Criminal Procedure

ZUNO vs CABEBE

 Facts:
- The instant administrative case stemmed from the sworn complaint of Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño of the
Department of Justice, against Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe, then Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court. The charges are
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law and partiality.
- In his complaint, Chief State Prosecutor Zuño alleged that Criminal Case for illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs
was filed with the Regional Trial Court, against Rey Daquep Arcangel, Victorino Gamet Malabed, William Roxas Villanueva, all
police officers, Jocelyn Malabed Manuel and Pelagio Valencia Manuel. Upon arraignment, all the accused, assisted by their
counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
- On May 6, 2002, the accused filed a motion to dismiss invoking as ground the right of the accused to a speedy trial. On
November 5, 2002, respondent judge motu propio issued an Order granting bail to the accused, fixing the bail for each
at P70,000.00 in cash or property bond at P120,000.00, except for accused Evelyn Manuel whose bail was fixed at P20,000.00 in
cash. Respondent judge issued the Order without the accused’s application or motion for bail.
- The prosecution then filed a motion for reconsideration. Instead of acting thereon, respondent judge issued an order inhibiting
himself from further proceeding with the case, realizing that what he did was patently irregular. Complainant thus prays that
respondent judge be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and be disbarred from the practice of law.
- In his comment, respondent denied the charges. While admitting that he issued the Order granting bail to the accused without
any hearing, “the same was premised on the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial.” The prosecution did not object
to the grant of bail to the accused.
- On March 26, 2003, respondent judge compulsorily retired.
- In his Report dated July 7, 2003, Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez found respondent judge liable for gross ignorance of
the law and recommended that a fine of P20,000.00 be imposed upon him, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

 Issue: W/N the judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law by granting bail without hearing.
 Ruling: YES.
- In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas, we held that jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the procedural necessity of
a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail, especially in cases involving offenses punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, where bail is a matter of discretion. Under the present Rules, a hearing is
mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion. It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in
cases where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong,
and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In
order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of
guilt is strong. In fact, even in cases where there is no petition for bail, a hearing should still be held.
- There is no question that respondent judge granted bail to the accused without conducting a hearing, in violation of Sections 8
and 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
- In Cortes vs. Catral, we laid down the following rules outlining the duties of the judge in case an application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail
or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion (Section 7 and 8, id.);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond (Section 19, id.);
otherwise the petition should be denied.
- Based on the above-cited procedure, after the hearing, the court’s order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the
evidence of the prosecution and based thereon, the judge should formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so
presented is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused.
- Respondent judge did not follow the above Rules and procedure enumerated in Cortes. He did not conduct a hearing before he
granted bail to the accused, thus depriving the prosecution of an opportunity to interpose objections to the grant of bail.
Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or weakness of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, he should have conducted
a hearing and thereafter made a summary of the evidence of the prosecution. The importance of a bail hearing and a summary
of evidence cannot be downplayed, these are considered aspects of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the
defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail.
 - Respondent’s contention is bereft of merit. There is no indication in the records of the criminal case that the prosecution has
intentionally delayed the trial of the case. Even assuming there was delay, this does not justify the grant of bail without a
hearing. This is utter disregard of the Rules. The requirement of a bail hearing has been incessantly stressed by this Court. In
the same vein, the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be conversant with the law and the Rules and maintain
professional competence; and by the very nature of his office, should be circumspect in the performance of his duties. He must
render justice without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. Obviously, respondent failed to live up to these standards.
- WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe, now retired, is found guilty of violation of Supreme Court Rules and is
hereby fined in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), the same to be deducted from his retirement benefits. SO
ORDERED

Criminal Procedure

People v. Hon. Bonifacio Maceda

January 24, 2000

 Facts
- This case stems from denial by the SC of the People’s motion seeking reconsideration of our August 13, 1990 decision holding
that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of August 8, 1989
giving custody over private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the Antique RTC, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario,
during the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason was shown why Javellana should not be
detained at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial court’s order specifically provided for private respondent’s detention at the
residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam around but was to be held as
detention prisoner in said residence. It was howevere found that the order was not strictly complied with because Javellana was
not detained in the residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he were a free man, including
engaging in the practice of law.
 Held:
- Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against him. By such arrest, he is deemed to
be under the custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias del Rosario the custody of private respondent Javellana
with the obligation “to hold and detain” him in Atty. del Rosario’s residence in his official capacity as the clerk of court of the
regional trial court. Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to be the personal custodian of accused
Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court must be deemed the custodian under the same undertaking.
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is
placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be
detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on
recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practice
their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention.