Health Policy and Planning, 2019, 1–9

doi: 10.1093/heapol/czz063
Original Article

Coca-Cola’s political and policy influence in

Mexico: understanding the role of institutions,

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interests and divided society
Eduardo J. Gómez*
Department of International Development, King’s College London, NE Bush House, 4th Floor, Room 4.13, London,
Strand, UK
*Corresponding author. Department of International Development, King’s College London, NE Bush House, 4th Floor,
Room 4.13, London, Strand, UK. E-mail: Eduardo.gomez@kcl.ac.uk
Accepted on 17 June 2019

Abstract
In response to Mexico’s burgeoning industrial epidemics of obesity and type-2 diabetes, triggered in
part by sugar-sweetened carbonated beverages’ ability to readily market their products and
influence consumption, the government has responded through a variety of non-communicable dis-
ease (NCD) policies. Nevertheless, major industries, such as Coca-Cola, have been able to continu-
ously obstruct the prioritization of those policies targeting the consumption, marketing and sale of
their products. To better understand why this has occurred, this article introduces a political science
agenda-setting framework and applies it to the case of Coca-Cola in Mexico. Devised from political
science theory and subsequently applied to the case of Coca-Cola in Mexico, my framework, titled
Institutions, Interests, and Industry Civic Influence (IPIC), emphasizes Coca-Cola’s access to institu-
tions, supportive presidents and industry efforts to hamper civic mobilization and pressures for
greater regulation of the soda industry. Methodologically, I employ qualitative single case study ana-
lysis, combining an analysis of 26 case study documents and seven in-depth stake-holder interviews.
My proposed analytical framework helps to underscore the fact that Coca-Cola’s influence is not
solely shaped by the corporation’s increased economic importance, but more importantly, its access
to politicians, institutions and strategies to divide civil society. Additionally, my proposed framework
provides several real-world policy recommendations for how governments and civil society can re-
structure their relationship with the soda industry, such as the government’s creation of laws prohib-
iting the industry’s ability to influence NCD policy and fund scientific research.

Keywords: Mexico, soda industry, policy, institutions, civil society

Key Messages
• Political science theory can go far in helping to unravel and understand how major soda industries in Mexico, such as
Coca-Cola, can continue to influence regulatory policy and scientific research.
• In order to fully understand Coca-Cola’s policy and research influence in Mexico, we need to better understand the com-
pany’s historical institutional connections and capacity to divide civic mobilization.
• The author’s proposed analytical political science framework can be applied to other emerging economies and help to
explain why big soda industries continue to interfere in policy and research despite increased government support for
obesity and type-2 diabetes prevention policies.

C The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press in association with The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.
V
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2 Health Policy and Planning, 2019, Vol. 0, No. 0

Introduction science theory be used to develop an analytical framework address-

ing this first empirical question while providing a useful tool for pol-
The product of global economic integration, foreign trade and eco-
icy-makers and civil society?
nomic growth, in recent years Mexico has seen one of the highest
In answering these questions, this article submits an analytical
levels of per-capita consumption of sugary-beverage and fast foods
framework titled Institutions, Political Interests, and Industry Civic
in the Americas (Luxton, 2015). While this situation has been under-
Influence (IPIC). The IPIC framework was devised from several pol-
pinned by the emergence of a thriving middle-income class, it has
itical science theories and subsequently applied and tested with the
also contributed to the growth of non-communicable diseases
case of Coca-Cola in Mexico. IPIC provides an in-depth analysis of
(NCDs). In Mexico, the top three NCD contributors to Disability-

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the actors and incentives shaping Mexico’s policy agenda-setting in
Adjusted Life Years are diabetes mellitus, ischaemic heart and
the area of NCD prevention, such as policies seeking to reduce soda
chronic kidney disease (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation,
consumption (e.g. soda taxes), marketing and sales regulation.
2019). As Figure 1 illustrates, the number of deaths attributed to
Through the application of this framework, it is argued that con-
NCDs in Mexico increased between 2000 and 2010. Figure 2 shows
straints in limiting Coca-Cola’s agenda-setting influence are attrib-
that the population percentage of obese individuals has increased
uted to three primary factors: first, the ability of industry lobbyists
from 23.3% in 2005 to 28.3% in 2015, while the percentage of
to meet with legislative members, taking advantage of pre-existing
type-2 diabetes rose from 10.1% in 2005 to 11.2% in 2014.
historic institutions and ties with policy-makers within government;
This study is motivated by two primary research questions. First,
second, the presidents’ pre-existing personal ties with Coca-Cola
since the beginning of the president Vincente Fox administration
and interests in benefiting from this company’s ongoing success; and
(2000–2006) to the present day, why has the government been re-
finally, the presence of what this article refers to as a ‘conflictual
peatedly incapable of limiting the ability of Mexico’s largest soda in-
civil societal response,’ with Coca-Cola-supported researchers/acti-
dustry, Coca-Cola, to obstruct government efforts to prioritize
vists vs public health advocates divided over the relationship be-
NCD prevention policies to discourage the consumption, marketing
tween these products and NCDs and what prevention policies
and sale of their products? This conundrum has contributed to the
should look like, in turn hampering civil society’s ability to mobilize
emergence of Mexico’s ‘industrial epidemics’ (Hastings, 2012): e.g.
and limit Coca-Cola’s agenda-setting influence.
obesity and type-2 diabetes, facilitated by Coca-Cola’s ability to eas-
ily market and sell its products. Second, to what extent can political

Soda industry development and political context

Mexico: NCD Deaths (diabetes, cardiovascular, chronic Mexico’s soda industry quickly emerged during the 1980s and
obstrucve pulmonary; reported deaths) 1990s, when the economy began to liberalize. The passage of the
160000 Cardiovascular North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 facilitated
134108 foreign direct investment from the USA and the expansion of
140000
Mexico’s soda industry (Lopez and Jacobs, 2018). As Figures 3 and
120000 Diabetes 108610 4 illustrate, this industry continues to see an increase in sales and
95202
100000 production. Today, the production and sales of soda are dominated
82619
80000 by two companies that have approximately 85% of the market
68164 Chronic obstrucve
pulnary share: Coca-Cola (70%) and Pepsi-Co (15%) (Lutzenkirchen,
60000 47448 2018), followed by Ajemex, Sociedad Cooperativa Trabajadores de
40000 35194
26251
30462 Pascual, Jarocito and Mister Q (Cortes, 2009). Coca-Cola FEMSA
20000 is the largest producer of sodas (Lutzenkirchen, 2018). Sales con-
0
tinue to be dominated by Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Co, followed by
2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 Grupo Pe~ natfiel, Ajemex, and Sociedad Cooperativa Trabajadores
de Pascual (Cortes, 2009). Coca-Cola essentially dominates the mar-
Figure 1 Mexico: NCD Deaths (diabetes, cardiovascular, chronic obstructive
ket and presents a formidable political and economic force.
pulmonary; reported deaths). Source: WHO and Global Health Observatory
Mexico’s political and policy-making context also facilitates
(2019).
Coca-Cola’s influence. Historically, the president wields consider-
able policy-making powers through legislative veto authority and in-
Mexico: Prevalence of Obesity, Diabetes, and Raised Blood Pressure formally as head of the governing political party (historically the
(age standardized, percentage) PRI, Partido Revolucionaro Institutional), enjoying, until recently,
30
27.8 28.3
26.8 27.3
25.8 26.3
25 24.8 25.3 Mexico: So Drink Sales (US$ million)
23.8 24.3
23.3 18,000
22.2 21.9 21.6 21.4 21.1 20.9 20.6 20.4
20 20.1 19.9 19.7 16,000 15,726
14,978
14,000 14,198
15 13,365
12,000 12,612
11,765
10 10.1 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 11 11.1 11.2 10,000 9,882 10,439 11,003

8,000
5 6,000
Obesity Diabetes Raised Blood Pressure
4,000
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2,000
0
Figure 2 Mexico: Prevalence of Obesity, Diabetes, and Raised Blood 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Pressure (age standardized, percentage). Source: WHO and Global Health
Observatory, 2019. Figure 3 Mexico: Soft Drink Sales (US$ million). Source: Statista (2019).
Health Policy and Planning, 2019, Vol. 0, No. 0 3

Mexico: So Drink Producon Obesity in the U.S., Mexico, Chile, Argenna, Colombia, and
(in millions of litres) Brazil (BMI >30, age standardized esmates, %)
19,000.00 40
18,950.00 18,937.70 36.2
18,926.70 35 34.9 35.6
18,900.00 33.6 34.3
32.3 33
31 31.7
18,850.00 30 29.7 30.3
29 28.3 28.9
28.3
26.8 27.3
26.8 27.8
27.3 27.8
18,800.00 25.3 25.8
25.3 26.3
25.8 26.3
25 24.3 24.8
24.4 24.8
23.3
23 23.8
23.4 23.9
18,750.00 21.4 21.9
21.6 22.3
22.1
20 20.4
20.1 20.9
20.6 21.1
19.1 19.5
19.2 20
19.6
18,700.00 17.8 18.2
17.8 18.7
18.2 18.7
17.4
16.8 17.3
15
18,650.00
18,624.90 18,634.20

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18,600.00 10 U.S. Mexico Chile Argenna Colombia Brazil
18,550.00 5
18,500.00
0
18,450.00
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
2014 2015 2016 2017
Figure 5 Obesity in the U.S., Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Colombia, and Brazil
Figure 4 Mexico: Soft Drink Production (in millions of litres). Source: Statista
(BMI >30, age-standardized estimates, %). Source: WHO and Global Health
(2019).
Observatory (2019).

majority representation in the congress, while leading the corporat-

ist political agreement between the governing party, business and la-
Diabetes in the US, Mexico, Chile, Argenna, Colombia, Brazil
bour sectors (Peschard and Rioff, 2005). The president’s ability to
(raised fasng blood glucose >=7.0 mmol/L, age-standardized esmates, %)
appoint and dismiss federal agency directors has also sustained the 12
11.1 11.2
10.7 10.8 11
10.5 10.6 10.5
president’s influence over policy agenda-setting (Edmonds-Poli and 10 10.1 10.3 10.4
9.6 9.7 9.9 10 10.2 10.3
9.5 9.7
9.2 9.3 9.4 9.1 9.3 9.4
8.8 8.9 9
Shirk, 2016). In this context, Coca-Cola has had a considerable 8
8.6 8.7
7.8 7.9 8 8.1
7.8
8.2
7.9
8.3
8
8.4
8.1
8.5
8.3
7.7 7.7
7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7
7.3 7.2 7.3
amount of policy influence when supported by the president and 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.9 7 7 7.1 7.1
6
political parties.
4

2 U.S. Mexico Chile Argenna Colombia Brazil

Methodology 0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
This study commenced in June 2018 and concluded in April 2019.
When conducting research, this study employed a qualitative case Figure 6 Diabetes in the US, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Colombia, Brazil
study methodological approach. This approach entails several bene- (raised fasting blood glucose 7.0 mmol/L, age-standardized estimates, %).
fits, ranging from hypothesis-building, establishing causal mecha- Source: WHO and Global Health Observatory (2019).

nisms, internal validation of theories and providing rich contextual

analysis (Gerring, 2011). Following Gerring’s (2011) discussion of documents discussing the Mexican case study, the author looked for
the benefits that case studies provide in establishing causal insight, and used relevant empirical analytical statements about the politics
the case of Mexico was selected in order to illustrate the potential ef- and policy process both to inform the article’s descriptive analysis
fectiveness of the IPIC framework by engaging in a form of ‘pattern and to provide evidence of IPIC’s effectiveness. In order to avoid se-
matching’, i.e. illustrating the presence of IPIC’s causal mechanisms lection bias, documents were randomly obtained from different aca-
in Mexico. The unit of analysis was restricted to the national gov- demic and non-academic sources. Finally, quantitative statistical
ernment level and those actors involved in agenda-setting processes. data of epidemiological NCD trends and quality of life were
The case of Mexico was chosen because of the author’s experience obtained from the World Health Organization (WHO) and used to
living and conducting research there, the vast amount of published provide a description of Mexico’s burden of disease.
literature on Coca-Cola’s policy influence in Mexico, and because Qualitative data were also obtained from stakeholder interviews
within the Americas, Mexico has one of the highest prevalence rates in Mexico, with ethical review. Seven interviewees were selected due
of obesity and diabetes—see Figures 5 and 6. Coca-Cola was also to their presence in Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), aca-
chosen because it is the most popular soda consumed in the country demia and government, chosen for their empirical knowledge and
(Tyler, 2018). policy experience, not their personal views (see Table 1). Snow-
With respect to data, this study used qualitative and quantitative balling procedures were used to find additional interviewees.
sources. Qualitative documents, such as journal articles, books, pol- Interviews were conducted for 30 min each, via Skype and
icy reports and news articles were obtained via Google’s online WhatsApp communication, from mid- to late-April 2019. Formal
search engine with keyword search terms. Online library search verbal consent was obtained prior to the interviews. With the excep-
engines, such as ArticleFirst, Web of Science and PubMed (consid- tion of two government officials, all gave consent to use their names,
ered the most thorough databases for finding social science and title and institutional affiliation. A total of eight interview questions
medicine articles), were also used. Book chapters and policy reports were used, focusing on the president’s relationship with Coca-Cola,
were obtained from colleagues in Mexico. When reviewing docu- the latter’s partnership with government and civil society, and the
ments, a narrative review process was used: selecting materials based importance of congressional/bureaucratic institutions for Coca-
on several key search terms, without a specific selection criteria, fol- Cola’s lobbying activities. Interview data were analysed in a themat-
lowed by a summary and analysis of the literature (Ferrari, 2015). A ic fashion, without particular software usage, and referenced as sup-
summary and analysis of the theoretical literature discussing indus- portive empirical evidence. Finally, these interview data were
try’s NCD policy influence was done in order to understand alterna- combined with the aforementioned qualitative documents in order
tive theoretical approaches to this topic and assess limitations of the to ‘triangulate’ the data, i.e. ensure that different types of data sour-
existing literature, providing information which was then used to ces were in agreement over particular issues, thus avoiding selection
explain the IPIC framework’s significance. With regards to bias in the usage of data.
4 Health Policy and Planning, 2019, Vol. 0, No. 0

Table 1 Interviews Pathways

Interviewee Affiliation

Academic
Dr Simon Barquera, Professor National Institute of Public Health
Dr Sergio Juárez, Associate Monterrey Technological Institute
Professor
Activist NGO Polical Interests
Ana Larra~ naga ContraPESO Industry Policy Agenda-Seng Influence

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Yarishdy Mora ContraPESO
Luis Cruz NCD Alliance, Mexico City
Government
Anonymous interview source Secretariat of Health
Anonymous interview source Secretariat of Health

Figure 7 IPIC framework: institutions, political interests, and industry civic

influence.
Theoretical contribution
This article introduces a political science analytical framework titled
IPIC. Following an ‘analytical narratives’ (Bates et al., 1998) per- career histories in the soda industry and long-standing corporate
spective, which applies political science theories to empirical case allies facilitated the latter’s influence over NCD policy. Here, ration-
studies and uses the latter to reveal the effectiveness and limitations al choice theory refers to politician’s strategies when maximizing
of theory, IPIC is an analytical framework that is used to better their personal preferences in a context of institutional, organization-
understand and explain the political and social factors shaping the al and social constraints (Ostrom, 2007). In this article, this ap-
policy agenda-setting process. This proposed framework is not proach focuses on presidents and their effort to maximize their
intended to introduce a generalizable theory about the policy- preferences in supporting the industry in exchange for their political
making process, i.e. applicable to, and validated by, many case stud- support and assistance in achieving other policy objectives.
ies, but rather to use political science theories in order to better ex- Finally, IPIC’s Industry Civic Influence pathway builds on the
plain, not predict, agenda-setting processes. theoretical importance of industries’ impact on civic mobilization
The IPIC framework combines historical institutional (HI) theo- and pressures on the government for policy reform. Building on
ries emphasizing the importance of formal institutional design and Walker (2009), Lee and Romano (2013) and De Bakker et al.
historic interest group access to congressional and bureaucratic insti- (2013) depiction of corporate efforts to mobilize citizens around
tutions (Institutions) (Thelen, 1999), rational choice institutionalism causes that are aligned with the former’s interests, IPIC’s application
in political elite decision-making (Political Interests) (Ostrom, 2007), to Mexico shows how industries can create a ‘conflictual civil soci-
and industry’s effects on civic mobilization (Industry Civic Influence) ety’ by supporting academic researchers and activists that could be
(Walker, 2009). As Figure 7 illustrates, these three pathways of the working with other public health activists safeguarding the public’s
IPIC framework operate simultaneously, are isolated from each health interests, in turn limiting the latter’s full potential to unify,
other, though eventually contributing to the same outcome—i.e. in- mobilize and thwart industry’s ongoing agenda-setting influence.
dustry policy agenda-setting influence. Moreover, all three pathways
are important and the presence of each is necessary to fully explain
agenda-setting outcomes. Considering the political elite-driven Results
agenda-setting process found in many developing nations, however, Since the early-1990s, the sugary-beverage and fast food industries
the Institutions and Political Interests pathways may be more causally in Mexico exhibited a great deal of influence over NCD prevention
significant than Industry Civic Influence—although the latter is policy. Despite civil societal actors working with the Secretariat of
needed to explain why agenda-setting continues to be elite-driven. Health (SoH) to propose marketing regulations, a soda tax in 2008
With respect to applying HI theories when addressing IPICs and 2012, along with improved nutritional food diagrams (Cecil,
Institutions pathway, and building on the works of Immergut 2018), these policies were never adopted (Rosenberg, 2015; Taylor
(1992) and Weir (1989), the application of the IPIC framework to and Jacobson, 2015; Processo, 2017). To help further reduce the
Mexico reveals how Coca-Cola lobbyists’ historic access to legisla- consumption of sugary drinks, in 2008 the SoH introduced the
tors and policy-makers through congressional and bureaucratic Recomendaciones de Bebidas para una Vida Saludable
institutions facilitated their subsequent ability to influence the NCD (Recommendation of Drinks for a Healthy Life), which also failed
policy agenda. In Mexico, the congress periodically holds sub- to materialize (Alianza por la Salud Alimentaria, 2013). Inter-
committee meetings covering 52 policy issues, one of them being ministerial efforts between the Secretariat of Education and Health
healthcare. When these sub-committee meetings on healthcare con- in 2010 were also introduced in order to prevent the sale of soft
vene, soda and junk food industry representatives consistently go to drinks and other sweetened beverages in schools; and yet, after vehe-
these meetings and confront committee members prior to and after ment opposition from the soda industry, mainly by vocalizing its op-
these meetings to discuss their company’s particular issues of con- position through votes in government-organized hearings, such as
cern. Moreover, these sub-committees routinely invite public testi- the Ministry of the Economy’s Federal Commission for Regulatory
mony and are there to help oversee, conduct research and assist the Improvement (COFEMER), this effort was eventually avoided
congress in the fulfilment of its duties (Mexican Congress, 1999). (Barquera et al., 2013; Taylor and Jacobson, 2015).
Next, with respect to the IPIC’s Political Interests pathway, Nevertheless, in 2013 the Enrique Pe~ na Nieto (PRI, 2012–18)
IPIC’s application to Mexico reveals how presidents with previous presidential administration succeeded in adopting a soda and
Health Policy and Planning, 2019, Vol. 0, No. 0 5

beverage (SSB) tax, which entailed a tax of one peso per litre of regulating corporate access to congressional bodies, Coca-Cola lob-
soda. To facilitate its passage, this tax was introduced as part of a byists and supportive labour unions, such as the Cámara Nacional
larger fiscal policy package focused on rejuvenating the economy, de la Industria de Azucar (CNIA), had repeated access to congres-
with proponents in civil society framing the endeavour on economic sional members and committee meetings focused on NCD preven-
rather than healthcare grounds (Bonilla-Chacı́n et al., 2016; Baker tion policies. For instance, the CNIA initially lobbied against the
et al., 2017). This fiscal package was introduced to diversify govern- soda tax because it would entail a substantial reduction in soda in-
ment revenue (reducing its dependence on oil revenue) and entailed dustry demand for sugar cane, with industries opting for the use of
increasing taxes for high-income earners, limiting corporate deduc- cheaper high-fructose corn syrup, potentially lowering sugar cane

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tions, creating a 10% tax on dividends, increasing taxes for the min- profits and employment (Lutzenkirchen, 2018).
ing sector, and a soda and snack tax (Valenzuela, 2016). In 2016, Within these congressional venues, lobbyists pressured legislative
further efforts were made to increase the SSB tax; nevertheless, this representatives into refraining from passing the aforementioned le-
proposal ultimately proved unsuccessful due to the Nieto adminis- gislation on a sugar tax (in 2008, 2012), marketing and sales
tration’s decision not to modify government taxes for the remainder (Calvillo and Peteranderl, 2018), made possible for several reasons.
of his presidential term (Bonilla-Chacı́n et al., 2016). First was the provision of largesse and campaign contributions
Yet another successful soda industry strategy for undermining (Rosenberg, 2015), with extensive private contributions deemed il-
policy development has been its ongoing funding of supportive sci- legal according to the 2011 constitutional reforms (O’Neil, 2013).
entific research. For instance, Coca-Cola has worked with research- Coca-Cola representatives also had access to SoH committees
ers, foundations, think-tanks and sponsored conferences to focused on proposing NCD policies, such as the Observatorio
downplay the harm that increased sugar consumption has on health, Mexı́cano de Enfermedades No Transmisbles (OMENT, Mexican
questioning the scientific evidence behind these claims, and the ef- Observatory for NCDs). Since its inception through the 2013
fectiveness of prevention policies (Taylor and Jacobson, 2015; inter- National Strategy, OMENT has consistently ensured Coca-Cola’s
view with Luis Cruz, April 29, 2019; interview with Yarishdy Mora, (and other industry’s) representation, far exceeding civil society’s,
April 9, 2019; interview with Ana Larra~ naga, April 15, 2019; inter- and, in the process, heavily influenced policy proposals
view with Sergio Juárez, April 12, 2019; interview with Simon (Lutzenkirchen, 2018; UK Health Forum, 2018; interview with Luis
Barquera, April 16, 2019; interview with anonymous health official, Cruz, April 29, 2019; interview with Yarishdy Mora, April 9, 2019;
April 29, 2019). A good example was a study by ITAM university interview with Ana Larra~ naga, April 15, 2019). Coca-Cola corpor-
economists, indirectly supported by Coca-Cola and other industries ate executives also had long-held personal ties and thus direct access
through the ConMéxico foundation, titled Taxing Calories in to senior health officials, such as former SoH Secretary Mercedes
Mexico (Aguilar et al., 2015; Cecile, 2018). This study provided Juan López, who often advocated on their behalf (Cecil, 2018; inter-
statistical evidence questioning the soda tax’s reduction in soda con- view with Luis Cruz, April 29, 2019). Other corporate strategies
sumption. FunSalud (Mexican Health Foundation), arguably the included using the media to question the relationship between the
most influential NGO when it comes to setting the SoH’s public consumption of sodas and NCDs and opposing policies on the
health agenda, has for years also criticized efforts to limit the con- grounds of threats to individual liberty and happiness. One good ex-
sumption of soda and processed foods. Funsalud has consistently ample in Mexico has been the soda industry’s usage of large bill-
taken this position because its directors and board have worked boards promoting their message that exercise is joyful and that
closely with Coca-Cola and other food industries, such as Nestlé having a little sugar every day is natural and good for individuals
(Rosenberg, 2015); one excellent example was Dr Mercedes Juan (Calvillo, 2017). Finally, some blamed the apathy and incompetence
López, who chaired Funsalud’s board prior to becoming Secretary of congressional members for industries’ ability to repeatedly influ-
of Health under President Pe~ na Nieto (Rosenberg, 2015). During ence policy (Lira, 2017).
her time at Funsalud, Dr López criticized the soda tax’s effective-
ness, instead emphasizing the importance of exercise and moder-
ation in soda consumption (Rosenberg, 2015); this message Political interests
comported with Coca-Cola’s position on the soda tax. FunSalud has Following IPIC’s Political Interests pathway, which applies rational
also worked closely with Coca-Cola on childhood obesity projects choice theories emphasizing the importance of presidents’ personal
(Cecil, 2018). Finally, in 2006 Coca-Cola also partnered with the and political preferences in health policy-making, the Mexican presi-
SoH to create the ‘Ponte 100’ programme, which promoted the dency’s historic ties and vested interests in advancing Coca-Cola’s
habit of individual exercise rather than dietary changes (Rosenberg, continued prosperity played an important role. For example, former
2015; Ochoa, 2016; interview with Luis Cruz, April 29, 2019; inter- President Vincente Fox had previously been a Coca-Cola executive
view with anonymous health official, April 25 and 29, 2019). and benefited from receiving campaign donations and advice from
trusted corporate friends (Cruz and Durán, 2017). In fact, before
becoming president, as head of Coca-Cola’s Latin America opera-
Institutions tions, Fox was committed to expanding its sales and becoming a
But what have been the institutional conditions facilitating Coca- market leader (Taylor, 2018). Consequently, Coca-Cola executives
Cola’s policy agenda-setting influence? Consistent with the IPIC were highly influential throughout Fox’s administration (Kilpatrick,
framework, first, Institutions mattered: Mexico’s congressional 2015; interview with Yarishdy Mora, April 9, 2019; interview with
committees, coupled with industries’ pre-existing ties with congres- Sergio Juárez, April 12, 2019; interview with anonymous health of-
sional legislators, facilitated Coca-Cola’s influence (Alianza por la ficial, April 25 and 29, 2019). Reporters and think tank experts
Salud Alimentaria, 2017; interview with Yarishdy Mora, April 9, claim that because of Fox’s pre-existing ties and reliance on Coca-
2019; interview with Sergio Juárez, April 12, 2019; interview with Cola, this company had tremendous influence over health policy
Ana Larra~ naga, April 15, 2019; interview with Simon Barquera, (Rosenberg, 2015; interview with Yarishdy Mora, July 9, 2019;
April 16, 2019; interview with anonymous health official, April 25 interview with Sergio Juárez, April 12, 2019). In 2003, for example,
and 29, 2019). Indeed, prior to the 2011 constitutional reforms under industry pressures, Fox ignored the idea of imposing a tax on
6 Health Policy and Planning, 2019, Vol. 0, No. 0

sodas using sugar cane ingredients (Juárez and Rio, 2017; interview Larra~ naga, April 15, 2019; interview with Sergio Juárez, April 12,
with Luis Cruz, July 29, 2019; interview with Sergio Juárez, April 2019; interview with Yarishdy Mora, April 9, 2019; interview with
12, 2019). Furthermore, the political connections that Fox created anonymous health official, April 25 and 29, 2019). Furthermore,
for Coca-Cola helped to deepen the company’s partnership with the SoH maintained its tradition of not proactively seeking the ad-
government officials after he left office (interview with Luis Cruz, vice of advocates in favour of defending the public’s healthcare
April 29, 2019; interview with Yarishdy Mora, April 9, 2019; inter- interests, reflecting a pre-existing tradition of policy elites viewing
view with Sergio Juárez, April 12, 2019; interview with Ana civil society as unworthy of participating in concrete policy discus-
Larra~naga, April 15, 2019; interview with anonymous health offi- sions (Rosenberg, 2015; interview with Luis Cruz, April 29, 2019;

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cial, April 25 and 29, 2019). interview with Yarishdy Mora, April 9, 2019).
Subsequent presidents, such as Felip Calderón (PAN, 2006–
2012), were also supportive of Coca-Cola’s activities, while Enrique
Pe~na Nieto also supported Coca-Cola and Nestlé’s distribution of its
products, mainly biscuits and fortified puddings, to support his anti-
Discussion
hunger programme (Ochoa, 2014; interview with Luis Cruz, April This article has shown that one of the reasons why the industrial epi-
29, 2019). These industries have continued to have considerable in- demics of obesity and type-2 diabetes burgeoned in Mexico has to
fluence within presidential administrations, while highlighting the do with Coca-Cola’s ongoing ability to negatively influence politi-
fact that there is no sense of conflict of interest within government cians’ decisions not to prioritize NCD policies, taking on several
(Rundall and Arana, 2013; interview with Yarishdy Mora, April 9, political strategies to prohibit ‘policy windows’ (Kingdon, 1984)
2019). from opening and leading to more aggressive NCD policies. With
unfettered access to markets, facilitating the marketing, sale and
consumption of Coca-Cola’s unhealthy products, this industry has
Industry civic influence behaved in what Moodie et al. (2013) refer to as a dangerous ‘dis-
Finally, IPIC’s Industry Civic Influence pathway, which applies the- ease vector’ (Gilmore et al., 2011).
ories underscoring industry’s manipulation of civic mobilization in In attempting to explain why this is the case, this article has
the former’s favour (Walker, 2009; Lee and Romano, 2013), also introduced the IPIC framework. In light of the recent literature dis-
sheds light into the challenges of civic mobilization and resistance to cussing the various political tactics that tobacco, alcohol and food
Coca-Cola’s policy influence. Indeed, Mexico has exhibited what industries use to manipulate NCD policies, why is another analytical
the author described as a ‘conflictual civil societal response,’ where framework needed? A brief review of the literature helps to address
influential segments of society, such as university academics and this question.
think-tanks, which have been approached by and work closely with Hillman and Hitt (1999) were the first to underscore how to-
Coca-Cola-funded foundations, such as ConMéxico, have repeated- bacco companies have engaged in what they and others refer to as
ly neglected to unify with NGOs, activists, and other academics rep- Corporate Political Activities (CPA). Industries engage in CPA in
resenting the general public’s healthcare needs. Seeking funding, order to influence health policy decisions in their favour through a
academics in the former camp, such as professors at the ITAM, El variety of political tactics. Hillman and Hitt (1999) introduced us to
Colegio de México, and the Autonomous University of Nuevo Leon, the tobacco industry’s CPA strategies of ‘information/messaging’
have often supported Coca-Cola and other soda industries and the (such as engaging in lobbying activities, funding supportive research,
ConMéxico foundation, due to the latter’s willingness to finance re- framing the debate on diet), ‘financing’ (e.g. providing gifts to politi-
search and facilitate publication (Gertner and Rifkin, 2017; inter- cians), and ‘constituency-building’ (e.g. partnering with commun-
view with Yarishdy Mora, April 9, 2019; interview with Luis Cruz, ities and industry). After the discovery of more documents
April 29, 2019; interview with Ana Larra~ naga, April 15, 2019; highlighting the tobacco industry’s alternative political strategies,
interview with Simon Barquera, April 16, 2019; interview with an- Savell et al. (2014) adopted Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) three strat-
onymous health official, April 25 and 29, 2019). Other NGOs, such egies and added three additional strategies, now totalling six; these
as the Mexican Diabetes Federation, have also received funding three additional strategies included: ‘legal’ (threat of legal action);
from Coca-Cola and no longer engage in public advocacy cam- ‘policy substitution’ (e.g. industry self-regulation); and opposition
paigns, while often sponsoring conferences that emphasize scientific ‘fragmentation/destabilization’ (criticizing opponents)—see
information supportive of Coca-Cola’s message emphasizing the im- Supplementary Appendix Table SA2. Savell et al. (2014) also
portance of individual responsibility and exercise (Asociación addressed the discourse frames used by industry to influence policy
Mexicana de Diabetes, 2019; interview with Yarishdy Mora, April discussions and agenda-setting, such as the unintended consequences
9, 2019). Alternatively, NGOs, such as El Poder del Consumidor, of policy, regulatory redundancy, and insufficient credible evidence.
and those advocating for the health and safety of Mexico’s citizens, Mialon et al. (2015) subsequently discovered that Savell et al.’s
such as Fundación Midete, ContraPESO, and researchers from the (2014) six political strategies used by the tobacco and alcohol indus-
National Institute of Public Health, have created their own Alianza tries were also used by the food industry in several nations (Gilmore
por la Salud Alimentaria. However, the Alianza has insufficient gov- et al., 2011; Mialon et al., 2016, 2017).
ernment and/or private sector support, with limited contributions Similarly, Moodie et al. (2013) emphasized tactics employed by
from the Bloomberg Foundation (Bonilla-Chacı́n et al., 2016). the food, tobacco and alcohol industries, such as: co-opting policy-
When compared with each other, however, academics and think- makers and health professionals by helping them design national
tanks working with food and beverage industries have had greater policy [falling into Savell et al.’s (2014) ‘information/messaging’ tac-
access to resources, funding for social media, and thus more political tic]; lobbying politicians (‘information/messaging’); encouraging
influence vs their rival public health proponents (Barquera et al., voters to oppose industry regulations based on principles of individ-
2013). This has led to a lack of unity in civil society’s ability to exert ual liberty; biasing research findings by funding research institutions
ongoing pressure on the president and congress to limit Coca-Cola’s providing supportive evidence (‘information/messaging’); and pro-
policy interference (Bonilla-Chacı́n et al., 2016; interview with Ana viding community programmes in order to deflect public criticism
Health Policy and Planning, 2019, Vol. 0, No. 0 7

(‘constituency-building’). More recently, Lima and Galea (2018) Future research will also need to examine to what extent IPIC
have introduced a 3D view of power in the food industry’s ability to applies to other countries. In India, similar to Mexico, soda indus-
interfere with NCD policy agenda-setting, with a specific influence tries have had historic access to federal institutions, while prime
over defining what constitutes an important health issue and avoid- ministers have had a career interest in ensuring that these industries
ing conflict between public–private groups; these power strategies and fast food companies prosper—especially as they have been
are operationalized through what they refer to as ‘practices of linked to the government’s efforts to develop the agricultural sector;
power’, such as lobbying activities (Savell et al.’s [2014] ‘informa- moreover, industries such as Pepsi-Co and Nestlé, have hampered
tion/messaging’), campaign donations (‘financial incentives’), part- civil society’s ability to mobilize (Gómez, 2018). Similar dynamics

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nerships with government (‘information/messaging’) and civil have been seen in Brazil, where soda industries have colluded with
societal capture, i.e. funding research organizations, co-opting them federal regulatory bodies and congressional committees, where pres-
into releasing supportive data in the hopes of influencing public idents have depended on sugary-beverage and fast food companies
opinion (‘information/messaging’) (Savell et al., 2014). to help eradicate hunger, and where industrial collusion with nutri-
While the IPIC framework also addresses issues of ‘information/ tion scientists has challenged civic mobilization and support
messaging’ (e.g. lobbying, funding research, Coca-Cola partnering (Gómez, 2018). These findings suggest that the IPIC framework has
with government to create policies), it goes beyond the above litera- the potential to help explain the soda industry’s ongoing influence
ture in four primary ways—see Supplementary Appendix Table over NCD agenda-setting policy and research in other countries.
SA2. First, with respect to Institutions, IPIC underscores the fact IPIC also provides several real-world policy recommendations.
that lobbyists have access to multiple institutions, ranging from con- First, bureaucrats and politicians can use IPIC’s Institutions and
gressional meetings and bureaucratic committees, while targeting Political Interests pathways to discover which political actors are
specific individuals within these institutions. The aforementioned lit- continuously colluding with industry; in response, IPIC can recom-
erature often fails to address these multiple institutional access mend legislation that tightly regulates government’s partnerships
points, and thus falls short of providing a deeper understanding of with the soda industry when considering NCD policy. Furthermore,
what lobbyists do and why they are consistently influential. Second, with respect to Institutions, after analysing the historic track record
IPIC’s emphasis of multiple institutional access points also provides of soda industries having access to congressional members and bur-
more insight into the HI reasons for Lima and Galea’s (2018) em- eaucratic committees, IPIC can recommend that congressional repre-
phasis on the food industry’s ‘practices of power’, i.e. by specifying sentatives propose laws increasing transparency, via monitoring and
how multiple institutional access contributes to this power. Third, reporting, of lobbying activities between the soda industry and gov-
with respect to Political Interests, IPIC delves more into political ernment officials; this endeavour could ultimately lead to transpar-
elite decision-making processes—an issue that the aforementioned ency laws targeting Mexico’s soda industry. And by focussing on
literature fails to adequately address (Mialon et al., 2016)—by IPIC’s Industry Civic Influence (ICI) pathway, congressional repre-
emphasizing why and how pre-existing relationships between the sentatives and bureaucrats can locate and propose legislation
soda industry and presidents negatively influence the latter’s policy increasing transparency processes between the soda industry and
decisions (e.g. Fox and Coca-Cola), as well as presidential support academic researchers. Indeed, applying IPIC could advocate for pro-
for industries in order to secure their assistance in achieving other hibiting the soda industry’s provision of research grants. Finally, in
social welfare policy objectives (e.g. Pe~na Nieto’s anti-hunger work civil society, NGOs can also use the ICI pathway to evaluate the ex-
with Coca-Cola). Finally, IPIC’s Industry Civic Influence goes be- tent of their supportive political and social networks, in the process
yond Savell et al.’s (2014) ‘constituency-building’ approach to show recommending that NGOs expand their support base within govern-
that in the process of working with select allies in society (e.g. aca- ment and academia in order to offset those civic actors supported by
demics), industries hamper civil society’s ability to create a unified industry.
voice, engendering a ‘conflictual civil society’, and thus limiting its Nevertheless, there were several methodological limitations with
ability to mobilize in response to Coca-Cola’s political tactics. the IPIC approach. First, this study only examined the role of Coca-
Empirically, the application of IPIC to Mexico revealed several Cola and no other soda industries in Mexico, thus limiting the num-
key lessons. First, Coca-Cola’s financial importance to Mexico’s ber of observable implications of IPIC’s explanatory effectiveness.
market is insufficient for explaining its ability to consistently influ- Second, a more extensive cross-national comparative analysis of
ence NCD policy agenda-setting. Equally if not more important is Mexico to several other emerging economies could have helped to
understanding the extent to which lobbyists have access to congres- further validate the IPIC framework. Finally, with respect to inter-
sional and bureaucratic institutions. Second, Coca-Cola’s policy in- view data, the evidence could have been strengthened by obtaining
fluence is further magnified when presidents have pre-existing the views of Coca-Cola and other soda industry representatives.
personal ties to these industries. Future research will need to exam- Finally, this article did not consider the deep cultural importance
ine if Mexican presidents without these historic ties are still commit- of Coca-Cola to the Mexican diet and impact on social perceptions.
ted to supporting these industries and what industry leaders are Since its emergence in Mexico’s market in the 1970s, Coca-Cola has
doing to court other politicians with these pre-existing ties. quickly become the most popular soda beverage in the nation, while
The case of Mexico also highlighted how a ‘conflictual civil soci- in some instances being perceived as a form of medical treatment
ety’ hampers efforts to unify and potentially thwart industry’s policy (Tyler, 2018). What’s more, this beverage has gradually been
agenda-setting influence. IPIC’s Industry Civic Influence pathway adopted into religious beliefs and customs (often used, e.g. during
revealed how Coca-Cola’s partnership with researchers hampered burial ceremonies in southern Mexico) (Tyler, 2018). Coca-Cola has
the influence of those NGOs striving to oppose Coca-Cola’s activ- also done wonders to promote sporting events and, in the process,
ities. More work will need to be done examining how Coca-Cola become an integral part of Mexican sports culture and history
and other industries investing in other emerging markets, such as (Rosenberg, 2015). All of this is to say that Coca-Cola’s deep cul-
Brazil and India, are dividing civil society, leading to similar mobil- tural penetration and influence may be creating a sense of cultural
ization problems, or if strong state-civil societal partnerships pre- acceptance and support of its products, which, in turn, could be gen-
date this industry civic interference. erating incentives not to mobilize in opposition to its policy and
8 Health Policy and Planning, 2019, Vol. 0, No. 0

political influence. Future research will therefore need to consider Calvillo A. 2017. How to Win a Campaign for a Soda Tax: The Mexican Case.
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Mexico, Coca-Cola continues to succeed in negatively influencing sensible

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