G.R. No.

171396 May 3, 2006

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP
1017) and 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Hence, such issuances are void
for being unconstitutional.

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017
declaring a state of national emergency, as there was a clear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the
Philippine State and of the Filipino people;

On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017, ordering the (AFP) and the (PNP), to prevent and
suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country;

For their part, petitioners cited the events that followed after the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.

Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary
celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments.

Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that " warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including media, can
already be implemented."

groups of protesters, marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of converging at the EDSA shrine. hundreds of
riot policemen broke up an EDSA celebration rally.

During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the
University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-
list Akbayan.

operatives of the (CIDG), on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila, confiscated news
stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue.

A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another pro-
opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.

Also, the police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing the Anakpawis Party and Chairman of (KMU).

In 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.

In the interim, these seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were filed with this Court
against the above-named respondents. Three (3) of these petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent.

on the grounds that:

it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law;

PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute "usurpation of legislative powers"; "violation of freedom of expression" and "a
declaration of martial law." They alleged that President Arroyo "gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed
forces without clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless violence and a showing that there is necessity
to do so."

PP 1017 is an "arbitrary and unlawful exercise by the President of her Martial Law powers." And assuming that PP 1017 is
not really a declaration of Martial Law, petitioners argued that "it amounts to an exercise by the President of emergency
powers without congressional approval."

In respondents’ Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General countered that: the petitions should be dismissed because:

petitioners have no legal standing;

it is not necessary for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as respondent;

ISSUE: Whether petitioners have legal standing. – YES

HELD:

II- Legal Standing

Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.

In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" who is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing an
allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public.

He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or ‘taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that he
is entitled to seek judicial protection.

In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen"
or "taxpayer.

Case law held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the former, the
plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the
public concern.

However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more
stringent "direct injury" test, which states that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an
executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not
sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public.

This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. Vera doctrine provides that, the person who impugns the validity
of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain
direct injury as a result."

However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court where there is
"transcendental importance" of the cases that may prompt the Court to act liberally. In Aquino v. Comelec, this Court resolved
to pass upon the issues raised due to the "far-reaching implications" of the petition notwithstanding its categorical statement
that petitioner therein had no personality to file the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has been
observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.

By way of summary, taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the
following requirements are met: (C-TVCL)

(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;

(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;

(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;

(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which
must be settled early; and

(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as
legislators.

Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions.

It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of
judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the "liberality doctrine" on legal standing. It cannot be doubted that the
validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. To paraphrase
Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The
petitions thus call for the application of the "transcendental importance" doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for
the petitioners in the "PP 1017 cases."1avvphil.net

This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.

ISSUE: Whether it is necessary for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as respondent?

HELD: No, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure
of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial
branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great
and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this
does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people but
he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.

In effect, GR: President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case. EX: but he
may be removed from office only by means of impeachment.

Petitioners maintain that PP 1017 has no factual basis. Hence, it was not "necessary" for President Arroyo to issue such
Proclamation.

ISSUE: Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.

HELD:

II. Constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5

b. Constitutional Basis of PP 1017

Now on the constitutional foundation of PP 1017.

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:

First provision:

"by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection
or rebellion"

First Provision: Calling-out Power (VIR)

The first provision pertains to the President’s calling-out power. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution reproduced as follows:

“Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out
such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it,
he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial
law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in
the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public
safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need
of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual bases of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
 A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize
the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of
the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.”

grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign/gentle, these
are:

1. the calling-out power,

2. the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and

3. the power to declare Martial Law.

The Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the
President may call the armed forces "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." Are these conditions
present in the instant cases? As stated earlier, considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary
to issue PP 1017. Owing to her Office’s vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of
the country.

Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion
and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered
illegal or ultra vires. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the limitations.

It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the President’s authority to declare a "state of rebellion" and
the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency.

While President Arroyo’s authority to declare a "state of rebellion" emanates from her powers as Chief Executive, the statutory
authority was Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:

SEC. 4. – Proclamations. – Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon
the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations
which shall have the force of an executive order.

President Arroyo’s declaration of a "state of rebellion" was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or
interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed
not written.

In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She
also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and
business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such
Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.

Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is no so. What defines the
character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was her calling-out power.

The declaration of Martial Law is a "warn[ing] to citizens that the military power has been called upon by the executive to assist in
the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not
commit any acts which will in any way render more difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement of law."

An authority in constitutional law, said that of the three powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, the power to declare
Martial Law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties. It is placed in the keeping of the President for the purpose of enabling
him to secure the people from harm and to restore order so that they can enjoy their individual freedoms. In fact, Section 18, Art.
VII, provides:

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts
are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by the President to the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such, any act done contrary to its command is ultra vires.
Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c)
take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be
exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus.

Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of
President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.

c. "AS APPLIED CHALLENGE"

Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? In general, does the illegal
implementation of a law render it unconstitutional? (such as: right against unreasonable search and seizure; the right
against warrantless arrest; and the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and of assembly)

Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be abused and misabused
and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be
determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case.

PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the President’s calling-out power. Its general purpose is to command the AFP to suppress all
forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP
1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the
citizens’ constitutional rights.

Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor committed illegal acts? The
answer is no. The criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for the exercise
of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion. This is logical. Just imagine the absurdity of situations
when laws maybe declared unconstitutional just because the officers implementing them have acted arbitrarily. If this were so,
judging from the blunders committed by policemen in the cases passed upon by the Court, majority of the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code would have been declared unconstitutional a long time ago.

President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP 1017. General orders are "acts and commands of the
President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines." They are internal rules issued by the
executive officer to his subordinates precisely for the proper and efficient administration of law. One requirement for these
rules to be valid is that they must be reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious.

G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the "necessary and appropriate actions and measures
to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."

the phrase "acts of terrorism" is still an amorphous and vague concept. Congress has yet to enact a law defining and punishing
acts of terrorism.

The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military.

Since there is no law defining "acts of terrorism," it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to
determine what acts constitute terrorism. Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without restrictions. These acts go far beyond
the calling-out power of the President. Certainly, they violate the due process clause of the Constitution.

Thus, this Court declares that the "acts of terrorism" portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.

xxx

Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the military or police to commit acts beyond what are necessary and
appropriate to suppress and prevent lawless violence, the limitation of their authority in pursuing the Order. Otherwise,
such acts are considered illegal.

In sum, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President – acting as Commander-in-Chief – addressed to
subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard – that the military and
the police should take only the "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
lawless violence." But the words "acts of terrorism" found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable
by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O. While "terrorism" has been denounced generally in media, no
law has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFP’s authority in carrying out
this portion of G.O. No. 5.
 SUMMATION

In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 – a supervening event – would have normally rendered this case
moot and academic.

However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal acts were committed allegedly in pursuance thereof. Besides, there is no
guarantee that PP 1017, or one similar to it, may not again be issued. Already, there have been media reports on April 30, 2006
that allegedly PP 1017 would be reimposed "if the May 1 rallies" become "unruly and violent." Consequently, the transcendental
issues raised by the parties should not be "evaded;" they must now be resolved to prevent future constitutional aberration.

The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant
jurisprudence discussed earlier.

However, PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP
to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and
(3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also
rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-
owned public utility and private business affected with public interest.

In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President – acting as Commander-in-Chief –
addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard – that the
military and the police should take only the "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent
acts of lawless violence."But the words "acts of terrorism" found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made
punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O. While "terrorism" has been denounced generally in
media, no law has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFP’s authority in
carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5.

Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the
AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.

G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e.
whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of
G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.