Commented [RM1]: Respondent was removed from his

GREGO vs. COMELEC Case Digest position for serious misconduct (2nd time) and
GREGO vs. COMELEC administrative complaint. Ran as councilor in manila and
won. Re-elected 1992 and 1995- this is question on the
274 SCRA 481, 1997 basis of his administrative case for Sec 40b of LGC 1991. But
SC refused to give it retroactive application as it was a
settled issue and a statute must be construed prospectively

Statutory case:
Facts: On October 31, 1981, before the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991, private Upon his dismissal his retirement benefits were
respondent Humberto Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by no less than the forfeited and the decision of the court included this
Supreme Court upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint. statement: “with prejudice to reinstatement to any
position in the national or local government, including
its agencies and instrumentalities or GOCCs”. The
question is whether the Tordesilla’s decision
barred Basco from running for any elective position. He
Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila in may still be elected because under the former Civil
the January 18, 1988 local elections. He won and assumed office. He was successfully re-elected in Service Decree, the law applicable at the time Basco, a
public officer, was administratively dismissed from
1992 and 1995. office, the term “reinstatement” had a technical
meaning, referring only to an appointive position. no
basis for holding that Basco is likewise barred from
running for an elective position
It was his latest re-election which is the subject of the present petition on the ground that he is
Another statcon case:
disqualified under Section 40(b) of the LGC of 1991. Under said section, those removed from office Is private respondent's proclamation as sixth winning
as a result of an administrative case are disqualified to run for any elective local position. candidate on May 17, 1995, while the disqualification
case was still pending consideration by COMELEC,
void ab initio?

Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646 which states:

Issue: Does Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 apply retroactively to those Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any
removed from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992? candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason, a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
Held: The Supreme Court held that its refusal to give retroactive application to the provision of Section receives the winning number of votes in such election,
40(b) is already a settled issue and there exist no compelling reason for the Court to depart therefrom. the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial
That the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidate’s removal from and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any
office and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter the Court from applying the law intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
prospectively. A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be so construed as to suspension of the proclamation of such
overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before its passage. candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
(Emphasis supplied).

GREGO V COMELEC The word "may" indicates that the suspension of a

proclamation is merely directory and permissive in
nature and operates to confer discretion. What is
FACTS merely made mandatory, according to the provision
itself, is the continuation of the trial and hearing of the
Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by the SC upon finding of serious action, inquiry or protest.
misconduct, for the second time, in an administrative complaint lodged by Nena It is to be noted that Section 5, Rule 25 of the
Tordesillas. His retirement benefits were forfeited and the decision of the court included COMELEC Rules of Procedure 25 states that:
this statement: “with prejudice to reinstatement to any position in the national or local Sec. 5. Effect of petition if unresolved before
completion of canvass. — . . . (H)is
government, including its agencies and instrumentalities or GOCCs. In 1988, he ran as proclamation shall be suspended notwithstanding
a candidate for Councilor in Manila and won. the fact that he received the winning number of
votes in such election.
However, being merely an implementing rule, the same
must not override, but instead remain consistent with ...
He sought re-election in 1992 and won again. However, his victory was contested.
Another candidate alleged his ineligibility to be elected on the basis of the Tordesillas
ruling. This was dismissed.
Basco, for the third time, ran again for councilor in 1995. His right to office
was contested by Grego who filed a petition for disqualification against Basco and
prayed for the suspension of Basco’s proclamation and Maranan’s declaration as the
city’s 6th duly elected councilor. The COMELEC conducted a hearing of the case.
Before the parties were able to submit their respective memoranda, the Board of
Canvassers proclaimed Basco as a duly elected councilor for the Second District of
Manila (6th place.) Due to the said proclamation, Grego filed an urgent motion seeking
to annul what he considered to be an illegal and hasty proclamation. COMELEC’s
first division dismissed the petion for disqualification ruling that the administrative
penalty imposed by the SC on Basco was wiped away and condoned by the electorate
which elected him. COMELEC en banc dismissed Grego’s MR.

ISSUE

Whether the Tordesilla’s decision barred Basco from running for any elective position.

HELD

NO. Under the former Civil Service Decree, the law applicable at the time Basco, a public
officer, was administratively dismissed from office, the term “reinstatement” had a
technical meaning, referring only to an appointive position. Reinstatement is the
reappointment of a person who was previously separated from the service through
no delinquency or misconduct on his part from a position in the career service to which
he was permanently appointed, to a position for which he is qualified.
In light of this definition, there is no basis for holding that Basco is likewise barred from
running for an elective position inasmuch as what is contemplated by the prohibition in
Tordesillas is reinstatement to an appointive position.

Grego v COMELEC (DIGEST)

WILMER GREGO, petitioner, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HUMBERTO
BASCO, respondents (DIGEST)

G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997

FACTS:
In 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff for serious misconduct.
Subsequently, he ran as a candidate for councilor in the Second District of the City of
Manila during the 1988, local elections. He won and assumed office. After his term,
Basco sought re-election. Again, he won. However, he found himself facing lawsuits
filed by his opponents who wanted to dislodge him from his position.

Petitioner argues that Basco should be disqualified from running for any elective
position since he had been “removed from office as a result of an administrative case”
pursuant to Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160.

For a third time, Basco was elected councilor in 1995. Expectedly, his right to office was
again contested. In 1995, petitioner Grego filed with the COMELEC a petition for
disqualification. The COMELEC conducted a hearing and ordered the parties to submit
their respective memoranda.

However, the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco in May 1995, as a duly elected
councilor for the Second District of Manila, placing sixth among several candidates who
vied for the seats. Basco immediately took his oath of office.

COMELEC resolved to dismiss the petition for disqualification. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of said resolution was later denied by the COMELEC,, hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not COMELEC acted in with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
petition for disqualification.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in
dismissing the petition for disqualification, however, the Court noted that they do not
agree with its conclusions and reasons in the assailed resolution.

The Court reiterated that being merely an implementing rule, Sec 25 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure must not override, but instead remain consistent with and in
harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative rules and
regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law. The law
itself cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute. An administrative agency cannot amend
an act of Congress.
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to
implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulations cannot go
beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. Since Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646, the
law which Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure seeks to
implement, employed the word “may,” it is, therefore, improper and highly irregular for
the COMELEC to have used instead the word “shall” in its rules.

Still, the Court DISMISSED the petition for lack of merit.

Grego vs COMELEC [274 SCRA 481]

Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011

(Municipal Government, Disqualification, Non-Retroactive effect)

Facts: Sec 40 (b) of Republic Act 7160 (the Local Government Code) which took effect on January 1, 1992,
disqualifies a person for any elective position on the ground that “had been removed from office as a result of an
administrative case”.
On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff upon a finding of serious misconduct in
an administrative complaint.

He ran as a candidate for Councilor, won and assumed office for three terms during the Elections of January 18,
1988; May 11, 1992 and May 8, 1995. As in the past, respondent’s right to office was contested.

On May 13, 1995, petitioner, seeks for the respondent’s disqualification, pursuant to the above provision, contending
that as long as a candidate was once removed from office due to an administrative case, regardless of whether it took
place during or prior to the effectivity of the Code, the disqualification applies.

Respondent contends that the petitioner is not entitled to said relief because Section 40 par. b of the LGC may not be
validly applied to persons who were dismissed prior to its effectivity. To do so would make it ex post facto, bill of
attainder, and retroactive legislation which impairs vested rights

Issue: WON Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 applies retroactively to those removed from office before it took
effect on January 1, 1992.
Held: No. It is a settled issue that Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 does not have any retroactive effect. Laws
operate only prospectively and not retroactively.
A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be so construed as to overreach acts, events or matters
which transpired before its passage: “Lex prospicit, non respicit.” The law looks forward, not backward.

Grego vs. COMELEC

GR. No. 125955, June 19, 1997

FACTS: On Oct. 31. 1981, private respondent Basco was removed from office as Deputy sheriff
by the court upon finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint. Ran for councilor
in the second district of Manila and had won the race for 3 term. On his final term, an election
protest was filed against him by petitioner Grego, seeking to disqualify him on the ground that he
was removed previously in an office as a result of an administrative case. On May 14, 1995,
COMELEC ordered the parties to submit memoranda, but before the parties able to comply the
directive, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Basco as duly elected councilor and took his oath
of office. Petitioner contends that, respondent COMELEC should have suspended the
proclamation. Such act according to the petitioner violated the provision of sec. 6 of R.A 6646,
which prohibits the proclamation of the elected candidate by the COMELEC pending final
judgment on the case filed, uses the word may, therefore giving discretion to order the suspension
of the proclamation.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent COMELEC violated the provision of R.A 6646 when it did not
suspend the proclamation of the petitioner as the elected councilor pending final judgment of the
case filed against it.

HELD: It did not. The use of the word “may” in sec.6 of R.A 6646 indicates that the proclamation
is merely directory and permissive in nature and confers no jurisdiction. What is merely
mandatory, according to the provision itself, is the continuation of trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest. The rule or regulations should be within the scope of the authority granted by
the legislature to the administrative agency. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a
rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or
regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic. Since section 6 of R.A 6646,
the law which section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure seeks to implement,
employed the word “may”, it is, therefore improper and highly irregular for the COMELEC to have
used instead the word “shall” in its rules.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 125955 June 19, 1997

WILMER GREGO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HUMBERTO BASCO, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

The instant special civil action for certiorari and prohibition impugns the resolution of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc in SPA No. 95-212 dated July 31, 1996, dismissing
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of an earlier resolution rendered by the COMELEC's First
Division on October 6, 1995, which also dismissed the petition for disqualification 1 filed by petitioner
Wilmer Grego against private respondent Humberto Basco.

The essential and undisputed factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by no less than this
Court upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by a certain Nena
Tordesillas. The Court held:

WHEREFORE, FINDING THE RESPONDENT DEPUTY SHERIFF HUMBERTO

BASCO OF THE CITY COURT OF MANILA GUILTY OF SERIOUS MISCONDUCT
IN OFFICE FOR THE SECOND TIME, HE IS HEREBY DISMISSED FROM THE
SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE OF ALL RETIREMENT BENEFITS AND WITH
PREJUDICE TO REINSTATEMENT TO ANY POSITION IN THE NATIONAL OR
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING ITS AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES,
OR GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS.

xxx xxx xxx 2

Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for Councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila
during the January 18, 1988, local elections. He won and, accordingly, assumed office.

After his term, Basco sought re-election in the May 11, 1992 synchronized national elections. Again,
he succeeded in his bid and he was elected as one of the six (6) City Councilors. However, his
victory this time did not remain unchallenged. In the midst of his successful re-election, he found
himself besieged by lawsuits of his opponents in the polls who wanted to dislodge him from his
position.

One such case was a petition for quo warranto 3 filed before the COMELEC by Cenon Ronquillo,
another candidate for councilor in the same district, who alleged Basco's ineligibility to be elected
councilor on the basis of the Tordesillas ruling. At about the same time, two more cases were also
commenced by Honorio Lopez II in the Office of the Ombudsman and in the Department of Interior
and Local Government. 4 All these challenges were, however, dismissed, thus, paving the way for
Basco's continued stay in office.

Despite the odds previously encountered, Basco remained undaunted and ran again for councilor in
the May 8, 1995, local elections seeking a third and final term. Once again, he beat the odds by
emerging sixth in a battle for six councilor seats. As in the past, however, his right to office was
again contested. On May 13, 1995, petitioner Grego, claiming to be a registered voter of Precinct
No. 966, District II, City of Manila, filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification, praying for
Basco's disqualification, for the suspension of his proclamation, and for the declaration of Romualdo
S. Maranan as the sixth duly elected Councilor of Manila's Second District.

On the same day, the Chairman of the Manila City Board of Canvassers (BOC) was duly furnished
with a copy of the petition. The other members of the BOC learned about this petition only two days
later.

The COMELEC conducted a hearing of the case on May 14, 1995, where it ordered the parties to
submit simultaneously their respective memoranda.

Before the parties could comply with this directive, however, the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco
on May 17, 1995, as a duly elected councilor for the Second District of Manila, placing sixth among
several candidates who vied for the seats. 5 Basco immediately took his oath of office before the
Honorable Ma. Ruby Bithao-Camarista, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch I, Manila.

In view of such proclamation, petitioner lost no time in filing an Urgent Motion seeking to annul what
he considered to be an illegal and hasty proclamation made on May 17, 1995, by the Manila City
BOC. He reiterated Basco's disqualification and prayed anew that candidate Romualdo S. Maranan
be declared the winner. As expected, Basco countered said motion by filing his Urgent Opposition
to: Urgent Motion (with Reservation to Submit Answer and/or Motion to Dismiss Against Instant
Petition for Disqualification with Temporary Restraining Order).

On June 5, 1995, Basco filed his Motion to Dismiss Serving As Answer pursuant to the reservation
he made earlier, summarizing his contentions and praying as follows:

Respondent thus now submits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief for the
following reasons:

1. The respondent cannot be disqualified on the ground of Section 40 paragraph b of

the Local Government Code because the Tordesillas decision is barred by laches,
prescription, res judicata, lis pendens, bar by prior judgment, law of the case
and stare decisis;

2. Section 4[0] par. B of the Local Government Code may not be validly applied to
persons who were dismissed prior to its effectivity. To do so would make it ex post
facto, bill of attainder, and retroactive legislation which impairs vested rights. It is also
a class legislation and unconstitutional on the account.

3. Respondent had already been proclaimed. And the petition being a

preproclamation contest under the Marquez v. Comelec Ruling, supra, it should be
dismissed by virtue of said pronouncement.

4. Respondent's three-time election as candidate for councilor constitutes implied

pardon by the people of previous misconduct (Aguinaldo v. Comelec G.R. 105128;
Rice v. State 161 SCRA 401; Montgomery v. Newell 40 SW 2d 4181; People v.
Bashaw 130 P. 2nd 237, etc.).

5. As petition to nullify certificate of candidacy, the instant case has prescribed; it was
premature as an election protest and it was not brought by a proper party in interest
as such protest.:

PRAYER

WHEREFORE it is respectfully prayed that the instant case be dismissed on instant

motion to dismiss the prayer for restraining order denied (sic). If this Honorable Office
is not minded to dismiss, it is respectfully prayed that instant motion be considered
as respondent's answer. All other reliefs and remedies just and proper in the
premises are likewise hereby prayed for.

After the parties' respective memoranda had been filed, the COMELEC's First Division resolved to
dismiss the petition for disqualification on October 6, 1995, ruling that "the administrative penalty
imposed by the Supreme Court on respondent Basco on October 31, 1981 was wiped away and
condoned by the electorate which elected him" and that on account of Basco's proclamation on May
17, 1995, as the sixth duly elected councilor of the Second District of Manila, "the petition would no
longer be viable." 6

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said resolution was later denied by the COMELEC en
banc in its assailed resolution promulgated on July 31, 1996. 7 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that Basco should be disqualified from running far any elective position since he
had been "removed from office as a result of an administrative case" pursuant to Section 40 (b) of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code (the Code), which took
effect on January 1, 1992. 8

Petitioner wants the Court to likewise resolve the following issues, namely:

1. Whether or not Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 applies retroactively to
those removed from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992;

2. Whether or not private respondent's election in 1988, 1992 and in 1995 as City
Councilor of Manila wiped away and condoned the administrative penalty against
him;

3. Whether or not private respondent's proclamation as sixth winning candidate on

May 17, 1995, while the disqualification case was still pending consideration by
COMELEC, is void ab initio; and

4. Whether or not Romualdo S. Maranan, who placed seventh among the candidates
for City Councilor of Manila, may be declared a winner pursuant to Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 6646.

While we do not necessarily agree with the conclusions and reasons of the COMELEC in the
assailed resolution, nonetheless, we find no grave abuse of discretion on its part in dismissing the
petition for disqualification. The instant petition must, therefore, fail.

We shall discuss the issues raised by petitioner in seriatim.

I. Does Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 apply retroactively to those removed from
office before it took effect on January 1, 1992?

Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code under which petitioner anchors Basco's alleged
disqualification to run as City Councilor states:

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

xxx xxx xxx

In this regard, petitioner submits that although the Code took effect only on January 1, 1992, Section
40 (b) must nonetheless be given retroactive effect and applied to Basco's dismissal from office
which took place in 1981. It is stressed that the provision of the law as worded does not mention or
even qualify the date of removal from office of the candidate in order for disqualification thereunder
to attach. Hence, petitioner impresses upon the Court that as long as a candidate was once
removed from office due to an administrative case, regardless of whether it took place during or prior
to the effectivity of the Code, the disqualification applies. 9 To him, this interpretation is made more
evident by the manner in which the provisions of Section 40 are couched. Since the past tense is
used in enumerating the grounds for disqualification, petitioner strongly contends that the provision
must have also referred to removal from office occurring prior to the effectivity of the Code. 10

We do not, however, subscribe to petitioner's view. Our refusal to give retroactive application to the
provision of Section 40 (b) is already a settled issue and there exist no compelling reasons for us to
depart therefrom. Thus, in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, 11 reiterated in the more recent cases of Reyes
v. COMELEC 12 and Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., 13 we ruled, thus:

The COMELEC applied Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code (Republic Act
7160) which provides:

Sec. 40. The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local positions:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case.

Republic Act 7160 took effect only on January 1, 1992.

The rule is:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the

power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of
contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that
statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive
effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is
expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the
language of the enactment. . . . (Jones v. Summers, 105 Cal. App.
51, 286 Pac. 1093; U.S. v. Whyel 28 (2d) 30; Espiritu v. Cipriano, 55
SCRA 533 [1974], cited in Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519
[1974]. See also Puzon v. Abellera, 169 SCRA 789 [1989]; Al-
Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines v. Civil Service
Commission, et al., G.R. No. 100599, April 8, 1992).

There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same
operates retroactively.

It, therefore, follows that [Section] 40 (b) of the Local Government Code is not
applicable to the present case. (Emphasis supplied).

That the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidate's removal from
office and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter us from applying the law
prospectively. The basic tenet in legal hermeneutics that laws operate only prospectively and not
retroactively provides the qualification sought by petitioner. A statute, despite the generality in its
language, must not be so construed as to overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before
its passage. Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward. 14
 II. Did private respondent's election to office as City Councilor of Manila in the 1988, 1992
and 1995 elections wipe away and condone the administrative penalty against him, thus
restoring his eligibility for public office?

Petitioner maintains the negative. He quotes the earlier ruling of the Court in Frivaldo
v. COMELEC 15 to the effect that a candidate's disqualification cannot be erased by the electorate
alone through the instrumentality of the ballot. Thus:

. . . (T)he qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the

electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure
the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the
candidate was qualified. . . .

At first glance, there seems to be a prima facie semblance of merit to petitioner's argument.
However, the issue of whether or not Basco's triple election to office cured his alleged ineligibility is
actually beside the point because the argument proceeds on the assumption that he was in the first
place disqualified when he ran in the three previous elections. This assumption, of course, is
untenable considering that Basco was NOT subject to any disqualification at all under Section 40 (b)
of the Local Government Code which, as we said earlier, applies only to those removed from office
on or after January 1, 1992. In view of the irrelevance of the issue posed by petitioner, there is no
more reason for the Court to still dwell on the matter at length.

Anent Basco's alleged circumvention of the prohibition in Tordesillas against reinstatement to any
position in the national or local government, including its agencies and instrumentalities, as well as
government-owned or controlled corporations, we are of the view that petitioner's contention is
baseless. Neither does petitioner's argument that the term "any position" is broad enough to cover
without distinction both appointive and local positions merit any consideration.

Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the Tordesillas decision did not bar Basco from running for any
elective position. As can be gleaned from the decretal portion of the said decision, the Court
couched the prohibition in this wise:

. . . AND WITH PREJUDICE TO REINSTATEMENT TO ANY POSITION IN THE

NATIONAL OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING ITS AGENCIES AND
INSTRUMENTALITIES, OR GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS.

In this regard, particular attention is directed to the use of the term "reinstatement." Under
the former Civil Service Decree, 16 the law applicable at the time Basco, a public officer, was
administratively dismissed from office, the term "reinstatement" had a technical meaning,
referring only to an appointive position. Thus:

Art. VIII. PERSONNEL POLICIES AND STANDARDS.

Sec. 24. Personnel Actions. —

xxx xxx xxx

(d) Reinstatement. — Any person who has been permanently APPOINTED to a

position in the career service and who has, through no delinquency or misconduct,
 been separated therefrom, may be reinstated to a position in the same level for
which he is qualified.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied).

The Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies issued by the Civil Service Commission on
November 10, 1975, 17 provides a clearer definition. It reads:

RULE VI. OTHER PERSONNEL ACTIONS

Sec. 7. Reinstatement is the REAPPOINTMENT of a person who was previously

separated from the service through no delinquency or misconduct on his part from a
position in the career service to which he was permanently appointed, to a position
for which he is qualified. (Emphasis supplied).

In light of these definitions, there is, therefore, no basis for holding that Basco is likewise barred from
running for an elective position inasmuch as what is contemplated by the prohibition in Tordesillas is
reinstatement to an appointiveposition.

III. Is private respondent's proclamation as sixth winning candidate on May 17, 1995, while
the disqualification case was still pending consideration by COMELEC, void ab initio? Commented [RM2]: Void from beginning

To support its position, petitioner argues that Basco violated the provisions of Section 20, paragraph
(i) of Republic Act No. 7166, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, as well as our ruling in the cases
of Duremdes v. COMELEC, 18Benito v. COMELEC 19 and Aguam v. COMELEC. 20

We are not convinced. The provisions and cases cited are all misplaced and quoted out of context.
For the sake of clarity, let us tackle each one by one.

Section 20, paragraph (i) of Rep. Act 7166 reads:

Sec. 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns. — Commented [RM3]: Sec 20 RA 7166

xxx xxx xxx

(i) The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless
authorized by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it
on appeal by the losing party. Any proclamation made in violation hereof shall be
void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the
election.

xxx xxx xxx

The inapplicability of the abovementioned provision to the present case is very much patent on its
face considering that the same refers only to a void proclamation in relation to contested returns and
NOT to contested qualifications of a candidate.

Next, petitioner cites Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646 which states:

 Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant
or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
(Emphasis supplied).

This provision, however, does not support petitioner's contention that the COMELEC, or more
properly speaking, the Manila City BOC, should have suspended the proclamation. The use of the
word "may" indicates that the suspension of a proclamation is merely directory and permissive in
nature and operates to confer discretion. 21 What is merely made mandatory, according to the
provision itself, is the continuation of the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest. Thus, in
view of this discretion granted to the COMELEC, the question of whether or not evidence of guilt is
so strong as to warrant suspension of proclamation must be left for its own determination and the
Court cannot interfere therewith and substitute its own judgment unless such discretion has been
exercised whimsically and capriciously. 22 The COMELEC, as an administrative agency and a
specialized constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, 23 has
more than enough expertise in its field that its findings or conclusions are generally respected and
even given finality. 24 The COMELEC has not found any ground to suspend the proclamation and the
records likewise fail to show any so as to warrant a different conclusion from this Court. Hence, there
is no ample justification to hold that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion.

It is to be noted that Section 5, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure 25 states that:

Sec. 5. Effect of petition if unresolved before completion of canvass. — . . . (H)is

proclamation shall be suspended notwithstanding the fact that he received the
winning number of votes in such election. Commented [RM4]: COMELEC rule that is against the
basic law
However, being merely an implementing rule, the same must not override, but instead remain
consistent with and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative rules
and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law. 26 Thus,
in Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Factoran, Jr., 27 the Court ruled that:

We reiterate the principle that the power of administrative officials to promulgate

rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to
carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative enactment. The principle was
enunciated as early as 1908 in the case of United States v.Barrias. The scope of the
exercise of such rule-making power was clearly expressed in the case of United
States v. Tupasi Molina, decided in 1914, thus: "Of course, the regulations adopted
under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general
provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So
long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provision of
the law, they are valid.

Recently, the case of People v. Maceren gave a brief delineation of the scope of said
power of administrative officials:
 Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the
sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of
course, the law itself cannot be extended (U.S. v. Tupasi Molina, supra). An
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos v. Estenzo, 109
Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June
30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29,
1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).

The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be
extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace
matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be
sanctioned (University of Santo Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382,
citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see Collector of Internal Revenue v.
Villaflor, 69 Phil. 319; Wise & Co. v. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del Mar v. Phil.
Veterans Administration, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).

xxx xxx xxx

. . . The rule or regulations should be within the scope of the statutory authority
granted by the legislature to the administrative agency (Davis, Administrative Law, p.
194, 197, cited in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil.
555, 558).

In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to
implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulations cannot go
beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People v. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091).

Since Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646, the law which Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure seeks to implement, employed the word "may," it is, therefore, improper and highly
irregular for the COMELEC to have used instead the word "shall" in its rules.

Moreover, there is no reason why the Manila City BOC should not have proclaimed Basco as the
sixth winning City Councilor. Absent any determination of irregularity in the election returns, as well
as an order enjoining the canvassing and proclamation of the winner, it is a mandatory and
ministerial duty of the Board of Canvassers concerned to count the votes based on such returns and
declare the result. This has been the rule as early as in the case of Dizon v. Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Laguna 28 where we clarified the nature of the functions of the Board of
Canvassers, viz.:

The simple purpose and duty of the canvassing board is to ascertain and declare the
apparent result of the voting. All other questions are to be tried before the court or
other tribunal for contesting elections or in quo warranto proceedings. (9 R.C.L., p.
1110)

To the same effect is the following quotation:

. . . Where there is no question as to the genuineness of the returns or that all the
returns are before them, the powers and duties of canvassers are limited to the
mechanical or mathematical function of ascertaining and declaring the apparent
result of the election by adding or compiling the votes cast for each candidate as
 shown on the face of the returns before them, and then declaring or certifying the
result so ascertained. (20 C.J., 200-201) [Emphasis supplied]

Finally, the cases of Duremdes, Benito and Aguam, supra, cited by petitioner are all irrelevant and
inapplicable to the factual circumstances at bar and serve no other purpose than to muddle the real
issue. These three cases do not in any manner refer to void proclamations resulting from the mere
pendency of a disqualification case.

In Duremdes, the proclamation was deemed void ab initio because the same was made contrary to
the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code regarding the suspension of proclamation in cases of
contested election returns.

In Benito, the proclamation of petitioner Benito was rendered ineffective due to the Board of
Canvassers' violation of its ministerial duty to proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of
votes and pave the way to succession in office. In said case, the candidate receiving the highest
number of votes for the mayoralty position died but the Board of Canvassers, instead of proclaiming
the deceased candidate winner, declared Benito, a mere second-placer, the mayor.

Lastly, in Aguam, the nullification of the proclamation proceeded from the fact that it was based only
on advanced copies of election returns which, under the law then prevailing, could not have been a
proper and legal basis for proclamation.

With no precedent clearly in point, petitioner's arguments must, therefore, be rejected.

IV. May Romualdo S. Maranan, a seventh placer, be legally declared a winning candidate?

Obviously, he may not be declared a winner. In the first place, Basco was a duly qualified candidate
pursuant to our disquisition above. Furthermore, he clearly received the winning number of votes
which put him in sixth place. Thus, petitioner's emphatic reference to Labo v. COMELEC, 29 where
we laid down a possible exception to the rule that a second placer may not be declared the winning
candidate, finds no application in this case. The exception is predicated on the concurrence of two
assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2)
the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the
ineligible candidate. Both assumptions, however, are absent in this case. Petitioner's allegation that
Basco was well-known to have been disqualified in the small community where he ran as a
candidate is purely speculative and conjectural, unsupported as it is by any convincing facts of
record to show notoriety of his alleged disqualification. 30

In sum, we see the dismissal of the petition for disqualification as not having been attended by grave
abuse of discretion. There is then no more legal impediment for private respondent's continuance in
office as City Councilor for the Second District of Manila.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The assailed resolution of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA 95-212
dated July 31, 1996 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban
and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Francisco, JJ., are on leave.