The attempted merger between General Electric and Honeywell

A case study of transatlantic conflict

March 2005

Jeremy Grant (Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva)

and

Professor Damien J. Neven (Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva)

Financial support from the TMR program on « Competition Policy in international markets » is gratefully
acknowledged. The authors would also like to thank all those participants in GE/Honeywell who
generously gave of their time to discuss the case. (Acknowledgements to be approved). Thanks are also due
to Sarah Nash at JP Morgan in New York. Helpful comments were also received from Dr. Thomas
Kirchmaier at the LSE and Selman Ansari at Bates, Wells in London.
Abstract

The thwarted merger of General Electric and Honeywell stands out as, so far, the only
merger between US companies to be derailed solely by the European anti-trust
authorities, while being cleared by the US Department of Justice (DoJ) and 11 other
jurisdictions. In this paper, the authors examine the European Commission’s decision,
and the theories underlying it and compare the Commission’s approach with that
followed by the DoJ. They observe that the Commission and the DoJ had a different
assessment of broadly similar facts, and attempt to understand the source of the
divergence.

The authors find that (i) the horizontal effects identified by the European Commission
rely on a particular perspective of market definition which is debatable (and leaves some
questions unanswered). (ii) The anti-competitive effects in the bundling and archimedean
leveraging theories are not sufficiently robust so that they could be presumed.
Accordingly, their likelihood should be supported by strong evidence but the evidence
presented by the Commission was far from compelling. (iii) The deal may have involved
significant efficiencies that were overlooked.

These observations raise the suspicion that the Commission’s decision may have been
affected by bureaucratic capture, such that civil servants did not follow the mandate that
had been assigned to them. We find that the procedure enforced at the time was
vulnerable to capture and that the Commission had an incorrect perception of the
standard of review that the Court would apply to its decision in the context of an appeal.
The accountability to which the Commission felt subject to was thus biased downwards
and enlarged the scope for capture. In addition some (admittedly casual) evidence
regarding the actual unfolding of the procedure, as well as subsequent reforms of process
and procedure undertaken by the Commission, would support the view that significant
problems arose in this area.

2
“In the macho world of merger regulation ….. authorities strive to win a tough
reputation” 1.

Introduction: Project Storm

As General Electric’s CEO Jack Welch strode onto the floor of the New York Stock
Exchange on October 19th 2000, little did he know that he was about to become
embroiled in a series of events that would lead to him bidding for Honeywell, a rival
industrial conglomerate, and place him in the eye of a transatlantic storm over
competition policy. 2 The deal, codenamed Project Storm, would have been the largest
industrial merger in history. Instead, it became infamous as the first, and so far only,
merger between US companies to be derailed solely by the European anti-trust
authorities, while being cleared by the US Department of Justice (DoJ) and 11 other
jurisdictions.

This paper will critically examine the European Commission’s decision, and the theories
underlying it and compare the Commission’s approach with that followed by the DoJ.
We observe that the Commission and the DoJ had a different assessment of broadly
similar facts, and attempt to understand the source of the divergence. In particular, we
examine how process and procedure differed between the United States and the European
Union, to determine what extent these factors influenced the outcomes of the regulatory
processes on either side of the Atlantic.

While a significant amount has already been written on the case, systematic comparisons
between the approaches followed by Commission and the DoJ have so far remained
difficult because much of the DoJ’ s analysis is not in the public domain. In addition,
little attention has been given so far to process and procedures. We attempt to gather
systematic evidence on these issues; beyond an extensive survey of public sources
currently available, we have extended our research through access to non-public sources
including submissions to the regulators and other non- public research done at the time of
the transaction. We have also conducted interviews with the regulators on both sides of
the Atlantic and lawyers representing parties on both sides of the argument3.

Part I briefly reviews the Commission’s decision, discusses possible sources of

divergence and dismisses some of them as highly unlikely. Part II provides a critical
review of the Commission’s decision and highlights differences with the DoJ’s analysis.

1
Buck (2004).
2
Welch and Byrne (2001).
3
One of the authors also attended the GE and Honeywell appeal hearings at the European Court of First
Instance in Luxembourg on May 25th and 27th 2004. e

3
Part III discusses the role that process and procedure have played in the emergence of
divergent outcomes.

Part 1: The European Commissions Case:

The Commission’s case was threefold. GE held a dominant position in the market for
Large Jet Aircraft engines (between 43% and 65% depending on how market share was
calculated) a situation where firms’ conduct is subject to particular scrutiny under Article
82 of the Treaty of Rome. 4 Meanwhile, Honeywell had a leading position in the avionics
and non-avionics aerospace component markets. The European Union Merger Regulation
enforced at the time prohibited mergers or acquisitions which “create or strengthen(s) a
dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly
impeded in the common market”. 5 According to the Commission, effective competition
would be impeded mostly because of “conglomerate” effects. These may arise when the
merging parties are active in different products markets 6 and when the merger raises the
scope for exclusionary practices.

The three main arguments in the case were as follows:

1) Bundling -The strength of the combined positions of the merging firms, the
Commission feared, would allow GE to engage in exclusionary product bundling with
the ultimate effect of foreclosing markets for single product line competitors (particularly
Rolls Royce in aircraft engines and Rockwell Collins in aerospace components). Such
foreclosure involves the deterrence of new entrants, the reduction of investment by
existing competitors and possibly their exit.
4
Art 82 ECT prohibits the abuse of a dominant position and not the dominant position by itself.
5
The Merger Regulation has since been amended. The criterion for assessing mergers has been modified.
Mergers which “would significantly impede effective competition, in the common market or in a
substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position” would
now be held unlawful. The new formulation is meant to include horizontal mergers which have substantial
unilateral effects despite the fact that merging partners do not reach the threshold of dominance. Given that
the anti-competitive effects identified by the Commission in the GE/HW merger were primarily associated
with conglomerate effects, and given that if anything, the criterion for horizontal effects have been
strengthened, one can presume that, other things being equal, anti-competitive effects would also have been
identified under the new merger regulation. The new merger regulation, however, emphasizes the role of
efficiencies and the question arises whether efficiencies could have trumped anti-competitive effects under
the new regime. This is further discussed below.
6
The Commission first utilized the theory of “portfolio effects” in Guinness/Grand Metropolitan (1997).
The merged entity was required to divest its rum distribution in Greece, although there was no horizontal
overlap as only Grand Metropolitan was a rum distributor in the country. The reasoning was that the firm
had too wide a portfolio of market leading brands, thus giving it extensive opportunities to increase market
share via bundling and tying, and “will be able to realize economies of scope and scale in sales and
marketing activities”. In Coco Cola/Carlsberg (1998), the Commission required the divestiture of the 3 rd
largest cola brand in Denmark and a bottling plant, because of fears of greater market power stemming
from the combined companies drinks portfolio and resultant economies of scope and scale, although in this
case there was clearly horizontal overlap. In both cases, the EC viewed enhancement of product portfolios
post-merger as extending scope for exclusionary practices, which by their very nature would harm
competitors.

4
To back up its case, the EC put forward an economic model of bundling supplied by
Rolls Royce and economic expert Professor Jay Pil Choi (Choi, 2001). 7 The Commission
claimed that the merged entity would have incentives to bundle its avionics (e.g. aircraft
communication and navigation equipment) and non-avionics products (e.g. wheels, lights
and landing gear) with engines, at a discount to single product purchases, which
competitors could not match. In the short to medium term, this would marginalize
competitors by depriving them of revenues which would mean they could not cover their
fixed costs. In turn this would effect their spending destined for research and
development on the next generation of products meaning they could not compete
effectively with respect to future platforms.

The Commission presented evidence that Honeywell was already deploying bundling in
what it designated as “multi-product” bids. The EC also received evidence from
aerospace component competitors (in particular Rockwell Collins) that they had faced
Honeywell component bundling, and were unable to compete. 8 Therefore, if the deal
were to proceed, they would have to withdraw from either the avionics or non-avionics
businesses to concentrate their resources.9

2) Archimedean Leveraging - GE would further increase its dominance by using the

position of GE Capital Aviation Services (GECAS) in the market for leasing service. This
was something GE had been doing since 1996 with its “GE only” policy of purchasing
GE engines, where available, for the planes it leases to clients, and had two effects.
Firstly, the Commission believed that substantial engine market share shifting to GE had
been driven by this policy on multi-source platforms (i.e aircrafts for which several
competing engines are certified, the choice of engine being made by the buyer).
Secondly, the Commission believed that this policy could convince manufacturers to
certify a GE engine on sole source platforms (where a single engine is certified). The
Commission observed that in the market for Large Regional Jet, the 3 manufacturers
choose GE as their single certified engine supplier, and GECAS subsequently ordered a
large number of regional aircraft from each. The EC feared that “GE only” would be
extended to Honeywell components, hence further transforming a leading market position
into a dominant one, again leading to or re-enforcing market foreclosure. It went on to
argue that this process would be aided by GE’s financial strength demonstrated by its low
market based cost of capital and triple AAA credit rating. These were all elements of
“GE’s toolkit for dominance” (Drauz, 2002).

This theory was controversial, not least because GE was being accused of market tipping
with a market share of less than 10% in aircraft leasing. However, to bolster its case the
Commission relied on an economic model of “Archimedean Leveraging” supplied to it

7
Professor of Economics, Michigan State University.
8
Source: Testimony given at Honeywell appeal hearing, Luxembourg May 25, 2004 – Rockwell’s clients
name was kept confidential.
9
Interview with John DeQ. Briggs, Rockwell’s American lawyer – Washington DC, February 2004.

5
by United Technologies (UTC), a multi-product competitor of GE. 10 This model
purported to demonstrate how a firm with a limited presence (as a buyer) in a
downstream, but not adjacent market, could affect competitive outcomes in upstream
markets due to the embedded nature of the products concerned. GECAS role as launch
customer for new aircraft models would further strengthen this effect as GECAS would
“seed” airlines, particularly smaller and regional ones, with GE and Honeywell products.
This might distort their later purchasing decisions in favor of General Electric products
from air-framers and other leasing companies, as it lowers airlines costs to maintain “fleet
commonality”.

Overall, according to opponents of the deal, “the merger would have sandwiched
airframers between their largest purchaser of aircraft, their largest supplier of avionics
and other equipment, and a major source of finance for the building of new aircraft. At
the same time, the combined firm would gain an advantage in the sale to airlines by
bundling a broad range of products and seeding them with aircraft” (DeQ. Briggs and
Rosenblatt, 2002)11.

3) Vertical and Horizontal Effects - The first two arguments related to “portfolio”
and/or “conglomerate” effects (also known as range effects), areas of anti-trust regulation
that remain contentious amo ngst economists and across jurisdictions. For its third line of
argument, the EC returned to more traditional anti-trust areas: horizontal overlap in large
regional and medium corporate jet engine markets and power systems. It also highlighted
vertical issues related to Honeywell as the sole manufacturer and supplier of component
engine starters to Rolls Royce. 12

The Commission also claimed that the parties had not presented any efficiencies as a
justification for the transaction. In principle, the analysis of efficiencies would allow the
Commission to distinguish a merger that strengthens a company’s market position
through efficiencies that ultimately benefit consumer welfare, from one whose main
purpose is to enable the combined entity to implement anti-competitive conduct including
possibly predatory behavior, with the effect of marginalizing and ultimately driving its
competitors from the market.

The Commission’s reasoning behind the decision is extensively detailed in its final report
which is 150 pages plus in length. By contrast, the US authorities cleared the merger,
demanding only limited remedies detailed in a 2 page press release on May 2nd 2001.13

10
Interestingly, Rolls Royce and UTC seemed to effectively coordinate their efforts. RR concentrated on
bundling, while UTC based it arguments on the vertical integration of GECAS and share shifting. Clearly
it was in their interests to not push the bundling argument in isolation as they had been the original
purchasers of Honeywell, and were out-bid by GE.
11
For an overview, see diagram in Appendix 1 presented by Rockwell Collins at appeal hearings of the
European Court of First Instance in Luxembourg, May 2004.
12
The parties did agree to a number of divestiture remedies in relation to some of these issues.
13
The merged entity would be required to divest Honeywell’s military helicopter engine business
(approximately $200mm in revenues) and open up the repair, maintenance and overhaul services for certain
Honeywell engines and auxiliary power units, to further competition. (See
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press _releases/2001/8140.htm). Subsequently, the DoJ did detail other

6
Therefore, we are left with the question of how two regulatory authorities could come to
such different outcomes. This is an important question as “such a wide divergence …
creates a lot of uncertainty - chaos - for business. This uncertainty will lead to behavior
that we can well imagine would discourage firms from doing the sort of acquisitions that
we would like them to be doing” (See Kogut, 2001 14).

In principle, one can identify the following possible sources of divergence. First, a
divergence may occur because the authorities are subject to different legal standards. In
particular, these standards may differ because they express different objectives or because
the burden and the quantum of proofs do not coincide. For instance, one legal standard
may give more importance to the prospect of prohibiting a pro-competitive merger than
another, and may accordingly impose more stringent conditions on the evidence that is
necessary to prohibit a merger. These objectives and rules governing evidence can be
explicitly stated by the statutes or inferred from the relevant case law.

Second, the authorities may pursue different objectives from those that they have been
assigned. The view of antitrust authorities as omniscient and benevolent agents seeking
the public good has long been dismissed. These authorities are properly seen as a
collection of agents pursuing their own objectives subject to an imperfect monitoring by
the principal having assigned particular tasks to them. Being exposed to imperfect
accountability, agents (civil servants) can take decisions which deviate from what the
objectives that have been assigned to them would dictate, but achieve their own goals.
This phenomenon is usually referred to as bureaucratic capture. For instance, a high
profile prohibition may advance the career objectives of civil servants. In such an
environment, interested parties may also try to influence the agents by offering prospects
for further fulfillment of their objectives, which are made contingent on a particular
course of action. Of course, the extent to which capture can arise is highly dependent
upon the type of accountability that agents are subject to. In this respect, the procedures
which govern the investigation as well as the prospects for appeal and the standard of
review that will applied by the Courts will play an important role.

Third, different authorities may have a different judgment on a similar set of facts.
Merger control involves a prospective exercise which is surrounded by much uncertainty
and different agents may have genuinely different views.

Fourth, the concentration under review may have different consequences across
jurisdictions. This may typically arise if the different jurisdictions belong to different
geographically relevant markets, in which the conditions of competition may differ 15.

aspects of its reasoning in a report submitted to the OECD on conglomerate mergers – (“Range Effects:
The United States Perspective” - http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/9550.pdf).
14
Antitrust Fall, 2001, Roundtable Discussion, pg 9
15
It may also arise if the jurisdictions belong to the same geographical market, but efficiencies differ across
jurisdictions and the authorities pursue a total welfare standard (which takes into account the profit of the
firms).

7
At the outset, it would appear this last source of divergence is unlikely to have played a
role in the case at hand, as both jurisdictions considered the relevant market as global.
Some observers have also suggested that capture by wider political interests is at the
source of divergence. In particular, it has been suggested that the US DoJ did not
undertake a thorough investigation of the merger under pressure from GE and the
incoming Bush Administration (see Kolasky, 2002 for a response). Meanwhile, the
European Commission was accused of acting in the narrow protectionist interests of
European companies and their member states (see DeQ. Briggs and Rosenblatt, 2001 for
a response).16

It is not clear however that one should give much credence to these suggestions. First,
regarding the claim that the DoJ did not undertake a proper investigation, it is worth
noting that while the major analysis in the US was done in a period after a number of
Clinton administration officials had departed the DoJ, 17 and the Bush appointees had not
arrived, a rigorous analysis was undertaken by the departments’ career staff in the Office
of Operations. The investigative team had in-depth knowledge of the aerospace industry,
having previously examined the merger of Honeywell and AlliedSignal. The DoJ retained
an external economist to assess the conglomerate effects doctrine with a track record
suggesting that he was unlikely to dismiss such effects off hand. 18

Second, regarding the claim that in challenging the merger, the European Commission
was acting in the narrow protectionist interests of European companies and their home
states, it is worth noticing that the major complainants in Europe included US firms such
as United Technologies and Rockwell Collins. These, as we have already seen, provided
significant elements of the Commissions case. Airbus, by contrast, appears not to have
opposed the deal. In addition, it does not seem that the Commission has a track record
suggesting that it favors EU firms in merger control,19 and we have not uncovered
evidence suggesting that this case is different from others in this respect.

16
For example, then US Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill stated that the decision was “off the wall” and the
Europeans were “meddling in things that one would think were outside their scope of attention” (Carney,
2001). Meanwhile, Senator Ernest Hollings, Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, sent a letter to
the EC accusing them of “an apparent double standard by swiftly approving mergers involving European
companies and holding up those of US groups. Its apparent EU disapproval gives credence to those who
suspect that the EU is using its merger review process as a tool to protect and promote European industry at
the expense of its US competitors.” (DeQ. Briggs and Rosenblatt, 2001)
17
For example, Joel Klein, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust had left for a position at the
Bertelsmann, while John Nannes the Acting Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust had to recuse himself.
(DeQ. Briggs and Rosenblatt, 2001).
18
Interestingly, the external expert was Professor Marius Schwartz who had previously served as the DoJ’s
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics and Economics Director of Enforcement during the
Clinton Administration. Schwartz had substantial research experience in vertical restraints and exclusionary
practices including having published research with Dr Robert Reynolds, co-author of the Archimedean
Leveraging theory. Source: Schwartz CV online at: www.georgetown.edu/faculty/schwarm2
19
A number of econometric studies have analysed the outcome of merger control in the EU, in particular
Lindsey and Williams (2003), Bergman et al. (2004) and Duso et al. (2003). These studies examine
different samples and use different methods. None of them uncovers evidence of a bias against non EU
firms.

8
Differences in legal standards between the US and the EU have been much discussed (see
for instance, Fox, 2002), both in terms of the substantive standard and in terms of the
standard of proof that agencies are held to. Differences in substantive standards are
probably such that the EU can be expected to prohibit mergers when the US may not, in
particular because the EU legal framework may give more weight to the fate of
competitors. But these differences are usually considered to be marginal. Similarly,
differences in judgment will only affect outcomes in relatively marginal cases20. There is
no clear indication either that agencies are held to different standards of proof, at least
formally, as both are supposed in a way or another to show that anti-competitive effects
would materialize “very probably” 21. Hence, in order to identify the importance that
capture (the third source of difference) may have played, a two pronged test can be
developed. First, is it that the decision taken by the DoJ was “marginal”? If not, it will
provide some (negative) evidence that capture may have played a role (competing
hypotheses being inconsistent with this observation). Second, is it that the Commission’s
analysis rests on firm grounds? In particular, is it that the weight the Commission has
attached to particular pieces of evidence appears well founded (relative to the DoJ). If
not, it will suggest that capture has indeed played a role.

Whether the decision taken by the DoJ can be seen as marginal is difficult to assess in a
systematic fashion; however, both the interviews with officials and lawyers involved as
well as the DoJ’s comments on the case (in particular in the context of the OECD)
suggest that the DoJ had a lot of confidence in its decision. The second question, namely
whether the Commission’s analysis rests on firm grounds can be assessed through a
detailed analysis of the Commission’s published decision. This is the object of the main
analytical section of this paper, which follows.

Part 2: Re-Examining the Commission’s Decision:

Overview of the Aerospace Market:

Jet Aircraft Engines:

As we have seen, General Electric is a manufacturer of jet aircraft engines. Its main
competitors are Rolls Royce of the UK and United Technologies (UTC), a US industrial
conglomerate, through its subsidiary Pratt & Whitney (P&W). The market is
concentrated between these three independent players. Manufacturers sometimes
compete to be the sole supplier of engines on each platform, in particular within the
Regional and Corporate Jet category (see below). However, for most large commercial

20
Assuming that both jurisdictions were exposed to a similar set of facts. This appears to be the case given
that the DoJ and the Commission had extensive contacts and debates from the very beginning of the
procedure (Source : interview with DoJ and Dg comp officials).
21
See Kolasky (2002) and Versterdof (2004) on the standard of proof in merger cases. Of course, the
significance of any particular standard of proof is largely determined by the standard of review that will
applied by Courts in case of an appeal. As discussed below, there are good reasons to believe that the
Commission was operation under an illusion with respect to standard of review that would apply in the
event of an appeal.

9
jets, the ultimate customer retains a choice of engines. 22 Therefore, the competitive
process in this area is two-stage. Firstly, the manufacturers compete to have their rival
engines certified on a new plane. Secondly, they have to further compete to persuade the
ultimate purchasers (airlines and leasers) to choose their engines over rivals, for the
planes they are purchasing. 23

Platforms can be broken down into 3 main categorizes based on aircraft size, and are used
in order to define segments in the engine market (as larger planes require more powerful
engines). The DoJ adopted a different approach based on the thrust of the engine itself.
This issue will be further discussed below. For the time being, we follow the approach of
the Commission. Each category is served by different aircraft manufacturers. (See
Appendix 2 for a complete breakdown of each category by manufacturer, aircraft model,
engine type and thrust).

1) Large Commercial Jets: In its decision, the Commission concentrated on the

market for large commercial aircraft which is dominated by the duopoly of Airbus
and Boeing. These can be sub-categorized into wide-bodied (twin aisle) and
narrow-bodied (single aisle) aircraft, based on the number of passengers and
mileage. The ultimate customers for these jets are airlines. Buyers from Airbus
and Boeing are either the airlines or leasing companies.
2) Regional Jet Aircraft: In the next segment, regional jet aircraft, there were four
manufacturers at the time of the decision, Bombardier, Fairchild Dornier,
Embraer and British Aerospace.24 Regional jets can be sub-divided into large and
small and are purchased by airlines, and in recent years, increasingly by leasing
companies. The Commission found that there was a “clear growing focus of
airlines on large regional jets …. demonstrated by the fact that such aircraft
constituted 14% of the European fleet in 1992 and 33% in 1998” (pg 8).
3) Corporate Jet Aircraft: In this category there are a greater number of
manufacturers including Gulfstream (General Dynamics), Raytheon, Dassault and
Lear (Bombardier) amongst others. The ultimate customers are corporations and
high net worth individuals. GE only manufactures one engine in this market, the
CF34.

22
A few platforms, most prominently the Boeing 737, sole source their engines (see Nalebuff, 2003 for a
discussion of the rational behind such exclusive agreements).
23
However, the 3 independent engine manufacturers have formed a number of joint ventures. Most
prominent of these is CFMI, a joint venture between GE and SNECMA, a state owned French industrial
firm (currently being privatized), which makes the CFM 56 engine. GE also has a joint venture with P&W,
the Engine Alliance. The other major joint venture is International Aero Engines (IAE), which was
established by P&W, Rolls Royce, MTU and Japanese Aero Engines. However, the Commission regards
the 3 major firms as controlling all joint ventures they participate in.
24
It should be noted that Fairchild Dornier subsequently went into bankruptcy and British Aerospace
withdrew from this segment, ceasing to manufacture the Avr o regional jet. Honeywell claimed that the
Commission knew this at the time and should not have placed emphasis on this model in finding horizontal
overlap in the engine market for large regional jets, as it was the only model for which Honeywell produced
an engine. This would have been in line with the exclusion of the Fokker 70 and 100 LRJs which are no
longer manufactured, and whose engines are solely supplied by Rolls Royce. Moreover, both GE and the
DoJ defined the market based on the thrust power of the engines, which excluded the engines for the Avro,
as their thrust was much lower than that of engines for other regional jets. See below for more details.

10
The Commission found GE to be dominant in the market for engines for large
commercial jets. It calculated market share based on current platforms and firm future
orders. It specifically excluded “aircraft that remain in service, but are no longer
manufactured” (pg 14). GE objected stating that the current installed base is not relevant
in isolation, and would not explain how it overtook the leadership position of Pratt &
Whitney in the 1980’s. P&W had an 80% market share in the 1960’s. In fact, it had a
90% market share as late as 1982 (Source: Back Associates Fleet Database, quoted in
Emch (2003)). The turn around in the engine market was based on Boeing’s launch of the
737 with GE/CFMI engines. The 737 went on to become the most successful aircraft in
history, selling 4,000 of 13,000 large commercial aircraft over 20 years (Emch, 2003).
Although, the first generation of 737s’ were fitted with P&W engines boosting its market
share, the second and third generation’s engines were sourced from GE/CFMI.

Therefore, it is clear that both GE and Rolls Royce emerged as competitive responses to
P&W’s market dominance in the 1960’s and 70’s. However, GE has failed to achieve
anything close to the same position P&W once enjoyed. Moreover, GE/CFMI is a joint
venture in which GE only receives half of the revenue stream, unlike P&W which
received 100% of all sales. This also suggests that even a 90% market share in an
industry with high entry barriers can be challenged (that is, even when competitors would
appear to be marginalized). Moreover, GE stated that the market was a bidding one
subject to constant competition, and market shares can be transitory, as the P&W case
entailed. The latter argument was ignored by the Commission (the issue is further
discussed below).

Non-Avionics and Avionics Markets:

Non-Avionics Products: These products include the basic components of an aircraft

including wheels, brakes, landing gear, auxiliary power units, lighting and environmental
controls.

Avionics: These products are employed to control the communication and navigation of
the aircraft, as well as monitor external flying conditions. The market divides into two
segments, large commercial aircraft (LCA) and regional corporate jets. Customers in the
LCA market are the airframe manufacturers and also airlines and leasing companies.
Avionics products are federated into a cockpit suite, which means that they can be chosen
or changed by airline and leasing customers. This is the basis for a further segmentation:

1) Buyer Furnished Equipment (BFE): These products are chosen by the

airlines. Standard avionics products tend to be buyer furnished. Such products
are multi-sourced, and the final products are selected from 2 or 3 certified
suppliers.
2) Supplier Furnished Equipment (SFE): Chosen by the airframe
manufacturer. Non-avionics products, (except those like wheels and brakes)

11
 are supplier furnished. The competition between rival suppliers takes place at
the time a new aircraft platform is being designed and developed.

However, for regional and corporate jets, avionics products are sold as part of an
integrated cockpit. Therefore, the ultimate customers have no choice over the products.

The Commission defined Honeywell as having a leading position in the supply of

aerospace components. In the avionics market, the EC calculates it holds a 50% market
share overall, followed by Rockwell Collins with 25%, Thales with 18% and Smi th
Industries with 3%.

In the non-avionics market, Honeywell competes against Hamilton Sundstrand (a

subsidiary of United Technologies), BF Goodrich and SNECMA.

Bidding Markets:

The question arises whether the markets for aircraft engines and components can be
characterized as “bidding market”, where competitors are required to repeatedly bid
against each other in order to win orders. In their investigation, the US authorities defined
it as such. According to Shapiro and Patterson (2001) to determine this, the DoJ
examined: (1) Whether multiple suppliers consistently entered the bidding contests to
supply platforms and subsequently airlines? They found that this was indeed the case
(Kolasky, 2002). (2) Did the customers determine that the competitors produced high
quality alternative products, which gave them a real choice. Again, the DoJ answered this
in the affirmative, after extensive surveys. Neither Boeing nor Airbus opposed the deal.25
(3) Are competing firms able to preserve their competitive advantages despite setbacks?
The DoJ found that this was indeed the case, and that GE’s competitors were thriving. In
the DoJ’s view, a high market share did not impact the ability of others to compete in
future, as buyers did not regard it as a proxy for quality. If it was, then GE would never
have been able to overtake Pratt & Whitney in market share. The nature of competition is
such that emphasis is on future competitions, not ones that have already been decided. (4)
Is the bidding process vigorous, with multiple rounds of bidding that force down prices?
The DoJ found that this was the case, and significant discounts were necessary to win
orders. The European Commission confirmed this, but defined the discounts as evidence
of the scope for anti-competitive practices on GE’s part, rather than evidence of vigorous
competition in the marketplace. 26 (5) Where all competitors winning orders on a regular
basis? As Kolasky (2002) states, “empirically, what we found when we examined the
markets in which GE already competes, was that GE’s engine rivals are both investing
just as heavily as GE in developing their next generation of engines and have had no
difficulty in raising capital to finance that effort.” Overall, Platt Majoras (2001)27 states
25
However, a number of the airframer’s customers did, although Lufthansa was the only airline to air its
complaints openly.
26
The Commission states, “These heavy discounting practices actually resulted in moving the break-even
point of an engine project further away from the commercial launch of a platform”.
27
Deborah Platt Majoras, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Anti-trust at the time of the decision, now
Chairwomen of the Federal Trade Commission. Quote from speech made to the Anti-trust Section of the
Georgia State Bar in 2001.

12
that there was no evidence “supporting the EU finding that Rolls Royce and Pratt &
Whitney were no longer in a position to constrain GE’s behaviour”. These findings
fundamentally undermine the market foreclosure argument put forward by the EC.

Therefore, in its approach, the Commission would appear to have ignored the dynamics
of the market itself, and focused purely on market share, and a controversial definition at
that (see above).28

Unbundling Bundling:

Having established GE’s market dominance, the Commission then turned to the issue of
bundling. There are two different types of bundling. Firstly, mixed bundling involves the
sale of two products tied together as well as the sale of stand alone components. Mixed
bundling can be incomplete if only one of the components, typically the tied good (in
which the seller does not have a dominant position), is sold independently of the other.
This is normally referred to as tying. The second type of bundling is pure bundling,
where the 2 products are tied, and neither is available separately. (See Nalebuff, 2003 for
more on these definitions). The type of bundling emphasized by the Commission was
mixed bundling29.

Bundling: The Theory: In principle, bundling will allow sellers to undertake some
profitable price discrimination. This arises because customers’ valuation for the bundle
may vary less than their valuation for individual items. As a result, the pricing of a
bundle can escape, to some extent, the problem of any firm facing customers with
different valuations (a demand curve) such that an increase in price will increase
revenues from customers with high valuation, but lose the custom of those with low
valuations. Bundling will increase profit, but it is not clear that welfare will fall and
some customers will typically be better off.

28
The Commission has defined bidders markets in previous cases such as Pirelli/BICC (2000) – there it
defined it as where “tenders take place infrequently, while the value of each individual contract is usually
very significant. Contracts are usually awarded to a single successful bidder (so-called “winner-takes-all”
principle). Strong incentives therefore exist for all for all competitors to bid aggressively for each contract”
(quoted from Shapiro and Patterson, 2001). The Commission has argued that in GE Honeywell it did not
define the market as a bidders one because of structural features such as high entry barriers, commonality
issues and the resource differentials of the players. The EC regards bidding markets to be more important to
cases of collective dominance, than simple dominance. (Source: Interviews with the Merger Task Force
Team members – Brussels).
29
The Commission has found tying illegal where a firm holds a dominant position in relation to one of the
products. See Hilti AG vs. Comm’n, Case C-53/92P, 1994 E.C.R I-667 (CJ), which relates to a German
manufacturer of nail guns who attempted to exclude independent producers of nails for it products via tying
the sale of its guns to its nails. The Commission has also found (complete) mixed bundling illegal when
undertaken by firms who occupy dominant market positions. For example, Hoffman-La Roche v. Comm’n,
Case 85/76, 1979 E.C.R. 461 (CJ) and Michelin NV v. Comm’n, Case 322/81, 1983 E.C.R. 2461 (CJ). In
the latter case, the European Court of Justice declared that “no discount should be granted (by a dominant
firm) unless linked to a genuine cost reduction in the manufacturers costs”. Mixed bundling was a key
element of the EC’s case, particularly in the Statement of Objections (May, 2001). The EC placed some
emphasis on pure bundling as theoretical future behavior by the merged parties in relation to new
generations of aircraft.

13
When bundling involves complements, a second effect comes into play. Complementary
products are such that a fall in the price of one product will increase the demand for both;
for instance, a decrease in the price of an engine will make planes more affordable and
will thus increase demand for avionics as well as engines. When different firms sell the
different components, they will not take this into account. For instance, a seller of
engines will set its price considering only the effect that a change in price will have on
the sale of engines. When complements are sold by the same firm, the matter is different.
When pricing engines, the firm will also consider the effect that a fall in price will have
on demand for avionics, besides engines. As a result, prices will be lower30. This is the
so called Cournot effect ; profits will increase but, since prices fall, consumers will also
be better off . 31 Note that in those circumstances, pricing can be seen as more
“efficient”. 32

The Cournot effect is strongest with firms implement pure bundling and faces no
competition. In the presence of competitors and mixed bundling matters are different. In
the presence of competition, it is not clear that bundling will be profitable: lower prices
for the bundle may trigger a response from competitors such that bundling is not
attractive. Mixed bundling in the presence of competition may or may not be attractive
depending on particular features of demand and in particular on the extent to which the
decrease in the price of the bundle enlarges aggregate demand (as opposed to shifting
market share). However, bundling will also typically be more profitable when it
involves a large number of components. This arises because of a Counot effect in
“reverse” ; in lowering its price to lure away consumer of the bundle, the manufacturer
of any given component will produce a large external benefit to manufacturers of other
components. Indeed, as he switches away from the bundle, each consumer will have to
choose a variety of components. This external effects will not be internalized and lead to
higher prices (a weaker response) by competitors. Overall, if the profitability of
bundling is somewhat uncertain, bundling will generally tend to lower the demand faced
by competitors in each market. They can expect to suffer both because of lower prices,
and because bundling allows for some price discrimination (which effectively enhances
the bundling firms’ ability to extract profits from buyers) 33. The extent to which they
will suffer is however dependent upon may parameters and modeling assumptions.

30
Note that in the presence of two monopolies, coordination of prices will suffice. With competitors in
either market, pricing coordination will not suffice as some of the benefit of lower prices in one market will
accrue to competitors in the market. Bundling is then necessary to make sure that the stimulation of
demand in the second market accrues to the firm selling the two items.
31
This effect was first pointed out by the 19th century French economist Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801-
1877). Cournot analyzed the effect on prices of merging producers of complementary products, for
example, copper and zinc used to produce brass in his illustration (see Cournot, 1838). He found that if two
monopoly producers of complementary products coordinated their pricing via a merger, not only would the
aggregate price of the products fall, but the combined corporate entity would increase both revenues and
profitability. Cournot’s model involved t wo monopolists producing single products and selling to a
fragmented customer base producing brass.
32
This issue will be further discussed below.
33
GE went to substantial lengths to show that it was not free to act without regard to competitors or
customers. However, ironically if the parties had monopolistic positions, the result on consumer welfare of
the merger would have clearly been positive via an increased consumer surplus (see Nalebuff, 2003) – i.e.
in the simplistic Cournot model – price for consumers would simply fall and stay at this lower level.

14
These effects also rely on the assumption that firms set a single price for their products.
Yet, there are no list prices in the aerospace industry. Very powerful buyers, Boeing,
Airbus and the airlines individually negotiate prices. Meanwhile, the vendors themselves
have significant information about the buyers’ preferences. Both of these factors aid
price negotiations, which precede the sale of products. In those circumstances, bundling
is obviously less attractive. It does not help in terms of reducing the heterogeneity of
buyers facing a single price, as individual prices are set for each deal. In addition, it does
not help in terms of exploiting the Cournot effect: firms will not obtain additional rents
from stimulating demand across products simply because competitors (who also negotiate
with the individual buyers) will force the price down to their marginal cost on individual
components. All the firm can obtain is the rent associated with customers’ particular
preference for each of its product, whether they are bundled or not.

In those circumstances, the transfer of profits from competitors to GE is small, as the

buyer already had a preference for GE products which limited rivals sales. Moreover,
bundling has the least effect where rivals are the preferred supplier for both engines and
avionics products. Where the buyer has a preference for one GE product and the other
from a rival, it is unlikely they will choose the bundle, as there is substantial evidence
that components are chosen on a “best of breed” basis.

Hence, the consequences of mixed bundling are highly dependent upon particular
circumstances, and a stylized economic model can hardly provide conclusive evidence.
Both the models presented to the Commission by Frontier Economics and Professor Jay
Pil Choi34 on behalf of Rolls Royce and by Professor Barry Nalebuff35 for GE are highly
stylized and they have not even been calibrated to actual data. For example, the Rolls
Royce model only has 2 competitors and 2 products. Whether there is actually an
economic incentive to bundle in the aerospace industry can hardly be inferred from these
exercises, nor can buyer and competitor responses and the possible losses to competitors.
To model bundling realistically, one needs to know the number of items in the bundle,
the total market demand elasticity, the preferences of each customer, the supplier’s
degree of awareness of these preferences and how much these preferences are likely to
shift over time due to exogenous shocks (Nalebuff, 2003). Estimates of these parameters
are naturally surrounded with much uncertainty (and all the more so because their
development needs to be anticipated). When the US authorities examined these same
issues they found that “such conduct is best addressed if and when it occurs, rather than
ex ante, at the time of the merger when we have none of the facts we would need to
determine whether the conduct, if it even occurs, would in fact be anti-
competitive”(Kolasky, 2002).

Bundling: The Practice: This leaves us to examine current practice. The Commission
put forward evidence that Honeywell had engaged in bundling, backed up by evidence
from Rockwell Collins. However, in its decision to clear the Honeywell AlliedSignal
merger, the Commission’s case team found that bundling was not a widespread practice

34
Professor of Economics, Michigan State University.
35
Professor of Economics, Yale School of Management.

15
in the avionics and non-avionics markets.36 They found that the characteristics of the
industry are such that bundling is difficult. This was because:

1) As stated above, there are no list prices for products and transactions are individually
negotiated. Buyers choose the best product on technical specifications.
2) The procurement process is long.
3) Concentrated and powerful buyers are able to play sellers off against one another.
4) Suppliers regularly re-price all products over a 2 month period.

The Commission stated that Honeywell had engaged in a number of multi-product bids
which were bundles by another name. However, the bundle discounts were small
(Nalebuff, 2003), and customers were able to break-up the packages, picking “best of
breed”, whilst still able to retain the bundle discount. Therefore, if bundling was taking
place, it clearly was not very effective in displacing buyers away from competitors.

The Commission presented confidential evidence of a number of “multi-product bids” by

Honeywell, which they claimed proved that despite the hurdles, bundling is possible. In
the original decision (see pages 127 – 130), the Commission gives a number of examples
such as a bid for a US airline by AlliedSignal, where extended warranties were offered
for purchasing two products together. We are not told by the Commission what
AlliedSignal’s competitors were offering, the value of the extended warranties or if the
bid was successful (in whole or in part), so it is almost impossible to draw any
conclusions from this example. One other example is offered, where more products were
offered in a bundle, although again the value of the discounts is not made clear, nor
whether the bundle was purchased in whole or in part. 37

The above examples relate to large commercial jet aircraft. The Commission goes on to
present examples of bundling in the area of corporate jets. In one example, the airframer
requested a bundle for non-avionic components, having already selected Honeywell as
the avionics supplier. Again, the facts are limited, and we are not informed of the
outcome. Subsequent investigation by the authors demonstrates that although, according
to the Commission, the manufacturer requested a bundle for non-avionics systems
including ECS, APU, electrical systems and wheels/brakes, the firm was not successful
in selling the entire bundle.38 While Honeywell was chosen to supply the ECS and AP U,
Hamilton Sunstrand (UTC) supplied the electrical system and ABSC the brakes/wheels.
This example would seem to demonstrate the industry practice of unbundling bundles,
and selecting components on a “best of breed” basis, whilst retaining substantial
discounts.

36
The unit of the Merger Task Force headed by Enrique Gonzalez Diaz which investigated GE/Honeywell
was different from the one that dealt with Honeywell/AlliedSignal. In the US the same DoJ team dealt with
both.
37
One is tempted to presume that if these “multi-product bids” had been accepted by the airlines, the
Commission would make it very clear that this was evidence that bundling was being practiced in the
aerospace market. As it stands, these cases are forwarded as evidence that “bundling is feasible” (page
127).
38
Source: Confidential correspondence with the manufacturer – on file with author.

16
Ultimately, the Commission only presents one case, of a mid-size corporate jet, in which
bundling (admittedly of engines and avionics) can be said to have taken place
successfully.

Moreover, the complaints of 2 rival components manufacturers, UTC and Litton,

maintained that bundling didn’t take place.39 The EC also omitted vital evidence from
Embraer, other OEMs and 5 airlines stating that bundling didn’t occur. Airbus gave
evidence that it breaks down all components and examines each on its merits. Also
Boeing and Bombardier require bids to be itemized. Airbus’s policy is to maintain
“dynamic competition”. In fact, its CEO Noel Forgeard stated in a letter to the
Commission that the company did not oppose the transaction, and that GE/HW were
important, but not dominant, and competitors were gaining ground. He went on to state
that Airbus own strategies could deal with any anti-competitive threats should they
arise.40

Ignoring this evidence, the Commission goes on to speculate that the merger would then
allow GE to bundle engines with avionics and non-avionics components. However,
where GE is a sole source engine supplier, for example on the Boeing 737, the customers
negotiate the purchase of the plane with Boeing, giving GE no room to attempt to bundle
other components.41 Moreover, on multi-source platforms, the engines are chosen a
significant period before the avionics and non-avionics components. Again, this makes it
impractical to bundle.42 While GE could offer a subsequent discount on avionics, this is
a problematic process, since the subsequent pricing of components is not based on
official price lists, but is negotiated. As Nalebuff (2003, pg 37) states, “all prices are
negotiated so a discount off the list price has no bite. One person can’t promise to give
the other party a better deal in future negotiations, as there is no baseline against which
to measure what makes a better deal.”

However, even if bundling becomes a common future practice, the Commission takes no
account of strategic counter moves by competitors. For example, even if competitors
were reluctant to offer counter-bundles, possibly due to the negotiating hurdles relating to
which partner would cut prices more or unwillingness of current managers to give up
power in a merger, it is likely the market would require them too (i.e. negotiations with
Boeing and Airbus would effectively concentrate their minds, as may their institutional

39
Source: Oral arguments at 25th May 2004 Honeywell hearing in Luxembourg.
40
In a breach of procedure, the Airbus letter was never revealed to the parties or the Commission’s
advisory committee prior to the decision. The summary of the letter above is based on the limited contents
revealed during the appeal hearings at the Court of First Instance. The Commission has argued that the
contents of the letter were manipulated by GE. As evidence they point to Forgeard’s admission in the letter
that from Airbus position, “remedies could be negotiated”, as heavily indicative of the strength of their case
(Source: Interviews with Merger Task Force Team members).
41
As stated above, Boeing pre-negotiated an engine pricing deal with GE to protect its customers
(Nalebuff, 2003).
42
The Commission presents some evidence that selection timelines are flexible enough to allow bundling
to take place. However, again the only conclusive example is the mid-size corporate jet, for which
Honeywell bundled avionics and engines.

17
shareholders).43 The end result of competition between bundles, again assuming bundling
is economically viable, would be unambiguously good for customers and consumers.
Such an outcome may have driven Airbus endorsement of the deal.

It is also important to note that even if competitors would not offer counter bundles, the
extension of the product line over which bundling occurs, while increasing the
attractiveness of bundling, would also reduce the extent to which competitors would be
affected. Indeed, bundling can then easily lead to an increase in all prices. That may not
be attractive from the point of view of consumers but indicates that the Commission’s
concern, that competitors would be marginalized, would become irrelevant. This
observation further emphasizes that the presumption such that competitors would be
marginalized is not robust and accordingly cannot be presumed.

After the publication of its Statement of Objections on May 8, 2001, the Commission
began to downplay the bundling arguments, instead relying on a broader theory of
Archimedean Leveraging. 44

Archimedean Leveraging:

The role of GE’s aircraft leasing company, GE Capital Aviation Services (GECAS) is at
the heart of the final decision to block the merger. This division of GE engages in a
number of transactions with airlines. A large percentage of its business relates to
leaseback agreements, whereby airlines sell planes they already own to GECAS and then
lease them back. These transactions improve airline balance sheets, and create tax and
depreciation benefits. However, GECAS has no influence over the choice of aircraft in
the deals, as these have already been purchased by the airline. Therefore, the Commission
concentrated on the speculative purchases of new aircraft by GECAS. This is where the
leaser purchases planes for which it does not have a final customer. It then looks to lease
these to airlines with short operating leases (usually 8-9 years, Emch (2003)). Such a
transaction allows the airline to lower its risk profile and may be efficient because GE is
better able to bear the risk. Ultimately, consumers may benefit.

Archimedean Leveraging:The Theory: As stated earlier, the Commission believed that

substantial engine market share shifting to GE had been driven by GECAS “GE only”
policy in the speculative purchase market. The EC also feared that this policy would be
extended to Honeywell components, hence further transforming a leading market position
into a dominant one, leading to or re-enforcing market foreclosure. This was a theory put
forward by Reynolds and Ordover (2002) on behalf of United Technologies. This theory
of “pivotal” or “Archimedean” leveraging is built around the following elements; assume

43
It’s an interesting question as to whether the Commission should concern itself with the fates of
managers who forego pro-competitive, value enhancing mergers at the expense of shareholders, to retain
there own positions. Moreover, it is ironic, as Kolasky (2002) points out, that the Commission downplays
the effectiveness of joint ventures as a competitive response, whilst describing in detail how the CFMI JV
between GE and SNECMA has been so successful.
44
This switch in emphasis was criticized by the Financial Times. “More than once Commissioner Monti
allowed his officials radically to shift ground for their objections, creating the unfortunate impression that
EU anti-trust policy was being made on the hoof.” (Hill and Done, 2001).

18
that a firm is present both as a supplier of components to manufacturers (Airbus/Boeing)
and as a buyer (GECAS) of final products from these manufacturers. This buyer is,
however, not a final user of the products. It packages the aircraft with a financing scheme
and sells the packages to final users (airlines). Final users can alternatively buy the
aircraft themselves and obtain financing from different sources (these alternatives being
substitutes for one another). Assume further that the manufacturers choose the
components (hence, components are supplier furnished equipment – SFE – or embedded)
and a single brand of component is selected for each model produced by the manufacturer
(choices of components are once and for all and exclusive). Finally, assume that final
users are rather indifferent to the choice of the component made by the manufacturers (in
other words, there is little product differentiation among them).

Consider the purchasing policy of the integrated firm. Faced with two aircrafts sold at the
same price, one with its components and one with other components, it will naturally
choose the former, as a purchase of this product will also increase the profit of its
affiliate, unless of course, its choice triggers changes among other buyers which reduce
demand for its components. More generally, faced with a given price for the aircraft, the
integrated company will choose to charge a lower price towards airlines for its bundle as
it has a higher margin on each aircraft sold (unless there is a compensating change in the
behavior of other buyers).45 Hence, the integrated firm will have a higher demand for
aircraft (at a given price of the aircraft) if they include its component. Assuming that the
price of financing airlines can obtain when they organize their own is fixed, aggregate
demand increases.

Consider now the behavior of the intermediate manufacturers. In the absence of

integration between a buyer and an upstream component supplier, it would select
components solely in terms of prices. Faced with an integrated firm, manufacturers will
as indicated above, face a larger aggregate demand for their product. Hence, they will
find it more profitable (at given prices for the components) to produce an aircraft which
includes the component of the integrated firm. 46 Prices for the components however, need
not be constant; one would indeed expect that the competitors will charge a lower price.
Assume, to fix ideas, that the integrated firm does not change its price (an assumption
which is favorable to the competitors). In order to convince manufacturers to choose
their components, they would have to charge a price which compensates manufacturers
for the increased sales which are triggered by the choice of the component produced by
the integrated firm. Given the value of the components relative to that of the aircraft,
they may not be in a position to do so.

As told, the theory of “pivotal” leveraging relies on extreme assumptions and in

particular the assumption that components are not differentiated. In those circumstances,
even a small presence of the integrated firm as a downstream buyer will change the
behavior of the manufacturer. This assumption, at least in such extreme form, is
probably not consistent with the facts; it implies, in particular that the prices of the

45
This is, in essence, a Cournot effect again, as the integrated firm considers an external effect across
complements (components and financing).
46
And may also increase the price of the aircraft.

19
components should be driven to marginal cost. Given the importance of fixed costs in the
development of components, this would in turn imply that firms make losses in the
component market, which cannot be an equilibrium situation. The question then arises
to what extent “pivotal” leveraging still operates when there is some product
differentiation in the component market. Product differentiation will clearly reduce the
extent to which the choice of component will be affected by integration (moving away
from this would otherwise be an optimal choice and will be costly for the manufacturers)
but should not annul it altogether, and it makes integration less attractive but not
necessarily unprofitable. Pivotal leveraging also works in the example above even if the
integrated firm has a small presence in the downstream market. At the extreme, any shift
in aggregate demand can tilt the choice of the manufacturer. When there is some product
differentiation among components, the magnitude of the shift, and hence the market
presence of the integrated firm in the downstream market, will matter. Hence, whether
pivotal leveraging can work in more realistic circumstances, is inherently an empirical
question. At the same time, the specificity of this construct is such that it can hardly be
presumed.

In order to give some credence to pivotal leveraging, the Commission considered the
effect that GECAS had with respect to the choice of engines. Engines are typically not
supplier furnished (embedded) and hence do not fit with the assumptions of the model
underlying pivotal leveraging, but the Commission found it informative. Indeed, if
GECAS was able to substantially shift purchases of buyer furnished equipment like
engines, one would expect that it would a fortiori be in a position to do so with a SFE. In
the context of BFE, suppliers will not be exclusivity upstream. The integrated firm can
nonetheless affect the relative position of these suppliers through its own purchasing
policy, like a GE only policy for engines fitted on aircrafts bought by GECAS.

Archimedean Leveraging:The Practice: Some debate first arose with respect to the
market share of GECAS. As Gotz Drauz, (then head of the merger task force) (2002, pg
194), states in his subsequent defense of the decision, “GECAS is the largest purchaser of
new aircraft, ahead of any individual airline and or other leasing company. GECAS is
also reported to have the largest single fleet of aircraft in service, as well as the largest
share of aircraft on order and options”. However, he neglects to mention GECAS low
market share in a fragmented and competitive market.

The EC states GECAS market share as approximately 10% 47. However, Nalebuff (2003)
argues that this overstates the figure. He gives evidence that it is closer to 7% over the
last 5 years as GECAS aircraft purchases are irregular, and it often has to clear a backlog.
In dollar terms GECAS market share is below 6%, as a third of its fleet are regional
aircraft (which are 30% – 50% cheaper than narrow body large commercial aircraft).
Overall, other leasers accounted for 16% of the market, and the airlines approximately
77%. (See graph in Appendix 3). If you determine market share via engine purchases
between 1996 and 2000, GECAS is in second place behind International Lease Finance

47
The 10% figure relates to both the large commercial and large regional jet aircraft markets.

20
Corporation (ILFC), which is owned by AIG. 48 Even if you attribute a 50% plus market
share in engines to GE, it would be extremely hard to tip the market with GECAS 6% -
10% market share, although not necessarily impossible.

Moreover, this is before factoring in the dynamic behavior of leasing competitors which,
although fragmented, have twice GECAS market share. Then there are also the
competitive responses of engine and aerospace component rivals, the air-framers and
airlines. Therefore, the Commission failed to undertake an equilibrium analysis.

Evidence has also been put forward that leasing competitors have moved away from GE
engines. In calculating market shares, you should only include platforms where
GE/CFMI competes head-to-head with other engine manufacturers. This excludes the
Boeing 737 for which GE/CFMI is the sole supplier, and the Boeing 757, where
customers can only choose between Rolls Royce and Pratt & Whitney engines. In the
period after GECAS started making speculative purchases of large commercial aircraft
(1996 to 2000), GE/CFMI’s engine market share to leasing companies actually fell from
52.3% to 50.6% on competitive platforms. Overall GE’s market share did increase, but
this was based on the fact that the leasing market expanded rapidly in the late 1990’s, and
so leasing companies market share compared to that of airline purchases also expanded
(from 13.5% to 28%). Many airlines chose to lease rather than buy outright. 49 Ultimately,
one transaction substituted for the other.

However, on competitive platforms, GECAS leasing rivals clearly shifted their purchases
away from GE, so on balance GE’s share of sales to leasers fell slightly (i.e. the “GE
only” policy did not deliver enough extra engine sales to cover the strategic shift away
from GE by competitors). ILFC, GECAS largest rival dramatically altered its purchases
of GE engines on competitive platforms. It dropped these from 58% in 96/97 to 25% in
98/99. Overall, from 1996 to 2000, all GECAS leasing rivals dropped their share from
53% to 29% (Source: GE/Nalebuff submission to the Commission). The US DoJ found
similar evidence of rivals shifting away from GE (see Kolasky, 2002, page 18).

All of this conflicts with the evidence presented by Reynolds and Ordover, who present 2
control groups (scheduled airlines and leasers). They find that in the airline group, GE
engine purchases fell from 50% to 45% from 1996, while in the leaser group they rose
from 40% to 60%. Firstly, the control groups encompass wide and narrow body
commercial aircraft (while large regional jets are mixed in with some of the calculations
as Emch (2003) points out). The model assumes that other factors affecting orders such
as pricing, aircraft quality, availability and commonality issues have no bearing, and are
static over time. Moreover, as noted above, it fails to recognize that airlines are customers
in both groups, and constantly substitute between buy and lease decisions. Thus, airlines
leasing GE powered planes rather than purchase them outright cannot be counted toward
share shifting (see Nalebuff (2003) and Emch (2003)). Overall, the only evidence that can

48
American International Group (AIG) is one of the world’s largest insurance companies with a current
market capitalization of $185 billion (21 June, 2004).
49
It should also be noted that the late 1990’s witnessed the rise of low cost carriers, which relied on leasing
a greater number of their planes.

21
be found is that GECAS has been able to increase the number of GE powered planes
leased by smaller airlines50. The period over which this increase occurred also witnessed
the rise of low cost carriers across the globe. If GE is leasing planes to many of these
(particularly on shorter leases), one cannot also exclude that it is the result of GE’s
superior ability to manage these risks.

As indicated earlier, the Commission also fails to mention that there are legitimate
strategic reasons for a “GE only” policy for engines. These include confidentiality and
publicity issues surrounding purchases from rivals. Moreover, Nalebuff, GE’s economic
advisor states that the policy allows GECAS to differentiate itself from leasing rivals via
product mix. Such a policy has clearly been accelerated by leasing competitors, and such
non-price competition is positive from the industry perspective. The evidence above
shows that while GECAS is “GE only”, ILFC and other leasing competitors have leaned
toward Rolls Royce and Pratt & Whitney in recent years.

To provide further evidence of market tipping toward GE, the Commission also
highlighted the Large Regional Jet (LRJ) market, and cases of 3 manufacturers,
Bombardier, Embraer and Fairchild Dornier, who had chosen GE as sole engine supplier
on their LRJ platforms. This is admittedly a situation which is closer to the assumptions
of the model underpinning pivotal leveraging, as engine choices are in this case once, for
all and exclusive. GECAS has placed large aircraft orders with all 3 companies in 2000. 51
However, the Commission neglected to mention that GECAS only started making
speculative purchases of LRJs well after the engines had been selected. For example, the
Bombardier engine was selected in 1994, Fairchild Dornier in 1998 52 and Embraer in
June 1999. GECAS only received board approval to make speculative purchases, based
on two independent studies of the LRJ market, after June 2000. 53 These findings were
backed up by the US Department of Justice investigation which examined each deal in
detail (Kolasky, 2002). Their investigation found that in the early 1990’s no currently
available engine was suitable for the next generation of Large Regional Jets. GE took a
gamble by producing a larger version of its CF 34 engine. This ultimately paid off when
the market for LRJs turned out to be larger than expected. Fairchild Dornier and Embraer
rushed to enter the market, where GE had the only readily available engine.

As indicated above, the Commission feared that pivotal leveraging would take place with
respect to Honeywell components, hence further transforming a leading market position
into a dominant one, leading to or re-enforcing market foreclosure. Such pivotal
leveraging would first hardly be profitable in the case of non exclusive buyer furnished
equipment. Indeed, the cost of an exclusive Honeywell policy would be large: for GE to

50
Most of the share shifting was to small scheduled and non-scheduled airlines who required narrow body
planes, not the major carriers. Narrow body aircraft equaled 81% of leasing companies orders (1988 to
2000). (Emph, 2003).
51
GECAS bought 50 LRJs from each, with an option for 100 more.
52
The Fairchild Dornier Large Regional Jet was cancelled when the Company went into bankruptcy post-
September 11th 2001.
53
After evidence of this was presented in the hearing pre the statement of objections, an affidavit from a
United Technologies executive who had previously worked for one of the LRJ manufacturers, had to be
withdrawn (source: Welch and Byrne (2001)).

22
do this, they would have to jeopardize tens of millions of engine and leasing profits to
gain tens or at most hundreds of thousands of dollars of components profits. The end
customers for speculative purchases have some power. If GECAS buys aircraft with lots
of components that customers don’t want, it will hurt its own business model as it is
likely to be left with planes on its books that nobody wants, as customers can easily go to
ILFC which also engages in speculative purchases. As discussed above, it is also highly
debatable whether GECAS has actually been able to successfully shift significant engine
market share, and it is not clear it would have been easier in the component market. It is
worth noticing from this perspective that there are no aircraft that have all Honeywell
components (Nalebuff, 2003).

With respect to embedded exclusive components, the Commission received substantial

evidence from Airbus, Boeing and Bombardier that they choose avionics and non-
avionics components on “best of breed” technical specifications. In fact, the Reynolds
and Ordover (2002) model does not take product differentiation or mix into account in
direct contradiction to the evidence presented by the airframe manufacturers.54 As
mentioned above, if components were undifferentiated, it begs the question of how the
manufacturers sustain their margins over time, and why they reinvest into R&D for the
next generation of components. If these facts were indeed true, then with or without the
GE Honeywell merger, a number of suppliers would likely be heading out of the
components space (either via bankruptcy or acquisition). This was one of the findings of
the DoJ’s outside economics expert Marius Schwartz of Georgetown University, which
led them to dismiss the model.55 The Reynolds and Ordover model also ignores the fact
that airframe manufacturers face switching costs from their current preferred component
suppliers, which are a mixture of Honeywell and other competitors. This would also
indicate that the products are differentiated.

The Role of GE Capital:

Another fundamental element of the EC’s case, allied with the bundling and GECAS
arguments, related to GE Capital (GEC). This is the financial services division of General
Electric, which accounted for 40% plus of GE’s earnings at the time. 56 Drauz, in his

54
The Commission implicitly admits products are differentiated, arguing that competitors would be
disadvantaged in future competition because, due to market tipping, they would lack R&D funds to produce
future components that would be sufficiently differentiated from competitors. In fact, the only evidence the
EC presents for this is the evidence of a Honeywell competitor, Rockwell Collins. As noted above, the
Company claimed that it would be forced to exit from either its avionics or non-avionics product lines. The
same evidence was given to the US authorities, although clearly dismissed by them. This might have been
based on the fact that, according to Jack Welch (2001), “competitors were viewing the European review
process as a way to extort a goodie bag of Honeywell assets.” Interestingly, Thales, a French avionics
competitor who had lobbied strongly against the deal in Brussels, withdrew its complaints from the appeal
process when divestiture was obviously no longer an option.
55
Sources: Emch (2003) and interview with Marius Schwarz, May 2004.
56
The Commission points out that if GE Capital were an independent company, it would be in the top 20 of
the Fortune 500. GEC’s revenue contribution has subsequently fallen due to acquisitions including
Universal from Vivendi and Amersham. A secondary benefit of the Honeywell acquisition for GE, was that
it decreased GEC’s revenue/earnings contribution (from approximately 40% at the time). In fact, the

23
reiteration of the Commission’s arguments (2002, pg 193) characterizes GE as “a rather
unique company”, and GE Capital was part of “GE’s toolkit for dominance” which would
be extended to Honeywell. As GE retains a triple AAA credit rating lowering the cost of
capital, the Commission argued that this allows it to “take more risks in product
development programs” (Drauz, 2002). Moreover, by providing increased investment and
competition in the aerospace market, GE has also “increased its competitor’s needs to
resort to external financial means further raising their leverage and resulting borrowing
costs, GE made its competitors – most of which are specialized single- product
companies – very much vulnerable to any down cycle or strategic mistake” (Drauz,2002).
GE Capital’s strengths allow GE to provide “significant financial support” to airframe
manufacturers, and obtain exclusivity for GE engines.

The Commission’s approach here can be seen as an “efficiency offense”, as it expresses

concern about the consequences for competitors of GE’s low cost of capital, which
presumably reflects the GE’s efficiency in investing internal funds. Low cost of capital
was indeed seen by the US authorities as a “source of efficiency, just like any other
valuable asset, be it machinery, knowledge or management skills. Cheap capital serves to
lower prices and promote innovation”. (Platt Majoras, 2001). As Kolasky (2002) states,
“this is the first time I remember seeing a triple AAA bond rating treated as an anti-trust
no-no” (page 14). Implying that a firm’s cost of capital is too low is quite a novel
approach, since the main beneficiaries of low costs are most often consumers.

We further discuss below the source of GE’s efficiency in investing internal funds and
the extent to which the efficiency of Honeywell’s operations could have been increased.
In what follows, we focus on the possible anti-competitive consequences of an
improvement in Honeywell’s efficiency. In particular, the Commission suggests that
Honeywell’s competitors would face higher borrowing costs.

From this perspective, it is worth noticing that a number of GE and Honeywell’s

competitors are beneficiaries of state guarantees 57, a fact which is overlooked by the
Commission. For example, Thales, the French avionics manufacturer which was one of
the most vocal opponents of the deal in Brussels,58 is a publicly listed company
controlled by the French government thorough its shareholding and golden share (see
Appendix 4). The latter mechanism has been ruled in violation of European law by the

Commission mentions this fact (paragraph 241), and seems to imply that GE was not being effectively
regulated.

“US banking organizations are generally required by law to be operated in a “safe and sound”
manner and are subject to extensive regulation, supervision and periodic examination by the
relevant regulatory authorities that for example restrict them to strict lending
restrictions/prohibitions on transactions involving affiliates.”

However, one would think that these were issues for the US banking and financial markets regulators,
rather than European anti-trust authorities.
57
This is clearly not the case of GE, as much of its low cost debt stems from deploying its triple AAA
rating in the highly liquid US Commercial Paper markets. See GE 2002 Annual Report: Consolidated
Financial Statements: Note 18 at - http://www.ge.com/ar2002/financial/notes/note18.jsp
58
See Welch and Bryne (2001).

24
European Court of Justice.59 Therefore, the firm receives, at the very least, an implicit
government guarantee of its debt, which at the time was triple A rated. Moreover,
Boullion Finance, a leasing competitor, is a Seattle based division of West LB, the
German Landesbank, which has benefited for a decade from illegal state guarantees and
subsidies 60.

In addition, Kolasky (2002) states that in the DoJ’s investigation of the deal,
“empirically, what we found when we examined the markets in which GE already
competes, was that GE’s engine rivals are both investing just as heavily as GE in
developing their next generation of engines and have had no difficulty in raising capital
to finance that effort.”

Horizontal Issues and Vertical Restraints:

Having based the main tenants of its case on “portfolio or range effects”, the Commission
returned to the more conventional anti-trust territory of horizontal effects and vertical
restraints. It found horizontal overlap in large regional and medium corporate jet engi ne
markets and power systems. The EC also highlighted issues of vertical restraints related
to Honeywell’s role as the sole manufacturer and supplier of component engine starters to
Rolls Royce. GE and Honeywell forwarded a number of divestiture remedies, which
obviously became irrelevant when the Commission blocked the merger based on
portfolio effects. However, the important question remains as to why the US anti-trust
authorities did not seek similar remedies on these horizontal and vertical issues.

Conflicting market definitions: Thrust vs. Seats: The reason the US Department of
Justice found no horizontal overlap in the engine market for Large Regional Jets, was that
it segmented it via the thrust power of the engines on the various platforms, as opposed to
the number of seats and costs used by the EC. 61 Therefore, the US authorities divided the
market between platforms that utilized engines with thrust power below and above 9000
lbs, which require significantly more expensive high temperature materials to
manufacture. The net result of such an analysis shows that Honeywell does not
manufacture engines larger than 7000 lbs thrust, and therefore has no horizontal overlap
with GE. All GE engines have 9000 lbs of thrust plus, and do not compete head-to-head
with Honeywell on any platform (See Appendix 2 for a complete breakdown of each
category by manufacturer, aircraft model, engine type and thrust, which demonstrates the
lack of overlap between General Electric and Honeywell).62

59
See Case C-438/99: Commission vs. France, Case C-367/98: Commission vs. Portugal and Case C-
503/99 Commission vs. Belgium, Commission of the European Communities vs. the United Kingdom
(2003): C-98/01.
60
Also at this time, the EC approved a $364 m British government loan to Rolls Royce. (see “EU Approves
Rolls Royce Loan” at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/1628264.stm).
61
Background information from author interviews with Bill Kolasky, former Deputy Assistant Attorney
General and interviews with the merger parties and advisors, Washington DC, March 2004..
62
It should be noted that this includes the corporate jet engine category, where GE’s sole model has 9,220 –
18,500 lbs of thrust.

25
The Commission acknowledged that thrust was an issue for regional jet engines, whilst
providing no information on the characteristics of the various engines. “In relation to
large regional jet aircraft, engines for such types are not substitutable to engines for
smaller regional jets. This is due to the different thrust power that these two categories of
engines are required to deliver”. (pg 8) However, this leaves the anomaly of the Avro
LRJ, which the EC used to base its argument on horizontal overlap and is now out of
production. The Avro is the only large regional jet (based on the Commission’s definition
of 70 – 100 seats), which uses the Honeywell ALF507 engine with thrust power of 7000
lbs. All other LRJs listed by the Commission, for whom GE supplies engines, utilize
thrusts of 9000 lbs plus. Uniquely, the Avro uses four smaller engines, and it is physically
impossible to fit 2 GE engines onto the airframe. The Commission tried to back up its
argument with reference to aircraft prices. The figures showed that the catalogue price of
the Avro is less than that of a narrow bodied large commercial aircraft. However, it also
demonstrates that it’s about 10% more expensive than comparable LRJs. 63

An Efficiency Defense?

The Commission also claimed that GE had failed to present any efficiency gains from the
merger, and therefore that this allowed them to rule out that the merger would strengthen
the company’s market position through efficiencies that ultimately benefit consumer
welfare. Enrique Gonzalez Diaz, head of the investigative team examining the deal has
stated, “the merging parties are not claiming, let alone quantifying, any type of
efficiencies”.64 However, the failure of GE to present and quantify efficiencies is
disputed. Jack Welch states in his biography – “I felt we could do so much more with
Honeywell’s assets by doing what we’ve done with GE: pushing more aggressively into
services, and adding Six Sigma and e-business initiatives to Honeywell’s operations. We
figured on $1.5 billion in savings from these initiatives and other productivity measures”
(Welch and Byrne, 2001, pg 362).

It appears however that GE did not formally invoke an efficiency defense of the deal
itself. This is partly because they did not believe that the deal was anti-competitive in the
first place, for many of the reasons stated above. In addition, at the time of the deal,
whether an efficiency defense existed in European law was ambiguous. 65 In 2002, the
Competition Commissioner, Mario Monti, explicitly recognized the existence of an

63
The higher price point of the Avro may be due to its “niche” characteristics, which make it particularly
suited to landing at hot and high altitude airports with steep approaches and climb-outs. The EC dismisses
any distinction of the Avro on this basis, since some European airlines use Avro’s to fly to airports without
these characteristics – e.g. Sabena (now Brussels Airlines) to Brussels National Airport. This begs the
question of why any airline would pay more for an aircraft with characteristics it did not need! Commission
officials have subsequently pointed out that this may be associated with substantial discounting, although in
turn this raises the question of whether it is efficient to give away extra “niche” features on a plane that the
customer has no need of.
64
Comments in Roundtable Discussion, Antitrust, Fall 2001.
65
Motta (2000), states that this ambiguity was the intention of European legislators (particularly the
Germans and the British) who feared that the French would put forward such a defense to justify anti-
competitive mergers among their companies. Others have speculated that there may have been an
efficiency offence in Europe (Kolasky, 2002/ Patterson and Shapiro, 2001). See Drauz (2002) for a
vigorous rebuttal.

26
efficiency defence for the first time, by stating that Article 2(1)(b) of the Merger
Regulation provides a clear legal basis (see Monti, 2002).66 He went on to state that such
efficiencies “would have to be of direct benefit to the consumer, as well as being merger
specific, substantial, timely and verifiable67.” Still, one can wonder about the nature of
efficiencies and why, unlike the DoJ, the Commission chose to ignore them?

It seems that GE’s efficiencies involve two distinct issues, namely whether as a
conglomerate GE can be expected to allocate capital efficiently, and whether GE could be
expected to generate particular efficiencies from the combination of its assets with those
of Honeywell.

Internal capital markets

Regarding the allocation of capital, history is littered with examples of conglomerates

which utilized “cheap” capital from their treasuries to subsidize weak divisions whilst
foregoing higher value investment opportunities, and ended up destroying billions of
dollars in value. The conglomerate mergers of the 1960’s and 70’s were generally shown
to be unprofitable (see Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1989), and were ultimately broken up in
the 1980’s. A significant body of academic literature has grown up examining the failings
of internal capital markets (see for example the work of Scharfstein and Stein, 1997).

For an internal capital market to work efficiently, it must equalize its cost of capital with
the market based cost for similar projects based on their risk profile. Only then can a
conglomerate assign capital to internal projects effectively, and know their true
opportunity cost. It would appear that GE’s internal capital market operates along these
lines. The Company employs a strong financial budgeting discipline to avoid the
mistakes of previous US conglomerates. The firm’s lower cost of funds is matched by
higher return expectations. All project funding is subject to significant competition
internally. Internal rates of return hurdles are high. Welch (2001, pg 232) describes one
of the screening processes in his autobiography – “potential deals are put through a
monthly torture chamber. The meetings are hands-on, no-holds-barred discussions among
some 20 GE insiders with more than 400 years diverse experience.” The same logic
applies with respect to mergers and acquisitions, with strong pressures and boundaries on
management. 68 The DoJ concurred in its investigation, finding that “GE has many other
uses for its capital and committing capital to one project entails opportunity costs because
that capital is no longer available for other, perhaps more worthwhile, projects. Taking
these opportunity costs into account, GE’s cost of capital, with respect to any particular
project, should be equal to that of its competitors.” (Platt Majoras, 2001). Therefore, it
looks as if the Commission did not appreciate GE’s effective use of funds.

66
Article 2 (1)(b) states that the Commission shall take account, inter alia, of “the development of technical
and economic progress provided it is to consumers’ advantage and does not form an obstacle to
competition”.
67
The new merger regulation has also clarified this.
68
An example of an industry where these constraints are clear is entertainment. Before its acquisition of
Universal, GE consistently walked away from deals in this area, including proposed ones with Disney and
Sony, much to the frustration of NBC head Bob Wright. See Leonard (2003).

27
Dealing with Merger Synergies:

The source of efficiency that GE anticipated with respect to acquisition of Honeywell,

appears to be related to deployment of GE’s intangible assets, in particular its
organizational structures and procedures, which are describes by Welch as the Six Sigma
initiative in his book. A number of case studies have highlighted these organizational and
knowledge based techniques at GE - see for example Bruner (2004) on Corporate
Development as a Strategic Capability in GE Power Systems 69 and Ashkenas, DeMonaco
and Francis (1998) on acquisition integration at GE Capital. 70 It is clear from these case
studies that GE has made large investments in its intangible assets, even in industrial
businesses, and has been successful in scaling these assets in multiple acquisitions in all
its business lines (the deployment of intangible assets as a source of efficiency in mergers
is discussed in Box 1). Therefore, the firm can be seen as adding unique value to a deal,
which is demonstrated to a degree in GE Honeywell, as General Electric was able to
significantly outbid Honeywell’s only other suitor, UTC. 71 The efficiencies to be realized
were not static ones (one off improvements in production possibilities), but dynamic
ones, which build and diffuse knowledge across the organization increasing innovation
and hence the production possibilities. The market reaction to the deal underlines this
analysis (see next section), as markets are more wary of dynamic/revenue synergies than
more traditional technical/cost cutting ones.72

Box 1. Synergies and intangible assets

Neven and Seabright (2003), develop an analytical framework for assessing the sources
of merger gains within the context of competition regulation. They state that “firms
engage in mergers and acquisitions because they anticipate that additional value will be
generated by re-combining assets and that the sources of these gains must be found in the
operation of intangible assets”. The authors distinguish between physical assets such as
capital and labour, and intangibles including skills, reputation, knowledge, organizational
learning and structures. Lev (2001) emphasizes the scalability of intangible assets.
Moreover, these intangible assets would have different values to different acquirers, so
during the acquisition process, it is unlikely that an alternative bidder will emerge with
similar gains.

Ultimately, firms that successfully combine intangible assets should produce higher
returns. However, the difficulties of combining such intangibles as human knowledge and
learning, as opposed to physical plants and machinery, will produce a greater variance in
returns overall. Through the examination of a cross section of mergers, the authors
demonstrate that there is a positive link between the share of intangible assets combined
69
In 2001, GE Power Systems acquired 17 other firms.
70
The authors summarize that GE’s organizational innovations stem from “dozens of experiments until
they crystallized to a form a metho dology others could follow” (page 165).
71
However, the deal included an option to buy 19.9% of Honeywell – a $9 bn hurdle to ward off other
suitors which might be thought unnecessary under the circumstances.
72
The underperformance of GE could reflect the wariness of financial markets of pricing in future revenue
synergies – the market would certainly be correct in this based on the empirical evidence presented by
Neven and Seabright (2003).

28
and the variance of returns – showing higher returns where deals have succeeded, but
overall greater risk of value destruction.

Regulators should rightly be skeptical about synergies, which may be harder to evaluate
than technical efficiencies and for which it may be harder to determine how much
consumers will benefit, as the benefits are often in the form of new or enhanced products
which do not exist yet. Neven and Seabright (2003) suggest that regulators should
examine the firm’s integration plans, mechanisms, incentives and previous track record.
If such an approach had been undertaken in GE Honeywell, the investigation of these
aspects would have likely weighed in GE’s favour. 73

This perspective is in line with that of the US DoJ, particularly in the assessment of
conglomerate mergers in general. Platt Majoras (2001), states “We recognize ….. that
conglomerate mergers have the potential as a class to generate significant efficiencies.
These potential benefits include providing infusions of capital; improving management
efficiency either through the replacement of mediocre executives or through the re-
enforcement of good ones with superior financial control and management information
systems; transfer of technical and marketing know how and best practices across
traditional industry lines; meshing of research and distribution; increasing ability to ride
out economic fluctuations through diversification; and providing owner-managers with a
market for selling the enterprises they created, thus encouraging entrepreneurship and
risk-taking.” Hence, it appears that US regulators recognize that conglomerate mergers
are driven by a strategy of leveraging or scaling intangible assets such as organizational
knowledge and effective control structures, the efficiency effects of which may beneficial
for society. The EU did not follow the same approach.

Market Reaction to GE Honeywell:

Whilst it is debatable how much emphasis should be placed on stock market reactions to
particular deals, it appears that the EU was confronted (in May 2001) with evidence on
the market reaction to the GE Honeywell deal, but took no account of it. 74 Hence, it may
be useful to review these reactions.

Theoretically, when anti-competitive effects take the form of unilateral or coordinated

effects, competitors will gain at least in the absence of efficiencies. When efficiencies
are strong enough to compensate for anti-competitive effects, the deal will be pro-
competitive and competitors will be hurt (their profits will fall). Hence, in this
environment, there is a correspondence between competitive effect and the change in the
profit of competitors. With conglomerate effects, the correspondence is however lost, as
competitors are typically hurt when the deal is anti-competitive75. Evidence that
73
In an off-the-record comment, an individual involved in the US side of the case told one of the authors
that past experience had lead the DoJ to view GE as one of the few firms whose estimates of efficiencies
could be regarded as accurate.
74
Testimony of Carl Shapiro and Greg Vistnes on behalf of GE, May 23rd 2001. The Commission was also
supplied with share price analysis and a report on the financial strength of competitors from the Consultants
Booz Allen Hamilton.
75
See Duso, Neven and Roller (2003) for a detailed discussion.

29
competitors gained is then a signal that the market did not anticipate strong conglomerate
effects (but possibly more conventional ones).

In the GE Honeywell case, almost all the aerospace competitors witnessed significant
gains in their stock prices and outperformed the market benchmark. In the engine
competitors segment, both UTC and Rolls Royce outperformed the benchmark, as did
avionics and non-avionics competitors Rockwell, L3 and Smiths.76 Such a reaction
would not be expected for financially weak competitors, about to be driven from the
marketplace. Moreover, both Boeing and Airbus parent company, EADS, out performed.
In fact, one of the few companies to under perform its benchmark was GE (see Appendix
5). Therefore, the market gave a very different verdict from the Commission in relation to
GE’s ability to bundle complementary products and leverage its financial strength –
although it should be noted that Honeywell performed very well suggesting that its
shareholders were gaining most of the benefits (rents).

The initial lukewarm reaction of equity analysts to the merger gives us some insight into
the mind of the market. Deutsche Bank stated that the “fit is reasonable but not
extraordinary …. (the) strategy (is) to provide “complete systems rather than individual
components for airlines ….. However, we are not sure if this thrust, which is fairly
common in the aerospace sector today, actually justifies the combination itself.” The
bank also talked of, “significant integration risk …. A repeat performance of the
Honeywell AlliedSignal merger is clearly the risk here.”

Merrill Lynch went further in quantifying the market’s concerns in relation to the
proposed merger of Honeywell with United Technologies, which GE broke up. The
“market’s response indicates that something else is at issue. We think that something else
is the Honeywell AlliedSignal record …. Size, management issues and perceived risk
would bother us.”

“A significant amount of operating power will have to reside in Honeywell’s

management at all levels. UTC’s management is terrific and tested, but we think that they
cannot, on their own, run a company twice the size ….. Honeywell management has not
performed. There is also the question of the pre-merger brain drain at AlliedSignal. Lots
of managers left from 1996 – 99, and often, when they ended up running other
companies, these companies did poorly quickly. This phenomena has resulted, we think,
in the view among investors that there was something amiss at Allied. Perhaps, that the
businesses and their managers had been pushed beyond their capacity to deliver
consistently.”

A subsequent Merrill Lynch equity research report on GE of August 31, 2001 sheds some
more light on what the market was really thinking. Honeywell was a step-back for GE

76
UTC rose 21% (11% out performance) from October 16th , 2000 to May 18th , 2001. Rolls Royce gained
34% (24% out performance) over the same period, which reflects a timeframe in which the market believed
the deal would be cleared in Europe. Of the component competitors, Rockwell rose 38% (28% out
performance), L3 34% (24% out performance), Smiths 28% (18% out performance) and Thales 2% (8%
underperformance).

30
because it was, “just a lot more of the cyclical slow-growing businesses which GE
already has enough of …. the new team is just as happy not to have Honeywell which
would have just gotten in the way”. The authors also note that GE sold its aerospace
division in the 1980’s. They continue, “the history of GE’s multiple seems to be that
when investors sense something new is happening at GE that will make it a better
company (cost cutting in the early 1980’s, the initiatives in the 1990’s), they ultimately
award GE a higher value. For much of 2001, GE’s stock has underperformed because
investors seemed to sense that what GE was doing for itself (trying to buy Honeywell),
was not such a great thing …. and the stock market was also weak during that time.”

The equity research analysts who wrote the report had had 10 months to canvass
institutional investor’s views on the merger, and it is clear that the market was highly
skeptical as to whether the deal conveyed any anti competitive advantages, and was in
any way good for GE. 77

There are some mitigating factors here. Firstly, it is likely that the share price rallies of
GE’s competitors to an extent reflected future acquisition premiums. However, this fact
undermines the Commission’s argument that competitors could not muster strategic
responses to the GE Honeywell combination via either mergers or joint ventures.78

Secondly, some of the pressure on GE’s share price was a result of M&A arbitrageurs
shorting the stock. 79 In relation to Honeywell, Deutsche Bank stated on December 12t h
2000, “Although we do not have an estimate of the number of shares in the hands of
arbitrageurs, we know that there is at least a component and the number remains

77
While the market had a clear view on the merits of the deal for GE, it had little insight into the
Commission’s decision making process. Honeywell’s stock price only began to reflect concerns that the
deal might be blocked from late May 2001. Deutsche Bank’s commentary on the deal is a good example of
this lack of insight:
22nd October, 2000 – “Our initial analysis suggests that any anti-trust issues to be minor (aircraft engines
and polymers are 2 areas of overlap) to be easily addressable via (small) dispositions if necessary.”
3rd May, 2001 – implies that after US approval that EU should be forthcoming, although perhaps with
further remedies.
June 14th , 2001 – DB is still optimistic about EU, “approvable on both political and competitive merits”.
June 15th , 2001 - Then – “we now believe the deal is unlikely to close” – after submitting their letter, GE
told the market that they believed the EU would not approve it. “We find ourselves unexpectedly
sympathetic to Commissioner Monti’s view. That is his surprise at the content of GE’s letter. It looks like
GE stopped negotiating.”
78
It is interesting to note that the only competitor which underperformed was Thales, a French company,
insulated from institutional shareholder pressure by the fact the French government is the largest
shareholder and retains extra powers via a “Golden Share” (see Appendix 4). This is in line with the
findings of Grant and Kirchmaier (2004), which demonstrates empirically that widely held firms
outperform those with dominant shareholders over the long term in Europe, and that States are the block
holders which destroy the greatest shareholder value.
79
Shorting entails a forward sale of stock. The seller sells an equity she currently doesn’t own at the current
price for delivery at a date in the future. She then has to buy the equity in the market to deliver it to the
buyer. If the price has fallen before delivery, the seller makes a profit. If it has risen she makes a loss.

31
significant.” 80 An economically rational parallel strategy, whilst going long on
Honeywell, would have been to short GE. Such a strategy would minimize the
arbitrageur’s capital outlay (but not capital at risk). Essentially, the arbitrageur could
deliver the GE stock she would have received when the deal closed, to cover the
outstanding short position. 81 Since the arbitrageurs would have bought Honeywell at a
discount to the GE offer price (to compensate for the risk of the deal not closing), and
theoretically the price of GE stock should fall further on closing, the arbs should have
cleaned up on both GE and Honeywell. Instead, they were forced to dump Honeywell
stock at a loss.

However, neither of these factors detracts from the strongly negative signals for GE
stemming from the equities markets in relation to the deal, nor the fact that the
Commission failed to consider them.

The EC has subsequently argued that issues of vertical foreclosure are too complex for
markets to understand. Regulators have better information than market participants, as
equity analysts rely on information fed to them by the firms they cover.82 Regulators have
the legal power to collate a broader range of evidence, and therefore have access to data
that markets don’t have, for example in this case on multi-product bids. However, as
indicated by the extensive review of equity research reports from the time of the deal
detailed above, it is clear that the analysts had carefully considered the deal and were
skeptical of revenue synergies, which could be associated with anti-competitive effects.
In addition, it is not clear that the confidential evidence collated by the Commission, in
particular multi-product bids would have modified the perception; as indicated above,
this evidence is far from conclusive and the theories on which the Commission relied are
controversial. Hence, it seems difficult to draw any conclusions about the relative
outcomes of information asymmetries between markets and regulators83.

Summing up

Overall, one cannot help concluding that (i) horizontal effects rely on a particular
perspective on market definition which is debatable (and leaves some questions
unanswered), (ii) that anti-competitive effects in the bundling and archimedean
leveraging theories cannot be presumed to say the least, and that their likelihood should
accordingly be supported by strong evidence, although that evidence was far from
compelling and (iii) that the deal may have involved significant efficiencies that were
overlooked.

80
In his autobiography, Former US Treasury Secretary and Goldman Sachs arbitrager, Robert Rubin, says
“Asking about … arbitrage operations is like walking into a couple’s home and asking about their sex life”
(Rubin, 2003).
81
See simple model in Appendix 6 for the dynamics of such a transaction.
82
Source: Interviews with Merger Task Force team members.
83
A former economist at the DoJ Anti-Trust division expressed a clear presumption on this issue: , “it boils
down to whether you trust the agencies or the stock market. I’ll take the stock market any day” (Bruce
Kobayashi in Fortune Magazine, April 14th 1997) - Quote from Neven and Roller (2002).

32
These observations indicate that the Commission did not meet the burden of proof (“very
probable anti-competitive effects”) that it should normally respect. It also suggest that
the Commission’s decision may have been affected by bureaucratic capture, such that
civil servants did not follow the mandate that has been assigned to them. The final part
of the paper reviews the procedure itself and discusses whether EU procedures are indeed
more prone to bureaucratic capture and whether there is direct evidence supporting the
view that capture did indeed play a significant role in the case.

Part 3: Process and Procedure

Commentators have highlighted the differences between the processes and procedures on
either side of the Atlantic, as another important element in explaining the divergence of
outcomes in this case (see for example Patterson and Shapiro, 2001).84 These authors
suggest that significant differences existed at the time of the investigation due to the fact
that the European system is a “regulatory process”, and the American system is a “law
enforcement” one. This crucial difference, along with differing perspectives on the role of
economic evidence, may have played a part in determining the outcome. It has also been
suggested that these process and procedural differences “tend to amplify differences in
substance” (see comments of John DeQ Briggs – Roundtable Discussion – Antitrust, Fall
2001, page 7).

Kühn (2003) also discusses particular features of the European procedure (at the time of
the case). He highlights the role of economists (or lack thereof) and the fact the process
of investigation by the Commission is subject to a self confirming biases. The standard
to review which is applied in case of an appeal must also play in important role in
delineating the scope for capture. We discuss these elements in turn.

Standard of review in court

The extent to which civil servants will be able to pursue objectives that are different from
those that they have been assigned and, for instance prohibit a merger with weak
evidence, is clearly dependent on what, they expect, will happen at the stage of appeal. If
they anticipate that an appeal is unlikely and/or that Court will not scrutinize their ruling,
they will benefit from greater freedom and the scope for capture will be greater.

At the time of GE Honeywell the legal appeals process to the European Court of First
Instance took a minimum of 18 months to 2 years. Monti (2001) stated, “It is true that the
decisions of the Courts take a long time (around 2 years) and that the merger will
probably be abandoned by that stage”. 85 This delay gives further power to the
Commission to direct the outcome without independent oversight (as well as improving
the negotiating position of the EC in relation to immediate remedies86).
84
Patterson was lead antitrust counsel for GE in the US, and Shapiro was one of GE’s economic experts.
85
This was indeed the case in Airtours vs. The Commission (2002). This can be contrasted with the
Oracle/Peoplesoft prohibition by the DoJ. This merger was blocked on February 26, 2004. The appeal trial
began before the US District Court for the Northern District of California on June 7, 2004. A decision was
handed down by Judge Vaughan Walker on September 10, 2004, a timeframe of just over 6 months.
86
“Parties negotiating a settlement with the EC have limited bargaining power, companies negotiating with
the DoJ know that a judge … will decide on the injunction ……. US companies enjoy a better situation

33
The standard of review applied by EU Courts in merger case has been subject of much
debate following the annulment by the CFI of Airtours/First Choice, Tetra Laval/Sidel
and Schneider/Legrand mergers. Interestingly, the Commission appealed the Tetral
Laval/Sidel ruling to the Court of Justice, precisely on the issue of the standard of review.
In essence, the Commission argued that the appropriate standard should be one of
“manifest error” and argued that CFI had applied a stronger standard, in particular one in
which the Court considered whether the evidence was “convincing” and substituted its
own economic assessment for that of the Commission.

The Court of Justice in its ruling on this appeal effectively confirms the decision of the
CFI. The Court indicates that a proper standard of review should include a control of the
economic assessment undertaken by the Commission. This control should include, in
particular, whether facts substantiate the conclusions, and this evaluation will naturally
include a discussion of whether the economic theories used by the Commission are
robust. The Court ruled in particular (§ 39) :

“Whilst the Court recognises that the Commission has a margin of discretion with
regard to economic matters, that does not mean that the Community Courts must
refrain from reviewing the Commission’s interpretation of information of an
economic nature. Not only must the Community Courts, inter alia, establish
whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but
also whether that evidence contains all the information which must be taken into
account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of
substantiating the conclusions drawn from it. Such a review is all the more
necessary in the case of a prospective analysis required when examining a
planned merger with conglomerate effect.”

And further, at § 41 :

“Although the Court of First Instance stated, in paragraph 155, that proof of anti-
competitive conglomerate effects of a merger of the kind notified calls for a
precise examination, supported by convincing evidence, of the circumstances
which allegedly produce those effects, it by no means added a condition relating
to the requisite standard of proof but merely drew attention to the essential
function of evidence, which is to establish convincingly the merits of an argument
or, as in the present case, of a decision on a merger.”

Hence, it would appear that the Commission may have anticipated that the standard of
review that would be applied in case of appeal would be relatively easy to meet. This
may have contributed to the scope for capture.

Role of Economists and Economic Reasoning:

when negotiating with the agencies than European companies when negotiating with the EC” (Baches Opi,
1997).

34
The US DoJ has a much larger professional staff and employs over 50 PhD economists.
At least one is attached to each case, and cannot be removed from the case team. The
Economic Analysis group is organized in parallel to the legal group. The latter group
breaks down along industry lines with 6 sections. The Economics group is more flexible
with 3 sections – each section has a Section Chief and Assistant Chief. The economists
on the case teams report to the Section Chiefs, who in turn report to the DoJ’s Chief
Economist. Their work is reviewed by both their Section Chief and the legal Section
Chief with industry expertise – in essence double checked.87 This structure also allows
the merging parties to engage in constructive dialogue with the DoJ economists including
external ones.

Within the European Commission structure, economists have not played a central role as
in the US. One EC economist stated that you are a civil servant first, then an economist.
The Competition Directorate has, until recently, not had the position of Chief Economist,
unlike the US, so economists have had to ultimately report to a non-economist. In GE
Honeywell, the Commission made no attempt to create its own economic models, rather
it relied “heavily on economic models supplied by competitors opposing the deal”
(Shapiro and Pattersen, 2001). When flaws in these models were pointed out, it then
claimed in the final decision “reliance on one or the other model not necessary for its
conclusions.”

The Commission hired its own economic expert, Professor Xavier Vives.88 However, the
Commission dismissed him when he stated his misgivings about the case. Vives
criticized statements on foreclosure as “too strong”, Rolls Royce exit scenario was “far
fetched”, and the Choi model, which had sellers as price setters and buyers as price
takers, as incorrect in aerospace89. Such differences reflect both a lack of emphasis on
economic reasoning in decisions, and the lack of immediate and informed third party
scrutiny of such decisions.

Regulatory Hearings and Courts:

One of the major differences between the US and EU is that the DoJ must seek an
injunction in a Federal District Court to block a merger, which may in fact lead to a full
trial. DoJ will move to get a temporary restraining order at a preliminary injunction
hearing within 10 days. If contested within 60 to 90 days there will be a trial on the
merits. 90 This immediately places a higher burden of proof on regulators, as the case will
be publicly scrutinized by independent observers. The facts of the case will then be
examined in a hearing, where the government and competitors evidence is cross-
examined by the merging parties counsel under oath with clear rules of evidence and
procedure. Beyond this the authorities face the prospect of a full public trial.

87
Organizational information from interview with Bill Kolasky – Washington DC, February 2004.
88
Professor of Economics, INSEAD.
89
Information from Honeywell hearing at the Court of First Instance – May 25, 2004. The Commission
responded that Vives was retained to examine selected issues, and left the project when his work was
completed. However, this begs the question as to why Vives did not testify on the EC’s behalf at the CFI.
90
Procedural information from interview with Deborah Platt Majoras – Washington DC, February 2004.

35
This contrasts starkly with European system of hearings, with independent judicial
review by the European Court of First Instance (CFI) only occurring a substantial period
after a decision has been reached (see Appendix 7 for overview of the European Court
System). The EC process revolves around formal hearings during phases 1 and 2 of an
investigation. However, Pattersen and Shapiro (2001) categorize these as resembling
“seminars” rather than court hearings. Evidential standards during these hearings are not
comparable with those of a court, with the merging parties having to defend themselves
from both the Commission and competitors. The Commission case team plays the role of
policeman, prosecutor, judge and jury, while the merging parties are forced to make their
case and come up with solutions with little guidance, so end up arguing
against/incriminating themselves (Welch). Power seems to lie almost exclusively with the
case team. There is a Hearing Officer, but he has limited powers, and does not rule on the
admissibility or weight to be accorded to the evidence or have any say in outcome. It was
also unclear in the European regulatory process where the burden of proof lay, at this
point. 91

This can be contrasted with the US process, which involves substantive review at each
level, (both on fact and economics). This reflects the need to make final argument in
court and larger number of economists on the staff. The parties in the US also have more
interaction with the equivalent of the case team at each stage of the process (less
structured and more informal).

According to Shapiro, “From the beginning of the investigation, DoJ staff engaged in an
intense and productive dialogue with GE and Honeywell regarding the theory. GE and
Honeywell had the opportunity to respond to both the DoJ’s concerns and to the
concerns and allegations communicated to the DoJ by others. Economists for the DoJ,
including a specially retained outside economist, and the parties were closely involved in
this process.”

It is striking from this respect that Jack Welch was quite unaware of the problems he was
going to face with the Commission. He recalls from a first oral presentation before the
statement of objections was published ; – “I argued my case for an hour and thought I
was making some progress. I built the argument around GE’s European performance, its
remarkable success energizing former state owned companies, its strong European
presence with 85,000 employees, and the lack of overlap between Honeywell and GE.
We offered non divestiture remedies, like those made earlier by Honeywell-AlliedSignal,
to address any problems.”

Conclusion

91
Even though in principle the Commission has the burden of proof, the regulatory nature of the hearings
seems to place it upon the merging parties, at least after the Statement of objections. This contrasts with the
US, where the burden of proof is clearly on the government to demonstrate that a transaction will adversely
impact competition.

36
Overall, it appears that EU procedures were at the time of the case vulnerable to
bureaucratic capture. The recollection of the parties (subjective as they may be) also
confirms that the actual procedures may not have allowed for a fair and constructive
investigation and appraisal of the case. Finally, particular incidents like the dismissal of
the Commission’s economic expert raise the suspicion that procedure may have been
manipulated. This evidence of the characteristics of the EU procedure, as well as the
actual unfolding of the procedure in this case, resonate with the analysis above suggesting
that the Commission’s case rests on weak grounds. There is at least a consistent set of
facts indicating that the case team was the victim of a self confirming bias or possibly
may have pursued a different objective from that assigned by the merger regulation.

Since the GE/Honeywell prohibition, the Commission has undertaken significant reforms
of its processes and procedures. This reform process began before GE/Honeywell, in July
2000, with the submission of the report to the Council of Ministers on the functioning of
the Merger Regulation. Subsequently, a Green Paper was adopted in December 2001, and
over 120 submissions were received over an 11 month period. However, the outcome of
the reform process was clearly influenced by the EC’s 3 court defeats, and the
controversy surrounding the GE decision. Monti (2002) called for “changes, as radical as
needed, to ensure that our merger investigations are conducted in a manner which is more
thorough and more firmly grounded in economic reasoning.” To this end, a new position
of Chief Competition Economist was created within the Competition Directorate-
General, with a staff to “provide an independent economic viewpoint to decision-makers
at all levels”.92 Monti also committed to “accelerate the ….. recruitment of industrial
economists …. and that greater use be made of outside economic expertise.” Other
“necessary improvements” included ensuring that “there is sufficient management
oversight to deal with the Commission’s full merger case-load, that the case teams are
sufficiently large, and that they are equipped with the expertise necessary to cope with in-
depth investigations.”

In terms of independent scrutiny of merger investigations, the Commission has set up

independent Peer Review or Devil’s Advocate Panels, to thoroughly examine a case
team’s conclusions during Phase 2 Merger cases. These provide a “fresh pair of eyes at
key points in the enquiry. This will prevent that the natural tendency of all human beings
of being convinced of their own arguments determines the outcome of our
investigations.” 93

The Commission has also enhanced the transparency of the process and the ability of the
merging parties to defend themselves against accusations leveled at them by competitors.
The parties now have immediate access to the Commission’s files on initiation of an
investigation, as well as constant access to third party (including competitor) submissions
received throughout the process and the ability to attend “state of play meetings” to better
92
This position was subsequently taken up by Professor Lars Hendrik Roller of Humboldt University in
Berlin.
93
It should be noted that after the Airtours decision and GE/Honeywell, Monte began to institute far greater
scrutiny of the work of MTF investigative teams. For example, he unexpectedly cleared the acquisition of
UK cruise operator P&O Princess by Carnival of the US after “he had instructed another team of officers to
sit in on the work of the officers handling the case, to act as skeptical arbiters” (Economist, Sept 21, 2002).

37
understand how the case team’s investigation is progressing. All of these measures better
allow the merging firms to defend themselves at an earlier stage in the proceedings, not
just when the EC has issued its statement of objections. Moreover, Monti called for the
merging parties to be able to confront third party complainants in meetings “ideally held
in good time before the issuing of a statement of objections”.

Finally, in relation to Judicial Review, Monti acknowledged that it “should not only be
effective in terms of substance – it must also be timely. There is clearly still some scope
for improvements in the speed with which judgments are delivered, particularly in cases
where the merging parties are keen to keep the deal alive pending the outcome of the
appellate process.” To this end, a fast track procedure has been introduced in the Court of
First Instance, which places greater emphasis on oral proceedings, which now can deliver
judgments within 9 months. 94 As mentioned above, the Court has also recently clarified
the standard of review that it will apply in merger cases. This should significantly
enhance the burden of proof to which the Commission will subject itself.

All of these reforms certainly reduce the scope for bureaucratic capture even if they fall
short of implementing a truly adversarial procedure. They also potentially increase the
importance of economic analysis, even if the resources involved fall short of those found
in the US. Whether these reforms will suffice will only be revealed by forthcoming cases
(and possibly other instances of transatlantic conflict).

Finally, it is worth placing the reforms instituted by Mario Monte at the end of his tenure,
in the context of the initial changes in the structure of the competition directorate at the
beginning of his period of office. The primary aim of these was to insulate commission
officials from political pressures stemming from member states, particularly in relation to
anti-competitive mergers involving “national champions”. Indeed there is evidence that
pressure from member states did initially play a significant role in merger decisions (see
Neven and Seabright, 2003). Although speculative in conclusion, we would suggest that
the aim of the initial reforms was very much in the interests of non-EU firms receiving a
fair hearing in Brussels. Ironically, the result left the EC’s processes and procedures open
to bureaucratic capture by Commission officials rather than member states.

94
Both Tetra Laval and Schneider Legrand decisions were decided within approximately 9 months and 1
year under this procedure. It should be noted that GE did not request use of this fast track when appealing
the Honeywell prohibition, partly because it felt that it may have truncated its ability to fully make its case.

38
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40
APPENDICES:

Appendix 1: Aerospace Market Overview:

GE / Honeywell
• Engines
• APUs
• Avionics
•Engines • Utilities
• Risk-Sharing $$$

•Avionics
Airframers
•APUs
• Major Customer
• Major Financier
•Other Products

•Aftermarket Services GECAS Leasing Companies

• Financing
• Leasing

Airlines/End Users

Source: Adapted from Diagram Presented by Rockwell Collins at CFI, Luxembourg, May 2004

Appendix 2. Engine market overview

41
Plane: Engines:
No. of Competitors: Seats: Type: Rolls Royce: Thrust: Pratt & Whitney: Thrust: GE: Thrust: Honeywell: Thrust:
Boeing 777: 200 (2) 3 200 - 400 Turboprop Trent 800 75,000 - 95,000 (Ibs) PW 4000 52,000 - 62,000 GE 90 75,000 - 115,000 (Ibs)
200 LR Sole Source GE 200 - 400 Turboprop GE 90 (115B) 75,000 - 115,000 (Ibs)
200ER (2) 2 200 - 400 Turboprop Trent 800 75,000 - 95,000 (Ibs) GE 90 75,000 - 115,000 (Ibs)
300 (2) 200 - 400 Turboprop Trent 800 75,000 - 95,000 (Ibs) PW 4000 52,000 - 62,000
300 ER (2) Sole Source GE 200 - 400 Turboprop GE 90 (115B) 75,000 - 115,000 (Ibs)

Boeing 747: Development (4) 200 - 400 Turboprop Trent 600 63,000 - 68,000 (Ibs) JT9D 48,000 - 56,000 (Ibs) CF 6 40,000 - 72,000 (Ibs)
400 (4) 200 - 400 Turboprop RB 211 524G/H-T 58,000 - 60,600 (Ibs) JT9D 48,000 - 56,000 (Ibs) CF 6 40,000 - 72,000 (Ibs)
400 F (Freighter) (4) 200 - 400 Turboprop RB 211 524G/H-T 58,000 - 60,600 (Ibs) JT9D 48,000 - 56,000 (Ibs) CF 6 40,000 - 72,000 (Ibs)

Boeing 767: 200 (4) 200 - 400 Turboprop P&W 4000 48,000 - 56,000 (Ibs)
300 (4) 200 - 400 RB 211 524G/H-T 58,000 - 60,600 (Ibs) JT9D 48,000 - 56,000 (Ibs) CF 6 40,000 - 72,000 (Ibs)

Boeing 757: 200 (4) 100 - 200 Turboprop RB 211 535 37,400 - 41,100 (Ibs) PW 2000 37,250 - 43,000 (Ibs)
300 (4) 100 - 200 Turboprop RB 211 535 37,400 - 41,100 (Ibs) PW 2000 37,250 - 43,000 (Ibs)
200 F (Freighter) (4) 100 - 200 Turboprop RB 211 535 37,400 - 41,100 (Ibs) PW 2000 37,250 - 43,000 (Ibs)

Boeing 737: 100 Sole Source PW 100 - 200 Turboprop JT8D 14,000 - 21,700 (Ibs)
200 Sole Source PW 100 - 200 Turboprop JT8D 14,000 - 21,700 (Ibs)
300 Sole Source GE 100 - 200 Turboprop CFM 56-3 18,500 - 23,500 (Ibs)
400 Sole Source GE 100 - 200 Turboprop CFM 56-3 18,500 - 23,500 (Ibs)
500 Sole Source GE 100 - 200 Turboprop CFM 56-3 18,500 - 23,500 (Ibs)
600 Sole Source GE 100 - 200 Turboprop CFM 56- 7B 18,500 - 27,300 (Ibs)
700 Sole Source GE 100 - 200 Turboprop CFM 56- 7B 18,500 - 27,300 (Ibs)
800 Sole Source GE 100 - 200 Turboprop CFM 56- 7B 18,500 - 27,300 (Ibs)
900 Sole Source GE 100 - 200 Turboprop CFM 56- 7B 18,500 - 27,300 (Ibs)
Business Jet Sole Source GE Turboprop CFM 56- 7 18,500 - 27,300 (Ibs)

Boeing 727: Sole Source PW JT8D 14,000 - 21,700 (Ibs)

Boeing MD 90: 2 Turboprop V2500 22,000 - 33,000 (Ibs) (NB - IAE - Engine Alliance - RR, P&W, MTU, JAEC)

Boeing MD 80: Sole Source PW JT8D 14,000 - 21,700 (Ibs)

McDonell Douglas DC 11: Sole Source PW PW 4000 52,000 - 62,000

McDonell Douglas DC 10: Sole Source PW JT9D 48,000 - 56,000 (Ibs)

McDonell Douglas DC 9: Sole Source PW JT8D 14,000 - 21,700 (Ibs)

Airbus 380: 800 (4) 2 200 - 400 Turboprop Trent 900 68,000 - 84,000 (Ibs) GP 7000 70,000 (Ibs) GP 7000 76,500 - 81,500 (Ibs)
F (Freighter) (4) 2 200 - 400 Turboprop Trent 900 68,000 - 84,000 (Ibs) GP 7000 70,000 (Ibs) GP 7000 76,500 - 81,500 (Ibs)
800R (4) 2 200 - 400 Turboprop Trent 900 68,000 - 84,000 (Ibs) GP 7000 70,000 (Ibs) GP 7000 76,500 - 81,500 (Ibs)
900 (4) 2 200 - 400 Turboprop Trent 900 68,000 - 84,000 (Ibs) GP 7000 70,000 (Ibs) GP 7000 76,500 - 81,500 (Ibs)
NB - Engine Alliance - GE, P&W NB - Engine Alliance - GE, P&W
Airbus 330: 300 (2) 3 200 - 400 Turboprop Trent 700 68,000 - 72,000 (Ibs) PW 4000 52,000 - 62,000 CF 6 40,000 - 72,000 (Ibs)
200 (2) 3 200 - 400 Turboprop Trent 700 68,000 - 72,000 (Ibs) PW 4000 52,000 - 62,000 CF 6 40,000 - 72,000 (Ibs)

Airbus 340: 600 (4) 2 200 - 400 Turboprop Trent 500 53,000 - 60,000 (Ibs) CF 6/CFM 56-5C 40,000 - 72,000 (Ibs)
500 (4) 2 200 - 400 Turboprop Trent 500 53,000 - 60,000 (Ibs) CF 6 40,000 - 72,000 (Ibs)
300 (4) Sole Source GE 200 - 400 CFM 56-5C 31,200 - 34,000 (Ibs)

Airbus A318: 2 100 - 200 PW 6000 22,100 - 23,800 (Ibs) CFM 56-5B 22,000 - 33,000 (Ibs)

Airbus A319: 3 100 - 200 Turboprop V250 22,000 - 33,000 (Ibs) V2500 23,000 - 32,000 (Ibs) CFM 56-5B 22,000 - 33,000 (Ibs)

Airbus A320: 3 100 - 200 Turboprop V250 22,000 - 33,000 (Ibs) V2500 23,000 - 32,000 (Ibs) CFM 56-5B 22,000 - 33,000 (Ibs)

Airbus A321: 3 100 - 200 Turboprop V250 22,000 - 33,000 (Ibs) V2500 23,000 - 32,000 (Ibs) CFM 56-5B 22,000 - 33,000 (Ibs)

Airbus A310: 2 200 - 400 JT9D 48,000 - 56,000 (Ibs) CF 6 40,000 - 72,000 (Ibs)

Airbus A300: 2 200 - 400 JT9D 48,000 - 56,000 (Ibs) CF 6 40,000 - 72,000 (Ibs)

Airbus Corporate Jetliner: Turboprop V250 22,000 - 33,000 (Ibs)

BAE Systems Avro: RJ 100 1 100 ALF 507 7000 Ibs
RJ 85 1 80 ALF 507 7000 Ibs
RJ 70 1 70 ALF 507 7000 Ibs

Bombardier Global Express (2) 1 19 Turbofan BR 710 14,750 - 15,600 (Ibs)

Bombardier Global 5000 (2) 1 19 Turbofan BR 710 14,750 - 15,600 (Ibs)
Bombardier CRJ 100 1 50 CF 34 9220 - 18,500 (Ibs)
200 1 50 CF 34 9220 - 18,500 (Ibs)
300 1 50 ? HTF 7000 ???
700 1 70 CF 34 9220 - 18,500 (Ibs)
900 1 86 CF 34 9220 - 18,500 (Ibs)
Bombardier Challenger: 601 1 19 CF 34 9220 - 18,500 (Ibs)
604 1 19 CF 34 9220 - 18,500 (Ibs)

Fairchild Dornier 728JET 70 CF 34 9220 - 18,500 (Ibs)

928JET 90 CF 34 9220 - 18,500 (Ibs)

Gulfstream G550 1 19 Turbofan BR 710 14,750 - 15,600 (Ibs)

Gulfstream G500 1 19 Turbofan BR 710 14,750 - 15,600 (Ibs)
Gulfstream G450 1 19 Tay 13,850 - 15,400 (Ibs)
Gulfstream G350 1 19 Tay 13,850 - 15,400 (Ibs)
Gulfstream G200 1 4 PW 300 4,500 - 8,000 (Ibs)
Gulfstream G150 1 4 HTF 731 4000 (Ibs)
Gulfstream G100 1 4 HTF 731 4000 (Ibs)

Boeing 717 200: 1 Turbofan BR 715 18,500 - 21,000 (Ibs)

Boeing 727 100F (3) 1 Turbofan Tay 13,850 - 15,400 (Ibs)

Fokker 70 1 80 Turbofan Tay 13,850 - 15,400 (Ibs)

Fokker 100 1 100 Turbofan Tay 13,850 - 15,400 (Ibs)

Embraer RJ 135 (2) 1 37 Turbofan AE 3007 6,500 - 9,000 (Ibs)

140 (2) 1 50 Turbofan AE 3007 6,500 - 9,000 (Ibs)
145 (2) 1 50 Turbofan AE 3007 6,500 - 9,000 (Ibs)

Embraer 170 1 70 CF 34 9220 - 18,500 (Ibs)

175 1 98 CF 34 9220 - 18,500 (Ibs)
190 1 108 CF 34 9220 - 18,500 (Ibs)
195 1 100 CF 34 9220 - 18,500 (Ibs)

Embraier CJ Legacy (2) 1 Turbofan AE 3007 6,500 - 9,000 (Ibs)

Cessna Citation X (2) 1 Turbofan AE 3007 6,500 - 9,000 (Ibs) PW 300 4,500 - 8,000 (Ibs)

Dassault Falcon 2000 1 8 PW 300 4,500 - 8,000 (Ibs) CFE 738 6,000 (Ibs) Joint Venture with Honeywell
10 1 8 TFE 731 4000 (Ibs)
50 1 9 TFE 731 4000 (Ibs)
900 1 12 TFE 731 4000 (Ibs)

Lear Jet (Bombardier): 31 1 7 TFE 731 4000 (Ibs)

35/36 1 7 TFE 731 4000 (Ibs)
45 1 7 TFE 731 4000 (Ibs)
55/56 1 8 TFE 731 4000 (Ibs)

Cessna CJ (2) 1 (2) 1 Turbofan FJ 44 1,900 - 2,400 (Ibs)

2 (2) 1 Turbofan FJ 44 1,900 - 2,400 (Ibs)

Saab SK 60 (2) 1 Turbofan FJ 44 1,900 - 2,400 (Ibs)

Sino Swearingen SJ30 (2) 1 Turbofan FJ 44 1,900 - 2,400 (Ibs)

Raytheon 1 (2) 1 Turbofan FJ 44 1,900 - 2,400 (Ibs)

Raytheon (2) Hawker 1 PW 300 4,500 - 8,000 (Ibs)

2
Appendix 3: Breakdown of Engines Purchasers Market Share:
GECAS/Rivals/Airlines totals

4500

4000

3500

3000

2500
Airlines
Non-GECAS Leasing

Engines
GECAS
2000

1500

1000

500

0
91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000
Year

Source: Nalebuff (2003)

3
Appendix 4: Thales Ownership Structure:

French State

100%

0.001% TSA, Alcatel and GIMD are bound by

TSA (State Holding Co) a shareholder pact
State Golden Share Powers:
100%
-Finance Minister must approve
any shareholding over 10%.
Group Industriel Marcel
Sofivision Alcatel Dassault (GIMD)
-Right to appoint a non-voting 25.9%
director to the board.

-Right to veto any disposal of

assets
4.7% 9.5% 5.7%

Thales

Source: Thales Annual Report 2002

4
5
Appendix 5: Share Price Reactions:

A) Engine Suppliers vs. S&P 500

160

140

120

100 S&P 500

GE
80 Honeywell
UTC
60 Rolls Royce

40

20

9/1/2000
1/1/2001
2/1/2001
3/1/2001
4/1/2001
5/1/2001
6/1/2001
7/1/2001
8/1/2001

10/1/2000
11/1/2000
12/1/2000
Source: Bloomberg

6
B) Avionics Suppliers vs. S&P 500
160

140

120

100 S&P 500

GE
80 HW
Thales
60 Rockwell Int

40

20

9/1/2000
1/1/2001
2/1/2001
3/1/2001
4/1/2001
5/1/2001
6/1/2001
7/1/2001
8/1/2001

10/1/2000
11/1/2000
12/1/2000
Source: Bloomberg

C) Airframe Manufacturers vs. S&P 500

7
 100
120
140
160

0
20
40
60
80

01/09/2000
01/10/2000
01/11/2000
Source: Bloomberg

01/12/2000
01/01/2001
01/02/2001
01/03/2001
01/04/2001
01/05/2001
01/06/2001
01/07/2001
01/08/2001
GE

EADS
Boeing
S&P 500

Honeywell

8
 0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70

9/1/2000
9/15/2000
9/29/2000
10/13/2000
10/27/2000
Source: Bloomberg

11/10/2000
11/24/2000
12/8/2000
12/22/2000
1/5/2001
1/19/2001
2/2/2001
2/16/2001
3/2/2001
3/16/2001
A) Value of GE Offer for Honeywell

3/30/2001
4/13/2001
4/27/2001
Appendix 6: GE/Honeywell Arbitrage Model

5/11/2001
5/25/2001
6/8/2001
6/22/2001
7/6/2001
7/20/2001
GE
Honeywell
Offer Value

9
 B) Merger Arbitrage Model

Assumptions:

Position & Payoff in Target Shares

Buy HW Target Shares at $ 47.97 median share price day after deal announced - day of highest volumes.
Offer Value 53.745
5.775 12.0% Spread is high - reflects higher than average risk that deal doesn't
Close.

Position & Payoff in Acquirer Shares

Short GE shares at 50.94
Deliver GE shares
at 48.5 closing share price GE - May 3rd when DoJ approves merger
2.44 4.79%

Value of GE offer @ $48.5 51.2

2.7 5.50%

Total Expected Return 10.29%

Actual long term capital outlay per share -2.97
Return per share 5.1

Capital outlay is minimal as you would pay off the Honeywell position with the proceeds of the GE short, and bank the rest of the cash.
If the deal had closed you deliver a portion of the GE shares received in payment for Honeywell to cover the position.

10
Result was that arbitrageurs had to dump Honeywell shares they paid $47.97 for, at between $42 and $34, and buy GE shares for
delivery between $47.85 and $49.91.

Sell HW @ 38
Buy GE @ 48.88
Return on HW -9.97
Return on GE 2.06
Total Return -7.91
Total Return % -16.5%

11
Appendix 7: Court of Justice of the European Communities

Court of Justice

President (elected by the Judges)

99Advocates
AdvocatesGeneral
General 15 Judges
Appeals against the decisions
Of the Court of First Instance.

Court of First Instance

President (elected by the Judges)

Appointed by common accord of

15 Judges the governments of the Member
States for a term of 6 years.

Actions for annulment, for declaration of failure

to act and for compensation

12