Handbook of Anesthesia

Handbook of Emergency
Management Concepts
A Step-by-Step Approach
http://taylorandfrancis.com
Handbook of Emergency
Management Concepts
A Step-by-Step Approach
Michael L. Madigan
CRC Press
Taylor & Francis Group
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Name: Madigan, Michael L., author.

Title: Handbook of emergency management concepts : a step-by-step approach /
Michael L. Madigan.
Description: Boca Raton, FL : CRC Press, 2018. | Includes bibliographical
references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017031852| ISBN 9781138568532 (hardback : alk. paper) |
ISBN 9780203704257 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Emergency management.
Classification: LCC HV551.2 .M3265 2018 | DDC 363.34--dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017031852
Visit the Taylor & Francis Web site at

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To my beautiful wife Michelle, who has sharpened my wit,
life, and soul that have evolved our life together. Who think
the same thoughts without need of speech, and babble the
same speech without need of meaning. This why I love
you and hold you dear and precious in my heart.
My best friend and battle comrade, SFC Joseph F. Johnston,
who has been there through thick and thin times.
To my sons, Michael Madigan and Mark Walker Madigan, and my
daughters, Kristen Genco, Nikole Madigan, Leisha Eshbach, Angela
Bryant, Neitha Engert, and Rachel Walker. I want to give a huge
thanks to my mentor and friend Daniel Arden, who has always been
there with advice, direction, and leadership throughout my military
and civilian career. I especially want to thank all of the Dragon
soldiers of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps and the instructors and
cadre of the Incident Response Training Department. HOOAH
Contents
Preface.................................................................................................................. xxiii
Author.....................................................................................................................xxv
Introduction...........................................................................................................xxvii
Chapter 1 Emergency Management....................................................................... 1

Emergency Planning Ideals................................................................... 1
Implementation Ideals........................................................................... 2
Preincident Training and Testing.....................................................2
Communicating and Incident Assessment....................................... 2
Phases and Personal Activities.........................................................2
Prevention....................................................................................2
Mitigation....................................................................................3
Preparedness................................................................................3
Response.................................................................................... 11
Recovery.................................................................................... 11
As a Profession.................................................................................... 12
Principles........................................................................................ 12
Tools............................................................................................... 13
Disaster Response Technologies.................................................... 13
Within Other Professions............................................................... 14
FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute.................................... 14
Chapter 2 Introduction to Emergency Management: Step by Step Process........ 17

Planning Process................................................................................. 17
Definitions...................................................................................... 17
Natural Disasters............................................................................ 17
Technological Disasters.................................................................. 17
Terrorist Disasters.......................................................................... 17
Emergency Manager’s Role............................................................ 18
Local Management......................................................................... 18
Planning Process............................................................................ 18
Hazard Mitigation...................................................................... 19
Preparedness.............................................................................. 19
Response.................................................................................... 19
Recovery.................................................................................... 19
Strategy Mix...................................................................................20
Summary........................................................................................20
Key Terms......................................................................................20
vii
viii Contents
The Four Pillars of Emergency Management.....................................20

Mitigation....................................................................................... 21
Preparedness................................................................................... 22
Response......................................................................................... 23
Recovery......................................................................................... 23
Hazard Vulnerability Analysis....................................................... 23
Hazard Vulnerability Analysis Assessment...................................24
The Principles of Emergency Management........................................24
Tools Used in Emergency Management.........................................24
Emergency Management Committee.............................................25
Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan..............................26
Incident Command System.............................................................26
Review............................................................................................28
Emergency Management Stakeholders...............................................28
Stakeholders...................................................................................28
Social Groups............................................................................28
Economic Groups......................................................................28
Government Stakeholders.......................................................... 29
Involving Stakeholders................................................................... 29
Power.............................................................................................. 29
Policy Process................................................................................. 29
Agenda Setting............................................................................... 30
Policy Formulation......................................................................... 30
Policy Adoption.............................................................................. 30
Summary........................................................................................ 31
Key Terms...................................................................................... 31
Building an Effective Emergency Management Organization........... 31
Local Emergency Management Agency......................................... 31
Emergency Manager....................................................................... 31
Local Emergency Management Agencies...................................... 32
Funding Sources............................................................................. 32
Effective Organizations.................................................................. 32
LEMA Effectiveness...................................................................... 32
Planning Process............................................................................ 33
Outcomes........................................................................................ 33
Emergency Operations Plan........................................................... 33
Summary........................................................................................34
Key Terms......................................................................................34
Risk Perception and Communication..................................................34
Risk and Warning...........................................................................34
Warning Processing........................................................................34
Continuing Hazard Phase............................................................... 35
Strategic Analysis...................................................................... 36
Operational Analysis................................................................. 36
Resource Mobilization............................................................... 36
Contents ix
Program Development............................................................... 36
Program Implementation........................................................... 37
Escalating Crisis Communication.................................................. 37
Risk Communication...................................................................... 37
Summary........................................................................................ 37
Key Terms...................................................................................... 38
Principal Hazards in the United States............................................... 38
Environmental Hazards.................................................................. 38
Meteorological Hazards................................................................. 38
Wildfires......................................................................................... 38
Floods............................................................................................. 39
Storm Surge.................................................................................... 39
Geophysical Hazards...................................................................... 39
Technological Hazards................................................................... 39
Toxic Chemicals.............................................................................40
Biological Hazards.........................................................................40
Summary........................................................................................ 41
Key Terms...................................................................................... 41
Hazard and Disaster Classification..................................................... 41
Major Categories............................................................................ 41
Earth Hazardous to Your Health.................................................... 41
Still Hazardous............................................................................... 42
Categories of Natural Hazards....................................................... 42
Atmospheric-Sourced Processes.................................................... 42
Geological-Sourced Processes....................................................... 42
Hydrological-Sourced Processes.................................................... 42
Extraterrestrial Processes............................................................... 43
Biological Processes....................................................................... 43
Anthropogenic Nonintentional....................................................... 43
Technological.................................................................................. 43
Nuclear............................................................................................ 43
Transportation................................................................................ 43
Structural........................................................................................44
Anthropogenic Intentional Hazards...............................................44
Mass Shootings...............................................................................44
Civil Disobedience.........................................................................44
Terrorism........................................................................................44
WMD CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives)..............................................44
Hazard, Vulnerability, and Risk Analysis...........................................44
Community Vulnerability..............................................................44
Preimpact Conditions..................................................................... 45
Event-Specific Conditions.............................................................. 45
Social Impacts................................................................................ 45
Interventions................................................................................... 45
x Contents
Hazard and Vulnerability Analyses...............................................46

Physical Vulnerability Assessment.................................................46
Social Vulnerability Assessment.................................................... 47
Vulnerability Analysis.................................................................... 47
Assessing Risk................................................................................ 47
Summary........................................................................................ 48
Key Terms...................................................................................... 48
Hazard Mitigation............................................................................... 48
Hazard Mitigation........................................................................... 48
Mitigation Strategies...................................................................... 48
Land-Use Practices......................................................................... 49
Building Construction Practices..................................................... 49
Structural Protection...................................................................... 50
Hazard Mitigation Measures.......................................................... 50
Natural Hazards.............................................................................. 50
Summary........................................................................................ 51
Key Terms...................................................................................... 51
Disaster Myths, Disaster Demands, and Citizen Emergency
Response.............................................................................................. 51
Response Myths.............................................................................. 51
Shock and Panic............................................................................. 51
Victim Response............................................................................. 51
Integrative Responses..................................................................... 52
Warnings......................................................................................... 52
Evacuation...................................................................................... 52
Search and Rescue.......................................................................... 53
Household Behavior....................................................................... 53
Stress and Health............................................................................ 53
Summary........................................................................................ 54
Key Terms...................................................................................... 54
Preparedness for Emergency Response and Disaster Recovery......... 54
Emergency Planning Principles..................................................... 54
Response Functions........................................................................ 54
Organizational Structures............................................................... 55
Incident Management System......................................................... 55
IMS Implementation....................................................................... 55
Emergency Operations Centers...................................................... 56
Organizational Structures............................................................... 56
Metropolitan Medical Response System................................... 56
Urban Areas Security Initiative................................................. 56
National Incident Management System..................................... 57
EOP Components........................................................................... 57
Summary........................................................................................ 57
Key Terms...................................................................................... 57
Contents xi
Organizational Emergency Response................................................. 58

Emergency Assessment.................................................................. 58
Hazard Monitoring......................................................................... 58
Monitoring and Assessment........................................................... 58
Hazard Operations.......................................................................... 58
Population Protection..................................................................... 59
Protective Actions........................................................................... 59
Population Protection..................................................................... 59
Care of Victims..............................................................................60
Emergency Medical Care...............................................................60
Exposure Control............................................................................60
Incident Management..................................................................... 61
Summary........................................................................................ 61
Key Terms...................................................................................... 61
Disaster Recovery............................................................................... 62
Communities.................................................................................. 62
Recovery Process........................................................................... 62
Household Recovery....................................................................... 62
Business Recovery.......................................................................... 63
State and Federal Governments...................................................... 63
Local Government Recovery.......................................................... 63
Recovery Operations Plan.............................................................. 63
Short-Term Recovery......................................................................64
Long-Term Reconstruction.............................................................64
Recovery Management...................................................................64
Summary........................................................................................ 65
Key Terms...................................................................................... 65
Evaluation............................................................................................ 65
Performance Appraisals................................................................. 65
Organizational Evaluation..............................................................66
NFPA Standard 1600......................................................................66
Capability Assessment for Readiness Program.............................. 67
Emergency Management Accreditation Program.......................... 67
Drill, Exercises, and Incidents....................................................... 67
Training and Risk Communication................................................ 68
Summary........................................................................................ 69
Key Terms...................................................................................... 69
International Emergency Management............................................... 69
Policy Variations............................................................................ 69
Economic Resources...................................................................... 69
Government Organization.............................................................. 69
Military and Organizations............................................................ 70
Emergency Management in Brazil................................................. 70
New Zealand Restructuring........................................................... 70
xii Contents
India’s Recovery............................................................................. 70
Land-Use in Colombia.................................................................... 71
Seveso Directives........................................................................... 71
Chi-Chi Earthquake....................................................................... 71
Summary........................................................................................ 72
Professional Accountability................................................................ 72
Distinguishing Emergency Management....................................... 72
Defining “Profession”..................................................................... 72
Emergency Management as a Profession....................................... 73
Development and Ethics................................................................. 73
Body of Knowledge........................................................................ 73
Emergency Management Certification........................................... 73
Academic Programs....................................................................... 74
Legal Liability................................................................................ 74
Summary........................................................................................ 75
Key Terms...................................................................................... 75
Future Directions in Emergency Management................................... 75
Global Challenges.......................................................................... 75
Opportunities.................................................................................. 76
National Challenges........................................................................ 76
Terrorist Threats............................................................................. 76
National Challenges........................................................................ 77
Professional Challenges.................................................................. 77
Professional Opportunities............................................................. 77
Summary........................................................................................ 77
Chapter 3 Security Management.......................................................................... 79

Loss Prevention................................................................................... 79
Security Risk Management................................................................. 79
Types of Security Threats................................................................... 79
External.......................................................................................... 79
Internal........................................................................................... 79
Risk Options........................................................................................80
Risk Avoidance...............................................................................80
Risk Reduction............................................................................... 81
Risk Spreading............................................................................... 81
Risk Transfer.................................................................................. 81
Risk Acceptance............................................................................. 81
Security Policy Implementations........................................................ 81
Intrusion Detection......................................................................... 81
Procedures...................................................................................... 82
What is Security?................................................................................ 82
Perceived Security Compared to Real Security............................. 82
Categorizing Security..................................................................... 83
Security Concepts...........................................................................84
Contents xiii
Home Security................................................................................84
Computer Security..........................................................................84
Security Management in Organizations......................................... 85
3D Security..................................................................................... 85
Security and Classified Information............................................... 85
Government Classification.................................................................. 86
Typical Classification Levels.......................................................... 86
Top Secret.................................................................................. 86
Secret......................................................................................... 87
Confidential............................................................................... 87
Restricted................................................................................... 87
Official....................................................................................... 87
Unclassified................................................................................ 87
Clearance................................................................................... 87
Compartmented Information............................................................... 87
International................................................................................... 88
NATO Classifications..................................................................... 88
United States................................................................................... 88
Classified Information in the United States............................... 88
Corporate Classification................................................................. 89
Traffic Light Protocol..................................................................... 89
Risk..................................................................................................... 89
Definitions......................................................................................90
Areas............................................................................................... 91
Risk Assessment and Analysis.................................................. 91
Quantitative Analysis..................................................................... 91
Security Increase................................................................................. 91
Surveillance....................................................................................92
A “Nest” of Surveillance Cameras............................................92
Countersurveillance, Inverse Surveillance, Sousveillance........ 93
Chapter 4 Crisis Management.............................................................................. 95

Introduction......................................................................................... 95
Types of Crisis.....................................................................................96
Natural Disaster..............................................................................96
Technological Crisis.......................................................................97
Confrontation Crisis.......................................................................97
Crisis of Malevolence.....................................................................97
Crisis of Organizational Misdeeds.................................................97
Crisis of Skewed Management Values.......................................97
Crisis of Deception.................................................................... 98
Crisis of Management Misconduct............................................ 98
Workplace Violence........................................................................ 98
Rumors........................................................................................... 98
xiv Contents
Crisis Leadership............................................................................ 98
Sudden Crisis............................................................................. 98
Smoldering Crisis........................................................................... 98
Signal Detection..................................................................................99
Containment and Damage Control......................................................99
Business Recovery...............................................................................99
Learning............................................................................................ 100
Crisis Communication....................................................................... 100
Models and Theories Associated with Crisis Management.............. 100
Crisis Management Strategy........................................................ 100
Crisis Management Model............................................................ 100
Crisis Management Planning....................................................... 101
Contingency Planning.................................................................. 101
Business Continuity Planning...................................................... 101
Structural-Functional Systems Theory........................................ 102
Diffusion of Innovation Theory................................................... 102
Role of Apologies in Crisis Management.......................................... 102
Crisis Leadership............................................................................... 103
Unequal Human Capital Theory....................................................... 103
Social Media and Crisis Management.............................................. 103
Chapter 5 Consequence Management................................................................ 105

Software............................................................................................ 108
Benefits of Consequence Management Systems............................... 111
Coordinating Response..................................................................... 112
Chapter 6 Risk Management.............................................................................. 115

Method.............................................................................................. 116
Principles of Risk Management........................................................ 116
Process............................................................................................... 117
Establishing the Context............................................................... 117
Identification................................................................................. 117
Assessment................................................................................... 118
Composite Risk Index.................................................................. 119
Risk Options................................................................................. 120
Potential Risk Treatments............................................................. 120
Risk Avoidance............................................................................. 120
Hazard Prevention........................................................................ 121
Risk Reduction............................................................................. 121
Risk Sharing................................................................................. 121
Risk Retention.............................................................................. 122
Risk Management Plan................................................................. 122
Contents xv
Implementation.................................................................................. 122
Review and Evaluation of the Plan............................................... 123
Limitations................................................................................... 123
Hazard Analysis........................................................................... 123
Hazards and Risk.......................................................................... 124
Severity Definitions—Safety Related............................................... 124
Likelihood of Occurrence................................................................. 125
Chapter 7 Composite Risk Management Process.............................................. 127

Five-Step CRM Process.................................................................... 127
Levels of Risk Management.............................................................. 127
CRM Principles................................................................................. 128
Risk Assessment Matrix.................................................................... 128
Risk Priority List............................................................................... 129
Components of Risk.......................................................................... 129
Exposure....................................................................................... 129
Severity......................................................................................... 129
Probability.................................................................................... 129
Chapter 8 Hazards (Risk)................................................................................... 131

Hazard Types..................................................................................... 131
Mechanical................................................................................... 131
Physical......................................................................................... 132
Hazard vs Risk.................................................................................. 132
Hazard Identification......................................................................... 132
Mechanical and Physical Hazards................................................ 132
Biological Hazards....................................................................... 132
Chemical Hazards........................................................................ 133
Environmental Hazards................................................................ 133
Natural Hazards....................................................................... 133
Mitigating Natural Hazards..................................................... 133
Natural Hazard and Disaster Definitions................................. 133
Risk................................................................................................... 135
Smaug Model—A Basis for Prioritizing Hazard Risks.................... 136
Hierarchy of Hazard Control............................................................. 136
Components of the Hierarchy....................................................... 137
Elimination................................................................................... 137
Substitution................................................................................... 138
Engineering Controls.................................................................... 138
Administrative Controls............................................................... 138
Personal Protective Equipment.................................................... 138
xvi Contents
Chapter 9 Vulnerability...................................................................................... 139

Common Applications....................................................................... 139
Research....................................................................................... 139
Types of Vulnerabilities.................................................................... 139
Social Vulnerability...................................................................... 139
Cognitive Vulnerability................................................................ 140
Military......................................................................................... 140
Invulnerability.............................................................................. 140
Vulnerability Assessment.................................................................. 140
Vulnerability Index........................................................................... 141
Basic Methodology............................................................................ 142
In Hazard Planning........................................................................... 142
Threats to Computers and IT Systems.............................................. 142
Definitions.................................................................................... 142
Phenomenology................................................................................. 144
OWASP: Relationship between Threat Agent and Business Impact..... 144
Threats Classification........................................................................ 146
System Threat Classification............................................................. 146
Associated Terms.............................................................................. 148
Corporations................................................................................. 149
Threat Source.................................................................................... 149
Threat Communities..................................................................... 149
Threat Action.................................................................................... 150
Threat Analysis................................................................................. 150
Threat Consequence.......................................................................... 150
Threat Landscape or Environment.................................................... 153
Threat Management.......................................................................... 153
Cyber Threat Management................................................................ 154
Threat Hunting.................................................................................. 154
Chapter 10 Emergency Management and Understanding the Impact

of Terrorism....................................................................................... 157
Origin of the Term............................................................................. 157
Definition of Terrorism..................................................................... 158
Pejorative Use.................................................................................... 160
Types of Terrorism............................................................................ 162
Motivations of Terrorists................................................................... 163
Democracy and Domestic Terrorism............................................ 163
Religious Terrorism...................................................................... 164
Intimate Terrorism........................................................................ 164
Perpetrators....................................................................................... 165
Nonstate Groups........................................................................... 165
State Sponsors.............................................................................. 165
State Terrorism.................................................................................. 165
Contents xvii
Tactics................................................................................................ 166
Responses.......................................................................................... 167
Databases........................................................................................... 167
War on Terror.................................................................................... 168
U.S. Objectives............................................................................. 168
Chapter 11 Managing Terrorism Threat/Vulnerability Assessments

and Risk Analysis.............................................................................. 171
Developing a Terrorism Risk Management Program........................ 171
Phase I—Threat Identification and Initial Site Assessment......... 172
Phase II—Detailed Risk Assessment........................................... 172
Phase III—Risk Management...................................................... 173
Step 1: Identify Threats and Pair with Assets.............................. 175
Step 2: Identify Asset Vulnerabilities........................................... 176
Step 3: Determine Risk Through Scenarios................................. 176
Step 4: Identify Actions, as Necessary, That Lead to Risk
Reduction...................................................................................... 176
Infrastructure Facility Designed Using the Crime Prevention
through Environmental Design Process............................................ 177
Threat/Vulnerability Assessments and Risk Analysis...................... 177
Threat Assessment........................................................................ 177
Vulnerability Assessment............................................................. 179
Risk Analysis................................................................................ 180
Upgrade Recommendations......................................................... 180
Reevaluation of Risks................................................................... 181
Application........................................................................................ 182
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design............................ 183
Design Basis Threat Tactics.............................................................. 184
Unauthorized Entry (Forced and Covert)..................................... 184
Insider Threats.............................................................................. 185
Ballistic Threats........................................................................... 185
WMDs: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological......................... 186
Cyber and Information Security Threats..................................... 186
Chapter 12 Mass Casualty Incident and Mass Fatality Incident......................... 189

Declaration of an MCI...................................................................... 189
Agencies and Responders.................................................................. 189
Emergency Medical Services....................................................... 189
Fire and Rescue............................................................................ 190
Public Safety................................................................................. 190
Specialized Teams........................................................................ 190
Public Services............................................................................. 190
Hospitals....................................................................................... 191
xviii Contents
Flow of an MCI................................................................................. 191

Triage............................................................................................ 191
Treatment...................................................................................... 192
On-Site Morgue....................................................................... 193
Definitive Care.................................................................................. 193
Interim-Care Center..................................................................... 194
Mass Casualty Event......................................................................... 194
Mass Fatality Incident....................................................................... 194
Mass Fatality Definition............................................................... 194
Response Functions...................................................................... 196
Mass Fatality Management Resources......................................... 196
Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team............................... 197
Organization................................................................................. 197
Identification of Remains............................................................. 197
Incidents....................................................................................... 198
Mass Fatality Management............................................................... 198
Search and Recovery.................................................................... 199
Morgue Operations....................................................................... 199
Family Assistance Center..................................................................200
Fatality Management....................................................................200
Function 1: Determine Role for Public Health in Fatality
Management............................................................................ 201
Function 2: Activate Public Health Fatality Management
Operations................................................................................ 201
Function 3: Assist in the Collection and Dissemination
of Antemortem Data................................................................202
Function 4: Participate in Survivor Mental/Behavioral
Health Services........................................................................202
Function 5: Participate in Fatality Processing and Storage
Operations................................................................................202
Security at a Mass Casualty and Mass Fatality Incident.................. 203
Overview......................................................................................203
Security Requirements.................................................................204
Security Objectives.......................................................................204
Information to Request for Security Planning When
Selecting Sites for Incident Morgue and FAC..............................205
Overview of Physical Security Assessment.................................206
Overview of Security and Traffic Control Plan Templates..........207
Chapter 13 Emergency Management and Weapons of Mass Destruction...........209

Definitions of the Term.....................................................................209
Strategic........................................................................................209
Military......................................................................................... 211
Criminal (Civilian)....................................................................... 211
Treaties Not to Use WMDs............................................................... 212
Contents xix
Use, Possession, and Access.............................................................. 213

Nuclear Weapons.......................................................................... 213
U.S. Politics.................................................................................. 213
An Atomic-Bomb Blueprint......................................................... 214
Media Coverage................................................................................. 214
Nuclear Terrorism............................................................................. 215
Scope................................................................................................. 216
Militant Groups............................................................................ 216
Incidents Involving Nuclear Material........................................... 217
Chapter 14 Cyberspace and Emergency Management........................................ 219

Virtual Environments........................................................................ 219
Recent Definitions of Cyberspace..................................................... 220
Cyber Threat Intelligence.................................................................. 220
Types of CTI................................................................................. 221
Benefits of Tactical Cyber Intelligence........................................ 221
The Challenge of Attribution............................................................ 221
Cyber Warfare................................................................................... 222
Types of Threat............................................................................. 222
Espionage...................................................................................... 222
Sabotage....................................................................................... 223
Denial-of-Service Attack.................................................................. 223
Electrical Power Grid........................................................................ 223
Motivations........................................................................................224
Military.........................................................................................224
Civil..............................................................................................224
Hacktivism.................................................................................... 225
Private Sector............................................................................... 225
Cyber Spying..................................................................................... 225
Details........................................................................................... 225
Proactive Cyber Defense.............................................................. 226
Current Status............................................................................... 226
Proactive Preemptive Operations................................................. 226
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace........................................... 227
Cyber-Humint.................................................................................... 228
Background in Cyber-Humint...................................................... 228
Cyber-Humint Strategy Orientation............................................. 228
Hackers and Cyber-Humint.......................................................... 229
The Interface Between Cyber Experts and Cyber-Humint.......... 229
Cybersecurity Standards................................................................... 230
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)
Cybersecurity Technical Committee................................................ 230
ISO 27001 and 27002........................................................................ 231
Standard of Good Practice................................................................ 232
National Institute of Standards and Technology............................... 232
xx Contents
Chapter 15 Emergency and the National Incident Management System (NIMS).... 235
Introduction....................................................................................... 235
Summary...........................................................................................240
Considerable Preparation Needed..................................................... 242
Certified Emergency Manager.......................................................... 243
Maintaining Certification.............................................................244
Benefits of Certifications..............................................................244
Chapter 16 School Emergency Response Plan Template..................................... 247

Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Template..................................... 247
Emergency Response Plan Organization.......................................... 247
Emergency Response Plan Template................................................. 279
Chapter 17 State or Local Emergency Response Plan Template......................... 281

Emergency Management Program.................................................... 281
Components of the Emergency Operations Plan............................... 282
Chapter 18 Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 Case Study..........................................307

Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004: Impact on Landscape
and Population...................................................................................307
Landscape.....................................................................................307
People...........................................................................................307
Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004: Methods of Prediction.......................307
Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004: Role of Aid Agencies.........................308
Short-Term Aid.............................................................................308
Long-Term Aid.............................................................................308
Effectiveness.................................................................................308
Impact of the 2004 Tsunami in the Islands of Indian Ocean:
Lessons Learned...............................................................................309
Introduction.......................................................................................309
Impact of the Tsunami in the Islands of the Indian Ocean............... 310
Lessons Learned from the 2004 Tsunami......................................... 310
National Level.............................................................................. 310
Regional Level.............................................................................. 311
International Level....................................................................... 311
Conclusion......................................................................................... 311
Chapter 19 Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill and BP Case Study................................... 313

Economic Impact.............................................................................. 313
Environmental Impact....................................................................... 313
Lessons Learned from the BP Oil Spill............................................ 315
Contents xxi
Improving the Safety of Offshore Operations................................... 316

The Need for a New Approach to Risk Assessment
and Management.......................................................................... 316
Recommendations........................................................................ 316
Strengthening Oil Spill Response, Planning, and Capacity.............. 317
The Need for a New Approach to Handling Spills of National
Significance....................................................................................... 317
The Need to Strengthen State and Local Involvement...................... 317
Local Involvement in Oil Spill Drills........................................... 318
Volunteer Management Program.................................................. 318
Vessel of Opportunity Program.................................................... 318
Appendix A: Terms and Definitions.................................................................... 321

Appendix B: Acronyms and Abbreviations........................................................ 327
Emergency Support Functions and Emergency Management Planning......... 335
References.............................................................................................................. 343
Index....................................................................................................................... 349
Preface
This book has been prepared for anyone who wants to know about emergency man-
agement and those professionals whose responsibility is to protect the public and is
based on the most reliable hazard awareness and emergency education information
available at the time of publication, including advances in scientific knowledge, more
accurate technical language, and the latest physical research on what happens in
disasters.
This publication cannot cover every factor, situation, or difference, as no plan can
really do so, but covers preplanning and mitigation efforts to help alleviate the dis-
ruption of the incident/disaster in buildings, infrastructure, or other environmental
features that might be of interest.
This book can be used as a reference source or as a step-by-step process. The
focus of the content is on how to develop, practice, and maintain emergency plans
that reflect what must be done before, during, and after a disaster to protect people
and their property.
The Planning process and the preparations for all types of disasters will ensure
that the committees planners will complete the preplans and mitigate as much as
possible that are recognize within their communities prior to an incident which will
allow the communities to be better prepared for event of any unlikely emergency
scenarios.
Information is provided on how the public can be ready in case of a national
emergency—including a possible terrorist attack involving biological, chemical, or
radiological weapons. Another source for the general public can be found by logging
on to the Department of Homeland Security’s website, http://www.ready.gov, or by
calling 1-800-BE-READY for printed information.
All of the recent devastation caused by tsunamis, hurricanes, and wildfires high-
lights the need for highly trained professionals who can develop effective strategies
in response to these disasters. This invaluable book will assist those with the tools to
address all phases of emergency management. It covers everything from the social
and environmental processes that generate hazards to vulnerability analysis, hazard
mitigation, emergency response, and disaster recovery.
xxiii
Author
Michael L. Madigan works as a master instructor for the
Department of Homeland Security for the Civil Support
Teams and Hazardous material emergency response
operations on weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
installation emergency management, and threat assess-
ments to the United States Army Chemical, Biological,
Radiological and Nuclear School (USACBRN) on Fort
Leonard Wood in Missouri. He is also retired from the
United States Army and served as a senior chemical
operation specialist to the USACBRN School, Central Command (CENTCOM), and
the Multi-National Forces Command (MNFI) in Iraq.
Mr. Madigan is married to his wife Michelle and has 7 children and 14 grandchil-
dren. He loves to travel.
He earned a BA degree in Criminal Justice from the University of Massachusetts
and a Master of Security Management from the American Military University from
Charles Town. In addition, he holds the Certificate in Security Management from
the University of Massachusetts, and is currently working on his doctoral degree in
Emergency Management (DEM) from Capella University. Mr. Madigan is also a cer-
tified fire instructor Level II, hazardous material technician train the trainer, incident
command system train the trainer, installation emergency management instructor,
WMD/terrorism response instructor, certified Incident Command System/National
Incident Management System (ICS/NIMS) instructor, and advanced chemical bio-
logical instructor.
Over his 40-plus-year career, he has distinguished himself by exceptionally meri-
torious service in a succession of positions of great importance and responsibility to
the Army and the Nation.
His previous positions directly influence the Operations for the J3 MNFI
CBRNE, United States Forces Iraq, and Iraqi Army WMD/Terrorism/CBRNE Non-
Commissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC) Team Chief, and Survey team chief of a
civil support team.
As the WMD/Terrorism and CBRNE Team Chief, he has positively and directly
influenced the Army and the Department of Defense Policies and program. He has
made recommendations to the MNFI Commander, and has communicated advice
and recommendations to reflect the depth and breadth with considerable experience
and affected future programs and policy that will carry the Army through the end of
the sustained combat operations and into an Army focused on building the capacity
of the partners of the United States dealing with CBRNE and hazardous materials
research, training, and response.
Mr. Madigan is also an adjunct professor for homeland security-related topics,
emergency management, mass casualty/mass fatality, terror/terrorism history, related
operations, and WMD at Central Texas College on Fort Leonard Wood Campus,
Missouri.
xxv
Introduction
There are many ways to describe emergency management and the importance of the
tasks that emergency managers perform. Indeed, in some respects, it hardly seems
necessary to explain the need for a profession whose purpose is saving lives and
property in disasters. It is likely that, while many people recognize that their com-
munities are exposed to environmental threats requiring a systematic program of
protection, only a few appreciate the magnitude and diversity of the threats. One can
introduce the study of emergency management by noting that losses from disasters—
in the United States and the rest of the world—have been growing over the years and
are likely to continue to grow.
The world is plagued by an increasing number and variety of types of disasters,
an impression that is certainly heightened by what seem to be frequent, very-large-
scale natural disasters—including earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, volcanic erup-
tions, and wildfires—all over the globe. When we add to these events a wide range
of severe storms, mudslides, lightning strikes, tornadoes, and other hazard agents
affecting smaller numbers of people, one might conclude that natural disasters are
increasing.
Technological activities also initiate disasters. Hazardous materials are trans-
ported via road, rail, water, and air. When containment is breached, casualties,
property loss, and environmental damage can all occur. Some technologies, such
as nuclear power plants, pose seemingly exotic risks, whereas more commonplace
technological processes such as metal plating operations use chemical agents that
are very dangerous. Even the queen of American technology, the space program, has
experienced disaster associated with system failures. Finally, we see terrorists oper-
ating on U.S. soil—made forever visible by the attacks on the World Trade Center
on September 11, 2001.
With increasing population density and changing land use patterns, more people
are exposed to natural hazards, and consequently, our accumulated human and eco-
nomic losses are increasing. Much of this exposure is a matter of choice. Sometimes,
people choose hazardous places, building houses on picturesque cliffs, on mountain
slopes, in floodplains, near beautiful volcanoes, or along seismic faults. Sometimes,
people choose hazardous building materials that fail under extreme environmen-
tal stresses—for example, unreinforced masonry construction in seismically active
areas. Some exposure results from constrained choices; the cheap land or low rent in
flood plains often attracts the poor.
Given the increasing toll from disasters arising from natural hazards, techno-
logical accidents, and terrorist attacks using technological agents, American society
must decide whether the risks are “acceptable.” Moreover, given the limited amount
of time and resources that can be devoted to risk management, decisions must be
made about which risks to address.
When individuals, organizations, or political jurisdictions reach consensus that
a given risk is unacceptable, resources can be marshaled to reduce the risk to some
level deemed more acceptable. Such resources can be used to attempt to eliminate
xxvii
xxviii Introduction
the source of the danger or, alternatively, change the way people relate to the source
of danger.
In general terms, emergency management is “the discipline and profession of
applying science, technology, planning and management to deal with extreme events
that can injure or kill large numbers of people, do extensive damage to property, and
disrupt community life” (Questions on the emergence of a discipline/field of study
training). Thus, emergency managers identify, anticipate, and respond to the risks
of catastrophic events in order to reduce to more acceptable levels the probability of
their occurrence or the magnitude and duration of their social impacts.
1 Emergency Management
Disaster management (or emergency management) is the creation of plans through

which communities reduce vulnerability to hazards and cope with disasters. Disaster
management does not avert or eliminate the threats; instead, it focuses on creating
plans to decrease the effect of disasters. Failure to create a plan could lead to human
mortality, lost revenue, and damage to assets. Currently, in the United States, 60%
of businesses do not have emergency management plans. Events covered by disas-
ter management include acts of terrorism, industrial sabotage, fire, natural disas-
ters (such as earthquakes, hurricanes, etc.), public disorder, industrial accidents, and
communication failures.
EMERGENCY PLANNING IDEALS

If possible, emergency planning should aim to prevent emergencies from occurring
and, failing that, should develop a good action plan to mitigate the results and effects
of any emergencies. As time goes on, and more data become available, usually
through the study of emergencies as they occur, a plan should evolve. The develop-
ment of emergency plans is a cyclical process, common to many risk management
disciplines, such as Business Continuity and Security Risk Management, as set out
below:
• Recognition or identification of risks

• Ranking or evaluation of risks
• Responding to significant risks
• Tolerate
• Treat
• Transfer
• Terminate
• Resourcing controls
• Reaction Planning
• Reporting and monitoring risk performance
• Reviewing the Risk Management framework
There are a number of guidelines and publications regarding emergency plan-

ning, published by various professional organizations such as ASIS, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Emergency Planning College.
There are very few emergency-management-specific standards, and emergency man-
agement as a discipline tends to fall under business resilience standards.
In order to avoid, or reduce, significant losses to a business, emergency managers
should work to identify and anticipate potential risks, hopefully to reduce their prob-
ability of occurring. In the event that an emergency does occur, managers should
1
2 Handbook of Emergency Management Concepts
have a plan prepared to mitigate the effects of that emergency, as well as to ensure
business continuity of critical operations postincident. It is essential for an organi-
zation to include procedures for determining whether an emergency situation has
occurred and at what point an emergency management plan should be activated.
IMPLEMENTATION IDEALS
An emergency plan must be regularly maintained, in a structured and methodical
manner, to ensure that it is up-to-date in the event of an emergency. Emergency
managers generally follow a common process to anticipate, assess, prevent, prepare,
respond, and recover from an incident.
Preincident Training and Testing

A team of emergency responders performs a training scenario involving anthrax.
Emergency management plans and procedures should include the identification of
appropriately trained staff members responsible for decision making when an emer-
gency occurs. Training plans should include internal people, contractors, and civil
protection partners and should state the nature and frequency of training and testing.
Testing of a plan’s effectiveness should occur regularly. In instances where several
business or organizations occupy the same space, joint emergency plans, formally
agreed to by all parties, should be put into place.
Communicating and Incident Assessment

Communication is one of the key issues during any emergency; preplanning of com-
munications is critical. Miscommunication can easily result in emergency events
escalating unnecessarily.
Once an emergency has been identified, a comprehensive assessment evaluating
the level of impact and its financial implications should be undertaken. Following
assessment, the appropriate plan or response to be activated will depend on a specific
preset criteria within the emergency plan. The steps necessary should be prioritized
to ensure that critical functions are operational as soon as possible.
Phases and Personal Activities

Emergency management consists of five phases: prevention, mitigation, prepared-
ness, response, and recovery (Mission Areas, FEMA.gov, 2017).
Prevention
Prevention was recently added to the phases of emergency management. It focuses
on preventing the human hazard, primarily from potential natural disasters or ter-
rorist attacks. Preventive measures are taken on both the domestic and international
levels, designed to provide permanent protection from disasters. Not all disasters,
particularly natural disasters, can be prevented, but the risk of loss of life and injury
can be mitigated with good evacuation plans, environmental planning, and design
Emergency Management 3
standards. In January 2005, a total of 167 governments adopted a 10-year global plan
for natural disaster risk reduction called the Hyogo Framework (Hyogo Framework
for Action (HFA), UNISDR, www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/hfa).
Preventing or reducing the impacts of disasters on our communities is a key focus
for emergency management efforts today. Prevention and mitigation also help reduce
the financial costs of disaster response and recovery. Public Safety Canada is work-
ing with provincial and territorial governments and stakeholders to promote disaster
prevention and mitigation using a risk-based and all-hazards approach. In 2008, federal/
provincial/territorial ministers endorsed a National Disaster Mitigation Strategy
(Emergency Management—Public Safety Canada, https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca
/cnt/mrgnc-mngmnt/index-en.aspx).
Mitigation
Preventive or mitigation measures take different forms for different types of disas-
ters. In earthquake-prone areas, these preventive measures might include structural
changes such as the installation of an earthquake valve to instantly shut off the
natural gas supply, seismic retrofits of property, and the securing of items inside a
building. The latter may include the mounting of furniture, refrigerators, water heat-
ers, and breakables to the walls and the addition of cabinet latches. In flood-prone
areas, houses can be built on poles/stilts. In areas prone to prolonged electricity
black-outs, installation of a generator ensures continuation of electrical service. The
construction of storm cellars and fallout shelters are further examples of personal
mitigation actions.
Disaster mitigation measures are those that eliminate or reduce the impacts and
risks of hazards through proactive measures taken before an emergency or disaster
occurs.
Preparedness
Preparedness focuses on preparing equipment and procedures for use when a disas-
ter occurs. This equipment and these procedures can be used to reduce vulnerability
to disaster, to mitigate the impacts of a disaster or to respond more efficiently in an
emergency. The FEMA has set out a basic four-stage vision of preparedness flowing
from mitigation to preparedness to response to recovery and back to mitigation in
a circular planning process. This circular, overlapping model has been modified by
other agencies, taught in emergency class, and discussed in academic papers.
FEMA also operates a Building Science Branch that develops and produces multi
hazard mitigation guidance that focuses on creating disaster-resilient communities to
reduce loss of life and property. FEMA advises citizens to prepare their homes with
some emergency essentials in the case that the food distribution lines are interrupted.
FEMA has subsequently prepared for this contingency by purchasing hundreds of
thousands of freeze-dried food emergency meals ready to eat to dispense to the com-
munities where emergency shelter and evacuations are implemented.
Emergency preparedness can be difficult to measure. The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) (https://www.cdc.gov) focuses on evaluating the
effectiveness of its public health efforts through a variety of measurement and
assessment programs.
Local Emergency Planning Committees

Local emergency planning committees (LEPCs) are required by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, under the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act, to develop an emergency response plan, review the plan at least
annually, and provide information about chemicals in the community to local citi-
zens. This emergency preparedness effort focuses on hazards presented by use and
storage of extremely hazardous, hazardous, and toxic chemicals. Particular require-
ments of LEPCs include the following:
• Identification of facilities and transportation routes of extremely hazardous

substances
• Description of emergency response procedures, on and off site
• Designation of a community coordinator and facility emergency coordi
nator(s) to implement the plan
• Outline of emergency notification procedures
• Description of how to determine the probable affected area and population
by releases
• Description of local emergency equipment and facilities and the persons
responsible for them
• Outline of evacuation plans
• A training program for emergency responders (including schedules)
• Methods and schedules for exercising emergency response plans
According to the Environmental Protection Agency, “Many LEPCs have expanded

their activities beyond the requirements of EPCRA, encouraging accident prevention
and risk reduction, and addressing homeland security in their communities,” and
the Agency offers advice on how to evaluate the effectiveness of these committees
(“Disaster Management with Case Study,” SlideShare, https://www.slideshare.net
/.../disaster-management-with-case-study).
Preparedness Measures
Preparedness measures can take many forms, ranging from focusing on individual
people, locations, or incidents to broader, government-based “all-hazard” planning.
There are a number of preparedness stages between all-hazard and individual plan-
ning, generally involving some combination of both mitigation and response plan-
ning. Business continuity planning encourages businesses to have a disaster recovery
plan. Community- and faith-based organizations’ mitigation efforts promote field
response teams and interagency planning.
Classroom Response Kit

School-based response teams cover everything from live shooters to gas leaks and
nearby bank robberies. Educational institutions plan for cyber-attacks and wind-
storms. Industry-specific guidance exists for horse farms, boat owners, and more
(Industrial Principal Emergency Response and Preparedness, https://www.osha.gov
/Publications/osha3122.pdf).
Family preparedness for disaster is fairly unusual. A 2013 survey found that only
19% of American families felt that they were “very prepared” for a disaster. Still, there
are many resources available for family disaster planning (“Disaster Management
with Case Study,” SlideShare Families, https://www.slideshare.net/.../disaster-mana
gement-with-case-study). The Department of Homeland Security’s* page includes
a Family Emergency Plan Checklist; has a whole webpage devoted to readiness for
kids, complete with cartoon-style superheroes; and ran a Thunderclap Campaign in
2014. The CDC has a Zombie Apocalypse website (Zombie Preparedness, PHPR,
CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/phpr/zombie/index.htm).
Kitchen Fire Extinguisher

Disasters take a variety of forms to include earthquakes, tsunamis, or regular struc-
ture fires. That a disaster or emergency is not large scale in terms of population or
acreage impacted or duration does not make it any less of a disaster for the people
or area impacted, and much can be learned about preparedness from so-called small
disasters. The Red Cross states that it responds to nearly 70,000 disasters a year, the
most common of which is a single family fire (https://www.redcross.org/ns/apology
/d isaster_homepage.html?q=red+cross&form=EDNTHT&mkt=en-us&httpsmsn
=1&refig=62c7e55a966c4731b4789c17e0ab1aec&sp=1&http%3A%2F%2Fwww
.redcross.org%2F=).
Items on Shelves in Basements

Preparedness starts with an individual’s everyday life and involves items and train-
ing that would be useful in an emergency. What is useful in an emergency is often
also useful in everyday life. From personal preparedness, preparedness continues
on a continuum through family preparedness, community preparedness, and then
business, nonprofit, and governmental preparedness. Some organizations blend these
various levels. For example, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
have a webpage on disaster training as well as offer training on basic preparedness
such as cardiopulmonary resuscitation and first aid (International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement, IFRC, official site www.ifrc.org). Other nonprofits such as Team
Rubicon bring specific groups of people into disaster preparedness and response
operations (Team Rubicon, official site, https://teamrubiconusa.org). FEMA breaks
down preparedness into a pyramid, with citizens on the foundational bottom, on
top of which rests local government, state government, and federal government in
that order (“Tiered Response Pyramid: A System-Wide Approach to Build Response
Capability and Surge Capacity,” https://www.hsaj.org/article).
Nonperishable Food in Cabinets

The basic theme behind preparedness is to be ready for an emergency, and there are
a number of different variations of being ready based on an assessment of what sort
* Ready.gov knows what disasters could affect your area, how to get emergency alerts, and where you
would go if you and your family need to evacuate. Check out the related links to learn what to do
before, during and after each type of emergency.
of threats exist. Nonetheless, there is basic guidance for preparedness that is com-
mon despite an area’s specific dangers. FEMA recommends that everyone have a
three-day survival kit for their household. Because individual household sizes and
specific needs might vary, FEMA’s recommendations are not item specific, but the
list includes the following:
• Three-day supply of nonperishable food

• Three-day supply of water—one gallon of water per person, per day
• Portable, battery-powered radio or television and extra batteries
• Flashlight and extra batteries
• First aid kit and manual
• Sanitation and hygiene items (e.g., toilet paper, menstrual hygiene products)
• Matches and waterproof container
• Whistle
• Extra clothing
• Kitchen accessories and cooking utensils, including a can opener
• Photocopies of credit and identification cards
• Cash and coins
• Special needs items, such as prescription medications, eyeglasses, contact
lens solutions, and hearing aid batteries
• Items for infants, such as formula, diapers, bottles, and pacifiers
• Other items to meet unique family needs
Along similar lines, but not exactly the same, the CDC has its own list for a proper
disaster supply kit (https://www.cdc.gov).
• Water—one gallon per person, per day

• Food—nonperishable, easy-to-prepare items
• Flashlight
• Battery-powered or hand crank radio (NOAA Weather Radio, if possible)
• Extra batteries
• First aid kit
• Medications (seven-day supply), other medical supplies, and medical paper-
work (e.g., medication list and pertinent medical information)
• Multipurpose tool (e.g., Swiss army knife)
• Sanitation and personal hygiene items
• Copies of personal documents (e.g., proof of address, deed/lease to home,
passports, birth certificates, and insurance policies)
• Cell phone with chargers
• Family and emergency contact information
• Extra cash
• Emergency blanket
• Map(s) of the area
• Extra set of car keys and house keys
• Manual can opener
Children are a special population when considering emergency preparedness, and

many resources are directly focused on supporting them. The Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) (https://www.samhsa.gov) has
a list of tips for talking to children during infectious disease outbreaks, to include
being a good listener, encouraging children to ask questions, and modeling self-
care by setting routines, eating healthy meals, getting enough sleep, and taking deep
breaths to handle stress.
FEMA has similar advice, noting that “Disasters can leave children feeling fright-
ened, confused, and insecure,” whether a child has experienced it first hand, had it
happen to a friend, or simply saw it on television. In the same publication (https://
www.fema.gov/disasters), FEMA further notes, “Preparing for disaster helps every-
one in the family accept the fact that disasters do happen, and provides an opportu-
nity to identify and collect the resources needed to meet basic needs after disaster.
Preparation helps; when people feel prepared, they cope better and so do children.”
To help people assess what threats might be in order to augment their emergency
supplies or improve their disaster response skills, FEMA has published a booklet
called the “Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Guide” (THIRA)
(https://www.fema.gov/threat-and-hazard-identification-and-risk). This guide, which
outlines the THIRA process, emphasizes “whole community involvement,” not just
governmental agencies, in preparedness efforts.
In this guide, FEMA breaks down hazards into three categories: natural, techno-
logical, and human caused, and notes that each hazard should be assessed for both
its likelihood and its significance. According to FEMA, “Communities should con-
sider only those threats and hazards that could plausibly occur” and “Communities
should consider only those threats and hazards that would have a significant effect on
them.” To develop threat and hazard context descriptions, communities should take
into account the time, place, and conditions in which threats or hazards might occur.
Not all preparedness efforts and discussions involve the government or estab-
lished nongovernmental organizations like the Red Cross. Emergency preparation
discussions are active on the Internet, with many blogs and websites dedicated to dis-
cussing various aspects of preparedness. Online sales of items such as survival food,
medical supplies, and heirloom seeds allow people to stock basements with cases of
food and drinks with 25-year shelf lives, sophisticated medical kits, and seeds that
are guaranteed to sprout even after years of storage.
Not all emergency preparation efforts revolve around food, guns, and shelters,
although these items help address the needs in the bottom two sections of Maslow’s
hierarchy of needs (“Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs—Learning Theories,” https://
www.learning-theories.com/maslows-hierarchy-of-needs.html). The American Preppers
Network has an extensive list of items that might be useful in less apparent ways than
a first aid kid or help add “fun” to challenging times (American Preppers Network—
National Family Survival, americanpreppersnetwork.com). These items include the
following:
• Books and magazines

• Arts and crafts
• Children’s entertainment
• Crayons and coloring books
• Notebooks and writing supplies
• Nuts, bolts, screws, nails, etc.
• Religious material
• Sporting equipment, card games, and board games
Emergency preparedness goes beyond immediate family members. For many

people, pets are an integral part of their families, and emergency preparation advice
includes them as well. It is not unknown for pet owners to die while trying to rescue
their pets from a fire or from drowning. CDC’s Disaster Supply Checklist for Pets
includes the following (Disaster Preparedness for Your Pet, Features, CDC, https://
www.cdc.gov/features/petsanddisasters/index.html):
• Food and water for at least 3 days for each pet; bowls, and a manual can
opener.
• Depending on the pet, you may need a litter box, paper towels, plastic trash
bags, grooming items, and/or household bleach.
• Medications and medical records stored in a waterproof container.
• First aid kit with a pet first aid book.
• Sturdy leash, harness, and carrier to transport pet safely. A carrier should
be large enough for the animal to stand comfortably, turn around, and lie
down. Your pet may have to stay in the carrier for several hours.
• Pet toys and the pet’s bed, if you can easily take it, to reduce stress.
• Current photos and descriptions of your pets to help others identify them in
case you and your pets become separated and to prove that they are yours.
• Information on feeding schedules, medical conditions, behavior problems,
and the name and telephone number of your veterinarian in case you have
to board your pets or place them in foster care.
Emergency preparedness also includes more than physical items and skill-specific
training. Psychological preparedness is also a type of emergency preparedness, and
specific mental health preparedness resources are offered for mental health profes-
sionals by organizations such as the Red Cross. These mental health preparedness
resources are designed to support both community members affected by a disaster
and the disaster workers serving them. CDC has a website (https://www.cdc.gov)
devoted to coping with a disaster or traumatic event.
After such an event, the CDC, through the SAMHSA, suggests that people seek
psychological help when they exhibit symptoms such as excessive worry, crying fre-
quently, an increase in irritability, anger, and frequent arguing, wanting to be alone
most of the time, feeling anxious or fearful, overwhelmed by sadness, confused,
having trouble thinking clearly and concentrating, and difficulty making decisions,
increased alcohol and/or substance use, increased physical (aches, pains) complaints
such as headaches, and trouble with “nerves.”
Sometimes, emergency supplies are kept in what is called a bug-out bag. While
FEMA does not actually use the term “bug-out bag,” calling it instead as some variation
of a “go kit,” the idea of having emergency items in a quickly accessible place is
common to both FEMA and CDC, although online discussions of what items a bug-
out bag should include sometimes cover items such as firearms and great knives that
are not specifically suggested by FEMA or CDC (https://www.cdc.gov). The theory
behind a bug-out bag is that emergency preparations should include the possibility
of emergency evacuation. Whether fleeing a burning building or hastily packing a
car to escape an impending hurricane, flood, or dangerous chemical release, rapid
departure from a home or workplace environment is always a possibility, and FEMA
suggests having a family emergency plan for such occasions.
Because family members may not be together when disaster strikes, this plan
should include reliable contact information for friends or relatives who live outside
of what would be the disaster area for household members to notify they are safe or
otherwise communicate with each other. Along with the contact information, FEMA
suggests having well-understood local gathering points if a house must be evacuated
quickly to avoid the dangers of reentering a burning home. Family and emergency
contact information should be printed on cards and put in each family member’s
backpack or wallet. If family members spend a significant amount of time in a spe-
cific location, such as at work or school, FEMA suggests learning the emergency
preparation plans for those places.
FEMA has a specific form, in English and in Spanish, to help people put together
these emergency plans, although it lacks lines for e-mail contact information (Resources
for Other Languages, https://www.fema.gov/resources-other-languages).
Like children, people with disabilities and other special needs have special emer-
gency preparation needs. While “disability” has a specific meaning for specific orga-
nizations such as collecting Social Security benefits, for the purposes of emergency
preparedness, the Red Cross uses the term in a broader sense to include people with
physical, medical, sensor, or cognitive disabilities or the elderly and other special
needs populations. Depending on the particular disability, specific emergency prepa-
rations might be required.
FEMA’s suggestions for people with disabilities includes having copies of pre-
scriptions, charging devices for medical devices such as motorized wheel chairs,
and a week’s supply of medication readily available or in a “go stay kit.” In some
instances, lack of competency in English may lead to special preparation require-
ments and communication efforts for both individuals and responders.
FEMA notes that long-term power outages can cause damage beyond the original
disaster that can be mitigated with emergency generators or other power sources to
provide an emergency power system. The U.S. Department of Energy states that
“homeowners, business owners, and local leaders may have to take an active role in
dealing with energy disruptions on their own.” This active role may include install-
ing or procuring generators that are either portable or permanently mounted and run
on fuels such as propane or natural gas or gasoline.
Concerns about carbon monoxide poisoning, electrocution, flooding, fuel storage,
and fire leads even small property owners to consider professional installation and
maintenance. Major institutions like hospitals, military bases, and educational insti-
tutions often have or are considering extensive backup power systems. Instead of, or
in addition to, fuel-based power systems, solar, wind, and other alternative power
sources may be used. Standalone batteries, large or small, are also used to provide
backup charging for electrical systems and devices ranging from emergency lights
to computers to cell phones.
Emergency preparedness does not stop at home or at school. The U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services addresses specific emergency preparedness issues
that hospitals may have to respond to, including maintaining a safe temperature,
providing adequate electricity for life support systems, and even carrying out evacu-
ations under extreme circumstances (www.dmort7.org/downloads/2009SpringNational
News.pdf). FEMA encourages all businesses to have an emergency response plan,
and the Small Business Administration specifically advises small business owners to
also focus on emergency preparedness and provides a variety of different worksheets
and resources.
FEMA cautions that emergencies happen while people are travelling as well and
provides guidance around emergency preparedness for a range of travelers to include
commuters, commuter emergency plan, and holiday travelers. In particular, Ready.
gov has a number of emergency preparations specifically designed for people with
cars. These preparations include having a full gas tank, maintaining adequate wind-
shield wiper fluid, and other basic car maintenance tips. Items specific to an emer-
gency include the following:
• Jumper cables: might want to include flares or reflective triangle

• Flashlights, to include extra batteries (batteries have less power in colder
weather)
• First aid kit, to include any necessary medications, as well as baby formula
and diapers if caring for small children
• Nonperishable food such as canned food (be alert to liquids freezing in
colder weather) and protein-rich foods like nuts and energy bars
• Manual can opener
• At least 1 gallon of water per person a day for at least 3 days (be alert to
hazards of frozen water and resultant container rupture)
• Basic toolkit: pliers, wrench, screwdriver
• Pet supplies: food and water
• Radio: battery or hand cranked
• For snowy areas: cat litter or sand for better tire traction; shovel; ice scraper;
warm clothes, gloves, hat, sturdy boots, jacket, and an extra change of clothes
• Blankets or sleeping bags
• Charged cell phone and car charger
In addition to emergency supplies and training for various situations, FEMA

offers advice on how to mitigate disasters. The Agency gives instructions on how to
retrofit a home to minimize hazards from a flood, to include installing a backflow
prevention device, anchoring fuel tanks and relocating electrical panels.
Marked Gas Shutoff

Given the explosive danger posed by natural gas leaks, Ready.gov states unequivocally
that “It is vital that all household members know how to shut off natural gas” and that
property owners must ensure they have any special tools needed for their particular
gas hookups. Ready.gov also notes that “It is wise to teach all responsible household
members where and how to shut off the electricity,” cautioning that individual circuits
should be shut off before the main circuit. Ready.gov further states that “It is vital that
all household members learn how to shut off the water at the main house valve” and
cautions that the possibility that rusty valves might require replacement.
Response
The response phase of an emergency may commence with search and rescue, but
in all cases, the focus will quickly turn to fulfilling the basic humanitarian needs of
the affected population. This assistance may be provided by national or international
agencies and organizations. Effective coordination of disaster assistance is often cru-
cial, particularly when many organizations respond and local emergency manage-
ment agency capacity has been exceeded by the demand or diminished by the disaster
itself. The National Response Framework (NRF) is a U.S. government publication
that explains the responsibilities and expectations of government officials at the local,
state, federal, and tribal levels. It provides guidance on emergency support functions
that may be integrated in whole or parts to aid in the response and recovery process.
On a personal level, the response can take the shape either of a shelter in place or
an evacuation.
Evacuation Sign
In a shelter-in-place scenario, a family would be prepared to fend for themselves in
their home for many days without any form of outside support. In an evacuation, a
family leaves the area by automobile or other mode of transportation, taking with
them the maximum amount of supplies they can carry, possibly including a tent for
shelter. If mechanical transportation is not available, evacuation on foot would ide-
ally include carrying at least three days of supplies and rain-tight bedding, a tarpau-
lin, and a bedroll of blankets.
Donations are often sought during this period, especially for large disasters that
overwhelm local capacity. Due to efficiencies of scale, money is often the most
cost-effective donation if fraud is avoided. Money is also the most flexible, and if
goods are sourced locally, then transportation is minimized and the local economy
is boosted. Some donors prefer to send gifts in kind; however, these items can end
up creating issues, rather than helping. One innovation by Occupy Sandy volunteers
is to use a donation registry, where families and businesses impacted by the disaster
can make specific requests, which remote donors can purchase directly via a web-
site (“Occupy Sandy: A New Model for Disaster Relief,” TIDES, https://startidesnet
.wordpress.com/2014/07/09/occupy-sandy-a-new).
Medical considerations will vary greatly based on the type of disaster and sec-
ondary effects. Survivors may sustain a multitude of injuries to include lacerations,
burns, near drowning, or crush syndrome.
Recovery
The recovery phase starts after the immediate threat to human life has subsided. The
immediate goal of the recovery phase is to bring the affected area back to normalcy
as quickly as possible. During reconstruction, it is recommended to consider the

location or construction material of the property.
The most extreme home confinement scenarios include war, famine, and severe
epidemics and may last a year or more. Then recovery will take place inside the
home. Planners for these events usually buy bulk foods and appropriate storage and
preparation equipment and eat the food as part of normal life. A simple balanced diet
can be constructed from vitamin pills, whole-meal wheat, beans, dried milk, corn,
and cooking oil. One should add vegetables, fruits, spices, and meats, both prepared
and fresh-gardened, when possible.
AS A PROFESSION
Professional emergency managers can focus on government and community pre-
paredness or private business preparedness. Training is provided by local, state,
federal, and private organizations and ranges from public information and media
relations to high-level incident command and tactical skills.
In the past, the field of emergency management has been populated mostly by
people with a military or first-responder background. Currently, the field has become
more diverse, with many managers coming from a variety of backgrounds other
than the military or first responder fields. Educational opportunities are increasing
for those seeking undergraduate and graduate degrees in emergency management
or a related field. There are over 180 schools in the United States with emergency-
management-related programs, but only one doctoral program specifically in emer-
gency management.
Professional certifications such as Certified Emergency Manager (CEM) and
Certified Business Continuity Professional (CBCP) are becoming more common
as professional standards are raised throughout the field, particularly in the United
States. There are also professional organizations for emergency managers, such as
the National Emergency Management Association and the International Association
of Emergency Managers.
Principles
In 2007, Dr. Wayne Blanchard of FEMA’s Emergency Management Higher Educa
tion Project, under the direction of Dr. Cortez Lawrence, superintendent of FEMA’s
Emergency Management Institute, convened a working group of emergency manage-
ment practitioners and academics to consider principles of emergency management.
This was the first time the principles of the discipline were to be codified. The group
agreed on eight principles that will be used to guide the development of a doctrine of
emergency management. Below is a summary (mentioned also in Chapter 2):
1. Comprehensive—consider and take into account all hazards, all phases, all
stakeholders and all impacts relevant to disasters.
2. Progressive—anticipate future disasters and take preventive and prepara-
tory measures to build disaster-resistant and disaster-resilient communities.
3. Risk-driven—use sound risk management principles (hazard identification,

risk analysis, and impact analysis) in assigning priorities and resources.
4. Integrated—ensure unity of effort among all levels of government and all
elements of a community.
5. Collaborative—create and sustain broad and sincere relationships among
individuals and organizations to encourage trust, advocate a team atmo-
sphere, build consensus, and facilitate communication.
6. Coordinated—synchronize the activities of all relevant stakeholders to
achieve a common purpose.
7. Flexible—use creative and innovative approaches in solving disaster challenges.
8. Professional—value a science and knowledge-based approach; based on edu-
cation, training, experience, ethical practice, public stewardship and continu-
ous improvement (Principles of Emergency Management Supplement, FEMA
.gov, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1822-25045-7625
/principles_of_emergency_management.pdf).
Tools
In recent years, the continuity feature of emergency management has resulted in a
new concept, Emergency Management Information Systems (EMIS). For continuity
and interoperability between emergency management stakeholders, EMIS supports
an infrastructure that integrates emergency plans at all levels of government and
nongovernment involvement for all four phases of emergencies. In the healthcare
field, hospitals utilize the Hospital Incident Command System (emsa.ca.gov, http://
www.emsa.ca.gov/media/default/HICS/HICS_Guidebook_2014_10.pdf; HICS is an
incident), which provides structure and organization in a clearly defined chain of
command.
Disaster Response Technologies

A Smart Emergency Response System (SERS) prototype was built in the Smart
America Challenge 2013–2014, a U.S. government initiative. SERS has been created
by a team of nine organizations led by MathWorks (Smart America, smartamerica
.org/teams/smart-emergency-response-system-sers).
The Smart America initiative challenges the participants to build cyber-physical
systems as a glimpse of the future to save lives, create jobs, foster businesses,
and improve the economy. SERS primarily saves lives. The system provides the
survivors and the emergency personnel with information to locate and assist each
other during a disaster. SERS allows submission of help requests to a MATLAB-
based mission center connecting first responders, apps, search-and-rescue dogs, a
6-feet-tall humanoid, robots, drones, and autonomous aircraft and ground vehicles.
The command and control center optimizes the available resources to serve every
incoming request and generates an action plan for the mission. The Wi-Fi network
is created on the fly by drones equipped with antennas. In addition, the autonomous
rotorcrafts, planes, and ground vehicles are simulated with Simulink and visualized
in a 3D environment (Google Earth) to unlock the ability to observe the operations

on a mass scale.
Within Other Professions

Practitioners in emergency management come from an increasing variety of back-
grounds. Professionals from memory institutions (e.g., museums, historical societies,
etc.) are dedicated to preserving cultural heritage—objects and records. This has
been an increasingly major component within this field as a result of the heightened
awareness following the September 11 attacks in 2001, the hurricanes in 2005, and
the collapse of the Cologne Archives.
To increase the potential successful recovery of valuable records, a well-
established and thoroughly tested plan must be developed. This plan should empha-
size simplicity in order to aid in response and recovery: employees should perform
similar tasks in the response and recovery phase that they perform under normal
conditions. It should also include mitigation strategies such as the installation of
sprinklers within the institution. Professional associations hold regular workshops to
keep individuals up to date with tools and resources in order to minimize risk and
maximize recovery.
Absolute requirements for participation are as follows:
• Have I chosen to participate?

• Have I taken Incident Command System (ICS) training?
• Have I taken other required background courses?
• Have I made arrangements with my company to deploy?
• Have I made arrangements with my family?
Incident participation:
• Have I been invited to participate?

• Are my skill sets a match for the mission?
• Can I access just-in-time training to refresh skills or acquire needed new
skills?
• Is this a self-support mission?
• Do I have supplies needed for three to five days of self-support?
FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute

The Emergency Management Institute’s (EMI’s) main campus is in Emmitsburg,
Maryland.
The EMI serves as the national focal point for the development and delivery of
emergency management training to enhance the capabilities of state, territorial,
local, and tribal government officials; volunteer organizations; FEMA’s disaster
workforce; other federal agencies; and the public and private sectors to minimize
the impact of disasters and emergencies on the American public. EMI curricula are
structured to meet the needs of this diverse audience with an emphasis on separate
organizations working together in all-hazards emergencies to save lives and pro-
tect property. Particular emphasis is placed on governing doctrine such as the NRF,
National Incident Management System, and the National Preparedness Guidelines.
EMI is fully accredited by the International Association for Continuing Education
and Training and the American Council on Education.
The Independent Study (IS) program at EMI consists of free courses offered to
U.S. citizens in Comprehensive Emergency Management techniques. Course IS-1
is entitled “Emergency Manager: An Orientation to the Position” and provides
background information on FEMA and the role of emergency managers in agency
and volunteer organization coordination. The EMI IS Program, a web-based dis-
tance learning program open to the public, delivered extensive online training with
approximately 200 courses and trained more than 2.8 million individuals. IS courses
are online and at no cost to anyone who has the proper login information and SSID
student number (e.g., 0000123456).
2 Introduction to
Emergency Management:
Step by Step Process
PLANNING PROCESS
Definitions
• Hazard refers to the potential for extreme events to affect people, property
and the natural environment in a given location.
• Two descriptions of emergency are as follows:
• Minor events that cause a few casualties and a limited amount of prop-
erty damage.
• An imminent event that will likely strike soon.
• Disaster is reserved for events that produce more losses than a community
can handle.
Natural Disasters
• Large scale natural disasters are common (earthquakes, floods, hurricanes,
volcanic eruptions, and wild land fires).
• More people are being affected by natural disasters and losses are becom-
ing progressively greater.
• People are choosing hazardous building designs and inadequate structural
materials that fail under extreme stress.
Technological Disasters
• People are more affected now by technological disasters because there are
more people living close to them.
• Risks are rising from increased quantity and variety of hazardous materials.
• Use of nuclear power plants and liquefied natural gas facilities.
Terrorist Disasters
• Terrorists use some of the same materials involved in technological disas-
ters and are intended to cause many casualties and major damage.
17
• Emergency managers respond to terrorist attacks using the same basic

approach used in other disasters.
• Emergency managers must
• Rapidly detect and assess the situation.
• Mobilize relevant organizations and facilities.
• Take action to limit casualties and damage.
• Coordinate the organizations responding to the incident.
Emergency Manager’s Role

• The emergency manager’s role is to prevent or reduce losses that occur due
to hazards, disasters, and emergencies.
• Losses are measured in a variety of ways, including the following:
• Number of deaths and injuries
• Property damage
• Increased importance of emergency management:
• Public awareness of hazards and disasters has increased along with the
cost of disasters.
• Businesses can be disrupted and even go bankrupt.
• Rapid population growth in hazardous geographical areas has created
increased disaster exposure.
• Emergency manager’s training has led to the development of emer-
gency management as a profession.
Local Management
• Emergency management is a local job to influence events with local
consequences.
• The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) practice of
attempting to manage events locally whenever possible places a major bur-
den on state and local government agencies.
• The current National Response Plan states that local jurisdictions must
be able to operate without external help for 72 hours after hazard impact
(https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NRP_Brochure.pdf).
Planning Process
There are four steps in performing a hazard/vulnerability analysis:
• Identify hazards.
• Estimate the probability.
• Project the consequences.
• Communities need to develop hazard management strategies from four
basic elements: hazard mitigation, emergency preparedness, emergency
response, and disaster recovery.
Introduction to Emergency Management 19
Hazard Mitigation
• Hazard mitigation addresses the causes of a disaster, reducing the likeli-
hood it will occur or limiting its impact.
• Focus is to stop disasters before they happen.
• Changing either the natural event or human behavior, or both, reduces the
impact of a natural event such as a flood, hurricane, or earthquake.
• The choice of whether to reduce technological hazards by controlling the
hazard agent or by controlling the human use depends on political and eco-
nomic decisions.
Preparedness
• Preparedness consists of plans, procedures, and resources that must be
developed in advance.
• Designed to support a timely and effective emergency response to an immi-
nent impact and guide the disaster recovery process.
• Disaster program needs to answer four questions:
• Which agencies will participate?
• What response and recovery actions are feasible?
• How will the response and recovery organizations function and what
resources are needed?
• How will disaster preparedness be established and maintained?
Response
• Emergency response begins when the event occurs or when hazard-
monitoring systems alert authorities of an imminent disaster.
• Emergency response goals are as follows:
• Protecting the population.
• Limiting damage from the primary impact.
• Minimizing damage from secondary impacts.
• Secondary impacts are “disasters caused by the disaster” and include haz-
ardous materials releases initiated by earthquakes.
• Local emergency responders dominate the response period, which is char-
acterized by uncertainty and urgency.
Recovery
• Recovery begins as the disaster is ending and continues until the commu-
nity is back to normal.
• The immediate goal is to restore the community’s infrastructure.
• The ultimate goal is to return the community’s quality of life to the same
level as it was before the disaster.
• Most resources during recovery come from outside the community—
the majority of resources in a major disaster come from the federal
government.
Strategy Mix
• Historically, more emergency management resources are used for response
and recovery than for mitigation and preparedness.
• Recent events, such as Hurricane Katrina, have called attention to the flaw
in this policy.
• Community’s hazard management strategy should combine all four activities.
Summary
• This section demonstrated how you must prepare for threats through the
use of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery plans. The use of
technological systems, risk communication, and sanctions and incentives
enables the effective implementation of emergency plans.
Key Terms
• Disaster
• Emergency
• Hazard
• Mitigation
• Natural disaster
• Recovery
• Response
• Secondary impacts
• Terrorist disasters
• Technological disasters
THE FOUR PILLARS OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Note: No community is exempt from emergencies.

• As much as we dislike thinking about the potential for natural, techno-
logical, human-related disasters, or disasters involving hazardous material,
these events do occur.
• The best way to minimize the effects of such events is to discuss the poten-
tial vulnerabilities that exist in an organization, while instituting strategies
that include the components of mitigation, preparedness, response, and
recovery (Figure 2.1).
• On August 3, 1993, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12856,
“Federal Compliance with the ‘Right-to-Know’ Laws and Pollution
Prevention Requirements” (National Archives, https://www.archives.gov
/.../executive-orders/pdf/12856.pdf).
• This Executive Order requires federal agencies, including the Department
of Defense, to fully comply with all provisions of Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) and the Pollution Prevention Act
FIGURE 2.1 Emergency management planning tree.
(https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/hsem/epcra) with one notable exception: the

reporting requirements under Section 313.
• Under the EPCRA, State Emergency Response Commission and
Local Emergency Planning Committee are charged with four primary
responsibilities:
• Write emergency plans to protect the public from chemical accidents.
• Establish procedures to warn and, if necessary, evacuate the public in
case of an emergency.
• Provide citizens and local governments with information about hazard-
ous chemicals and accidental releases of chemicals in their communities.
• Assist in the preparation of public reports on annual release of toxic
chemicals into the air, water, and soil.
• The plan must be reviewed annually, more often is preferred, to include a
table-top exercise, a small local exercise, and a full scale exercise to see if
the plan is functional.
The four pillars of emergency management are the phases of planning and action
undertaken to ensure a comprehensive approach to emergency management, while
maximizing the security of the infrastructure, continuity of operations, and the
safety of staff, public.
The four pillars are as follows (Figure 2.2).
Mitigation
• Mitigation is the most cost-efficient method for reducing the impact of
hazards.
• A precursor activity to mitigation is the identification of risks.
• Physical risk assessment refers to the process of identifying and evaluating
hazards.
• The higher the risk, the more urgent the need is to target hazard specific
vulnerabilities through mitigation efforts.
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FIGURE 2.2 The four pillars of emergency management.
• One example of mitigation is the 96-Hour Continuity Plan, which includes

mitigation strategies and plans that have been developed to ensure continuity
of operations in areas such as utilities, communications, food, water, medi-
cal support, staffing, and medical supplies when the installation is unable
to support due to an external disaster scenario (Emergency Management
and Business Continuity, dp.ccalac.org/Policies/BusinessContinuityPlan
/Documents/EOP-BCP).
Preparedness
• Preparedness is a continuous cycle of planning, organizing, training, equip-
ping, exercising, evaluation, and improvement activities that ensure effective
coordination and the enhancement of capabilities to prevent, protect against,
respond to, recover from, and mitigate against disaster events that have been
identified within the Hazard Vulnerability Analysis (HVA) (https://training
.fema.gov/emiweb/downloads/untservicelearning.pdf).
• In the preparedness phase, the Emergency Management Department devel-
ops plans of action to manage and counter risks and takes action to build the
necessary capabilities needed to implement such plans.
Response
• The response phase includes the mobilization of the identified emergency
staff, including first responders, to an internal or external event that could
have an impact on patient care operations.
• Response procedures are predetermined by the local government and are
detailed in disaster plans during the preparedness phase.
• Response to an internal or external event on the local government is directed
through the Incident Command System (ICS).
• Response plans remain flexible in nature due to the varying members of
staff available on the installation at any given time.
• Response procedures and plans are constantly evaluated and changed based
on improvements identified during After Action Reviews, which are held
after disaster events.
• Response is also evaluated regularly by the local government through drills,
exercises, tracers, and live events.
Recovery
• The aim of the recovery phase is to restore the affected area to its previous
state.
• It differs from the response phase in its focus: recovery efforts are con-
cerned with issues and decisions that must be made after immediate needs
are addressed.
• Recovery efforts are primarily concerned with actions that involve rebuild-
ing destroyed property, reemployment, the repair of other essential infra-
structure, as well as the reopening of essential services.
• Recovery operations are an extremely important phase in the emergency
management continuum and yet one that is often overlooked.
• The ICS team is responsible for the implementation of the recovery phase.
Hazard Vulnerability Analysis

• The basis of the “all-hazards” approach starts with the installation of the
HVA.
• The HVA identifies disasters and other events from a technological, natural,
manmade, and hazardous materials perspective that are most prevalent for
the region.
• These events are ranked in order of severity and greatest impact to the local
government and its operations.
• A risk factor is obtained for each identified hazard by ranking probability,
human impact, property impact, business impact, and overall preparedness
from an internal and external response entity.
Hazard Vulnerability Analysis Assessment

• The HVA is reviewed annually, or as required by installation leadership and
the Emergency Management Committee.
• The HVA, including the top five ranked disasters, is shared with commu-
nity government and emergency response agencies including the Office
of Emergency Management, Public Health, emergency medical services
(EMS), police, fire, and the medical examiner’s (ME) office.
• The top five events identified by installation were patients (surge), pandemic/
epidemic, snowfall, water failure, hurricanes, tornadoes, snow storms,
floods and internal flood.
THE PRINCIPLES OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

1. Comprehensive—consider and take into account all hazards, all phases, all
stakeholders and all impacts relevant to disasters.
2. Progressive—anticipate future disasters and take preventive and prepara-
tory measures to build disaster-resistant and disaster-resilient communities.
3. Risk-driven—use sound risk management principles (hazard identification,
risk analysis, and impact analysis) in assigning priorities and resources.
4. Integrated—ensure unity of effort among all levels of government and all
elements of a community.
5. Collaborative—create and sustain broad and sincere relationships among
individuals and organizations to encourage trust, advocate a team atmo-
sphere, build consensus, and facilitate communication.
6. Coordinated—synchronize the activities of all relevant stakeholders to
achieve a common purpose.
7. Flexible—use creative and innovative approaches in solving disaster
challenges.
8. Professional—value a science and knowledge-based approach, based on edu-
cation, training, experience, ethical practice, public stewardship, and con-
tinuous improvement (Principles of Emergency Management Supplement,
FEMA.gov, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1822
-25045-7625/principles_of_emergency_management.pdf).
Tools Used in Emergency Management

• In recent years, the continuity feature of emergency management has
resulted in a new concept, Emergency Management Information Systems
(EMIS).
• For continuity and interoperability between emergency management stake-
holders, EMIS supports an infrastructure that integrates emergency plans at
all levels of government and nongovernment involvement for all four phases
of emergencies.
• In the healthcare field, hospitals utilize the hospital ICS, which provides
structure and organization in a clearly defined chain of command.
• Professional certifications such as Certified Emergency Manager (CEM)

and Certified Business Continuity Professional (CBCP) are becoming more
common as professional standards are raised throughout the field, particu-
larly in the United States.
• There are also professional organizations for emergency managers, such
as the National Emergency Management Association and the International
Association of Emergency.
Emergency Management Committee

• The Emergency Management Committee is a multidisciplinary installation
team that is charged with developing processes, policies, and procedures;
conducting staff education; and securing necessary resources to ensure
a prompt, coordinated, and effective response by local government to all
disasters affecting the environment, continuity of operations, life safety,
and property of the installation.
• The Committee is responsible for all facets of the emergency operations
plan (EOP), including the incorporation of exercises and After Action
Reports intended to examine our response while identifying opportunities
for improvement.
As a basis for its foundation, the Emergency Management Committee centers its
attention on six critical planning areas:
1. Communications
2. Resources and assets
3. Safety and security
4. Staff responsibility
5. Utilities
6. Support activities
These are just six areas to be a foundation of response to a disaster or potential

disaster and key elements to an all-hazards approach to emergency management.
Members of the Emergency Management Committee represent multiple disci-
plines across the installation, including the following:
• Post commander
• Installation commander
• Emergency manager
• Emergency management team
• Emergency operation center (EOC) personnel
• Provost marshal
• Fire department (on and off base)
• Emergency medical service (on and off base)
• Department of Public Works (on and off base)
• Information management and technology
These are just some areas to be considered during the development, planning,
writing, and maintain of the EOP.
Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan

• The Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) is a procedural
document that contains disaster response plans and policies that assist the
organization in applying the all-hazards approach in emergency management.
• The CEMP manual, which is available to installation staff in both paper
and electronic formats, contains detailed plans addressing the steps to be
taken during specific emergencies.
• The plan defines the roles and responsibilities of different departments and
personnel.
• It provides job responsibilities for the different members of the Incident
Command Team, listed in job action sheets.
• It includes phone numbers and emergency contacts at the local government
and throughout the community.
• The CEMP guides response while providing the Incident Command Team
with the information they need to make effective decisions during emer-
gency situations.
Note: The plan must be reviewed annually; this is not an option.
Incident Command System

• The ICS was created in response to a series of destructive wildfires in
southern California in 1970 called Fire Scope (for Fire Scope history, see
http://www.firescope.org/history.htm).
• National, state, and local emergency responders required a tool to effec-
tively provide command and control functions while coordinating the
efforts of many individual agencies and departments working together to
stabilize a disaster, while protecting life, property and the environment.
The ICS is used by emergency responders across the nation as well as by our local
governments and agencies. The ICS is successful because it uses a common organi-
zational structure with standardized management principles.
• The structure being used in the hospital is similar to the structure being
used in the community by police, fire fighters, homeland security, and other
rescue personnel.
• With ICS in effect, the hospital and other organizations can communicate effec-
tively and efficiently to solve problems and get the emergency under control.
• In fact, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security requires all organiza-
tions that receive federal funds become National Incident Management
System (NIMS) compliant, which includes the incorporation of ICS (https://
www.fema.gov/national-incident-management-system).
BP Section 1
Regional oil spill response plan – Gulf of Mexico Quick guide
Incident management team organizational chart Figure 1–13

Qualified individual
Safety officer Law officer
Incident commander/
Human resources deputy incident Security officer
commander
Information officer Liaison officer
Operations Planning Logistics Finance

section chief section chief section chief section chief
On-scene commander Situation unit leader Service branch director Support branch director Cost unit leader
Air operations Resource unit leader Ground/vessel Time unit leader

Communications
support unit unit leader
Staging Documentation unit Procurement unit
leader Supply unit leader Medical unit leader leader
Site safety
Demobilization unit Facilities unit Food unit leader Compensation/
Branch leader leader claims unit leader
Environmental unit Security group Law group

Source Division and group leader
control/salvage group
Technical specialist Human
Task force resources group
Single resource Health and safety unit
Title of document: regional oil spill response plan UPS-US-SW-GOM-HSE-DOC-00177-2

Authority: Dan R. Replogle Custodian: Earnest Bush,
GoM EMS mgmt representative Environment coordinator
Scope: GoM EMS Document administrator: Kristy McNease,
Issue date: 12/01/00 GoM HSSE document mgmt administrator
Revision date: 06/30/09 Issuing dept.: GOM SPU
Next review date: 06/30/11 Control tier: tier 2 - GoM region
appendix A, page 39 of 116 pages
© The response group 06/2009
FIGURE 2.3 Example ICS from the BP oil spill.
The ICS has evolved over the years and has taken on a specific meaning for instal-
lation systems in the form of the installation ICS (IICS). While IICS provides a
prescriptive model for implementation, the installation can tailor the conventional
methodology of the ICS in most cases to fit their specific needs (Figure 2.3).
• IICS is employed at the installation to respond to emergency situations.

When a disaster is declared, IICS is “activated” and an entire system of
planning and operations is put into play.
• Chains of command and job descriptions in the form of specific job action
sheets developed by the Emergency Management Department provide
everyone on the IICS team with the information they need and the proce-
dures to follow to address the emergency situation at hand.
The Department of Emergency Management at the installation should specialize

in this type of “what if” thinking.
• The mission is to give the local government personnel the support system
they need to continue to provide continuity of operations across all post
functions, even in disaster situations.
• In order to offer this critical response, the department maintains an exten-
sive CEMP that addresses an all-hazards approach to disaster preparedness
and an emergency management team that continually reviews and improves
the program.
• Through a continuous planning approach that includes mitigation, prepared-

ness, response, and recovery, the emergency management program at the local
government should strive to continuously improve the installation response to
all types of disasters while supporting the mission in times of crisis.
Review
Q: What are the four pillars of emergency management?
A: Mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery
Q: What type of thinking should the emergency planning team have?
A: “What if” thinking
Q: What is the name of the process that the all-hazards approach planning done by?
A: Hazard vulnerability analysis
Q: How often must the EOP be reviewed?
A: Annually
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT STAKEHOLDERS

Stakeholders
Community stakeholders can be divided into three categories:
• Social groups
• Economic groups
• Political groups
Much of your skill in dealing with stakeholders will depend on power, how it plays
in your relationships with stakeholders and how it influences policies.
Social Groups
The basic social group unit is the household. Households
• Try to prevent accidents

• Prepare for natural disasters
• Evacuate
• Suffer economic losses
Community emergency response teams (CERTs) help homeowners organize as

groups to develop emergency management policy.
Economic Groups
• Small businesses are the most at risk, but are more likely to respond to
appeals for assistance.
• Businesses tend to focus on response and recovery.
• Disasters cause business interruption—a loss of revenue due to a disruption.
• A critical business stakeholder is public utilities.
Government Stakeholders
Governmental stakeholders include the town or city, the county, the state, and the
federal level.
The most important stakeholders are the state emergency management agencies
(SEMAs). They
• Set policies
• Provide the legal framework
• Link local governments with FEMA
At the national level, with the establishment of Health and Safety Authority, a restruc-
turing of emergency management began. FEMA’s role remains to be determined.
Involving Stakeholders
The local emergency manager must involve all relevant stakeholders in the process.
There are four simple ways to get the community involved in hazard prevention.
• Talk up your work to friends and neighbors. Creating buzz about emergency
management is an inexpensive and valuable way to get community support.
• Set up a hazard hotline. Advertise the hotline.
• Speak at schools, neighborhood, and community organizations. Discuss
potential threats and emergency management plans.
• Form citizen committees to help advise on the emergency management
plans and to get volunteers for carrying out the plans.
Power
Stakeholders have different levels of power.
Organizational theorists have described six bases of power:
• Reward
• Coercive
• Legitimate
• Expert
• Referent
• Information power
Power operates in the upward and downward directions. Power operates along a
chain between households and the federal government.
Policy Process
• The basic steps of the policy process are five stages through which policies
move.
• The emergency manager’s first task is to put hazards on the political agenda.
• Three types of political agendas are as follows:

• The systemic agenda is hot topics that concern voters.
• The governmental agenda is the issues the government is working on.
• The institutional agenda is the issues that institutions are working on.
• A natural or technological disaster is a focusing event that draws public
attention to the need for local disaster planning and hazard mitigation.
Agenda Setting
• Window of opportunity—The time immediately following a focusing event
during which local emergency managers are most likely to be able to influ-
ence policy.
• Because of the short amount of time to effect policy change, individual
actors must work aggressively to set issues on the agenda and to keep them
there.
• Three qualities are needed to be successful:
• Technical expertise in hazards, acquired either through education or
experience
• Political expertise necessary for any successful policy change effort
• Personal commitment because it can take years to overcome opposition
to new policies
Policy Formulation
• Managers should have a set of proposals before they attempt to shape the
agenda.
• A goal is to minimize court challenges and unintended consequences of the
policy or law.
• When developing any public policy, stakeholders must be included. This is
especially important for hazard policies, because these policies often require
• Certain present investment
• Certain opportunity cost
• Uncertain future benefit
Policy Adoption
• Policy adoption involves getting stakeholders to urge elected officials to
pass the policy.
• Adoption is not the end of the story. All policies must be implemented to
be effective.
• Three factors that affect policy implementation.
• How easy is it to solve the problem?
• Is there a clear link between the solution and the problem?
• What level of technology and amount of resources is available to solve
the problem?
• A policy should be evaluated periodically and either improved or terminated.
Summary
• This section examined the essential elements of an emergency management
policy. It also demonstrated how you can involve stakeholders in emergency
management planning and processes. It is important to recognize your own
power in influencing stakeholders and policies.
Key Terms
• Business interruption
• CERTs
• Economic groups
• Expert power
• Focusing event
• Governmental groups
• Information power
• Legitimate power
• Referent power
• Reward and coercive power
• Stakeholder
• Social groups
• Window of opportunity
BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION
Local Emergency Management Agency
• In practice, a local emergency management agency (LEMA) might be
known by as the Office of Civil Defense, Emergency Management,
Emergency Services, or Homeland Security.
• The LEMA might be separate or part of another department or an indi-
vidual attached to the chief administrative officer’s (CAO’s) office.
• In many communities, one person staffs the LEMA.
Emergency Manager
• As the local emergency manager, you will report to the CAO during
emergencies.
• Your status depends on the following:
• Size of community
• Financial resources of the community
• Community’s vulnerability to hazards
• You will work mostly with the police, fire, EMS, and public works
departments.
• Usually, the CAO is not an expert in public safety, emergency medicine, or
emergency management.
Local Emergency Management Agencies

• Some LEMAs have professional staff and many have volunteers with valu-
able skills.
• Performance reviews are valuable in improving performance effectiveness.
• FEMA has advised emergency managers to set annual goals for major areas.
• A LEMA’s budget categorizes anticipated expenses, details each category
of funding, and covers the 12 month fiscal year.
• A budget’s contingency fund addresses the funds needed in case of an
emergency.
Funding Sources
• Your most obvious source of funding is the CAO.
• FEMA has a range of programs that provide financial assistance.
• Continued financial support is based on meeting performance and financial
requirements.
• For some forms of FEMA funding, LEMAs submit applications through
their SEMAs.
• Industrial facilities, such as nuclear power plants, can help defray the costs
of preparing their facilities for an emergency.
Effective Organizations
• An effective LEMA focuses on
• Organizational outcomes
• Individual outcomes
• Planning process
• Frequent, recent, and severe impacts can lead to a disaster subculture in
which residents adopt routines to prepare for disasters.
• Community support from senior officials, news media, and public affects
the resources allocated to the LEMA.
• Effectiveness of LEMAs can be partly attributed to availability of resources.
LEMA Effectiveness
• Emergency management network effectiveness is greater in communities
with recent disaster experience. The more effective networks
• Have members with more experience
• Have a wider range of local contacts
• Have written plans and were familiar with them
• Have personal experience in managing routine natural hazards such as
floods
• Are more familiar with the policies and procedures of emergency-
relevant state and federal agencies
• Have representation by elected officials and by citizens’ groups
Planning Process
The planning process consists of five functions.
1. Plan activities: Cities with a better planning process adopt more prepared-
ness practices.
2. Provide a positive work climate: Planning effectiveness is highest in posi-
tive organizational climates.
3. Analyze the situation: Examine the five factors.
4. Acquire resources: Obtain staff, equipment, and information from a variety
of sources.
5. Choose a strategy: You can use multiple strategies, and the extent to which
you use each one will depend on the size of the community, available fund-
ing, and your own personal characteristics.
Outcomes
• For a LEMA to be effective, you need dedicated individuals. People are
committed to organizations that provide benefits:
• Personal (salary, benefits, or feeling of doing something positive for the
community)
• Social (having friends at work)
• Purposeful (work gives a purpose, an identity)
• Emergency management organizations are often judged based on
• Effectiveness of plans
• Timeliness
• Cost of plans
• Hazard vulnerability analyses
• Public information briefings
• Education efforts, such as brochures and websites
Emergency Operations Plan

The development of an EOP is a multistage process that encompasses eight steps.
• Step 1: Establish a preliminary planning schedule.

• Identify the principal tasks and the expected amount of time required
to perform them.
• Step 2: Publish a planning directive.
• Coordinate the efforts of other agencies with CAO’s delegated authority.
• Step 3: Organize the LEMC.
• You build a committee by asking others to serve.
LEMCs are more effective when members are assigned to specific tasks
rather than having everyone contribute to all tasks—use subcommittees.
• Step 4: Assess disaster demands and capabilities.
• LEMC members must identify the tasks that need to be performed in a
community-wide emergency.
• Step 5: Write plans.

• Every LEMA needs an EOP, a recovery operations plan (ROP), and a
hazard mitigation plan.
• Step 6: Evaluate and revise draft plans.
• Make sure that all drafts are reviewed by committees within the LEMC
to identify potential problems.
• Step 7: Obtain community review.
• After the draft plans have been reviewed within the LEMC, release the
plans for review throughout the community.
• Step 8: Publish plans in final form.
• Give all input from the community to the appropriate committees.
• The committees must address any problems in the final versions of the
plans.
• Forward copies of the final plans and accompanying documents to all
government agencies and other participating organizations.
Summary
• LEMAs should be organized and managed well, as should the tasks of
developing emergency organizations, and creating emergency operating
plans. All of these tasks are outcomes based and all of them will rely on
your ability to organize resources, find funding, and communicate well.
Key Terms
• Contingency fund
• Disaster subculture
• LEMA
RISK PERCEPTION AND COMMUNICATION

Risk and Warning
• Risk is a possibility that people or property could be hurt.
• This risk must be effectively communicated to the people who are
likely to be affected.
• A warning is a risk communication about an imminent event that is intended
to produce an appropriate disaster response.
• People must receive, heed, and comprehend information about risks.
Warning Processing
• Decisions about how to respond to a hazard begin with risk identification.
• Important sources are warning messages from authorities, the media,
and peers.
• Risk assessment involves evaluating what the personal consequences will

be if the disaster occurs.
• Assessment includes the perceived probability, magnitude, and imme-
diacy of the disaster impact.
• In a protective action search, people are likely to recall actions they have
taken on previous occasions.
• When disaster impact is imminent, households must rely mostly on
their own resources to achieve protection.
• Protective action is unlikely to be followed unless it is considered to be
effective.
• The result of protective action assessment is an adaptive plan.
• Protective action implementation occurs when those at risk know they have
to take action.
• People sometimes postpone taking action, even when faced with danger.
• People frequently seek additional information because the consequences of
a decision error are very serious.
• Any confusing messages from officials or any doubts expressed will
cause people to seek more information.
• Uncertainty about risk identification and assessment can stimulate ques-
tions directed to officials and the news media.
• People are often forced to rely on the media and their peers even when
they would prefer to contact authorities.
• Communication action implementation can have one of three outcomes.
• First, people can confirm the threat and proceed to take protective
action.
• Second, if an information source is unavailable, people can try to find
different sources.
• Third, if new information contradicts previous information, then peo-
ple can try to resolve the conflict.
Continuing Hazard Phase

• The continuing hazard phase is marked by a low probability that a cata-
strophic incident will threaten public safety, property, and the environment.
• During this phase, you should engage in hazard mitigation, emergency pre-
paredness, and recovery preparedness actions.
• There are five basic risk communication functions to address in the con-
tinuing hazard phase. These are
• Strategic analysis
• Operational analysis
• Resource mobilization
• Program development
• Program implementation
Strategic Analysis
• You should know basic information about your community’s ethnic compo-
sition, communication channels, perception of authorities, levels of educa-
tion, and income distribution.
• The hazards that produce the greatest community conflict are those that
have a potential for inflicting significant harm on bystanders.
• To be successful, your risk communication program must foster people’s
sense of personal responsibility for self-protection.
• Recognize that even the most effectively implemented risk communica-
tion program may not lead a large percentage of people to take immedi-
ate protective action.
Operational Analysis
• There are five tasks to complete when performing an operational analysis.
• Task 1: Identify and assess feasible hazard adjustments for the commu-
nity and its households/businesses.
• Task 2: Identify ways to provide incentives, sanctions, and technologi-
cal innovations.
• Task 3: Identify the available risk communication sources in the
community.
• Task 4: Identify the available risk communication channels in the
community.
• Task 5: Identify specific audience segments.
Resource Mobilization
• As an emergency manager, there are five tasks you must perform to mobi-
lize resources for risk communication.
• Task 1: Obtain the support of senior appointed and elected officials.
• Task 2: Enlist the participation of other government agencies.
• Task 3: Enlist the participation of nongovernmental and private sector
organizations.
• Task 4: Work with the mass media.
• Task 5: Work with neighborhood associations and civic organizations.
Program Development
• There are five tasks in the program development step.
• Task 1: Staff and train a crisis communication team.
• Task 2: Establish procedures for maintaining an effective communica-
tion flow during an escalating crisis or emergency response.
• Task 3: Develop a comprehensive risk communication program.
• Task 4: Plan to make effective use of informal communication networks.
• Task 5: Establish procedures for obtaining feedback from the news
media and the public.
Program Implementation
• There are five tasks you must complete to implement the risk communica-
tion program.
• Task 1: Build source credibility by increasing perceptions of expertise
and trustworthiness.
• Task 2: Use a variety of channels to disseminate hazard information.
• Task 3: Describe community or facility hazard adjustments being
planned or implemented.
• Task 4: Describe feasible household hazard adjustments.
• Task 5: Evaluate program effectiveness.
Escalating Crisis Communication

• An escalating crisis is a situation in which there is a significantly increased
probability of an incident occurring that will threaten the public’s health,
safety, or property.
• Be sure to classify the situation. The categories in the emergency classifica-
tion system correspond to meaningful differences in the levels of response
by local authorities.
• With this system, decisions are made based on rational scientific consider-
ations rather than emotion or other considerations.
Risk Communication
• One of the most important incident management actions is risk communi-
cation, which consists of six tasks.
• Task 1: Activate the crisis communication team promptly.
• Task 2: Determine the appropriate time to release sensitive
information.
• Task 3: Select the communication channels that are appropriate to the
situation.
• Task 4: Maintain source credibility with the news media and the
public.
• Task 5: Provide timely and accurate information about the hazard to the
news media and the public.
• Task 6: Evaluate performance through post-incident critiques.
Summary
• You learned how critical communication is when it comes to influencing
people’s perceptions of danger. Apply the communication skills discussed
in this lesson, and you just might save lives.
Key Terms
• Adaptive plan
• Escalating crisis
• Risk
• Risk assessment
• Warning
PRINCIPAL HAZARDS IN THE UNITED STATES

Environmental Hazards
• Environmental hazards are commonly classified as natural or technological:
• Natural hazards are extreme events that originate in nature. Natural
hazards are commonly categorized as meteorological, hydrological, or
geophysical.
• Technological hazards originate in human-controlled processes but are
released into the air and water. The most important technological haz-
ards include explosives, flammable materials, toxic chemicals, radio-
logical materials, and biological hazards.
Meteorological Hazards
• Severe storms have wind speeds exceeding 58 miles per hour, produce tor-
nadoes, release hail, spawn lightning strikes, and cause flash floods.
• Severe winter storms can immobilize travel, isolate residents of remote
areas, deposit enormous amounts of snow that collapse long-span roofs,
and bring down telephone and electric power lines.
• Heat associated with extreme summer weather can be a silent killer. Heat-
related illnesses include heat cramp, heat syncope, heat exhaustion, and
heat stroke.
• An increased number of tornadoes have been reported during recent years,
suggesting that some long-term changes in climate are also involved.
• For protection from tornadoes, building occupants should go to an interior
room on the lowest floor. Mobile home residents should go to a community
shelter.
• Hurricanes produce four specific threats:
• High winds
• Tornadoes
• Inland flooding
• Storm surge
Wildfires
• Wild land fires burn areas with nothing but natural vegetation for fuel.
• Interface fires burn into areas containing a mixture of natural vegetation
and built structures.
• Firestorms are distinguished from other wildfires because they burn so

intensely that they warrant a special category.
• Firestorms actually create their own local weather and are virtually
impossible to extinguish.
Floods
• Flooding is a widespread problem in the United States that accounts for
three-quarters of all presidential disaster declarations (PDDs).
• There are seven different types of flooding that are widely recognized.
• Flood risk areas in the United States are defined by the 100-year flood, an
event that is expected to have a 100-year recurrence interval and, thus, a 1%
chance of occurrence in any given year.
• Three types of automated devices detect imminent flooding: radar, rain
gages, and stream gages.
Storm Surge
• Storm surge is increased height of a body of water that exceeds the normal
tide, most commonly associated with hurricanes.
• Tsunamis are sea waves that are generated by undersea earthquakes, but volca-
nic eruptions or landslides can also cause tsunamis. Tsunamis are rare events.
Over the course of a century, 15,000 earthquakes generated only 124 tsunamis.
• Evacuation to higher ground is the most effective method of protection.
People must evacuate a long distance if they live on low-lying coasts.
Geophysical Hazards
• Threats from volcanoes include lightweight gases and ash that are blasted
high into the air and heavier lava and mud that travel downslope.
• The impacts of volcanic eruption tend to be strongly directional because
ash fall and gases disperse downwind.
• Within an earthquake’s impact area, the primary threats are ground shak-
ing, surface faulting, and ground failure.
• Protective measures can be understood by the common observation that
“earthquakes don’t kill people, falling buildings kill people.”
Technological Hazards
• Hazardous materials (also known as hazmat) are defined as substances that
are “capable of posing unreasonable risk to health, safety, and property”
(Hazardous Material Definitions—Defined Term, https://definedterm.com
/hazardous_material).
• Hazmat shipments result in an average of 280 liquid spills or gaseous
releases per year, the majority occurring in transport.
• 81% take place on the highway and 15% are in rail transportation.
FIGURE 2.4 Plume model.
• Hazmat is produced, stored, or used in diverse locations, including the following:

• Facilities such as petrochemical and manufacturing plants
• Warehouses (e.g., agricultural fertilizers and pesticides)
• Water treatment plants (chlorine is used to purify the water)
• Breweries (ammonia is used as a refrigerant)
• Hazmat chemicals have three important temperatures—boiling point, flash
point, and ignition temperature—that affect potential for fires.
• Toxic chemicals released from a storage container will produce an invisible
cloud similar to the smoke plume that travels downwind from a campfire
(Figure 2.4).
• Airborne dispersion of toxic industrial chemicals can produce serious inha-
lation exposures at distances up to 10 miles.
• Wind speed, wind direction, and atmospheric stability class affect the dis-
persion of a chemical.
Toxic Chemicals
• Terrorists might attempt to use weaponized toxic agents, which are toxic
chemicals that require smaller doses to achieve disability or death.
• Capabilities needed to respond effectively to a toxic chemical attack are
the same as those needed for an industrial accident. Few communities have
these capabilities.
• In the case of radiological releases, even a late evacuation is better than home
shelter; large building shelter is better than late evacuation; and early evacua-
tion is best of all. The decrease in risk as a function of distance is quite large.
Biological Hazards
• Most biological agents that might be used in deliberate terrorist attacks also
exist as natural hazards.
• Terrorists can spread disease by contaminating the food or water supply, or they
can disperse biological agents in an aerosol cloud to cause inhalation exposure.
• It can be difficult to detect a biological agent infection because symptoms

resemble the common cold and flu.
• If there is an outbreak, there are two actions to take: isolate and
quarantine.
Summary
• As this section illustrates, each type of hazard has a different cause and
effect. Each hazard also has a distinct set of characteristics and potential
dangers. You must understand what to do to prepare for each type of haz-
ard, inform others of the hazard, and aid others in the event that a hazard
threatens your community.
Key Terms
• 100-year flood
• Earthquake
• Explosives
• Firestorms
• Flood
• Hazmat
• Hurricane
• Interface fires
• Natural hazards
• Severe storms
• Storm surge
• Technological hazards
• Tornadoes
• Tsunamis
• Wild land fires
HAZARD AND DISASTER CLASSIFICATION

Major Categories
• Natural hazards
• Anthropogenic nonintentional
• Anthropogenic intentional
Earth Hazardous to Your Health

• 516 active volcanoes, eruption every 15 days (average)
• 2,000 tremors daily
• Two significant earthquakes daily, severe damage 15–20 times annually
• 1,800 thunderstorms at any given time
Still Hazardous
• Lightning strikes 100 times per second.
• Late summer, an average of five hurricanes developing
• Four tornadoes per day or 600–1,000 annually
• 11 blizzards annually in the United States
Categories of Natural Hazards

• Atmospheric (meteorological)
• Geological (earth)
• Hydrological (water)
• Extraterrestrial
• Biological
Atmospheric-Sourced Processes
• Tropical cyclones
• Thunderstorms
• Tornadoes
• Lightning
• Hailstorms
• Windstorms
• Ice storms
• Snowstorms
• Blizzards
• Cold waves
• Heat waves
• Avalanches
• Fog
• Frost
Geological-Sourced Processes
• Earthquakes
• Volcanoes
• Tsunami
• Landslides
• Subsidence
• Mudflows
• Sinkholes
Hydrological-Sourced Processes
• Floods
• Droughts
• Wildfires
Extraterrestrial Processes
• Meteorites
• Asteroids
• Solar Flares
• Space Debris
Biological Processes
• Diseases
• Epidemics
• Pandemics
• Overpopulation
• Famine
Anthropogenic Nonintentional
• Technological
• Hazardous Materials
• Environmental
• Industrial
• Mining
• Nuclear
• Transportation
• Structural
• Industrial
• Mining
Technological
• Acts of people
• Technological systems that fail because of complexities and human fallibil-
ity (accidents)
Nuclear
• Power plants
• Industrial use
• Medical use
Transportation
• Aviation
• Highways
• Railroads
• Maritime
Structural
• Fires
• Collapse
Anthropogenic Intentional Hazards

• Mass shootings
• Civil disobedience
• Terrorism
• Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
Mass Shootings
• School shootings
• Workplace violence
• Hate crimes
• Public shooting
Civil Disobedience
• Labor riots
• Race riots
• Political riots
Terrorism
• State/state sponsored
• International nonstate
• Domestic
WMD CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear,

and High-Yield Explosives)
• Chemical
• Biological
• Nuclear/radiological
• Explosives
HAZARD, VULNERABILITY, AND RISK ANALYSIS

Community Vulnerability
• Communities can engage in three types of emergency management inter-
ventions to ameliorate disaster impacts.
• Physical impacts can be reduced by hazard mitigation practices and
emergency preparedness practices.
• Social impacts can be reduced by recovery preparedness practices.
Preimpact Conditions
• Three pre-impact conditions must be considered:
• Hazard exposure (living, working, or being in places that can be
affected by hazard impacts)
• Physical vulnerability (human, agricultural, or structural susceptibility
to damage or injury from disasters)
• Social vulnerability (lack of psychological, social, economic, and polit-
ical resources to cope with disaster impacts)
Event-Specific Conditions
• Three event-specific conditions affect a disaster’s impact on the community:
• Hazard event characteristics
– Each hazard has six significant characteristics.
• Improvised disaster responses
– When existing organizations seem incapable of meeting needs,
they expand with new members or extend with new tasks, or new
organizations emerge.
• Improvised disaster recovery
– Improvised recovery tasks may include damage assessment, debris
clearance, reconstruction of infrastructure (e.g., electric power,
fuel, water, wastewater, telecommunications, and transportation
networks), and reconstruction of buildings in the residential, com-
mercial, and industrial sectors.
Social Impacts
• Long-term social effects of disasters tend to be minimal in the United
States.
• Psychosocial impacts are usually mild and brief.
• The largest demographic impacts of disasters are due to immigration
and emigration.
• Economic impact losses are difficult to measure because not all infor-
mation is recorded.
• Political impacts can create conflict as one group’s attempts to solve its
problems create problems for other groups.
Interventions
• There are three sets of actions that can reduce losses.
• Hazard mitigation practices do not require people to take action when
a disaster strikes. These practices usually involve physical preventive
measures.
• Emergency preparedness practices are preimpact actions that provide
resources to support active responses at the time of hazard impact.
• Recovery preparedness practices are preimpact actions that can reduce

the time it takes to recover after a disaster. Recovery from a major
disaster takes much longer and involves much more conflict than people
expect, and it is faster and more effective when it is based on a plan that
has been developed before a disaster strikes.
Hazard and Vulnerability Analyses

• Mapping natural hazard exposure
• One source is the set of maps contained in FEMA’s Multi-Hazard
Identification and Risk Assessment (Figure 2.5).
• Mapping hazmat exposure
• To assess the risks, an inventory of facilities that use chemicals as well
as vulnerable zones (VZs) that are likely to be affected by chemical
releases can be created.
• Mapping exposure to secondary hazards
• One way of identifying areas exposed to multiple hazards is to use a
geographical information system (GIS) to overlay the areas subject to
the different hazards.
Physical Vulnerability Assessment

• Buildings can be vulnerable to environmental hazards because of inade-
quate designs, inadequate construction materials, or both. It is very impor-
tant to identify facilities that have special needs.
RRT areas
I
X
V II
VIII
III
IX
VII
IV
VI
Alaska
Caribbean
Oceania Puerto Rico
Hawaii U.S. Virgin Islands
Guam
Northern Marianas
Pacific Islands Gov’ts
American Somoa
FIGURE 2.5 FEMA regions.

• To limit human vulnerability to inhalation exposure, buildings should

have vapor barriers in the walls and ceilings for sheltering in-place.
• To limit human vulnerability to radiological materials, dense building
materials such concrete, brick, and stone provide the best protection.
• Note that the emergency manager’s job rarely involves assessing agricultural
vulnerability or determining how crops and livestock will react to hazards.
Social Vulnerability Assessment

• The groups most likely to have high psychosocial vulnerability are the very
young (who have limited verbal skills), the very old (who tend to be more
isolated), and people with preexisting psychological problems.
• Households have most of their wealth in their homes, which are vulnerable
to disaster impact.
• Households with high social vulnerability often occupy the areas most
likely to be hit by a disaster and also occupy the oldest, most poorly main-
tained buildings.
• Data can be combined on hazard exposure, structural lifeline vulner-
ability, and social vulnerability in a vulnerability hotspot analysis.
Vulnerability Analysis
• HAZUS-MH is a computer program that predicts losses from earthquakes,
floods, and hurricane winds. It features three levels of analysis (Hazus
Overview, https://www.fema.gov/hazus-mh-overview):
• Level 1 is an initial screen that identifies the communities at highest
risk.
• Level 2 takes refined data and hazard maps to produce more accurate
estimates.
• Level 3 uses community-specific information to produce the most accu-
rate loss estimates.
• Federal and state agencies have generated many hazard analysis documents that
are available on various Web sites (e.g., Social Impacts of Disaster Training,
fema.gov/hiedu/docs/fem/chapter).
• This allows users to access information that might take those months to
obtain if they were to request paper copy.
Assessing Risk
• FEMA’s Multi-Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment program, as well
as information from state and federal agency websites, can identify the haz-
ards to which a community is exposed. This is a good start, but it is not
enough.
• You need enough HVA data to decide how to allocate resources among
hazard mitigation, emergency response preparedness, and disaster recovery
preparedness.
• You also need HVA data to lobby for more money. Emergency management
must compete with other community needs such as education, health care,
and transportation. In this case, the HVA should be specific enough for you
to persuade others that an increase in funding will benefit the community.
Summary
• As an emergency manager, you must be aware of the factors that make a com-
munity vulnerable to a disaster, identify key groups of people that are most likely
to be affected, and understand the level of impact that a disaster will have on a
community. With these details in mind, you can determine how to best protect
your community using mitigation practices and emergency response practices.
Key Terms
• Agricultural vulnerability
• Emergency preparedness practices
• Hazard exposure
• Hazard mitigation practices
• HAZUS-MH
• Human vulnerability
• Multi-Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
• Physical vulnerability
• Social vulnerability
• Vulnerable zone (VZ)
HAZARD MITIGATION
Hazard Mitigation
• Hazard mitigation is most effective when it takes place before disasters.
• The federal government cannot intervene directly in local land-use or
building construction practices.
• The federal government wants to change these practices because it pays
for much of the high cost of disaster recovery.
• States have encouraged local governments to include hazard mitigation
objectives in their everyday investment policies to reduce community haz-
ard vulnerability.
Mitigation Strategies
• Hazard source control does not work for most natural hazards, with some
exceptions.
• The four major types of flood control works are as follows:
• Stream channelization
• Dams
• Levees
• Floodwalls
• Levees have a number of design, construction, and maintenance problems.
• Floodwalls are built of strong materials, such as concrete, and are more
expensive than levees, but they are also stronger.
• Landslide controls are designed to reduce shear stress, increase shear resis-
tance, or a combination of the two.
• Industrial hazard controls are used to confine hazardous materials flows.
• Dikes can be constructed around storage tanks to confine any liquid
releases that might occur.
• Such protection works are especially common around petroleum stor-
age tanks.
Land-Use Practices
• The local government can influence land-use practices through the use of
risk communication, incentives, and sanctions.
• Local governments have a variety of land-use management practices avail-
able to them that can be used to reduce hazard exposure.
• Some states require local governments to develop comprehensive plans that
include land-use elements and environmental hazards elements.
• Tools available to local governments for hazard mitigation are zoning, sub-
division regulations, capital improvements programs, acquisition of prop-
erty or development rights, and fiscal policies.
• One advantage of a comprehensive plan is the increased likelihood that
hazard mitigation measures will be area-wide rather than site-specific.
• A mitigation plan should be based on the HVA.
• Zoning can keep residential and commercial property away from earth-
quake fault lines, floodplains, explosions, and/or hazmat releases.
Building Construction Practices

• Property owners can change their construction practices voluntarily
because of risk communication or incentives or can change involuntarily
because of building code requirements.
• There are four major methods for providing protection from hydrological
hazards.
• The most cost-effective method is to raise a house so its lowest floor is
elevated above flood level.
• Dry flood proofing seals the structure so floodwater cannot enter. Walls
are sealed with an impermeable coating.
• Wet flood proofing allows water to enter empty portions of the structure
during flooding.
• Equipment is moved to a higher location or protected in place by a

floodwall.
• Relocation involves moving the structure to higher ground out of the
floodplain.
Structural Protection
• For wildfire hazards, a structure should be built with its exterior walls or
roof constructed of nonflammable materials.
• For wind hazards, the best solution is to install stronger-than-normal con-
nections among the foundation, walls, rafters or roof trusses, and roof
decking.
• Many of the basic principles for protecting buildings from wind hazards
also apply to seismic protection.
• T-shaped, L-shaped, and U-shaped buildings are much more vulnerable
than rectangular buildings.
• Buildings constructed from masonry respond poorly to earthquakes
because they are too rigid.
• Buildings can provide protection from inhalation of hazmat.
• In-place sheltering is more effective than most people believe.
• Local building codes are based on model building codes established by
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
• Code adoption is only the first step in reducing vulnerability. The sec-
ond step is to train building contractors and construction workers.
• For most hazards, protecting buildings from damage also protects the
buildings’ contents from harm.
Hazard Mitigation Measures

• There is an array of mitigation measures that can be effective for a variety
of hazards.
• The federal approach to reducing toxic chemical hazards focuses on local
emergency planning and community right-to-know (RTK) provisions.
• Local governments are expected to develop standards on hazardous facility
siting in their land-use plans.
Natural Hazards
• Local governments can devise hazard mitigation programs. Such programs
should emphasize the following:
• Preventive actions must be decided at the local level.
• Private sector participation is vital.
• Long-term efforts and investments in prevention measures are essential.
• There is a connection between disaster reduction and sustainable development.
• It is important to realize that development is not the same as growth.
Summary
• This section looked at hazard mitigation strategies and mitigation mea-
sures. It explained how building construction practices, land-use practices,
and other mitigation legalities affect mitigation in communities. It is your
responsibility to also know how to manage the risks of natural and techno-
logical hazards by reducing them.
Key Terms
• Channelization
• Floodwalls
• Hazard mitigation
• Industrial hazard controls
• Land-use practices
• Levees
• Right-to-know (RTK) provisions
• Sustainable development
DISASTER MYTHS, DISASTER DEMANDS,

AND CITIZEN EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Response Myths
• People act in what they believe is their best interest, given their limited
understanding of a situation.
• Emergency managers make poor decisions if they believe response myths.
• The myth that people will panic becomes a reason to withhold informa-
tion about a threat.
Shock and Panic

• Shock appears most frequently in sudden events involving widespread
destruction, traumatic injuries, or death.
• When symptoms do appear, few people are affected.
• Shock lasts for a maximum of a few hours or days.
• The most stubborn myth about human response to disasters is that there is
widespread panic.
• When panic flight is observed, it involves a relatively small proportion
of the people exposed.
Victim Response
• One common misconception is that there is a single “public” or “population.”
• In reality, population segments differ in their willingness and ability to
evacuate.
• People in special facilities such as schools, hospitals, nursing homes, and

jails have different patterns of warning and evacuation than residents and
transients.
Integrative Responses
• The therapeutic community response is related to convergence.
• Although convergence provides resources, it can also hamper response.
• A second aspect of the positive social response is sympathetic behavior
from the public.
• This promotes positive psychological outcomes for disaster victims;
however, it is short-lived.
Warnings
• The effectiveness of a given warning method varies with the types of activi-
ties in which people are engaged.
• Available warning methods are face-to-face, route alert, siren, commer-
cial radio and television, tone alert radio, telephones, and newspapers.
• There is substantial variation across communities in the relative importance
of different warning sources to different ethnic groups.
• People also use their own preexisting beliefs about appropriate protective
actions.
Evacuation
• Evacuation trip generation refers to the number and location of vehicles
evacuating from a risk area.
• Evacuations initiated during daytime hours should include time for
travel from work or school to home.
• As much as one-third or more of the households in some cities are depen-
dent on public transportation (Public Transportation’s Demographic Divide,
www.governing.com/topics/transportation...public-transportation).
• Warning compliance refers to the percentage of people warned to evacuate
who actually do so.
• Spontaneous evacuation refers to the percentage of people who were not
warned to evacuate but do so anyway.
• When considering departure timing, you must consider two distinct popula-
tion groups: residents and transients.
• It is important to estimate the percentage of early evacuating house-
holds (those who evacuate before an official warning) and the distribu-
tion of departure times for households leaving after an official warning
is issued.
• There are four factors defining evacuees’ destination/route choice:
• Ultimate evacuation destination
• Proximate destination (where the evacuees leave the risk area)
• Route choice
• Primary evacuation route utilization (the percentage of evacuating
vehicles using official evacuation routes)
Search and Rescue (Disaster Research Center, https://www.drc.udel.edu)

• Forty-six percent of casualties reach hospitals in their own vehicles or in the
vehicles of peers or bystanders.
• Evacuees prefer to avoid mass care facilities, with only 14.7% of evacuees
going to shelters across all disasters.
• The Disaster Research Center’s studies of hundreds of emergencies showed
no evidence of role abandonment.
• Hurricane Katrina was an exception.
• Volunteers must be placed into groups that perform tasks within the scope
of their abilities.
• Disaster response organizations can be placed into four different categories
(social associations, professional associations, industry associations, and haz-
ards practitioners) Disaster Relief Agencies and Nongovernment Organizations
www.disastercenter.com/agency.htm.
Household Behavior
• People threatened by disaster have multiple sources of information, and
none is considered completely credible.
• Fear is rarely so overwhelming that it prevents people from responding,
but it does impair people’s ability to reason through complex, unfamiliar
problems. To help people overcome fear, be sure to:
• Provide clear, direct, relevant information about the hazard agent.
• Inform people of the hazard’s potential personal consequences.
• Let people know what the authorities are doing to protect them.
• Tell people how they can receive additional information.
• Official warning messages must include recommended protective actions.
• Without recommended protective actions, people take the most appropriate
actions they already know or that they are told about by peers or the media
(even if the action is incorrect for the hazard).
• The level of compliance with a warning is contingent upon the information
source, message content, receiver characteristics, and situational character-
istics such as threat familiarity and urgency for response.
• Some of those who are not at risk will also comply with protective action
recommendations (spontaneous evacuation).
Stress and Health

• There may be cases of posttraumatic stress disorder among some popula-
tion segments.
• Even in the apparent absence of psychological symptoms, victims and non-
victims have developed physical health problems following disasters.
• You should assume that many risk area residents have disaster-relevant
competencies.
• Recognize the differences among households and, especially, avoid the
error of assuming other households are just like yours.
Summary
• Because you can predict some behaviors, it’s important you develop plans
to respond to those behaviors. As emergency managers, you have to dis-
seminate information to those who seek it, and you have to ensure that
you’ve given appropriate warnings, solutions for protection, and even plans
for organizing the people who show up to help after a disaster.
Key Terms
• Evacuation trip generation
• Panic
PREPAREDNESS FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE

AND DISASTER RECOVERY
Emergency Planning Principles
• Emergency planners should anticipate both active and passive resistance to
the planning process.
• Preimpact planning should
• Address all the community’s hazards.
• Elicit participation, commitment, and agreement among all response
organizations.
• Be based upon accurate assumptions about the threat, typical human
behavior in disasters, and likely support from external sources such as
state and federal agencies.
• EOPs should identify the types of emergency response actions that are most
likely to be appropriate but encourage improvisation.
• Emergency planning should address the linkage of emergency response to
disaster recovery and hazard mitigation.
• Preimpact planning should provide for training and evaluating the emer-
gency response organization at all levels.
• Emergency planning should be recognized as a continuing process.
Response Functions
• Basic emergency response functions include emergency assessment and
hazard operations:
• Emergency assessment is the process of detecting a threat, predicting
its potential impact, and determining how to respond.
– Population monitoring and assessment identify the size of the pop-

ulation at risk and are important if the number of people varies over
time.
• Hazard operations involves taking actions to limit the magnitude of
disaster impacts.
– Plan in advance to develop procedures for contents protection prac-
tices. For example, locate sources of plywood for protecting win-
dows from wind damage.
• Other basic emergency response functions include population protection
and incident management:
• Population protection involves taking protective actions to minimize
the number of casualties.
– Be aware that population protection tasks may require special
equipment and procedures.
• Incident management involves mobilizing and directing resources to
respond to an emergency.
– Develop procedures to ensure that key personnel are notified quickly.
– Establish a space that will be used as the EOC.
Organizational Structures
• Organizational structures should
• Form the basis of a larger structure to deal with disasters.
• Be flexible.
• The ICS has seven basic principles (National Incident Management System
[NIMS], https://training.fema.gov/nims).
• ICS was changed so that it could be used readily in both small and large
events; the result was called the Incident Management System (IMS).
• The major advantage of IMS is that it makes all resources available for
every incident.
Incident Management System

• The fundamental principle of IMS is that there must always be one and only
one incident commander at every incident scene.
• Agencies select and train their staff to perform all the duties associated
with specific standardized positions.
• Basic principles of IMS are easy to grasp, while more advanced concepts
provide a sophisticated method of allocating responsibility for response
strategy, tactics, and tasks.
IMS Implementation
• The goal of an articulated command is to spread functions to specialists.
• Most jurisdictions provide for the command staff to be supported by an
on-scene public information officer and a police liaison.
• The advantage of IMS over the earlier ICS is that it provides for a better account-
ing of the activities that must be performed away from the incident scene.
• IMS is a flexible structure with close linkage between emergency plans and
operations.
• IMS can only be executed effectively if emergency responders are thor-
oughly trained before incidents occur.
Emergency Operations Centers

• An EOC is a facility located in a safe area that provides support to respond-
ers at the scene of an incident.
• An EOC is important because resources are often widely dispersed
throughout a jurisdiction.
• EOC staff includes both those who have technical knowledge and
policymakers.
• EOCs are used to provide close coordination among organizations at
all levels.
• There are eight EOC design tasks: (1) assume position responsibilities,
(2) common operating picture, (3) EOC processes and support systems,
(4) leadership and accountability, (5) work group supervision, (6) opera-
tional requirements, (7) meetings, EOC briefings and debriefings, and
(8) end of operational period/transition/demobilization.
Organizational Structures
• Three of the most important organizational structures include the following:
• Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) (MMRS Program,
www.dhses.ny.gov/grants/hsgp/FY09_MMRS_Program_Guidance.pdf)
• Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) (Homeland Security, www
.dhs.gov)
• NIMS (National Incident Management System, NIMS-FEMA.gov, https://
www.fema.gov/national-incident-management-system)
Metropolitan Medical Response System

• MMRS tends to be concentrated in high population density areas and other
areas that are terrorist targets.
• Funding is provided directly to cities.
• MMRS imposes a comprehensive emergency management process on
recipient cities.
Urban Areas Security Initiative

• UASI’s purpose is to prevent, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism.
• UASI requires a strategic plan for terrorist attacks anywhere in an
urban area.
• The program provides substantial funding for local needs.

• UASI allows local choice in planning, administration, and funding.
• There are concerns that under this program, federal authorities tightly
define authorized expenditures within a budget category.
National Incident Management System

• NIMS was created in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.
• NIMS is a standardized system for managing emergency preparedness
and emergency response that builds on the ICS/IMS framework.
• NIMS is broader than IMS because it addresses emergency prepared-
ness and emergency response.
• One concern many emergency managers and responders have regard-
ing NIMS is the level of detail in which processes and protocols are
specified.
• NIMS requires significant commitments to training, drills, and
exercises.
EOP Components
• EOPs should have four basic components:
• Basic plan: The provisions of the basic plan are captured under seven
separate headings.
• Functional annex: Each annex should describe how the emergency
response organization will perform a function needed to respond to
disaster demands.
• Hazard-specific appendixes: These provide information about the ways
in which the response to a particular hazard agent differs from the stan-
dard response.
• Standard operating procedures and checklists: These list the steps that
individuals and organizations will take to perform specific emergency
response tasks.
Summary
• As an emergency responder, you strive to prevent casualties and damage
in a disaster situation. As evidenced from recent natural disasters such as
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and terrorist attacks such as those on 9/11,
emergency managers must develop a state of readiness to respond to
extreme events threatening their communities.
Key Terms
• Emergency assessment
• Functional annex
ORGANIZATIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Emergency Assessment
• Emergency assessment activities in the response phase are directed toward
intelligence.
• Threat detection includes the following:
• Recognizing that a threat exists.
• Assessing the threat’s magnitude and location and the timing of
impact.
• Determining how to respond.
• An emergency classification system organizes a large number of potential
incidents into a small set of categories.
• Categories link the threat assessment to the level of activation of the
responding organization.
Hazard Monitoring
• The hazard agent must be tracked over time to determine whether the threat
is changing in its likelihood, magnitude, immediacy, or location of impact
or whether there are changing environmental conditions.
• For hazmat releases, responders should do the following before the appro-
priate monitoring equipment arrives:
• Establish a perimeter around the scene.
• Prevent entry into the “hot zone.”
• Decontaminate anyone who has been exposed.
• Maintain medical observation and isolation until released by a compe-
tent medical authority.
Monitoring and Assessment

• Census data documents the size and composition of the community’s per-
manent population.
• It’s important to break the population down by age and ethnic
composition.
• Estimates of workers, tourists, and other transients should also be
added.
• Damage assessment focuses on measuring the impacts of a disaster on pub-
lic and private property.
• This is a continuing process that begins during emergency response.
Hazard Operations
• Hazard operation actions are implemented only when the need arises.
These actions must be able to be implemented rapidly.
• Hazard operations actions can be grouped into the same categories as

permanent hazard mitigation measures.
• Hazard operations measures are not feasible for hazards such as torna-
does and earthquakes in which there is insufficient forewarning.
• Standard operating procedures should contain rules that define the con-
ditions under which each hazard operations action should be used or
avoided.
Population Protection
• Information collected through the emergency assessment function forms
the basis for the population protection function.
• The appropriate protective strategy varies based on the following factors:
• Type of environmental threat
• Certainty of occurrence
• Severity of impact
• Immediacy of impact
• Duration of impact
• During an emergency, specific warnings should be disseminated by expert
and credible sources.
• These warnings should describe the threat in terms of its location,
severity, and expected time of impact.
The warnings should also recommend appropriate protective actions and indicate
how to obtain additional information.
Protective Actions
• People might need the following elements to implement protective actions:
• Money
• Knowledge and physical skill
• Facilities and vehicles
• Tools and equipment
• Time and energy
• Social cooperation
• Three population segments will need help in an evacuation.
Population Protection
• To establish impact zone access control and security, you should take the
following steps:
• Set up traffic control points on major routes at the perimeter of the
impact area to prevent people from entering without authorization.
• Provide security patrols within the impact area.
• For search and rescue operations, you should directly address the need for
heavy rescue. This includes the following tasks:
• Assigning a lead agency.
• Maintaining a list of available heavy rescue equipment.
• Establishing decision criteria for prioritizing buildings in the event of
multiple collapses.
• Creating a protocol for quickly obtaining services of victim location
specialists.
Care of Victims
• Emergency authorities provide short-term support for victims in the form of
food, accommodations, and limited medical care.
• Evacuee registration provides a link to the population monitoring function,
especially accountability and casualty assessment.
• Experience has shown that not allowing pets discourages needy families
from using shelters.
Emergency Medical Care

• Medical care for victims of major disasters is provided by three components
of the emergency response:
• Emergency personnel in the field
• The network of local hospitals
• The National Disaster Medical System, which is a system of military
aircraft equipped to sustain treatment
• Triage is used to sort victims into categories so that emergency responders
can make the most effective use of medical treatment to save the maximum
number of lives.
• In the United States, the county ME’s office typically performs the morgue
function.
Exposure Control
• Hazard exposure control seeks to reduce exposure to a level that is as low
as reasonably achievable.
• Emergency personnel can achieve the as low as reasonably achievable
(ALARA) objective in three ways:
• Minimizing the amount of time spent in hazardous areas (time).
• Staying as far away from hazard sources as necessary (distance).
• Insulating themselves from the hazard (shielding).
• Many communities use hazmat response teams to test for, abate, and moni-
tor chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) contamination.
• A CBR contaminated area might also be a crime scene and may therefore
involve FBI participation.
Incident Management
• The concept of operations is a summary statement of what emergency func-
tions are to be performed and how they are to be accomplished.
• Notification to the jurisdictional authorities comes from different sources,
depending on the nature of the threat.
• The notification process differs among different types of hazards.
• EOCs are the hub of emergency information processing within the
jurisdiction.
• The need for organizations to be represented in the EOC depends on the
nature of the threat as well as the network of governmental resources
needed to respond to that threat.
• The communications team collects, displays, and records data on
environmental conditions, casualties, and damage to property and the
environment.
• Communication logs should record who called into or out of the EOC,
when the call took place, who participated in the call, and the content of
the call.
• Analysis/planning teams assess the current status of the situation and proj-
ect its future status.
• The location from which public information is given depends upon the size
of the incident and upon whether emergency operations are taking place at
a defined incident scene.
• Incident managers should designate a broadly knowledgeable chief
spokesperson who can call upon specialists to respond to specific
questions.
• Administrative and logistical support is handled at the incident command
post during minor events. However, it is transferred to the EOC during a
community-wide disaster.
Summary
• The EOP and procedures developed during the emergency preparedness
phase affect the actions you take during emergency response. However, no
emergency can ever be predicted with accuracy; therefore, it is important
that you learn to improvise effectively when the need arises. Focus on the
four basic functions: emergency assessment, hazard operations, population
protection, and incident management. Understand what tasks are associated
with each of these basic functions.
Key Terms
• Concept of operations
• Damage assessment
• Emergency classification system
DISASTER RECOVERY
Communities
• A community is a specific geographic area (town, city, or county) with a
government.
• Two additional elements of community are psychological ties and social
interaction.
• If a disaster causes members of a community’s households to change their
normal patterns of daily activity, this can cause psychological and eco-
nomic distress and social conflict.
• A community’s industries that produce exports should receive immediate
attention in the aftermath of a disaster to stimulate economic activity.
Recovery Process
• Recovery begins when the emergency has been stabilized so there is no
longer a threat to life and property.
• Disaster recovery is both physical and social.
• Restoring the community to its previous status can reproduce the hazard
vulnerability that led to the disaster.
• A disaster-resilient community learns how to use a disaster as a focusing
event that changes people’s behavior.
• Developing preimpact plans for disaster recovery is important because
there will not be much time for recovery planning after disaster strikes.
Household Recovery
• Households typically pass through four stages of housing recovery follow-
ing a disaster: emergency shelter, temporary shelter, temporary housing,
and permanent housing.
• Households lacking adequate insurance coverage must use other strategies
for recovery, such as the following:
• Obtaining Small Business Administration or commercial loans
• Seeking FEMA or NGO grants
• Withdrawing personal savings
• Not replacing damaged items
• There are differences in the rate of economic recovery among ethnic groups.
• Few victims develop major psychological problems from disasters. Most
people experience only mild distress.
• Work with local mental health agencies to ensure that an organized mental
health referral system will be available for people in higher risk groups.
• Households can be characterized in terms of three modes of disaster recovery:
• Autonomous recovery
• Kinship recovery
• Institutional recovery
Business Recovery
• During and after a disaster, disruption of infrastructure such as water/
sewer, electric power, fuel, transportation, and telecommunications may
force businesses to shut down.
• Small businesses are more vulnerable than large businesses for two impor-
tant reasons:
• They are more likely to be located in nonengineered buildings that
become damaged.
• They are less likely to have hazard management programs to reduce
their physical vulnerability.
• Wholesale and retail businesses report significant sales losses following
disasters. However, manufacturing and construction companies often show
gains.
State and Federal Governments

• The burden of disaster recovery most frequently falls on local governments.
• In large events, PDDs open up a broad range of programs for relief and
reconstruction.
• The state plays a coordinating role between the federal government and
local governments.
• The federal government will influence state and local behavior during
the recovery period.
• The lead recovery agency at the federal level is FEMA.
• The main types of programs providing recovery assistance are the individual
assistance, infrastructure support, and hazard mitigation grant programs.
Local Government Recovery

• By planning for recovery before disaster strikes, a community can allocate
resources more effectively and efficiently during and after a disaster.
• There are three major misconceptions about recovery:
• Recovery can be improvised after the response is complete.
• There is ample time to collect data and plan the recovery during emer-
gency response.
• The objective of recovery should be to restore the community to the
conditions that existed before the disaster.
• A recovery/mitigation committee should work with the rest of the com-
munity to formulate a vision of the type of disaster recovery it intends to
implement.
Recovery Operations Plan

• Disaster assessment should include both physical and social impact
assessment.
• There are three types of damage assessment:

• Rapid assessment
• Preliminary damage assessment
• Site assessment
• In preparing for damage assessment, local government staff should be
trained in a common assessment procedure.
• The psychological, demographic, and economic impacts of disasters can be
evaluated using a victims’ needs assessment.
Short-Term Recovery
• The first benefit of disaster assessment is that it guides short-term recovery,
which consists of the following eight tasks performed in the immediate
aftermath of a disaster:
• Impact area security and reentry
• Temporary shelter/housing
• Infrastructure restoration
• Debris management
• Emergency demolition
• Repair permitting
• Donations management
• Disaster assistance
Long-Term Reconstruction
• A disaster opens a window of opportunity to change a community’s hazard
management policy.
• Over the long-term, a community should avoid increases in vulnerability by
making changes in its land-use and building construction practices.
• During reconstruction, waterborne illnesses may be a problem if survi-
vors drink from, wash food in, or bathe in water sources that have been
contaminated.
• Note that natural disasters produce minimal mental health consequences.
• Hazmat spills are an increasing problem during natural disasters.
• In communities that are highly dependent on tourism, active promotion is
needed to assure potential visitors that all facilities are back in operation
following a disaster.
Recovery Management
• To manage disaster recovery, you need to perform many of the same types
of tasks as during the incident management function of the emergency
response phase.
• The recovery process typically involves the same tasks that agencies per-
form as part of their normal duties.
• The ROP should describe the procedure for providing public information.
• The recovery/mitigation committee needs to obtain legal authority for a

wide range of short-term recovery actions.
• Special provisions are required to support the additional staff gener-
ated by obtaining mutual aid personnel from other jurisdictions and
volunteer personnel such as architects and engineers used as building
inspectors.
Summary
• Once disaster strikes, recovery takes center stage as many organizations
and people come together to rebuild. Recovery involves households, busi-
nesses, and communities. Working together and understanding the obsta-
cles can aid in the recovery process. It is important to utilize the state and
federal governments and various charities to assist people and groups in
restoring the community’s normal patterns of social functioning.
Key Terms
• Community
• Emergency shelter
• Permanent housing
• Preliminary damage assessment
• Rapid assessment
• Site assessment
• Temporary housing
• Temporary shelter
• Victims’ needs assessment
EVALUATION
Performance Appraisals
• Personnel performance appraisals serve four functions: development,
reward, internal research, and legal protection.
• Appraisals should be conducted at least once a year.
• Performance should be rated based on data that meet three conditions:
• The data must be available within the time period in which the appraisal
is being conducted.
• The data must be relevant to job performance.
• The data must be comprehensive.
• When conducting an appraisal, ensure that both the short-term and long-
term aspects of the job are evaluated.
• Human resource departments typically have performance appraisal criteria
devised for all civil service jobs.
• There are nine typical performance appraisal categories.
• If you have an overall positive performance appraisal, do not dwell on the

negative aspects of the appraisal. Unfortunately, dwelling on the negative
is quite common.
Organizational Evaluation
• Work with the other members of the LEMA and the LEMC to set specific, mea-
surable objectives that can be accomplished within the period of performance.
• Evaluating the performance of the LEMC is more complex than evaluating
that of the LEMA, but it involves basically the same procedures.
• Your control over the allocation of resources in the LEMC is more limited
than your control over the LEMA.
NFPA Standard 1600

• The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standards Council estab-
lished a Disaster Management Committee in 1991 that developed standards
for preparedness, response, and recovery (“NFPA Publishes New Disaster and
Emergency Management,” www.facilities.net.com/emergencypreparedness
/article/NFPA-Publishes).
• The committee adopted what it called a “total program approach.”
• The standard covers both public and private sector organizations.
• Business continuity programs are included in the scope of the standard.
• Programs established under the standard must address 14 elements.
• The standard requires organizations to have the following components in
place:
• A documented emergency management program
• An adequate administrative structure
• An identified coordinator
• An advisory committee
• Procedures for evaluation
• The Hazard Mitigation element of the standard requires organizations to
develop a strategy to eliminate hazards or limit their consequences.
• NFPA 1600 requires the specification of roles and responsibilities. Roles
must be defined for external organizations that will participate in mitiga-
tion, preparedness, response, and recovery activities.
• The Direction, Control, and Coordination element specifically includes
adopting an IMS and assigning functional responsibilities to specific enti-
ties within the organization.
• The Operations and Procedures element requires the organization to
develop the procedures needed to respond to the hazards identified in the
Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment, and Impact Analysis element.
• The Crisis Communications, Public Education, and Information element
requires the entity to establish procedures for disseminating relevant infor-
mation to the news media and the public during the pre-, trans-, and post-
disaster phases of operation.
• NFPA 1600 is important to the emergency management profession for sev-

eral reasons:
• It was issued by a respected and established authority. The government
and major emergency managers respect and understand the importance
of NFPA standards.
• It is extremely useful in program assessment. The standard provides
a model that can be used in self-assessment and also by external
evaluators.
• It can serve as a basis for planning to create a program or for planning
to enhance an existing program so that it meets the standard.
• It can be used as the authoritative basis for your position when making
an argument to expand or change your program.
Capability Assessment for Readiness Program

• In 1997, FEMA and the National Emergency Management Association
released the State Capability Assessment for Readiness (CAR) program
(www.allhandsconsulting.com/.../capability-assessment-for-readiness-car).
• The CAR program describes a self-assessment process for SEMAs to do
the following:
• Evaluate their readiness to mitigate hazards
• Prepare and respond to emergencies
• Recover from disasters
• The CAR program consists of standards that begin, at the highest level,
with 13 emergency management functions adapted from NFPA 1600.
Emergency Management Accreditation Program

• The Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) is closer to
NFPA 1600 than CAR because it includes the requirements for program man-
agement (https://www.emap.org/.../the-emergency-management-standard).
• EMAP was written specifically for state and local emergency manage-
ment agencies.
• The EMAP accreditation process is more elaborate than the CAR
assessment. Once a jurisdiction submits an application, it has
18 months to conduct a self-assessment of its compliance with EMAP’s
54 standards.
• The self-assessment portion of the process requires a proof of compliance
record for each standard.
• If accredited, a jurisdiction is issued a certificate that is valid for five
years.
Drill, Exercises, and Incidents

• Drills are used to test people, facilities, and equipment on tasks that are dif-
ficult, critical, and performed infrequently.
• A drill is conducted by a controller, the person who provides the informa-

tion from the scenario. Drills are relatively simple, so the same person can
also serve as the evaluator.
• Some tasks have a significant mental as well as physical component.
• A functional exercise differs from a drill by involving more people.
• Functional exercises are more comprehensive than drills.
• The scenario for a functional exercise is usually more complex because
it involves more tasks, equipment, and people.
• Functional exercises test people’s ability to perform both task work and
teamwork.
• Unlike drills, functional exercises cannot combine the roles of controller
and evaluator. In fact, exercises sometimes require many controllers.
• A full-scale exercise simulates a community-wide disaster by testing mul-
tiple functions at the same time.
• The complexity of full-scale exercises requires thorough planning of the
scenario as well as coordination among the many controllers and evaluators.
• Large exercises conducted for nuclear power plants can involve thousands
of players and as many as 50 to 100 controllers and evaluators.
• Most full-scale exercises are unannounced.
• FEMA organizes the development of an emergency exercise into eight
steps.
• Evaluations of performance in incidents are extremely informative because
incidents are unscheduled.
• The disadvantage of using actual incidents for evaluations is that incidents are
uncontrolled. Both the size of the event and the response functions that are
tested are matters of chance. Incidents also have no controllers or evaluators.
• All three forms of exercises and incident responses benefit from an oral
critique by the players, controllers, and evaluators.
• Critique results should be documented in a written report that includes an
action plan. Be sure to write specific recommendations, assign responsi-
bility for implementation, and schedule completion of each element of the
action plan.
Training and Risk Communication

• The procedures for evaluating training and risk communication programs
are different from the procedures for the previous types of evaluations.
• Training and risk communication programs are usually administered to
many more people than you can afford to evaluate. Thus, it may be best
to test a subset (called a sample) of individuals from the larger group that
received the training or risk communication program (called the treat-
ment group).
• The performance of this sample from the treatment group can then be com-
pared to the performance of a group of people who did not receive the train-
ing or risk communication program (called the control group).
Summary
• Given how important emergency management is, you must hold people
accountable for their job responsibilities in this area. This chapter shows you
how to conduct your own performance appraisals and how to prepare drills and
exercises to assess the performance of your emergency response organization.
Key Terms
• CAR program
• Controller
• Drills
• Evaluator
• Full-scale exercise
• Functional exercise
• Task work
• Teamwork
INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Policy Variations
• In disaster management, the influence of the United Nations has contrib-
uted to the use of common models.
• Countries with high levels of exposure have been described as having “disas-
ter cultures” (Disaster Risk, PreventionWeb.net, www.preventionweb.net/risk
/disaster-risk).
• Emergency management is low on the priority list in poorer countries.
• The quality of emergency management in a country is related to the amount
of internal and external resources available.
Economic Resources
• Hazard insurance availability varies from one country to the next.
• Availability of “specialized assets” is a factor affecting emergency man-
agement. These assets may include heavy equipment, trained urban search
and rescue teams, hazmat capabilities, technical expertise such as GIS, and
training facilities.
• The control of policies, programs, and resources at the national level limits
the ability of local governments to mount a rapid emergency response.
Government Organization
• Too much emphasis on large disasters tends to lead to the over centraliza-
tion of disaster management.
• Few countries have an adequate supply of well-trained emergency manage-
ment professionals.
• The quality of a country’s infrastructure and housing affects its level of

disaster exposure.
• When members of the public are well informed and have strong beliefs in
their rights, they are likely to demand competence from their government.
Military and Organizations

• The armed forces are involved in emergency management to some degree
almost everywhere.
• The armed forces usually have more of the resources necessary for disaster
response.
• Countries vary widely in their approach to foreign aid.
• Many international institutions are devoted to promoting improved emer-
gency management practices.
• In addition to the United Nations, there are regional groups involved in
emergency management.
Emergency Management in Brazil

(https://training.fema.gov/hiedu/docs/fem/chapter)
• Brazil is a republic whose states have strong political powers.
• Emergency management in Brazil has developed over time to reflect the
structure of the country’s government and the country’s hazards.
• Landslides are the most common cause of death from natural disasters in
Brazil. Many factors contribute to this situation.
• The Southern Hemisphere’s summer rainy season is from December
through March. During this time, emergency managers in the Serra do Mar
activate a landslide monitoring system by entering the Observation stage.
New Zealand Restructuring

• New Zealand is exposed to floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, and cyclones.
• Local financial and environmental management plans enabled commu-
nities to integrate emergency management into land-use planning and
development.
• A comprehensive approach was adopted that incorporated all hazards and
all phases of emergency management.
• New Zealand has sought a balance between centralization and localization
of emergency management.
India’s Recovery
• As in many poor countries, emergency management in India has been pri-
marily reactive, concentrating on relief after major disasters.
• The Maharashtra Emergency Earthquake Reconstruction Program focused
on reconstruction and rehabilitation (India—Maharashtra Emergency
Earthquake Rehabilitation documents.worldbank.org).
• Disaster management planning gave the state a unique level of expertise.

In later disasters, other Indian states were able to draw upon this expertise.
• The Patanka project used a three-stage process that was developed and
implemented over a two-year period (“Patanka Project—Community
Recovery and Its Sustainability: Lessons from Gujarat Earthquake of
India,” https://ajem.infoservices.com.au/downloads/AJEM-18-02-03).
• The project team worked closely with local leaders to win community trust
and develop strong local leadership.
Land-Use in Colombia
• Colombia is vulnerable to several hazards, including volcanoes, earth-
quakes, floods, and landslides.
• Colombia’s Territorial Development Law includes provisions for natu-
ral hazard risk assessment, land-use planning, and urban development
(“Organic Law of Territorial Organization in Colombia,” https://wp.nyu
.edu/mariamonicasalazartamayo/wp-content/uploads/). The law provides
detailed directions on the elements to be included in land-use plans.
• Colombia’s law is remarkable because its requirements are more stringent
than those that many states in the United States place on local governments.
This law is also interesting in the way it incorporates hazard mitigation
directly into the fabric of local land-use planning.
Seveso Directives
• The Seveso Directives (Seveso Directives—Major Accident Hazards—
Environment—European ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso. It also is a plan
for international use with US involvement):
• Incorporate many of the community RTK provisions set forth in SARA
Title III.
• Go further by requiring active dissemination of information to the
public.
• Use land-use planning to manage chemical hazards.
• The primary goal of the Seveso Directives is to prevent hazmat accidents.
The secondary goal is to limit the health, safety, and environmental conse-
quences of any accidents that do occur.
• Seveso II requires the operator of each hazmat facility to develop an on-site
emergency response plan and supply it to local authorities. The local authori-
ties must then use each facility’s on-site plans to develop their own EOPs.
Chi-Chi Earthquake
• In 1999, a 7.6-magnitude earthquake hit Taiwan. Known as the Chi-Chi
earthquake, it caused 2,400 deaths and 11,000 injuries requiring medical
attention (Chi-Chi, Taiwan Earthquake Event Report, forms2.rms.com/rs
/729-DJX565/images/eq_chi_chi_taiwan_eq.pdf).
• Local government lacked the resources and experience to respond to the

disaster until the central government could overcome its lack of emergency
assessment capability.
• The educational infrastructure of the affected area was severely damaged;
75% of the area’s schools were closed.
• The government’s social services were also stretched to the limit and
beyond after the Chi-Chi earthquake.
Summary
• People are now much more aware of natural disasters than they were in the
past. And, countries are able to collaborate more easily to provide assis-
tance. Responding to natural disasters often brings the world together, as
evidenced by the devastating tsunami of December 2004.
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Distinguishing Emergency Management
• Emergency managers have knowledge about a wide range of hazards and
must know how to manage a community’s vulnerability.
• Emergency responders directly respond to disasters, attacking the threat to
reduce potential disaster losses.
• Public-sector emergency managers work for all levels of government—
federal, state, and local.
• Private-sector emergency managers work for organizations such as chemi-
cal facilities, nuclear power plants, and railroads.
• The final distinction is among local, state, and federal emergency managers.
• For a city or town, emergency management rarely exists as a separate
department. It is often located within a fire or police department.
• State and federal emergency managers have positions that are quite differ-
ent from those of local emergency managers.
• FEMA works with other agencies, such as the Environmental Protection
Agency, Coast Guard, and Department of Transportation.
• Together, they develop programs and provide technical and financial
assistance to LEMAs.
• The principal requirements are the willingness and ability to work with
multidisciplinary teams.
Defining “Profession”
• A profession holds its members accountable to their peers for behavior that
is relevant to the profession.
• Professions have membership rules to exclude unqualified people.
• Membership rules usually relate to education and training requirements.
• A profession has an “evolving and agreed-upon body of knowledge.”
• A defining feature of professions is that they have ethical standards.
Emergency Management as a Profession

• Most people would agree that emergency management is a profession.
• The current model for emergency managers is that of a career-oriented,
college-educated professional who has acquired knowledge from the physi-
cal and social sciences.
• An emergency manager must possess many skills, including communica-
tion skills, organizational skills, and the ability to grasp the technical fun-
damentals of a range of threats.
• Emergency managers are generalists who know where to find and how to
request the services of specialists.
Development and Ethics

• Emergency managers should participate in one or more professional
associations.
• Continuing education credits are offered through a variety of colleges and
universities, and FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute also offers pro-
fessional development opportunities.
• The International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) empha-
sizes ethics among its members and has adopted a three-part formal ethical
code (iaem.com):
• Respect people, laws, regulations, and fiscal resources.
• Gain trust, act fairly, and be effective stewards of resources.
• Embrace professionalism founded on education, safety, and protection
of life and property.
Body of Knowledge
• Emergency management is an interdisciplinary profession, so you must
always draw upon knowledge in the physical and social sciences.
• In addition to their other duties, emergency managers may want to conduct
research.
• In asserting their credibility to the public, emergency managers are set
apart from other professions by their body of knowledge.
• Organizations are attempting to explicitly define the emergency management
body of knowledge. The FEMA Higher Education Project is contributing to
this effort by examining how to develop an accreditation system for degree
programs.
Emergency Management Certification

• When academic degrees are unavailable, certificates are especially impor-
tant to ensure that you have received the necessary technical training.
• Business continuity planning offers a wide range of certificates.
• There are many new programs of unproven quality.
• The critical certification is that of Certified Emergency Manager (CEM),

which is offered through the IAEM.
• The CEM is the only certification that assures competence in comprehensive
emergency management and integrated emergency management systems.
Academic Programs
• The growth of academic degree programs to support a profession represents
the maturing of that profession.
• Professional degree programs do the following:
• They help you acquire principles and procedures from different theo-
retically organized disciplines.
• They bring together practitioners and researchers.
• To serve the profession, degree programs must achieve some level of stan-
dardization. There must be an assurance that graduates of degree programs
know the body of professional knowledge.
• FEMA has created a learning resource center and posted sample syllabi for
a wide range of classes. The agency has also developed full college courses
with instructor guides, readings, exercises, field trips, and student notes.
Legal Liability
• Legal liability applies more to organizations and government agencies than
to individuals.
• It is important to note that emergency management statutes vary widely among
the states, as do the emergency powers that are available to address disasters.
• Two areas of legal concern commonly arise:
• The claim that, in responding to an emergency, government officials
caused damage to persons or property.
• The claim that a government’s failure to plan for or respond to a disaster
resulted in damage to persons or property.
• Three exceptions to immunity are important for emergency managers:
• Claims for damages may not be brought in connection with the imposi-
tion of quarantine.
• A person may not bring suit if federal agencies or employees can dem-
onstrate that they exercised “due care” in carrying out a statute.
• The “discretionary function exception” provides immunity for federal
agencies and employees when a claim is based on the “exercise or per-
formance or failure to exercise or perform” a discretionary action.
• Immunity is recognized unless it can be shown that some form of negli-
gence exists.
• To mount a successful defense, a jurisdiction needs to document that it has
a technically sound emergency plan.
Summary
• Emergency management is a challenging career that is maturing as a pro-
fession. There are education, training, and certification opportunities, as
well as professional associations you can belong to that will help you in
your career.
Key Terms
• Certification
• Emergency manager
• Emergency responder
• Profession
FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Global Challenges
• Scientists agree that climate change is a fact and that the consequences of
this change are likely to be serious.
• Climate change will increase the number of extreme events taking place
across the globe.
• It will increase the number of severe storms and floods.
• It will lead to an increase in drought conditions across the plains of
Africa, North America, and South America.
• The world’s population may increase by as much as 50% in the next
50 years (www.un.org/press/en/2005/pop918.doc.htm).
• The biggest increases will be mostly in the developing countries of Asia
and Africa.
• The population boom will create greater demands for food, water, and
energy.
• Shortages will bring about political instability and breeding grounds
for terrorists.
• The concentration of population and wealth in urban areas will create the
potential for a mega-disaster.
• Worldwide consumption of fresh water supply may reach 90% by 2030.
• Two-thirds of the world’s population will experience chronic shortages
of safe drinking water by that time.
• Income and wealth are becoming increasingly concentrated in the hands of
the wealthiest.
• Residents of developed countries are demanding that many technologies
become safer.
• Few of these people, however, are willing to pay higher taxes.
• Emergency managers must be prepared to “make do” with current levels of

resources, respond quickly during and after disasters, and be patient with
some people’s unrealistic expectations.
Opportunities
• Policymakers need to understand the causes of hazards to manage them
effectively.
• People are becoming aware that the state of our environment is a major fac-
tor in the occurrence of disasters.
• There are many rapidly developing technologies to support emergency
management.
• You will be more effective if you can show that it is less expensive to miti-
gate hazards than to rebuild after a disaster.
• The data you need, together with computer programs such as HAZUS,
are becoming increasingly available.
• The greatest advance in technology has been the availability of GISs.
• Emergency response technologies have improved forecast and warning sys-
tems for a variety of different hazards.
• There are more ways to record and communicate information than ever before.
• There will continue to be significant advances in the communication tech-
nology used to warn residents about hazards.
• In disaster recovery, you can use many of the common technology tools to
quickly assess damage and send the information back to the EOC.
National Challenges
• Much of the future increase in the U.S. population will occur in hazard-
prone areas.
• Emergency managers need to promote smart growth that minimizes disas-
ter losses.
• Property owners in disaster-prone areas are being subsidized by other
taxpayers.
• There will continue to be an increase in the cultural and language diversity
of the population.
• Rich communities will be able to adopt new technology, but poor commu-
nities may not have the money to do so.
Terrorist Threats
• Plans for responding to terrorist threats can include many of the procedures
you expect to use for technological accidents.
• Terrorist threats also present new challenges, however.
• Exotic chemicals such as sarin gas, “dirty bombs,” and biohazards pres-
ent different problems from technological accidents.
• An intelligent adversary creates some important information security
problems.
• Terrorists can take advantage of predictable population protective

responses to inflict even greater casualties in secondary attacks during
mass evacuations.
National Challenges
• In the past, emergency management was a low priority on the government
agenda. This changed dramatically after 9/11.
• It is important for emergency managers to build coalitions with other agen-
cies, NGOs, and private-sector organizations.
• Legal liability is a major issue because each state has different rules regard-
ing liability in an emergency response.
• There is a conflict between the goals of economic development and private
property rights versus the goals of public safety and welfare.
Professional Challenges
• Many emergency managers have limited contact with land-use planners
and public health departments.
• Cooperation between emergency managers and disaster researchers is not
easy.
• This situation seems to be changing for the better.
• Professors in emergency management and related fields now have
greater contact with emergency managers.
• There are increasing numbers of research projects designed to solve
practical problems.
Professional Opportunities
• Recent years have seen an increase in graduates holding postsecondary
degrees in emergency management.
• The need for emergency managers to become involved in hazard mitigation
has been recognized for many years.
• Preimpact recovery planning provides opportunities to work with land-use
planners and building construction officials.
• Emergency managers’ knowledge and skills in preparing communi-
ties for unexpected events makes them an invaluable consultant to senior
administrators.
• Collaboration among jurisdictions within a region or between levels of gov-
ernment requires some degree of organizational standardization.
Summary
There are many challenges and opportunities facing emergency managers at the
global, national, and local levels. It is essential that communication improves so that
emergency managers can collaborate with other professionals for better preparedness.
3 Security Management
Security management is the identification of an organization’s assets (including

information assets), followed by the development, documentation, and implementa-
tion of policies and procedures for protecting these assets.
An organization uses such security management procedures as information clas-
sification, risk assessment, and risk analysis to identify threats, categories assets, and
rate system vulnerabilities so that they can implement effective controls (Figure 3.1).
LOSS PREVENTION
Loss prevention focuses on what your critical assets are and how you are going to
protect them. A key component to loss prevention is assessing the potential threats
to the successful achievement of the goal. This must include the potential opportu-
nities that further the object (why take the risk unless there’s an upside?). Balance
probability and impact determine and implement measures to minimize or eliminate
those threats.
SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT

Management of security risks applies the principles of risk management to the man-
agement of security threats. It consists of identifying threats (or risk causes), assess-
ing the effectiveness of existing controls to face those threats, determining the risks’
consequence(s), prioritizing the risks by rating the likelihood and impact, classifying
the type of risk, and selecting an appropriate risk option or risk response (Figure 3.2).
TYPES OF SECURITY THREATS

External
Strategic: like competition and customer demand
Operational: regulation, suppliers, contract
Financial: Forex (FX) credit
Hazard: natural disaster, cyber, external criminal act
Compliance: new regulatory or legal requirements are introduced, or existing
ones are changed, exposing the organization to a non-compliance risk if
measures are not taken to ensure compliance
Internal
Strategic: R&D operational: systems and process (H&R, Payroll)
Financial: liquidity, cash flow
79
Plan
(what, when,
how)
Monitor
Assess
and report
(identify and
(know what’s
analyze)
happening)
Handle
(mitigate the
risk)
A continuous interlocked process—not an event
FIGURE 3.1 Security management cycle.
Output
Step 1 Definition of examples
security policy Policy
document
Definition of
Step 2 ISMS scope Scope of
Input examples
the ISMS
Threats,
Step 3 impacts List of
vulnerabilities Risk assessment assessed
risks
Risk
management Risk management
Step 4 strategy Identified
weaknesses
Focus of the site for assets
Additional
controls Selection of
Step 5 controls Strength of
controls and
implementation
Step 6 Statement of
Statement of
applicability applicability
FIGURE 3.2 Risk process chart.
Hazard: safety and security; employees and equipment

Compliance: actual or potential changes in the organization’s systems, processes,
suppliers, etc. may create exposure to a legal or regulatory noncompliance.
RISK OPTIONS
Risk Avoidance
This is the first choice to be considered. The possibility of eliminating the existence
of criminal opportunity or avoiding the creation of such an opportunity is always the
Security Management 81
best solution, when additional considerations or factors are not created as a result of
this action that would create a greater risk. As an example, removing all the cash
from a retail outlet would eliminate the opportunity for stealing the cash—but it
would also eliminate the ability to conduct business.
Risk Reduction
When avoiding or eliminating the criminal opportunity conflicts with the ability to
conduct business, the next step is the reduction of the opportunity and potential loss
to the lowest level consistent with the function of the business. In the example above,
the application of risk reduction might result in the business keeping only enough
cash on hand for one day’s operation.
Risk Spreading
Assets that remain exposed after the application of reduction and avoidance are the
subjects of risk spreading. This is the concept that limits loss or potential losses by
exposing the perpetrator to the probability of detection and apprehension prior to
the consummation of the crime through the application of perimeter lighting, barred
windows, and intrusion detection systems. The idea here is to reduce the time avail-
able to steal assets and escape without apprehension.
Risk Transfer
Risk transfer involves transferring risks to other alternatives when those risks have
not been reduced to acceptable levels. The two primary methods of accomplishing
risk transfer are to insure the assets or raise prices to cover the loss in the event of
a criminal act. Generally speaking, when the first three steps have been properly
applied, the cost of transferring risks is much lower.
Risk Acceptance
All remaining risks must simply be assumed by the business as a risk of doing busi-
ness. Included with these accepted losses are deductibles that have been made as part
of the insurance coverage.
SECURITY POLICY IMPLEMENTATIONS

Intrusion Detection
• Alarm devices
• Access control
• Locks, simple or sophisticated, such as biometric authentication and key-
card locks
• Physical security
• Environmental elements (e.g., mountains, trees, etc.)

• Barricade
• Security guards (armed or unarmed) with wireless communication devices
(e.g., two-way radio)
• Security lighting (spotlight, etc.)
• Security cameras
• Motion detectors
Procedures
• Coordination with law enforcement agencies
• Fraud management
• Risk management
• Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)
• Risk Analysis
• Risk mitigation
• Contingency planning
WHAT IS SECURITY?
Security is the degree of resistance to, or protection from, harm. It applies to any
vulnerable and valuable asset, such as a person, dwelling, community, item, nation,
or organization.
As noted by the Institute for Security and Open Methodologies in the OSSTMM 3,
security provides “a form of protection where a separation is created between the assets
and the threat” (Linux Magazine, www.linux-magazine.com). These separations are
generically called “controls” and sometimes include changes to the asset or the threat.
Security is said to have two dialogues. Negative dialogue is about danger, risk,
threat, etc. Positive dialogue is about opportunities, interests, profits, etc. Negative
dialogue needs military equipment, armies, or police. Positive dialogue needs social
capital, education, or social interaction.
Perceived Security Compared to Real Security

Perception of security may be poorly mapped to measurable objective security. For
example, the fear of earthquakes has been reported to be more common than the
fear of slipping on the bathroom floor, although the latter kills many more people
than the former does. Similarly, the perceived effectiveness of security measures is
sometimes different from the actual security provided by those measures. The pres-
ence of security protections may even be taken for the safety itself. For example, two
computer security programs could be interfering with each other and even canceling
each other’s effect, while the owner believes he/she is getting double the protection.
Security Theater is a critical term for deployment of measures primarily aimed
at raising subjective security without a genuine or commensurate concern for the
effects of that action on real safety. For example, some consider the screening of
airline passengers based on static databases to have been Security Theater and the
Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System to have created a decrease in

objective security (What Is “Security Theater”? Privacy SOS, https://privacysos.org
/security_theater).
Perception of security can increase objective security when it affects or deters mali-
cious behavior, as with visual signs of security protections, such as video surveillance,
alarm systems in a home, or an antitheft system in a car such as a vehicle tracking sys-
tem or warning sign. Since some intruders will decide not to attempt to break into such
areas or vehicles, and there can be less damage to windows in addition to protection of
valuable objects inside. Without such advertisement, an intruder might, for example,
approach a car, break the window, and then flee in response to an alarm being trig-
gered. Either way, perhaps the car itself and the objects inside aren’t stolen, but with
perceived security, even the windows of the car have a lower chance of being damaged.
Categorizing Security
There is an immense literature on the analysis and categorization of security. Part of
the reason for this is that, in most security systems, the “weakest link in the chain”
is the most important. The situation is asymmetric since the “defender” must cover
all points of attack while the attacker need only identify a single weak point upon
which to concentrate.
Describing Categorizing Security: In preparation for selecting and specifying
the appropriate security controls for organizational information systems and their
respective environments of operation, organizations categorize their information and
information system. To categorize the information and information system, complete
the following activities:
• Information technology (IT) realm

• Computer security
• Internet security
• Application security
• Data security
• Information security
• Network security
• Endpoint security
• Physical realm
• Airport security
• Aviation security
• Communications security
• Corporate security
• Food security
• Home security
• Infrastructure security
• Physical security
• Port security/supply chain security
• Private security
• School security
• Shopping center security

• Transportation security
• Political
• National security
• Public security
• Homeland security
• Internal security
• State security
• International security
• Human security
• Monetary
• Economic security
• Financial security
• Social security
Operations security is a complement to other “traditional” security measures that

evaluates the organization from an adversarial perspective.
Security Concepts
Certain concepts recur throughout different fields of security:
• Assurance—assurance is the level of guarantee that a security system will

behave as expected.
• Countermeasure—a countermeasure is a way to stop a threat from trigger-
ing a risk event.
• Defense in depth—never rely on one single security measure alone.
• Risk—a risk is a possible event that could cause a loss.
• Threat—a threat is a method of triggering a risk event that is dangerous.
• Vulnerability—this is a weakness in a target that can potentially be
exploited by a security threat.
• Exploit—a vulnerability that has been triggered by a threat—a risk of 1.0
(100%).
Home Security
Security is something applicable to all of us and involves the hardware in place on
a property and personal security practices. The hardware would be the doors, locks,
alarm systems, and lighting that are installed on your property. Personal security
practices would be ensuring doors are locked, alarms are activated, windows are
closed, and many other routine tasks that act to prevent a burglary.
Computer Security
Computer security, also known as cybersecurity or IT security, is security applied to
computing devices such as computers and smartphones, as well as computer networks
such as private and public networks, including the whole Internet. The field includes
all five components: hardware, software, data, people, and procedures, by which digi-
tal equipment, information, and services are protected from unintended or unauthor-
ized access, change, or destruction and is of growing importance due to the increasing
reliance of computer systems in most societies. It includes physical security to pre-
vent theft of equipment and information security to protect the data on that equipment.
Those terms generally do not refer to physical security, but a common belief among
computer security experts is that a physical security breach is one of the worst kinds
of security breaches as it generally allows full access to both data and equipment.
Security Management in Organizations

In the corporate world, various aspects of security are historically addressed
separately—notably by distinct and often no communicating departments for IT
security, physical security, and fraud prevention. Today, there is a greater recognition
of the interconnected nature of security requirements, an approach variously known
as holistic security, “all-hazards” management, and other terms.
3D Security
3D security is a framework promoting development, diplomacy, and defense as secu-
rity strategies.
The 3D security framework recognizes that security challenges like terrorism,
nuclear proliferation, global warming, and SARS or Avian Flu epidemics require a
variety of tools in addressing complex threats. These tools can be categorized broadly
under the headings of Development, Diplomacy, and Defense—the 3Ds of security.
3D security or “whole of government” approaches have been promoted by coun-
tries like Canada and the United Kingdom for a number of years. Now, bipartisan
Congressional leaders and the Bush administration promote 3D security as a new
vision for rethinking security as detailed in the 2006 National Security Strategy.
Development refers to governmental and nongovernmental efforts to build the eco-
nomic, social, and political foundations of stable communities and societies. Diplomacy
refers to communication or negotiation between people to solve shared problems and
address conflicts through political and legal channels. Official State Department negotia-
tions (Track I) and unofficial diplomacy (Track II) between religious, business, aca-
demic, or other civil society leaders work best on parallel tracks resulting in agreements
that are legitimate, widely supported, and sustainable. Defense refers to a wide range of
military tasks, including waging war, peacekeeping, or coordinating disaster response.
Security and Classified Information

Classified information is material that a government body claims is sensitive infor-
mation that requires protection of confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Access is
restricted by law or regulation to particular groups of people, and mishandling can incur
criminal penalties and loss of respect. A formal security clearance is often required to
handle classified documents or access classified data. The clearance process usually
requires a satisfactory background investigation. Documents and other information

assets are typically marked with one of several (hierarchical) levels of sensitivity—for
example, restricted, confidential, secret, and top secret. The choice of level is often
based on an impact assessment; governments often have their own set of rules, which
include the levels, rules on determining the level for an information asset, and rules
on how to protect information classified at each level. This often includes security
clearances for personnel handling the information. Although “classified information”
refers to the formal categorization and marking of material by level of sensitivity, it
has also developed a sense synonymous with “censored” in U.S. English. A distinc-
tion is often made between formal security classification and privacy markings such
as “commercial in confidence.” Classifications can be used with additional keywords
that give more detailed instructions on how data should be used or protected.
Some corporations and nongovernment organizations also assign sensitive infor-
mation to multiple levels of protection, either from a desire to protect trade secrets or
because of laws and regulations governing various matters such as personal privacy,
sealed legal proceedings, and the timing of financial information releases.
With the passage of time, much classified information becomes much less sensi-
tive and may be declassified and made public. Since the late 20th century, there has
been freedom of information legislation in some countries, whereby the public is
deemed to have the right to all information that is not considered to be damaging if
released. Sometimes, documents are released with information still considered con-
fidential obscured (redacted).
GOVERNMENT CLASSIFICATION
The purpose of classification is to protect information. Higher classifications protect
information that might endanger national security. Classification formalizes what
constitutes a “state secret” and accords different levels of protection based on the
expected damage that the information might cause in the wrong hands.
However, classified information is frequently “leaked” to reporters by officials for
political purposes. Several U.S. presidents have leaked sensitive information to get
their point across to the public (“A History of How Israel Out-Foxed US Presidents,”
https://israelpalestinenews.org/history-israel-foxed-us-presidents).
Typical Classification Levels

Although the classification systems vary from country to country, most have levels
corresponding to the following British definitions (from the highest level to lowest).
Top Secret
Top secret is the highest level of classified information. Information is further com-
partmented so that specific access using a code word after top secret is a legal way
to hide collective and important information. Such material would cause “exception-
ally grave damage” to national security if made publicly available. Prior to 1942, the
United Kingdom and other members of the British Empire used Most Secret, but this
was changed to match the U.S.’s top secret to simplify allied interoperability.
Secret
Secret material would cause “serious damage” to national security if it were publicly
available. In the United States, operational “secret” information can be marked with
an additional “LIMDIS,” to limit readership.
Confidential
Confidential material would cause damage or be prejudicial to national security if
publicly available.
Restricted
Restricted material would cause “undesirable effects” if publicly available. Some
countries do not have such a classification; in public sectors, such as commercial
industries, such a level is also called and known as “Private Information.”
Official
Official material forms the generality of government business, public service deliv-
ery, and commercial activity. This includes a diverse range of information, of vary-
ing sensitivities, and with differing consequences resulting from compromise or loss.
Official information must be secured against a threat model that is broadly similar to
that faced by a large private company.
Unclassified
Unclassified is technically not a classification level, but this is a feature of some clas-
sification schemes, used for government documents that do not merit a particular
classification or which have been declassified. This is because the information is
low impact and therefore does not require any special protection, such as vetting of
personnel. A plethora of pseudo-classifications exist under this category.
Clearance
Clearance is a general classification that comprises a variety of rules controlling the
level of permission required to view such classified information, and how it must be
stored, transmitted, and destroyed. Additionally, access is restricted on a “need-to-
know” basis. Simply possessing a clearance does not automatically authorize the
individual to view all material classified at that level or below that level. The indi-
vidual must present a legitimate need to know in addition to the proper level of
clearance.
COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION
In addition to the general risk-based classification levels, additional compartmented
constraints on access exist, such as (in the U.S.) Special Intelligence (SI), which
protects intelligence sources and methods; No Foreign dissemination (NOFORN),
which restricts dissemination to U.S. nationals; and Originator Controlled dis-
semination (ORCON), which ensures that the originator can track possessors of the
information. Information in these compartments is usually marked with specific
keywords in addition to the classification level.
Government information about nuclear weapons often has an additional marking

to show it contains such information (CNWDI).
International
When a government agency or group shares information between an agency and
group of other country’s government, they will generally employ a special classifica-
tion scheme that both parties have previously agreed to honor.
For example, the marking ATOMAL is applied to U.S. RESTRICTED DATA
or FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA and United Kingdom ATOMIC informa-
tion that has been released to NATO. ATOMAL information is marked COSMIC
TOP SECRET ATOMAL (CTSA), NATO SECRET ATOMAL (NSAT), or NATO
CONFIDENTIAL ATOMAL (NCA).
NATO Classifications
For example, sensitive information shared amongst NATO allies has four levels of
security classification; from most to least classified:
1. COSMIC TOP SECRET (CTS),

2. NATO SECRET (NS),
3. NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NC), and
4. NATO RESTRICTED (NR).
A special case exists with regard to NATO UNCLASSIFIED (NU) informa-

tion. Documents with this marking are NATO property (copyright) and must not
be made public without NATO permission. In general, documents with this clas-
sification aren’t cleared for Internet transmission either, unless clearly marked with
RELEASABLE FOR INTERNET TRANSMISSION. Documents that can be made
public, however, should be clearly marked with NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION
RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC.
United States
Classified Information in the United States
The U.S. classification system is currently established under Executive Order 13526
and has three levels of classification—confidential, secret, and top secret. The United
States had a restricted level during World War II but no longer does. U.S. regulations
state that information received from other countries at the restricted level should be
handled as confidential.
A variety of markings are used for material that is not classified but whose dis-
tribution is limited administratively or by other laws, for example, For Official
Use Only (FOUO) or Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU). The Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 provides for the protection of information related to the design of nuclear
weapons. The term “Restricted Data” is used to denote certain nuclear technology.
Information about the storage, use, or handling of nuclear material or weapons is

marked “Formerly Restricted Data.” These designations are used in addition to level
markings (Confidential, Secret and Top Secret). Information protected by the Atomic
Energy Act is protected by law and information classified under the Executive Order
is protected by Executive privilege.
The U.S. government insists that it is “not appropriate” for a court to question
whether any document is legally classified. In the 1973 trial of Daniel Ellsberg
for releasing the Pentagon Papers, the judge did not allow any testimony from
Ellsberg, claiming it was “irrelevant” because the assigned classification could not
be challenged. The charges against Ellsberg were ultimately dismissed after it was
revealed that the government had broken the law in secretly breaking into the office
of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist and in tapping his telephone without a warrant. Ellsberg
insists that the legal situation in the United States today is worse than it was in 1973,
and Edward Snowden could not get a fair trial. The State Secrets Protection Act of
2008 might have given judges the authority to review such questions in camera, but
the bill was not passed (“Trial of Daniel Ellsberg: Indictment,” law2.umkc.edu/faculty
/projects/FTrials/ellsberg/indictment.html).
Corporate Classification
Private corporations often require written confidentiality agreements and conduct
background checks on candidates for sensitive positions. The U.S. the Employee
Polygraph Protection Act prohibits private employers from requiring lie detector
tests, but there are a few exceptions. Policies dictating methods for marking and
safeguarding company-sensitive information (e.g., “IBM Confidential”) are com-
mon, and some companies have more than one level. Such information is protected
under trade secret laws. New product development teams are often sequestered and
forbidden to share information about their efforts with uncleared fellow employees,
the original Apple Macintosh project being a famous example. Other activities, such
as mergers and financial report preparation, generally involve similar restrictions.
However, corporate security generally lacks the elaborate hierarchical clearance and
sensitivity structures and the harsh criminal sanctions that give government classifi-
cation systems their particular tone.
Traffic Light Protocol

The Traffic Light Protocol was developed by the G8 countries to enable the sharing
of sensitive information between government agencies and corporations. This proto-
col has now been accepted as a model for trusted information exchange by over 30
other countries. The protocol provides for four “information sharing levels” for the
handling of sensitive information.
RISK
Risk is the potential of gaining or losing something of value. Values (such as physical
health, social status, emotional well-being, or financial wealth) can be gained or lost
when taking risk resulting from a given action or inaction, foreseen or unforeseen.
Risk can also be defined as the intentional interaction with uncertainty. Uncertainty
is a potential, unpredictable, and uncontrollable outcome; risk is a consequence of
action taken in spite of uncertainty.
Risk perception is the subjective judgment that people make about the severity
and probability of a risk and may vary person to person. Any human endeavor car-
ries some risk, but some are much riskier than others.
Definitions
The Oxford English Dictionary cites the earliest use of the word in English (in the
spelling of risqué from its from French original, risqué) as of 1621 and the spelling
as risk from 1655 (https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/risk). It defines risk as:
(Exposure to) the possibility of loss, injury, or other adverse or unwelcome circum-
stance; a chance or situation involving such a possibility.
1. Risk is an uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, has an effect on at

least one [project] objective. (This definition, using project terminology, is
easily made universal by removing references to projects.)
2. The probability of something happening multiplied by the resulting cost or
benefit if it does. (This concept is more properly known as the “expectation
value” or “risk factor” and is used to compare levels of risk.)
3. The probability or threat of quantifiable damage, injury, liability, loss, or
any other negative occurrence that is caused by external or internal vulner-
abilities, and that may be avoided through preemptive action.
4. Finance: The possibility that an actual return on an investment will be
lower than the expected return.
5. Insurance: A situation where the probability of a variable (such as burn-
ing down of a building) is known but when a mode of occurrence or the
actual value of the occurrence (whether the fire will occur at a particular
property) is not. A risk is not an uncertainty (where neither the probability
nor the mode of occurrence is known), a peril (cause of loss), or a haz-
ard (something that makes the occurrence of a peril more likely or more
severe).
6. Securities trading: The probability of a loss or drop in value. Trading risk is
divided into two general categories:
a. Systematic risk affects all securities in the same class and is linked to
the overall capital-market system and therefore cannot be eliminated by
diversification. Also called market risk.
b. Nonsystematic risk is any risk that isn’t market-related. Also called
nonmarket risk, extra-market risk, or diversifiable risk.
7. Workplace: Product of the consequence and probability of a hazardous
event or phenomenon. For example, the risk of developing cancer is esti-
mated as the incremental probability of developing cancer over a lifetime
as a result of exposure to potential carcinogens (cancer-causing substances).
Areas
Risk Assessment and Analysis
Risk Assessment and Operational Risk Management
Since risk assessment and management are essential in security management, both
are tightly related. Security assessment methodologies like CCTA Risk Analysis and
Management Method contain risk assessment modules as an important part of the
first steps of the methodology. On the other hand, risk assessment methodologies
like Mehari evolved to become security assessment methodologies. An ISO standard
on risk management (Principles and guidelines on implementation) was published
under code ISO 31000 on November 13, 2009.
Quantitative Analysis
There are many formal methods used to “measure” risk.
Often, the probability of a negative event is estimated by using the frequency of
past similar events. Probabilities for rare failures may be difficult to estimate. This
makes risk assessment difficult in hazardous industries, for example, nuclear energy,
where the frequency of failures is rare, while harmful consequences of failure are
severe.
Risk is often measured as the expected value of an undesirable outcome. This
combines the probabilities of various possible events and some assessment of the
corresponding harm into a single value. See also expected utility. The simplest case
is a binary possibility of accident or no accident. The associated formula for calculat-
ing risk is then as follows:
R = (probability of the accident occurring) × (expected loss in case of the accident).
For example, if performing activity X has a probability of 0.01 of suffering an

accident of A, with a loss of 1,000, then total risk is a loss of 10, the product of 0.01
and 1,000.
Situations are sometimes more complex than the simple binary possibility case.
In a situation with several possible accidents, total risk is the sum of the risks for each
different accident, provided that the outcomes are comparable:
R= ∑ for all accidents (probability of the accident occurring)

× (expected loss in case of the accident).

SECURITY INCREASE
A security increase often occurs when a nation, state, or institution has recently suf-
fered from a serious incident or is under the perception that there is an increased risk
for an incident to occur that endangers or potentially endangers its well-being.
Historically, security has been increased by governments and private institutions

for a variety of reasons, including incidents that have occurred to themselves, to
other similar institutions, or to the world, nation, or region following a high-profile
event or a perceived threat of one. When this occurs, many identify the move as
elevated, heightened, or “beefed-up” security.
Those who are forced to make changes or be extra vigilant as a result or the
increase sometimes refer to the new era as the “security age.”
Institutions that often increase security in response to perceived risks include air-
ports, government buildings, international borders, hospital, schools, religious insti-
tutions, and tourist attractions. The September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center
in 2001 resulted in security being greatly increased around the world.
Common methods employed to increase security include the following:
• Increased presence of police officers and/or security guards

• Photo ID checks
• Use of surveillance (human or video)
• Use of certain instruments, like metal detectors or X-ray scanners
• Banning items seen as a potential hazard in a secured area
• Random searches
• Increased enforcement of existing rules and regulations that were previ-
ously overlooked
• Background checks
• Warning the public of the perceived threat
Surveillance
A “Nest” of Surveillance Cameras
Surveillance is the monitoring of the behavior, activities, or other changing informa-
tion, usually of people for the purpose of influencing, managing, directing, or pro-
tecting them. This can include observation from a distance by means of electronic
equipment (such as CCTV cameras) or interception of electronically transmitted
information (such as Internet traffic or phone calls), and it can include simple, rela-
tively no- or low-technology methods such as human intelligence agents and postal
interception. Surveillance is the close observation of a person or a group by law
enforcement that conducts investigations into criminal activities; continuous observa-
tion of a place, person, group, or ongoing activity in order to gather information; and
use of a variety of means to collect information; an example is electronic surveillance.
Surveillance is used by governments for intelligence gathering; the prevention of
crime; the protection of a process, person, group or object; or for the investigation of
crime. It is also used by criminal organizations to plan and commit crimes such as rob-
bery and kidnapping, by businesses to gather intelligence, and by private investigators.
Surveillance is often a violation of privacy and is opposed by various civil liber-
ties groups and activists. Liberal democracies have laws that restrict domestic gov-
ernment and private use of surveillance, usually limiting it to circumstances where
public safety is at risk. Authoritarian government seldom have any domestic restric-
tions; and international espionage is common among all types of countries.
Supporters of surveillance systems believe that these tools can help protect soci-
ety from terrorists and criminals. They argue that surveillance can reduce crime by
three means: by deterrence, by observation, and by reconstruction.
Surveillance can deter by increasing the chance of being caught and by revealing
the modus operandi. This requires a minimal level of invasiveness.
Another method on how surveillance can be used to fight criminal activity is
by linking the information stream obtained from them to a recognition system (for
instance, a camera system that has its feed run through a facial recognition system).
This can, for instance, auto-recognize fugitives and direct police to their location.
A distinction here has to be made, however, on the type of surveillance employed.
Some people that say support video surveillance in city streets may not support
indiscriminate telephone taps and vice versa. Besides the types, the way this surveil-
lance is done also matters a lot; that is, indiscriminate telephone taps are supported
by far fewer people than, say, telephone taps done only to people suspected of engag-
ing in illegal activities (Electronic Surveillance, Revolvy, https://www.revolvy.com
/topic/Electronic surveillance&item_type=topic).
Surveillance can also be used to give human operatives a tactical advantage
through improved situational awareness or through the use of automated processes,
that is, video analytics. Surveillance can help reconstruct an incident and provide
evidence through the availability of footage for forensics experts. Surveillance can
also influence subjective security if surveillance resources are visible or if the con-
sequences of surveillance can be felt.
Some of the surveillance systems (such as the camera system that has its feed
run through a facial recognition system mentioned above) can also have other uses
besides countering criminal activity. For instance, it can help with retrieving run-
away children, abducted or missing adults, and mentally disabled people.
With the advent of programs such as the Total Information Awareness program
(SourceWatch, www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Total_Information_Awareness) and
ADVISE (“US Plans Massive Data Sweep,” www.csmonitor.com), technologies such
as high-speed surveillance computers and biometrics software, and laws such as the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (www.fcc.gov), governments
now possess an unprecedented ability to monitor the activities of their subjects.
The biggest concern of detriment is securing information that is collected of those
who are under total surveillance and educating the public as to why those under sur-
veillance are being watched for the intended purpose of identifying terrorists. This
is in opposition to those who use the same surveillance systems and mechanisms
against civilians and have the intent to remove the laws of the land.
In addition, a significant risk of private data collection stems from the fact that
this risk is too much unknown to be readily assessed today. Storage is cheap enough
to have data stored forever, and the models using which it will be analyzed in a
decade from now cannot reasonably be foreseen.
Countersurveillance, Inverse Surveillance, Sousveillance

Countersurveillance is the practice of avoiding surveillance or making surveil-
lance difficult. Developments in the late 20th century have caused countersurveil-
lance to dramatically grow in both scope and complexity, such as the Internet,
increasing prevalence of electronic security systems, high-altitude (and possibly

armed) unmanned aerial vehicles, and large corporate and government computer
databases.
Inverse surveillance is the practice of the reversal of surveillance on other
individuals or groups (e.g., citizens photographing police). Well-known examples
are George Holliday’s recording of the Rodney King beating and the organization
Cop watch, which attempts to monitor police officers to prevent police brutality
(“20 Years After Rodney King, Who’s Holding Cops Accountable,” www.colorlines
.com/articles/20-years-after-rodney-king-whos). Countersurveillance can be used in
applications to prevent corporate spying or to track other criminals by certain crimi-
nal entities. It can also be used to deter stalking methods used by various entities and
organizations.
Sousveillance is inverse surveillance involving the recording by private individu-
als rather than government or corporate entities. Sousveillance also describes the
present state of modern technological societies where anybody may take photos or
videos of any person or event and then diffuse the information freely all over the
world.
4 Crisis Management
Crisis management is the process by which an organization deals with a major event
that threatens to harm the organization, its stakeholders, or the general public. The
study of crisis management originated with the large-scale industrial and environ-
mental disasters in the 1980s. It is considered to be the most important process in
public relations.
Three elements are common to a crisis:
1. A threat to the organization

2. The element of surprise
3. A short decision time
“Crisis is a process of transformation where the old system can no longer be

maintained.” Therefore, the fourth defining quality is the need for change. If change
is not needed, the event could more accurately be described as a failure or incident.
In contrast to risk management, which involves assessing potential threats and
finding the best ways to avoid those threats, crisis management involves dealing
with threats before, during, and after they have occurred. It is a discipline within
the broader context of management consisting of skills and techniques required to
identify, assess, understand, and cope with a serious situation, especially from the
moment it first occurs to the point that recovery procedures start.
INTRODUCTION
Crisis management is a situation-based management system that includes clear roles
and responsibilities and process-related organizational requirements company-wide.
The response shall include action in the following areas: crisis prevention, crisis
assessment, crisis handling, and crisis termination. The aim of crisis management
is to be well prepared for crisis, ensure a rapid and adequate response to the crisis,
maintaining clear lines of reporting and communication in the event of crisis and
agreeing rules for crisis termination.
The techniques of crisis management include a number of consequent steps from
the understanding of the influence of the crisis on the corporation to preventing,
alleviating, and overcoming the different types of crisis.
Crisis management consists of different aspects, including the following:
• Methods used to respond to both the reality and perception of crisis.

• Establishing metrics to define what scenarios constitute a crisis and should
consequently trigger the necessary response mechanisms.
• Communication that occurs within the response phase of emergency-
management scenarios.
95
Crisis management methods provide a useful foundation for understanding termi-

nology and frameworks relating to crisis; in this document, the focus is on the corpo-
rate exposure to risks, in particular to the black swan events that result in significant
strategic threats to organizations. Crisis management is occasionally referred to as
incident management.
A crisis mindset requires the ability to think of the worst-case scenario while
simultaneously suggesting numerous solutions. Trial and error is an accepted disci-
pline, as the first line of defense might not work. It is necessary to maintain a list of
contingency plans and to be always on alert. Organizations and individuals should
always be prepared with a rapid response plan to emergencies, which would require
analysis, drills, and exercises.
The credibility and reputation of organizations is heavily influenced by the per-
ception of their responses during crisis situations. The organization and communi-
cation involved in responding to a crisis in a timely fashion make for a challenge
in businesses. There must be open and consistent communication throughout the
hierarchy to contribute to a successful crisis-communication process.
The related terms “emergency management” and “business continuity manage-
ment” focus, respectively, on the prompt but short-lived “first aid” type of response
(e.g., putting, the fire out) and the longer-term recovery and restoration phases
(e.g., moving operations to another site). Crisis is also a facet of risk management,
although it is probably untrue to say that crisis management represents a failure of
risk management, since it will never be possible to totally mitigate the chances of
catastrophes occurring.
TYPES OF CRISIS
During the crisis management process, it is important to identify the types of crisis
in that different crises necessitate the use of different crisis management strategies.
Potential crises are enormous, but crises can be clustered.
The categorized eight types of crises are as follows:
1. Natural disaster
2. Technological crises
3. Confrontation
4. Malevolence
5. Organizational misdeeds
6. Workplace violence
7. Rumors
8. Terrorist attacks/manmade disasters
Natural Disaster
Natural-disaster-related crises, typically natural disasters, are such environmental
phenomena as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tornadoes and hurricanes, floods,
landslides, tsunamis, storms, and droughts that threaten life, property, and the envi-
ronment itself.
Crisis Management 97
Technological Crisis
Technological crises are caused by human application of science and technology.
Technological accidents inevitably occur when technology becomes complex and
coupled and something goes wrong in the system as a whole (technological break-
downs). Some technological crises occur when human error causes disruptions
(human breakdowns). People tend to assign blame for a technological disaster
because technology is subject to human manipulation, whereas they do not hold any-
one responsible for natural disaster. When an accident creates significant environ-
mental damage, the crisis is categorized as mega damage. Samples include software
failures, industrial accidents, and oil spills.
Confrontation Crisis
Confrontation crises occur when discontented individuals and/or groups fight busi-
nesses, government, and various interest groups to win acceptance of their demands
and expectations. The common type of confrontation crisis is boycotts, and other
types are picketing, sit-ins, ultimatums to those in authority, blockade or occupation
of buildings, and resisting or disobeying police.
Crisis of Malevolence
An organization faces a crisis of malevolence when opponents or miscreant
individuals use criminal means or other extreme tactics for the purpose of
expressing hostility or anger toward, or seeking gain from, a company, country,
or economic system, perhaps with the aim of destabilizing or destroying it.
Examples include product tampering, kidnapping, malicious rumors, terrorism,
and espionage.
Crisis of Organizational Misdeeds

Crises occur when management takes actions it knows will harm or place stakehold-
ers at risk for harm without adequate precautions. Three different types of crises of
organizational misdeeds are crises of skewed management values, crises of decep-
tion, and crises of management misconduct.
Crisis of Skewed Management Values

Crises of skewed management values are caused when managers favor short-term
economic gain and neglect broader social values and stakeholders other than inves-
tors. This state of lopsided values is rooted in the classical business creed that focuses
on the interests of stockholders and tends to disregard the interests of its other stake-
holders such as customers, employees, and the community.
It has three stages:
1. Precrisis
2. Acute
3. Chronic and conflict resolution
Crisis of Deception
Crises of deception occur when management conceals or misrepresents information
about itself and its products in its dealing with consumers and others.
Crisis of Management Misconduct

Some crises are caused not only by skewed values and deception but also deliberate
amorality and illegality.
Workplace Violence
Crises occur when an employee or former employee commits violence against other
employees on organizational grounds.
Rumors
False information about an organization or its products creates crises hurting the
organization’s reputation. Sample is linking the organization to radical groups or
stories that their products are contaminated.
Crisis Leadership
Alan Hilburg, a pioneer in crisis management, defines organizational crises as cat-
egorized as either acute crises or chronic crises (Crisis Management Explained by
Alan Hilburg, http://everything.explained.today/Crisis_management/). Erika Hayes
James, an organizational psychologist at the University of Virginia’s Darden Graduate
School of Business, identifies two primary types of organizational crisis. James
(2008) defines organizational crisis as “any emotionally charged situation that,
once it becomes public, invites negative stakeholder reaction and thereby has the
potential to threaten the financial well-being, reputation, or survival of the firm or
some portion thereof.”
1. Sudden crisis
2. Smoldering crises
Sudden Crisis
Sudden crises are circumstances that occur without warning and beyond an institu-
tion’s control. Consequently, sudden crises are most often situations for which the
institution and its leadership are not blamed.
Smoldering Crisis
Smoldering crises differ from sudden crises in that they begin as minor internal
issues that, due to manager’s negligence, develop to crisis status. These are situations
when leaders are blamed for the crisis and its subsequent effect on the institution in
question.
There are five phases of crisis that require specific crisis leadership competencies.
Each phase contains an obstacle that a leader must overcome to improve the structure
and operations of an organization. The leadership competencies of integrity, positive
intent, capability, mutual respect, and transparency impact the trust-building process.
1. Signal detection
2. Preparation and prevention
3. Containment and damage control
4. Business recovery
5. Learning
SIGNAL DETECTION
Sense making represents an attempt to create order and make sense, retrospectively,
of what occurs. Perspective taking is the ability to consider another person’s or
group’s point of view.
• Preparation and prevention
It is during this stage that crisis handlers begin preparing for or averting the crisis that had
been foreshadowed in the signal detection stage. Using an impact/probability model allows
organizations to fairly accurately predict crisis scenarios. It is recognized that the greatest
organizational challenge is “speaking truth to power” to predict truly worst-case scenarios
(“The Origin of the Phrase ‘Speaking Truth to Power,’” http://classroom.synonym.com
/origin-phrase-speaking-truth-power-11676.html). Organizations such as the Red Cross’s
primary mission is to prepare for and prevent the escalation of crisis events. Walmart has
been described as an emergency-relief standard bearer after having witnessed the incred-
ibly speedy and well-coordinated effort to get supplies to the Gulf Coast of the United
States in anticipation of Hurricane Katrina (https://corporate.walmart.com/_news_/news
-archive/2005/09/04/media-information-wal-marts-response-to-hurricane-katrina).
CONTAINMENT AND DAMAGE CONTROL

Usually the most vivid stage, the goal of crisis containment and damage control is to limit
the reputational, financial, safety, and other threats to firm survival. Crisis handlers work
diligently during this stage to bring the crisis to an end as quickly as possible to limit the
negative publicity to the organization and move into the business recovery phase.
BUSINESS RECOVERY
When crisis hits, organizations must be able to carry on with their business in the
midst of the crisis while simultaneously planning for how they will recover from
the damage the crisis caused. Crisis handlers not only engage in continuity plan-
ning (determining the people, financial, and technology resources needed to keep the
organization running) but will also actively pursue organizational resilience.
LEARNING
In the wake of a crisis, organizational decision makers adopt a learning orienta-
tion and use prior experience to develop new routines and behaviors that ultimately
change the way the organization operates. The best leaders recognize this and are
purposeful and skillful in finding the learning opportunities inherent in every crisis
situation.
CRISIS COMMUNICATION
This is the effort taken by an organization to communicate with the public and stake-
holders when an unexpected event occurs that could have a negative impact on the
organization’s reputation. This can also refer to the efforts to inform employees or
the public of a potential hazard that could have a catastrophic impact.
There are three essential steps that an organization can take to prepare for and
withstand a communications crisis:
1. Define your philosophy

2. Assess your vulnerabilities
3. Develop a protocol
MODELS AND THEORIES ASSOCIATED

WITH CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Crisis Management Strategy
Crisis management strategy (CMS) is a corporate development strategy designed
primarily to prevent crisis for follow-up company advancement. Thus, CMS is
synthesis of strategic management. It includes projection of the future based on
ongoing monitoring of business internal and external environment, as well as
selection and implementation of crisis prevention strategy and operating manage-
ment. This includes current status control based on ongoing monitoring of the
internal and external environment, as well as crisis-coping strategy selection and
implementation.
Crisis Management Model

Successfully managing a crisis requires an understanding of how to handle a crisis—
beginning with before they occur. The arc consists of crisis avoidance, crisis mitiga-
tion, and crisis recovery.
There are three phases in any crisis management, as shown in the following:
1. The diagnosis of the impending trouble or the danger signals.

2. Choosing appropriate Turnaround Strategy.
3. Implementation of the change process and its monitoring.
Crisis Management Planning

No corporation looks forward to facing a situation that causes a significant disruption
to their business, especially one that stimulates extensive media coverage. Public
scrutiny can result in a negative financial, political, legal and government impact.
Crisis management planning deals with providing the best response to a crisis.
Contingency Planning
Preparing contingency plans in advance, as part of a crisis-management plan, is
the first step to ensuring that an organization is appropriately prepared for a crisis.
Crisis-management teams can rehearse a crisis plan by developing a simulated sce-
nario to use as a drill. The plan should clearly stipulate that the only people to speak
to publicly about the crisis are the designated persons, such as the company spokes-
person or crisis team members. Ideally, it should be one spokesperson who can be
available on call at any time. Cooperation with the media is crucial in crisis situation,
and assure that all questions are answered on time and information on what was done
to resolve the situation is provided.
The first hours after a crisis breaks are the most crucial, so working with speed
and efficiency is important, and the plan should indicate how quickly each function
should be performed. When preparing to offer a statement externally as well as inter-
nally, information should be accurate and transparent.
Providing incorrect or manipulated information has a tendency to backfire and
will greatly exacerbate the situation. The contingency plan should contain informa-
tion and guidance that will help decision makers to consider not only the short-term
consequences but also the long-term effects of every decision.
Business Continuity Planning

When a crisis will undoubtedly cause a significant disruption to an organization,
a business continuity plan can help minimize the disruption. First, one must iden-
tify the critical functions and processes that are necessary to keep the organization
running. This part of the planning should be conducted in the earliest stages and
is part of a business impact analysis phase that will signpost “How much does the
organization stand to lose?” Each critical function and or/process must have its own
contingency plan in the event that one of the functions/processes ceases or fails, then
the business/organization is more resilient, which in itself provides a mechanism to
lessen the possibility of having to invoke recovery plans. Testing these contingency
plans by rehearsing the required actions in a simulation will allow those involved to
become more acutely aware of the possibility of a crisis. As a result, and in the event
of an actual crisis, the team members will act more quickly and effectively.
A note of caution when planning training scenarios: all too often, simulations
can lack ingenuity and an appropriate level of realism and as a consequence poten-
tially lose their training value. This part can be improved by employing external
exercise designers who are not part of the organizational culture and are able to test
an organizations response to crisis, in order to bring about a crisis of confidence for

those who manage vital systems.
Following a simulation exercise, a thorough and systematic debriefing must be
conducted as a key component of any crisis simulation. The purpose of this is to cre-
ate a link and draw lessons from the reality of the simulated representation and the
reality of the real world.
The whole process relating to business continuity planning should be periodically
reviewed to identify any number of changes that may invalidate the current plan.
Structural-Functional Systems Theory

Providing information to an organization in a time of crisis is critical to effective cri-
sis management. The structural-functional systems theory addresses the intricacies
of information networks and levels of command making up organizational commu-
nication. The structural-functional theory identifies information flow in organiza-
tions as “networks” made up of “members.” Information in organizations flow in
patterns called networks.
Diffusion of Innovation Theory

Another theory that can be applied to the sharing of information is the Diffusion of
Innovation Theory. Developed by Everett Rogers, the theory describes how innova-
tion is disseminated and communicated through certain channels over a period of
time (https://web.stanford.edu/class/symbsys205/DiffusionofInnovations.htm).
Diffusion of innovation in communication occurs when an individual communi-
cates a new idea to one or several others. At its most elementary form, the process
involves the following:
1. An innovation
2. An individual or other unit of adoption that has knowledge of or experience
with using the innovation
3. Another individual or other unit that does not yet have knowledge of the
innovation
4. A communication channel connecting the two units. A communication
channel is the means by which messages get from one individual to another.
ROLE OF APOLOGIES IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

There has been debate about the role of apologies in crisis management, and some
argue that apology opens an organization up for possible legal consequences:
“However some evidence indicates that compensation and sympathy, two less expen-
sive strategies, are as effective as an apology in shaping people’s perceptions of the
organization taking responsibility for the crisis because these strategies focus on the
victims’ needs. The sympathy response expresses concern for victims while com-
pensation offers victims something to offset the suffering” (Sandman, 2005).
CRISIS LEADERSHIP
The five leadership competencies that facilitate organizational restructuring during
and after a crisis are the following:
1. Building an environment of trust

2. Reforming the organization’s mindset
3. Identifying obvious and obscure vulnerabilities of the organization
4. Making wise and rapid decisions as well as taking courageous action
5. Learning from crisis to effect change
Crisis leadership research concludes that leadership action in crisis reflects the
competency of an organization, because the test of crisis demonstrates how well
the institution’s leadership structure serves the organization’s goals and withstands
crisis. Developing effective human resources is vital when building organizational
capabilities through crisis management executive leadership.
UNEQUAL HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY

Organizational crisis can result from discrimination lawsuits. Unequal human capi-
tal and social position derives from economic theories of human and social capital
concluding that minority employees receive fewer organizational rewards than those
with access to executive management. In a recent study of managers in a Fortune 500
company, race was found to be a predictor of promotion opportunity or lack thereof
(“Models and Theories Associated with Crisis Management,” http://eng-sciencee
.blogspot.com/). Thus, discrimination lawsuits can invite negative stakeholder reac-
tion, damage the company’s reputation, and threaten corporate survival.
SOCIAL MEDIA AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Social media has accelerated the speed that information about a crisis can spread.
The viral effect of social networks such as Twitter means that stakeholders can break
news faster than traditional media can—making managing a crisis harder. This can
be mitigated by having the right training and policy in place as well as the right social
media monitoring tools to detect signs of a crisis breaking. Social media also gives
crisis management teams (CMTs) access to real-time information about how a crisis
is impacting stakeholder sentiment and the issues that are of most concern to them.
Organizations should have a planned approach to releasing information to the
media in the event of a crisis. A media reaction plan should include a company media
representative as part of the CMT. Since there is always a degree of unpredictability
during a crisis, it is best that all CMT members understand how to deal with the
media and be prepared to do so, should they be thrust into such a situation.
In the face of crisis, leaders must deal with the strategic challenges they face, the
political risks and opportunities they encounter, the errors they make, the pitfalls
they need to avoid, and the paths away from crisis they may pursue. The necessity
for management is even more significant with the advent of a 24-hour news cycle
and an increasingly Internet-savvy audience with ever-changing technology at its

fingertips.
Public leaders have a special responsibility to help safeguard society from the
adverse consequences of crisis.
Experts in crisis management note that leaders who take this responsibility seri-
ously would have to concern themselves with all crisis phases: the incubation stage,
the onset, and the aftermath. Crisis leadership then involves five critical tasks: sense
making, decision making, and meaning making, terminating, and learning.
A brief description of the five facets of crisis leadership includes the following:
1. Sense making may be considered as the classical situation assessment step

in decision making.
2. Decision making is both the act of coming to a decision and the implemen-
tation of that decision.
3. Meaning making refers to crisis management as political communication.
4. Terminating a crisis is possible only if the public leader correctly handles
the accountability question.
5. Learning refers to the crisis and is limited to the event and experience
gained from that event. A crisis often opens a window of opportunity for
reform for better or for worse.
5 Consequence
Management
Consequence management, by contrast, describes ways and means to alleviate the
short- and long-term physical, socioeconomic, and psychological effects of a chemi-
cal or biological attack. It describes the coordination of local, regional, national, and
international assets before, during, and after an attack.
Consequence management means measures taken to restore essential operations
and services in a permissive environment. It includes measures to protect public health
and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to
governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism.
For consequence management at the national level, the primary authority rests with
the states to respond and the federal government to provide assistance as necessary.
Consequence management is predominantly an emergency management function
and includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential govern-
ment services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and indi-
viduals affected by an incident (Figure 5.1).
In an actual or potential incident or incidents involving terrorism, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the federal lead for consequence
management, following the Federal Response Plan. The Environmental Protection
Agency’s (EPA’s) Criminal Enforcement program is integrated closely with and is
dependent upon the Agency’s Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 (U.S. Policy
on Counterterrorism, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm) consequence manage-
ment expertise and resources, which includes numerous EPA functions, such as
Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Emergency and Remedial Response and
Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office, Air and Radiation, Water
and Radiation and Indoor Air. All of these functions operate under the coordinated
consequence management lead of the FEMA.
What else would help our nation’s communities and private sector organiza-
tions to better prepare for the threats that we face on a daily basis? The Department
of Homeland Security has legislated the use of “inherently safer technologies” in
response to emergency situations. Technologies exist that, had they been utilized,
would have made a dramatic and positive difference in the overall preparation for,
and response to, 9/11 and subsequent incidents.
What technologies would qualify for funding by Homeland Security awards and
make an immediate difference in a community-wide response to a natural or manmade
emergency? Clearly, there are a lot of vendors making announcements in today’s market-
place on technologies related to homeland security, from chem/bio decision aids for first
responders to syndromic surveillance and health alert tools, to mobile command cen-
ters filled with sophisticated communications equipment. There is no question that these
products add value and individually can improve a part of the overall incident response.
105
Law
enforcement
t
en
em
Threat
ag
an assessment and
Co
consultation
sm
ns
isi
eq
Cr
ue
nc
WMD
ema
technical support
na
g
em
en
t
Follow-on assets to support the response
to consequences on lives and property
FIGURE 5.1 Crisis and consequence management.
However, it is in the area called “consequence management,” where new tech-

nologies can really make a difference in the way a community responds to an
emergency situation. Consequence management includes measures to protect
public health and safety, restore essential services, and provide emergency relief
to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a
natural or manmade hazard. Consequence management is based upon the emer-
gency management principles of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery
defined by FEMA back in the 1970s with the creation of the Federal Disaster
Response Plan (Resources—Federal Response Plan, www.disasters.org/emgold
/frp.htm) (Figure 5.2).
True consequence management not only provides heightened preparedness for
potential disasters but also focuses on improved emergency response and constant,
consistent actions that mitigate the risk of emergency incidents. It also provides for
coordinated efforts in recovery and remediation, from volunteer credentialing to
asset management and tracking, key components in relief efforts from catastrophic
emergencies, like Hurricane Katrina from last year.
FEMA further defines the components of a consequence management solution as
the following.
Assessment tools:
• Hazard/Threat vulnerability and emergency readiness assessments

• Human and physical resource catalogue (emergency response/recovery assets)
Planning tools:
• Customized, hazard-specific contingency plans for emergency response

• Prebuilt standard operating procedure templates/checklists
Consequence Management 107
Media/legal Command
DEST
component group
Operations Support Consequence

group group management
group
Negotiations Joint interagency

intelligence FBI FEMA
component support element liaison component
Aviation and Tactical

special ops Administrative Liaison DOD DOE
component component component component component
component
Hazardous
Technical Logistics Communications HHS EPA
materials
component component component component component
response unit
Joint technical Legal Media State FM Local EM

operations team component component component component
Other FRP
agencies
as requested
FIGURE 5.2 ICS chart. DOD, Department of Defense; DOE, Department of Energy; EM,
emergency management; EPA, Environmental Protection Agency; FBI, Federal Bureau of
Investigation; FEMA, Federal Emergency Management Agency; FRP, Federal Response Plan;
HHS, Human & Health Services; ICS, Incident Command System.
• Geomapping and situational awareness (tools for mission planning, asset

tracking, and training/exercises)
• Communication and alert tools
• Risk surveillance and event prediction
• Real-time alert dissemination with chain-of-command notification
• Medical response tools
• Syndromic surveillance tied to point of care/incident clinical documentation
• C4I Tools (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence)
• Command, control, communication, coordination, and information
Recovery tools:
• Damage assessment and reimbursement

• Volunteer management/credentialing and asset management (mutual aid)
The above components combine to form a solution that provides hazard vulnera-
bility and emergency readiness assessments for any type of emergency (an all-hazard
approach) followed by response plans jointly developed by government and industry
(mutual aid) and improved alert dissemination and communication leading to coor-
dinated medical response and overall incident command and control, with a focus
on improving the preparedness and response efforts of first responders (firefight-
ers, policemen, and emergency medical technicians) and local emergency manag-
ers (trained incident commanders who typically manage the emergency operations
center (EOC) that resides in each community). The solution is completed with
components for recovery/remediation, including the management of volunteers and
assets from lending organizations.
The need for a complete consequence management solution to better prepare for
and respond to natural and manmade emergencies is clear. There are numerous and
meaningful, measurable benefits to improving command, control, communication,
coordination, and recovery within each community for all-hazard emergency situa-
tions, the number one benefit being the saving of lives.
SOFTWARE
Several different software automation tools are available to support the planning,
coordination and response of local governments and private sector organizations to
potential emergencies.
These solutions include the latest in event prediction, community-wide physi-
cal and human resource identification and management, automation of contingency
plans, awareness of emergency situations via geomapping, real-time interagency
communication, and overall incident response task workflow and management.
Consequence management technologies serve to help our communities establish
control over their resources, effectively plan for emergency situations, and improve
the appropriate response to an event, thereby mitigating risk and saving lives.
So what overall functionality should a true consequence management solution
provide (Figure 5.3)?
1. Event prediction and alerts (real-time identification and visualization of

resource status, availability and location, and rapid risk communication/
alert dissemination to key personnel as part of a simulation/drill exercise,
or prior to an actual event)
• Monitoring of multiple information sources for possible alerts to
response participants (via existing external system interfaces)
• Rapid risk communication and alerts regarding an identified threat
(reaching response participants via e-mail, fax, phone, Internet, cel-
lular, wireless and handheld connectivity and connecting with existing
information sources, including EOCs, fire, police, emergency medical
service, e911, hospitals, public works and even federal/state agencies)
• Preevent polling and visualization of physical and human resources
(status, availability, and location)
2. Contingency planning (identification of physical and human resources by
type and workflow, threat response planning, graphical design of response
plans, and automation of resource and response plan templates/checklists)
• Human and physical resource inventory automation and cataloguing
• Geomapping and situational awareness (asset tracking, mission plan-
ning, and incident management tools)
• Prebuilt response templates/checklists (natural and manmade hazards)
• Response template/checklist design tool (to create custom templates)
• Public/private sector response communication and coordination
Consequence = impact or severity of the effect
Score Impact Descriptor
1 Insignificant • Negligible effects

• Strategic view: normal difficulties
Stakeholder faith affected lasting less than 6 months
Isolated injury
Financial loss of less than $5K
2 Minor • Normal administrative difficulties
• Strategic view: delay will occur in fulfilling objective
Stakeholder faith affected lasting longer than 6 months
Isolated injury
Financial less than $1M
3 Significant • Delay in accomplishing program or project
Multiple injury
System interruption
Dispute that could affect term
Financial loss greater than $1M less than $2M
4 Major • Program or project redesign required, re-approval and or re-do
required
• Strategic view: integrated plan timeline affected
Isolated loss of life
Major system loss at critical time
Dispute that could affect term
Financial loss greater than $2M less than $5M
5 Severe/ • Project or program irrevocable finished, objective not met
catastrophic • Strategic view: mandate or objective not met
Stake holder faith affected lasting longer than 24 months
Multiple loss of life
Complete system crash
Dispute that could cause loss of full term
Inability to recruit students or staff
Financial loss greater than $5M
FIGURE 5.3 Consequence impact/severity.
3. Consequence coordination and response (actual deployment/coordination

of resources during an event, rapid risk communication/alert dissemination
to response participants, activation of response plans, prompts to users for
specific actions, embedded escalation of alerts, and prompts and full audit/
documentation of actions taken by participants during the event)
• Real-time identification/polling and visualization of physical or human
resource status, location, and availability
• Real-time alert facility to human participants with embedded work-
flow, timers, and escalation options
• Resource deployment and optimization (automated prompts for users
to take appropriate actions, and for specific allocation/coordination of
resources across emergency service disciplines)
• Rapid risk communication/alert information dissemination (to the
media and the public)
• Command center and control via a graphical user interface (geo-
mapping, top-level view of the incident with drill-down to specific
components of the response—also allows user input regarding response

components that may change a component’s action within the response,
or the overall response template)
• Real-time suggested actions for all response participants
• Full audit trail of actual actions performed by response participants
• All functionality available in a “live” incident response is available in a
full response simulation
• Real-time event audit and “live” documentation of the entire incident
response scenario during the simulation
4. Postevent audit/documentation (including resource optimization, recom-
mendations for future events, actual vs. plan reports, and non-emergency
coordination such as logistics)
• Graphical reports (standard line/pie/bar graphing tool) of actual versus
plan variances
• Geomapping summary of incident response (geographic information
system mapping and trend analysis, with a “playback” of asset move-
ments and actions taken by emergency service discipline)
• Customized regulatory reports (National Response Center, Envi
ronmental Protection Agency, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Department of Transportation, etc.)
• Postevent resource deployment and coordination planning
5. Recovery/remediation initiatives (including mutual aid initiatives such as
volunteer credentialing and management; asset identification, coordination,
and tracking; damage assessment; and interagency postevent coordination)
• Volunteer credentialing/management (technologies for identifying per-
sons by role/function, credentialing them, and managing their efforts)
• Asset management (identification of available assets for recovery
efforts, obtaining, activating, and tracking these resources)
• Damage assessment (automated documentation of post-event damage,
and submission for financial reimbursement)
• Interagency collaboration (postevent planning and coordination between
agencies on recovery initiatives)
6. Simulation and drill development (automated, real-time coordination of the
critical exercises that can expose gaps in response plans, improve response
time, and mitigate risk to actual events)
• A library of simulations (templates)
• A simulation development wizard (creating custom drills for multiple
threats)
• Simulation execution and management (real-time, automated drills
with full audit functions by human and physical resource)
• Visualization of the exercise (mission planning and situational aware-
ness of the exercise incident and assets utilized in the exercise via geo-
mapping tools)
• Postdrill reports
BENEFITS OF CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

There are numerous benefits for local communities in identifying and implementing
a complete consequence management solution. Among these are the following:
• Day-to-day value in improved communication among community agencies

• Faster, accurate, more precise alerts to key personnel regarding potential
emergencies
• Improved preparedness in advance of potential disasters
• Better coordination among agencies during the response to an incident
• Real-time, accurate information regarding status of human and physical
resources responding to an emergency
• Optimized deployment, control, and coordination of resources in the field
• Full, real-time audit and documentation of actions taken by incident responders
• Full documentation of mutual-aid requests, and the community response to
these requests
• Faster recovery from the event
• Complete control and coordination of simulation/drill exercises to identify
weaknesses in emergency response plans by hazard type and to ensure full
education/preparedness of response participants
• Ability to document improvements in incident response over time
• A clear indication of positive actions taken to respond to the threat of terror-
ism, and to protect the safety of citizens within the community
• Proof of steps taken to improve preparedness for, and response to, virtually
any kind of emergency situation
• Lives saved as a result of a faster, coordinated disaster response
The greatest benefit to local communities will be in the adoption of solutions that
can facilitate the overall incident response to any natural or manmade hazard. These
consequence management solutions will provide numerous, quantifiable benefits for
U.S. communities and their corporate citizens by mitigating the risks associated with
emergency situations, better preparing the community and private sector organiza-
tions for these events, vastly improving the response to natural and manmade inci-
dents and facilitating a smooth recovery from the event.
The need for leadership, expertise, and resources in identifying and responding to
both natural and manmade threats has become more clearly understood in the after-
math of 9/11 and the recent hurricane season. The next task for every community is to
define the distinct roles of first responders, the medical community, public health pro-
fessionals, and all other participants in a community-based response system; get them
to focus on interagency collaboration; cross-train them on emergency management
principles and the Incident Command System (ICS); and to define emergency response
plans based on an all-hazard approach—and to do so before the next event occurs.
Natural disasters and terrorism do not respect geographic boundaries, and we
now know that each and every community in this nation is vulnerable to a natural or
Likelihood Consequence
management management
C
O
N
H S
A E
Z Q
A Risk
event U
R E
D N
S C
E
S
Examples of where we correctly Examples of where we correctly
focus on likelihood management: focus on consequence management:
• Brushing our teeth • Earthquakes
• Anti-lock brakes in cars • Bushfires
Some areas where risk management Some areas where risk management
might improve by diverting resources might improve by diverting resources
to consequence management: to likelihood management:
• Climate change • Diabetes
• Snakebite • Global financial crises
FIGURE 5.4 Risk event.
manmade disaster. We may not be able to prevent these incidents, but we can mini-
mize the effects of these emergencies, both on an economic and human scale, with
the adoption of technologies that provide consequence management solutions, and
with a focus on interagency collaboration (Figure 5.4).
COORDINATING RESPONSE
Information sharing and interagency coordination are clearly needed to facilitate a
successful emergency incident response. Yet many public and private organizations
lack the comprehensive emergency response plans that define the roles and responsi-
bilities of trained personnel responding to an unexpected incident and describe how
to work “side by side” with responders from other agencies.
Training itself is an issue, as many organizations do not know where to turn for
assistance regarding emergency preparedness, nor do they have the time to stop the
daily task of operating a business or service to educate personnel on how to respond
to disasters or to implement the emergency preparedness and response requirements
now mandated by the federal government.
In the local communities, where such training is mandated, agencies participat-
ing in an emergency response are often not coordinated in their efforts, and, to make
matters worse, severe shortages exist in the area of emergency management person-
nel. The preparedness and response expertise reflected in this type of human capital
is in great demand post-9/11, but very hard to find.
Clearly, the response to a bioterrorism incident would be improved with better
collaboration and coordination among the agencies and private companies par-
ticipating in this response effort. How is this accomplished? With training on the
principles of emergency management and the ICS established by FEMA for use in
response to any type of hazard (an all-hazard approach) and the implementation of
“inherently safer technologies for improved incident response,” advocated by the
Department of Homeland Security.
The all-hazard approach has been a cornerstone of FEMA’s response program
since the agency was first established. It integrates the various emergency plans and
activities into a “life cycle” of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery (the
principles of emergency management) and, when combined with the ICS, provides a
template for interagency coordination that is directly applicable to events stemming
from chemical and biological hazards, as well as all other manmade or natural events.
Every community with an EOC has “in-house” expertise on the all-hazard approach,
which should be utilized to assist other agencies (such as public health) in the assess-
ment, planning, and simulation of a community-based response to emergency situations.
Each and every year, cities across the nation demonstrate that collaboration
between agencies, using the all-hazard approach to fully prepare the communities
for a coordinated incident response. This example refers to communities that are
within a 10-mile radius of a nuclear power facility, where radiological emergency
preparedness exercises are performed.
Horizontal communication and rapid exchange of information among agencies
are a basic requirement during any emergency, and the all-hazard approach has
proven to be a successful response system for both natural and manmade events.
Each community should leverage their experience and knowledge of the all-hazard
response system and ensure that all agencies participating in an emergency incident
response are cross-trained in this approach.
Summarizing about what “consequence management” is, it was introduced into
the national security lexicon with the promulgation of PDD 39 in 1995. This PDD’s
purpose was to establish how the nation would respond to terrorism employing weap-
ons of mass destruction (WMD) and how the consequences of such an incident would
be managed. Despite the very broad outlines of the PDD, consequence management,
for the most part, continues to be a tabula rasa. It has never been done before. There
are not yet any experts. The concept of “consequence management” will remain
ill-defined as well-intentioned organizations and individuals grapple with how they
might institutionalize a comprehensive operational response to a terrorist’s use of
WMD. Make no mistake, though, consequence management is not only a character-
istic of the post-Cold War, it is also an indicator of just how capable this nation is of
reconceptualizing and reorganizing for its security in the 21st century.
6 Risk Management
Risk management is the identification, assessment, and prioritization of risks (defined

in ISO 31000 as the effect of uncertainty on objectives) followed by coordinated and
economical application of resources to minimize, monitor, and control the probability
and/or impact of unfortunate events or to maximize the realization of opportunities
(Risk Management—Principles and Guidelines, www.iso.org). Risk management’s
objective is to assure uncertainty does not deflect the endeavor from the business goals.
Risks can come from various sources, including uncertainty in financial mar-
kets, threats from project failures (at any phase in design, development, production,
or sustainment life cycles), legal liabilities, credit risk, accidents, natural causes
and disasters, deliberate attack from an adversary, or events of uncertain or unpre-
dictable root-cause. There are two types of events; that is, negative events can be
classified as risks, while positive events are classified as opportunities. Several risk
management standards have been developed, including the Project Management
Institute, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, actuarial societies,
and International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards. Methods,
definitions, and goals vary widely according to whether the risk management
method is in the context of project management, security, engineering, industrial
processes, financial portfolios, actuarial assessments, or public health and safety.
Risk sources are identified and located in human factor variables, mental states, and
decision making as well as infrastructural or technological assets and tangible variables.
The interaction between human factors and tangible aspects of risk highlights the
need to focus closely on human factors as one of the main drivers for risk manage-
ment, a “change driver” that comes first of all from the need to know how humans
perform in challenging environments and in face of risks.
It is an extremely hard task to be able to apply an objective and systematic self-
observation and to make a clear and decisive step from the level of the mere “sensa-
tion” that something is going wrong to the clear understanding of how, when, and
where to act. The truth of a problem or risk is often obfuscated by wrong or incom-
plete analyses, fake targets, perceptual illusions, unclear focusing, altered mental
states, and lack of good communication and confrontation of risk management solu-
tions with reliable partners. This makes the human factor aspect of risk management
sometimes heavier than its tangible and technological counterpart.
Strategies to manage threats (uncertainties with negative consequences) typically
include avoiding the threat, reducing the negative effect or probability of the threat,
transferring all or part of the threat to another party, and even retaining some or all
of the potential or actual consequences of a particular threat, and the opposites for
opportunities (uncertain future states with benefits).
In ideal risk management, a prioritization process is followed whereby the risks with
the greatest loss (or impact) and the greatest probability of occurring are handled first, and
risks with lower probability of occurrence and lower loss are handled in descending order.
115
In practice, the process of assessing overall risk can be difficult, and balancing
resources used to mitigate between risks with a high probability of occurrence but
lower loss versus a risk with high loss but lower probability of occurrence can often
be mishandled.
Intangible risk management identifies a new type of a risk that has a 100% probability
of occurring but is ignored by the organization due to a lack of identification ability.
For example, when deficient knowledge is applied to a situation, a knowledge risk
materializes. Relationship risk appears when ineffective collaboration occurs. Process-
engagement risk may be an issue when ineffective operational procedures are applied.
These risks directly reduce the productivity of knowledge workers and decrease cost-
effectiveness, profitability, service, quality, reputation, brand value, and earnings qual-
ity. Intangible risk management allows risk management to create immediate value
from the identification and reduction of risks that reduce productivity.
Risk management also faces difficulties in allocating resources. This is the idea of
opportunity cost. Resources spent on risk management could have been spent on more
profitable activities. Again, ideal risk management minimizes spending (or manpower or
other resources) and also minimizes the negative effects of risks.
According to the definition of risk, the risk is the possibility that an event will
occur and adversely affect the achievement of an objective. Therefore, risk itself
has uncertainty. Risk management such as Committee of Sponsoring Organizations
(COSO) Enterprise Risk Management (ERM)–Integrated Framework can help man-
agers have a good control for their risk.
Each company may have different internal control components, which leads to different
outcomes. For example, the framework for enterprise risk management components
includes Internal Environment, Objective Setting, Event Identification, Risk Assessment,
Risk Response, Control Activities, Information and Communication, and Monitoring.
METHOD
For the most part, these methods consist of the following elements, performed, more
or less, in the following order.
1. Identify and characterize threats.

2. Assess the vulnerability of critical assets to specific threats.
3. Determine the risk (i.e., the expected likelihood and consequences of spe-
cific types of attacks on specific assets).
4. Identify ways to reduce those risks.
5. Prioritize risk-reduction measures based on a strategy.
PRINCIPLES OF RISK MANAGEMENT

The ISO identifies the following principles of risk management:
Risk management should:
• Create value—resources expended to mitigate risk should be less than the

consequence of inaction.
• Be an integral part of organizational processes.
Risk Management 117
• Be part of decision making process.

• Explicitly address uncertainty and assumptions.
• Be a systematic and structured process.
• Be based on the best available information.
• Be tailorable.
• Take human factors into account.
• Be transparent and inclusive.
• Be dynamic, iterative, and responsive to change.
• Be capable of continual improvement and enhancement.
• Be continually or periodically reassessed.
PROCESS
According to the standard ISO 31000 “Risk management—Principles and guide-
lines on implementation,” the process of risk management consists of several steps
as follows (www.iso.org).
Establishing the Context

This involves the following:
1. Identification of risk in a selected domain of interest

2. Planning the remainder of the process
3. Mapping out the following: the social scope of risk management
4. The identity and objectives of stakeholders
5. The basis upon which risks will be evaluated, constraints
6. Defining a framework for the activity and an agenda for identification
7. Developing an analysis of risks involved in the process
8. Mitigation or solution of risks using available technological, human and
organizational resources.
Identification
After establishing the context, the next step in the process of managing risk is to
identify potential risks. Risks are about events that, when triggered, cause problems
or benefits. Hence, risk identification can start with the source of our problems and
those of our competitors (benefit), or with the problem itself.
• Source analysis—Risk sources may be internal or external to the system

that is the target of risk management (use mitigation instead of management
since by its own definition risk deals with factors of decision making that
cannot be managed).
• Problem analysis—Risks are related to identified threats. For example: the
threat of losing money, the threat of abuse of confidential information or the
threat of human errors, accidents, and casualties. The threats may exist with
various entities, most important with shareholders, customers, and legisla-
tive bodies such as the government.
When either source or problem is known, the events that a source may trigger or
the events that can lead to a problem can be investigated. For example: stakeholders
withdrawing during a project may endanger funding of the project; confidential infor-
mation may be stolen by employees even within a closed network; lightning striking
an aircraft during takeoff may make all people on board immediate casualties.
The chosen method of identifying risks may depend on culture, industry practice,
and compliance. The identification methods are formed by templates or the develop-
ment of templates for identifying source, problem, or event. Common risk identifica-
tion methods are as follows:
• Objectives-based risk identification—Organizations and project teams

have objectives. Any event that may endanger achieving an objective partly
or completely is identified as risk.
• Scenario-based risk identification—In scenario analysis, different sce-
narios are created. The scenarios may be the alternative ways to achieve
an objective, or an analysis of the interaction of forces in, for example, a
market or battle. Any event that triggers an undesired scenario alternative
is identified as risk.
• Taxonomy-based risk identification—The taxonomy in taxonomy-based
risk identification is a breakdown of possible risk sources. Based on the
taxonomy and knowledge of best practices, a questionnaire is compiled.
The answers to the questions reveal risks.
• Common-risk checking—In several industries, lists with known risks are
available. Each risk in the list can be checked for application to a particular
situation.
• Risk charting—This method combines the above approaches by listing
resources at risk, threats to those resources, and modifying factors that
may increase or decrease the risk and consequences it is wished to avoid.
Creating a matrix under these headings enables a variety of approaches.
One can begin with resources and consider the threats they are exposed to
and the consequences of each. Alternatively, one can start with the threats
and examine which resources they would affect, or one can begin with the
consequences and determine which combination of threats and resources
would be involved to bring them about.
Assessment
Once risks have been identified, they must then be assessed as to their potential
severity of impact (generally a negative impact, such as damage or loss) and to the
probability of occurrence. These quantities can be either simple to measure, in the
case of the value of a lost building, or impossible to know for sure in the case of an
unlikely event, the probability of occurrence of which is unknown. Therefore, in
the assessment process, it is critical to make the best educated decisions in order
to properly prioritize the implementation of the risk management plan.
Risk Management 119
Even a short-term positive improvement can have long-term negative impacts.

Take the “turnpike” example. A highway is widened to allow more traffic. More traf-
fic capacity leads to greater development in the areas surrounding the improved traf-
fic capacity. Over time, traffic thereby increases to fill available capacity. Turnpikes
thereby need to be expanded in a seemingly endless cycles. There are many other
engineering examples where expanded capacity (to do any function) is soon filled
by increased demand. Since expansion comes at a cost, the resulting growth could
become unsustainable without forecasting and management.
The fundamental difficulty in risk assessment is determining the rate of occur-
rence since statistical information is not available on all kinds of past incidents and
is particularly scanty in the case of catastrophic events, simply because of their infre-
quency. Furthermore, evaluating the severity of the consequences (impact) is often
quite difficult for intangible assets. Asset valuation is another question that needs to
be addressed.
Thus, best educated opinions and available statistics are the primary sources of
information. Nevertheless, risk assessment should produce such information for
senior executives of the organization that the primary risks are easy to understand
and that the risk management decisions may be prioritized within overall com-
pany goals. Thus, there have been several theories and attempts to quantify risks.
Numerous different risk formulae exist, but perhaps the most widely accepted for-
mula for risk quantification is the following: rate (or probability) of occurrence mul-
tiplied by the impact of the event equals risk magnitude.
Composite Risk Index

The above formula can also be rewritten in terms of a composite risk index, as
follows:
Composite risk index = impact of risk event × probability of occurrence.
The impact of the risk event is commonly assessed on a scale of 1 to 5, where

1 and 5 represent the minimum and maximum possible impact, respectively, of an
occurrence of a risk (usually in terms of financial losses). However, the 1 to 5 scale
can be arbitrary and need not be on a linear scale.
The probability of occurrence is likewise commonly assessed on a scale from
1 to 5, where 1 represents a very low probability of the risk event actually occurring
while 5 represents a very high probability of occurrence. This axis may be expressed
in either mathematical terms (event occurs once a year, once in ten years, once in
100 years, etc.) or may be expressed in “plain English” (event has occurred here very
often, event has been known to occur here, event has been known to occur in the
industry, etc.). Again, the 1 to 5 scale can be arbitrary or nonlinear depending on
decisions by subject matter experts.
The composite risk index can thus take values ranging (typically) from 1 through
25, and this range is usually arbitrarily divided into three subranges. The overall risk
assessment is then low, medium, or high, depending on the subrange containing the
calculated value of the Composite Index.
Likewise, the impact of the risk is not easy to estimate since it is often difficult to
estimate the potential loss in the event of risk occurrence.
Further, both the above factors can change in magnitude depending on the ade-
quacy of risk avoidance and prevention measures taken and due to changes in the
external business environment. Hence, it is absolutely necessary to periodically reas-
sess risks and intensify/relax mitigation measures, or as necessary. Changes in pro-
cedures, technology, schedules, budgets, market conditions, political environment,
or other factors typically require reassessment of risks.
Risk Options
Risk mitigation measures are usually formulated according to one or more of the
following major risk options:
• Design a new business process with adequate built-in risk control and con-
tainment measures from the start.
• Periodically reassess risks that are accepted in ongoing processes as a nor-
mal feature of business operations and modify mitigation measures.
• Transfer risks to an external agency (e.g., an insurance company).
• Avoid risks altogether (e.g., by closing down a particular high-risk business
area).
Later research has shown that the financial benefits of risk management are less
dependent on the formula used but are more dependent on the frequency and how
risk assessment is performed.
Potential Risk Treatments

Once risks have been identified and assessed, all techniques to manage the risk fall
into one or more of these four major categories:
1. Avoidance (eliminate, withdraw from or not become involved)

2. Reduction (optimize—mitigate)
3. Sharing (transfer—outsource or insure)
4. Retention (accept and budget)
Ideal use of these risk control strategies may not be possible. Some of them may
involve trade-offs that are not acceptable to the organization or person making the
risk management decisions.
Risk Avoidance
This includes not performing an activity that could carry risk. An example would
be not buying a property or business in order to not take on the legal liability that
Risk Management 121
comes with it. Another would be not flying in order not to take the risk that the
airplane were to be hijacked. Avoidance may seem the answer to all risks, but
avoiding risks also means losing out on the potential gain that accepting (retain-
ing) the risk may have allowed. Not entering a business to avoid the risk of loss
also avoids the possibility of earning profits. Increasing risk regulation in hospi-
tals has led to avoidance of treating higher risk conditions, in favor of patients
presenting with lower risk (Risk Management—Bolds Risk, https://boldrisk.com
/risk-management).
Hazard Prevention
Hazard prevention refers to the prevention of risks in an emergency. The first
and most effective stage of hazard prevention is the elimination of hazards. If
this takes too long, is too costly, or is otherwise impractical, the second stage is
mitigation.
Risk Reduction
Risk reduction or “optimization” involves reducing the severity of the loss or the
likelihood of the loss from occurring. For example, sprinklers are designed to put
out a fire to reduce the risk of loss by fire. Acknowledging that risks can be positive
or negative, optimizing risks means finding a balance between negative risk and the
benefit of the operation or activity and between risk reduction and effort applied.
Outsourcing could be an example of risk reduction if the outsourcer can demonstrate
higher capability at managing or reducing risks.
Risk Sharing
Briefly defined as “sharing with another party the burden of loss or the benefit of
gain, from a risk, and the measures to reduce a risk” (Aujero, 2014).
The term of “risk transfer” is often used in place of risk sharing in the mistaken
belief that you can transfer a risk to a third party through insurance or outsourcing.
In practice, if the insurance company or contractor go bankrupt or end up in court,
the original risk is likely to still revert to the first party. As such, in the terminology
of practitioners and scholars alike, the purchase of an insurance contract is often
described as a “transfer of risk.” However, technically speaking, the buyer of the
contract generally retains legal responsibility for the losses “transferred,” mean-
ing that insurance may be described more accurately as a postevent compensatory
mechanism. For example, a personal injuries insurance policy does not transfer the
risk of a car accident to the insurance company. The risk still lies with the policy
holder, namely, the person who has been in the accident. The insurance policy simply
provides that if an accident (the event) occurs involving the policy holder, then some
compensation may be payable to the policy holder that is commensurate with the
suffering/damage.
Some ways of managing risk fall into multiple categories. Risk retention pools
are technically retaining the risk for the group, but spreading it over the whole group
involves transfer among individual members of the group. This is different from tra-
ditional insurance, in that no premium is exchanged between members of the group
up front, but instead losses are assessed in all members of the group.
Risk Retention
Risk retention involves accepting the loss, or benefit of gain, from a risk when it
occurs. True self-insurance falls in this category. Risk retention is a viable strategy
for small risks where the cost of insuring against the risk would be greater over
time than the total losses sustained. All risks that are not avoided or transferred are
retained by default.
This includes risks that are so large or catastrophic that they either cannot be
insured against or the premiums would be infeasible. War is an example since
most property and risks are not insured against war, so the loss attributed by war is
retained by the insured.
Also any amounts of potential loss (risk) over the amount insured are retained
risk. This may also be acceptable if the chance of a very large loss is small or if
the cost to insure for greater coverage amounts is so great it would hinder the goals
of the organization too much. Risk retention or acceptance is common type of risk
response on treats and opportunities.
Risk Management Plan

Select appropriate controls or countermeasures to measure each risk. Risk mitiga-
tion needs to be approved by the appropriate level of management. For instance, a
risk concerning the image of the organization should have top management decision
behind it, whereas information technology management would have the authority to
decide on computer virus risks.
The risk management plan should propose applicable and effective security con-
trols for managing the risks. For example, an observed high risk of computer viruses
could be mitigated by acquiring and implementing antivirus software. A good risk
management plan should contain a schedule for control implementation and respon-
sible persons for those actions.
According to ISO/IEC 27001 (www.iso.org), the stage immediately after com-
pletion of the risk assessment phase consists of preparing a Risk Treatment Plan,
which should document the decisions about how each of the identified risks should be
handled. Mitigation of risks often means selection of security controls, which should
be documented in a Statement of Applicability, which identifies which particular con-
trol objectives and controls from the standard have been selected, and why.
IMPLEMENTATION
Implementation follows all of the planned methods for mitigating the effect of the
risks. Purchase insurance policies for the risks that have been decided to be trans-
ferred to an insurer, avoid all risks that can be avoided without sacrificing the entity’s
goals, reduce others, and retain the rest.
Risk Management 123
Review and Evaluation of the Plan

Initial risk management plans will never be perfect. Practice, experience, and actual
loss results will necessitate changes in the plan and contribute information to allow
possible different decisions to be made in dealing with the risks being faced.
Risk analysis results and management plans should be updated periodically.
There are two primary reasons for this:
1. To evaluate whether the previously selected security controls are still appli-
cable and effective.
2. To evaluate the possible risk level changes in the business environment. For
example, information risks are a good example of rapidly changing busi-
ness environment.
Limitations
Prioritizing the risk management processes too highly could keep an organization
from ever completing a project or even getting started. This is especially true if other
work is suspended until the risk management process is considered complete.
It is also important to keep in mind the distinction between risk and uncertainty.
Risk can be measured by impacts × probability.
If risks are improperly assessed and prioritized, time can be wasted in dealing
with risk of losses that are not likely to occur. Spending too much time assessing
and managing unlikely risks can divert resources that could be used more profit-
ably. Unlikely events do occur, but if the risk is unlikely enough to occur, it may be
better to simply retain the risk and deal with the result if the loss does in fact occur.
Qualitative risk assessment is subjective and lacks consistency. The primary justifi-
cation for a formal risk assessment process is legal and bureaucratic.
Hazard Analysis
A hazard analysis is used as the first step in a process used to assess risk. The result
of a hazard analysis is the identification of different type of hazards. A hazard is
a potential condition and exists or not (probability is 1 or 0). It may in single exis-
tence or in combination with other hazards (sometimes called events) and conditions
become an actual functional failure or accident (mishap). The way this exactly hap-
pens in one particular sequence is called a scenario.
This scenario has a probability (between 1 and 0) of occurrence. Often, a system
has many potential failure scenarios. It also is assigned a classification, based on the
worst case severity of the end condition. Risk is the combination of probability and
severity. Preliminary risk levels can be provided in the hazard analysis.
The validation, more precise prediction (verification), and acceptance of risk are
determined in the risk assessment (analysis). The main goal of both is to provide the
best selection of means of controlling or eliminating the risk. The term is used in
several engineering specialties, including avionics, chemical process safety, safety
engineering, reliability engineering, and food safety.
Hazards and Risk

A hazard is defined as a “Condition, event, or circumstance that could lead to or
contribute to an unplanned or undesirable event” (Federal Aviation Administration,
2017). Seldom does a single hazard cause an accident or a functional failure. More
often, an accident or operational failure occurs as the result of a sequence of causes.
A hazard analysis will consider system state, for example, operating environment, as
well as failures or malfunctions.
While in some cases, safety or reliability risk can be eliminated, in most cases, a
certain degree of risk must be accepted. In order to quantify expected costs before
the fact, the potential consequences and the probability of occurrence must be con-
sidered. Assessment of risk is made by combining the severity of consequence with
the likelihood of occurrence in a matrix. Risks that fall into the “unacceptable”
category (e.g., high severity and high probability) must be mitigated by some means
to reduce the level of safety risk.
IEEE STD-1228-1994 Software Safety Plans (standards.ieee.org/findstds/standard
/1228-1994.html) prescribes industry best practices for conducting software safety haz-
ard analyses to help ensure that safety requirements and attributes are defined and speci-
fied for inclusion in software that commands, controls, or monitors critical functions.
When software is involved in a system, the development and design assurance of that
software are often governed by DO-178B.* The severity of consequence identified by
the hazard analysis establishes the criticality level of the software. Software criticality
levels range from A to E, corresponding to the severity of Catastrophic to No Safety
Effect. Higher levels of rigor are required for level A and B software, and corresponding
functional tasks and work products in the system safety domain are used as objective
evidence of meeting safety criteria and requirements.
SEVERITY DEFINITIONS—SAFETY RELATED
Severity Definition
Catastrophic Results in multiple fatalities and/or loss of the system
Hazardous Reduces the capability of the system or the operator ability to cope with adverse
conditions to the extent that there would be
• Large reduction in safety margin or functional capability
• Crew physical distress/excessive workload such that operators cannot be relied
upon to perform required tasks accurately or completely
• Serious or fatal injury to small number of occupants of aircraft (except
operators)
• Fatal injury to ground personnel and/or general public
(Continued)
* DO-178B, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, is a guideline

dealing with the safety of safety-critical software used in certain airborne systems. Although techni-
cally a guideline, it is (or was) a de facto standard for developing avionics software systems.
Risk Management 125
Major Reduces the capability of the system or the operators to cope with adverse operating
conditions to the extent that there would be
• Significant reduction in safety margin or functional capability
• Significant increase in operator workload
• Conditions impairing operator efficiency or creating significant discomfort
• Physical distress to occupants of an aircraft (except operator), including
injuries
• Major occupational illness and/or major environmental damage, and/or major
property damage
Minor Does not significantly reduce system safety. Actions required by operators are well
within their capabilities. Include
• Slight reduction in safety margin or functional capabilities
• Slight increase in workload, such as routine flight plan changes
• Some physical discomfort to occupants or aircraft (except operators)
• Minor occupational illness and/or minor environmental damage and/or minor
property damage
No safety effect Has no effect on safety
LIKELIHOOD OF OCCURRENCE
Likelihood Definition
Probable • Qualitative: Anticipated to occur one or more times during the entire system
of the operational life of an item.
• Quantitative: Probability of occurrence per operational hour is greater than
1 × 105 {\displaystyle 1\times 10^{5}}
Remote • Qualitative: Unlikely to occur to each item during its total life. May occur
several times in the life of an entire system or fleet.
• Quantitative: Probability of occurrence per operational hour is less than the
1 × 105 {\displaystyle 1\times 10^{greater occurrence. 1 × 107
{\displaystyle 1\times 10^{7}}
Extremely remote • Qualitative: not anticipated to occur to each item during its total life. May
occur a few times in the life of an entire system or fleet.
• Quantitative: probability of occurrence per operational hour is less than the
1 × 107 {\displaystyle 1\times 10^{greater than occurrence. 1 × 109
{\displaystyle 1\times 10^{9}}
Extremely • Qualitative: so unlikely that it is not anticipated to occur during the entire
improbable operational life of an entire system or fleet.
• Quantitative: probability of occurrence per operational hour is less than
occurrence. 1 × 109 {\displaystyle 1\times 10^{9}}
Again, hazard analysis is used as the first step in a process used to assess risk.
The result of a hazard analysis is the identification of different type of hazards.
A hazard is a potential condition and exists or not (probability is 1 or 0). It may be in
single existence or in combination with other hazards (sometimes called events) and
conditions become an actual functional failure or accident (mishap).
7 Composite Risk
Management Process
The U.S. Army uses this process to lessen the impact of risk and threat on its opera-
tions, and I believe this process would be a valuable tool in the emergency manage-
ment planning process.
The composite risk management (CRM) process is a process for decision making
developed by the U.S. military to acknowledge, assess, and address hazards and control
risks—during missions, operations, and even day-to-day activities (U.S. Army, 2010).
FIVE-STEP CRM PROCESS

• Step 1: Identify hazards to the force. Consider all aspects of current and
future situations, environments, and known historical problem areas.
• Step 2: Assess hazards to determine risks. Assess the impact of each hazard
in terms of potential loss and cost based on probability and severity.
• Step 3: Develop controls and make risk decisions. Develop control measures
that eliminate the hazard or reduce its risk. As control measures are devel-
oped, risks are reevaluated until the residual risk is at a level where the benefits
outweigh the cost. The appropriate decision authority then makes the decision.
• Step 4: Implement controls that eliminate the hazards or reduce their risks.
Ensure the controls are communicated to all involved.
• Step 5: Supervise and evaluate. Enforce standards and controls. Evaluate
the effectiveness of controls and adjust/update as necessary. Ensure lessons
learned are fed back into the system for future planning.
LEVELS OF RISK MANAGEMENT

CRM is designed to help you in your decision-making process. It’s not intended to be
a time-consuming effort. Therefore, use only the amount of risk management neces-
sary for the task. There are three levels of risk management:
1.
Time critical: Used when there is little time, little complexity, or low risk.
Often used during the execution phase of an operation where an unplanned
change occurs and must be managed. It’s easily applied to any situations.
2.
Deliberate: Used in the majority of workplace applications where experi-
ence in a group setting will produce the best results.
3.
Strategic: Used in high-priority or high-visibility situations, strategic CRM
generally requires use of more thorough hazard identification and risk
assessment tools. It is generally reserved for the more complex and riskier
efforts, as it may be time-consuming.
127
CRM PRINCIPLES
CRM has four key principles that govern its application. These underlying princi-
ples should be considered before, during, and after every application of the five-step
process.
• Accept no unnecessary risk. Of course, all task and daily routines

involve risk. You must accept necessary risk required to successfully com-
plete the mission or task. Unnecessary risk comes without a corresponding
return, in terms of real benefits or available opportunities. CRM is dedi-
cated to exposing and avoiding unnecessary risks.
• Make risk decisions at the appropriate level. Those accountable for the suc-
cess or failure of the mission must be included in the risk-decision process.
This establishes clear accountability. Commanders must ensure that subor-
dinates know how much risk they may accept and when they must elevate
the decision to a higher level.
• Accept the risk when the benefits outweigh the costs. Even high-risk endeav-
ors may be undertaken when there is a clear knowledge that the sum of the
benefits exceeds the sum of the costs. CRM is about controlling risk, not
avoiding all risk. Integrate CRM into Doctrine and Planning at all Levels.
• Integrating risk management into planning as early as possible provides
the decision-maker the greatest opportunity to apply CRM principles.
Usually, it reduces costs and enhances CRM’s overall effectiveness too.
RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX

Once exposure, severity, and probability have been determined, you can now complete
the last action of risk assessment. Combine the severity and probability estimates to
form a Risk Assessment Matrix as shown in Figure 7.1. For example, if you have a haz-
ard whose severity is judged to be critical but is unlikely to happen, the risk level is low.
Risk assessment matrix

Probability
Frequent Likely Occasional Seldom Unlikely
Severity
A B C D E
Catastrophic I E E H H M
Critical II E H H M L
Marginal III H M M L L
Negligible IV M L L L L
E – extremely high H – high M – moderate L – low
FIGURE 7.1 Risk assessment matrix.

Composite Risk Management Process 129
Remember that the risk assessment matrix doesn’t directly consider exposure lev-
els. You must factor any exposure considerations into the judgment of severity and
probability. For example, a normally seldom occurrence of equipment failure may
be increased to occasional if the exposure rate is high, thus making the overall risk
level medium.
RISK PRIORITY LIST

The output of risk assessment is a prioritization of risk. You need to list the risks in
order from the most serious risk to the least serious risk of any consequence. This
ensures that controls are first identified for the most serious threat to mission accom-
plishment. All steps in the risk assessment process should be fully documented for
future reference.
COMPONENTS OF RISK
Exposure
Exposure is the first action in assessing risk. Remember that exposure is the number
of resources (personnel or equipment) affected by a given event or by repeated events
over time. Exposure can be expressed in the following terms:
• Time—how long resources are exposed to the hazard.

• Proximity—how close to resources would the hazard occur.
• Volume—the number of resources affected by the hazard.
• Repetition—the frequency with which the hazard would recur.
Although exposure is a component of risk, it is not used directly in assigning a

level of risk. However, you should consider the exposure potential when assigning
levels of probability and severity.
Severity
The severity assessment should be based on the worst possible outcome that can
be expected. It’s expressed in terms of the impact on mission, people, material,
facilities, and environment. Rank hazard severity using the following standard
categories:
Probability
Next, estimate the probability of the hazard. Probability tells you how often the haz-
ard will affect some operation within the mission. If you have reliable data available,
you can also express probability as a number, in terms of a ratio or as a percentage.
Express the level of probability by using the following ranking levels.
Keep in mind the cumulative probability of the causes listed for the hazard. For
example, if there are four causes for a single hazard, the probability of its occurrence
will be greater than if there were only one cause. For future reference, document
your supporting rationale for assigning a probability to each hazard.
• Frequent—Occurs often, continuously experienced

• Likely—Occurs several times
• Occasional—Occurs sporadically
• Seldom—Unlikely, but could occur at some time
• Unlikely—Can assume it will not
Figure 7.1 presents a simple chart to assist one in the CRM process. This chart can
be made up of whatever means one needs that may apply to one risk and threat, kind
of fill in the blanks to be adaptable to one’s needs.
8 Hazards (Risk)
A hazard is any biological, chemical, mechanical, environmental, or physical agent

that is reasonably likely to cause harm or damage to humans, other organisms, or
the environment in the absence of its control. This can include, but is not limited
to, asbestos, electricity, microbial pathogens, motor vehicles, nuclear power plants,
pesticides, vaccines, and X-rays. Identification of hazards is the first step in perform-
ing a risk assessment, although in some cases, risk assessment may not be necessary.
HAZARD TYPES
Biological hazards are associated with food, including certain viruses, parasites,
fungi, bacteria, and plant and seafood toxins. Pathogenic Campylobacter and
Salmonella are common food-borne biological hazards. The hazards from these
bacteria can be avoided through risk mitigation steps such as proper handling, stor-
ing, and cooking of food. Disease in humans can come from biological hazards
in the form of infection by bacteria, antigens, viruses, or parasite. There is some
concern that new technologies such as genetic engineering pose biological hazards.
Genetically modified (GM) organisms are relatively new manmade biological haz-
ards and many have yet to be fully characterized.
Chemicals can be considered a hazard if, by virtue of its intrinsic properties, it
can cause harm or danger to humans, property, or the environment.
Some harmful chemicals occur naturally in certain geological formations, such
as radon gas or arsenic. Other chemicals include products with commercial uses,
such as agricultural and industrial chemicals, as well as products developed for home
use. Pesticides, which are normally used to control unwanted insects and plants, may
cause a variety of negative effects on nontarget organisms.
Dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane (DDT) can build up, or bioaccumulate, in birds,
resulting in thinner-than-normal egg shells, which can break in the nest. The organo
chlorine pesticide dieldrin has been linked to Parkinson’s disease. Corrosive chemi-
cals like sulfuric acid, which is found in car batteries and research laboratories,
can cause severe skin burns. Many other chemicals used in industrial and labora-
tory settings can cause respiratory, digestive, or nervous system problems if they are
inhaled, ingested, or absorbed through the skin. The negative effects of other chemi-
cals, such as alcohol and nicotine, have been well documented. Hazards associated
with chemicals are dependent on the dose or amount of the chemical.
Mechanical
A mechanical hazard is any hazard involving a machine or process. Motor vehicles,
aircraft, and air bags pose mechanical hazards. Compressed gases or liquids can also
be considered a mechanical hazard.
131
Physical
A physical hazard is a naturally occurring process that has the potential to create loss
or damage. Physical hazards include earthquakes, floods, and tornadoes. Physical
hazards often have both human and natural elements. Flood problems can be
affected by the natural elements of climate fluctuations and storm frequency and by
land drainage and building in a flood plain, human elements.
Another physical hazard, X-rays, naturally occurs from solar radiation but has
also been utilized by humans for medical purposes; however, overexposure can lead
to cancer, skin burns, and tissue damage.
HAZARD VS RISK
The terms “hazard” and “risk” are often used interchangeably. However, in terms of
risk assessment, these are two very distinct terms. As defined above, a hazard is any
biological, chemical, mechanical, or physical agent that is reasonably likely to cause
harm or damage to humans or the environment with sufficient exposure or dose. Risk
is defined as the probability that exposure to a hazard will lead to a negative conse-
quence or, more simply, Risk = Hazard × Dose (Exposure). Thus, a hazard poses no
risk if there is not exposure to that hazard.
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
Mechanical and Physical Hazards
Many mechanical hazards (aircraft, motor vehicles) and physical hazards (earth-
quakes, floods) have already been identified and well described. Hazard identifica-
tion of new machines and/or industrial processes occurs at various stages in the
design of the new machine or process. These hazard identification studies focus
mainly on deviations from the intended use or design and the harm that may occur
as a result of these deviations. These studies are regulated by various agencies such
as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration.
Biological Hazards
Many biological hazards have also been identified. For example, the hazards of natu-
rally occurring bacteria such as Escherichia coli and Salmonella are well known as
disease-causing pathogens, and a variety of measures have been taken to limit human
exposure to these microorganisms through food safety, good personal hygiene, and
education. However, the potential for new biological hazards exists through the dis-
covery of new microorganisms and through the development of new GM organisms.
Use of new GM organisms is regulated by various governmental agencies. The
US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) controls GM plants that produce or
resist pesticides (i.e., BT corn and Roundup ready crops). The US Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) regulates GM plants that will be used as food or for medicinal
purposes.
Hazards (Risk) 133
Chemical Hazards
A variety of chemical hazards (DDT, atrazine) have been identified as well. However,
every year, companies produce more new chemicals to fill new needs or to take the
place of older, less effective chemicals. Laws, such as the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act and the Toxic Substances Control Act in the United States, require
protection of human health and the environment for any new chemical introduced.
In the United States, the EPA regulates new chemicals that may have environmen-
tal impacts (i.e., pesticides or chemicals released during a manufacturing process),
while the FDA regulates new chemicals used in foods or as drugs. The potential
hazards of these chemicals can be identified by performing a variety of tests prior
to the authorization of usage. The amount of tests required and the extent to which
the chemicals are tested vary, depending on the desired usage of the chemical.
Chemicals designed as new drugs must undergo more rigorous tests than those used
as pesticides.
Environmental Hazards
Natural Hazards
Natural hazard risks have threatened people, society, the natural environment, and
the built environment, particularly more vulnerable people, throughout history and,
in some cases, on a day-to-day basis. The social, natural, and built environments are
at risk not only from geophysical hazards such as earthquakes, floods, volcanoes, and
tsunami but also from manmade technological hazards, including industrial explo-
sions, release of chemical hazards, and major accident hazards. Manmade hazards
include the emergence of risks to people and the built environment in the modern
world where hazards are presented by terrorist threats and technological hazards.
According to the Red Cross (Alexander, 2014), each year, 130,000 people are killed,
90,000 are injured, and 140 million are affected by unique events known as disaster,
and the effects of the loss of life, property damage, and social and economic disrup-
tion are caused by natural disasters, such as earthquakes, wind storms, tsunamis,
floods, landslides, volcanic eruptions, wildfire, grasshopper and locust infestations,
drought, and desertification and other calamities of natural origin.
Mitigating Natural Hazards

Methods to reduce risk from natural hazards include construction of prone facilities
away from areas with high risk, redundancy, emergency reserve funds, purchasing
relevant insurance, and the development of operational recovery plans.
Natural Hazard and Disaster Definitions

Disaster can be defined as the degree of risk of hazard that has a defined potential to
cause significant personal, societal, property, or environmental damage or destruc-
tion. Disaster can manifest in various forms, threatening those people or environ-
ments specifically vulnerable to disaster. For example, a hurricane making landfall
in the southeast United States presents a risk to those people, buildings, and environ-
ments in the path of the hurricane and within proximity to the hazard where there is
a risk and potentially those who will be involved in the emergency response. Such
impacts include death, injury, trauma, or posttraumatic stress disorder.
The definition of an environmental hazard is “the threat potential posed to man or
nature by events originating in, or transmitted by, the natural or built environment.”
Keith Smith (2001) says that this definition includes a broader range of hazards rang-
ing from long-term environmental deterioration, such as acidification of soils and
build-up of atmospheric carbon dioxide, to communal and involuntary social haz-
ards such as crime and terrorism to voluntary and personal hazards such as drug
abuse and mountain climbing.
Environmental hazards usually have defined or common characteristics, includ-
ing their tendency to be rapid-onset events, meaning they occur with a short warning
time, they have a clear source of origin which is easily identified, impact will be
swift and losses are suffered quickly during or shortly after the onset of the event,
risk of exposure is usually involuntary due to location or proximity of people to set
hazard, and the disaster occurs with an intensity and scale that justify an emergency
response.
Hazards were grouped by Christopher and Burton (2001) according to their char-
acteristics. These were factors related to geophysical events which were not process
specific (Smith, 2001). They were the following:
1. Areal extent of damage zone

2. Intensity of impact at a point
3. Duration of impact at a point
4. Rate of onset of the event
5. Predictability of the event
Disaster can take various forms, including hurricane, volcano, tsunami, earth-
quake, drought, famine, plague, disease, rail crash, car crash, tornado, deforestation,
flooding, toxic release, and spills.
These can affect people and the environment on the local regional level, national
level, or international level, where the international community becomes involved
with aid donation and governments give money to support affected countries’ econo-
mies with disaster response and reconstruction postdisaster.
In defining hazard, it is important to distinguish between natural hazards, which
may be defined as extreme events that originate in the biosphere, hydrosphere, lith-
osphere or atmosphere and a potential threat to humans and their welfare, which
include earthquakes, landslides, hurricanes, and tsunamis, and technological haz-
ards, including explosions, release of toxic materials, episodes of severe contami-
nation, structural collapses, and transportation, construction and manufacturing
accidents, etc. There is also a distinction to be made between rapid-onset natural
hazards, technological hazards, and social hazards and the consequences of environ-
mental degradation such as desertification and drought, which are described as being
of sudden occurrence and relatively short duration. The distinction between hazard
and risk are defined as the hazard will cause harm or damage and the chance of the
hazard happening is not mitigated. Risk has the additional implication of the chance
of a particular hazard actually occurring and thus define risk as the probability of
Hazards (Risk) 135
hazard occurrence. Major disaster, as it is usually assessed on quantitative criteria of

death and damage, was defined by Hewitt and Sheehan (1969) as having to conform
to the following criteria:
• At least 100 people dead

• At least 100 people injured
• At least $1 million damage
RISK
Risk can be defined as the likelihood or probability of a given hazard of a given level
causing a particular level of loss of damage. The elements of risk to the populations
and communities come from the built-up environment, the natural environment, and
economic activities and services which are under threat of disaster in any given area.
Risk can be equated with a simple equation, although it is not mathematical. The
total risk according to UNDRO (1982) is the “sum of predictable deaths, injuries,
destruction, damage, disruption, and costs of repair and mitigation caused by a disas-
ter of a particular level in a given area or areas.” Mathematically, it can be written as
Total risk = (Sum of the elements at risk ) × (Hazard × Vulnerability)
Distinguishing between risk and vulnerability, we can say that vulnerability

refers to the potential for casualty, destruction, damage, disruption or other form of
loss in a particular element: risk combines this with the probable level of loss to be
expected from a predictable magnitude of hazard. As hazard has varying degrees of
severity, the more intense or severe the hazard, the greater vulnerability there will
be as potential for damage and destruction is increased with respect to severity of
hazard. Ben Wisner (2003) argues that risk or disaster is “a compound function of
the natural hazard and the number of people, characterized by their varying degrees
of vulnerability to that specific hazard, who occupy the space and time of exposure
to the hazard event.” This is simplified into a nonmathematical equation: R = H × V.
Risk, vulnerability, and hazard are the three factors or elements that we are con-
sidering here in this pseudo-equation. Another definition of risk given by factor
analysis of information risk that may be related to disaster is “the probable fre-
quency and probable magnitude of future losses.” Again, this definition focuses on
the probability of future loss whereby the degree of vulnerability to hazard repre-
sents the level of risk on a particular population, built environment, or environment.
The relationship between severity of environmental hazard, the probability of it hap-
pening, and risk will obviously vary, and it is necessary to outline the threats posed
by a hazard. These are the following:
1. Hazards to people—death, injury, disease, and stress

2. Hazards to goods—property damage and economic loss
3. Hazards to environment—loss of flora and fauna, pollution, and loss of
amenity
SMAUG MODEL—A BASIS FOR PRIORITIZING HAZARD RISKS

In emergency or disaster management, the SMAUG model of identifying and pri-
oritizing risk of hazards associated with natural and technological threats is an effec-
tive tool. SMAUG stands for seriousness, manageability, acceptability, urgency,
and growth, which are the criteria used for prioritization of hazard risks. The
SMAUG model provides an effective means of prioritizing hazard risks based
upon the aforementioned criteria in order to address the risks posed by the hazards
to the avail of effecting effective mitigation, reduction, and response and recovery
methods.
• Seriousness can be defined as “the relative impact in terms of people and

dollars.” This includes the potential for lives to be lost and potential for
injury, as well as the physical, social, and as mentioned, economic losses
that may be incurred
• Manageability can be defined as “the relative ability to mitigate or reduce
the hazard (through managing the hazard, or the community or both).”
Hazards presenting a high risk and as such requiring significant amounts of
risk reduction initiatives will be rated high.
• Acceptability is the degree to which the risk of hazard is acceptable in terms
of political, environmental, social, and economic impact
• Urgency is related to the probability of risk of hazard and is defined in
terms of how imperative it is to address the hazard
• Growth is the potential for the hazard or event to expand or increase in either
probability or risk to community or both. Should vulnerability increase,
potential for growth may also increase.
An example of the numerical ratings for each of the four criteria is shown in the
following:
• Manageability: high = 7+, medium = 5–7, low = 0–4

• Urgency: high = >20 years, medium = <20 years, low = 100 years
• Acceptability: high priority—poses more significant risk; low priority—
lower risk of hazard impact
• Growth: high = 3, medium = 2, low = 1
• Seriousness: high = 4–5, medium = 2–3, low = 0–1
HIERARCHY OF HAZARD CONTROL

Hierarchy of hazard control is a system used in industry to minimize or eliminate
exposure to hazards (Figure 8.1). It is a widely accepted system promoted by numer-
ous safety organizations. This concept is taught to managers in industry, to be pro-
moted as standard practice in the workplace. Various illustrations are used to depict
this system, most commonly a triangle.
Hazards (Risk) 137
Elimination
Substitution
Engineering controls
Administrative controls
Personal protective equipment
FIGURE 8.1 Hierarchy of hazard control.
The hazard controls in the hierarchy are, in order of decreasing effectiveness:
• Elimination
• Substitution
• Engineering
• Administration
• Personal protective equipment (PPE)
Components of the Hierarchy

The components of the hierarchy are shown in Figure 8.2.
Elimination
Eliminating the hazard—physically removing it is the most effective hazard control.
For example, if employees must work high above the ground, the hazard can be
Best Best
Elimination
Design it out
Substitution
Use something else
Engineering controls
Isolation and guarding
Administrative controls
Training and work scheduling
Personal protective equipment
Control Last resort Business
effectiveness value
FIGURE 8.2 Components of the hierarchy.

eliminated by moving the piece they are working on to ground level to eliminate the
need to work at heights.
Substitution
This pesticide contains DDT, and an effective substitution would be to replace it with
a environmentally friendly. Substitution, the second most effective hazard control,
involves replacing something that produces a hazard (similar to elimination) with
something that does not produce a hazard—for example, replacing lead-based paint
with acrylic paint. To be an effective control, the new product must not produce
another hazard. Because airborne dust can be hazardous, if a product can be pur-
chased with a larger particle size, the smaller product may effectively be substituted
with the larger product.
Engineering Controls
The third most effective means of controlling hazards is engineered controls. These
do not eliminate hazards, but rather isolate people from hazards. Capital costs of
engineered controls tend to be higher than less effective controls in the hierarchy;
however, they may reduce future costs. For example, a crew might build a work plat-
form rather than purchase, replace, and maintain fall arrest equipment. “Enclosure
and isolation” create a physical barrier between personnel and hazards, such as using
remotely controlled equipment. Fume hoods can remove airborne contaminants as a
means of engineered control.
Administrative Controls
Administrative controls are changes to the way people work. Examples of admin-
istrative controls include procedure changes, employee training, and installation of
signs and warning labels (such as those in the Workplace Hazardous Materials
Information System [WHMIS], https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services
/environmental).
Administrative controls do not remove hazards, but limit or prevent people’s
exposure to the hazards, such as completing road construction at night when fewer
people are driving.
Personal Protective Equipment

PPE includes gloves, respirators, hard hats, safety glasses, high-visibility clothing,
and safety footwear. PPE is the least effective means of controlling hazards because
of the high potential for damage to render PPE ineffective. Additionally, some PPE,
such as respirators, increase physiological effort to complete a task and therefore
may require medical examinations to ensure that workers can use the PPE without
risking their health.
9 Vulnerability
Vulnerability refers to the inability (of a system or a unit) to withstand the effects
of a hostile environment. A window of vulnerability is a time frame within which
defensive measures are diminished, compromised, or lacking.
COMMON APPLICATIONS
In relation to hazards and disasters, vulnerability is a concept that links the rela-
tionship that people have with their environment to social forces and institutions
and the cultural values that sustain and contest them. “The concept of vulnerability
expresses the multi dimensionality of disasters by focusing attention on the totality
of relationships in a given social situation which constitute a condition that, in com-
bination with environmental forces, produces a disaster” (Bankoff, 2004).
It’s also the extent to which changes could harm a system, or to which the com-
munity can be affected by the impact of a hazard or exposed to the possibility of
being attacked or harmed, either physically or emotionally: “we were in a vulnerable
position.”
Research
Within the body of literature related to vulnerability, major research streams include
questions of methodology, such as measuring and assessing vulnerability, including
finding appropriate indicators for various aspects of vulnerability, up and down scal-
ing methods, and participatory methods.
Vulnerability research covers a complex, multidisciplinary field including develop-
ment and poverty studies, public health, climate studies, security studies, engineering,
geography, political ecology, and disaster risk management. This research is of impor-
tance and interest for organizations trying to reduce vulnerability—especially as related
to poverty and other Millennium Development Goals. Many institutions are conduct-
ing interdisciplinary research on vulnerability. A forum that brings many of the cur-
rent researchers on vulnerability together is the Expert Working Group (Biometric
Vulnerability Assessment Expert Group, https://www.biometricsinstitute.org/biometric
-vulnerability). Researchers are currently working to refine definitions of “vulnerability,”
measurement and assessment methods, and effective communication of research to deci-
sion makers.
TYPES OF VULNERABILITIES
Social Vulnerability
In its sense, social vulnerability is one dimension of vulnerability to multiple stress-
ors (agent responsible for stress) and shocks, including abuse, social exclusion, and
139
natural hazards. Social vulnerability refers to the inability of people, organizations,

and societies to withstand adverse impacts from multiple stressors to which they are
exposed. These impacts are due in part to characteristics inherent in social interac-
tions, institutions, and systems of cultural values.
Cognitive Vulnerability
A cognitive vulnerability, in cognitive psychology, is an erroneous belief, cognitive
bias, or pattern of thought that is believed to predispose the individual to psychologi-
cal problems.
It is in place before the symptoms of psychological disorders start to appear, such
as high neuroticism, and after the individual encounters a stressful experience, the
cognitive vulnerability shapes a maladaptive response that may lead to a psycho-
logical disorder. In psychopathology, cognitive vulnerability is constructed from
schema models, hopelessness models, and attachment theory. Attentional bias is
one mechanism leading to faulty cognitive bias that leads to cognitive vulnerabil-
ity. Allocating a danger level to a threat depends on the urgency or intensity of the
threshold. Anxiety is not associated with selective orientation.
Military
In military terminology, vulnerability is a subset of survivability, the others being sus-
ceptibility and recoverability. Vulnerability is defined in various ways depending on
the nation and service arm concerned, but in general, it refers to the near-instantaneous
effects of a weapon attack. In aviation, it is defined as the inability of an aircraft to
withstand the damage caused by the manmade hostile environment. In some defini-
tions, recoverability (damage control, firefighting, restoration of capability) is included
in vulnerability. Some military services develop their own concept of vulnerability.
Invulnerability
Invulnerability is a common feature found in video games. It makes the player impervi-
ous to pain, damage, or loss of health. It can be found in the form of “power-ups” or
cheats; when activated via cheats, it is often referred to as “god mode.” Generally, it does
not protect the player from certain instant-death hazards, most notably “bottomless” pits
from which, even if the player were to survive the fall, they would be unable to escape.
As a rule, invulnerability granted by power-ups is temporary and wears off after
a set amount of time, while invulnerability cheats, once activated, remain in effect
until deactivated, or the end of the level is reached. Depending on the game in ques-
tion, invulnerability to damage may or may not protect the player from nondamage
effects, such as being immobilized or sent flying.
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
A vulnerability assessment is the process of identifying, quantifying, and priori-
tizing (or ranking) the vulnerabilities in a system. Examples of systems for which
Vulnerability 141
vulnerability assessments are performed include, but are not limited to, information
technology (IT) systems, energy supply systems, water supply systems, transporta-
tion systems, and communication systems.
Such assessments may be conducted on behalf of a range of different organiza-
tions, from small businesses up to large regional infrastructures. Vulnerability from
the perspective of disaster management means assessing the threats from potential
hazards to the population and to infrastructure. It may be conducted in the political,
social, economic, or environmental fields.
Vulnerability assessment has many things in common with risk assessment.
Assessments are typically performed according to the following steps:
• Cataloging assets and capabilities (resources) in a system

• Assigning quantifiable value (or at least rank order) and importance to those
resources
• Identifying the vulnerabilities or potential threats to each resource
• Mitigating or eliminating the most serious vulnerabilities for the most valu-
able resources
Classical risk analysis is described as follows: “Classical risk analysis is prin-

cipally concerned with investigating the risks surrounding a plant (or some other
object), its design and operations. Such analysis tend to focus on causes and the
direct consequences for the studied object. Vulnerability analysis, on the other hand,
focus both on consequences for the object itself and on primary and secondary con-
sequences for the surrounding environment. It also concerns itself with the possibili-
ties of reducing such consequences and of improving the capacity to manage future
incidents.” In general, a vulnerability analysis serves to “categorize key assets and
drive the risk management process” (Faulstich, 2015).
In the United States, guides providing valuable considerations and templates for com-
pleting a vulnerability assessment are available from numerous agencies, including the
Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the U.S. Department
of Transportation, just to name a few (Vulnerability Assessment Report report template,
https://www.reporttemplates.net/.../Vulnerability_Assessment_Report).
The framework makes use of nested flowcharts to show how social and environ-
mental forces interact to create situations vulnerable to sudden changes. Proposing
an analytical framework, based on research, suggests that the first stage is to assess
current vulnerability by documenting exposures and current adaptive strategies.
This should be followed by a second stage that estimates directional changes in those
current risk factors and characterizes the community’s future adaptive capacity. The
framework utilizes historic information including how communities have experi-
enced and addressed climatic hazards, with information on what conditions are likely
to change and what constraints and opportunities there are for future adaptation.
VULNERABILITY INDEX
A vulnerability index is a measure of the exposure of a population to some haz-
ard. Typically, the index is a composite of multiple quantitative indicators that, via
some formula, delivers a single numerical result. Through such an index, “diverse
issues can be combined into a standardized framework…making comparisons pos-
sible” (SIDS of the Pacific, 2015). For instance, indicators from the physical sciences
can be combined with social, medical, and even psychological variables to evaluate
potential complications for disaster planning.
The origin of vulnerability indexes as a policy planning tool began with the United
Nations Environmental Program. One of the participants in the early task forces has
also conducted secondary research documenting the evolution of the analytic tool
through various stages (United Nations Environment Programme, www.unep.org).
BASIC METHODOLOGY
The basic methodology of constructing a vulnerability index is that the individual
measures are weighted according to their relative importance. A cumulative score
is then generated, typically by adding the weighted values. Decision trees can evalu-
ate alternative policy options.
IN HAZARD PLANNING
The concept has been extended and applied in dealing with risk from natural hazards
and the part that population metrics play in making such a situation into a disaster.
In the United States, this has been done at a county level and is run by the Hazards
and Vulnerability Research Institute.
THREATS TO COMPUTERS AND IT SYSTEMS

In computer security, a threat is a possible danger that might exploit a vulnerability
to breach security and therefore cause possible harm.
A threat can be either “intentional” (i.e., hacking: an individual cracker or a crim-
inal organization) or “accidental” (e.g., the possibility of a computer malfunctioning
or the possibility of a natural disaster such as an earthquake, a fire, or a tornado) or
otherwise a circumstance, capability, action, or event.
Definitions
ISO 27005 defines threat as, “A potential cause of an incident that may result in harm
of systems and organization” (ISO/IEC 27005:2011—Information technology—
Security www.iso.org).
A more comprehensive definition, tied to an Information assurance point of view, can
be found in “Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 200 (Minimum Security
Requirements for Federal, https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/fips/200/final/),
Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems”
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology of the United States:
Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational

operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational
Vulnerability 143
assets, or individuals through an information system via unauthorized access,

destruction, disclosure, modification of information, and/or denial of service.
Also, the potential for a threat-source to successfully exploit a particular informa-
tion system vulnerability.
The National Information Assurance Glossary defines threat as follows (https://

www.ecs.csus.edu/csc/iac/cnssi_4009.pdf):
Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact an IS through unau-
thorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of data, and/or denial of service.
European Union Agency for Network and Information Security gives a similar
definition (https://www.enisa.europa.eu):
Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact an asset through unau-
thorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of data, and/or denial of service.
The Open Group defines threat as follows:
Anything that is capable of acting in a manner resulting in harm to an asset and/or

organization; for example, acts of God (weather, geological events, etc.); malicious
actors; errors; failures.
Factor analysis of information risk defines threat as follows:
Threats are anything (e.g., object, substance, human, etc.) that are capable of acting
against an asset in a manner that can result in harm. A tornado is a threat, as is a flood,
as is a hacker. The key consideration is that threats apply the force (water, wind, exploit
code, etc.) against an asset that can cause a loss event to occur.
The National Information Assurance Training and Education Center gives a more
articulated definition of threat (niatec.info):
1. The means through which the ability or intent of a threat agent to

adversely affect an automated system, facility, or operation can be mani-
fest. Categorize and classify threats as follows: Categories Classes Human
Intentional Unintentional Environmental Natural Fabricated.
2. Any circumstance or event with the potential to cause harm to a system in
the form of destruction, disclosure, modification or data, and/or denial of
service.
3. Any circumstance or event with the potential to cause harm to the ADP
system or activity in the form of destruction, disclosure, and modification
of data, or denial of service. A threat is a potential for harm. The presence
of a threat does not mean that it will necessarily cause actual harm. Threats
exist because of the very existence of the system or activity and not because
of any specific weakness. For example, the threat of fire exists at all facili-
ties regardless of the amount of fire protection available.
4. Types of computer systems related adverse events that may result in losses.
Examples are flooding, sabotage, and fraud.
5. An assertion primarily concerning entities of the external environment
(agents); we say that an agent (or class of agents) poses a threat to one or
more assets; we write: T (e; i) where: e is an external entity; i is an internal
entity or an empty set.
6. An undesirable occurrence that might be anticipated but is not the result
of a conscious act or decision. In threat analysis, a threat is defined as an
ordered pair, <peril; asset category>, suggesting the nature of these occur-
rences but not the details (details are specific to events).
7. A potential violation of security.
8. A set of properties of a specific external entity (which may be either an indi-
vidual or class of entities) that, in union with a set of properties of a specific
internal entity, implies a risk (according to some body of knowledge).
PHENOMENOLOGY
The term “threat” relates to some other basic security terms, as shown in Figure 9.1.
A resource (both physical and logical) can have one or more vulnerabilities that
can be exploited by a threat agent in a threat action. The result can potentially com-
promise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability properties of resources (poten-
tially different from the vulnerable one) of the organization and others involved
parties (customers and suppliers).
The so-called Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) triad is the basis of information
security.
The attack can be active when it attempts to alter system resources or affect their
operation, so it compromises integrity or availability. A “passive attack” attempts
to learn or make use of information from the system but does not affect system
resources: so it compromises confidentiality.
OWASP: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THREAT

AGENT AND BUSINESS IMPACT
Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) depicts the same phenomenon in
slightly different terms: a threat agent through an attack vector exploits a weakness
An attack—a threat Countermeasures A system resource:

action target of the attack
Attack Passive Vulnerability

a threat agent or
active attack Threat consequences
FIGURE 9.1 Threat flow chart.

Vulnerability 145
(vulnerability) of the system and the related security controls, causing a technical
impact on an IT resource (asset) connected to a business impact.
A set of policies concerned with information security management, the infor-
mation security management systems (ISMS) (www.iso.org), has been developed to
manage, according to risk management principles, the countermeasures in order to
accomplish a security strategy set-up following rules and regulations applicable in
a country. Countermeasures are also called security controls; when applied to the
transmission of information, they are named security services.
The overall picture represents the risk factors of the risk scenario (Figure 9.2).
The widespread of computer dependencies and the consequent raising of the con-
sequence of a successful attack, led to a new term: cyber warfare.
It should be noted that, nowadays, the many real attacks exploit psychology at
least as much as technology. Phishing and pretexting and other methods are called
social engineering techniques. The Web 2.0 applications, specifically social network
services, can be a means to get in touch with people in charge of system administra-
tion or even system security, inducing them to reveal sensitive information.
The most widespread documentation on computer insecurity is about technical
threats such as a computer virus, Trojan, and other malware, but a serious study to
apply cost-effective countermeasures can only be conducted following a rigorous IT
risk analysis in the framework of an ISMS: a pure technical approach will let out the
psychological attacks that are increasing threats.
Cyber threat
management
Threat intelligence research
and data management, SIEM
BigData analytics, behavior
and malware analysis,
honeypots, situational
awareness
Security ops, Identify threats,

asset mgmt threat modeling
Policy, compliance, Incident

manage security response
controls, vendor Organization
management, wide risk
Risk
security standards, strategy,
assessment,
security report risk
vuln
architecture, management
encryption, access
control, assurance
Information Risk
security management
FIGURE 9.2 Risk factors of the risk scenario.

THREATS CLASSIFICATION
Threats can be classified according to their type and origin (Figure 9.3).
Types of threats:
• Physical damage: fire, water, and pollution

• Natural events: climatic, seismic, and volcanic
• Loss of essential services: electrical power, air conditioning, and
telecommunication
• Compromise of information: eavesdropping, theft of media, and retrieval
of discarded materials
• Technical failures: equipment, software, and capacity saturation
• Compromise of functions: error in use, abuse of rights, and denial of actions
Note that a threat type can have multiple origins.
• Deliberate: aiming at information asset

• Spying
• Illegal processing of data
• Accidental
• Equipment failure
• Software failure
• Environmental
• Natural event
• Loss of power supply
• Negligence: known but neglected factors, compromising the network
safety and sustainability
SYSTEM THREAT CLASSIFICATION

Microsoft has proposed a threat classification called STRIDE (The STRIDE Threat
Model, msdn.microsoft.com), from the initials of threat categories:
• Spoofing of user identity

• Tampering
• Repudiation
• Information disclosure (privacy breach or data leak)
• Denial of service (DoS)
• Elevation of privilege
Microsoft previously rated the risk of security threats using five categories in
a classification called DREAD: Risk assessment model. The model is considered
obsolete by Microsoft. The categories were as follows:
• Damage—how bad would an attack be?

• Reproducibility—how easy it is to reproduce the attack?
Observe Orient Decide Act
Vulnerability
Guidance and
control
Threat indicators Org/agency

culture
Org/agency Internal
External Feed history intelligence Feed Decision Feed Action
intelligence Observations (hypothesis) (test)
Forward Forward Forward
New Previous
information incidents
Unfolding interaction
with environment
Unfolding
interaction
Feedback with
Feedback environment
Feedback
Boyd cycle or
OODA loop
Operate at a faster tempo than adversaries adapted to
cyber threat
management
FIGURE 9.3 Threat classification decision chart.

147
• Exploitability—how much work is it to launch the attack?

• Affected users—how many people will be impacted?
• Discoverability—how easy it is to discover the threat?
The DREAD name comes from the initials of the five categories listed.
The spread over a network of threats can lead to dangerous situations. In military
and civil fields, threat level has been defined: for example, INFOCON is a threat
level used by the United States. Leading antivirus software vendors publish global
threat level on their websites.
ASSOCIATED TERMS
The term “threat agent” is used to indicate an individual or group that can manifest
a threat. It is fundamental to identify who would want to exploit the assets of a com-
pany, and how they might use them against the company.
Individuals within a threat population, practically anyone and anything, can,
under the right circumstances, be a threat agent—the well-intentioned, but inept,
computer operator who trashes a daily batch job by typing the wrong command, the
regulator performing an audit, or the squirrel that chews through a data cable.
Threat agents can take one or more of the following actions against an asset:
• Access—simple unauthorized access

• Misuse—unauthorized use of assets (e.g., identity theft, setting up a porn
distribution service on a compromised server, etc.)
• Disclose—the threat agent illicitly discloses sensitive information
• Modify—unauthorized changes to an asset
• Deny access—includes destruction, theft of a nondata asset, etc.
It’s important to recognize that each of these actions affects different assets dif-
ferently, which drives the degree and nature of loss. For example, the potential for
productivity loss resulting from a destroyed or stolen asset depends upon how critical
that asset is to the organization’s productivity.
If a critical asset is simply illicitly accessed, there is no direct productivity loss.
Similarly, the destruction of a highly sensitive asset that doesn’t play a critical role
in productivity won’t directly result in a significant productivity loss. Yet that same
asset, if disclosed, can result in significant loss of competitive advantage or reputa-
tion and generate legal costs.
The point is that it’s the combination of the asset and type of action against the
asset that determines the fundamental nature and degree of loss. Which action(s)
a threat agent takes will be driven primarily by that agent’s motive (e.g., financial gain,
revenge, recreation, etc.) and the nature of the asset. For example, a threat agent bent
on financial gain is less likely to destroy a critical server than they are to steal an
easily pawned asset like a laptop.
It is important to separate the concept of the event that a threat agent gets in
contact with the asset (even virtually, i.e., through the network) and the event that a
threat agent acts against the asset.
Vulnerability 149
OWASP collects a list of potential threat agents in order to prevent system design-
ers and programmers insert vulnerabilities in the software.
• Threat Agent = Capabilities + Intentions + Past Activities
These individuals and groups can be classified as follows:
• Non-target specific: Non-target specific threat agents are computer viruses,

worms, Trojans, and logic bombs.
• Employees: These include staff, contractors, operational/maintenance per-
sonnel, or security guards who are annoyed with the company.
• Organized crime and criminals: Criminals target information that is of
value to them, such as bank accounts, credit cards, or intellectual property
that can be converted into money. Criminals will often make use of insiders
to help them.
Corporations
Corporations are engaged in offensive information warfare or competitive intelli-
gence. Partners and competitors come under this category.
• Human, unintentional: accidents, carelessness

• Human, intentional: insider, outsider
• Natural: flood, fire, lightning, meteor, earthquakes
THREAT SOURCE
Threat sources are those who wish a compromise to occur. It is a term used to dis-
tinguish them from threat agents/actors who are those who actually carry out the
attack and who may be commissioned or persuaded by the threat actor to knowingly
or unknowingly carry out the attack.
Threat communities
Subsets of the overall threat agent population that share key characteristics, and the
notion of threat communities is a powerful tool for understanding who and what
we’re up against as we try to manage risk.
For example, the probability that an organization would be subject to an attack
from the terrorist threat community would depend, in large part, on the characteristics
of your organization relative to the motives, intents, and capabilities of the terrorists.
1. Is the organization closely affiliated with ideology that conflicts with

known, active terrorist groups?
2. Does the organization represent a high-profile, high-impact target?
3. Is the organization a soft target? How does the organization compare with
other potential targets?
4. If the organization were to come under attack, what components of the

organization would be likely targets?
5. For example, how likely is it that terrorists would target the company infor-
mation or systems?
The following threat communities are examples of the human malicious threat
landscape many organizations face:
Internal
• Employees
• Contractors (and vendors)
• Partners
External
• Cyber-criminals (professional hackers)

• Spies
• Nonprofessional hackers
• Activists
• Nation-state intelligence services (e.g., counterparts to the CIA, etc.)
• Malware (virus/worm/etc.) authors
THREAT ACTION
Threat action is an assault on system security. A complete security architecture deals
with both intentional acts (i.e., attacks) and accidental events. Various kinds of threat
actions are defined as subentries under “threat consequence.”
THREAT ANALYSIS
Threat analysis is the analysis of the probability of occurrences and consequences of
damaging actions to a system. It is the basis of risk analysis.
THREAT CONSEQUENCE
Threat consequence is a security violation that results from a threat action. It
includes disclosure, deception, disruption, and usurpation.
The following subentries describe four kinds of threat consequences and also list
and describe the kinds of threat actions that cause each consequence. Threat actions
that are accidental events are marked by the following.
“Unauthorized disclosure (a threat consequence)”: A circumstance or event
whereby an entity gains access to data for which the entity is not authorized. (See:
data confidentiality.) The following threat actions can cause unauthorized disclosure:
• “Exposure”: A threat action whereby sensitive data is directly released to an

unauthorized entity. This includes the following:
Vulnerability 151
• “Deliberate Exposure”: Intentional release of sensitive data to an unau-

thorized entity.
• “Scavenging”: Searching through data residue in a system to gain unau-
thorized knowledge of sensitive data.
• “Human error”: Human action or inaction that unintentionally results in
an entity gaining unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data.
• “Hardware/software error”: System failure that results in an entity
gaining unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data.
• “Interception”: A threat action whereby an unauthorized entity directly
accesses sensitive data travelling between authorized sources and destina-
tions. This includes:
• “Theft”: Gaining access to sensitive data by stealing a shipment of a
physical medium, such as a magnetic tape or disk, that holds the data.
• “Wiretapping (passive)”: Monitoring and recording data that is flowing
between two points in a communication system. (See: wiretapping.)
• “Emanations analysis”: Gaining direct knowledge of communicated
data by monitoring and resolving a signal that is emitted by a system
and that contains the data but is not intended to communicate the data.
• “Inference”: A threat action whereby an unauthorized entity indirectly
accesses sensitive data (but not necessarily the data contained in the com-
munication) by reasoning from characteristics or byproducts of communi-
cations. This includes the following:
• “Traffic analysis”: Gaining knowledge of data by observing the charac-
teristics of communications that carry the data.
• “Signals analysis”: Gaining indirect knowledge of communicated data
by monitoring and analyzing a signal that is emitted by a system and
that contains the data but is not intended to communicate the data. (See:
Emanation.)
• “Intrusion”: A threat action whereby an unauthorized entity gains access
to sensitive data by circumventing a system’s security protections. This
includes the following:
• “Trespass”: Gaining unauthorized physical access to sensitive data by
circumventing a system’s protections.
• “Penetration”: Gaining unauthorized logical access to sensitive data by
circumventing a system’s protections.
• “Reverse engineering”: Acquiring sensitive data by disassembling and
analyzing the design of a system component.
• “Cryptanalysis”: Transforming encrypted data into plain text without
having prior knowledge of encryption parameters or processes.
• “Deception” (a threat consequence): A circumstance or event that may
result in an authorized entity receiving false data and believing it to be true.
The following threat actions can cause deception:
• “Masquerade”: A threat action whereby an unauthorized entity gains access
to a system or performs a malicious act by posing as an authorized entity.
• “Spoof”: Attempt by an unauthorized entity to gain access to a system
by posing as an authorized user.
• “Malicious logic”: In context of masquerade, any hardware, firmware,

or software (e.g., Trojan horse) that appears to perform a useful or
desirable function but actually gains unauthorized access to system
resources or tricks a user into executing other malicious logic.
• “Falsification”: A threat action whereby false data deceives an autho-
rized entity. (See: active wiretapping.)
• “Substitution”: Altering or replacing valid data with false data that
serves to deceive an authorized entity.
• “Insertion”: Introducing false data that serve to deceive an authorized
entity.
• “Repudiation”: A threat action whereby an entity deceives another by
falsely denying responsibility for an act.
• “False denial of origin”: Action whereby the originator of data denies
responsibility for its generation.
• “False denial of receipt”: Action whereby the recipient of data denies
receiving and possessing the data.
• “Disruption” (a threat consequence): A circumstance or event that inter-
rupts or prevents the correct operation of system services and functions.
(See: denial of service.) The following threat actions can cause disruption:
• “Incapacitation”: A threat action that prevents or interrupts system
operation by disabling a system component.
• “Malicious logic”: In the context of incapacitation, any hardware, firm-
ware, or software (e.g., logic bomb) intentionally introduced into a sys-
tem to destroy system functions or resources.
• “Physical destruction”: Deliberate destruction of a system component
to interrupt or prevent system operation.
• “Human error”: Action or inaction that unintentionally disables a sys-
tem component.
• “Hardware or software error”: Error that causes failure of a system
component and leads to disruption of system operation.
• “Natural disaster”: Any natural disaster (e.g., fire, flood, earthquake,
lightning, or wind) that disables a system component.
• “Corruption”: A threat action that undesirably alters system operation
by adversely modifying system functions or data.
• “Tamper”: In the context of corruption, deliberate alteration of a sys-
tem’s logic, data, or control information to interrupt or prevent correct
operation of system functions.
• “Malicious logic”: In the context of corruption, any hardware, firm-
ware, or software (e.g., a computer virus) intentionally introduced into
a system to modify system functions or data.
• “Human error”: Human action or inaction that unintentionally results in
the alteration of system functions or data.
• “Hardware or software error”: Error that results in the alteration of sys-
tem functions or data.
• “Natural disaster”: Any natural event (e.g., power surge caused by light-
ning) that alters system functions or data.
Vulnerability 153
• “Obstruction”: A threat action that interrupts delivery of system ser-

vices by hindering system operations.
• “Interference”: Disruption of system operations by blocking communi-
cations or user data or control information.
• “Overload”: Hindrance of system operation by placing excess bur-
den on the performance capabilities of a system component. (See:
flooding.)
• “Usurpation” (a threat consequence): A circumstance or event that results
in control of system services or functions by an unauthorized entity. The
following threat actions can cause usurpation:
• “Misappropriation”: A threat action whereby an entity assumes unau-
thorized logical or physical control of a system resource.
• “Theft of service”: Unauthorized use of service by an entity.
• “Theft of functionality”: Unauthorized acquisition of actual hardware,
software, or firmware of a system component.
• “Theft of data”: Unauthorized acquisition and use of data.
• “Misuse”: A threat action that causes a system component to perform a
function or service that is detrimental to system security.
• “Tamper”: In the context of misuse, deliberate alteration of a system’s
logic, data, or control information to cause the system to perform unau-
thorized functions or services.
• “Malicious logic”: In the context of misuse, any hardware, software, or
firmware intentionally introduced into a system to perform or control
execution of an unauthorized function or service.
• “Violation of permissions”: Action by an entity that exceeds the entity’s
system privileges by executing an unauthorized function.
THREAT LANDSCAPE OR ENVIRONMENT

A collection of threats in a particular domain or context along with the informa-
tion can help identify vulnerable assets, threats, risks, threat actors, and observed
trends.
THREAT MANAGEMENT
Threats should be managed by operating an information security management sys-
tem (ISMS), performing all the IT risk management activities foreseen by laws, stan-
dards, and methodologies.
Very large organizations tend to adopt business continuity management plans
in order to protect, maintain, and recover business-critical processes and systems.
Some of these plans are foreseen to set up a computer security incident response
team or a computer emergency response team.
There are two kinds of verification of the threat management process:
1. Information security audit

2. Penetration test
Most organizations perform a subset of these steps, adopting countermeasures

based on a nonsystematic approach: computer insecurity studies the battlefield of
computer security exploits and defenses that result.
Information security awareness is a significant market. There has been a lot of
software developed to deal with IT threats, including both open-source software and
proprietary software.
CYBER THREAT MANAGEMENT

Threat management involves a wide variety of threats, including physical threats like
flood and fire. While the ISMS risk assessment process does incorporate threat man-
agement for cyber threats such as remote buffer overflows, the risk assessment pro-
cess doesn’t include processes such as threat intelligence management or response
procedures.
Cyber threat management (CTM) is emerging as best practice for managing cyber
threats beyond the basic risk assessment found in ISMS. It enables early identifi-
cation of threats, data-driven situational awareness, accurate decision making, and
timely threat mitigating actions.
CTM includes the following:
• Manual and automated intelligence gathering and threat analytics

• Comprehensive methodology for real-time monitoring including advanced
techniques such as behavioral modeling
• Use of advanced analytics to optimize intelligence, generate security intel-
ligence, and provide situational awareness
• Technology and skilled people leveraging situational awareness to enable
rapid decisions and automated or manual actions
THREAT HUNTING
Cyber threat hunting is the process of proactively and iteratively searching through
networks to detect and isolate advanced threats that evade existing security solu-
tions. This is in contrast to traditional threat management measures, such as firewall
intrusion detection systems, and security information and event management, which
typically involve an investigation after there has been a warning of a potential threat
or an incident has occurred.
Threat hunting can be a manual process, in which security analysts sift through
various data information using their own knowledge and familiarity with the net-
work to create hypotheses about potential threats. To be even more effective and
efficient, however, threat hunting can be partially automated, or machine assisted,
as well. In this case, the analyst utilizes a software that harnesses machine learn-
ing and user and entity behavior analytics (UEBA) to inform the analyst of poten-
tial risks.
The analyst then investigates these potential risks, tracking suspicious behav-
ior in the network. Thus, hunting is an iterative process, meaning that it must be
Vulnerability 155
continuously carried out in a loop, beginning with a hypothesis. There are three
types of hypotheses (Géron, 2017):
1. Analytics driven: “Machine-learning and UEBA, used to develop aggre-

gated risk scores that can also serve as hunting hypotheses”
2. Situational-awareness driven: “Crown Jewel analysis, enterprise risk assess-
ments, company- or employee-level trends”
3. Intelligence driven: “Threat intelligence reports, threat intelligence feeds,
malware analysis, vulnerability scans”
Analysts research their hypothesis by going through vast amounts of data about
the network. The results are then stored so that they can be used to improve the
automated portion of the detection system and to serve as a foundation for future
hypotheses.
Representative vendors of threat hunting software and services include the
following:
• Carbon Black
• Domain tools
• Exabeam
• Raytheon Foreground Security
• Sqrrl
• Tenable Network Security
In closing, as mentioned in the first paragraph, computer security as a threat is

a possible danger that might exploit a vulnerability to breach security and therefore
cause possible harm.
A threat can be either “intentional” (i.e., hacking: an individual cracker or a crim-
inal organization) or “accidental” (e.g., the possibility of a computer malfunctioning
or the possibility of a natural disaster such as an earthquake, a fire, or a tornado) or
otherwise a circumstance, capability, action, or event.
and Understanding the
Impact of Terrorism
Terrorism is, in its broadest sense, the use of intentionally indiscriminate violence
(terror) in order to achieve a political, religious, or ideological aim. It is classified
as fourth-generation warfare and as a violent crime. In modern times, terrorism is
considered a major threat to society and therefore illegal under antiterrorism laws
in most jurisdictions. It is also considered a war crime under the laws of war when
used to target noncombatants, such as civilians, neutral military personnel, or enemy
prisoners of war.
A broad array of political organizations have practiced terrorism to further their
objectives. It has been practiced by both right-wing and left-wing political organiza-
tions, nationalist groups, religious groups, revolutionaries, and ruling governments.
The symbolism of terrorism can exploit human fear to help achieve these goals.
According to data from the Global Terrorism Database (http://www.start.umd
.edu/gtd), more than 61,000 incidents of nonstate terrorism claiming over 140,000
lives have been recorded from 2000 to 2014.
ORIGIN OF THE TERM

“Terrorism” comes from the French word terrorism and originally referred specifi-
cally to state terrorism as practiced by the French government during the 1793–1794
Reign of Terror.
The French word terrorism in turn derives from the Latin verb terrere (e, terreo),
meaning “to frighten.” The terror cimbricus was a panic and state of emergency in
Rome in response to the approach of warriors of the Cimbri tribe in 105 BCE that the
Jacobins cited as a precedent when imposing the Reign of Terror during the French
Revolution. After the Jacobins lost power, the word “terrorist” became a term of abuse.
Although terrorism originally referred to acts committed by a government, cur-
rently, it usually refers to the killing of innocent people for political purposes in such
a way as to create a spectacle. This meaning can be traced back to Sergey Nechayev,
who described himself as a terrorist. Nechayev founded the Russian terrorist group
“People’s Retribution” (Народная расправа) in 1869.
The lack of consensus as to what a terrorist is can affect policies designed to deal
with terrorists. Some view them as soldiers who can be held at the end of a war and
are entitled to various privileges spelled out in the Geneva Conventions. Others view
them as criminals that should be tried in civil courts. Still, others will argue that ter-
rorists are best treated as a category to themselves and need policies tailored to them.
157
In November 2004, a Secretary-General of the United Nations report described

terrorism as any act “intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians
or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a
government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.”
DEFINITION OF TERRORISM
The definition of terrorism has proven controversial. Various legal systems and gov-
ernment agencies use different definitions of terrorism in their national legislation.
Moreover, the international community has been slow to formulate a universally
agreed, legally binding definition of this crime. These difficulties arise from the fact
that the term “terrorism” is politically and emotionally charged.
The international community has never succeeded in developing an accepted
comprehensive definition of terrorism. During the 1970s and 1980s, the United
Nations’ attempts to define the term floundered mainly due to differences of opinion
between various members about the use of violence in the context of conflicts over
national liberation and self-determination.
These divergences have made it impossible for the United Nations to conclude a
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism that incorporates a single,
all-encompassing, legally binding, criminal law definition of terrorism. The inter-
national community has adopted a series of sectorial conventions that define and
criminalize various types of terrorist activities.
Since 1994, the United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly condemned ter-
rorist acts using the following political description of terrorism:
Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the public, a group
of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjus-
tifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial,
ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.
United Nations
50/53. Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism
U.S. Code Title 22 Chapter 38, Section 2656f (d), defines terrorism as “Premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-
national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”
Bruce Hoffman (2006), a scholar, has noted:
It is not only individual agencies within the same governmental apparatus that cannot
agree on a single definition of terrorism. Experts and other long-established scholars
in the field are equally incapable of reaching a consensus.
Bruce Hoffman
Inside Terrorism
In the first edition of his magisterial survey, “Political Terrorism: A Research

Guide,” Alex Schmid (1983) devoted more than a hundred pages to examining more
than a hundred different definitions of terrorism in an effort to discover a broadly
Emergency Management and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism 159
acceptable, reasonably comprehensive explication of the word. Four years and a sec-
ond edition later, Schmid was no closer to the goal of his quest, conceding in the
first sentence of the revised volume that the “search for an adequate definition is still
on.” Walter Laqueur (2001) despaired of defining terrorism in both editions of his
monumental work on the subject, maintaining that it is neither possible to do so nor
worthwhile to make the attempt.
Each act of terrorism is a “performance” devised to affect many large audiences.
Terrorists also attack national symbols, to show power and to attempt to shake the
foundation of the country or society they are opposed to. This may negatively affect
a government, while increasing the prestige of the given terrorist group and/or ideol-
ogy behind a terrorist act.
Terrorist acts frequently have a political purpose. This is often where the inter-
relationship between terrorism and religion occurs.
When a political struggle is integrated into the framework of a religious or “cos-
mic” struggle, such as over the control of an ancestral homeland or holy site such as
Israel and Jerusalem, failing in the political goal (nationalism) becomes equated with
spiritual failure, which, for the highly committed, is worse than their own death or
the deaths of innocent civilians.
Their suffering accomplishes the terrorists’ goals of instilling fear, getting their
message out to an audience, or otherwise satisfying the demands of their often radi-
cal religious and political agendas.
Some official, governmental definitions of terrorism use the criterion of the
illegitimacy or unlawfulness of the act to distinguish between actions authorized
by a government (and thus “lawful”) and those of other actors, including indi-
viduals and small groups. For example, carrying out a strategic bombing on an
enemy city, which is designed to affect civilian support for a cause, would not be
considered terrorism if it were authorized by a government. Criterion is inher-
ently problematic and is not universally accepted, because it denies the existence
of state terrorism; the same act may or may not be classed as terrorism depending
on whether its sponsorship is traced to a “legitimate” government; “legitimacy”
and “lawfulness” are subjective, depending on the perspective of one government
or another; and it diverges from the historically accepted meaning and origin of
the term.
According to Ali Khan, the distinction lies ultimately in a political judgment
(Mughal, 2012).
An associated, and arguably more easily definable, but not equivalent term is
violent nonstate actor. The semantic scope of this term includes not only “terrorists,”
but while excluding some individuals or groups who have previously been described
as “terrorists” also explicitly excludes state terrorism.
Barack Obama, commenting on the Boston Marathon bombings of April 2013,
declared that “Anytime bombs are used to target innocent civilians, it is an act
of terror.” Various commentators have pointed out the distinction between “act
of terror” and “terrorism,” particularly when used by the White House. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2331 defines “international terrorism” and “domestic terrorism” for purposes of
Chapter 113B of the Code, entitled “Terrorism”:
“International terrorism” means activities with the following three characteristics:
Involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state
law; Appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect
the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
Occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S., or transcend national
boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they
appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators
operate or seek asylum.
By distinguishing terrorists from other types of criminals and terrorism from
other forms of crime, we come to appreciate that terrorism is:
• Ineluctably political in aims and motives;

• Violent—or, equally important, threatens violence;
• Designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the
immediate victim or target;
• Conducted either by an organization with an identifiable chain of command
or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identi-
fying insignia) or by individuals or a small collection of individuals directly
influenced, motivated, or inspired by the ideological aims or example of
some existent terrorist movement and/or its leaders; and by a subnational
group or non-state entity.
A definition proposed by Carsten Bockstette (2008) at the George C. Marshall

European Center for Security Studies underlines the psychological and tactical
aspects of terrorism:
Terrorism is defined as political violence in an asymmetrical conflict that is designed

to induce terror and psychic fear (sometimes indiscriminate) through the violent vic-
timization and destruction of noncombatant targets (sometimes iconic symbols). Such
acts are meant to send a message from an illicit clandestine organization. The purpose
of terrorism is to exploit the media in order to achieve maximum attainable publicity as
an amplifying force multiplier in order to influence the targeted audience(s) in order to
reach short- and midterm political goals and/or desired long-term end states.
Carsten Bockstette
Jihadist Terrorist Use of Strategic Communication Management Techniques
PEJORATIVE USE
The terms “terrorism” and “terrorist” (someone who engages in terrorism) carry strong
negative connotations. These terms are often used as political labels; to condemn vio-
lence or the threat of violence by certain actors as immoral, indiscriminate, and unjus-
tified; or to condemn an entire segment of a population (Figures 10.1 and 10.2).
Those labeled “terrorists” by their opponents rarely identify themselves as such
and typically use other terms or terms specific to their situation, such as separatist,
freedom fighter, liberator, revolutionary, vigilante, militant, paramilitary, guerrilla,
rebel, patriot, or any similar-meaning word in other languages and cultures. Jihadi,
RU
IQ AF
DZ LY
IL
IN
PK
YE TH
NG PH
CO SO
Since 2000 there were more
than 72 thousand attacks.
More than half of them were
conducted in four countries:
Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan and
India The area of the circle corresponds to
the amount of terrorist attacks in the
The number of terrorist attacks terrorist attacks
committed in the world country from 2000 to 2014
grows because of the four
countries since 2000 5000 1000 less than 40
FIGURE 10.1 Terrorism incidents.
15,864 1. Iraq 2848 6. Thailand 1738 11. Colombia
9708 2. Pakistan 2313 7. Somalia 1311 12. Algeria
7641 3. Afghanistan 2170 8. Nigeria 1084 13. Libya
6023 4. India 1821 9. Yemen 1025 14. Israel
2872 5. Philippines 1753 10. Russia 13,964 Other countries
FIGURE 10.2 Terrorism acts of violence.
mujaheddin, and fedayeen are similar Arabic words that have entered the English
lexicon. It is common for both parties in a conflict to describe each other as terrorists.
On whether particular terrorist acts, such as killing noncombatants, can be jus-
tified as the lesser evil in a particular circumstance, philosophers have expressed
different views. While, according to David Rodin (2007), utilitarian philosophers
can (in theory) conceive of cases in which the evil of terrorism is outweighed by the
good that could not be achieved in a less morally costly way, in practice, the “harm-
ful effects of undermining the convention of non-combatant immunity is thought to
outweigh the goods that may be achieved by particular acts of terrorism.”
Among the nonutilitarian philosophers, Michael Walzer (2016) argued that ter-
rorism can be morally justified in only one specific case: when “a nation or com-
munity faces the extreme threat of complete destruction and the only way it can
preserve itself is by intentionally targeting non-combatants, then it is morally
entitled to do so.”
Terrorist acts frequently have a political purpose. This is often where the inter-
relationship between terrorism and religion occurs. When a political struggle is
integrated into the framework of a religious or “cosmic” struggle, such as over the
control of an ancestral homeland or holy site such as Israel and Jerusalem, failing in
the political goal (nationalism) becomes equated with spiritual failure, which, for the
highly committed, is worse than their own death or the deaths of innocent civilians.
TYPES OF TERRORISM
Depending on the country, the political system, and the time in history, the types of
terrorism vary.
In early 1975, the Law Enforcement Assistant Administration in the United
States formed the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals. One of the five volumes that the committee wrote was titled “Disorders
and Terrorism,” produced by the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism under the
direction of H. H. A. Cooper, Director of the Task Force staff (Cooper, 2017).
The Task Force defines terrorism as “a tactic or technique by means of which a
violent act or the threat thereof is used for the prime purpose of creating overwhelm-
ing fear for coercive purposes.”
It classified disorders and terrorism into six categories:
1. Civil disorder—A form of collective violence interfering with the peace,

security, and normal functioning of the community.
2. Political terrorism—Violent criminal behavior designed primarily to gen-
erate fear in the community, or a substantial segment of it, for political
purposes.
3. Nonpolitical terrorism—Terrorism that is not aimed at political purposes
but which exhibits “conscious design to create and maintain a high degree
of fear for coercive purposes, but the end is individual or collective gain
rather than the achievement of a political objective.”
4. Quasi-terrorism—The activities incidental to the commission of crimes
of violence that are similar in form and method to genuine terrorism but
which nevertheless lack its essential ingredient. It is not the main purpose
of the quasi-terrorists to induce terror in the immediate victim as in the
case of genuine terrorism, but the quasi-terrorist uses the modalities and
techniques of the genuine terrorist and produces similar consequences and
reaction. For example, the fleeing felon who takes hostages is a quasi-
terrorist, whose methods are similar to those of the genuine terrorist but
whose purposes are quite different.
5. Limited political terrorism—Genuine political terrorism is characterized
by a revolutionary approach; limited political terrorism refers to “acts of
terrorism which are committed for ideological or political motives but
which are not part of a concerted campaign to capture control of the state”
(http://preventwmd.org, 2017).
6. Official or state terrorism—“Referring to nations whose rule is based upon
fear and oppression that reach similar to terrorism or such proportions”
(http://preventwmd.org, 2017). It may also be referred to as structural ter-

rorism, defined broadly as terrorist acts carried out by governments in pur-
suit of political objectives, often as part of their foreign policy.
Other sources have defined the typology of terrorism in different ways, for exam-
ple, broadly classifying it into domestic terrorism and international terrorism, or
using categories such as vigilante terrorism or insurgent terrorism. One way the
typology of terrorism may be defined:
• Political terrorism
• Substate terrorism
• Social revolutionary terrorism
• Nationalist–separatist terrorism
• Religious extremist terrorism
• Religious fundamentalist terrorism
• New religions terrorism
• Right-wing terrorism
• Left-wing terrorism
• State-sponsored terrorism
• Regime or state terrorism
• Criminal terrorism
• Pathological terrorism
MOTIVATIONS OF TERRORISTS
Attacks on “collaborators” are used to intimidate people from cooperating with the
state in order to undermine state control. This strategy was used in Ireland, in Kenya,
in Algeria, and in Cyprus during their independence struggles.
Attacks on high-profile symbolic targets are used to incite counterterrorism by the
state to polarize the population. This strategy was used by Al-Qaeda in its attacks
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the United States on September 11,
2001. These attacks are also used to draw international attention to struggles that are
otherwise unreported, such as the Palestinian airplane hijackings in 1970 and the
South Moluccan hostage crisis in the Netherlands in 1975.
Terrorist organizations do not select terrorism for its political effectiveness.
Individual terrorists tend to be motivated more by a desire for social solidarity with
other members of their organization than by political platforms or strategic objec-
tives, which are often murky and undefined. Additionally, possible relationships
between the type of economy within a country and ideology are associated with
terrorism. Some terrorists like Timothy McVeigh were motivated by revenge against
a state for its actions against its citizens.
Democracy and Domestic Terrorism

The relationship between domestic terrorism and democracy is very complex.
Terrorism is most common in nations with intermediate political freedom, and it
is least common in the most democratic nations. However, one study suggests that
suicide terrorism may be an exception to this general rule. Evidence regarding this
particular method of terrorism reveals that every modern suicide campaign has tar-
geted a democracy—a state with a considerable degree of political freedom. The
study suggests that concessions awarded to terrorists during the 1980s and 1990s
for suicide attacks increased their frequency (Hamdan, 2015). There is a connec-
tion between the existence of civil liberties, democratic participation, and terrorism.
According to Young and Dugan, these things encourage terrorist groups to organize
and generate terror.
Some examples of terrorism in nondemocratic nations include ETA in Spain
under Francisco Franco (although the group’s terrorist activities increased sharply
after Franco’s death), the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in prewar Poland,
the Shining Path in Peru under Alberto Fujimori, the Kurdistan Workers Party when
Turkey was ruled by military leaders, and the ANC in South Africa. Democracies,
such as Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, Israel, Indonesia, India, Spain,
Germany, and the Philippines, have also experienced domestic terrorism.
While a democratic nation espousing civil liberties may claim a sense of higher
moral ground than other regimes, an act of terrorism within such a state may cause
a dilemma: whether to maintain its civil liberties and thus risk being perceived as
ineffective in dealing with the problem or, alternatively, to restrict its civil liberties
and thus risk delegitimizing its claim of supporting civil liberties. For this reason,
homegrown terrorism has started to be seen as a greater threat, as stated by former
Central Intelligence Agency Director Michael Hayden (2015). This dilemma, some
social theorists would conclude, may very well play into the initial plans of the act-
ing terrorist(s), namely, to delegitimize the state and cause a systematic shift toward
anarchy via the accumulation of negative sentiments toward the state system.
Religious Terrorism
Religious terrorism is terrorism performed by groups or individuals, the motivation of
which is typically rooted in faith-based tenets. Terrorist acts throughout history have
been performed on religious grounds with the goal to either spread or enforce a system
of belief, viewpoint, or opinion. The validity and scope of religious terrorism are lim-
ited to the individual or a group view or interpretation of that belief system’s teachings.
Intimate Terrorism
Intimate terrorism (IT), also known as domestic abuse, may also involve emotional
and psychological abuse. IT is one element in a general pattern of control by one
partner over the other. IT is more likely to escalate over time, not as likely to be
mutual, and more likely to involve serious injury. IT batterers include two types:
“generally violent-antisocial” and “dysphoric–borderline.” The first type includes
people with general psychopathic and violent tendencies. The second type includes
people who are emotionally dependent on the relationship. Violence by a person
against his or her intimate partner is often done as a way to control his or her partner,
even if this kind of violence is not the most frequent.
PERPETRATORS
The perpetrators of acts of terrorism can be individuals, groups, or states. According
to some definitions, clandestine or semiclandestine state actors may also carry out
terrorist acts outside the framework of a state of war. However, the most common
image of terrorism is that it is carried out by small and secretive cells, highly moti-
vated to serve a particular cause, and many of the most deadly operations in recent
times, such as the September 11 attacks, the London underground bombing, the 2008
Mumbai attacks, and the 2002 Bali bombing were planned and carried out by a
close clique, composed of close friends, family members, and other strong social
networks. These groups benefited from the free flow of information and efficient
telecommunications to succeed where others had failed.
To avoid detection, a terrorist will look, dress, and behave normally until execut-
ing the assigned mission. Some claim that attempts to profile terrorists based on
personality, physical, or sociological traits are not useful. The physical and behav-
ioral description of the terrorist could describe almost any normal person. However,
the majority of terrorist attacks are carried out by military age men, aged 16–40
(martinslibrary.blogspot.com/2014/08/terrorism-types-of-terrorism).
Nonstate Groups
Groups not part of the state apparatus or in opposition to the state are most com-
monly referred to as a “terrorist” in the media.
State Sponsors
A state can sponsor terrorism by funding or harboring a terrorist group. Opinions as
to which acts of violence by states consist of state-sponsored terrorism vary widely.
When states provide funding for groups considered by some to be terrorist, they
rarely acknowledge them as such.
STATE TERRORISM
Civilization is based on a clearly defined and widely accepted yet often unarticu-
lated hierarchy. Violence done by those higher on the hierarchy to those lower is
nearly always invisible, that is, unnoticed. When it is noticed, it is fully rational-
ized. Violence done by those lower on the hierarchy to those higher is unthinkable
and, when it does occur, is regarded with shock, horror, and the fetishization of the
victims.
State terrorism has been used to refer to terrorist acts committed by governmen-
tal agents or forces. This involves the use of state resources employed by a state’s
foreign policies, such as using its military to directly perform acts of terrorism,
examples of which include the German bombing of London, the Japanese bombing
of Pearl Harbor, the British firebombing of Dresden, and the U.S. atomic bombing of
Hiroshima during World War II. The use of terror tactics is common in international
relations, and the state has been and remains a more likely employer of terrorism
House (beit)
2
People of the
book (Muslim, Clan (fukhdh)
Jewish, 3
Christian)
10
Family
Religion Tribe (qabila)
(kham) 4
(Islam)
9
1
Sect (Sunni,
Shia)
8 Region
Ethnicity 5 Infidels
(Arab) Nation 11
7 6
FIGURE 10.3 Muslim hierarchy of allegiance.
within the international system than insurgents. The first strike option as an example
of the “terror of coercive diplomacy” as a form of this, which holds the world hos-
tage with the implied threat of using nuclear weapons in “crisis management” and
argues that the institutionalized form of terrorism has occurred as a result of changes
that took place following World War II.
In this analysis, state terrorism exhibited as a form of foreign policy was
shaped by the presence and use of weapons of mass destruction and that the
legitimizing of such violent behavior led to an increasingly accepted form of this
state behavior.
The concept is also used to describe political repressions by governments against
their own civilian populations with the purpose of inciting fear. For example, tak-
ing and executing civilian hostages or extrajudicial elimination campaigns are com-
monly considered “terror” or terrorism, for example, during the Red Terror or the
Great Terror. Such actions are also often described as democide or genocide, which
have been argued to be equivalent to state terrorism. Empirical studies on this have
found that democracies have little democide.
Understanding the structure of the Muslim hierarchy of allegiance will help one
understand the terrorist cell structure, their duty, and the flow of information and
obedience (Figure 10.3) (Ansarian, 2010).
TACTICS
Terrorism is a form of asymmetric warfare and is more common when direct con-
ventional warfare will not be effective because forces vary greatly in power.
The context in which terrorist tactics are used is often a large-scale, unresolved politi-
cal conflict. The type of conflict varies widely; historical examples include the following:
• Secession of a territory to form a new sovereign state or become part of a

different state
• Dominance of territory or resources by various ethnic groups
• Imposition of a particular form of government
• Economic deprivation of a population
• Opposition to a domestic government or occupying army
• Religious fanaticism
Terrorist attacks are often targeted to maximize fear and publicity, usually using
explosives or poison. There is concern about terrorist attacks employing weapons of
mass destruction. Terrorist groups usually methodically plan attacks in advance and
may train participants, plant undercover agents, and raise money from supporters or
through organized crime. Communications occur through modern telecommunica-
tions or through old-fashioned methods such as couriers.
RESPONSES
One posting a sign notifying shoppers with the increase of surveillance is due to a
perceived increase in the risk of a terrorism threat.
Responses to terrorism are broad in scope. They can include realignments of the
political spectrum and reassessments of fundamental values.
Specific types of responses include the following:
• Targeted laws, criminal procedures, deportations, and enhanced police

powers
• Target hardening, such as locking doors or adding traffic barriers
• Preemptive or reactive military action
• Increased intelligence and surveillance activities
• Preemptive humanitarian activities
• More permissive interrogation and detention policies
The term “counterterrorism” has a narrower connotation, implying that it is

directed at terrorist actors (Global Terrorism Database, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd).
DATABASES
The following terrorism databases are or were made publicly available for research
purposes and track specific acts of terrorism (Global Terrorism Database, http://www
.start.umd.edu/gtd):
• Global Terrorism Database, an open-source database on terrorist events

around the world from 1970 through 2015, with more than 150,000 cases
• MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base
• Worldwide Incidents Tracking System

• Tocsearch (dynamic database)
The following is a publicly available resource index electronic and bibliographic

resource on the subject of terrorism:
• Human Security Gateway
The following terrorism databases are maintained in secrecy by the U.S.

Government for intelligence and counterterrorism purposes:
• Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment

• Terrorist Screening Database
WAR ON TERROR
The War on Terror (WoT), also known as the Global War on Terrorism, is a meta-
phor of war referring to the international military campaign that started after the
September 11 attacks on the United States. U.S. President George W. Bush first used
the term “War on Terror” on September 20, 2001. The Bush administration and
the western media have since used the term to argue a global military, political,
legal, and conceptual struggle against both organizations designated terrorist and
regimes accused of supporting them. It was originally used with a particular focus
on countries associated with Islamic terrorism organizations including al-Qaeda and
like-minded organizations.
In 2013, President Barack Obama announced that the United States was no lon-
ger pursuing a WoT, as the military focus should be on specific enemies rather than
a tactic. He stated, “We must define our effort not as a boundless ‘Global War on
Terror,’ but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific net-
works of violent extremists that threaten America.”
U.S. Objectives
• NATO
• Trans Sahara initiative
• Major military operations (Afghanistan • Pakistan • Iraq • Somalia • Yemen)
• Allies involved in major operations
The Authorization for Use of Military Force against Terrorists, or AUMF, was
made law on September 14, 2001, to authorize the use of U.S. Armed Forces against
those responsible for the attacks on September 11, 2001. It authorized the President
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks
that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in
order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States
by such nations, organizations, or persons. The congress declares this is intended to
constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the
War Powers Resolution of 1973.
The George W. Bush administration defined the following objectives in the WoT:
• Defeat terrorists such as Osama bin Laden, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and
demolish their organizations
• Identify, locate, and demolish terrorists along with their organizations
• Deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists
• End the state sponsorship of terrorism
• Establish and maintain an international standard of accountability with
regard to combating terrorism
• Strengthen and sustain the international effort to combat terrorism
• Work with willing and able states
• Enable weak states
• Persuade reluctant states
• Compel unwilling states
• Interdict and disorder material support for terrorists
• Abolish terrorist sanctuaries and havens
• Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit
• Partner with the international community to strengthen weak states and
prevent (re)emergence of terrorism
• Win the war of ideals
• Defend U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad
• Integrate the National Strategy for Homeland Security
• Attain domain awareness
• Enhance measures to ensure the integrity, reliability, and availability of
critical, physical, and information-based infrastructures at home and abroad
• Implement measures to protect U.S. citizens abroad
• Ensure an integrated incident management capability
Terrorism and counterterrorism research is an interdisciplinary academic field

that seeks to understand the causes of terrorism, how to prevent it as well as its
impact in the broadest sense. Terrorism research can be carried out in both military
and civilian contexts.
11 Managing Terrorism
Threat/Vulnerability
Assessments and
Risk Analysis
With the increased threat of terrorism, public, private, and governmental agencies
face an increased need to understand and manage the risk to their employees and
organizational assets. A three-tiered terrorism risk management plan, which includes
initial and detailed assessments and a variety of risk management techniques, can
effectively reduce the terrorism risk.
Over the past decade, the changing political landscape has dictated that public,
private, and governmental organizations not only understand terrorism risk but also
develop a proactive plan to assess and/or manage this risk. As demonstrated by the
attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, simply
being located in a less populous city or region does not guarantee safety. In fact, it is
the lower profile targets with lower levels of security awareness that may appear to
be the “softer” target to a potential terrorist.
In addition to the terrible loss of life, the events in 2001 also highlighted the
financial costs of terrorism. As with other natural and manmade hazards, financial
coverage may not be available and/or affordable to protect the financial assets of an
organization when faced with a terrorism threat.
DEVELOPING A TERRORISM RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

Managing risk associated with the threat of terrorism can be a daunting task for
companies. Some of the most common questions include how to begin a terrorism
risk management program, what assets should be protected, and what are the most
effective mitigation solutions.
Similar to managing the risk from other hazards, a terrorism risk management
program should provide a logical and systematic framework for identifying and deal-
ing with potential terrorist threats. A three-phase terrorist risk management pro-
gram, detailed below, can be used as a framework for establishing a terrorism risk
management program.
171
Phase I—Threat Identification and Initial Site Assessment

Understanding the type, source, and probability associated with different threats is
an important element in the program. The key elements of the threat identification
phase include the following.
1. Threat recognition and identification

2. Threat potential
3. Site security assessment
While many organizations have some knowledge of the various threats facing
their facilities and employees, many do not recognize how vulnerable their sites
actually are until a detailed assessment is performed.
One of the products that may result from the site security assessment is a detailed
site survey that includes the determination of the effective standoff distance at all
exposed sides of the building perimeter. Even for sites that are considered “secure,”
existing security measures are often found to be insufficient to deter a well-planned
terrorist attack.
Phase II—Detailed Risk Assessment

The information gathered in the Phase I assessment can then be used to focus orga-
nizational resources to determine the impact of a particular terrorist event on the
facility. Analyses that may form part of the detailed risk assessment include the
following.
• Blast and explosion analysis

• Progressive collapse (structural stability) analysis
• Chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) threat assessment
The blast, progressive collapse, and chemical/biological analyses can provide

a detailed assessment of the threat to the structures, nonstructural elements, and
the employees. Examples of these analyses are shown in Tables 11.1 and 11.2.
Software tools are available to estimate the impact and dispersion of toxic releases
TABLE 11.1
Probability Levels of an Undesired Event
Probability Level Specific Event
A: Frequent Likely to occur frequently
B: Probable Will occur several times
C: Occasional Likely to occur sometimes
D: Remote Unlikely but possible to occur
E: Improbable So unlikely it can be assumed occurrence may not be experienced
Managing Terrorism Threat/Vulnerability Assessments and Risk Analysis 173
TABLE 11.2
Severity Levels of Undesired Event Consequences
Severity Level Characteristics
I. Catastrophic Death, system loss, or severe environmental damage
II. Critical Severe injury, severe occupational illness, major system or environmental damage
III. Marginal Minor injury, minor occupational illness, or minor system or environmental damage
IV. Negligible Less than minor injury, occupational illness, or less than minor system or
environmental damage
and produce similar types of contours as a result of a biological or chemical ter-

rorist attack.
Phase III—Risk Management

Once the risks have been identified and assessed, putting a comprehensive risk manage-
ment plan in place for terrorism risk is similar in many respects to understanding and
managing the risks due to other hazards, such as extreme wind or earthquakes. Often,
emergency planning and disaster recovery preparations that are in place for other types
of hazards can be extended to prepare for and/or protect against terrorist attacks.
A comprehensive terrorism risk management plan should, at a minimum, include
the following components.
• Protection of the facility and its occupants

• Emergency planning and disaster recovery
• Reduction of financial risk
Protection of the building occupants through the implementation of physical or

electronic security measures, the application of window film to reduce glazing haz-
ards, and increased employee awareness is often a first step in many terrorism risk
management plans. Reducing the financial risk associated with a terrorism event
may be a more challenging issue. As with other natural and manmade hazards, the
cost of insurance for losses associated with a terrorism event, if available, may have
risen to a level that is no longer affordable. The financial exposure may need to be
addressed through a combination of risk mitigation measures, alternate or back-up
facilities, and insurance.
Threat and risk assessments are widely recognized as valid decision support tools
to establish and prioritize security program requirements.
A threat analysis, the first step in determining risk, identifies and evaluates each
threat on the basis of various factors, such as its capability and intent to attack an
asset, the likelihood of a successful attack, and its lethality.
Risk management is the deliberate process of understanding “risk”—the like-
lihood that a threat will harm an asset with some severity of consequences—and
Analyze
vulnerabilities
Identify
characterize Identify
the threat countermeasures
Risk
management
decisions
Assess Assess risk

asset value
Cost
effective
FIGURE 11.1 Factors considered in making risk management decisions.
deciding on and implementing actions to reduce it (Figure 11.1). Risk management

principles acknowledge the following:
1. While risk generally cannot be eliminated, it can be reduced by enhancing

protection from validated and credible threats.
2. Although many threats are possible, some are more likely to occur than
others.
3. All assets are not equally critical.
Generally, the risk assessment process is a deliberate, analytical approach to

identify which threats can exploit which vulnerabilities in an organization’s specific
assets.
These variables are ranked according to predetermined criteria, such as the prob-
ability of a threat targeting a specific asset or the impact of a vulnerability being
exploited by a specific threat. The risk assessment results in a prioritized list of risks
(i.e., threat–asset–vulnerability combinations) that can be used to select safeguards
to reduce vulnerabilities and create a certain level of protection.
The following are challenges to applying an accepted threat and risk assessment
process to cities and infrastructure:
1. Security issues (e.g., revealing intelligence sources and methods) related to

providing valid threat data from the intelligence community to city officials
2. The lack of specificity in the intelligence community’s threat information
3. The complexity and magnitude of a large city as a subject of a threat and

risk assessment. These challenges could be overcome through federal-city
collaboration.
The risk assessment generates specific threat scenarios from valid intelligence
and threat data and pairs them with vulnerabilities in its critical assets. The mul-
tidisciplinary risk assessment then assigns weights or values to these threat–asset
vulnerability pairings according to the likelihood of such events occurring and
the consequences of assets being compromised or attacked. This process is based
on a Department of Defense military standard and work by the Department of
Transportation’s Volpe National Transportation Systems Center.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is in the best position to take the fed-
eral lead in facilitating city-specific threat and risk assessments. The FBI, through
the Attorney General, is the lead agency for domestic terrorism crisis management.
As a member of the intelligence community, the FBI also collects, analyzes, and
reports threat information on domestic origin threats and targets.
Cities are larger and more complex than most entities subject to threat and risk assess-
ments, such as military bases, ports, and petroleum processing facilities. However, size
and complexity would not preclude conducting threat and risk assessments.
Threat and risk assessments are widely recognized as effective decision support
tools for prioritizing security investments, and we identified several public and pri-
vate sector organizations that use them.
While it is not possible to reduce risk to all potential targets against weapon of
mass destruction (WMD) terrorism, risk assessments can help ensure that training,
equipment, and other safeguards are justified and implemented based on threat, the
vulnerability of the asset to an attack, and the importance of the asset.
A vulnerability assessment should consist of experienced military and civilian
personnel from a range of disciplines, including structural and civil engineering,
security, and operations readiness. The assessment team uses a risk assessment
model to identify and rank order a site’s strengths and weaknesses. The specific
elements of the model include asset criticality, site vulnerability, and the ease with
which a threat can gain access to an asset.
A comprehensive vulnerability assessment of the U.S. surface transportation and
inner infrastructure (i.e., road, rail, transit, pipeline, and maritime) was conducted
(Transportation Security Administration, 2016). The goal of the assessment is to
1. Identify and rank key threats to and critical vulnerabilities of the national
transportation infrastructure
2. Recommend possible countermeasures to improve infrastructure protection
from a host of threats such as terrorism, accidents, and natural disasters
Step 1: Identify Threats and Pair with Assets

Threat identification is the most important step in the risk assessment process. If threats are
not accurately identified, the risks they represent cannot be reduced or eliminated. Threats
that the company is concerned with include trusted or incompetent insiders, criminals,
terrorists, and environmental and system-induced threats. In characterizing the threat, the
infrastructure examines the historical record of security and safety breaches and obtains
location-specific threat information from the intelligence community and open sources.
These threats are then paired with company assets that represent likely targets.
Step 2: Identify Asset Vulnerabilities

The risk assessment team identifies weaknesses in the infrastructures critical assets
that could be exploited by the threats identified in Step 1 and determines their
nature and source. Methods used to identify vulnerabilities include evaluating data
obtained through surveys and historical data from related incidents and applying for-
mal vulnerability analysis techniques. Asset vulnerabilities can include operations
and processes, policies and procedures, physical and technical security, information
security, personnel security, and operations security.
Step 3: Determine Risk Through Scenarios

The risk assessment team develops credible risk scenarios to describe how undesired
events may occur and to determine the effect of each undesired event on the infra-
structure assets. The set of scenarios may not be an exhaustive list of all possible
undesired events, but each valid threat that has been identified should be represented
in at least one scenario.
Step 4: Identify Actions, as Necessary, That Lead to Risk Reduction

Countermeasures are actions that either eliminate the causes or reduce the effects of
one or more vulnerabilities. Countermeasures could include additional checkpoints
controlling access to a facility, security cameras, personnel background investiga-
tions, new procedures, or chemical protective gear. Countermeasures are identified
and inserted into a scenario, and the risk rating for that scenario is recalculated to
account for the effect of the countermeasure.
The countermeasures are selected on the basis of factors such as whether they
reduce the probability of an undesired event occurring, their implementing cost, and
any additional enforcement and audit requirements. Countermeasures can be pri-
oritized by considering a number of factors, including the amount of resulting risk
reduction, cost, difficulty to implement, or a combination thereof. Usually, there is
a point beyond which adding countermeasures will raise costs without appreciably
enhancing the protection afforded.
In closing as part of that effort on exploring how some public and private sector
organizations can establish the requirements and prioritize those allocated resources
to support the incident and safeguard those assets against a variety of threats through
prior planning and procedures design to lessen the impact on those public and pri-
vate sector organizations to include the threat of terrorism.
1. Examined threat and risk assessment approaches used by several public and
private sector organizations to deal with terrorist and other security risks and
obtained detailed information on a private company’s risk-assessment process.
2. Determined whether training and assistance used threat and risk assess-
ments to establish requirements for dealing with WMD terrorist incidents.
3. Assessed the challenges of using formal threat and risk assessments to help
define requirements and prioritize, and target resources.
INFRASTRUCTURE FACILITY DESIGNED USING THE CRIME

PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN PROCESS
The risk management plan should have a capability for determining changes in risk
due to threat information or changes to security operations and building protection.
The regimented procedure will maintain a focus on effectiveness and prevent frag-
mented decision making for risk reduction.
With the increased threat of terrorism, both in the United States and abroad,
public, private, and governmental agencies face an increased need to understand
and manage the risk to their employees and organizational assets due to the terror-
ism risk. A three-tiered terrorism risk management plan, which includes initial and
detailed assessments and a variety of risk management techniques, can be imple-
mented to effectively reduce the risk from a terrorist attack.
THREAT/VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS AND RISK ANALYSIS

All facilities face a certain level of risk associated with various threats. These threats
may be the result of natural events, accidents, or intentional acts to cause harm.
Regardless of the nature of the threat, facility owners have a responsibility to limit
or manage risks from these threats to the extent possible.
The federal government has implemented The Risk Management Process for
Federal Facilities: An Interagency Security Committee Standard (Integrated Security
Committee, 2016), which states,
Risk is a function of the values of threat, consequence, and vulnerability. The objective
of risk management is to create a level of protection that mitigates vulnerabilities to
threats and the potential consequences, thereby reducing risk to an acceptable level.
A variety of mathematical models are available to calculate risk and to illustrate the
impact of increasing protective measures on the risk equation.
Facility owners, particularly owners of public facilities, should develop and

implement a security risk management methodology that adheres to the Interagency
Security Committee (ISC) standard while also supporting the security needs of the
organization. Landlords who desire to lease space to federal government agencies
should implement the ISC standard in the design of new facilities and/or the renova-
tion of existing facilities.
Threat Assessment
The first step in a risk management program is a threat assessment. A threat assess-
ment considers the full spectrum of threats (i.e., natural, criminal, terrorist, accidental,
etc.) for a given facility/location. The ISC standard addresses only manmade threats,
but individual agencies are free to expand upon the threats they consider. The assess-
ment should examine supporting information to evaluate the relative likelihood of
occurrence for each threat. For natural threats, historical data concerning frequency
of occurrence for given natural disasters such as tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, fire,
or earthquakes can be used to determine the credibility of the given threat.
For criminal threats, the crime rates in the surrounding area provide a good indi-
cator of the type of criminal activity that may threaten the facility. In addition, the
type of assets and/or activity located in the facility may also increase the target
attractiveness in the eyes of the aggressor. The type of assets and/or activity located
in the facility will also relate directly to the likelihood of various types of accidents.
For example, a facility that utilizes heavy industrial machinery will be at higher risk
for serious or life-threatening job related accidents than a typical office building.
For terrorist threats, the attractiveness of the facility as a target is a primary
consideration. In addition, the type of terrorist act may vary based on the potential
adversary and the method of attack most likely to be successful for a given scenario.
For example, a terrorist wishing to strike against the federal government may be
more likely to attack a large federal building than to attack a multitenant office build-
ing containing a large number of commercial tenants and a few government tenants.
However, if security at the large federal building makes mounting a successful
attack too difficult, the terrorist may be diverted to a nearby facility that may not
be as attractive from an occupancy perspective but has a higher probability of suc-
cess due to the absence of adequate security. In general, the likelihood of terrorist
attacks cannot be quantified statistically since terrorism is, by its very nature, ran-
dom. Specific definitions are important to quantify the level of each threat.
The more specific the definition, the more consistent the assessments will be
especially if the assessments are being performed by a large number of assessors.
Example assessments are provided below:
• Defined: Manmade: There are aggressors who utilize this tactic who are
known to be targeting this facility or the organization. There is a history of
this type of activity in the area and this facility is a known target. Specific
threats have been received or identified by law enforcement agencies.
Natural: Events of this nature occur in the immediate vicinity on a frequent
basis.
• Credible: Manmade: There are aggressors who utilize this tactic who are
known to target this type of facility. There is a history of this type of activity
in the area, and this facility and/or similar facilities have been targets previ-
ously. No specific threat has been received or identified by law enforcement
agencies. Natural: Events of this nature occur in the immediate vicinity
periodically (i.e., once every 10 years).
• Potential: Manmade: There are aggressors who utilize this tactic, but they
are not known to target this type of facility. There is a history of this type
of activity in the area, but this facility has not been a target. Natural: Events
of this nature occur in the region on a sporadic basis.
• Minimal: Manmade: No aggressors who utilize this tactic are identified for
this facility and there is no history of this type of activity at the facility or
the neighboring area. Natural: There is no history of this type of event in
the area.
Vulnerability Assessment
Once the plausible threats are identified, a vulnerability assessment must be per-
formed. The vulnerability assessment considers the potential impact of loss from
a successful attack as well as the vulnerability of the facility/location to an attack.
Impact of loss is the degree to which the mission of the agency is impaired by a suc-
cessful attack from the given threat. A key component of the vulnerability assess-
ment is properly defining the ratings for impact of loss and vulnerability.
These definitions may vary greatly from facility to facility. For example, the
amount of time that mission capability is impaired is an important part of impact of
loss. If the facility being assessed is an Air Route Traffic Control Tower, a downtime
of a few minutes may be a serious impact of loss, while for a Social Security office,
a downtime of a few minutes would be minor. A sample set of definitions for impact
of loss is provided below. These definitions are for an organization that generates
revenue by serving the public.
• Devastating: The facility is damaged/contaminated beyond habitable use.

Most items/assets are lost, destroyed, or damaged beyond repair/restoration.
The number of visitors to other facilities in the organization may be reduced
by up to 75% for a limited period of time.
• Severe: The facility is partially damaged/contaminated. Examples include
partial structure breach resulting in weather/water, smoke, impact, or fire
damage to some areas. Some items/assets in the facility are damaged
beyond repair, but the facility remains mostly intact. The entire facility
may be closed for a period of up to two weeks and a portion of the facil-
ity may be closed for an extended period of time (more than one month).
Some assets may need to be moved to remote locations to protect them from
environmental damage. The number of visitors to this and other facilities in
the organization may be reduced by up to 50% for a limited period of time.
• Noticeable: The facility is temporarily closed or unable to operate but can
continue without an interruption of more than one day. A limited number
of assets may be damaged, but the majority of the facility is not affected.
The number of visitors to this and other facilities in the organization may
be reduced by up to 25% for a limited period of time.
• Minor: The facility experiences no significant impact on operations (down-
time is less than four hours) and there is no loss of major assets.
Vulnerability is defined to be a combination of the attractiveness of a facility as

a target and the level of deterrence and/or defense provided by the existing counter-
measures. Target attractiveness is a measure of the asset or facility in the eyes of an
aggressor and is influenced by the function and/or symbolic importance of the facil-
ity. Sample definitions for vulnerability ratings are as follows:
• Very high: This is a high-profile facility that provides a very attractive tar-
get for potential adversaries, and the level of deterrence and/or defense pro-
vided by the existing countermeasures is inadequate.
• High: This is a high-profile regional facility or a moderate profile national
facility that provides an attractive target and/or the level of deterrence and/
or defense provided by the existing countermeasures is inadequate.
• Moderate: This is a moderate-profile facility (not well known outside the local
area or region) that provides a potential target and/or the level of deterrence and/
or defense provided by the existing countermeasures is marginally adequate.
• Low: This is not a high-profile facility and provides a possible target and/
or the level of deterrence and/or defense provided by the existing counter-
measures is adequate.
The vulnerability assessment may also include detailed analysis of the potential impact
of loss from an explosive, chemical or biological attack. Professionals with specific train-
ing and experience in these areas are required to perform these detailed analyses.
Risk Analysis
A combination of the impact of loss rating and the vulnerability rating can be used to
evaluate the potential risk to the facility from a given threat. A sample risk matrix is
depicted in Figure 11.2. In Figures 11.3 through 11.5, high risks are designated by the
dark gray cells, moderate risks by the light gray cells, and low risks by the gray cells
(Figure 11.6).
Upgrade Recommendations
Based on the findings from the risk analysis, the next step in the process is to identify
countermeasure upgrades that will lower the various levels of risk. If an organization
has minimum standard countermeasures for a given facility level which are not cur-
rently present, these countermeasures should automatically be included in the upgrade
Vulnerability
Impact of loss Low Medium High Very high
Minor
Noticeable
Severe
Devastating
FIGURE 11.2 Matrix identifying levels of risk minimal threat.

Vulnerability
Minor
Noticeable
Severe
Devastating
FIGURE 11.3 Potential threat.
Vulnerability
Minor
Noticeable
Severe
Devastating
FIGURE 11.4 Credible threat.
Vulnerability
Minor
Noticeable
Severe
Devastating
FIGURE 11.5 Defined threat.
recommendations. Additional countermeasure upgrades above the organization’s rec-

ommended minimum standards should be recommended as necessary to address the
specific threats and associated unacceptable risks identified for the facility.
Reevaluation of Risks
The implementation of the recommended security and/or structural upgrades should
have a positive effect on the impact of loss and/or the vulnerability ratings for each
Rating category Description
The risk is totally unacceptable. Immediate measures must be taken to

Very high
reduce these risks and mitigate hazards.
The risk is unacceptable. Measures to reduce risk and mitigation hazards

High
should be implemented as soon as possible.
The risk may be acceptable over the short term. Plans to reduce risk and
Medium
mitigate hazards should be included in future plans and budgets.
The risks are acceptable. Measures to further reduce risk or mitigate
Low hazards should be implemented in conjunction with other security and
mitigation upgrades.
FIGURE 11.6 Interpretation of the risk ratings.
threat. The final step in the process is to reevaluate these two ratings for each threat
in light of the recommended upgrades. Using an exterior explosive threat as an
example, the installation of window retrofits (i.e., security window film, laminated
glass, etc.) will not prevent the explosive attack from occurring, but it should reduce
the impact of loss/injury caused by hazardous flying glass. Therefore, the impact of
loss rating for an explosive threat would improve, but the vulnerability rating would
stay the same.
A second example could be introduction of an explosive into the interior of the
facility. The potential upgrade for this threat might be X-ray package screening for
every package entering the facility. While the potential impact of loss from an inter-
nal detonation remains the same, the vulnerability to an attack is lessened because
a package containing explosives should be detected prior to entering the facility. To
further reduce risk, structural hardening of the package screening areas could also
reduce potential impact of loss. Reduction of either the impact of loss rating or the
vulnerability rating has a positive effect on the reduction of overall risk.
APPLICATION
Threat/vulnerability assessments and risk analysis can be applied to any facil-
ity and/or organization. The federal government has been utilizing varying types
of assessments and analyses for many years. Federal Security Risk Management
(FSRM) is basically the process described in this paper. FSRM is currently being
used by several federal agencies as well as commercial businesses to assess their
facilities.
Software is available to assist in performing threat/vulnerability assessments and
risk analyses. The software tool associated with implementation of FSRM is entitled
FSR-Manager (http://www.wbdg.org/resources/threat-vulnerability-assessments-and
-risk-analysis). This tool is designed to be used by security personnel and allows the user to
• Input a description of the facility, including the number of people occu-

pying the facility, the tenants represented, the contacts made during the
assessment, any information gathered from the contacts, the construction
details, etc.
• Input existing countermeasures
• Input threats and rate
• Assign an impact of loss to each threat
• Input countermeasure upgrade alternatives and their associated costs
The FSR-Manager uses the above inputs to
• Calculate vulnerability to each threat based on existing countermeasures.

• Determine the risk level from each threat and classify the risk level as high,
medium, or low.
• Check the existing countermeasures against a list of ISC-recommended
countermeasures for the given facility security level and specific threats.
The user is provided a list of potential countermeasure upgrades from
which the user may choose what to recommend for implementation.
• Reevaluate the vulnerability and associated risk level for each threat based
on countermeasure upgrade recommendations.
• Use all of the input information to complete a template report in Microsoft
Word. (Nancy A. Renfroe, 2016)
CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN

The Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a proven method-
ology that not only enhances the performance of these security and safety measures,
but also provides aesthetics and value engineering (Fennelly, 2013).
CPTED utilizes four primary, overlapping principles:
1. Natural surveillance
2. Natural access control
3. Territoriality
4. Maintenance
Natural surveillance follows the premise that criminals do not wish to be observed;
placing legitimate “eyes” on the street, such as providing window views and lighting,
increases the perceived risk to offenders, reduces fear for bona fide occupants and
visitors, as well as lessening reliance on camera surveillance.
Natural access control supplements physical security and operational measures
with walls, fences, ravines, or even hedges to define site boundaries, to channel legit-
imate occupants and visitors to designated entrances and to reduce access points and
escape routes.
Territoriality involves strategies to project a sense of ownership to spaces such that

it becomes easier to identify intruders because they don’t seem to belong. Clear dif-
ferentiation between public, semipublic, and private spaces by using signage, fences,
pavement treatment, art, and flowers are examples of ways to express ownership.
Maintenance is a key element to preserve lines of sights for surveillance, to retain
the defensiveness of physical elements, and to project a sense of care and ownership.
Together, the principles of CPTED increase the effectiveness of operational, techni-
cal, and physical safety methods, thereby lessening equipment and operating costs.
For total design efficiency and cost effectiveness, security, safety, and CPTED
measures are best applied at the beginning of a project. Security programming is a
useful practice to identify security design requirements necessary to satisfy stake-
holder concerns.
DESIGN BASIS THREAT TACTICS

Depending on the building type, acceptable levels of risk, and decisions made based
on recommendations from a comprehensive threat assessment, vulnerability assess-
ment, and risk analysis, appropriate countermeasures should be implemented to pro-
tect people, assets, and mission.
Some types of attack and threats to consider include the following:
• Unauthorized entry/trespass (forced and covert)

• Insider threats
• Explosive threats: stationary and moving vehicle-delivered, mail bombs,
package bombs
• Ballistic threats: small arms, high-powered rifles, drive-by shootings, etc.
• WMDs (CBR)
• Disruptive threats (hoaxes, false reports, malicious attempts to disrupt
operations)
• Cyber and information security threats
Supervisory Control and Acquisition Data system threats are relevant as they
relate to HVAC, mechanical/electrical systems control, and other utility systems that
are required to operate many functions within building.
Unauthorized Entry (Forced and Covert)

Protecting the facility and assets from unauthorized persons is an important part of
any security system. Some items to consider include the following:
• Compound or facility access control

• Control perimeter: fences, bollards, antiram barriers
• Traffic control, remote controlled gates, antiram hydraulic drop arms,
hydraulic barriers, parking control systems
• Forced-entry-ballistic-resistant doors, windows, walls, and roofs
• Barrier protection for man-passable openings (greater than 96 square

inches) such as air vents, utility openings, and culverts
• Mechanical locking systems
• Elimination of hiding places
• Multiple layer protection processes
• Perimeter intrusion detection systems
• Clear zone
• Video and CCTV surveillance technology
• Alarms
• Detection devices (motion, acoustic, infrared)
• Personnel identification systems
• Access control, fingerprints, biometrics, ID cards
• Credential management
• Tailgating policies
• Primary and secondary credential systems
• Protection of information and data
• Acoustic shielding
• Shielding of electronic security devices from hostile electronic
environments
• Computer screen shields
• Secure access to equipment, networks, and hardware, for example, sat-
ellites and telephone systems
Insider Threats
One of the most serious threats may come from persons who have authorized access
to a facility. These may include disgruntled employees or persons who have gained
access through normal means (e.g., contractors, support personnel, etc.). To mitigate
this threat, some items to consider include the following:
• Implement personnel reliability programs and background checks

• Limit and control access to sensitive areas of the facility
• Compartmentalization within the building/campus
• Two-man rule for access to restricted areas
• Video and CCTV surveillance technology
Ballistic Threats
These threats may range from random drive-by shootings to high-powered rifle
attacks directed at specific targets within the facility (assassinations). It is important
to quantify the potential risk and to establish the appropriate level of protection.
• Obscuration or concealment screening using trees and hedges, berms, solid

fencing, walls, and less critical buildings
• Ballistic resistant rated materials and products
• Locating critical assets away from direct lines of sight through windows
and doors
• Minimize number and size of windows
• Physical energy absorption screens such as solid fences, walls, and earthen
parapets
• Provide opaque windows or window treatments such as reflective coatings,
shades, or drapes to decrease sight lines
• Avoid sight lines to assets through vents, skylights, or other building
openings
• Use foyers or other door shielding techniques to block observation through
a doorway from an outside location
• Avoid main entrances to buildings or critical assets that face the perimeter
or an uncontrolled vantage point
WMDs: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological

Commonly referred to as WMD, these threats generally have a low probability of
occurrence, but the consequences of an attack may be severe. These threats may be
delivered by hand, mail, or as a result of accidental release of toxic industrial agents.
While fully protecting a facility against such threats may not be feasible with few
exceptions, there are several common sense and low-cost measures that can improve
resistance and reduce the risks. Some items to consider include the following:
• Protect ventilation pathways into the building

• Control access to air inlets and water systems
• Locate air intake well above ground level
• Provide detection and filtration systems for HVAC systems, air intakes
and water systems
• Provide for emergency HVAC shutoff and control
• Segregate portions of building spaces (i.e., provide separate HVAC for
the lobby, loading docks, and the core of the building)
• Consider positive pressurization to keep contaminates outside of the
facility
• Provide an emergency notification system to facilitate orderly response and
evacuation
• Avoid building locations in depressions where air could stagnate
• Provide access control to mechanical rooms
• Provide CBR monitoring apparatus
Cyber and Information Security Threats

Businesses rely heavily on the transmission of, storage of, and access to a wide range
of electronic data and communication systems. Protecting these systems from attack
is critical. Some items to consider include the following:
• Understand and identify the information assets you are trying to protect.
These may include personal information, business information such as
proprietary designs or processes, national security information, or simply
the ability of your organization to communicate via email and other LAN/
WAN and wireless functions.
• Protect the physical infrastructure that supports information systems. If the
computer system is electronically secure but vulnerable to physical destruc-
tion, it may need more protection.
• Provide software and hardware devices to detect, monitor, and prevent
unauthorized access to or the destruction of sensitive information.
The closing comments made by a person or persons making a terrorist threat,

verbally or in writing, may or may not be real, and the infrastructure and its repre-
sentatives must take that threat seriously and follow the proper protocols as outlined
in the organization’s emergency threat plan. A terrorist threat needs to be handled
with a reasonable conclusion that it may occur and a conclusion may be made that
the person’s actions convey a threat to commit a violent act. These issues need to be
handled with diligence and established guidelines in response to the emergency plan,
along with consultation with the intelligent analysis section through the proper chain
of command to ensure whether the threat is real, and the most important part is to
never underestimate the threat.
12 Mass Casualty
Incident and Mass
Fatality Incident
A mass casualty incident (often shortened to MCI and sometimes called a multiple-
casualty incident or multiple-casualty situation) is any incident in which emergency
medical service (EMS) resources, such as personnel and equipment, are over-
whelmed by the number and severity of casualties. For example, an incident where
a two-person crew is responding to a motor vehicle collision with three severely
injured people could be considered an MCI. The general public more commonly rec-
ognizes events such as building collapses, train and bus collisions, earthquakes, and
other large-scale emergencies as MCIs. Events such as the Oklahoma City bombing
in 1995 and the September 11 attacks in 2001 are well-publicized examples of MCIs.
DECLARATION OF AN MCI
An MCI will usually be declared by the first arriving unit at the scene of the incident.
However, it may alternately be declared by a dispatcher, based on the information
available from people who call their local emergency telephone number about the
incident. A formal declaration of an MCI is usually made by an officer or chief of
the agency in charge.
Initially, the senior paramedic at the scene will be in charge of the incident, but
as additional resources arrive, a senior officer or chief will take command, usually
using an incident command system structure to form a unified command to run all
aspects of the incident. In the United States, the Incident Command System is known
as the National Incident Management System (NIMS). According to the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), “NIMS provides the template for the
management of incidents.”
AGENCIES AND RESPONDERS

An MCI can involve a variety of responders and agencies. The most common are
listed below.
Emergency Medical Services

Certified first responders or emergency medical responders may arrive as part of
local EMS or may arrive on their own. They will assist with all aspects of patient
189
care, including triage and treatment at the scene and transport from the scene to the
hospital.
Paramedic and emergency medical technician (EMT) personnel may arrive in
ambulances, in their personal vehicles, or from another agency. They will have
control of all aspects of patient care, as assigned by the medical officer or incident
commander.
Ground ambulances will be assigned to the transport sector to transport patients
and personnel to and from the incident scene, emergency departments of hospitals,
and a designated helipad. These ambulances may be municipal services, volunteer
services, or from private corporations.
Air ambulances will transport patients from the scene or from designated heli-
pads to receiving hospitals.
Fire and Rescue

Firefighters will perform all initial rescue-related operations, as well as fire sup-
pression and prevention. They may also provide medical care if they are trained
and assigned to do so. They may arrive on a fire truck, in their personal vehicles,
or from another agency. Many areas near airports will have automatic mutual aid
agreements with airport fire departments in the event of a plane crash outside of the
airport boundaries.
Public Safety
Police officers will secure and control access to the scene, to ensure safety and
smooth operations. Utility services will ensure that utilities in the area are turned off
as necessary, in order to prevent further injury or damage at the scene.
Specialized Teams
HazMat specialists in Level II/B protection suits carry a patient out of the incident
zone to be decontaminated. Specialized rescue teams may be part of the local fire
department; they may be associated with the state, provincial, or federal govern-
ments; or they may be privately operated teams. These teams are specialists in spe-
cific types of rescue, such as urban search and rescue or confined space rescue.
HazMat teams are responsible for cleaning up and neutralizing any hazardous
materials at the scene. Sometimes, these will be specialized CBRNE (chemical, bio-
logical, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives) teams. National Guard Units
have medics specifically trained in mass casualty triage who may be called in to
respond to a disaster-related incident.
Public Services
Railways and transportation agencies will be notified if an incident involves their
tracks or right-of-way or if they are required to cease operations in and through
affected areas. Transportation agencies will provide buses to transport lightly injured
Mass Casualty Incident and Mass Fatality Incident 191
people to the hospital. Buses can also provide shelter at the scene (e.g., “warming
buses”) if required.
The media plays an important role in keeping the general public informed about
the incident and in keeping them away from the incident area. However, a public
information officer should be assigned as the only designated responder who com-
municates with the media, to prevent the spread of misinformation.
Nongovernmental organizations such as St. John Ambulance, the Order of Malta,
the Red Cross, the Red Crescent, the Medical Reserve Corps, and the Salvation
Army will provide assistance with all aspects of an MCI, including trained medical
staff, vehicles, individual registration and tracking, temporary shelter, food service,
and many other important services.
Hospitals
Hospitals with emergency departments will have an MCI protocol which they initi-
ate as soon as they are notified of an MCI in their community. They will have prepa-
rations in place to receive a massive number of casualties, like calling in more staff,
pulling extra and spare equipment out of storage, and clearing nonacute patients out
of the hospital. Some hospitals will send doctors to the scene of the incident to assist
with triage, treatment, and transport of injured persons to the hospital.
This is not an exhaustive list, and many other agencies and groups of people could
be involved in an MCI.
FLOW OF AN MCI
Ideally, once an MCI has been declared, a well-coordinated flow of events will occur,
using three separate phases: triage, treatment, and transportation.
Triage
The first-arriving crew will conduct triage. Prehospital emergency triage generally
consists of a check for immediate life-threatening concerns, usually lasting no more
than one minute per patient. In North America, the START system (Simple Triage
and Rapid Treatment) is the most common and is considered the easiest to use. Using
START, the medical responder assigns each patient to one of four color-coded triage
levels, based on his or her breathing, circulation, and mental status.
The triage levels are as follows:
• Immediate: Patients who have major life-threatening injuries but are sal-
vageable given the resources available
• Delayed: Patients who have non-life-threatening injuries but are unable
to walk or exhibit an altered mental status
• Walking wounded: Patients who are able to ambulate out of the incident
area to a treatment area
• Deceased or expectant: Used for victims who are dead or whose injuries
make survival unlikely
Hot zone Warm zone – contamination reduction Cold zone – MCI management
Retrieval Decontamination Monitoring Triage Treatment/transport
1 Ambulatory Triage corridor

Decon corridor
Yellow BLS
Green
4
Patient
generator LSI 3
2
Initial triage
4
Non-ambulatory
Decon corridor ALS
Black
Yellow
Sector 3 Sector 2 Sector 1 Red
FIGURE 12.1 Simplified HazMat MCI response work flow. ALS, advance life saving; BLS,
basic life saving.
Triage personnel do not conduct treatment, with the exception of
• Airway maneuvers;
• Tourniquets for life-threatening hemorrhage; and
• Where allowed by local protocols, needle decompressions for tension
pneumothoraces.
Generally, a small group of responders, usually the first two or three crews on
scene, can complete triage.
When responding to a chemical, biological, or radiological incident, the first-
arriving crew must establish safety zones prior to entering the scene.
Safety zones include the following:
• The hot zone: the contaminated area

• The warm zone: the area where HazMat specialists will decontaminate
patients and fellow responders
• The cold zone: the safe zone, where any personnel who are not specially
trained in HazMat and do not have chemical or biological protection gear
must remain at all times. Depending on the contaminant, the cold zone
should be roughly 200–300 yards from the incident. It should also be at
least 50 yards uphill and upwind from the warm zone.
These zones should be clearly identified with engineer tapes, lights, or cones.
All responders and patients must leave the hot zone in designated pathways into
the warm zone, where they will be decontaminated. A designated officer should be
posted at the hot zone and warm zone to make sure all contaminated personal are
treated and decontaminated before entering the cold zone (Figure 12.1).
Treatment
Once casualties have been triaged, they can be moved to appropriate treatment
areas. Unless a patient is Green Tagged and ambulatory, litter bearers will have to
transport patients from the incident scene to safer treatment areas located nearby.
These treatment areas must always be within walking distance and will be staffed
by appropriate numbers of properly certified medical personnel and support people.
The litter bearers do not have to be advanced medical personnel; their role is to
simply place casualties onto carrying devices and transport them to the appropri-
ate treatment area. Casualties should be transported in order of treatment priority:
red-tagged patients first, followed by yellow tagged, then green tagged, and finally
black tagged.
Each colored triage category will have its own treatment area. Treatment areas
are often defined by colored tarpaulins, flagging tape, signs, or tents. Upon arrival in
the treatment area, the casualties are reassessed and they are treated with the goal of
stabilizing them until they can be transported to hospitals, transported to the morgue
or medical examiner’s office, or released.
On-Site Morgue
Some MCIs require an on-site morgue, for several reasons:
• To await transfer of these victims to a permanent morgue

• When the deceased must be removed to access injured victims
• To keep the deceased out of public sight and prevent heightening distress,
fear, or panic in an already emotionally-charged scene
• Most often, on-site morgues are set up on the far side of the incident and is
in an enclosed area such as a temporary tent or nearby building
• Transport
• Ambulance on scene with emergency lights on
The final stage in the prehospital management of a MCI is the transport of casual-
ties to hospitals for more definitive care. If an insufficient number of ambulances are
available, other vehicles may transport patients, such as police cars, fire trucks, air
ambulances, transit buses, or personal vehicles. As with treatment, transport priority
is decided based on the severity of the patient’s injuries. Usually, the most seriously
injured are transported first, with the least serious transported only after all the criti-
cal patients have been transported.
However, in an effort to remove as many lightly injured civilians as possible, an
incident commander may choose to have those least seriously injured transported to
local hospitals or interim-care centers in order to provide more room for emergency
personnel to work. It is also possible that lightly injured casualties will be trans-
ported first when access to those who are more severely injured will be delayed due
to heavy or difficult rescue efforts.
DEFINITIVE CARE
The care that is rendered at the scene of an MCI is usually only temporary and is
designed to stabilize the casualties until they can receive more definitive care at a
hospital or an interim-care center.
Interim-Care Center
An interim-care center is a temporary treatment center that allows for the assess-
ment and treatment of patients until they can either be discharged or transported to
a hospital. These are often placed in gymnasiums, schools, arenas, community cen-
ters, hotels, and/or other locations that can support a field hospital setup. Permanent
buildings are preferred to tents as they provide shelter, power, and running water,
but many governments maintain complete field hospital setups that can be deployed
anywhere within their jurisdiction within 12–24 hours. While full field hospitals
require a significant amount of time to deploy (in relation to the length of most
incidents), emergency personnel can set up temporary interim-care centers fairly
quickly if needed using the personnel and resources they have on-hand. These cen-
ters are usually staffed by a combination of doctors, nurses, paramedics/EMTs, first
responders, and social workers (e.g., from the Red Cross), who work to get families
reunited after a disaster.
MASS CASUALTY EVENT

Generally, in the healthcare field, the term “mass casualty event” is used when
hospital resources are overwhelmed by the number or severity of casualties.
During these incidents, hospitals can discharge all fit patients, dedicate more
resources to the emergency department, and expand their intensive care unit to
accommodate anticipated long-term care needs. While up to 80% of victims will
be transported from the scene to hospitals, others who are less injured might walk
themselves to these facilities and increase the load at the closest facility to the
incident.
MCEs can include bioterrorism attacks, chemical emergencies, radiation emer-
gencies, and natural disasters like weather.
MASS FATALITY INCIDENT

Mass Fatality Definition
A mass fatality incident (MFI), by definition, is any situation where more deaths
occur than can be handled by local medical examiner/coroner (ME/C) resources.
There is no minimum number of deaths for an incident to be considered an MFI
because communities vary in size and resources.
An MFI may be caused by natural hazards (e.g., earthquakes, floods, and hurri-
canes), human-related hazards (e.g., airline accidents and bridge or tunnel collapses),
and proactive human hazards (e.g., terrorist acts).
A mass fatality becomes a catastrophic mass fatality when, as defined in California
(Supervisors, 2012), the “loss of life overwhelms the state’s mutual aid system and
requires extraordinary support from state, federal, and private resources.” This defi-
nition may vary from state to state. However, in all states, a catastrophic mass fatal-
ity is likely to trigger disaster declarations at the state and federal level, and a federal
disaster declaration will mobilize an array of resources to support state and local
response and recovery efforts.
Regardless of the size of the MFI, the ME/C is the legal authority to conduct
victim identification (or augment the lead investigative agencies to complete victim
identification), determine the cause and manner of death, and manage death cer-
tification. The ME/C is also responsible for other medico-legal activities, such as
notification of next of kin.
MFI is an emergency management term used to identify an incident involving
more dead bodies and/or body parts than can be located, identified, and processed
for final disposition by available response resources.
Although it is a somewhat relative term in that there is no widely accepted number
of fatalities that define an MFI, it is generally recognized that if the number of fatali-
ties exceeds the local city or county’s resource capabilities, causing them to request
assistance or mutual aid from neighboring jurisdictions, the term applies.
MFIs may or may not be a result of an MCI, which is considered a different type
of incident and usually focuses more on managing the surviving victims of an inci-
dent. MFI and MCI may, and often do, occur simultaneously. MFI differs from MCI
in that most, if not all, of the victims of the incident are deceased. A catastrophic
plane crash with no survivors is one example of an MFI. Part of the distinction
between MFI and MCI is because different kinds of resources are needed to man-
age each. Living victims are attended to by medical personnel such as EMS, and
deceased victims are attended to by medical examiners or coroners.
MFIs may be either human caused, such as hazardous materials releases, trans-
portation accidents, or terrorist attacks, or they may be the result of natural disasters
such as earthquakes, floods, or severe weather.
Some significant MFIs are
• South Asian tsunami disaster

• Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
• Hurricane Katrina
• The September 11 attacks
• Oklahoma City bombing
• Bhopal disaster
• Spanish flu
One of the naturally occurring incidents with great potential to cause a MFI is
pandemic influenza (flu). The Spanish Flu pandemic of 1918 killed millions and
overwhelmed response resources on a global level. A modern pandemic could have
similarly overwhelming impacts. Catastrophic incidents that result in mass fatalities
usually also result in mass injuries and/or illnesses. While it is more important to
dedicate resources to care for the living, many people have public health concerns
about the dead. This is one important reason why jurisdictions usually include mass
fatality planning as part of their overall emergency preparedness efforts.
After some MFI authorities have conducted hasty mass burials, research has
shown that this is a generally unsatisfactory response.
Mass burials are usually not required for public health reasons, as they increase dis-
tress among survivors and interfere with long-term community recovery. In all cultures,
there are customs and rituals for dealing with the dead. Universally, survivors want to
know what happened to their loved ones and that their loved ones’ remains were treated
with respect. These are important reasons to plan for mass fatality management.
Response Functions
The primary response functions in a MFI are the following:
• Human remains recovery—the search and rescue efforts to locate bodies

and body parts, marking and documenting the location of found remains
and eventually transporting the remains to either decontamination or the
site morgue for examination as appropriate.
• Decontamination (depending on event)—the “cleaning” of either chemi-
cally or biologically contaminated remains to make them safe for further
handling and examination.
• Examination
• Identification and death certification
• Processing for final disposition
Mass Fatality Management Resources

The following may provide helpful information for mass fatality planning: www
.dmort7.org. The Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team (DMORT) is part of
the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) and provides support to the National
Transportation Safety Board and other mass fatality requirements (NACCHO, 2016).
The DMORT is “A free, online collection of local public health tools produced by
members of the public health community” (NACCHO, 2017).
• Section A—Acknowledgements
• Section B—Introduction
• Section C—Planning Context
• Section D—Concept Of Operation
• Section E—Incident Notification/Plan Activation
• Section F—Command and Control
• Section G—Human Remains Recovery
• Section H—Morgue Services
• Section I—Family Assistance
• Section J—Public Communications
• Section K—Death Certificates and Disposition Permits
• Section L—Death Care Industry
• Section M—Mass Fatality Plan Maintenance
• Section N—Security
• Section O—Mass Fatality Information Systems
• Section P—Staff/Volunteer Processing Center
• Section Q—Family Concerns and Religious/Cultural Considerations
• Section R—Infection and Other Health and Safety Threats
• Section S—Pandemic Influenza
DISASTER MORTUARY OPERATIONAL RESPONSE TEAM

A Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team, or DMORT, is a team of experts
in the fields of victim identification and mortuary services. DMORTs are activated
in response to large-scale disasters in the United States to assist in the identifica-
tion of deceased individuals and storage of the bodies pending the bodies being
claimed.
Organization
For organizational purposes, the country is divided into 10 regions, each with
a regional coordinator. For the duration of their service, DMORT members work
under the local authorities of the disaster site and their professional licenses are
recognized by all states.
DMORT Teams:
• REGION I (ME, NH, VT, MA, CT, RI)

• REGION II (NY, NJ, PR, VI)
• REGION III (PA, MD, DC, DE, VA, WV)
• REGION IV (AL, KY, TN, NC, SC, GA, MS, FL)
• REGION V (MN, WI, IL, IN, MI, OH)
• REGION VI (NM, TX, OK, AR, LA)
• REGION VII (NE, IA, KS, MO)
• REGION VIII (MT, ND, SD, WY, UT, CO)
• REGION IX (AZ, NV, CA, HI)
• REGION X (WA, AK, OR, ID)
MORTs are organized under the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) NDMS. The DMORTs are composed of civilian funeral directors, medical
examiners, coroners, pathologists, forensic anthropologists, fingerprint specialists,
forensic odontologists, dental assistants, and radiographers. They are supported by
medical records technicians and transcribers, mental health specialists, computer
professionals, administrative support staff, and security and investigative personnel.
When a DMORT is activated, the personnel on the team are treated and paid as a
temporary federal employee.
The HHS maintains three Disaster Portable Morgue Units (DPMUs), which are
staged at HHS Logistics Centers, one each in Frederick, Maryland, Fort Worth,
Texas, and San Jose, California. Each DPMU is a cache of equipment and supplies
for a complete morgue with designated workstations for each process the DMORT
team is required to complete.
Identification of Remains
Identification of remains is a two-part process that utilizes a sophisticated com-
puter program for matching physical characteristics. The families of the deceased
provide as much information about them as possible: dental records, X-rays,
photographs or descriptions of tattoos, clothing and jewelry, blood type infor-

mation, and objects that may contain the deceased’s DNA, such as hair or a
toothbrush.
The information gathered, called antemortem, or “before death,” information is
entered into a computer program called VIP (Victim Identification Profile), which
is capable of assimilating 800 different item categories, including graphics, photo-
graphs, and X-rays. As forensic scientists (pathologists, anthropologists, and odontol-
ogists) examine the recovered remains, they enter their findings—called postmortem
data—into VIP. Depending on the availability of data, the Windows-VIP system
enables scientists to match the remains to their identity.
Incidents
For the World Trade Center disaster, U.S. Secretary of Health and Human
Services Tommy G. Thompson activated the NDMS. It was the first time this
federally coordinated response system had been activated on a full nationwide
basis.
In 2006, DMORT operated the Find Family National Call Center in Baton
Rouge, Louisiana. This is the center of all operations concerning the location and
reuniting of families scattered by Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita. Out of
nearly 13,000 people reported missing after the impacts of hurricanes Katrina,
Rita, Stan, and Wilma, nearly 7,000 were found alive and reunited with their
families.
MASS FATALITY MANAGEMENT

The ME/C is responsible for the recovery, identification, and disposition of MFI
victims.
One of the sad realities of disasters is that they can result in the loss of human
life. Many emergency responders have learned this from their own experience, and
they will remember the incident for a long time. Mass fatality disasters are often
long remembered by the responders, the community, the state, and the nation.
Disaster management is important, and every plan should have a section on fatality
management.
When a passenger aircraft crashes carrying 100 to 300 passengers or a building
structure with hundreds of people inside collapses, the incident would probably be
deemed an MFI, even in the largest of cities. Likewise, an incident like a mad gun-
man killing five people can be called a multiple fatality incident, but it may not be a
MFI if it occurs in a major city. In any case, the recovery, identification, and disposi-
tion of the victims are the responsibilities of the ME/C of the jurisdiction where the
incident occurs.
There are three major operational areas in a mass fatalities incident response:
1. Search and recovery (S&R)

2. Morgue operation
3. Family assistance
Trained personnel should oversee the tasks associated with each of the three
areas.
Search and Recovery

Simply stated, S&R normally involves locating and removing at least bodies, body
parts, and personal effects. A good S&R team will document everything found at
the disaster site, as it may help in the investigation and in the morgue operations. A
good policy is to treat every site as a crime scene, until the ME/C says differently. As
a rule of thumb, search teams systematically search and mark where bodies, body
parts, and personal effects are located with pin flags, stakes, etc.
A team member will assign a number to that particular finding. They log each
finding on a grid chart, photograph it, and move on until the search is completed.
Recovery starts after the search of an area is complete. Bodies and body parts
must be treated with dignity and respect at all times. Each finding should be tagged
with the number assigned by the search team. Bodies and body parts should be
placed into a body bag or acceptable substitute. A tag with the same number as the
finding inside the bag will be placed on the outside of bag. The body bag should be
removed from the scene and taken to a location designated by the ME/C. Personal
effects found on the body should not be removed from the victims at the scene.
If weathering may be a problem, the personal effects can be wrapped in plastic
and affixed to the body or body part. Victim identification is a function within the
morgue operations, not the S&R team.
Morgue Operations
Depending on the size and nature of the incident, the ME/C will determine where
to establish an incident morgue site. The site may be in the existing morgue for that
geographical area or it may be a temporary incident morgue site in another location,
such as a warehouse, airplane hangar, or fairground building. School gymnasiums
should not be used, particularly when school is in session.
The ME/C should lay out the morgue operation site considering the physical con-
dition of the victims, the number of victims, and the number of personnel needed to
perform such morgue functions as administration, logistics, refrigeration, and opera-
tions. The operational areas can include areas for receiving, photography, X-ray, per-
sonal effects, anthropology, dental, fingerprinting, pathology, storage, and shipping.
In some cases, an area for embalming may be desirable.
The main purposes for the morgue are to determine the cause of death and iden-
tify victims. The use of highly skilled professionals for each of the morgue opera-
tional areas is important. Postmortem records will be completed for every body and
body part as they are processed through each of the operational stations. Postmortem
records include personal effects, photography, radiographs, anthropology, finger-
prints, and dental and pathology reports.
The postmortem records will be compared to the antemortem (predeath) records
obtained from the victim’s family and other sources such as fingerprint reposito-
ries and hospitals. Personal effects, such as driver licenses found on the victim or
statements of recognition, should not be used as positive identification, but rather

tentative identification.
Positive identification is a responsibility of the ME/C. After identification is
established, the medical examiner can release the body and/or body parts based on
the desires of the “next of kin.”
FAMILY ASSISTANCE CENTER

The family assistance center (FAC) is one of the most sensitive operations in a mass
fatalities event. Its purposes are as follows:
• To provide relatives of victims with information and access to services they

may need in the days following the incident
• To protect families from the media and curiosity seekers
• To allow investigators and the ME/C access to families so they can obtain
information more easily
An FAC should be established quickly, in an area such as a hotel, conference cen-

ter, school, or church. The area selected should be secured, in order to give privacy
to the families. Regular briefing by the ME/C or staff twice daily will help keep the
families informed. Meeting with the families on an individual basis early on makes
it possible to start the process of collecting antemortem records for use in the morgue
operations. The FAC has become so important that federal law recommends one to
be established whenever a major aviation disaster occurs. Staffing for the FAC is
important. Grief counselors should be available. Personnel from the American Red
Cross possessing trained counseling skills and funeral service personnel are good at
working with grieving families. Translators may be necessary when working with
families from foreign countries.
There are many volunteer organizations and community businesses able to assist
the ME/C during an MFI response. If you have or are contemplating forming a response
team, be sure they receive quality training on the basic MFI response principles and pro-
cedures. Contact your local emergency management office for training information or
contact your state emergency management training officer to obtain information on sched-
uling a MFI response course in your area. The course is available from FEMA’s Emergency
Management Institute and is entitled Mass Fatalities Incident Response Course.
Your response program should include policies and procedures that meet the
approval of the ME/C.
They should also be consistent with the overall disaster response plan managed by
the emergency management office.
The subject of fatality management must be taken seriously in this day of natural
and manmade disasters.
Fatality Management
Fatality management is the ability to coordinate with other organizations (e.g., law
enforcement, healthcare, emergency management, and ME/C) to ensure the proper
recovery, handling, identification, transportation, tracking, storage, and disposal of

human remains and personal effects; certify cause of death; and facilitate access to
mental/behavioral health services to the family members, responders, and survivors
of an incident.
This capability consists of the ability to perform the following functions:
1. Determine role for public health in fatality management

2. Activate public health fatality management operations
3. Assist in the collection and dissemination of ante mortem data
4. Participate in survivor mental/behavioral health services
5. Participate in fatality processing and storage operations
Function 1: Determine Role for Public Health in Fatality Management

Coordinate with the lead jurisdictional authority (e.g., coroner, medical examiner,
sheriff, or other agent) to identify the roles and responsibilities of jurisdictional pub-
lic health entities in fatality management activities.
This function consists of the ability to perform the following tasks:
Task 1: Prior to an incident, characterize potential fatalities based on jurisdic-

tional risk assessment and the impact of these potential fatalities on juris-
dictional resource needs.
Task 2: Prior to an incident, coordinate with subject matter experts (e.g., those
with expertise in epidemiology, laboratory, surveillance; community cultural/
religious beliefs or burial practices; chemical, biological, radiological, and
emergency operations leads; and partners from hospital, mortuary, EMS) to
determine public health’s role in an incident that may result in fatalities.
Task 3: Prior to an incident, coordinate with jurisdictional, private, and fed-
eral Emergency Support Function 6 and Emergency Support Function
8 resources as necessary to determine their roles and requirements for the
response.
Function 2: Activate Public Health Fatality Management Operations

This is in accordance with public health jurisdictional standards and practices and as
requested by the lead jurisdictional authority.
Task 1: Assess data from the incident to inform and guide the public health
resources needed for the response.
Task 2: Identify and coordinate with jurisdictional, regional, private, and fed-
eral Emergency Support Function 8 resources with expertise in the poten-
tial cause(s) of fatalities to make recommendations regarding all phases
of human remains disposition: recovery, processing (e.g., decontamination,
infection control, and other mitigation measures), storing, and disposing.
Task 3: Coordinate with partners to initiate predetermined (e.g., local, regional,
state, federal, and private sector) processes for all phases of human remains
disposition.
Task 4: Coordinate incident details among members of the public health

and medical health systems by sharing information between programs
and linking information databases, based on the scope of the incident.
(For additional or supporting detail, see Capability 6: Information
Sharing.)
Function 3: Assist in the Collection and Dissemination of Antemortem Data

Assist, if requested, the lead jurisdictional authority and jurisdictional and regional
partners to gather and disseminate ante mortem data 71 through a Federal Acquisition
Circular (FAC) Model 72 or other mechanism.
Task 1: Coordinate with partners for the establishment of a mechanism (e.g.,

FAC) to collect antemortem data.
Task 2: Coordinate with partners to identify and assemble the resources
required to collect and communicate antemortem data.
Task 3: Coordinate with partners and assist, if needed, in the collection and
dissemination of antemortem data to families of the deceased and law
enforcement officials.
Task 4: Coordinate with partners to support electronic recording and reporting
of antemortem data through electronic systems and/or other information
sharing platforms.
Function 4: Participate in Survivor Mental/Behavioral Health Services

Coordinate with the lead jurisdictional authority and jurisdictional and regional
partners to support the provision of non-intrusive, culturally sensitive mental/
behavioral health support services to family members of the deceased, incident
survivors, and responders, if requested.
Task 1: Coordinate with partners to assemble the required staff and

resources to provide nonintrusive mental/behavioral health services to
responders.
Task 2: Coordinate with partners to facilitate availability of culturally appro-
priate assistance (e.g., addressing language barriers and religious or cultural
practices).
Task 3: Coordinate with Emergency Support Function 8 partners to support
the provision of mental/behavioral health services to family members of the
deceased and incident survivors as needed.
Function 5: Participate in Fatality Processing and Storage Operations

Assist the lead jurisdictional authority and partners in ensuring that human
remains and associated personal effects are safely recovered, processed, trans-
ported, tracked, stored, and disposed of or released to authorized person(s), if
requested.
Task 1: Make recommendations to the incident management/jurisdictional

lead agency on procedures for the safe recovery, receipt, identification,
decontamination, transportation, storage, and disposal of human remains.
Recommendations can also include an assessment of the need for tempo-
rary burial, procurement of public property for temporary burial, and
security/privacy requirements of the processing facility.
Task 2: Assist, if needed or requested, in multispecialty forensic analysis to
identify human remains and determine the cause and manner of death.
Task 3: Coordinate with partners to support electronic death reporting.
Task 4: Coordinate with partners to facilitate the collection and reporting of
mortality information (e.g., vital records).
SECURITY AT A MASS CASUALTY AND MASS FATALITY INCIDENT

Security is critical to effective mass fatality management. A lack of security can
derail the best plans.
In the event of a mass fatality, the incident site, incident morgue, and the FAC will
require security and traffic control. The law enforcement agency for the jurisdiction
where the incident takes place will be responsible for these operations. When the
emergency operations center is activated, the law enforcement branch in the opera-
tions section will provide oversight and coordination of law enforcement mutual aid
that is called in to assist with site security and traffic control.
A written security plan and traffic control plan that outline the procedures and
requirements of the operation are recommended for the incident site, incident
morgue, and the FAC during the early stages of mass fatality operations.
Many law enforcement agencies will have established protocols and procedures
for developing security and traffic control plans. However, when the ME/C office
requests security support for its mission, it needs to be appropriately prepared.
That means being prepared to request the right number and type of security
resources that will be needed and being able to promptly provide law enforcement
with the information it will need to achieve success in its support mission.
Overview
Mass fatality security requirements, security objectives, and information to request
when selecting sites for mass fatality operations are described below. This informa-
tion is followed by a description of the associated tools included with this section.
The associated tools are a questionnaire that can be used to perform a physical secu-
rity assessment, a security plan template, and a traffic control plan template. These
resources have been developed to assist the ME/C office and the local law enforce-
ment agency in effective mass fatality management.
These associated tools are
• Identification of stakeholders involved in mass fatality management and

recommendations for a planning process that is co-led by public health and
the medical examiner/coroners office;
• Specific guidelines for all medical examiner/coroner responsibilities at the

incident site, morgue, and family assistance center;
• Guidance on infection and other health and safety threats; and
• Requirements and recommendations for managing mass fatalities during a
worst-case scenario pandemic influenza.
Security Requirements
In a mass fatality, the nature of the incident will dictate required security. The fol-
lowing are general security requirements to anticipate:
• Incident site
• Morgue (jurisdiction’s morgue, temporary incident morgue, and long-term
examination center/sifting site, if one is required)
• FAC(s)/reception center(s)
• Traffic control at all sites
In addition, agencies tasked to provide security for mass fatality operations may
also be tasked with providing heightened security throughout the jurisdiction.
Security Objectives
Key considerations for securing all mass fatality operations sites are the following:
• Controlling access into, within, and out of the facility

• Perimeter protection
• Parking lot protection
• Traffic control
• Establishing and protecting landing zones as needed (e.g., for the delivery
of Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team’s portable morgue unit)
• Crowd control
The following are the general security objectives for each site.
Incident site objectives are as follows:
• To control site access 24/7

• All authorized personnel, volunteers, and approved visitors must have photo
ID security badges that reference function and access
• To recover human remains
• To preserve evidence
• To facilitate identification of victims
• If a crime or terrorism is suspected
• To protect response personnel and volunteers
• To protect the public from potential physical dangers (e.g., building
collapse) and when chemical, biological, and/or radiological agents are
involved
• To escort vehicles transporting human remains from the incident site to

the morgue (as needed)
• To secure parking areas
The morgue services objectives are as follows:

• To preserve evidence
• To facilitate identification of victims
• If a crime or terrorism is suspected
• To protect morgue personnel and volunteers
• To protect the deceased
FAC objectives are as follows:

• All family members and loved ones of potential victims must have photo ID
security badges that reference their roll and access
• No media, curiosity seekers, general public, etc., are to be admitted under
any circumstances without authorization
• To ensure that families feel protected when visiting the FAC
• May want to consider police in plain clothes who patrol inside the FAC to
ensure that no unauthorized persons have gained entry
• To protect response personnel and volunteers
Security is a high priority at the FAC.
Information to Request for Security Planning When

Selecting Sites for Incident Morgue and FAC
Other than the incident site itself, the Emergency Operations Center Logistics
Section will be responsible for site selection—the incident morgue and the FAC. The
following are security-related recommendations when selecting sites:
• Involve law enforcement in site selection so that major security risks can be
identified immediately.
• Collect the following information, as available, for each site:
• Exterior and interior photos
• Map-wide view
• Map-tight view
• Aerial photo—wide view
• Aerial photo—tight view
• Facility’s floor plan diagram
• Parking plan
• Mass transit map
Give this information with the ME/C’s proposed floor plans/layouts for the tem-
porary incident morgue and for the FAC to the law enforcement branch to assist them
with development of security and traffic control plans.
Overview of Physical Security Assessment

A Physical Security Assessment is included as a tool with this section. It contains
the following sections:
Physical security assessment: exterior of the site
• Perimeter
• Lighting
• Parking areas
• Landscaping
Physical security assessment: interior of building(s)
• Doors, windows, and other openings

• Ceilings and walls
• Emergency power system
• Lighting
Physical security assessment: specific security devices, technologies, and machines
• Alarms
• Fire protection
• Utility control points
• Attic, basements, crawl spaces, and air-conditioning and heating ducts
• Communications
• Physical security assessment: roadway access
• Physical security assessment: neighborhood characteristics (within four
blocks of the site)
• Physical security assessment: standard operating procedures. Public areas
(waiting areas, restrooms, and hallways). Offices within the facility that
handle money
• Security procedures
These questions are followed by a space for any specific security concerns and a
summary rating system to present an overview of security issues and requirements.
Overview of Security and Traffic Control Plan Templates

The Security Plan Template includes the following sections:
• Security plan staffing and postings

• Security postings, interior
• Security postings, exterior
• Site specific security operations plan and comments
• Diagram and photos of facility utility shut-off controls
The Traffic Control Plan Template includes the following sections:
• Traffic control plan staffing and postings

• Traffic control postings
• Site-specific traffic control operations plan and comments
Once the security and traffic control plans have been completed, standard oper-
ating procedures will be needed. It is expected that law enforcement agencies will
modify existing applicable operating procedures as required to implement the secu-
rity and traffic control plans.
The Physical Security Assessment, Security Plan Template, and Traffic Control
Plan Template are included as tools to assist jurisdictions in developing mass fatality
security and traffic control plans.
These tools are based on the work of many County Department of Public Health
Emergency Preparedness & Response Program’s multidisciplined Strategic National
Stockpile Force Protection Committee’s work on security for Points of Dispensing
Preplans.
The purpose of mass casualty and mass fatality incidents is to respond to and
manage differently than our normal response system (Figure 12.2).
Admin
FIGURE 12.2 Example mass fatality layout.

Incident site Wind direction

V
Ambulatory Decontamination a
area p
patient assembly o
area (secondary r
triage) C
l T
o r
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Hot zone Warm zone Cold zone
FIGURE 12.3 Example of a mass casualty and mass fatality layout.
Most mass casualty/fatality incidents occur without notice, yet require a major
response effort. Because of the number of casualties, first arriving emergency work-
ers are often overwhelmed.
A majority of our existing plans are designed to effectively respond to major
incidents. However, for mass casualty/fatality incidents, they must be expanded in
scope very quickly (Figure 12.3). The incident management provides the means to
accomplish this and maintain control.
and Weapons of
Mass Destruction
A weapon of mass destruction (WMD) is a nuclear, radiological, chemical, biologi-
cal, or other weapon that can kill and bring significant harm to a large number of
humans or cause great damage to human-made structures (e.g., buildings), natural
structures (e.g., mountains), or the biosphere. The scope and application of the term
has evolved and been disputed, often signifying more politically than technically.
Originally coined in reference to aerial bombing with chemical explosives, since
World War II it has come to refer to large-scale weaponry of other technologies, such
as chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear.
DEFINITIONS OF THE TERM

Strategic
The most widely used definition of “weapons of mass destruction” is that of nuclear,
biological, or chemical weapons (NBC), although there is no treaty or customary
international law that contains an authoritative definition. Instead, international law
has been used with respect to the specific categories of weapons within WMD, and
not to WMD as a whole.
While nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are regarded as the three major
types of WMDs, some analysts have argued that radiological materials as well as
missile technology and delivery systems such as aircraft and ballistic missiles could
be labeled as WMDs as well.
The abbreviations NBC (for nuclear, biological and chemical) and CBR (chemical,
biological, and radiological) are used with regards to battlefield protection systems
for armored vehicles, because all three involve insidious toxins that can be carried
through the air and can be protected against with vehicle air filtration systems.
However, there is an argument that nuclear and biological weapons do not belong
in the same category as chemical and “dirty bomb” radiological weapons, which
have limited destructive potential (and close to none, as far as property is concerned),
whereas nuclear and biological weapons have the unique ability to kill large numbers
of people with very small amounts of material, and thus could be said to belong in a
class by themselves.
The NBC definition has also been used in official U.S. documents, by the U.S.
President, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Department of Defense,
and the U.S. Government Accountability Office.
209
Other documents expand the definition of WMD to also include radiological or con-
ventional weapons. The U.S. military refers to WMD as (Department of Defense, 2012):
Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capable of a high order of

destruction or causing mass casualties and exclude the means of transporting or
propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part from the
weapon. Also called WMD.
This may also refer to nuclear ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles).

The significance of the words separable and divisible part of the weapon is that
missiles such as the Pershing II and the SCUD are considered weapons of mass
destruction, while aircraft capable of carrying bomb loads are not.
In 2004, the United Kingdom’s (2006) Butler Review recognized the “consid-
erable and long-standing academic debate about the proper interpretation of the
phrase ‘weapons of mass destruction.’” The committee set out to avoid the gen-
eral term but when using it employed the definition of United Nations Security
Council Resolution 687, which defined the systems that Iraq was required to
abandon:
• Nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any sub-systems or
components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facili-
ties relating to [nuclear weapons].
• Chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related
subsystems and components and all research, development, support and
manufacturing facilities.
• Ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers and related major
parts, and repair and production facilities.
Chemical weapons expert Gert G. Harigel considers only nuclear weapons true
WMDs because “only nuclear weapons are completely indiscriminate by their explo-
sive power, heat radiation and radioactivity, and only they should therefore be called
a weapon of mass destruction.” He prefers to call chemical and biological weapons
“weapons of terror” when aimed against civilians and “weapons of intimidation” for
soldiers (Harigel, 2017).
For a period of several months in the winter of 2002–2003, U.S. Deputy Secretary
of Defense Paul Wolfowitz frequently used the term “weapons of mass terror,”
apparently also recognizing the distinction between the psychological and the physi-
cal effects of many things currently falling into the WMD category.
Gustavo Bell Lemus, the vice president of Colombia, at the July 9, 2001, United
Nations (UN) Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in
All Its Aspects, quoted the Millennium Report of the UN Secretary-General to the
General Assembly, in which Kofi Annan said that small arms could be described as
WMD because the fatalities they cause “dwarf that of all other weapons systems—and
in most years greatly exceed the toll of the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima
and Nagasaki” (United Nations, 2001).
An additional condition often implicitly applied to WMD is that the use of
the weapons must be strategic. In other words, they would be designed to “have
consequences far outweighing the size and effectiveness of the weapons themselves.”
Emergency Management and Weapons of Mass Destruction 211
The strategic nature of WMD also defines their function in the military doctrine of
total war as targeting the means a country would use to support and supply its war
effort, specifically its population, industry, and natural resources.
Within U.S. civil defense organizations, the category is now Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive, which defines WMD as
• Any explosive, incendiary, poison gas, bomb, grenade, or rocket having a

propellant charge of more than four ounces [113 g], missile having an explo-
sive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce [7 g], or mine or
device similar to the above.
• Poison gas.
• Any weapon involving a disease organism.
• Any weapon that is designed to release radiation at a level dangerous to
human life.
Military
For the general purposes of national defense, the U.S. Code defines a WMD as:
Any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious
bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or
impact of:
• Toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors
• A disease organism
• Radiation or radioactivity
For the purposes of the prevention of weapons proliferation, the U.S. Code defines
WMDs as “chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and chemical, biological, and
nuclear materials used in the manufacture of such weapons.”
Criminal (Civilian)
For the purposes of U.S. criminal law concerning terrorism, WMDs are defined as
follows (FBI, www.fbi.gov):
• Any “destructive device” defined as any explosive, incendiary, or poison

gas—bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant charge of more than four
ounces, missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-
quarter ounce, mine, or device similar to any of the devices described in
the preceding clauses
• Any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily
injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous
chemicals, or their precursors
• Any weapon involving a biological agent, toxin, or vector
• Any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level
dangerous to human life
The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s definition is similar to that presented above

from the terrorism statute:
• Any “destructive device” as defined in Title 18 USC Section 921: any explo-
sive, incendiary, or poison gas—bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant
charge of more than four ounces, missile having an explosive or incendiary
charge of more than one-quarter ounce, mine, or device similar to any of
the devices described in the preceding clauses
• Any weapon designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury
through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemi-
cals or their precursors
• Any weapon involving a disease organism
• Any weapon designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level danger-
ous to human life
• Any device or weapon designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily
injury by causing a malfunction of or destruction of an aircraft or other
vehicle that carries humans or of an aircraft or other vehicle whose mal-
function or destruction may cause said aircraft or other vehicle to cause
death or serious bodily injury to humans who may be within range of the
vector in its course of travel or the travel of its debris
Indictments and convictions for possession and use of WMD such as truck bombs,
pipe bombs, shoe bombs, and cactus needles coated with a biological toxin have been
obtained under 18 USC 2332a.
As defined by 18 USC §2332 (a) (“Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” https://
www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2332a), a WMD is
• Any destructive device as defined in section 921 of the title.

• Any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily
injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous
chemicals, or their precursors.
• Any weapon involving a biological agent, toxin, or vector (as those terms
are defined in section 178 of this title).
• Any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level
dangerous to human life.
TREATIES NOT TO USE WMDs

The development and use of WMD are governed by several international conven-
tions and treaties, although not all countries have signed and ratified them:
• Partial Test Ban Treaty

• Outer Space Treaty
• Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
• Seabed Arms Control Treaty
• Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT, has not entered into force as of
2015)
• Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)

• Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
A variety of treaties and agreements have been enacted to regulate the use, devel-
opment, and possession of various types of WMDs. Treaties may regulate weap-
ons use under the customs of war (Hague Conventions and Geneva Protocol), ban
specific types of weapons (Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons
Convention), limit weapons research (Partial Test Ban Treaty and Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty), limit allowable weapons stockpiles and delivery systems
(START I and SORT), or regulate civilian use of weapon precursors (Chemical
Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons Convention). The history of weapons
control has also included treaties to limit effective defense against WMDs in order to
preserve the deterrent doctrine of mutual assured destruction (Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty) as well as treaties to limit the spread of nuclear technologies geographically
(African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty).
USE, POSSESSION, AND ACCESS

Nuclear Weapons
The only country to have used a nuclear weapon in war is the United States, which
dropped two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during
World War II.
There are eight countries that have declared they possess nuclear weapons and
are known to have tested a nuclear weapon, only five of which are members of the
NPT. The eight are China, France, India, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
Israel is considered by most analysts to have nuclear weapons numbering in the
low hundreds as well but maintains an official policy of nuclear ambiguity, neither
denying nor confirming its nuclear status.
South Africa developed a small nuclear arsenal in the 1980s but disassembled
them in the early 1990s, making it the only country to have fully given up an inde-
pendently developed nuclear weapons arsenal.
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine inherited stockpiles of nuclear arms following
the break-up of the Soviet Union but relinquished them to the Russian Federation.
Countries with access to nuclear weapons through nuclear sharing agreements
include Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey.
U.S. Politics
Due to the indiscriminate impact of WMD, the fear of a WMD attack has shaped
political policies and campaigns, fostered social movements, and has been the cen-
tral theme of many films. Support for different levels of WMD development and
control varies nationally and internationally. Yet understanding of the nature of the
threats is not high, in part because of imprecise usage of the term by politicians and
the media.
An Atomic-Bomb Blueprint
Fear of WMD, or of threats diminished by the possession of WMD, has long been
used to catalyze public support for various WMD policies. They include mobiliza-
tion of pro- and anti-WMD campaigners alike and generation of popular political
support. The term WMD may be used as a powerful buzzword or to generate a
culture of fear. It is also used ambiguously, particularly by not distinguishing among
the different types of WMD.
More recently, the threat of potential WMD in Iraq was used by President George
W. Bush as justification for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Broad reference to Iraqi WMD
in general was seen as an element of President Bush’s arguments. The claim that Iraq
possessed WMDs led to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by Coalition forces.
Over 500 munitions were discovered throughout Iraq since 2003 containing
chemical agents mustard and Sarin gas, produced in the 1980s and no longer usable
as originally intended.
In 2004, Polish troops found nineteen 1980s-era rocket warheads, thwarting an
attempt by militants to buy them at $5,000 each. Some of the rockets contained
extremely deteriorated nerve agent.
The American Heritage Dictionary defines a WMD as “a weapon that can cause
widespread destruction or kill large numbers of people, especially a nuclear, chemi-
cal, or biological weapon.” In other words, it does not have to be NBC.
For example, the terrorist for the Boston Marathon bombings was charged under
U.S. law 18 U.S.C. 2332A for using a WMD, and that was a pressure cooker bomb. In
other words, it was a weapon that caused large-scale death and destruction, without
being an NBC weapon.
MEDIA COVERAGE
In 2004, the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
released a report examining the media’s coverage of WMD issues during three sepa-
rate periods: nuclear weapons tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998, the U.S.
announcement of evidence of a North Korean nuclear weapons program in October
2002, and revelations about Iran’s nuclear program in May 2003 (Moeller, 1998).
The CISSM report notes that poor coverage resulted less from political bias among the
media than from tired journalistic conventions. The report’s major findings were that:
Most media outlets represented WMD as a monolithic menace, failing to adequately

distinguish between weapons programs and actual weapons or to address the real dif-
ferences among chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological weapons.
Most journalists accepted the Bush administration’s formulation of the “War on

Terror” as a campaign against WMD, in contrast to coverage during the Clinton era,
when many journalists made careful distinctions between acts of terrorism and the
acquisition and use of WMD.
Many stories reported the incumbent administration’s perspective on WMD,
giving too little critical examination of the way officials framed the events, issues,
threats, and policy options, and too few stories proffered alternative perspectives to
an official line, a problem exacerbated by the journalistic prioritizing of breaking-

news stories and the “inverted pyramid” style of storytelling.
In a separate study published in 2005 (Strumfels, 2015), a group of researchers
assessed the effects reports and retractions in the media had on people’s memory
regarding the search for WMD in Iraq during the 2003 Iraq War.
The study focused on populations in two coalition countries (Australia and the
United States) and one opposed to the war (Germany). Results showed that U.S.
citizens generally did not correct initial misconceptions regarding WMD, even fol-
lowing disconfirmation; Australian and German citizens were more responsive to
retractions. Dependence on the initial source of information led to a substantial
minority of Americans exhibiting false memory that WMDs were indeed discov-
ered, while they were not.
This led to three conclusions:
• The repetition of tentative news stories, even if they are subsequently dis-
confirmed, can assist in the creation of false memories in a substantial pro-
portion of people.
• Once information is published, its subsequent correction does not alter
people’s beliefs unless they are suspicious about the motives underlying the
events the news stories are about.
• When people ignore corrections, they do so irrespective of how certain they
are that the corrections occurred.
A poll conducted between June and September 2003 asked people whether they
thought evidence of WMD had been discovered in Iraq since the war ended.
They were also asked which media sources they relied upon. Those who obtained
their news primarily from Fox News were three times as likely to believe that evi-
dence of WMD had been discovered in Iraq as those who relied on PBS and NPR
for their news, and one third more likely than those who primarily watched CBS.
NUCLEAR TERRORISM
Nuclear terrorism refers to an act of terrorism in which a person or persons belong-
ing to a terrorist organization detonates a nuclear device. Some definitions of
nuclear terrorism include the sabotage of a nuclear facility and/or the detonation of
a radiological device, colloquially termed a dirty bomb, but consensus is lacking.
In legal terms, nuclear terrorism is an offense committed if a person unlawfully
and intentionally “uses in any way radioactive material…with the intent to cause
death or serious bodily injury; or with the intent to cause substantial damage to
property or to the environment; or with the intent to compel a natural or legal per-
son, an international organization or a State to do or refrain from doing an act,”
according to the 2005 UN International Convention (https://treaties.un.org/doc/db
/Terrorism/english-18-15.pdf) for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
The possibility of terrorist organizations using nuclear weapons (including those
of a relatively smaller size), such as those contained within suitcases (suitcase nuclear
device), is something which is known of within U.S. culture and at times previously
discussed within the political settings of the United States. It is considered plausible
that terrorists could acquire a nuclear weapon.
However, despite thefts and trafficking of small amounts of fissile material, all
low-concern and less than Category III Special nuclear material (SNM), there is
no credible evidence that any terrorist group has succeeded in obtaining Category I
SNM, the necessary multi-kilogram critical mass amounts of weapons grade pluto-
nium required to make a nuclear weapon.
SCOPE
Nuclear terrorism could include the following:
• Acquiring or fabricating a nuclear weapon

• Fabricating a dirty bomb
• Attacking a nuclear reactor, for example, by disrupting critical inputs (e.g.,
water supply)
• Attacking or taking over a nuclear-armed submarine, plane, or base
Nuclear terrorism, according to a 2011 report published by the Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, can be executed and distin-
guished via four pathways (Harvard Kennedy School of Government, 2007):
1. The use of a nuclear weapon that has been stolen or purchased on the black
market
2. The use of a crude explosive device built by terrorists or by nuclear scien-
tists who the terrorist organization has furtively recruited
3. The use of an explosive device constructed by terrorists and their accom-
plices using their own fissile material
4. The acquisition of fissile material from a nation-state
U.S. President Barack Obama calls nuclear terrorism “the single most important
national security threat that we face.” In his first speech to the U.N. Security Council,
President Obama said that “Just one nuclear weapon exploded in a city—be it New York
or Moscow, Tokyo or Beijing, London or Paris—could kill hundreds of thousands of
people.” It would “destabilize our security, our economies, and our very way of life.”
Militant Groups
Nuclear weapons materials on the black market are a global concern, and there is
concern about the possible detonation of a small, crude nuclear weapon by a militant
group in a major city, with significant loss of life and property.
It is feared that a terrorist group could detonate a dirty bomb, a type of radiological
weapon. A dirty bomb is made of any radioactive source and a conventional explo-
sive. There would be no nuclear blast and likely no fatalities, but the radioactive
material is dispersed and can cause extensive fallout depending on the material used.
A foot-long stick of radioactive cobalt could be taken from a food irradiation plant
and combined with ten pounds of explosives to contaminate 1,000 square kilome-
ters and make some areas uninhabitable for decades. There are other radiological
weapons called radiological exposure devices where an explosive is not necessary.
A radiological weapon may be very appealing to terrorist groups as it is highly suc-
cessful in instilling fear and panic among a population (particularly because of the
threat of radiation poisoning) and would contaminate the immediate area for some
period of time, disrupting attempts to repair the damage and subsequently inflicting
significant economic losses.
Incidents Involving Nuclear Material

Information reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) shows “a
persistent problem with the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materi-
als, thefts, losses and other unauthorized activities” (International Atomic Energy
Agency, 2017). The IAEA Illicit Nuclear Trafficking Database notes 1,266 incidents
reported by 99 countries over the last 12 years, including 18 incidents involving
highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium trafficking:
Some examples of the threats that could have been an issue if successful are
the following:
• There have been 18 incidents of theft or loss of HEU and plutonium con-
firmed by the IAEA.
• Security specialist Shaun Gregory argued in an article that terrorists have
attacked Pakistani nuclear facilities three times in the recent past, twice in
2007 and once in 2008.
• In November 2007, burglars with unknown intentions infiltrated the
Pelindaba nuclear research facility near Pretoria, South Africa. The bur-
glars escaped without acquiring any of the uranium held at the facility.
• In June 2007, the Federal Bureau of Investigation released to the press the
name of Adnan Gulshair el Shukrijumah, allegedly the operations leader for
developing tactical plans for detonating nuclear bombs in several American
cities simultaneously.
• In November 2006, MI5 warned that al-Qaida was planning on using
nuclear weapons against cities in the United Kingdom by obtaining the
bombs via clandestine means.
• In February 2006, Oleg Khinsagov of Russia was arrested in Georgia,
along with three Georgian accomplices, with 79.5 grams of 89% HEU.
• The Alexander Litvinenko poisoning with radioactive polonium “repre-
sents an ominous landmark: the beginning of an era of nuclear terrorism,”
according to Andrew J. Patterson (Sensagent Corporation, 2016).
• In June 2002, U.S. citizen José Padilla was arrested for allegedly planning
a radiological attack on the city of Chicago; however, he was never charged
with such conduct. He was instead convicted of charges that he conspired
to “murder, kidnap and maim” people overseas.
14 Cyberspace and
Emergency Management
Cyberspace is “the notional environment in which communication over computer
networks occurs” (Reynolds, 2016). The word became popular in the 1990s when
the uses of the Internet, networking, and digital communication were all growing
dramatically and the term “cyberspace” was able to represent the many new ideas
and phenomena that were emerging.
The parent term of cyberspace is “cybernetics,” derived from the Ancient Greek
(steersman, governor, pilot, or rudder), a word introduced by Norbert Wiener for his
pioneering work in electronic communication and control science.
As a social experience, individuals can interact, exchange ideas, share informa-
tion, provide social support, conduct business, direct actions, create artistic media,
play games, engage in political discussion, and so on, using this global network.
They are sometimes referred to as cybernauts.
The term “cyberspace” has become a conventional means to describe anything
associated with the Internet and the diverse Internet culture.
The U.S. government recognizes the interconnected information technology (IT)
and the interdependent network of IT infrastructures operating across this medium
as part of the U.S. national critical infrastructure. Among individuals on cyberspace,
there is believed to be a code of shared rules and ethics mutually beneficial for all to
follow, referred to as cyber ethics.
Many view the right to privacy as most important to a functional code of cyber
ethics. Such moral responsibilities go hand in hand when working online with global
networks, specifically, when opinions are involved with online social experiences.
Cyberspace is defined more by the social interactions involved rather than its
technical implementation. In their view, the computational medium in cyberspace
is an augmentation of the communication channel between real people; the core
characteristic of cyberspace is that it offers an environment that consists of many
participants with the ability to affect and influence each other. They derive this con-
cept from the observation that people seek richness, complexity, and depth within a
virtual world.
VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS
Although the present-day, loose use of the term “cyberspace” no longer implies or
suggests immersion in a virtual reality, current technology allows the integration of a
number of capabilities (sensors, signals, connections, transmissions, processors, and
controllers) sufficient to generate a virtual interactive experience that is accessible
regardless of a geographic location.
219
RECENT DEFINITIONS OF CYBERSPACE

The most recent draft definition is the following (Strate, 1999): Cyberspace is a
global and dynamic domain (subject to constant change) characterized by the com-
bined use of electrons and electromagnetic spectrum, whose purpose is to create,
store, modify, exchange, share and extract, use, and eliminate information and dis-
rupt physical resources.
Cyberspace includes the following:
a. Physical infrastructures and telecommunications devices that allow for the

connection of technological and communication system networks, under-
stood in the broadest sense (Supervisory Control and Acquisition Data
devices, smartphones/tablets, computers, servers, etc.)
b. Computer systems (see point a) and the related (sometimes embedded)
software that guarantee the domain’s basic operational functioning and
connectivity
c. Networks between computer systems
d. Networks of networks that connect computer systems (the distinction
between networks and networks of networks is mainly organizational)
e. The access nodes of users and intermediaries routing nodes
f. Constituent data (or resident data). Often, in common parlance (and some-
times in commercial language), networks of networks are called internet
(with a lowercase i), while networks between computers are called intranet.
Internet (with a capital I, in journalistic language sometimes called the Net)
can be considered a part of system a)
A distinctive and constitutive feature of cyberspace is that no central entity exercises

control over all the networks that make up this new domain.
CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE

Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) is an “elusive” concept. While cybersecurity com-
prises the recruitment of IT security experts and the deployment of technical means,
to protect an organization’s critical infrastructure or intellectual property, CTI is
based on the collection of intelligence using open-source intelligence (OSINT),
social media intelligence, human intelligence (HUMINT), or intelligence from the
deep and dark web. CTI’s key mission is to research and analyze trends and technical
developments in three areas:
• Cyber crime
• Cyber activism
• Cyber espionage (advanced persistent threat or APT)
Those accumulated data based on research and analysis enable states to come up with
preventive measures in advance. Considering the seriousness of the impacts of cyber
threats, CTI has been raised as an efficient solution to maintain international security.
Cyberspace and Emergency Management 221
Types of CTI
According to UK’s Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), there
are four types of threat intelligence (CPNI, 2017):
1. Tactical: Attacker methodologies, tools, and tactics; relies on enough

resources and involves certain actions to go against potentially dangerous
actors trying to do infiltration.
2. Technical: Indicators of specific malware.
3. Operational: Details of specific incoming attack; assess the organization’s
ability in determining the future cyber threats.
4. Strategic: High-level information on changing risk (strategic shifts);
senior leadership is required for thorough determination to critically
assess threats.
In the financial sector, the CBEST* framework of the Bank of England assumes
that penetration testing is no longer adequate to protect sensitive business sectors,
such as the banking sector. In response, the UK Financial Authorities (Bank of
England, Her Majesty’s Treasury, and the Financial Conduct Authority) recommend
several steps to guard financial institutions from cyber threats, including receiving
“advice from the CTI providers operating within the UK Government” (Bank of
England, 2016).
Benefits of Tactical Cyber Intelligence

• Provides context and relevance to a tremendous amount of data.
• Empowers organizations to develop a proactive cybersecurity posture and
bolster its overall risk management policies.
• Informs better decision making during and following the detection of a
cyber-intrusion.
• Drives momentum toward a cybersecurity posture that is predictive, not
just reactive.
THE CHALLENGE OF ATTRIBUTION

Behind any cyber threat, there are people using computers and networks. During
or after a cyber-attack, technical information about the network and computers
between the attacker and the victim can be collected. However, identifying the
person(s) behind an attack, their motivations, or the ultimate sponsor of the attack
is difficult. Recent efforts in threat intelligence emphasize understanding adversary
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).
* To assist the boards of financial firms and infrastructure providers, and regulators, in improving their
understanding of the types of cyber-attack that could undermine financial stability in the UK, and the
extent to which the UK financial sector is vulnerable to those attacks, a new, intelligence-led testing
framework has been devised by the UK Financial Authorities in conjunction with CREST (the Council
for Registered Ethical Security Testers) and Digital Shadows.
CYBER WARFARE
Cyber warfare has been defined as “actions by a nation-state to penetrate another
nation’s computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption”
(IMSM, 2010), but other definitions also include nonstate actors, such as terrorist
groups, companies, political or ideological extremist groups, hacktivists, and trans-
national criminal organizations.
Some governments have made it an integral part of their overall military strategy,
with some having invested heavily in cyber warfare capability. Cyber warfare is
essentially a formalized version of penetration testing in which a government entity
has established it as a warfighting capability. This capability uses the same set of
penetration testing methodologies but applies them, in the case of U.S. doctrine, in
a strategic way to
• Prevent cyber-attacks against America’s critical infrastructure

• Reduce national vulnerability to cyber-attacks
• Minimize damage and recovery time from cyber-attacks
Offensive operations are also part of these national level strategies for officially
declared wars as well as undeclared secretive operations.
Types of Threat
1. Cyber-attacks, where damage or disruption is caused are the main concern
2. Cyber espionage, which can provide the information needed to launch a
successful attack
Espionage
Traditional espionage is not an act of war, nor is cyber-espionage, and both are gener-
ally assumed to be ongoing between major powers.
Despite this assumption, some incidents can cause serious tensions between
nations and are often described as “attacks.” Examples are the following:
• Massive spying by the United States on many countries, revealed by Edward

Snowden.
• After the National Security Administration’s (NSA’s) spying on Germany’s
Chancellor Angela Merkel was revealed, the Chancellor compared the NSA
with the Stasi (Traynor, 2013).
• NSA recording nearly every cell phone conversation in the Bahamas with-
out the Bahamian government’s permission, and similar programmers in
Kenya, the Philippines, Mexico, and Afghanistan.
• The “Titan Rain” probes of American defense contractor computer systems
since 2003.
• The Office of Personnel Management data breach, in the United States,
widely attributed to China.
Sabotage
Computers and satellites that coordinate other activities are vulnerable components
of a system and could lead to the disruption of equipment. Compromise of military
systems, such as C4ISTAR components that are responsible for orders and commu-
nications, could lead to their interception or malicious replacement. Power, water,
fuel, communications, and transportation infrastructure all may be vulnerable to dis-
ruption. Especially the civilian realm is also at risk, noting that the security breaches
have already gone beyond stolen credit card numbers and that potential targets can
also include the electric power grid, trains, or the stock market.
In mid-July 2010, security experts discovered a malicious software program called
Stuxnet that had infiltrated factory computers and had spread to plants around the
world. It is considered “the first attack on critical industrial infrastructure that sits
at the foundation of modern economies,” notes The New York Times (Zetter, 2014).
Stuxnet, while extremely effective in delaying Iran’s nuclear program for the
development of nuclear weaponry, came at a high cost. For the first time, it became
clear that not only could cyber weapons be defensive but they could also be offensive.
The large decentralization and scale of cyberspace makes it extremely difficult to
direct from a policy perspective.
Nonstate actors can play as large a part in the cyberwar space as state actors can,
which leads to dangerous, sometimes disastrous, consequences.
Small groups of highly skilled malware developers are able to as effectively
impact global politics and cyber warfare as large governmental agencies. A major
aspect of this ability lies in the willingness of these groups to share their exploits and
developments on the web as a form of arms proliferation.
This allows lesser hackers to become more proficient in creating the large-scale
attacks that once only a small handful were skillful enough to manage. In addition,
thriving black markets for these kinds of cyber weapons are buying and selling these
cyber capabilities to the highest bidder without regard for consequences.
DENIAL-OF-SERVICE ATTACK
In computing, a denial-of-service attack (DoS attack) or distributed DoS attack is
an attempt to make a machine or network resource unavailable to its intended users.
Perpetrators of DoS attacks typically target sites or services hosted on high-
profile web servers such as banks, credit card payment gateways, and even root name
servers.
DoS attacks may not be limited to computer-based methods, as strategic physical
attacks against infrastructure can be just as devastating. For example, cutting under-
sea communication cables may severely cripple some regions and countries with
regard to their information warfare ability.
ELECTRICAL POWER GRID

The federal government of the United States admits that the electric power grid is
susceptible to cyber warfare. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security works with
industries to identify vulnerabilities and to help industries enhance the security of

control system networks, the federal government is also working to ensure that secu-
rity is built in as the next generation of “smart grid” networks is developed.
In April 2009, reports surfaced that China and Russia had infiltrated the U.S.
electrical grid and left behind software programs that could be used to disrupt
the system, according to current and former national security officials. The North
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) has issued a public notice that
warns that the electrical grid is not adequately protected from cyber-attack.
China denies intruding into the U.S. electrical grid. One countermeasure would
be to disconnect the power grid from the Internet and run the net with droop speed
control only. Massive power outages caused by a cyber-attack could disrupt the econ-
omy, distract from a simultaneous military attack, or create a national trauma.
MOTIVATIONS
Military
In the United States, General Keith B. Alexander, first head of the recently formed
USCYBERCOM, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that computer net-
work warfare is evolving so rapidly that there is a “mismatch between our techni-
cal capabilities to conduct operations and the governing laws and policies. Cyber
Command is the newest global combatant and its sole mission is cyberspace, out-
side the traditional battlefields of land, sea, air and space” (Sensagent, 2016). It will
attempt to find and, when necessary, neutralize cyber-attacks and to defend military
computer networks.
Now, the issue for the computer warfare command is envisioned, listing the kind
of targets that his or her new headquarters could be ordered to attack, including
“traditional battlefield prizes—command-and-control systems at military head-
quarters, air defense networks and weapons systems that require computers to
operate.”
One cyber warfare scenario, Cyber Shockwave, which was war gamed on the cab-
inet level by former administration officials, raised issues ranging from the National
Guard to the power grid to the limits of statutory authority.
The distributed nature of internet-based attacks means that it is difficult to deter-
mine motivation and attacking party, meaning that it is unclear when a specific act
should be considered an act of war.
Civil
Potential targets in internet sabotage include all aspects of the Internet from the
backbones of the web, to the internet service providers, to the varying types of data
communication mediums and network equipment. This would include web servers,
enterprise information systems, client server systems, communication links, network
equipment, and the desktops and laptops in businesses and homes. Electrical grids
and telecommunication systems are also deemed vulnerable, especially due to cur-
rent trends in automation.
Hacktivism
Politically motivated hacktivism involves the subversive use of computers and com-
puter networks to promote an agenda and can potentially extend to attacks, theft, and
virtual sabotage that could be seen as cyber warfare—or mistaken for it.
Private Sector
Computer hacking represents a modern threat in ongoing industrial espionage
and as such is presumed to widely occur. It is typical that this type of crime is under-
reported. Corporations around the world face millions of cyber-attacks a day. Most
of these attacks don’t gain any media attention or lead to strong political statements
by victims. This type of crime is usually financially motivated.
CYBER SPYING
Cyber spying, or cyber espionage, is the act or practice of obtaining secrets without
the permission of the holder of the information (personal, sensitive, proprietary, or
of classified nature), from individuals, competitors, rivals, groups, governments, and
enemies for personal, economic, political, or military advantage using methods on
the Internet, networks, or individual computers through the use of cracking tech-
niques and malicious software including Trojan horses and spyware.
It may wholly be perpetrated online from computer desks of professionals on
bases in faraway countries or may involve infiltration at home by computer-trained
conventional spies and moles or in other cases may be the criminal handiwork of
amateur malicious hackers and software programmers.
Details
Cyber spying typically involves the use of such access to secrets and classified infor-
mation or control of individual computers or whole networks for a strategic advan-
tage and for psychological, political, and physical subversion activities and sabotage.
More recently, cyber spying involves analysis of public activity on social networking
sites like Facebook and Twitter.
Such operations, like non-cyber-espionage, are typically illegal in the victim
country while fully supported by the highest level of government in the aggressor
country.
The ethical situation likewise depends on one’s viewpoint, particularly one’s
opinion of the governments involved.
In response to reports of cyber spying by China against the United States, Amitai
Etzioni of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies has suggested that China
and the United States should agree to a policy of mutually assured restraint with
respect to cyberspace (Revolvy, 2017).
This would involve allowing both states to take the measures they deem nec-
essary for their self-defense while simultaneously agreeing to refrain from taking
offensive steps or engaging in cyber espionage; it would also entail vetting these
commitments. In September 2015, the United States and China agreed not to allow
parties in their nations to cyber spy on each other for commercial gain, but did not
prohibit government spying.
Proactive Cyber Defense

Proactive cyber defense or active cyber defense means acting in anticipation to
oppose an attack against computers and networks. Proactive cyber defense will most
often require additional security from internet service providers.
Some of the reasons for a proactive defense strategy are about cost and choice.
Making choices after an attack is difficult and costly. Proactive defense is key to
mitigating operational risk.
Cyberspace typically refers to the vast and growing logical domain composed
of public and private networks; independently managed networks linked together
through the lingua franca of the Internet, the Internet Protocol (IP).
The definition of cyberspace has been extended to include all network-space,
which at some point, through some path, may have eventual access to the public
internet. Under this definition, cyberspace becomes virtually every networked device
in the world, which is not devoid of a network interface entirely. There is no air-gap
anymore between networks.
The origins of cyber defense undoubtedly evolved from the original purpose of
the Internet, which was to harden military networks against the threat of a nuclear
strike. Later cyber defense was coveted by the tenets of information warfare and
information operations.
Current Status
Information warfare is an emergent reality that comes from a self-organization pro-
cess that has never been seen before. The problem is that we talk about it using terms
that have well-known connotations. And it is difficult to talk about something com-
pletely new using words that bring with them specific understanding and expectan-
cies. The early period of the automobile faced a similar situation. At one time, it was
called a “horseless carriage,” as this was the only way to define its essential quality.
The car is more than a carriage without a horse. This is the dilemma we face
when we discuss information warfare. The danger is that the uses of familiar words
misrepresent and mask the true extend of the revolution that will have to take place
if we are to be able to retain a military capacity in a new physical, social, and cogni-
tive space.
Proactive Preemptive Operations

Effective cyber defenses ideally prevent an incident from taking place. Any other
approach is simply reactive. Federal Technology Service Federal Computer Incident
Response Center, the National Infrastructure Protection Center, the National
Structural Integrity Research Centre, the Department of Defense (DoD), and indus-
try components realize that the best [action] is a preemptive and proactive approach.
The mission of the Proactive, Preemptive Operations Group (P2OG; a U.S. intel-
ligence agency that would employ “black world” [black operations] tactics) is report-
edly to conduct aggressive, proactive, and preemptive operations to interdict and
disrupt the threat using psychological operations, managed information dissemi-
nation, precision targeting, information warfare operations, and signals intelligence
(SIGINT). The proactive defense strategy is meant to improve information collection
by stimulating reactions of the threat agents, provide strike options, and enhance
operational preparation of the real or virtual battle space.
The P2OG has been recommended to be constituted of “one hundred ‘highly
specialized’ people with unique technical and intelligence skills such as informa-
tion operations, PSYOPS, network attack, covert activities, SIGINT, HUMINT,
SOF, influence warfare/deception operations and to report to the National Security
Council.”
The DoD doctrinally would initiate a “preemptive” attack on the basis of evidence
that an enemy attack is imminent. Proactive measures, according to the DoD, are
those actions taken directly against the preventive stage of an attack by the enemy.
Strike-back doctrine aligns with the preemptive and counterattack tactics of a
proactive cyber defense strategy.
NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE

In the U.S. government, the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace is a compo-
nent of the larger National Strategy for Homeland Security. The National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace was drafted by the Department of Homeland Security in reaction
to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks (Department of Homeland Security, 2014).
Released on February 14, 2003, it offers suggestions, not mandates, to business,
academic, and individual users of cyberspace to secure computer systems and net-
works. It was prepared after a year of research by businesses, universities, and gov-
ernment and after five months of public comment. The plan advises a number of
security practices as well as promotion of cybersecurity education.
The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace identifies three strategic objectives:
1. Prevent cyber-attacks against America’s critical infrastructures

2. Reduce national vulnerability to cyber-attacks
3. Minimize damage and recovery time from cyber-attacks that do occur
To meet these objectives, the National Strategy outlines five national priorities:
• The first priority, the creation of a National Cyberspace Security Response

System, focuses on improving the government’s response to cyberspace
security incidents and reducing the potential damage from such events.
• The second, third, and fourth priorities (the development of a National
Cyberspace Security Threat and Vulnerability Reduction Program, the cre-
ation of a National Cyberspace Security Awareness and Training Program,
and the necessity of Securing Governments’ Cyberspace) aim to reduce
threats from, and vulnerabilities to, cyber-attacks.
• The fifth priority, the establishment of a system of National Security and

International Cyberspace Security Cooperation, intends to prevent cyber-
attacks that could impact national security assets and to improve the inter-
national management of and response to such attacks.
Ultimately, the National Strategy encourages companies to regularly review their

technology security plans and individuals who use the Internet to add firewalls and
antivirus software to their systems. It calls for a single federal center to help detect,
monitor, and analyze attacks and for expanded cybersecurity research and improved
government–industry cooperation.
CYBER-HUMINT
Cyber-Humint refers to the set of skills used by hackers, within cyberspace, in order to
obtain private information while attacking the human factor, using various psychologi-
cal deceptions. Cyber-Humint includes the use of traditional human espionage method-
ologies, such as agent recruitment, information gathering through deception (traditionally
known as Humint), combined with deception technologies known as social engineering.
Background in Cyber-Humint
Intelligence gathering involves a range of specialized approaches—from SIGINT,
imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, and geospatial intel-
ligence, to OSINT. In many cases, information collected from human sources is still
considered highly reliable by intelligence analysts, especially while transforming a
collection of disparate data strands into an actionable prevention plan.
Cyber-Humint methodology was first coined by Ed Alcantara AFX DBI in
February 2010 (AOL Inc., 2017). Amit Steinhart argued that the cooperation between
skilled Humint experts trained with specific Humint capabilities and computer
security specialists, who apply “social engineering” techniques, is one of the main
advantages of Cyber-Humint. Steinhart offered a new model of information security
strategy that imports concepts from Humint espionage and combines it with social
engineering strategies, such as the usage of avatars for agents operating in cyber-
space or information and disinformation spreading through cyberspace.
Humint experts often argue that in comparison to the relatively young social
engineering concept, Humint practices, which had been developed for many years
by professionals working at national intelligence services, hold the higher ground in
terms of experience, technologies, and practices. A new form of cyber capability was
created when the technical capabilities of computer experts were combined with the
intelligence experience of Humint experts.
Cyber-Humint Strategy Orientation

Cyber-Humint is aimed to effectively defend organizations against APT attacks. In
the beginning of the 2010s, organizations such as the American NSA and British
GCHQ have started to invest significant resources into acquiring technological and
intelligence capabilities, to help identify cyber aggressors and assess their abilities
and tactical skills.
Recently, information security has shifted from building firewalls to building
systems, in order to provide real-time intelligence. Most near-future scenarios sug-
gest that organizations who fail to adapt to the systematic cyber approach will find
themselves in a critical situation.
In 2011, attention was drawn to the fact that while cybersecurity experts can
deliver extensive reports on Internet risks, most of the alerts are still general and
unspecific and do not actually meet the expectations of the specific organization. In
addition, cybersecurity companies locate hackers or cyber-attackers only when the
attack is already in progress or, worse, after a given system has already been dam-
aged or compromised.
The majority of cybersecurity defenders currently use automatic network scans
as a routine measure. A human analyst becomes involved only at the final stage of
data gathering, which means that the bulk of the available data will not be analyzed
in real time.
Hackers and Cyber-Humint

The majority of cybersecurity companies have no access to human operators within
the dark web. Hence, they do not benefit from the key input of informants and agent
provocateurs. These companies do not apply the methods of agent recruitment and
agent management, which various national intelligence organizations have devel-
oped and used effectively for years.
New information technologies allow hackers to acquire the upper hand in any
confrontation with the targeted organization. A case in point is APT, which in
impact and devastation equals to a military strike against a civilian entity. Many
peripheral defense systems are not capable of recognizing indications of incoming
attacks in advance and cannot intercept the attack during its course. The majority
of security systems can acknowledge the attack only after the damage has already
occurred.
Most organizations prefer to focus their security efforts on inward-facing protec-
tion strategies, in an attempt to prevent attackers from entering the organization’s
network. Their defense protocols are not designed to protect from attempts to exploit
the organization’s employees, who have become the main target for willful intel-
ligence gathering.
Personal behavior, compromising private situations, work habits, passwords, and
other private and business information can be easily harvested and used to facilitate
an attack against the organization.
The Interface Between Cyber Experts and Cyber-Humint

The concept of Cyber-Humint allows cyber experts and Humint specialists to use
real-life human sources, both in and within many public or secret online social net-
works and operating systems.
By investigating authentic human sources, intelligence experts and cyber experts

can explore the various possible aims of potential attackers and their abilities, by
monitoring their electronic activities. Outcomes usually leave much to be desired.
Attackers are identified only after the attack has started. In just a handful of cases
did companies manage to alert their clients against a pending attack.
Cyber-Humint involves recruiting human agents and deploying them with stra-
tegic efficiency to provide the organization with a clear, focused picture of likely
threats and hostile actors with the intention of harming the organization. Cyber-
Humint uses classic Humint tactics that had been practiced for more than half a
century by the national intelligence agencies. It combines them with hackers’ social
engineering concepts.
Using Cyber-Humint requires qualified computer professionals who are well
versed in the behavior patterns, linguistic nuances, and conventions accepted within
the Darknet, as well as other online networks and subcultures.
Conversant computer experts and intelligence specialists work in synchrony to
uncover indications of intent, long before it develops into an attack plan, so orga-
nizations can decide how, where, and when to expose or incapacitate the potential
attackers.
CYBERSECURITY STANDARDS
Cybersecurity standards (also styled cyber security standards) are techniques gener-
ally set forth in published materials that attempt to protect the cyber environment
of a user or organization. This environment includes users themselves, networks,
devices, all software, processes, information in storage or transit, applications, ser-
vices, and systems that can be connected directly or indirectly to networks.
Principal objective is to reduce the risks, including prevention or mitigation of
cyber-attacks. These published materials consist of collections of tools, policies,
security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches,
actions, training, best practices, assurance, and technologies.
EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS INSTITUTE

(ETSI) CYBERSECURITY TECHNICAL COMMITTEE
The ETSI Cybersecurity Technical Committee (TC CYBER) is responsible for the
standardization of cybersecurity internationally and for providing a center of relevant
expertise for other ETSI committees. Growing dependence on networked digital sys-
tems has brought with it an increase in both the variety and quantity of cyber-threats.
The different methods governing secure transactions in the various Member
States of the European Union sometimes make it difficult to assess the respective
risks and to ensure adequate security. Building on ETSI’s world-leading expertise in
the security of information and communications technologies, it set up a new cyber-
security committee (TC CYBER) in 2014 to meet the growing demand for standards
to protect the Internet and the communications and business it carries.
TC CYBER is working closely with relevant stakeholders to develop appropri-

ate standards to increase privacy and security for organizations and citizens across
Europe.
The committee is looking in particular at the security of infrastructures, devices,
services, and protocols, as well as security tools and techniques to ensure security. It
offers security advice and guidance to users, manufacturers, and network and infra-
structure operators. Its standards are freely available online. A principal work item
effort is the production of a global cybersecurity ecosystem of standardization and
other activities.
ISO 27001 AND 27002

ISO/IEC 27001:2013, part of the growing ISO/IEC 27000 family of standards, is an
information security management system (ISMS) standard published in October 2013
by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International
Electro technical Commission (IEC) (Consultant.com, 2017). Its full name is ISO/
IEC 27001:2013—Information technology—Security techniques—Information
security management systems—Requirements.
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 formally specifies a management system that is intended to
bring information security under explicit management control.
ISO/IEC 27002 incorporates mainly part 1 of the BS 7799 good security manage-
ment practice standard. The latest version of BS7799 is BS7799-3. Sometimes, ISO/
IEC 27002 is therefore referred to as ISO 17799 or BS 7799 part 1, and sometimes,
it refers to part 1 and part 7. BS 7799 part 1 provides an outline or good practice
guide for cybersecurity management, whereas BS 7799 part 2 and ISO 27001 are
normative and therefore provide a framework for certification. ISO/IEC 27002 is a
high-level guide to cybersecurity.
It is most beneficial as an explanatory guide for the management of an orga-
nization to obtain certification to the ISO 27001 standard. The certification, once
obtained, lasts three years. Depending on the auditing organization, no or some
intermediate audits may be carried out during the three years.
ISO 27001 (ISMS) replaces BS 7799 part 2, but since it is backward compatible,
any organization working toward BS 7799 part 2 can easily transition to the ISO
27001 certification process. There is also a transitional audit available to make it eas-
ier once an organization is BS 7799 part 2 certified for the organization to become
ISO 27001 certified. ISO/IEC 27002 provides best practice recommendations on
information security management for use by those responsible for initiating, imple-
menting, or maintaining ISMS. It states the information security systems required
to implement ISO 27002 control objectives. Without ISO 27001, ISO 27002 control
objectives are ineffective. ISO 27002 controls objectives are incorporated into ISO
27001 in Annex A.
ISO/IEC 21827 (SSE-CMM–ISO/IEC 21827) is an international standard based
on the Systems Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM) that
can measure the maturity of ISO control objectives.
STANDARD OF GOOD PRACTICE

In the 1990s, the Information Security Forum (ISF) published a comprehensive list
of best practices for information security, published as the Standard of Good Practice
(SoGP) (ISF, 2017). The ISF continues to update the SoGP every two years (with the
exception of 2013–2014); the latest version was published in 2016.
Originally, the SoGP was a private document available only to ISF members, but
the ISF has since made the full document available for sale to the general public.
Among other programs, the ISF offers its member organizations a comprehensive
benchmarking program based on the SoGP. Furthermore, it is important for those in
charge of security management to understand and adhere to NERC CIP compliance
requirements.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY

1. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity
Framework provides a high level taxonomy of cybersecurity outcomes and
a methodology to assess and manage those outcomes. It is intended to help
private sector organizations that provide critical infrastructure with guid-
ance on how to protect it, along with relevant protections for privacy and
civil liberties.
2. Special publication 800-12 provides a broad overview of computer security
and control areas. It also emphasizes the importance of the security controls
and ways to implement them. Initially, this document was aimed at the fed-
eral government, although most practices in this document can be applied
to the private sector as well. Specifically, it was written for those people in
the federal government responsible for handling sensitive systems.
3. Special publication 800-14 describes common security principles that are
used. It provides a high-level description of what should be incorporated
within a computer security policy. It describes what can be done to improve
existing security as well as how to develop a new security practice.
4. Eight principles and 14 practices are described within this document.
5. Special publication 800-26 provides advice on how to manage IT security.
It is superseded by NIST SP 800-53 rev3. This document emphasizes the
importance of self-assessments as well as risk assessments.
6. Special publication 800-37, updated in 2010, provides a new risk approach:
“Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal
Information Systems.”
7. Special publication 800-53 rev4, “Security and Privacy Controls for Federal
Information Systems and Organizations,” was published in April 2013 and
updated to include updates as of January 15, 2014. It specifically addresses
the 194 security controls that are applied to a system to make it “more secure.”
8. Special Publication 800-82, Revision 2, “Guide to Industrial Control

System (ICS) Security,” revised in May 2015, describes how to secure mul-
tiple types of Industrial control systems against cyber-attacks while consid-
ering the performance, reliability, and safety requirements specific to ICS.
In summary, the principal objective is to reduce the risks, including prevention

or mitigation, of cyber-attacks. These published materials consist of collections of
tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management
approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance, and technologies.
15 Emergency and the
National Incident
Management
System (NIMS)
Emergency management and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) go
hand in hand; one cannot exist without the other. It’s a great tool to plan and write
one’s Local Emergency Response Plan (LERP) and perform the analysis process.
The NIMS provides a systematic, proactive approach to guide departments and
agencies at all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and
the private sector to work seamlessly to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover
from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or com-
plexity, in order to reduce the loss of life and property and harm to the environment.
NIMS works hand in hand with the National Response Framework (NRF). NIMS
provides the template for the management of incidents, while the NRF provides the
structure and mechanisms for national-level policy for incident management.
INTRODUCTION
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5—Management of Domestic Incidents
called for the establishment of a single, comprehensive national incident manage-
ment system.
As a result, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security released the NIMS in
March (Department of Homeland Security, 2008). The NIMS provides a systematic,
proactive approach guiding departments and agencies at all levels of government, the
private sector, and NGOs to work seamlessly to prepare for, prevent, respond to,
recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location,
or complexity, in order to reduce the loss of life, property, and harm to the environment.
This consistency provides the foundation for implementation of the NIMS for
all incidents, ranging from daily occurrences to incidents requiring a coordinated
Federal response. The NIMS document, as revised in 2007, reflects contributions
from stakeholders and lessons learned during recent incidents.
States and territories play an important role in ensuring effective NIMS imple-
mentation; not only must they implement NIMS within state and territory depart-
ments and agencies but also ensure that the systems and processes are in place to
communicate and support NIMS compliance at all jurisdictional levels. In some
instances, when tribal nations or local government may not have the resources to
235
implement all NIMS elements on their own, states and territories should support
their efforts by encouraging them to cooperate with other localities in their regions
and pool their resources to implement NIMS.
The long-term goal of NIMS is to provide a consistent framework for all aspects
of emergency management and incident response. This framework should be sus-
tainable, flexible, and scalable to meet changing incident needs and allow for integra-
tion of other resources from various partners through mutual aid agreements and/or
assistance agreements.
The following are the NIMS Compliance Objectives and a path to follow when
performing emergency management planning process and setting up objectives.
I. What needs to happen?

1. Adopt NIMS for all Departments/Agencies, as well as promote and
encourage NIMS adoption by associations, utilities, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and private sector emergency management and
incident response organizations.
2. Monitor formal adoption of NIMS, to include formal NIMS adoption
by Departments/Agencies.
3. Establish and maintain a planning process to communicate, moni-
tor and implement all NIMS requirements across the State/Territory
(including Departments/Agencies), including local governments. This
process must provide a means for measuring progress and facilitate
reporting.
4. Designate and maintain a single point of contact within government to
serve as principal coordinator for NIMS implementation jurisdiction-
wide (to include a principal coordinator for NIMS implementation
within each Department/Agency).
5. Ensure that Federal Preparedness Awards [to include, but not limited
to, DHS Homeland Security Grant Program and Urban Area Security
Initiative Funds] to State/Territorial Departments/Agencies, as well as
local governments, support all required NIMS compliance Objectives.
6. Audit agencies and review organizations should routinely include
NIMS compliance requirements in all audits associated with Federal
Preparedness Awards.
7. Assist Tribal Nations with formal adoption and implementation of
NIMS.
II. Preparedness: Planning
1. Revise and update emergency operations plans (EOPs), standard oper-
ating procedures (SOPs), and standard operating guidelines (SOGs) to
incorporate NIMS and NRF components, principles and policies, to
include planning, training, response, exercises, equipment, evaluation,
and corrective actions.
2. Promote and/or develop intrastate and interagency mutual aid agree-
ments and assistance agreements (to include agreements with the pri-
vate sector and NGOs).
Emergency and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) 237
3. Include preparedness organizations and elected and appointed officials

in the development of emergency operations plans (EOPs).
4. Plan for special needs populations in the development of EOPs (to
include, but not limited to, individuals with limited English language
proficiency; individuals with disabilities; children; the aged, etc.).
5. Use existing resources such as programs, personnel, and training facili-
ties to coordinate and deliver NIMS training requirements.
6. Promote and encourage delivery of NIMS training (as identified in the
Five-Year NIMS Training Plan Schedule, December 2007).
III. Preparedness: Exercise
1. Incorporate NIMS concepts and principles into all appropriate State/
Territorial training and exercises.
2. Plan for and/or participate in an all-hazards exercise program [for
example, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program] that
involves emergency management/response personnel from multiple
disciplines and/or multiple jurisdictions.
3. Incorporate corrective actions into preparedness and response plans
and procedures.
4. Include NGOs and the private sector in an all-hazards exercise pro-
gram, when appropriate.
5. Promote the integration of Incident Command, MACS, and Public
Information into appropriate exercises.
IV. Communications and Information Management
1. Apply common and consistent terminology as used in NIMS, includ-
ing the establishment of plain language (clear text) communications
standards.
2. Utilize systems, tools, and processes to present consistent and accu-
rate information (e.g., common operating picture) during an incident/
planned event.
3. Institute procedures and protocols for operational and information
security during an incident/planned event.
4. Institute multidisciplinary and/or multi-jurisdictional procedures and
protocols for standardization of data collection and analysis to utilize
or share information during an incident/planned event.
5. Develop procedures and protocols for communications (to include
voice, data, access to geospatial information, Internet/Web use, and
data encryption), where applicable, to utilize or share information dur-
ing an incident/planned event.
V. Resource Management
1. Inventory response assets to conform to NIMS National Resource
Typing.
2. Definitions, as defined by FEMA Incident Management Systems
Division.
3. Ensure that equipment, communications and data systems acquired
through State/Territorial and local acquisition programs are interoperable.
4. Utilize response asset inventory for intrastate and interstate mutual

aid requests [such as Emergency Management Assistance Compact
(EMAC)], training, exercises, and incidents/planned events.
5. Initiate State/Territory-wide system to credential emergency management/
response personnel to ensure proper authorization and access to an inci-
dent including those involving mutual aid agreements and/or assistance
agreements.
6. Inventory and type specific emergency management/response resources
and assets to address unique needs beyond current “Tier One” NIMS
National Resource Typing Definitions.
7. Institute policies, plans, procedures and protocols to prevent spontane-
ous deployment of resources/personnel and/or responding to a request
that bypassed official resource coordination processes (i.e., resources
requested through improper channels).
8. Institute mechanisms to deploy, track, recover, demobilize, and to pro-
vide reimbursement for resources utilized during response and recovery.
VI. Command and Management
1. Incident Command System (ICS): Manage all incidents/planned events in
accordance with ICS organizational structures, doctrine and procedures.
2. ICS implementation must include the consistent application of Incident
Action Planning (IAP), common communications plans, implemen-
tation of Area Command (AC) to oversee multiple incidents that are
handled by separate ICS organizations or to oversee the management of
a very large or evolving incident that has multiple incident management
teams engaged, and implementation of unified command (UC) in multi-
jurisdictional or multiagency incident management, as appropriate.
3. Multi-agency Coordination System (MACS): Coordinate and support
emergency management and incident response Objectives through
the development and use of integrated multi-agency coordination sys-
tems, i.e.,—develop and maintain connectivity capability between local
Incident Command Posts (ICP), local 911 Centers, local Emergency
Operations Centers (EOCs), the State/Territorial EOC and Regional
and/Federal EOCs and NRF organizational elements.
4. Public Information: Institutionalize, within the framework of ICS,
Public Information, [e.g., Joint Information System (JIS) and a Joint
Information Center (JIC)] during an incident/planned event.
5. Ensure that Public Information procedures and processes can gather,
verify, coordinate, and disseminate information during an incident/
planned event.
6. Utilize access control measures during an incident, as appropriate.
In summary, the long-term goal of NIMS is to provide a consistent framework

for all aspects of emergency management and incident response. This framework
should be sustainable, flexible, and scalable to meet changing incident needs and
allow for integration of other resources from various partners through mutual aid
agreements and/or assistance agreements. Using this format and guidelines from
your community surveys and hazard analysis and vulnerability surveys will help one
create and maintain a common sense approach to the emergency planning process.
It is recommended for all response personnel and emergency management personnel
to have the following courses from Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
These courses are online and of no charge to the agency and local government.
ICS and NIMS courses:
• ICS-100: Introduction to the Incident Command System

• ICS-200: ICS for Single Resources and Initial Action Incidents
• ICS-300: Intermediate ICS for Expanding Incidents
• ICS-400: Advanced ICS for Command and General Staff
• IS-700: National Incident Management System, An Introduction
• IS-701: NIMS Multiagency Coordination System (MACS)
• IS-702: NIMS Publication Information Systems
• IS-703: NIMS Resource Management
• IS-704: NIMS Communication and Information Management (unavailable)
• IS-706: NIMS Intrastate Mutual Aid—An Introduction
• IS-800: National Response Framework, An Introduction
• G-191: Incident Command System/Emergency Operations Center Interface
• G-402: Incident Command System (ICS) Overview for Executives/Senior
Officials
• G-775: Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Management and Operations
NIMS courses can be located at https://training.fema.gov/nims/.

ICS 300/400, G191, G402, and G-775 are coordinated by local Emergency
Management Agencies, please contact them directly for course offerings in your
area. Contact information for State or Territorial Emergency Management Agencies
can be found at https://training.fema.gov/programs/aps/stolist.aspx.
All-Hazards Position Specific courses:
• E/L 950: All-Hazards Position Specific Incident Commander

• E/L 952: All-Hazards Position Specific Public Information Officer
• E/L 954: All-Hazards Position Specific Safety Officer
• E/L 956: All-Hazards Position Specific Liaison Officer
• E/L 958: All-Hazards Position Specific Operations Section Chief
• E/L 960: All-Hazards Position Specific Division/Group Supervisor
• E/L 962: All-Hazards Position Specific Planning Section Chief
• E/L 964: All-Hazards Position Specific Situation Unit Leader
• E/L 965: All-Hazards Position Specific Resources Unit Leader
• E/L 967: All-Hazards Position Specific Logistics Section Chief
• E/L 969: All-Hazards Position Specific Communications Unit Leader
• E/L 970: All-Hazards Position Specific Supply Unit Leader
• E/L 971: All-Hazards Position Specific Facilities Unit Leader
• E/L 973: All-Hazards Position Specific Finance/Admin. Section Chief
• E/L 975: All-Hazards Position Specific Finance/Admin. Unit Leader Course
• E/L 984: Task Force/Strike Team Leader
• E/L 986: Air Support Group Supervisor

• E/L 987: Introduction to Air Operations
The NIMS ICS All-Hazards Position Specific Training Program official website is at
https://training.fema.gov/allhazards/.
SUMMARY
The following are emergency management skills, training, and experiences needed
to be an effective emergency manager and direct these operations.
• Coordinate disaster response or crisis management activities, such as order-

ing evacuations, opening public shelters, and implementing special needs
plans and programs.
• Prepare plans that outline operating procedures to be used in response to
disasters or emergencies, such as hurricanes, nuclear accidents, and terror-
ist attacks, and in recovery from these events.
• Develop and maintain liaisons with municipalities, county departments,
and similar entities to facilitate plan development, response effort coordi-
nation, and exchanges of personnel and equipment.
• Design and administer emergency or disaster preparedness training courses
that teach people how to effectively respond to major emergencies and disasters.
• Keep informed of activities or changes that could affect the likelihood of
an emergency, as well as those that could affect response efforts and details
of plan implementation.
Technology used:
• Database user interface and query software—Emergency Managers Weather

Information Network, Federal Emergency Management Information System,
relational database software, and SoftRisk Technologies (SoftRisk SQL)
• Electronic mail software—IBM Lotus Notes
• Map creation software—Digital Engineering Corporation E-MAPS; ESRI
ArcGIS software Hot technology; Geographic information system (GIS)
software Hot technology; MapInfo Professional
• Project management software—Alert Technologies OpsCenter; Emergency
Services Integrators ESi WebEOC; Microsoft SharePoint software Hot tech-
nology; National Center for Crisis and Continuity Coordination NC4 E Team
• Spreadsheet software—Microsoft Excel Hot technology
Leadership responsibilities to ensure compliance and readiness
• Public safety and security—Knowledge of relevant equipment, policies,

procedures, and strategies to promote effective local, state, or national
security operations for the protection of people, data, property, and
institutions.
• Law and government—Knowledge of laws, legal codes, court procedures,

precedents, government regulations, executive orders, agency rules, and the
democratic political process.
• Administration and management—Knowledge of business and manage-
ment principles involved in strategic planning, resource allocation, human
resources modeling, leadership technique, production methods, and coordi-
nation of people and resources.
• English language—Knowledge of the structure and content of the English
language including the meaning and spelling of words, rules of composition,
and grammar.
• Education and training—Knowledge of principles and methods for cur-
riculum and training design, teaching and instruction for individuals and
groups, and the measurement of training effects.
• Service orientation—actively looking for ways to help people.
• Complex problem solving—identifying complex problems and reviewing
related information to develop and evaluate options and implement solutions.
• Coordination—adjusting actions in relation to others’ actions.
• Critical thinking—using logic and reasoning to identify the strengths and
weaknesses of alternative solutions, conclusions, or approaches to problems.
• Speaking—talking to others to convey information effectively.
• Deductive reasoning—the ability to apply general rules to specific
problems to produce answers that make sense.
• Oral comprehension—the ability to listen to and understand informa-
tion and ideas presented through spoken words and sentences.
• Oral expression—the ability to communicate information and ideas in
speaking so others will understand.
• Problem sensitivity—the ability to tell when something is wrong or is
likely to go wrong. It does not involve solving the problem, only recog-
nizing there is a problem.
• Speech clarity—the ability to speak clearly so others can understand you.
Having the ability and communicating skills with supervisors, peers, or subordi-
nates will provide the information by using the following means, telephone, written
form, e-mail, or in person.
Communicating with supervisors, peers, or subordinates—providing informa-

tion to supervisors, coworkers, and subordinates by telephone, in written form,
e-mail, or in person.
Getting information—observing, receiving, and otherwise obtaining information
from all relevant sources.
Making decisions and solving problems—analyzing information and evaluating
results to choose the best solution and solve problems.
Communicating with persons outside the organization—communicating with
people outside the organization, representing the organization to customers, the pub-
lic, government, and other external sources. This information can be exchanged in
person, in writing, or by telephone or e-mail.
Establishing and maintaining interpersonal relationships—developing constructive

and cooperative working relationships with others, and maintaining them over time.
• Coordinate special events or programs.

• Develop emergency response plans or procedures.
• Establish interpersonal business relationships to facilitate work activities.
• Maintain knowledge of current developments in area of expertise.
• Evaluate program effectiveness.
CONSIDERABLE PREPARATION NEEDED

Education: Is really important and seeking a degree in the emergency manage-
ment field is an added plus.
The required experience and work related skills are necessary to gain the required
knowledge for this occupation.
Job training: Emergency management on the job training and experiences in
these occupations usually need several years of work-related experience, on-the-job
training, and/or vocational training.
Job zone: Many of these occupations involve coordinating, supervising, manag-
ing, or training others.
Training certifications:
1. Emergency Management Institute (EMI) | National Preparedness Directorate

National Training and Education Division:
a. FEMA-based certification
– The FEMA certification programs are conducted in cooperation
with the Emergency Management Institute (EMI). The first certifi-
cation is the Professional Development Series (PDS). It is awarded
upon completion of seven FEMA courses. These courses may be
taken as independent study or in the classroom.
The required courses in the PDS program are the following:
– Principles of Emergency Management, IS230
– Emergency Planning, IS235
– Effective Communication, IS242
– Decision-Making and Problem-Solving, IS241
– Leadership and Influence, IS240
– Developing and Managing Volunteers, IS244
– Exercise Design, IS139
Once the PDS program is completed, you can then consider going on to the
Advance Professional series (APS) certification, but you have to submit
a request to enroll in the APS program through your State Emergency
Manager Training Officer. If approved, your request will then be for-
warded to your FEMA regional office. The next step is final approval
by the Superintendent of the Emergency Management Institute (EMI).
The required APS courses are as follows:

– EOC Management and Operations, G275
– Incident Command System/Emergency Operations Center Interface,
G191
– Rapid Assessment Workshop, G250.7
– Recovery from Disaster: The Local Government Role, G270.4
– Mitigation Planning Workshop for Local Governments, G318
– Then select five of these elective courses:
– Donations Management Workshop, G288
– Multi-Hazard Emergency Planning for Schools, G362
– Emergency Planning and Special Needs Populations, G197
– Resource Management, G276
– Debris Management, G202
– Mass Fatalities, G386
– Exercise Program Manager, G137
– Flood Fight Operations, G361
– Emergency Management Operations Course for Local Governments,
G110
– Homeland Security Planning for Local Governments, 408
– Community Mass Care Management, G108
– Evacuation and Re-Entry Planning, G358
– Basic Public Information Officer, G290
– Hazardous Weather and Flood Preparedness, G271
– Warning Coordination, G272
– Advanced Incident Command System, G196
CERTIFIED EMERGENCY MANAGER

The Certified Emergency Manager (CEM) is considered by many to be the top cer-
tification in emergency management (IAEM, 2017). Created as a joint venture by
FEMA and the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM), The
CEM was developed as a standard to recognize professional competency in emer-
gency management across the nation. Since the creation of the CEM, it has spread
worldwide with the 1,000th CEM being certified within the last year.
The requirements for the Certified Emergency Manager Program are as follows:
• Three years emergency management experience

• A four-year baccalaureate degree; those without the education requirement
should inquire about the Associate Emergency Manager (AEM) credential.
• 100 contact hours in emergency management training and 100 hours in
general management training
• Six separate contributions to the profession, such as being published, speak-
ing, professional membership, or other activities beyond your day-to-day
activities
• A comprehensive emergency management essay to display your knowledge

in all phases of emergency management
• Completion of a 100 question multiple-choice examination involving all
topics in emergency management
• The requirements for the AEM program are the same as the CEM pro-
grams, except applicants are not required to hold a baccalaureate degree.
Maintaining Certification
The PDS and APS do not require a recertification once initially completed. The
CEM/AEM credential requires recertification every five years. That recertification
is required to remain current in the emergency management field. The recertifica-
tion requirements include 100 hours of training, with at least 75 hours in emergency
management and six contributions to the field of emergency management.
Benefits of Certifications
You may be asking yourself what the benefits of being certified are. One of the pri-
mary reasons for becoming certified is to be NIMS compliant. By being certified,
you show that you are knowledgeable in the four core components of emergency
management: preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. The certification is
recognized as a standard that is recognized across the country. Another reason is to
be professionally recognized by other professional emergency managers. The next
reason may appear to be a little selfish, but it is valid nevertheless. By being certified,
you are more marketable in looking for another position, whether it is for a promo-
tion or another position outside of the law enforcement profession. Many positions
for managers in emergency management or homeland security are seeking a CEM as
a prerequisite to employment. With that in mind, when will you start your certifica-
tion process?
Some really important traits for an emergency manager or those working in the
emergency management field are the following:
• Dependability—Job requires being reliable, responsible, and dependable,

and fulfilling obligations.
• Integrity—Job requires being honest and ethical.
• Stress tolerance—Job requires accepting criticism and dealing calmly and
effectively with high-stress situations.
• Initiative—Job requires a willingness to take on responsibilities and
challenges.
• Leadership—Job requires a willingness to lead, take charge, and offer
opinions and direction.
• Independence—Occupations that satisfy this work value allow employ-
ees to work on their own and make decisions. Corresponding needs are
Creativity, Responsibility, and Autonomy.
• Relationships—Occupations that satisfy this work value allow employ-

ees to provide service to others and work with co-workers in a friendly,
noncompetitive environment. Corresponding needs are Coworkers, Moral
Values, and Social Service.
• Recognition—Occupations that satisfy this work value offer advance-
ment and potential for leadership and are often considered prestigious.
Corresponding needs are Advancement, Authority, Recognition and Social
Status.
In closing, the overall responsibility of an emergency manger is to maintain pub-

lic trust, and confidence is central to the effectiveness of the emergency management
profession. The emergency manager must reflect the spirit and proper conduct dic-
tated by the conscience of society and commitment to the well-being of all and abide
by the core values of respect, commitment, professionalism, ethics, and integrity.
A really good tool to follow as an emergency manager is the Code of ethics at
the IAEM. Their website is http://www.iaem.com/page.cfm?p=certification/cem
-code-of-ethics.
16 School Emergency
Response Plan Template
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN (ERP) TEMPLATE

The Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Template supplied in this chapter provides
guidance that can be used by your district and schools in developing or revising each
site’s own comprehensive Emergency Response Plan (ERP). The template may be
used in its entirety or in part. Districts and schools should work together to adapt the
template to their own unique needs.
The process of developing, implementing, and maintaining a viable all hazards
response capability is derived from the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA). FEMA developed the Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101,
Version 2, and November 2010 (https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726
-1828-25045-0014/cpg_101_comprehensive_preparedness_guide_developing_and
_maintaining_emergency_operations_plans_2010.pdf), which includes key elements
of a viable ERP that have been incorporated in this template. The minimum require-
ments for school ERPs, per ARS 15-341 Part A. 32, may be found in the attached
Minimum Requirements document.
In the current format, this template is public information; however, districts and
schools should be aware of the need to protect specific emergency planning informa-
tion and should redact information from the final ERP as necessary for the safety of
the school.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN ORGANIZATION

An Emergency Response Plan (ERP) contains policies and procedures to follow
before, during and after an emergency. The ERP integrates emergency preparedness
activities into one document. It is the focal point for school planning and prepared-
ness procedures.
Upon the recommendation of the Arizona Department of Emergency and Military
Affairs, Division of Emergency Management and local emergency management, the
AGENCY/DEPARTMENT–FOCUSED ERP FORMAT, found on page 3–8 of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Comprehensive Preparedness
Guide 101 (CPG 101), Version II, November 2010, was selected for this ADE ERP
template. This format supports key elements of a viable school ERP. Although, we
have chosen this particular format to use as our template, CPG 101 offers a variety of
formats that you may select from for your school emergency response plan.
Additional tools to aid in developing and implementing an ERP are found at
http://www.azed.gov/prevention-programs/resources/#11schoolresourse.
247
AGENCY/DEPARTMENT–FOCUSED ERP FORMAT BASIC PLAN

SECTION I:
a) INTRODUCTION MATERIALS
i. Promulgation Document/Signatures
ii. Approval and Implementation
iii. Record of Changes
iv. Record of Distribution
v. Table of Contents
b) PURPOSE, SCOPE SITUATION OVERVIEW AND ASSUMPTIONS
i. Purpose
ii. Scope
iii. Situation Overview
a. Hazard Analysis Summary
b. Capability Assessment
c. Mitigation Overview
iv. Planning Assumptions
v. Concept of Operations
vi. Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities
vii. Direction, Control, and Coordination
viii. Information Collection, Analysis and Dissemination
ix. Communication
x. Administration, Finance and Logistics
Plan Development and Maintenance
xi. Authorities and References
SECTION II: LEAD AGENCIES
i. FIRE
ii. LAW ENFORCEMENT
iii. EMERGENCY MEDICAL
iv. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
v. HOSPITAL
vi. PUBLIC HEALTH
vii. OTHERS AS NEEDED
SECTION III: SUPPORT AGENCIES
Identify those agencies that have a support role during an emergency and describe
or address the strategies they are responsible for implementing.
SECTION IV: HAZARD-SPECIFIC PROCEDURES
For any response or support agency, describe or address its hazard-specific strategies.
EXAMPLE 1 LERP FOR SCHOOLS

Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION MATERIAL
A. PROMULGATION STATEMENT
B. APPROVAL AND IMPLEMENTATION
School Emergency Response Plan Template 249
II. PURPOSE, SCOPE, SITUATION, AND ASSUMPTIONS

A. PURPOSE
B. SCOPE
C. SITUATION OVERVIEW
D. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS
III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
A. GENERAL
B. SIX KEY AREAS OF EMERGENCY PLANNING AND INCIDENT
MANAGEMENT
C. NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (NIMS)
D. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN ACTIVATION AUTHORITY
AND COMMUNICATION
IV. ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES
A. ORGANIZATION
B. SCHOOL POSITION ROLES AND EXPECTED ACTIONS
V. DIRECTION, CONTROL, AND COORDINATION
A. INCIDENT COMMAND
B. COMMUNICATION
C. NOTIFICATION AND WARNING
D. EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION
E. NON-EMERGENCY EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS
VI. INFORMATION COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND DISSEMINATION
VII. ADMINISTRATION, FINANCE, AND LOGISTICS
VIII. PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE
A. PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE
B. TESTING, TRAINING AND EXERCISE
C. PLAN CONTACT INFORMATION
D. RECORD OF CHANGE
E. RECORD OF DISTRIBUTION
IX. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES
X. DEFINITIONS
ERP ATTACHMENT 1
I. INTRODUCTION MATERIAL
A. Promulgation Statement
Promulgation Document
Promulgation is the process that officially announces/declares a plan (or law). The
promulgation document gives the plan official status. It gives both the authority and
the responsibility to organizations to perform their tasks.
It should also mention the responsibilities of tasked organizations with regard
to preparing and maintaining their own procedures/guidelines and commit those
organizations to carrying out the training, exercises, and plan maintenance needed
to support the plan. In addition, the promulgation document allows senior officials to
affirm their support for emergency management.
The Emergency Response Plan (ERP) and supporting materials, is a guide to how
the School conducts all-hazards response. To clarify, all-hazards events (please refer
to ERP Section IV: Hazard Specific Procedures) are typically associated with the
following categories:
• Natural Hazard—These events are emergencies caused by forces extrane-

ous to man in elements of the natural environment (e.g., earthquake, flood,
hazardous weather, public health emergency).
• Technological Hazard—These incidents involve materials created by man
and that pose a unique hazard to the general public and environment. The
jurisdiction needs to consider incidents that are caused by accident (e.g.,
mechanical failure, human mistake), result from an emergency caused by
another hazard, or are caused intentionally (e.g., infrastructure/utility dis-
ruption, radiological, or hazardous material release).
• Human-caused—These are disasters created by man, either intentionally or
by accident (e.g., criminal or violent behavior, intruder, civil unrest, active
shooter, terrorism).
More guidance on all-hazards planning may be found in Section IV: Hazard Specific
Procedures.
The ERP is written in support of emergency management and is built upon the
National Response Framework as scalable, flexible and adaptable coordinating struc-
tures to align key roles and responsibility. This plan and contents within shall apply
to all (add School/District name) administration, staff, and students, and others par-
ticipating in protection, prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery
efforts. Furthermore, tasked organizations supporting ERP procedures shall main-
tain their own procedures and actively participate in the training, exercise, and main-
tenance needed to support this plan.
This plan is intended to capture specific authorities and best practices for manag-
ing incidents from the serious but purely local, to large-scale community or regional
events, or catastrophic in nature.
Most emergencies follow some recognizable build-up period during which actions
can be taken to achieve an appropriate state of maximum readiness. General actions
are detailed in the appropriate sections of this document; however, it is acknowl-
edged that disasters are unique occurrences, which require specific resources
dependent upon the type, nature, and extent of the emergency. In this regard, this
document is not all-inclusive, nor does it limit or restrict reasonable or prudent
actions.
This ERP was prepared by (add School/District name) staff and approved by
senior administration, whereas enabling activities contained within this document to
be performed within the school capability.
Furthermore, this ERP has been distributed internally within the (add
School/District name) and with external agencies that may be affected by its
implementation.
B. Approval and Implementation

Approval and Implementation Page
The approval and implementation page introduces the plan, outlines its applicabil-
ity, and indicates that it supersedes all previous plans. It should include a delegation
of authority for specific modifications that can be made to the plan and by whom
they can be made without the senior official’s signature. It should also include a date
and should be signed by the senior official(s) (e.g., governor, tribal leader[s], mayor,
county judge, commissioner[s]).
This plan shall apply to all (add School/District name) students, faculty, and staff
and others participating in protection, prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response
and recovery efforts. Furthermore, the ERP may be applied to any school-sponsored
events whether on or off property and all public or private, school-sanctionedactivities.
The School/District (add Principal, Superintendent, etc.), or designee shall be
responsible for plan oversight and coordination with applicable stakeholders, such
as, law enforcement, county health department, fire services, emergency manage-
ment, etc. This emergency response plan is based on the “all-hazards” concept and
plans for natural and man-made disasters and incidents. The plan is flexible in that
part of the plan or the entire plan may be activated based on the specific emergency
and decision by school leadership.
This ERP and its supporting contents are hereby approved, supersedes all previ-
ous editions formerly referred to as the (insert previous name of document), and is
effective immediately upon the signing of signature authority noted below.
Approval Signature: _______________________________________________,

Principal
School Name: _____________________________________________________
Date: ____________________________________________________________
DISTRICT LEVEL SIGNATURE PAGE
Approval Signature: _______________________________________________,

Superintendent
District Name: ____________________________________________________
Date: ____________________________________________________________
The following signatures appear in recognition of the coordination, collaboration,

and document review with local partners.
Signature: _______________________ Date: ___________________________

(Emergency Management Agency)
Signature: _______________________ Date: ___________________________
(Public Health Department)
Signature: _______________________ Date: ___________________________
(Law Enforcement Agency)
Signature: _______________________ Date: ___________________________
(Fire Services Agency)
II. PURPOSE, SCOPE, SITUATION, AND ASSUMPTIONS

A. Purpose
Purpose
The purpose sets the foundation for the rest of the EOP. The basic plan’s
purpose is a general statement of what the EOP is meant to do. The state-
ment should be supported by a brief synopsis of the basic plan and annexes.
The purpose of the (add School/District name) Emergency Response Plan
is to outline the school’s approach to emergency operations and to enable
local, State and federal coordination in addition to public/private support. It
provides general guidance for emergency management activities. The ERP
and its contents describe the school emergency response organization and
assigns responsibilities for various emergency tasks.
Specific support materials found in the ERP Sections beyond the Basic
Plan, or in attachments, may describe details of who does what, when and
how, or provides additional information in support of potential emergency
response actions.
Additionally, the ERP describes capabilities and resources, as well as estab-
lishes responsibilities and operational processes, to help protect the school
from natural, technological, and man-made hazards; with the primary objec-
tives to save lives and protect public health, property and the environment,
and, reduce adverse psychological consequences and disruptions.
Although emergencies/disasters and catastrophic incidents typically result in
impacts far beyond the immediate or initial incident area, the ERP provides
a framework to enable the management of cascading impacts and multiple
incidents as well as the prevention of and preparation for subsequent events.
The (add School/District name) Emergency Response Plan supports the
school and the district general operating procedures. It is the responsibility
of those referenced in this plan to integrate their departmental policy, pro-
cedures, and emergency management activities such as task performance
and organization, while also participating in training, exercises and plan
integration and maintenance needed to support a collective process.
Additionally, the Plan:
• Empowers employees in an incident to act quickly and knowledgably;
• Informs students, faculty, and staff, and trains key stakeholders on their
roles and responsibilities before, during, and after an incident;
• Provides other members of the community with assurances that the
School/District has established policy and procedures to respond to
incidents/hazards in an effective way;
• Establishes intra-agency and multi-jurisdictional mechanisms for involve-
ment in, and coordination of, incident response and recovery operations;
• Provides guidance for emergency operations and the utilization of all
available (add School/District name) and government resources for the
protection of lives, property, and the continuance of school operations
in an emergency.
B. Scope
Scope
The ERP/EOP should also explicitly state the scope of emergency and
disaster response and the entities (e.g., departments, agencies, private sec-
tor, citizens) and geographic areas to which the plan applies.
It is the school’s (add staff position, or designee) that is the responsible
authority to direct the response involving an incident occurring on property,
or at any (add School/District name) event sponsored or sanctioned.
This plan and all contents contained herein shall apply to all (add School/
District name) students, faculty, staff and visitors, and others participating
in protection, prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery
efforts. An incident or event influencing (add School/District name) may
also affect the surrounding community; therefore, this plan shall support
community emergency operations and any supporting Memorandums of
Understanding (MOU) and/or Memorandums of Agreement (MOA).
The scope of the ERP applies to incidents and/or events of all sizes, includ-
ing those that exceed the school response services and capabilities that may
result in activation of the local emergency operations center. MOUs/MOAs
in coordination with additional support requested from local, State and
Federal entities may be activated.
The School ERP outlines the expectations of faculty and staff; roles and
responsibilities; direction and control systems; internal and external com-
munications; training and sustainability of the ERP; authority and ref-
erences as defined by local, State, and Federal government mandates;
common and specialized procedures; and specific hazard vulnerabilities
and response/recovery for (add School/District name).
C. Situation Overview
Situation Overview
The situation section characterizes the “planning environment,” making it
clear why an EOP is necessary. The level of detail is a matter of judgment;
some information may be limited to a few specific annexes and presented
there.
At a minimum, the situation section should summarize hazards faced by
the jurisdiction and discuss how the jurisdiction expects to receive (or pro-
vide) assistance within its regional response structures. The situation sec-
tion covers a general discussion of:
• Relative probability and impact of the hazards
• Geographic areas likely to be affected by particular hazards
• Vulnerable critical facilities (e.g., nursing homes, schools, hospitals,
infrastructure)
• Population distribution and locations, including any concentrated popu-
lations of individuals with disabilities, others with access and functional
needs, or individuals with limited English proficiency, as well as unac-

companied minors and children in daycare and school settings
• Dependencies on other jurisdictions for critical resources
• The process used by the jurisdiction to determine its capabilities and
limits in order to prepare for and respond to the defined hazards
• Actions taken in advance to minimize an incident’s impacts, including
short- and long-term strategies.
(Add School/District name) is a stakeholder in the local and state disaster

risks. The school/district is exposed to hazards, which have the potential
for disrupting the school community and causing widespread damage and
casualties. Such hazard exposure may include geographic location, popula-
tion concentration to include demographics, buildings, rail, air and highway
traffic.
Other risk factors may include: floods, tornadoes, terrorist activities, fires,
explosions, transportation accidents, pandemic and other infectious diseases,
shooting, school collapse, tornado, bomb threats, hostage situation, utility
outage, neighborhood disturbance, food poisoning, armed intruder, etc.
The information gathered during the jurisdictional assessment of individu-
als with disabilities and others with access and functional needs requires a
detailed analysis. Emergency planners need to review the assessment find-
ings and analyze the quantity and types of resources (including personnel)
needed during different types of incidents.
The (add School/District name) participated in the hazard assessment
process, utilizing local resources, such as emergency management, law
enforcement, fire services, county health department and private entities
where applicable, to determine the threat and risk for the school and sur-
rounding community.
For information on (add School/District name) demographics, building
information, threat and risk, please see (add School/District web site) or
(add attachment location).
To enhance capability and mitigation efforts, the (add School/District name)
is a signatory on (may be local emergency management plan, MOU, etc.)
which may be found at the following location(s) (add locations). Capabilities
to be able to respond to the most likely hazards were assessed by the school
and the surrounding emergency management community. Collectively,
measures are in place to address these hazards.
• The school works with the law enforcement, county health department,
fire services and emergency management staff of the following city
(ies) (add names) and/or county (ies) of (add names) on a regular basis.
A cooperative working relationship and team approach between the
school and municipal governments for emergency response is seen as a
major responsibility for which the school supports. Prevention, protec-
tion, response, and recovery capability consideration, along with the
adequate training, equipment, and personnel needs are coordinated.
• The school is dependent upon the local municipalities for fire suppres-
sion and rescue services, major hazardous material response capabilities,
EMS, bomb squad response, public health guidance, law enforcement
tactical responses, support from emergency management, and assis-
tance in emergency operations staffing. If written agreements exist, add
location of these agreements.
• The school maintains staffing resources, or has written agreements in
place, that may provide the following services: (add items such as CPR,
first aid, counseling).
The (add School/District name) has assigned the following staff, (list posi-
tion) to address emergency preparedness. In addition to supporting (add
local, private, and regional stakeholders) the school has adopted and sup-
ports FEMA emergency management practices, protection, prevention,
mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery in their planning process,
and is committed to developing and exercising plans in addition to training
and exercising with local populations.
D. Planning Assumptions
Planning Assumptions
These identify what the planning team assumes to be facts for planning
purposes in order to make it possible to execute the EOP. During opera-
tions, the assumptions indicate areas where adjustments to the plan have to
be made as the facts of the incident become known. These also provide the
opportunity to communicate the intent of senior officials regarding emer-
gency operations priorities.
The (add School/District name) ERP is based on the following planning
assumptions and considerations as presented in this section.
• Any employee of (add School/District name) may be tasked by this
ERP.
• School officials and representatives recognize their responsibilities for
the safety and well-being of students, staff, and visitors; and assume
their responsibilities in the implementation of this ERP.
• External resources may be requested to assist the school.
• In most cases, law enforcement or fire service personnel will assume
Incident Command, or establish a unified command, depending on the
type of emergency.
• Incident management activities will be initiated and conducted using
the Incident Command System, contained in the National Incident
Management System (NIMS).
• Outside assistance will likely be available in most emergencies affect-
ing the school. Although these procedures define procedures for coor-
dinating such assistance, it is essential for the school to be prepared to
carry out disaster response and short-term actions on an independent
basis, or in the event, the incident is community or region wide.
• It is possible for a major disaster to occur any time and any place in or
near the school. In some cases, timely dissemination of warnings and
increased readiness measures may be possible. However, many disas-
ters can, and may occur with little or no warning.
• Proper implementation and understanding of these procedures through
training and exercising will reduce or prevent disaster-related losses.
• Emergencies on the School grounds may involve multiple responding
departments and agencies including, but not limited to, local law enforce-
ment, county health department, fire services, emergency management,
environmental health and safety, emergency medical services, and appro-
priate school, city, county, state and federal agencies.
• Other schools operating on the (add School/District name) property
shall coordinate their emergency actions with this ERP. (Add other
items as applicable)
III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Concept of Operations (CONOPS)
The audience for the basic plan needs to be able to visualize the sequence
and scope of the planned emergency response. The CONOPS section is
a written or graphic statement that explains in broad terms the decision
maker’s or leader’s intent with regard to an operation.
The CONOPS should describe how the response organization accomplishes
a mission or set of objectives in order to reach a desired end-state. Ideally, it
offers clear methodology to realize the goals and objectives to execute the
plan. This may include a brief discussion of the activation levels identified
by the jurisdiction for its operations center. The CONOPS should briefly
address direction and control, alert and warning, and continuity matters
that may be dealt with more fully in annexes.
A. General
It is the responsibility of the school to protect life and property from the effects of
emergency situations within its own jurisdiction. (Add School/District name) has
the primary responsibility for initial emergency management activities. Concept of
Operations information located in this section is designed to give an overall picture
of incident management.
It will primarily clarify the purpose, and explain the school’s overall approach to
an emergency (i.e., what should happen, when, and at whose direction).
Top priorities for incident management are to:
• Protect and save lives, and protect health and safety of students, faculty,
staff, visitors, responders, and recovery workers.
• Protect property and mitigate damages and impacts to individuals, the
community, and the environment.
To assist in delineating levels of response, the following terms have been pro-
vided, but it is of the utmost importance that terminology is used that is acceptable
and applicable to your individual school, district and response community.
An emergency, as used in this plan, is intended to describe a range of situations,
from an incident to a major disaster. It includes the following:
INCIDENT—An incident is a situation that is limited in scope and potential

effects.
EMERGENCY—An emergency is a situation that is larger in scope and more
severe in terms of actual or potential effects than an incident.
DISASTER—A disaster involves the occurrence or threat of significant casu-
alties and/or widespread property damage that is beyond the capability of
the local government to handle with available local resources.
This ERP is based on the “all-hazards” concept and is flexible in that part of the plan
or the entire plan may be activated based on the specific emergency and decision by
school leadership.
The school concept of operations is that the emergency functions of various
departments and agencies involved in emergency management will generally paral-
lel normal day-to-day functions or operations.
Day-to-day functions that do not contribute directly to the emergency may be
suspended for the duration of any emergency. The efforts that would normally be
required for those functions will be redirected to the accomplishment of emergency
tasks by the school.
The (add School/District name) ERP addresses preparedness activities embedded
within the key areas of emergency planning (CPG 101 v.2, pg. 1–8).
B. Six Key Areas of Emergency Planning and Incident Management

In the event of an incident, the (add School/District name) will utilize these defini-
tions (CPG 101, pgs. 1–8/1–10) that are predicated on an all-hazard approach. There
is acknowledgement that most responsibilities and functions performed during an
emergency are not hazard specific. Likewise, these procedures account for activities
pre-incident, incident, and post-incident; consequently, key areas are noted as the
following:
1. Prevention—Consists of actions that reduce risk from human-caused inci-

dents. Prevention planning can also help mitigate secondary or opportunis-
tic incidents that may occur after the primary incident.
2. Protection—Reduces or eliminates a threat to people, property and the
environment. Primarily focused on adversarial incidents, the protection of
critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) is vital to local jurisdic-
tions, national security, public health and safety and economic vitality.
3. Mitigation—Mitigation activities are those which eliminate or reduce the
probability of a disaster occurring. Also included are those long-term activ-
ities which lessen the undesirable effects of unavoidable hazards.
4. Preparedness—Preparedness activities serve to develop the response capa-

bilities needed in the event an emergency should arise. Planning and train-
ing are among the activities conducted under this phase.
5. Response—Response is the actual provision of emergency services during
a crisis. These activities help to reduce casualties and damage, and speed
recovery. Response activities include evacuation, rescue, and other similar
operations.
6. Recovery—Recovery is both a short-term and long-term process. Short-
term operations seek to restore vital services to the School and provide for
the basic needs of students, faculty, and staff. Long-term recovery focuses
on restoring the School to its normal pre-disaster, or an improved, state of
affairs. The recovery period is also an opportune time to institute future
mitigation measures, particularly those related to the recent emergency.
C. National Incident Management System (NIMS)

NIMS provides a consistent framework for incident management at all jurisdictional
levels regardless of the cause, size, or complexity of the incident. NIMS is not an
operational incident management or resource allocation plan. NIMS represents a
core set of doctrine, concepts, principles, terminology, and organizational processes
that enables effective, efficient, and collaborative incident management.
NIMS ensures that those involved in incident response and recovery, understand
what their roles are and have the tools they need to be effective. Additionally NIMS:
• Defines incident response organizational concepts and structures.

• Consists of procedures for managing personnel, facilities, equipment, and
communications.
• Is used throughout the life cycle of an incident (e.g., from threat to parent/
student reunification).
NIMS components include:
• Preparedness—Effective emergency management and incident response

activities begin with a host of preparedness activities conducted on an ongoing
basis, in advance of any potential incident. Preparedness involves an inte-
grated combination of planning, procedures and protocols, training and exer-
cises, personnel qualifications and certification, and equipment certification.
• Communications and Information Management—Emergency management
and incident response activities rely upon communications and informa-
tion systems that provide a common operating picture to all command and
coordination sites. NIMS describes the requirements necessary for a stan-
dardized framework for communications and emphasizes the need for a
common operating picture. NIMS is based upon the concepts of interoper-
ability, reliability, scalability, portability, and the resiliency and redundancy
of communications and information systems.
• Resource Management—Resources (such as personnel, equipment, and/

or supplies) are needed to support critical incident objectives. The flow
of resources must be fluid and adaptable to the requirements of the inci-
dent. NIMS define standardized mechanisms and establishes the resource
management process to: identify requirements, order and acquire, mobi-
lize, track and report, recover and demobilize, reimburse, and inventory
resources.
• Command and Management—The Command and Management compo-
nent within NIMS is designed to enable effective and efficient incident
management and coordination by providing flexible, standardized incident
management structures. The structures are based on three key organiza-
tional constructs: the Incident Command System, Multiagency Coordination
Systems, and Public Information.
• Ongoing Management and Maintenance—Within the auspices of Ongoing
Management and Maintenance, there are two components: the National
Integration Center (NIC) and Supporting Technologies.
The (add School/District name) has adopted NIMS and the use of the Incident
Command System (ICS) in accordance with the Homeland Security Presidential
Directive (HSPD) 5. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Education has pro-
vided guidance as to “key personnel,” such as executive leaders, general personnel,
Command Staff and Incident Managers, to complete specific courses in order to
meet organizational NIMS compliance.
Appropriate school staff will participate in NIMS preparedness programs, com-
munity collaboration and planning efforts, and participate in training and exercising
of the ERP’s procedures.
In a major emergency or disaster, the school may be damaged or need to be evacu-
ated, people may be injured, and/or other incident management activities may need
to be initiated. These activities will be organized and coordinated to ensure efficient
incident management. The Incident Command System (ICS), a component of NIMS,
will be used to manage all incidents and major school/district planned events. The
school ICS approach will be used in all phases of incident management, including
pre-incident activities, incident and post incident.
D. Emergency Operations Plan Activation Authority and Communication

The (add at least two to three staff positions) is/are typically the responsible author-
ity for directing emergency measures for the school or district, and is provided the
authority to activate this ERP. (Add staff position order of succession here)
The (add school staff position(s)) will obtain information on the nature of the inci-
dent and assessment of the situation and will make the determination of next steps
and assume the role of, or delegate the role of incident commander if the situation
warrants.
An incident warranting multi-jurisdictional resources, emergency response activ-
ities will employ the Incident/Unified Command System (ICS) structure.
Timely warnings of emergency conditions are essential to preserve the safety

and security of the school or district community and critical to an effective response
and recovery. Direction on communications may be found (add location). Additional
information may be obtained at the District level (add location).
IV. ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES

Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities
The basic plan establishes the operational organization that will be relied
on to respond to an emergency. It includes a list of the kinds of tasks to
be performed, by position and organization, without all of the procedural
details included in functional annexes. When two or more organizations
perform the same kind of task, one should be given primary responsibil-
ity, with the other(s) providing a supporting role. For the sake of clarity, a
matrix of organizations and areas of responsibility (including functions)
should be included to summarize the primary and supporting roles. Shared
general responsibilities, such as developing SOPs/SOGs, should not be
neglected, and the matrix might include organizations not under jurisdic-
tional control, if they have defined responsibilities for responding to emer-
gencies that might occur in the jurisdiction. Organization charts, especially
those depicting how a jurisdiction is implementing the ICS or Multiagency
Coordination System structure, are helpful.
This section should also outline agency and departmental roles related
to prevention and protection activities. In addition, this section is where a
jurisdiction discusses the option that it uses for organizing emergency
management—ESF, agency and department, functional areas of ICS/NIMS,
or a hybrid. The selected management structure determines what types of
annexes are included in the EOP and should be carried through to any hazard
annexes.
A. Organization
Emergency Management for (add School/District name) is comprised of the
following:
(The following are examples and should be modify as applicable to your school
or district.)
Policy Group (District)

The Policy Group is comprised of the following: (add position names)
• Superintendent
• School Board President
• Other
In complex incidents, the Policy Group will be convened at (add location and
alternative location). The role of the Policy Group is to:
• Support the on-scene Incident Commander with strategic guidance, infor-

mation analysis, and needed resources
• Provide policy and strategic guidance
• Help to ensure that adequate resources are available
• Identify and resolve issues common to all organizations
• Keep elected officials and other executives informed of the situation and
decisions
• Provide factual information, both internally and externally through the
Joint Information Center (JIC)
School Site Safety and Security Staff

The (add position name) is responsible for (list what this position is responsible for
on a daily bases. It may include duties such as emergency management planning
and operations for the school.) Upon the activation of the ERP for a school incident,
the (add position name) assumes the role as (list the role this position will assume),
unless delegated.
District or School Departments

District and school departments will support emergency response operations through
performance of their normal roles and responsibilities. If called upon, school depart-
ments will activate personnel and implement appropriate response actions identified
in the plan, or as directed by the Incident Commander or school administration.
Activation of the ICS for a school event may be modified as needed to best serve
the nature of the incident. When the ICS is activated, staff will direct the efforts of
their departments according to their respective procedures for emergency operations.
Department Departmental Duties and Responsibilities

1. Transportation Upon learning of an incident, the Transportation
Coordinator/Director will report directly to the
Incident Commander for assignment unless
otherwise notified.
B. School Position Roles and Expected Actions

Principal/Building Administrator
The principal may serve as the Incident Commander or delegate that authority to a
qualified individual. At all times, the principal still retains the responsibility for the
overall safety of students and staff. However, delegating the authority to manage the
incident allows the principal to focus on policy-level activities and interfacing with
other agencies and parents. The principal shall coordinate between the policy group
and the Incident Commander.
Teachers
Teachers shall be responsible for the supervision of students and shall remain with
students until directed otherwise.
Responsibilities include:
• Supervise students under their charge.

• Take steps to ensure the safety of students, staff, and other individuals in
the implementation of incident management protocols.
• Direct students in their charge to inside or outside assembly areas, in
accordance with signals, warning, written notification, or intercom orders
according to established incident management procedures.
• Give appropriate action command during an incident.
• Take attendance when class relocates to an outside or inside assembly area
or evacuates to another location.
• Report missing students to the Incident Commander or designee.
• Execute assignments as directed by the Incident Commander or ICS supervisor.
• Obtain first aid services for injured students from the school nurse or person
trained in first aid. Arrange for first aid for those unable to be moved.
• Render first aid if necessary. School staff should be trained and certified in
first aid and CPR.
Instructional Assistants
Responsibilities include assisting teachers as directed.
Counselors, Social Workers, and Psychologists

Counselors, social workers, and psychologists provide assistance with the overall
direction of the incident management procedures at the site.
Responsibilities may include:
• Take steps to ensure the safety of students, staff, and other individuals in
the implementation of incident management protocols.
• Direct students in their charge according to established incident manage-
ment protocols.
• Render first aid if necessary.
• Assist in the transfer of students, staff, and other individuals when their
safety is threatened by a disaster.
• Execute assignments as directed by the Incident Commander or ICS supervisor.
School Nurses/Health Assistants

• Administer first aid or emergency treatment as needed.

• Supervise administration of first aid by those trained to provide it.
• Organize first aid and medical supplies.
Custodians/Maintenance Personnel
• Survey and report building damage to the Incident Commander or Operations

Section Chief.
• Control main shutoff valves for gas, water, and electricity and ensure that
no hazard results from broken or downed lines.
• Provide damage control as needed.
• Assist in the conservation, use, and disbursement of supplies and equipment.
• Keep Incident Commander or designee informed of condition of school.
School Secretary/Office Staff

• Answer phones and assist in receiving and providing consistent information

to callers.
• Provide for the safety of essential school records and documents.
• Execute assignments as directed by the Incident Commander or ICS
supervisor.
• Provide assistance to the principal and Policy/Coordination Group.
• Monitor radio emergency broadcasts.
• Assist with health incidents as needed, acting as messengers, etc.
Food Service/Cafeteria Workers

• Use, prepare, and serve food and water on a rationed basis whenever the
feeding of students and staff becomes necessary during an incident.
supervisor.
Transportation/Bus Drivers
• Supervise the care of students if disaster occurs while students are in the
bus.
• Transfer students to new location when directed.
supervisor.
• Transport individuals in need of medical attention.
Other Staff (Itinerant Staff, Substitute Teachers)

Responsibilities include reporting to the Incident Commander or ICS supervisor if
requested or activated.
Students
• Cooperate during emergency drills and exercises, and during an emergency

situation.
• Learn to be responsible for themselves and others if the emergency situation
warrants.
• Understand the importance of not being a bystander by reporting situations
of concern to appropriate staff.
• Develop a general awareness of natural, technological, and human-caused
hazards and associated prevention, preparedness, and mitigation measures.
Parents/Guardians
• Understanding their roles during a school emergency.

• Encourage and support school safety, violence prevention, and incident pre-
paredness programs within the school.
• Participate in volunteer service projects for promoting school incident
preparedness.
• Provide the school with requested information concerning the incident,
early and late dismissals, and other related release information.
• Practice incident management preparedness in the home to reinforce school
training and ensure family safety.
V. DIRECTION, CONTROL, AND COORDINATION

Direction, Control, and Coordination
This section describes the framework for all direction, control, and coor-
dination activities. It identifies who has tactical and operational control of
response assets. Additionally, Direction, Control, and Coordination explain
how multijurisdictional coordination systems support the efforts of organiza-
tions to coordinate efforts across jurisdictions while allowing each jurisdiction
to retain its own authorities. This section also provides information on how
department and agency plans nest into the EOP (horizontal integration) and
how higher-level plans are expected to layer on the EOP (vertical integration).
A. Incident Command
Incident Command System
The Incident Command System (ICS) organizational structure develops in a top-down,
modular fashion that is based on the size and complexity of the incident, as well as the spe-
cifics of the hazard environment created by the incident. As incident complexity increases,
the organization expands from the top down as functional responsibilities are delegated.
To provide for the effective direction, control, and coordination of an incident,

either single site or multi-incidents, the school ERP will be activated including the
implementation of the Incident Command System (ICS). When needed, separate
functional elements will be established and subdivided to enhance internal organi-
zational management and external coordination.
The Policy Group is responsible for providing the Incident Commander with stra-
tegic guidance, information analysis, and needed resources. The Executive/Senior
Leadership (Principal, Superintendent, etc.) is responsible for the incident. Along
with this responsibility, by virtue of their position, these individuals have the author-
ity to make decisions, commit resources, obligate funds, and command the resources
necessary to protect the students and facilities.
Having the responsibility does not mean that the Executive/Senior Leadership
assumes a command role over the on-scene incident operation. Rather, the Executive/
Senior Official:
• Provides policy guidance on priorities and objectives based on situational

needs and the Emergency Operations Plan.
• Oversees resource coordination and support to the on-scene command from
an Operations Center.
Incident Management
The school ICS may be organized into the following functional areas: provides stra-
tegic guidance and resource support.
Organization Expansion
Expanding the Organization

The School/District Incident Commander will be integrated into the
Incident Command structure, or assume a role within a Unified Command
structure.
If a school emergency is within the authorities of the first-responder com-
munity, i.e. emergency requiring law enforcement or fire services, etc.,
Command will transition, or form a Unified Command structure, upon the
arrival of qualified first responders. A transfer of command briefing shall
occur.
Incident Command Post

The Incident Command Post (ICP) is the location from which the Incident
Commander oversees all incident operations. There is generally only one ICP for
each incident, but it may change locations during the event. Every incident must have
some form of an ICP.
The ICP will be positioned outside of the present and potential hazard zone, but
located within safe proximity to the emergency site. The ICP is generally responsible
for incident response management as follows:
• Serves as a temporary field location for tactical-level on-scene incident

command and management
• Is the on-site headquarters for the Incident Commander, Command Staff
and General Staff; and
• Serves as a field collection point for tactical intelligence and analysis
• The Incident Command Post (ICP) conducts all operations using the
Incident/Unified Command System (ICS)
• The Incident Command Post provides the initial securing of the perimeter
of the area, coordinates the actions of the operating units, and remains oper-
ational during the field actions (rescue, response, recovery, etc.) as required
Incident Commander
The Incident Commander (IC) is the primary person in charge at the incident and
will establish incident objectives based on the following five primary objectives:
1. Life Safety
2. Protect Public Health
3. Incident Stabilization
4. Property and Environment Preservation
5. Reduce adverse psychological consequences and disruptions
Additionally, the IC will manage the incident scene, and he or she must keep the
Executive/Senior Administration and the Policy Group informed and up to date on
important matters pertaining to the incident.
School-related responsibilities and duties include:
• The first staff person on scene, (or insert position) will assume the role of
Incident Commander until a more qualified individual can assume command.
• The Incident Commander is delegated the appropriate authority to direct
tactical on-scene operations until a coordinated incident management
framework can be established with local resources.
• Establish an Incident Command Post (ICP) and provide an assessment
of the situation to the Executive/Senior Administration, which may also
include the Policy Group or other officials, recommend incident response
activities, identify incident management resources required, and direct the
on-scene incident management activities from the ICP.
• Establish and manage the Command Post, establish the incident organiza-
tion, and determine strategies to implement protocols and adapt as needed.
• Monitor incident safety conditions and develop measures for ensuring the safety
of building occupants (including students, staff, volunteers, and responders).
• Coordinate media relations and information dissemination with the principal.
• Serve as the primary on-scene contact for outside agencies assigned to the
incident, establish unified command as necessary, develop working knowl-
edge of local/regional agencies, and assist in accessing services when the
need arises.
• Document activities.
• Assume overall direction of all incident management procedures based on
actions and procedures outlined in this EOP.
• Determine whether to implement incident management protocols (e.g.,
Evacuation, Shelter in Place, Lockdown, etc.), as described more fully in
the (add location) in this document.
• Arrange for transfer of students, staff, and other individuals when safety is
threatened by a disaster.
• Work with emergency services personnel. (Depending on the incident,
community agencies such as law enforcement or fire department may have
jurisdiction for investigations, rescue procedures, etc.)
• Keep the Executive/Senior Leadership and Policy Group informed of the
situation.
Unified Command
Unified Command applies ICS to incidents involving multiple jurisdictions or agen-
cies. It enables schools and agencies with different legal, geographic, and functional
responsibilities to coordinate, plan, and interact effectively.
Additionally, the Incident Commanders within the Unified Command will make
joint decisions and speak as one voice. Any differences are worked out within the
Unified Command. Within Unified Command, law enforcement would not tell
school personnel how to manage, i.e., parent-student reunification, etc., or tell the
firefighters how to do their job.
• The Incident Commander, through the Incident/Unified Command System,

coordinates the actions of responding community units to the scene
• Advise School Leadership and the District of needs that may include per-
sonnel recall from other departments/schools as required
• Isolate the incident site and maintain control of the inner and outer
perimeters
• Establish tactical communications and designate a primary radio channel
• Facilitate tactical planning and contingency planning
• Brief first responder personnel
• Designate a staging area for supporting agencies
• Ensure documentation of decisions and activities
• Provide situational updates to the policy group
• Approve requests for additional resources or for the release of resources
(demobilization)
• Approve additional alerts as needed
• Ensure staff prepares an incident After Action Report (AAR)
• Establish immediate priorities
• Coordinate any specific transportation issues (such as helicopter landing
zones, EMS locations, morgue location, etc., as appropriate)
• Determines security boundaries
• Perform other duties as required by the situation
Public Information Officer

The Public Information Officer (PIO) is responsible for interfacing with the
media or other appropriate agencies requiring information directly from the
incident.
• Check in with Incident Commander and receive a situation brief

• Assume the duties of the School Public Information Officer (PIO)
• If necessary, establish and supervise a Joint Information Center (JIC) with
PIO’s from the other responder agencies
• Coordinate press releases among response organizations
• Designate a media center and facilitate scheduled press briefings
• Ensure all press releases and public information are reviewed and approved
by the Incident Commander, or designee
• Monitor news media outlets reports of the incident
• Prepare periodic briefings to Executive Policy Group on public information
activities and submit draft press releases for review and approval
Operations Section
The Operations Section directs all tactical operations of an incident including imple-
mentation of response/recovery activities according to established incident manage-
ment procedures and protocols, care of students, first aid, crisis intervention, search
and rescue, site security, damage assessment, evacuations, and the release of students
to parents.
Specific responsibilities include:
• Analyze school staffing to develop a Parent-Student Reunification Plan, and

implement an incident action plan.
• Monitor site utilities (i.e., electric, gas, water, heat/ventilation/air condition-
ing) and shut off only if danger exists or directed by Incident Commander,
and assist in securing facility.
• Establish medical triage with staff trained in first aid and CPR, provide
and oversee care given to injured persons, distribute supplies, and request
additional supplies from the Logistics Section.
• Provide and access psychological first aid services for those in need, and
access local/regional providers for ongoing crisis counseling for students,
staff, and parents.
• Coordinate the rationed distribution of food and water, establish secondary
toilet facilities in the event of water or plumbing failure, and request needed
supplies from the Logistics Section.
• Document all activities.
Planning Section
Collects, evaluates, and disseminates information needed to measure the size,
scope, and seriousness of an incident, and to plan appropriate incident management
activities.
Duties may include:

• Assist Incident Commander in the collection and evaluation of information
about an incident as it develops (including site map and area map of related
events), assist with ongoing planning efforts, and maintain incident time
log.
Logistics Section
Supports incident management operations by securing and providing needed person-
nel, equipment, facilities, resources, and services required for incident resolution;
coordinating personnel; assembling and deploying volunteer teams; and facilitating
communication among incident responders. This function may involve a major role
in an extended incident.
Additional responsibilities include:
• Establish and oversee communications center and activities during an

incident (two-way radio, battery-powered radio, written updates, etc.), and
develop telephone tree for after-hours communication.
• Establish and maintain school and classroom preparedness kits, coordinate
access to and distribution of supplies during an incident, and monitor inven-
tory of supplies and equipment.
Finance/Administration Section
Oversees all financial activities including purchasing necessary materials, tracking
incident costs, arranging contracts for services, timekeeping for emergency respond-
ers, submitting documentation for reimbursement, and recovering school records
following an incident.
Additional duties may include:
• Assume responsibility for overall documentation and recordkeeping activi-

ties; when possible, photograph or videotape damage to property.
• Develop a system to monitor and track expenses and financial losses, and
secure all records.
The Finance and Administration Section may not be established onsite at the inci-
dent. Rather, the school and school district management offices may assume respon-
sibility for these functions.
An important component of the ERP is a set of interagency agreements with
various city/county agencies to aid timely communication. These agreements help
coordinate services between the agencies and (add District name). Various agen-
cies and services include county governmental agencies such as mental health,
law enforcement, county health department, and fire departments. The agreements
specify the type of communication and services provided by one agency to another.
The agreements also make school personnel available beyond the school setting in
an incident or traumatic event occurring in the community.
Source and Use of Resources

(Add School/District name) will use its own resources and equipment to respond
to incidents until incident response personnel arrive. Parent volunteers and com-
munity members can be trained to assist if called upon and available after an inci-
dent occurs. The following organizations or agencies have agreed to be responsible
for providing additional resources or assistance by means of written or contractual
agreement: (add location of agreements)
Examples:
• First aid kit and sanitation supplies

• Counseling services
• Food/water supplies
• Security
B. Communication
Communications
This section describes the communication protocols and coordination
procedures used between response organizations during emergencies and
disasters. It discusses the framework for delivering communications sup-
port and how the jurisdiction’s communications integrate into the regional
or national disaster communications network. It does not describe com-
munications hardware or specific procedures found in departmental
SOPs/SOGs. Planners should identify and summarize separate interoper-
able communications plans. This section may be expanded as an annex
and is usually supplemented by communications SOPs/SOGs and field
guides.
Communication is a critical part of incident management. This section
outlines (add School/District name) communications plan and supports
its mission to provide clear, effective internal and external communication
between the school, staff, students, parents, responders, and media. (Add
location of communication plan, policy, and procedures.)
C. Notification and Warning

Timely warnings of emergency conditions are essential to preserve the safety and
security of the school community and critical to an effective response and recovery.
• Upon learning of an emergency and assessing need for local agency sup-
port such as law enforcement or fire services, (add staff positions) will
call 911.
• Notification to key (add School/District name) administrators, departments

and personnel for emergency response will follow procedures outlined in
(add your notification procedures here, or in a section such as an Appendix
or Attachment to the ERP).
Notification of critical personnel will be in accordance with the following:
• District and/or school personnel shall relay threat information, warnings, to

ensure the school community is notified.
• Staff shall respond according to their procedures for emergency operations,
unless otherwise dictated by the event.
• Emergency notifications, warnings and alerts will typically be disseminated
within the school or district using items such as, voice command, intercom
system, email, the school radio or television system, or other modes.
• Law enforcement agencies and other emergency services may be required
to disseminate emergency warnings to the public who cannot be reached by
school primary warning systems.
• In any case, it is important for the communication hubs to be notified of
the emergency to ensure all appropriate notifications are made. Any one or
more communication strategies may become disabled.
• Telephones, cellular or landline, (add items applicable) are the primary means
of communications for contacting key emergency responders or departments.
• The 800 or 900 MHz radios (if applicable) with common channels are one
example of communication for emergency responder communications.
• All school radios (if applicable) have a set of common channels for inter
operability among departments.
D. Emergency Public Information

In the event that a crisis occurs on school property, the Public Information Officer
will be notified as soon as possible to report to the Incident Command location. In
his/her role as chief spokesperson for the School, will ultimately be responsible for
the communications efforts relative to the crisis.
For a detailed plan of emergency public information, (add location if applicable).
E. Non-Emergency External Communications

During an incident the school expects to receive a high volume of calls seeking
information as to the welfare of students, staff and faculty from concerned parents,
relatives, spouses, friends and loved ones. The surge in volume of calls to the school
main numbers may quickly exceed the system capabilities.
It is essential that call centers are activated and staffed as soon as possible to
handle anticipated volume of non-emergency calls related to the incident.
Call centers may also be a resource in helping to control rumors.
VI. INFORMATION COLLECTION, ANALYSIS,

AND DISSEMINATION
Information Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination
This section describes the critical or essential information common to all
operations identified during the planning process. It identifies the type of
information needed, the source of the information, who uses the informa-
tion, how the information is shared, the format for providing the informa-
tion, and any specific times the information is needed. School/District
prevention and protection assets must develop the Information Collection,
Analysis, and Dissemination section in close cooperation with school
departments and local support agencies such as, law enforcement, fire,
emergency management, utilities, insurance agencies, risk management,
transportation, etc. The contents of this section are best provided in a tabu-
lar format, and may be expanded as an annex if needed.
Essential information necessary for emergency operations identified in this
ERP are recorded on Attachment 1. (If, Attachment 1 was not used, add
actual process used) and shared with all appropriate school and district
departments, and with external partners including law enforcement, fire,
and emergency management.
More in-depth information in this topic area is found in the following
materials:
• FEMA-428/BIPS-07/January 2012 Edition 2—this primer focuses on
a single facility type with a very specific occupancy and vulnerability.
• FEMA P-424, Design Guide for Improving School Safety in
Earthquakes, Floods, and High Winds (2010)—addresses the protec-
tion of schools from school shooting or terrorist threats.
• BIPS 06 (Formerly FEMA 426), Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential
Terrorist Attacks against Buildings—deals with all building types and
occupancies, and terrorism.
VII. ADMINISTRATION, FINANCE, AND LOGISTICS

Administration, Finance, and Logistics
This section covers general support requirements and the availability of
services and support for all types of emergencies, as well as general poli-
cies for managing resources. Planners should address the following in this
section of the plan:
• References to mutual aid agreements.
• Authorities for and policies on augmenting staff by reassigning pub-
lic employees and soliciting volunteers, along with relevant liability
provisions.
• General policies on keeping financial records, reporting, tracking
resource needs, tracking the source and use of resources, acquiring
ownership of resources, and compensating the owners of private prop-
erty used by the jurisdiction.
If this section is expanded, it should be broken into individual functional

annexes—one for each element.
Consider adding a section covering general support requirements and the
availability of services and support for all types of emergencies, as well as
general policies for managing resources and adding items such as:
• References to Mutual Aid Agreements: Written agreements between
organizations, either public or private, for reciprocal aid and assistance
in case of disasters too great may be dealt with unassisted.
• Authorities for, and policies on augmenting staff by reassigning public
employees and soliciting volunteers, etc.
• General policies on keeping financial records, reporting, tracking
resource needs, tracking the source and use of resources, acquiring
ownership of resources, and compensating the owners of private prop-
erty used by the school.
For the purposes of potential insurance, local, state, or federal assis-

tance, or reimbursement, identify the process for which school or district
event documentation is tracked. For example, Financial Management
may issue a project number for the incident response effort, and may dis-
seminate the project number for use by all school or district departments
participating.
This project number would be utilized in conjunction with the applicable
accounting code to document all response and recovery costs associated
with any emergency or disaster requiring a substantial response effort.
VIII. PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE

Plan Development and Maintenance
This section discusses the overall approach to planning and the assignment
of plan development and maintenance responsibilities. This section should:
• Describe the planning process, participants in that process, and how
development and revision of different “levels” of the EOP (basic plan,
annexes, and SOPs/SOGs) are coordinated during the preparedness
phase.
• Assign responsibility for the overall planning and coordination to a spe-
cific position.
• Provide for a regular cycle of training, evaluating, reviewing, and
updating of the EOP.
A. Plan Development and Maintenance

The ERP integrates with school and district policy and procedures and a number of
stakeholder ERPs or guidelines. The school ERP utilizes existing program expertise
and personnel to provide prevention, protection, mitigation, preparedness, response,
and recovery efforts of post event consequences. The ERP is structured according to
the Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101, Nov 2010, while also following
the principles of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident
Command System (ICS).
Furthermore, the ERP utilizes the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation
Program (HSEEP) to addresses response, training, exercises, equipment, evaluation,
and corrective action practices.
The (add school position) shall oversee or coordinate with applicable partners the
following ERP actions:
• The ERP shall be reviewed annually and modified as necessary by (add

position/committee).
• The school ERP shall be coordinated with the District and external agen-
cies that may be affected by ERP implementation, in an effort to ensure
consistency and compatible of their jurisdictional plans.
• Substantive changes between review periods, such as changes in roles or
responsibilities, will prompt notification to listed stakeholders. Minor edits
such as grammar or spelling changes will require no notification.
• If the organization and upkeep of the ERP includes process changes such as
an ERP review, or a promulgation document designed to capture signature
acknowledgement from each partner agency named within the document,
the (add position/committee) will generate a draft document that will be
sent to the relevant partners for review and recommendations.
• After a review period and consideration of stakeholder comments, the doc-
ument will be finalized and signatures obtained.
• Final results of the reviews and any changes to the ERP shall be presented
to the (add school position) for final approval before being adopted.
• Each school unit or department identified as having a role in this ERP is
responsible for communicating the content of the ERP to their staff and
ensuring key staff has the opportunity to attend ERP training and exercise
activities.
• Ensure ERP compliance with the applicable local, State, and federal
procedures.
B. Testing, Training, and Exercise

The development of the ERP Training and Exercise Plan is a key component of
the School ability to respond to an emergency situation. It is imperative that all
school staff have a general understanding of what (add School/District name) role
will be during an event and the expected response protocol, which is structured by
NIMS while also following the HSEEP procedures. Therefore, training and exercise
opportunities will provide the required background and understanding of staff and
response volunteers.
• ERP training opportunities, as well as review of preparedness or response

support materials, shall be incorporated into the annual Training and
Exercise schedule and Workforce Development Plan.
• Each school unit or department identified as having a role in this ERP is

responsible for communicating the content of the ERP to their staff and
ensuring key staff has the opportunity to attend and participate in ERP
training and exercise activities.
• Working with response agency partners, HSEEP compliant exercises should
be held to train school and response personnel and evaluate the adequacy
of the ERP. Following HSEEP procedures, an After Action Report (AAR)
and the Improvement Plan (IP) for each exercise shall be developed and
documented appropriately.
C. Plan Contact Information
Name and Position Phone Number Alternant Phone Number

E-mail:
Department:
D. Record of Change
Change Number Date of Change Description of Change Made By
E. Record of Distribution
Date Version Name and Title Department/Agency
IX. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES

Authorities and References
This section provides the legal basis for emergency operations and activi-
ties. This section of the plan includes:
Lists of laws, statutes, ordinances, executive orders, regulations, and formal
agreements relevant to emergencies (e.g., MAAs)
Specification of the extent and limits of the emergency authorities granted
to the senior official, including the conditions under which these authorities
become effective and when they would be terminated
Pre-delegation of emergency authorities (i.e., enabling measures sufficient
to ensure that specific emergency-related authorities can be exercised by the
elected or appointed leadership or their designated successors)
Provisions for COOP and COG (e.g., the succession of decision-making
authority and operational control) to ensure that critical emergency func-
tions can be performed
Procedures within this document apply to (add School/District name). The
organizational and operational concepts set forth in these procedures are
promulgated under the following:
LOCAL
(Insert any applicable local citations)
STATE
State Revised Statutes
FEDERAL
• Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act, PL 100-707
• Emergency Management and Assistance, Code of Federal
Regulations, Title 44
• Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, PL
99-499 (Title III, “Emergency Planning and Community Right-
to-Know Act of 1986”)
• Comprehensive Environment Response Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980, PL 96510 (CERCLA or “Superfund”)
• County Health Department Security and Bioterrorism Prepared
ness and Response Act (42 CFR Part 73)
• Homeland Security Act of 2002 (CIKR, Intro-2, CPG 101)
• Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 3, 5 and 8:
• National Response Framework
• National Incident Management Systems (NIMS)
• Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Rule
1910.120
X. DEFINITIONS
1. Common Terminology: Using common terminology helps to define orga-
nizational functions, incident facilities, resource descriptions, and position
titles.
2. Demographic profile: Marketers typically combine several variables to
define a demographic profile. A demographic profile (often shortened to “a
demographic”) provides enough information about the typical member of
this group to create a mental picture of this hypothetical aggregate.
3. Disaster Recovery Center (DRC). The Disaster Recovery Center is estab-
lished by FEMA in partnership with state and local emergency management
offices. Representatives from federal, state, local, and volunteer agencies
are there to explain the assistance available and to assist victims in procur-
ing it.
4. Emergency Alert System (EAS). A network of broadcast stations and
interconnecting facilities which have been authorized by the Federal
Communications Commission to operate in a controlled manner during
a war, state of public peril or disaster, or other national emergency—as
provided by the emergency broadcast system plan. Supersedes EBS
(Emergency Broadcast System).
5. Emergency Management (EM). A framework for organizing and managing
emergency protection efforts. Prevention, protection, mitigation, prepared-
ness, response, and recovery—in the all-hazards approach.
6. Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Specially equipped facilities from

which government officials exercise direction and control and coordinate
necessary resources in an emergency.
7. Emergency Public Information (EPI). Information that is disseminated to the
public via the news media before, during, and/or after an emergency or disaster.
8. Emergency Response Plan (ERP). Contains policies and procedures to fol-
low before, during and after an emergency. The ERP integrates emergency
preparedness activities into one document. It is the focal point for School
planning and preparedness procedures.
9. Emergency Situation. As used in this plan, this term is intended to describe a
range of situations, from an incident to a major disaster. It includes the following:
• Incident. An incident is a situation that is limited in scope and potential
effects.
• Emergency. An emergency is a situation that is larger in scope and more
severe in terms of actual or potential effects than an incident.
• Disaster. A disaster involves the occurrence or threat of significant
casualties and/or widespread property damage that is beyond the capa-
bility of the local government to handle with available local resources.
10. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The federal agency
charged with development of an integrated emergency management system
and with supporting emergency management and disaster assistance efforts
at all levels of government. See: http://www.fema.gov.
11. Hazard: Something that is potentially dangerous or harmful, often the root
cause of an unwanted outcome.
• Human-Caused Hazard: A hazard that arises from deliberate, inten-
tional human actions to threaten or harm the well-being of others.
Examples include school violence, terrorist acts, or sabotage.
• Natural Hazard: A hazard related to weather patterns and/or physical
characteristics of an area. Often natural hazards occur repeatedly in the
same geographical locations.
• Technological Hazard: A hazard originating from technological or
industrial accidents, infrastructure failures, or certain human activities.
These hazards may cause loss of life or injury, property damage, social
and economic disruption, or environmental degradation, and often
come with little to no warning.
12. Hazardous Material (HAZMAT). A substance in a quantity or form posing
an unreasonable risk to health, safety and/or property when manufactured,
stored or transported. The substance, by its nature, containment and reactiv-
ity, has the capability for inflicting harm during an accidental occurrence. It
may be toxic, corrosive, flammable, reactive, an irritant, a strong sensitizer
and poses a threat to health and the environment when improperly man-
aged. Included are toxic substances, certain infectious agents, radiological
materials and other related materials such as oil or other petroleum prod-
ucts, and industrial solid waste substances.
13. Incident Commander (IC). The person responsible for the management of
all incident operations. The IC is in charge of the incident site.
14. Incident Command Post (ICP). The location from which the Incident
Commander oversees all incident operations. The ICP may be located outside,
in a vehicle, trailer, or tent, or within a building. The ICP will be positioned at a
safe distance from an accident site where the incident commander, responders
and technical representatives can make response decisions, deploy man power
and equipment, maintain liaison with the media and handle communications.
15. Incident Command System (ICS). The combination of facilities, equip-
ment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating with a com-
mon organizational structure, with responsibility for the management of
assigned resources to effectively accomplish stated objectives pertaining to
an incident and/or event.
16. Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) establishes guidance and proce-
dures to ensure the resumption of essential functions in the event that an
emergency or disruption incapacitates operations and/or requires the relo-
cation of selected personnel and functions. (See Annex A COOP.)
17. Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC). A group of representa-
tives of government and private industry who coordinate response plans for
emergency conditions.
18. Lockdown. A procedure of locking classroom doors, covering windows,
moving all persons away from windows and doors during a situation involv-
ing dangerous intruders, or other incidents that may result in harm to per-
sons inside the school building.
19. Liaison Officer. A member of the command staff responsible for interacting
with representatives from cooperating and assisting agencies.
20. Logistics Section. The section responsible for providing facilities, services,
and materials for the incident.
21. Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS). Document containing specific infor-
mation on the safe handling of chemicals in the workplace.
22. National Weather Service (NWS). To provide weather and flood warnings,
public forecasts and advisories for all of the United States, its territories,
adjacent waters and ocean areas, primarily for the protection of life and
property. NWS data and products are provided to private meteorologists for
the provision of all specialized services. See: http://www.nws.noaa.gov.
23. NIMS provides a consistent framework for incident management at all
jurisdictional levels regardless of the cause, size, or complexity of the inci-
dent. NIMS is not an operational incident management or resource allo-
cation plan. NIMS represents a core set of doctrine, concepts, principles,
terminology, and organizational processes that enables effective, efficient,
and collaborative incident management.
24. Public Information Officer (PIO). A member of the command staff respon-
sible for interfacing with the media or other appropriate agencies requiring
information directly from the incident.
25. Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES). A radio communica-
tion service conducted by volunteer licensed amateur radio operators, for
providing emergency radio communications to local, regional, or state
emergency management organizations. FCC 97.163(a).
26. Resources List. A current list of all resources (equipment, personnel, sup-
plies), which can be used by emergency services in response to local disaster/
emergencies.
27. Shelter-In-Place. A procedure addressing the need to provide refuge for
students, staff and visitors within the school building during an emergency.
28. Staging Area (SA). A pre-selected location having large parking areas and
cover for equipment, vehicle operators, and other personnel such as a major
shopping area, schools, etc. The SA provides a base for coordinated emer-
gency operations, assembly of persons to be moved by public transportation
to reception jurisdictions, a rally point for mutual aid, or a debarking area
for returning evacuees.
29. Transfer of Command: The process of moving the responsibility for inci-
dent command from one Incident Commander to another is called “transfer
of command.” It should be recognized that transition of command on an
expanding incident is to be expected. It does not reflect on the competency
of the current Incident Commander.
30. Unified Command. In ICS, Unified Command is a unified team effort that
allows all agencies with responsibility for the incident, either geographi-
cal or functional, to manage an incident by establishing a common set of
incident objectives and strategies. This is accomplished without losing or
abdicating agency authority, responsibility, or accountability. The opera-
tions section chief is responsible for implementing the incident action plan.
31. Unity of Command and Chain of Command: Chain of command refers to
the orderly line of authority within the ranks of the incident management
organization. Unity of command means that every individual has a desig-
nated supervisor to whom he or she reports at the scene of the incident.
These principles clarify reporting relationships and eliminate the con-
fusion caused by multiple, conflicting directives. Incident managers at
all levels must be able to control the actions of all personnel under their
supervision.
32. Unified Command: In incidents involving multiple jurisdictions, a single
jurisdiction with multiagency involvement, or multiple jurisdictions with
multiagency involvement, Unified Command allows agencies with different
legal, geographic, and functional authorities and responsibilities to work
together effectively without affecting individual agency authority, responsi-
bility, or accountability.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN TEMPLATE

ATTACHMENT—1
INFORMATION COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND DISSEMINATION
1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
2. INFORMATION SHEET (Click Link to Open)
3. WORKSHEET (Click Link to Open)
1. Background Information
The goal of the Information Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination section is to
gather critical information to enhance life safety, in addition to the physical resis-
tance of our school and district to man-made and natural hazards.
Furthermore, we hope to achieve integrated infrastructure protection and disaster
management, and at the same time meet the needs of the students, staff, administra-
tion, and public.
Protecting a school building and grounds from physical attack is a significant
challenge because the design, construction, renovation, operation, and maintenance
of a facility must consider numerous building users, infrastructure systems, and
building design codes and in collecting, analyzing and disseminating this informa-
tion we hope to assist you in capturing critical information that will assist school or
district staff, and first responders when responding to and recovering from an emer-
gency or disaster occurring on school property.
Schools are an integral part of every community in the United States. As of fall
2010, approximately 75.9 million people were projected as enrolled in public and
private schools at all levels including elementary, secondary, and postsecondary
degree-granting. In addition, the number of professional, administrative, and sup-
port staff employed in educational institutions was projected at 5.4 million (U.S.
Department of Education 2010).
Additionally, schools serve as resources for their communities. Many schools are
used as shelters, command centers, or meeting places in times of crisis. Schools are
also used widely for polling and voting functions. In some communities, schools
are places of health care delivery. Consequently, ensuring the safety of students, fac-
ulty, and staff in our schools, as well as the safety of the school buildings themselves,
is critically important.
Schools may or may not be the targets, but could be indirectly threatened by col-
lateral damage from an event occurring at nearby facilities.
Protecting a school against terrorist attack or active shooter is a challenging task.
A school may have considerable vulnerabilities, because of its well-defined periods
of use, designated access points, storage of sensitive personal information, minimal
security forces, and numerous avenues of penetration and escape for attackers.
More in-depth information on this topic may found in the following materials:
• FEMA-428/BIPS-07/January 2012 Edition 2, this primer focuses on a sin-

gle facility type with a very specific occupancy and vulnerability.
• FEMA P-424, Design Guide for Improving School Safety in Earthquakes,
Floods, and High Winds (2010). In dealing with the protection of schools
from school shooting or terrorist threats.
• BIPS 06 (Formerly FEMA 426), Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential
Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings. BIPS 06 deals with all building types
and occupancies.
17 State or Local Emergency
Response Plan Template
The Basic Plan needs to be developed in coordination with other state agencies,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private sector partners (PSPs) and con-
tinues to align with the National Incident Management System (NIMS), as well as
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Response Framework (NRF)
and the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF). In addition, the Basic Plan
and its appendices, Emergency Support Function (ESF) Annexes, and Support and
Hazard Specific Annexes should incorporate lessons learned from exercises, train-
ing, incidents, and events.
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

The strategies and objectives of the emergency management program are established
in several plans, including the following:
• Secure Strategic Plan sets the overall course and direction of Preparedness,
including the emergency management program, by defining its vision, mis-
sion, goals, and objectives.
• Emergency Operations Plan supports and includes annexes and is an all-
discipline, all-hazards plan that establishes a single, comprehensive frame-
work for the management of statewide events.
• The Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resiliency Strategic Plan sup-
ports the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) by establishing
a coordinated approach to national priorities, goals, and requirements for
critical infrastructure and key resource protection.
• The strategic plan requires the development of sector-specific plans (SSPs)
to provide the means by which the NIPP is implemented across all critical
infrastructure and key resources sectors.
• The Hazard Mitigation Plan identifies hazards and analyzes the risk and
potential impacts. The plan focuses on reducing the long-term vulnerability
to identified hazards by establishing interim and long-term goals, objec-
tives, and actions.
• The Recovery and Mitigation Standard Operating Guide describes the
framework and associated actions to be taken in the establishment, opera-
tions, and demobilization of a joint field office and area coordinating offi-
cers, to deliver disaster assistance and support throughout all phases of
recovery in a timely and effective manner.
281
• The Plan for the Public Assistance Grant Program identifies the roles,
responsibilities, processes, and procedures for administering the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Public Assistance program.
• Other hazard-specific plans developed by individual agencies to address
specific incidents or pursuant to federal guidance.
• Agency strategic plans that focus on prioritized actions, including the func-
tions of each agency, which are critical to the emergency response and
recovery operations.
• Agency continuity plans that address an agency’s ability to continue to
provide essential government functions in the event of a disruption. Plans
include orders of succession, delegations of authority, and essential records,
systems, and equipment. They also address the procedures for restoring
essential government functions, including those that are critical to emer-
gency response and recovery operations.
COMPONENTS OF THE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN

The Basic Plan uses an all-hazards approach to incident management. It describes
the concepts and structures of response and recovery operations, identifies agencies
and coordinating NGOs and PSPs with lead and support emergency management
functions, and defines emergency preparedness, response, recovery, and mitiga-
tion responsibilities of local governments. There are 17 ESF Annexes, 5 Support
Annexes, and 7 Hazard-Specific Annexes to the Basic Plan.
ESF Annexes provide the structure for state coordinated emergency operations
in support of affected local governments, individuals, and businesses. The annexes
identify lead and supporting agencies, NGOs, and PSPs and explain in general
terms how the local government will organize and implement support functions.
Agencies, NGOs, or PSPs are assigned to lead or support the ESFs based on authori-
ties, resources, and capabilities.
Support Annexes address those functions that may be applicable to every type
of incident and provide support for all ESFs. They describe the framework through
which state agencies, NGOs, and PSPs coordinate and execute the common func-
tional processes and administrative requirements necessary to ensure efficient and
effective incident management.
Hazard-Specific Annexes address contingency or hazard situations requiring
specialized response and recovery procedures. They describe policies, situations,
concepts of operations and responsibilities pertinent to incidents such as radio-
logical emergencies, hurricanes, public health threats like pandemic influenza,
terrorism incidents, technological hazards, and large-scale hazardous-materials
incidents.
State or Local Emergency Response Plan Template 283
COMPONENT RESPONSE DIAGRAM
Hazard
specific annexes
Support annexes
Emergency support function

annexes
Basic plan
FIGURE 17.1 Plan flow from basic to complex.
The diagram in Figure 17.1 demonstrates the process in which the four components
of the operation plan are activated. The Basic Plan, forming the foundation, is always
activated during an incident.
As the state’s response grows, select ESF annexes are called upon to support
specific missions. Support annexes may then be implemented to supplement actions
carried out under the Basic Plan and ESFs. Located at the top of the pyramid are
Hazard-Specific Annexes, which play an important role during the state’s response
to particular incidents. These comprehensive, incident-specific documents address
enhanced response actions not identified in the Basic Plan and underlying ESFs.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD i
PREFACE ii
Basic Plan
I. INTRODUCTION 1
A. Purpose 1
B. Scope and Applicability 1
C. Situation and Planning Assumptions 2

D. Policies 4
II. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT 5
III. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 5
IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 7
A. Notification 8
B. Alert and Warning 9
C. Activation of the EOC/Emergency Respinse Team (ERT) 9
D. Response Actions 9
E. Assess Damage and Analyze Impact 10
F. Request for Federal Assistance Under the Stafford Act 11
G. Recovery Actions 11
H. Mitigation Actions 13
V. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 13
A. State Government—Governor of the State 13
B. Local Government 16
C. Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) 17
D. Private Sector Partners (PSPs) 17
VI. PLAN MANAGEMENT AND MAINTENANCE 18
A. Coordination 18
B. EOP Maintenance 19
C. Standards for other Emergency Plans 20
D. Plan Testing, Training, and Exercises 20
E. Plan Implementation 20
VII. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES 21
Appendices to the Basic Plan
A. Key Terms & Definitions
B. Acronyms
C. Authorities & References
D. Disaster Declarations
E. VERT Matrix
F. Governor’s Executive Order Promulgating the COVEOP
G. Record of Changes
Emergency Support Function Annexes
1. Transportation
2. Communications
3. Public Works & Engineering
4. Firefighting
5. Emergency Management
6. Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, & Human Services
7. Logistics Management & Resource Support
8. Public Health & Medical Services
9. Search & Rescue
10. Oil & Hazardous Materials Response
11. Agriculture & Natural Resources
12. Energy
13. Public Safety & Security

14. Recovery & Mitigation
15. External Affairs
16. Military Affairs
17. Volunteer & Donations Management
Support Annexes
1. Continuity of Government
2. Recovery Programs
3. Finance & Administration
4. Mass Care & Sheltering
5. Evacuation & Re-entry
Hazard Specific Annexes
1. Radiological Emergency Response
2. Terrorism Consequence Management (restricted)
3. Hurricane & Tropical Storm Response
4. Pandemic Influenza Response
5. Hazardous Materials Response
6. Technological Hazards Response (restricted)
7. Earthquake Response
I. INTRODUCTION
The plan provides the coordinating structures, processes, and mechanisms in a col-
lective framework for the coordination of state support to affected local govern-
ments, individuals, and businesses. It is compatible with the NRF and NDRF, and
provides the structure for coordinating with the federal government in the delivery
of federal disaster assistance. The plan supports the emergency management mission
of the Commonwealth by improving the capability to respond to and recover from
natural and human-caused disasters.
A. Purpose
The Basic Plan is the foundation of the local/state’s emergency response and recov-
ery organization. This plan identifies the role of state government and coordinating
NGOs and PSPs before, during, and after a disaster, large-scale emergency, or event
affecting the local government. It establishes the concepts and policies under which
all elements of state government and coordinating NGOs and PSPs will operate dur-
ing emergencies. It also provides the framework within which more detailed emer-
gency plans or procedures can be developed and maintained by state agencies, local
governments, NGOs, and PSPs.
To ensure the local government capability to implement this plan, each agency
tasked with essential emergency management responsibilities shall develop and
maintain response plans in support of the plan. In addition, executive branch agen-
cies and institutions of higher education are required to develop and maintain an all
hazards continuity plan that identifies the critical and time-sensitive functions, appli-
cations, and processes of the agency to be recovered and continued in an emergency
or disaster, including alternate operating capabilities. Agency functions critical to

the state emergency response and recovery operations shall have restoration priority.
Top priorities for incident management are to:
• Lives and protect the health and safety of the public, responders, and recov-
ery workers.
• Protect property and mitigate damages and impacts to individuals, com-
munities, and the environment.
• Protect and restore critical infrastructure and key resources. Facilitate
recovery of individuals, businesses, communities, governments, and the
environment.
• Manage public expectations regarding response and recovery activities.
B. Scope and Applicability

The plan covers the full range of complex and constantly changing requirements in
anticipation of or in response to threats or acts of terrorism, major disasters, other
emergencies, and events within or affecting the local government.
The plan establishes interagency, multi-jurisdictional, and public/private mecha-
nisms for state agency involvement in domestic incident management operations.
These mechanisms include coordinating structures and processes for incidents
requiring:
• Local-to-local support through Statewide Mutual Aid (SMA).

• State support to cities, counties, and the towns.
• State-to-state support through Emergency Management Assistance
Compact (EMAC) agreements or other appropriate instruments.
• Public and private sector incident management integration.
This plan is applicable to all agencies of the local government, and coordinating
NGOs and PSPs that may be requested to provide assistance or conduct operations in
response to an incident or event. Depending on the severity of the incident or event,
the governor may declare an emergency or determine that state emergency manage-
ment coordination is required in order to protect or save lives, prevent or minimize
property or environmental impacts, or otherwise assist affected areas. Moreover,
this plan also provides the foundation for the organization and coordination of com-
munity recovery and mitigation activities.
C. Situation and Planning Assumptions

This plan was developed with the following assumptions:
1. Local/State agencies assigned responsibilities in the plan have developed

and will maintain the necessary plans, standard operating procedures,
mutual aid agreements, and model contracts to successfully accomplish
their tasks.
2. Local/State agencies are prepared to fulfill responsibilities assigned to them

in the plan, supporting plans, and joint operational or regional plans.
3. Local/State agencies’ capabilities to carry out response and recovery tasks
are enhanced through the development, maintenance, and testing of agency
continuity plans.
4. Coordinating NGOs and PSPs have internal plans or procedures specific to
their assigned roles and responsibilities outlined in the plan.
5. Incidents, including large scale emergencies or events, require full coordi-
nation of operations and resources, and may:
• Occur at any time with little or no warning.
• Require significant information sharing across multiple jurisdictions
and between the public and private sectors.
• Involve single or multiple jurisdictions and/or geographic areas.
• Have significant statewide and/or national impact and/or require sig-
nificant inter-governmental coordination.
• Involve multiple, highly varied hazards or threats on a local, regional,
statewide or national scale.
• Result in mass casualties; displaced persons; property loss; environ-
mental damage; and disruption of the economy and normal life sup-
port systems, essential public services, and basic infrastructure. These
effects may be minimized by the proactive notification and deployment
of state resources in anticipation of or in response to major incidents in
coordination and collaboration with local, private and federal entities.
• Require resources to assist individuals with access and functional
needs.
• Impact critical infrastructures across sectors.
• Exceed the capabilities of state agencies, local governments, NGOs, and
PSPs (to include private sector infrastructure owners and operators).
• Attract a sizeable influx of public, private, and voluntary resources,
including independent and spontaneous volunteers.
• Require short-notice state asset coordination and response.
• Require prolonged, sustained incident management operations and sup-
port activities for long-term community recovery and mitigation.
6. The factors influencing the need for federal involvement in response and
recovery may include, but are not limited to:
Severity and magnitude of the incident.
• State or local needs exceeding available resources. Incident type or loca-
tion. The need to protect the public health, welfare, or the environment.
• The economic ability of the state and/or the affected localities to
recover from the incident.
7. The combined expertise and capabilities of government at all levels, PSPs,
and NGOs will be required to prepare for, respond to, mitigate, and recover
from incidents of major or catastrophic proportions.
8. Localities have a plan as part of an emergency management program that
reflects current doctrine and protocol, and includes provisions for the needs
and requirements of the population, such as children, individuals with
disabilities or access and functional needs, service animals, and house-

hold pets.
9. The negative effects on residents and its economy from natural disasters
such as hurricanes, floods, winter storms, earthquakes, and wildfires may
increase due to increased urban development in vulnerable areas, industrial
expansion, traffic congestion and widespread use and transport of hazard-
ous materials. These factors may also increase the risk of human-caused
emergencies such as hazardous materials accidents, gas pipeline accidents,
power failures, resource shortages and environmental contamination. In
addition, depending on the proximity to any federal facilities located
throughout area increase the potential for terrorism related incidents.
D. Policies
1. The Emergency Services and Disaster Laws require the state, and each city,
county, and certain towns to establish an emergency management organiza-
tion, and develop and maintain a current EOP structured around the exist-
ing constitutional government.
2. Incidents are typically managed at the lowest possible geographic, organi-
zational, and jurisdictional level. As such, direction of emergency opera-
tions will be exercised by the level of affected local government closest to
the incident. If an incident is determined to have a terrorism nexus, appro-
priate federal agencies will likely assume direction and control of the inves-
tigation, in coordination with state and local authorities.
3. Coordination of emergency response will be accomplished within the
Incident Command System, allowing for the incorporation of local, state,
and federal agencies, and other responsible parties.
4. The provision of state assistance and the deployment of resources for emer-
gency response are dependent upon the receipt of prompt and accurate situ-
ational information from local officials. Local requests for assistance and/
or situation reports will be submitted utilizing WebEOC. If WebEOC is
unavailable, information may be transmitted via other means, such as fax,
email, telephone, or radio.
5. The Governor may issue an Executive Order declaring that a “state of emer-
gency” exists in all or a portion of the state.
6. All Executive Branch agencies (including state institutions of higher educa-
tion) are resources of the Governor, and therefore may be activated to sup-
port the emergency response plan during response or recovery activities.
7. Requests for assistance from entities including, but not necessarily limited
to, nursing homes, colleges and universities, and authorities will be submit-
ted to the local Emergency Management Coordinator in the jurisdiction in
which the entity resides.
Requests for assistance will be submitted to the local Emergency
Management Coordinator or their designee when local capabilities are
exceeded.
8. Emergency response and recovery activities will be initiated and conducted

using the principles contained in NIMS.
9. Assistance from state agencies will be coordinated by the state EOC.
10. Resources furnished to local governments from state agencies, NGOs, and
PSPs will be assigned on a mission-type basis to the appropriate ESF and
will be under the operational control of the agency, or organization furnish-
ing the resources. These resources will be furnished as soon as reasonably
possible.
11. If the need for resources exceeds the capabilities of localities and the
state, the Governor may request federal assistance. The Governor may
request the President declare an emergency or major disaster, and may
request assistance for individuals, public entities, state agencies, and local
governments.
12. During incidents for which the President has declared an emergency or
major disaster, federal support is delivered in accordance with relevant pro-
visions of the Robert T. Stafford Act, as well as other available disaster
assistance programs in coordination with the appropriate agencies of the
state.
II. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT

Preparedness, response, recovery, prevention, and mitigation strategies are largely
based on analyses of natural and human-caused hazards with a history of or potential
for impacts. The Hazard Mitigation Plan identifies and assesses risk to both natural
and human-caused hazards. The hazards are categorized based on their character-
istics: natural, technological, hazardous materials, and human-caused. In addition,
a threat hazard identification and risk assessment (THIRA) has been completed for
the Commonwealth, which addresses capability gaps for specific high consequence
hazards. The plan is designed to address all hazards identified.
III. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
The state provides that emergency management organizations and operations will be
structured around existing constitutional government. The Director of Emergency
Management for the state appoints a Coordinator of Emergency Management
(State Coordinator). The State Coordinator appoints the managers and coordinates
response activities. The State Coordinator also appoints the Director of Recovery and
Mitigation, who coordinates state recovery activities for a disaster that is declared
by the President as authorized by the Stafford Act. For a presidentially declared
disaster, the State Coordinator is usually designated the State Coordinating Officer
by the Governor.
The planning and coordination of state, local, and federal entities to accomplish
productive and timely recovery efforts. All agencies, NGOs, and PSPs will coordi-
nate with state coordinator to develop and maintain their designated part(s) of the
plan.
The organization for state level emergency operations includes:
The Governor and his immediate staff.

• State resources coordinated by emergency manager during routine
operations and by agencies during augmentations. Prior to a declara-
tion, the Governor (with or without the recommendation of the State
Coordinator), may issue a deployment authorization of National Guard
and/or Defense Force personnel. The State Coordinator will be noti-
fied of authorization approvals, including any limitations other than
those specified in code, either directly from the Governor or through
the Secretary of Public Safety and Homeland Security.
• State agencies assigned emergency responsibilities in the plan. This
plan identifies ESFs and designates responsibilities to lead and support
agencies for each function.
• Coordinating NGOs designated in the plan and/or affiliated with ESFs.
Some NGOs enter into agreements with the state to perform specific
disaster functions.
• PSPs designated in the plan and/or working with the lead state agency
for each ESF. Additional PSPs may be incorporated into the state
response as deemed necessary by the state Coordinator.
• Recovery activities coordinated by state emergency manager for the
short and interim phases and by the Economic Crisis Strike Force
(ECSF) for interim and long-term phases is to respond as needed to
economic disasters in the local communities by assisting localities in
developing short and long-term strategies to address the crisis and pro-
vide a single point of contact for citizens in affected communities. This
Strike Force is led by the Secretary of Commerce and Trade, in coordi-
nation with other Secretariats as appropriate.
• Local governments: Each city and county, as well as certain towns, are
required to have an emergency management organization as defined in the
state code. Locally available manpower, materials, equipment, and facili-
ties should be identified in each local EOP. Localities not affected may
be asked to provide assistance through the mutual agreements Program.
• Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and VDEM coordi-
nate the delivery of disaster assistance from a Joint Field Office (JFO).
The state organization for recovery and mitigation parallels the federal
organization at the JFO to ensure the effective interface and coordina-
tion from both a functional and programmatic perspective. The recov-
ery framework is structured to be flexible and scalable to quickly adapt
to any disaster situation.
• Other Federal agencies when requested and within their statutory
authority.
IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
This section describes the state emergency management coordinating structures,
processes, and protocols employed for incident management. These coordinating
structures and processes are designed to enable execution of the responsibilities
of the Governor through the appropriate state agencies. It integrates federal, state,
local, NGOs and PSPs efforts into a comprehensive statewide approach to incident
management.
The state plan and local emergency operations plans are founded upon the
concept that emergency operations begin at the jurisdiction level closest to the
event, and are managed by local police, fire, emergency medical and health,
emergency management, and other response personnel. In the vast majority of
disasters, local resources will operate under the umbrella of a mutual aid agree-
ment or compact to provide the first line of emergency response and incident
management support. In some instances, a state or federal agency with princi-
pal activities or facilities in a local area may act as a first responder and may
provide direction or assistance consistent with its specific statutory authorities
and responsibilities. State assistance will be provided upon request when needs
exceed local capabilities.
Situations in which several localities are threatened or affected concurrently may
involve the state from the onset. If the state capabilities are exceeded, the Governor
may request federal assistance. At each level, the government should officially
declare a ‘state of emergency’ to exist in order to request assistance. A local emer-
gency declaration indicates that local resources capable of handling the situation
are fully committed before state assistance is requested. Likewise, state resources
should be fully committed before federal assistance is requested. Exceptions are
made to these procedures when localities request state assistance with search and
rescue or hazardous materials response.
The EOC has four operational levels:
1. Routine Operations: Emergency Operations plans and procedures are devel-

oped and maintained. Training and exercises are conducted periodically as
required to maintain readiness.
2. Increased Readiness: When a disaster threatens, all agencies, and coordi-
nating NGOs, and PSPs assigned responsibilities in the COVEOP will take
action as called for in their respective parts of the plan.
3. Response Operations: Full-scale operations and a total commitment of
manpower and resources are required to mobilize and respond in time of
emergency.
4. Recovery Operations: Essential facilities and services are restored.
Displaced persons return to their homes. Federal disaster assistance pro-
grams are implemented. Severely damaged structures are rebuilt, or demol-
ished and replaced.
Damaged transportation, water, and communication infrastructure are replaced.

Normal conditions and the economy are restored. The duration of this period may
extend for two or more years, depending upon the severity of the disaster.
The operational levels are used for all emergencies and are not related to the emer-
gency classification levels for fixed nuclear facilities referenced in the Radiological
Emergency Response Annex of the COVEOP, or the Readiness Condition Action
Guidelines referenced in the Hurricane and Tropical Storm Response Annex of the
plan.
In time of emergency:
• Provides centralized state government emergency operations in order to

coordinate the delivery of resources to local governments.
• Provides advice and counsel to the Governor or the Governor’s designee to
formulate policy.
• Establishes priorities.
• Collects, analyzes, and disseminates situational awareness information.
• Provides sufficient staff to maintain communications with the federal, state,
local, and private sector partners related to conditions or developing situa-
tions related to the emergency.
Incident Management Actions

Incident management begins with identification of a risk, threat, or actual event,
and concludes when those affected have been restored to pre-incident conditions,
when feasible. Actions may include, but are not limited to, notification and warning,
activation of the response actions, assessment of impact, request for federal assis-
tance, and recovery and mitigation activities.
A. Notification
State agencies, local governments, NGOs, and PSPs report threats, incidents, and
potential incidents using established communications and reporting channels.
The Fusion Center receive threat and operational information regarding incidents
or potential incidents, and then makes an initial determination to implement Federal
information sharing and incident management protocols.
B. Alert and Warning

Public notifications shall be disseminated through multiple means that may include:
• Public Announcements
• Social Media
• Watches and Warnings
• Emergency Alert System (EAS)
• Other Emergency Bulletins
C. Activation of the EOC/Emergency Response Team (ERT)

The EOC receives notification of conditions, events, and/or occurrences that may
affect the state, reports of incidents or hazardous conditions existing within the state,
and requests for assistance from local governments.
In support of the EOC’s mission, is to maintain an Incident Management Cadre
(IMC) to assist the State Coordinator in determining the requirement to augment
the ERT. The IMC consists of the VERT Coordinator, the Staff Duty Officer,
Operations Chief, Plans Section Chief, Logistics Chief, Finance and Administration
Chief, Recovery Chief, External Affairs Chief, Search and Rescue Duty Officer, and
Communications Maintenance Officer. Subject matter experts may be requested to
participate as needed.
The ERT Coordinator will, based on information provided from the IMC, brief
the State Coordinator and/or his or her designee(s) of the recommended operational
course of action.
The ERT Coordinator, in consultation with the State Coordinator, Deputy State
Coordinator, and/or his or her designee, will initiate notification of the appropriate
VERT Staff and necessary state agency, NGO, and PSP points of contact of an aug-
mentation and request representatives to support the ERT.
Based on an analysis of the information received, the State Coordinator may rec-
ommend to the Governor that he/she declare a state of emergency, so that all neces-
sary state resources can be immediately prepared or deployed to affected areas.
D. Response Actions
At the request of local governments, the ERT directs state response activities that
address the short-term direct effects of an incident. These activities include immedi-
ate actions to preserve life, property, and the environment, meet basic human needs,
and maintain the social, economic, and political structure of the affected community.
As part of an effective response, the ERT must continuously refine its ability to
assess the situation as an incident unfolds and rapidly provide accurate and accessi-
ble information to decision makers. This is accomplished by maintaining situational
awareness and a common operating picture through receipt of prompt and accurate
information from affected localities using established reporting mechanisms.
Response actions may include the following resources and/or elements:
• Law enforcement
• Fire and emergency medical services
• Evacuation and transportation management
• Emergency public information or other actions taken to minimize addi-
tional damage
• Urban search and rescue services
• Deployment of advance teams to assess the severity of impact and expedite
the delivery of state resources
• Establishment of mass care facilities, including shelters and feeding operations
• Establishment of a Family Assistance Center

• Provision of public health and medical services, food, water, and other
emergency essentials
• Debris clearance and/or the emergency restoration of critical infrastructure
• Control, containment, and removal of environmental contamination
E. Assess Damage and Analyze Impact

An assessment of the damages and impacts of an incident begins at the local level.
Local officials and state agency representatives are required to submit situation
reports to the EOC throughout the course of the incident, and to send an Initial
Damage Assessment (IDA) to the EOC within seventy-two (72) hours after the impact
of the event.
The time frame may be adjusted by the ERT depending on the type of incident
and/or circumstances. It is critical that the information provided in the IDA accu-
rately reflect the damages and impacts sustained by the community, as the decision
to request a Preliminary Damage Assessment and seek a Presidential disaster decla-
ration is made based on this information.
As the situation changes and new information becomes available, local officials
and state agency representatives will update the VERT as soon as reasonably possible.
IDAs should be submitted to the EOC through WebEOC or on the standard forms
provided by EM. ERT staff summarizes damage assessments from all sources and
evaluates the impact of the incident on localities and the state. These assessments are
used by the ERT to determine if state resources are sufficient to manage the incident.
Depending on the findings from the Initial Damage Assessment submitted by
localities and state agencies, the State Coordinator may request FEMA conduct a
joint Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA) in coordination with affected locali-
ties or state agencies, to verify the damages and estimate the amount of supplemental
assistance needed. ESF #14 will work with FEMA and other ESFs as appropriate,
to coordinate joint PDAs. Joint PDAs focus on the more significantly affected areas
identified on the Initial Damage Assessments submitted that may be eligible for federal
assistance under the Robert T. Stafford Act, as amended (e.g., Individual Assistance,
Public Assistance and Hazard Mitigation), or the Small Business Administration
(SBA) Disaster Loan Program. State and federal personnel knowledgeable in these
programs will accompany local or state officials to the damaged sites.
F. Request for Federal Assistance under the Stafford Act

The State Coordinator will report the findings of the PDAs to the Governor and make
a recommendation regarding a request for federal assistance. Based on findings, the
Governor will then send a letter to the President requesting a declaration of emer-
gency or major disaster for specific localities in the states for Individual Assistance,
Public Assistance, Hazard Mitigation Assistance, or all three.
When a large-scale disaster is imminent, it might be obvious that the scope of the
event justifies federal assistance. For an expedited declaration, the Governor relies on
forecasted or visual impact rather than damages verified through the PDA process.
When a Governor’s request for a federal declaration is approved, the declara-

tion will specify the federal assistance programs that will be made available to the
state, as well as the jurisdictions included in the action. A Public Assistance Disaster
Declaration provides the basis for financial and other forms of aid to state and local
governments, and non-profit organizations for debris removal, implementation of
protective measures, and damages sustained to critical infrastructure.
An Individual Assistance Disaster Declaration provides the basis for financial
and other forms of aid to private citizens and, to a more limited extent, to busi-
nesses. When a disaster event does not meet the criteria for a Stafford Act Individual
Assistance Disaster Declaration, it may meet the criteria for a Small Business
Disaster Declaration. If requested and approved, hazard mitigation assistance may
be available through the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.
This program is based on 15% of the total federal assistance received through the
Individual Assistance and/or Public Assistance programs. The Governor can request
a SBA declaration if the findings of the SBA damage assessment process fulfills
the criteria for a declaration. Other federal disaster assistance declarations can be
requested independently including the U.S. Department of Agriculture and DHS/
FEMA Fire Management Assistance.
G. Recovery Actions
Recovery involves actions needed to assist individuals and communities in returning
to pre-incident conditions when feasible, as well as mitigating the potential impacts
of future events. The state joins with federal agencies to establish a JFO that serves
as the central coordination point among federal, state, local and voluntary organiza-
tions for delivering recovery assistance programs. ESF #14 and the ECSF will be
the organizational framework used to plan, implement, and coordinate the incident
specific short, interim, and long-term components of recovery. The ECSF will focus
primarily on the long-term phase and be organized in the context of the Recovery
Support Functions described in NDRF.
Recovery actions typically include direct financial assistance to eligible individu-
als who have lost residential dwellings or personal property, the coordination and
execution of service and site restoration plans, and the reconstitution of state and
local government operations and services through private sector, non-governmental,
and public assistance programs.
The Hazard Mitigation Grant Program is a component of the Public Assistance
Program, and is also implemented statewide, based on a strategy designed to miti-
gate future damage throughout the state.
Short-Term Recovery
The short-term component of the recovery process supports a variety of activities,
including reviewing and assessing IDA’s, recommending, arranging, and support-
ing PDAs, developing the request for a federal declaration, and if the declaration
request is approved, establishing a JFO with FEMA. The JFO focuses primarily
on the delivery of disaster assistance programs authorized by The Stafford Act, the
management of the cost reimbursement process, and the coordination of available
resources and support from local, state, federal, and non-governmental organiza-
tions, as well as the private sector.
Long-Term Recovery
The long-term recovery component of ESF #14 will assess the severity of impacts
on the community, and begin defining the anticipated long-term recovery needs
and resource requirements. The assessment associated with the long-term phase is
broader in scope and focuses on the social and economic impact to the community
and associated infrastructure.
Factors that are considered in this process include:
• Impacts on the housing sector and the projected number of displaced per-
sons on a long-term basis.
• The severity and scope of the infrastructure damage precipitating major
service and economic disruptions, and impacting negatively on overall
response and recovery operations.
• Impacts on key sectors of the communities’ economic base.
Based on the initial assessment of long-term recovery needs and resource require-
ments, and following consultation with the appropriate state officials and support
agencies, the ESF #14 long-term recovery team will make a recommendation with
regard to activating the ECSF. The ECSF will begin developing the necessary plans,
priorities, initiatives and assistance to address the long-term recovery issues identi-
fied. The long-term recovery liaison team will continue to interface and coordinate
with the short-term recovery component until the housing and associated issues of
the shelter population have been addressed. The ECSF will support and be repre-
sented in the JFO as required and continue to support long-term recovery processes
until objectives have been fulfilled.
State Public Assistance Program—Emergency Relief to Localities

For incidents that do not meet the level of impact to result in a federal declaration,
state recovery programs may be implemented with or without a field office near the
disaster site. The state codes established a state public assistance program entitled
Emergency Relief to Localities to assist local governments in the recovery of eligible
costs associated with localized major emergencies or disasters that lack sufficient
damages to warrant a Presidential Declaration. The program, which is administered
by DEM, is structured like the federal Public Assistance Program in terms of catego-
ries of work and having a threshold requirement. The program is considered one of
last resort for those local jurisdictions that cannot meet the full cost. Any assistance
provided under the program is at the discretion of the Governor.
H. Mitigation Actions
DEM maintains the state Hazard Mitigation Plan separate from the plan due to the
federally mandated content and a separate review schedule. The goal of this plan is
to reduce the impacts of hazards on human, economic, critical infrastructure, and

natural resources throughout the state by incorporating mitigation concepts and
objectives into existing and future policies, plans, regulations, and laws in the state,
improving the quality of the data and analysis used in the hazard identification and
risk assessment process, identifying and implementing projects that will eliminate
long-term risk, directly reduce impacts from hazards, and maintain continuity of
operations, and promoting awareness of hazards and potential mitigation strategies
in order to increase resiliency.
Hazard mitigation involves reducing or eliminating long-term risk to people and
property from hazards and their impacts. The JFO is the central coordination point
among federal, state, local agencies, and NGOs for beginning the process that leads
to the delivery of post disaster hazard mitigation assistance.
Mitigation measures may be implemented prior to, during, or after an inci-
dent, and in accordance with stated objectives and strategies in the states Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
The joint federal-state mitigation unit in the JFO coordinates the delivery of miti-
gation programs within the affected area, including:
• Grant programs for loss reduction measures (if available).

• Delivery of loss reduction building-science expertise.
• Coordination of federal flood insurance operations and integration of miti-
gation with other program efforts.
• Conducting hazard recovery mapping to permit expedited and accurate
implementation of both recovery and mitigation programs.
• Predictive modeling to protect critical assets.
• Early documentation of losses avoided due to previous hazard mitigation
measures.
• Community education and outreach necessary to foster loss reduction.
• Education materials to affected property owners.
V. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

A. State Government—Governor of the State
As the chief executive officer of the state, the Governor is responsible for the public
safety and welfare of the people of the state.
The powers and duties of the Governor in and or Emergency manager for emer-
gency management are summarized below.
The Governor/Director Emergency Manager: (DEM)

• Is responsible for implementing the EMP and coordinating state resources
to address the full spectrum of actions to respond to and recover from inci-
dents in an all-hazards context to include terrorism, natural disasters, acci-
dents, and other contingencies.
• If appropriate, makes a verbal declaration of a “state of emergency,” to

include an authorization to grant or seek temporary overweight, over width,
registration, license, or hours worked exemptions to carriers transporting
emergency relief supplies or providing utility restoration services. These
verbal orders will be followed by a written authorization and an executive
order.
• If appropriate, amends and rescinds orders and regulations and/or directs
and compels evacuation of all or part of the populace from any threatened
or affected area.
• Ensures the provision of essential services, including emergency and disas-
ter response and recovery activities by executive branch agencies and insti-
tutions of higher education.
• Provides leadership and plays a key role in communicating to the public
and in helping people, businesses, and organizations cope with the conse-
quences of any type of declared emergency within any jurisdiction of the
state.
• Encourages participation in mutual aid and implements authorities for
the state to enter into mutual aid agreements with other states to facilitate
resource sharing.
• May request federal assistance when it becomes clear that the capabilities
of the state will be insufficient or have been exceeded or exhausted.
• May expend “sum sufficient” monies.
• May, without an Emergency Declaration, authorize the deployment of up to
300 members of the National Guard or Virginia Defense Force and materi-
als (pursuant to state codes) to assist in times of emergency. Deployments
under this code section are limited to a maximum of 300 personnel not to
exceed five days, unless a state of emergency is declared.
• May provide financial assistance to localities.
• Serves as the Commander-in-Chief of the Commonwealth military forces
pursuant to the state code.
State Coordinator and DEM

The State Coordinator of the Department of Emergency Management serves as the
State Emergency Planning Director and has the following powers and duties as sum-
marized below.
The State Coordinator and DEM:
• Implements portions of the plan to provide timely assistance to localities for

non-declared incidents or events.
• Coordinates and provides guidance and assistance to affected political sub-
divisions to ensure orderly and timely response to and recovery from disas-
ter effects.
• Coordinates disaster response actions of federal, state, and volunteer relief
agencies.
• Establishes and maintains liaison with affected political subdivisions.

• In an emergency which does not warrant a gubernatorial declaration of
a state of emergency, may after consultation with and approval of the
Secretary of Public Safety and Homeland Security, enter into contracts and
incur obligations necessary to prevent or alleviate damage, loss, hardship,
or suffering caused by such emergency and to protect the health and safety
of persons or property.
• Determines requirements for disaster relief and recovery assistance.
• Is responsible for ensuring that state response and recovery actions con-
sider the resources needed for individuals with disabilities and/or access
and functional needs.
Emergency Response Team (ERT)

The ERT consists of representatives from state agencies, NGOs, and PSPs who
may be supported by federal partners. During a disaster, ERT personnel ensure that
needed resources are provided to disaster stricken areas.
All ERT agencies and organizations have the responsibility to:
Maintain situational awareness through the collection, analysis, and dissemi-

nation of information and intelligence data.
• Receive, track, and coordinate requests for resources.

• Ensure all incident-applicable ESFs are staffed.
• Implement plans to coordinate emergency management efforts among
local, state, and federal entities; as well as NGOs and PSPs.
Facilitate resolution of legal, policy, political, social, and economic concerns

of the affected jurisdiction(s) as they affect response and recovery operations.
• Facilitate formulation of Protective Action Decisions, as needed.

• Facilitate demobilization plans and procedures.
• Participate in the after action report process.
State Agencies and Institutions of Higher Education

It is the responsibility of state government to provide for the well-being of the citi-
zens of the state and ensure the continuity of state government operations, including
the delivery of essential state government services during a disaster as tasked in this
plan. Therefore, state agencies and institutions of higher education must continue to
be prepared for all disasters.
All state agencies and institutions of higher education have the responsibility to:
• Have plans or procedures to implement their specific responsibilities out-

lined in the EOP.
• Have documented emergency action and continuity plans for their response
to and recovery from a natural or human-caused disaster.
Direct agency area supervisors (from applicable division, district, or local offices)
to participate in the local emergency planning process and become a part of the local
emergency response organization, as appropriate.
• During small localized events, when possible, provide assistance directly to

political subdivisions.
B. Local Government
The state code designates powers and duties for emergency management to political
subdivisions (summarized below). Each jurisdiction:
• Shall have a director of emergency management.

• May request assistance from the state when local resources and capabilities
are overwhelmed.
• The local Emergency Management Director in the political subdivision
within the disaster area may, under the supervision and control of the
Governor or his designated representative:
• Control, restrict, allocate or regulate the use, sale, production, and distri-
bution of food, fuel, clothing, and other commodities, materials, goods,
services and resource systems which fall within the boundaries of that
jurisdiction and which do not impact systems affecting adjoining or other
political subdivisions.
• Enter into contracts and incur obligations necessary to combat threatened
or actual disaster, protect the health and safety of person and property, and
provide emergency assistance to the victims of such disaster.
• Proceed without regard to time-consuming procedures and formalities pre-
scribed by law (except mandatory constitutional requirements) pertaining
to the performance of public work, entering into contracts, incurring of
obligations, employment of temporary works, rental of equipment, pur-
chase of supplies and materials, levying of taxes, and appropriation and
expenditure of public funds.
In addition, the local jurisdiction:
• Shall identify a primary party responsible for managing emergencies

within their jurisdiction.
• Is responsible for coordinating local resources to address the full spec-
trum of actions to respond to, and recover from incidents involving
all hazards including terrorism, natural disasters, accidents, and other
contingencies.
• Is responsible for ensuring that local actions include and accommodate
individuals with disabilities and/or access and functional needs.
• May develop, or cause to be developed, mutual aid agreements for

reciprocal assistance in the case of a disaster too great to be dealt with
unassisted. Such arrangements shall be consistent with state plans and
programs and it shall be the duty of each local organization for emer-
gency management to render assistance in accordance with the provi-
sions of such mutual aid agreements.
• Will receive and fulfill requests for assistance from entities including,
but not necessarily limited to, nursing homes, colleges, universities, and
authorities within their jurisdiction until local capabilities have been
exceeded or exhausted.
• Will coordinate with state and federal officials after a disaster to imple-
ment recovery and mitigation strategies and programs.
• May form strong partnerships with citizen groups and organizations
who provide support for incident management response, recovery,
and mitigation. Local citizen groups, such as Community Emergency
Response Teams and Medical Reserve Corps may coordinate with local
and state agencies to provide resources to augment response and recov-
ery activities.
C. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

NGOs (including voluntary organizations) may:
• If appropriate, provide specific disaster relief services during response and

recovery in cooperation with state or local officials. This includes collabo-
rating with first responders, governments at all levels, and other agencies
and organizations providing relief services to sustain life, reduce physical
and emotional distress, and promote recovery of disaster victims.
D. Private Sector Partners (PSPs)

Private sector organizations are critical to the capabilities of the ERT. They may:
• If appropriate, provide specific disaster relief services during response and

recovery in cooperation with state or local officials.
• Support the ERT by participating in the planning process, sharing informa-
tion, identifying risks, performing vulnerability assessments, developing
emergency response and business continuity plans, enhancing their overall
readiness, implementing appropriate prevention and protection programs,
and donating or otherwise providing goods and services through contrac-
tual arrangement or government purchases to assist in response to and
recovery from an incident.
Table 17.1 summarizes the roles of private sector organizations.

TABLE 17.1
Affected Organization or Infrastructure
Organization Role
Affected Organization Private-sector organizations may be affected by direct or indirect
or Infrastructure consequences of the incident. These include privately owned critical
infrastructure, key resources, and other private sector entities that are
significant to local, regional, and national economic recovery from the
incident. Examples of privately owned infrastructure include transportation,
telecommunications, private utilities, financial institutions, and hospitals.
Critical infrastructure and key resources are grouped into 18 sectors that
together provide essential functions and services supporting various aspects of
the state government, economy, and society. Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 7 establishes a national policy for Federal departments and agencies
to identify and prioritize critical infrastructure and to protect them from
terrorist attacks. The directive defines relevant terms and delivers 31 policy
statements. These policy statements define what the directive covers and
the roles various federal, state, and local agencies will play in carrying
it out.
Response Resource Private-sector entities provide response resources (donated or compensated)
during an incident, including specialized teams, essential services,
equipment, and advanced technologies through local public-private
emergency plans or mutual aid and assistance agreements, or in response to
requests from government and non-governmental volunteer initiatives.
Regulated and/or Owners/operators of certain regulated facilities or hazardous operations may
Responsible Party be legally responsible for preparing for and preventing incidents from
occurring and responding to an incident once it occurs. For example,
Federal regulations require owners/operators of nuclear power plants to
maintain emergency plans and facilities, and to perform assessments,
prompt notifications, and training for response to an incident.
State/Local Emergency Private-sector organizations may serve as an active partner in local and state
Organization Member emergency preparedness and response organizations, planning, and
activities.
Components of the As the key element of the state economy, private-sector resilience and
State Economy continuity of operations planning, as well as recovery and restoration from
an actual incident, represent essential emergency management activities.
VI. PLAN MANAGEMENT AND MAINTENANCE

A. Coordination
The state uses the “preparedness organization” concept described in the NIMS
for preparedness and maintenance of the EOP. The organization includes all agen-
cies, NGOs and PSPs with a role in state level incident management and provides
a forum for coordination of planning, training, equipping, and other preparedness
requirements.
The following entities are critical to the state’s preparedness efforts to include the
development and maintenance of this plan:
• The Secretary of Public Safety and Homeland Security (SPSHS)

The DEM reports. SPSHS works with federal, state, and local officials,
as well as the private sector, to develop a seamless, coordinated security
and preparedness strategy for implementation of this plan and appropriate
state-level response efforts.
• Secure state Panel
Appointed by the governor and assigned the responsibility to moni-
tor and assess the implementation of statewide prevention, preparedness,
response and recovery initiatives…
• Department of Emergency Management (DEM)
The state code assigns the Department of Emergency Management the
responsibility to:
• Prepare and maintain the State Emergency Operations Plan for disas-
ter response and recovery operations that assigns primary and support
responsibilities for basic emergency services functions to state agen-
cies, organizations, and personnel as appropriate.
• Coordinate and administer the disaster mitigation, preparedness, response,
and recovery plans and programs with the proponent federal, state, and
local government agencies and related groups.
B. EOP Maintenance
DEM is responsible for maintaining the EOP. The EOP is continually reviewed
and periodically updated as required to incorporate federal policy changes, guber-
natorial directives, legislative changes, and operational changes based on lessons
learned from exercises and actual events. The EOP will be reviewed and adopted in
its entirety by the Governor at least every four years. This section outlines protocols
for interim changes and full updates of the EOP. An EOP Management Standard
Operating Procedure has been adopted to further define these protocols. Changes
include additions of new or supplementary material and deletions. No proposed
change should contradict or override authorities or other plans.
Any agency or coordinating NGO or PSP may propose and develop a change
to the EOP. DEM is responsible for coordinating review of the proposed change
among the lead and support agencies, NGOs, and PSPs of each affected ESF and any
associated agency program areas as required. If DEM identifies planning needs that
require immediate resolution, or at the request of a state agency, DEM may convene
an EOP Plan Committee and revise areas of the plan identified by the committee.
Interim changes to the EOP that are administrative in nature may be approved by
the State Coordinator, however major revisions or full updates will be sent to the
Secretary of Public Safety and Homeland Security for review and concurrence prior
to submitting the plan to the Governor for approval.
After receiving approval by the Governor, full updates will be promulgated by
Executive Order.
The DEM procedure for changes includes:
• Obtaining the official approval for the change from the appropriate officials
of the affected agencies, NGOs, and PSPs.
• A process to notify and receive approval from the Governor or his/her des-
ignee for all requested changes.
• Ensure appropriate notification is made about the changes and maintain a
record of changes.
C. Standards for other Emergency Plans

The EOP, including all annexes, is the core plan for emergency operations, and
provides the structures and processes for coordinating incident management activi-
ties for human-caused disasters, natural disasters, and other emergencies or events.
Following the guidance provided by the NRF, NIMS, and other related documents,
the EOP incorporates and/or provides an umbrella configuration for state emergency
and incident management plans (with appropriate modifications and revisions) as
integrated components of the EOP, as supplements, or as supporting operational
plans.
Accordingly, state agencies must incorporate key EOP concepts and operational
elements when developing or updating agency specific incident management and
response plans. All additional response and recovery plans or procedures developed
by agencies should be compatible with the EOP. Agencies are responsible for provid-
ing DEM with current agency plans or procedures that support their role in the EOP.
D. Plan Testing, Training, and Exercises

Responsible state agencies, and coordinating NGOs and PSPs, will conduct training
to ensure the EOP can be effectively implemented in a timely manner.
DEM, in coordination with the ERT, will conduct an annual exercise or a series
of exercises of the EOP. As required by the state Code, one exercise must address,
among other issues, a prolonged and widespread loss of electric power.
Exercises may include multiple agencies, jurisdictions, NGOs, and PSPs. In addi-
tion, the ERT will participate with FEMA in an annual exercise of the Radiological
Response Annex. Any deficiencies, findings, areas recommended for corrective
action, or improvement arising from these exercises, or any other exercises coordi-
nated from the EOC, will be considered and corrected by appropriate training, plan
update, and/or demonstration in any subsequent exercise or postulated event. DEM
has developed and instituted an after action review (AAR) process in which all ERT
agencies participate. Local government, NGO, and PSP representatives are encour-
aged to participate in the AAR process.
E. Plan Implementation
This plan is effective for execution upon and pursuant to the Executive Order pro-
mulgating the same. The State Coordinator will ensure that this document is subject
to a minimum of an annual maintenance, review, and update based on selective

evaluations, AARs, and new guidance.
VII. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES

Note that authorities and references for the entire plan are located in Appendix C
• Authorities
• Emergency Services and Disaster Laws References
• The Stafford Act
• National Incident Management System
• National Response Framework
• National Disaster Recovery Framework
• EMAP Standards (2013): 3.1.2, 4.6.1, 4.6.2, 4.6.3, 4.10.1, 4.10.5, 4.14.3
18 Indian Ocean Tsunami
2004 Case Study
On December 26, 2004, there was a massive and sudden movement of the Earth’s
crust under the Indian Ocean. This earthquake was recorded at magnitude 9 on the
Richter scale and, as it happened under the ocean, caused a devastating sea wave
called a tsunami.
The epicenter of the earthquake occurred 200 km west of the island of Sumatra
in the Indian Ocean. The earthquake itself happened due to the subduction of the
Indo-Australian plate under the Eurasian plate. As the Indian plate (part of the Indo-
Australian plate) moved underneath the Burma plate (part of the Eurasian plate), the
crustal rocks stuck as they moved past one another. At 8 a.m. local time, the pressure
build up was too great and the crustal rocks snapped, causing an earthquake. When
this happened, the sea floor was pushed upward, displacing a huge volume of water
and creating the devastating Tsunami waves.
INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI 2004: IMPACT

ON LANDSCAPE AND POPULATION
Landscape
• Some smaller islands in the Indian Ocean were completely destroyed.
• Coastal buildings were completely destroyed making people homeless.
• Fishing villages were completely destroyed.
• Lines of communication were cut off, including phone and electricity power
lines.
• Roads and railways were destroyed.
• Fires broke out due to severed water pipes.
People
Approximately 250,000 people are estimated to have been killed including many
tourists on the beaches of Thailand.
• There was an outbreak of disease such as Cholera due to a lack of fresh

water supplies.
• There was a lack of food as many fish died and farms were destroyed.
INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI 2004: METHODS OF PREDICTION

Earthquakes are extremely difficult to predict, although scientists now know which
areas have a higher risk of earthquakes and can identify frequency patterns from
307
previous earthquakes. As a result, active earthquake zones are closely monitored for
seismic activity, including the use of tilt meters and laser equipment to measure earth
movements and sophisticated sound recording equipment to monitor earth tremors.
In developed countries such as the United States, building earthquake-proof
buildings, such as the Transamerica Pyramid in San Francisco, which sways with
the movement of the earth, has helped to reduce the damage caused by earthquakes.
Some countries practice earthquake drills, e.g., Tokyo in Japan, just as we have fire
drills and emergency services are better prepared and equipped to deal with such a
disaster.
Despite all of these measures, there were few warnings or successful predictions
of the Indian Ocean Tsunami. Most of the countries affected were developing coun-
tries without the funds for these sophisticated methods of detection.
They also lacked the improved communications, which may have allowed them
to evacuate from coastal areas in time. All the warning they received was the retreat
of sea water from beaches before the wave hit.
INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI 2004: ROLE OF AID AGENCIES

Short-Term Aid
• Emergency medical aid was provided by The Red Cross.
• Tents and blankets were provided for the homeless by United Nations (UN)
Children’s Fund.
• Temporary shelters were constructed.
• Bottled water was supplied as there was restricted access to fresh, clean
water.
• Bulldozers, sniffer dogs, and heat seeking equipment were used to detect
people who may have been lost or missing in collapsed buildings.
• Food supplies given by the UN due to destruction of farmland and buildings.
• Clothing supplies would be needed.
• Airlifting of more serious cases to hospitals in unaffected areas was done
by the U.S. military.
Long-Term Aid
• Roads, electricity supplies, water pipes, etc., needed to be rebuilt.
• Houses and other buildings such as schools and hospitals needed rebuilding.
• Flood prevention measures such as sea walls to be built.
Effectiveness
• There was still a huge loss of life.
• The tourist industry, which was a large source of income, particularly to
Thailand and Sri Lanka, was up and running again after only a few months.
• Warning through media saved lives in areas such as East Africa.
Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 Case Study 309
• Money was raised initially through TV campaigns, but this dried up once
the tsunami was no longer in the news.
• Potential corruption and stories of aid not reaching victims of the disaster
IMPACT OF THE 2004 TSUNAMI IN THE ISLANDS

OF INDIAN OCEAN: LESSONS LEARNED
The tsunami of 2004, caused by a 9.0-magnitude earthquake, is the most devastat-
ing tsunami in modern times, affecting 18 countries in Southeast Asia and Southern
Africa, killing more than 250,000 people in a single day, and leaving more than
1.7 million homeless. However, less reported, albeit real, is its impact in the islands
of the Indian Ocean more than 1,000 miles away from its epicenter.
The 2004 tsunami events, specifically in the 11 nations bordering the Indian
Ocean, as they constitute a region at risk, due to the presence of tectonic interactive
plate, absence of a tsunami warning system in the Indian Ocean, and lack of estab-
lished communication network providing timely information to that region. Our
paper has a dual objective: The first objective is to report the 2004 tsunami event in
relation to the 11 nations bordering the Indian Ocean.
The second one is to elaborate on lessons learned from it from national, regional,
and international disaster management programs to prevent such devastating conse-
quences of tsunami from occurring again in the future.
INTRODUCTION
Tsunami is a series of ocean waves typically caused by large undersea earthquakes
or volcano eruptions at tectonic plate boundaries. These surges of water may reach
100 feet and cause widespread destruction when they crash ashore. They race across
the sea at a speed up to 500 miles per hour and cross the entire Pacific Ocean in less
than one day. Their long wavelength means that they lose very little energy along
the way.
The tsunami of December 2004, caused by a 9.0-magnitude earthquake, is the
most infamous tsunami of modern times with disastrous consequences in many areas:
1. (i) Humanitarian toll: It affected more than 18 countries from Southeast

Asia to Southern Africa, killing more than 250,000 people in a single day
and leaving more than one million homeless. (ii) Economic toll: It left sev-
eral millions of dollars of economic loss affecting fishing and tourist indus-
tries. (iii) Environmental and medical threats including water pollution and
flooding and endemic diseases.
The rationale for writing this paper is to report the tsunami events in the
11 nations bordering the Indian Ocean, as they received less publicity than
their Southeast Asian country counterparts, although the 2004 tsunami had
real humanitarian, economic, and environmental impact in these regions
more than 1,000 miles away from the epicenter.
2. Furthermore, these regions are at risk from the devastating effects of future
tsunami due to the presence of a tectonic interactive plate.
3. The absence of a tsunami warning system in the Indian Ocean and lack of
established communication network providing timely information to that
region.
IMPACT OF THE TSUNAMI IN THE ISLANDS

OF THE INDIAN OCEAN
These 11 countries bordering the Indian Ocean are Mauritius, Madagascar, Reunion
Island, and Seychelles, Comoros islands, and by geographical extension include
countries in southern borders of Africa such as Somalia, Tanzania, Mozambique,
and South Africa.
These individual countries suffered humanitarian loss, with more than 3,000 peo-
ple killed and more than 10,000 left homeless about 1,000 miles away from the epi-
center. In terms of economic toll, several million dollars were reported accompanied
by environmental threat due to flooding (“Impact of 2004 Tsunami in the Islands of
Indian Ocean,” https://www.hindawi.com/journals/emi/2011/920813).
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE 2004 TSUNAMI

To prevent the devastating effects of future tsunami, these islands of Indian Ocean
have set their priorities in achieving three goals:
1. Development of a disaster tsunami program that includes implementation

of a tsunami program at the national, regional, and international levels and
coordination of all these programs.
2. Development of an Indian Ocean early warning system.
3. Development of a tsunami research program.
National Level
This national response plan was developed by Indian in 2006 and is the most exhaustive
of all the other national plans and should serve as a model for other islands (National
Response Plan, https://fas.org/irp/agency/dhs/nrp.pdf). It includes five objectives:
1. Development of a national evacuation plan on tsunami.

2. Establishment of an early warning system in conjunction with a regional
system.
3. Increase public and community awareness through publication and training
of media and local authorities.
4. Conduct mock exercises on tsunami.
5. Strengthen the operational capacity of the national meteorological service
to include a national warning system.
Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 Case Study 311
Regional Level
Disaster management is a regional priority in the Indian Ocean due to permanent
threat of cyclones, floods, and tsunamis. The stated two goals set by a series of
regional meetings in 2005 and 2006 are the following:
1. Implementation of the Indian Ocean tsunami warning and mitigation sys-

tem, which focuses on defining disaster management and reduction (pre-
vention, mitigation, response, and relief) of disaster by all the participating
countries.
2. Development of the integrated regional information network, with the goals
of creation of an early warning system for the islands in the Indian Ocean
and ensuring adequate equipment to manage natural disasters, including
tsunamis.
The important issues are the cost of establishing such a warning system in the
Indian Ocean, the transfer of existing technology versus improving an old one,
global warming, and extreme weather events in that region.
International Level
A series of international meetings have been convened to discuss the role interna-
tional organizations (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural, https://
sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/index.php?):
1. International coordination meeting sponsored by the UN Educational

Scientific and Cultural Organization intergovernmental oceanographic
commission in Mauritius in 2005 with a dual goal: (a) development of a
tsunami warning and mitigation system and (b) coordination of a national
tsunami warning center with regional centers.
2. International strategy for disaster reduction (UN/ISDR) attended by rep-
resentatives from the Indian Ocean countries and international experts on
early warning system in 2006 with two objectives:
(a) Funding of projects and rehabilitation of roads and bridges
(b) Increase public awareness and training of key staff in tsunami pre-
paredness and warning at all levels.
CONCLUSION
The 2004 tsunami on the islands bordering the Indian Ocean and the lessons learned
from this event from national, regional, and international organizations to prevent
such events from occurring again in the future are discussed.
A tsunami is an ever-present and real threat for the islands of the Indian Ocean
due to the presence of a tectonic interactive plate.
Their disaster management priority is the development of an early tsunami warn-

ing system in order to effectively and timely communicate with all the people in that
region.
Disaster management should involve national, regional, and international organi-
zations at all levels in order to develop tsunami program, fund tsunami projects, and
continue research program.
19 Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill
and BP Case Study
On April 20, 2010, a deep-water oil well exploded in the Gulf of Mexico. The
immediate effect was that it killed 11 people and injured 17 others. Oil leaked at a
high rate, which is difficult to calculate. Some estimates are around 40,000 barrels
a day. The oil spill posed risks to the environment and affected the local industry.
The impact of this oil spill depended on which parts of the coastline you look at.
It is difficult to measure the effects because of seasonal changes in wildlife.
ECONOMIC IMPACT
• The government asked for $20 billion in damages from British Petroleum
(BP) and BP’s share price fell. Local industries, such as fishing, were threat-
ened. There was a ban on fishing in the water.
• Tourism declined.
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
Gulf of Mexico oil spill rescue, 2010
• An environmental worker rescued an oil-covered pelican.

• Plants and animals were completely covered in the oil.
• Seabirds, sea turtles, and dolphins were found dead.
• Oil that entered wetland areas meant recovery was slow.
• Fish stocks were harmed, and productivity decreased.
The size of the oil spill was one of the largest America had seen. However,
because the oil entered warm waters, organisms in the water helped to breakdown
the oil. The overall effect may be less than the Exxon Valdez Oil spill in 1989, which
happened in colder water (Figure 19.1).
The cause and effects of the oil spill were immense, and the massive damage to
the wetlands expanded the dead zones, killing off marine mammals and blobs of
oil coating deep-sea coral and causing illness in dolphins. Immersed underwater
plumes of dissolved oil tar balls, also found in fishing nets.
The British multinational oil and gas company BP headquartered in London in
the United Kingdom owned Deepwater Horizon, which experienced the oil spill in
the Gulf of Mexico near Mississippi River Delta in the United States. At approxi-
mately 9:45 p.m. on April 20, 2010, an explosion occurred, causing a massive oil
spill in the Gulf.
313
Mississippi Alabama
Mobile
Louisiana Biloxi Pensacola
Gulfport Pascagoula Florida
New Orleans
Venice
Incident site
Gulf of Mexico Mississippi

Alabama
Key Beached oil Louisiana Florida

Wildlife reserves
Oil slick
FIGURE 19.1 Map of the oil spill.
The spill caused 4,200 square miles (11,000 km²) of the Gulf to close due to the mas-
sive oil spill and the time it took to clean it up.
In the efforts to clean the spill up and monitor its effects:
• BP made use of skimmers to clean up the oil spill. They also tested the
new gigantic oil skimmer called “the Whale,” which can clean up a large
quantity of water.
• They gave money to people who lost their livelihood, as reparation for
the spill, and they looked forward to finding solutions to avoid similar
spills.
• BP was still paying for commercials encouraging toursim to the Gulf of
Mexico as late as 2012, two years after the disaster.
• BP aims to maintain readiness to respond on a global scale, to minimize
adverse effects and facilitate rapid mitigation activities. Some companies
from the United States helped in the cleanup process of some affected ani-
mals, e.g., Dawn (dishwashing soap company). Local birds and animals were
muddied in toxic sludge. Volunteers and rescue used a common household
ingredient to clean up the oil-coated wildlife—Dawn dishwashing liquid.
• People across the United States were ready to dedicate their time and ideas
to clean up the oil at the coasts. They cleaned up the Gulf Coast, and they
had crews cleaning up the beaches, as well as skilled workers taking care
of animals.
Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill and BP Case Study 315
• The U.S. Coast Guard also set up a base in St. Petersburg, Florida, to track
and coordinate cleanup efforts for any spilled oil that touches the state’s
west coast.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE BP OIL SPILL

The fallout from this disaster has raised many questions about both the history and
future of oil drilling and our future in energy resources as a country.
Releasing an estimated 4.4 million barrels, or 185 million gallons, of oil into the
Gulf of Mexico, BP’s oil spill is now a tragic example of the need for better energy
technologies. To understand the current situation, researchers have been investigat-
ing past spills and drilling history, as ways to estimate the potential impacts the Gulf
will still have in the years ahead.
Seven distinct areas of critical issues are as follows:
• Improving the safety of offshore operations

• Safeguarding the environment
• Strengthening oil spill response, planning, and capacity
• Advancing well-containment capabilities
• Overcoming the impacts of the deepwater horizon spill and restoring the
gulf
• Ensuring financial responsibility of responsible parties
• Promoting congressional engagement to ensure responsible offshore drilling
Three critical issues as having relevance to efforts to strengthen its oil spill pre-
vention, preparedness, and response system are the following:
• Improving the safety of offshore operations

• Strengthening oil spill response, planning, and capacity
• Ensuring financial responsibility
Like many states around the nation, the question is often asked here—how pre-
pared is Washington for a catastrophic spill? The reality here and around the nation
is that no matter how well prepared we are for spills, we fight a losing battle from the
start and we have to rely on other regions to assist in our response and recovery to a
Spill of National Significance.
Recognizing that preparedness is a continuous cycle, we must put in place now
the mechanism and processes to the following:
• Address the risk of oil spills and shift priorities as that risk evolves.
• Analyze the adequacy of and access to appropriate response equipment.
• Continuously find and fix the weak areas of the system through testing of
plans.
• Promote and encourage response technology development.

• Strengthen and enhance relationships with our federal, state, local, tribal
industry, and community partners.
IMPROVING THE SAFETY OF OFFSHORE OPERATIONS

The Need for a New Approach to Risk Assessment and Management
Neither the industry’s nor the federal government’s approaches to managing and over-
seeing the leasing and development of offshore resources have kept pace with rapid
changes in the technology, practices, and risks associated with the different geologi-
cal and ocean environments being explored and developed for oil and gas produc-
tion (“Improving Oil Spill Prevention and Response in Washington,” http://www.ecy
.wa.gov/programs/spills/studies_reports/ecypspreview-dwh).
There are operational risks inherent in oil transportation and refining activi-
ties taking place on our state waters and lands. Preventing large and small spills
is Washington’s top priority and a legislative goal (“zero spills”). Meeting this goal
requires the EPA agency to identify industry-specific risks at every level in marine
transportation and oil handling systems and to target those risks with the right pre-
vention activities.
Key prevention issues, such as fatigue, inadequate crewing requirements and
inadequate company training, operating procedures, and policies continue to be
prominent causal factors in these incidents. Ecologists must continue working
with industry partners to emphasize human factors as the key to spill preven-
tion. The data also indicate that incidents from nonregulated sources, such as
fishing and recreational vessels, pose a disproportionate risk of incidents and
spills.
Recommendations
• Complete a rigorous risk analysis on higher-risk industry sectors to ensure
that there is an appropriate level of investment reducing the risk of oil
spills. Target our spill prevention education, grant assistance, inspec-
tion, and regulatory activities based on the risks presented by the various
sectors.
• Complete an analysis of U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and Ecology tug/
oil barge incident data. This industry sector appears to have a relatively
high risk of towing incidents in which the oil barges contain millions
of gallons.
• Expand vessel inspection activities of regulated fishing vessels and ensure
that nonregulated fishing vessels receive voluntary pollution control techni-
cal assistance.
• Continue to seek opportunities to influence federal standards relating to
these risk factors. Seek formal or informal delegation from the USCG of
some activities where the agencies have concurrent jurisdiction and pro-
gram missions.
STRENGTHENING OIL SPILL RESPONSE,

PLANNING, AND CAPACITY
The Area Plan contains response policies and tools and provides a coordination
mechanism for all three states and the federal government. The Area Plan is updated
annually. Industry oil spill plans are reviewed for their consistency with the Area
Plan and are measured against regulatory standards for approval.
There are many complex coordination and logistical issues that must be addressed
well ahead of a spill. The goal must be to mount a response that is rapid, aggressive,
and well coordinated with our Canadian partners in industry, the federal govern-
ment, and province.
Recommendations
• Once the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force report is
issued, response agencies in the Trans-boundary area should develop and
implement an action plan around the findings in the Tran’s boundary Spill
Planning and Response Issues report.
• The Joint Response Teams should work quickly to resolve gaps in coordi-
nation mechanisms and adopt consistent policies and processes to manage
cross-border spills.
THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH TO HANDLING

SPILLS OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE
Recommendations
• Ecology will adopt the methodology and process for making decisions on
equipment movement during spills of national significance (SONS) into the
Area Plan as a best management practice.
• The federal government should develop an alternative process to ensure
rapid cascading of equipment other than the emergency rule standard used
in the Gulf SONS.
• The federal government should develop a SONS process mechanism to
engage in Tribal Consultation when tribal resources are impacted by a
SONS designation.
THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN STATE AND LOCAL INVOLVEMENT

Local elected official, tribal government, and citizen involvement in the oil spill plan-
ning process is critical if an area is to be truly prepared to deliver a well-coordinated
response.
This involvement ensures that the response team is able to take advantage of
local knowledge and local resources in the response. The Area Plan has a long-
standing policy to include tribes and local government in Unified Command.
Beyond decision-making processes, local involvement also includes volunteer
management and assisting in the identification of local commercial vessels of

opportunity for use as response assets.
Local Involvement in Oil Spill Drills

Drills are a requirement for companies to test their plans. They are also an oppor-
tunity to involve local officials and tribes in the Area Plan, so that the coordination
and prioritization issues experienced in the Gulf do not occur here. Area Plan ini-
tiatives are also an opportunity for companies and response agencies to learn local
knowledge that is critical during a spill response. All parties to a spill need to know
other people involved in the spill response prior to the day of the spills. This requires
practice. We recognize that funding limitations for tribes and local government is a
limiting factor to their involvement.
Volunteer Management Program

Many Washington State citizens feel outraged and frustrated when oil spills impact
their beaches, and they feel compelled to take action. For many, this means looking for
opportunities to be involved as volunteers and contribute to restoring their community.
Through the Beach Watchers program, Ecologists has provided training to community
groups around the state who serve as “eyes” for Ecology and in many cases are the
closest field observers to help size up reported spills (Beach Watchers | Snohomish
MRC, www.snocomrc.org/Projects/Education-Outreach/Beach-Watchers.aspx).
Many volunteers are interested in participating with oiled wildlife care. Because
of the potential to harm affected wildlife and the potential for human exposures to
toxic oil and diseases, additional levels of training are required. This training is
coordinated by the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife and federal agen-
cies within an existing network of wildlife care organizations.
There are a number of issues to be addressed regarding use of volunteers during
oil spill response, including liability, proper training, compensation, reporting, and
supervision relationships. Similar to the need to have local governmental and tribal
involvement prior to a large spill, it is also critical to have trained and organized
volunteers to be accessible during spill incidents. While managing volunteers is an
inherently governmental function, funding for use of volunteers should be borne by
the industry during an actual spill incident.
Vessel of Opportunity Program

In a major spill, it is evident early on that the need for vessels to support response
activities over large geographic areas will outgrow the professional, dedicated
vessel response assets. The Vessel of Opportunity Program (VOO) is an oppor-
tunity to utilize existing vessels, such as fishing and other commercial vessels
in our waters during oil spill response (Factsheet on BP Vessels of Opportunity
Program, https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/group-documents). The
Gulf oil spill offered many lessons learned in using local fishing fleets and other
commercial vessels as spill response assets.
The VOO Program offers assistance in many response activities, including the
following:
• Transporting supplies and providing overnight berthing (lodging).

• Assisting wildlife survey and rescue.
• Deploying containment and sorbent boom.
• Providing on-water recovery (skimming) and storage.
There are many viable advantages to using vessels of opportunity, such as access-
ing local knowledge of waterways and environmental conditions. It also offers
employment opportunities for an economic sector that may be severely impacted by
oil spills.
The reality of the Gulf oil spill is that as long as we are dependent on oil as our
main energy resource, we are required and obligated to ensure that oil exploration
and refining and transport of petroleum are safe and our environment and economy
are protected from oil spills.
The Gulf area is heavily dependent on maritime commerce, the marine environ-
ment, and the continued recovery and restoration of the Gulf are key elements of its
economic engine. It is recognized that implementing some of these recommenda-
tions may be challenging in the state’s current economic environment.
However, it is critical that our state make appropriate investments now to ensure
that we protect the state’s future economic interests against major oil spills.
The recommendations outlined in this report promise effective protections
to avert or mitigate damages from a major oil spill and avoid the potential of an
environmental disaster that would threaten our economy, our environment, and our
region’s quality of life.
Appendix A: Terms
and Definitions
Terms and definitions in the Federal Response Plan generally are consistent with
current terminology used in the emergency management community. A number of
these terms are defined below. Others are defined in the Basic Plan and individual
annexes. Many of these terms are cross-referenced in this appendix.
LIST OF TERMS
Accountable Property: Action Plan. See ESF 5.
Aerial Port of Debarkation: See ESF 9.
Aerial Port of Embarkation: See ESF 9.
After-Action Report
Asset Visibility
Assets
Base Support Installation: See ESF 9.
Biological Agents
Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (CDRG)
Chemical Agents
Civil Air Patrol (CAP): See ESF 5.
Civil Transportation Capacity: See ESF 1.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA): See ESF 10.
Congressional Affairs Representative (CAR)
Congressional Relations Officer (CRO)
Consequence Management
Contingency Plan: See ESF 5.
Credible Threat
Crisis Management
Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)
Designated Agency Safety and Health Official (DASHO)
Disaster Field Office (DFO)
Disaster Finance Center (DFC)
Disaster Information Systems Clearinghouse (DISC)
Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT): See ESFs 8 and 9.
Disaster Mortuary Team (DMORT): See ESF 8.
Disaster Recovery Center (DRC)
Disaster Recovery Manager (DRM)
Disaster Response Support Facility (DRSF)
Disaster Safety Officer (DSO)
321
322 Appendix A
Disaster Transportation Management System (DTMS): See ESF 1.

District Response Group: See ESF 10.
Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST)
Donations Coordination Center
Donations Coordination Team
DOT Crisis Coordinator: See ESF 1.
Emergency Response Team (ERT)
Emergency Response Team—Advance Element (ERT-A)
Emergency Support Function (ESF)
Emergency Support Function Leaders Group (ESFLG)
Emergency Support Team (EST)
Environmental Response Team: See ESF 10.
Essential Elements of Information (EEIs): See ESF 5.
Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO)
Federal Emergency Support Coordinator (FESC): See ESF 7.
Federally Arranged Transportation Support: See ESF 1.
FEMA Voluntary Agency Liaison (VAL)
Fire Suppression Support Coordinator: See ESF 4.
Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) Disaster Task Force: See ESF 11.
Functional Plan: See ESF 5.
Goods
Governor’s Authorized Representative (GAR)
Hazardous Materials: See ESF 10.
Hazardous Substances: See ESF 10.
Incident Command System (ICS): ESF 4.
Incident Support Team (IST): See ESF 9.
Incident Support Team—Advance Element (IST-A): See ESF 9.
Information Coordination Unit (ICU): See ESF 5.
Initial Response Resources (IRR)
In-Kind Donations: See Donations Management Support Annex.
Joint Information Center (JIC)
Joint Operations Center (JOC)
Lead Agency
Lead Federal Agency
Logistics Information Management System (LIMS): See ESF 5.
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA): See ESF 9.
Mobilization Center: See ESF 9.
Monitoring Period: See ESF 5.
Movement Coordination Center (MCC): See ESF 1.
National Disaster Medical System (NDMS): See ESF 8.
National Fire Suppression Liaison Officer: See ESF 4.
National Interagency Coordination Center (NICC): See ESF 4.
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP):
See ESF 10.
National Processing Service Center (NPSC)
Appendix A 323
National Response Center (NRC): See ESF 10.

National Response Team (NRT): See ESF 10.
National Security Council (NSC)
National Strike Force: See ESF 10.
National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD)
Nuclear Weapons
On-Scene Coordinator (OSC): See ESF 10.
Operating Site: See ESF 9.
Operational Period: See ESF 5.
Personal Property
Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA)
Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39): Primary Agency. See Basic Plan,
pages 13 and 28.
Radiological Emergency Response Team: See ESF 10.
Reconstruction Information Center (RIC)
Regional Emergency Coordinator (REC): See ESF 7.
Regional Emergency Transportation Coordinator (RETCO): See ESF 1.
Regional Operations Center (ROC): See Basic Plan, page 17.
Regional Response Teams (RRTs): See ESF 10.
Regional/Area Fire Coordinator: See ESF 4.
Requirements Processing
Resource Tracking
Resources
Scientific Support Coordinator: See ESF 10.
Senior FEMA Official
Situation Assessment: See ESF 5.
Situation Report (SITREP): See ESF 5.
Situation Room: See ESF 5.
Staging Area: See ESF 9.
State Coordinating Officer (SCO)
Status Briefing: See ESF 5.
Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC)
Strategic Plan: See ESF 5.
Supervisor of Salvage and Diving (SUPSALV): See ESF 10.
Support Agency
System to Locate Survivors (STOLS): See ESF 9.
Technical Operations
Territory Logistics Centers (TLCs)
Terrorist Incident: Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL). See ESF 1.
Unaffiliated Volunteer
Undesignated Goods
Unsolicited Goods
Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD)
Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD)
324 Appendix A
DEFINITIONS
Agency Logistics Center (ALC): See Logistics Management Support Annex.
Assembly Point: A designated location for responders to meet, organize, and prepare
their equipment prior to moving to the point of departure. Since emergency
teams, organizations, and resources involved in a disaster or emergency can
originate from a variety of geographic locations, each typically has its own
assembly point.
Base Camp: The designated location under local or state control within the disaster
area that is equipped and staffed to provide sleeping facilities, food, water,
and sanitary services to response personnel.
Designated Area: The geographic area designated under a Presidential major disas-
ter declaration that is eligible to receive disaster assistance in accordance
with the provisions of the Stafford Act.
Direct Federal Assistance: Is provided to the affected state and local jurisdictions
when they lack the resources to provide specific types of disaster assis-
tance either because of the specialized nature of the assistance or because
of resource shortfalls (e.g., providing debris removal, potable water, emer-
gency medical services, and urban search and rescue).
Emergency: As defined in the Stafford Act, an emergency is any occasion or
instance for which, in the determination of the president, Federal assistance
is needed to supplement state and local efforts and capabilities to save lives
and to protect property, public health, and safety and includes emergencies
other than natural disasters.
Federal Operations Support: Is available to FEMA or other Federal responding
agencies when they require logistical or technical support of their Federal
operations—ESF activation, personnel for preparing damage survey reports,
supplies, and equipment for DFO and DRC operations.
Major Disaster: As defined under the Stafford Act, any natural catastrophe (includ-
ing any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven water, tidal
wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snow-
storm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion,
in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the presi-
dent causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major
disaster assistance under this act to supplement the efforts and available
resources of states, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in
alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby.
Mitigation: Those activities designed to alleviate the effects of a major disaster
or emergency or long-term activities to minimize the potentially adverse
effects of future disaster in affected areas.
Point of Arrival (POA): The designated location (typically an airport) within or near
the disaster-affected area where newly arriving staff, supplies, and equip-
ment are initially directed. Upon arrival, personnel and other resources
are dispatched to either the DFO, a mobilization center, a staging area, or
directly to a disaster site.
Appendix A 325
Point of Departure (POD): The designated location (typically an airport) outside

the disaster-affected area from which response personnel and resources
will deploy to the disaster area.
Recovery: Activities traditionally associated with providing Federal supplemental
disaster relief assistance under a presidential major disaster declaration.
These activities usually begin within days after the event and continue after
response activity ceases. Recovery includes individual and public assis-
tance programs that provide temporary housing assistance, as well as grants
and loans to eligible individuals and government entities to recover from the
effects of a disaster.
Response: Activities to address the immediate and short-term effects of an emer-
gency or disaster. Response includes immediate actions to save lives, pro-
tect property, and meet basic human needs. Based on the requirements of
the situation, response assistance will be provided to an affected state under
the FRP using a partial activation of selected ESFs or the full activation of
all ESFs to meet the needs of the situation.
Technical Assistance: Is provided to state and local jurisdictions when they have
the resources but lack the knowledge and skills needed to perform a
required activity (such as mobile-home park design and hazardous material
assessments).
Appendix B: Acronyms
and Abbreviations
AE Aeromedical evacuation
AEC Agency emergency coordinator
AECC Aeromedical evacuation control center
AECE Aeromedical evacuation control element
AECM Aeromedical evacuation crew member
AELT Aeromedical evacuation liaison team
AID Agency for International Development
ALC Agency logistics center
AMC Air mobility command
AMTA Agricultural Marketing Transition Act
AOC Army operations center
ARAC Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability
ARC American Red Cross
ASH Assistant secretary for health
AWD Available without declaration
B&I Business and Industrial Loan Program
C/B Chemical/biological
CAP Civil Air Patrol
CAR Congressional affairs representative
CC Coordination center
CCP Casualty collection point
CCP Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program
CDBG Community Development Block Grant
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CDRG Catastrophic Disaster Response Group
CEPPO Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office
CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act
CFO Chief financial officer
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CINCLANT Commander-in-Chief Atlantic
CINCPAC Commander-in-Chief Pacific
CLO Congressional liaison officer
CMC Crisis management center
CNS Corporation for national service
CONUS Continental United States
CPD Community planning and development
CR Community relations
327
328 Appendix B
CRO Congressional relations officer

CRP Conservation Reserve Program
CWA Clean Water Act
DAE Disaster assistance employee
DALO Disaster area liaison officer
DASHO Designated agency safety and health official
DCE Defense coordinating element
DCLO Deputy congressional liaison officer
DCO Defense coordinating officer
DEST Domestic emergency support team
DFC Disaster finance center
DFCO-M Deputy federal coordinating officer for mitigation
DFO Disaster field office
DISC Disaster information systems clearinghouse
DLA Defense logistics agency
DMAT Disaster medical assistance team
DMORT Disaster mortuary team
DOC Department of Commerce
DOD Department of Defense
DOE Department of Energy
DOEd Department of Education
DOI Department of the Interior
DOJ Department of Justice
DOL Department of Labor
DOMS Director of Military Support
DOS Department of State
DOS-A/DCP Department of State, Office of Diplomatic Contingency
Programs
DOT Department of Transportation
DRC Disaster recovery center
DRF Disaster relief fund
DRM Disaster recovery manager
DRSF Disaster response support facilities
DSO Disaster safety officer
DTMS Disaster transportation management system
DUA Disaster unemployment assistance
DWI Disaster welfare information
EC Emergency coordinator
ECS Emergency communications staff
ECWAG Emergency community water assistance grants
EDA Economic Development Administration
EEI Essential element of information
EICC Emergency Information and Coordination Center
EIDL Economic injury disaster loans
EM Emergency management
EMRT Emergency medical response team
Appendix B 329
EMS Emergency medical service

EMT Emergency management team
EMWIN Emergency Managers’ Weather Information Network
E.O. Executive order
EOC Emergency operations center
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EPLO Emergency preparedness liaison officer
ERL Environmental Research Laboratories
ERT Emergency response team
ERT Environmental response team
ERT-A Emergency response team—advance element
ERT-N National emergency response team
ESF Emergency support function
ESFLG Emergency Support Function Leaders Group
ESP Electric service priority
EST Emergency support team
EWP Emergency watershed protection
FAO Federal approving official
FAR Federal acquisition regulation
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCC Federal Communications Commission
FCC Federal coordinating center
FCO Federal coordinating officer
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
FECC Federal emergency communications coordinator
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FESC Federal emergency support coordinator
FHWA Federal Highway Administration
FNS Food and nutrition service
FORSCOM Forces Command
FRERP Federal radiological emergency response plan
FRMAC Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
FRP Federal response plan
FS Forest service
FSA Farm Service Agency
FTS Federal telecommunications service
GAO Government Accounting Office
GAR Governor’s authorized representative
GIS Geographic information system
GPMRC Global Patient Movement Requirements Center
GSA General Services Administration
HHS Department of Health and Human Services
HMGP Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
HQ Headquarters
HQAMC Headquarters Air Mobility Command
HQUSACE Headquarters U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
330 Appendix B
HQUSAF Headquarters U.S. Air Force

HSO Human services officer
HUD Department of Housing and Urban Development
ICS Incident Command System
ICU Information Coordination Unit
IFG Individual and Family Grant
IMA Individual mobilization augmentee
IRR Initial response resources
IRS Internal Revenue Service
IRT Initial response team
IST Incident support team
IST-A Incident support team—advance element
J-4/JCS Medical Readiness Division, Office of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff
JIC Joint Information Center
JOC Joint Operations Center
JPMT Joint Patient Movement Team
JRMPO Joint Regional Medical Planning Office
JTF Joint Task Force
JTPA Job Training Partnership Act
JTRB Joint Telecommunications Resources Board
LFA Lead Federal Agency
LIMS Logistics Information Management System
MA Mission assignment
MAC Mapping and Analysis Center
MAC Mission assignment coordinator
MASF Mobile Aeromedical Staging Facility
MATTS Mobile Air Transportable Telecommunications System
MCC Movement Coordination Center
MERRT Medical emergency radiological response team
MERS Mobile emergency response support
MOA Memorandum of Agreement
MOC MERS Operations Center
MOU Memorandum of understanding
MREs Meals-ready-to-eat
MSCA Military Support to Civil Authority
MSU Management support unit
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NCC National Coordinating Center
NCP National contingency plan
NCS National communications system
NCS/DISA-GOSC NCS/Defense Information Systems Agency—Global
Operations Security Center
NCSRM NCS regional manager
NDMS National disaster medical system
NECC National Emergency Coordination Center
Appendix B 331
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act

NFIP National Flood Insurance Program
NGB National Guard Bureau
NICC National Interagency Coordination Center
NIFC National Interagency Fire Center
NIMA National Imagery and Mapping Agency
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NOS National Ocean Service
N/P Not provided
NPSC National Processing Service Center
NRC National Response Center
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRCS Natural Resources Conservation Service
NRS National Oil and Hazardous Substances Response System
NRT National response team
NS/EP National security/emergency preparedness
NSC National Security Council
NSF National Strike Force
NTSP National telecommunications support plan
NVOAD National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster
NWR National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Weather
Radio
NWS National Weather Service
OC Operations center
OCHAMPUS Office of Civilian Health and Medical Program of the
Uniformed Services
OCONUS Outside the continental United States
OEP Office of Emergency Preparedness
OET Office of Emergency Transportation
OFM Office of Financial Management
OIG Office of Inspector General
OMB Office of Management and Budget
OPA Oil Pollution Act
OPAC Online payment and collection system
OPHS Office of Public Health and Science
OPM Office of Personnel Management
OSC On-scene commander
OSC On-scene coordinator
OSC Operations Support Center
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
OSTP Office of Science and Technology Policy
PAO Public affairs officer
PBS Public buildings service
PD Presidential Declaration
PDA Preliminary damage assessment
332 Appendix B
PDASH Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health

PDD Presidential Decision Directive
PMS Payments management system
PNP Private nonprofit
POA Point of arrival
POC Point of contact
POD Point of departure
PPE Personal protective equipment
PRA Patient reporting activity
RAP Radiological Assistance Program
RC&D Resource conservation and development
RCP Region Oil and Hazardous Pollution Contingency Plan
RD Regional director
REAC/TS Radiation emergency assistance center/training site
REC Regional emergency coordinator
RECP Regional emergency services communications planner
REP Regional evacuation point
REPLO Regional emergency preparedness liaison officer
RERT Radiological emergency response team
RETCO Regional emergency transportation coordinator
RFA Request for Federal assistance
RHA Regional health administrator
RHS Rural housing service
RIC Reconstruction Information Center
RISC Regional Interagency Steering Committee
RMA Risk Management Agency
ROC Regional Operations Center
RR Response and recovery
RRIS Rapid response information system
RRT Regional response team
RSPA Research and Special Programs Administration
RTF Response task force
RUS Rural utilities service
SA Supplemental appropriation
SARA Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
SBA Small business administration
SCO State coordinating officer
SIOC Strategic information and operations center
SITREP Situation report
SOP Standard operating procedure
SSA Social Security Administration
SSC Scientific support coordinator
STOLS System to locate survivors
SUPSALV Supervisor of salvage and diving
TAES Tactical aeromedical evacuation system
Appendix B 333
TIMACS Telecommunications information management and control

system
TLC Territory Logistics Center
TPFDD Time-phased force and deployment data
TPFDL Time-phased force and deployment list
TREAS Department of the Treasury
TSP Telecommunications Service Priority
TVA Tennessee Valley Authority
UC Unified Command
U.S. United States
U.S.C. U.S. Code
US&R Urban Search and Rescue
USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USACOM U.S. Atlantic Command
USCG U.S. Coast Guard
USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture
USPACOM U.S. Pacific Command
USPS U.S. Postal Service
USSOUTHCOM U.S. Southern Command
USTRANSCOM U.S. Transportation Command
VA Department of Veterans Affairs
VAL Voluntary agency liaison
VIP Very important person
VISTA Volunteers in service to America
VOAD Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster
VOLAG Voluntary agency
WMD Weapon of mass destruction
Emergency Support
Functions and Emergency
Management Planning
EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) is the grouping of governmental and cer-
tain private sector capabilities into an organizational structure to provide support,
resources, program implementation, and services that are most likely needed to save
lives, protect property and the environment, restore essential services and critical
infrastructure, and help victims and communities return to normal following domes-
tic incidents.
• ESF1 Transportation
• ESF2 Communications
• ESF3 Public Works and Engineering
• ESF4 Firefighting
• ESF5 Emergency Management
• ESF6 Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services
• ESF7 Resources Support
• ESF8 Public Health and Medical Services
• ESF9 Urban Search and Rescue
• ESF10 Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
• ESF11 Agriculture and Natural Resources
• ESF12 Energy
• ESF13 Public Safety and Security
• ESF14 Long-term Community Recovery and Mitigation
• ESF15 External Affairs
ESF 1—Transportation
• ESF Coordinator: Department of Transportation
• Aviation/airspace management and control
• Transportation safety
• Restoration and recovery of transportation infrastructure
• Movement restrictions
• Damage and impact assessment
335
336 Emergency Support Functions and Emergency Management Planning
ESF 2—Communications
• ESF Coordinator: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (National
Communications System)
• Coordination with telecommunications and information technology industries
• Restoration and repair of telecommunications infrastructure
• Protection, restoration, and sustainment of national cyber and information
technology resources
• Oversight of communications within the Federal incident management and
response structures
ESF 3—Public Works and Engineering

• ESF Coordinator: Department of Defense (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers)
• Infrastructure protection and emergency repair
• Infrastructure restoration
• Engineering services and construction management
• Emergency contracting support for life-saving and life-sustaining services
ESF 4—Firefighting
• ESF Coordinator: Department of Agriculture (U.S. Forest Service)
• Coordination of Federal firefighting activities
• Support to wildland, rural, and urban firefighting operations
ESF 5—Information and Planning

• ESF Coordinator: DHS (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA])
• Collects, analyzes, processes, and disseminates information about a poten-
tial or actual incident
• Conducts planning activities
ESF 6—Mass Care, Emergency Assistance,

Temporary Housing, and Human Services
• ESF Coordinator: DHS (FEMA)
• Mass care
• Emergency assistance
• Disaster housing
• Human services
ESF 7—Logistics Management and Resource Support

• ESF Coordinators: General Services Administration and DHS (FEMA)
• Comprehensive, national incident logistics planning, management, and sus-
tainment capability
Emergency Support Functions and Emergency Management Planning 337
• Resource support (facility space, office equipment and supplies, contracting

services, etc.)
ESF 8—Public Health and Medical Services

• ESF Coordinator: Department of Health and Human Services
• Public health
• Medical
• Mental health services
• Mass fatality management
ESF 9—Search and Rescue

• ESF Coordinator: DHS (FEMA)
• Life-saving assistance
• Search and rescue operations
ESF 10—Oil and Hazardous Materials Response

• ESF Coordinator: Environmental Protection Agency
• Oil and hazardous materials (chemical, biological, radiological, etc.) response
• Environmental short- and long-term cleanup
ESF 11—Agriculture and Natural Resources

• ESF Coordinator: Department of Agriculture
• Nutrition assistance
• Animal and plant disease and pest response
• Food safety and security
• Natural and cultural resources and historic properties protection
• Safety and well-being of household pets
ESF 12—Energy
• ESF Coordinator: Department of Energy
• Energy infrastructure assessment, repair, and restoration
• Energy industry utilities coordination
• Energy forecast
ESF 13—Public Safety and Security

• ESF Coordinator: Department of Justice
• Facility and resource security
• Security planning and technical resource assistance
• Public safety and security support
• Support to access, traffic, and crowd control
ESF 14—Long-Term Community Recovery

• Superseded by the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF)
• Long-Term Community Recovery was superseded by the NDRF. For guid-
ance on long-term community recovery, please refer to the NDRF. http://
www.fema.gov/national-disaster-recovery-framework Refer to this link
for more information on ESF 14: http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets
/documents/32222?id=7368
ESF 15—External Affairs

• ESF Coordinator: DHS
• Emergency public information and protective action guidance
• Media and community relations
• Congressional and international affairs
• Tribal and insular affairs
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLANNING—

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
1.
What is emergency management (EM) planning?
• EM planning is a systematic approach for identifying and minimizing
the impact of risks to life, property, and the environment.
• EM planning provides the foundation for coordinating and integrating
all activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve the capability to
mitigate against, prepare for, respond to, and recover from threatened
or actual natural disasters, criminal acts including terrorism, or other
manmade disasters.
2.
Why should federal/state/local institutions undertake EM planning?
Emergency managers are responsible for developing, testing, and main-
taining mandate-specific EM plans and identifying risks that are within or
related to their area of responsibility.
• EM planning promotes a common understanding of the risks, threats,
and vulnerabilities that may impact an organization and its related sec-
tors and integrates strategies for addressing possible situations.
• EM planning will help federal institutions develop more comprehen-
sive and robust systems and practices in EM which will, in turn, help
strengthen the Government of Canada system.
• EM planning provides a systematic way to think through the life cycle
of a potential event, determine the required capabilities and resources,
and help stakeholders learn and practice their roles.
3.
What is the EM Planning Guide for?
The EM Planning Guide (the Guide) is to assist government institutions
in the preparation of an EM plan and also in response to the recommenda-
tions made by the NIMS/FEMA/NRP and other institutions on EM.
• The Guide furthers the objectives of the EM and, together with the
Federal Policy for Emergency Management, serves to assist in strength-
ening resiliency by promoting a coordinated approach and a more uni-
form structure across federal/state/local government institutions.
• Its purpose is to assist all federal/state/local institutions in meeting their
responsibilities to identify the risks that are within or related to their area
of responsibility—including those related to critical infrastructure—and
to provide those institutions with a step-by-step approach to develop
their all-hazards Strategic Emergency Management Plans (SEMP).
4. What is the planning premise of EM planning?
• EM planning should be based on all four pillars of EM and a compre-
hensive All-Hazards Risk Assessment.
5. What are the “4 pillars” of EM?
1. Prevention and mitigation: Prevention and mitigation refers to actions
taken to identify and reduce the impacts and risks of hazards before an
emergency or disaster occurs.
2. Preparedness: Preparedness increases the ability to respond quickly
and effectively to emergencies and to recover more quickly from their
long-term effects and involves actions taken prior to an event to ensure
the capability and capacity to respond.
3. Response: Response refers to actions taken during or immediately after
an emergency or disaster for the purpose of managing the consequences.
4. Recovery: Recovery refers to actions taken after an emergency or disas-
ter to reestablish or rebuild conditions and services.
6. When should I begin EM planning?
• Optimally, the timing for EM planning would correspond with the
environmental-related risk assessment activities.
• Your SEMP should be linked to your EM planning and reflective of
your established priorities.
7. What is a SEMP?
• A SEMP establishes a federal/state/local government institution’s
objectives, approach, and structure that set out how the institution will
assist the coordinated federal emergency response and should, if appli-
cable, include any Emergency Support Functions.
• EM plans, such as the SEMP, represent an institution’s planning associ-
ated with its “external” environment.
• The qualifier “Strategic” is used to differentiate this high-level plan
from other types of EM plans, including operational plans. The devel-
opment and implementation of a SEMP are important complements to
other types of EM plans because it promotes an integrated and coordi-
nated approach to EM planning.
8. Are there other types of EM plans?
Yes. There are several different types of EM plans:
• Operational Plans
• Response Plans
• Incident-/Risk-Specific Plans (i.e., fire)

• Event-Specific Plans (i.e., G8)
• Institution or Division Specific Plans (i.e., Regional Plan)
• Business Continuity Plans
9. What is meant by All-Hazards Risk Assessment?
All-Hazards Risk Assessment is a systematic approach for concurrently
identifying, analyzing, and estimating all natural, accidental, and malicious
threats and hazards.
All-Hazards Risk Assessment answers four key questions in a system-
atic way, as a basis for all EM planning:
• What can go wrong and how much warning time are we likely to have?
• How likely is it that the risk will happen?
• What are the consequences for specific stakeholders and society as a
whole?
• How well prepared is the institution, collectively, to respond and recover
from such a risk?
By addressing these questions systematically, an All-Hazards Risk
Assessment
• Promotes the development of a management structure, processes, and
procedures throughout the four phases of EM that are applicable to
every significant identified hazard;
• Helps to balance and prioritize risk investments and actions;
• Helps to identify interdependencies;
• Promotes integration of lessons learned and adoption of a forward-
looking approach; and
• Supports consistent approach and enables cooperation.
10. How does All-Hazards Risk Assessment relate to EM planning?
• All-Hazards Risk Assessment informs all pillars of EM planning.
• EM planning based on an all-hazards approach recognizes that the
causes of emergencies can vary greatly, but many of the effects do not.
• EM Planning based on an all-hazards approach allows planners to
address emergency functions common to all hazards in the basic plan
instead of having unique plans for every type of hazard.
• All-hazards EM planning supports the identification of common tasks
and who is responsible for accomplishing those tasks.
11. What EM training is available and where can it be provided?
• The Emergency Management Institute (EMI) and FEMA offers mul-
tiple courses available to all levels of employees, which are free online
or traditional classroom courses.
12. What tools are available to assist me through the EM planning process?
In addition to offering several EM-related courses, EMI and FEMA pro-
vide you with guidance documents such as the EM Planning Guide and the
Emergency Management Leading Practices.
• Moreover, workshops are also held in support of implementation of
those EM leading practices.
• Finally, criteria for self-assessment and evaluation of Strategic EM

Plans are established by NIMS, NRP, and other documents.
13.
How frequently will the EM Planning Guide be updated?
• The EM Planning Guide will be needs to be updated to reflect the inte-
gration of the All-Hazards Risk Assessment Framework.
• Subsequent revisions will be made on an annual basis, or as the situa-
tion dictates and amendments will be made at that time.
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Index
A Communication
crisis, 100
Accountability, see Professional accountability escalating crisis, 37
Acronyms and abbreviations, 327–333 risk perception and, 34–38
Agricultural vulnerability, 47 Community, 62
Anthropogenic intentional hazards, 44 emergency response teams (CERTs), 28
Anthropogenic nonintentional processes, 43 stakeholders, 28–29
As low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) Composite risk management (CRM) process,
objective, 60 127–130
Atmospheric-sourced processes, 42 exposure, 129
Atomic-bomb blueprint, 214 levels of risk management, 127
principles, 128
B probability, 129
risk assessment matrix, 128–129
Ballistic threats, 185–186 risk components, 129–130
Biological hazards, 131, 132 risk priority list, 129
Biological processes, 43 severity, 129
BP case study, see Gulf of Mexico oil spill and steps, 127
BP case study Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan
Business (CEMP), 26
continuity planning, 101–102 Computer security, 84–85
interruption, 28 Computers and IT systems, threats to, 142–144
recovery, 63, 99 Concept of operations (CONOPS), 61, 256, 291
Confrontation crisis, 97
C Consequence management, 105–113
all-hazard approach, 107
CAR program, see State Capability Assessment benefits of consequence management
for Readiness (CAR) program systems, 111–112
CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, coordinating response, 112–113
nuclear, and high-yield explosives), 44 software, 108–110
CEMP, see Comprehensive Emergency Contingency
Management Plan fund, 32
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) triad, 144 planning, 101
Certification, 73–74 Controller, 68
Certified Business Continuity Professional Countersurveillance, 93–94
(CBCP), 12, 25 Crime Prevention through Environmental Design
Certified Emergency Manager (CEM), 12, 25, (CPTED), 183
74, 243 Crisis management, 95–104
CERTs, see Community emergency response apologies, role of, 102
teams (CERTs) business continuity planning, 101–102
Channelization, 48 business recovery, 99
Chemical hazards, 131, 133 confrontation crisis, 97
CIKR, see Critical infrastructure and key containment and damage control, 99
resources (CIKR) contingency planning, 101
Citizen emergency response, see Disaster crisis communication, 100
myths, disaster demands, and citizen crisis leadership, 98–99, 103
emergency response crisis of malevolence, 97
Civil disobedience, 44 crisis management model, 100
Coercive power, reward and, 29 crisis management planning, 101
Cognitive vulnerability, 140
349
350 Index
crisis management strategy (CMS), 100 Diffusion of innovation theory, 102

crisis management teams (CMTs), 103 Disaster
crisis of organizational misdeeds, 97–98 classification, see Hazard and disaster
diffusion of innovation theory, 102 classification
learning, 100 management, definition of, 1
models and theories, 100–102 natural, 17, 96
natural disaster, 96 recovery, preparedness for, see Preparedness
rumors, 98 for emergency response and disaster
signal detection, 99 recovery
social media and, 103–104 response technologies, 13–14
structural-functional systems theory, 102 subculture, 32
technological crisis, 97 technological, 17
types of crisis, 96–99 terrorist, 17–18
unequal human capital theory, 103 Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team
workplace violence, 98 (DMORT), 196, 197–198
Critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR), identification of remains, 197–198
257 incidents, 198
CRM process, see Composite risk management organization, 197
(CRM) process Disaster myths, disaster demands, and citizen
Cyberspace, emergency management and, emergency response, 51–54
219–233 evacuation, 52–53
attribution, challenge of, 221 household behavior, 53
civil motivations, 224 integrative responses, 52
Cyber-Humint, 228–230 panic, 51
cybersecurity standards, 230 response myths, 51
cyber spying, 225–227 search and rescue, 53
cyber threat intelligence (CTI), 220–221 shock and panic, 51
cyber warfare, 222–223 stress and health, 53–54
denial-of-service attack, 223 victim response, 51–52
electrical power grid, 223–224 warnings, 52
espionage, 222 Domestic terrorism, 163–164
European Telecommunications Standards Donations, 11
Institute Cybersecurity Technical Drills, 67–68
Committee, 230–231
hacktivism, 225 E
ISO 27001 and 27002, 231
military motivations, 224 Earth hazardous to your health, 41
motivations, 224–225 Earthquake, 39
National Institute of Standards and Economic Crisis Strike Force (ECSF), 290
Technology, 232–233 Economic groups, 28
national strategy to secure cyberspace, Electrical power grid, 223–224
227–230 Emergency assessment, 54
private sector, 225 Emergency classification system, 58
recent definitions of cyberspace, 220 Emergency management, 1–15
sabotage, 223 communicating and incident assessment, 2
standard of good practice, 232 definition of, 1
virtual environments, 219 disaster response technologies, 13–14
Cyber threat management (CTM), 154 emergency planning ideals, 1–2
Cyber threats, 186–187 FEMA Emergency Management Institute,
14–15
D implementation ideals, 2–12
mitigation, 3
Damage assessment, 58 phases and personal activities, 2–12
Definitions, 324–325 preincident training and testing, 2
Denial-of-service (DoS) attack, 223 preparedness, 3–11
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) prevention, 2–3
National Response Framework, 281 as profession, 12–15
Index 351
recovery, 11–12 European Telecommunications Standards

response, 11 Institute (ETSI) Cybersecurity
within other professions, 14 Technical Committee, 230–231
Emergency Management Accreditation Program Evacuation trip generation, 52
(EMAP), 67 Evaluation, 65–69
Emergency Management Committee, 25–26 CAR program, 67
Emergency Management Information Systems controller, 68
(EMIS), 13, 24 drill, exercises, and incidents, 67–68
Emergency Management Institute (EMI), 14–15, Emergency Management Accreditation
243 Program, 67
Emergency management planning (frequently evaluator, 67, 68
asked questions), 338–341 full-scale exercise, 68
Emergency manager, 72, 73 functional exercise, 68
Emergency medical services (EMS), 189–190 NFPA Standard 1600, 66–67
Emergency medical technician (EMT), 190 organizational evaluation, 66
Emergency operations plan (EOP), 25, 33–34 performance appraisals, 65–66
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to- task work, 68
Know Act (EPCRA), 4, 20 teamwork, 68
Emergency preparedness practices, 44, 45 training and risk communication, 68
Emergency responder, 72 Evaluator, 67, 68
Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Template, Explosives, 38
see School Emergency Response External threat, 79
Plan (ERP) Template; State or local Extraterrestrial processes, 43
Emergency Response Plan (ERP)
Template F
Emergency shelter, 62
Emergency support functions, 335–338 Family assistance center (FAC), 200–203
agriculture and natural resources, 337 collection and dissemination of antemortem
communications, 336 data, 202
energy, 337 fatality processing and storage operations,
external affairs, 338 202–203
firefighting, 336 public health fatality management operations,
information and planning, 336 201–202
logistics management and resource support, role for public health in fatality management,
336–337 201
long-term community recovery, 338 survivor mental/behavioral health services,
mass care, emergency assistance, temporary 202
housing, and human services, 336 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 175
oil and hazardous materials response, 337 Federal Emergency Management Agency
public health and medical services, 337 (FEMA), 1, 105
public safety and security, 337– consequence management solution
public works and engineering, 336 definitions, 106
search and rescue, 337 Emergency Management Higher Education
transportation, 335 Project, 12
Environmental hazards, 133–135 Emergency Management Institute,
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 14–15
Criminal Enforcement program, 105 Multi-Hazard Identification and Risk
EOP, see Emergency operations plan (EOP) Assessment, 46, 47
EPCRA, see Emergency Planning and Public Assistance program, 282
Community Right-to-Know Act Federal Security Risk Management (FSRM), 182
(EPCRA) Firefighters, 190
ERP Template, see School Emergency Response Fire Scope, 26
Plan (ERP) Template; State or local Firestorms, 39
Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Floods, 39
Template Floodwalls, 49
Escalating crisis communication, 37 FSRM, see Federal Security Risk Management
Espionage, 222 (FSRM)
352 Index
Full-scale exercise, 68 major categories, 41

Functional annex, 57 mass shootings, 44
Functional exercise, 68 natural hazards, categories of, 42
nuclear processes, 43
G still hazardous, 42
structural processes, 44
Geological-sourced processes, 42 technological processes, 43
Global challenges, 75–76 terrorism, 44
Governmental groups, 29 transportation processes, 43
Government classification, 86–87 WMD CBRNE, 44
clearance, 87 Hazard mitigation, 19, 48–51
confidential, 87 building construction practices, 49–50
official, 87 channelization, 48
restricted, 87 floodwalls, 49
secret, 87 hazard mitigation measures, 50
top secret, 86 industrial hazard controls, 49
unclassified, 87 land-use practices, 49
Government stakeholders, 29 levees, 49
Gulf of Mexico oil spill and BP case study, mitigation strategies, 48–49
313–319 natural hazards, 50
economic impact, 313 practices, 44, 45
environmental impact, 313–315 right-to-know provisions, 50
improving the safety of offshore operations, structural protection, 50
316 sustainable development, 50
lessons learned, 315–316 Hazards (risk), 131–138
local involvement in oil spill drills, 318 administrative controls, 138
need for new approach to handling spills of biological hazards, 131, 132
national significance, 317 chemical hazards, 131, 133
need to strengthen state and local engineering controls, 138
involvement, 317–319 environmental hazards, 133–135
recommendations, 317 hazard identification, 132–135
strengthening oil spill response, planning, hazard types, 131–132
and capacity, 317 hazard vs risk, 132
Vessel of Opportunity Program, 318–319 hierarchy of hazard control, 136–138
volunteer management program, 318 mechanical hazard, 131, 132
personal protective equipment, 138
H physical hazard, 132
risk, 135
Hacktivism, 225 Hazards (U.S.), 38–41
Hazard earthquake, 39
analysis, 123 explosives, 38
exposure, 45, 46, 47 firestorms, 39
prevention, 121 floods, 39
SMAUG model, 136 hazmat, 39, 40
vulnerability analysis (HVA), 23, 24; hurricane, 38, 39
see also Hazard, vulnerability, interface fires, 38
and risk analysis natural hazards, 38, 40, 42
Hazard and disaster classification, 41–44 100-year flood, 39
anthropogenic intentional hazards, 44 severe storms, 38
anthropogenic nonintentional processes, 43 storm surge, 39
atmospheric-sourced processes, 42 technological hazards, 38, 39–40
biological processes, 43 tornadoes, 38
civil disobedience, 44 tsunamis, 39
earth hazardous to your health, 41 wild land fires, 38
extraterrestrial processes, 43 Hazard, vulnerability, and risk analysis, 44–48
geological-sourced processes, 42 agricultural vulnerability, 47
hydrological-sourced processes, 42 assessing risk, 47–48
Index 353
community vulnerability, 44 Information, compartmented, 87–89

emergency preparedness practices, 44, 45 corporate classification, 89
event-specific conditions, 45 international, 88
hazard exposure, 45, 46, 47 NATO classifications, 88
hazard mitigation practices, 44, 45 traffic light protocol, 89
hazard and vulnerability analyses, 46 United States, classified information in, 88–89
HAZUS-MH, 47 Insider threats, 185
human vulnerability, 47 Installation ICS (IICS), 27
interventions, 45–46 Interface fires, 38
Multi-Hazard Identification and Risk Internal threat, 79
Assessment, 46, 47 International Association of Emergency
physical vulnerability, 45, 46, 47 Managers (IAEM), 73
preimpact conditions, 45 International emergency management, 69–72
social impacts, 45 Chi-Chi earthquake, 71–72
social vulnerability, 45, 47 economic resources, 69
vulnerability analysis, 47 emergency management in Brazil, 70
vulnerable zone, 46 government organization, 69–70
Hazmat, 39, 40, 190 India’s recovery, 70–71
HAZUS-MH, 47 land-use in Colombia, 71
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation military and organizations, 70
Program (HSEEP), 274 New Zealand restructuring, 70
Home security, 84 policy variations, 69
Hospital Incident Command System, 13 Seveso Directives, 71
Hospitals, 191 International Organization for Standardization
Household recovery, 62 (ISO), 115
Housing Intimate terrorism, 164
permanent, 62 Inverse surveillance, 93–94
temporary, 62, 64 Invulnerability, 140
Human vulnerability, 47
Hurricane, 38, 39 J
HVA, see Hazard vulnerability analysis (HVA)
Hydrological-sourced processes, 42 Joint Field Office (JFO), 290
Joint Information Center (JIC), 261
I
L
IAEM, see International Association of
Emergency Managers (IAEM) Land-use practices, 49
Incident Command Post (ICP), 265 Legitimate power, 29
Incident Command System (ICS), 23, 26–28 Levees, 49
Incident Management Cadre (IMC), 293 Local emergency management agency (LEMA),
Incident Management System (IMS), 55 31, 32
Indian Ocean tsunami 2004 case study, Local Emergency Response Plan (LERP), 235
307–312 Loss prevention, 79
impact of tsunami in islands of the Indian
Ocean, 310 M
impact of tsunami on landscape and
population, 307 Malevolence, crisis of, 97
lessons learned, 309, 310–311 Mass casualty incident (MCI) and mass fatality
long-term aid, 308 incident (MFI), 189–208
methods of prediction, 307–308 agencies and responders, 189–191
role of aid agencies, 308–309 definitive care, 193–194
short-term aid, 308 Disaster Mortuary Operational Response
Industrial hazard controls, 49 Team, 197–198
Information emergency medical services, 189–190
power, 29 family assistance center, 200–203
security management system (ISMS), 153 fire and rescue, 190
security threats, 186–187 hospitals, 191
354 Index
interim-care center, 194 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), 281

mass casualty event, 194 National Institute of Standards and Technology
mass fatality management, 198–200 (NIST), 232–233
mass fatality management resources, 196 National Response Framework (NRF), 11, 235
MCI, declaration of, 189 National Security Administration (NSA), 222
MCI, flow of, 191–193 NATO information classifications, 88
MFI definition, 194–196 Natural disaster, 96
morgue operations, 199–200 Natural hazards, 38, 40, 42
on-site morgue, 193 NBC, see Nuclear, biological, or chemical
physical security assessment, 206 weapons (NBC)
public safety, 190 NERC, see North American Electric Reliability
public services, 190–191 Corporation (NERC)
response functions, 196 NGOs, see Nongovernmental organizations
search and recovery, 199 (NGOs)
security, 203–208 NIMS, see National Incident Management System
security objectives, 204–205 NIST, see National Institute of Standards and
security planning, information to request for, Technology
205–206 No Foreign dissemination (NOFORN), 87
security requirements, 204 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 50,
security and traffic control plan templates, 235, 281
207–208 North American Electric Reliability Corporation
specialized teams, 190 (NERC), 224
treatment, 192–193 NRF, see National Response Framework (NRF)
triage, 191–192 NSA, see National Security Administration (NSA)
Mass shootings, 44 Nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons (NBC),
MCI, see Mass casualty incident (MCI) and mass 209
fatality incident (MFI) Nuclear processes, 43
Mechanical hazard, 131, 132
Medical examiner/coroner (ME/C), 194 O
Memorandums of Understanding (MOU), 253
Metropolitan Medical Response System 100-year flood, 39
(MMRS), 56 Open Web Application Security Project
MFI, see Mass casualty incident (MCI) and mass (OWASP), 144–145
fatality incident (MFI) Organizational emergency response, 58–61
Military vulnerability, 140 care of victims, 60
Morgue concept of operations, 61
on-site, 193 damage assessment, 58
operations, 199–200 emergency assessment, 58
Multi-Hazard Identification and Risk emergency classification system, 58
Assessment, 46, 47 emergency medical care, 60
exposure control, 60
N hazard monitoring, 58
hazard operations, 58–59
National challenges, 76 incident management, 61
National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), 196 monitoring and assessment, 58
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) population protection, 59–60
Standards Council, 66 protective actions, 59
National Incident Management System (NIMS), Organizational evaluation, 66
189, 235–245, 281 Organizational misdeeds, crisis of, 97–98
benefits of certifications, 244–245 Originator Controlled dissemination (ORCON), 87
Certified Emergency Manager, 243–245 OWASP, see Open Web Application Security
Compliance Objectives, 236–238 Project
courses, 239–240
leadership responsibilities, 240–241 P
maintaining certification, 244
preparation needed, 242–243 Panic, 51
technology, 240 PDDs, see Presidential disaster declarations (PDDs)
Index 355
Permanent housing, 62 community stakeholders, 28–29

Personal protective equipment (PPE), 138 community vulnerability, 44
Physical hazard, 132 Comprehensive Emergency Management
Physical vulnerability, 45, 46 Plan, 26
Planning process, 17–20 concept of operations, 61
definitions, 17 contingency fund, 32
emergency manager’s role, 18 controller, 68
hazard mitigation, 19 damage assessment, 58
local management, 18 definitions, 17
natural disasters, 17 development and ethics, 73
preparedness, 19 disaster myths, disaster demands, and citizen
recovery, 19 emergency response, 51–54
response, 19 disaster recovery, 62–65
secondary impacts, 19 disaster subculture, 32
strategy mix, 20 distinguishing emergency management, 72
technological disasters, 17 drill, exercises, and incidents, 67–68
terrorist disasters, 17–18 earth hazardous to your health, 41
Political terrorism, 162 earthquake, 39
Pollution Prevention Act, 20 economic groups, 28
PPE, see Personal protective equipment (PPE) effective organizations, building of, 31–34
Preincident training and testing, 2 emergency assessment, 58
Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA), 64, 294 emergency classification system, 58
Preparedness for emergency response and Emergency Management Accreditation
disaster recovery, 54–57 Program, 67
emergency assessment, 54 Emergency Management Committee, 25–26
emergency operations centers, 56 emergency management planning tree, 21
emergency planning principles, 54 emergency management as a profession, 73
EOP components, 57 emergency management stakeholders, 28–31
functional annex, 57 emergency manager, 31, 72, 73
IMS implementation, 55–56 emergency medical care, 60
Incident Management System, 55 emergency operations centers, 56
organizational structures, 55, 56–57 emergency operations plan, 33–34
response functions, 54–55 emergency planning principles, 54
Presidential disaster declarations (PDDs), 39, 105 emergency preparedness practices, 44, 45
Principles of emergency management, 24–28 emergency responder, 72
Private sector partners (PSPs), 281 emergency shelter, 62
Process of emergency management, 17–77 environmental hazards, 38
academic programs, 74 EOP components, 57
agenda setting, 30 escalating crisis communication, 37
agricultural vulnerability, 47 evacuation, 52–53
anthropogenic intentional hazards, 44 evaluation, 65–69
anthropogenic nonintentional processes, 43 evaluator, 67, 68
assessing risk, 47–48 explosives, 38
atmospheric-sourced processes, 42 exposure control, 60
biological hazards, 40 extraterrestrial processes, 43
biological processes, 43 firestorms, 39
body of knowledge, 73 floods, 39
building construction practices, 49–50 floodwalls, 49
business interruption, 28 full-scale exercise, 68
business recovery, 63 functional annex, 57
care of victims, 60 functional exercise, 68
CAR program, 67 funding sources, 32
certification, 73–74 future directions in emergency management,
CERTs, 28 75–77
channelization, 48 geological-sourced processes, 42
civil disobedience, 44 geophysical hazards, 39
community, 62 global challenges, 75–76
356 Index
governmental groups, 29 planning process, 17–20

government stakeholders, 29 policy adoption, 30
hazard and disaster classification, 41–44 policy formulation, 30
hazard exposure, 45, 46, 47 policy process, 29–30
hazard mitigation, 19, 48–51 population protection, 59–60
hazard monitoring, 58 preliminary damage assessment, 64
hazard operations, 58–59 preparedness, 19, 22, 54–57
hazard and vulnerability analyses, 46 principal hazards (U.S.), 38–41
hazard vulnerability analysis, 23, 24 principles of emergency management, 24–28
hazard, vulnerability, and risk analysis, profession, defining, 72
44–48 professional accountability, 72–75
hazmat, 39, 40 professional challenges, 77
HAZUS-MH, 47 professional opportunities, 77
household behavior, 53 protective actions, 59
household recovery, 62 rapid assessment, 64
human vulnerability, 47 recovery, 19, 23
hurricane, 38, 39 recovery management, 64–65
hydrological-sourced processes, 42 recovery operations plan, 63–64
IMS implementation, 55–56 recovery process, 62
Incident Command System, 26–28 referent power, 29
Incident Management System, 55 response, 19, 23
India’s recovery, 70–71 response functions, 54–55
industrial hazard controls, 49 response myths, 51
information power, 29 reward and coercive power, 29
integrative responses, 52 right-to-know provisions, 50
interface fires, 38 risk assessment, 35
international emergency management, 69–72 risk communication, 37
land-use practices, 49 risk perception and communication, 34–38
legal liability, 74 search and rescue, 53
legitimate power, 29 severe storms, 38
LEMA, 31, 32 shock and panic, 51
levees, 49 short-term recovery, 64
local government recovery, 63 site assessment, 64
local management, 18 social groups, 28
long-term reconstruction, 64 social vulnerability, 45, 47
mass shootings, 44 state and federal governments, 63
meteorological hazards, 38 storm surge, 39
mitigation, 21–22 strategy mix, 20
mitigation strategies, 48–49 stress and health, 53–54
monitoring and assessment, 58 structural processes, 44
Multi-Hazard Identification and Risk structural protection, 50
Assessment, 46, 47 sustainable development, 50
national challenges, 76, 77 task work, 68
natural disasters, 17 teamwork, 68
natural hazards, 38, 40, 50 technological disasters, 17
NFPA Standard 1600, 66–67 technological hazards, 38, 39–40
nuclear processes, 43 technological processes, 43
100-year flood, 39 temporary housing, 62, 64
opportunities, 76 temporary shelter, 62, 64
organizational emergency response, 58–61 terrorism, 44
organizational evaluation, 66 terrorist disasters, 17
organizational structures, 55, 56–57 terrorist threats, 76–77
panic, 51 tools used in emergency management, 24–25
performance appraisals, 65–66 tornadoes, 38
permanent housing, 62 toxic chemicals, 40
physical vulnerability, 45, 46, 47 training and risk communication, 68
pillars of emergency management, 20–24 transportation processes, 43
Index 357
tsunamis, 39 identification, 117–118

victim response, 51–52 implementation, 122–124
victims’ needs assessment, 64 likelihood of occurrence, 125
vulnerability analysis, 47 limitations, 123
vulnerable zone, 46 method, 116
warnings, 34–35, 52 potential risk treatments, 120
wild land fires, 38 principles, 116–117
window of opportunity, 30 process, 117–122
WMD CBRNE, 44 review and evaluation of plan, 123
Profession, defining, 72 risk avoidance, 120–121
Professional accountability, 72–75 risk management plan, 122
academic programs, 74 risk options, 120
body of knowledge, 73 risk reduction, 121
certification, 73–74 risk retention, 122
development and ethics, 73 risk sharing, 121–122
distinguishing emergency management, 72 severity definitions (safety related), 124–125
emergency management as a profession, 73 Risk perception and communication, 34–38
emergency manager, 72, 73 adaptive plan, 35
emergency responder, 72 continuing hazard phase, 35–37
legal liability, 74 escalating crisis communication, 37
profession, defining, 72 risk assessment, 35
Professional certifications, 25 risk communication, 37
risk and warning, 34
Q warning processing, 34–35
RTK provisions, see Right-to-know (RTK)
Quantitative analysis, 91 provisions
Quasi-terrorism, 162 Rumors, 98
R S
Rapid assessment, 64 Sabotage, 223
Recovery, 19 School Emergency Response Plan (ERP)
Referent power, 29 Template, 247–280
Religious terrorism, 164 administration, finance, and logistics,
Response, 19 272–273
Reward and coercive power, 29 agency/department-focused ERP format basic
Right-to-know (RTK) provisions, 50 plan, 248
Risk, 89–91; see also Hazards (risk) authorities and references, 275–276
acceptance, 81 Concept of Operations, 256–260
assessment and analysis, 91 definitions, 276–279
avoidance, 80–81 direction, control, and coordination,
communication, 68 264–271
definitions, 90 Emergency Response Plan organization, 247
options, 80–81 Emergency Response Plan Template, 247,
quantitative analysis, 91 279–280
reduction, 81 information collection, analysis, and
spreading, 81 dissemination, 272
transfer, 81 introduction material, 249–251
Risk management, 115–125; see also National Incident Management System,
Composite risk management 258–259
(CRM) process organization and assignment of
assessment, 118–119 responsibilities, 260–264
composite risk index, 119–120 plan development and maintenance, 273–275
establishing the context, 117 purpose, scope, situation, and assumptions,
hazard analysis, 123 252–256
hazard prevention, 121 table of contents, 248–249
hazards and risk, 124 Secondary impacts, 19
358 Index
Security management, 79–94 policy process, 29–30

categorizing security, 83–84 power, 29
compartmented information, 87–89 State Capability Assessment for Readiness
computer security, 84–85 (CAR) program, 67
countersurveillance, 93–94 State emergency management agencies (SEMAs),
definition of security, 82–86 29
government classification, 86–87 State or local Emergency Response Plan (ERP)
home security, 84 Template, 281–305
intrusion detection, 81–82 authorities and references, 305
inverse surveillance, 93–94 component response diagram, 283
loss prevention, 79 components of emergency operations plan,
perceived security compared to real security, 282
82–83 concept of operations, 291–297
risk, 89–91 emergency management program, 281–282
risk acceptance, 81 hazard identification and risk assessment, 289
risk avoidance, 80–81 introduction material, 285–289
risk options, 80–81 organizational structure, 289–290
risk reduction, 81 plan management and maintenance, 302–305
risk spreading, 81 roles and responsibilities, 297–302
risk transfer, 81 table of contents, 283–285
security and classified information, 85–86 State terrorism, 162–163, 165–166
security concepts, 84 Storm surge, 39
security increase, 91–94 Structural-functional systems theory, 102
security management in organizations, 85 Structural processes, 44
security policy implementations, 81–82 Surveillance, 92–94
security risk management, 79 Sustainable development, 50
sousveillance, 93–94 System threat classification, 146–148
surveillance, 92–94
3D security, 85 T
types of security threats, 79–80
SEMAs, see State emergency management Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), 221
agencies (SEMAs) Task work, 68
SERS, see Smart Emergency Response System Teamwork, 68
(SERS) Technological crisis, 97
Severe storms, 38 Technological disasters, 17
Shelter Technological hazards, 38, 39–40
emergency, 62 Technological processes, 43
temporary, 62, 64 Temporary housing, 62, 64
Site assessment, 64 Temporary shelter, 62, 64
Small Business Administration (SBA) Disaster Terms, 321–323
Loan Program, 294 Terrorism, 44
Smart Emergency Response System (SERS), 13 Terrorism, impact of, 157–169
SMAUG model (hazard risks), 136 databases, 167–168
Social groups, 28 definition of terrorism, 158–160
Social media, crisis management and, 103–104 democracy and domestic terrorism, 163–164
Social vulnerability, 45, 139–140 intimate terrorism, 164
Software, 108–110 motivations of terrorists, 163–164
Sousveillance, 93–94 origin of the term, 157–158
Special Intelligence (SI), 87 pejorative use, 160–162
Stakeholders, 28–31 perpetrators, 165
agenda setting, 30 religious terrorism, 164
community stakeholders, 28–29 responses, 167
government stakeholders, 29 state terrorism, 165–166
involving stakeholders, 29 tactics, 166–167
policy adoption, 30 types of terrorism, 162–163
policy formulation, 30 War on Terror, 168–169
Index 359
Terrorism threat/vulnerability assessments Vulnerability, 139–155; see also Hazard,

and risk analysis, management of, vulnerability, and risk analysis
171–187 applications, 139
actions leading to risk reduction, basic methodology, 142
identification of, 176–177 cognitive vulnerability, 140
application, 182–183 computers and IT systems, threats to, 142–144
asset vulnerabilities, identification of, 176 cyber threat management, 154
ballistic threats, 185–186 hazard planning, 142
Crime Prevention through Environmental invulnerability, 140
Design, 183–184 military vulnerability, 140
cyber and information security threats, Open Web Application Security Project,
186–187 144–145
design basis threat tactics, 184–187 research, 139
detailed risk assessment, 172–173 social vulnerability, 139–140
infrastructure facility design, 177 system threat classification, 146–148
insider threats, 185 terminology, 148–149
reevaluation of risks, 181–182 threat action, 150
risk analysis, 180 threat analysis, 150
risk management, 173–175 threat classification, 146
scenarios, determination of risk through, threat consequence, 150–153
176 threat hunting, 154–155
terrorism risk management program, threat landscape or environment, 153
development of, 171–177 threat management, 153–154
threat assessment, 177–179 threat source, 149–150
threat identification and initial site types, 139–140
assessment, 172 vulnerability assessment, 140–141
threats, identification of, 175–176 vulnerability index, 141–142
unauthorized entry (forced and covert), window of vulnerability, 139
184–185 Vulnerable zone (VZ), 46
upgrade recommendations, 180–181
vulnerability assessment, 179–180 W
WMDs, 186
Terrorist Warning processing, 34–35
disasters, 17–18 War on Terror (WoT), 168–169
threats, 76–77 Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), 44, 175,
Threats, see Vulnerability 209–217
3D security, 85 atomic-bomb blueprint, 214
Tornadoes, 38 CBRNE, 44
Transportation processes, 43 criminal (civilian) definition, 211–212
Triage, 191–192 definitions of term, 209–212
Tsunamis, 39 media coverage, 214–215
TTPs, see Tactics, techniques, and procedures militant groups, 216–217
(TTPs) military definition, 211
nuclear material, incidents involving, 217
U nuclear terrorism, 215–216
nuclear weapons, 213
Unauthorized entry (forced and covert), strategic definition, 209–211
184–185 treaties not to use WMDs, 212–213
Unequal human capital theory, 103 use, possession, and access, 213–214
Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI), 56 U.S. politics, 213
User and entity behavior analytics (UEBA), 154 Wild land fires, 38
Window of opportunity, 30
V Window of vulnerability, 139
WMD, see Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)
Vessel of Opportunity Program (VOO), 318–319 Workplace violence, 98
Victims’ needs assessment, 64 WoT, see War on Terror

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Printed on acid-free paper

International Standard Book Number-13: 978-1-138-56853-2 (Hardback)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Name: Madigan, Michael L., author.

Visit the Taylor & Francis Web site at

and the CRC Press Web site at

Chapter 1 Emergency Management....................................................................... 1

Chapter 2 Introduction to Emergency Management: Step by Step Process........ 17

The Four Pillars of Emergency Management.....................................20

Hazard and Vulnerability Analyses...............................................46

Organizational Emergency Response................................................. 58

Chapter 3 Security Management.......................................................................... 79

Chapter 4 Crisis Management.............................................................................. 95

Chapter 5 Consequence Management................................................................ 105

Chapter 6 Risk Management.............................................................................. 115

Chapter 7 Composite Risk Management Process.............................................. 127

Chapter 8 Hazards (Risk)................................................................................... 131

Chapter 9 Vulnerability...................................................................................... 139

Chapter 10 Emergency Management and Understanding the Impact

Chapter 11 Managing Terrorism Threat/Vulnerability Assessments

Chapter 12 Mass Casualty Incident and Mass Fatality Incident......................... 189

Flow of an MCI................................................................................. 191

Chapter 13 Emergency Management and Weapons of Mass Destruction...........209

Use, Possession, and Access.............................................................. 213

Chapter 14 Cyberspace and Emergency Management........................................ 219

Chapter 16 School Emergency Response Plan Template..................................... 247

Chapter 17 State or Local Emergency Response Plan Template......................... 281

Chapter 18 Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 Case Study..........................................307

Chapter 19 Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill and BP Case Study................................... 313

Improving the Safety of Offshore Operations................................... 316

Appendix A: Terms and Definitions.................................................................... 321

Disaster management (or emergency management) is the creation of plans through

EMERGENCY PLANNING IDEALS

• Recognition or identification of risks

There are a number of guidelines and publications regarding emergency plan-

Preincident Training and Testing

Communicating and Incident Assessment

Phases and Personal Activities

Local Emergency Planning Committees

• Identification of facilities and transportation routes of extremely hazardous

According to the Environmental Protection Agency, “Many LEPCs have expanded

Classroom Response Kit

Kitchen Fire Extinguisher

Items on Shelves in Basements

Nonperishable Food in Cabinets

• Three-day supply of nonperishable food

• Water—one gallon per person, per day

Children are a special population when considering emergency preparedness, and

• Books and magazines

Emergency preparedness goes beyond immediate family members. For many

• Jumper cables: might want to include flares or reflective triangle

In addition to emergency supplies and training for various situations, FEMA

Marked Gas Shutoff

as quickly as possible. During reconstruction, it is recommended to consider the

3. Risk-driven—use sound risk management principles (hazard identification,

Disaster Response Technologies

in a 3D environment (Google Earth) to unlock the ability to observe the operations