1

Pakistan –Afghanistan Relations,

Historical background.

On September 12, 2001, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage made a series of unilateral dem

ands on Pakistan. The head of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) General Mahmood Ahmad plea

ded with him to reconsider, stating, “You have to understand history.” “No,” Armitage responded, “Hist

ory begins today.”1

Unfortunately, the burden of history can not be wished away so easily.

The present relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan are merely the latest chapter in a complex tom

e that extends well into Pakistan’s predecessor state in the modern state system, that of British Indi

a. Likely, its anthropological antecedents stretch back even further. Therefore, there can be no ignorin

g the historic, geographic and ethnological context of poor relations between Afghanistan and Paki

stan, framed within the backdrop of overarching regional and international factors. This paper aims t

o highlight some of the salient moments within this context and to illustrate that the present impass

e between the two countries has numerous historical continuities and identifiable changes. In doing so,

the account here will map out some of the complexities involved in relations between the two states. It

will also provide a historicized counternarrative to the onedimensional portrayals that hold Pakistan

primarily responsible for Afghanistan’s malaise and largely ignore history and geopolitics in favor of na

rrow management strategies. Though direct policy recommendations are avoided, it is hoped that thi

s paper will assist policymakers in assessing more realistic, holistic and comprehensive strategies fo

r engagement, peace and stability in the region.

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A. From Colonialism to Nationalism

The British in India had initially adopted the ‘policy of masterful inactivity’ or ‘closed border policy’ to

wards the Pashtun2 tribal areas that lay astride the largely ungoverned frontiers of India and Afgha

nistan. A continuation of the policies of the former Sikh kingdoms of the Punjab3, it implied mini

mal interference in the affairs of the Pashtun tribes straddling the border. However, the drive to secure

India’s frontiers against increased threat perceptions from an expanding Tsarist Russia led the British to

opt for a ‘forward policy’ from 1876 onward4. They pushed their actual control into the tribal areas and

sought to exercise dominant influence in Afghanistan. This policy resulted in the Second AngloAfghan

War (18781880) in the aftermath of which Kabul accepted British suzerainty.

At stake was transforming Afghanistan into a buffer between Russia and British India; this required d

efined boundaries to demarcate the limit of imperial expansion by either empire. In 1887, an agree

ment between Britain and Russia marked Afghanistan’s northern boundary with the latter as laying firm

ly along the Amu Darya (Oxus River). To reciprocate, the Durand Line Agreement was signed between t

he British Indian Foreign Secretary Sir Mortimer Durand and Amir Abdur Rahman Khan of Afghanistan in

1893. The Durand Line demarcated the outer frontier of British India. Afghanistan also agreed to create

a narrow land corridor in the north east to ensure that the Russian Empire in Central Asian and the Brit

ish Indian Empire did not share a common border that could be subject to dispute and clashes. This resul

ted in the Wakhan Corridor, the narrow strip of land that today seperates Tajikistan from Pakistan’s Nor

thern Areas and Kashmir, and abuts China.

Pashtuns are an Eastern Iranian ethno-linguistic group found in eastern, southern and south-western

Afghanistan as well as the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Federally Administered Tribal Areas

(FATA) and Baluchistan province of Pakistan. Pashtuns can be broadly characterized by their distinct
 3

Pashto language and adherence to strict codes of behavior called Pashtunwali. They are estimate to

number in the range of 40 million, making them the largest tribal grouping in the world. The last reliable

census of Afghanistan in 1979 found Pashtuns to constitute 42% of Afghanistan’s population, forming a

relative majority in the ethnically heterogeneous country. The word Pashtun is pronounced Pakhtun in

the harsher Pashto/Pakhto dialect spoken by eastern Pashtuns of the border tribal areas in both

Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pashtuns/Pakhtuns are also be referred to as Pathans in India and Pakistan.

The word is likely a variation of the term ‘Pashtahan’, the Pashto plural of Pashtun.

Thus, the British were able to rely on a number of defensive rings. The first was the buffer state of Afg

hanistan itself. The second was the Durand Line (which to a lesser extent was meant to limit Afghanista

n’s influence as well) and the semiautonomous tribal areas that it bounded. The final bulwark for the Bri

tish Indian Empire was beyond the eastern limits of the tribal areas where laid the “settled districts” of

the frontier province; these included the bristling garrison towns of Peshawar and Quetta. This three tie

red defense was meant to protect against any Russian advance towards India.

The tribes that were now to be administered by the British were kept pacified through a combination o

f semiautonomy, and agreements with and subsidies paid to tribal leaders, as well as coercive means su

ch as punitive expeditions and other collective punishments5. The Durand Line also formally split the Pa

shtuns in Afghanistan from their coethnics in India and later, Pakistan. The Line of course has importan

t symbolic and juridical significance. In real terms however, the tribes and particularly nomadic groups h

ave moved back and forth across the border with relative ease. There were numerous tribal uprisin

gs in protest against the British forward policy and the Durand Line. Kabul continued to exercise influe

nce among these tribes, believing in any case that it could control them better than the British in Pesha

war and Delhi6. Nonetheless, the Durand Line Agreement came to be confirmed by each successive rule

r of Afghanistan through subsequent treaties with the British government.

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i. Transition to Post‐Colonial States

Prior to the partition of the SubContinent politics in India’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP)7 was

dominated by the prominent leader Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his younger brother Dr. Khan Sahib

through their Khudai Khitmatgar Movement (KKM). Known as the “Frontier Ghandi”, the elder Khan le

d the Congress8 ministry in the NWFP. An ardent Pashtun nationalist, he remained staunchly opposed

to the province’s inclusion into Pakistan. The KKM advocated In keeping with the British tradition of

bureaucratic and legalistic authoritarianism in the Sub-Continent, these coercive measures were

legitimized by rooting them in the Frontier Crimes Regulation, first passed in 1848. This legislation is

still in force in the tribal areas of Pakistan, though the government announced its intention to repeal it

in April, 2008. 7 The so-called ‘settled districts’ and the mostly Pashtun areas around them were

consolidated into the NWFP in 1901. Prior to this, these territories were part of the province of the

Punjab. NWFP did not include the tribal areas straddling the India/Afghanistan border. 8 Founded in

1885, the Indian National Congress was the first and largest mass political party in India.

It led the Independence Movement against the British and opposed the partition of India till 1946. It is

still a powerful force in Indian politics and is presently the largest party in the ruling

coalition.the idea of an independent and sovereign ‘Pashtunistan’ with the support of the Congress Pa

rty. Kabul had sought to open negotiations with the British on the issue of the return of lost territory a

nd later, on a merger of Pashtun areas with Afghanistan through the partition referendum. Promptly s

nubbed by Britain, Kabul became a public supporter of Pashtunistan, though it presumably harbo

ured the idea that an independent Pashtun state would be incorporated into a greater Afghanistan9. G

iven only the choice of joining a predominantly Hindu India or a Muslim Pakistan, the devout Pashtuns

opted for the latter by a wide margin.

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The Pashtunistan movement, however, continued in varying capacity until at least 1979 and the res

entment and fears that this aroused in Pakistan’s leaders, particularly its Punjabi dominated military, c

ontinues to affect perceptions of Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan10. The tribal territories bounde

d by the Durand Line and the limits of the NWFP were not included in the partition referendum as

technically they were autonomous from British control. Therefore, all quasiconstitutional arrange

ments between the tribes and the British government lapsed on August 14, 1947, as an Pakistan was p

roclaimed. However, a tribal Jirga11 was held in November and December of 1947. All major tribes at t

he Jirga decided to transfer their allegiance to the new state of Pakistan, particularly in view of a great

er grant of autonomy and the withdrawal of all Pakistani military presence12. This was followed by wr

itten confirmations and treaties13.

ii. Early Relations.

In September, 1947, Afghanistan became the only nation in the world to oppose Pakistan’s entry into t

he United Nations citing the Pashtunistan debate. This opposition did much to jaundice relations be

tween the two states early in Pakistan’s life. It was seen as particularly hurtful coming from a fellow

Muslim country, given Pakistan’s difficult transition into statehood and the existential threat it faced t

hen from India. Further, Afghanistan’s posture added to the Pakistani leaders’ persecution complex; t

hey felt that Pakistan was beset by enemies on all sides – and from within through sub‐

nationalists and subversive fifth columnists bent on the state’s isolation and destruction.

Almost immediately after the British transfer of power, Afghanistan encouraged armed tribal incursi

ons into Pakistani territory, particularly the tribal areas. These raids were a constant irritant that co

mplicated Pakistan’s defense calculus on its Eastern border with India, particularly as at the time of par
 6

tition the Pakistani military was too weak to face an Afghan and Indian threat simultaneously14.

These border skirmishes led to the aerial bombing of an Afghan village in 1949. In an emotional s

ession thereafter, the Afghan Loya Jirga (i.e. Parliament) adopted a resolution unilaterally repudiati

ng all nineteenth century treaties with British India. The most important of these was the Durand Lin

e Agreement that demarcated the international frontier between Afghanistan and the now Pakistan15

. No government in Kabul since has ever recognized the validity of the Durand Line – not even the pro‐

Pakistan Taliban causing an obvious strain on relations.

The support for Pashtunistan and rejection of the Durand Line were designed to gain influence in and

leverage against Pakistan, as well as to potentially gain territory that may have provided Afghanistan

with an egress to the sea. Further, Afghanistan had remained a Pashtun ruled and dominated state sin

ce the 18th century16; support for the independence or the absorption of Pashtun areas thus served t

o mobilize their identity in support of the state. A Pashtunistan Day was officially declared and celebr

ated every year on August 31 to symbolically highlight Kabul’s support for the cause and to empha

size the importance that the issue held for the state of Afghanistan.

iii. Entry into the Cold War

Being landlocked, Afghanistan relied on port facilities at Karachi for its link to the international market.

Therefore, it began to look for alternate trade outlets that would bypass its economic dependence. Iran

presented the next closest port but transportation networks through Eastern Iran were extremely p

oor18. Afghanistan’s quest for alternatives became more dire when Pakistan imposed an arguably ille

gal ‘slow down’ of intransit trade19. This turned into a full fledged economic blockade following se

rious tribal incursions into Pakistan in 195051. Afghanistan insisted that the tribal insurgents were ‘free

dom fighters’ unsupported by Kabul despite ample evidence to the contrary20. The blockade led to a th
 7

aw in relations with the USSR which allowed Afghanistan free transit through its territory via the Central

Asian Republics.

Afghanistan’s early opposition to Pakistan was a clear indication that it was not prepared to simply let P

akistan walk into the hegemonic role that the British had recently vacated. Pakistan’s internal crisis, inte

rnational isolation, foreign policy disarray and military weakness meant that it had to relinquish any pre

tensions that Afghanistan remained within its sphere of influence. Nor could it at present act as the enf

orcer for British interests in the region as the British Indian Army had done22. The weakening of spec

ifically British and generally Western hegemony in the region was not lost on the USSR. Thus, its supp

ort was subtly aimed at pulling Afghanistan into its orbit even though it made much of the fact that unli

ke US aid its own assistance came without strings attached23. In fact, the Soviets were making a long te

rm investment in Afghanistan. They knew that the US had ignored Afghanistan’s requests for military ai

d and the economic aid that it provided was insufficient for the purposes of allowing a weak Afghan stat

e to be able to remain in control of its territory24. Thus, Afghanistan would become increasingly reliant

on the USSR and allow it to exercise influence in the state through aid, education and military training.

Pakistan was also being pulled into the geopolitics of the Cold War. In 1949 the Indian Prime Minister

Jawaharlal Nehru had been invited to visited Washington where, to the US’s disappointment, he had

elucidated his country’s overarching foreign policy principle of nonalignment25. Thus, early on it had be

come clear that India would not be the much coveted keystone in the budding anticommunist alli

ance that the US hoped to build in Asia. Pakistan exploited India’s policy choice and sought to position it

self as an alternative US ally in South Asia26. Further, the US begun to view Pakistan as an important reg

ional ally following the election of the nationalist regime of Mohammed Mossadeq in Iran in 195127.

Mossadeq, a fiery antiimperialist, had embarked on a popular nationalization program, asserting s

tate control over the AngloIranian Oil Company that had hitherto dominated Iran’s oil industry. By 19
 8

53, the US was convinced that Iran was gravitating towards the Soviet Union28. In this altered regional

environment, Pakistan’s efforts to secure US military assistance to address its security anxieties vis

a vis India bore fruit. In 1954 the US inducted Pakistan into the anticommunist South East Asia Treaty Or

ganization (SEATO), followed in 1955 by entry into the Baghdad Pact. This was renamed the Central Tr

eaty Organization (CENTO) after the 1958 republican revolution in Iraq resulted in its withdrawal fr

om membership. Both pacts included a military aid package. This occurred over strong protests by Afgh

anistan (and India) which had argued that it would upset the regional balance of power29. Pakista

n’s membership in these regional security organizations effectively shut out any substantial assistance

to Afghanistan, a country that was antagonistic to Washington’s newest ally in the region. The die w

as cast; Afghanistan signed on to a comprehensive Soviet assistance package a month after the US‐

Pakistan deal30, even though it would continue to receive some economic aid from the US as well.

iii. The Decade of Daud

In 1953, Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan, a first cousin of King Zahir Shah, had been appointed the Prim

e Minister of Afghanistan. The primary proponent of Afghanistan’s Pashtunistan policy, he was appoint

ed in the hopes of being able to force a quick solution to the issue31. Afghanistan’s foreign policy conti

nued to formally embrace baytarafi, literally, without sides, meaning nonalignment. However, un

der Daud’s decade long premiership Afghanistan moved considerably closer to the USSR. This says l

ess about Daud and more about the balance of regional and international constraints and opportunitie

s available to him and his country at the time. This brought about a strategic reorientation in alliances

and interests in the region: India and Afghanistan remained formally nonaligned while receiving consid

erable support and assistance from the USSR. Pakistan became allied with the US, and later developed
 9

friendly relations with China32. China viewed Soviet assistance to India and Afghanistan as a policy of

strategic encirclement aimed against it33; this brought it closer to Pakistan.

In 1955 the One Unit Scheme came into force in Pakistan. This consolidated the provinces of Punjab,

Sind, Baluchistan and NWFP into the single political unit of West Pakistan. This was to be given elector

al parity with the more populous province of Bengal, now dubbed East Pakistan. The scheme was

vastly unpopular in Pakistan, seen as denying Bengal its demographic majority and as solidifying Punja

bi domination over the smaller provinces34. It proved unpopular in Afghanistan as well which saw the

Pashtun areas it claimed being drawn more tightly into Pakistan35. Riots broke out in Kabul that led to

the sacking of the Pakistani Embassy in Kabul and the consulate in Jalalabad while the police looked

on36. It also led to an increase in border clashes. The seriousness of the situation in 1955 can be gauge

d by the fact that Afghanistan mobilized upwards of 70,000 reservists on the border, expecting a stron

g military response from Pakistan37. The situation also precipitated another border closure that lasted

5 months.

The US attempted to mediate relations between the two countries. Concerned, probably without cau

se, that the US would attempt to draw Afghanistan into the CENTO pact as well, the USSR suddenly

threw its support behind Pashtunistan38. Despite great oratory in its favour, the Soviets never seriou

sly backed Pashtunistan. Perhaps this was in trepidation of the dire instability that a successful separa

tist movement may cause in coethnic areas in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, even causing the for

mer two to completely balkanize and unravel as states. Therefore, the USSR consistently decided again

st inviting suchinstability on its southeastern borders by refraining from actively encouraging or clande

stinely supporting a breakup of Pakistan.

Normal diplomatic and trade relations resumed in 195539. However, relations again took a downtur

n after the change of power in Pakistan. General (later President and Field Marshal) Mohammad Ay
 10

ub Khan, himself an ethnic Pashtun40, had come to power in a military coup in 1958. Flush with Paki

stan’s newly acquired military strength and Western connections, Ayub pursued a more aggressive for

eign policy orientation41. He purportedly advised the Afghan Foreign Minister that his military could m

arch into Kabul in the space of a day42; the threat precipitously terminated the negotiations. Nor

was US President Eisenhower’s visit to Kabul in 1959 able to bring a thaw in PakAfghan relatio

ns.

Pashtunistan dominated Afghan foreign policy in the early 1960s44 despite the fact that it enjoyed lit

tle support amongst the Pashtuns of Pakistan45. Daud too adopted a more aggressive approach. In 19

60 over a thousand Afghan soldiers disguised as Pashtun nomads and tribesmen infiltrated the Bajaur

Agency of Pakistan’s frontier tribal areas. The infiltrators were repelled by proPakistan tribesmen46. T

his was followed by two separate and larger incursions in 1961, both supported by Afghan troops. A br

eak in diplomatic relations and border closure followed, with Daud resolving that the, “border will rem

ain closed until the Pashtunistan issue is solved.”47

iv. A Brief Abatement of Tension

Daud had followed an interventionist policy of supporting all Pakistani dissidents with sanctuary,

funds and weapons48. By 1963 amid economic hardships imposed by the border closure there w

as real fear that a newly confident and militarily capable Pakistan allied to the US and friendly with C

hina would escalate the confrontation with Kabul. Thus, that year King Zahir Shah convinced Daud to re

sign from power, publicly citing the tensions with Pakistan and Daud’s inability to resolve the Pashtu

nistan imbroglio. The Pashtunistan issue abated following the reestablishment of diplomatic ties and t

he reopening of the border in 1963, brought about through Iranian mediation49. The subsequent rappr

ochement between the countries was cited as justification for Daud’s dismissal. The new policy was
 11

to continue moral support for Pashtunistan without endangering Afghanistan’s economic or diplo

matic interests50. Relations between the two countries were never better than during this decade, no

r have they been since. They further improved with the dismantling of the One Unit in Pakistan in 1

970. Upon the reintroduction of the provinces, a number of tribal areas were incorporated into the

NWFP and Baluchistan while the others were organized as the Federally Administered Tribal Are

as (FATA). Though the geographic composition of these areas has changed somewhat over the years, th

ey continue to lack most constitutional and other lawful protections afforded to the rest of Pakistan, lac

ked the rights of franchise until recently and are governed directly by the centre through draconia

n British era legislation51.

A measure of the thaw in relations between the two countries was evident in Kabul’s military restraint

in this period. Pakistan and India had gone to war in 1965 and 1971. Pakistan’s forces were spread dea

dly thin during both conflicts.However, Kabul refrained from taking advantage of its weakness and in fac

t, provided both material and moral support to Pakistan52. Unfortunately, Islamabad has failed to see

the historical, and indeed, historic lesson inherent in Kabul’s support during its wars with India. Seeking

good terms with a government in Kabul eased Pakistan’s security concerns against India in a more subs

tantial way than its quest for a pliable government has been able to todate.

v. Mutual Intervention

Relations again cooled when Daud Khan returned to power in a leftist inspired military coup in 1973 tha

t abolished the monarchy and established the Republic of Afghanistan. The change in state structures w

as cosmetic; as before Daud ruled through coercive military strength and in consultation with a Loya Jirg

a that had no power to bind him. Pashtunistan was part of the justification provided for the coup; Daud

claimed that the King had not sufficiently exploited Pakistan’s military and political weakness to its adv

antage, particularly after the 1971 loss of East Pakistan53. The USSR was the first country to recogniz
 12

e the Daud government, given its past relations with him and that many military officers belonging to th

e proSoviet Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) had heavily aided the coup. Zulfiqar Ali Bh

utto, the charismatic Pakistani Prime Minister at the time, also made friendly overtures to Daud and rec

ognized his government. At the time, Bhutto faced a nationalist tribal insurgency in the province of Balu

chistan and hoped to preempt any support that Afghanistan might provide the rebels54.

The Pashtun dominated PDPA urged Daud’s government on to a policy of brinkmanship with Pa

kistan on Pashtunistan, hoping to further increase Afghan dependence on the USSR55. In reality, as a Pa

shtun nationalist committed to consolidating the power of the central state to modernize Afghan societ

y, Daud probably needed little encouragement from the PDPA. Despite Pakistan’s gesture, Daud s

upported the insurgency in Pakistani Baluchistan, sheltering rebels and establishing training camps o

n Afghan territory56, a resumption of Afghanistan’s proxy intervention in Pakistan. This led to not infreq

uent border clashes between the two countries. In 1976, it led to a sharp escalation, prompting

a deployment of Afghan forces in anticipation of a Pakistani attack57.

Pakistan’s war with India in 1971 had led to its province of Bengal seceding to form the independent Ba

ngladesh. Pakistan had thereby lost substantial territory and half its population. Thus, Afghanistan’s

revived irredentist claims and support for the Baluchistan insurgency this time around found a much

more wary and sensitive Pakistan. Though a socialist and himself opposed by domestic Islamists,

Bhutto decided to arm and support Islamists opposed to Daud as a counter policy. Further, his advisors

calculated that there would be a power vacuum in Kabul upon the ailing and aged Daud’s death; having

allies in the form of the Islamists would serve Pakistan well in influencing a postDaud order58. Thus, Pa

kistan supported the unsuccessful focostyle Islamist uprising in 1975 against the perceived unIslamic

communist influence in the Daud government. This provided Pakistan with a fateful opportunity to tu

rn the tables on Kabul. Pakistan provided refuge and in all likelihood, special operations training to the
 13

wouldbe Islamist revolutionaries fleeing Daud’s wrath59. Some of these ragtag rebels would go on to be

come household names in the region: Ahmad Shah Massoud, Barhuddin Rabbani and Gulbadin Hekmet

yar. This was the readymade strategic policy initiative that was expanded by Pakistan and exploited by t

he US after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan60. Thus the struggle between nationalists in Kabul and Pa

kistan backed Islamists only intensified after the Soviet invasion; its roots stretched back to at least 197

3 and, of course, its offshoots persist to the present day.

Pakistan’s reciprocal interventionist policy certainly put pressure on Daud to reconsider the Pashtunista

n issue and return to the negotiating table. This was part of the reason that an agreement on the recogn

ition of the Durand Line in return for Pakistan granting autonomy to the NWFP and Baluchistan was nea

rly reached between Bhutto and Daud in 197861. Further, Daud was increasingly disconcerted by the o

vert proMoscow tenor of many of the communists in his government as well as by Afghanistan’s growi

ng dependency on the USSR. This was probably not Daud’s intention in having strengthened ties. Howev

er, lying on the borders of the Soviet superpower the geopolitical calculus of a bipolar world was heavil

y weighted against him.

vi. Reorienting Foreign Policy and Twin Coups

The failure of the USled SEATO and CENTO alliance systems to be of any substantial aid to Pakistan in its

wars against India in 1965 and 1971 had led first Ayub Khan and then Bhutto to reconsider its Western

political and military orientation62. Bhutto withdrew from SEATO (though he kept up membership in C

ENTO to maintain its strategic link to both Turkey and Iran, as well as to receive weapons to rebuild the

military). He continued a more balanced foreign policy symbolized by the “all weather friendship” with

China and by evolving bilateral ties with the Soviet Union. Relations had begun improving after Pa

kistan closed the US military base and listening station in Peshawar. The USSR even assisted it in setting

up a steel factory near Karachi in 197063. Pakistan also pursued closer ties with other socialist countries
 14

, including North Korea and Eastern European nations. Bhutto also reoriented Pakistan towards the Mid

dle East, particularly towards Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Sheikdoms/United Arab Emirates which had ass

isted it in its wars with India64. This balancing of foreign policy was developed by Bhutto into what

he referred to as “bilateral nonalignment”65.

Given Daud’s unease with Afghanistan’s growing tilt towards Moscow, he attempted a foreign po

licy reorientation similar to Bhutto’s by moving towards the Muslim world and fostering closer relations

with regional powers Iran and Saudi Arabia. Both countries were then staunch US allies, and concerned

about the growing influence of the USSR in Kabul (which, even then, they hoped to replace with their o

wn). Newly flush with incredible oil revenues following the 1973 Oil Shocks, they offered Kabul an aid p

ackage that would have dwarfed Soviet assistance over the previous two decades66. Viewing both Afgh

anistan and Pakistan as important anticommunist bulwarks, the two oil rich Muslim states worked hard

at bringing them to see eye to eye67. The result was the nearagreement on Pashtunistan and the Duran

d Line in 1978.

It is unclear how far such a deal would have held water in the long term given that the structures of bot

h states would be incredibly resistant to the deal being effectively realized. Though perhaps not a long t

erm resolution of the issues of Pashtunistan and provincial autonomy in Pakistan, in the medium te

rm it offered a détente that was based on concessions that were easily reversible but also allowed bot

h countries to save face. It would have also have enabled them to ease defence spending and concent

rate more on development efforts. Additionally, the deal offered Bhutto a window to negotiate

a peace in Baluchistan. In any event, Bhutto was overthrown in a military coup and then “judicially mu

rdered”68 before an agreement could be finalized.

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The coupmaker, General Mohammad Ziaul Haq continued Bhutto’s efforts till Daud too was overthro

wn in a PDPA led coup in 1978 and murdered shortly thereafter along with most of his family69. Both D

aud and Bhutto had enjoyed varying degrees of popular legitimacy and possessed unassailable nationali

st credentials. As such, they were better poised to resolve the impasse between the two countries tha

n any leader before or since. As is often the case in both countries, events swamp and overwhel

m even the best of intentions.

The PDPA government initially renewed support for Baluch and Pashtun separatists and revived c

alls for Pashtunistan70. Anticipating a ‘counterrevolutionary’ response from the conservative Pashtun

countryside, these moves were aimed at placating potential rebels and rallying Pashtun support, t

he standard strategy of consolidating and exercising state power in Afghanistan. This support was cut s

hort after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas Day, 1979. Kabul now followed Moscow’s l

ine that Pakistan should not be broken up and that ‘selfdetermination’ was an internal matter. For all

intents and purposes, this signified the substantive end of the Pashtunistan movement as one that pre

sented a material irredentist threat to Pakistan. Its symbolic value, however, remains potent in Afghanis

tan and has been revived since 2001.

B. Communism, Islamism, Intervention and Invasion

The relationship between Pakistan and the US had cooled down considerably by the 1970s. Pakistan sm

arted under the arms embargo slapped on it since the 1965 war with India71. By this time India had also

received considerable military aid and hardware from the US. The SinoIndian war of 1962 (prompted in

part by China’s perception of encirclement by the USSR) had turned New Delhi into an important antiC

hinese ally in the region for Washington. It also led to closer relations between Pakistan and China; in
 16

deed to this day China remains Pakistan’s closest ally. These close relations were utilized by the US in

1970 to open secret negotiations with China which led to the famous détente between the two countri

es. A vector of these delicate negotiations was that neither the US nor China chose to endanger their bu

dding antiSoviet convergence by coming to Pakistan’s military aid in the war with India in 1971. In any c

ase, neither power was willing to risk going to war with the Soviet Union over the war in Bengal72. Mor

eover, the genocide that the Pakistan military was committing in Bengal made even a diplomatic charge

in its favour unpalatable. This further estranged Pakistan from the US. Relations got more embittered w

hen Bhutto began to pursue a nuclear program in 1972 given the demonstrated failure of both co

nventional arms and international alliances to aid it against Indian ‘aggression’73. The military cou

p and dictatorship of 1977 also isolated Pakistan from the West. Moreover, the American Embassy in

Islamabad had been ransacked in 197974. Therefore, this year saw PakUS relations at low ebb.

The Islamic revolution in Iran with its antiimperialist (and specifically antiUS) rhetoric and the Soviet i

nvasion of Afghanistan changed this dramatically.

i. The Cold War Turns Hot

Soviet influence in Kabul had, of course, increased dramatically after the communist coup. How

ever, PDPA factions were locked in an increasingly bloody factional war that undermined the regime

internally75. Revolts in the Soviet trained Afghan military had severely curtailed its strength. A th

en fledgling nationalist and Islamist uprising in the countryside threatened to conflagrate. Stemmi

ng the fratricidal power struggle and shoring up the communists in Kabul was certainly one moti

vation for the Soviet invasion. However, the Soviet invasion was largely provoked by the covert suppo

rt that the US had begun providingtoantigovernment groups in Afghanistan months prior to the Soviet i

nvasion. This assistance was provided despite the calculation that it would induce a Soviet military resp

onse. In fact, this was precisely the strategy; the US hoped to embroil the Soviet Union in a blood
 17

y conflict comparable to the American experience in Vietnam76. This would slowly bleed the Soviet Un

ion and prevent it from politically or militarily penetrating further south towards the Middle East. The U

S used this space to build up a deterrent military capability in the Persian Gulf that culminated in the Gu

lf War and the ‘internationalization’ of Arab oil77. Thus, Afghanistan remained a pawn, suffering a

still ongoing and rapacious hot war in the big power rivalry of the so called Cold War.

American President Jimmy Carter called the Soviet invasion “the most serious threat to peace since the

Second World War,”78 and sought to enlist Pakistan’s assistance. Some in General Zia’s cabinet stro

ngly objected to Pakistan’s involvement in the Afghan war, concerned for angering the Soviet bear an

d presciently stirring up a hornets nest inside the country. Zia disagreed and sought to exploit Pakistan’s

geostrategic potential to the fullest. Zia proved a wily operator; refusing the outgoing Carter administra

tion’s offer of $400 million in aid as “peanuts”, he held out till the Reagan government provided Pakista

n with an aid package worth more than $3.2 billion over six years79. Pakistan, under Zia a sclerotic and

thoroughly repressive military dictatorship, was now a “frontline state” in the war for freedom and dem

ocracy.

Pakistan stage managed most of the Islamic resistance against the Soviet Union. It allowed the so‐

called Mujahideen80 thousands of bases in its tribal areas from which to mount crossborder raids into A

fghanistan81. Further, the ISI funnelled funds and arms provided by the US and Saudi Arabia, but also to

a lesser extent by the UK, China, the Gulf States, Egypt, and Israel82.

Even before the Soviet invasion, Pakistan had withheld recognition of the PDPA government83. India’

s entente with the USSR dictated that it recognized all communist era governments in Kabul and w

as mostly uncritical of the Soviet invasion84. Iran, convulsed by revolution and contending with a cruel

Westernbacked invasion by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, remained only a minor player in Afghanistan for ma
 18

ny years. It entered the arena only later to arm, mediate between and unite various armed factions of t

he Shia Hazaras after the Soviet withdrawal85.

By the mid1980s, however, another front was added to the proxy war In Afghanistan. Both Afgha

nistan and Pakistan would become battlegrounds for Saudi Arabia and Iran in their struggle for the lead

ership of Muslims world wide, each sponsoring its own religious zealots and sectarian militants86 that c

ontinue to proliferate even today.

ii. Pakistan’s Role in the Resistance

Pakistan’s strategic objectives in Afghanistan were primarily framed by its allconsuming obsession with

securing arms and alliances to offset Indian predominance in the region. They were also informe

d by the historically troubled relations with Afghanistan over Pashtunistan87. Thus, over the course of

the war these objectives evolved to include the imposition of a friendly – or better yet, a puppet –

government in Kabul to stabilize Pakistan’s western frontiers. This would provide Pakistan with “str

ategic depth” against India88. In a sense, this was a reprise of the British ‘forward policy’ that also looke

d upon Afghanistan as a strategic buffer to counter external threats89. Despite appearances and p

ublic exhortations to the contrary, the possibility of a Soviet invasion was considered far more remot

e in Islamabad than it was in Washington90. As can be deciphered, the core of Pakistan’s strategic p

olicies were still military oriented and conceptualized India as the main threat despite the presence of S

oviet troops at its doorstep and conducting ‘hot pursuits’ of the Mujahideen through Pakistan’s tribal ar

eas.

Pakistan provided covert and carefully calibrated support to the Mujahideen so as to avoid a direct con

frontation with the USSR and to be able to control the outcome of the war91. It recognized and fun

nelled assistance only to the Peshawar based ‘alliance’ of seven Islamic parties, channelling the lion’s

share of25weapons to favoured groups, particularly the extremist Hekmetyar’s HizbeIslami. Further, wi
 19

th the US’s approval, support and encouragement it accentuated the Islamic dimension of the resist

ance to the Soviet occupation, including encouraging fighters from all over the Muslim world to come a

nd join the jihad in Afghanistan92. These tactics were aimed at sidelining the ostensibly secular nationa

lists, keeping the resistance dependent on Pakistan and ensuring that no one party was able to garner t

oo much success and hence, nation wide support independent of Pakistan’s influence. Further, Zia was

mindful of the more than two million Afghan mostly Pashtun refugees living in squalid camps in Pakist

an93. Zia’s experience of Black September in 1970 was thus, important in his calculations. Black Se

ptember was the name given to an uprising (and alleged putsch) by Palestinians in Jordan led by the Pal

estinian Liberation Organization (PLO). This uprising was brutally suppressed with assistance from Pakis

tani troops led by then Brigadier Zia ulHaq. Zia had learnt first hand the danger a united and organized r

esistance movement in exile, combined with a large refugee population, could pose to an unpopular ho

st government. He had no intention of allowing that danger to materialize by giving the Afghans the ch

ance to arrive at a broadly popular and legitimate leadership or governmentin‐exile.

iii. Costs and Consequences

Zia’s policies of supporting the Mujahideen resistance in Afghanistan, in connivance with the US a

nd other states, have exacted a disastrous toll on the peoples of both countries and its legacy continues

to haunt the region. Pakistan faced retaliation by becoming a victim of numerous terrorist outrage

s and bombings engineered by KhAD (Afghan intelligence), the Soviet KGB and India’s Research an

d Analysis Wing (RAW). These attacks killed or maimed over 4000 Pakistanis over the course of the war9

5. Public exhortations to jihad, the open operation of foreign militants and terrorists in Pakistan and the

use of the mushrooming madrassahs to indoctrinate and recruit ‘holy warriors’ led to the opening of vi

cious sectarian fissures. Sectarian and factional violence too became commonPakistan crossed a moral t

hreshold into a disregard for human life. The number of random bombings and killings in Pakistan have
 20

only increased since, only now with mostly local perpetrators. Opium cultivation and drug trafficking in

mujahideen controlled areas of Afghanistan and FATA turned swathes of territory into narco‐

fiefdoms and international drug routes. The Pakistani state and particularly the military were heavily inv

olved and benefited greatly from this spread of the lucrative illegal economy. Its influence on the state g

rows as a new class of nouveau riche drugs entrepreneurs have emerged in the cities and use their pow

er and pelf to insinuate themselves within the machinery of state and government97. In addition to nar

cotics, lethal weapons flooded the society. As many as 70% of the weapons supplied for Afghanistan ne

ver made it there98. The more sophisticated weapons systems were often pilfered by the military while

many of the armaments were sold for profit by the Pakistani military or its various entrepreneurial mi

ddlemen. This so called ‘heroin and Kalashnikov culture’ has undermined Pakistan’s political econom

y and society ever since. In the words of American historian Paul Kennedy,

“Ten years of active involvement in the Afghan war has changed the social profile of Pakistan to such an

extent that any government faces serious problems in effective governance. Pakistani society is now m

ore fractured, inundated with sophisticated weapons, brutalized due to growing civic violence and over

whelmed by the spread of narcotics.”

Afghanistan begun to disintegrate as a state around the time of the Soviet invasion. It complet

ely collapsed in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal and the recession of most international aid. It ha

s to date failed to recover from the civil war it was plunged into in the 1970s. With over a million civilian

s dead and counting since 1979 and the worlds largest displaced population100, Afghanistan is sorely fr

agmented and has lost at least two generations of its people to war and dislocation. Its climb out of obli

vion remains a slippery slope.

C. Democracy and Civil War, Neo‐fundamentalism and Terrorism

 21

Soviet forces withdrew across the Amu Darya in 1989, defeated as much by the sinews of the resistan

ce fighters as by Pakistan’s highcost covert operations and the endless foreign supply of cash and ar

maments, including sophisticated weapons such as shoulderfired antiaircraft Stinger Missiles101. The

Soviet lifeline to the Afghan government as well as the infighting between various resistance com

manders allowed the ‘communists’102 to stay in power till 1992. As antigovernment forces advanced o

n Kabul, President Dr. Najibullah stepped down in this year in favour of a Mujahideen ‘coalition’ led by n

ationalist and spiritual leader, Sibgatullah Mujadedi. But the Mujahideen were soon rent apart by bruta

l factional struggles.

A terrible phase in the civil war in Afghanistan was now unleashed whereby largely ethnically divided

factions fought for personal power. Most of Afghanistan came under the rule of various local comm

anders and warlords. Kabul was seized by the Tajik dominated JamiateIslami of Barhuddin Rabbani and

his most able commander, Ahmed Shah Massoud. Hekmetyar, Pakistan’s favourite, failed to prise it f

rom their grasp despite repeated attempts and indiscriminate rocket and artillery barrages that dest

royed much of the city and killed thousands. Hekmetyar was not solely responsible for the misery inflict

ed on the proud Kabulis. In an ever shifting Rorschach of alliances and international patrons, heavy figh

ting ensued between the forces of the Tajik led JamiateIslami, the Pashtun dominated HizbeIslami, the H

azara HizbeWahdat and Abdul Rashid Dostum’s predominantly Uzbek Jowzjan militia103. All armed

groups in Afghanistan share the blame for the misery they inflicted on their own people, as do those w

ho armed them and those who abandoned them. With the Soviet forces withdrawn, the Cold War at an

end and the Gulf War on the horizon, the superpowers lost interest in the region. There was no earnest

effort to broker peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan.

Pakistan, Iran and Uzbekistan attempted to fill the power vacuum. But in the absence of serious interna

tional support and mediation, they could predictably do little other than strengthen client warlords or f
 22

actions just enough to maintain a stalemate. Pakistan too was left out in the cold; most US aid was with

drawn and it was sanctioned for a nuclear program that had been conveniently ignored during the war.

This has left a bitter legacy that poses a formidable challenge to peace making and state building activit

ies in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

i. Enter the Taliban

With the crumbling of the Soviet empire and the ostensible independence of the former Soviet Republic

s in the early 1990s, Pakistan was anxious to extend both trade and political ties to Central Asia. This ne

cessitated measures to bring some stability to an Afghanistan mired in civil war and under the fragment

ed rule of numerous warlords and armed gangs. The ISI, trapped by its own strategic vision, continued t

o back the sinking ship of Hekmetyar. But in a seeming repeat of history, the second democratically elec

ted and secular government of Benazir Bhutto, under its Interior Minister General (retired) Naseerullah

Babur, laid the ground work for utilizing the TehrikeTaliban (The Movement of Students) to bring stabil

ity to southern and eastern Afghanistan104. Babur, who had previously advised Benazir’s father on

his aggressive Afghanistan policy in the 1970s, again saw the high stakes for Pakistan: a highly lucrative

potential trade and energy route through to Turkmenistan and the other former Central Asian Republics

The Taliban were a product of the war, displacement and dislocation brought by the Soviet invasion and

Western response. The leaders of the Taliban movement were almost without exception former mujahi

deen, many of them affiliated with traditionalist Pashtun parties105. The majority of Taliban fighters an

d leaders hadonly known war and life in the refugee camps. Thus, the Taliban’s ultraconservative

orthodoxy was not simply a fundamentalist or literalist return to the scriptures or a traditionalist reversi

on to a pristine life in Afghanistan. It was the translation of the myths of religious and traditional Afghan
 23

village life as interpreted through the harsh conditions of the refugee camp106. Therefore, the Taliban

have been aptly described as neo‐fundamentalist (‘neo’ because the

world they recreated never actually existed)107. This enabled the Taliban to commit acts that wou

ld have been unthinkable in the Afghan village or towns. These included publicly chastising or beating w

omen who did not belong to their own family for slights such as appearing in public ‘immodestly’ dresse

d108, or even for seeking employment, education or medical treatment. Their extremely harsh and co

mpletely exclusionary gender policy gained them notoriety and opprobrium in the region and across the

world109.

The Taliban were successful in liberating a Pakistani trade convoy en route to Turkmenistan and went

on to capture Kandahar City110. Strengthened by support from transport mafias in Pakistan, a weapons

cache seized from Hekmetyar and extensive assistance from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia111, the Taliban

began their whirlwind campaign to conquer Afghanistan. The Taliban promised to have no desire to sei

ze power but only to break the hold of the warlords and transfer power to an Islamic government. As su

ch they were initially welcomed by those sections of population tired of bickering and predatory warlor

ds. To paraphrase the Roman historian Tacitus, the ultraorthodox neofundamentalist Taliban made

a wilderness and called it peace; but still, it was a kind of peace and as such it was welcomed by the war

weary population112. However, it is easy to overestimate this point in explaining their success as the m

yths propagated by the Taliban and Pakistan have done. Apart from the southern provinces of Ka

ndahar and to a much lesser extent, Helmand, and the region immediately surrounding the capital city

of Kabul, the rest of the country was not nearly as lawless and chaotic as is often popularly believed;

in fact much of it was relatively stable and beginning to thrive.Thus, the essential factor in the

Taliban’s rise was not the desire for bringing order from chaos, but rather the surge in military and ec
 24

onomic assistance provided by Pakistan and SaudArabia when outside support for and the morale of

other armed groupings was sagging.

The ISI and Pakistani military eventually threw their weight behind the Taliban, retaking control of P

akistan’s Afghanistan policy. The US too favoured the Taliban as a force of stability in an energy rich

region115 up until 1998’s terrorist attacks on the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. These were wide

ly believed to be perpetrated by Osama bin Laden, a Saudi businessman and Arab mujahideen co

mmander from the antiSoviet war turned leader of alQaeda, an international terrorist organization. O

n his expulsion from Sudan in 1996, Hekmetyar had invited bin Laden to Afghanistan. He was now gu

est of the Taliban in the Emirate of Afghanistan who refused to extradite him. Even then, the US mainta

ined contacts with the Taliban till 2001. With Pakistani military planning and assistance, the Taliban wer

e able to march into Kabul in 1996. Pakistan recognized the Taliban government immediately, given the

tantalizing prospect of a friendly regime in Kabul whose puritan Islamic neofundamentalism made

it vehemently opposed to an ‘infidel’ India. Pakistan would remain only one of three countries to b

estow recognition116.

However, generous assistance did not mean that the Pakistani government could fully control the Talib

an; they made use of their various social and political networks to play benefactors and supporters a

t various levels of Pakistani government and society against each other and managed to maintai

n their relative autonomy117. This was amply displayed by the fact that like every other regime in Kab

ul since 1948 the Taliban too refused to accept the Durand Line. Pakistan’s powerlessness was further d

emonstrated by its impotence in getting the Taliban to temper their human rights excesses, as well as it

s failure to prevent the destruction of the ancient Buddhas of Bamiyan.

By 2001 Pakistan had squandered much of the good will gathered during the AfghanSoviet war by its

blatant interference in Afghanistan and its sponsorship of the Taliban’s ongoing military campaign ag
 25

ainst the so called Northern Alliance, a Tajik led coalition of militias mostly consisting of Afghanistan’s

ethnic minority groups. The Taliban now controlled most of the country, with the Northern Allian

ce restricted to and doggedly holding on to a pocket of territory around the Panjshir valley, home of the

famous Tajik commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. The then leader of Pakistan, another military putschist

named General Parvez Musharraf, openly admitted Pakistan’s ongoing support for the Taliban, declari

ng, “This is our national interest…the Taliban cannot be alienated by Pakistan. We have a national securi

ty interest there.”118

Other regional powers had also rejoined the fray with renewed vigour in response to Pakistan’s s

ustained and brazen assistance to the Taliban119. Iran, which had been fundamental in bringing togeth

er the Northern Alliance120, also armed the Shia Hazara. Russia and Uzbekistan supplied assistance and

weapons to their clients and coethnics in the Northern Alliance. Tajikistan provided logistical sup

port to Massoud, who in turn assisted in mediating its bloody civil war. India too had shifted its support

from the former communists to the former mujahideen of the Northern Alliance, though it bears n

oting that former communist leaders and militias were also part of Alliance, as well as the Taliban. Indi

a’s turn was based on the changing situation in Afghanistan and on its antipathy to Pakistan, particularly

the fact that Pakistan was using Taliban run militant camps in Afghanistan to train fighters for oper

ations in Indian Controlled Kashmir.

ii. Taliban: Support and Isolation

Shunned by the international state system, the Taliban were increasingly drawn into a parallel undergr

ound transnational community, one of international terrorists and criminal and jihadist networks121.

These networks allowed them to maintain military dominance in a war weary country with a ready sup

ply of resources and fighters from Pakistani madrassahs, as well as Arab fighters under the umbrella of

alQaeda and Islamic Jihad. The Taliban’s main ‘strike corps’, the feared Brigade 55 for instance, was enti
 26

rely composed to nonAfghans122. It also hosted likeminded dissidents from its neighbours, including th

e leaders and fighters of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)123. Though obviously Afghan

led and dominated, the Taliban have always been a transnational phenomenon; it was natural for t

hem to seek allies in the same manner and through similar channels.

Even prior to 2001 the Taliban movement was far from monolithic. There were differences, including

with regard to sheltering Osama bin Laden, and the relationship to be pursued with the internation

al community. By 2001, internal and external pressure on the regime was mounting. There was consider

able diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to withdraw its support and recognition124, Saudi Arabia ha

d severed aid due to the Taliban’s refusal to extradite bin Laden, and the Northern Alliance’s effective c

ampaign to gather support in European capitals was seeing increasing success. The Taliban’s lack of

interest in governance beyond law and order and warmaking had turned Afghanistan into the world’s

largest humanitarian disaster. But it was the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the US tha

t renewed international interest in Afghanistan and refreshed the opportunity for it and the global com

munity to play a role in the region and in the latest strategic realignments therein.

With Afghanistan once more an international battlefield, Pakistan too was able to reprise its role as a ‘f

rontline state’ in the fight for ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’. As fate would have it, it saw this role again tw

o years into the regime of another military dictator, General Parvez Musharraf.
 27

Pakistan and Afghanistan after 9/11

After some fevered deliberation, Islamabad was relatively prompt in declaring support for Washington i

n its so called War Against Terror. The decision was not made lightly by the Pakistan military; supporting

the Taliban was so important to Pakistan’s security and regional calculations that Musharraf even consi

dered going to war with the United States rather than abandon his allies in Afghanistan126. Ulti

mately, Pakistan assisted the US with facilities and bases as well as the intelligence necessary to win the

war in Afghanistan quickly. At the same time, the paucity of ground troops only scattered the Taliban a

nd many elements of alQaeda. Thousands of them escaped into Afghanistan’s rugged mountains and P

akistan’s tribal areas. Many simply returned to their villages and towns, or to refugee camps and madra

ssahs in Pakistan where they had family and friends waiting. Once in Pakistan or near the border many f

ighters were also able to rely on clan connections or bribe their way to safety. The ISI, utilizing its assets

in Pakistan’s religious political parties, also welcomed many of the demoralized fighters back, saving th

em for a rainy day.

Pakistan’s panic regarding the new situation in Afghanistan began in November of 2001, when despite

US assurances to the contrary, the Northern Alliance forces moved into Kabul. The Alliance had develop

ed close ties to India; its control of Kabul was seen as a profound strategic threat to Pakistan and a com

plete failure of Pakistan’s costly investment in cultivating the friendly Taliban regime. At the conference

in Bonn, Germany, where an interim Afghan government was chosen, the Northern Alliance receiv

ed the portfolios of most of the important ministries, including defense. Its forces physically controlled t

hese ministries and the US or other allies had little interest in evicting them. Even though a Durrani Pas

htun in the form of Hamid Karzai was elected interim president in December 2001, Pashtuns still felt un

derrepresented in the government.

 28

A Constitution was adopted following a constitutional Loya Jirga in 2004127. This adopted a unitary (as

opposed to federal) and presidential form of government, rejecting any formal ethnic representation in

state institutions. Thus, the flip side to Pashtun concerns is that the Constitution provides no defen

se against perceived or actual domination of the state by any one particular ethnic community,

which has historically been and is almost certain to again eventually be the Pashtuns. This has led to Afg

hanistan’s minorities being extremely wary of the present set up as well128. Moreover, against Pa

kistan’s insistence, the defeated and demoralized Taliban were completely left out of any negotiations

on the future of Afghanistan when potentially – though this is far from certain –

they could have been dictated to from a position of strength.

i. Heating Insurgency, Cooling Relations

By 2005, Afghanistan had once again begun to celebrate Pashtunistan Day each August 31. Moreover,

in February, 2006, President Hamid Karzai publicly dubbed the Durand Line a “line of hatred” and ex

pressed that he did not accept it as an international border as “it raised a wall between the two brother

s.”129 Pakistani and Afghan troops had already clashed over the disputed border as early as 2003. Anti

Pakistan protests had followed in Kandahar, Lagman, MazariSharif, Urozgan and Kabul among other citie

s. In a seeming repeat of tensions from the 1950s, on July 8, 2003, protestors in Kabul ransacked the Pa

kistani Embassy, an incident which threatened to escalate into a wider conflict.130 Pakistani and

Afghan soldiers have periodically clashed across the border since131.

Pakistan also faced pressure on sealing its border and denying the Taliban sanctuary as early as 20

0203. The first reported clash between US and Pakistani troops took place then in South Waziristan in t

his period132. It was then that Major Steve Clutter, the then US military spokesperson at the Bagram Ba
 29

se near Kabul, first enunciated the US’s ‘hot pursuit’ policy saying, “the US reserves the right to pursue

fleeing Taliban and alQaeda fighters from Afghanistan into Pakistan without Pakistan’s permission. It is

a long standing policy, that if we are pursuing enemy forces, we’re not just going to tiptoe and stop righ

t at the border.”133 Thus, the controversy over recent incursions by US troops into Pakistani terri

tory134 have been part of the overall nexus of relations and tensions between the two countries since t

he early days of the latest war in Afghanan. A Tripartite Commission involving senior military and diplo

matic officials from Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States was set up in 2003 in an effort to facilit

ate communication and information sharing to avoid further incidents. Its role has remained purely tech

nical around these lines as opposed to facilitating or being a springboard for broader political dialogue.

By 2006 relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan had sharply deteriorated. The Taliban insurgency

had gathered substantial strength in this period135. President Karzai publicly accused Pakistan of su

pporting the insurgency and sheltering insurgent leaders in its cities. President Karzai went so far

as to provide a list of names and addresses for alleged Taliban leaders living in Pakistan. Pakista

n vehemently denied the charges.

The situation in Pakistan itself substantially altered in this period. The putschist General Musharraf had

assumed the office of President and held parliamentary and provincial elections in 2002. The elections b

rought the MMA, a coalition of six Islamist parties, into government in the provinces of NWFP and Baluc

histan, both of which border Afghanistan. The MMA was also the third largest party in the National Ass

embly immediately following elections. General Musharraf’s government encouraged defections from t

he secular opposition parties until it effectively became the official opposition.

 30

The unprecedented success partly capitalized on protest votes as the MMA was the only party resolut

ely opposed to the invasion of coethnic Afghanistan. This allowed the religious parties to increase their

collective share of the popular vote from the usual 5% to about 11%136. But they also benefited from s

evere electoral engineering. This included sidelining the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan

Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN), the two largest parties in Pakistan. Both were led by two former Prime

Ministers, Benazir Bhutto and Mian Nawaz Sharif respectively. Both leaders were refused entry into the

country, much less allowed to contest elections. Further, opponents were disqualified on the basis of c

orruption charges or lack of educational credentials137. Religious parties were allowed to openly camp

aign while there were severe restrictions imposed on secular parties. As a result, the election process w

as sharply criticized by the European Union Observer Mission138 and termed “deeply flawed” by Huma

n Rights Watch139. Contrary to these finding, the US concluded that the election results were “accepta

ble”; Canada did not utter any protests.

The success of the MMA shored up the traditional alliance between the religious parties and the milita

ry and buoyed Musharraf’s rule both domestically and internationally. His gambit largely successful,

Musharraf was able to convincingly project himself to an international audience as the only thing

standing between the ‘Talibanization’ of Pakistan. The reality was different for most Pakistanis. The mu

llahs were allowed numerous concessions in return for supporting Musharraf, his constitutional chang

es and his government. The militarysupported Islamist provincial governments did much to foster

the insurgency in both Afghanistan and Pakistan by sheltering militants, reigning in law enforcement a

gencies that tried to curb their activities and broadly legitimating their obscurantist ideology140. D

omestically they were increasingly successful in foisting an ultraconservative neofundamentalist agenda

through a combination of intimidation, thuggery and popular legislation. Thus, contrary to interntional
 31

perceptions, Talibanization occurred at an unprecedented rate largely due to the government’s cynic

al patronage.

Further, Musharraf’s rule also saw the reignition of a burgeoning nationalist insurgency in Baluchistan.

Baluchistan also shares a border with some of the most volatile areas of Afghanistan, namely the pr

ovinces of Helmand and Kandahar. Thus, the insurgency there not only taxed the Pakistani military but

also presented numerous exploitable opportunities for the Taliban.

By 2005, the Taliban insurgency had already become crossborder and was equally active on eith

er side142. It now included the so called ‘Pakistani Taliban’. Large swathes of territory in FATA, the NWF

P and Baluchistan slipped out of control of the Pakistani government and were converted into mini versi

ons of Afghanistan under the Taliban. Even the suburbs of the city of Peshawar, capital of the NWFP, w

ere thus Talibanized. Moreover since 2007 a campaign of suicide and conventional bombings have ter

rorized all of Pakistan’s cities, killing hundreds if not thousands143. Not even Islamabad, the country’

s capital, has been spared. The insurgency has turned into Pakistan’s Frankenstein’s Monster; it can no l

onger delude itself into thinking that it still controls the actors or that it is insulated or contained in th

e lawless border areas away from the Pakistani heartlands. It now presents a palpable threat to the

state144.

ii. Just what is Pakistan’s Game?

Pakistan has many apologists that insist that the growing insurgency in Afghanistan has little to d

o with it and everything to do with the occupation of Afghanistan and bad governance under President

Hamid Karzai. Others say that it is difficult for an army to fight its own people and therefore, the militar

y has failed to subdue the Pakistani Taliban. Then there are those that claim Pakistan is a duplicitous all

y that publicly condemns the Taliban while privately assisting them. Still other claim that Pakistan simpl
 32

y does not have the military capability to pacify its restive border areas and the insurgency that rages

therein. There are elements of truth and mythmaking in all these positions.

The Pakistani military has historically been more adept at suppressing usually very brutally insurgenci

es by its compatriots than it has been at fighting external threats. It has done so in Baluchistan in t

he 1940s, 1950s, 1970s and then from 2003 to 2008. It was also vicious in its suppression of an uprising

in rural Sind in the late 1980s and in the province’s first city of Karachi in the 1990s. Its brutality was u

nmatched in 1971 when it committed genocide against the Bengalis and was more or less on track f

or extinguishing the rebellion prior to Indian intervention. Thus, explanations relying on the assertion th

at Pakistan’s military does not have the stomach to fight its own people, or that it does not possess suff

icient expertise in dealing with asymmetric warfare does not hold water historically

even providing for the virtual revolution in asymmetric warfare tactics following the occupation in

Iraq.

What distinguishes the present insurgency from previous ones, including the one in Baluchistan which

the military has fought simultaneously? Clan and kinship ties may have played some role in the mili

tary’s initial lackadaisical performance. Many of Pakistan’s frontier paramilitary forces share not o

nly ethnic but also blood ties with the Pashtun Taliban fighters. This situation has been remedied rece

ntly by moving ethnic Punjabi troops into the frontier regions.

But the main distinction has less to do with fighting fellow citizens than with the difficulty in squaring t

he ideological dimensions of the insurgency. The Taliban consider and proclaim themselves to be jihadis

or mujahideen and are garbed in the cloak of Islamic legitimacy. Pakistan is itself an ideological state

with a confused national identity tied in with Islam. It has for decades lionized and sometimes idealized

the struggle for a puritan Islamic state in Afghanistan. The challenge now is that the Pakistani Taliban a

nd their vocal sympathizers are proving increasingly adept at appropriating the Pakistani state’s discour
 33

se of legitimacy resting in its Islamic credentials and recasting it in a radical mould. Thus, ideationally it i

s now extremely difficult to recharacterize this subverted discourse as illegitimate, terroristic or even an

ti‐state.

It is this dimension of the insurgency that is potentially the most damaging to Pakistan in the long‐

run as it requires a more comprehensive and longterm social solution than a mere military campaign wi

thin a particular time and space. Despite the dramatic increase in suicide bombings and sectarian a

nd terror attacks in Pakistan, many Pakistanis are still unsure about the fight against the Taliban and al‐

Qaeda and continue to regard it only as America’s proxy war. This is evidenced by the recent parliam

entary resolution that calls for an immediate halt to military operations without calling on the Taliba

n to do the same145. Thus, posing effective ideological and ideational opposition to the Taliban wi

ll require carefully crafting a social consensus not only on what must be done at present to stem the risi

ng tide of extremism but also on the symbolic signifiers of the Pakistani state, particularly on its foundat

ional myths and on the ways in which Islam is to play a role in its public sphere (or not). Such a consens

us will prove difficult given a Pakistani polity increasingly fragmented along political, class, ethnic, sect

arian, religious and urban/rural lines. Regardless, initiating a sustained public dialogue on these is

sues is crucial, particularly now when the elections of February, 2008 have inflicted a crushing defeat

on the radical parties146 and have provided the government with a democratic mandate.

Notwithstanding, Pakistan has undertaken earnest military efforts to keep the threat manageable, an

d its nuclear and human assets (i.e., proPakistan Taliban) safe from external action. It has set up more t

han 1000 checkpoints on its side of the border, as compared to less than 200 on the Afghan side. It has

deployed up to 110,000 troops on its border and lost over 3000, far more than the number of troops de

ployed on the Afghan side of the border147.

 34

Recently, the Pakistani military has pursued more aggressive and increasingly successful actions agains

t the militants in its Bajaur Agency, described as a “crucial hub” and the “centre of gravity” for the

Taliban insurgents. The action saw hundreds of Taliban fighters pouring over the border from Afghanist

an to reinforce their comrades in Pakistan148. The military has been confronting and repelling attacks

in Bajaur itself but has been unable to keep the Taliban restricted to the Afghan side of the border

. Nor, of course, have foreign troops based in Afghanistan or the Afghan National Army (ANA) been able

to prevent Taliban fighters from crossing the border and joining the fray in Pakistan. This demonstrates

the limits of Pakistan – and Afghanistan – to effectively seal or manage the porous border.

Moreover, it is naïve to imagine that there is an ‘off switch’ for the insurgency somewhere in Islamaba

d. The ‘Taliban’ appellation no longer applies merely to the movement that seized power in Kabul back i

n 1996. The movement is now sorely fragmented, decentralized and remains regionalized and inter

nationalized. It incorporates neo‐

fundamentalists, Islamists, other militants and terrorists, as well as drug barons, criminals, spoilers vyin

g for local power and the destitute fighting for some semblance of a regular pay cheque149. As the vici

ous Taliban insurgency within Pakistan itself shows, Pakistan does not control all the various strand

s of the renewed movement or its multifarious radical affiliates and has little influence over them. In th

e words of a prominent scholar on the subject, Pakistani intelligence agencies have “no clue” as to the

numerous fragmented, loosely affiliated, networked or even competing radical organizations in Pakista

n150. This is demonstrated by the fact that when over forty different militant groups in the NWFP and F

ATA banded together as the Tehrik‐e-

Taliban under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud, the ISI only found out after the fact151.

But this is not to say that Pakistan does not control some Taliban commanders and fighters; indeed it

does and has used them against both Afghanistan and India. Thus, it is also important to recognize that
 35

not only is Pakistan unable to control the border and reign in all the militants, it is also –

to the extent that it can unwilling to do so. Pakistan hopes to keep the areas in a state of controlled ch

aos whereby its Taliban intelligence assets, such as the Haqqani father and son team, are preserved to b

e utilized to expand influence into both Afghanistan and India. The ‘control’ in this chaos comes in its ta

rgeting of foreign (i.e. nonAfghan and Pakistani) fighters and those Taliban commanders, such as B

aitullah Mehsud, Mangal Bagh or Maulana Fazalullah (more popularly known as Maulana Radio fo

r his skill in setting up pirate radio stations), that are bent on fighting the Pakistani state. The control, ho

wever, is often illusory and threatens to get entirely lost amidst the chaos.

The questions thus are: why is Pakistan unwilling to fight all the Taliban and why does it maintain its li

nks with some of them? A cynical though not entirely unreasonable view holds that the insurgency has

been good for Pakistan, and particularly its military managers. The Pakistani military under Musharr

af benefited immensely from the at least $10 billion, and perhaps as much as $20 billion, in aid provide

d to Pakistan152. Most of this aid went to the military153. Without the ongoing turmoil in Pakistan and

the border areas the Pakistani military stands to lose a lucrative revenue stream.154 No doubt this play

s some role in Pakistan’s approach to the Taliban insurgency, just as its carefully calibrated suppo

rt for the Mujahideen prolonged the war against the Soviets by keeping it at a low intensity. But the eco

nomic motive for the military is overly simplistic and fails to explain the entire scenario. Tactical m

otives aside, Pakistan’s strategic objectives in the region have remained the same even when it was co

mpletely isolated from US largesse in the 1990s. Though Pakistan no doubt realizes that US engagement

in the region has given it the opportunity to build its military capability vis a vis India, its strategy is a co

ntinuation of gaining leverage in Afghanistan and building up the military security against India that it h

as pursued since the 1970s.

 36

Pakistan is motivated by the desire to have a friendly government in Kabul that it can exercise some in

fluence with. Pakistan needs this to be able to expand

political and trade ties with the Central Asian Republics and to keep Afghanistan’s irredentist Pas

htunistan claims in check. Most importantly, however, Pakistan’s managers, and particularly its milita

ry that still controls its defence and foreign policies, are concerned with the perceived threat from India.

Pakistan is a security state defined by its ideational opposition to India. The Pakistani military remains

obsessed with the idea of gaining strategic depth against India. Its worst nightmare remains an Afgh

anistan friendly to and dominated by its archnemesis. Therefore, Delhi’s growing influence in Kabul h

as been causing panic in Islamabad.

Indeed, India’s ties with Afghanistan are partly aimed at disrupting Pakistan’s security calculations. P

akistan continues to pursue a proxy war of varying intensity against India in Kashmir. This ‘death by

a thousand cuts’ has the dual purpose of maintaining pressure on India to ultimately come to a settlem

ent on Kashmir, and also to keep a substantial portion of the Indian military tied up in the Himalayan re

gion, thereby reducing its strike capability against the rest of Pakistan. In the minds of military planners,

this tactic gives Pakistan a ‘force equalizer’ against the much larger and more advanced Indian military.

However, by strengthening its position in Afghanistan, India is countering Pakistan’s long standing prox

y tactics. An Afghanistan that is stable, adding to its military strength and increasingly (and justifia

bly) resentful of Pakistan would turn the tables. If India can not utilize its full military capability because

of Kashmir, the thinking goes, then Pakistan can not utilize it because of Afghanistan. It is within this fra

mework that Pakistan views and processes reports that India may provide training to the Afghan Nation

al Army (ANA)155, as well as recently announced plans of increasing the projected strength of the ANA f

rom 80,000 to 134,000156. Many, including Afghan Defence Minister Abdul Wardak, argue that it shoul
 37

d be much larger still157. Therefore, it has received the news of the increase in militarization in Afghani

stan with much trepidation158 – and it is not the only country in the region to have done so.

In contrast to Pakistan’s influence exercised through madrassahs and militants, India is making invest

ments in Afghanistan that, in the long term, are aimed at cultivating and cementing its ties with the Afg

han elites of tomorrow. These include economic aid, infrastructural development and educational ties.

Pakistan has been outmanoeuvred but has been slow to adapt or alter its policies accordingly.

However, there is also a dark side to Indian involvement in Afghanistan that is often ignored or written

off to a mix of Pakistani paranoia and propaganda. This is the building of a dam on the Kunar river in nor

thern Afghanistan. This would provide much needed electricity to Afghanistan. However, the river flows

(via the Kabul River) into the Indus at Attock. In Pakistan’s view, the Kunar dam would have serious ra

mifications for its water supply159. Further, its construction comes amid ongoing disputes between Indi

a and Pakistan over the use of water resources and a dam on the Chenab River160.

More disturbing still India funds and supports training camps for Pakistani Baluch insurgents in southe

rn Afghanistan161. The latest rebellion raged from 2003 to recently in 2008 when the main insurgent gr

oups declared a ceasefire162. However, tensions are still running high and a conflict could easily reignit

e. Thus, it seems Afghanistan has reprised its role of support to Baluch militiants and proxy intervention

in Pakistan – albeit at a lesser intensity than Pakistan is able to muster against it –

while India has found its opportunity to give Pakistan a taste of its own medicine.

That such intense rivalry is occurring between ostensible Western allies while tens of thousands of troo

ps are stationed in the region is a troubling portent. At the very least, the present strategies are failing t

o bring lasting peace and security to the region and are contributing to its militarization. This also demo

nstrates the limits of Western – even imperial –

power to superimpose its own interests onto related states without regard for underlying and longstan
 38

ding regional interests. As a result, a hegemonic agenda can not simply be transcribed onto the region

without feeding the kind of turmoil that we are presently witnessing. The mutual animus between Afgh

anistan, Pakistan and India has lasted a long time. If the current course is followed without involving

the entire region in an open dialogue, this turmoil will likely far outlast Western involvement in Afgha

nistan.

E. Regional Cooperation or Towards a New Cold War?

As we have seen, both Pakistan and India are using Afghanistan as a proxy battlefield. Afghanistan, the

weakest of the three countries, is certainly a victim in the circumstances, but not an entirely passive or

blameless one. Further, they are not the only countries that are exploiting Afghanistan to pursue their o

wn realpolitik agendas, both legitimate and otherwise. The regional consensus that had been built by t

he US in support of its invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 is now unravelling, a victim of geopolitics and sus

picions over its longterm goals and motivations in the country. To states in the region Afghanistan rese

mbles more and more an expansion of the US imperium.

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Russia had proposed to accept US “global leadership” if

the US allowed it “hegemonic responsibility for the former Soviet Union.”163 Offered from a position o

f weakness, the proposal was rejected by Washington which planned to establish military bases in Centr

al Asia to support the war in Afghanistan. It also hoped that the bases would be ‘enduring’, proje

cting US influence in the region the extending it to Russia’s south eastern borders, as the extension of N

ATO already inched towards its western borders164. By 2005, however, as the US got increasingly bogg

ed down in Iraq, Russia was once again acting like a great power and expanding its alliances in the regio

n. It has conducted joint military exercises with China and India. It squarely rejected imposing sanction

s on Iran for its uranium enrichment activities and has publicly decided to remain neutral in any

future USIran war165. As in Soviet times, it had also made attempts to take over supplying and trainin
 39

g the ANA, though the recent boost in US aid to Afghanistan is presumably meant to ward off t

his development. Given the rising rancor between the US and Russia, if it views the growing ANA as a

threat, Afghanistan may once again turn into a proxy battlefield between the two powers.

Iran too, under the moderate leadership of Mohammad Khatami, had offered its support in containin

g the Taliban and securing the border. Instead of fostering this regional cooperation, Iran was added to

the list of the socalled Axis of Evil.It views the possibility of ‘enduring’ bases in Afghanistan as well as the

planned increase in the size of the ANA with considerable and reasonable suspicion. Since 2003 it has h

ad to live with US troops on both its eastern and western (Iraq) borders while relations between the tw

o countries have considerably worsened. It has few good options ahead in Afghanistan, as long as the ex

isting choices remain a government allied with the US with unprecedented military strength in manpow

er and equipment, or the Pakistan/Saudi Arabia aligned and rabidly antiShia Taliban that attacked and ki

lled its consular staff in 1990s. Without a third option in Afghanistan, Iran is likely to continue hedging it

s bets, with some factions within its security establishment contributing to the ongoing chaos in Afghan

istan.

However, it is China that is proving the major magnet f

or shifting interests in the region. Soon after the election of President George W. Bush, the US redefine

d China from “strategic partner” to “strategic competitor”. This was in keeping with US defence doctri

nes aimed at preempting and preventing the reemergence of a new rival for global power, preventin

g any hostile power from becoming a regional hegemon and maintaining a mechanism for deterrin

g potential competitors aspiring to a larger regional or global role. China fit squarely within the d

octrine.

Part of this requalification included luring New Delhi into accepting a leading role in the new US strate

gy for containing China166. India and the US have moved considerably closer since then, exacerbating
 40

strains in the USPakistan relationship. The recent unprecedented nuclear deal between the US and In

diathat accepts the latter as a legitimate member of the nuclear club is an indication of the importance

the US ascribes this budding alliance167. This is leading to further nuclearization of South Asia. China re

cently agreed to provide Pakistan with two more nuclear reactors. Publicly the reason is to address Paki

stan’s acute energy crisis. The real reason is to restore some modicum of balance to the geopolitical po

wer equation in South Asia that the comprehensive US‐India deal had disturbed168.

In this context, China too sees a lingering US presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia, as well

as the steadily strengthening ANA as a threat. It is obviously wary of a US strategy of containment

and strategic encirclement. It perceives Afghanistan as a plank in an encirclement strategy that also incl

udes India among other countries. China’s concerns are not aided by a feeling of déjà vu, having seen a

similar encirclement attempted by the former Soviet Union. Pakistan is the wildcard for China. The two

countries share an “allweather friendship” and this is likely to continue; however China is not presently i

n a position to replace US generosity in terms of military, civil and financial aid. However, China has con

tinued to court Pakistan as a large donor of military hardware and has assisted Pakistan in a number of s

trategic projects, including a new port at Gwador in Baluchistan. It has also begun to seek preem

ptive counteralignments with Russia and Iran, and has improved and increased ties with Sri Lanka and

Bangladesh, in addition to Pakistan, almost certainly to secure its position against India. However, China

is also concerned about the chaos in Afghanistan and destabilization and Talibanization in Pakistan

as reports begin to emerge about rebels in the Xingjian province finding sanctuary and training facilities

in Pakistan’s border areas. _________________________________

Thus, a prolonged Western military presence in Afghanistan is slowly leading to the opposite of establ

ishing peace and stability in the region. It is exacerbating regional tensions and contributing to its increa

sed militarization. But despite the deliberately provocative title of this section, it is as yet doubtful that t
 41

his will lead to a new Cold War or even a classic arms race in the near future. However, a pair of opposi

ng alliances led by the US and China will likely emerge169. The multilayered relations between countri

es in the region are largely interest based. Russia and China still have their many differences. In

dia does not desire a conflict with China, and vice versa, as both countries understand that this would

be devastating to their emerging economies. Thus, India and China have been putting out feelers aime

d at better bilateral relations as well. However, both are historical competitors. Further, the history of t

he region shows that there is a possibility of regional and international conflagrations stemming fro

m the plethora of interests and particularly the involvement of big powers and veritable empires.

Therefore, any road that seeks to diffuse the tension and leads to peace goes through increased regi

onal cooperation. Hence, an earnest and honest dialogue is required on the situation in both Pakista

n and Afghanistan that brings all regional players and the countries presently involved in the occ

upation of Afghanistan to the negotiating table under the auspices of the UN. As this section ho

pes to demonstrate, the conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan and across the region have important tran

snational dimensions. Their solutions must be the same. ________________________________ A

s a prologue to this section, it is useful to consider that Pakistan has often been described as a “pivotal

state”, meaning a country “whose fates would significantly affect regional, even international stabil

ity.”170 Peace, stability and prosperity in the country would have a knockon multiplier effect throughou

t the region. I suggest Afghanistan is in a similar position. Once a crossroads between East and West, be

tween Asian and Europe through the fabled Silk Route, Afghanistan can once again be an important rou

te for trade and energy. Thus, to create an enabling environment where this can be achieved needs to b

e an urgent policy priority.

F. Canada’s Role in Afghanistan…and Pakistan?

 42

Given Canada’s policies, or lack thereof, with respect to Pakistan in the context of Afghanistan, the rele

vant questions raised by this paper are: What can Canada do? And what can Canada get Pakistan to do?

The discussion that proceeds also deals with a third normative question implied in the first two:

what should Canada do? The suggested answers are likely to be unpopular. But they are offered earne

stly to allow policymakers to adopt realistic expectations and to explore opportunities for effecting sust

ainable change in the long term. ________________________________

Afghanistan is Canada’s largest foreign policy undertaking and commitment since the Korean War. How

ever, this policy is equally notable for its gaps and lack of international and regional context, particularly

with regard to the impasse in relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Recent revelations that year

s into Canada’s military intervention in Afghanistan there is no up‐to

date policy concerning Pakistan171 is good reason for foreboding and may undermine any gains made

by Canada in Afghanistan; at worst it may unravel and render meaningless Canada’s entire effort. There

fore, if Canada is to take its direction in Afghanistan seriously, as it must given the gravity and mag

nitude of its involvement and its costs, then it can not afford to ignore Pakistan in its policy calculus.

However, it is also vital to avoid the analytic pitfalls of simplistic jingoisms that hold Pakistan solely resp

onsible for the current misery befalling its neighbour. Such a portrayal will barely move us beyond the le

vel of crude caricature and cliché. Instead, Canada must recognize that Afghanistan and Pakistan share

a long and deep history and for better or for worse, it is likely that their futures will be similarly intertwi

ned. The adverse relationship between the two states, clearly evident in their public exchanges of di

plomatic barbs, has been an ongoing state of affairs and not one that has developed only recently. Ca

nada must be mindful of this history and the regional context if it to play a creative and effective role as

a peacemaker in the region and avoid being seen as seeking to enforce a hegemonic or imperialist agen

da. It must also move beyond simple management strategies that focus on technical issues like border r
 43

egulation and military operations to engage the range of substantive political issues that are at the hea

rt of the current crisis. Of course, the face of Pakistan and Afghanistan that emerges will ultimately depe

nd on the political choices available and made by its people and ruling establishment. However, foreign

policy can be a tool of creating an enabling environment for peace and stability.

To do so will no doubt require adroit diplomacy supported by expert analysis and knowledge creation.

This can not be achieved by ignoring or outsourcing foreign policy formulation; it will require rebuilding

the specialist capabilities of government departments, particularly in foreign affairs and defense, as wel

l as supporting regional analyses in public and private fora.

i. Engaging Pakistan within a Regional Framework

It is a fact that Western powers have preferred working with military strongmen in Pakistan. Despite C

anada’s foreign policy emphasis on democracy, it is often thought the most expendable plank of the ‘3

D approach’ that also emphasizes defense and development. Many Pakistanis do not believe that Cana

da sincerely holds democracy in high regard anywhere outside of its borders. Their cynicism is warrant

ed given that Pakistanis struggled alone and isolated against military dictatorship from March 2007 to

February 2008 without any substantial support expressed from Ottawa or other Western capitals. The

message to Pakistanis was clear: the human rights, development and democracy that justified dra

stic measures such as the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan do not hold similar importance for it

s neighbour. It cheapened Canada’s standing in both countries.

Presently Canada enjoys a relatively clean slate in the region, despite the unavoidable and nec

essary detractors of its military role in Afghanistan. Its relatively low profile can be something of a

n opportunity. However, if Canada is to be taken seriously in the region and is to take the region serio

usly it must urgently align its entire array of foreign policy tools with its declared values. Therefore, C

anada must vocally and visibly support the restoration and continuance of democracy in Pakistan.
 44

Positive transformations and better focus on security and economic development in Pakistan can

only flow from prolonged political stability within a democratic framework. Nine long years of direct

and indirect military rule have brought Pakistan to its current precipice. It could likely take as long if no

t longer to pull it back from the edge. During this time its democrats and the fearless denizens of its civ

il society require all the friends and support they can get as they continue to struggle for rule of law an

d substantive democracy. There is also great capacity for broadening engagement with progressive a

nd democratic vectors of Pakistani society. As the recent “Black and White Revolution” of the lawy

ers movement has shown, there is a vibrant and increasingly assertive civil society, a fearless media, an

d increased youth involvement in politics. Thus, the façade of the military being the only socalled worki

ng institution of the state can no longer be sustained.

Canada can use its position of perceived neutrality within Pakistan to pedal its structural or ‘soft power

’ in a way that can assist in addressing instability in Pakistan and, at its core, the imbalance in state‐

society and civilmilitary relations. Canada should review and focus its development tools and assistanc

e programs as part of broader foreign policy engagement. Some factors that would result in strengthe

ning the present democratic dispensation in the short to medium term could be, for example, addr

essing Pakistan’s severe energy crisis and directing investment to assist its moribund economy even no

w at risk of defaulting on its external debt obligations. These would bear results in the short to medium

term, and assist in undercutting the near global opposition that many Pakistanis have developed tow

ards ‘the West’. The development of FATA should also become part of the strategy to rebuild Af

ghanistan; this would recognize the reality on the ground that these areas in particular are closely link

ed and that they can be mutually constructive – or destructive.

Further, Canada has the opportunity to expand its assistance in reforming the education sector. As dis

cussed above, ultimately the struggle against militant Muslims in Pakistan is one of ideas and ideolo
 45

gy. Poverty and the gap in expectations and opportunities are essential factors in the rise of extremis

m in Pakistan (or anywhere else for that matter). But while these may be enabling ingredients, they are

not drivers. Clearly, not everyone mired in poverty and the lack of opportunity turns to violence, nor ar

e the middle classes immune from radicalization. The essential driver is a militant ideology that the

state is increasingly unable to oppose and replace with anything more substantive. Without dev

eloping a social consensus around a Pakistani identity and the direction in which to take Pakistani s

ociety and polity, the jihadis will continue to have an attractive ideology. Reforming the education s

ector and civil institutions that, above all else, allows Pakistani youth to develop into critical thinkers a

nd engage in public debate is what is urgently required to arrest the rising tide of militancy in the long r

un172. Assistance in this enterprise will be essential in the long‐

term for it will determine the future direction and viability of the Pakistani state.

However, Canada must also come to terms with dilemmas of Pakistan’s security and insecurity. Pakis

tan will insist on exercising some influence in Kabul with a view to security against India, and to a second

ary extent, for guaranteed access to trade routes and checking Afghanistan’s irredentist claims. The Tali

ban share ethnic and other ties to Pakistan through various networks. Though not strictly controlled by

Pakistan, it can hope to exercise the most influence on them. Other ethnic and political groups in Afgha

nistan have historically and traditionally looked elsewhere in the region and often at Pakistan’s regional

rivals – for solidarity and support. Thus, the Taliban – whatever form they take in the future –

will likely form the basis of Pakistan’s influence.

With this backdrop it is increasingly important to begin talking to Taliban factions that are prepa

red to come to the table. The centripetal force previously exercised by Mullah Omar and his clansmen fr

om Kandahar appears to have weakened. Some Taliban commanders have expressed the need to temp

er their puritanical neofundamentalist excesses. Indeed, some have taken this tack in practice; in the ar
 46

eas like the Helmand province where they are aiming to expand their influence the Taliban have lifted b

ans on music, television, kiteflying and other entertainment, and the shaving of beards173. Thus, there i

s every indication of the appearance of more flexible Taliban commanders open to dialogue. The propo

sition of pursuing negotiations is no longer radical. It is now being widely discussed, including by Presi

dent Karzai himself174. It is time to pursue it seriously and vigorously.

There is a quandary in working with Pakistan while knowing that it has hedged its bets and played bot

h sides to some extent all along. As noted above, Pakistan is motivated by its security concerns, particul

arly vis a vis India and will not be easily swayed in its outlook. The solutions to a stable and peaceful Pak

istan are only longterm ones. They include a Pakistan that alters its state structures sufficiently to

limit the role of the military in the sphere of political decisionmaking. Thereby it can redefine its securit

y as a function of friendly relations and alliances with its neighbours rather than military strength a

nd proxy intervention. This can only be achieved in a substantively democratic Pakistan where the elec

ted and accountable institutions of the state are able to impose their pre‐eminence over the non‐

elected ones, particularly the military, and recast statesociety relations in the sphere of political parti

cipation. It will also require an environment of reasonable reciprocation by Pakistan’s neighbours.

However, there are no good alternatives in the short term. Pakistan will remain a military dominated s

ecuritystate for the foreseeable future while Pakistan’s fragile democracy struggles to entrench itself

. Pakistan’s militarybased security obsession with India can be gauged by the fact that its strategic

policies ultimately remain concerned with India regardless of the present threat. This was true when S

oviet troops were operating along its borders and the KGB and KhAD orchestrated terror attacks in Paki

stan in the 1980s. It remains true today even as a spiraling Taliban led insurgency in the tribal areas exte

nds its tentacles across the country with related terror attacks butchering hundreds across the country,

including in the heart of the capital city of Islamabad. The words of a senior Pakistani government offici
 47

al in a recent interview with me captured this sentiment well. “Even if Pakistan disintegrates from the w

est,” the official said ruefully, “We will continue to look toward the east.”175

Ultimately, the solutions to the stalemate are political, not military. In this context, Canada’s dip

lomatic capital would be well spent in the role of peacemaker in the nuclear powered rivalry of India and

Pakistan. Further, intense diplomacy is required between Islamabad, New Delhi and Kabul that assures

each party of its legitimate interests while calming fears that the other is trying to undermine it. Each st

ate, and particularly Pakistan, must eschew proxy militant intervention as a tool of foreign policy. To

do so, Kabul must also take a friendlier posture towards Pakistan and reassess its open alliance with

India.

Given that the Pakistani state has lost much territory in the past, it will continue to react strongly –

even pathologically to territorial challenges. Thus, border issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan als

o need to be urgently assessed and resolved peacefully. The Durand Line is mired in too much hist

ory and symbolism. A bilateral border commission with international oversight is required to prop

erly demarcate a border. But a border between the two countries can not be a ‘hard’ one; both Pakistan

and Afghanistan must foster open borders and exchanges that will boost both social and economic coo

peration. It is India and Pakistan however, that hold the key to better relations across the region. Bett

er understanding between the two will remove the largest obstacle to much increased cooperation in t

he region under the auspices of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). This will

realize the potential of bringing the countries together organically in areas of social, cultural and

economic cooperation.

The South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) would boost the latter by providing each country with ea

sy access to its natural markets. This will have a stabilizing and uplifting impact on the region as a

whole. Needless to say, all this requires deft diplomacy and nuanced facilitation to be likely.
 48

ii. Reassessing Afghanistan

Further, it is also high time to make an honest and critical assessment at the highest levels of the dis

mal aid and reconstruction effort undertaken in Afghanistan. Without such democratic criticism the

re can be no improvement or reform. The reconstruction in Afghanistan is the cheapest per capita

‘state building’ exercise in postWorld War II history176. Moreover, for the most part development ef

forts are poorly conceived and implemented. Efforts are duplicated and developmental organizat

ions view each other as competitors rather than partners. Many opportunities are wasted as a

result of petty personality clashes. Private contractors have frittered and swindled vast amounts of r

esources. The lack of effective oversight and monitoring has led to ghost projects and sub‐

standard work. CIDA funded projects are no different. There are obvious exemptions to these observat

ions, but they are the exceptions that make the rule.

The Afghan government is also in dire need of reform. The highly centralized nature of the governm

ent offers little protection from corruption. Indeed, there are indications that the present government

is more corrupt that the Taliban178. In addition to a high proportion of former warlords in government

and parliament, the largest drug barons in the country also remain in government with relative impun

ity179. Some are closely connected to President Karzai himself180. The government can not conti

nue to rely on support and trust merely because it is not the Taliban. Ultimately, the test of effective g

overnance is how it improves the lives of the governed. Afghanistan’s government is failing the test ev

en when its performance is adjusted for the Taliban insurgency. This too has resulted in the disenfranc

hised and economically marginalized to respond to the call of extremists and others opposed to the go

vernment.
 49

Chapter 3
Pak-Afghan relations: Issues and
challenges
The horrific acts of September 11, 2001 changed the world and Pakistan found itself between the devil

and the deep sea. It marks a new phase of the Pakistan foreign policy in general and Pakistan’s

Afghanistan policy in particular. Pakistan was given a stark choice by America; ‘either to be with us or

against us’.79

Pakistan stood at a crossroad as President of United States George W. Bush made it clear that he would

not make any distinction between the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks and those who harbor them:

“We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place,

until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to

terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are

with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will

be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime”

Pakistan was to either stand with America in its war against Al Qaida and Taliban or suffer U.S.

retaliation if continue with its pro Taliban stand. Pakistan opted to side the international coalition and

provide intelligence, flight corridor and bases for logistic support and recovery to the U.S. led military

attack over Afghanistan on October 7, 2001.

80 Pakistan, to avert likely war, did its best to mediate between U.S and the Taliban. George Tenet,

former head of C I A, in his book amply records Pakistan’s efforts of bringing Taliban to the table and
 50

averting war. He claims that Pakistan helped in arranging meetings between Robert Grenier, (CIA boss in

Islamabad) and Mullah Akhter Mohammed Osmani, Taliban leader to sort out any peaceful solution.81

Reportedly, Pakistan spy master Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed (DG ISI) with a high level delegation also

visited Taliban leader Mullah Omar in Kandahar on 17th September 2001, and persuaded him to

extradite bin Laden so as to avert drastic consequences from US attack.82 The attack was effective in

destroying the training camps, however, the large numbers of the Taliban and Al Qaeda dispersed and

disappeared in to the hinterland and some fled in to the neighbouring Iran and Pakistan. Within 8-10

weeks the Taliban were over powered, routed, major cities including the capital fell on November 13th,

2001.

Being a gate way to Central Asia, the geo- strategic location of Afghanistan provides a shortest and most

cost effective route for channeling vast energy resources of Central Asia to the outside world. The fall of

Taliban in Afghanistan paved the way for foreign actors to intervene in Afghanistan to secure their

strategic interests. After the disintegration of Taliban and surrender of Kabul, UN arranged meeting of

selected Tribal chiefs in Bonn (Germany) to decide upon Afghan interim government under Hamid Karazi

with six months mandate commencing from 22 December 2001. Pakistan supported the interim set up

and Hamid Karzai paid an official visit to Pakistan in February 2002 that renewed bilateral relations on

friendly terms. Pakistan offered all sort of moral, political and economic support to strengthen new

government in Kabul under the presidency of Mr Karazai. President Musharraf’s visit to Afghanistan in

April 2002 and announcement of 100 million dollars aid for reconstruction of Afghanistan should be

seen in this context. Pakistan also provided full support for the peaceful conduct of presidential and

parliamentary polls in October 2004 and September 2005 and sealed its border to guard against any

incursions across the border to disrupt election process. President Musharraf was the first head of state

to visit Afghanistan after the successful completion of presidential election.

 51

Soon the warmth of relations between the two neighbors started deteriorating because of the intrigues

of the cabinet members belonging to Northern Alliance. The trust deficit widened further with each

passing day and president Karzai, once considered to be pro-Pakistan, started blaming Pakistan for

supporting cross border terrorism. Baring the person of Hamid Karazi, the Bonn Conference wrongly

neglected dominant tribes while giving political role in future set up of Afghanistan. This mistake turned

in to catastrophe as it helped blossom the Afghan insurgency. The other Bonn conspiracy turned in to

blunder was keeping Pakistan out of the process and from under taking any kind of reconstruction work.

On the contrary Afghanistan’s distant neighbour like India was provided opportunity to further its

strategic interests against Pakistan. Since then, India has found a vast platform in Afghanistan to conduct

its covert activities in Balochistan through Balochi dissidents and FATA through TTP in order to

destabilize Pakistan.

Establishment of over a dozen Indian Consulates all along PakAfghan border has become security

concern for Pakistan. These Consulates are doing less humanitarian work and more running the spy/

sabotage network to destabilize Pakistan. Anti-Pakistan activities that include channeling of arms,

ammunition, and money in to Balochistan and FATA by these consulates have been pointed out by

Pakistan at number of forums/ occasions. Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Mr Yousuf Raza Gilani has

reportedly provided requisite proofs of Indian involvement in Balochistan affairs to his Indian counter

part Egyptian resort of Sharmel Sheikh Summit on July 16th 2009. The proofs also included names and

photographs of Indian officials meeting with Baloch dissentient Brahamdagh Bugti and other terrorists in

Afghanistan and during their visits to India.

Challenges in Pak- Afghanistan Relations

Ensuing discussion in view, Pakistan and Afghanistan relations have never been, smooth rather a painful

experience of course. Pakistan’s resolve to promote closer fellowship and cooperation between Muslim
 52

countries especially with Afghanistan could not materialize in its true letter and spirit. Pakistan

succeeded in cherishing very cordial relations with every Muslim country baring Afghanistan. With the

sole exception of the four years of Taliban rule (1997-2001), successive governments in Kabul have

displayed varying degrees of antagonism towards Islamabad. The most disturbing period with bitter

experiences was the two spells of Sardar Daud, from 1947 to 1963 and from 1973 to 1978. He proved to

be the champion of Paktoonistan issue and Durand Line controversy. His period of rule carries repeated

incidences of border clashes, insurgents surge, sabotages, border closure, trade embargoes, burning of

national flags and embassies, and severing of diplomatic relations etc. All these acts of antagonism and

Pakhtoonistan issue were architect of IndoAfghan connivance so as to keep Pakistan wanting peace and

stability in its hinter land. More over on every occasion of trade embargo or border closure India and

Soviet Union presented themselves as alternatives to Pakistan. When Sardar Daud realized that stability

across both sides of the borders is mandatory for peace and security in the region then it was too late.

An in-depth look in to the making and breaking of the roller coaster type bilateral relations points

towards mainly two interrelated historical problems; the Durand Line issue and Pakhtoonistan

movement and remaining all irritants were effects of these two. Excluding a long list of minor nature of

irritants from this write up, few of the worth mentioning challenges / findings identified during the

research analyses are:

1. Durand Line Issue

2. Pakhtoonistan Issue

3. Interference into each other’s internal affairs

4. Foreign hand and particularly Indian Factors

5. Fight against Terrorism

6. Indian Factor

7. Refugee factor
 53

8. Link between Al-Qaeda and Taliban

Durand Line Issue:

Durand Line is a historic fact of British legacy that kept hounding the Pak-Afghan relations for the last

sixty two years or so. It is a de jure boundary line between Pakistan & Afghanistan, drawn as a result of a

fully negotiated agreement on 12th November 1893 between British Government of India and the

Afghanistan, and signed by Sir Mortimor Durand (British Foreign Secretary) and Afghanistan’s Amir Abul

Rehman Khan.83

The agreement was subsequently reaffirmed by the later Afghan rulers in their different agreements

and treaties. Amir Abul Rehman’s own autobiography states that the boundary line was agreed upon

from Chitral and Baroghil Pass up to Peshawar, and thence up to Koh-i- Malik Siyah( the tri junction of

Persia, Afghanistan and Balochistan) in this way that: “Wakhan Kafiristan, Asmar, Mohmand of Lalpura,

and one portion of Waziristan(Birmal) came under my rule, and I renounced my claims from the railway

station of New Chaman, Chaghi, the rest of Waziri, Biland Khel, Kurrum, afridi, Bajaur, Swat, buner, Dir,

Chilas and Chitral.” The legal acceptability of the line was doubted by the people and various

governments of Afghanistan from time to time that fueled mistrust and suspicions against each other.

Research finds that the issue is simple, clear and easy to understand/ interpret but roots to the

continuity of the issue lie in lack of proper information and misunderstanding of related documents. The

factual position of the issue is:

 The agreements/ treaty documents signed, ratified and endorsed by successive Afghan regimes

negate the claim that the agreement was coerced or imposed by the British.

 It also refutes the baseless claim that the validity of agreement has expired after 100 years in

1993.
 54

 Research also finds that the view of the Line being an arbitrary and not physical is also dubious.

The line follows the tribal boundaries and well recognized features. The only tribes which were

partly divided were the Mohmand and Waziri.

 Rights and obligations for the newly emerged state like Pakistan under International Law also

support Pakistan’s stand that the agreement is enforceable in post-British period as well. The

law clearly states that treaties of extinct states concerning boundary lines remain valid and all

rights and obligations arising from such treaties of the extinct state devolve on the successor

nation which inherits treaty rights. Pakistan is the successor nation on the north western part of

the Indian subcontinent.

 After partition of the sub continent, British Governments of different times with stand to their

pre-partition position on Durand Line as a willingly negotiated and internationally accepted

border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The permanency and legality of the Durand Line was

also validated by the Lord Home, British foreign secretary, in the British parliament on

November 3, 1953. And lately British Prime Ministers; Mr Anthony Eden and Mr Harold

Macmillan confirmed this position in separate statements made by them in the British

parliament on March 1, 1956, and May 20, 1960, respectively. 84

Foregoing rationale in view and a cursory glance of history points that a large number of states have

their borders drawn and redrawn on different account. Now reversal or realignment of their borders on

the basis of historic setting of the past would jeopardize the socio- politico system of the world leaving

chaos, confusion and anarchy. This even may result in to call an end of Afghanistan itself as Afghanistan

has 200 years life of its own but remain a subsidiary of India and Pakistan for more than 1000 years or

so. Hence, if we choose to regard declaring borders illegitimate on historical grounds then it will become

a right to each state to reject the status of its international border thereby collapsing the current

international regime for governing borders.

 55

Whereas, the Durand Line is the only boundary that was demarked through bilateral understanding and

yet the only border that Afghanistan is not willing to recognize. Under international law and the

international legal regime, Afghanistan’s objections to the Durand Line are unlikely to hold grounds.

Pakhtoonistan Issue:

Pakistan's Afghan policy has always been predominantly influenced by its ideology and earnest desire

for closer ties with all countries of the Muslim world. Afghanistan was not an exception to it, rather it

occupied more important place in Pakistan’s foreign policy due to its location, commonality of its

ethnically Pakhtoon population and socio-cultural history. On the contrary, Afghanistan never accepted

Pakistan with all its territorial manifestations as it claimed Pakhtoon areas of NWFP and Balochistan as

an integral part of state of Afghanistan that were forcefully annexed by British India. The central theme

of Afghanistan’s argument made in favour was that the Pakhtoons living across the Durand Line are one

nation and the Durand line arbitrarily splits the nation into two. Afghanistan failed to realize that the

Durand line was not an arbitrarily drawn but a physically drawn and accepted border since 1893. The

border follows physical geo-political features of tribal boundaries. Syed Abdul Qadoos in his research

studies finds that the line separated those tribes which go to markets in Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Tank

and Quetta from those with economic links with Khorasan,, having Kabul, Ghazni, Kandhar as their

market towns'.85

The only tribes which were partly divided were the Mohmand and Waziri. Furthermore, the interesting

phenomenon of the Pakhtoonistan issue was that it was applicable only on the union of Pakhtoon with

Afghanistan and not Afghanistan based Pakhtoon with NWFP. The Afghan concept of Pakhtoonistan

consisted of only those

Pakhtoon who live in Pakistan. When ever the idea of holding a plebiscite for a united Pakhtoon land

was put forward the Afghan government always reacted angrily and rejected the idea. Instead of helping
 56

new born Pakistan to secure and maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity against the heavy odds

of unjust partition Afghanistan challenged Pakistan’s right to rule over its Pakhtoon areas as a successor

state of the British India. Rather, its government at that point of time, did it’s all out effort to push for

creation of another independent state in Pakhtoon dominated areas West of Indus River or alongside

the Durand Line. Afghanistan not only supported the Pakhtoon uprisings but also instigated, housed,

equipped, and armed Baloch insurgents to destabilize Pakistan from with in.

Pakistan initially reacted with diplomatic and political protests followed by the repeated incidences of

closing border, severing of diplomatic relations, and disconnected Afghan trade transit through Pakistan.

Trade blockade badly affected Afghanistan’s economy and her socio-economic development. Whereas,

on the other hand Pakistan taking cognizance of the Afghanistan’s land locked state allowed Afghan

goods to pass through Pakistani territory and allocated a number of railways carriages to transport

Afghan goods. The issue remained at forefront during the Sardar Daud eras; from 1947 to 1963 and

1973 to 1978. The issue went in to dormancy with Sardar Daoud’s stepping out of power in 1963 and

later with his assassination in 1978. Though Communist regime from 1978 to 1995 and Northern

Alliance government since 2002 has kept the issue alive though at low profile, for their vested interests.

Fears of Pashtunistan led Pakistan to support Jihadist surrogates in the Afghan resistance during the

Soviet occupation in the 1980s and, later, to build up the Taliban. Ironically, during its rule in Kabul the

Taliban refused to endorse the Durand Line despite pressure from Islamabad.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai has also resisted, calling it "a line of hatred that raised a wall between

the two brothers."

Encouraging Insurgents for Across Border Activities & Indian Factor:

It has already been discussed above that Afghan government not only supported the Pakhtoon uprisings

but also instigated, housed, equipped, and armed Baloch insurgents to succumb Pakistan before
 57

Afghanistan’s demands of Durand Line and Pakhtoonistan issue. Sardar Daud era as Defence minister

and Prime Minister, from 1947 to 1963 is replicated with number of incidences of Afghanistan’s

involvement in internal disturbance in Pakistan. Faqir of Appi’s arm resistance in Waziristan and

Balochie’s uprising in Kalat in 1948-49 are extreme examples in this regard. To desist Kalat state merger

with Pakistan, Prince Karim, brother of Khan of Kalat, launched the first armed insurgency against

Pakistan on 16th April 1948 with its base in Afghanistan.86

Prince Karim Khan was later apprehended by Pakistan’s security forces and was sentenced to prison.

Afghanistan’s moral, and material support to Prince Karim Khan in his armed resistance against

Pakistan’s control over Kalat was to embroil Pakistan’s security forces in Balochistan so as to weaken its

counter insurgency effort against Faqir of Appi in NWFP. Afghanistan’s involvement in Pakistan’s internal

affairs remained active through out without short lulls of dormancy. Involvement of Indo-Afghan and

even Russians hand was obvious behind the Balochies insurgencies of 1958, 1960s and 1970s. Fears of

communists renewed support for Pakhtoonistan and Baloch insurgents led Pakistan to support Afghan

jihadist surrogates in their resistance against the Soviet occupation in the 1980s and, later. Pakistan’s

support to the Afghan Mujahideen against Communist invasion, later against Najeeb Ullah and later to

the Taliban movement was to create a Pakistan friendly government in Kabul. On the other hand,

India’s and Russia’s support for the Northern Alliance arose from its desire to establish an anti-Taliban,

anti-Pakistan government in Afghanistan. Taliban’s gains led to Russia supplying arms while India began

“airlifting non-military supplies” to the Northern Alliance troops via Iran. In early 2001, the United States

also joined the triad of India, Russia and Iran as their fourth partner in aiding Northern Alliance in their

bid to change Taliban regime. The blame game of involving each others internal affairs is on the turf

again. Afghanistan is accusing unobstructed flow of militants infiltrating from Pakistani side of the

border to Afghanistan. Afghanistan has no regard of Pakistan’s troops deployment along the border to

prevent any infiltration across and its successful operations in Swat, South Waziristan and else where.
 58

Without giving recognition to Pakistan’s substantive effort against the militants, Afghanistan’s rhetoric

‘to do more’ is spoiling the trust and confidence. Afghanistan has also failed to satisfy Pakistan on its

counter accusations that many Indian consulates in Afghanistan appear to be indulging in undesirable

activities against Pakistan. Compared to Pakistani efforts, the Afghan efforts are not only negligible but

extremely limited

Fight Against Terrorism

The event of 9/11 compelled Pakistan to pursue anti Taliban policy that Pakistan had been supporting

politically and diplomatically during the 1990s. Pakistan committed itself to fight global war against

terrorism and to reconstruct war ravaged Afghanistan. It actively participated and mustered support

during and after the donor conferences aimed to rebuild Afghanistan. Pakistan deployed more than

80,000 troops to stop alleged infiltrators crossing into Afghan territory.

However, in the long run this cooperation on terrorism has entered an era of trouble. Key Afghan

Officials in Kabul have been pointing their fingers at Pakistan for some time, accusing it of turning a blind

eye to cross-border terrorism targeting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and International

Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces and Afghan central government. Many observers also put forth

the idea that much of the former Taliban regime's leadership, along with leaders of Al-Qaeda, are

present and operating from the lawless Afghan-Pakistani border region between Afghanistan and

Pakistan (Tarzi, 2009).

 59

Repeatedly Afghan officials have also been blaming involvement of Pakistan’s intelligence agency ISI in

aiding and abetting of extremists and terrorists. When Indian embassy in Kabul was attacked on July 14,

2008 Karzai, without wasting time, accused the ISI of being behind the terrorist attacks which rocked

Afghanistan and caused heavy casualties and destruction (Khan, 2008). He continued with same tune

and alleged that the killing, destruction, and insecurity in Afghanistan have been caused by the

intelligence institutions of Pakistan (Khan, 2008). When NATO forces were attacked by the militants

killing scores of soldiers earlier on July 13, 2008 Afghanistan government intensified the blame game,

and put the entire responsibility on Pakistan (Khan, 2008). Pakistan’s response to these charges has

been that a prosperous and developed Afghanistan is in the larger interest of Pakistan and it has no role

in any destructive activities of the militants to sabotage the peace of Afghanistan (Khan, 2008). The PPP

government led by Prime Minister Gilani has rejected Afghanistan’s allegations and it holds the opinion

that stable and peaceful Afghanistan is in Pakistan’s interest, and Karzai's statements may contribute in

hampering development work in the region (Khan, 2008).

Pakistan foreign ministry has also denied the accusations as baseless, urging the Kabul government to

stop playing the blame game (Khan, 2008). There is also very strong relevant argument that how

Pakistan can identify a person going to Afghanistan whether he is an Afghan national or militant?

Pakistan’s belief is that Afghanistan itself and international forces present in Afghanistan are responsible

for this entire predicament. To detract from their own colossal failure and incompetence, the embattled

Afghan officials are blaming the insurgency on Pakistan (Qarabaghi, 2005). Afghan administration and
 60

officials are too weak and incompetent to take care of the problems in the country and when they fail to

tackle them they simply put the failure on Pakistan (Qarabaghi, 2005).

They try to show the world that Pakistan is responsible for all their failure in Afghanistan. The relations

between Afghanistan and Pakistan have further deteriorated due to NATO strikes into Pakistan’s

territory. Theses strikes have significantly alienated Pakistan as it considers it blatant violation of its

sovereignty. It is also against the principles and rules of international law. Afghan government’s carte

blanche to NATO forces to conduct strikes inside the territorial frontier of Pakistan has brought the

relationship between the two countries to the lowest ebb. The current state of relationship urges the

two countries to revert back to the original objectives of war against terrorism which were aimed to

cooperate but at the same time to respect each others sovereignty and not to allow foreign elements to

use any of their territories against each other’s interests. Until now it has been observed that, despite

Karzai's provocative accusations, Islamabad desires cordial relations with Kabul and it must pursue the

policy of peace with Afghanistan vigorously (Khan, 2008).

Indian Factor

The pattern of Indian and Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan is generally analyzed in terms of zero-

sum game where India’s gain have been considered the loss of Pakistan and Pakistan’s gains have

directly been affecting the gains of India. In the present circumstances it is India that has fully capitalized

upon the changed conditions and new realities in the aftermath of 9/11, where it has found favorable

opportunities to establish and develop relations with Afghanistan at the expense of Pak-Afghan
 61

relations. It has pursued proactive diplomacy and has become able to create pro Indian lobbies in

Afghanistan. They have established numerous diplomatic missions in the major and strategically

important cities of Afghanistan, which have been allegedly busy to pursue Indian gains harming

Pakistani interests. The Pakistan’s government has been officially expressing its serious concerns

regarding the Indian activities and endeavors along the Pakistan Afghanistan frontier. Its allegations

concerning India include charges of printing forged Pakistani currency and operations involving acts of

terrorism and sabotage on Pakistan’s territory (Grare, 2006: 12).

Pakistan has been accusing India of establishing networks of terrorist training camps located in various

cities of Afghanistan, including at the Afghan military base of Qushila Jadid, north of Kabul; near

Gereshk, in southern Helmand province; in the Panjshir Valley, northeast of Kabul; and at Kahak and

Hassan Killies in western Nimruz province (Grare, 2006). Pakistan believes that these Indian consulate

offices in Afghanistan are involved in a conspiracy against the Pakistan’s western provinces of

Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (former NWFP) and tribal areas to sabotage the peace and process of

development in these regions. It was on August 13, 2004 that former Chief Minister of Balochistan, Jam

Muhammad Yusuf, declared that the Indian intelligence services had been maintaining forty terrorist

camps all over Balochistan territory (Grare, 2006).

India was subjected to more accusations by Pakistan whereby it was accused of inciting troubles in its

Waziristan territory, where the Pakistan military was confronting significant resistance from Al Qaeda

and the local Taliban. Pakistan’s government claims that India is involved in flaring up unrest in North
 62

and SouthWaziristan and the Indian consulate offices in southern Afghanistan have been contributing

negatively to the trouble and militancy in the tribal region by providing money as well as weapons and

ammunition to the militants (Grare, 2006). Thus it is also believed that the foreign elements present in

Afghanistan are using Afghan territory against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan.

Former Chairman of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Mushahid Hussain stated in July

2006 that RAW had been training 600 Baluchs in Afghanistan, arguing that India had been fomenting the

Baloch insurgency and denounced Afghan intelligence agency connections with RAW (Grare, 2006).

Pakistani authorities consider that all this has overall shaken the confidence of Pakistan on Afghanistan

and has resultantly affected its efforts to contribute in war against terrorism. Afghanistan should think

seriously on Pakistan’s concerns and try to remove its reservation regarding foreign elements involved in

anti-Pakistan activities from the Afghan soil. The reservations of Pakistan have the potential to incline

policy makers to rethink its Afghan policy, and can make Pakistan indifferent to the rebuilding of

Afghanistan. Afghanistan should realize that its long term interests are linked with Pakistan. Afghanistan

should behave realistically in its relations with Pakistan vis-à-vis India. Need of the hour is that

Afghanistan should try to remove Pakistan’s concerns for the betterment and prosperity of this region. If

India continues anti-Pakistan activities with Afghan support the prospects of cordial relations between

Pakistan and Afghanistan appear dim. A possible scenario where America withdraws itself back and

leaves Afghanistan has to be seriously considered as Afghanistan’s interests might not be better served

by having deteriorated relations with Pakistan. This is especially significant in the context that it is a land
 63

locked country and does not have any direct frontier link with India. Pakistan on the other hand should

also step up its diplomatic efforts for the revival of amicable relations with Afghanistan.

Refugee's Factor

Afghan nationals seeking shelter in Pakistan have been a source of concern between the two since

1980s when former Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and Pakistan not only welcomed Afghans coming

to her territory but also accommodated almost three millions refugees. This was despite the historical

fact that the same Afghans had blocked their border for the aspiring Muslims of Subcontinent when

these sought refuge in Afghanistan in their times of crisis during Khilafat movement in early 1920s.

Anyhow, the Afghan refugees had put extra burden not only on Pakistan’s economy but also created

many social and political problems. The second wave of refugees came after 2000 due to drought,

continuing civil war and Taliban repression, etc (Hussain, 2002: 72)

. However, this time Pakistan denied the availability of its territory to the new refuge seekers mainly due

to ethnic, political, social and economic reasons. Moreover, international community was also not

willing to share the burden. There is an urgent need to repatriate already residing refugees in Pakistan

that number almost 2.6 million. Such a huge number includes some militants who criss-cross Afghan

border creating troubles both for Pakistan and Afghanistan (Nuri, 2007: 36). The Afghanistan

government perceives it mismanagement on the part of Pakistani government. On the other hand,

Pakistan on its part clarifies these charges that it tries its best to scrutinize all such elements and tackle

the matter appropriately.

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Link between Al-Qaeda and Taliban

Another challenge in the way to establish smooth relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan is the

support provided by Al-Qaeda to Taliban in Afghanistan. It is also important to note that Al-Qaeda

provides support to Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which is considered responsible for conducting

suicide bombing in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda has generally endorsed and heavily influenced the TTP and its

two leaders, Baitullah Mehsud and Hakimullah Mehsud. Many analysts argue that Osama bin Laden's

organization is pushing the Pakistani ‘militants’ to conduct its operations (Allbritton, 2010).

After Al-Qaeda and Taliban were driven out of Afghanistan by U.S.-led forces in 2001, Al-Qaeda

regrouped in North Waziristan under the protection of the Haqqani network led by Jalaluddin Haqqani,

an old ally of Bin Laden. While the command structure of al-Qaeda has been smashed by a combination

of military actions and drone strikes, its several leaders remain at large and influential. Al-Qaeda also

provides suicide bombers for the Haqqani network to use in Afghanistan, including the Jordanian double

agent who killed seven CIA employees near Khost, Afghanistan, in December. Hakimullah Mehsud

appeared alongside the bomber in a video released after that attack, indicating a close link between

Haqqani's group, Al-Qaeda and the TTP (Allbritton, 2010). Mehmood Shah, a former security official in

Pakistan’s tribal areas, said “there is no doubt that a link between the Haqqani network and the

Pakistani Taliban exists” (Khattak, 2010).

Jalaluddin Haqqani took refuge in North Waziristan after the Soviet invasion on Afghanistan in 1979. He

started setting up training camps and opening recruitment centres there and became able to establish a

guerrilla war base against the Soviet military. Soon the Haqqani network emerged as the strongest

group especially in Khost, Paktia and Paktika provinces of Afghanistan. Haqqani came closer to Osama

bin Laden during the Afghan war and the Pakistani Taliban also consider them allies. Thus it can be

argued that the Haqqani network has links with al-Qaeda and the TTP. Each one of them is considered
 65

supportive of each other across the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The governments of both

the countries, Afghanistan and Pakistan, have taken steps to counter the support of Al-Qaeda to Taliban.

Pakistan conducted military operations in Northern Areas and endeavored to establish the writ of the

government. Afghan forces along with the coalition forces are conducting operations to counter

insurgent networks. These steps would provide help to both the countries to run their relations on a

smooth way.
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Chapter 4
Insurgency in Afghanistan, Implications
for Pakistan’s Internal and external
security.

Introduction

Pakistan and Afghanistan have long historical ties that go back far beyond the partition of the

subcontinent in 1947. Despite their cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious proximities, the relationship

between the two cannot be termed friendly. At times it reached deteriorating levels because of certain

contentious issues – for example, historical legacies magnified by inner divisions and external influences.

After independence, Pakistan found itself confronted with a neighbor that was the only country that

voted against Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations because of its claims over the Durand Line,

Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan on its Western side.

The Pakistan–Afghanistan relationship has been the victim of conflicting interests. The two have never

been at ease with each other and deep suspicions prevail in the bilateral policies pursued by their

respective governments. Their elations tend to lean more toward mutual suspicion. Once the Taliban

regime, recognized by Pakistan, had been ousted by the USA, Pakistan became the US’s non-North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally in the fight against terrorism. The failure in controlling terrorism

in Afghanistan spilled over into Pakistan, even when it was thought that the eight long years of “war on

terror” had defeated both the Taliban and Al Qaeda insurgents. The resurgence of the Taliban with more

formidable tactics and maneuvering skills has since become more troublesome for both countries and

for the USA and the allied forces, globally. The fierce comeback of the insurgents has challenged the
 67

political and territorial integrity of Pakistan, one that it cannot tolerate. The lives of ordinary people on

both sides of the border are seriously threatened. The USA and its NATO allies in Afghanistan have been

unable to control the insurgency and will withdraw their forces by the end of 2014. The Taliban so far

has continued to inflict damage using suicide bombers, improvised explosive devices and homemade

explosives. These have greatly undermined the credibility of the Afghan government, which has been

unable to provide either essential services or the security and protection to the Afghan people outside

of the capital city. This complex situation has become a serious threat for Pakistan.3

The nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan

Compared with other wars, the “War on Terror” in Afghanistan became very serious when the coalition

forces failed to achieve their declared objectives. Moreover, even though the coalition forces were

successful in removing the Taliban from the government, they failed to win the people’s support.

Afghanistan possessed all the necessary prerequisites for an “ideal” insurgency as outlined by David

Galula.

A perfect cause

The most significant reason that attracted most of the insurgents was the liberation of Afghanistan from

foreign invaders, an objective that was perfectly in line with the historical traditions of the Afghan

people. For the insurgent, this was a just cause. The insurgents, such as the Taliban, portrayed

themselves as the freedom fighters. Most Taliban are Pashtun and have ruled Afghanistan

forcenturies.ThePashtuncausewasthereforeautomaticallyinvolvedintheinsurgentmovement. In addition

to Pashtun nationalism, the Taliban called themselves the true representatives of Islam and their leader,

Mullah Omer, was considered the Amir-ul-Momineen and unchallenged leader

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oftheIslamicjihad.BoththeTalibanandAlQaedausedtheterm “IslamicJihad” againstthenonbelievers to

motivate its members and other Muslim insurgents.5

Geographic conditions

Afghanistan’s geography is ideal for insurgency as it is a land-locked state with porous borders. It covers

over 250,000 square miles of which more than 70% is mountainous. These conditions make it difficult to

counter insurgency and contain terrorists. Ground movements are limited to the valleys making

ambushes on Afghan and coalition forces a relatively easy task. Afghanistan is also entirely dependent

on its neighbors, especially Pakistan, to get access to the world. Moreover, the coalition forces and

Afghan government cannot successfully fight the insurgents unless Afghanistan’s neighbors, particularly

Pakistan, are cooperative. These several disadvantages have helped limit their operations.6

Weakness of the Afghan state

Insurgency is a contest between two forces – the government and its partners and the insurgents. It is

fought to exercise government control over the masses. The Karzai government in Afghanistan has

proved to be weak and dysfunctional, despite substantial foreign economic aid. In comparison, the

insurgent groups, led by the Taliban, have received support throughout the Muslim world and benefited

from the prevailing situation.

The insurgents and their support network

The insurgency in Afghanistan has been an example of an amalgamation of transnational and local

support. Afghan insurgents have received every kind of help from the Global Jihadi network, as well as

receiving support from the Pakistani government and from local tribes, Afghan and Pakistan militias and

criminal groups. There are many insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan with different capacities. The
 69

more prominent groups are discussed below and have some system of coordination with each other as

well, including through numerous shuras (consultative groups) located in neighboring Pakistan.7

Hezb-i-Islami

Hezb-i-Islami is a prominent insurgent group that aims at ousting the current Afghan government.

Historically,Hezb-i-IslamihasreceivedhelpnotonlyfromthePakistaniandIraniangovernments but also from

the US government during the Cold War. Hezb-i-Islami openly cooperates with other insurgent groups,

such as Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and has a strong organizational

structure.Itisdividedintofourgroupsincluding: guerillaspoliticalandfinancialsupport,commanders and

logistics support. All of these groups work according to their specific assigned duties.

Foreign fighters

ForeignfightershavealsoassistedtheAfghaninsurgentsandareclassifiedintotwobroadgroups: the Arabs

(such as Saudis, Libyans and Egyptians) and Central Asians (such as Tajiks, Chechens and Uzbeks). In

addition, there are supporting transnational organizations such as Al Qaeda. These insurgents have close

ties with Pakistan’s militant organizations such as Lashkar-eJhangvi, Jiash-e-Muhammad and Harakat-ul-

Jihad-ul-Islami. The Taliban and other insurgent groups have been implementing Al Qaeda tactics in

Afghanistan.

Tribes

MostofthePashtuntribesofAfghanistanandPakistanhaveprovidedcontinuousassistancetothe insurgents

and have supported the insurgency. The Taliban have had close affiliation with the Ghilzai, Norzais,

Alekozai, Eshaqzais and Durrani tribes. Mahsuds, Wazirs and Ahmadzai in South and North

Waziristanhave alsosupported the insurgent groups by coordinating their different activities in

Afghanistan.
 70

Criminal groups

A number of organizations involved in drug trafficking have also assisted the Taliban particularly in the

southern region of Afghanistan. Drug traffickers and other criminal groups developed a strong network

to export drugs to neighboring states. The Taliban have received income from these groups in different

ways, such as providing protection, imposing a tax on most of the farmers and also taking bribes from

criminal groups at different checkpoints.8

Support from external states

Afghan insurgents have been successful in eliciting assistance from other states, especially from

Pakistan.9 The Pakistani government has been supporting the Taliban because it wants to balance its

influence with that of India, which has strong ties with the Afghan government, having provided millions

of dollars in financial support. After the USA and NATO forces have withdrawn, Pakistan would have to

rely on the Taliban to fulfill its objectives. In addition to Pakistan and India, Iran has always shown a

special interest in Afghan internal affairs. After the defeat of the Taliban government, Iran funded many

projects and also provided funding to some of the warlords. At best, the Iranian strategy can be

described as a “hedging strategy.”10

Jihadist support

The international Jihadist network also supported the Afghan insurgents. It has helped the Taliban and

other insurgent groups to become more fatalistic in their attacks on coalition forces and Afghan soldiers.

This encouragement comes from different Jihadist organizations, such as the international Al Qaeda

network. Afghan insurgents have also received help from the collection of ZAKAT (charitable giving)

from all the Muslim countries. Most of the financial assistance, however, comes from the wealthy Arabs

especially from Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

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Pakistan’s security issues after the insurgency in Afghanistan

After the insurgency started in Afghanistan, different military groups smuggled various type of

ammunition and weapons to Pakistan, including missiles, hand grenades, anti-tank missilesand all types

of rapid fire guns. All these weapons reached every part of Pakistan. There is little doubt that the current

wave of terrorism in Pakistan is a direct result of this weaponization of society. Militancy in Balochistan

and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), increasing suicide and terrorist attacks throughout

Pakistan have only been made possible because of this weaponization, the increasing militarization of

society and an increase in crime.11 The display of the weapons has become a symbol both of status and

of power. Daily bomb blasts and the widening influence of Taliban ideology are turning Pakistan, once a

liberal and moderate society,intoanextremistandless-tolerant

society.12After9/11,Pakistanfacedmanyarmedinsurgencies that precipitated serious threats to its

security and economy.

13 After the support of USA, a wave of terrorism swept across the country. To date, more than 46,000

Pakistanis have fallen prey to this development. Furthermore, there has since then been a rapid brain-

drain; foreign direct investment is in decline and exacerbates Pakistan’s already severe economic,

financial and security crisis.14 Balochistan, the largest province in Pakistan, consists of 43% of the total

area of Pakistan and shares borders with Afghanistan and Iran. It occupies the most significant geo-

strategic position in the region. However, the sub-nationalist leaders of Balochistan have always

distanced themselves from Islamabad.15 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan also had an impact on the

politics of Balochistan in which Soviet Intelligence (the KGB) also instigated and exploited Balochistan’s

nationalist movements. As a result, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the weaponization of Pakistani

society and the US occupation of Afghanistan have combined to accelerate the secession movement of

sub-nationalist of Balochistan.
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In addition, the discovery of huge mineral resources and the strategically important Gwader port have

increased the interest of international economic players. This has benefitted the separatists as they look

for financial and moral support from the outside world. Pakistan has endeavored to counter these

developments and contain this separatist movement, but the law and order situation in Balochistan

remains serious. 16 It is evident that Pakistan has had to contend with very heavy economic and security

losses due to the Afghan insurgency. It has also tried to liberate its occupied areas from Afghan

insurgents and totally failed to eradicate all the insurgents’ sanctuaries in its territory. The International

Security Assistance Forces reported in 2011 that cross-border attacks from Afghanistan had increased

five-fold as compared with the previous year.17 After the Afghan insurgency, suicide attacks in Pakistan

have become a very common phenomenon. In 2011, the ratio of suicide attack on Pakistan was two per

month, half of which occurred in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK).

Terrorist incidents in Pakistan before and after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan

Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the spatial distribution of terrorist incidents in Pakistan before and after the

US-led invasion of Afghanistan. Figure 1 makes it clear that terrorist incidents in Pakistan before the

invasion were concentrated mostly in Punjab and Sindh – the two eastern provinces bordering India.

Figure 2 shows the distribution of incidents after the Afghan invasion which point to a geographical shift

from the eastern regions to the western regions of Peshawar, Swat, Quetta, FATA and Bolan and Dera-

Bugti areas of Balochistan.

Causalities in Pakistan Pakistan has suffered a lot as a consequence of the “War on Terror” in

Afghanistan. The ratio of killings and injuries has increased significantly.

Suicide attacks Trends of suicide attacks have increased significantly.

Internal security complexities after the Afghan insurgency

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After the current Afghan insurgency, Pakistan’s internal security deteriorated with suicide terrorists’

attacks becoming normal practice. The militants have manifestly exploited Pakistan’s economic, social

and political conditions. Pakistan’s internal security has been mainly threatened by the following factors.

The Taliban

After theAfghan insurgency, thousands of insurgents moved toward Pakistan asthe NATOforces started

their operations in Afghanistan. These operations resulted in US pressure on the Pakistan government to

address the militancy issues in the country. The Pakistan Army then startedmilitary operations in the

Pashtun belt, which prompted the formation of a Taliban movement in Pakistan, one that posed a very

serious threat to its security.18 This increased Taliban’s influence and increased the radicalization of the

population. To date, more than 46,000 people in Pakistan have been killed. Moreover, Pakistan also has

sustained the heavy loss of 5000 trained soldiers with severe consequences. Until a comprehensive

counterinsurgency strategy is adopted, the TTP (Pakistan’s Taliban group) will continue to destabilize

domestic security by their attacks on civilian officials, security forces and government institutions.19

Al Qaeda

NATO’s operations in Afghanistan forced hundreds of Al Qaeda insurgents into Pakistan, leading the

NATO Commander, General David Petraeus, to view Pakistan as harboring the headquarters of Al

Qaeda’s senior leadership. Hundreds of Al Qaeda activists have been captured in Pakistan, including

Osama bin Laden. Both the Afghan government and the USA have accused Pakistan of providing a safe

haven for Al Qaeda. Even after the killing of Osama bin Laden, the USA has claimed that key Al Qaeda

and Taliban leaders are still residing in Pakistan. Al Qaeda is a very serious threat to Pakistan; its

influence on local militant movements has resulted in new forms of terrorist attacks. Pakistani military

officials have claimed that Al Qaeda is involved in planning and devising major terrorists attack on

Pakistan’s western cities and thereby has destabilized the internal security situation. Until Pakistan takes
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offensive measures to eradicate it, Al Qaeda will continue to negatively influence not only Pakistan but

also Afghanistan.

Impact of refugees

When the NATO and US forces invaded Afghanistan, thousands of Afghans took refuge in

Pakistan.Approximatelymorethan1.9millionAfghanrefugeesarestillinPakistanwithamajority residing in

Balochistan, KPK and FATA. These refugees have introduced a Kalashnikov culture into the country and

their refugee camps serve as terrorists’ recruitment centers and safe houses.

Domestic terrorism

In March 2009, counterinsurgency expert and senior advisor to the US military, David Kilcullen, stated

that “Pakistan could collapse within six months if immediate steps are not taken to remedy the

situation.” Recent terrorists attacks have made it clear that no part of Pakistan is unaffected. The

Pakistani security forces’ weak counterinsurgency capability and a non-existent comprehensive

government strategy to defeat these militants have allowed the terrorists to operate within the country

and target those institutions that govern and protect the greater Pakistani population.20 The Pakistan

military has launched its operations Rah-e-Rast, Sher Dil and Rah-e-Nijat in Swat, Bajor and Waziristan,

respectively. The scale of these operations required many more troops than were in place in the

affected areas.21 After 9/11, the world geo-political and socioeconomic scenario has changed with

severe consequences for Pakistan. Pakistan has paid a heavier price in both physical and economic terms

than the USA has in its “war on terror” against the Taliban owing to the severity of the terrorists’

attacks.22

External security complexities

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Since its inception, Pakistan has faced serious external security threats. Initially, it faced a serious

security threat on its western border with Afghanistan. NATO operations and the involvement of

countries such as India, Iran and Russia’s have created a serious security threat for Pakistan. Pakistan is

especially concerned with India’s involvement in Afghanistan and has tried toconstruct an “Af–Pak”

alliance to protect itself. In addition, Iranian, Russian and Chinese involvement in the region has further

security implications for Pakistan.

The impact of NATO operations in Afghanistan on Pakistan’s external security

NATO operations in Afghanistan have posed serious threats to Pakistan’s external security. NATO’s

presence has increased the intensity and complexity of the region’s dynamics. Drone attacks in Pakistan

by US and NATO forces have adversely affected Pakistan’s national security on one hand and ever-

increasing political pressure has led Pakistan toward instability on the other.23 US policies and NATO

operations in Afghanistan have given rise to extremist activities in Pakistan and allowed extremist

movements to spread the call of jihad all over the country. In addition, the US-installed puppet

government of President Karzai in Afghanistan contains Tajik and Uzbek officials who are pro-India and

Iran. Moreover, the Afghan government and NATO’s political and economic partnership with India has

been seen as an Indian–Western attempt to constrain their Muslim neighbor.

Importantly,PakistanicitizenshaveaperceptionthattheUSAisdestabilizingPakistan.Moreover,civiliancasual

tiesfromdroneattackshaveenragedthepublicagainsttheUSA.ThePakistan government’s inability to stop

these drone attacks has raised the serious question whether or not the government is a puppet of the

USA.

The impact of Indian operations in Afghanistan on Pakistan’s external security

Since its inception, Pakistan has faced serious security threats from India. Pakistan and India have been

involved in a consistent conflict ever since their emergence as separate states.24 India has never
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accepted the partition of the subcontinent or the creation of Pakistan.25 India has always supported all

governments in Afghanistan except the period of Taliban rule. The current Indian–Afghan relationship

has prompted fears that India will use it to destabilize Pakistan. Pakistan has openly pointed out that, by

investing in Afghanistan, Indians are trying to encircle Pakistan along its eastern and western borders.

On NATO’s withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, India’smajorconcernis that it will facilitate aTaliban–

Pashtunpolitical movement, one that will eject Indians from Afghanistan. Pakistan has pointed out

repeatedly that since the Afghan insurgency, India has more than six consulates in Afghanistan and an

Embassy in Kabul all of which are being use to foment unrest in Balochistan. Furthermore, there are

more than 4000 Indian workers doing development and other work in Afghanistan, thereby

perpetuating Pakistan’s suspicion of Indian intentions. India has donated billions of dollars to

Afghanistan, which Pakistan has assumed is to establish an anti-Pakistan government.

OtherchargesthathavebeenmadebyPakistanarethatIndiaissupportingmilitantsandinsurgents in

Balochistan and has supported them against the Pakistani government. The Indian intelligence agency,

RAW, is supported by their consulates and has been trying to prevent Pakistan’s influence on its western

borders. Moreover, India is providing military training to Baloch insurgents and transporting them into

Pakistan to destabilize the country. All these actions by India within and around Afghanistan have

provided Pakistan with the evidence to support its suspicion that India is attempting to strategically

encircle their country.

Impact of China in Afghanistan on Pakistan’s external security

China’s strategic interest in Afghanistan stems from three general foreign policy objectives. First, China

has economic interests in Afghanistan. Second, China wants to prevent the exportation ofmilitant

Islamic ideology into its country. This stems from China sharing a porous 76-kilometer border with

Afghanistan through the Wakhjar Pass into their Xinjiang Province. The Chinese historical concern is over
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the Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang and struggle for independence over their Beijing rulers. Therefore, China

has diplomatically engaged both Afghanistan and Pakistan to establish pro-Sino relations and preclude a

militant Islamic spillover across their border. Third, Chinese foreign policy toward Afghanistan has been

linked with its policy with Pakistan, which is to ensure economic access across the region and to counter

both US and Indian influence in the region. Currently, the assessment of Chinese relations with

Afghanistan is that China’s interaction with Pakistan’s western neighbor does not negatively impact on

Pakistan’s external security. The three nations’ collective foreign relations are friendly, which is positive

from their point of view; the USA and India are concerned about such a Chinese intrusion as they do not

know its long-term implications.

Impact of Iran in Afghanistan on Pakistan’s external security

In Afghanistan , Iran has always supported anti-Pakistani groups. Currently, Pak–Iran relations are

neutral. Pakistan has registered serious concern about India’s building a highway from an Iranian port to

Afghanistan. This will help India to export its goods to Afghanistan which will negate the Afghan trade

agreement with Pakistan. On the one hand, the perception of an India–Iran economic alliance feeds a

Pakistani suspicion that the two countries may be militarily aligning themselves and further using

Afghanistan to gain a strategic military advantage. On the other hand, Pakistan

andIranhavecooperatedtoreduceBalochinsurgency.ThecurrentanalysissuggeststhatIranisnot

intentionallyleveragingAfghanistantogivethemaregionaladvantageoverPakistanandthattheir political

interaction will keep the relationship between the two neighbors civil.