VI

GURU NANAK'S CONCEPT OF NATURE

KApUR SINGH

This paper deals with the following problem: Guru Nanak in his
writings (guruban; - the voice of the Light, according to the Sikh creed).
while formulating the philosophic bases of the Sikh religion. has employed
an Arabic word, qudret. ' It is a philosophical term 'correlated to lh'
time-honoured Sanskrit term. purusa. In the traditional philosophic
system of India, purusa is correlated to the term. prakriti. All religious
systems of India, by tradition, must have one of the philosophical schools-
six in number - as their base or they must be supported by an authoritative
interpretation of the cryptic texts. Brahmasutra by Badarayana. Guru
Nanak. on the other hand, has either taken ancient philosophical terms
of India and then reinterpreted them or. as in the case of the term qudret,
has picked up a non-Indo-Sanskrit word and then imparted a precise
philosophic status to it. Here, it is proposed to examine what the
dualism of purusa and prakriti originally meant in Indian philosophy
and what extended and changed meanings the Guru has given to the first
term of this dualism. purusa. Finally, it is proposed to scrutinize the
semantic changes the word qudret has undergone till its exaltation as a
fundamental philosophical concept of Sikhism. Possible reasons for Guru
Nanak's choice of the term qudret are also briefly sought to be explained.
Guru Nanak: was a prophet of religion, and philosophy was not central
to his teachings.
:-':umel'OlIs dogmas there are and a~ many more arc illldl«tllal '1i~· iplil1('s.
A~ many are the ~y~tems of philo!lOphy. An lhe;c. !In many of them an:
the (·hain. that curb the sponlaneity of Ihe pSydlC. !'or a man flf rc\i~illil.
the ('COITal conrern is lhc way to Iihcration.-

But that is not to say that Guru Nanak was unconcerned with the study
of the humanities and sciences or placed little value on the cul.ture of
the mind.
There are Iho~ who aTe ClIllllroo neilher in philosophy nOr in l\Cl'iptIlTt·.
nor have developed proper la'ie for music. And. likewisc. thcre arc
Ihose who are una(qllainled with ae~lhelirs a 1111 the al'l~ . They havl'
neilhcr a trained character, nor disl'iplined inlcl\(fI. anil. as .~III·h. Ihl'Y

45
46 PERSPECTIVES ON GURU NANAK

are devoid of Irlle learning. ,.. n1ll<h so lhal the tl'l!C si;.:nilicancc 01'
arnIOllIlared human lYi~dom is nUlsicle their sphere of inl cl't'S1. Slich
people. says :'Ilanak. arc true animals for Ihey SlrllI as 1111111:111 h(·in.~ '
wilholll the qualificalions o( n hUlllan 1"'inA": '

Guru NanaJc also asserts that:

Inlcllcc'wal ('lIrim;ly and ,,'ientific knnwlrdge are l1<'c '('ssary for I CII"',··
illl{ dOllhl< lhal hescl human uOIlcrSlancling.'

From this position of Guru Nanak. three propositions follow: (1) intel-
lectual activity is not identical with or directly relevant to religious
activity; (2) that. for a properly developed and integrated person, intel-
lectual and scientific studies are imperative ; and (3) that. although religion
is philosophically indeterminate. philosophical enquiries are necessary for
preparing the mind suitably towards the acceptance of religious discipline.
It is in this background that it is proposed to study and examine a
philosophical problem which is fundamental to the philosophies of the
East and the West and which Gutu Nana'k has explicitly stated and
attempted to answer in his writings.
There are two fundamental concepts t.hat run through almost all systems
of Indian philosophy down the ages: the concepts of pllrusa and prakriti.
Very broadly speaking. these concepts correspond to the concepts of
"subject"' and "object:' The dualism between "mind" and "mailer."
"life" and "nature" has been recognized by thinkers in alJ philosophies of
the East and the West. but the Samkhya system provides the most ancient
and systematic speculation on this topic.
This system was founded by KapiJa before sixth century B.C., but the
original text Samkhya Sulra has been irretrievably lost. The basic text
we have today is the Samkhya-Karika of Isvarakrishna of the fifth century.
Commentaries on this text were written by Gaudapada in the seventh
century. Another text. the Samkhya-prllvacan. that has come down to
us was considered to be Kapila's original text. but now it has been shown
to be a work of the fifteenth century. Commentaries on this text were
written by Aniruddha and Vijnanabh.iksu. who belong to the sixteenth
century. approximately.
Samklzya doctrines of purusa and prakriti have undergone developments
through the past centuries. In the Bhagavad-Gita. these concepts of
purusa and prakriti have been given extended and more sophisticated
meanings. whereas Vijnanabhiksu and Aniruddha have developed the
classical Samkhya still further.
Guru Nanak, in his writings, whereas he has retained the term purusa
as fundamental to his system of religion. has abandoned altogether the
term prakriti for· this purpose. though he was quite familiar not only with
the dualism of these terms. but also with their philosophical impOrt:'
The term purllsa. though retained as fundamental to what might be
called the philosophic infrastructure of the religion he revealed. he has
 GURU NANAK'S CONCEPT OF NATURE 47

interpreted it altogether otherwise than that in the classical Samkhya, the

Karika. or the Samkhy'a of the Bhagvad-Gifa or the Neo-Samlchya of
Aniruddha and Vijnanabhiksu. For the other term of this dualism.
Guru Nanak has employed an Arabic word qudret and has relegated the
term prakriti altogether to other contexts.
Let us examine briefly the original connotation of the term purwa
to distinguish it from the vernacular or apbhramsha form of it, purakh.
as employed by Guru Nanak with an altogether extended and new con-
notation given it. Let us also examine briefly the philosophical meanings
of the term prakriti as understood in the ancient thought- . system of
Samkhya and to discriminate it .from the Arabil: word qudret. which Guru
Nanalc has substituted as the second term of Ihis duaJism, and speculate
upon the reasons for it. Last, we may speculate upon what might be the
motivation of Guru Nanak for sub~lituting an Arabic word for one from
Sanslc.rit-based vocabulary which latter was weIJ integrated with Indian
modes of philosophic thought.
Since it is not our purpose to write a dissertation on the system of
Samkhya itself, it is most convenient to confine ourselves to the text
of Samkha-Karika. for the purpose of examining the terms puru!itl and
prakrili.
The world, manifest or un-manifest, according to Samkhya. is not
derived (rom purusa, does not have its matrix in the mind. Thc world
is comprehended in the term pIITlISa . but does not originate from it and
is not grounded in it. This purtlsa is not personal thought ; it is discrete
and individual (K arika. 38)." 1t is the propinquity of this PUI'IISU to
prakriti which gives rise to the world of appearances . In the absence
of this nearness, the world is there but it simply remains aV.l'akta. un-
manifest. This world is that which is perceived or witnessed. !okyanti
iIi lokah. and thus the world of appearances serves the purpose of the
individual purusartha (Karika. 63).< This discrete and individual purusa
is in itself translucent and transparent: it is a witness; it is a fact of
consciousness and thai is its primary mode of function, witnessing or
seeing the world IKarika. 19)." It is inherent in this primary function
of the purusa that by so functioning it appears different from what it
is; it appears as if it were a panorama of appearances, and appearances
likewise appear as if they were possessed of consciousness. That is
how a double obfuscation afflicts the basic human situation. namely
concerning il\ awareness of the world and of himself (K{lrika. 20)." The
purusa appears as what it is not and the prakrili appears other than
itself. This double negation occurs because of the very nature or the
purwa which has its function as witness and to reflect or to appear as
what it is not. In order to be what it is, it must appear as what it is
not. It is to the implications of this doctrine that Bhai Nand Lal Goya.
a contemporary and beloved disciple of the Tenth Nanak. Guru Guhind
Singh, refers in his Persian poem .
48 PERSPECTTVES ON GURU NANAK

We understand nOI thaI, from the beginning of Time, the human

con!iCi()\I~nes.~ comtitule~
the in~ITUmentali(y through which the Maker
of appearance~ builds a man~ion for HimlOClI.l0

It follows that in this arrangement between purllsa and the process

of - purusartha, "for the sake of the pllrusa" no consciousness. deity or
mind functions in the genesis of the manifest world. In its own nature.
and by itself the world is simply avyakta (un-manifest) as long ~s it is
not in the vicinity of the purusa. The ultimate avyakta, mulaprakr;I;,
is a confection of three 1!unas, but these I(unas do not become creative
unless in the presence of the purusa. In its primal state, the avyakta
potentially contains everything that is in the manifest world. but in,
and of. itself it is just an unconditioned. un-manifest, plenitude of being
which is completely and utterly unconscious (Karika. II)." The manifest
world b:gins to emerge or unfold when purl/sa comes into the proximity
of this avyakta, the plenitude of the unmanifest being. The gunas, three
in number. tr;l(u1la. in admixture with the mlliaprakr;ti, give rise to a
series of evolutes or emergents from which is created the world of
appearances. These /.runas extend through the avyakta and vyakta. and
they are continually modified and transformed in the proximity of the
purusa. They constitute the psychophysical make-up of human nature
and they likewise constitute the nature of everything non-human and
inorganic and, thus, they represent the fundamental structure of both
the worlds. the seen and the unseen. In themselves. however. they are
wholly and utterly unconscious and like the mulaprakriti they are
absolutely separate from the purusa (Karika, 14).11
Thus in this Samkhyo philosophy. the fundamental categories recognize
no consciousness. or absolute. or a creator God. It does not deny the
existence of gods. or even a God, the only and lonely God. The God
or the gods, indeed, may exist but they can -be no more than products
of the interaction of unconscious muloprakriti and the conscious purl/sa,
and the unconscious gunas.
It follows that this dualism of the ancient Indian Samkhya focuses on
the distinction of the conscious and the unconscious. that between ind;vi-
dual consciousness as one term and"the unconscious as the other term .
It is not the dualism of "mind" and "body" or the dualism of "thoughi"
and "extension." "Thought" and "extension," "mind" and "body" are
regarded simply as different dimensions or attributes of the world of
appearances and this unity of "thought" and "extension" is supported
by the doctrine of the ,unas. which functions without hindrance on both'
the psychological and gross physical levels. The purusa. the essence
of which 'is consciousness is not a part of the manifest world which is
unconsciousness. The p"rusa is simply the fact of impersonal conscious-
ness. not to be confused with buddhi. the intellect. ahamkora. the 1-
consciousness. or monas. the mind. The ahomkora and monos are the·
 GURU NANAK'S CONCEPT OF NATURE 49

evolutes of the three fundamental categories. Since the Inulaprakr;ti.

in admixture with the three gUllllS. makes up everything that constitutes
the manifest world. including mental dimensions of the nature and man,
the purllSCI is simply the presence of emptiness; as pure consciousness
it simply witnesses or sees. It appears as what it is not. but its appearance
is what it is. The content of this p"rtlsa can only be what it is not.
Consciousness is always consciousness of something and pure conscious-
ness is beyond the grasp of the mind and the intellect.
The insight is the hridya, the heart, of the contribution of the SlIlIIkhya
made to the philosophy and those so interested might find it rewarding
to search for basic similarities between the Samkhya and the phenomeno-
logy ' of Sartre. 13
The TantrayallU or Vlljl'tlyana school of Buddhism. founded in the
fourth century by Arya Asanga. adopted this insight as the base of the
doctrine of SlIlIyala. the basic emptiness that sustains the human situa-
tion. the world and man's awareness of it. dridham saramasaus;ryam
ac"hedya abhedya laksnam adaM av;nas; ca sunyala vaira mucayale
(Su"ayala is designated as vajra, because it is firm. sound, cannot be
pierced. cannot be penetrated. cannot be burnt and cannot be destroyed).
it is this insight on which are based the most charming pieces of
poetic imagery in the ancient text of Samkhya-Karika which tell us that,
after showing her face 10 Ihe pUTl4sa the jlraio-iti disappears like a
dancer after her enchanting performance on the slage. (59)

'ibis is Illy considcrcu view that I'here is nothing more sensitive and shy
than tJrtlkriti who. once she knows Ihat shc has been S(;en by the fllll// ,WI.
never again unveils her IJcwitching facc 1,0 the IJIII'IIW . (61)11

It is on this insight that the Sikh doctrine of the ulter irrelevance of

liCience and objective knowledge to the penultimate goal of religion.
namely deliverance from the bondage of sam:ilIr. the transmigration,
is based.
Science purponing to l>c 311 end ill itself IS weal'iJlc:.s of Ocsh ;",,1
waSle of soul,lS

In the writings of Guru Nanak. the decisive argument against the utter
irrelevance of objective science. and. by implication. against contemporary
Western scientism is that by objectively becoming preoccupied with
the phenomenal world. man inevitably becomes drawn into the morass
of conjectures and illusions and. therefore. drawn away from the possibility
of release or deliverance. The wish for exactitude of scientism can be
shown as being far from constituting a guarantee of intrinsic value and
spiritual legitimacy for the simple reason that the exactitude in question
is already jeopardized by the most serious begging of the question: that
is. scientism by denying the intellect and the Absolute rejects a priori
so 1'I!RSPECTIVES ON GURU HANAK

the certainty of all knowledge. This argument, in essence, occurs clearly

and succinctly in the ancient Buddhist text, Lankavatarasutra (400 A.D.)
which runs as fQllows:
They do not UlIdCI'Sl,UlU lhal the objccli\'(: world derives from the
mind itsclf and do not grasp that the whole system of thought likewise
derh'cs from the mind; but attributing reality to these manifestations
of mind tbey examine them. senseless IK'Ople Ibat Ihey arc. and gCI
attached 10 dualities such as "this" and "that" or "being" or "001-
being'" withoul reatizing that there is but a single Essence.

The religious system and the way of life which Guru Nanak revealed
and preached are based on the philosophical doctrines that the one
Absolute Purusa. both as self-conscious and unconscious, is the matrix
of the world and not simply a term in a confection or admixture. That
the world has a Creator. that as created Nature it has no absolute basis
or essence independently and apart from this Purusa. and last. that the
relation between the Creator and the created Nature is not a separate
and independent category of existence. but is merely an extension. an
emanation of this Purusa. This One Absolute Purusa is to be contra-
distinguished from the Purusa of the Vedas repeatedly described in all
the four Vedas ;15 in Purusasukta. as "a fourth of Him is all beings and
the three-fourths is in immortal heavens." This Vedic Purusa is not
the Creator or Controller of the world but just the neutral stuff of the
manifest and the unmanilest worlds. not fundamentally and essentially
different from the purllsa of the Samkhya.
The first of these two doctrines stems from the Samkllya dualism of
pllrusa and prakriti. and the third. out of a pivotal problem of the
nature of relation. In modern Western philosophy. Hume brought the
problem of relation to the forefront. particularly the problem of the .
causal relation. But his formulation of this problem is in a very
different context lrom that of the Indian philosophy. as Hume was
attacking it in the context of British Empiricism. His problem is
epistemological in nature. whereas that raised in Indian pbilosophy is
metaphysical in nature where the question asked straightway is whether
Ihe relations are real.
Two basic features of our experience arc identity and difference and
we find them in our experience as subject as well as object. All pairs
of categories. "subject" and "object." "substance" and "mind," "universal"
and "particular," can be reduced to these two basic aspect'> of
human experience. identity and difference. These two' asj>e(.:ts arc
inevitably related to each other. Tbey are not jumbled together. What
is ~e l1alure of this relation between the two. and if this relation is
real. how can both belong to one and the same thing. because both
are opposed to each other fundamentally? Either the difference and
the identity and .the relation. all three; are ~uaUyreaJ or the relation
 GURU NANAK'S CONCEPT OF NATURE 51

between the two is false. whereas the two are real. or last. it might be
that the relation as well as one of the relata is false. Of course. there
is a fourth logical possibility that the identity. the difference as well as
the relation might be .equally false, implicating the ultimate sunyata.
just as the Vajrayana Buddhism depicts ,it. The Nyaya.-vaisesika and
the Mimamsa. Jainism and the realist interpretations of Vedanta such
as Dvaita, Visistadvaita, Suddhadvaita hold that all the three. the
relata as well as the relation are real. Without holding this. it is not
possible to uphold a pluralist view of reality. because how can there
be an unreal relation between the two reals. The doctrine of Samvaya
(inherence) of Nyaya-vaisesika and its doctrine of asatkaryavada (the
theory that the effect does not pre-exist in its cause) is based on the
reality of the relation and the relata. The Buddhist and the Vedantin.
accepting the centrality of this problem of relation in the philosophical
context of India. attacked the doctrine of the reality of relation with
much vigour. The Vedantin attacked it by pressing the question that.
if relation is real like the relata, this gives rise to regressus ad infinitum.
The Buddhist puts the question: "If the relation is as real as the relata.
why is it not seen as a thing as the relata are?" This weakness of the
realist view of relation. has given rise to the q>ncept of release or moha.
which is central to all systems of Indian thought. Since purl/sa and
prakriti, the one representing the identity and the other representing
difference. are both real (the relation between the two is not ultimately
rea!), the relation can be eliminated or removed by some technique or
know-how. by some discipline .or sadhalla and thus purusa and prakr~ti
can be released from the bondage of each other al)d the purusa freed
from the drudgery of samsara.
The possibility of this release is logically implicated by the Buddhist
dictum. yo viruddha dharmadhyasavan lie usau ekah (that which has
opposite attributes cannot be one). There is, however. a Haw in this
argument. for. it presupposes that relation merely implies a connection.
but it fajJs to see that it also implies separation. Through rejection of
the relation. therefore. they will not fall apart: Anyhow. if the relation
between the pllrusa and the prakriti is false. what is there to separate
the two. In other words, they cannot see that the conception of the
two absolutes is self-contradictory, a gross . nescience which is sought
to be .removed in Sikhism in the' Mu/-Mantra. IT which has the arith-
metical numeral 'I' as its first term. But if the relation is not real.
then the two terms, "identity" and "difference," are false. The Buddhist
holds the "identity" as false. That is why the Buddhist rejects the
unifying categories such as, "substance" .or "universal," (samanya), and
the Vedantin is in favour of the unifying category of Atma: bralfma
sa/yam jaganmillhya jivabrahmaiva naparah. The Vedantins and
Buddhists both accept the falsity of the relation and also its implication
that one of the relata must be false. but yet one goes to accept the
52 PEkSPECfIVES ON GVkU NANAK

relata of "difference" and the other ,relata of "identity." and Veduntins

argue that logically the "identity" is more fundamental than "difference,"
abheda purvako bhedah, while the Buddhist argues that reality must be
tlrthakriyakarin, i.e. efficient. whereas the ~'identity," or "permanence."
cannot be efficient. The coup d'grace. in this controversy, has been
administered 'by the Madbyamika who rightly detects strains of dogmatism
in both the schools which reject one relata and accept the other. and
thus he argues that the '''identity'' and "difference" being correlated must
disappear together and since atmavada and anatmavada are incompatible
with each other, both cannot be accepted, but both can be rejected all
right. If the falsity of relation leads to the falsity of one relata. the
falsity of one relata likewise implicates the falsity of both the relates.
This inexorable logic of the Madhyamib exalts the reality to a pedestal
which is outside the reach of human experience. This would mean
that the reality. or taltva, is completely beyond the reach of human
experience and thus is logically unrealizable. If that is so. then all
quests for the ultimate religious goal. the swnmum bonum. become
futile and pointless. In order to remove the stigma of ~ontradiction.
the reality must be transcended. but in order to be realizable. it must
also be immanent in experience.
It is in this background that Guru Nanak h"as favoured the three
philosophical doctrines stated in the opening pages of this paper.
Guru Nanak, as we have said. employed the word qudret as the second
term of the dualism. with Purakh as the first term. Qudret is an Arabic
word, meaning "that under the power and authority of' its Master.
AI-Qadir as one of the attributes is distinguishable Crom another allribute
of God (/[·KhIlUq, i.e. the Crcator. In the Quran (57-3), with the con·
Lcnts of which Guru Nanak was familiar. it being part of the high
culture of Islamic Asia during Guru Nanak's days of which Islamic
Asia Punjab was an integral part in the fifteenth century, God is spok.en
of as "the First and Last."18 He is also spoken of as ·'the Originator
of Heavens and Earth." (6-101)19 GlJru NanaJc. in his term qudret.
includes both th'ese Quranie attributes of God. al·Khaliq and al·Qadir.
He Him~c1r creates and arranges Lbe Nature. He Himself wntrols its
progression and evolution. (Basanl, l)lIG
•
He is the trauscelldent as well ;,5 the immanent and He is al:.o the
appearances. He is the Pure Con", iOllsness. and He is also the Creator
of fhe l\"ature. (Sri, 1)21

The Universal Self has (reatcd rhe individual self and He Himself
haLh t.Teated the differentiating names. Thus Nature hath He created
as 'tbe other' and depositing Himself therein He is in a relation of
aesthetic contemplation to Nature. ("'sa, !)II

Nature is all that appears and Nature iJ the World ill seen, felt alld
 GURU NANAK'S CONCEPT OF NATURB 53
appreciated. Nature is all Ihe spacH and Nature i~ Ihe l"lalil), o[ f.. rm~.
(ASII, 1)t3

Glory to Thee who dwellelh in Nature. Jnfinile ancl ('lel'lIai. Thy

limils and fronliel'll arc unknowahle. (",(11. 1):14

He who has o'eatrd the Ivorld in whi.eh He ahides as 1111111311('111. Ih;1I

1.(,1'(1 may be rccogniu·.1 Ihrongh Nalure. lie is nOI 10 he 1'11\31'11('(1 ;\~
wholly lI·all~('ndl'nf. a, Jlis voice ('an be hcard in ere,,' 111':11'1 .
("II11llnll.<, J)I:<

o Irlle lord. Thy nealCtI Nallire is real. (A .tn, 1)211

All that is your qut/I'el and you arc its QadiI' anel KfIJ'/II, i.1'. Ahsolnle
Conlroller and Creal or. (.1.tll, ])31

(;001 ('reales Nalllre and single and alone He conlemplales il. (lI.m. l)tA

The qllestion arises but no answer is forlhcoming: The plll'pose, Ihe

~ignifl(allce allli Ihe \'allie of Nalure arc beyond man's colllpTchclI.ion.
«(;I1I1"i, 1)t9

The l.ord cOnlemplal~ His own creal ion, !';al\lTe. lie contemplate.
if and he ~\I5tain. il. Why? He who cloes, He alone knows. (1'111/1>1111.<, I)'"'

It thus becomes clear that Guru Nanak employs the term qlldret to
designate Nature and Cosmos. in the sense of the general cosmic order
ordained by God in contrast to human derivations from it. Nature
here is the complex of created things. in contradistinction to the Creator-
Nalllre Naturans of scholasticism. whereas the created things are Natura
Natllrata. Guru Nanak adopted this Vword from the common lingual
pool of the medieval Indo-Islamic world in which he lived. In Arabic.
qudret. literally means power, might. The same word qudret. as a part
of the Turkish language. means power. strength, omnipotence of God,
Nature (Turkish Languof!e Dictionary. by H. C. Hony. Oxford. 1957).
This word qudret. as a verbal noun of qadar in the Persian language.
means power, potency. authority of God. the Creation. Universe. Nature
(Persian-English Dictionary by Steingass).
It was this word qudret which Guru Nanak picked up from the
cultural parlance of his contemporary world to which he gave a precise
meaning and philosophical exactitude.
The foregoing discussion suggests also the reasons {or which Guru
Nanu abandoned the term prakriti. The term prakriti has a permanent
odour of absoluteness. existence in its own right. about it and no amount
of reinterpretation of the term through the process which Nietzsche
called. "transvaluation of values." could possibly have divestetl, it of
this inconveniently unpleasant smell. . The "Nature," in Guru Nana'll:.
is elUted by and is utterly dependent on the Creator. at every moment
of its existence. The status of Nature in the philosophic scheme of
S4 PERSPECTIVIlS ON GURU NANAK

Guru Nanak is also encompassed within the time-cycle, ' so tbat the
Quranic status of God, "tho First and Last," remains intact.
This concept of Nature is totally different from the concept of prakritj
which forms the warp of the entire fabric of Ind.ian philosophy. It is
strangely akin to the concept of "Nature" held by Meister Eckhart in
his Opus Trjpartitum.
It remains now to conjecture the reasons of Guru Nanak's being at
pains to borrow a fundamental term of Sikh philosophy from a source,
non-Jndo-Sanskrit.
It would appear that the main reasons were three: (I) Primarily,
Guru Nanak wanted a term of philosopby to which he could impart
such connotation and meanings as would fit in with tb~ base of tbe
religion that he revealed. It is a subject in itself as to what that
religion is and how precisely tbe concept of qudret is necessary for its '
intellectual base and proper practice. (2) Incidentally, Guru Nanak
wanted to break: the shell of prejudice enclosing the Hindu mind and
attitudes towards modes of human communication in languages other
than Indo-Sanskr!t. There is a severe injunction in the Bhavishyapurana :

Even if the consequence is death, a true Hindu should reru5C to learn

the vulgar speech of the Western regjon~.31

Th.is Guru Nanak discountenanced. It was concretized in the broad

liberalism of the Tenth Nanak:
All languages of whatever people and whatever region of the earlh
and all the true sciences, they are proper and acceplablc. 3t

Last, the Hindu mind was afflicted with a gross bias, for centuries
past, symptomatic of dogmatism and mental stagnation. The famous
Indologist, AI-Biruni (973-1048), in his Kitabul-Hind bas recorded:
The Hindus think ~hat there is no science, no knowledge which exisl~
or has originated beyond the frontiers of the sacred land of Inclia.

Guru Nanak aimed at opening the windows of the human mind to

all the four Ql!8rters of space, so that man's mjnd may grow freely and
his soul may remain whole through healthy contacts with tbe insigbts
gained by mankind in all countries and in all ages, througb such ~uca­
tion as trains him to .employ his "critical faculty as the anvil and the
accumulated wisdom of mankind as the fashioning tool. "33
 GURU NANAJ('S CONCEPT OF NATURE 55
NOTES AND REFF.RENCES

l. The ja/III is the ·pi,·olal text in the ~acrcd \Vriling~ of Gnrn !\!anak anI! the fir~t
chaptcr in thc Glint Grant/I, which evcry Sikh mn't commit to ntemory 10
rccite il as thc firsl ritnal ·prayer at dawn: it is the llI't/a)'lIwlm of the Sikh
Sn-ipiIlfC and in Ihis text the word, !]lIdrrl, is straighlway inlrodn/cd : .
Qlldrnli kaJlftl/ "nita , ,)rurll.
(GIl "' G"nl/III , T. 1)
2. IIlftli IIfIII, /",dhi lIelin 111'1(' "I'd bienr, "rIc ',al/dltall jlfl III' [{II 1'111 II "It
mnl:iI dl/nI·.
(GIII"II G,nl/II,. I , fb)

:I . ]/Illa 1I11(/U 1/a lied II I/n gia rn>lI, ,·a.n l lIa.t tl I/a jllllallti,
Iklla sidlli na bur/hi 1/11 aI/ali sal', 1I1:1II,n1' Ita IJltro nn lahallli,
/l.'al/alr II' lIar lun/i lIliaI', ji /Jillll f!;1I1l gamllll !tnrnllii .
(Gili'll Gmllllt, J, I.JlI)
.1. .\1(111 .mmjlrll1'(lj1 hamll(, "arllllflil /)(I/'Ilini Ainl/ .
(Gili'll Grnl/II,. Kahir , :I.jo)
Ii. PammndlJlllllal/ lmrnl';1i pfl/all .
(GilI'll. r.ralllll , 'aide\" [,26)
6. Tn 1/11111 I I'll ... "i.t('.t liS le/lll)'" Illrln ... pflllrn /Ull/rnl"lynh.
i. PII,.,t.<nrlllnlll /'1'111; T'illloclI),nl), rl,nrl/tulla .
R. Kaival)'lInt malill ),a,<1 llyn'" drnsl rlvnllar 'r'l'(l bllnl'n.t ca .
!I. Tnslllal IIJlsnlll)'ngnti ('('rlnnnln ceta nm,nd iT'n lin.~nlll
Glil/f,Jrnrtrtvai en /lnrlr.lla bllftTl(tlity udtf.tinllit .
10. Nadalli.t/am 11% rllz·i-a:n/ ill IIl1rj-t/,-i-arillm 1"11, hi nll!]!]n.t ll a;: Illlfllr /mr/lllI -i- I:i."rI
khalla III i.mznd_
I I. Trigul/am IIviveld "isnya" salllallynlll arctallnlll j:iI'llSftT,n(/lIfIl'lII i
"yaklam lat/,a fIYadllflllnm Ind "ipar; la.l lalltn Ora pl/mnll .
12 . Avivekylldih siddltas I raigllll)'a I lac/vipn.y a )'a IJIlfIT'nl.
1:\. Jean -I'aul Sartre, Bei,,!!; nlld .votld/lgIlPu, tl': Ha1Ct Bal'll(,~. N, y _ I'hil~ :
Lib:, t95~.
11 _ Rnllgas)'a t/a)'.t(l),ilya Ili""rlnl; /llIrlaki )'lItha II rIyal

Pllnt.ta.tYIl Inillalmnllalll /lInl((l.<)," I,ivnrlnle tll'lIkrlill

I'l'IIkrlrh ." dlllll/nmlal'fllll 1/(1 hindrl IIslili /li e tII,,'ir hh",·nt;
1"11 dmsla 111;1; /lIIl1nr lIn dll,',!{Il/nm flpn;l; /111 I'll tfI.<yn .
I ". !.iii IIi /illl'i l,nrltill (('III haria .
«(;111'1/ (;mlllll, I, .,lii)
IIi. II i~ found in Rig: (X-20) and consists of In "crsc~ . h i~ asn·ihccl '0 Ri~hi
~a .. ayana . In the Sh,dl/a),njltr. "1Ij.tnllc),i-.' nlllili ln (XXXI. I.) it ha, ~2 ,·er.e~ .
In the Tniltiliyn.(lI'nll,l'nila of Ihe J\ ";'t/lll(/~·njllr (In. 2) it ha ~ If! "NSCS. In
," I'IIya ..<lIIIII,ila 01 SOlllnt'l','n (IV. 3) and in ,h(' .1I1ofll1'11 (XIX . ~) al~o il i~ Ih"r('.
Ii. IIt()t,,,hn,' ,m /;tt"",,, 1:0 1"" /Hu'llllu lIi"'Jhnu lIinJII;,." iI/mllll" r,; nju" i .({,ill/wtl
glll·prasadi.
«(:11/'11. (;I'nllll, , I. I)
1I1111··n/-nw!t'a/ IIInl ni:/lirll.
IInr/i n/-.tnlllfll<'ftt lI'nl·n" .
• I
20. II I'c 'I "'/1'11 Ii IlfIrr .mji , 'nell "/,i nil,rrr. mJII r"ii ,

:\, II/,r lI(rni rll/ri n/le hi ape IIIf11'jili lII;alla,

.,/". l"'/;JWj ."'"1' 11/'1' I, ; !]III/lft/; kflre illlWlln .
((;11111 Grnlllll, 1, 2:,)
'~ '.' . .f/' ;""; "/HI ,'ill;io II/,i nn; 'fllli.) unH,
0".1" !]"dl/,Ii snji/ll 1:111; 111111/1/ (/i'"11 CIlI/,
S6 PBRSPE~ ON GURU NANAK

15. Qudrali disai qudrati suniai qudrali bhau sulth sal1l,

Qudrali palali awi qudrali sarab altaru.
(Guru Granlh, I. 46.)
... Ballhari qudrali vossia lera aliI" na jai liIlehia.
(Guru Gmnlh, I. 469)
.5. lini jagu siraji samllia so sahibu qudrali jllllOva,
Sacra duri na bhlliiai ghilli ghali .",bad" pachannl/a.
(Gum Grlln/h, I. a8.)
16. SlIcci leri qudrali .",cer. (Mli."'".
(Guru Granth, I, 463)
17. &lbh teri qudrali lun qadi". learln . ..
(Guru Grllnlh, I. 464)
18. Ape qudrati sajileai ape Itare bicaru.
(Guru Granlh, I. 145)
ag. Kahna hai leiehu ltahanu no jol,
Tau qudrati qimali nahi pai,
(Guru Gmn/h, I. 15')
30. Kila velehai sahibu apno qudrilli leore bicaro,
Qudroli bieore dhoran dhare jini leia so jane.
(Gllru Grllnlh, I, .0;80)
51. Na parel yawani bhasha partm ltaran gnlernpi.
51. Sabhai "olebhlJJha sabhlli deshbani
Sabhai shIJJlra bidill ",maslo pa,dhani.
!l5. AAran; frUlti tledu ha/hillru.
(Guru Grllt/lh, I, 8)