert testified about
a typical way people conceal weapons in cars and the
typical reasons for their concealment. In fact, on cross-
examination, the expert admitted that he had no
information that Webb knew the weapon was in the
engine compartment. Under these circumstances, it was
left to the jury to determine whether Webb knew the gun
was hidden in the car. Thus, the expert did not give an
impermissible opinion under Rule 704(b).488

In Simmons v. State,489 expert testimony by an FBI agent that the crime scene

characteristics indicated that the murder was sexually motivated and so the offender

received sexual gratification from the acts was ruled not a violation of the ultimate

issue rule. The court said: "in this case, Neer frankly conceded the limitations of his

testimony. He unequivocally testified that he was not saying that Simmons committed

the murder, only that in his opinion the physical evidence from the crime scene and

from M.A. 's body indicated that the offense itself was sexually motivated. Neer did

not reach a "diagnosis" of sexual abuse and certainly did not identify the offender;

thus we do not perceive Neer's testimony as testimony on the ultimate issue.,,49o

In the final analysis, it does appear that ultimate issue is in-built in all forms of

offender profile evidence. By that we mean that no matter how or which form or

shape offender profile is being presented, there is the over-lapping tendency to touch

488 United States v. Webb, J15 F.3d 7J1, 715 (1997).

489
supra at 202.

490 Simmons v. State, 797 So.2d 1134, 1158 (2000).

220
on the ultimate issue. Offender profile testimony and its derivatives are generally

geared towards one thing - pointing to the accused as being either guilty or innocent.

In effect, profile evidence is a 'leading' evidence. It leads to a certain conclusion. It

should be noted however, that with appropriate jury instruction by the trial judge, this

problem can at least be minimized. The trial judge should in all cases, limit the scope

of the testimony and remind the witnesses of their role to testify and not to decide the

case. We are in support of the ultimate issue rule, at least in cases involving offender

profiling, as without it witnesses will go beyond their function to assist with their

testimony, and extend their role into that of final arbiters. The result will then be a

trial by witnesses rather than trial by judges and jurors.

Is Offender Profiling Sufficiently Reliable as to be Admissible?

Offender profiling is not sufficiently reliable as to be admissible. Offender profiling

involves gathering information from various sources - from the crime scene,

witnesses, victim statements, autopsy reports, offender's physical characteristics, age,

race, criminal records, and so on. The question then is - how reliable is information

gathered in this manner/from these sources? Should it be tendered in court as an

indication or proof of guilt or innocence? Offender profiling does not point to specific

offenders. It cannot determine that a given defendant committed a specific act.

Offender profiling only predicts, it suggests, but it cannot prove. We should also bear

in mind the problem posed by crime scene 'staging', which could lead to profiling

221
 being based on inaccurate crime scene analysis. Fundamentally, offender profiling is

very useful in narrowing down the suspects during crime investigation, but it has not

reached the level of reliability necessary for courtroom use. The modus operandi of

offenders may assist judges and jurors in understanding the behavioral patterns in

some cases, but that alone is not a sufficient basis to warrant its admission in court,

nor is that an adequate proof that the technique is reliable.

Many scholars agree that offender profiling is not a reliable technique. It is a

technique whose foundation or scientific basis cannot be ascertained at the moment.

Godwin maintained that, "Nine out often profiles are vapid. They play at blind man's

bluff, groping in all directions in the hope of touching a sleeve. Occasionally they do,

but not firmly enough to seize it, for the behaviourists producing them must

necessarily deal in generalities and types. But policemen can't arrest a type. They

require hard data: names, dates, none of which the psychiatrists [or others involved in

creating profile evidence] can offer.,,491

Alison et al noted that "there remains no evidence that the scientific community has

accepted the technique as an accurate or reliable indicator of identification of an

offender. Therefore, it would probably not be surprising to learn that police officers

remain relatively unaware of the benefits and limitations of profiling and of the ways

491 Godwin, 1., Murder USA: The Ways We Kill Each Other, 276 (1978).

222
 in which they should or should not be utilized. It is incumbent upon the profi1er to

outline the expectations that officers had of the account.,,492

Professor Risinger and Loop maintained that "while still a valuable investigatory tool

perhaps, the existing data does not indicate that process of offender profiling results

in sufficiently reliable information to support evidentiary admissibility.,,493

On a similar vem, Professor Ormerod and Sturman maintained that "the

psychological profile has serious limitations: it is practiced in an inconsistent manner,

often from unverified base of material by a body of individuals with diverse levels of

training and experience, and inadequate independent monitoring and review.,,494

They concluded that "psychologists face the struggle of demonstrating the reliability

of the technique and of the people who practice it.,,495

Snook et a1 carried out a narrative review of 130 articles on criminal profiling and

meta-analytic reviews and concluded that criminal profiling "appears at this juncture

to be an extraneous and redundant technique for use in criminal investigations.,,496

They also concluded that criminal profiling "will persist as a pseudoscientific

492 Alison, L., West, A, and Goodwill A, "The Academic and the Practitioner Pragmatists' Views of
Offender Profiling", 10 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 78 (2004).

493 Risinger and Loop, supra note 34, at 252.

494
Ormerod and Sturman, supra note 414, at 191.

495 Id.

496Brent Snook., Joseph, Eastwood., Paul Gendreau., Claire Goggin., and Richard M. Cullen, "Taking
Stock of Criminal Profiling: A Narrative and Meta-Analysis", Criminal Justice and Behavior, vol. 34, No.
4,437,448 (2007).

223
 technique until such time as empirical and reproducible studies are conducted on the

abilities of large groups of active profilers to predict, with more precision and greater

magnitude, the characteristics of offenders.,,497

As we stated in chapter three, the rules guiding the admissibility of expert testimony

in United States, emphasize the reliability of any expert evidence. Yet, in many cases

involving offender profiling the reliability of the technique was not questioned, as in

State v. Pennell. 498 However, some courts agree that offender profiling is unreliable

and have ruled it inadmissible.

In State v. Cavallo 499 for instance, the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated that the

technique is not generally accepted as being reliable. In this case, two defendants,

Michael Cavallo and David R. Murro were convicted of rape, abduction and private

lewdness. On June 16, 1977 the two defendants met the victim (S.T.) at the Pittstown

bar in Hunterdon, New Jersey. The victim who was two months pregnant at the time

of the alleged rape, claimed that the defendants abducted her from the bar and took

her to an empty field where she was raped. The defendants on the other hand, claimed

that they had consensual sexual encounter with S.T. The two sides gave conflicting

versions of events that took place that night. There were no eye witnesses.

497
Id.

498 State v. Pennell, 602 A.2d 48 (De1.l991).

499 State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J 508,443 A.2d 1020 (1982).

224
 At the trial, Cavallo sought to introduce testimony from a psychiatrist, Dr. Kuris

which will show that he does not have the psychological traits of a rapist. 500 The

defense informed the court that Dr. Kuris was being proffered to testify as to "Mr.

Cavallo's character which is that he knows right from wrong, that he is a well-

meaning individual, he would not willfully do a wrong, he recognizes the force and

violence of rape are wrongful acts, he is non-violent, non-aggressive person and he

will also testify to the fact the physical or the characteristics exhibited by rapists in

his experience as a psychiatrist are these people are aggressive, violent people and

that Mr. Cavallo does not fit within this mold.,,501

The prosecution argued that the testimony should be excluded because it was

irrelevant and not reliable. The prosecution contended that the expert character

evidence was irrelevant "since regardless of whether Cavallo has the characteristics

of a "rapist", he may indeed have committed rape on this particular occasion.,,502 The

Hunterdon County Superior Court ruled that the testimony was inadmissible. The

defendants were convicted. Cavallo was sentenced to three to five years for

abduction, one to two years for lewdness and ten to twenty years for rape. Murro was

sentenced to three to seven years for abduction, two to three years for lewdness and

twelve to twenty years for rape. 503 Their request for a new trial was denied. The case

went to the Superior Court, Appellant Division.

500
Id.

SOlId, at 51l.
502
Id,at515.
503
Id,at513.

225
 The appellate division agreed with the trial court's decision to exclude the expert

testimony. It was held that the expert character testimony was inadmissible under

Rule 47, which governs the admissibility of character evidence. so4 The appellate

division stated that "the rule could not contemplate testimony of the kind proffered in

this case"sos, and that the admission of such testimony "could divert the attention of

the jury from factual guilt or innocence to the defendant's propensities."so6 The

appellate division affirmed the convictions but remanded the trial for re-sentencing,

as the court deemed the sentences excessive. The defendants each later received ten to

fifteen years for rape and lesser sentences on the abduction and private lewdness

charges.

The case reached the Supreme Court of New Jersey where the defendants argued that

the exclusion of the expert character evidence was error. In their ruling, the Supreme

Court stated that the evidence by Dr. Kuris was not generally accepted as being

reliable. Delivering the judgment, Justice Pashrnan stated that the "defendants have

thus failed to persuade us that the proffered evidence has been accepted as reliable by

other jurisdictions, or for other purposes in the New Jersey legal system. Defendants

therefore have not met their burden under Rule 56 of showing that Dr. Kuris'

testimony is based on reasonably reliable scientific prernises."so7 In a footnote, the

504
Id.

505 Id.

506
Id, at 514.
507
Id, at 526.

226
 Supreme Court noted that "even if psychiatric testimony of this nature were found to

be generally admissible, we would have serious questions about whether the

foundation for Dr. Kuris' testimony - only two meetings with Cavallo - is sufficient

to support the conclusions drawn about his personality and propensities.,,508

The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the appellate division's judgment and

concluded that the "defendants have not met their burden of showing that the

scientific community generally accepts the existence of identifiable character traits

common to rapists. They also have not demonstrated that psychiatrists possess any

special ability to discern whether an individual is likely to be a rapist. Until the

scientific reliability of this type of evidence is established, it is not admissible.,,509

In State v. Lowe,510expert testimony on offender's behavioral motivations was also

ruled inadmissible. The defendant, Terry Lowe was charged with two counts of

aggravated murder of Phyllis Mullet and Murray Griffin. On July 5, 1986, Phyllis

Mullet was at her home in Belle Center, Ohio, when she was stabbed to death,

multiple times, with her throat cut. 511 Murray Griffin, a Belle Center Marshall was at

the scene, attending to the victim, when the perpetrator shot him and he also died at

the scene. When the trial began, the State filed a notice of intention to call FBI agents

who will testify on crime scene characteristics, which will assist in the identification

508 Id.

509 Id, at 529.

510 State v. Lowe, 75 Ohio App.3d 404,599 NE.2d 783 (Ohio. 1991).

511 Id.

227
 of Lowe as the person who committed the murders. The State informed the court that

the FBI agents will testify regarding the psychological profile of the offender. That

FBI Agent John Douglas will testify on criminal investigative analysis and death

threat analysis. That Agent Douglas will testify regarding the offender's motivation

for the murder of Mullet, as well as the motivation behind a certain document that

Lowe had written. S12 It was reported that this document contained a list of women and

the names of their immediate family members and that the document contained sexual

languages and that Mullet's name was on the list. S13

In his testimony, Agent Douglas stated that based on his review of the crime scene

photographs, autopsy reports, police reports and the document written by Lowe, that

he was of the opinion that the murder of Phyllis Mullet was sexually motivated. He

testified that his opinion was based on (1) "the fact Mullet's hands and feet were

bound with ligatures that had been brought to the scene by the perpetrator of the

crime," the "presence of the ligatures indicated preplanning on the part of the

perpetrator," and that preplanning is one of the characteristics of sexually motivated

murders. Sl4 Agent Douglas further stated that the document written by Lowe was

sexually motivated and represented the perpetrator's plan or mission for power. SIS It

should be pointed out that during cross-examination, Agent Douglas acknowledged

512 Id, at 406.

513
Id.
514
Id
515
Id.

228
 the fact that his testimony on the motivations could not be "stated to a reasonable

scientific certainty.,,516

The defendant presented Dr. Solomon Ful ero , a psychologist, to rebut Douglas's

testimony. In his testimony, Dr. Fulero also acknowledged the fact that "opinions

based on criminal-investigative analysis do not rise to the level of reasonable

scientific certainty that is a prerequisite to consideration as expert opinion

testimony. ,,517

In its ruling, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress Agent

Douglas' testimony. The State appealed, after certification of its inability to proceed

to trial without the suppressed testimony. The State argued that the trial court erred in

granting the motion to suppress the testimony.

The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third District, reiterated the fact that a trial judge has

the discretion to decide whether any evidence is relevant and will assist the trier of

fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. The Court of Appeals

said:

In this case before us, the trial court suppressed the

testimony of Douglas upon finding, inter alia, that "Mr.
Douglas' opinion is an investigative tool like a
polygraph; it might be used to investigate, but it does not
have the reliability to be evidence." Having given careful
consideration to the testimony elicited in this matter, we
conclude that there is evidence in the record to support

516 Id, at 407.

517
Id.

229
 the trial court's finding that the opinion testimony of
Douglas is not reliable evidence.

As a whole, the record reflects that Douglas's opinion for

the most part is based on the behavioral science of
clinical psychology, an area in which he has no formal
education, training or license. In short, the purported
scientific analytical processes to which Douglas testified
are based on intuitiveness honed by his considerable
experience in the field of homicide investigation. While
we in no way trivialize the importance of Douglas' work
in the field of crime detection and criminal apprehension,
we do not find that there was sufficient evidence of
reliability adduced to demonstrate the relevancy of the
testimony or to qualify Douglas as an expert witness.
Accordingl~, the error as assigned by the state is
overruled. S 8

The Court of Appeals therefore, affirmed the trial court's decision to suppress Agent

Douglas'testimony.

Similarly, in State v. Stevens,519 the Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed a trial

court's decision to exclude expert testimony on crime scene analysis. In excluding the

testimony, the trial court stated that it was not "convinced that this type of analysis

has been subject to adequate objective testing, or that it is based upon longstanding,

reliable, scientific principles."s2o In Stevens, the defendant William Richard Stevens

was charged with two counts of first-degree premeditated murder of his wife, Sandi

Stevens and his mother-in-law Myrtle Wilson. He was also charged with one count of

aggravated robbery. On December 22, 1997 the defendant called the police and when

518 Id, at 408.

519
State v. Stevens, 78 S. W3d 817 (Tenn.2002).

520 Id, at 831.

230
 the police arrived at his mobile home in Nashville, Tennessee, they found the

defendant, his friend Corey Milliken and the bodies of the victims. It was reported

that Mrs. Stevens' nude body was "left in a "displayed" position, which is, lying on

her back with her legs spread apart.,,52J Pornographic magazines and Sandi's own

nude photographs were also found around her body.522 Wilson's nightgown was

pulled above her waist. The police found no sign of a forced entry into the apartment.

The police suspected that the house showed signs of "staging" and so Stevens and

Milliken were the immediate suspects. While the police were questioning Milliken,

they noticed blood stains on his shirt, under his nails and gouge marks on his wrist

and cheek. 523 Milliken confessed that Stevens had hired him to kill his wife and make

it look like a robbery. The medical examination revealed that Sandi Stevens died as a

result of ligature strangulation. That she also had a tear in her vagina. The medical

examination showed that Wilson died as a result of stab wounds and manual

strangulation.

At the trial, the State presented several witnesses, including Shawn Austin Milliken,

the junior brother of Corey Milliken, who testified that in 1997 Stevens offered him

and his brother $2,500 each to kill his wife. He testified that he later decided not to go

on with the plan and so Corey accepted $5,000 to carry out the murder on his own.

The State also presented evidence of Steven's conviction in 1997 for second degree

521 Id, at 826.

522 Id.

523 Id, at 825.

231
 murder. During the trial, Stevens claimed that Corey Milliken killed Sandi and Myrtle

during his sexual assault on them. He argued that he did not hire Corey to kill the two

women. The defense decided to call Mr. Gregg McCrary, a former FBI Agent and an

expert on crime scene analysis. McCrary was called to testify that "Milliken

committed sexual murder as an act of aggression precipitated by an argument with his

mother and step-father the night before the crimes."S24 "Mr. McCrary testified that the

display of pornographic magazines around Mrs. Stevens could "best be interpreted as

an attempt to further humiliate or degrade" the victim, which goes to the motive of a

sex crime." He defined a sex crime as primarily a crime of violence in which the

perpetrator uses sex to punish, humiliate, and degrade the victim."s2s McCrary

testified outside the jury. He stated that from his analysis of the crime scene photos,

the crime scene video tapes, the autopsy report and Sandi Steven's diary, he was of

the opinion that the crime scene indicated characteristics of a "disorganized sexual

homicide."s26 As such, that the murders were sexually motivated. In his testimony,

McCrary also made distinctions between the characteristics of "disorganized sexual

homicide crime scene" and a "contract murder crime scene."S27 McCrary said:

The crime scene is quite sloppy and in great disarray.

There is minimal use of restraints. The sexual acts tend
to occur after death; so, there is post-mortem injury to
the victim ... indication of post-mortem sexual activity.
The body is left at the death scene and is typically left
in view. There's a good deal of physical evidence
that's - that's left at the scene. And, anytime just a

524 Id, at 827.

525 Id, at 828.

526 Id, at 830.

527 I d.

232
 weapon of opportunity that the offender uses, and by
that, I mean a weapon that is contained at the scene,
uses it and then, it's not uncommon for the offender to
leave that weapon either at or near-near the scene. 528

McCrary further testified that "criminals usually commit disorganized violent crimes

as a result of some "precipitating stressors, or stressful event" in the criminal's life.

Such an event invokes a lot of anger in the offender, and that anger - transferred onto

the victim - triggers this violent behavior.,,529 He also stated that his crime scene

analysis indicated that more than one person committed the murders and that the

crime scene also showed elements of 'staging.'

The reliability of McCrary's testimony was questioned during cross-examination.

On cross-examination, Mr. McCrary testified that the

FBI had conducted a study to determine the accuracy rate
of its crime scene analysis. The results of that study
yielded a seventy-five to eight percent accuracy rate. He
presented as further evidence of the reliability of crime
scene analysis the FBI's increased number of trained
agents in this field from seven to forty. Although Mr.
McCrary acknowledged that crime scene analysis "is not
hard science where you can do controlled experiments
and come up with the ratios in all this," he said that "the
proof that there is validation and reliability in the process
is that it's being accepted. It's being used and the
demand is just outstripping our resources to provide it. 530

In its ruling, the trial court qualified McCrary as an expert on crime scene staging and

he was allowed to testify that the murders could be the work of more than one person.

528 Id.

529
Id.

530 Id, at 831.

233
 The court however, ruled that McCrary's testimony would not be admitted on the

issue of the motives for the murders. The trial court stated that "while the expert and

many of the other FBI profilers are a tremendous asset as an investigative tool in law

enforcement, the expert's testimony regarding the motivation of the suspect could not

comply with the Tennessee Rule of Evidence 702 in terms of substantially assisting

the trier of fact, because there is no trustworthiness or reliability.,,531

The trial court also stated that it was not "convinced that this type of analysis has

been subject to adequate objective testing, or that it is based upon longstanding,

reliable, scientific principles.,,532 Justice Steve Dozier, delivering the judgment, also
33
stated that the testimony could not satisfy the McDaniet test of scientific reliability.

It should be noted that Stevens also called other witnesses, including family members,

co-workers, and neighbors, who testified that he was a good father, a good and

hardworking employee and always helped his neighbors. 534

Stevens was found guilty by the Criminal Court, Davidson County, Tennessee, and

sentenced to death for the murders and also sentenced to life without parole on the

531 Id.

532 Id.

533 McDaniel v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 955 S.W. 2d 257,264-65 (Tenn. 1997); which held that the

Daubert factors also applied to non-scientific testimony.

534 State v. Stevens, 78 S. W3d 817,828 (Tenn.2002).

234
 aggravated robbery charge. Corey Milliken pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and

was sentenced to life imprisonment.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment of conviction and the

sentence. The case automatically went to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, as it was a

death sentence for first degree murder. 535 Among other issues, the Supreme Court

addressed the issue of whether the trial court erred by limiting McCrary's testimony.

The Supreme Court agreed with both the trial court and the Court of Appeals

decisions and held that McDaniel applied to both scientific and non scientific

testimony.

On the issue of the reliability of the expert's testimony, the Supreme Court stated:

"Consequently, we are reluctant to measure the reliability of expert testimony that is

not based on scientific methodology under a rigid application of the McDaniel

factors. However, we are equally reluctant to admit nonscientific expert testimony

based on an unchallenged acceptance of the expert's qualifications and an

unquestioned reliance on the accuracy of the data supporting the expert's

conclusions. ,,536

Delivering the judgment ofthe Supreme Court, Justice Barker further stated that:

This type of crime scene analysis, developed by the FBI as a

means of criminal investigation, relies on the expert's

535 In accordance with Tenn. Code. Ann.s 39-13-206(a)(1)(1997).

536
State v. Stevens, 78 S. W3d 817, 833 (Tenn. 2002).

235
 subjective judgment to draw conclusions as to the type of
individual who committed this crime based on the physical
evidence found at the crime scene. Although we do not doubt
the usefulness of behavioral analysis to assist law enforcement
officials in their criminal investigations, we cannot allow an
individual's guilt or innocence to be determined by such
"opinion evidence connected to existing data only by the ipse
dixit" of the expert. Essentially, the jury is encouraged to
conclude that because this crime scene has been identified by
an expert to exhibit certain patterns or telltale clues consistent
with previous sexual homicides triggered by "precipitating
stressors", then it is more likely that this crime was similarly
motivated. 537

Justice Barker also stated that:

Moreover, we find that the FBI's study revealing a seventy-

five to eighty percent accuracy rate for crime scene analysis
lacks sufficient trustworthiness to constitute evidence of this
technique'S reliability. Although the frequency with which a
technique leads to accurate or erroneous results is certainly
one important factor to determine reliability, equally
important is the method for determining that rate of accuracy
or error. In this case, there is no testimony regarding how the
FBI determined the accuracy rate of this analysis. For
example, was accuracy determined by confessions or
convictions, or both? Even then, the absence of a confession
does not indicate the offender's innocence and thus an
inaccuracy in the technique. Clearly, the accuracy rate alone,
without any explanation of the methodologies used in the
study, is insufficient to serve as the foundation for the
admission of this testimony.

Therefore, because the behavioral analysis portion of Mr.

McCrary's testimony does not bear sufficient indicia of
reliability to substantially assist the trier of fact, we conclude
that this testimony was properly excluded. 538

537 Id, at 835.

538 Id, at 836.

236
 The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant's arguments lacked merit and

therefore affirmed the death sentence. The Court stated that the exclusion of the

unreliable expert testimony by the trial court was not error.

In State v. Fortin,539 linkage analysis, signature analysis and results of the FBI's

ViCAP program were ruled inadmissible. Linkage analysis was also seen as an

opinion on the ultimate issue. Steven Fortin was charged with capital murder, having

killed the victim in the course of a gruesome sexual assault. The victim, Melissa

Padilla, aged twenty five, was found sexually assaulted, robbed and strangled to death

on August 11,1994 in Avenel, Woodbridge Township, New Jersey.540

Padilla's body was naked from the waist down. She was
wearing a shirt, but no bra. Bags of food, a partially eaten
sandwich, a store receipt, an earring, debris including
cigarette butts, and a bloody one-dollar bill were found
scattered near the body. Padilla's shorts, with her underwear
still inside them, were found on a nearby shrub.

Inside the concrete pipe was a large blood stain. The

assailant had brutally beaten Padilla about her face and head.
Her face was swollen and bruised, and her nose was broken.
She had been killed by manual strangulation. The autopsy
revealed rectal tearing, and bite marks on Padilla's left
breast, left nipple, and the left side of her chin. 541

On April 3, 1995, a Maine State Trooper, Vicki Gardner, aged thirty four, was also

sexually assaulted, beaten and strangled to unconsciousness. She survived. She was

539 State v. Fortin, 162 NJ 517, 745 A.2d 509 (2000).

540 State v. Fortin, 318 NJSuper. 577, 724 A.2d 818 (1999).

541 State v. Fortin, 162 NJ 517, 510, 745 A.2d 509 (2000).

237
 off duty on that day but was traveling in a marked police vehicle, when she saw a car

parked on the shoulder of Highway 95 in the state of Maine. State Trooper Gardner

stopped to check what was wrong. The defendant, Steven Fortin was inside the car.

The defendant had a learner's permit issued in New Jersey. Trooper Gardner noticed

that Fortin was under the influence of alcohol and gave him some sobriety tests. The

tests showed that Fortin was under the influence of alcohol and Gardner placed him

under arrest. She called her office and requested for an officer to come to assist her. It

was reported that while she was waiting for back-up to arrive, she was attacked by
542
Fortin. She was beaten, sexually assaulted and strangled into unconsciousness. It

was reported that Fortin "then placed Gardner in the passenger's seat of the police

vehicle, and drove the police vehicle down the highway. Gardner regained

consciousness and partially jumped, and was partially pushed by defendant, from the

vehicle".543 Fortin lost control of the vehicle. He fled but was later arrested at a

nearby rest area.

Gardner's face was badly battered, and she suffered a broken

nose; bite marks to her chin, to her left breast nipple and on
the outer left side of her left breast; and vaginal and anal
tearing and lacerations. After defendant's attack, Gardner
was naked from the waist down. Her pants were pulled off,
with her underwear inside out. When interviewed later,
defendant said Gardner pulled her own rants off while
5
attempting to make sexual advances to him. 4

542 State v. Fortin, 318 NJ.Super. 577, 588, 724 A.2d 818 (1999).

544
Id.

238
 At the trial for this case in the State of Maine, Fortin pleaded guilty to seven counts of

kidnapping, robbery, aggravated assault, assault on an officer, attempted gross sexual

assault, unlawful sexual contact, and criminal operation of motor vehicle under the

influence of alcohol. 545 He was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment.

The New Jersey police were not making any progress in the investigation into

Padilla's death, until April 1995 when they were informed by the State of Maine

Police Department that Steven Fortin had been arrested and charged in Maine for the

sexual assault of Vicki Gardner. The Maine police contacted the New Jersey police to

know if Fortin had any prior convictions, since his leamer's permit showed that he

lived in New Jersey. After analyzing the two cases, Lieutenant Lawrence Nagle who

was involved with the investigation into Padilla's murder, felt that Fortin might have

committed the two sexual assauits. He found several similarities between the two

crimes. Further investigations also revealed that Fortin was indeed at the area where

Padilla was killed on the day of the murder. This was confirmed by Dawn Archer,

Fortin's girlfriend. 546

At trial, the State therefore filed a motion to admit evidence from the Maine incidence

to the present case in New Jersey, on the issue of identity. The State also informed the

court of their intention to call a former FBI Agent Roy Hazelwood to testify as to the

ritualistic and signature aspects of the crimes which will bolster their claim that the

545 rd, at 589.

546 rd, at 584.

239
 two crimes were committed by the same person. The defense objected to both

motions and argued that the testimony should not be allowed.

Agent Roy Hazelwood was called as an expert on modus operandi and ritualistic

behavior. "He is a former FBI agent, has over thirty-two years experience as a law

enforcement professional, a seventeen-year affiliation with the National Center for

the Analysis of Violent Crime, and has consulted on more than 7,000 crimes of

violence. He has published approximately thirty articles on topics of homicide, rape,

serial rape, other types of sexual assault, and various other criminal or deviant sexual

behavior, and has taught at various academies and at a few universities".547

A pre-trial hearing was conducted on the admissibility of the other-crime evidence

and on the admissibility of the expert testimony. The Superior Court, Law Division,

Middlesex County, New Jersey, ruled that the evidence that Fortin sexually assaulted

a police officer in Maine was admissible as other-crime evidence. The court also

ruled that Agent Hazelwood was qualified as an expert on ritualistic and signature

aspects of crime and so his testimony was permitted. The trial court in granting the

motion to introduce the other-crimes evidence, added that the defendant's guilty plea

in the State of Maine should be excluded during the State's case-in-chief. 548

In his testimony, Agent Hazelwood stated that he used "linkage analysis" and

reviewed the two crimes and that the modus operandi of the crimes showed fifteen

547 Id, at 590.

548 Id, at 581.

240
 similarities. That he was therefore, of the opinion that the two crimes were committed

by one person. The fifteen similarities according to Hazelwood are as follows:

1. High-risk crimes;

2. Crimes committed impulsively;

3. Victims are female;

4. Age of victims generally the same;

5. Victims crossed the path of the offender;

6. Victims were alone;

7. Assaults occurred at confrontation point;

. '1

,,:j
8. Adjacent to or on well-traveled highway;

9. Occurred during darkness;

10. No weapons involved in assaults;

11. Blunt-force injuries inflicted with fists, with nose of victims broken;

12. Trauma primarily to upper face, no teeth damaged;

13. Lower garments totally removed, with panties found inside the shorts or pants of

the victims;

14. Shirt left on victims and breasts free; and

549
15. No seminal fluid found inion victims.

Agent Hazelwood also testified that the two crimes "were anger-motivated, and that the

offender demonstrated anger through the following identified "ritualistic" or "signature"

behavior in both crimes":

549 Id, at 591.

241
 1. Bites to the lower chin;

2. Bites to the lateral left breast;

3. Injurious anal penetration;

4. Brutal facial beating; and

5. Manual frontal strangulation. sso

It should be noted that the defense on the other hand, stated that there were sixteen

differences between the two crimes. "There are differences in the age, race, weight and

height of the victims. There is a significant difference in the status of each victim.

Trooper Gardner is a professional police officer and a potentially dangerous target for

someone to perpetrate a crime against, particularly when the defendant knew, prior to the

assault, that his identity was made known to the state police dispatcher by Trooper

Gardner. There are also differences in the type of assault. Trooper Gardner was anally

and vaginally assaulted, while Padilla was assaulted anally, but not vaginally".SSl

Apart from Hazelwood, the State also called other witnesses. Lieutenant Lawrence Nagle

of the New Jersey Police Department, one of the investigating officers also testified.

"Nagle described the injuries to Padilla, stating she had trauma to the head, was beat

about the face, was manually strangled, her pants were ripped down, there was rectal

tearing and there were marks on her left breast area and on the left side of her chin that

550 Id, at 592.

551 Id, at 609.

242
appeared to be bite marks".552 Dr. Marvin Schuster, who performed the autopsy, testified

that the victim died as a result of "asphyxiation; assault and strangulation".553 Two police

officers from the Maine State Police also testified as to the events that happened in the

sexual assault of Vicki Gardner, and the type of injuries that she sustained. Dr. Lowell J.

Levine, a forensic odontologist also testified. He stated that his review and comparison of

the autopsy reports, the bite marks on both victims, dental casts and Fortin's bite-mark

samples, showed that the bite marks found on both victims came from the defendant's

teeth. Dr. Levine concluded that "based upon the comparison revealing similarities

among the bite marks, it is my opinion that the bite marks on both women could have

been caused by Steven Fortin".554

It should also be noted that DNA samples recovered from Padilla's body, a cigarette butt

found at the crime scene, fingernail clippings, a dollar bill with blood stain, and blood

samples from the victim and the defendant were analyzed. Some of the results were

inconclusive and some could not exclude the defendant as being the source of the

DNA. 555 The court ruled that the other-crime evidence and Hazelwood's testimony were

admissible.

The defendant appealed and argued that:

552 Id, at 584.

553 Id, at 586.

554 Id, at 590.

555 Id, at 587.

243
 1. The State should not be allowed to introduce inflammatory and severely

prejudicial evidence of allegedly similar crime under the provisions of the NJ.R.E

404(b) to substitute for its "paucity" of evidence.

2. The admission of evidence regarding the incident in the state of Maine would be

contrary to the established case law because the State failed to meet its burden to

prove the two crimes were sufficiently identical and because the prejudicial value

grossly outweighs the limited probative value.

3. The proffered testimony of Robert Hazelwood does not meet the standard of

admissibility for expert testimony as set forth by the New Jersey Supreme Court
556
and the trial court's ruling was therefore erroneous.

In its ruling, the Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the trial judge's decision

that the other-crime evidence can be admitted on the issue of identity. Delivering the

opinion of the appellate division, Justice Fall stated that "given our standard of review,

we are satisfied the trial judge's decision was not "so wide off the mark that manifest

denial of justice resulted," or that his ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion .... The

judge carefully applied the four prong test outlined in Codjield in determining whether

the proffered other-crime evidence was admissible".557 Justice Fall further stated that

"the potential for prejudice by admission of the other-crime evidence in this crime is

great. Therefore, while we are in accord with the judge's ruling in permitting its

admission, at trial the judge must "sanitize" the other-crime evidence by confining its

556 Id, at 582.

557 Id, at 597.

244
admissibility to those facts reasonably necessary for the probative purpose of "identity".

To an extent, the judge ruling inadmissible defendant's guilty plea in Maine, goes to this

effort of minimizing the prejudicial effect". 558

The appellate division however, ruled that Hazelwood's testimony using linkage analysis

is not sufficiently reliable to be admissible as expert evidence. 559 Justice Fall said:

Here, as the judge noted, Hazelwood testified "this analysis is

not based on science, but based on his training and experience
with violent crime". While not based on science in the
technical sense, his linkage analysis methodology is certainly
founded in the area of behavioral science, in that it analyzes
the conduct of the crime perpetrator in two or more crimes to
determine whether there is sufficient consistency of behavior
to conclude that one person committed both crimes.
We conclude that the same detailed analysis regarding
admission of scientific evidence is applicable and necessary in
determining whether linkage analysis expert testimony is
admissible. Theories or methods of explaining human conduct
and behavior have consistently been subject to significant
scrutiny and analysis by our courts when admission is
sought. 560

It should also be pointed out that Hazelwood in his testimony stated that modus operandi

and ritualistic behavior analysis was accepted by the law enforcement community. On

that issue, Justice Fall stated that "we have no doubt that these methods are valid and

have great value in performing the very difficult task of criminal investigation. We are

not persuaded, however, that these techniques are sufficiently reliable for an expert in

those fields to testify that the same person who committed one crime committed the other

558 Id, at 598.

559 Id, at 600.

560 Id.

245
under the analysis of the facts and circumstances presented in this case".561 Justice Fall

further stated that:

Our examination of the authorities and literature authored by

Hazelwood convinces us that a linkage analysis as a foundation
for the expert behavior identification testimony proffered in
this case is wholly inappropriate. In the recent book The Evil
that Men Do, Stephen G. Michaud with Roy Hazelwood
(1988), there is significant discussion concerning the
application of linkage analysis in the identification of serial
offenders. ... Hazelwood defines therein a serial offender as
one who has committed three or more offenses. Additionally,
as described in this book, the use of linkage analysis leading to
identification of the perpetrator also involves an evaluation of
the personal history and background of the suspected
perpetrator, to develop a profile. 562

The Appellate Division therefore, held that "we are simply not convinced that the State

has satisfied its burden to establish that "the field testified to is at a state of art such that

an expert's testimony could be sufficiently reliable".563 The Appellate Division also saw

the testimony as an opinion on the ultimate issue. "Further, given the conclusive nature of

Hazelwood's testimony, we find there is no acceptable limiting instruction that could be

given to the jury to avoid the prohibition against an expert expressing his opinion in such

a way as to emphasize that the expert believes the defendant is guilty of the crime

charged under the statute". 564

561 Id, at 609.

562
Id.

563 Id, at 610.

564 Id.

246
"In summary, we affirm the decision permitting the introduction of other-crime evidence,

after it is properly sanitized, and reverse the order permitting Hazelwood to give expert

testimony that the same person who committed the Maine crime also committed the New

Jersey crime". 565

The case reached the Supreme Court of New Jersey, on appeal and cross-appeal. On one

hand, the defendant sought a review of the appellate division's ruling that the other-crime

evidence was admissible. The State on the other hand, prayed the Court to review the

appellate division's ruling that Hazelwood's testimony was inadmissible. In its ruling, the

Supreme Court of New Jersey held that "for the reasons stated in its opinion, we agree

with the judgment of the Appellate Division that the proposed expert testimony of

Hazelwood concerning linkage analysis lacks sufficient scientific reliability to establish

that the same perpetrator committed the Maine and New Jersey crimes".566 Delivering the

opinion of the Supreme Court, Justice O'Hern added that linkage analysis is similar to the

rapist profile evidence which is inadmissible. That Hazelwood's testimony failed to

"meet the standards for the admission of testimony that relates to scientific knowledge.

Although Hazelwood possess sufficient expertise in his field and his intended testimony

is beyond the ken of the average juror, the field of linkage analysis is not at a "state of the

art" such that his testimony could be sufficiently reliable".567 Justice O'Hern went on to

say that "as the Appellate Division noted however, the authorities and literature authored

565 Id.
566 State v. Fortin, 162 NJ 517, 525, 745 A.2d 509 (2000).

567 Id, at 526.

247
by Hazelwood and others do not demonstrate that linkage analysis has attained such a

state of art as to have the scientific reliability of DNA testing". 568

Moreover, linkage analysis is a field in which only Hazelwood

and a few of his close associates are involved. Concerning
consensus on acceptance of "linkage analysis" in the scientific
community, the other experts mentioned by Hazelwood in his
testimony were either current or former co-workers. In this
respect, there are no peers to test his theories and no way in
which to duplicate his results. 569

Summing up Hazelwood's linkage analysis, Justice O'Hern stated that if "stripped of its

scientific mantra, the testimony is nothing more than a description of the physical

circumstances present".570 Justice O'Hern ruled that Hazelwood would have to prove the

reliability of linkage analysis by producing a reliable database from which it was based.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment and remanded the matter

to the Law Division for further proceedings. At the Superior Court, Law Division,

Middlesex County, Fortin was convicted of capital murder, aggravated sexual assault,

first-degree robbery, and felony murder. He was sentenced to death and he appealed.

The State filed a motion for clarification of certain aspects of the judgment. 571 The

Supreme Court of New Jersey held that:

1. trial court improperly limited voir dire by rejecting inquiry concerning evidence

of the defendant's sexual assault oflaw enforcement officer in another state;

568 rd, at 527.

569 rd.

570 rd, at 533.

571 State v. Fortin, 178 NJ 540, 843 A.2d 974 (2004).

248
 2. State's expert should not have been permitted to testify on violent sexual crimes

without producing a reliable database of violent sexual assault cases that he had

investigated, studied or analyzed;

3. defendant could waive protection of Ex Post Clause in order to obtain instruction

on life in prison without parole, if jury rejected death sentence;

4. convictions for manslaughter several years earlier and sexual assault

approximately eight months after murder were relevant and admissible at penalty

phase; and

5. aggravating factors are elements of capital murder and thus, must be submitted to

a grand jury and returned in an indictment; overruling State v. Martini, 131 N.J.

176,619 A.2d 1208. 572

The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded for

a new trial.

At the retrial,573 the State presented several witnesses at the pretrial hearing. Dr. Geetha

Natarajan (the medical examiner who carried out the autopsy on Padilla), testified that in

more than twenty-five years that she had conducted autopsies that she could not

remember any other case in which the autopsy revealed bite marks on the chin of the

other victims. 574 Dr. Lawrence Ricci (an expert in emergency medicine and pediatrics)

572 Id.

573 State v. Fortin, 189 NJ. 579; 917 A.2d 746; (2007).

574 Id, at 589.

249
also "testified that both Padilla and Gardner suffered traumatic anal injuries, but could

not say that those injuries were any more distinctive than similar injuries inflicted on

other sexual assault victims".575 Dr. Lowell Levine (an odontologist) also testified that in

more than thirty years that he had been in the field that "he had never seen the

combination of bite marks on the chin, the left nipple, and the left breast that appeared on

both Gardner's and Padilla's bodies".576 He said that he compared the bite marks on the

two victims with Fortin's dental casts/impressions and was of the opinion that there was a

high degree of probability that the bite mark on Padilla's left breast was caused by the

defendant's teeth. 577The State also called Mark Safarik (FBI Supervisory Agent), who

testified that the results of a search of the FBI's ViCAP database showed a match

between the Gardner and Padilla assaults as signature-crime. Hence, he was of the

opinion that Fortin committed both crimes. It should be noted that the State decided not

to call Agent Hazelwood to testify again. They called Mark Safarik instead.

In his testimony, FBI Supervisory Special Agent Mark Safarik

described the Violent Criminal Apprehension Program, more
commonly known as ViCAP. Created in 1984, ViCAP is a
national database of approximately 167,000 reported violent
crimes (homicides, attempted homicides, and kidnappings)
maintained by the FBI in Quantico, Virginia. The database
represents about three to seven percent of the violent crimes
committed since ViCAP's inception. Participation in Vi CAP
nationwide is voluntary. Law enforcement agencies that
complete the ViCAP form answer numerous questions about
the crime for inclusion in the national database.

The general purpose of Vi CAP "is to identity similarities in

crimes" through a computer search isolating particular

575 Id.

576 Id.

577 Id.

250
 characteristics in the commission of the offense. Through such
a computer search focusing on specific crime criteria, one law
enforcement agency can contact and cooperate with another
agency working on a "similar case with similar
characteristics." According to Agent Safarik, the "Vi CAP
system is looking for ... solved or unsolved homicides, or
attempted homicides, missing persons cases, kidnappings,
where there is a strong possibility of foul play, or unidentified
dead bodies, where the manner of death is suspected to be
homicide. 578

There was a problem with the admission of Safarik's testimony.

Law enforcement authorities completed the ViCAP form for

the Padilla murder in a timely manner for inclusion in the
national database. The Maine State Police, however did not
complete a ViCAP form for the 1995 Gardner sexual assault.
In 2004, in preparation for the defendant's trial, the State
requested that Agent Safarik submit a ViCAP form for the
Gardner case. He did so with the assistance of a ViCAP
analyst and the Maine State Police. Agent Safarik then ran a
series of searches on the Vi CAP for specific criteria common
to both the Padilla and Gardner crimes, such as manual
strangulation, sexual assault, and bite marks on the face and
chest. The searches yielded only three cases - the Padilla
murder, the Gardner sexual assault, and a 1988 case from
Washington State. The State argued that the searches showed
that the similarities between the Padilla and Gardner crimes
were so unusual as to constitute a signature. Significantly,
Agent Safarik indicated that the ViCAP database could not
be released to defense counsel because of privacy concerns
and that it was exempt from the Freedom of Information
ACt. 579

On the other hand, the defense offered two expert witnesses. First, Dr. Norman D.

Sperber (the Chief Forensic Dentist in the San Diego Medical Examiner' s Office), stated

that there are doubts as to whether the marks on Padilla's breast and chin were indeed

578 Id.
579 Id, at 590.

251
bite marks. 58o Dr. Sperber further stated that "even assuming the injuries to the breast and

chin were bite marks, that they were not caused by defendant's teeth".581 It should be

noted that Dr. Sperber testified in the original trial and all parties agreed that the

testimony should be used in this retrial hearing.

The defense also presented Dr. Grover Godwin, as an expert in statistical evaluation of

crime scenes. Dr. Godwin stated that the reliability of the ViCAP database was

questionable because of what he described as "a bias in entering the variables".582

The motion judge ruled that only the evidence on the bite marks which suggested

uniqueness, would be allowed. That the other injuries would not be allowed because they

were common to sexual crimes, and that these other injuries would be unduly prejudicial

to the defendant. I""

"
'"""

The motion judge also maintained that the ViCAP database

might have applicability at trial. For instance, "absent the
insertion of the Maine crime, she found that the ViCAP
database would be a reliable database upon which the State
may rely to test the expert opinions." With regard to the
Gardner ViCAP form, she observed that it was prepared for
litigation purpose and therefore "failed to provide an
unbiased generation of data." Alternatively, she suggested
that "if the ViCAP database could be crafted to report on the
uniqueness of the human bite mark criteria alone, "the
database would then be useful in proving "a signature-like
crime. To be useful, for example, the ViCAP analysis would
have "to determine how many, if any, cases involve bite
marks on the chin." The judge noted, however, that the

580 Id, at 591.

581 Id.

582 Id.

252
 Vi CAP forms do not contain a box for bite marks to the
583
chin.

The State filed a motion appealing the motion judge's decision, but it was denied by the

Appellate Division. The State therefore, filed an interlocutory appeal at the Supreme

Court of New Jersey. The State argued that there were three errors in the motion judge's

ruling.

1. The motion judge conditioned the introduction of the signature-crime evidence on

expert testimony explaining the uniqueness of the bite marks in the Padilla and

Gardner cases;

2. The motion judge would not admit evidence of the injuries sustained by Gardner

other than the bite marks, thereby denying the jury the necessary context in which

to determine whether the two crimes are indeed signature crimes;

3. The motion judge would not allow the Vi CAP database to be used to show that a

computer search revealed only three cases with the pattern of bite marks to the
584
breast and chin - the Padilla and Gardner cases, and a Washington State case.

In their ruling, the Supreme Court of New Jersey said: "We did not consider in Fortin 1

whether, absent expert testimony, the Gardner-other-crime evidence would be admissible

to establish that the Padilla murder was the distinctive handiwork of defendant. We now

hold that the comparative analysis necessary to determine whether the Padilla murder and

583 Id, at 754.

584 Id, at 593.

253
Gardner sexual assault are signature crimes is outside of the ordinary experience and

knowledge of jurors and requires the assistance of expert testimony". 585

Delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, Justice Albin stated that the motion judge

did not err by conditioning the signature-crime evidence on the presentation of expert

testimony.586 Justice Albin further stated that the motion judge did not abuse her

discretion by asking the State to provide the defense with the database of cases from

which Dr. Levine and Dr. Natarajan based their opinion. Additionally, Justice Albin

stated that "our evidentiary rules provide trial courts with the authority to require pretrial

disclosure of "the underlying facts or data" that supports an expert's opinion".587 Justice .111 ••

'''":;
Albin also stated that "significantly, although the State presented Agent Safarik to

explain the functions of ViCAP, neither he nor any other expert witness vouched that a

ViCAP crime match, such as the one in this case, constituted reliable signature-crime

evidence".588 Justice Albin said:

We share the judge's concern that only relevant evidence

should bear on the issues that must be decided by the jury. We
disagree, however, that details of the Gardner assault can be so
finely parsed. Although the other injuries suffered by Gardner
do not fall into the category of signature evidence, the bite
marks were inflicted during a vicious sexual assault. That
reality cannot be ignored or withheld from the jury without
seriously distorting the import of the bite-mark evidence. By
its very nature, signature-crime evidence carries the potential
for prejudice. Nevertheless, signature-crime evidence may be
highly probative, and in this case, we conclude that its

585 Id.

586 Id, at 597.

587 Id, at 598.

588 Id, at 603.

254
 probative value is not outweighed by its prejudicial effect. ...
Therefore, we will allow the State to present the bitemark
evidence within the general narrative of the sexual assault on
Trooper Gardner. 589

It was held that "placing the bite-mark evidence in context will permit the jury to better

fulfill its truth-seeking function. That approach benefits defendant as much as the State.

Sanitizing the Gardner assault would keep from the jury the many differences between

the two crimes that might lead it to reject the signature-crime evidence".59o Therefore,

Justice Albin stated that allowing all the material details from the Gardner assault was

fair.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the motion judge's ruling with modifications.

Justice Albin stated that "the State must be permitted to present the bite-mark evidence in

context and therefore material details of the Gardner sexual assault cannot be censored.

Testimony describing that assault, however, is subject to specific jury instructions

explaining the limited use of "other-crimes" evidence under NJ.R.E. 404(b). Finally,

because the State's experts have not relied on the Vi CAP database to form their opinions,

the ViCAP database should not be admissible to bolster those opinions".591

Justice Albin acknowledged the fact that Vi CAP is a very useful tool of crime

investigation but stated that "ultimately, in conducting a fair trial, courts must ensure that

589 Id, at 599.

590 Id, at 600.

591 Id, at 585.

255
only reliable evidence is submitted to our juries consistent with our evidentiary rules. As

presented, Vi CAP does not meet the standards for admissibility of evidence".592

The Supreme Court of New Jersey therefore, remanded the case for further proceedings.

As we can see from this case, offender profiling evidence, no matter which label it has

been dressed up in, still need to be based upon reliable facts or data. In this case, we have

seen the terms linkage analysis, ritualistic behavior, signature-crime analysis, and Vi CAP

program all being used to show one thing - that bite marks on two victims came from one
"I'
Ii

individual. This case clearly supports my argument that some profilers have the tendency

to dress up their testimony in different labels so that it will be admitted. Offender

profiling and its derivatives or its other labels should not be admitted as evidence until its

foundation can be properly and objectively ascertained. The foundations must be proved

by reliable facts and data.

At this point, it should be noted that a few studies have been carried out on the

accuracy of profilers. In 1990, for instance, Pinnizzotto and Finkel carried out a study

in United States. 593 The study was made up of five groups - (1) four pro filers from

the FBI, (expert/teachers) (2) six police detectives who had been trained by the FBI

profilers, (3) six experienced police homicide and sex detectives, with no training in

criminal personality profiling, (4) six clinical psychologists, who according to

rd, at 606.
592
Anthony 1. Pinizzotto., and Norman J. Finkel, "Criminal Profiling: An Outcome and Process Study",
593
Law and Human Behavior, vol. 14, No.3, (1990), 215 - 233.

256
 Pinizzotto and Finkel were "naive to both criminal profiling and criminal

investigations,,,s94 and (5) six undergraduate psychology students.

The five groups were given two real and solved cases - one sex offense case and one

homicide case. Pinizzotto and Finkel noted that this study was based on the rationale

that, "given the growing use of the personality profile and the fact that this growing

use is largely supported by testimonials and accuracy figures that were not obtained

through controlled studies, this research was undertaken to provide more precise

answers to both outcome and process questions."s9s The materials given to the

participants for this study, in the homicide case, included crime scene reports, crime II .

scene photographs, autopsy and toxicology reports, as well as the victim report. S96 For

the sexual offense case, the participants also received victim statement, police reports ii,

:1
and victim reports. S97

This study, even though it was based on a very small sample, generated interesting

and controversial results. First, the study found out that "for both the homicide and

the sex offense cases, the profiles written by the professional profilers were indeed

richer than the nonprofiler groups of detectives, psychologists, and students."s98 The

result also showed that "an analysis of the specific questions for each case shows that

594 Id,at219.

595 Id, at 217.

596 Id, at 219.

597 Id.

598 Id, at 222.

257
 pro filers achieved higher group scores for the sex offense case in questions dealing

with the age of the offender, the education of the offender, age, and condition of the

offender's automobile, and the victim-offender relationship."s99

Interestingly, the results also showed that "the profilers did not achieve higher scores

than subjects in the other groups in these same categories for the homicide case.,,600

In the homicide case, "profilers, however, do not appear to process this material in a

way qualitatively different from any other groUp.,,601

In the lineup rankings, the study also showed that "in the sex offense case, the

expert/teachers were accurate in picking out the offender 100% of the time, and the

profilers were accurate 83% of the time. As for the other groups, accuracy is lower, i,

and declines as we move from detectives (67%) to psychologists (50%) to students

(16%).,,602

Based on the results of this study, Pinizzotto and Finkel concluded that; "Concerning

the outcome issue, professional pro filers are more accurate (i.e., more correct

answers, higher-accuracy scores, more correct lineup identifications) for the sex

offense case than nonprofilers, but these accuracy differences disipate when we look

at the homicide case. There were, however, significant outcome differences between

599 Id, at 223.

600 Id, at 224.

601 Id, at 215.

602 Id, at 224.

258
 pro filer and nonprofiler groups for the homicide case in all the analyses of the written

profile.,,603

It should be noted that the authors did acknowledge certain limitations of this study.

On the small sample, the authors noted that they "were unable to locate sufficient

numbers of expert/teachers who were both actively engaged in profiling and willing

to cooperate in this study.,,604 This goes a long way in highlighting my argument that

there is a need for closer cooperation among the different segments involved in

offender profiling. It is noteworthy to point out that Pinizzotto after this study, joined

the FBI.

Finally, Pinizzotto and Finkel also noted that "while the overall outcome superiority

of the profilers is most likely indicative of greater expertise, it must be kept in mind

that an "investment" factor could also be invoked to explain these results.

Psychologists and students may see this task as an interesting exercise, whereas

profilers, and detectives, perhaps, see it as the "blood and guts" of their professions,

and therefore generate lengthier profiles and spend more time on the task.,,605

603 Id, at 227.

604 I d,at218.

605 Id, at 227.

259
 This study undoubtedly has been criticized. Kocsis et al argued that "only 15 items of

offender information were processed by Pinizzotto and Finkel, and there was no

scrutiny of the types of information on which profilers were more accurate.,,606

Risinger and Loop were also highly critical of this study. They maintained that

"Pinizzotto and Finkel reanalyzed the results giving half credit for some of the

inaccurate multiple choice answers based on the judgment of the "expert" profiler

subgroup that some wrong answers were less wrong than others; however, they never

set out the results of that reanalysis, simply asserting that for both cases the only

significant differences that emerged were an advantage of the profiler group

compared to the student group. ,,607 Risinger and Loop further argued that the authors

only set out the number of accurate predictions without adding the number of

inaccurate predictions. 608 As such Risinger and Loop concluded that "the profilers got

one-third of the questions wrong even in the rape case, and two-thirds wrong in the

homicide case. ,,609

It should be noted also that in 1995, FBI profilers came up with what they called the

key attributes of successful profilers. In their work, Hazelwood et al maintained that

606Richard N. Kocsis., Harvey 1. Irwin., Andrew F. Hayes., and Ronald Nunn, "Expertise in Psychological
Profiling: A Comparative Assessment", Journal ofInterpersonal Violence, vol. 15, No.3, 314 (2000).

607See footnote 320, in Michael D. Rissinger., and Jeffrey L. Loop, "Three Card Monte, Monty Hall,
Modus Operandi and "Offender Profiling": Some Lessons of Modem Cognitive Science for the Law of
Evidence", 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 193,320 (Nov. 2002).

See footnote 322, in Michael D. Risinger., and Jeffrey L. Loop, "Three Card Monte, Monty Hall,
608
Modus Operandi and "Offender Profiling": Some Lessons of Modem Cognitive Science for the Law of
Evidence", 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 193,320 (Nov. 2002).

609 Risinger and Loop, supra note 34, at 249.

260
 the main attributes for successful profilers are knowledge of the criminal mind,

investigative experience, objectivity, logical reasoning/critical thinking and a high

level of intuition. 610

In 2000, Kocsis et al replicated the study by Pinizzotto and Finkel. This study

involved four groups:

(1) Five profilers. These profilers were those who had gIVen some form of

psychological profiling advice to a law enforcement agency.

(2) Thirty-five active police officers.

(3) Thirty Australian psychologists with no prior study of forensic or criminal

psychology.

(4) Thirty-one Australian science and economics university undergraduates.

'",

(5) Twenty Australian psychics. These are those psychics who believed that their
611
paranormal abilities could be useful in constructing an offender profile.

Kocsis et al chose these groups because they are believed to possess the key attributes

outlined by Hazelwood et al. Thus, the psychologists were chosen for appreciation of

criminal mind, police officers for their investigative experience, university students for

objectivity and logical reasoning and psychics for intuition. Kocsis et al stated that this

study was aimed at investigating the "skills underlying the effective performance of

610 Hazelwood, R.R., Ressler, R.K, Duppue, R.L., and Douglas, J.e., "Criminal Investigative Analysis: An
Overview", in R.R. Hazelwood and A.W. Burgess, (eds) Practical Aspects of Rape Investigation: A
nd
Multidiciplinary Approach, 2 ed. (1995).
611 Kocsis, Irwin, Hayes, and Nunn, supra note 606, at 316.

261
criminal psychological profiling.,,612 In order to achieve this, the study groups were

presented with a solved murder case. In this study, the performance of the groups were

compared in the profiling task.

In the five-part survey inventory, the groups were given detailed information about this

solved murder case. They were presented with several materials including the crime

scene report, crime scene photographs, photos of the victim's body, a forensic biologist's

report, a forensic entomologist's report, a ballistics report, autopsy reports, and basic

background information of the victim. 613 In this study, the participants were asked "'<I
II"

questions about the physical characteristics, cognitive processes, offense behaviors and

social history and habits of the offender. 614

',II

The results of the study showed that the "five groups did differ in their total accuracy but

only marginally.,,615 In order to specifically answer the question of whether profilers were

more accurate than nonprofilers, Kocsis et al decided to collapse the psychologists, police

officers, students and psychics into one group (nonprofiliers) and then compared their

performance with that of the profilers. The result showed that "on every measure of

accuracy, the profilers answered more questions correctly than the nonprofilers.

612 Id, at 311.

6I3 Id ,at317.

614 I d,at319.

615 Id, at 320.

262
Furthennore, this difference was statistically significant on the total accuracy

measure.,,616

The results of this study also showed that "in spite of their training, knowledge, and

experience, profilers did no better than anyone else in the correct identification of

features of the offender or offense.,,617 It should be noted however, that "the profilers did

descriptively outperfonn all other groups on the two omnibus measures of accuracy and

on two of the submeasures (cognitive processes and social status and behavior). On the

other two submeasures, the profilers were the second most accurate group with the

difference between them and the most accurate group (psychologists) negligible and

easily attributable to sampling error.,,618

The results also showed that "in comparison to the police and perhaps the psychics, the

group of psychologists showed superior perfonnance on several components of the task.

"
",I'

The study's findings therefore might be taken to suggest that specifically psychological

knowledge is more pertinent to successful profiling than are investigative experience and

intuition.,,619

The authors noted however, that:

616
Id.

617 Id, at 321.

619 Id, at 325.

263
 In any event, the study does encourage the view that
an educated insight into human behavior could play
an important role in the process of psychological
profiling. At the same time, it must be stressed that
the psychologists' performance did not differ
significantly from that of the student group, so it
remains uncertain whether the psychologists'
advantage over some other groups was predominately
in regard to specific knowledge of the behavioral
science or to a broader capacity for objective and
logical analysis. 62o

The result also showed that the police officers did not perform well in the profiling task.

Kocsis et al therefore, disagreed with the earlier work by the FBI profilers which stated

that investigative experience is a key attribute of successful profilers. The study also

showed that "the accuracy of the psychics was not high and indeed, unlike all other

groups used in the project, these participants showed no insight into the nature of the

offender beyond what reasonably could be gleaned from the prevailing social stereotype

of a murderer. Notwithstanding anecdotal reports of the successful use of psychics in

police investigations, this study certainly does not serve to encourage reliance on

psychics by police services.,,621

Kocsis et al noted the problem with the small sample of profilers in their study (only

five), which they correctly noted "not only impeded the chances of statistical significance

but also raised substantial doubts about this groups' representativeness of profilers as a

620 Id.

621 Id.

264
whole.,,622 It should be noted that Kocsis et al invited more than forty pro filers in several

countries to participate in this study but only five agreed.

This study has been criticized extensively. It has been argued that the data was a mere

reflection of the differences in intelligence across the groups. 623

Kocsis et al carried out other studies in their effort to provide an empirical foundation for

the key skills and abilities necessary for successful profiling. In 2002, Kocsis et al carried

out another study involving senior detectives, homicide detectives, trainee detectives,

police recruits and university students. This study also involved details of a solved

murder case. The results of the study showed that the university students performed better

than other groups on all the submeasures except on cognitive processes and offense

behaviors. 624 The result also showed that groups with post-secondary education ",I

outperformed those without post-secondary education. Kocsis et al therefore concluded

that based on this study, investigative experience is not a key attribute of effective

profiling.

In 2003, Kocsis carried out another study involving nine groups - profilers,

psychologists, undergraduate students, specialist detectives, general police officers,

622 Id, at 327.

623 Richard N. Kocsis., Harvey J. Irwin., Andrew F. Hayes., and Ronald Nunn, "Expertise in Psychological
Profiling: A Comparative Assessment", Journal oflnterpersonal Violence, vol. 15, No.3, (2000), at 326,
citing an anonymous referee.

624Kocsis R.N., Hayes, A.F., and Irwin H. J. , "Investigative Experience and Accuracy in Psychological
Profiling of a Violent Crime." Journal oflnterpersonal Violence, 17 (2002) 811 - 823.

265
police recruits, non-police specialists and psychics. 625 In this study, the profilers scored

highest, followed by undergraduate students and psychologists. Kocsis concluded that

logical reasoning ability and appreciation of criminal mind are the key attributes.

In 2004, and using arson cases, Kocsis carried out another study involving detectives

(specialists in arson), arson investigators from the fire service, professional profilers, and

undergraduate university students. 626 There was a control group of community college

students. The results of the study showed that profilers were more accurate than

detectives, followed by undergraduate students, arson investigators, the control group and

police detectives. Based on the results of this study, Kocsis again concluded that logical

reasoning ability was the key attribute for effective profiling.

Many scholars have criticized the studies by Kocsis. Bennell et aI, for instance, argued

that Kocsis did not provide an operational definition of logical reasoning/critical thinking

and also failed to "assess whether or not the skills that are supposedly being examined are

actually possessed by their participants.,,627 Further studies are still needed.

In this chapter, we have examined the central admissibility problems with offender

profiling testimony in United States. We have noted the different areas of attacking

Richard N. Kocsis, "Criminal Psychological Profiling: Validities and Abilities', International Journal of
625
Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 47 (2003) 126 - 144.

Richard N. Kocsis, "Psychological Profiling of Serial Arson Offenses: An Assessment of Skills and
626
Accuracy', Criminal Justice and Behavior, 31 (1004) 341 - 361.

627 Craig Bennel!., Shevaun Corey., Alyssa Taylor., and John Ecker, "What Skills are required for Effective
Offender Profiling? An Examination of the Relationship between Critical Thinking Ability and Profile
Accuracy", Paper presented at the 35th annual conference of the Society for Police and Criminal
Psychology, Washington/Chevy Chase Maryland, October 26,2006.

266
offender profiling evidence and answered such questions as:- is offender profiling

impermissible character evidence? Who is qualified to give expert offender profiling

evidence? Is offender profiling too prejudicial than probative? Is offender profiling an

opinion on the ultimate issue? Is offender profiling sufficiently reliable as to be

admissible? It has also been noted that in some cases, offender profiling is an improper

subject for expert testimony. This chapter has also highlighted the impact of the three

rules of admissibility on offender profiling. The Federal Rule of Evidence being loose

and too liberal has created problems for trial judges in making decisions on offender

profiling cases. Under the Rule, almost anybody can qualify as an expert, and can give

testimony either on a scientific, technical or other specialized field of knowledge. Under

a stringent application of Frye, it has to be shown that offender profiling has achieved

widespread acceptance by the relevant community. A strict application of Daubert

requires offender profiling evidence to satisfy the four factors, especially the requirement

that the technique must be based on a reliable data or foundation. In the next chapter, we

examine offender profiling in other countries.

267
 Chapter Five

Offender Profiling in Comparative Perspective

England

The prevIOUS chapter has shown that United States courts are inconsistent in their

decisions on cases involving offender profiling. In England on the other hand, offender

profiling evidence is generally seen as inadmissible at the moment. Several reasons

account for this, but first we examine the rules governing the admissibility of expert

testimony in England. In general terms, the English law of evidence provides that all

relevant evidence is admissible so long as it is not excluded by other laws of evidence,

such as the hearsay rule, opinion on character evidence rule, as well as conduct on other

occasions rule.

In England, the main rule governing the admission of expert evidence was arguably laid

down in the case of Folkes v. Chadd, 628 where it was held that:

The opinion of scientific men upon proven facts may be

given by men of science within their own science. An
expert's opinion is admissible to furnish the court with
scientific information which is likely to be outside the
experience and knowledge of a judge or jury. If on the
proven facts a judge or jury can form their own conclusions
without help, then the opinion of an expert is unnecessary.
In such a case if it is given dressed up in scientific jargon it
makes judgment more difficult. The fact that an expert
witness has impressive scientific qualifications does not by

628 Folkes v. Chadd, (J 782) 3 Doug KB 157.

268
 that fact alone make his opmlOn on matters of human
nature and behaviour within the limits of normality any
more helpful than that of the jurors themselves; but there is
a danger that they may think it does. 629

In this case, the issue was whether the embankment erected by the plaintiff for the

purpose of preventing the overflowing of Wells Harbour caused the decay/silting up of

the harbour, by stopping the back water. The embankment was erected in 1758 and the

harbour started to choke/fill up soon after that. The case was tried three times before it

reached the Court of Appeal. First, at the last Lent Assizes for the County of Norfolk, Mr.

Milne, an engineer was called by the plaintiffs, and he testified that in his opinion that the

embankment was not the cause of the decay. The plaintiffs also proffered evidence that
',,11
1'.1: 11
showed that "other harbours on the same coast, similarly situated, where there were no

embankments, had begun to fill up and to be choked about the same time as Wells

Harbour.,,63o At the trial presided over by Mr. Justice Ashurst, the jury ruled in the

defendant's favor.

At the Court of Chancery, the plaintiffs called another expert, Mr. John Smeaton, a civil

engineer. He stated that in his opinion the bank did not cause the choking and filling up

of the harbor. He also stated that removing the embankment would not solve the problem.

An objection was raised. It was argued that "the inquiring into the site of other harbour

was introducing a multiplicity of facts which the parties were not prepared to meet.,,631

629 Id.

630 Id.

631 Id, at 159.

269
"It was also objected that the evidence of Mr. Smeaton was a matter of opinion, which

could be no foundation for the verdict of the jury, which was to be built entirely on facts,

and not on opinions.,,632 The testimony was admitted. The Court of Chancery ruled in the

plaintiffs' favor and the defendants asked for a new trial. At the lower court, Chief Justice

Gould rejected Smeaton's evidence and stated that the evidence was mere opinion, based

on speculation and not based on direct observation.

On appeal, Lord Mansfield permitted the evidence and stated that "this is a matter of

opinion, the whole case is a question of opinion, from facts agreed upon".633 Delivering

the judgment, Lord Mansfield noted that; "On the first trial, the evidence of Mr. Milne,

who has constructed harbours, and observed the effects of different causes operating

upon them, was received; and it never entered into the head of any man at the Bar that it

was improper; nor did the Chief Baron, who tried the cause, think so. On the motion for
II ~ , I

the new trial, the receiving Mr. Milne's evidence was not objected to as improper; but it

was moved for on the ground of that evidence being a surprise; and the ground was

material, for, in matters of science, the reasonings of men of science can only be

answered by men of science,,634.

In reversing the lower court's decision, Lord Mansfield said:

It is objected that Mr. Smeaton is going to speak, not as to

facts, but as to opinion. That opinion, however, is deduced
from facts which are not disputed - the situation of banks, the

632 Id.

633 Id.

634 Id.

270
 course of tides and of winds, and the shifting of sands. His
opinion, deduced from all these facts, is, that, mathematically
speaking, the bank may contribute to the mischief, but not
sensibly. Mr. Smeaton understands the construction of
harbours, the causes of their destruction, and how remedied.
In matters of science no other witnesses can be called. An
instance frequently occurs in actions for unskillfully
navigating ships. The question then depends on the evidence
of those who understand such matters; and when such
questions come before me, I always send for some of the
brethren of the Trinity House. I cannot believe that where the
question is, whether a defect arises from a natural or an
artificial cause, the opinions of men of science are not to be
received. Hand-writing is proved every day by opinion; and
for false evidence on such questions a man may be indicted
for perjury. Many nice questions may arise as to forgery, and
as to the impressions of seals; whether the impression was
made from the seal itself, or from an impression wax. In such
cases I cannot say that the opinion of seal-makers is not to be 'I
.',1

taken. I have myself received the opinion of Mr. Smeaton

respecting mills, as a matter of science. The cause of the
decay of the harbour is also a matter of science, and still
more so, whether the removal of the bank can be beneficial.
Of this, such men as Mr. Smeaton alone can judge. Therefore
we are of the opinion that his judgment, formed on facts, was
very proper evidence. 635

The above decision in Folkes v. Chadd, was later supported by Justice Lawton in R v.

Turner.636 This decision in Turner, also known as the Turner Rule, established the

boundaries as to the admissibility of expert evidence in England. Under the Turner rule,

expert evidence is inadmissible unless it provides the courts with such information that is

outside the common experience and knowledge of the judge or jury. Turner also states

that expert evidence must be based upon facts which can themselves be proved by

admissible evidence.

635 Id.

636
R v. Turner, (1975) Q.B. 834 (CA).

271
In Turner, the defendant, Terence Stuart Turner, was charged with the murder of his

girlfriend, Wendy Butterfield, by hitting her with a hammer fifteen times. The defendant

claimed that he was provoked by the victim's statement that while he was in prison that

she had slept with two other men and that the child she was expecting was not his. After

killing her, the defendant called the police, admitted the killing and his defence was

provocation. 637

At the trial, the defendant sought to call a psychiatrist, Dr. Smith, who would give

evidence that he was not "suffering from a mental illness, that he was not violent by

nature but that his personality was such that he could have been provoked in the
11,.11

circumstances and that he was likely to be telling the truth,,638. The defense stated that the 1:1',111

psychiatrist's opinion would be based on information from the defendant, his medical

records, his family and friends. That the psychiatric evidence will help establish lack of

intent, help establish that Turner was likely to be easily provoked and to show that Turner

was likely to have told the truth in his statements. 639 In the psychiatric report, Dr. Smith

stated that "from all accounts his personality has always been that of a placid, rather quiet

and passive person who is quite sensitive to the feelings of other people. He was always

regarded by his family and friends as an even-tempered person who is not in any way

aggressive. In general until the night of the crime he seems to have displayed remarkably

good impulse control".64o

637 rd, at 838.

638 rd, at 840.

639 rd.

640 rd, at 839.

272
The Crown (prosecution) objected to the admission of this evidence. The Crown argued

that the psychiatric evidence should not be admitted. Mr. Calcutt, the prosecution counsel

argued that the evidence should be excluded because, first, the defendant had not put his

character in issue, and second that the report did not mention the fact that the defendant

was convicted in November 1971 for unlawful possession of an offensive weapon and

was also convicted in May 1972 of assault with intent to rob. 641 The Crown argued that

allowing the psychiatric evidence would "put the defendant before the jury as having a

character and disposition which in the light of his previous record of violence he had not

got,,642.

, .'
At Bristol Crown Court, Justice Bridge ruled that the psychiatric evidence was irrelevant "

and inadmissible. Justice Bridge also stated that the evidence was inadmissible hearsay

character evidence. Turner was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. He

appealed, arguing that the judge erred by excluding the psychiatric evidence. He also

contended that it was error for the trial judge to rule that provocation was not a matter for

expert medical evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that the psychiatric evidence was hearsay

character evidence and therefore inadmissible. Lord Justice Lawton, delivering the

judgment, stated that "it is not for this court to instruct psychiatrists how to draft their

reports, but those who call psychiatrists as witnesses should remember that the facts upon

641 Id.

642 Id, at 834.

273
which they base their opinions must be proved by admissible evidence. This elementary

principle is frequently overlooked".643

The Court of Appeal held that:

Before a court can assess the value of an opinion it must

know the facts upon which it is based. If the expert has been
misinformed about the facts or has taken irrelevant facts into
consideration or has omitted to consider relevant ones, the
opinion is likely to be valueless. In our judgment, counsel
calling an expert should in examination in chief ask his
witness to state the facts upon which his opinion is based. It
is wrong to leave the other side to elicit the facts by cross-
examination. 644

On the issue of whether the psychiatric evidence was relevant to the facts of the case, the ',1'
!'II'

Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial judge's ruling that it was irrelevant. Lord Justice

Lawton stated that:

In our judgment the psychiatrist's OpInIOn was relevant.

Relevance, however, does not result in evidence being
admissible: it is a condition precedent to admissibility. Our
law excludes evidence of many matters which in life outside
the courts sensible people take into consideration when
making decisions. Two broad heads of exclusion are hearsay
and opinion. As we have already pointed out, the
psychiatrist's report contained a lot of hearsay which was
inadmissible. A ruling on this ground, however, would
merely have trimmed the psychiatrist's evidence: it would
not have excluded it altogether. Was it inadmissible because
of the rules relating to opinion evidence? 645

643 Id, at 840.

644
Id.

645 Id, at 841.

274
The Court of Appeal stated that the foundation of these rules was laid down in Folkes v.

Chadd. It was held "that, since the question whether the defendant was suffering from a

mental illness as defined by the Mental Health Act 1958 was not in issue, the psychiatric

evidence that the defendant was not suffering from a mental illness although admissible,

was irrelevant and had been rightly excluded,,646. Lord Justice Lawton said:

We all know that both men and women who are deeply in
love can, and sometimes do, have outbursts of blind rage
when discovering unexpected wantonness on the part of their
loved ones: the wife taken in adultery is the classical example
of the application of the defence of "provocation"; and when
death or serious injury results, profound grief usually
follows. Jurors do not need psychiatrists to tell them how
ordinary folk who are not suffering from any mental illness
are likely to react to the stresses and strains of life. It follows
that the proposed evidence was not admissible to establish
that the defendant was likely to have been provoked. The
same reasoning applies to its suggested admissibility on the
issue of credibility. The jury had to decide what reliance they
could put upon the defendant's evidence. He had to be
judged as someone who was not mentally disordered. This is
what juries are empanelled to do. The law assumes they can
perform their duties properly. The jury in this case did not
need, and should not have been offered, the evidence of a
psychiatrist to help decide whether the defendant's evidence
was truthful. 647

The Court of Appeal dismissed the case and concluded that "we are firmly of the opinion

that psychiatry has not yet become a satisfactory substitute for the common sense of

juries or magistrates on matters within their experience of life,,648.

646 Id, at 834.

647 Id, at 841.

648 Id, at 843.

275
In England, a technique, method or field of knowledge does not have to be generally

accepted before it can be admitted. However, it must be sufficiently established to be

reliable, before it can be admitted. This was established in R v. Robb,649 where it was held

that general acceptance was not a condition for the admissibility of expert testimony. In

this case, a phonetics lecturer was allowed by the trial court to give expert opinion on

voice identification. The expert was qualified by training and experience but in his

analysis he used a method which was not generally accepted by the majority of the

experts in the field unless it was supplemented by another form of acoustic analysis based

on physical measurements of resonance frequency. The defendant objected to the

admission of this evidence. The trial judge however, admitted the evidence. The

defendant was convicted and he appealed.

The Court of Appeal, through Lord Justice Bingham stated that the trial judge did not err

in admitting the evidence and upheld the judgment. It was also held that expert evidence

does not have to be scientific to be admitted. Lord Justice Bingham said:

Expert evidence is not limited to the core areas. Expert

evidence of fingerprinting, handwriting, and accident
reconstruction is regularly given. Opinions may be given of
the market value of land, ships, pictures, or rights. Expert
opinions may be given of the quality of commodities, or on
the literary, artistic, scientific or other merit of works alleged
to be obscene. Some of these fields are far removed from
anything which could be called a formal scientific discipline.
Yet while receiving this evidence the courts would not accept
the evidence of an astrologer, a soothsayer, a witch-doctor or
an amateur psychologist and might hesitate to receive
evidence of attributed authorship based on stylometric
analysis. 65o

649
R v. Robb, (1991) 93 Cr. App. R. 161.

650 Id, at 164.

276
It should also be noted that in R v. Stockwell,651 it was held that "one should not set one's

face against fresh developments, provided they have a proper foundation,,652.

Having examined the main rules guiding the admission of expert testimony in England,

we now examine specifically the admissibility of offender profiling evidence. In contrast

to United States, offender profiling has not been admitted by any court in England. The

first case where the prosecution sought to introduce offender profiling evidence was in R

v. Stagg,653 where the trial judge refused to admit the evidence. In Stagg, Justice Ognall

stated that there was "no authority in any common law jurisdiction to the effect that such

evidence has ever been treated as properly admissible in proof of identity,,654. The trial

judge was highly critical of the manner in which the evidence was gathered. Justice

Ognall also stated that "it was doubtful that psychological profile evidence is sufficiently

well established or 'generally accepted' as a scientific method to be received as expert

evidence. And that such a novel technique must satisfy tests such as those in Frye v. US

(1923) and Daubert v. Merrell Dow (1993)". Justice Ognall further stated that he "would

not wish to give encouragement either to investigating or prosecuting authorities to

construct or seek to supplement their cases on this kind of basis,,655. Following the

rejection of the evidence, the case collapsed. There was no full trial. There has been no

attempt since then by any party to introduce such evidence in the English courtroom. This

651 R v. Stockwell, (1993) Cr. App.R. 260.

652 Lord Taylor C.J., in R v. Stockwell, (1993) Cr. App.R. 260,264

653 supra at 51,52,277.

654 R v. Stagg, Central Criminal Court, 14 September, 1994

655 Id.

277
leads us to the question - How will English courts receive offender profiling evidence in

future?

Lord Taylor, the Lord Chief Justice of England is not in support of the admission of

offender profiling in the courtroom. In a lecture delivered to the British Academy of

Forensic Science on November 1, 1994, Lord Taylor echoed the problems with the

proliferation of experts in court and was critical of the introduction of offender profiling

evidence in courtS. 656 Lord Taylor called on experts to maintain integrity and clarity, and

he said:

Sometimes, however, although helpful in criminal

investigation, a technique may not produce admissible
evidence. So-called 'personality profiling' is an example:
used properly, this technique can be of great assistance in
helping the police to target their investigative work upon a
limited number oflikely suspects.

But we must not confuse such techniques, or their results,

with evidence admissible in a court of law. The rules of
criminal evidence have grown up gradually over many years.
Some of them, particularly the embargo on hearsay, are now
of dubious value and I hope will soon be extensively
reformed as the Royal Commission has recommended. But
the rules have grown up in response to the essential need to
ensure that the material which is considered by the jury is
only that which, as a matter of logic, actually tends to
demonstrate guilt or innocence, not that which creates a
suspicion and therefore, invites the making of assumptions
for which there is no proper basis. The rules exist to ensure
that a conviction of a criminal offence is founded upon fact
not guesswork or conjecture. They afford vital protection of
our freedom under the law. 657

656Rt. Hon. Lord Taylor of Gosforth, "The Lund Lecture", Medicine, Science and the Law, Vol. 35, No.1,
January 1995, at 3.

657 Id.

278
Professor Ormerod maintained that if offender profiling evidence is introduced in English

courts in future, that the two hurdles of the law of evide;nce have to be overcome -

relevance and admissibility,658 He argued that the profile must render the facts more

probable or less probable before it is legally relevant. He also noted that "English courts

have, in recent years, adopted a strict interpretation of relevance in relation to both

prosecution and defence evidence,,659, Professor Ormerod contended that a typical profile

contains much information and that not all of the information will be relevant to any

given case,660

It has also been argued that in England, profile evidence will be excluded as being

insufficiently relevant, unreliable, prejudicial and unscientific,661 Ormerod and Sturman

argued that ''unless a profiler can show that psychology can support with sufficient

strength a claim that he can reliably and consistently identify behavioural traits from

scenes of crime and related information the evidence would lack a reliable foundation,

and the English courts would rule it inadmissible,,662, Professor Ormerod concluded that

"the prosecutor seeking to rely on a profile (if such a thing exists) or even part of a profile

658 Ormerod, supra note 412, at 867.

659 Id.

66° Id.

661 Ormerod and Sturman, supra note 414, at 182.

662 Id, at 184.

279
will have to navigate his way through practically all the most difficult rules of

evidence,,663. Professor Ormerod further maintained that:

The rules of evidence also present difficulties for the criminal

psychologist. If involved in the presentation of the case the
criminal psychologist will have to face extensive questioning
as to his expertise, the reliability of his methodology and
working practices, the availability of alternative
methodologies and their success rates. There would also be
the inevitably detailed and testing questions in the light of
evidence provided by the opposing party's own criminal
psychologist who will have cast doubt on the methodology,
the interpretations etc. In addition, the psychologist will have
been constrained by the evidential rules even before setting
foot in court. The hearsay rule will inhibit reliance on data
even though it may be the most reliable available, the
provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 will
also necessitate the proof of computer reliability.

In the case of a prosecution profile, the story does not end

there. In the event that all of these problems are overcome by
both the psychologist and the prosecutor, the court may still
exclude the evidence, in its discretion, on the ground that it
would be unfair to the accused. 664

Professor Ormerod further argued that English courts will exclude offender profiling

evidence because of its extreme prejudice. He contended that "the prejudice contained in

a profile will in almost all cases exceed the limited probative value of such an

opinion,,665. Ormerod contended that offender profiling evidence will not be accorded

much weight by the trier of fact because of its unreliability. Hence, "in any future trial in

663 David Ormerod, "Criminal Profiling: Trial by Judge and Jury, not Criminal Psychologist", in D. Canter
(ed) Profiling in Policy and Practice, 242 (1999)

664 Id, at 243.

665 Ormerod, supra note 412, at 877.

280
which is sought to adduce psychological profile evidence, these problems of reliability

will be a hotly contested issue,,666.

In fact, there are three main areas where offender profiling evidence is likely to be ruled

inadmissible if it is introduced in a future trial in England. First, and as we have noted

throughout this research, offender profiling is a technique without any adequate, reliable

or objective foundation at the moment. As such, English courts will likely rule it

inadmissible based on the Turner rule which requires that expert evidence must be based

on facts which can themselves be proved by admissible evidence. If offender profiling

evidence is introduced again in an English court, the trial judge is also likely to draw on

United states court decisions that have rejected the evidence. English courts will likely

adopt the decision in State v. Cavallo,667 where the Supreme Court of New Jersey held

that "until the scientific reliability of this type of evidence is established, it is not

admissible,,668.

The extreme prejudicial effect of offender profiling evidence is also another area where it

is likely to be excluded in future trials in England. Indeed as Professor Ormerod and

Sturman have pointed out "the prejudicial effect includes risks that the jurors could:

convict a defendant on the basis of the characteristic alone (where it is reprehensible);

assign a disproportionate weight to the evidence of the characteristic; deny the accused

666 Id, at 870.

667 supra at 224.

668 State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508, 529, 443 A.2d 1020 (1982).

281
the benefit of doubt and convict on less than the full standard of proof; and the police

could be inclined to 'round up the usual suspects",669.

Above all, where the manner and methods of offender profiling were questionable, a trial

judge will apply Section 78 of PACE (Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984), and

exclude the evidence. This is one rule that may be applied to exclude offender profiling

evidence in any future trial in English courts. Under Section 78 of PACE, a judge is

allowed to exclude evidence "if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the

circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would
I.
, I

have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to I,

admit it":

In England, expert testimony on any form of offender profiling is not likely to be

excluded merely on the hearsay rule. There are many exceptions to the rule. In fact, in R

v. Abadom,670 it was held that once the primary facts on which an opinion is based have

been proved by admissible evidence, the expert is entitled to draw on the work of others

as part of arriving at his own conclusions. This was also supported in English Exporters

(London) v. Eldonwall Limited. 671 Professor U glow also maintained that "where the

primary information consists mainly or entirely of hearsay, the judge would be justified

in warning the jury about the flimsiness of any foundation for that opinion". 672

669 Ormerod and Sturman, supra note 414, at 185.

670 R v. Abadom, [1983} 1 WLR 126.

671 English Exporters (London) v. Eldonwall Limited, [1973} Ch. 415, Chancery Division.
672
Uglow, supra note 173, at 623.

282
In the final analysis, one can safely say that in England, there are more rules and reasons

supporting the exclusion of offender profiling evidence than are rules or reasons for its

admission. Offender profiling deals with character traits, is too prejudicial than probative,

not based on any reliable or objective data at the moment and Section 78 of PACE gives

judges the wide discretion to exclude such evidence that is unfair to an accused.

Canada

Canada is a close neighbor of United States. It is not surprising therefore, that some

forms of offender profiling have been admitted in Canadian courtrooms. There is general

disagreement amongst scholars as to whether there is a specific rule governing the

admissibility of expert evidence in Canada. As Professor Bernstein has pointed out,

"most courts have adopted some version of a reliability test, while a minority apply the

general acceptance test".673 Arguably, the main rule governing the admissibility of expert

evidence in Canada today was laid down in R v. Mohan,674 where the Supreme Court of

Canada laid down four factors that should be examined when faced with a decision to

admit or exclude expert evidence. Prior to Mohan, two court rulings provided some

673David E. Bernstein, "Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth", 21 Yale 1. Int'} L. 123,
140 (Winter 1996).

674 R v. Mohan, 89 C. C. C 3d 402 (1994); 114 D.L.R (4th) 419; 1994 D.L.R LEXIS 1297.

283
guidelines to trial judges. The first is R v. Beland, 675 a case that involved the admissibility

of polygraph. In this case, the defendant offered polygraph evidence but the prosecution

argued that it should be excluded because it has not reached an acceptable standard of

reliability. Delivering the judgment, Justice McIntyre stated that "even the finding of a

significant percentage of error in the results of a polygraph would not by itself, be

sufficient to exclude it as an instrument for use in courts,,676. The second case is R v.

Lavellee,677 where evidence of battered woman syndrome was ruled admissible.

Delivering the opinion, Justice Wilson stated that expert evidence is admissible if it was

beyond the common experience and knowledge of jurors. Concurring, Justice Sopinka

said that expert opinion should be based on forms of enquiry and practice accepted within

the expertise. 678

In Mohan, the defendant, Dr. Chikmaglur Mohan, a pediatrician was charged with four

counts of sexual assault of four of his patients. The patients, all females, were aged

between thirteen and sixteen at the time of the assaults. The assaults took place at the

defendant's medical office. 679 "The alleged assaults consisted of fondling of the girls'

breasts and digital penetration and stimulation of their vaginal areas, accompanied by

intrusive questioning of them as to their sexual activities. All of the complainants testified

675 R v. Beland, [1987] 2 S. CR. 398.

676 Id, at 417.

677 R v. Lavallee, 55 CCC 3d 97 (1990).

678 Id, at 132.

679
R v. Mohan, 114 DLR (4 Ih) 419; 1994 DLR LEXIS 1297.

284
that the respondent did not wear gloves while examining them internally. The respondent,

who testified in his own defence, denied the complainants' evidence,,68o.

At the trial, the defence sought to introduce a psychiatrist, Dr. Hill, "who would testify

that the perpetrator of the offences alleged to have been committed would be part of a

limited and unusual group of individuals and that the respondent did not fall within that

narrow class because he did not possess the characteristics belonging to that group,,681.

Dr. Hill stated that he had interviewed and treated three doctors who were accused of

sexual assault of their patients. He also stated that based on a psychological profile, the

likely offender in the first three sexual assaults was likely to be a pedophile, and that the

perpetrator of the fourth sexual assault was likely to be a sexual psychopath. 682

In the voir dire, Dr. Hill, the expert, began his testimony by
explaining that there are three general personality groups that
have unusual personality traits in terms of their psychological
profile perspective. The first group encompasses the
psychosexual who suffers from major mental illnesses (e.g.,
schizophrenia) and engages in inappropriate sexual behaviour
occasionally. The second and largest group contains the sexual
deviation types. This group of individuals shows distinct
abnormalities in terms of the choice of individuals with whom
they report excitement and with whom they would like to
engage in some type of sexual activity. The third group is that
of the sexual psychopaths. These individuals have a callous
disregard for people around them, including a disregard for the
consequences of their sexual behaviour towards other
individuals. Another group would include pedophiles who gain
sexual excitement from young adolescents, probably pubertal
or post-pubertal. 683

680
Id.

681 Id.

682 R v. Mohan, 89 C. C. C 3d 402 (J 994); 114 DL.R (4th) 419, 423; 1994 DLR LEXIS 1297.

683 Id.

285
Dr. Hill stated that pedophiles and sexual psychopaths constitute an unusual and limited

class of individuals. Dr. Hill stated that he was of the opinion that Mohan does not

possess the characteristics of pedophiles or sexual psychopaths and so would not have

sexually assaulted the four victims. The trial judge, Justice Bernstein, ruled that the

testimony was inadmissible. Justice Bernstein stated that the testimony was unnecessary

and that the jury could decide for themselves. Justice Bernstein said:

The evidence of Doctor Hill is not sufficient, I believe, to

establish that doctors who commit sexual assaults on patients
are in a significantly more limited group in psychiatric terms
than are other members of society. There is no scientific data
available to warrant that conclusion. A sample of three
offenders is not a sufficient basis for such a conclusion. Even
the allegations of the fourth complainant are not so unusual, as
sex offenders go, to warrant a conclusion that the perpetrator
must have belonged to a sufficiently narrow class. 684

Justice Bernstein concluded that "if the evidence was received as proposed, it would

merely be character evidence of a type that is inadmissible as going beyond evidence of

general reputation, and does not fall within the proper sphere of expert evidence". Mohan

was convicted and sentenced to nine months imprisonment on each count, concurrently

and two years probation. 685

The defendant appealed and the Crown also appealed arguing that the sentence was too

light. At the Ontario Court of Appeal,686 Finlayson J.A. ruled that the trial judge erred by

684 Id, at 425.

685 Id, at 423.

686 R v. Mohan, (1992) 8 o.R. 3d 173.

286
excluding the testimony by Dr. Hill. Justice Finyalson stated that the testimony was

admissible on two basis.

On the first basis, given that similar fact evidence was

admitted showing that the acts compared are so unusual and
strikingly similar that their similarities cannot be attributed to
coincidence, Dr. Hill's testimony was admissible to show
that the offences alleged were unlikely to have been
committed by the same person.

On the second basis, it was admissible to show that the

respondent was not a member of either the unusual groups of
aberrant personalities which could have committed the
offences alleged. 687

Justice Finyalson also stated that the trial judge's conclusion was based on a

misapprehension of the evidence. Justice Finyalson further stated that in his view, the

expert did not base his opinion only on the three cases with three doctors, but based his

opinion on all of his experience. 688 The Court of Appeal therefore, reversed the judgment

and remanded for a new trial.

The case reached the Supreme Court of Canada, where Justice Sopinka stated that "on the

basis of the principles relating to exceptions to the character evidence rule and under the

principles governing the admissibility of expert evidence, the limitations on the use of

this type of evidence require that the evidence in this case be excluded,,689. The Supreme

Court of Canada held that the admission of expert evidence depends on the application of

687 R v. Mohan, 89 C.C.C 3d 402 (1994);114 D.L.R (4th) 419, 426; 1994 D.L.R LEXIS 1297.

688 Id, at 426.

689 Id, at 427.

287
the following criteria - (a) relevance; (b) necessity in assisting the trier of fact; (c) the

absence of any exclusionary rule; and (d) a properly qualified expert. 690

On the relevance of expert evidence, Justice Sopinka stated that:

Relevance is a threshold requirement for the admission of

expert evidence as with all other evidence. Relevance is a
matter to be decided by a judge as question of law. Although
prima facie admissible if so related to a fact in issue that it
tends to establish it, that does not end the inquiry. This
merely determines the logical relevance of the evidence.
Other considerations enter into the decision as to
admissibility. This further inquiry may be described as a cost
benefit analysis, that is "whether its value is worth what it
costs": ... Cost in this context is not used in its traditional
economic sense but rather in terms of its impact on the trial
process. Evidence that is otherwise logically relevant may be
excluded on this basis, if its probative value is overborne by
its prejudicial effect, if it involves an inordinate amount of
time which is not commensurate with its value or if it is
misleading in the sense that its effect on the trier of fact,
particularly a jury, is out of proportion to its reliability.691

Justice Sopinka further stated that "in summary, therefore, it appears from the foregoing

that expert evidence which advances a novel scientific theory or technique is subjected to

special scrutiny to determine whether it meets a basic threshold of reliability and whether

it is essential in the sense that the trier of fact will be unable to come to a satisfactory

conclusion without the assistance of the expert. The closer the evidence approaches an

opinion on an ultimate issue, the stricter the application of this principle,,692.

690 Id.

691 Id.

692 Id, at 431.

288
Addressing the issue of expert evidence as to disposition, Justice Sopinka stated that in

his opinion,

In order to be relevant on the issue of identity the evidence must

tend to show that the accused shared a distinctive unusual
behavioral trait with the perpetrator of the crime. The trait must
be sufficiently distinctive that it operates virtually as a badge or
mark identifying the perpetrator.

Conversely, the fact that the accused is a member of an abnormal

group some of the members which have the unusual behavioral
characteristics shown to have been possessed by the perpetrator
is not sufficient. In some cases it may, however, be shown that
all members of the group have the distinctive unusual
characteristics. If a reasonable inference can be drawn that the
accused has these traits then the evidence is relevant subject to
the trial judge's obligation to exclude it if its prejudicial effect
outweighs its probative value. The greater the number of persons
in society having these tendencies, the less relevant the evidence
on the issue of identity and the more likely that its prejudicial
effect predominates over its probative value. 693

The Supreme Court of Canada also held that:

"Psychiatric evidence with respect to the personality traits or disposition of an accused, or

another is admissible provided:

(a) the evidence is relevant to some issue in the case;

(b) the evidence is not excluded by a policy rule;

(c) the evidence falls within the proper sphere of expert evidence.

693 Id.

289
One of purposes for which psychiatric evidence may be admitted is to prove identity

when that is an issue in the case, since psychical as well as physical characteristics may

be relevant to identify the perpetrator of the crime".694

"Psychiatric evidence with respect to the personality traits or disposition of the accused,

or another, if it meets the three conditions of admissibility above set out, is also

admissible, however, as bearing on the probability of the accused, or another, having

committed the offence".695 Justice Sopinka further stated that "where the crime under

consideration does not have features which indicate that the perpetrator was a member of

an abnormal group, psychiatric evidence that the accused has a normal mental make-up

but does not have a disposition for violence or dishonesty or other relevant traits

frequently found in ordinary people is inadmissible. The psychiatric evidence in the

circumstances postulated is not relevant on the issue of identity to exclude the accused as

the perpetrator any more than the possession of violent or dishonest tendencies by the

accused or a third person would be admissible to identify the accused or the third person

as the perpetrator of the crime".696

The Supreme Court of Canada therefore reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal

and upheld the trial court's ruling.

694 Id, at 435.

695 Id.

696 Id.

290
In R v. Ranger,697the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that the trial judge erred by admitting

expert testimony on crime scene staging, where the expert went into 'criminal profiling'.

On August 16, 1995, two sisters Marsha (19) and Tamara Ottey (16) were stabbed to

death in their home in Scarborough. The defendant, Rohan Ranger and his cousin Adrian

Kinkead were charged with the murders. The defendants were tried and convicted

separately. Marsha was the Ranger's girlfriend but she ended the relationship because the

defendant was very possessive and abusive. The Crown claimed that Ranger refused to

accept that the relationship was over and that Ranger killed Marsha after he heard that

Marsha was moving to United States to start college. The prosecution claimed that

Ranger killed Marsha because "ifhe could not have her, nobody else can,,698.

The defendant claimed that he was not in the house at the time of the murders and that

Kinkead committed the murders. Police investigation showed that the house was

ransacked but only three items belonging to Marsha were taken. The three items were a

gold necklace given to Marsha by the defendant, a videotape of Marsha playing soccer

and Marsha's electronic organizer. 699 The Crown therefore, decided to call a crime scene

reconstruction expert and criminal profiling expert, who testified that the crime scene was

staged and made to look like a burglary. The expert, Detective Inspector Kathryn Lines

(Manager of the Behavioral Sciences Section of the Ontario Provincial Police) testified

that the crime scene was staged by "someone who had an association or relationship with

697 R v. Ranger, 178 c.c.c. (3d) 375; 2003 c.c.c. LEXIS 265.
698 Id, at 378.

699 Id.

291
the victim, M., and who had a particular interest in M. 's possessions".7oo Detective

Inspector Lines stated that she based her opinion on the crime scene photographs, crime

scene videotapes, police reports and autopsy reports.

At the trial, several witnesses testified for the Crown. Kinkead also testified for the

Crown. The Crown also introduced evidence of the defendant's trip to Jamaica in January

1996, where he overstayed and was arrested. The defense argued that the evidence should

be excluded because it was prejudicial. Five witnesses also testified that they saw a man

fitting the description of the defendant near the victims' home around 7.30 am on the day

of the murder and the day before the murders. The defendant on the other hand,

introduced a security video tape showing that he was at a shopping mall at 8.08am on the

day of the murder. It should be noted that the time of death of the victims was given as

7.30am. The prosecution contended that the defendant created a false alibi by going to the

shopping mall so that he can be captured on the security video camera. 701

The defense argued that the expert testimony by Detective Inspector Lines should not be

admitted. They argued that the jury did not need expert assistance to determine whether

the crime scene was staged or not. That the expert evidence by Detective Lines was not

required since the crime scene photographs and videotapes had already been provided to

the court by Detective Ian Mann.

700 Id.

701 Id, at 379.

292
The trial judge ruled that the expert evidence was admissible and he said: "I am satisfied

that opinion evidence is needed in this case in the sense that it will likely provide

information that is outside the experience and knowledge of the jury. The factual issue of

whether a break and entry is authentic or staged is not likely to be a subject within the

common knowledge of the jurors. This, of course, is subject to the Crown qualifying the

proposed expert as an expert in this particular area".702 Detective Inspector Lines was

qualified by the court as an expert on crime scene staging and her testimony was

admitted.

The defendants were convicted. Ranger was convicted of first degree murder for the

death of Marsha and convicted of manslaughter for the death of Tamara. He appealed,

arguing that he received an unfair trial. He contended that the trial judge erred by

admitting the unscientific expert evidence by Detective Inspector Lines; that the trial

judge erred by admitting evidence of his arrest in Jamaica; and that the trial judge's

instructions to the jury were insufficient. The defendant also argued that the expert

evidence did not meet the reliability or necessity criteria as required by the Supreme

Court decision in Mohan.

At the Court of Appeal, Charron J .A, ruled that the trial judge erred and that there were

five errors. Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Charron said: "". Detective

Inspector Lines's testimony was not confined to the opinion that the crime scene was

staged. Notwithstanding the Crown's assurance that he would not elicit evidence relating

to motivation, Detective Inspector Lines' examination-in-chief included an opinion about

702 Id, at 388.

293
the motivation of the perpetrator for staging the scene and a description of the most likely

suspects as someone who had a particular interest in Marsha Ottey". 703

Justice Charron restated the fact that the Mohan requirements must be satisfied and she

said; "The party seeking to introduce expert opinion evidence must meet four criteria:

relevance, necessity, the absence of any other exclusionary rule, and a properly qualified

expert. Even where these requirements are met, the evidence may be rejected if its

prejudicial effect on the conduct of the trial outweighs its probative value. The first two

criteria and the assessment of whether the probative value outweighs the prejudicial

effect also include an inquiry into the reliability of the proposed evidence". 704

Justice Charron also stated that the Mohan criteria applies on a case by case basis. Justice

Charron further stated that "Detective Inspector Lines' testimony, from the outset, went

far beyond the scope of properly admissible evidence and, eventually, profiling that, in

my view, was clearly inadmissible". Furthermore, "the manner in which the crime scene

evidence was packaged for the jury in this case exemplifies the usual dangers associated

with expert opinion evidence".70s Justice Charron stated that:

In this case, Detective Inspector Lines' opinions about the

perpetrator's likely motivation for staging the crime scene
and his characteristics as a person associated with the victims
and having a particular interest in Marsha constituted
evidence of criminal profiling. Criminal profiling is a novel
field of scientific evidence, the reliability of which was not

703 Id, at 390.

704 Id, at 394.

705 Id, at 398.

294
 demonstrated at trial. To the contrary, it would appear from
her limited testimony about the available verification of
opinions in her field of work that her opinions amounted to
no more than educated guesses. As such, her criminal
profiling evidence was inadmissible. The criminal profiling
evidence also approached the ultimate issue in this case and,
hence, was highly prejudicial. The prejudice was further
heightened by the limits placed on defence counsel's cross-
examination and by the prominence that the trial judge gave
to Detective Inspector Lines' evidence in his charge. 706

Charron J.A, also ruled that the evidence about the defendant's trip and arrest in Jamaica

was of no probative value and was very prejudicial. The Court of Appeal concluded that

the errors were harmful and remanded for a new trial.

In R v. Clark, 707 the Court of Appeal for Ontario ruled that expert evidence on crime

scene staging was admissible even though it went into criminal profiling. This is quite in

contrast with its prior decision in Ranger discussed above. On December 26, 1995, the

bodies of William Tweed and his wife Phyllis were found in their home in Thornhill,

Ontario. They have been stabbed to death. Police investigators suspected that the

perpetrator had staged the crime scene to show forced entry and burglary. The defendant,

Clark, was the main suspect. Investigations showed that a few weeks before the murders

that Clark had stolen the victims' credit card and used it to buy an engagement ring for

his girlfriend. 708 It should be noted that the defendant lived with his grandmother near the

Tweeds and that his grandmother was very close to the Tweeds. The defendant also visits

706 Id, at 405.

707 R v. Clark, 69 OR. (3d) 321; 2004 Onto Rep. LEXIS 25.

708 Id, at 325.

295
the Tweeds regularly as he helps them out with some odd jobs. They were so close that

the Tweeds gave his grandmother a duplicate key to their house to keep in case of

emergency. 709

It should be pointed out that blood stains found on the defendant's pants matched Mr.

Tweed's DNA. Furthermore, while he was in custody, the defendant confided in his cell

mate (an undercover police officer), Sergent Matthews, that he stabbed the Tweeds and

that he could not understand how the police were still able to detect blood on his pants

because he had washed the pants after the murders.71 0

The defendant admitted stealing the credit card but denied the murders. He stated that

another man, Marcel Whyte committed the murders. 711 At the trial, the Crown called a

crime scene reconstruction expert to testify. Detective Inspector Kathryn Lines stated that

the crime scene examination revealed elements of crime scene staging and that one

individual was responsible for the murders. She stated that she based her opinion on the

crime scene photographs, crime scene videotapes, personal visit to the house, police

reports and autopsy reports. Detective Inspector Lines testified that the crime scene had

been staged to look like a burglary, and that the killer was "someone who had some

knowledge or relationship with the victims and some knowledge of the layout of their

apartment".712 She also stated that it was a blitz-attack and that the victims were sleeping

709 Id, at 326.

710 Id, at 327.

711 Id, at 331.

712 Id, at 322.

296
 at the time they were killed. In his ruling, Justice Peter Howden admitted the evidence.

The defendant was convicted of two counts of murder and he appealed.

Among other claims, the defendant argued that the expert testimony by Detective

Inspector Lines should not have been admitted because it was unnecessary, unreliable

and too prejudicial than probative. The defendant also argued that much of the testimony

by Detective Inspector Lines constituted inadmissible criminal profiling evidence.

Delivering the opinion of the Court of Appeal, Justice Moldaver ruled that the trial judge

did not err in admitting the expert evidence. Justive Moldaver however, stated that a

small amount of the evidence was impermissible criminal profiling evidence, but the

small amount could not have affected the outcome. The Court of Appeal held that:

A properly qualified expert in crime scene analysis can offer

opinion evidence about what occurred at the crime scene and how
the crime was committed (crime scene reconstruction evidence).
Crime scene reconstruction evidence is potentially admissible. Its
ultimate acceptance or rejection will depend on whether it
conforms with the rules that govern the admissibility of expert
evidence in general. In respect of crime scene reconstruction
evidence, the following three areas will generally require close
attention: whether the evidence is necessary in the sense that it is
likely to fall outside the knowledge or normal experience of the
average juror; whether the opinion is reliable in the sense that it is
anchored in the evidence and not the product of guesswork or
speculation; and whether there is a real danger that the jury will be
overwhelmed by the evidence and give it more weight than it
deserves. Crime scene reconstruction evidence is to be contrasted
with expert evidence offered to explain why the crime was
committed in a particular manner (the perpetrator's motivation)
more particularly, who is more likely to have committed the crime

I ("criminal profiling evidence"). Criminal profiling evidence will

generally be inadmissible, as criminal profiling is a novel field of
scientific evidence and often appears to be based on nothing more
than educated guesses. In this case, the police officer's evidence

297
 that the crime scene was staged was properly admitted, as was her
evidence as to how the crime was committed. She was qualified to
express an opinion about staging and her evidence fell outside the
knowledge and experience of the average juror. Her opinion was
reliable in the sense that it was anchored in the evidence and not
the product of guesswork or speCUlation, and the evidence of
staging was not so complex or technical that the jury was likel~ to
be overwhelmed by it and give it more weight than it deserved. 13

Justice Moldaver went on to say that the expert evidence was not an opinion on the

ultimate issue. Justice Moldver stated that there was overwhelming evidence against the

defendant that the some amount of criminal profiling could not have affected the

outcome. 714

In dismissing the appeal, Justice Moldaver stated that the crime scene reconstruction

evidence was properly admitted even though it contained some amount of criminal

profiling evidence. This is quite in contrast with the Court's earlier ruling in Ranger on

the admissibility of criminal profiling evidence. This case also supports our call for extra

judicial control in all cases involving offender profiling or its derivatives.

Offender Profiling in Other Countries

Offender profiling is still in its infancy but it has been used in criminal investigations in a

few countries, including Australia, Finland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Russia and South

713 Id, at 323.

714 Id.

298
Africa. This does not mean that it has been admitted in the courtroom. In Australia,

offender profiling per se has not been admitted in any court. There has been no major

court decision banning the reception of offender profiling evidence in courts. Under the

Australian rules of evidence, expert testimony is admissible if it is relevant to the facts at

issue and not excluded by other evidence rules, such as the expertise rule, the common

knowledge rule, the factual basis rule and the ultimate issue rule. Generally speaking, and

as Petherick et al have pointed out, "the rules of expert evidence in Australia allow for

profiling as expert testimony, even if only in a limited fashion, perhaps in some lower

levels of the criminal justice system. As profiling receives more attention through

practical application and academic literature, it stands to reason that it will receive a

greater chance of being accepted in court".715

In Finland, offender profiling is only used in crime investigations. It is not admissible in

courts. Courts see offender profiling and its derivatives as an aid to crime investigation,

not admissible evidence. In Netherlands, the Criminal Investigative analysis/FBI

approach has been adopted, and is done by the Offender Profiling Unit of the National

Intelligence Division of the National Police Agency.

As we mentioned earlier, offender profiling technique is still in its infancy, hence the

technique is not used in many countries, especially the developing countries. For

instance, in countries like Nigeria, the technique has not been used in crime investigation.

715 Wayne Petherick, David Field, Andrew Lowe and Elizabeth Fry, "Criminal Profiling as Expert
Evidence", in Wayne Petherick (ed), Serial Crime: Theoretical and Practical Issues in Behavioral Profiling,
94 (2006).

299
As such, the evidential implications of such evidence has not arisen. However, it is

important to examine how the courts will receive such evidence if offered in future trials.

Offender profiling deals with the character traits of an individual. In Nigeria, it is likely

to be seen by the courts as permissible character evidence. In Nigeria, "the general rule is

that the fact an accused has committed some other offences or other misconduct on other

previous occasions or is of bad character or reputation is not relevant in subsequent

proceedings. The rationale behind this rule is that the accused person's guilt has to be

independently proved by the prosecution. The admissibility of previous misconduct will

only go to prejudice the mind of a court. Section 69(1) of the Nigerian Evidence Act,716

provides that the fact that an accused person is of bad character is irrelevant in

subsequent proceedings, but this general rule is subject to some exceptions".717 The

exceptions are contained in Section 69(2) of the Evidence Act, which states that:

"The fact that an accused person is of bad character is relevant:

(a) when the bad character of the accused person is a fact in issue;

(b) when the accused person has given evidence of his good character;

It is noteworthy to point out that Nigeria is a former colony of Britain, hence the Nigerian

legal system is based on the English common law tradition. In fact, the Nigerian rules of

expert evidence is virtually the same as that of England. Thus, a witness must be

qualified as an expert and the opinion must be outside the experience and knowledge of

716 Evidence Act, Laws of the Federation, 1990.

717 Adah C. Eche, The Nigerian Law of Evidence, 115 (2000).

300
the judge or jury.718 In Nigeria, the general principle is that the facts upon which an

expert based his opinion must be provided. This is where offender profiling evidence will

likely be ruled inadmissible if it is to be introduced in a Nigerian court today. The

Nigerian Supreme Court will likely draw from the position of English courts on the

admissibility of offender profiling. They are also likely to state that such evidence should

not be admitted until its reliability can be established. Thus, in Dickson Arisa v. The

State,719 the Supreme Court of Nigerian ruled that opinion evidence by an expert on

mental disease/natural mental infinity had no evidential weight because the expert failed

to provide the basis for his opinion. Justice Agbaje stated that the law required that for

expert evidence to be admitted, the facts upon which the opinion was based must be

provided. Nigerian courts may not accord much weight to expert evidence where the

factual basis was not produced. 72o Furthermore, "where there are two conflicting expert

opinions, the court will rely on that of the expert who shows the data on which he based

his opinion".721 It should also be noted that in Nigeria, a technique, method or field of

knowledge does not have to be scientific before it can be admitted. In a nut shell, the

main area where offender profiling evidence is likely to be excluded in Nigeria, in future,

is the lack of reliable data upon which the technique is based. The prejudicial effect of

offender profiling will probably be another strong area for exclusion of offender profiling

evidence.

718 There is a legal provision for a jury in Nigerian, but jurors are not used. The trier of fact is the judge and
whether expert opinion will assist him is not an issue to be contested by the parties.

719 Dickson Arisa v. The State, [1988] 7 S.C.NJ (Pt.1) 76,84.

720 Adah, supra note 717, at 126.

721 Id.

301
In this chapter, we have examined the state of offender profiling in various jurisdictions.

In all jurisdictions examined in this work, the trial judge has enormous latitude to decide

who is qualified to give expert evidence and when such evidence is needed. Similarly, no

jurisdiction examined in this study requires an expert to have gained the expertise in a

certain way. An expert can be qualified by education, skill, training, or knowledge. All

jurisdictions appear to be liberal in deciding who is qualified to give expert testimony.

302
 Conclusion

Offender profiling is a crime investigation technique that is normally used when an

offender did not leave any physical traces at the scene of crime. It aims to predict the

likely characteristics of the unknown offender by looking at behavioral patterns and other

non physical clues. Profiling in general was not originally intended to be used for crime

investigation or for courtroom purpose. Offender profiling began from the early attempts

by criminologists to explain criminality and to predict criminals. It then moved on to the

next stage of using it to profile heads of states (for intelligence purposes only and not for

crime investigation). Later, psychiatrists and psychologists starting providing

psychological profiles because they felt it could assist the police to find unknown killers.

Following this stage, the FBI discovered that psychological profiles were indeed very

helpful in their pursuit of unknown serial killers, and they devoted much attention into it

and came up with their crime scene analysis approach. Today offender profiling has

become one of the most controversial, useful, but worrying technique of crime

investigation. It is submitted that we should now move on to the next stage of using

offender profiling as a crime prevention technique.

This dissertation concludes that there is an uneasy relationship among the different

segments involved with offender profiling. All the different segments/approaches to

offender profiling have a parochial view. Each segment sees offender profiling as their

own monopoly, their exclusive club. As a result, the potential of offender profiling has

been limited. Therefore the sharing of knowledge and experience is suggested. We need

303
.,..
11
an integrated approach, whereby all the segments can come together as a team. This will

also ensure that we move on to the next level of using offender profiles in producing

crime prevention measures. Psychiatrists, psychologists, criminologists, and law

enforcement agents all have a role to play, not only in crime investigations, but also in

coming up with crime prevention measures and programs. These professionals have

knowledge of the kind of individuals likely to commit certain types of crime, knowledge

of the location a particular crime is likely to happen, and knowledge about the type of

individual that is likely to be a victim of a certain type of crime. Therefore, by coming

together as a team and pulling resources together, the future of offender profiling looks

very exciting and will prove to be an invaluable technique of crime investigation and

crime prevention. As we have seen, offender profiling has not yet reached the level to be

called a hard science at the moment, but in time it will be. It has been pointed out

elsewhere that "if a technique cannot be proved, then it is not science,,722. Offender

profiling at the moment cannot be proved, therefore, it is not science.

The current lack of unity, cooperation, and absence of sharing information among the

different segments further creates a legal dilemma - how much can one convince the

courts as to the reliability and validity of offender profiling? Until all the different

segments come together as a team, the search for the scientific basis and for general

acceptance of this technique will continue to be a mirage. A way forward in the United

States, for instance, will be the establishment of a professional body for offender pro filers

where all the different professionals can come together and become members. The well-

established professional bodies can playa big role in this issue by organizing well

722 Ebisike, supra note 12, at 93.

304
publicized interdisciplinary conferences, where all the different segments should be

encouraged to attend and present papers. Such professional bodies, as the American

Psychological Association, the Academy of Forensic Sciences, and the Society for Police

and Criminal Psychology are best suited for this function. There is no gainsaying the fact

however, that offender profiling at the moment is a 'specialized field of knowledge,' that

is very useful in crime investigation. At the moment, there has been the tendency for the

different segments to publish their work in their own preferred/particular journals. This is

also hampering the potential of offender profiling.

This research study has shown that at the moment, all the different approaches base their

arguments on assumptions, inferences, on probabilities, on personal intuition, as well as

on their clinical practice experience. Suffice it to say therefore, that none of these

approaches can properly be described as being sufficiently reliable as to be used in

proving the guilt or innocence of a defendant. We have also seen that offender profiling

at best should be described as a multi-disciplinary practice that calls for knowledge and

experience in such fields as criminology, psychiatry, psychology and law enforcement.

This study supports the idea put forward by Professor David Ormerod that for offender

profiling to be easily admitted in courts, the profile should be produced by a 'profiling

team' rather than by individual profilers. We believe that courts are reluctant to accept

expert opinion of a profiler because more of it is based on personal intuition.

305
 The three main rules governing the admissibility of expert testimony in United States

have their various strengths and weaknesses. Arguably, the Frye test offers ease of

application. Trial judges do not have to become scientists to be able to decide on

scientific evidence, thereby ensuring less burden on trial judges. The Federal Rule of

Evidence 702 is too loose and too liberal. Almost anything can be admitted as expert

evidence - be it scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge. Similarly, almost

anybody can qualify as an expert under the Federal Rule of Evidence 702, either by way

of knowledge, skill, experience, training or education. Daubert has proved very

problematic in application, and is arguably not favored by many trial judges. Daubert has

raised more questions than answers.

Our examination of the three rules has shown the confusion and inconsistencies resulting

from the adoption of these three rules of admissibility. This leads to one obvious question

- is it possible to adopt one particular rule? The Frye test, the Federal Rules of Evidence

and Daubert are not constitutional constructions. As such they are not binding on the

states. The United States operates a federal system of government. Hence, the states have

always enjoyed the freedom to choose the rule they prefer. Above all, the United States

Supreme Court has not given any reason why states should adopt one particular rule.

It is hereby submitted that Frye, combined with the Federal Rules of Evidence, offers the

most appropriate standard for the admissibility of expert testimony. This is not new and

its success has been noted in Christophersen v. Allied -Signal Corp.,723 It is submitted

723 supra at 132.

306
 that the United States Supreme Court should revisit the issue and give the lower courts

and the states reasons justifying the need for the adoption of one rule. Then we can have

some sort of uniformity in judicial decisions. Then the lower courts will not face the risk

of having their decision reversed, simply because their state has adopted a rule different

from the one adopted by the federal courts.

One of the main issues surrounding the admissibility of expert testimony has been on

general acceptance. Many states are in favor of the Frye test. Interestingly, many trial

judges generally accept and prefer the Frye test. Several research studies have supported

this argument. 724 Dahir et aI, for instance, carried out a study of 325 state trial judges

(from the 50 states and the District of Columbia) and found out that there is "a strong

tendency for judges to continue to rely on more traditional standards such as general

acceptance and qualifications of the expert when assessing psychological syndrome and

profile evidence.,,725 Their study also suggests that "judges do understand some of the

less technical guidelines (i.e., general acceptance and peer review and publication) but

not the more technical ones (i.e., falsifiability and error rate), and that they prefer general

acceptance and qualifications of the expert as guidelines when determining the

admissibility of psychological evidence.,,726 The study therefore, concluded that "judges

724 See generally, Veronica B. Dahir., James T. Richardson., Gerald P. Ginsburg., Sophia I. Gatowski.,
Shirley A. Dobbin, and Mara L. Merlino, "Judicial Application of Daubert to Psychological Syndrome and
Profile Evidence", 11 Psycho!. Pub. Pol'y & L. 62, 74 (March 2005).

725 Veronica B. Dahir., James T. Richardson., Gerald P. Ginsburg., Sophia I. Gatowski., Shirley A. Dobbin,
and Mara L. Merlino, "Judicial Application of Daubert to Psychological Syndrome and Profile Evidence",
11 Psycho!. Pub. Pol'y & L. 62, 73 (March 2005).

726 Id, at 75.

I
j

J 307
...,
j
are relying on criteria and habits of analysis familiar to them (mainly Frye v. United

States's [l923) general acceptance standard, relevance, and qualifications and credibility

of the expert) even as they struggle with new ideas foisted on them from above.,,727 It

makes sense therefore, to adopt a standard which is generally accepted by trial judges as

being the appropriate standard, bearing in mind that these trial judges are the

'gatekeepers. '

Offender profiling is a multidisciplinary practice that falls under many disciplines.

Offender profiling is largely based on intuition, guesswork and speculation. At the

moment it can best be described as an art with the potential of becoming a science. When

it comes to general acceptance, offender profiling should be generally accepted as being

sufficiently reliable by the general profiling community, not just the law enforcement

community. At the moment, it is only those in the law enforcement segment/community

that see offender profiling or its derivatives as reliable techniques for courtroom

purposes. Until the different segments come together as a team, offender profiling should

not be taken as a technique that has achieved widespread recognition as to be

admittedlintroduced into the courtroom as evidence.

This research has noted that many of the experts who give testimony on offender

profiling have the tendency to flaunt their qualifications in front of the courts. The result

is that courts tend to be seduced by these impressive and sometimes "intimidating

credentials". This also results in many of these experts testifying beyond their expertise.

I 727 Id, at 78.

J 308
-r
1
1
1 What is happening today is that many of the pro filers who are supposed to be criminal

investigators have now assumed the role of criminal prosecutors. They tend to forget that

their role is to testify and not to decide cases. It is therefore, submitted that there should

be extra judicial control when dealing with expert testimony on offender profiling. In all

cases involving offender profiling, the trial judge should inform the jury at the onset that

offender profiling evidence does not identify a specific offender; that it is not

identification evidence; and that its reliability cannot be objectively ascertained at the

moment. The trial judge should limit the testimony to patterns of behavior and crime

scene characteristics, which in some cases may assist the trier of fact in understanding the

circumstances of a case. It is worrying that in some cases, profile testimony has even

been admitted by trial courts, when it was clearly irrelevant to the case, as in United

States v. Baldwin. 728 There should be a jury instruction in all cases involving offender

profiling and its derivatives. The trial judge should inform the jury about the level of

reliability and validity of this technique. This will help them to determine the weight (if

any) that should be accorded to the testimony.

The above problem has been compounded by the Federal Rule of Evidence 702 which as

we have found out in this study is too liberal. Almost anybody can qualify as an expert

either by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education. Offender profiling as we

have seen falls under a specialized field of knowledge, but Rule 702 has created problems

for trial judges when deciding who is qualified to give expert offender profiling

testimony.

728 United States v. Baldwin, 418 F.3d 575 (Ohio. 2005).

j 309
,-
1 This research has also noted that offender profiling testimony is more effective when it is

being proffered by the defendant to show innocence, than when it is being offered by the

prosecution to show that the defendant is likely to have committed the crime. This

argument merits further research though. Offender profiling is also effective when there

are co-defendants and it is being offered to show that one defendant is less likely to have

committed the crime. With offender profiling evidence, it is easier to prove innocence

than guilt, but this does not mean that it is reliable.

Offender profiling per se, is supposedly inadmissible in many jurisdictions, including the

United States and Canada. However, when it is labeled differently and dressed up in

other terms, courts have admitted it. Perhaps this is because many people including

judges do not understand what offender profiling is and the different forms or shapes of

offender profiling. Or is it that some criminal pro filers are playing on the intelligence of

judges, lawyers and jurors? It is suggested that more research is needed in this area. If an

expert witness says that he or she is going to testify on 'offender profiling', it will not be

allowed, but if the same expert says he or she is going to testify on the same thing under a

different label, then it will be allowed. Two of the cases in Canada at least have clearly

highlighted this issue. There are other cases where an expert has been allowed to testify

for instance, on crime scene staging, and then had gone beyond that area and eventually

touched on the ultimate issue. It seems therefore, that in many cases, whether any form of

offender profiling will be admitted depends on the label the expert is using, not on the

content/issue involved. In United States for instance, profiling evidence on motivational

analysis has been allowed in some cases. In Canada on the other hand, expert testimony

310
j
 on motivational analysis is supposedly not allowed, but when it is dressed up as

testimony on crime scene reconstruction analysis, then it may be admitted. Who is

fooling who?

After a critical examination of issues and several cases we conclude that offender

profiling is not sufficiently reliable as to be admissible. It is also submitted that offender

profiling is too prejudicial than probative. The findings of this research also supports my

claim that there is an uneasy relationship among the different segments involved with

offender profiling. As a result, the potential of this technique has been limited. There are

doubts as to the reliability and validity of this technique. It is submitted that offender

profiling should not be used in the courtroom until its reliability can be properly and

objectively ascertained. The guessing game of offender profiling should not be played in

the courtroom. Offender profiling and its derivatives should not be admitted until their

reliability can be objectively ascertained. Offender profiling is a technique based on

probabilities and we conclude that no individual should be convicted on probability.

I
311
j
 Table of Cases

Brunson v. State ............................................................... 186, 196,219

Christophersen v. Allied Signal Corp. . .................................................. 132

Coppolino v. State ........................................................................... 116

Comet v. State ................................................................................ 105

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc ...................................... 138, 139

Dickson v. The State ........................................................................ 301

Dillion v. State ................................................................................ 190

English Exporters (London) v. Eldonwall Limited ...................................... 282

Folkes v. Chadd .............................................................................. 268

Frye v. United States ................................................................... 102, 103

General Electric Co. v. Joiner ............................................................... 151

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael ............................................................. 156

Penson v. State ................................................................................ 181

People v. Kelly ............................................................................... 108

People v. Leahy .............................................................................. 148

People v. Robbie ............................................................................. 196

Reed v. State ............................................................................ 110, 121

R v. Abadom .................................................................................. 282

R v. Beland .................................................................................... 284

R v. Clark ...................................................................................... 295

R v. Lavallee .................................................................................. 284

312
 R v. Mohan ..................................................................................... 283

R v. Ranger ..................................................................................... 291

R v. Robb ....................................................................................... 276

R v. Stagg .............................................................................. 51,52,277

R v. Stockwell ................................................................................... 277

R v. Turner ....................................................................................... 271

Sanders v. State ................................................................................. 183

Simmons v. State ........................................................................... 202, 220

State v. Armstrong ............................................................................... 216

State v. Cavallo ............................................................................. 224, 281

State v. Fortin .................................................................................... 237

State v. Haynes ............................................................................. 167,218

State v. Kersting ................................................................................. 131

State v. Lowe .................................................................................... 227

State v. Parkinson .......................................................................... 178, 219

State v. Pennell ................................................................................... 224

State v. Porter ..................................................................................... 211

State v. Roquemore ........................................................................ 172, 196

State v. Sorabella ................................................................................. 209

State v. Stevens ................................................................................... 230

United States v. Addison .................................................................. 106, 110

United States v. Baldwin ........................................................................ 309

United States v. Downing ....................................................................... 130

313
j
United States v. Smith ............................................................. ············· .129

United States v. Webb ...................................................................... 199, 219

314
 Bibliography

Ainsworth, B. P., Offender Profiling and Crime Analysis; Devon, Willan Publishing,
(2001).

Alison, L., Bennell, C., Mokros, A., and Ormerod, D., "The Personality Paradox in
Offender Profiling: A Theoretical Review of the Process Involved in Deriving
Background Characteristics from Crime Scene Actions", 8 Psychology, Public Policy and
Law; 115 - 135 (2002).

Alison, L., Smith, M., Eastman, 0., and Rainbow, L, "Interpreting the Accuracy of
Offender Profiles"; 9 Psychology, Crime and Law, 185 -195 (2003).

Alison, L. J., Smith, M., Eastman 0., and Rainbow, L., "Toulmin's Philosophy of
Argument and its Relevance to Offender Profiling"; 9 Psychology, Crime and Law, 173-
183, (2003).

Alison, L., West, A., and Goodwill, A., "The Academic and the Practitioner: Pragmatists'
Views of Offender Profiling"; 10 Psychology, Public Policy and Law, 71 -100,
(March/June 2004).

Alison, L., (Eds.), The Forensic Psychologist's Casebook: Psychological Profiling and
Criminal Investigation; Devon, Willan Publishing, (2005).

Allen, J. R., "Expertise and the Daubert Decision"; The Journal o/Criminal Law and
Criminology, Volume 84, Number 4., 1157 - 1175, (1993-94).

Atikian, M. K., "Nasty Medicine: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Applied
to a Hypothetical Medical Malpractice Case; 27 Loyola Los Angeles Law Review, 1513-
1557, (June 1994).

Ault, R. L., and Reese, J. T., "A Psychological Assessment of Crime Profiling"; ... FBI
Law Enforcement Bulletin, 22 - 25 (1980).

Badcock, J. R., "Developmental and Clinical Issues in Relation to Offending in the

Individual"; in J. L. Jackson., and D. A. Bekerian, Offender Profiling: Theory, Research
and Practice, Chichester, John Wiley (1997).
th
Bartol, C., Criminal Behavior: A psychosocial Approach; New Jersey, Prentice Hall, (5
ed. 1999).

Bartol, c., "Police Psychology: Then, Now and Beyond"; 23 Criminal Justice and
Behavior, 70 - 79 (1996).

315
 Bazelon, L.D., "Coping with Technology through the Legal Process"; Cornell Law
Review, volume 62, Number 5.,817 - 828, (June 1977).

Becker, R. E., and Orenstein, A., "The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years-
The Effect of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, The Need for an Advisory Committee on
the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules"; George
Washington Law Review, Volume 60, Number 4.,857 - 914, (1992).

Bennell, c., and Jones, N. J., "Between a ROC and a Hard Place: A Method for Linking
Serial Burglaries by Modus Operandi"; 2 Journal of Investigative Psychology and
offender Profiling, 23 - 41, (2005).

Bennell, C., Jones, J. N., Taylor, J. P., and Snook, B., "Validities and Abilities in
Criminal Profiling: A Critique of the Studies Conducted by Richard Kocsis and his
Colleagues"; International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology,
Volume 50, Number 3, 344 - 360, (June 2006).

Bennell, C., Corey, S., Taylor, A., and Ecker, J., "What Skills are Required for Effective
Offender Profiling? An Examination of the Relationship between Critical Thinking
Ability and Profile Accuracy"; Paper Presented at the 35 th Annual Conference of the
Society for Police and Criminal Psychology, Washington/Chevy Chase Maryland,
(October, 2006).

Bernstein, E. D., "Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, Present, and the Future of the General
Acceptance Test"; 41 Jurimetrics Journal, 385 - 407, (Spring 2001).

Black, B., "A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence"; Fordham Law Review, Volume
56, 595 - 694, (1988).

Blau, H. T., The Psychologist as Expert Witness; New York, John Wiley, (1984).

Bleil, C., "Evidence of Syndromes: No Need for a "Better Mousetrap"; 32 South Texas
Law Review, 27 - 76, (1990).

Blinka, D. D., "Expert Testimony and the Relevancy Rule in the Age of Daubert";
Marquette Law Review, Volume 90, Number 2., 173 - 226, (Winter 2006).

Boon, J., and Davies, G., "Criminal Profiling"; 9 PoliCing, 218 - 227, (1993).

Boon, J. C. W., "Offender Profiling: Distinguishing the Media Prurience from Real-Life
Science"; 1 Inter Alia, 31 - 35, (1995).

Boon, J., "Contribution of Personality Theories to Psychological Profiling", in J. L.

Jackson., and D. A. Bekerian, (Eds.), Offender Profiling: Theory, Research and Practice,
Chichester, John Wiley, (1997).

316
j
 Borders, D. J., "Fit to be Fryed: Frye v. United States and the Admissibility of Novel
Scientific Evidence"; 77 Kentucky Law Journal, 849 - 879, (Sept/Oct. 1989).

Boyce, N. R, "Judicial Recognition of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases"; 8 Utah

Law Review, 313 - 327, (1964).

Bretz, J. R., "Scientific Evidence and the Frye Rule: The Case for a Cautious Approach";
4 Cooley Law Review, 506 - 521, (1987).

Britton, P., "Editorial: Articulating a Systematic Approach to Clinical Crime Profiling";

70 Criminal Behaviour and Mental Health, 13 - 17, (1997).

Britton, P., The Jigsaw Man; London, Bantam Press, (1997).

Britton, P., Picking up the Pieces, Bantum Press, (2000).

Brussel, J. A., Casebook of a Crime Psychiatrist; New York, Simon and Schuster,(1968).

Burgess, A., Douglas, J., D' Agostino, R, Hartman, C., and Ressler, R., "Sexual Killers
and their Victims: Identifying Patterns through Crime Scene Analysis"; Journal of
Interpersonal Violence, Volume 1, Number 3.,288 - 308, (September 1986).

Canter, D., "Offender Profiling"; 2 Psychologist, 12 -16, (1989).

Canter, D., and Heritage, R, "A Multivariate Model of Sexual Offence Behaviour:
Developments in Offender Profiling"; Journal of Forensic Psychiatry, Volume 1,
Number 2.,185 - 212, (1990).

Canter, D., and Larkin, P., "The Environmental Range of Serial Rapists"; 13 Journal of
Environmental Psychology, 63 - 69, (1993).

Canter, D., Criminal Shadows: Inside the Mind of the Serial Killer; London,
HaperCollins, (1994).

Canter, D., "Profiling as Poison"; Inter-alia, Volume 2, Number 1., 10- 11, (1998).

Canter, D., and Alison, L., (Eds.), Profiling Property Crimes; Ashgate, Aldershot, (2000).

Canter, D., and Alison, L., (Eds.), Profiling Rape and Murder; Ashgate, Aldershot,
(2000).

Canter, D., "Offender Profiling and Investigative Psychology"; Journal of Investigative

Psychology and Offender Profiling, Volume 1, Number 1,1 - 15, (December 2003).

317
j
Canter, D., Alison, J. L., Alison, E., and Wentink, N., "The Organized/Disorganized
Typology of Serial Murder"; 10 Psychology, Public Policy and Law, 293 - 320,
(September 2004).

Cameron, E., "Some Psychoanalytic Aspects of Serial Homicide"; 24 Cardozo Law

Review, 2267 - 2285, (August 2003).

Chisum, W. J., and Turvey, E. B., Crime Reconstruction; San Diego, Academic Press,
(2007).

Christian, V., "Admissibility of Scientific Expert Testimony: Is Bad Science Making

Law?; 18 Northern Kentucky Law Review, 21 - 40, (Fall 1990).

Cleary, W. E., "Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence"; 57 Nebraska Law
Review, 908 - 919, (1978).

Cleary, W. E., Brown, S. K., Dix, E. G., Gellhom, E., Kaye, H. D., Meisenholder, R.,
Roberts, E. F., and Strong, W. J., McCormick on Evidence, St. Paul. Minn., West
Publishing, (3 rd ed., 1984).

Cochran, Q. D., "Alabama v. Clarence Simmons: FBI "Profiler" Testimony to Establish

an Essential of Capital Murder"; 23 Law and Psychiatry Review, 69 - 89, (1999).

Cooley, C., and Turvey, B., "Reliability and Validity: Admissibility Standards Relative to
Forensic Expert's Illustrated by Criminal Profiling Evidence, Testimony and Judicial
Rulins"; Journal o/Behavioral Profiling, Volume 3, Number 1, (2002).

Cook, E. P., and Hinman, L. D., "Criminal Profiling: Science and Art"; Journal 0/
Contemporary Criminal Justice, Volume 15, Number 3,230 - 241, (August 1999).

Copson, G., Coals to Newcastle? Part 1: A Study o/Offender Profiling, London: Police
Research Group Special Series, Home Office, (1995).

Curran, J. W., "Expert Psychiatric Evidence of Personality Traits"; University 0/

Pennsylvania Law Review, Volume 103, Number 8, 999 - 1019, (1955).

Dabney, A., Dean, D. L., Topalli, v., and Hollinger, C. R., "The Impact of Implicit
Stereotyping on Offender Profiling: Unexpected Results from an Observational Study of
Shoplifting"; Criminal Justice and Behavior, Volume 33, Number 5,646 - 674, (October
2006).

Dahir, B. V., Richardson, T. J., Ginsburg, P. G., Gatowski, I. S., Dobbin, A. S., and
Merlino, L. M., "Judicial Application of Daubert to Psychological Syndrome and Profile
Evidence", 11 Psychology, Public Policy and Law, 62 - 82, (March 2005).

318
.,.
i
Davies, A, "Rapists Behaviour: A Three Aspect Model as a Basis for Analysis and
1 Identification of a Serial Crime"; Forensic Science International, 173 - 194, (1992).

Davies, A, "Editorial: Offender Profiling"; Medicine, Science and Law, Volume 34,
Number 3, 185 - 186, (1994).

Davies, A J., "Criminal Personality Profiling and Crime Scene Assessment: A

Contemporary Investigative Tool to Assist Law Enforcement Public Safety"; Journal of
Contemporary Criminal Justice, Volume 15, Number 3, 292 - 301, (August 1999).

Davies, D., and Follette, C. W., "Rethinking the Probative Value of Evidence: Base
Rates, Intuitive Profiling, and the "Postdiction" of Behavior"; Law and Human Behavior,
Volume 26, Number 2, 133 -158, (April 2002).

DeNevi, D., and Campbell, J., Into the Minds ofMadmen: How the FBI's Behavioral
Science Unit Revolutionalized Crime Investigation, New York, Prometheu Books,
(2003).

Dietz, P. E., and Reese, J. T., "The Perils of Police Psychology: 10 Strategies for
Minimizing Role Conflicts when Providing Mental Health Services and Consultation to
Law Enforcement Agencies"; 4 Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 385 - 400, (1986).

Dietz, P., "Criminal Investigative Analysis ("Profiling") in Civil Litigation"; Association

of Trial Lawyers of America, Annual Convention Reference Materials, Volume 2, (July
2003).

Douglas, E .J., Ressler, K. R., Burgess, W. A, and Hartman, R. c., "Criminal Profiling
from Crime Scene Analysis"; Behavioral Sciences and the Law, Volume 4, Number 4,
401-421, (1986).

Douglas, E. J., Burgess, A E.., "Criminal Profiling: A Viable Investigative Tool Against
Violent Crime"; 12 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 1 - 5, (1986).

Douglas, E. J., and Munn, C., "Violent Crime Scene Analysis: Modus Operandi,
Signature, and Staging"; 61 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 1 - 10, (1992).

Douglas, E. J. and Olshaker, M., Mindhunter: Inside the FBI's Elite Serial Crime Unit,
New York, Pocket Books, (1996).

Douglas E. J., and Olshaker, M., Journey into Darkness, New York, Scribner, (1997).

Douglas, J., and Olshaker, M., Anatomy of Motive, New York, Scribner, (1999).

Douglas, E. J., and Douglas, K. L., "Modus Operandi and the Signature Aspects of
Violent Crime", in Douglas, E. J., Burgess. W. A, Burgess .0 A, and Ressler, K. R.,
Crime Classification Manual, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, (2 nd ed. 2006).

319
 Douglas, E. J., Burgess. W. A, Burgess .G A, and Ressler, K. R., Crime Classification
Manual: A Standard System for Investigating and Classifying Violent Crimes; San
Francisco, Jossey-Bass, (2 nd ed. 2006).

Duncan, L. K., "Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics"? Psychological Syndrome Evidence
in the Courtroom After Daubert"; 71 Indiana Law Journal, 753 -771, (1996).

Duruigbo, AE., Multinational Corporations and International Law: Accountability and

Compliance in the Petroleum Industry, New York, Transnational Publishers, (2003).

Dwyer, D., "Evidence - Federal Rules of Evidence Supersede General Acceptance

Standard for Admissibility of Scientific Evidence - Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 28 Suffolk University Law Review, 252 - 260, (Spring 1994).

Ebisike, N., An Appraisal of Forensic Science Evidence in Criminal Proceedings,

London, Greenway Press, (2001).

Eche, C. A., The Nigerian Law of Evidence; Lagos, Malthouse Press, (2000).

Egger A S., "Psychological Profiling: Past, Present, and Future"; Journal of

Contemporary Criminal Justice, Volume 15, Number 3,242 - 261, (1999).

Faigman, L. D., Porter E., and Saks, J. M., "Check your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse
Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying about the
Future of Scientific Evidence"; 15 Cardozo Law Review, 1799 - 1835 (1994).

Faigman, L. D., Kaye, D. H., Saks, M. J., and Sanders, J., Science in the Law: Standards,
Statistics, and Research Issues; St. Paul. Minn., Westgroup, (2002).

Farrell, G. M., "Daubert v. Merrrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemiology and Legal
Prosess"; 15 Cardozo Law Review, 2183 - 2217, (1994).

Farrell, S. N., "Congressional Action to Ammend Federal Rule of Evidence 702: A

Mischievous Attempt to Codify Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc."; 13
Journal o/Contemporary Health Law and Policy, 523 - 551, (Spring 1997).

Farrington, D., and Lambert, S., "Statistical Approaches to Offender Profiling", in D.

Canter and L. Allison (Eds.), Profiling Property Crimes, 233 - 273, Aldershot, Ashgate,
(2000).

Faukner, F. J., and Steffen, T. D., "Evidence of Character: From the :Crucible of the
Community" to the "Couch of the Psychiatrist"; 102 University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, 980 - 994, (1954).

Feehan, G. J., "Life After Daubert and Kumho Tire: An Update on Admissibility of
Expert Testimony"; 88 Illinois Bar Journal, 134 - 142, (March 2000).

j 320
 Feldman, L. C. M., "May I Have the Next Dance, Mrs. Frye?"; 69 Tulane Law Review,
793 - 807, (February 1995).

Fenicato, M. A., "PA Supreme Court Unable to Rule on Daubert and/or Frye Rules";
Lawyers Journal, Volume 3, Number 3,3, (February 2001).

Foster, R. K., and Huber, W. P., Judging Science: Scientific Knowledge and the Federal
Courts; Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, (1997).

Fradella, F. H., Fogarty, A., O'Neill, L., "The Impact of Daubert on the Admissibility of
Behavioal Science Testimony"; 30 Pepperdine Law Review, 403 - 444, (2003).

Friedland, S. I., Bergman., and Taslitz, A. E., Evidence Law and Practice; New York,
LexisNexis/Matthew Bender, (2000).

Friedman, D. R., "The Death and Transfiguration of Frye"; 34 Jurimetrics Journal, 133 -
148, (Winter 1994).

Friedman, D. R., The Elements o/Evidence; st. Paul, Minn., Westgroup, (2 nd ed. 1998).

Fullgrabe, U., "Criminal Profiling"; Corrections Today, 297 - 305 and 373 - 376, (1993).

Garofalo, B. R., Criminology, Translation. R. W. Millar, Boston, Little and Brown,

(1914).

Geberth, J. V., "The Signature Aspect in Criminal Investigations"; Law and Order,
Volume 43, Number 11, (November 1995).

Geberth, J. V., Practical Homicide Investigation: Tactics, Procedures and Forensic

Techniques; Boca Raton, CRC Press/Taylor and Francis, (4 th ed. 2006).

Gildea, S. L., "Sifting the Dross: Expert Witness Testimony in Minnesota After the
Daubert Trilogy"; 26 William Mitchell Law Review, 93 - 116, (2000).

Giannelli, C. P., "The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States,
A Half-Century Later"; 80 Columbia Law Review, 1197 - 1250, (1980).

Giannelli, C. P., "Daubert: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence"; 15 Cardozo Law
Review, 1999 - 2026, (1994).

Giannelli, P., and Imwinkelried E., "Scientific Evidence: The Fallout from Supreme
Court's Decision in Kumho Tires"; 14 Criminal Justice, 12 -19, (Winter 2000).

Glueck, S., and Glueck, E., Physique and Delinquency; New York, Harper and Bros.,
(1956).

, 321

.-1
Godwin, J., Murder USA: The Ways We Kill Each Other; New York, Ballantine (1978).

Godwin, M., and Canter, D., "Encounter and Death: The Spatial Behavior of US Serial
Killers"; 20 Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategy and Management,
Volume 20, Number 1, 24 - 38, (1997).

Godwin, G. M., Hunting Serial Predators: A Multivariate Approach to Profiling Violent

Behavior, "" (1999).

Godwin, G. M., (Eds.), Criminal Psychology and Forensic Technology: A Collaborative

Approach to EJfective Profiling, Boca Raton, CRC Press, (2001).

Goldsworthy, T., "Criminal Profiling: Is it Investigatively Relevant?; The Journal of

Behavioral Profiling, Volume 2, Number 1, (June 2001).

Gonzalez, L., "The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: The History and Demise of Frye
v. United States"; 48 University ofMiami Law Review, 371 - 397, (November 1993).

Goring, c., The English Convict: A Statistical Study, London, His Majesty's Stationery
Office, (1913).

Gottfreddson, R. M., and Hirschi, T., A General Theory of Crime; Stanford, Stanford
University Press, (1990).

Graham, H. M., Handbook of Federal Evidence; Volume 3, St. Paul., Minn., Thomson
West, (6 th ed. 2006).

Gross, H., Criminal Psychology; New Jersey, Patterson Smith, (4 th ed.1924).

Grubin, D., "Offender Profiling"; Journal of Forensic Psychology, Volume 6, Number 2,

259 - 263 (1995).

Gudjonsson, G., "The Admissibility of Expert Psychological and Psychiatric Evidence in

England and Wales"; Criminal Behaviour and Mental Health, (1992).

Gudjonsson, G., "The Implications of Poor Psychological Evidence in Court"; 2 Expert

Evidence, 12 - 124, (1992).

Gudjonsson, G. H., and Copson, G., "The Role of the Expert in Criminal Investigation",
in J. L. Jackson and D. A. Bekerian, (Eds.), Offender Profiling: Theory, Research and
Practice, Chichester, John Wiley, (1997).

Hagan, F. E., Introduction to Criminology; Chicago, Nelson-Hall Publishers, (3 rd ed.

1994).

322
..,,
Hagen, A. M., Whores of the Court: The Fraud of Psychiatric Testimony and Rape of
American Justice, New York, Regan Books, (1997).

Hakkanen, H., "Finnish Research Team Applies Psychological Science to Police Work";
Psychology International, Volume 14, Number 1, 1,4 - 5, (Winter 2003).

Hakkanen, H., Lindlof, P., and Santtila, P., "Crime Scene Actions and Offender
Characteristics in a Sample of Finnish Stranger Rapes"; Journal of Investigative
Psychology and Offender Profiling, Volume 1, Number 1,17 - 32, (December 2003).

Hand, L., "Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony"; 15

Harvard Law Review, 40 - 58, (1902).

Hanson, S. R., "James Alphonzo Frye Is Sixty-Five Years Old: Should He Retire?;
Western State University Law Review, Volume 16, Number 2,357 - 460, (Spring 1989).

Hazelwood, R. R. and Douglas, E. J., "The Lust Murderer"; 49 FBI Law Enforcement
Bulletin, 18 - 22, (1980).

Hazelwood, R. R., Dietz, E. P., and Warren, J., "The Criminal Sexual Sadist"; 61 FBI
Law Enforcement Bulletin, 12 - 20, (February 1992).

Hazelwood, R. R., and Burgess, A. W.,(Eds.), Practical Aspects of Rape Investigation: A

Multidisciplinary Approach; Boca Raton, CRC Press, (3 rd ed. 2001).

Hazelwood, R. R., and Warren, J. I., "Linkage Analysis: Modus Operandi, Ritual, and
Signature in Serial Sexual Situations"; 8 Aggression and Violent Behavior, 587 - 598,
(2003).

Hickey, E. W., Serial Murderers and their Victims, Belmont, California, Wadsworth
Publishing, (4th ed. 2005).

Hicks, J. S., and Sales, D. B., Criminal Profiling: Developing an Effective Science and
Practice; Washington D.C., American Psychological Association, (2006).

Hilton, K., and Irons, A., "A "Criminal Personas" Approach to Countering Criminal
Creativity"; 8 Crime Prevention and Community Safety, 248 - 259, (2006).

Holcomb, W. R., and Daniel, A. E., "Homicide Without an Apparent Motive"; 6

Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 429 - 437, (1988).

Holmes, M. R. and Holmes, T. S., Profiling Violent Crimes: An Investigative Tool;

Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, (2 nd ed. 1996).

323
Homant, J. R., and Kennedy, B. D., "Psychological Aspects of Crime Scene Profiling:
Validity Research"; Criminal Justice and Behavior, Volume 25, Number 3,319 - 343,
(September 1998).

Hooton, A. E., The American Criminal: An Anthropological Study, Volume 1,

Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, (1939).

Hooton, A. E., Crime and Man, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, (1939).

Home, M. M., "Novel Scientific Evidence; Does Frye Require that General Acceptance
within the Scientific Community be Established by Disinterested Scientists?; 65
University o/Detroit Law Review, 147 -162, (Fall 1987).

Horton, M. T. , "The Debate is Over: Frye Lives No More" 19 Thurgood Marshall Law
Review, 379 - 400, (Spring 1994).

Howlett, J., Hanfland, K., and Ressler, R., "The Violent Criminal Apprehension
Program"; 55 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 14 - 18, (1986).

Imwinkeried, J. E., "a New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence - A Primer on
Evaluating the Weight of Scientific Evidence"; 23 William and Mary Law Review, 261 -
290, (1981).

Imwinkeried, J. E., (Eds.), Scientific and Expert Evidence, New York, Practicing Law
Institute, (2 nd ed. 1981).

Imwinkeried, J. E., "The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique from the
Perspective of Juror Psychology"; 28 Villanova Law Review, 554 - 571 (1983).

Imwinkeried, J. E., "Federal Rule of Evidence 402: The Second Revolution, 6 The
Review o/Litigation, 129 - 174, (1987).

Imwinkeried, J. E., Giannelli, C. P., Gilligan, A. F., and Lederer, I. F., Courtroom
Criminal Evidence, Virginia, The Michie Co., (2 nd ed. 1993).

Imwinkeried, J. E., "A Brief Defense of the Supreme Court's Approach to the
Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence; 27 Indiana Law Review, 267 - 294,
(1994).

Imwinkeried, J. E., "The Next Step after Daubert: Developing a Similarly

Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert
Testimony"; 15 Cardozo Law Review, 2271 2294, (1994).

Imwinkeried, J. E., "Moving Beyond "Top Down" Grand Theories of Statutory

Construction: A "Bottom UP" Interpretive Approach to the Federal Rules of Evidence";
75 Oregon Law Review, 389 - 427, (1996).

324
.....,.
1
1
,
Imwinkeried, J. E., "Daubert Revisited: Disturbing Implications"; 22 Champion, 18 - 27,
(May 1998).

Imwinkeried, J. E., "Whether the Federal Rules of Evidence Should be Conceived as a

Perpetual Index Code: Blindness is Worse than Myopia"; 40 William and Mary Law
Review, 1595 -1612, (1999).

Imwinkeried, J. E., "Evaluating the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert Testimony: A

Partial Answer to the Questions left Unresolved by Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael"; 52
Maine Law Review, 19 - 41, (2000).

Imwinkeried, J. E., The Methods ofAttacking Scientific Evidence; New Jersey,

LexisNexis, (4 th ed. 2004).
th
Imwinkelried, J. E., Evidentiary Foundations; New Jersey, LexisNexis, (6 ed. 2005).

Imwinkeried, J. E., "The Importance of Daubert in Frye Jurisdictions"; Criminal Law

Bulletin, Volume 42, Number 2,5 - 17, (March-April 2006).

Ingram, S., "If the Profile Fits: Admitting Criminal Psychological Profiles into Evidence
in Criminal Trials"; 54 Washington University Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law,
239 - 266, (1998).

Innes, M., Fielding, N., and Cope, N., "The Appliance of Science ? The Theory and
Practice of Criminal Intelligence Analysis"; 45 British Journal of Criminology, 39 - 57,
(2005).

Jackson, J.D., "The Ultimate Issue Rule: One Rule too Many"; Criminal Law Review, 75
- 86, (1984).

Jackson L. J., and Bekerian, A. D., (Eds.), Offender Profiling: Theory, Research and
Practice; Chichester, John Wiley, (1997).

Jenkins, P., Using Murder: The Social Construction of Serial Homicide, New York,
Aldine De Gruyter, (1994).

Jensen, J. P., "Frye Versus Daubert: Practically the Same?; 87 Minnesota Law Review,
1577 - 1619, (May 2003).
rd
Johnson, H. E., Crime, Correction, and Society; Illinois, The Dorsey Press, (3 ed.
1974).
}!
i Jonakait, N. R., "The Meaning of Daubert and What that Means for Forensic Science";
i 15 Cardozo Law Review, 2103 - 2117, (April 1994).

325
......,. j,

Kantrowitz, A., "Controlling Technology Democratically"; 63 American Scientist, 505 -

509 (1975).

Kaye, H. D., Bernstein, E. D., and Mnookin, L. J., The New Wigmore: A Treatise on
Evidence, New York, Aspen Publishers, (2004).

Keane, A., The Modern Law of Evidence, London, Butterworths, (1989).

Keane, P., "Ethical Issues and Role of the Judge"; Paper Presented at the 2004 ABA
Judicial Division's Traffic Court Seminar, San Francisco, California, October 13, 2004.

Keppel, R., "Signature Murders: A Report of Several Related Cases"; Journal of

Forensic Sciences, Volume 40, Number 4,670 - 674, (July 1995).

Keppel, R., Signature Killers; New York, Pocket Books, (1997).

Kennedy, B. D., and Homant, 1. R., "Problems with the Use of Criminal Profiling in
Premises Security Litigation"; 20 Trial Diplomacy Journal, 223 - 229, (1997).

Kiely, T. F., Forensic Evidence: Science and the Criminal Law; Boca Raton, Taylor and
Francis, (2 nd ed. 2006).

Knight, A., Warren, I. J., Reboussin, R., and Soley, J. B., "Predicting Rapist Type from
Crime-Scene Variables"; Criminal Justice and Behavior, Volume 25, Number 1, 46 - 80,
(March 1998).

Kocsis, N. R., Cooksey, W. R., and Irwin, J. H., "Psychological Profiling of Offender
Characteristics from Crime Behaviors in Serial Rape Offences"; International Journal of
Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, Volume 46, Number 2, 144 - 169,
(2002).

Kocsis, N. R., Cooksey, W. R., and Irwin, J. H., "Psychological Profiling of Sexual
Murders: An Empirical Model"; International Journal of Offender Therapy and
Comparative Criminology, Volume 46, Number 5,532 - 554, (2002)

Kocsis, N. R., "Criminal Psychological Profiling: Validities and Abilities"; International

Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, Volume 47, Number 2, 126
- 144, (2003).

Kocsis, N. R., Heller, Z. G., and Try, A., "Visual Versus Narrative Case Material: The
Impact on Criminal Psychological Profiling"; International Journal of Offender Therapy
and Comparative Criminology, Volume 47, Number 6,664 - 676, (2003).

Kocsis, N. R., and Middledorp, J., "Believing is Seeing 111: Perceptions of Content in
Criminal Psychological Profiles"; International Journal of Offender Therapy and
Comparative Criminology, Volume 48, Number 4,477 - 494, (2004).

326
j
..,
1

Kocsis, N. R., 'Validities and Abilities in Criminal Profiling: The Dilemma for Gavid
Canter's Investigative Psychology"; International Journal of Offender Therapy and
Comparative Criminology, Volume 50, Number 4,458 - 477, (August 2006).

Kocsis, N. R., Criminal Profiling: Principles and Practice; New Jersey, Humana Press,
(2006).
Kretschemer, E., Physique and Character: An Investigation of the Nature of Constitution
and the Theory of Temperament, New York, Harcourt, (1925).

Lane, B., The Encyclopedia of Forensic Science; London, Headline, (1992).

Langer, C. W., The Mind ofAdolfHitler; New York, Basic Books, (1972).

Leiter, B., "The Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of Science
Would Not Make for Good Philosophy of Evidence"; Brigham Young University Law
Review, 803 - 820, (1997).

Lester, D. J., Writing Research Papers: A Complete Guide; New York, HaperCollins, (8 th
ed.1996).

Levin, J., and Fox, J. A., Mass Murder,' New York, Plunem, (1985).

Liebert, J., "Contributions of Psychiatric Consultation in the Investigation of Serial

Murder"; International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology,
Volume 29, Number 3, 187 - 199, (1985).

Lilly C. Graham., An Introduction to the Law of Evidence; St. Paul. Minn., Wset
Publishing, (3 rd ed. 1996).

Lipson, S. A., Is it Admissible?; Costa Mesa, CA., James Publishing, (2007).

Lombroso, C., L'Uoma Delinquente; Fratella Bocca, Turin, (1876).

Lombroso, c., Crime: Its Causes and Remedies, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., (1918).
Markle, A., Criminal Investigation and Presentation of Evidence; st. Paul, Minn., West
Publishing, (1976).

Makros, A., and Alison, L. J., "Is Offender Profiling Possible? Testing the Predicted
Homology of Crime Scene Actions and Background Characteristics in a Sample of
Rapists"; 7 Legal and Criminological Psychology, 25 - 43, (2002).

Maletskos, c., and Spielman, S., Introduction of New Scientific Methods in Court, Law
Enforcement Science and Technology, 957 - 958, (S.S. Yefsky, Eds. 1967).

327
 Maliver, D., "Out of the FRYE ING Pan and into Daubert: Trial Judges at the Gate will
not Spell Relief for Plaintiffs"; 56 University of Pittsburgh Law Review, 245 - 269, (Fall
1994).

Mair, K., "Can a Profile Prove a Sex Offender Guilty?'; Expert Evidence, 139 (1995).

Martin, A. J., "The Proposed "Science Court"; 75 Michigan Law Review, 1058 -1091,
(1977).

Maskin, A., "The Impact of Daubert on the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: The
Supreme Court Catches Up with a Decade of Jurisprudence"; 15 Cardozo Law Review,
1929 - 1943, (1994).

Mauch, E. J., and Birch, W. J., Guide to Successful Thesis and Dissertation: A Handbook
for Students and Faculty; New York, Marcel Dekker, Inc., (3 rd ed. 1993).

McCaghy, H. c., and Capron, A. T., Deviant Behavior: Crime, Conflict and Interest
Groups; New York, (3 rd ed. 1994).

McCann, T. J., "Criminal Personality Profiling in the Investigation of Violent Crime:

Recent Advances and Future Directions" 10 Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 475 - 481,
(1992).

McCormick, T. C., Handbook of the Law of Evidence; St. Paul, Minn., West Publishing,
(1954).

McCormick, M., "Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Appproach to Admissibility"; 67

Iowa Law Review, 879 - 916, (1982).

McCord, D., "Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the
Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases"; 66 Oregon
Law Review, 19 - 108, (1987).

McCrary, G., and Ramsland, K., The Unknown Darkness: Profiling the Predators Among
US; New York, HarperTorch, (2004).

McCrary, G., Telephone Interview with him on October 27,2006.

McGrath, G. M., "Criminal Profiling: Is there a Role for the Forensic Psychiatrist?'; The
Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 315 - 324, Volume 28,
Number 3, (2000).

McLeod, A. K., "Is Frye Dying or is Daubert Doomed? Determining the Standard of
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence in Alabama Courts"; 51 Alabama Law Review, 883
- 905, (Winter 2000).

328
j
Michaud, S. G., and Hazelwood, R., The Evil that Men Do; New York, St. Martin's
Press, (1998).

Milich, S. P., "Controversial Science in the Courtroom: Daubert and the Law's Hubris";
43 Emory Law Journal, 913 - 926, (1994).

Mogck, L. D., "Are We there Yet? Refining the Test for Expert Testimony through
Daubert, Kumho Tire and Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 702"; 33 Connecticut Law
Review, 303 - 336, (Fall 2000).

Moenssens, A A., "Admissibility of Scientific Evidence - An Alternative to the Frye

Rule"; 25 William and Mary Law Review, 545 - 575, (Summer 1984).

Moenssens, A. A, Inbau, E. F., and Starra, E. J., Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases;
New York, The Foundation Press, (3 rd ed. 1986).

Moenssens A A, "Novel Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: Some Words of

Caution"; 84 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 1 - 21, (Spring 1993).

Mueller, B. c., and Kirkpatrick, C. L., Evidence; New York, Aspen Law Publishers, (2 nd
ed. 1999).

Muller, A D., "Criminal Profiling: Real Science or Just Wishful Thinking?; Homicide
Studies, Volume 4, Number 3,234 - 264 9August 2000).

Murphy, T., "The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence in Illinois"; 21 Loyola University

of Chicago Law Journal, 935 - 972, (Spring 1990).

Murphy, D. W., and Peters, M. J., "Profiling Child Sexual Abusers: Psychological
Considerations"; Criminal Justice and Behavior, Volume 19, Number 1, 24 - 37, (March
1992).

Myers, E. B. J., Evidence in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases; New York, John Wiley,
Volume 1, (3 rd ed. 1997).

Neal, S. B., "Into the Minds of Madmen: How the FBI's Behavioral Science Unit
Revolutionalized Crime Investigation"; 40 Trial, 89 - 90, (May 2004).

Neufeld, P. J., "Admissibility of New or Novel Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases,

DNA Technology and Forensic Science, The Banbury Report; Coldspring Harbor
Laboratory Press, (1989).

Nowikowski, F., "Psychological Offender Profiling: An Overview"; 19 Criminologist,

225 - 226, (1995).

329
 O'Connor, S., "The Supreme Court's Philosophy of Science: Will the Real Karl Popper
Please Stand Up? 35 Jurimetrics Journal, 263 - 276, (1995).

Oleson, 1., "Psychological Profiling: Does it Actually Work?; 46 Forensic Update, 11 -

14, (1996).

Okeke N. C., Controversial Subjects of Contemporary International Law: An

Examination of the New Entities of International Law and their Treaty-Making Capacity,·
Little, Brown and Company, (1973).

Okeke, N. C., The Theory and Practice of International Law in Nigeria; Enugu, Fourth
Dimension Press, (1086).

Okeke, N. C., "International Law in the Nigerian Legal System"; 27 California Western
International Law Journal, 311 - 355, (1997).

Ormerod, C. D., "The Evidential Implications of Psychological Profiling"; Criminal Law

Review, 863 - 877, (1996).

Ormerod, D., "Criminal Profiling: Trial by Judge and Jury, Not Criminal Psychologist",
in D. Canter and L. Alison, (Eds), Profiling in Policy and Practice, Aldershot, Ashgate
Publishing, (1999).

Ormerod, D., and Sturman, J., "Working with the Courts: Advice for Expert Witnesses",
in L. Alison, (Eds), The Forensic Psychologist's Casebook: Psychological Profiling and
Criminal Investigation, 170 - 243, (2005).

Osborn, S. A., "Reasons and Reasoning in Expert Testimony" 2 Law and Contemporary
Problems, 490 - 494, (1935).

Osborne, W. J., "Judicial/Technical Assessment of Novel Scientific Evidence"; ...

University of Illinois Law Review, 497 - 546, (1990).

O'Toole, M., "Criminal Profiling: The FBI Use Criminal Investigative Analysis to Solve
Crimes"; Corrections Today, Volume 6, Number .. .44 - 47, (1999).

Owen, D., Criminal Minds: The Science and Psychology of Profiling; New York, Barnes
and Noble, (2004).

Palermo, B. G., "Criminal Profiling: The Uniqueness of the Killer"; International

Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, Volume 46, Number 4,383
- 385 (2002).

Palermo, B. G., and Kocsis, N. R., Offender Profiling: An Introduction to the

Sociopsychological Analysis of Violent Crime; Springfield, Charles C. Thomas
Publishers, (2005).

J 330
 Park, C. R., Leonard, P. D., and Goldberg, H. S., Evidence Law: A Student's Guide to the
Law of Evidence as Applied in American Trials; St. Paul, Minn., Westgroup, (1998).

Peterson, L. l, Ryan, P. J., Houlden, J. P., and Mihajlovic, S., "The Use and Effects of
Forensic Science in the Adjudication of Felony Cases"; 32 Journal ofForensic Science,
1730 - 1748, (1987).

Petherick, W., "What's in a Name? Comparing Applied Profiling Methodologies"; 5

Journal of Law and Social Challenges, 173 -188, (Summer 2003).

Petherick, W., The Science of Profiling; New York, Barnes and Noble, (2005).

Petherick, W., (Eds), Serial Crime: Theoretical and Practical Issues in Behavioral
Profiling; Amsterdam, Academic Press, (2006).

Pinizzotto, A, "Forensic Psychology: Criminal Personality Profiling"; Journal of Police

Science and Administration, Volume 12, Number 1, 32 - 40 (1984).

Pinizzotto, l A., and Finkel, J. N., "Criminal Personality Profiling: An Outcome and
Process Study"; Law and Human Behavior, Volume 14, Number 3, 215 - 233, (1990).

Pistorius, M., Profiling Serial Killers and Other Crimes in South Africa; South Africa,
Penguin Books, (2005).

Polentz, C. M., "Post-Daubert Confusion with Expert Testimony"; 36 Santa Clara Law
Review, 1187 -1218, (1996).

Porter, B., "Mindhunters: Tracking Down Killers with the FBI's Psychological Profiling
Team"; Psychology Today, 44 - 52, (April 1983).

Prater, D. D., Capra, J. D., Saltzburg, A. S., and Arguello, M. C., Evidence: The
Objection Method; New Jersey, LexisNexis, (2 nd ed. 2002).

Reese, J., "Obsessive Compulsive Behavior"; 48 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 612 - '"
(August 1979).

Ressler, K. R., Burgess, W. A., and Douglas, E. J., Sexual Homicide: Patterns and
Motives, New York; The Free Press, (1992).

Ressler, R., and Shachtman, T., Whoever Fights Monsters; New York, Pocket Books,
(1992).

Richardson, R. J., Modern Scientific Evidence: Civil and Criminal; Cincinnati, The W.H.
Anderson Co., (2 nd ed. 1974).

J 331
Risinger. D. M., and Loop, L. J., "Three Card Monte, Monty Hall, Modus Operandi and
"Offender Profiling": Some Lessons of Modern Cognitive Science for the Law of
Evidence"; 24 Cardozo Law Review, 193 - 285, (November 2002).

Rogers, H. W., The Law ofExpert Testimony, St. Louis, Central Law Journal, (2 nd ed.
1891).

Rossi, D., "Crime Scene Behavioral Analysis: Another Tool for the Law Enforcement
Investigator"; The Police Chief, 152 - 155, (January 1982).

Rossi, F. F., Expert Witnesses; Chicago, American Bar Association, (1991).

Rossmo, D. K., "Geographic Profiling", in J. L. Jackson, and D. A. Bekerian, (Eds.),

Offender Profiling: Theory, Research and Practice, Chichester, John Wiley, (1997).

Rossmo, D. K., Geographic Profiling; Boca Raton, CRC Press, (2000).

Rudd, G. R., The Nigerian Law of Evidence, London, Butterworths, (1964).

Rumbelow, D., The Complete Jack the Ripper, London, Penguin, (1988).

Saccuzzo, P. D., "Still Crazy after all these Years: California's Persistent Use ofthe
MMPI as Character Evidence in Criminal Cases'; 33 University of San Francisco Law
Review, 379 - 400, (1999).

Saferstein, R., Criminalistics: An Introduction to Forensic Science; Prentice Hall, (9 th ed.

2006).

Salfati, C. G., and Canter, V. D., "Differentiating Stranger Murders: Profiling Offender
Characteristics from Behavioral Styles"; 17 Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 391 - 406,
(1999).

Salfati, C. G., and Bateman, A. L., "Serial Homicide: An Investigation of Behavioral

Consistency"; 2 Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 121 - 144,
(2005).

Sanders, J., Diamond, S. S., and Vidmar, E., "Legal Perceptions of Science and Expert
Knowledge"; 8 Psychology, Public Policy and Law, 139 - 153, (June 2002).

Santtila, P., Ritvanen, A., and Mokros, A., "Predicting Burgler Characteristics from
Crime Scene Behavior"; 6 International Journal of Police Science and Management, 136
- 154, (2004).

Santtila, P., Fritzon, K., and Tamelander, A.L., "Linking Arson Incidents on the Basis of
Crime Scene Behavior"; 19 Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology, 1 - 16, (2005).

332
Scallen, A. E., "Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence: The Use and Abuse of the
Advisory Committee Notes"; 28 Loyola Los Angeles Law Review, 1283 - 1302, (1995).

Scallen, A. E., "Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the Law of Evidence"; 44
American University Law Review, 1717 - 1749, (1994-5).

Schwartz, A., "A "Dogma of Empiricism" Revisited: Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and the Need to Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye v.
United States"; Harvard Journal ofLaw and Technology, Volume 10, Number 2, 149-
237, (Winter 1997).

Schurman-Kauflin, D., Vulture: Profiling Sadistic Serial Killers; Boca Raton, Universal
Publishers, (2005).

Sheldon, H. W., Varieties of Delinquent Youth; New York, Harper and Bros.,(1949).

Shehab, J. M., "The Future of the Davis-Frye Test in Michigan: Rumors of Its Demise
have been Greatly Exaggerated"; University ofDetroit Mercy Law Review, 113 - 134,
(Fall 19996).

Shuman, W. D., Psychiatric and Psychological Evidence, St. Paul. Minn., Thomson
West, (3 rd ed. 2005).

Skaggs, C. C., "Evidence: Say Good-Bye to the Frye "General Acceptance" Test
[Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals"; 33 Washburn Law Journal, 450 - 465,
(Spring 1994).

Smith, C., "Psychological Offender Profiling"; 17 The Criminologist, 244 - 250, (1993).

Snook, B., Eastwood, J., Gendreau, P., Goggin, C., and Cullen, M. R., "Taking Stock of
Criminal Profiling: A Narrative Review and Meta-Analysis"; Criminal Justice and
Behavior, Volume 34, Number 4,437 - 453, (April 2007).

Starrs, E. J., "A Still-Life Watercolor"; Frye v. United States"; Journal ofForensic
Sciences, Volume 27, Number 3,684 - 694, (July 1982).

Strano, M., "A Neural Network Applied to Criminal Psychological Profiling: An Italian
Initiative"; International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology,
Volume 48, Number 4,495 - 503, (2004).

Staurt, H. J., and Nordby, J. J., ( .. ), Forensic Science: An Introduction to Scientific

Investigative Techniques; CRC/Taylor and Francis, (2 nd ed. 2005).

Sucharitkul, S., State Immunities and Trading Activities in International Law; London,
Stevens and Sons, (1959).

333
 th
Sucharitkul, S., "The Future of International Law"; Paper Presented at the 16 Regional
Meeting of the American Society oflnternational Law, at Golden Gate University School
of Law, San Francisco, California, on April 6, 2007.

Sutherland, E. H., and Cressey, D. R., Principles of Criminology; J.B. Lippincott, (7th ed.
1966).
Sutherland, E., and Cressey, D., Criminology; J.B. Lippincott, (1970).

Tarantino, A. J., Strategic Use of Scientific Evidence; New York, Kluwer Law Book
Publishers, (1988).

Taslitz, E. A., "Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice through Psychological Character

Evidence"; 52 Maryland Law Review, 1 - 120, (1993).

Taylor, Rt. Hon. Lord Taylor of Gosforth, Lord Chief Justice of England, "The Lund
Lecture"; Medicine, Science and the Law, Volume 35, Number 1, 3 - 8, (January 1995).

Teten, H., "Offender Profiling", in B. William, (Eds.), The Encyclopedia ofPolice

Science, 365 - 367, (1989).

Torres, N. A., Boccaccini, T. M., and Miller, A. H., "Perceptions of the Validity and
Utility of Criminal Profiling Among Forensic Psychologists and Psychiatrists";
Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, Volume 37, Number 1, 51 - 58,
(February 2006).

Tuerkheimer, F., "The Daubert Case and Its Aftermath: Shot-Gun Wedding of
Technology and Law in the Supreme Court"; 51 Syracuse Law Review, 803 - 840,
(2001).

Turco, R., "Psychological Profiling"; International Journal of Offender Therapy and

Comparative Criminology, Volume 34, 47 -154, (1990).

Turvey, B., Criminal Profiling: An Introduction to Behavioral Evidence Analysis; San

Diego, Academic Press, (1999)

Turvey, B., Criminal Profiling: An Introduction to Behavioral Evidence Analysis; San

Diego, Academic Press, (2 nd ed. 2002),

Uglow, S., Evidence,· Text and Materials; London, Sweet and Maxwell, (1997).

Van Den Wyngaert, c., Criminal Procedure Systems in the European Community;
London, Butterworths, (1993).

i
.1.
Vandiver, J., "Crime Profiling Shows Promise"; Law and Order, Volume 30, Number 10,
33 - 78, (1982).

334
VoId, B. G., Theoretical Criminology; New York; Oxford University Press, (1958).

Vorpagel, R. E., "Painting Psychological Profiles: Charlatanism, Coincidence, Charisma,

Chance or New Science?; Police Chief, 156 - 159, (January 1982).

Waltz, R. J., and Park, C. R., Evidence: Cases and Materials; New York, Foundation
Press, (loth ed. 2005).

Walsh, T. J., "Keeping the Gate: The Evolving Role of the Judiciary in Admitting
Scientific Evidence"; Judicature Genes and Justice, Volume 83, Number 3, (Nov/Dec.
1999).

Ward, J., Crime Busting: Breakthroughs in Forensic Science; London, Blandford Press,
(1998).

Warren, A R., The Effective Expert Witness, Lightfoot, Virginia, Gaynor Publishing,
(1997).

Wayne, C. R, Colomb, G. G., and Williams, M. J., The Craft of Research; Chicago, The
University of Chicago Press, (1995).

Wecht, H. C., and Rago, T. J., (Eds.), Forensic Science and Law: Investigative
Applications in Criminal, Civil and Family Justice; Boca Raton, CRC Press, (2006).

West, A, "Clinical Assessment of Homicide Offenders: The Significance of Crime Scene

Analysis in Offence and Offender Analysis"; 4 Homicide Studies, 219 - 233, (2000).

Weissenberger, G., 'The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence"; 53 Ohio State Law Journal, 1307 - 1339, (1992).

Weissenberger, G., "The Elusive Identity of the Federal Rules of Evidence"; 40 William
and Mary Law Review, 1613 - 1622, (May 1999).

Weissenberger, G., "Evidence Myopia: The Failure to See the Federal Rules of Evidence
as a Codification of the Common Law"; 40 William and Mary Law Review, 1539 -1593,
(May 1999).

Weissenberger, G., Weissenberger's Federal Evidence: 2007 Courtroom Manual, New

Jersey, LexisNexis/Mathew Bender, (2006).

Weissenberger, G., and Duane, J. J., Weissenberger's Federal Evidence; New Jersey,
LexisNexis, (5 th ed. 2006).

White, P., (Eds.), Crime Scene to Court: The Essentials of Forensic Science; The Royal
Society of Chemistry, Cambridge, (1998).

335
Wigmore, J. H., Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Volume 7, revised by James H.
Chadbourn, (1978)

Wigmore, J. H., Wigmore on Evidence; Little Brown and Company, (1983).

Wilson, P., and Soothhill, K., "Psychological Profiling: Red, Green or Amber?; The
Police Journal, 12 - 20, (1996).

Wilson, P., Lincoln, R., and Kocsis, R., "Validity, Utility and Ethics of Profiling for
Serial Violent and Sexual Offenders"; Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, Volume 4,
Number 1,1 - 12, (1997).

Winerman, L., "Does Profiling Really Work?; Monitor on Psychology, Volume 35,
Number 7,67, (July/August 2004).

Winslow, W. R., and Zhang, X. S., Criminology: A Global Perspective; New Jersey,
Prentice Hall, (2007).

Woodhams, J., and Toye, K., "An Empirical Test of the Assumptions of Case Linkage
and Offender Profiling with Serial Commercial Robberies"; 13 Psychology, Public Policy
and Law, 59 - 85, (February 2007).

Younger, I., Goldsmith, M., and Sonenshein, A. D., Principles of Evidence; Cincinnati,
th
Anderson Publishing, (4 ed. 2000).

336