TORTS CASES

I.
FE CAYAO VS. RAMOLETE

FACTS:

On July 28, 1994, respondent, three months pregnant Editha Ramolete (Editha) was brought
to the Lorma Medical Center (LMC) in San Fernando, La Union due to vaginal bleeding. Upon
advice of petitioner relayed via telephone, Editha was admitted to the LMC on the same day. A
pelvic sonogram was then conducted on Editha revealing the fetus weak cardiac pulsation.The
following day, Edithas repeat pelvic sonogram showed that aside from the fetus weak cardiac
pulsation, no fetal movement was also appreciated. Due to persistent and profuse vaginal
bleeding, petitioner advised Editha to undergo a Dilatation and Curettage Procedure (D&C) or
raspa.

On July 30, 1994, petitioner performed the D&C procedure. Editha was discharged from the
hospital the following day.

On September 16, 1994, Editha was once again brought at the LMC, as she was suffering from
vomiting and severe abdominal pains. Editha was attended by Dr. Beatriz de la Cruz, Dr. Victor
B. Mayo and Dr. Juan V. Komiya. Dr. Mayo allegedly informed Editha that there was a dead
fetus in the latters womb. After, Editha underwent laparotomy, she was found to have a
massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage and a ruptured uterus. Thus, Editha had to undergo a
procedure for hysterectomy and as a result, she has no more chance to bear a child.

On November 7, 1994, Editha and her husband Claro Ramolete (respondents) filed a Complaint
for Gross Negligence and Malpractice against petitioner before the Professional Regulations
Commission (PRC).

Respondents alleged that Edithas hysterectomy was caused by petitioners unmitigated

negligence and professional incompetence in conducting the D&C procedure and the
petitioners failure to remove the fetus inside Edithas womb. Among the alleged acts of
negligence were: first, petitioners failure to check up, visit or administer medication on Editha
during her first day of confinement at the LMC; second, petitioner recommended that a D&C
procedure be performed on Editha without conducting any internal examination prior to the
procedure; third, petitioner immediately suggested a D&C procedure instead of closely
monitoring the state of pregnancy of Editha.

In her Answer, petitioner denied the allegations of negligence and incompetence with the
following explanations: upon Edithas confirmation that she would seek admission at the LMC,
petitioner immediately called the hospital to anticipate the arrival of Editha and ordered
through the telephone the medicines Editha needed to take, which the nurses carried out;
petitioner visited Editha on the morning of July 28, 1994 during her rounds; on July 29, 1994,
she performed an internal examination on Editha and she discovered that the latters cervix
was already open, thus, petitioner discussed the possible D&C procedure, should the bleeding
become more profuse; on July 30 1994, she conducted another internal examination on
Editha, which revealed that the latters cervix was still open; Editha persistently complained of
her vaginal bleeding and her passing out of some meaty mass in the process of urination and
bowel movement; thus, petitioner advised Editha to undergo D&C procedure which the
respondents consented to; petitioner was very vocal in the operating room about not being able
to see an abortus; taking the words of Editha to mean that she was passing out some meaty
mass and clotted blood, she assumed that the abortus must have been expelled in the process

1
of bleeding; it was Editha who insisted that she wanted to be discharged; petitioner agreed, but
she advised Editha to return for check-up on August 5, 1994, which the latter failed to do.

Petitioner contended that it was Edithas gross negligence and/or omission in insisting to be
discharged on July 31, 1994 against doctors advice and her unjustified failure to return for
check-up as directed by petitioner that contributed to her life-threatening condition on
September 16, 1994; that Edithas hysterectomy was brought about by her very abnormal
pregnancy known as placenta increta, which was an extremely rare and very unusual case of
abdominal placental implantation. Petitioner argued that whether or not a D&C procedure was
done by her or any other doctor, there would be no difference at all because at any stage of
gestation before term, the uterus would rupture just the same.

HELD:

In the present case, the Court notes the findings of the Board of Medicine:

When complainant was discharged on July 31, 1994, herein respondent advised her to
return on August 4, 1994 or four (4) days after the D&C. This advise was clear in
complainants Discharge Sheet. However, complainant failed to do so. This being the case,
the chain of continuity as required in order that the doctrine of proximate cause can be validly
invoked was interrupted. Had she returned, the respondent could have examined her
thoroughly. x x x (Emphases supplied)

Also, in the testimony of Dr. Manalo, he stated further that assuming that there was in fact a
misdiagnosis, the same would have been rectified if Editha followed the petitioners order to
return for a check-up on August 4, 1994. Dr. Manalo stated:

Granting that the obstetrician-gynecologist has been misled (justifiably) up to thus point
that there would have been ample opportunity to rectify the misdiagnosis, had the
patient returned, as instructed for her follow-up evaluation. It was one and a half months
later that the patient sought consultation with another doctor. The continued growth of an
ectopic pregnancy, until its eventual rupture, is a dynamic process. Much change in physical
findings could be expected in 1 months, including the emergence of suggestive ones.

It is undisputed that Editha did not return for a follow-up evaluation, in defiance of the
petitioners advise. Editha omitted the diligence required by the circumstances which could have
avoided the injury. The omission in not returning for a follow-up evaluation played a substantial
part in bringing about Edithas own injury. Had Editha returned, petitioner could have conducted
the proper medical tests and procedure necessary to determine Edithas health condition and
applied the corresponding treatment which could have prevented the rupture of Edithas uterus.
The D&C procedure having been conducted in accordance with the standard medical practice, it
is clear that Edithas omission was the proximate cause of her own injury and not merely a
contributory negligence on her part.

Contributory negligence is the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part
of the person injured, which, concurring with the defendants negligence, is the proximate
cause of the injury. Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured
party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident. Where the immediate cause of an
accident resulting in an injury is the plaintiffs own act, which contributed to the principal
occurrence as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover damages for the injury. Again,
based on the evidence presented in the present case under review, in which no
negligence can be attributed to the petitioner, the immediate cause of the accident
resulting in Edithas injury was her own omission when she did not return for a follow-up

2
check up, in defiance of petitioners orders. The immediate cause of Edithas injury was
her own act; thus, she cannot recover damages from the injury.

II.
David Taylor vs Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company

FACTS:

David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin boy at sea; he was also able to
learn some principles of mechanical engineering and mechanical drawing from his dad’s office
(his dad was a mechanical engineer); he was also employed as a mechanical draftsman earning
P2.50 a day – all said, Taylor was mature well beyond his age.

One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises of Manila Electric power plant
where they found 20-30 blasting caps (A detonator, frequently a blasting cap, is a device
used to trigger an explosive device ) which they took home. In an effort to explode the said
caps, Taylor experimented until he succeeded in opening the caps and then he lighted it using
a match which resulted to the explosion of the caps causing severe injuries to his companion
and to Taylor losing one eye.
Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company left the caps exposed to
children, they are liable for damages due to the company’s negligence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages.

HELD:

No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows:

(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts
it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.

In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in disposing off the caps
which they used for the power plant, and that said caps caused damages to Taylor. However,
the causal connection between the company’s negligence and the injuries sustained by
Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor which led to the explosion of the caps as
he even, in various experiments and in multiple attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is from
said acts that led to the explosion and hence the injuries.

Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and
physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn
P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the
record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care. The evidence
of record leaves no room for doubt that he well knew the explosive character of the cap with
which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to
produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the
use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final
success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to the contents of the
cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that
he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous.

3
 III.
HIDALGO VS BALANDAN

FACTS:

Guillermo Balandan and his wife is claiming damages in the sum of P2,000 for the death of
their son, Mario. Petitioner was the owner of an Ice plant, who had in their premises 2 tanks
filled of water, 9 feet deep. The factory was fenced but Ingress and egress was easily made
because the gates were always open and there was no guard assigned in the said gate. Also the
tanks didn’t have any barricade or fence. One day when Mario was playing with his friend, they
saw the tank inside the factory and began playing and swimming inside it. While bathing,
Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already as a cadaver, having
died of ‘asphyxia secondary to drowning.’ The lower decided in the favor of the parents saying
that the petitioner is liable for damages due to the doctrine of attractive nuisance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of attractive nuisance is applicable in this case?

RULING: NO.
The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that “One who maintains on his premises dangerous
instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to
exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable
to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in
the premises. American Jurisprudence shows us that the attractive nuisance doctrine
generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the
absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and
its location. In the case bar, the tanks themselves cannot fall under such doctrine thus the
petitioners cannot be held liable for Mario’s death.

IV.
NIKKO HOTEL VS REYES “AMAY BISAYA”

FACTS:
Amay Bisaya was having a coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko when an old friend, Dr. Filart,
Allegedly asked him to join the party of the former manager of the said hotel, Mr. Tsuruoka.
When he was helping himself at the buffet table, Ms. Lim approached him and said to leave the
party for it was intended for a number of guests. Amay Bisaya claimed that he was humiliated
by the manner Ms. Lim asked him to leave. He alleged that Ms. Lim asked him to leave in a
loud voice enough to be heard by the other guests. He was accompanied by a Makati policeman
in leaving the penthouse. He was more embarrassed when Dr. Filart denied that she invited
him on the said party.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of Ms. Lim constitutes an abuse of right to make the petitioners
liable for damages caused to Amay Bisaya.

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that any damage which Amay Bisaya might have suffered
through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good
faith, must be his to bear alone.

It is unlikely to happen that Ms. Lim exposed him to ridicule and shame because admittedly,
Amay Bisaya stated that Ms. Lim was very close enough for him to kiss when she asked him to

4
leave the party. It was intended to be heard only by Amay Bisaya. Nevertheless , his reaction
to the request must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. Since
Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Amay Bisaya to leave the party for being a gate-crasher,
neither she nor her employer be held liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code.

On the other hand, Reyes brought whatever damage he incurred upon himself. Under the
doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, by coming to the party uninvited, Reyes opens
himself to the risk of being turned away, and thus being embarrassed. The injury he
incurred is thus self-inflicted. Evidence even shows that Dr. Filart herself denied inviting
Reyes into the party and that Reyes simply gate-crashed. Reyes did not even present any
supporting evidence to support any of his claims. Since he brought injury upon himself,
neither Lim nor Nikko Hotel can be held liable for damages.

V.
FERNANDO VS CA

FACTS:

←November 7, 1975: Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a
requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying
of the septic tank in Agdao wherein Bascon won November 22, 1975: bidder Bertulano with
four other companions namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose
Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank.
← The bodies were removed by a fireman.
←
← The body of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the
Regional Hospital but he expired there.
←
←The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned they entered the septic tank
without clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master.
← Since the septic tank was found to be almost empty, they were presumed to be the ones
who did the re-emptying.
←Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office found them to have died from "asphyxia" -
diminution of oxygen supply in the body and intake of toxic gas
←November 26, 1975: Bascon signed the purchase order
←RTC: Dismissed the case
←CA: Reversed - law intended to protect the plight of the poor and the needy, the ignorant and
the indigent

ISSUE: W/N Davao city is negligent and its negligence is the proximate cause therefore can be
liable for damages

HELD: NO. CA affirmed.

←Test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence.

←Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would
have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable warrant his foregoing
the conduct or guarding against its consequences.
←
← The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given
situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of

5
the facts involved in the particular case
←
← Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this
provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist
←Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury
←
← Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors,
he can not recover.
←
← Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he
may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such
injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence
←
←Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the New Civil
Code which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public
←
← While the construction of these public facilities demands utmost compliance with safety
and sanitary requirements, the putting up of warning signs is not one of those requirements
←
Accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one
removes its covers.

←Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has
not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of
the attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in
this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and
that of his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the
accident.

Proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims was due to their own
negligence.

VI.
ILOCOS ELECTRIC COMPANY VS CA

FACTS:

From the evidence of plaintiffs it appears that in the evening of June 28 until the early morning
of June 29, 1967 a strong typhoon by the code name "Gening" buffeted the province of
Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding in its wake. Between 5:30 and 6:00
A.M. on June 29, 1967, after the typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters were beginning
to recede the deceased Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called Nana Belen, ventured out of the house of
her son-in-law, Antonio Yabes, on No. 19 Guerrero Street, Laoag City, and proceeded
northward towards the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was the owner
and proprietress, to look after the merchandise therein that might have been damaged.
Wading in waist-deep flood on Guerrero, the deceased was followed by Aida Bulong, a Salesgirl
at the Five Sisters Grocery, also owned by the deceased, and by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket
seller at the YJ Cinema, which was partly owned by the deceased. Aida and Linda walked side
by side at a distance of between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased, Suddenly, the deceased
screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear
dissuaded them from doing so because on the spot where the deceased sank they saw
an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water.
Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of Antonio Yabes. Ernesto

6
tried to go to the deceased, but at four meters away from her he turned back shouting that the
water was grounded. Aida and Linda prodded Ernesto to seek help from Antonio Yabes at the
YJ Cinema building which was four or five blocks away.
When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother-in law had been electrocuted, he
acted immediately. With his wife Jane, together with Ernesto and one Joe Ros, Yabes passed by
the City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask the people of defendant Ilocos Norte Electric
Company or INELCO to cut off the electric current. Then the party waded to the house on
Guerrero Street. The floodwater was receding and the lights inside the house were out
indicating that the electric current had been cut off in Guerrero. Yabes instructed his boys to
fish for the body of the deceased. The body was recovered about two meters from an electric
post.

HELD:

Likewise, the maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no application in
the case at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the
deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. As testified by Linda
Alonzo Estavillo (see TSN, p. 5, 26 Sept. 1972) and Aida Bulong (see TSN, p. 43, 26 Sept.
1972), the deceased, accompanied by the former two, were on their way to the latter's grocery
store "to see to it that the goods were not flooded." As such, shall We punish her for exercising
her right to protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable
presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it has been
held that a person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily
assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is
found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril (65A C.S.C.
Negligence(174(5), p. 301), or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property (Harper
and James, "The Law of Torts." Little, Brown and Co., 1956, v. 2, p. 1167). Clearly, an
emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was
faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal
incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to
petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private
respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering damages as a result of the death
caused by petitioner's negligence (ibid., p. 1165, 1166).

VII.
VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and
FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents.

FACTS:
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

At 10 oclock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga,
then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a
passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was
filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an
"extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.

On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off.
As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as
she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva
bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained
a fracture of the "distal third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying skin."
Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting, and case wedging were done under

7
sedation. Her confinement in the hospital lasted from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her
attending physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain
on a cast for a period of three months and would have to ambulate in crutches during said
period.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of
the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a
common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco
Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved
Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the
accident. It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva
and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver
Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.

HELD:

We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioners contention that Sungas taking an
"extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the
injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated
merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an
overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioners contention that the jeepney being bumped
while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could
not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that the following
requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the debtors will; (b) the
event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in
causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his
jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway

VIII.
PICART VS SMITH

FACTS:
On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he
had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. As
the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of
his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more
successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not
observing the rule of the road.

Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed
(CONFUSE) by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony
closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says
that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to
the other side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the
proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman
would move to the other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant,
instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to
approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite
near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant
quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the

8
automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned
its body across the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its
rider was thrown off with some violence.As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff
received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention
for several days.
From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart has appealed.

ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the
damage done

HELD: the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is here rendered that
the Picart recover of Smith damages
YES

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would
have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The existence of
negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor
in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or
negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The
question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must
of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts
involved in the particular case.

Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course
actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that
harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this
prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the
proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is
said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen
that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or
guarding against its consequences.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence
is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our
opinion, have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and
would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of
that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the duty to guard
against the threatened harm.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was
guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But
as we have already stated, Smith was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to
discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent
acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

IX.
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS VS BAESA

9
FACTS:
←
Spouses Baesa, their 4 children, the Ico spouses and their son and 7 other people boarded a
passenger jeep driven by David Ico to go to a picnic in Isabela, to celebrate the 5th wedding
anniversary of the Baesa spouses
←
←While they were proceeding towards Malalam River at a speed of about 20 kph, a speeding
PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on a route to Manila, encroached on the jeepney’s lane while
negotiating a curve, and collided with it.
←
←As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for their daughter Maricar Baesa, as well as
David Ico, died, and the rest suffered from injuries. Maricar Baesa, through her guardian filed
separate actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO.
← PANTRANCO: alleged David Ico's negligence as a proximate cause of the accident and
invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
driver.
←CA upheld RTC: favor of Baesa

ISSUE: W/N the last clear chance applies thereby making David Ico who had the chance
to avoid the collision negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and
competence?

HELD: NO.
←
←Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant
liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be
raised as a defense to defeat claim for damages
←
←For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is necessary to show that the person
who allegedly has the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence
of the peril, or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it
←
← There is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger
← When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did
not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have
assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney
approaching form the opposite direction
←
← Even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before
the actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it.

←
The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to
act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all
means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered

X.
DE ROY VS CA

FACTS:
The firewall of a burned out building owned by Felisa De Roy collapsed and destroyed the

10
tailoring shop occupied by the family of Luis Bernal resulting in injuries and even to the death
of Bernal’s daughter. De Roy claimed that Bernal had been warned prior hand but that she was
ignored.
In the RTC, De Roy was found guilty of gross negligence. She appealed but the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC. On the last day of filing a motion for reconsideration, De Roy’s
counsel filed a motion for extension. It was denied by the CA. The CA ruled that pursuant to
the case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon (August 1985), the fifteen-day period for appealing
or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
De Roy’s counsel however argued that the Habaluyas case should not be applicable because
said ruling was never published in the Official Gazette.

ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding.

HELD: No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is bounden
duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme
Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in
the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law
journal. LAST CLEAR CHANCE APPLICABLE ONLY TO VEHICULAR MISHAPS

XI.
Gan y Yu vs CA
No. L-44264. 19 Sept 1988.

Facts:
In the morning of 4 July 1972, the accused Hedy Gan was driving along North Bay Boulevard,
Tondo, Manila. There were two vehicles parked on one side of the road, one following the other.
As the car driven by Gan approached the place where the two vehicles were parked, there was
a vehicle coming from the opposite direction, followed by another which tried to
overtake the one in front of it thereby encroaching the lane of the car driven by Gan. To
avoid a head-on collision, Gan swerved to the right and as a consequence, hit an old
man who was about to cross the street, pinning him against the rear of one of the
parked vehicles. The force of the impact caused the parked vehicle to move forward hitting
the other parked vehicle in front of it. The pedestrian was injured, Gan's car and the two
parked vehicle suffered damages. The pedestrian was pronounced dead on arrival at the
hospital.

Issue: WON CA erred in convicting petitioner Gan for Homicide thru simple imprudence.

Ruling: SC reversed CA's decision, acquitting petitioner.

Under the emergency rule, one who suddenly fonds himself in a place of danger, and is
required to act w/o tme to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and
upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in
which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.
Applying the above test to the case at bar, the SC finds the petitioner not guilty of the crime of
simple imprudence resulting in Homicide.

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 XII.
Valenzuela vs CA : 115024 : February 7, 1996

Facts:

At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving
a blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No. FFU 542 from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her
home at Palanza Street, Araneta Avenue. She was travelling along Aurora Blvd. with a
companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the direction of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake
Street, she noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where
there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed .
Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot
reach her home in that cars condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1 feet away,
put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the
trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man
who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer
driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial,
Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the
defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under
defendants car. Plaintiffs left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin
and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial
Center where she was found to have a traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above
knee). She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an
artificial leg

Issue: Emergency Rule

Held:

Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted with an
emergency is not to be held up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an individual
who is in no such situation. The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when placed in
threatening or dangerous situations and does not require the same standard of
thoughtful and reflective care from persons confronted by unusual and oftentimes
threatening conditions. Under the emergency rule adopted by this Court in Gan vs Court of
Appeals an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to
act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own
negligence.

Applying this principle to a case in which the victims in a vehicular accident swerved to the
wrong lane to avoid hitting two children suddenly darting into the street, we held, in Mc Kee vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, that the driver therein, Jose Koh, adopted the best means
possible in the given situation to avoid hitting the children. Using the emergency rule the court
concluded that Koh, in spite of the fact that he was in the wrong lane when the collision with
an oncoming truck occurred, was not guilty of negligence.

While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought, or the opportunity
to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, the conduct which is required of an
individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the event which
absolutely negates thoughtful care, but by the over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman
driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping

12
at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other
motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn
on a dark Street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous
for her not to stop and assess the emergency (simply because the entire length of Aurora
Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her
safety and to other motorists. In the instant case, Valenzuela, upon reaching that portion of
Aurora Boulevard close to A. Lake St., noticed that she had a flat tire. To avoid putting herself
and other motorists in danger, she did what was best under the situation.

She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and
to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat
and that she cannot reach her home she parked along the sidewalk, about 1 feet away, behind
a Toyota Corona Car. In fact, respondent court noted, Pfc. Felix Ramos, the investigator on the
scene of the accident confirmed that Valenzuelas car was parked very close to the sidewalk.
The sketch which he prepared after the incident showed Valenzuelas car partly straddling the
sidewalk, clear and at a convenient distance from motorists passing the right lane of Aurora
Boulevard. This fact was itself corroborated by the testimony of witness Rodriguez.

Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated
by the emergency and could not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate
circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The
emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own
making, and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions.

Under present day traffic conditions, any driver of an automobile must be prepared for
the sudden appearance of obstacles and persons on the highway, and of other vehicles at
intersections, such as one who sees a child on the curb may be required to anticipate its
sudden dash into the street, and his failure to act properly when they appear may be
found to amount to negligence.

XIII.
DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. C & A CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
respondent.

FACTS:

The undisputed facts reveal that respondent C & A Construction, Inc. was engaged by the
National Housing Authority (NHA) to construct a deflector wall at the Vitas Reclamation Area in
Vitas, Tondo, Manila. The project was completed in 1994 but it was not formally turned over to
NHA.

On October 9, 1994, M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and operated by petitioner Delsan
Transport Lines, Inc., anchored at the Navotas Fish Port for the purpose of installing a cargo
pump and clearing the cargo oil tank. At around 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, Captain
Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan Express received a report from his radio head operator in
Japan that a typhoon was going to hit Manila in about eight (8) hours. At approximately 8:35
in the morning of October 21, 1994, Capt. Jusep tried to seek shelter at the North Harbor but
could not enter the area because it was already congested. At 10:00 a.m., Capt. Jusep decided
to drop anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth, 4 miles away from a Napocor power barge. At
that time, the waves were already reaching 8 to 10 feet high. Capt. Jusep ordered his crew to
go full ahead to counter the wind which was dragging the ship towards the Napocor power

13
barge. To avoid collision, Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel. He succeeded in
avoiding the power barge, but when the engine was re-started and the ship was maneuvered
full astern, it hit the deflector wall constructed by respondent. The damage caused by the
incident amounted to P456,198.24.

HELD:

In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that Capt. Jusep was negligent
in deciding to transfer the vessel only at 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994. As early as
12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, he received a report from his radio head operator in Japan
that a typhoon was going to hit Manila after 8 hours.This, notwithstanding, he did nothing,
until 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994, when he decided to seek shelter at the North
Harbor, which unfortunately was already congested. The finding of negligence cannot be
rebutted upon proof that the ship could not have sought refuge at the North Harbor even if the
transfer was done earlier. It is not the speculative success or failure of a decision that
determines the existence of negligence in the present case, but the failure to take immediate
and appropriate action under the circumstances. Capt. Jusep, despite knowledge that the
typhoon was to hit Manila in 8 hours, complacently waited for the lapse of more than 8 hours
thinking that the typhoon might change direction. He cannot claim that he waited for the sun
to rise instead of moving the vessel at midnight immediately after receiving the report because
of the difficulty of traveling at night. The hour of 8:35 a.m. is way past sunrise. Furthermore,
he did not transfer as soon as the sun rose because, according to him, it was not very cloudy
and there was no weather disturbance yet.

When he ignored the weather report notwithstanding reasonable foresight of harm, Capt.
Jusep showed an inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary prudent person
would have observed in the same situation.Had he moved the vessel earlier, he could
have had greater chances of finding a space at the North Harbor considering that the
Navotas Port where they docked was very near North Harbor. Even if the latter was already
congested, he would still have time to seek refuge in other ports.

The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule. Under this rule, one who suddenly
finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he
fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
method, unless the danger in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence. Clearly, the emergency rule is not applicable to the instant case because the
danger where Capt. Jusep found himself was caused by his own negligence.

XIV.
ERNESTO SYKI, petitioner, vs.
SALVADOR BEGASA, respondent.

FACTS:
On June 22, 1992, around 11:20 a.m., near the corner of Araneta and Magsaysay Streets,
Bacolod City, respondent Salvador Begasa and his three companions flagged down a passenger
jeepney driven by Joaquin Espina and owned by Aurora Pisuena. While respondent was
boarding the passenger jeepney (his right foot already inside while his left foot still on the
boarding step of the passenger jeepney), a truck driven by Elizalde Sablayan and owned by
petitioner Ernesto Syki bumped the rear end of the passenger jeepney. Respondent fell and
fractured his left thigh bone (femur). He also suffered lacerations and abrasions in his left leg,
thus as follows:
1. Fracture left femur, junction of middle and distal third, comminuted.

14
2. Lacerated wounds, left poplitial 10 cm. left leg anterior 2.5 cm.
3. Abrasion left knee.
On October 29, 1992, respondent filed a complaint for damages for breach of common carriers
contractual obligations and quasi-delict against Aurora Pisuena, the owner of the passenger
jeepney;, herein petitioner Ernesto Syki, the owner of the truck;, and Elizalde Sablayan, the
driver of the truck.
After hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint against Aurora Pisuena, the owner and
operator of the passenger jeepney, but ordered petitioner Ernesto Syki and his truck driver,
Elizalde Sablayan, to pay respondent Salvador Begasa, jointly and severally, actual and moral
damages plus attorneys fees as follows:
1. Actual damages of P48,308.20 less the financial assistance given by defendant Ernesto Syki
to plaintiff Salvador Begasa in the amount of P4,152.55 or a total amount of P44,155.65;
2. The amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages;
3. The amount of P20,000.00 as reasonable attorneys fees.

HELD:

The underlying precept of the above article on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff
who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be and is not entitled to recover
damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. Inferrably, The
defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his
negligence.
In the present case, was respondent partly negligent and thus, should not recover the full
amount of the damages awarded by the trial court? We rule in the negative.

There was no evidence that respondent Begasa and his three companions flagged down the
passenger jeepney at in a prohibited area. All the facts only showed was that the passenger
jeepney was near the corner of Araneta and Magsaysay Streets, Bacolod City when petitioners
driver bumped it from the rear. No city resolution, traffic regulation or DPWH memorandum
were was presented to show that the passenger jeepney picked up respondent and his three
companions at in a prohibited area. In fact, the trial court dismissed the case against the driver
and/or owner of the passenger jeepney on the ground that they were not liable, which means,
that no negligence could be attributed to them. The trial court also found no negligence on the
part of respondent Begasa. This factual finding was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.

Thus, we affirm the appellate courts finding that there was no contributory negligence on the
part of respondent.

In sum, the sole and proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioners driver
who, as found by the lower courts, did not slow down even when he was already approaching a
busy intersection within the city proper. The passenger jeepney had long stopped to pick up
respondent and his three companions and, in fact, respondent was already partly inside the
jeepney, when petitioners driver bumped the rear end ofrear-ended it. The impact was so
strong such that respondent fell and fractured his left thigh bone (femur), and suffered severely
woundeds in his left knee and leg. No doubt that respondentpetitioners driver was reckless
speeding.

Since the negligence of petitioners driver was the sole and proximate cause of the accident, in
the present case, petitioner is liable, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, to pay damages to
respondent Begasa for the injuries sustained by him.

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 XV.
NELEN LAMBERT, assisted by her husband, GLENROY ALOYSUIS LAMBERT, petitioners,
vs. HEIRS OF RAY CASTILLON, Represented by MARILOU T. CASTILLON and SERGIO
LABANG, respondents.

FACTS:
In the evening of January 13, 1991, Ray Castillon visited the house of his brother Joel
Castillon at Tambo, Iligan City and borrowed his motorcycle. He then invited his friend, Sergio
Labang, to roam around Iligan City. Ray drove the motorcycle with Sergio as the backrider.
At around past 10:00 p.m., after eating supper at Honas Restaurant and imbibing a bottle of
beer, they traversed the highway towards Tambo at a high speed. Upon reaching Brgy. Sto.
Rosario, they figured in an accident with a Tamaraw jeepney, owned by petitioner Nelen
Lambert and driven by Reynaldo Gamot, which was traveling on the same direction but made a
sudden left turn. The incident resulted in the instantaneous death of Ray and injuries to
Sergio.
Respondents, the heirs of Ray Castillon, thus filed an action for damages with prayer for
preliminary attachment against the petitioner Nelen Lambert. The complaint was docketed as
Civil Case No. 06-2086 of the RTC of Iligan City, Branch 06. [The complaint was subsequently
amended to include the claim by Joel Castillon for the damages caused to the motorcycle.

ISSUE: Contributory Negligence

HELD:
To the mind of the court, this is exactly what happened. When Reynaldo Gamot was
approaching the side road, he slightly veered to the right for his allowance. Ray Castillon, who
was following closely behind, instinctively veered to the left but it was also the moment when
Reynaldo Gamot sharply turned to the left towards the side road. At this juncture both were
moving obliquely to the left. Thus the motorcycle sliced into the side of the jeepney throwing
the driver forward so that his forehead hit the angle bar on the left front door of the jeepney
even as the motorcycle shot forward and the jeepney veered back to the right and sped away.

In the case at bar, it was established that Ray, at the time of the mishap: (1) was driving the
motorcycle at a high speed; (2) was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has imbibed one or two
bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing a protective helmet. These circumstances, although not
constituting the proximate cause of his demise and injury to Sergio, contributed to the same
result. The contribution of these circumstances are all considered and determined in terms of
percentages of the total cause. Hence, pursuant to Rakes v. AG & P, the heirs of Ray Castillon
shall recover damages only up to 50% of the award. In other words, 50% of the damage shall be
borne by the private respondents; the remaining 50% shall be paid by the petitioner.

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