Delector Vs Ogayan
Delector Vs Ogayan
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte (now
Regional Trial Court), dismissing the petition for quo warranto which prayed for the ouster of
respondents as policemen of Palo, Leyte, and for the petitioners' reinstatement to the same
positions.
At the pre-trial hearing, the parties submitted the case for decision on the following agreed facts:
1. That the petitioners are all duly appointed, have qualified and assumed office as
Patrolman of the Palo Police Department, Palo, Leyte, with corresponding items in
the annual budget of the municipality and their appointment duly approved by the
Civil Service Commission all having been appointed on January 4, 1964, except
Miguel Agner who was appointed on July 16, 1965.
2. That upon dismissal of petitioners from the police force of Palo, Leyte, on January
1, 1968, respondent municipal mayor appointed on the same date the other
respondents as special agents of his office force of Palo effective this fiscal year
1968-1969.
3. That petitioners and respondents (except respondent municipal mayor) are not
civil service eligibles.
The respondent Judge Jesus N. Borromeo who is now Deputy Minister of Justice dismissed the
petition, stating:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO LAW THAT NO APPOINTING
OFFICIAL CAN REPLACE NON-ELIGIBLES BY OTHER SET OF NON-ELIGIBLES.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE CIRCULAR REFERRING TO THE REPLACEMENT
OF NON-ELIGIBLES BY THOSE CERTIFIED BY THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF
ELIGIBLES AS MERELY DIRECTORY AND HAS NO BINDING FORCE AND LEGAL EFFECT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DETERMINING WHETHER THE CIRCULAR OF THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION REGARDING REPLACEMENT OF NON-ELIGIBLES IS FAIR, AND
SOUND.
IV
With regard to the first assignment of error, petitioners contend that they cannot be replaced by non-
eligibles as this is prohibited by Section 23, Article VI of the Civil Service Law and thus, as
provisional appointees, their services cannot be terminated at will by the appointing officer, except
upon certification of appropriate eligibles by the Civil Service Commission or by a subsequent
appointment of eligibles to the position. (Petition, pp. 16-17, Reno). Therefore, at least in the interest
of public service, the petitioners state that they should be allowed to stay until eligibles are available.
(Id., p. 18)
The contention is without merit. Petitioners are not provisional appointees. Section 24(c) of Republic
Act No. 2260, the Civil Service Act of 1959 defines a provisional appointment as follows:
(c) Provisional Appointment.-A provisional appointment may be issued upon the prior
authorization of the Commissioner in accordance with the provisions of this Act and
the rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereto to a person who has not
qualified in an appropriate examination but who otherwise meets the requirements
for appointment to a regular position in the competitive service, whenever a vacancy
occurs and the filling thereof is necessary in the interest of the service and there is
no appropriate register of eligibles at the time of appointment.
There is absolutely no showing that the petitioners possess the requirements for appointment to a
regular position in the competitive or classified service and that whatever eligibility they possess is
not appropriate for the positions to which they were appointed. What the law considers a provisional
appointee is one with a civil service eligibility but different from that which is appropriate for the
position to which he was appointed. Since petitioners did not possess any civil service eligibility, their
appointments are considered temporary. It is a settled rule that temporary appointees may be
terminated at any tune even without cause. They have no fixed tenure. (Abrot v. Court of Appeals,
116 SCRA 468) The Civil Service Commission cannot even legally approve their appointments as
provisional as this act would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the discretion of the appointing
power. (Natural v. Maglana, 113 SCRA 268)
This being the law, there is no necessity for us to rule on the other contentions of the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.