[G.R. No. 123169.

November 4, 1996]

DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:

Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay

of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A
petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the
barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing
on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1995.[1] At least 29.30%
of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided
by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioners
opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time
on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed
as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining
order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order,
dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they
should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election
was without COMELEC approval.[2]

In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled
the recall election on January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with
urgent prayer for injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order and required the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public
respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of the Office of the Solicitor Generals
manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the latter
through its law department filed the required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a
reply.[3]

Petitioners argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act
No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that no recall
shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one (1)
year immediately preceding a regular local election, petitioner insists that the scheduled
January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every
three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner citesAssociated Labor Union v.
Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SK election as a
regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular local
election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months separate the SK
election from the recall election. We do not agree.

The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:

1
SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall
election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.

(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.

[Emphasis added.]

It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.[4] The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to
recall election once during his term of office.Paragraph (b) construed together with
paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be
subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus,
subscribing to petitioners interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the
SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code
on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end
of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held every three
years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase regular local
election, as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted
rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.

In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the
legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to
have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute.[5] An interpretation should, if
possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or
as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or
rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.[6]

It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be

interpreted in harmony with the Constitution.[7] Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of
the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict
with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to enact a
local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum x x x.

Moreover, petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we
cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition:

We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather
than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually
found not in the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth x x x[8]

The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as
in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.

Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local
government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the

2
conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The
proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local
elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the officials replacement in the
said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through
a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall
provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election
where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested
and be filled by the electorate.

Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated
under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election involving the
barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been
scheduled on May 1997.[9]

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and
academic. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996,
enjoining the recall election should be as it is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987

CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious conjecture, whether

we are a court of law or a court of justice. Do we apply the law even if it is unjust or do
we administer justice even against the law? Thus queried, we do not equivocate. The
answer is that we do neither because we are a court both of law and of justice. We apply
the law with justice for that is our mission and purpose in the scheme of our Republic.
This case is an illustration.

Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered
in 'the name of their deceased parents under OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of Deeds of
Tarlac. 1

On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share of the
herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale. 2 One year later, on
April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same vendees, in
an instrument denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of P 440.00. 3

By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area
corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The
vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In 1975, with their consent, their
son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed
area. 4

3
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to redeem the area
sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he
was an American citizen . 5 On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir,
filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption claimed by her
brother. 6

The trial court * also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground that the right had
lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963 and
1964. Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the
sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. 7

In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot be plausibly denied. The
other co-heirs, including Tecla Padua, lived on the same lot, which consisted of only 604
square meters, including the portions sold to the petitioners . 8 Eustaquia herself, who
had sold her portion, was staying in the same house with her sister Tecla, who later
claimed redemption petition. 9 Moreover, the petitioners and the private respondents
were close friends and neighbors whose children went to school together. 10

It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of the sales and that they
thought, as they alleged, that the area occupied by the petitioners had merely been
mortgaged by Celestino and Eustaquia. In the circumstances just narrated, it was
impossible for Tecla not to know that the area occupied by the petitioners had been
purchased by them from the other. co-heirs. Especially significant was the erection
thereon of the permanent semi-concrete structure by the petitioners' son, which was
done without objection on her part or of any of the other co-heirs.

The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct interpretation and
application of the pertinent law as invoked, interestingly enough, by both the
petitioners and the private respondents. This is Article 1088 of the Civil Code,
providing as follows:

Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.

In reversing the trial court, the respondent court ** declared that the notice required by
the said article was written notice and that actual notice would not suffice as a
substitute. Citing the same case of De Conejero v. Court of Appeals 11 applied by the trial
court, the respondent court held that that decision, interpreting a like rule in Article
1623, stressed the need for written notice although no particular form was required.

Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente of the Court, furnishing the
co-heirs with a copy of the deed of sale of the property subject to redemption would
satisfy the requirement for written notice. "So long, therefore, as the latter (i.e., the
redemptioner) is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof," he
declared, "the thirty days for redemption start running. "

4
In the earlier decision of Butte v. UY, 12 " the Court, speaking through the same learned
jurist, emphasized that the written notice should be given by the vendor and not the
vendees, conformably to a similar requirement under Article 1623, reading as follows:

Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except
within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the
vendors, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of
Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written
notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the adjoining owners.

As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately
selected a particular method of giving notice, and that notice must be deemed
exclusive," the Court held that notice given by the vendees and not the vendor would not
toll the running of the 30-day period.

The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes dictum that "hard
cases make bad laws" as the petitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact that
there was really no written notice given by the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied
and interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one conclusion, to wit, that in view of
such deficiency, the 30 day period for redemption had not begun to run, much less
expired in 1977.

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may
add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first
concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the in tent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice
as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact,
for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there
are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a
particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish
obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word
and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as
it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we
are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes
beyond them." 13 While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the
power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature. While
we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right
to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that
killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the law maker's will.

5
The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a statute
must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the
letter but although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter
but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is
within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter;
and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless
within the intent of the lawmakers. 14

In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is
properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time
of the 30-day period of redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really
necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin, to
obviate any problem of alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or two.

The instant case presents no such problem because the right of redemption was invoked
not days but years after the sales were made in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed
by Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen years after the
second sale. The delay invoked by the petitioners extends to more than a decade,
assuming of course that there was a valid notice that tolled the running of the period of
redemption.

Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be written, would
such notice be necessary in this case? Assuming there was a valid notice although it was
not in writing. would there be any question that the 30-day period for redemption had
expired long before the complaint was filed in 1977?

In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense
that they were unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964.
By requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious
truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the
law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners
are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were
actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that
such notice was sufficient.

Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?

While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such sales in
1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime between those years and 1976, when the first
complaint for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were actually informed of the
sale and that thereafter the 30-day period started running and ultimately expired. This
could have happened any time during the interval of thirteen years, when none of the
co-heirs made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when
Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption had already been extinguished
because the period for its exercise had already expired.

The following doctrine is also worth noting:

6
While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion of an alleged
right it is essential that he should have knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his
claim, yet if the circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and the
means of ascertaining the truth were readily available upon inquiry, but the party
neglects to make it, he will be chargeable with laches, the same as if he had known the
facts. 15

It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the spouses Alonzo,
who were not among them, should enclose a portion of the inherited lot and build
thereon a house of strong materials. This definitely was not the act of a temporary
possessor or a mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act of ownership. Yet,
given this unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least inquire, to
ascertain the facts, which were readily available. It took all of thirteen years before one
of them chose to claim the right of redemption, but then it was already too late.

We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict
letter of the law, which the respondent court understandably applied pursuant to
existing jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it had no competence to reverse
the doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited cases. In fact, and this should
be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero and Buttle
doctrines. What we are doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in
view of the peculiar circumstances of this case.

The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in
writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and
ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint
for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These
are the justifications for this exception.

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual
wish to render every one his due." 16 That wish continues to motivate this Court when
it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always
an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the
law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the
lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. So we have done in this
case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is

REVERSED and that of the trial court is reinstated, without any pronouncement as to
costs. It is so ordered

G.R. No. 78687 January 31, 1989

ELENA SALENILLAS AND BERNARDINO SALENILLAS, petitioners, vs.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HONORABLE RAYMUNDO SEVA,
JUDGE OF BRANCH 38 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CAMARINES
NORTE and WILLIAM GUERRA, respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

7
This petition for review on certiorari which seeks the reversal and setting aside of the
decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 dismissing the petition for certiorari against Judge
Raymundo Seva of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte and the private
respondent, William Guerra, involves a pure question of law i.e., the coverage and
application of Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, known
otherwise as the Public Land Act.

The facts are undisputed.

The property subject matter of the case was formerly covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. P-1248, issued by virtue of Free Patent Application No. 192765, in favor of the
spouses, Florencia H. de Enciso and Miguel Enciso. The said original certificate of title
was inscribed in the Registration Book for the Province of Camarines Norte on
December 10, 1961. On February 28, 1970, the patentees, the Enciso spouses, by an
Absolute Deed of Sale, sold the property in favor of the petitioners, the spouses Elena
Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas for a consideration of P900.00. Petitioner Elena
Salenillas is a daughter of the Encisos. As a result of the aforementioned sale, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-8104 of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte was issued in
the name of the Salenillas, cancelling Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248. On June
30, 1971, the petitioners mortgaged the property now covered by T.C.T. No. T-8104 with
the Rural Bank of Daet, Inc. The mortgage was subsequently released on November 22,
1973 after the petitioners paid the amount of P1,000.00. Later, or on December 4, 1975,
the petitioners again mortgaged the property, this time in favor of the Philippine
National Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as security for a loan of P2,500.00.

For failure of the petitioners to pay their loan, extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding,
pursuant to Act No. 3135, was instituted by the Philippine National Bank against the
mortgage and the property was sold at a public auction held on February 27, 1981. The
private respondent, William Guerra, emerged as the highest bidder in the said public
auction and as a result thereof a "Certificate of Sale" was issued to him by the Ex
Officio Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Norte. Ultimately, on July 12, 1983, a "Sheriff's
Final Deed" was executed in favor of the private respondent.

On August 17,1983, the Philippine National Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Camarines Norte at Daet, a motion for a writ of possession. The public respondent,
Judge Raymundo Seva of the trial court, acting on the motion, issued on September 22,
1983 an order for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the private respondent.
When the deputy sheriff of Camarines Norte however, attempted on November 17,
1983, to place the property in the possession of the private respondent, the petitioners
refused to vacate and surrender the possession of the same and instead offered to
repurchase it under Section 119 of the Public Land Act. On August 15, 1984, another
motion, this time for the issuance of an alias writ of possession was filed by the private
respondent with the trial court. The petitioners, on August 31, 1984, opposed the private
respondents' motion and instead made a formal offer to repurchase the property.
Notwithstanding the petitioners' opposition and formal offer, the trial court judge on
October 12, 1984 issued the alias writ of possession prayed for the private respondent.
The petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the order but their motion was denied.

8
Undeterred by their initial setback, the petitioners elevated the case to the respondent
Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari claiming that the respondent trial
court judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order dated October 12,
1984 granting the writ of possession, and the order dated October 22, 1984, denying
their motion for reconsider consideration.

In a resolution dated January 23, 1985, the respondent appellate court gave due course
to the petition; required the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda in support to
their respective positions; and restrained the trial court and the private respondent from
executing, implementing or otherwise giving effect to the assailed writ of possession
until further orders from the court. 3 However, in a decision promulgated on September
17, 1986, the respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of merit.
According to the appellate court:

It must be noted that when the original owner, Florencia H. Enciso whose title, OCT No.
P-1248, was issued on August 9, 1961, executed a deed of absolute sale on February 28,
1970 of the property covered by said title to spouses Elena Salenillas and Bernardino
Salenillas, the five year period to repurchase the property provided for in Section 119 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended could have already started. Prom this fact
alone, the petition should have been dismissed. However, granting that the transfer
from parent to child for a nominal sum may not be the "conveyance" contemplated by
the law. We will rule on the issue raised by the petitioners. 4

xxx xxx xxx

Applying the case of Monge, et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 5 the appellate court went on to hold
that the five-year period of the petitioners to repurchase under Section 119 of the Public
Land Act had already prescribed. The point of reckoning, ruled the respondent court in
consonance with Monge is from the date the petitioners mortgaged the property on
December 4, 1973. Thus, when the petitioners made their formal offer to repurchase on
August 31, 1984, the period had clearly expired.

In an effort to still overturn the decision, the petitioners moved for reconsideration.
Their motion apparently went for naught because on May 7, 1987, the respondent
appellate court resolved to deny the same. Hence, this petition.

Before us, the petitioners maintain that contrary to the rulings of the courts below, their
right to repurchase within five years under Section 119 of the Public Land Act has not
yet prescribed. To support their contention, the petitioners cite the cases of Paras vs.
Court of Appeals 6 and Manuel vs. Philippine National Bank, et al. 7

On the other side, the private respondent, in support of the appellate court's decision,
states that the sale of the contested property by the patentees to the petitioners
disqualified the latter from being legal heirs vis-a-vis the said property. As such, they
(the petitioners) no longer enjoy the right granted to heirs under the provisions of
Section 119 of the Public Land Act. 8

In fine, what need be determined and resolved here are: whether or not the petitioners
have the right to repurchase the contested property under Section 119 of the Public

9
Land Act; and assuming the answer to the question is in the affirmative, whether or not
their right to repurchase had already prescribed.

We rule for the petitioners. They are granted by the law the right to repurchase their
property and their right to do so subsists.

Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as amended, provides in full:

Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead
provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or
legal heirs within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance.

From the foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that only three classes of persons are
bestowed the right to repurchase — the applicant-patentee, his widow, or other legal
heirs. Consequently, the contention of the private respondent sustained by the
respondent appellate court that the petitioners do not belong to any of those classes of
repurchasers because they acquired the property not through inheritance but by sale,
has no legal basis. The petitioners-spouses are the daughter and son-in-law of the
Encisos, patentees of the contested property. At the very least, petitioner Elena
Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such, and even
on this score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase. This must be so because
Section 119 of the Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no
distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.

Moreover, to indorse the distinction made by the private respondent and the appellate
court would be to contravene the very purpose of Section 119 of the Public Land Act
which is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and
his family the land that the State had gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in
clearing and cultivating it. 9 Considering that petitioner Salenillas is a daughter of the
spouses Florencia H. Enciso and Miguel Enciso, there is no gainsaying that allowing her
(Elena) and her husband to repurchase the property would be more in keeping with the
spirit of the law. We have time and again said that between two statutory
interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.

Guided by the same purpose of the law, and proceeding to the other issue here raised,
we rule that the five-year period for the petitioners to repurchase their property had not
yet prescribed.

The case of Monge et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 10 cited as authority by the respondent Court of
Appeals is inapplicable to the present controversy. The facts obtaining there are
substantially different from those in this case. In Monge the conveyance involved was
a pacto de retro sale and not a foreclosure sale. More importantly, the question raised
there was whether the five-year period provided for in Section 119 "should be counted
from the date of the sale even if the same is with an option to repurchase or from the
date the ownership of the land has become consolidated in favor of the purchaser
because of the homesteader's failure to redeem it. 11 It is therefore understandable why
the Court ruled there as it did. A sale on pacto de retro immediately vests title,
ownership, and, generally possession over the property on the vendee a retro, subject

10
only to the right of the vendor a retro to repurchase within the stipulated period. It is an
absolute sale with a resolutory condition.

The cases 12 pointed to by the petitioner in support of their position, on the other hand,
present facts that are quite identical to those in the case at bar. Both cases involved
properties the titles over which were obtained either through homestead or free patent.
These properties were mortgaged to a bank as collateral for loans, and, upon failure of
the owners to pay their indebtedness, the mortgages were foreclosed. In both instances,
the Court ruled that the five-year period to. repurchase a homestead sold at public
auction or foreclosure sale under Act 3135 begins on the day after the expiration of the
period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale is executed thereby formally
transferring the property to the purchaser, and not otherwise. Taking into account that
the mortgage was foreclosed and the mortgaged property sold at a public auction to the
private respondent on February 27, 1981, with the "Sheriff's Final Deed" issued on July
12, 1983, the two offers of the petitioners to repurchase the first on November 17, 1983,
and the second, formally, on August 31, 1984 were both made within the prescribed
five-year period.

Now, as regards the redemption price, applying Sec. 30 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules
of Court, the petitioners should reimburse the private respondent the amount of the
purchase price at the public auction plus interest at the rate of one per centum per
month up to November 17, 1983, together with the amounts of assessments and taxes
on the property that the private respondent might have paid after purchase and interest
on the last named amount at the same rate as that on the purchase price. 13

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 17, 1986, and
the Resolution dated May 7, 1987 of the Court of Appeals, and the Orders dated
September 22, 1983, October 12, 1984, and October 22, 1984 of the Regional Trial Court
of Daet, Camarines Norte, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one
ENTERED directing the private respondent to reconvey the subject property and to
execute the corresponding deed of reconveyance therefor in favor of the petitioners
upon the return to him by the latter of the purchase price and the amounts, if any, of
assessments or taxes he paid plus interest of one (1%) per centum per month on both
amounts up to November 17, 1983.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992

OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners, vs.ESPERANZA C.

PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C.
PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR.,
INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL,
ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER,
NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-
DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of
Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.

11
PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside: (a) the
decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010
entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista,
Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual,
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al." which dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed the
decision of the trial court and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural
children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent
Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).

Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate,
acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived by the
following:

(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;

(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased, to
wit:

Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista
Manuel C. Pascual
Jose C. Pascual
Susana C. Pascual-Bautista
Erlinda C. Pascual
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.

(c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit:

Avelino Pascual
Isoceles Pascual
Loida Pascual-Martinez
Virginia Pascual-Ner
Nona Pascual-Fernando
Octavio Pascual
Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;

(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the
deceased, to wit:

Olivia S. Pascual
Hermes S. Pascual

(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and
represented by the following:

12
Dominga M. Pascual
Mamerta P. Fugoso
Abraham S. Sarmiento, III
Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay
Eleuterio P. Sarmiento
Domiga P. San Diego
Nelia P. Marquez
Silvestre M. Pascual
Eleuterio M. Pascual
(Rollo, pp. 46-47)

Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special
Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband
(Rollo, p. 47).

On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition to the
Petition for letters of Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and
Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).

On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to the
effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother of her
late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made by the oppositors, that
they were are not among the known heirs of the deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p.
102).

On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual
and Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V of such compromise agreement provides,
to wit:

This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the

above-entitled proceedings until the final determination thereof by the court, or by
another compromise agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes
Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual. (Rollo, p. 108)

The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the
Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual,
manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their
uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).

On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights
(Rollo, pp. 113-114) and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary
Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).

On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S.
Padolina issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

13
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is hereby resolved to Deny
this motion reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual (Rollo, p.
136).

On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 515-
526). and such motion was denied.

Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 14010
(Rollo, p. 15.).

On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the decision the
dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 38)

Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July 14, 1988,
the Court of Appeals issued its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration (Rollo,
p. 42).

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course.

The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from
the inheritance of the deceased.

Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized and of the
doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA 645 [1987]) because being acknowledged
natural children, their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage
when such children were under conception (Rollo, p. 418).

Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in Article 992 must
be strictly construed to refer only to spurious children (Rollo, p. 419).

On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are within the
prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC is
applicable to them.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:

An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child.

The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where
this Court ruled that:

14
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992.
Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully
looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate
child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the
law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.

Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.

Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding
that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of
the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of
their father.

In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of Articles 902
and 989 of the Civil Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to represent Eligio Pascual
in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual.

On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court further
elucidated the successional rights of illegitimate children, which squarely answers the
questions raised by the petitioner on this point.

The Court held:

Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate children,
which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of
these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may
be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that
the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions
are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate
descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may
be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child
is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that
"the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such
a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to
the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the
provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant case because Article
992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestatobetween the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state
Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.

The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other descendants shall
inherit by right of representation" and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate
children . . . are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate

15
or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother. (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister
Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-
432; [1990]).

Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but
it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases
of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the
language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what is says.
(Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the
probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233
[1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied
regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous.
(Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may be
conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved
in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule
is established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by
implication (Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).

Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.

Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally
placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not
acknowledged natural children should be treated differently, in the negative.

It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 72005 May 29, 1987

PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner, vs. HONORABLE

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT; SYCWIN COATING & WIRES, INC., and
DOMINADOR CACPAL, CHIEF DEPUTY SHERRIF OF MANILA, respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Resolution dated September 12, 1985 of
the Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. CR-05409 1 granting private
respondent's motion for execution pending appeal and ordering the issuance of the
corresponding writ of execution on the counterbond to lift attachment filed by
petitioner. The focal issue that emerges is whether an order of execution pending appeal
of a judgment maybe enforced on the said bond. In the Resolution of September 25,
1985 2 this Court as prayed for, without necessarily giving due course to the petition,

16
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the
order complaint of.

The records disclose that private respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a
complaint for collection of a sum of money against Varian Industrial Corporation before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. During the pendency of the suit, private
respondent succeeded in attaching some of the properties of Varian Industrial
Corporation upon the posting of a supersedeas bond. 3 The latter in turn posted a
counterbond in the sum of P1,400, 000.00 4 thru petitioner Philippine British Assurance
Co., Inc., so the attached properties were released.

On December 28, 1984, the trial court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED, and

judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Varian
Industrial Corporation, and the latter is hereby ordered:

1. To pay plaintiff the amount of P1,401,468.00, the principal obligation with 12%
interest per annum from the date of default until fully paid;

2. To pay plaintiff 5% of the principal obligation as liquidated damages;

3. To pay plaintiff P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4. To pay plaintiff 15% of P1,401,468.00, the principal obligation, as and for attorney's
fees; and

5. To pay the costs of suit.

Accordingly, the counterclaim of the defendant is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 5

Varian Industrial Corporation appealed the decision to the respondent Court. Sycwin
then filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the properties of Varian in
respondent Court. Varian was required to file its comment but none was filed. In the
Resolution of July 5, 1985, respondent Court ordered the execution pending appeal as
prayed for. 6 However, the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied as Varian failed
to deliver the previously attached personal properties upon demand. In a Petition dated
August 13, 1985 filed with respondent Court Sycwin prayed that the surety (herein
petitioner) be ordered to pay the value of its bond. 7 In compliance with the Resolution
of August 23, 1985 of the respondent Court herein petitioner filed its comment. 8 In the
Resolution of September 12, 1985, 9 the respondent Court granted the petition. Hence
this action.

It is the submission of private respondent Sycwin that without a previous motion for
reconsideration of the questioned resolution, certiorari would not lie. While as a general
rule a motion for reconsideration has been considered a condition sine qua non for the
granting of a writ of certiorari, this rule does not apply when special circumstances
warrant immediate or more direct action. 10 It has been held further that a motion for

17
reconsideration may be dispensed with in cases like this where execution had been
ordered and the need for relief was extremely urgent. 11

The counterbond provides:

WHEREAS, in the above-entitled case pending in the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch LXXXV, Quezon City, an order of Attachment was
issued against abovenamed Defendant;

WHEREAS, the Defendant, for the purpose of lifting and/or dissolving the order of
attachment issued against them in the above-en-titled case, have offered to file a
counterbond in the sum of PESOS ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND
ONLY (P1,400,000.00), Philippine Currency, as provided for in Section 5, Rule 57 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

NOW, THEREFORE, we, VARIAN INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, as Principal and

the PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC., a corporation duly
organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, as Surety, in
consideration of the above and of the lifting or dissolution of the order of attachment,
hereby jointly and severally, bind ourselves in favor of the above Plaintiff in the sum of
PESOS ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND ONLY (P1,400,000.00),
Philippine Currency, under the condition that in case the Plaintiff recovers judgment in
the action, and Defendant will, on demand, re-deliver the attached property so released
to the Officer of the Court and the same shall be applied to the payment of the
judgment, or in default thereof, the defendant and Surety will, on demand, pay to the
Plaintiff the full value of the property released.

EXECUTED at Manila, Philippines, this 28th day of June, 1984. 12

Sections 5, 12, and 17 of Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court also provide:

SEC. 5. Manner of attaching property. — The officer executing the order shall without
delay attach, to await judgment and execution in the action, all the properties of the
party against whom the order is issued in the province, not exempt from execution, or
so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand, unless the
former makes a deposit with the clerk or judge of the court from which the order
issued, or gives a counter-bond executed to the applicant, in an amount sufficient to
satisfy such demand besides costs, or in an amount equal to the value of the property
which is about to be attached, to secure payment to the applicant of any judgement ment
which he may recover in the action. The officer shall also forthwith serve a copy of the
applicant's affidavit and bond, and of the order of attachment, on the adverse party, if
he be found within the province.

SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counterbond. — At any time after an
order of attachment has been granted, the party whose property has been attached, or
the person appearing on his behalf, may, upon reasonable notice to the applicant, apply
to the judge who granted the order, or to the judge of the court in which the action is
pending, for an order discharging the attachment wholly or in part on the security
given. The judge shall, after hearing, order the discharge of the attachment if a cash

18
deposit is made, or a counter-bond executed to the attaching creditor is filed, on behalf
of the adverse party, with the clerk or judge of the court where the application is made,
in an amount equal to the value of the property attached as determined by the judge, to
secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching creditor may recover in the action. Upon
the filing of such counter-bond, copy thereof shall forthwith be served on the attaching
creditor or his lawyer. Upon the discharge of an attachment in accordance with the
provisions of this section the property attached, or the proceeds of any sale thereof,
shall be delivered to the party making the deposit or giving the counterbond aforesaid
standing in place of the property so released. Should such counterbond for any reason
be found to be, or become, insufficient, and the party furnishing the same fail to file an
additional counterbond, the attaching creditor may apply for a new order of
attachment.

SEC. 17. When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond. — If the
execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, the surety or sureties on any counter-
bond given pursuant to the provisions of this rule to secure the payment of the judgment shall
become charged on such counter- bond, and bound to pay to the judgement creditor upon
demand, the amount due under the judgment, which amount may be recovered from such
surety or sureties after notice and summary hearing in the same action. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Under Sections 5 and 12, Rule 57 above reproduced it is provided that the counterbond
is intended to secure the payment of "any judgment" that the attaching creditor may
recover in the action. Under Section 17 of same rule it provides that when "the execution
be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part" it is only then that "payment of
thejudgment shall become charged on such counterbond."

The counterbond was issued in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57 of
the Rules of Court as provided in the second paragraph aforecited which is deemed
reproduced as part of the counterbond. In the third paragraph it is also stipulated that
the counterbond is to be "applied for the payment of the judgment." Neither the rules
nor the provisions of the counterbond limited its application to a final and executory
judgment. Indeed, it is specified that it applies to the payment of any judgment that
maybe recovered by plaintiff. Thus, the only logical conclusion is that an execution of
any judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied maybe charged
against such a counterbond.

It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguere debemos. 13 "The rule, founded on
logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words and phrases in a statute should
ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. 14 The rule requires that a
general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished
from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the law. 15 In other
words, there should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is
indicated.16 For courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no
distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but
as they find it and without regard to consequences. 17

19
A corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law does not make any exception,
courts may not except something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent
in the law to justify it.18 Thus where a statute grants a person against whom possession
of "any land" is unlawfully withheld the right to bring an action for unlawful detainer,
this Court held that the phrase "any land" includes all kinds of land, whether
agricultural, residential, or mineral.19 Since the law in this case does not make any
distinction nor intended to make any exception, when it speaks of "any judgment"
which maybe charged against the counterbond, it should be interpreted to refer not
only to a final and executory judgment in the case but also a judgment pending appeal.

All that is required is that the conditions provided for by law are complied with, as
outlined in the case of Towers Assurance Corporation v. Ororama Supermart, 20

Under Section 17, in order that the judgment creditor might recover from the surety on
the counterbond, it is necessary (1) that the execution be first issued against the
principal debtor and that such execution was returned unsatisfied in whole or in part;
(2) that the creditor make a demand upon the surety for the satisfaction of the
judgment, and (3) that the surety be given notice and a summary hearing on the same
action as to his liability for the judgment under his counterbond.

The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in accordance
with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be charged with the
payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and
executory judgement but also the execution of a judgment pending appeal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the restraining
order issued on September 25, 1985 is hereby dissolved with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-27489. April 30, 1970.]

LEONORA TANTOY VDA. DE MACABENTA, for herself and in behalf of her

minor child, RAQUEL MACABENTA, claimants-appellees, v. DAVAO STEVEDORE
TERMINAL COMPANY, Respondent-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION ACT;

DEPENDENTS OF INJURED EMPLOYER. — From the express language of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, a widow living with the deceased or actually dependent
upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years of age or incapable
of supporting him or herself, and unmarried, whether or not actually dependent upon
the deceased, are considered dependents.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANT CASE. — Claimant here is clearly the widow of the deceased
Conrado Macabenta. It is true that the marriage took place after the fatal accident but

20
there was no question that at the time of his death she was marked to him.

3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; WHERE LAW IS CLEAR; DUTY OF COURT TO

APPLY THE LAW TO FACTS AS FOUND. — Where the law is clear, our duty is
equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as found. What is more, we have taken
pains to defeat any evasion of its literal language by rejecting an interpretation, even if
not totally devoid of plausibility, but likely to attach to it a significance different from
that intended by the lawmakers. A paraphrases of an aphorism from Holmes is not
inappropriate. there can always occur to intelligence hostile to a piece of legislation a
misinterpretation that may, without due reflection, be considered not too far-fetched.

4. ID.; ID.; SETTLED RULE. — The Court has constantly held from the early cases of Ty
Sue v. Hord, 12 Phil. 485, a 1909 decision, in United States v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 and
again in Riera v. Palmori, 40 Phil. 105 (1919) that , assuming a choice is necessary
between conflicting theories, that which best conforms to the language of the statute
and its purpose should prevail and that no construction is to be adopted that would
"tend to defeat the purpose and object of the legislator."cralaw virtua1aw library

5. ID.; ID.; WHERE POLICY OF LAW IS CLEAR; DUTY COURT TO GIVE EFFECT. —
Once the policy of purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it
by the judiciary. Even if honest doubts could be entertained, therefor, as to the meaning
of the statutory provisions, still respect for such a basic doctrine calls for a rejection of
the plea of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company.

6. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION ACT;

INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION, TO BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE. — "To state the constructions sought to be fastened
on the clear and explicit language of the statute is to reject it. It comes into collision with
the constitutional command pursuant to the social justice principle that the government
extend protection to labor." How could such an intent then be imputed to the legislative
body. No such suspicious ought to be entertained that it was contemplated by our
lawmakers that any provision of the Workmen’s Compensation Act could be so worded
as to deny protection to the laboring elements and their dependents and thus frustrate
the constitutional objective of social justice.

7. ID.; ID.; WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION; FINDINGS OF FACT IT

BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, NOT DISTURBED ON APPEAL; INSTANT
CASE. — The alleged error that the accident resulting in the death of Condrado
Macabenta could not be considered as having arisen out of and in the course of
employment is not to be taken too seriously. The facts as set forth in the decision, which
must be accepted by us in view of their being based on substantial evidence argue
against the condensation of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company.

8. ID.; ID.; APPEAL FROM DECISION OF THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION

COMMISSION TO SUPREME COURT ASCERTAINTMENT OF CREDIBILITY AND
WEIGHT OF CONFLICTING EVIDENCE, BEYOND AUTHORITY IN APPEALS BY

21
CERTIORARI. — The task of ascertaining the credibility and weight of conflicting
evidence is, however, beyond the province of our authority in appeals by certiorari.
Even if the possibility that the Commission’s conclusions were erroneous could not be
ruled out, still, to borrow the language of justice Dizon in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,
Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, ‘such errors would constitute mere
errors of judgment but do not involve any grave abuse of discretion on its part.’

DECISION

FERNANDO, J.:

The success of the employer Davao Stevedore Terminal Company in imparting

plausibility to the novel question raised as to whether or not the widow of a deceased
employee whose marriage occurred after the accident as well as the posthumous child
could be considered dependents within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act may be gauged by the fact that we gave due course to the petition for the review of
a decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission answering the question in the
affirmative and sustaining the right to compensation of the claimant Leonora Tantoy
Vda. de Macabenta for herself and in behalf of her minor child, Raquel Macabenta.
After hearing the parties and in the right of the language of the law, its manifest
purpose, and the constitutional provisions on social justice and protection to labor, we
answer the question similarly. We affirm the appealed decision of the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission.

In the decision rendered by the then Chairman of the Commission, Nieves Baens del
Rosario, dated September 27, 1966, it is stated that there is no dispute "that at the time
that the decedent met the vehicular accident on September 13, 1961 which led to his
death on September 29, 1961, the claimant-widow was not yet married to the decedent
although they had already been living together as husband and wife for the past three
months. However. on the day following the accident, they were lawfully wedded in a
marriage ceremony solemnized at San Pedro Hospital in Davao City where the
deceased was hospitalized up to his death. It is noteworthy that the marriage was
facilitated through the intercession of the general manager of the respondent company."
1 The decision likewise noted that the claimant widow gave birth on April 8, 1962 to the
posthumous daughter of the deceased who was given the name Raquel Tantoy
Macabenta.

As to how the deceased Conrado Macabenta met his accident, the decision, after stating
that the deceased was a laborer in the sawmill of the Davao Stevedore Terminal
Company at Manay, Panabo, Davao, about 48 kilometers from his residence in Davao
City, went on as follows: "Although some sort of quarters were provided by the
respondent to its employees at the sawmill, many of them apparently preferred to
commute, and the deceased in particular went home about three times a week. While
the respondent, through its lone witness and at the same time production manager,
Sergio Dalisay, disclaimed the claimant’s declarations that the company provided a
service pickup to transport its employees to and from work, the synthesis of the very
same testimonial evidence does not support this denial, but on the contrary tends to

22
bring out the fact that the respondent did furnish transportation." 2 As a result, it
reversed the finding of the then acting referee of its regional office in Davao City and
awarded to the claimant widow for herself and in behalf of her minor child the amount
of P2,708.00 as compensation and the sum of P270.80 as attorney’s fees.

Hence, this petition for review, which, as noted, was given due course primarily due to
the question raised being one of first impression. As announced at the opening of this
opinion, we uphold the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.

1. From the express language of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, a widow living
with the deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her
daughter, if under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting him or herself, and
unmarried, whether or not actually dependent upon the deceased are considered
dependents. 3 Claimant here is clearly the widow of the deceased Conrado Macabenta.
It is true that the marriage took place after the fatal accident but there was no question
that at the time of his death she was married to him. She, therefore, comes entirely
within the letter of the law. Nor can there be any doubt that the child, Raquel
Macabenta, also falls within the words the Act employs. As set forth in the decision,
while the marriage took place on Sept. 14, 1961, the widow and the deceased had
already been living together as husband and wife the preceding three months. The child
born of such relationship, later legalized, is, as made clear in the decision, the
posthumous daughter of the deceased. What the employer Davao Stevedore Terminal
Company seems bent in ignoring is that our Civil Code, in no uncertain terms,
considers a conceived child born for all purposes that are favorable to her provided the
birth is attended with the conditions specified, namely, that she is alive at the time she
is completely delivered from the mother’s womb. 4 Here, fortunately, the child has
survived the ordeal of the loss of the one called upon to support her, her father, who,
unfortunately however, met his death before her birth.

Time and time again, we have stressed that where the law is clear, our duty is equally
plain. We must apply it to the facts as found. 5 What is more, we have taken pains to
defeat any evasion of its literal language by rejecting an interpretation, even if not
totally devoid of plausibility, but likely to attach to it a significance different from that
intended by the lawmakers. A paraphrase of an aphorism from Holmes is not
inappropriate. There can always occur to an intelligence hostile to a piece of legislation
a misinterpretation that may, without due reflection, be considered not too far-fetched.
The employer in this case, without impugning its motives, must have succumbed to
such a temptation, quite understandable but certainly far from justifiable. It is quite
obvious then why we find its stand devoid of merit.

2. Our conclusion likewise finds support in the fundamental principle that once the
policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the
judiciary. 6 Even if honest doubts could be entertained, therefore, as to the meaning of
the statutory provisions, still respect for such a basic doctrine calls for a rejection of the
plea of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company. We have never deviated from our
constant holding from Ty Sue v. Hord, 7 a 1909 decision, that, assuming a choice is

23
necessary between conflicting theories, that which best conforms to the language of the
statute and its purpose should prevail. Again, as far back as United States v. Toribio, 8
decided the next year, we made unmistakable our view that no construction is to be
adopted that would bend "to defeat the purpose and object of the legislator." We made
use of an expression almost identical in Riera v. Palmaroli 9 with our warning against
so narrowly interpreting a statute "as to defeat the manifest purpose of the legislator."
The employer in this case should have been well advised to take into consideration the
teachings of the above cases before it sought to press upon us the desirability of
imparting to the applicable statutory language a meaning that would render fruitless
the purpose so clearly evident on the face of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

3. There is still another avenue of approach that similarly calls for the affirmance of the
decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission now on appeal. This is apparent
from an excerpt from a recent case of Automotive Parts & Equipment Company,
Incorporated v. Lingad: 10 "To state the construction sought to be fastened on the clear
and explicit language of the statute is to reject it. It comes into collision with the
constitutional command pursuant to the social justice principle that the government
extend protection to labor." How could such an intent then be imputed to the legislative
body. No such suspicion ought to be entertained that it was contemplated by our
lawmakers that any provision of the Workmen’s Compensation Act could be so worded
as to deny protection to the laboring elements and their dependents and thus frustrate
the constitutional objective of social justice. To quote from the Lingad case anew: "For it
is undeniable that every statute, much more so one arising from a legislative
implementation of a constitutional mandate, must be so construed that no question as
to its conformity with what the fundamental law requires need arise.

4. The basic question in this petition for review thus disposed of, there is nothing to
stand in the way of the affirmance of the decision now on appeal. The alleged error that
the accident resulting in the death of Conrado Macabenta could not be considered as
having arisen out of and in the course of employment is not to be taken too seriously.
The facts as set forth in the decision, which must be accepted by us in view of their
being based on substantial evidence argue against the contention of the Davao
Stevedore Terminal Company. As we had occasion to state only last month in B. F.
Goodrich Philippines, Inc. v. Acebedo: 11 "Nor can the conclusion reached by
respondent Commission be repudiated unless ‘on a clear showing of failure to consider
the evidence on record or failure to consider fundamental and patent logical
relationships in the evidence, amounting to a clear travesty of justice or grave abuse of
discretion.’ What was said by us in Basaysay v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission,
through the present Chief Justice, bears repeating: ‘The task of ascertaining the
credibility and weight of conflicting evidence, is, however, beyond the province of our
authority in appeals by certiorari.’ Even if the possibility that the Commission’s
conclusions were erroneous could not be ruled out, still, to borrow the language of
Justice Dizon in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission.’such errors would constitute mere errors of judgment but do not involve
any grave abuse of discretion on its part.’"

24
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission of September
27, 1966 is affirmed. With costs against respondent Davao Stevedore Terminal
Company.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs.EUSEBIO NAZARIO, accused-

appellant.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The petitioner was charged with violation of certain municipal ordinances of the
municipal council of Pagbilao, in Quezon province. By way of confession and
avoidance, the petitioner would admit having committed the acts charged but would
claim that the ordinances are unconstitutional, or, assuming their constitutionality, that
they do not apply to him in any event.

The facts are not disputed:

This defendant is charged of the crime of Violation of Municipal Ordinance in an

information filed by the provincial Fiscal, dated October 9, 1968, as follows:

That in the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in the Municipality of Pagbilao, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then the owner and operator of a fishpond situated in the barrio
of Pinagbayanan, of said municipality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously refuse and fail to pay the municipal taxes in the total amount of THREE
HUNDRED SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTY TWO CENTAVOS (P362.62), required of
him as fishpond operator as provided for under Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as
amended, inspite of repeated demands made upon him by the Municipal Treasurer of
Pagbilao, Quezon, to pay the same.

Contrary to law.

For the prosecution the following witnesses testified in substance as follows;

MIGUEL FRANCIA, 39 years of age, married, farmer and resident of Lopez, Quezon —

In 1962 to 1967, I resided at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. I know the accused as I

worked in his fishpond in 1962 to 1964. The fishpond of Nazario is at Pinagbayanan,
Pagbilao, Quezon. I worked in the clearing of the fishpond, the construction of the dikes
and the catching of fish.

On cross-examination, this witness declared:

I worked with the accused up to March 1964.

NICOLAS MACAROLAY, 65 years of age, married, copra maker and resident of

Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon —

I resided at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon since 1959 up to the present. I know the
accused since 1959 when he opened a fishpond at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. He
still operates the fishpond up to the present and I know this fact as I am the barrio
captain of Pinagbayanan.

25
On cross-examination, this witness declared:

I came to know the accused when he first operated his fishpond since 1959.

On re-direct examination, this witness declared:

I was present during the catching of fish in 1967 and the accused was there.

On re-cross examination, this witness declared:

I do not remember the month in 1962 when the accused caught fish.

RODOLFO R. ALVAREZ, 45 years old, municipal treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon,

married —

As Municipal Treasurer I am in charge of tax collection. I know the accused even before
I was Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao. I have written the accused a letter asking him to
pay his taxes (Exhibit B). Said letter was received by the accused as per registry return
receipt, Exhibit B-1. The letter demanded for payment of P362.00, more or less, by way
of taxes which he did not pay up to the present. The former Treasurer, Ceferino
Caparros, also wrote a letter of demand to the accused (Exhibit C). On June 28, 1967, I
sent a letter to the Fishery Commission (Exhibit D), requesting information if accused
paid taxes with that office. The Commission sent me a certificate (Exhibits D-1, D-2 & D-
3). The accused had a fishpond lease agreement. The taxes unpaid were for the years
1964, 1965 and 1966.

On cross-examination, this witness declared:

I have demanded the taxes for 38.10 hectares.

On question of the court, this witness declared:

What I was collecting from the accused is the fee on fishpond operation, not rental.

The prosecution presented as part of their evidence Exhibits A, A-1, A-2, B, B-2, C, D, D-
1, D-2, D-3, E, F, F-1 and the same were admitted by the court, except Exhibits D, D-1,
D-2 and D-3 which were not admitted for being immaterial.

For the defense the accused EUSEBIO NAZARIO, 48 years of age, married, owner and
general manager of the ZIP Manufacturing Enterprises and resident of 4801 Old Sta.
Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, declared in substance as follows:

I have lived in Sta. Mesa, Manila, since 1949. I buy my Residence Certificates at Manila
or at San Juan. In 1964, 1965 and 1966, I was living in Manila and my business is in
Manila and my family lives at Manila. I never resided at Pagbilao, Quezon. I do not
own a house at Pagbilao. I am a lessee of a fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon, and I
have a lease agreement to that effect with the Philippine Fisheries Commission marked
as Exhibit 1. In 1964, 1965 and 1966, the contract of lease, Exhibit 1, was still existing and
enforceable. The Ordinances Nos. 4, 15 and 12, series of 1955, 1965 and 1966, were
translated into English by the Institute of National Language to better understand the
ordinances. There were exchange of letters between me and the Municipal Treasurer of
Pagbilao regarding the payment of the taxes on my leased fishpond situated at

26
Pagbilao. There was a letter of demand for the payment of the taxes by the treasurer
(Exhibit 3) which I received by mail at my residence at Manila. I answered the letter of
demand, Exhibit 3, with Exhibit 3-A. I requested an inspection of my fishpond to
determine its condition as it was not then in operation. The Municipal Treasurer
Alvarez went there once in 1967 and he found that it was destroyed by the typhoon and
there were pictures taken marked as Exhibits 4, 4-A, 4-B and 4C. I received another
letter of demand, Exhibit 5, and I answered the same (Exhibit 5-A). I copied my
reference quoted in Exhibit 5-A from Administrative Order No. 6, Exhibit 6. I received
another letter of demand from Tomas Ornedo, Acting Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao,
dated February 16, 1966, Exhibit 7, and I answered the same with the letter marked as
Exhibit 7-A, dated February 26, 1966. I received another letter of demand from
Treasurer Alvarez of Pagbilao, Exhibit 8, and I answered the same (Exhibit 8-A). In
1964, I went to Treasurer Caparros to ask for an application for license tax and he said
none and he told me just to pay my taxes. I did not pay because up to now I do not
know whether I am covered by the Ordinance or not. The letters of demand asked me to
pay different amounts for taxes for the fishpond. Because under Sec. 2309 of the Revised
Administrative Code, municipal taxes lapse if not paid and they are collecting on a
lapsed ordinance. Because under the Tax Code, fishermen are exempted from
percentage tax and privilege tax. There is no law empowering the municipality to pass
ordinance taxing fishpond operators.

The defense presented as part of their evidence Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 3-A, 4, 4-B, 4-B, 4-C, 5, 5-
A, 6, 6-A, 6-B, 6-C, 7, 7-A, 8 and 8-A and the same were admitted by the court.

From their evidence the prosecution would want to show to the court that the accused,
as lessee or operator of a fishpond in the municipality of Pagbilao, refused, and still
refuses, to pay the municipal taxes for the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in violation of
Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended by Municipal Ordinance No. 15,
series of 1965, and finally amended by Municipal Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966.

On the other hand, the accused, by his evidence, tends to show to the court that the
taxes sought to be collected have already lapsed and that there is no law empowering
municipalities to pass ordinances taxing fishpond operators. The defense, by their
evidence, tried to show further that, as lessee of a forest land to be converted into a
fishpond, he is not covered by said municipal ordinances; and finally that the accused
should not be taxed as fishpond operator because there is no fishpond yet being
operated by him, considering that the supposed fishpond was under construction
during the period covered by the taxes sought to be collected.

Finally, the defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ultra vires as it is outside
of the power of the municipal council of Pagbilao, Quezon, to enact; and that the
defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ambiguous and uncertain.

There is no question from the evidences presented that the accused is a lessee of a parcel
of forest land, with an area of 27.1998 hectares, for fishpond purposes, under Fishpond
Lease Agreement No. 1066, entered into by the accused and the government, through
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on August 21, 1959.

27
There is no question from the evidences presented that the 27.1998 hectares of land
leased by the defendant from the government for fishpond purposes was actually
converted into fishpond and used as such, and therefore defendant is an operator of a
fishpond within the purview of the ordinance in question. 1

The trial Court 2 returned a verdict of guilty and disposed as follows:

VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4,
series of 1955, as amended by Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965 and further amended by
Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao, Quezon; and
hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P50.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency at the rate of P8.00 a day, and to pay the costs of this proceeding.

SO ORDERED. 3

In this appeal, certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner alleges that:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 4,

SERIES OF 1955, AS AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 15, SERIES OF 1965, AND AS
FURTHER AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 12, SERIES OF 1966, OF THE
MUNICIPALITY OF PAGBILAO, QUEZON, IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING
AMBIGUOUS AND UNCERTAIN.

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDINANCE IN
QUESTION, AS AMENDED, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING EX POST FACTO.

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDINANCE IN
QUESTION COVERS ONLY OWNERS OR OVERSEER OF FISHPONDS OF PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP AND NOT TO LESSEES OF PUBLIC LANDS.

IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE QUESTIONED
ORDINANCE, EVEN IF VALID, CANNOT BE ENFORCED BEYOND THE
TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF PAGBILAO AND DOES NOT COVER NON-
RESIDENTS. 4

The ordinances in question are Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, Ordinance No. 15, series
of 1965, and Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao.
Insofar as pertinent to this appeal, the salient portions thereof are hereinbelow quoted:

Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of
Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare of
fishpond on part thereof per annum. 5

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. l (a). For the convenience of those who have or owners or managers of fishponds
within the territorial limits of this municipality, the date of payment of municipal tax
relative thereto, shall begin after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said
fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries.6

28
xxx xxx xxx

Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of
Pagbilao shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare or any fraction
thereof per annum beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond
started operating before the year 1964. 7

The first objection refers to the ordinances being allegedly "ambiguous and
uncertain." 8 The petitioner contends that being a mere lessee of the fishpond, he is not
covered since the said ordinances speak of "owner or manager." He likewise maintains
that they are vague insofar as they reckon the date of payment: Whereas Ordinance No.
4 provides that parties shall commence payment "after the lapse of three (3) years
starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of
Fisheries." 9 Ordinance No. 12 states that liability for the tax accrues "beginning and
taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started operating before the year
1964." 10

As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible

standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application."11 It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by
either a saving clause or by construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 12 the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more
persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner
annoying to persons passing by." 13 Clearly, the ordinance imposed no standard at all
"because one may never know in advance what 'annoys some people but does not
annoy others.' " 14

Coates highlights what has been referred to as a "perfectly vague" 15 act whose obscurity
is evident on its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from legislation couched in
imprecise language — but which nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively
phrased — in which case, it may be "saved" by proper construction.

It must further be distinguished from statutes that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly
applicable to certain types of activities. In that event, such statutes may not be
challenged whenever directed against such activities. In Parker v. Levy, 16 a prosecution
originally under the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice (prohibiting, specifically,
"conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman"), the defendant, an army officer who
had urged his men not to go to Vietnam and called the Special Forces trained to fight
there thieves and murderers, was not allowed to invoke the void for vagueness doctrine
on the premise that accepted military interpretation and practice had provided enough
standards, and consequently, a fair notice that his conduct was impermissible.

It is interesting that in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 17 a divided Court sustained

an act of Congress (Republic Act No. 4880 penalizing "the too early nomination of

29
candidates" 18 limiting the election campaign period, and prohibiting "partisan political
activities"), amid challenges of vagueness and overbreadth on the ground that the law
had included an "enumeration of the acts deemed included in the terms 'election
campaign' or 'partisan political activity" 19 that would supply the standards. "As thus
limited, the objection that may be raised as to vagueness has been minimized, if not
totally set at rest." 20 In his opinion, however, Justice Sanchez would stress that the
conduct sought to be prohibited "is not clearly defined at all." 21 "As worded in R.A
4880, prohibited discussion could cover the entire spectrum of expression relating to
candidates and political parties." 22 He was unimpressed with the "restrictions"
Fernando's opinion had relied on: " 'Simple expressions of opinions and thoughts
concerning the election' and expression of 'views on current political problems or issues'
leave the reader conjecture, to guesswork, upon the extent of protection offered, be it as
to the nature of the utterance ('simple expressions of opinion and thoughts') or the
subject of the utterance ('current political problems or issues')." 23

The Court likewise had occasion to apply the "balancing-of-interests" test, 24 insofar as
the statute's ban on early nomination of candidates was concerned: "The rational
connection between the prohibition of Section 50-A and its object, the indirect and
modest scope of its restriction on the rights of speech and assembly, and the embracing
public interest which Congress has found in the moderation of partisan political
activity, lead us to the conclusion that the statute may stand consistently with and does
not offend the Constitution." 25 In that case, Castro would have the balance achieved in
favor of State authority at the "expense" of individual liberties.

In the United States, which had ample impact on Castro's separate opinion, the
balancing test finds a close kin, referred to as the "less restrictive alternative
" 26 doctrine, under which the court searches for alternatives available to the
Government outside of statutory limits, or for "less drastic means" 27 open to the State,
that would render the statute unnecessary. In United States v. Robel,28 legislation was
assailed, banning members of the (American) Communist Party from working in any
defense facility. The U.S. Supreme Court, in nullifying the statute, held that it impaired
the right of association, and that in any case, a screening process was available to the
State that would have enabled it to Identify dangerous elements holding defense
positions. 29 In that event, the balance would have been struck in favor of individual
liberties.

It should be noted that it is in free expression cases that the result is usually close. It is
said, however, that the choice of the courts is usually narrowed where the controversy
involves say, economic rights, 30 or as in the Levy case, military affairs, in which less
precision in analysis is required and in which the competence of the legislature is
presumed.

In no way may the ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness. It
is unmistakable from their very provisions that the appellant falls within its coverage.
As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term " manager." He does
not deny the fact that he financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish
fries into the fishponds, and had employed laborers to maintain them. 31 While it

30
appears that it is the National Government which owns them, 32 the Government never
shared in the profits they had generated. It is therefore only logical that he shoulders
the burden of tax under the said ordinances.

We agree with the trial court that the ordinances are in the character of revenue
measures 33designed to assist the coffers of the municipality of Pagbilao. And obviously,
it cannot be the owner, the Government, on whom liability should attach, for one thing,
upon the ancient principle that the Government is immune from taxes and for another,
since it is not the Government that had been making money from the venture.

Suffice it to say that as the actual operator of the fishponds in question, and as the
recipient of profits brought about by the business, the appellant is clearly liable for the
municipal taxes in question. He cannot say that he did not have a fair notice of such a
liability to make such ordinances vague.

Neither are the said ordinances vague as to dates of payment. There is no merit to the
claim that "the imposition of tax has to depend upon an uncertain date yet to be
determined (three years after the 'approval of the fishpond' by the Bureau of Fisheries,
and upon an uncertain event (if the fishpond started operating before 1964), also to be
determined by an uncertain individual or individuals." 34 Ordinance No. 15, in making
the tax payable "after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is
approved by the Bureau of Fisheries," 35 is unequivocal about the date of payment, and
its amendment by Ordinance No. 12, reckoning liability thereunder "beginning and
taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964
," 36 does not give rise to any ambiguity. In either case, the dates of payment have been
definitely established. The fact that the appellant has been allegedly uncertain about the
reckoning dates — as far as his liability for the years 1964, 1965, and 1966 is concerned
— presents a mere problem in computation, but it does not make the ordinances vague.
In addition, the same would have been at most a difficult piece of legislation, which is
not unfamiliar in this jurisdiction, but hardly a vague law.

As it stands, then, liability for the tax accrues on January 1, 1964 for fishponds in
operation prior thereto (Ordinance No. 12), and for new fishponds, three years after
their approval by the Bureau of Fisheries (Ordinance No. 15). This is so since the
amendatory act (Ordinance No. 12) merely granted amnesty unto old, delinquent
fishpond operators. It did not repeal its mother ordinances (Nos. 4 and 15). With respect
to new operators, Ordinance No. 15 should still prevail.

To the Court, the ordinances in question set forth enough standards that clarify
imagined ambiguities. While such standards are not apparent from the face thereof,
they are visible from the intent of the said ordinances.

The next inquiry is whether or not they can be said to be ex post facto measures. The
appellant argues that they are: "Amendment No. 12 passed on September 19, 1966,
clearly provides that the payment of the imposed tax shall "beginning and taking effect
from the year 1964, if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964.' In other
words, it penalizes acts or events occurring before its passage, that is to say, 1964 and
even prior thereto." 37

31
The Court finds no merit in this contention. As the Solicitor General notes, "Municipal
Ordinance No. 4 was passed on May 14, 1955. 38 Hence, it cannot be said that the
amendment (under Ordinance No. 12) is being made to apply retroactively (to 1964)
since the reckoning period is 1955 (date of enactment). Essentially, Ordinances Nos. 12
and 15 are in the nature of curative measures intended to facilitate and enhance the
collection of revenues the originally act, Ordinance No. 4, had prescribed. 39 Moreover,
the act (of non-payment of the tax), had been, since 1955, made punishable, and it
cannot be said that Ordinance No. 12 imposes a retroactive penalty. As we have noted,
it operates to grant amnesty to operators who had been delinquent between 1955 and
1964. It does not mete out a penalty, much less, a retrospective one.

The appellant assails, finally, the power of the municipal council of Pagbilao to tax
"public forest land." 40 In Golden Ribbon Lumber Co., Inc. v. City of Butuan 41 we held that
local governments' taxing power does not extend to forest products or concessions
under Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy Act then in force. (Republic Act No.
2264 likewise prohibited municipalities from imposing percentage taxes on sales.)

First of all, the tax in question is not a tax on property, although the rate thereof is based
on the area of fishponds ("P3.00 per hectare" 42). Secondly, fishponds are not forest
lands, although we have held them to the agricultural lands. 43 By definition, "forest" is
"a large tract of land covered with a natural growth of trees and underbush; a large
wood." 44 (Accordingly, even if the challenged taxes were directed on the fishponds,
they would not have been taxes on forest products.)

They are, more accurately, privilege taxes on the business of fishpond maintenance.
They are not charged against sales, which would have offended the doctrine enshrined
by Golden Ribbon Lumber, 45 but rather on occupation, which is allowed under Republic
Act No. 2264. 46 They are what have been classified as fixed annual taxes and this is
obvious from the ordinances themselves.

There is, then, no merit in the last objection.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. Costs against the appellant.

G.R. No. L-2877 April 26, 1951

MALATE TAXICAB & GARAGE CO., petitioner, vs. PUBLIC SERVICE

COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents.

TUASON, J.:

This is a petition to review a decision of the Public Service Commission on applications

by pre-war taxi operators for an increase of equipment and by post-war taxi operators
for both such increase and regular certificates of public convenience in lieu of
temporary certificates which theretofore had been issued to them. These applications
having been heard jointly, the Commission authorized an increase of 125 units for five
pre-war operators, 399 units for 78 post-war operators and 15 units for 8 new operators,
or a total of 539 units. The allocations to pre-war operators were thus distributed: to
Francisco Benitez 10, in addition to 40 he was already operating; to Malate Taxicab &

32
Garage Co. Inc. 15, in addition to 185; to Amador D. Santos, 60, in addition to 90; and to
Jose F. Zamora 40, in addition to 160.

Malate Taxicab Company, the only applicant which has appealed, prefaces its petition
for review with the admission "the decision has fairly established the actual need of
increase of equipment due to the present demand," and says that the only issue
involved is "whether it (Applicant)is entitled to increase its equipment by adding 115
new units (which it applied for) to its present equipment." But in its brief it assails the
increase of post-war operators' equipment and the granting of permanent certificates of
public convenience to them.

On the expediency and justice of allowing post-war operators permanent certificates,

the findings of the Commission may be cited as convenient background. Says the
Commission, "After liberation in 1945, the Pre-War operators, upon resumption of
service, operated only a very small portion of their pre-war equipment, which was
insufficient to meet the demands of the traveling public. In order to remedy the
situation, the Commission issued certificates of public convenience which were
temporary in nature and good only up to December 31, 1948, to operate taxicab services
within the City of Manila and neighboring municipalities." "In spite, however, of several
extensions of term granted to the pre-war operators to complete their pre-war
equipment, the last extension having expired on September 30,1948, only six of them
were able to do so," one of them being the Malate Taxicab Company.

It would seem a matter of simple justice, in the light of their past performance, of the
enormous increase of population of Manila and neighboring cities and municipalities,
and of the encouragement given them by the Commission, thank to the failure or
inability of the pre-war operators to supply normal needs, that the post-war operators
should not now be left in the lurch. They had answered the call of service for the
convenience of the public," at a time when, in the words of the appellant," the supply (of
cars and taxi meters) was very meager and limited, "when "everything was priced at a
premium," when "a new cars could be obtained only in the so-called Black Market."
Whatever the reasons for the pre-war operators' refusal or inability to resume full
operation during the acute shortage of transportation facilities, the investment of the
post-war, small operators deserved protection, at least as much as those who claim to
have lost heavily as a result of the war. At the most, the Commission does not appear to
have acted arbitrarily in issuing regular certificates of public convenience to this
operators.

Whether the allocations were unfair and should have been done differently as a matter
which it is well nigh impossible for this Court to consider How the increase should have
been opportioned, we are not informed and we are not in a position to determined
intelligently. If any operators got more than was proper, such operators have not been
named, nor is it stated how much increase they should have been granted. This matter
is a highly complex one necessitating consideration of facts and circumstances beyond
those revealed by the testimony of witnesses and the arguments of counsel. It is hardly
necessary to call attention to the fact that the allotments of cars necessarily depend upon
numerous factors some of which transcend the record presented for review. From the
facts and circumstances at hand, there is no warrant for holding that the Commission
has stepped beyond the bounds of reason and equity. The Commission has taken into
consideration the result of its own observation and investigation and besides the
evidence.

33
As matters now stand, the only feasible remedy of Malate Taxicab Company would be
to make a new application for an increase of its equipment instead of forcing a
readjustment of the general increase already authorized and allocated. The decision
complained of has not foreclosed the step thus indicated, and such step would have the
advantage of focusing on the question of the expediency and reasonableness of limiting
to 200 the maximum number of units of each operator's equipment, which seems to be a
policy adopted but not expressly stated by the Commission. After all, the main interest
of the appellant is to obtain an increase of its own fleet of cars, as we gather from its
formulation of the issue in its application for review.

The appealed decision or order is affirmed with costs of the appeal against the
appellant.

G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992

LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner, vs. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE

NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION and THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act No.
6683 was approved on 2 December 1988 providing for benefits for early retirement and
voluntary separation from the government service as well as for involuntary separation
due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in
Sec. 2 of the Act, as follows:

Sec. 2. Coverage. — This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the
National Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters, as well as the personnel of all local government units. The
benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and
emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two
(2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation. Uniformed
personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are
excluded from the coverage of this Act.

Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the
program, filed an application on 30 January 1989 with respondent National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered
separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of
service commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service
Commission yielded negative results. 1 Her letter for reconsideration dated 25 April
1989 pleaded thus:

xxx xxx xxx

With due respect, I think the interpretation of the Honorable Commissioner of RA

6683 does not conform with the beneficent purpose of the law. The law merely
requires that a government employee whether regular, temporary, emergency, or
casual, should have two consecutive years of government service in order to be
entitled to its benefits. I more than meet the requirement. Persons who are not
entitled are consultants, experts and contractual(s). As to the budget needed, the law
provides that the Department of Budget and Management will shoulder a certain

34
 portion of the benefits to be allotted to government corporations. Moreover,
personnel of these NIA special projects art entitled to the regular benefits, such (sic)
leaves, compulsory retirement and the like. There is no reason why we should not
be entitled to RA 6683.

xxx xxx xxx 2

Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) emphasized:

xxx xxx xxx

We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted. The provision of
Section 3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 does not only require an
applicant to have two years of satisfactory service on the date of
separation/retirement but further requires said applicant to be on a casual,
emergency, temporary or regular employment status as of December 2, 1988, the
date of enactment of R.A. 6683. The law does not contemplate contractual employees
in the coverage.

Inasmuch as your employment as of December 31, 1988, the date of your separation
from the service, is co-terminous with the NIA project which is contractual in nature,
this Commission shall sustain its original decision.

xxx xxx xxx 3

In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by way of a special civil action
for certiorari, insisting that she is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No.
6683. Her arguments:

It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section 3.1 of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular
Letter No. 89-1 requires an applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or
regular employment status. Likewise, the provisions of Section 23 (sic) of the Joint
DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1, implementing guidelines of R.A. No. 6683,
provides:

"2.3 Excluded from the benefits under R.A. No. 6683 are the following:

a) Experts and Consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform

specific activities or services with a definite expected output: i.e. membership in
Task Force, Part-Time, Consultant/Employees.

b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of

the Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police (PC-INP).

c) Appointive officials and employees who retire or elect to be separated from the
service for optional retirement with gratuity under R.A. No. 1616, 4968 or with
pension under R.A. No. 186, as amended by R.A. No. 6680 or P.D. No. 1146, an
amended, or vice- versa.

d) Officials and employees who retired voluntarily prior to the enactment of this
law and have received the corresponding benefits of that retirement/separation.

35
 e) Officials and employees with pending cases punishable by mandatory separation
from the service under existing civil service laws, rules and regulations; provided
that if such officials and employees apply in writing within the prescriptive period
for the availment of the benefits herein authorized, shall be allowed only if
acquitted or cleared of all charges and their application accepted and approved by
the head of office concerned."

Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner does not belong to any one of them.
Ms. Chua is a full time employee of NIA entitled to all the regular benefits provided
for by the Civil Service Commission. She held a permanent status as Personnel
Assistant A, a position which belongs to the Administrative Service. . . . If casuals and
emergency employees were given the benefit of R.A. 6683 with more reason that this
petitioner who was holding a permanent status as Personnel Assistant A and has
rendered almost 15 years of faithful, continuous service in the government should be
similarly rewarded by the beneficient (sic) purpose of the law. 4

The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in their comment petitioner's
exclusion from the benefits of Republic Act No. 6683, because:

1. Petitioner's employment is co-terminous with the project per appointment papers

kept by the Administrative Service in the head office of NIA (the service record was
issued by the Watershed Management and Erosion Control Project (WMECP),
Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija). The project, funded by the World Bank, was completed as
of 31 December 1988, after which petitioner's position became functus officio.

2. Petitioner is not a regular and career employee of NIA — her position is not included
in its regular plantilla. She belongs to the non-career service (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 807) which
is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient; on the other hand, retirement
presupposes employment for a long period. The most that a non-career personnel can
expect upon the expiration of his employment is financial assistance. Petitioner is not
even qualified to retire under the GSIS law.

3. Assuming arguendo that petitioner's appointment is permanent, security of tenure is

available only for the term of office (i.e., duration of project).

4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really to grant separation or retirement
benefits but reorganization 5 to streamline government functions. The application of the
law must be made consistent with the purpose for which it was enacted. Thus, as the
expressed purpose of the law is to reorganize the government, it will not have any
application to special projects such as the WMECP which exists only for a short and
definite period. This being the nature of special projects, there is no necessity for
offering its personnel early retirement benefits just to induce voluntary separation as a
step to reorganization. In fact, there is even no need of reorganizing the WMECP
considering its short and limited life-span. 6

5. The law applies only to employees of the national government, government-owned

or controlled corporations with original charters and local government units.

Due to the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interpretations of the parties, the
Court is called upon to define the different classes of employees in the public sector (i.e.
government civil servants).

36
Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as amended)
deems an employment regular where the employee has been engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer. No equivalent definition can be found in P.D.No. 807 (promulgated on 6
October 1975, which superseded the Civil Service Act of 1965 — R.A. No. 2260) or in the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292 promulgated on 25 July 1987).
The Early Retirement Law itself (Rep. Act No. 6683) merely includes such class of
employees (regular employees) in its coverage, unmindful that no such specie is
employed in the public sector.

The appointment status of government employees in the career service is classified as

follows:

1. permanent — one issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to
which appointment is made, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Act
and the Rules and Standards promulgated in pursuance thereof; 7

2. temporary — In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the

public interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment should be issued to a person
who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except
the appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided, That such temporary appointment
shall not exceed twelve months, but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified
civil service eligible becomes available. 8

The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service as:

(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an

appropriate examination is required;

(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these
include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and
scientific and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which shall
establish and maintain their own merit systems;

(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant

Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant
Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank
as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are
appointed by the President.

(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are
appointed by the President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department
of Foreign Affairs;

(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain
a separate merit system;

(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing

governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service;
and

(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled. 9

37
The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by:

. . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness
utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified
by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to
his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which
purpose employment was made.

Included in the non-career service are:

1. elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;

2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the
pleasure of the President and their personal confidential staff(s);

3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed terms of office
and their personal or confidential staff;

4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in

accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job requiring
special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished
within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year and performs or
accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum
of direction and supervision from the hiring agency.

5. emergency and seasonal personnel. 10

There is another type of non-career employee:

Casual — where and when employment is not permanent but occasional,

unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature (Caro v. Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70;
Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co., 96 Phil. 945)

Consider petitioner's record of service:

Service with the government commenced on 2 December 1974 designated as a

laborer holdingemergency status with the NIA — Upper Pampanga River Project, R
& R Division. 11 From 24 March 1975 to 31 August 1975, she was a research aide
with temporary status on the same project. On 1 September 1975 to 31 December
1976, she was with the NIA-FES III; R & R Division, then on 1 January 1977 to 31
May 1980, she was with NIA — UPR IIS (Upper Pampanga River Integrated
Irrigation Systems) DRD. On 1 June 1980, she went to NIA — W.M.E.C.P.
(Watershed Management & Erosion Control Project) retaining the status
of temporary employee. While with this project, her designation was changed to
personnel assistant on 5 November 1981; starting 9 July 1982, the status
became permanent until the completion of the project on 31 December 1988. The
appointment paper 12 attached to the OSG's comment lists her status as co-terminus
with the Project.

The employment status of personnel hired under foreign — assisted projects is

considered co-terminous, that is, they are considered employees for the duration of the
project or until the completion or cessation of said project (CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 39, S. 1990, 27 June 1990).

38
Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefits regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive
years government service.

Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April 1987, provides:

WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966 dated June 22, 1984, the Civil
Service Commission is charged with the function of determining creditable services
for retiring officers and employees of the national government;

WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive Order No. 966 provides that all
previous services by an officer/employee pursuant to a duly approved appointment
to a position in the Civil Service are considered creditable services, while Section 6
(a) thereof states that services rendered oncontractual, emergency or casual status are
non-creditable services;

WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid provisions inasmuch as some

contractual, emergency or casual employment are covered by contracts or
appointments duly approved by the Commission.

NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that services rendered on contractual, emergency or
casual status, irrespective of the mode or manner of payment therefor shall be considered as
creditable for retirement purposes subject to the following conditions: (emphasis provided)

1. These services are supported by approved appointments, official records and/or

other competent evidence. Parties/agencies concerned shall submit the necessary
proof of said services;

2. Said services are on full time basis and rendered prior to June 22, 1984, the
effectivity date of Executive Order No. 966; and

3. The services for the three (3) years period prior to retirement are continuous and
fulfill the service requirement for retirement.

What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency, seasonal, project,
co-terminous or contractual personnel? All are tenurial employees with no fixed term,
non-career, and temporary. The 12 May 1989 CSC letter of denial 13 characterized herein
petitioner's employment as co-terminous with the NIA project which in turn
was contractual in nature. The OSG says petitioner's status is co-terminous with the Project.
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 1991 (5 April 1991) characterizes the status
of a co-terminous employee —

(3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person whose entrance in the service is
characterized by confidentiality by the appointing authority or that which is subject to
his pleasure or co-existent with his tenure.

The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified into the following:

a) co-terminous with the project — When the appointment is co-existent with the
duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject
to the availability of funds for the same;

39
 b) co-terminous with the appointing authority — when appointment is co-existent with
the tenure of the appointing authority.

c) co-terminous with the incumbent — when appointment is co-existent with the

appointee, in that after the resignation, separation or termination of the services of
the incumbent the position shall be deemed automatically abolished; and

d) co-terminous with a specific period, e.g. "co-terminous for a period of 3 years" — the
appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration thereof, the position is
deemed abolished.

It is stressed, however, that in the last two classifications (c) and (d), what is termed
co-terminous is the position, and not the appointee-employee. Further, in (c) the
security of tenure of the appointee is guaranteed during his incumbency; in (d) the
security of tenure is limited to a specific period.

A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant,

like casual and emergency employees. We see no solid reason why the latter are extended
benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be noted that
Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular,
temporary, casual andemergency employees. But specifically excluded from the benefits
are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued
that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The legislature would not have made a specific
enumeration in a statute had not the intention been to restrict its meaning and confine
its terms and benefits to those expressly mentioned 14 or casus omissus pro omisso
habendus est — A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to
have been omitted intentionally. 15 Yet adherence to these legal maxims can result in
incongruities and in a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 16 comes to mind where, workers belonging to a
work pool, hired and re-hired continuously from one project to another were
considered non-project-regular and permanent employees.

Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive projects during a
span of fifteen (15) years. Although no proof of the existence of a work pool can be
assumed, her service record cannot be disregarded.

Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws."

. . . In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled that the equal protection clause
applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable
classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1)
it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present
conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of
the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same
class. 17

Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would violate the equal
protection clause were we to sustain respondents' submission that the benefits of said
law are to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as

40
those covered by said law. The maxim of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not
be the applicable maxim in this case but the doctrine of necessary implication which holds
that:

No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application.
There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is
thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be
inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps in the
law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to
fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states that what
is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every
statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be
necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers,
privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate
legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all
incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser,
expressed in the Maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus. 18

During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon (re: Early Retirement Law), in
response to Congressman Dimaporo's interpellation on coverage of state university
employees who are extended appointments for one (1) year, renewable for two (2) or
three (3) years, 19 he explained:

This Bill covers only those who would like to go on early retirement and voluntary
separation. It is irrespective of the actual status or nature of the appointment one
received, but if he opts to retire under this, then he is covered.

It will be noted that, presently Pending in Congress, is House Bill No. 33399 (a proposal
to extend the scope of the Early Retirement Law). Its wording supports the submission
that Rep. Act No. 6683 indeed overlooked a qualified group of civil servants. Sec. 3 of
said House bill, on coverage of early retirement, would provide:

Sec. 3. Coverage. — It will cover all employees of the national government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, as well as the personnel of all local
government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular,
temporary, casual, emergency and contractual employees, regardless of age, who have
rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years government service as of the
date of separation. The term "contractual employees" as used in this Act does not
include experts and consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform
specific activities or services with definite expected output.

Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including those of the
PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act. (emphasis supplied)

The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to trim the
bureaucracy, hence, vacated positions are deemed abolished upon early/voluntary
retirement of their occupants. Will the inclusion of co-terminous personnel (like the
petitioner) defeat such objective? In their case, upon termination of the project and
separation of the project personnel from the service, the term of employment is
considered expired, the officefunctus officio. Casual, temporary and contractual
personnel serve for shorter periods, and yet, they only have to establish two (2) years of
continuous service to qualify. This, incidentally, negates the OSG's argument that co-

41
terminous or project employment is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient,
whereas, retirement presupposes employment for a long period. Here, violation of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution becomes glaring because casuals are not
even in the plantilla, and yet, they are entitled to the benefits of early retirement. How
can the objective of the Early Retirement Law of trimming the bureaucracy be achieved
by granting early retirement benefits to a group of employees (casual) without plantilla
positions? There would, in such a case, be no abolition of permanent positions or
streamlining of functions; it would merely be a removal of excess personnel; but the
positions remain, and future appointments can be made thereto.

Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered years of
continuous service should be included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as
long as they file their application prior to the expiration of their term, and as long as
they comply with CSC regulations promulgated for such purpose. In this connection,
Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1990 (5 March 1990) implementing Rep. Act
No. 6850, 20 requires, as a condition to qualify for the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or
total of seven (7) years of government service which need not be continuous, in the
career or non-career service, whether appointive, elective, casual, emergency, seasonal,
contractualor co-terminous including military and police service, as evaluated and
confirmed by the Civil Service Commission. 21 A similar regulation should be
promulgated for the inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of co-terminous personnel who
survive the test of time. This would be in keeping with the coverage of "all social
legislations enacted to promote the physical and mental well-being of public
servants" 22 After all, co-terminous personnel, are also obligated to the government for
GSIS contributions, medicare and income tax payments, with the general disadvantage
of transience.

In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and
CSC of petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is
unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for
voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of
said law. While the application was filed after expiration of her term, we can give
allowance for the fact that she originally filed the application on her own without the
assistance of counsel. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must be
granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years — the minimum
requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive
governmental projects.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for a favorable disposition of petitioner's
application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683, in accordance with
the pronouncements in this decision.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-46825 October 18, 1939

ARSENIO C. ROLDAN, Judge-at-Large of First Instance assigned to the Province of

Bulacan, and IÑIGO S. DAZA, as Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, petitioners, vs.
PEDRO VILLAROMAN, DIEGO CUEVAS, and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

42
IMPERIAL, J.:

By this petition for prohibition, petitioners would have the Court of Appeals abstain
absolutely from taking cognizance of, hearing and deciding the certiorari proceedings
instituted by the respondents Pedro Villaroman and Diego Cuevas against Judge
Arsenio C. Roldan and provincial fiscals Iñigo S. Daza and Roman de Jesus, the first
two being petitioners, bearing CA-G.R. No. 5295 of said Court of Appeals, and would
further have, during the pendency of this petition, a writ of preliminary injunction
issued to the end that the Court of Appeals abstain from executing or carrying out the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by it in the aforesaid certiorari proceedings.

On February 6, 1939 the provincial fiscal of Bulacan, Iñigo S. Daza, filed an information
in the justice of the peace court of San Rafael, Bulacan, against the respondents Pedro
Villaroman and Diego Cuevas, Pablo de la Cruz and one, John Doe, charging them with
having committed the crime of murder upon the person of Joaquin Venturina, on
November 30, 1936, in the municipality of San Rafael, Province of Bulacan, with
treachery and the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and price or
reward. Villaroman and Cuevas were arrested and at the preliminary investigation they
pleaded not guilty. Both were set a liberty under bail for P20,000 which each of them
put up. As a result of the preliminary investigation, the justice of the peace elevated the
case to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan and there docketed as criminal case No.
7652. In the said Court of First Instance the same provincial fiscal reproduced the very
allegations of the information filed by him in the justice of the peace court.

Upon arraignment in the Court of First Instance, Villaroman and Cuevas also pleaded
not guilty. The trial of the case went forward against the two accused and the
prosecution presented the greater part of all its evidence. While the prosecution was
adducing its evidence, Cuevas was taken ill and to be confined in the Manila Central
Hospital. The petitioner judge, who was hearing the case, denied various petitions for
postponements filed indiscriminately by the attorneys for the respondents-defendants.
When the fiscal rested his case, waiving the testimony of many government witnesses
appearing in the list which he had prepared and served upon the attorneys for the
defense, the latter reiterated the petition for postponement on the ground, principally,
that the accused Cuevas was absent due to sickness. The court denied the petition and
compelled the attorney for Villaroman to present the evidence in defense if this accused.
The attorney felt bound to abide by the order and so presented some witnesses for the
defense. When he ran short of available witnesses, as the others were not present, he
again asked for the postponement of the trial to which the court acceded; but before
Villaroman left the courtroom, the prosecuting attorneys filed a written motion asking
for the cancellation of the bonds filed by the accused. The attorneys for the latter
sharply opposed this, but the court sustained the motion, cancelled the bonds and
ordered the arrest of the accused. As a result, Villaroman was rearrested as well as
Cuevas who was confined in the Bilibid Prison Hospital.

At this stage of the case, Pedro Villaroman and Diego Cuevas

instituted certiorari proceedings in the Court of Appeals against of the petitioners and
fiscal Roman de Jesus, CA-G.R. No. 5295, impugning in their petition the jurisdiction of
the petitioner judge to proceed with the criminal case for murder in the absence of
Diego Cuevas, and asking that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued, enjoining the
petitioner judge from setting the continuation of the trial of the criminal case until
further order. The Court of Appeals issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for
and ordered the petitioner judge to abstain from going forward with the trial of said
case until further order. The Solicitor-General, on behalf of the then respondents, asked

43
that certiorari proceedings be transferred to the Supreme Court of Appeals to try and
decide the same, and asked likewise for the setting aside of the writ of preliminary
injunction as well as to take cognizance of and decide the certiorari proceedings. The
resolution thus promulgated. Justice Enage dissenting and Justices Paras, Montemayor
and A. Reyes reserving their votes, are the ones which gave rise to the remedy by
prohibition now before us.

Passing upon the petition of the herein petitioners, this court granted the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for and ordered the Court of Appeals to abstain from
carrying out and executing the writ of preliminary injunction issued by it.

The petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals has no original jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the petition forcertiorari filed by Villaroman and Cuevas under section
145-G of the Revised Administrative Code, inserted by section 3 of the Commonwealth
Act No. 3, reading:

SEC. 145-G. Original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. — The Court of Appeals
shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition,
injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs and process in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction.

The Spanish translation of said section is couched in the following language:

ART. 145-G. Jurisdiction originaria del tribunal de Apelacion. — El Tribunal de

Apelacion tendra jurisdiction originaria para librar mandamientos perentorios de
inhibicion, de avocacion y de habeas corpus, interdictos prohibitorios y todos los
demas mandamientos y providencias auxiliares necesarios en el ejercicio de su
jurisdiccion en apelacion.

Comparing both texts, it will be noted that the Spanish translation is incorrect because
the English phrase "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" was translated "necesarios en el
ejercicio de du jurisdiccion en apelacion." The Spanish translation of the phrase does not
quite convey the idea expressed in the English phrase. Commonwealth Act No. 3 was
finally approved in English by the First National Assembly, wherefore, the English text
of the entire law should govern (section 15 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917).

Section 145-G is the provision of Commonwealth Act No. 3, which confers on the Court
of Appeals original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition,
injunction, certiorari, and habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs known and
permitted by the law of procedure; but the granted power or jurisdiction is subject to
the condition that such writs should be in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. No other
thing is meant by the phrase "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" but the legal true.

The resolution of the Court of Appeals denying the motions of the Solicitor-General,
and now assailed in this petition, rely principally upon its decision rendered in the case
of Mujer vs. Court of First Instance of Laguna (CA-G.R. No. 613, September 21, 1936),
holding that the phrase "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" only refers to its
approximate antecedent " and all other auxiliary writs and process", and not to the writ
of mandamus or to the writs of prohibition, injunction, certiorari, and habeas
corpus mentioned in the only sentence if said section, in reliance upon the rule of
interpretation that a qualifying phrase should be understood as referring to the nearest
antecedent. The rule of interpretation applied is in fact the general rule in the
interpretation of qualifying or condition phrases found in a law (59 C.J., sec. 584, p. 985

44
but the rule is subject to the extension that where the intention of the law is to apply the
phrase to all the antecedents embraced in the provision, the same should be made
extensive to the whole. This exception is summarized in the same volume of the Corpus
Juris, at pages 985 and 986, as follows: "This rule is, however, merely an aid to
construction and will not be adhered to where the extension to a more remote
antecedent is clearly required by a consideration of the entire act. Slight indication of
legislative intent so to extend the relative term is sufficient. Where several words are
followed by a clause as much applicable to the first and other words as to the last, the
clause should be read as applicable to all." (Stevens vs. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 137 N.E.,
859; Warner vs. King, 107 N.E., 837; Grenough vs. Phoenix Ins. Co. of Hartford, 92 N.E.,
447; State vs. St. Louis, 73 S.W., 623; Nebraska State Ry. Commission vs. Alfalfa Butter
Co., 178 N.W., 766; Myer vs. Ada Xounty, 293 P., 322; Porto Rico Ry., Light and Power
Co. vs. Mor, 253 U.S., 345.)

The cardinal rule in the interpretation of laws is to ascertain and give effect to the
intention of the legislator (Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil., 322; People vs. Concepcion,
44 Phil., 126); and when the language of a law is reasonably susceptible of two or more
interpretations, that should be adopted which tends to give effect to the manifest
intention of the legislator and to promote the purpose for which it was enacted, and that
interpretation should be rejected which tends to defeat the purpose which the
legislators has intended to attain by its enactment (U.S. vs. Toribio, 15 Phil., 85; U.S. vs.
Navarro, 19 Phil., 134). A close study of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 3 and
those of the amending Act, No. 259, will disclose that the purpose of the national
Assembly was to confer upon the Court of Appeals as appellate jurisdiction that is
special and limited, unlike the original and appellate jurisdiction conferred upon the
Supreme Court and upon the Courts of First Instance of the Archipelago.lâwphi1.nêt

Commonwealth Act No. 3 reorganized the membership of the Supreme Court, created
the Court of Appeals and defined the original and appellate jurisdiction of both. Section
2 amended section 138 of the Revised Administrative Code relative to the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court. Section 138 was subsequently modified by section 3 of
Commonwealth Act No. 259 which amended paragraphs (4) and (5). Section 138, as
finally amended reads:

SEC. 138. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. — The Supreme Court shall have such
original jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of
the Philippines at the time of the approval of this Act, including cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.

The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm, on appeal,certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court
may provide, final judgments of inferior courts may provide, final judgments
and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in —

(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance,
or executive order or regulation is in question;

(2) All cases involving the legality of any tax, compost, assessment of toll, or any
penalty imposed in relation thereto;

(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue;.

45
 (4) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or
life imprisonment, and those involving other offenses which, although not so
punished, arose out of the same occurrence or which may have been committed by
the accused on the same occasion, as that giving rise to the more serious offense,
regardless of whether the accused are charged as principals, accomplices or
accesories, or whether they have been tried jointly or separately;

(5) All civil cases in which the value in controversy exceeds fifty thousand pesos,
exclusive of interest and costs, or in which the title or possession of real estate
exceeding in value the sum of fifty thousand pesos to be ascertained by the oath of a
party to the cause or by other competent evidence, is involved or brought in
question. The Supreme Court shall likewise have exclusive jurisdiction over all
appeals in civil cases, even though the value in controversy, exclusive of interests
and costs, is fifty thousand pesos or less, when the evidence involved in said cases is
the same as the evidence submitted in an appealed civil case within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided herein.

Section 145-F of the Revised Administrative Code, inserted by section 3 of the

Commonwealth Act No. 3, also reads:

SEC. 145-F. Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. — The Court of Appeals shall have
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of all cases, actions, and proceedings, not
enumerated in section one hundred and thirty-eight of this Code, properly
brought to it from Courts of First Instance. The decision of the Court of Appeals
in such cases shall be final; Provided, however, That the Supreme Court in its
discretion may, in any case involving a question of law, upon petition of the
party aggrieved by the decision and under rules and conditions that it may
prescribe by certiorari that the said case be certified to it for review and
determination, as if the case had been brought before it on appeal.

It is inferred from a reading of sections 138 and 145-f that the Court of Appeals has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction only in all cases not enumerated in the first of said
sections, brought to it on appeal from Courts of First Instance. Section 145-F does not
enumerate the cases appealable exclusively to the Court of Appeals has not enumerate
the case appealable exclusively to the Court of Appeals, but bearing in mind the other
legal provisions relative to cases which may be appealed from Courts of First Instance,
it will be seen that cases, whether civil or criminal, appealable to the Court of Appeals
are limited as to kind, amount and nature. The Court of Appeals has no power of
supervision, unlike the Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance. Under
Commonwealth Act Nos. 3 and 259, the decisions of the Court of Appeals are final only
with respect to disputed and adjudicated facts; all questions of law are appealable to the
Supreme Court. Generally, in the special remedies by mandamus, prohibition, injunction
and certiorari and in habeas corpus proceedings, the questions raised by the parties are
legal in character. In the light of these legal provisions, it is evident that the National
Assembly, in conferring original jurisdiction upon the Court of Appeals to take
cognizance of petitions formandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari and habeas corpus,
did so with the limitation that it should be exercised in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
It is groundless to assume that the National Assembly meant to confer this jurisdiction
without any limitation if, ultimately, the decisions to be rendered by the Court of
Appeals may again be appealed to the Supreme Court because involving, in many
cases, questions of law.

46
In the case of Mujer vs. Court of First Instance of Laguna, supra, invoked as a precedent
upon which the questioned resolutions are based, is cited as authority the case of Hyatt
vs. Allen (54 Cal., 353, 357), and the case of Tyler vs. Houghton (25 Cal., 26), cited with
approval in the first, wherein the Supreme Court of the State of California, interpreting
section 4, Title VI, of the Constitution of the State, held that it had jurisdiction to pass
upon petitions for mandamus, prohibitions, injunction, certiorari and habeas corpus. The
constitutional provision relied upon by the Supreme Court of California is couched in
the following language:

The court shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition
and habeas corpus, and all other writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction.

Comparing this constitutional provision with section 145-G of the Revised

Administrative Code, inserted by the amendment introduced by Commonwealth Act
No. 3, it will be seen that both provisions differ substantially in their wordings,
inasmuch as the first does not contain the phrase "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"
which is found in the record. The language of both provisions not being identical, the
ruling of the Supreme Court of California in the case of Hyatt vs. Allen and Tyler v.
Houghton does not constitute and cannot be invoked as a precedent to bulwark the
conclusion reached in the Mujer case as well as in the Resolutions complained of.

Section 2, article VII, of the Constitution of the State of Louisian, provides"

S 2. Habeas Corpus — Power to issue writ — Supervisory powers of appellate

courts. — The Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, and each of the judges
thereof subject to review by the court of which he is a member, and each district
judge throughout the State including judges of the Civil and Criminal District
Courts in the Parish of Orleans, may issue writs of habeas corpus, in behalf of any
person in actual custody in cases within their respective jurisdictions; and may
also in aid of their respective jurisdictions, original, appellate, or supervisory,
issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and all other needful
writs, orders and process, and where any of said writs are refused, the appellate
courts shall indicate the reasons therefor.

It will be noted that the closing portion of the constitutional provision is closely similar
to section 145-G of our law in providing "and may also in aid of their respective
jurisdictions, original, appellate, or supervisory, issue writs ofmandamus, . . . ."
Interpreting this constitutional provision in connection with the original jurisdictions of
the Court of Appeals of Louisiana to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo
warranto and habeas corpus, the Supreme Court of said State, in the cases of Riccobono vs.
Kearney (114 So., 707), resolved the question negatively, on the ground that the original
jurisdiction of said Court of Appeal to issue the said writs is confined to cases in which
it is exercised in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. In said case the Supreme Court of
Louisiana said:

From the foregoing provisions of the Constitution it appears that the Court of Appeal
for the Parish of Orleans has appellate jurisdiction only, with the exception of the right
to issue the writ of habeas corpus, and the right to issue in aid of its jurisdiction, which is
appellate only, save as here stated, writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and other
needful orders and process. Therefore, as the Court of Appeal for the Parish of Orleans
has appellate jurisdiction only, save as above stated, the question is resolved into

47
whether the rule that issued was in aid of the appellate jurisdiction of that court, for the
limited original jurisdiction which it possesses is not here involved.

"In our opinion, the rule was not in aid of the appellate jurisdiction of that court. The
fact that true recorder refused to register the judgment could not affect in any manner
the jurisdiction of that court, which was appellate only, over the case in which the
judgment was rendered. The right, if it existed, to have the judgment registered in the
mortgage office, is a right distinct from the appeal, and not in separately connected with
it. It is one which should have been enforced independently of the appeal by
proceedings begun in a court possessing original jurisdiction, in this instance the civil
district court for the parish of Orleans.

"The present case is unlike the cases of Dannenmann & Charlton vs. Charlton (113 La.,
276; 36 So., 965); Cluseau vs. Wagner (126 La., 375; 52 So., 547); and Daly vs. Brook (133
La., 752; 63 So., 318), cited by plaintiff, and relied on by the Court of Appeal in
overruling the plea to the jurisdiction. In the Dannenmann & Charlton case a moneyed
judgment was recovered in the trial court, and recorded in the mortgage records, while
a suspensive appeal was pending in this Court from the judgment rendered. In each of
the remaining cases cited, moneyed judgments were obtained in the trial court, and
recorded in the mortgage records prior to the taking of a suspensive appeal. In each of
these cases the appellant proceeded by rule in this court to force the appellee and the
recorded in the mortgages to cancel the inscriptions of the judgment. This court in each
of those cases, held or considered that the registry of the judgment was a partial
execution of them, in violation of the right of suspensive appeal, and maintained
jurisdiction in order to preserve intact the suspensive appeal in each case, and to
prevent any interference wit it. The fact in the present case are entirely different. Here
there was no partial execution of the judgment, which was rendered for the first time on
appeal, and no interference with the appeal. Here the issue simply is whether the Court
of Appeal has jurisdiction, in a proceeding commenced before it, to force the recorder of
mortgages to register in the mortgage records a judgment rendered by it while the
appeal in the case is still pending. To this we answer no, and do so because the
proceeding is not in aid of the appellate jurisdiction of the court.

For these reasons, the judgment under review is annulled and set aside, the
exception to the jurisdiction is sustained, and the rule issued by the Court of
Appeal is dismissed.

The Court of Appeal of Louisiana followed the same interpretation in the cases of Wall
vs. Tangipahoa School Board (119 So., 371); State ex rel. Truxillo vs. Gilbert (128 So., 204;
and State ex rel. Griffin vs. Morgan (130 So., 868).

In the State of Indiana, section 803, Chapter 87 of the Laws of 1915, section 1244, Burns'
1926, confers original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court and on the Court of Appeals on
the State to issue writs of mandamus and prohibition in aid of their appellate
jurisdiction and functions in the following language:

Writs of mandate and prohibition may issue in aid of the appellate Courts of this
State in aid of the appellate Courts of this State in aid of the appellate powers
and functions of said courts respectively.

The Supreme Court of the State of Indiana, interpreting its original jurisdiction to issue
the aforesaid writs in section 803, said the following in the case of State ex. rel. Hanrahan
vs. Chambers (181 N. E., 282.)"

48
In the case of Kesinger vs. Cox (141 N.E., 225), the Supreme Court of Indiana, interpreting
the same law, said:

The petition for a writ of mandamus was filed in the Supreme Court on September
26, 1923, which was 259 days after the decision is alleged to have been made and
the judgment to have been rendered in the election contest, and it does not allege
that a motion for a new trial had been ruled on which postponed the running of
the time allowed (180) days for taking an appeal, nor does it aver that an appeal
already had been perfected, ion aid of which this writ is asked.

And the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus only when
necessary for the exercise of its powers as an appellate tribunal, and has no
authority to require a bill of exceptions to be certified or the filing of a motion for
a new trial to be noted, unless such acts are to be done ion aid of an appeal which
the law authorizes to be taken. (Section 1224, Burns' Supp., 1921, Acts 1915, c. 87,
p. 207; Collins vs. Laybold, 182 Ind., 126, 129; 104 N.E. 971.)

In the following cases, the Federal Court of Appeals of Indiana adhered to the
interpretation laid down by the Supreme Court of the same State in the cited cases:

In the State ex. rel. Green vs. Jeffries (149 N.E., following:

A question having been raised as to the jurisdiction of this court over the subject-
matter, that question will be considered first. This court has jurisdiction to issue
writs of mandamus only in aid of its appellate powers and functions. (Section
1224, Burns' 1921 [Acts 1915, p. 207, c. 87]; State ex rel. vs. Cox, 193 Ind., 519; 141
N.E., 225.) If the relatrix were in a position to appeal from the action of the Vigo
circuit court, should her appeal be to the Supreme Court or to this court? If to
this court, we have jurisdiction to entertain her petition filed herein. If that
appeal should be to the Supreme Court, we have no jurisdiction to act upon her
petition for want of jurisdiction. If it were an appeal instead of an original action,
and, if we had no jurisdiction, it would be our duty to transfer the appeal to the
Supreme Court.

In the case of Frankel vs. Woodrough (7 Fed. [2d], 796, 797), the same Federal Court said:

This character of action (an original writ) is somewhat unusual in Courts of

Appeals and it is proper that this court examine its jurisdiction to entertain it. The
purpose of the petition is to compel the determination of a criminal action
against petitioner which, he avers, the trial court will not hear although it is its
duty to do so.This jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is purely and they have no
original jurisdiction except such as is necessary to aid, protect or enforce their appellate
jurisdiction. (Whitney vs. Dick, 202 U.S., 132; 26 S. Ct., 584; 50 Law. ed., 963;
United States vs. Meyer, 235 U.S., 55; 35 S. Ct., 16; 59 Law. ed., 129.)

The petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals has no original jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the certiorariproceedings instituted by the respondents Villaroman and
Cuevas because the decision to be rendered in the criminal case against the latter, if
appealed, would have to be passed upon by the Supreme Court because of the death
penalty which has to be imposed in view of the allegations of the information and the
evidence presented. In opposition the respondents contend that the appeal which may
be interposed should not be the basis in the determination of the original jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals to entertain the petition for certiorari, because if no appeal is taken

49
from the decision to be rendered, there would be no way of determining if the Court of
Appeals has original jurisdiction to act upon the certiorari proceedings. Following the
ruling in the case of Re Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. (67 L.T.A., 761, 768, 769), cited in the
memorandum of counsel for the respondents, we hold that the basis of the original
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals should not be the appeal which may be interposed
in the criminal case against the respondents Villaroman and Cuevas, but the right to
appeal. Otherwise stated, the original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to try and
decide the petition for certiorari instituted by Villaroman and Cuevas should be
determined by the existing right of appeal from the decision to be rendered in the
criminal case and not only by the contingency of whether or not such appeal will be
taken.

Paragraph (4) of section 138 of the Administrative Code, as amended by section 2 of

Commonwealth Act No. 259, reads:

(4) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death
or lite imprisonment, and those involving other offenses which, although not so
punished, arose out of the same occurrence or which may have been committed
by the accused on the same occasion, as that giving rise to the more serious
offense, regardless of whether the accused are charged as principals,
accomplices, or accessories, or whether they have been tried jointly or separately.

In accordance with this provision, appeals from decisions in criminal cases imposing
the penalties of death orreclusion perpetua and those taken from decisions in which,
while lesser penalties have been imposed, the facts constituting the less grave offenses,
however, arose out of the same occurrence as that giving rise to the more serious
offense, correspond to the Supreme Court and appellate jurisdiction shall be exercised
by the latter. Where criminal case has not yet been decided, the bases in determining
what court has original jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari founded upon questions
arising from said criminal case, should be the penalty fixed by law for the offense
charged in the information. Applying this criterion to the case at bar, it follows that the
Court of Appeals has no original jurisdiction to pass upon the petition for certiorari filed
by the respondents Villaroman and Cuevas, not to issue the auxiliary writ of
preliminary injunction issued by it, because in both cases the jurisdiction assumed by it
was not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, which it does not have for the following
reasons: First, because under paragraph (4) of section 138 of the Administrative Code,
as amended, the appeal to be taken from any judgment of conviction which may be
rendered in the criminal case would, in any avert, correspond to the Supreme Court;
and, secondly, because no decision having rendered in the criminal case, the penalty
imposable under the allegations of the information is the capital penalty, in which case
the appellate jurisdiction would likewise be exercised by the Supreme Court.

The respondent Villaroman and Cuevas asked in their answer that this court pass upon
the legality of the order issued by the petitioner judge in the aforesaid criminal case,
cancelling the bonds put up by said respondents and ordering their re-arrest. We hold
that it is not in order to pass upon said question in this petition for prohibition not being
necessarily included therein. For all the appears, the question was one of the grounds of
the petition forcertiorari filed by the said respondents, a petition which has to be
dismissed because it was filed before an incompetent court.

The writ prayed for by the petitioners is granted; it is held that the Court of Appeals has
no original jurisdiction to entertain a petition for certiorari filed before it by the
respondents Villaroman and Cuevas, not to issue the writ of preliminary injunction

50
which it issued; the resolutions of the Court of Appeals holding that it has power and
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the said petition for certiorari, as set aside; and the writ
of preliminary injunction issued in this made permanent, with costs to the respondents
Pedro Villaroman and Diego Cuevas. So ordered.

G.R. No. 14129 July 31, 1962

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs.GUILLERMO

MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.

REGALA, J.:

This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan dismissing the information against the defendant.

The records show that the statement of the case and the facts, as recited in the brief of
plaintiff-appellant, is complete and accurate. The same is, consequently, here adopted,
to wit:

In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of

First Instance of that Province, defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with
a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation
conducted by said court resulted in the finding a probable cause that the crime
charged as committed by defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon
defendant's plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on
the ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers
enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied
the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview
Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support
thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg, (CA-G.R.
No. 15613-R, 54 Off. Gaz., pp. 1873-76) where it was held that a justice of the
peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code. Acting on this second motion to dismiss, the answer of the prosecution,
the reply of the defense, and the opposition of the prosecution, the lower court
dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in
the case cited by the defense.

Both parties are submitting this case upon the determination of this single question of
law: Is a justice the peace included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code?

Section 54 of the said Code reads:

No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or

employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or
rural police force and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any
candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in a election or take part therein,
except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace
officer.

Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the
officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. He submits the

51
aforecited section was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code,
which provided the following:

SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and
no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or
employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence
in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the
right to vote.

When, therefore, section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words "justice of
the peace," the omission revealed the intention of the Legislature to exclude justices of
the peace from its operation.

The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is to be noted that under
Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, the word "judge" was modified or
qualified by the phrase "of First instance", while under Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code, no such modification exists. In other words, justices of the peace were
expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code because the kinds
of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and justice of the peace.
In Section 54, however, there was no necessity therefore to include justices of the peace
in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and
broader term, "judge." It was a term not modified by any word or phrase and was
intended to comprehend all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance,
Judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations,
and justices of the peace.

It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as "judge" in
this jurisdiction. It is because a justice of the peace is indeed a judge. A "judge" is a
public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority (U.S. v.
Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. 441, 422). According to Bouvier Law Dictionary, "a judge is a public
officer lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions according to law. In its most
extensive sense the term includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions
while acting in that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who
are judges of facts."

A review of the history of the Revised Election Code will help to justify and clarify the
above conclusion.

The first election law in the Philippines was Act 1582 enacted by the Philippine
Commission in 1907, and which was later amended by Act. Nos. 1669, 1709, 1726 and
1768. (Of these 4 amendments, however, only Act No. 1709 has a relation to the
discussion of the instant case as shall be shown later.) Act No. 1582, with its subsequent
4 amendments were later on incorporated Chapter 18 of the Administrative Code.
Under the Philippine Legislature, several amendments were made through the passage
of Acts Nos. 2310, 3336 and 3387. (Again, of these last 3 amendments, only Act No. 3587
has pertinent to the case at bar as shall be seen later.) During the time of the
Commonwealth, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 23 and later on
enacted Commonwealth Act No. 357, which was the law enforced until June 1947, when
the Revised Election Code was approved. Included as its basic provisions are the
provisions of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 233, 357, 605, 666, 657. The present Code was
further amended by Republic Acts Nos. 599, 867, 2242 and again, during the session of

52
Congress in 1960, amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 3036 and 3038. In the history of our
election law, the following should be noted:

Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:

No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for elections, nor shall he be
eligible during the time that he holds said public office to election at any
municipal, provincial or Assembly election, except for reelection to the position
which he may be holding, and no judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace,
provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the
Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner or take
part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly election under the penalty of
being deprived of his office and being disqualified to hold any public office
whatsoever for a term of 5 year: Provide, however, That the foregoing provisions
shall not be construe to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to
vote it any election." (Enacted January 9, 1907; Took effect on January 15, 1907.)

Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise provided:

. . . No judge of the First Instance, Justice of the peace provincial fiscal or officer
or employee of the Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall
aid any candidate or influence in any manner to take part in any municipal
provincial or Assembly election. Any person violating the provisions of this
section shall be deprived of his office or employment and shall be disqualified to
hold any public office or employment whatever for a term of 5 years, Provided,
however, that the foregoing provisions shall not be construed to deprive any
person otherwise qualified of the right to vote at any election. (Enacted on
August 31, 1907; Took effect on September 15, 1907.)

Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated in the Administrative Code
on March 10, 1917, the provisions in question read:

SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and
no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or any Bureau or
employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence
in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the
right to vote. (Emphasis supplied)

After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent legislation was Act No. 3387. This Act
reads:

SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the election. — Any judge of the
First Instance, justice of the peace, treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province,
any officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the police of any
municipality, or any officer or employee of any Bureau of the classified civil
service, who aids any candidate or violated in any manner the provisions of this
section or takes part in any election otherwise by exercising the right to vote,
shall be punished by a fine of not less than P100.00 nor more than P2,000.00, or
by imprisonment for not less than 2 months nor more than 2 years, and in all
cases by disqualification from public office and deprivation of the right of
suffrage for a period of 5 years. (Approved December 3, 1927.) (Emphasis
supplied.)

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Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was enacted on August 22, 1938.
This law provided in Section 48:

SEC. 48. Active Interventation of Public Officers and Employees. — No justice, judge,
fiscal, treasurer or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army,
the Constabulary of the national, provincial, municipal or rural police, and no
classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, nor exert
influence in any manner in any election nor take part therein, except to vote, if
entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.

This last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the Revised Election Code
was taken.

It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the legislative development or
history of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code that the first omission of the word
"justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not
in the present code as averred by defendant-appellee. Note carefully, however, that in
the two instances when the words "justice of the peace" were omitted (in Com. Act No.
357 and Rep. Act No. 180), the word "judge" which preceded in the enumeration did not
carry the qualification "of the First Instance." In other words, whenever the word
"judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance", the words "justice of the
peace" would follow; however, if the law simply said "judge," the words "justice of the
peace" were omitted.

The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to justify the

conclusion that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in Rep. Act
No. 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had
considered the said officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge".

It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had destroyed congressional
records which might have offered some explanation of the discussion of Com. Act No.
357 which legislation, as indicated above, has eliminated for the first time the words
"justice of the peace." Having been completely destroyed, all efforts to seek deeper and
additional clarifications from these records proved futile. Nevertheless, the conclusions
drawn from the historical background of Rep. Act No. 180 is sufficiently borne out by
reason hid equity.

Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be among the officers enumerated in
Section 54 inasmuch as under that said section, the word "judge" is modified or
qualified by the phrase "of any province." The last mentioned phrase, defendant
submits, cannot then refer to a justice of the peace since the latter is not an officer of a
province but of a municipality.

Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. If it is true that the phrase "of any
province" necessarily removes justices of the peace from the enumeration for the reason
that they are municipal and not provincial officials, then the same thing may be said of
the Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals. They are national
officials. Yet, can there be any doubt that Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court
of Appeals are not included in the prohibition? The more sensible and logical
interpretation of the said phrase is that it qualifies fiscals, treasurers and assessors who
are generally known as provincial officers.

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The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the
defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. If that rule is applicable
to the present, then indeed, justices of the peace must be held to have been intentionally
and deliberately exempted from the operation of Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code.

The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus" can operate
and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. In the case under
consideration, it has already been shown that the legislature did not exclude or omit
justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in
partisan political activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term. In the new
law, or Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, justices of the peace were just called
"judges."

In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case, defendant-
appellee cites authorities to the effect that the said rule, being restrictive in nature, has
more particular application to statutes that should be strictly construed. It is pointed out
that Section 54 must be strictly construed against the government since proceedings
under it are criminal in nature and the jurisprudence is settled that penal statutes
should be strictly interpreted against the state.

Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of penal statutes,

defendant asserts that the spirit of fair play and due process demand such strict
construction in order to give "fair warning of what the law intends to do, if a certain line
is passed, in language that the common world will understand." (Justice Holmes, in
McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25, L. Ed. 816).

The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere fact that a
case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular
person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present
case, and for reasons already mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has
only been a substitution of terms.

The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor
controlling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an
additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal
laws. This has been recognized time and again by decisions of various courts. (3
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 56.) Thus, cases will frequently be found
enunciating the principle that the intent of the legislature will govern (U.S. vs. Corbet,
215 U.S. 233). It is to be noted that a strict construction should not be permitted to defeat
the policy and purposes of the statute (Ash Sheep Co. v. U.S., 252 U.S. 159). The court
may consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular instance, where a
literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the
clear purpose of the law makers (Crawford, Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294). A
Federal District court in the U.S. has well said:

The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such construction of it
as to deprive it of the meaning intended. Penal statutes must be construed in the
sense which best harmonizes with their intent and purpose. (U.S. v. Betteridge 43
F. Supp. 53, 56, cited in 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction 56.)

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As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the language of criminal
statutes, frequently, has been narrowed where the letter includes situations inconsistent
with the legislative plan (U.S. v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354; See also Ernest Brunchen,
Interpretation of the Written Law (1915) 25 Yale L.J. 129.)

Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the purpose
of the statute is to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial
Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the
prohibition under the old statute, are now within its encompass. If such were the
evident purpose, can the legislature intend to eliminate the justice of the peace within
its orbit? Certainly not. This point is fully explained in the brief of the Solicitor General,
to wit:

On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the phrases "Judge of First
Instance" and justice of the peace", found in Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code, and used "judge" in lieu thereof, the obvious intention was
to include in the scope of the term not just one class of judges but all judges,
whether of first Instance justices of the peace or special courts, such as judges of
the Court of Industrial Relations. . . . .

The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the peace court, and to so
construe the law as to allow a judge thereof to engage in partisan political
activities would weaken rather than strengthen the judiciary. On the other hand,
there are cogent reasons found in the Revised Election Code itself why justices of
the peace should be prohibited from electioneering. Along with Justices of the
appellate courts and judges of the Court of First Instance, they are given
authority and jurisdiction over certain election cases (See Secs. 103, 104, 117-123).
Justices of the peace are authorized to hear and decided inclusion and exclusion
cases, and if they are permitted to campaign for candidates for an elective office
the impartiality of their decisions in election cases would be open to serious
doubt. We do not believe that the legislature had, in Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code, intended to create such an unfortunate situation. (pp. 708,
Appellant's Brief.)

Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the
administrative or executive department has regarded justices of the peace within the
purview of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

In Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. v. The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Justice, etc. (G.R. No.
L-12601), this Court did not give due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction against the respondents, for not setting aside, among
others, Administrative Order No. 237, dated March 31, 1957, of the President of the
Philippines, dismissing the petitioner as justice of the peace of Carmen, Agusan. It is
worthy of note that one of the causes of the separation of the petitioner was the fact that
he was found guilty in engaging in electioneering, contrary to the provisions of the
Election Code.

Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House Bill No. 2676, which was
filed on January 25, 1955. In that proposed legislation, under Section 56, justices of the
peace are already expressly included among the officers enjoined from active political
participation. The argument is that with the filing of the said House Bill, Congress

56
impliedly acknowledged that existing laws do not prohibit justices of the peace from
partisan political activities.

The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed
amendment to Rep. Act No. 180 as a whole and not merely to section 54 of said Rep. Act
No. 180. In other words, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed re-codification of the
existing election laws at the time that it was filed. Besides, the proposed amendment,
until it has become a law, cannot be considered to contain or manifest any legislative
intent. If the motives, opinions, and the reasons expressed by the individual members of
the legislature even in debates, cannot be properly taken into consideration in
ascertaining the meaning of a statute (Crawford, Statutory Construction, Sec. 213, pp.
375-376), a fortiori what weight can We give to a mere draft of a bill.

On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee's contention that justices of the
peace are not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is to
render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid down by the legislature.

Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the peace from
participating in partisan politics. They were prohibited under the old Election Law since
1907 (Act No. 1582 and Act No. 1709). Likewise, they were so enjoined by the Revised
Administrative Code. Another which expressed the prohibition to them was Act No.
3387, and later, Com. Act No. 357.

Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule
of "expressio unius, est exclusion alterius" in arriving at the conclusion that justices of
the peace are not covered by Section 54. Said the Court of Appeals: "Anyway, guided by
the rule of exclusion, otherwise known as expressio unius est exclusion alterius, it would
not be beyond reason to infer that there was an intention of omitting the term "justice of
the peace from Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. . . ."

The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the
peace from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals
has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged
change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius est exclusion alterius has been erroneously
applied. (Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)

Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to
particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why
other persons or things not so enumerated should not have been included, and
manifest injustice will follow by not so including them, the maxim expressio unius
est exclusion alterius, should not be invoked. (Blevins v. Mullally 135 p. 307, 22
Cal. App. 519.) .

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be
set aside and this case is remanded for trial on the merits.

57