Blo Umpar Adiong vs.

Commission on Elections

Facts:

On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its
powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646
and 7166 and other election laws. Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:
“SEC. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda.—The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten or printed letters, or other
written or printed materials not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and
fourteen (14) inches in length: Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in
any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.”
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
“SEC. 21 (f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.— It is unlawful:
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in
any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC
common posted areas and/or billboards, at the campaign headquarters of the candidate
or political party, organization or coalition, or at the candidate’s own residential house
or one of his residential houses, if he has more than one: Provided, that such posters or
election propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size.”

Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now
assails the COMELEC’s Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and
stickers in “mobile” places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such
prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a)
of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio,
television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics
stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition.

Issue:

W/N the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places,
public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas
that it fixes.

Held:

The COMELEC’s prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places

whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself
is null and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the
citizen’s fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article
III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction
involved in this case.
This qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the fact that it is the
matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom. It is difficult to
imagine how the other provisions of the Bill of Rights and the right to free elections may
be guaranteed if the freedom to speak and to convince or persuade is denied and taken
away.

A statute is considered void for overbreadth when “it offends the constitutional principle
that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.”

The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not more than eight and one-
half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any place, including
mobile places whether public or private except in areas designated by the COMELEC.
Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad
that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property, which in this case is a privately-
owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by
the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that
no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether
public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes
censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.
Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections

Facts:

On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its
powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646
and 7166 and other election laws. Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:
“SEC. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda.—The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten or printed letters, or other
written or printed materials not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and
fourteen (14) inches in length: Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in
any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.”
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
“SEC. 21 (f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.— It is unlawful:
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in
any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC
common posted areas and/or billboards, at the campaign headquarters of the candidate
or political party, organization or coalition, or at the candidate’s own residential house
or one of his residential houses, if he has more than one: Provided, that such posters or
election propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size.”

Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now
assails the COMELEC’s Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and
stickers in “mobile” places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such
prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a)
of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio,
television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics
stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition.

Issue:

W/N the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places,
public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas
that it fixes.

Held:

The COMELEC’s prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places

whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself
is null and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the
citizen’s fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article
III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction
involved in this case.
Chavez v COMELEC

Facts:

Petitioner enetered into formal agreements with certain establishments to endorse their
products. On August 18, 2003, he authorized a certain Andrew So to use his name and
image for 96° North, a clothing company. Petitioner also signed Endorsement
Agreements with Konka International Plastics Manufacturing Corporation and another
corporation involved in the amusement and video games business, GBox. These last two
agreements were entered into on October 14, 2003 and November 10, 2003, respectively.
Pursuant to these agreements, three billboards were set up along the Balintawak
Interchange of the North Expressway. One billboard showed petitioner promoting the
plastic products of Konka International Plastics Manufacturing Corporation, and the
other two showed petitioner endorsing the clothes of 96° North. One more billboard was
set up along Roxas Boulevard showing petitioner promoting the game and amusement
parlors of G-Box.

However, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Senator.

Respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which contained Section 32, the
provision assailed herein. On January 21, 2004, petitioner was directed to comply with
the said provision by the COMELEC’s Law Department. He sent another letter dated
February 23, 2004, this time asking the COMELEC that he be exempted from the
application of Section 32, considering that the billboards adverted to are mere product
endorsements and cannot be construed as paraphernalia for premature campaigning
under the rules. The COMELEC answered petitioner’s request by issuing another letter,
dated February 27, 2004, wherein it ordered him to remove or cause the removal of the
billboards, or to cover them from public view pending the approval of his request.

Issue:

W/N said resolution violates freedom of expression

Held:

It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse certain
products, he acted as a private individual and had all the right to lend his name and
image to these products. However, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for Senator,
the billboards featuring his name and image assumed partisan political character because
the same indirectly promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well
within its scope of powers when it required petitioner to discontinue the display of the
subject billboards. If the subject billboards were to be allowed, candidates for public office
whose name and image are used to advertise commercial products would have more
opportunity to make themselves known to the electorate, to the disadvantage of other
candidates who do not have the same chance of lending their faces and names to endorse
popular commercial products as image models. Similarly, an individual intending to run
for public office within the next few months, could pay private corporations to use him
as their image model with the intention of familiarizing the public with his name and
image even before the start of the campaign period.

Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is expressly authorized to supervise or regulate

the enjoyment or utilization of all media communication or information to ensure equal
opportunity, time, and space. All these are aimed at the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections. The nonimpairment clause of the Constitution must
yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government. Equal opportunity to proffer
oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources one may have
at his disposal, is indeed of vital interest to the public. The State has the duty to enact and
implement rules to safeguard this interest. Time and again, this Court has said that
contracts affecting public interest contain an implied reservation of the police power as a
postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be activated at anytime to change
the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection
of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which
is subject to and limited by the paramount police power.

Solicitor General rightly points out that the assailed provision does not prohibit
billboards as lawful election propaganda. It only regulates their use to prevent premature
campaigning and to equalize, as much as practicable, the situation of all candidates by
preventing popular and rich candidates from gaining undue advantage in exposure and
publicity on account of their resources and popularity. Moreover, by regulating the use
of such election propaganda materials, the COMELEC is merely doing its duty under the
law. Under Sections 3 and 13 of the Fair Elections Act, all election propaganda are subject
to the supervision and regulation by the COMELEC.

A statute or regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the

constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to State regulations may not be achieved by means that sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.