SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR.

y ASUELA, Petitioner,

vs.

HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

G.R. No. 226679 August 15, 2017

TOPIC: Section 23 of RA 9165, rule-making power of Supreme Court, equal protection

clause

PONENTE: Peralta

FACTS:

Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165.

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea
Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a
plea of guilty for violation of Section 12 (NOTE: should have been Section 15?) of the
same law, with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and
the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.

Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all
violations of said law violates:

1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;

2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution; and
3. The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the
government.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon the

power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure.
2. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for being violative of the
Constitutional right to equal protection of the law.
 HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: YES

The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is now Their exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and
Legislative departments.

The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-equal branches
of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate
rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The
other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that
effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.

Viewed from this perspective, the Court had rejected previous attempts on the part of
the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court
(Rules), to wit:

1. Fabian v. Desierto -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an
administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the
provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as
provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative,
Inc. – The Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on
summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of
Legal Fees; Baguio Market Vendors MultiPurpose Cooperative
(BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes; In Re: Exemption of the
National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; and Rep.
of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. – Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS,
BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by
Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) – The first paragraph of
Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from
issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule
58 of the Rules.

Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its
discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of
the legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court’s authority
to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the
safeguards of Our institutional independence.

SECOND ISSUE: UNRESOLVED

The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is
contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt
any future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of
R.A. No. 9165.

Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a

qualified version thereof, the Court deemed it proper to declare as invalid the
prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the
rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PLEA BARGAINING:

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure

Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive
or procedural in nature.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the
test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested
right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an
existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.

In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates

substantive rights. By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in all courts that the rules on
plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by agreement of
the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an “important,” “essential,” “highly
desirable,” and “legitimate” component of the administration of justice.

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a process whereby the accused
and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to
court approval.” There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The
essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions
to avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be
encouragedbecause the chief virtues of the system – speed, economy, and finality – can
benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea

bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it
operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.
No constitutional right to plea bargain

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed
by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he
prefers to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty
is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party and the
prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense
that is necessarily included in the offense charged. The reason for this is that the
prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always
prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence
on hand can sustain.

Plea bargaining, when allowed

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point
when the prosecution already rested its case.

As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court’s exercise of
discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof.

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing
or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the
prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged.
The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing
change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the
evidence on record. The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of
the prosecution’s evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand,
the judge’s acceptance of the defendant’s change of plea is improper and irregular.
MORALES v. CA AND BINAY

Facts:

• A complaint was filed against Binay and other public officers of the City
Government of Makati charging them with administrative cases for Grave Misconduct,
Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and
criminal cases for violation of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification
of Public Documents. Binay, Jr. was alleged to be involved in anomalous activities
attending the procurement and construction phases of the Makati Parking Building
project, committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati.

• The Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension order, placing Binay Jr., et al.,
under preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay, during the
pendency of the OMB Cases.

• Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of
the preventive suspension order.

• The CA granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, notwithstanding Peña, Jr.'s
assumption of duties as Acting Mayor. Citing Governor Garcia, Jr. v.CA, it found that it
was more prudent on its part to issue a TRO in view of the extreme urgency of the
matter and seriousness of the issues raised, considering that if it were established that
the acts subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all committed during
his prior term, then, applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant
that he can no longer be administratively charged.

Binay’s contention:

• Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010;
and

• (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City
Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability
therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic.

• In view of the condonationdoctrine, as well as the lack of evidence to sustain the

charges against him, hissuspension from office would undeservedly deprive the
electorate of the services ofthe person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into
office.

The Ombudman’s contentions:

• The condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether the

evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders.
• Reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have
been raised by before it during the administrative proceedings.

• There is no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed acts subject of the OMB
Complaint after his re-election in 2013.

Issue: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and the
WPI enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr.
based on the condonation doctrine.

Ruling: No. However, the condonation doctrine is abandoned, but the abandonment is
prospective in effect.

A. The WPI againstthe Ombudsman's preventive suspension order was

correctly issued.

1. The CA's resolutions directing theissuance of the assailed injunctive writs were all
hinged on cases enunciating thecondonation doctrine.By merely following settled
precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly remained "good
law," it cannot be concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion based on
its legal attribution above.

B. The Condonation Doctrine

1. Condonation is defined as "a victim's express or implied forgiveness of an

offense, especially by treating the offender as if there had been no offense."

2. Under the Condonation Doctrine,

a. First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the
public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct.

b. Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous

misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor.

c. Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the
life and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers.

3. It is not based on statutory law but a jurisprudential creation.

a. It originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva
Ecija. In which case, as there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the Court,
resorted to American authorities and found that the weight of authorities seems to
incline toward the rule denying the right to remove one from office because of
misconduct during a prior term.

4. The condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case. Also, it would not
apply to appointive officials since, as to them, there is no sovereign will to
disenfranchise.

C. The doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.

1. There is really no established weight of authority in theUS favoring the doctrine

of condonation.

2. The plain difference in setting, including the sheer impact of the condonation
doctrine on public accountability, calls for Pascual's judicious re-examination.

a. Pascual was decided within the context of the 1935 Constitution which was silent
with respect to public accountability, or of the nature of public office being a public
trust.

3. The concept of public office, under the 1987 Constitution, AS A PUBLIC TRUST
and thecorollary requirement of ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE PEOPLE AT ALL TIMES
is PLAINLY INCONSISTENTwith the idea that an elective local official's administrative
liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact
that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post.

4. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense.

5. There is no constitutional or statutory basis to support the notion.In fact the

Local Government Code and the RRACCS precludes condonation since in the first place,
an elective local official who is meted with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected
to an elective local position due to a direct disqualification from running for such post.

6. If condonation of an electiveofficial's administrative liability would perhaps, be

allowed in this jurisdiction, then thesame should have been provided by law under our
governing legal mechanisms.
7. The proposition that the electorate, when re-electing alocal official, are assumed
to have done so with knowledge of his life and character, andthat they disregarded or
forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any, is infirm. No such
presumption exists in any statute or proceduralrule.

a. Most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in secrecy, and concealedfrom
the public. At a conceptual level, condonation presupposes that the condoner hasactual
knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no condonationof an act that
is unknown.

8. Liability arising from administrative offenses may only be condoned by the

President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

D. The Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be

prospective in application. It should be, as a general rule, recognized as
"good law" prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance
thereupon should be respected.
DE LIMA v. JUDGE GUERRERO

Facts: (timeline)

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, and Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Status Quo Ante
Order1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Senator Leila De Lima.

 Dec 2, 2016 – DOJ panel conducted preliminary hearing on 4 cases

- Omnibus Motion to Immediately Endorse the Cases to the Office of
the Ombudsman and for the Inhibition of the Panel of Prosecutors
and the Secretary of Justice
- Petitioner argued that the Office of the Ombudsman has the
exclusive authority and jurisdiction to hear the four complaints
against her. Further, alleging evident partiality on the part of the
DOJ Panel, the petitioner contended that the DOJ prosecutors
should inhibit themselves and refer the complaints to the Office of
the Ombudsman.
 Dec 9, 2016- hearing on Omnibus Motion, complainants filed a joint
comment/opposition to petitioner’s motion
 Dec 12, 2016 – Petitioner filed Reply to the Joint Comment/Opposition filed by
complainants VACC, Esmeralda and Lasala. In addition, petitioner submitted a
Manifestation with Motion to First Resolve Pending Incident and to Defer
Further Proceedings.
 Dec 21, 2016 - petitioner manifested that she has decided not to submit her
counter-affidavit citing the pendency of her two motions. The DOJ Panel,
however, ruled that it will not entertain belatedly filed counter-affidavits, and
declared all pending incidents and the cases as submitted for resolution.
Petitioner moved for but was denied reconsideration by the DOJ Panel
 Jan 13, 2017 - petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Prohibition and Certiorari14assailing the jurisdiction of the DOJ Panel over the
complaints against her.
 Feb 14, 2017 - In the absence of a restraining order issued by the Court of
Appeals, the DOJ Panel proceeded with the conduct of the preliminary
investigation16 and, in its Joint Resolution.
 Feb 17, 2017 - Three Informations were filed against petitioner De Lima and
several co-accused before the RTC ofMuntinlupa City. One of the Infonnations
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 17-16518 and raffled off to Branch 204,
presided by respondent judge. This Information charging petitioner for violation
of Section 5 in relation to Section (jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28 of Republic
Act No. (RA) 9165.
  Feb 20, 2017 – Motion to Quash by Petitioner (lack of jurisdiction, DOJ lacks
authority to file information, information charges more than one offense, no
corpus delicti, testimonies were based on witnesses who are not qualified,
hearsay)
 Feb 23, 2017 – Respondent judge issued the presently assailed Order finding
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against De Lima and her
co-accused
 Feb 24, 2017 – WOA served
 Feb 27, 2017 – petition by de lima
 March 9. 2017 – OSG comment
 March 13, 2017 - OSG filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 2017,30 claiming
that petitioner falsified the jurats appearing in the: (1) Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping page of her petition; and (2) Affidavit of
Merit in support of her prayer for injunctive relief
 March 14, 21, and 28, 2017 – oral arguments
 March 20 , 2017 – Affidavit Atty. Cabalo to shed light on the allegations of falsity
in petitioner's jurats.
 April 17, 2017 - Parties simultaneously filed their respective Memoranda

Procedural Issues:

A. Whether or not petitioner is excused from compliance with the doctrine on hierarchy
of courts considering that the petition should first be filed with the Court of Appeals. no

B. Whether or not the pendency of the Motion to Quash the Information before the trial
court renders the instant petition premature. yes

C. Whether or not petitioner, in filing the present petition, violated the rule against
forum shopping given the pendency of the Motion to Quash the Information before the
Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City in Criminal Case No. 17-165 and the Petition for
Certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 149097, assailing the
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ Panel. yes

Substantive Issues:

A. Whether the Regional Trial Court or the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction over the
violation of Republic Act No. 9165 averred in the assailed Information. RTC

B. Whether or not the respondent gravely abused her discretion in finding probable
cause to issue the Warrant of Arrest against petitioner. No
C. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status
Quo Ante Order in the interim until the instant petition is resolved or until the trial
court rules on the Motion to Quash.

Ruling:

Verification
Without the presence of the notary upon the signing of the Verification and Certification
against Forum Shopping, there is no assurance that the petitioner swore under oath that
the allegations in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, and
not merely speculative. It must be noted that verification is not an empty ritual or a
meaningless formality. Similarly, the absence of the notary public when petitioner
allegedly affixed her signature also negates a proper attestation that forum shopping has
not been committed by the filing of the petition. Thus, the petition is, for all intents and
purposes, an unsigned pleading that does not deserve the cognizance of this Court.

Notably, petitioner has not proffered any reason to justify her failure to sign the
Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping in the presence of the notary.
There is, therefore, no justification to relax the rules and excuse the petitioner's non-
compliance therewith. This Court had reminded parties seeking the ultimate relief of
certiorari to observe the rules, since nonobservance thereof cannot be brushed aside as a
"mere technicality."44 Procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded, for
these prescribed procedures ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.

1. PETITIONER DISREGARDED THE HEIRARCHY OF COURTS

In a fairly recent case, we summarized other well-defined exceptions to the doctrine on
hierarchy of courts. Immediate resort to this Court may be allowed when any of the
following grounds are present: (1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised
that must be addressed immediately; (2) when the case involves transcendental
importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when the constitutional issues raised are
better decided by this Court; (5) when time is of the essence; (6) when the subject of
review involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy,
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8) when the petition includes questions
that may affect public welfare, public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of
justice; (9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and (10) when the appeal
was considered as an inappropriate remedy.51

Unfortunately, none of these exceptions were sufficiently established in the present

petition so as to convince this court to brush aside the rules on the hierarchy of courts.
Petitioner's allegation that her case has sparked national and international interest is
obviously not covered by the exceptions to the rules on hierarchy of courts. A primary
hallmark of an independent judiciary is its political neutrality. This Court is thus loath to
perceive and consider the issues before it through the warped prisms of political
partisanships.

That the petitioner is a senator of the republic does not also merit a special treatment of
her case. The right to equal treatment before the law accorded to every Filipino also
forbids the elevation of petitioner's cause on account of her position and status in the
government.

Further, contrary to her position, the matter presented before the Court is not of first
impression. Petitioner is not the first public official accused of violating RA 9165 nor is
she the first defendant to question the finding of probable cause for her arrest.

In like manner, petitioner's argument that the rule on the hierarchy of court should be
disregarded as her case involves pure questions of law does not obtain. One of the
grounds upon which petitioner anchors her case is that the respondent judge erred and
committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause to issue her arrest. By
itself, this ground removes the case from the ambit of cases involving pure questions of
law. It is established that the issue of whether or not probable cause exists for the
issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused is a question of fact, determinable as it
is from a review of the allegations in the Information, the Resolution of the Investigating
Prosecutor, including other documents and/ or evidence appended to the
Information.52 This matter, therefore, should have first been brought before the
appellate court, which is in the better position to review and determine factual matters.

2. THE PRESENT PETITION IS PREMATURE

The prematurity of the present petition cannot be over-emphasized considering that
petitioner is actually asking the Court to rule on some of the grounds subject of her
Motion to Quash. The Court, if it rules positively in favor of petitioner regarding the
grounds of the Motion to Quash, will be preempting the respondent Judge from doing
her duty to resolve the said motion and even prejudge the case. This is clearly outside of
the ambit of orderly and expeditious rules of procedure. This, without a doubt, causes an
inevitable delay in the proceedings in the trial court, as the latter abstains from resolving
the incidents until this Court rules with finality on the instant petition.

Without such order, the present petition cannot satisfy the requirements set before this
Court can exercise its review powers. Section 5 (2)(C) of Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution explicitly requires the existence of "final judgments and orders of lower
courts" before the Court can exercise its power to "review, revise, reverse, modify, or
affirm on appeal or certiorari" in "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is
in issue”.
In the palpable absence of a ruling on the Motion to Quash -- which puts the jurisdiction
of the lower court in issue -- there is no controversy for this Court to resolve; there is
simply no final judgment or order of the lower court to review, revise, reverse, modify,
or affirm. As per the block letter provision of the Constitution, this Court cannot
exercise its jurisdiction in a vacuum nor issue a definitive ruling on mere suppositions.

Succinctly, the present petition is immediately dismissible for this Court lacks
jurisdiction to review a non-existent court action. It can only act to protect a party from
a real and actual ruling by a lower tribunal. Surely, it is not for this Court to negate
"uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not
occur at all," as the lower court's feared denial of the subject Motion to Quash.

3. PETITIONER VIOLATED THE RULE AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING

Forum shopping therefore exists when the following elements are present: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties representing the same interests in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration.

All these requisites for forum shopping are are present in this case.

In situations like the factual milieu of this instant petition, while nobody can restrain a
party to a case before the trial court to institute a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, still such petition must be rejected outright because petitions that
cover simultaneous actions are anathema to the orderly and expeditious processing and
adjudication of cases.

4. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION

With the designation of the offense, the recital of facts in the Information, there can be
no other conclusion than that petitioner is being charged not with Direct Bribery but
with violation of RA 9165.
Granting without conceding that the information contains averments which constitute
the elements of Direct Bribery or that more than one offence is charged or as ill this
case, possibly bribery and violation of RA 9165, still the prosecution has the authority to
amend the information at any time before arraignment. Since petitioner has not yet
been arraigned, then the information subject of Criminal Case No. 17-165 can still be
amended.
The pertinent special law governing drug-related cases is RA 9165, which updated the
rules provided in RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. A
plain reading of RA 9165, as of RA 6425, will reveal that jurisdiction over drug-related
cases is exclusively vested with the Regional Trial Court and no other. The designation
of the RTC as the court with the exclusive jurisdiction over drug-related cases is
apparent in the following provisions where it was expressly mentioned and recognized
as the only court with the authority to hear drug-related cases. Sec 20, 61, 62, 90
Notably, no other trial court was mentioned in RA 9165 as having the authority to take
cognizance of drug-related cases.
The foregoing immediately betrays that the Sandiganbayan primarily sits as a special
anti-graft court pursuant to a specific injunction in the 1973 Constitution.99 Its
characterization and continuation as such was expressly given a constitutional fiat under
Section 4, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
Certainly, jurisdiction over offenses and felonies committed by public officers is not
determined solely by the pay scale or by the fact that they were committed "in relation to
their office." In determining the forum vested with the jurisdiction to try and decide
criminal actions, the laws governing the subject matter of the criminal prosecution must
likewise be considered.

In this case, RA 9165 specifies the RTC as the court with the jurisdiction to "exclusively
try and hear cases involving violations of [RA 9165)." This is an exception, couched in
the special law on dangerous drugs, to the general rule under Section 4(b) of PD 1606,
as amended by RA 10660. It is a canon of statutory construction that a special law
prevails over a general law and the latter is to be considered as an exception to the
general.

Certainly, jurisdiction over offenses and felonies committed by public officers is not
determined solely by the pay scale or by the fact that they were committed "in relation to
their office." In determining the forum vested with the jurisdiction to try and decide
criminal actions, the laws governing the subject matter of the criminal prosecution must
likewise be considered.

it would not only be unwise but reckless to allow the tribunal uninstructed and
inexperienced with the intricacies of drugs cases to hear and decide violations of RA
9165 solely on account of the pay scale of the accused.

5. RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HER DISCRETION IN FINDING

PROBABLE CAUSE TO ORDER THE PETITIONER'S ARREST

In the present case, the respondent judge had no positive duty to first resolve the
Motion to Quash before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no rule of procedure,
statute, or jurisprudence to support the petitioner's claim. Rather, Sec.5(a), Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court117 required the respondent judge to evaluate the prosecutor's
resolution and its supporting evidence within a limited period of only ten (10) days

there is no rule or basic principle requiring a trial judge to first resolve a motion to
quash, whether grounded on lack of jurisdiction or not, before issuing a warrant of
arrest. As such, respondent judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
assailed February 23, 2017 Order even before resolving petitioner's Motion to Quash.
There is certainly no indication that respondent judge deviated from the usual
procedure in finding probable cause to issue the petitioner's arrest.