THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 166759. November 25, 2009.]

SOFIA TORRES, FRUCTOSA TORRES, HEIRS OF MARIO

TORRES and SOLAR RESOURCES, INC., petitioners, vs.
NICANOR SATSATIN, EMILINDA AUSTRIA SATSATIN, NIKKI
NORMEL SATSATIN and NIKKI NORLIN SATSATIN,
respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J : p

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision 1(1) dated
November 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 83595, and its
Resolution 2(2) dated January 18, 2005, denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

The siblings Sofia Torres (Sofia), Fructosa Torres (Fructosa), and Mario
Torres (Mario) each own adjacent 20,000 square meters tract of land situated at
Barrio Lankaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
Nos. 251267, 3(3) 251266, 4(4) and 251265, 5(5) respectively.

Sometime in 1997, Nicanor Satsatin (Nicanor) asked petitioners' mother,

Agripina Aledia, if she wanted to sell their lands. After consultation with her
daughters, daughter-in-law, and grandchildren, Agripina agreed to sell the properties.
Petitioners, thus, authorized Nicanor, through a Special Power of Attorney, to
negotiate for the sale of the properties. 6(6) DCASEc

Sometime in 1999, Nicanor offered to sell the properties to Solar Resources,

Inc. (Solar). Solar allegedly agreed to purchase the three parcels of land, together with
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 the 10,000-square-meter property owned by a certain Rustica Aledia, for
P35,000,000.00. Petitioners alleged that Nicanor was supposed to remit to them the
total amount of P28,000,000.00 or P9,333,333.00 each to Sofia, Fructosa, and the
heirs of Mario.

Petitioners claimed that Solar has already paid the entire purchase price of
P35,000,000.00 to Nicanor in Thirty-Two (32) post-dated checks which the latter
encashed/deposited on their respective due dates. Petitioners added that they also
learned that during the period from January 2000 to April 2002, Nicanor allegedly
acquired a house and lot at Vista Grande BF Resort Village, Las Piñas City and a car,
which he registered in the names of his unemployed children, Nikki Normel Satsatin
and Nikki Norlin Satsatin. However, notwithstanding the receipt of the entire
payment for the subject property, Nicanor only remitted the total amount of
P9,000,000.00, leaving an unremitted balance of P19,000,000.00. Despite repeated
verbal and written demands, Nicanor failed to remit to them the balance of
P19,000,000.00.

Consequently, on October 25, 2002, petitioners filed before the regional trial
court (RTC) a Complaint 7(7) for sum of money and damages, against Nicanor,
Ermilinda Satsatin, Nikki Normel Satsatin, and Nikki Norlin Satsatin. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 2694-02, and raffled to RTC, Branch 90, Dasmariñas,
Cavite.

On October 30, 2002, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of
a Writ of Attachment, 8(8) alleging among other things: that respondents are about to
depart the Philippines; * (9)that they have properties, real and personal in Metro
Manila and in the nearby provinces; that the amount due them is P19,000,000.00
above all other claims; that there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to
be enforced; and that they are willing to post a bond fixed by the court to answer for
all costs which may be adjudged to the respondents and all damages which
respondents may sustain by reason of the attachment prayed for, if it shall be finally
adjudged that petitioners are not entitled thereto.

On October 30, 2002, the trial court issued an Order 9(10) directing the
petitioners to post a bond in the amount of P7,000,000.00 before the court issues the
writ of attachment, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, and finding the present complaint

and motion sufficient in form and substance, this Court hereby directs the herein
plaintiffs to post a bond, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, in the amount of Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00), before

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 the Writ of Attachment issues. 10(11)

On November 15, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Deputation of Sheriff,

informing the court that they have already filed an attachment bond. They also
11(12)

prayed that a sheriff be deputized to serve the writ of attachment that would be issued
by the court. cCaATD

In the Order 12(13) dated November 15, 2002, the RTC granted the above
motion and deputized the sheriff, together with police security assistance, to serve the
writ of attachment.

Thereafter, the RTC issued a Writ of Attachment 13(14) dated November 15,
2002, directing the sheriff to attach the estate, real or personal, of the respondents, the
decretal portion of which reads:

WE, THEREFORE, command you to attach the estate, real or personal,

not exempt from execution, of the said defendants, in your province, to the
value of said demands, and that you safely keep the same according to the said
Rule, unless the defendants give security to pay such judgment as may be
recovered on the said action, in the manner provided by the said Rule, provided
that your legal fees and all necessary expenses are fully paid.

You shall return this writ with your proceedings indorsed hereon within
twenty (20) days from the date of receipt hereof.

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL of this Court, this 15th day of
November, 2002, at Imus for Dasmariñas, Cavite, Philippines. 14(15)

On November 19, 2002, a copy of the writ of attachment was served upon the
respondents. On the same date, the sheriff levied the real and personal properties of
the respondent, including household appliances, cars, and a parcel of land located at
Las Piñas, Manila. 15(16)

On November 21, 2002, summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was
served upon the respondents. 16(17)

On November 29, 2002, respondents filed their Answer. 17(18)

On the same day respondents filed their answer, they also filed a Motion to
Discharge Writ of Attachment 18(19) anchored on the following grounds: the bond was
issued before the issuance of the writ of attachment; the writ of attachment was issued
before the summons was received by the respondents; the sheriff did not serve copies
of the application for attachment, order of attachment, plaintiffs' affidavit, and
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 attachment bond, to the respondents; the sheriff did not submit a sheriff's return in
violation of the Rules; and the grounds cited for the issuance of the writ are baseless
and devoid of merit. In the alternative, respondents offered to post a counter-bond for
the lifting of the writ of attachment. 19(20)

On March 11, 2003, after the parties filed their respective pleadings, the RTC
issued an Order 20(21) denying the motion, but at the same time, directing the
respondents to file a counter-bond, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, after the pertinent pleadings of the

parties have been taken into account, the herein defendants are hereby directed
to file a counter-bond executed to the attaching party, in the amount of Seven
Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00), to secure the payment of any judgment that the
attaching party may recover in the action, with notice on the attaching party,
whereas, the Motion to Discharge Writ of Attachment is DENIED.

SO ORDERED. 21(22)

Thereafter, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration and/or motion for

clarification of the above order. On April 3, 2003, the RTC issued another Order 22(23)
which reads: DTaSIc

In view of the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration And/Or Motion For

Clarification of the Order of this Court dated March 11, 2003, denying their
Motion to Discharge Writ of Attachment filed by the defendants through
counsel Atty. Franco L. Loyola, the Motion to Discharge Writ of Attachment is
denied until after the defendants have posted the counter-bond in the amount of
Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00).

The defendants, once again, is directed to file their counter-bond of

Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00), if it so desires, in order to discharge the
Writ of Attachment.

SO ORDERED.

On December 15, 2003, respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Lift/Set Aside

Order Dated March [11], 2003, 23(24) which the RTC denied in an Order 24(25) of even
date, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants' Urgent Motion to

Lift/Set Aside Order Dated March 23, 2003 (With Manifestation to Dissolve
Writ of Attachment) is hereby DENIED for lack of Merit.

SO ORDERED.
Copyright 1994-2016 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2015 4
 Respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, 25(26) but it was
denied in the Order 26(27) dated March 3, 2004.

Aggrieved, respondents filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari,

Mandamus and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order 27(28) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 83595,
anchored on the following grounds:

(1) public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting

to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in failing to notice that the lower court has
no jurisdiction over the person and subject matter of the complaint when the
subject Writ of Attachment was issued;

(2) public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting

to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of the Writ of
Attachment despite non-compliance with the formal requisites for the issuance
of the bond and the Writ of Attachment. 28(29)

Respondents argued that the subject writ was improper and irregular having
been issued and enforced without the lower court acquiring jurisdiction over the
persons of the respondents. They maintained that the writ of attachment was
implemented without serving upon them the summons together with the complaint.
They also argued that the bond issued in favor of the petitioners was defective,
because the bonding company failed to obtain the proper clearance that it can transact
business with the RTC of Dasmariñas, Cavite. They added that the various clearances
which were issued in favor of the bonding company were applicable only in the
courts of the cities of Pasay, Pasig, Manila, and Makati, but not in the RTC, Imus,
Cavite. 29(30)

On November 23, 2003, the CA rendered the assailed Decision in favor of the
respondents, finding grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing the Orders dated December 15, 2003
and March 3, 2004. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,

the assailed Orders are hereby nullified and set aside. The levy on the properties
of the petitioners pursuant to the Writ of Attachment issued by the lower court
is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED. 30(31) aESHDA

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 31(32) but it was denied in the

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 Resolution 32(33) dated January 18, 2005.

Hence, this petition assigning the following errors:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE

LIFTING OF THE WRIT OF ATTACHMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13,
RULE 57 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
GRANTING THE WRIT OF ATTACHMENT DESPITE THE BOND BEING
INSUFFICIENT AND HAVING BEEN IMPROPERLY ISSUED.

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING

THE PETITION BY REASON OF ESTOPPEL, LACHES AND
PRESCRIPTION AND IN HOLDING THAT THE WRIT OF ATTACHMENT
WAS IMPROPERLY AND IRREGULARLY ENFORCED IN VIOLATION
OF SECTION 5, RULE 57 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL WILL NOT LIE AGAINST
RESPONDENTS.

Petitioners maintain that in the case at bar, as in the case of FCY Construction
Group, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 33(34) the only way the subject writ of attachment
can be dissolved is by a counter-bond. They claim that the respondents are not
allowed to file a motion to dissolve the attachment under Section 13, Rule 57 of the
Rules of Court. Otherwise, the hearing on the motion for the dissolution of the writ
would be tantamount to a trial on the merits, considering that the writ of preliminary
attachment was issued upon a ground which is, at the same time, the applicant's cause
of action.

Petitioners insist that the determination of the existence of grounds to

discharge a writ of attachment rests in the sound discretion of the lower court. They
argue that the Certification 34(35) issued by the Office of the Administrator and the
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 Certifications 35(36) issued by the clerks of court of the RTCs of Dasmariñas and Imus,
Cavite, would show that the bonds offered by Western Guaranty Corporation, the
bonding company which issued the bond, may be accepted by the RTCs of
Dasmariñas and Imus, Cavite, and that the said bonding company has no pending
liability with the government. TICAcD

Petitioners contend that respondents are barred by estoppel, laches, and

prescription from questioning the orders of the RTC issuing the writ of attachment.
They also maintain that the issue whether there was impropriety or irregularity in the
issuance of the orders is moot and academic, considering that the attachment bond
questioned by the respondent had already expired on November 14, 2003 and
petitioners have renewed the attachment bond covering the period from November
14, 2003 to November 14, 2004, and further renewed to cover the period of
November 14, 2004 to November 14, 2005.

The petition is bereft of merit.

A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional remedy issued

upon order of the court where an action is pending to be levied upon the property or
properties of the defendant therein, the same to be held thereafter by the sheriff as
security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment that might be secured in the said
action by the attaching creditor against the defendant. 36(37)

In the case at bar, the CA correctly found that there was grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial
court in approving the bond posted by petitioners despite the fact that not all the
requisites for its approval were complied with. In accepting a surety bond, it is
necessary that all the requisites for its approval are met; otherwise, the bond should be
rejected. 37(38)

Every bond should be accompanied by a clearance from the Supreme Court

showing that the company concerned is qualified to transact business which is valid
only for thirty (30) days from the date of its issuance. 38(39) However, it is apparent
that the Certification 39(40) issued by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) at
the time the bond was issued would clearly show that the bonds offered by Western
Guaranty Corporation may be accepted only in the RTCs of the cities of Makati,
Pasay, and Pasig. Therefore, the surety bond issued by the bonding company should
not have been accepted by the RTC of Dasmariñas, Branch 90, since the certification
secured by the bonding company from the OCA at the time of the issuance of the
bond certified that it may only be accepted in the above-mentioned cities. Thus, the
trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
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 jurisdiction when it issued the writ of attachment founded on the said bond.

Moreover, in provisional remedies, particularly that of preliminary attachment,

the distinction between the issuance and the implementation of the writ of attachment
is of utmost importance to the validity of the writ. The distinction is indispensably
necessary to determine when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be
acquired in order to validly implement the writ of attachment upon his person.

This Court has long put to rest the issue of when jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant should be acquired in cases where a party resorts to provisional
remedies. A party to a suit may, at any time after filing the complaint, avail of the
provisional remedies under the Rules of Court. Specifically, Rule 57 on preliminary
attachment speaks of the grant of the remedy "at the commencement of the action or
at any time before entry of judgment". 40(41) This phrase refers to the date of the filing
of the complaint, which is the moment that marks "the commencement of the action".
The reference plainly is to a time before summons is served on the defendant, or even
before summons issues. 41(42) EIcTAD

In Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 42(43) this Court
clarified the actual time when jurisdiction should be had:

It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court prior
to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of defendant . . . issuance of
summons, order of attachment and writ of attachment . . . these do not and
cannot bind and affect the defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his
person is eventually obtained by the court, either by service on him of
summons or other coercive process or his voluntary submission to the court's
authority. Hence, when the sheriff or other proper officer commences
implementation of the writ of attachment, it is essential that he serve on the
defendant not only a copy of the applicant's affidavit and attachment bond, and
of the order of attachment, as explicitly required by Section 5 of Rule 57, but
also the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of the
complaint . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)

In Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, 43(44) this Court held that the grant of the
provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages: first, the court issues the
order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the
order granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it
is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained.
However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court has
no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing
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 from the Court will not bind the defendant. 44(45)

Thus, it is indispensable not only for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, but also upon consideration of fairness, to apprise the
defendant of the complaint against him and the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment and the grounds therefor that prior or contemporaneously to the serving of
the writ of attachment, service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint, the
application for attachment, the applicant's affidavit and bond, and the order must be
served upon him.

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the trial court validly issued the
writ of attachment on November 15, 2002, which was implemented on November 19,
2002, it is to be noted that the summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was
served only on November 21, 2002.

At the time the trial court issued the writ of attachment on November 15, 2002,
it can validly to do so *(46) since the motion for its issuance can be filed "at the
commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment". However, at
the time the writ was implemented, the trial court has not acquired jurisdiction over
the persons of the respondents since no summons was yet served upon them. The
proper officer should have previously or simultaneously with the implementation of
the writ of attachment, served a copy of the summons upon the respondents in order
for the trial court to have acquired jurisdiction upon them and for the writ to have
binding effect. Consequently, even if the writ of attachment was validly issued, it was
improperly or irregularly enforced and, therefore, cannot bind and affect the
respondents.

Moreover, although there is truth in the petitioners' contention that an

attachment may not be dissolved by a showing of its irregular or improper issuance if
it is upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant's cause of action in the
main case, since an anomalous situation would result if the issues of the main case
would be ventilated and resolved in a mere hearing of a motion. However, the same is
not applicable in the case bar. It is clear from the respondents' pleadings that the
grounds on which they base the lifting of the writ of attachment are the irregularities
in its issuance and in the service of the writ; not petitioners' cause of action.
THADEI

Further, petitioners' contention that respondents are barred by estoppel, laches,

and prescription from questioning the orders of the RTC issuing the writ of
attachment and that the issue has become moot and academic by the renewal of the
attachment bond covering after its expiration, is devoid of merit. As correctly held by
the CA:
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 There are two ways of discharging the attachment. First, to file a
counter-bond in accordance with Section 12 of Rule 57. Second[,] [t]o quash the
attachment on the ground that it was irregularly or improvidently issued, as
provided for in Section 13 of the same rule. Whether the attachment was
discharged by either of the two ways indicated in the law, the attachment debtor
cannot be deemed to have waived any defect in the issuance of the attachment
writ by simply availing himself of one way of discharging the attachment writ,
instead of the other. The filing of a counter-bond is merely a speedier way of
discharging the attachment writ instead of the other way. 45(47)

Moreover, again assuming arguendo that the writ of attachment was validly
issued, although the trial court later acquired jurisdiction over the respondents by
service of the summons upon them, such belated service of summons on respondents
cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the writ. The
trial court cannot enforce such a coercive process on respondents without first
obtaining jurisdiction over their person. The preliminary writ of attachment must be
served after or simultaneous with the service of summons on the defendant whether
by personal service, substituted service or by publication as warranted by the
circumstances of the case. The subsequent service of summons does not confer a
retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her person because the law does not allow
for retroactivity of a belated service. 46(48)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision

and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated November 23, 2004 and January 18,
2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 83595 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. cSCADE

Corona, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr. and Nachura, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo (now a member of this Court),
with Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner (now deceased) and Magdangal M. de
Leon, concurring; rollo, pp. 41-59.
2. Rollo, p. 39.
3. CA rollo, pp. 54-55.
4. Id. at 56-57.
5. Id. at 58-59.
6. Id. at 60-65.
7. Records, pp. 1-14.
8. CA rollo, pp. 79-83.
9. Id. at 110-112.
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 10. Id. at 112.
11. Id. at 127.
12. Id. at 128.
13. Id. at 129-130.
14. Id. at 130.
15. Id. at 154-156.
16. Id. at 131-132.
17. Id. at 133-145.
18. Id. at 146-153.
19. Id. at 146-149.
20. Id. at 169-170.
21. Id. at 170.
22 Id. at 171.
23. Id. at 171-178.
24. Id. at 39.
25. Id. at 184-189.
26. Id. at 36-38.
27. Id. at 2-35.
28. Rollo, p. 52.
29. Id. at 53.
30. Id. at 58.
31. Id. at 60-69.
32. Id. at 38-39.
33. G.R. No. 123358, February 1, 2000, 324 SCRA 270.
34. CA rollo, p. 354.
35. Id. at 356-365.
36. Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102448, August 5, 1992, 212 SCRA 260.
37. Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of Confiscated Cash, Surety and Property
Bonds at RTC, Tarlac City, Brs. 63, 64 & 65, A.M. No. 04-7-358-RTC, July 22,
2005, 464 SCRA 21, 28.
38. Id.
39. CA rollo, p. 119.
40. Rules of Court, Rule 57, Sec. 1.
41. Mangila v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 870, 880 (2002).
42. G.R. No. 93262, November 29, 1991, 204 SCRA 343, 355-356.
43. Supra note 36.
44. Id. at 266.
45. Rollo, pp. 57-58.
46. Supra note 41, at 883.

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 Endnotes

1 (Popup - Popup)
1. Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo (now a member of this Court),
with Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner (now deceased) and Magdangal M. de
Leon, concurring; rollo, pp. 41-59.

2 (Popup - Popup)
2. Rollo, p. 39.

3 (Popup - Popup)
3. CA rollo, pp. 54-55.

4 (Popup - Popup)
4. Id. at 56-57.

5 (Popup - Popup)
5. Id. at 58-59.

6 (Popup - Popup)
6. Id. at 60-65.

7 (Popup - Popup)
7. Records, pp. 1-14.

8 (Popup - Popup)
8. CA rollo, pp. 79-83.

9 (Popup - Popup)

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 * Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official copy. The phrase "to
depart the Philippines" should read as "to depart from the Philippines".

10 (Popup - Popup)
9. Id. at 110-112.

11 (Popup - Popup)
10. Id. at 112.

12 (Popup - Popup)
11. Id. at 127.

13 (Popup - Popup)
12. Id. at 128.

14 (Popup - Popup)
13. Id. at 129-130.

15 (Popup - Popup)
14. Id. at 130.

16 (Popup - Popup)
15. Id. at 154-156.

17 (Popup - Popup)
16. Id. at 131-132.

18 (Popup - Popup)

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 17. Id. at 133-145.

19 (Popup - Popup)
18. Id. at 146-153.

20 (Popup - Popup)
19. Id. at 146-149.

21 (Popup - Popup)
20. Id. at 169-170.

22 (Popup - Popup)
21. Id. at 170.

23 (Popup - Popup)
22 Id. at 171.

24 (Popup - Popup)
23. Id. at 171-178.

25 (Popup - Popup)
24. Id. at 39.

26 (Popup - Popup)
25. Id. at 184-189.

27 (Popup - Popup)
26. Id. at 36-38.
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 28 (Popup - Popup)
27. Id. at 2-35.

29 (Popup - Popup)
28. Rollo, p. 52.

30 (Popup - Popup)
29. Id. at 53.

31 (Popup - Popup)
30. Id. at 58.

32 (Popup - Popup)
31. Id. at 60-69.

33 (Popup - Popup)
32. Id. at 38-39.

34 (Popup - Popup)
33. G.R. No. 123358, February 1, 2000, 324 SCRA 270.

35 (Popup - Popup)
34. CA rollo, p. 354.

36 (Popup - Popup)
35. Id. at 356-365.

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 37 (Popup - Popup)
36. Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102448, August 5, 1992, 212 SCRA 260.

38 (Popup - Popup)
37. Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of Confiscated Cash, Surety and Property
Bonds at RTC, Tarlac City, Brs. 63, 64 & 65, A.M. No. 04-7-358-RTC, July 22,
2005, 464 SCRA 21, 28.

39 (Popup - Popup)
38. Id.

40 (Popup - Popup)
39. CA rollo, p. 119.

41 (Popup - Popup)
40. Rules of Court, Rule 57, Sec. 1.

42 (Popup - Popup)
41. Mangila v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 870, 880 (2002).

43 (Popup - Popup)
42. G.R. No. 93262, November 29, 1991, 204 SCRA 343, 355-356.

44 (Popup - Popup)
43. Supra note 36.

45 (Popup - Popup)

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 44. Id. at 266.

46 (Popup - Popup)
* Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official copy. The phrase "it can
validly to do so" should read as "it can validly do so."

47 (Popup - Popup)
45. Rollo, pp. 57-58.

48 (Popup - Popup)
46. Supra note 41, at 883.

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