113 Matugas vs.

COMELEC
G.R. No. 151944 (January 20, 2004)
J. Tinga / RLS

SUBJECT MATTER: Elective Officials > Qualifications and Elections > Qualifications

CASE SUMMARY: Barbers files his certificate of candidacy as governor of Surigao del Norte for 2001 elections. Matugas
also runs for governor, files petition to disqualify Barbers. Barbers won the election, COMELEC dismisses petition to
disqualify, stating that little probative value in letter evidence and no other independent evidence. Matugas files an MR before
COMELEC and still denied. Hence, Matugas files petition before the Supreme Court. SC rules in favor of Barbers. Basic in the
law of evidence is that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. In administrative cases, the quantum of proof
required is substantial evidence. Petitioner did not overcome his burden. The documentary evidence Matugas’ submitted claims
fails to establish that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.
DOCTRINE/S:

Basic in the law of evidence is that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. In administrative cases (in particular,
this case), the quantum of proof required is substantial evidence.

Action Before SC: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court; Certiorari

Petitioner: Engr. Ernesto T. Matugas

Respondent: Commission on Elections, and Robert Lyndon S. Barbers

FACTS:

 On 28 February 28 2001, Private Respondent Robert Lyndon Barbers filed his certificate of candidacy as governor of
Surigao del Norte for 2001 elections. Petitioner Ernesto T. Matugas, who is also a candidate for governor, filed with
COMELEC a Petition to Disqualify Barbers as candidate.
 His main contention is that Barbers is not a Filipino citizen. To support his claim, Matugas presented the following
documents:
o Photocopy of a letter-request of a certain Jesus Agana, a “confidential agent” of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID), addressed to one George Clarke, purportedly of the United States Embassy regarding the US
citizenship of Barbers;
o A notation on the letter request allegedly made by George Clarke, stating that Barbers was naturalized on 11 October
1991;
o Photocopy of a Certification from the BID containing Barbers' travel records and indicating in some documents that he
is American;
o Certification from the Office of the Solicitor General's Special Committee on Naturalization stating that there is no
pending petition by, or grant of repatriation to, Barbers.

 Meanwhile, Barbers won the gubernatorial race on 17 May 2001. Matugas then filed a Motion for Suspension/Annulment
of Proclamation of Barbers. However, Barbers was proclaimed the duly elected governor of Surigao del Norte on 28 May
2001.

 COMELEC then dismissed the Petition to Disqualify. It found “little or no probative value” in the notation of George
Clarke to Agana’s letter-request.While noting that the BID certification involving the travel records of Barbers stated that
he was an American, it held that there is no other independent evidence to justify Matugas's claim that Barbers has
renounced his allegiance to the Philippines.

 Matugas filed a Motion for reconsideration, which was denied. He then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme
Court, and presented the following additional documents:
o Photocopy of a document purportedly coming from the US Dirstrict Court of California showing the Naturalization of
Barbers signed by its Deputy Clerk;
 o Photocopy of a purported Authentication attached to the previous document coming from the Philippine Consul in Los
Angeles, California stating the following: "The annexed document is an Information of Naturalization Re: Robert
Lyndon Barbers executed by United States District Court, Central District of California."

 Subsequently, petitioner filed a Manifestation with Motion for Leave to Admit Original Documents, appending the
originals of the above documents.

ISSUE/S: WON Barbers should have been disqualified.

HOLDING:NO. In favor of Respondent Barbers.

 Basic in the law of evidence is that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. In administrative cases, the quantum
of proof required is substantial evidence. Petitioner did not overcome his burden. The documentary evidence Matugas’
submitted claims fails to establish that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.

 For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private. Public documents include the
written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country. The record of such public documents may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record.

 If the record is not kept in the Philippines, the attested copy should be accompanied by a certificate that such officer has
custody thereof. Said certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul,
or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.

 The grant of United States citizenship by naturalization is an official act of the United States. The document containing the
record of this act is a public document, so this document can only be evidenced by its official publication or a copy duly
attested by the officer having legal custody thereof.

 The George Clarke's notation in the letter-request of Jesus Agana is neither an official publication of the document that
contains the record of private respondent’s naturalization, nor a copy attested by the officer who has legal custody of the
record. Matugas also did not show if Clarke is the officer charged with the custody of such record.

 Furthermore, Matugas only presented photocopies of the letter-request and notation, as well as the BID certification, in
contravention of the above-cited rule.

 In any case, the BID certification contains inconsistent entries regarding the “nationality” of Barbers. While some entries
indicate that he is “American,” other entries state that he is “Filipino.”

 The new documents presented in the Petition for Certiorari cannot also be admitted in evidence. In this case, the
Authentication executed the Philippine Consul in Los Angeles does not state that the Deputy Clerk who signed the
document has the custody of the document being authenticated.

 Lastly, the Petitioner's calls to consider alleged new evidence not presented before the COMELEC is clearly beyond the the
Supreme Courts’ certiorari powers. Doing so would be tantamount to holding a new investigation.

 The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and it cannot be asked to substitute its own judgment and discretion for that of the
COMELEC.

 The rule in appellate procedure is that a factual question may not be raised for the first time on appeal, and documents
forming no part of the proofs before the appellate court will not be considered in disposing of the issues of an action.
Piecemeal presentation of evidence is simply not in accord with orderly justice.
 The same rules apply with greater force in certiorari proceedings. It would be absurd to hold COMELEC guilty of grave
abuse of discretion for not considering evidence not presented before it. The patent unfairness of Matugas’s plea militates
against the admission and consideration of the subject documents.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

NOTES:
Section 39 of the LGC on the Qualifications of an Elective Official:
Section 39. Qualifications.—(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sanggunian bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. (b) Candidates for the position
of governor, vice-governor or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang
panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.