EMMANUEL PELAEZ v.

THE AUDITOR GENERAL

G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965, EN BANC, (CONCEPCION, J.)

Pursuant to Revised Administrative Act Section 68, President Macapagal issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to
121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities. Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the
Philippines, instituted a special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor
General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds
in the implementation. Pelaez alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said 1) Section
68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 2) constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and 3)
Sec 68 can allow the President to interfere in local government affairs.

ISSUES:
1) Can the President create a new municipality without creating new barrios that would violate RA 2370?
2) Did such exercise constitute undue delegation of legislative power?
3) Can the president interfere in local government affairs?

HELD:

1) NO. Since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or
their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding
provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation
of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Statutory
denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create
municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. The cogency and force of this argument is too
obvious to be denied or even questioned. Founded upon logic and experience, it cannot be offset except
by a clear manifestation of the intent of Congress to the contrary, and no such manifestation, subsequent
to the passage of Republic Act No. 2379, has been brought to our attention.
2) YES. Although1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate2 — and (b) fix a standard — the limits
of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.2a Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well
settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It
does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a
standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.
3) NO. Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of
its officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned
resides, for his office would thereby become vacant.6 Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a
new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his
dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the
respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to.
 SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID v. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ET. AL
G.R. NO. 161414, January 17, 2005, EN BANC, (TINGA, J.)

In Palaez v. The Auditor General, wherein President Diosdado Macapagal issued several EOs creating 33
municipalities, among the Executive Orders annulled was Executive Order No. 107 which created the Municipality of
Andong. Sultan Osop B. Camid (Camid) represents himself as a current resident of Andong, suing as a private citizen
and taxpayer alleges that Andong ―has metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a complete set of officials
appointed to handle essential services for the municipality and its constituents. He presented certificates from various
agencies that purported to recognize the existence of the Municipality of Andong.

Camid prays that the Court annul the DILG Certification dated 21 November 2003; direct the DILG to
classify Andong as a ―regular existing municipality;‖ all public respondents, to extend full recognition and support to
Andong; the Department of Finance and the Department of Budget and Management, to immediately release the
internal revenue allotments of Andong; and the public respondents, particularly the DILG, to recognize the ―Interim
Local Officials‖ of Andong.

ISSUE:

Can a municipality whose creation by executive fiat was previously voided by Court may attain recognition in
the absence of any curative or reimplementing statute?

HELD:

NO.

Andong was expressly annulled by order of this Court in 1965. If we were to affirm Andong’s de facto status by
reason of its alleged continued existence despite its nullification, we would in effect be condoning defiance of a valid
order of this Court. Court decisions cannot obviously lose their efficacy due to the sheer defiance by the parties
aggrieved. It bears noting that based on Camid’s own admissions, Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by
Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code. Section 442(d) requires that in order that the municipality created by
executive order may receive recognition, they must ―have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of [the Local Government] Code.‖ Camid admits that Andong has never elected its
municipal officers at all. This incapacity ties in with the fact that Andong was judicially annulled in 1965. Out of
obeisance to our ruling in Pelaez, the national government ceased to recognize the existence of Andong, depriving it of
its share of the public funds, and refusing to conduct municipal elections for the void municipality.

Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 PATRICIO TAN, FELIX FERRER, JUAN M. HAGAD, SERGIO HILADO, VIRGILIO GASTON,
CONCHITA MINAYA, TERESITA ESTACIO, DESIDERIO DEFERIA, ROMEO GAMBOA, ALBERTO
LACSON, FE HOFILENA, EMILY JISON, NIEVES LOPEZ, AND CECILIA MAGSAYSAY, petitioners v.
COMELEC and THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondents.
III. Creation and abolition of municipal corporations

FACTS.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, “An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province
of Negros del Norte” was enacted. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava,
Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto were proposed to belong to this
new province. To implement this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed
and filed a case for Prohibition, contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the
Local Government Code because of the following reasons:
1) The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the new
province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite.
2) The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km.,
which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.

ISSUE. WON BP. Blg. 885 violated Article XI, Sec. 3 of the Consititution, which states that:
"No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected."

HELD.
NO, petitioner’s contention is correct.
Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, “the approval
of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected” must first be obtained. The creation of the
proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing
boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province).

Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent
province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would
be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros
del Norte. The people of Negros Occidental should have been allowed to vote in the plebiscite as they are directly
affected by the diminution in land size of their area.

As to the issue on the new province’s land area, a reading of the last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 of
the LGC says that “the territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands”. The use of the word
“territory” clearly reflects that the law refers only to the land mass and excludes the waters over which the political unit
has control. Therefore, Negros del Norte failed to meet the required land area of 3,500 sq. km for it to become a
province.
"WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the new province
of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials thereof are also declared null and void.
 GOVERNOR ZOSIMO J. PAREDES AND MAYOR MARIO W. CHILAGAN, petitioners v. THE
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.,
respondents.
III. Creation and abolition of municipal corporations

FACTS.
Pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 56 certain barangays in the municipality of Mayoyao, Ifugao were directed to hold a
plebiscite to determine whether they want to constitute themselves into the new municipality of Aguinaldo. Petitioners,
however, alleged that BP blg. 86 is unconstitutional for being violative of Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution. The
basis for such contention is that the state excluded from the plebiscite the voters from the poblacion and other
barangays of the Municipality of Mayoyao and included only those which were specifically mentioned in the Act.

ISSUE. WON all the inhabitants of the municipality of Mayoyao should participate in the plebiscite as they are
included in the "unit or units affected" as contended by Paredes.

HELD.
Petitioner’s contention is wrong. The Court sustained respondent’s contention that:
In the interpretation of the above phrase, the Court "should not lose sight of the fact that this provision is intended to
promote autonomy of our local government units. Thus, in a case where barrios are being separated from an existing
municipality to form a new municipality, as in the case at bar, the units affected are the barrios whose transfer is being
sought. It is the people in these barrios who will really be affected by the new grant of autonomy. They will be under a
new set of officials, a new government, a new set of powers and responsibilities. They should thus be consulted on
whether they are willing to shoulder the responsibilities attendant to autonomy. Barrios which will remain with the
original municipality are not affected since their autonomy vis-a-vis the national government is not in any way
diminished. They will be under the same local government, without any diminution whatsoever of their rights. There is
therefore no infringement of the Constitution if people in these barrios do not vote in the plebiscite.

Presumption of constitutionality must be applied in the case at bar. Admittedly, this is one of those cases where the
discretion of the Court is allowed considerable leeway. There is indeed an element of ambiguity in the use of the
expression "unit or units affected." It is plausible to assert as petitioners do that when certain barangays are separated
from a parent municipality to form a new one, all the voters therein are affected. It is much more persuasive, however,
to contend as respondents do that the acceptable construction is for those voters, who are not from the barangays to be
separated, should be excluded in the plebiscite.

The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially the [barangays], to ensure
their fullest development as self-reliant communities." It is clear that in granting autonomy, priority is to be accorded
the smallest unit, the barangay. That enables its residents the fullest development as a self-reliant community, with a
distinct personality of its own. Adherence to such a philosophy compels the conclusion that when there are indications
that the inhabitants of several barangays are inclined to separate from a parent municipality they should be allowed to
do so. What is more logical than to ascertain their will in a plebiscite called for that purpose. If is they, and they alone,
who shall constitute the new unit. New responsibilities will be assumed. New burdens will be imposed. A new
municipal corporation will come into existence. Its birth will be a matter of choice - their choice. They should be left
alone then to decide for themselves. To allow other voters to participate will not yield a true expression of their will.
They may even frustrate it. That certainly will be so if they vote against it for selfish reasons, and they constitute the
majority. That is not to abide by the fundamental principle of the Constitution to promote local autonomy, the
preference being for smaller units.
 MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY, BOHOL v. CA & MUNICIPALITY OF ALICIA, BOHOL
G.R. No. 116702, December 28, 1995, THIRD DIVISION (Panganiban, J.)

The municipality of Candijay filed a petition claiming that its boundary line covers barrio Pagahat since the
municipality of Alicia also claims to have current territorial jurisdiction over it. The RTC declared barrio Pagahat as
within the territorial jurisdiction of the municipality of Candijay. However, on appeal the CA stated that the RTC
committed an error in declaring that Barrio Pagahat is within the territorial jurisdiction of the municipality of Candijay.
The CA ruled in favor of the municipality of Alicia based on equiponderance of evidence which states that “When the
scale shall stand upon equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other, the
court will find for the defendant.”

ISSUE:

Does the municipality of Alicia lack juridical personality, having been created under a void E.O which was
issued by President Quirino and was declared unconstitutional, per this Court's ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General?

HELD:

NO. The municipality of Alicia’s situation is similar to that with the municipality of San Andres. The
municipality of Alicia was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 265 in 1949 and therefore had been in existence for
all of 16 years when Pelaez vs. Auditor General was promulgated. And various governmental acts throughout the years all
indicate the State's recognition and acknowledgment of the existence thereof. For instance, under Administrative Order
No. 33 above-mentioned, the Municipality of Alicia was covered by the 7th Municipal Circuit Court of Alicia-Mabini
for the province of Bohol. Likewise, under the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of Alicia
is one of twenty municipalities comprising the Third District of Bohol. The municipality of Alicia, it should benefit
from the effects of Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code, and should henceforth be considered as a regular,
de jure municipality. The objection against it being a municipal corporation should have been done before the LGC was
enacted.
 MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ v. BAZ, JR., & MUNICIPALITY OF SINACABAN
G.R. No. 105746, December 2, 1996, EN BANC (Mendoza, J.)

The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by E.O. 258 of then President Quirino, pursuant to Sec. 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917. By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No. 171, Sinacaban laid claims to 5
barrios which was filed with the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against the Municipality of Jimenez. The
Municipality of Jimenez, while conceding that under E.O. No. 258 the disputed area is part of Sinacaban, nonetheless
asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement it had with the Municipality of Sinacaban.The Provincial Board
declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban.

Jimenez filed an a petition in the RTC alleging that, in accordance with the decision in Pelaez v. Auditor General,
the power to create municipalities is essentially legislative and consequently Sinacaban, which was created by an
executive order, had no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim vis-à-vis Jimenez, of which it remains
part. The RTC held that Sinacaban is a de facto corporation since it had completely organized itself even prior to the
Pelaez case and exercised corporate powers for 40 years before the existence was questioned and Jimenez did not have
the legal standing to question the existence of Sinacaban.

ISSUE:

Does the municipality of Sinacaban legally exist?

HELD:

YES. The same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipal
corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially. Sinacaban
had been in existence for sixteen years when Pelaez v. Auditor General was decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the
validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40 years later that its
existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to an area that apparently is desired for its revenue. This
fact must be underscored because under Rule 66, Sec. 16 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto suit against a corporation
for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within 5 years from the time the act complained of was done or
committed. On the contrary, the State and even the municipality of Jimenez itself have recognized Sinacaban’s
corporate existence. Under A.O. 33 of this Court, Sinacaban is constituted part of municipal circuit for purposes of the
establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country. For its part, Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in
1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding their common boundary. The agreement was embodied in
Resolution no. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental.

Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution,
apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of the 2nd District of Misamis
Occidental. Following the ruling in Municipality of an Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., Sec. 442 (d) of the LGC must be
deemed to have cured any defect in the creation of Sinacaban. This provision states:

“Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such.
Existing municipal district organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities.”
 Mendenilla v. Onandia

Petitioner Emilio Mendenilla was appointed Chief of Police of the then Municipality of Legaspi, Albay, on June 21,
1954 by the Municipal Mayor. Then, in 1959, Congress passed R.A. 2234 converting the municipality of Legaspi into
the City of Legaspi R.A. 2234 provides that the position of Chief of Police of the city of Legaspi is to be appointed by
the President. Therefore, when Jose Manuel Onandia was appointed by the President City Chief of Police, Mendenilla
assailed the legality of such a move, claiming that his position as chief of police was not abolished when Legaspi was
converted from a municipality to a city.

Issue: When Legaspi was converted from municipality into a city, was the termination of Mendenilla as chief of police
valid?

Held: Yes.
Well-settled is the rule that "the power to create or establish municipal corporations, to enlarge or diminish their area, to
reorganize their governments, or to dissolve or abolish them altogether, is a political function, which rests solely in the
legislative branch of the government and, in the absence of constitutional restrictions, the power is practically
unlimited." In this country, the power to create or abolish municipal corporations resides in Congress which, under the
Constitution, is given general legislative powers. Municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress. Municipal
corporations are here created under a general law, i.e., pursuant to the Municipal Law embodied in the Revised
Administrative Code, in the case of municipalities proper, and, under special charters, in the case of chartered cities.
Pursuant to the aforementioned legislative power, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 2234, otherwise known as the
charter of the City of Legaspi, which became effective on June 12, 1959.

With the creation of the City of Legaspi on said date, the legal personality of the Municipality of Legaspi was
extinguished, and the city, which superseded the municipality came into being as a new legal entity or municipal
corporation. The consequent effect of said dissolution, was the abolition of all municipal offices then existing under the
superseded municipality, including that held by petitioner, save those excepted in the charter itself. Petitioner's
appointment of June 21, 1954 by the then municipal mayor of the municipality of Legaspi, therefore, ceased to have
legal force and effect. The weight of authorities support this view:
The absolute and unconditioned repeal of a municipal corporation without any saving clause, as to the right of
officers under the former charter, abolishes all offices thereunder. The adoption of a general law or charter
abolishes all offices not excepted . . . . (62 C.J.S. Sec. 465.).

Statutory offices may be altered or abolished by the legislature. . . . The same general principle applies to
municipal offices. The may be abolished, extended or vacated by the municipal authority by which the
corporation itself was created . . . . (Mechem, Public Officers, Sec. 465.)

In the absence of a provision to the contrary, the superseding of the old charter by the new, has the effect of
abolishing the offices under the old charter. The general rule is, that the repeal of a charter destroys all offices
under it, and puts an end to the functions of the incumbents.

The only offices expressly excepted from said abolitions were those mentioned in Section 96, Article XVII of the
charter, which reads:

SEC. 96. Change of Government. — The incumbent Mayor, Vice-Mayor and members of the Municipal Board
shall continue in office as the Mayor, Vice-Mayor and members of the Municipal Board of the City,
respectively, until the expiration of their present terms of office.

Applying the principle of "expressio unius, est exclusio alterius" in statutory construction, all municipal offices including that
held by petitioner, in the then municipality of Legaspi not included in the above-excepted offices were deemed
abolished.

Hence, no reversible error in the decision appealed. Decision was AFFIRMED.

 MOISES S. SAMSON, petitioner, vs. HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, in his capacity as the Executive
Secretary, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and the DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents.
President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law Republic Act No. 8535, creating the City of Novaliches out of 15
barangays of Quezon City. Petitioner Moises S. Samson, incumbent councilor of the first district of Quezon City, is
now before the Court challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8535.
Petitioner bases his petition on the following grounds:

“a) R.A. No. 8535 failed to conform to the criteria established by the Local Government Code particularly, Sections 7,
11(a) and 450(a), as to the requirements of income, population and land area; seat of government; and no adverse effect
to being a city of Quezon City, respectively, and its Implementing Rules as provided in Article 11(b)(1) and (2), as to
furnishing a copy of the Quezon City Council of barangay resolution; and

b) The said law will in effect amend the Constitution.”

Issue:

1. Did Republic Act No. 8535, creating the City of Novaliches, fail to conform to the criteria by the Local Government
Code?

2. Will the said law affect the constitution?

Held: 1. No, City of Novaliches conforms to the criteria by the Local Government Code.

The Local Government Code of 1991 provides under Section 7:

“SECTION 7. Creation and Conversion. – As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its conversion
from one level to another level shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide
services, to wit:

(a) Income. – It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities
and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the local
government unit concerned;

(b) Population. – It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the
local government unit concerned; and

(c) Land Area. – It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a local
government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions;
and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.

Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF), the National
Statistics Office (NSO), and the Land Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).

Corollarily, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Code provide in Article 11:

ART. 11. Cities. – (a) Requisites for creation – A city shall not be created unless the following requisites on
income and either population or land area are present:
 (1) Income – an average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00), for the
immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by
DOF. The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of
special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income; and
(2) Population or land area – Population which shall not be less than one hundred fifty thousand
(150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with an area of
at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which
do not contribute to the income of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply where
the proposed city is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a city sought
to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.
The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original LGU or LGUs at
the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation
shall be borne by the petitioners.”
During the public hearings held by the Senate Committee on Local Government were resource persons from the
different government offices like National Statistics Office, Bureau of Local Government Finance, Land Management
Bureau, and Department of Budget and Management, aside from officials of Quezon City itself.

The representative from the Bureau of Local Government Finance estimated the combined average annual income of
the 13 barangays for the years 1995 and 1996 to be around P26,952,128.26. Under the Local Government Code, a
proposed city must have an average annual income of only at least P20,000,000.00 for the immediately preceding two
years. The representative from the NSO estimated the population in the barangays that would comprise the proposed
City of Novaliches to be around 347,310. This figure is more than the 150,000 required by the Implementing
Rules. There is no need to consider the land area, given these figures, since under the Local Government Code, the
proposed city must comply with requirements as regards income and population or land area. Other than the income
requirement, the proposed city must have the requisite number of inhabitants or land area. Compliance with either
requirement, in addition to income, is sufficient. Judicial notice may also be taken that Novaliches is now highly
urbanized.

2. No, City of Novaliches will in no way result in a prohibited amendment of the Constitution. The ordinance
appended to the Constitution merely apportions the seats of the House of Representatives to the different legislative
districts in the country. Nowhere does it provide that Metro Manila shall forever be composed of only 17 cities and
municipalities as claimed by petitioner. Too literal a reading of the ordinance in or appendix of the Constitution will
only result in its erroneous interpretation.
Petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality being enjoyed
by R.A. No. 8535. Nor did he succeed to convince the Court with substantial and persuasive legal reasons for us to
grant the reliefs he seeks.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition was DISMISSED.

 CAWALING v COMELEC

Facts: President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an “Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging
The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor.”

Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of Sorsorgon, Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. filed
on January 2, 2001 the present petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 146319) seeking the annulment of the plebiscite.
Petitioner contends that RA 8806 is unconstitutional because creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities
violates Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution)
which requires that only “a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city”.

Issue: Is the RA 8806 unconstitutional for merging 2 municipalities to be to a component city?

Held: No.

Petitioner’s constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase “A municipality or a
cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city” is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a
city may be created.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution which provides, inter alia:

“Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.”

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows the merger of local government units to create a province, city,
municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code. Thus, Section 8 of the Code distinctly
provides:

“Section 8. Division and Merger. – Division and merger of existing local government units shall comply with
the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided, however, That such division shall not
reduce the income, population, or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of the original
local government unit or units shall not fall below its current income classification prior to such division. x x x.”
(Emphasis ours)

Verily, the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of existing local
government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the
requirements prescribed by the Code.
Petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit.
 THE CENTRAL (POBLACION) BARRIO, CITY OF DAVAO, represented by its BARRIO CAPTAIN,
HONORIO B. GARCIA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CITY TREASURER, MAXIMO ASISTIDO, THE HON. CITY COUNCIL, THE HON. CITY AUDITOR,
ATTY. FELIX PEPITO and the HON. CITY MAYOR, CARMELO PORRAS, respondents-appellees.

Facts:

On August 29, 1962, the City of Davao passed Resolution No. 732 declaring as officially and legally existing,
pursuant to Republic Act 2370, the several barrios of the city. Among these were barrios Agdao, Bucana and Poblacion.

Subsequently, barrio Poblacion, also called barrio Central, claiming that it was created under Section 27 of the
Code of Mindanao and Sulu, asked from Davao City for its alleged 10% share in taxes collected on real property located
within the barrio, as provided in Section 23 of Republic Act 3590. Davao City's Treasurer, however, refused to release
the share for said barrio, on the ground that the amount pertaining to said barrio, in relation to those of barrios Agdao
and Bucana, cannot be determined, because the respective boundaries of said barrios were not yet fixed as required by
law.

The Court, upon motion of the Fiscal, dismissed the case without prejudice, on the ground that the issues were
rendered academic by the passage of Republic Act 4354, on June 19, 1965, amending the Charter of Davao City.

Issue:

Is the dismissal order duly warranted?

Held:

Yes. Republic Act 4354, in Section 2, enumerated the barrios comprising the City of Davao. Petitioner barrio
Central or Poblacion was not mentioned therein. Accordingly, there prima facie arises the conclusion that said law
abolished barrio Central as part of Davao City. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The court a quo had sufficient and
tenable reason to dismiss the suit in the face of said law, for being academic. A non-existent barrio, or a barrio not
situated in Davao City, cannot present a claim against it or its officials for a share in taxes under Republic Act 3590.
Said law must be presumed, until squarely challenged and declared by the courts to be otherwise, as constitutional,
especially because the power to create or abolish municipal corporations resides in Congress (Mendenilla v. Onandia, L-
17803, June 30, 1962).
 Navarro v. Ermita
Facts:

Republic Act No. 9355 created a province of Dinagat Islands, formerly part of Surigao Del Norte. It was questioned for
constitutionality for not being in compliance with the population or the land area requirements of the Local
Government Code under Sec. 461. Previous decisions relating to this case declared the creation of the province as
unconstitutional.

Issue: Is the creation of Dinagat Islands as a separate province constitutional?

Held:

Yes. The Court looked at the central policy considerations in the creation of provinces. They compared the LGC
provisions on the creation of municipalities and cities and how they allow an exception to the land area requirement in
cases of non-contiguity as provided for under Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC.

SEC. 442. Requisites for Creation. (Municipality)

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The
requirement on land area shall not apply where the municipality proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more
islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

SEC. 450. Requisites for Creation. (City)

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement
on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

The Court held that it must have been the intent of the legislators to extend such exception to provinces especially
considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago. In fact, while such exemption was absent under
Section 461 of the LGC, Such was incorporated under the LGC-IRR thus correcting the congressional oversight in said
provision and reflecting the true legislative intent.

LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 9. Provinces.

(2) Population or land area - Population which shall not be less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants,
as certified by NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. The land area requirement
shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a
province sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.

Moreover, the earlier decisions show a very restrictive construction which could trench on the equal protection clause,
as it actually defeats the purpose of local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the
land area requirement should be read together with territorial contiguity.
 DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, AND CLAUDE P. BAUTISTA, RESPONDENTS.

Facts:

Petitioner Douglas R. Cagas was proclaimed the winner for the gubernatorial race for the province of Davao del Sur.
Respondent Claude P. Bautista, his rival, filed an electoral protest alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying
and violations of election laws, rules and resolutions. The protest was raffled to the COMELEC First Division.
In his affirmative defense, Cagas argued that Bautista did not make the requisite cash deposit on time and that Bautista
did not render a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of. The COMELEC First Division denied
the special affirmative defences. Thus, Cagas prayed that the matter be certified to the COMELEC En Banc. Bautista
countered that the assailed orders, being merely interlocutory, could not be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. The
COMELEC First Division issued an order denying Cagas’ motion for reconsideration, prompting him to file a petition
for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Does the Supreme Court have the power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order issued by a Division of
the COMELEC?

Held:

No. Although Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Court the power to review any decision,
order or ruling of the COMELEC, it limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and
does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no
power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.
There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for certiorari
assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper
remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the
result should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC En Banc along
with the other errors committed by the Division upon the merits.
It is true that there may be an exception to the general rule, which is when an interlocutory order of a Division of the
COMELEC was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, as the Court conceded in
Kho v. Commission on Elections. However, the said case has no application herein because the COMELEC First
Division had the competence to determine the lack of detailed specifications of the acts or omissions complained of as
required by Rule 6, Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, and whether such lack called for the outright
dismissal of the protest.
 SIMPLICIO C. GRINO, ARTURO GADIAN, THE LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO,
EVELYN C. JIZ AND PERLA ZULUETA, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
ILOILO PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

Section 462 of the LGC called for the conversion of existing sub-provinces into regular provinces upon approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be held in the areas directly affected by such conversion. Said section
likewise directed the holding of the said plebiscite simultaneously with the national elections following the effectivity of
R.A. 7160. Pursuant thereto, a plebiscite to determine whether the sub-province of Guimaras (its mother province was
Iloilo) wants to become a regular province was held simultaneously with the May 11, 1992 elections. The participants in
the said plebiscite were the residents of Iloilo (except Iloilo city) and the 3 municipalities of Guimaras. Surprisingly, the
ballots issued in the said 3 municipalities did not provide any space for the election of governor, vice-governor and the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province of Iloilo. LDP Iloilo governor-candidate Simplicio Grino
claims that the COMELEC erred in not allowing the said 3 municipalities to vote for the provincial officials of Iloilo,
since at the time of the plebiscite Guimaras was still a sub-province of Iloilo. Grino says if Guimaras voted for regular
“provincehood” then there would have been no need for them at all to vote for the provincial officials of Iloilo. But
what if Guimaras votes to remain as a sub-province? Should special election be held for the 3 municipalities so that they
can vote for the provincial official of Iloilo?

ISSUE:

WON COMELEC erred in not allowing the voters of the sub-province of Guimaras from voting for the
provincial officials of Iloilo

RULING:

YES.

The Commission was under mistaken presumption that under Section 462 of the LGC, whether or not the
conversion of Guimaras into a regular province is ratified by the people in a plebiscite, the President will fill up the
positions of provincial officials (sub-province officials in case of a negative vote) through appointment until their
successors shall have been elected and qualified. The law did not provide that the President shall also appoint provincial
officials of the sub-province because, by a negative vote, the people of the sub-province of Guimaras shall continue to
be represented by the provincial officials of the province of Iloilo elected at large by registered voters of Iloilo province
including the sub-province of Guimaras.

However, it would serve no useful purpose if we undo all that the Commission on Elections had done in that
plebiscite. In the recently conducted plebiscite, the voters of the sub-province of Iloilo overwhelmingly voted for the
approval of the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province. In this event, the President shall appoint, the governor
for the newly created province of Guimaras, and he shall also appoint a vice-governor and the member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan in accordance with the third paragraph of Section 462 of R.A. 6170. The then sub-province
of Guimaras is now a regular province, politically independent from the province of Iloilo. There is no more legal basis
for the calling of a special election for the 3 municipalities of Guimaras for the purpose of electing the governor and
vice-governor of Iloilo and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the second district thereof.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for being moot and academic.

 RAMON B. CENIZA, FEDERICO C. CABILAO, JR., NELSON J. ROSAL AND ALEJANDRO R.
ALINSUG, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, AND
NATIONAL TREASURER, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

On Dec. 22 1979, the interim Batasang Pambansa enacted B.P. Blg. 51 providing for local elections on Jan 30,
1980. Its section 3, the subject of controversy, reads as follows:

xxx Until cities are reclassified into highly urbanized and component comes in accordance with standard established in
the LGC as province for in Art XI, Sec 4 (1) of the Constitution. Any city now existing with an annual regular income
derived from infrastructure and general funds of not less than P40M at the time of the approval of the act shall be
classified as a highly urbanized city. All other cities shall be considered components of the provinces where they are
geographically located. xxx The registered voters may be entitled to vote in the election of the official of the province of
which that city is a component. If it’s charter so provides. However, voters in a highly urbanized city, as hereinabove
defined shall not participate nor vote in the election of the official of the province in which the highly urbanized city is
geographical located.

Robert Ceniza et.al. filed a case as tax payers and registered voters in the cities of Cebu and Mandaue assailing the
aforementioned section. They questioned the use of annual income of a given city as basis for classification of whether
or not a particular city is a highly urbanized city whose voters may no participate in the election of provincial officials of
the province in which the city is geographically located.

ISSUE:

WON the basis of annual income of a city for its classification as highly urbanized is unconstitutional

RULING:

NO.

The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that "The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of
local government units, especially the barrio, to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities." Art. XI,
Section 4(1) of the said Constitution places highly urbanized cities outside the supervisory power of the province where
they are geographically located. This is as it should be because of the complex and varied problems in a highly
urbanized city due to a bigger population and greater economic activity which require greater autonomy.

The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual
income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence
and development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city
has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically
situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the
continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances.

Moreover, corollary to independence however, is the concomitant loss of the right to participate in provincial
affairs, more particularly the selection of elective provincial officials since these provincial officials have ceased to
exercise any governmental jurisdiction and authority over said city.

WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed.

 ROBERT V. TOBIAS, et al. v. MAYOR BENJAMIN ABALOS
G.R. No. 114783, 8 December 1994, EN BANC, (Bidin, J.)

Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one
legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district,
sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675 which converts the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a
Highly Urbanized City as the City of Mandaluyong. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9,
1994. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas
7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.

ISSUES:
1. Did R.A. 7675 violated the “one title-one subject rule” of the Constitution?
2. Did R.A. 7675 violated the “one city-one representative rule of the Constitution?
3. Did R.A. 7675 violated the limit of number of representatives set forth in the Constitution?
4. Should the people of San Juan participate in the plebescite on whether to convert Mandaluyong into a HUC?

RULING:
1. NO.
The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the
subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a
highly urbanized city.
A liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to
cripple or impede legislation.
"Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title
should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the
subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation"
2. NO
The statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two
hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in the
Constitution.
3. NO
The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250
members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present
composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore,
the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
4. NO
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No.
7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal
subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of
separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded
from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.
 JOSE MIRANDA, et al. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, et al.
G.R. No. 133064, 16 September 1999, EN BANC, (Puno, J.)

On 1994, R.A. 7720 converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an independent component city. The people
of Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite. On 1998, R.A. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720. Among
others, it downgraded the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city. However, R.A.
No. 8528 lacked provision for the ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite.

The OSG argued that R.A. No. 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent component city to a
component city, hence, it does not involve any "creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units," thus, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary.

ISSUE:
Is R.A. No. 8528 unconstitutional for its failure to provide that the conversion of the city of Santiago from an
independent component city to a component city should be submitted to its people in a proper plebiscite?

RULING:
YES.
The Court holds that the Constitution requires a plebiscite, as per section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution. This constitutional requirement is reiterated in Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code
(R.A. No. 7160).
A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator —
material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as
the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people "in
the political units directly affected."
The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent component city
to a component city are many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial. For one, the independence of the city as a
political unit will be diminished. The city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial
governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial
Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will now have to be shared with the province.
It is clear that the Constitution imposes two conditions — first, the creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundary of a local government unit must meet the criteria fixed by the Local Government
Code on income, population and land area and second, the law must be approved by the people "by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
In accord with the Constitution, sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Local Government Code fixed the said criteria and
they involve requirements on income, population and land area. These requirements, however, are imposed to help
assure the economic viability of the local government unit concerned. The criteria fixed by the Local Government
Code on income, population and land area are designed to achieve an economic purpose. The people's
plebiscite is required to achieve a political purpose.
With due respect, the cities of Oroquieta and San Carlos are not similarly situated as the city of Santiago. The
said two cities then were not independent component cities unlike the city of Santiago. The two cities were chartered
but were not independent component cities for both were not highly urbanized cities which alone were considered
independent cities at that time.
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION REPRESENTED BY NORMA TAN, PETITIONER,
VS. HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., ET AL.
G.R. No. 169588, October 07, 2013, LEONEN, J., THIRD DIVISION

Facts

Jadewell is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City,
they are also able to render a vehicle immobile by placing clamps on its wheels when it’s illegally parked pursuant to
City Ordinance 003-2000. On May 17, 2003, Jadewell filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
San Fernando City, La Union against Edwin Ang ET AL. for dismantling and carrying away the clamp (valued at 26k)
attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure because the vehicle was illegally parked, a violation of the
Baguio City Ordinance no. 003 - 2000. The information was filed with the Municipal Trial court on October 2, 2003.
The Municipal TC dismissed the complaint on the ground that offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure and Act 3326 being alleged violations of City Ordinances. Under Section 9, the running of the prescriptive
period shall be halted on the date the case is filed in Court and that such action prescribes in 2 months. RTC likewise
dismissed the petitioner’s appeal on the ground of prescription.

Issue

WON the prescription period for violation of city ordinances halts when filed with the prosecutor’s office

Decision

No, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of
special laws and municipal ordinances (Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months).
Likewise, according to the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the rule shall govern summary procedure with
municipal trial courts concerning criminal cases for violations of municipal or city ordinances. Section 11 from the same
rules provide that - The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by
information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced
only by information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio.

Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be highly urbanized cities or component cities. An
independent component city has a charter that proscribes its voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It
stands that all cities as defined by Congress are chartered cities. In cases as early as United States v. Pascual Pacis, the
Court recognized the validity of the Baguio Incorporation Act or Act No. 1963 of 1909, otherwise known as the charter
of Baguio City. As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information shall halt
the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance.

Petition denied.
 ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 176970, December 08, 2008, BRION, J., EN BANC
Facts
On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro's then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed and sponsored House
Bill No. 5859: "An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De
Oro." This law eventually became Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371. It increased Cagayan de Oro's legislative district from
one to two. On March 13, 2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No. 7837 implementing R.A. No.
9371. Petitioner Bagabuyo contends that COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No. 9371 without providing for the rules,
regulations and guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a local
government unit and that it violates the equality of representation doctrine.
Issue
WON a plebiscite is indispensable in dividing congressional districts
Decision
No, the concern of Article VI, Section 5 is political representation and the means to make a legislative district
sufficiently represented so that the people can be effectively heard. The aim of legislative apportionment is "to equalize
population and voting power among districts." Hence, emphasis is given to the number of people represented; the
uniform and progressive ratio to be observed among the representative districts; and accessibility and commonality of
interests in terms of each district being, as far as practicable, continuous, compact and adjacent territory. In terms of the
people represented, every city with at least 250,000 people and every province (irrespective of population) is entitled to
one representative. In this sense, legislative districts, on the one hand, and provinces and cities, on the other, relate and
interface with each other. To ensure continued adherence to the required standards of apportionment, Section 5(4)
specifically mandates reapportionment as soon as the given standards are met.
In contrast with the equal representation objective of Article VI, Section 5, Article X, Section 10 expressly
speaks of how local government units may be "created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered.
A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement of a
plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation,
division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite requirement
exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision.
The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense, be called a political unit because it is
the basis for the election of a member of the House of Representatives and members of the local legislative body. It is
not, however, a political subdivision through which functions of government are carried out. A district does not act for
and in behalf of the people comprising the district; it merely delineates the areas occupied by the people who will
choose a representative in their national affairs.
In the case at bar, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and corporate entity takes place or is
mandated by RA 9371. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its administration is not divided along
territorial lines thus it does not need a plebiscite for legislative apportionment.
The ground that such law violates the equality of representation doctrine likewise, cannot be sustained. The
Constitution does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of
representation. In fact, for cities, all it asks is that "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand
shall have one representative," while ensuring representation for every province regardless of the size of its population.
Petition Denied
Note:
Legislative apportionment (Black's Law Dictionary) - the determination of the number of representatives which a
State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in
proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among
the districts.
Reapportionment - the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and
mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.